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July 13, 2023
Document Release Date: 
February 22, 2022
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August 23, 1972
Approved for Release: 2022/02/16 C06924583 NaS 'skire DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE ISe (b)(3) Central Intelligence Bulletin lop-Secret 208 (b)(3) 23 August 1972 Approved for Release: 2022/02/16 C06924583 Approved for Release: 2022/02/16 C06924583 No I s re 210 e r) Sc No. 00202/72 23 August 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS VIETNAM: Government counterattacks achieve some 7g7grilit- (Page 1) CHILE: Violence ends but military leaders are aTiCassing coup plans. (Page 3) MOROCCO: Hassan calls for elections at some in- definite time. (Page 4) JAPAN: Space program making limited progress. (17-a-47 6) EURATOM-IAEA: French reservations may delay rat- ification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (Page 7) LAW OF THE SEA: UN committee agrees on agenda for conference (Page 8) Approved for for Release: 2022/02/16 C06924583 Approved for Release: 2022/02/16 C06924583 ipp_sEGRET /EURATOM-IAEA: New French reservations about safeguard verification arrangements between EURATOM and the IAEA threaten further delays in European ratifications of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Ratification of the NPT by the non-nuclear- weapon members of EURATOM has depended on an agree- ment with IAEA to verify EURATOM's safeguards and thus satisfy NPT provisions. France now says no IAEA-EURATOM agreement can be completed until the EC Council has approved the negotiations, and Paris is objecting to the arrangements negotiated with IAEA by the EC Commission. Paris apparently will argue that the Commission has exceeded its author- ity. In return for its approval of the verifica- tion arrangements, Paris is likely to seek conces- sions that could further weaken the applicability of EURATOM safeguards to France. As the only nuclear weapons state in EURATOM, France has long argued that it should be under no more constraints than are the super-power signatories of the NPT. Most of France's EURATOM partners are appar- ently willing to put off notification of the agree- ment with the IAEA in order not to provoke the French. They probably believe that France does not want to be responsible for delaying the NPT indefinitely--and its controls over any West Ger- man nuclear ambitions. They may be prepared even- tually to grant Paris further exceptional status within EURATOM, although this could pose consider- able political problems, especially for Bonn. A formal announcement that the EURATOM-IAEA agreement is ready for ratification had been sched- uled for September. Any delay will almost certainly draw a sharp Soviet response. Moscow has already protested Washington's decision to continue to sup- ply fissionable materials to EURATOM before NPT ratification by EURATOM's non-nuclear-weapon members. 23 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 X-OP-SEeitEr Approved for Release: 2022/02/16 C06924583