WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 16202191
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01252
• Publication Date: March 15, 1968

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'Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
lecret_
50
15 March 1968
No. 0011/68
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,.
and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requir-
ing more comprehensive treatment and therefore published sep-
arately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information af-
fecting the national security of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded horn automatic
downgrading and
declassification
SECRET
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Nwi
CONTENTS
(Information (Information as of noon EST, 14 March 1968)
Far East
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 1
VIETNAM 3
Communist forces avoided large-scale ground action
this week but kept up the pressure on population
centers in an effort to prevent the allies from
conducting large-scale offensive operations through-
out South Vietnam. The Saigon government replaced
eight province chiefs and is preparing to appoint a
new group of regional civilian officials to take
over some of the responsibilities of the military
corps commanders. This move has already generated
some grumbling among the military.
COMMUNIST DRIVE CONTINUES IN LAOS
The Communists are continuing to make progress in
their annual dry-season offensive.
VIOLENCE DECLINES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The tide continues to turn against militant Maoists,
both in Peking and the provinces, and the level of
disorders seems to be dropping from the high point
reached in January and February.
Europe
7
9
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 11
USSR PROTESTS BONN'S TIES WITH BERLIN
Moscow publicly and privately recorded its disap-
proval of last week's West German parliamentary
committee meetings in West Berlin, but did not re-
inforce these remonstrances by conducting harassing
operations.
Page i
1TErtiR7&L
WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 Mar 68
12
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or-7
75r6BAa_
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT AND YEMEN
The USSR has stepped up its training effort in Egypt
and is continuing its extensive re-equipment of the
UAR armed forces. Moscow also continues to provide
military aid to the Yemeni Republic Army.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN TURMOIL
The struggle between conservatives and liberals in
the Czechoslovak Communist Party is coming to a head,
with more calls being heard for the immediate ouster
of former party boss Novotny from the presidency and
the party presidium.
POLISH REGIME SHAKEN BY PUBLIC UNREST
Repressive measures so far taken by the regime have
failed to curb the spread throughout the country of
student demonstrations or to prevent the students
from organizing to present antiregime demands. At
the same time, the unrest has intensified factional
struggles within the party, which may weaken party
leader Gomulka's position.
WARSAW PACT SUMMIT MEETING ENDS IN DISAGREEMENT
The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee
adjourned its 6-7 March meeting in Sofia in open dis-
agreement. Rumania's refusal to endorse the Soviet
position on nonproliferation and the failure of the
final communique to deal with other divisive issues,
notably the German question, once more exposed the
weakness of the pact as a politically unifying mech-
anism.
COMMON MARKET LOOKS AT PREFERENTIAL TRADE OFFERS TO
BRITAIN
Debate within the European Community on Britain's
bid for membership has been diverted, for the moment
at least, to the possibility of a purely commercial
"arrangement" with Britain.
Middle East - Africa
13
14
15
16
17
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
JARRING MISSION NEARS FAILURE
United Nations special representative Jarring will
soon have to report that he has been unable to bring
together the warring parties in the Arab-Israeli
dispute, and the issue seems fated for reconsidera-
tion by the UN Security Council.
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Mar 68
20
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*NW
-sreR-ux_
PRESIDENT MAKARIOS WOOS TURK CYPRIOTS
Cypriot President Makarios has relaxed his restric-
tions on the Turkish Cypriots, but this and expected
constitutional proposals seem to fall short of the
concessions necessary to gain Turkish Cypriot agree-
ment to local talks.
EXECUTIONS EMPHASIZE RHODESIAN "INDEPENDENCE"
Right-wing pressures to underscore the fact of Rho-
desia's "independence" apparently weighed heavily in
the regime's decision to proceed with the execution
of African murderers reprieved by the British crown.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
PANAMANIAN ASSEMBLY MOVING AHEAD WITH IMPEACHMENT
Activity surrounding Panama's three-week-old polit-
ical crisis is focused on the impeachment of Presi-
dent Robles by the Arias-controlled National Assembly,
but a showdown probably will not come until late this
month. There are increasing indications that Na-
tional Guard chief Vallarino will take over the
government himself to ward off a possible clash by
the opposing factions--possibly postponing the sched-
uled elections on 12 May.
CUBA PUSHES TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD
Cuba's efforts to match last year's ten-percent in-
crease in trade with the free world are being ham-
pered by the prospect of a poor sugar harvest.
Page iii
WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 Mar 68
21
22
23
25
26
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rim
COMMUNIST TERRORISM IN GUATEMALA
Terrorist activity in Guatemala City has been stepped
up, and a major campaign of violence and sabotage is
still reportedly being planned.
ELECTORAL REPLAY IN ECUADOR
National elections set for 2 June offer no alterna-
tives to the personalistic politics that have given
Ecuador the Latin American record for unconstitutional
changes of government in the past 30 years.
Page iv
WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Mar 68
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Naar Van,'
FAR EAST
The Communist winter-spring campaign in South
Vietnam remains in a phase of regrouping, recruit-
ing, and refitting in preparation for the next
round of large-scale attacks. The few significant
engagements last week mainly resulted from renewed
allied sweep operations. Communist initiatives
were mostly limited to rocket and mortar attacks
on allied positions and facilities.
pthe Communists have gained in consolidating
their grip on the countryside since the Tet offen-
sive. The threat posed by the presence of substan-
tial Communist forces near urban areas, combined
with sporadic shelling and harassment, has de-
pressed public morale and reduced confidence in
the South Vietnamese Government.
In Saigon, the anti-Communist "National Sal-
vation Front" was formally inaugurated, but its
effectiveness as a vehicle for rallying public
support probably will be limited by the abstention
of several prominent political figures and by
widespread suspicion that the front was contrived
to advance the ambitions of Vice President Ky and
its main sponsor, Senator Tran Van Don.
Communist forces in Laos are maintaining
pressure on government positions in widely scattered
areas. They captured the important guerrilla base
and radar site at Phou Pha Thi in northeastern
Laos on 11 March and then quickly overran several
small outposts in the area. They have also made
small-scale attacks south of the Plaine des Jarres
and are poised for another coordinated offensive
in southern Laos, with the government base at Lao
Ngam as the probable main objective.
North Korea has renewed its threat to bring
the Pueblo crew to trial if the US refuses to make
a formal apology. An authoritative article in
the party newspaper stated that the incident could
be settled "somewhat leniently" if the US would
apologize, but warned that Pyongyang will take
"some other measure" against the crew if the US
position remains unchanged.
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Mar 68
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*trol
VIETNAM
Allied forces in several
areas of South Vietnam are begin-
ning to move out from defensive
positions held since the Commu-
nist Tet offensive and to take
the initiative with renewed sweeps
against enemy main force units.
Most of the major ground engage-
ments this week were initiated
by the allies while the enemy
sought generally to disperse into
small units and avoid large-scale
confrontations. The Communists
have, however increased pressure
in the northern provinces with
stepped-up shelling and vigorous
logistical efforts.
The Communists' strategy
in the present phase of their
winter-spring campaign is to
evade large-scale allied offen-
sive operations in the field
while at the same time keeping
military, economic, and psycho-
logical pressure on population
centers. These objectives, as
set forth in captured documents
and other intelligence reports,
call for emphasis on economy-of-
force tactics, including continued
bombardments of both towns and
allied military installations and
harassment of lines of communica-
tion in order to isolate and in-
timidate the population in the
key urban areas.
At the same time, extensive
enemy battle preparations are
being made in certain strategic
areas of the country, most notably
Page 3
in the northern provinces of
Quang Tri and Thua Thien. Here,
the Communists appear to be plan-
ning a sustained campaign to ob-
tain control.
Intensified artillery, rocket,
and mortar barrages were directed
against allied positions from Khe
Sanh to the US Navy supply com-
plex at Cua Viet. In this region,
the enemy is evidently preparing
to take on US and South Vietnamese
troops in somewhat more conven-
tional style of warfare, utiliz-
ing main force units, heavier
firepower and even armored ve-
hicles.
Increased allied search-and-
destroy activities resulted in
intense fighting during the week
between allied and Communist
forces in two strategic areas--
in Quang Tri Province near Dong
Ha and in Quang Tin north and
west of the provincial capital
of Tam Ky. The encounters near
Dong Ha involved elements of
the North Vietnamese 320th Divi-
sion, which may have been pre-
paring offensive moves after
its recent shift from the cen-
tral DMZ area to eastern Quang
Tri Province. The division may
also have accepted battle in an
effort to mask infiltration of
additional enemy units along the
coastal corridor. In the fight-
ing near Tam Ky, the US Americal
Division scored two impressive
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 Mar 68
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victories against elements of the
North Vietnamese 2nd Division.
Meanwhile, to the south,
joint US - South Vietnamese forces
have begun several multibattalion
operations to seek out and destroy
concentrations of enemy forces.
One of these is a concerted drive
in the area surrounding the capi-
tal, while another is under way
in the Mekong Delta province of
Dinh Tuong.
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
The Thieu government con-
tinued to move ahead this week
with its long-promised adminis-
trative reforms. On 11 March.
eight province chiefs were re-
placed, six of them for corrup-
tion or inefficiency. Some of
the changes had been long planned,
two were necessitated by death
or injury, while the rest were
directly linked to ineffective
performance during the Tet offen-
sive.
The government is also mov-
ing to break up the strong power
of the corps commanders by strip-
ping them of their civil author-
ity. It plans to appoint civil-
ian "delegates" to the various
regions to oversee the perform-
ance of province chiefs
military matters.
in non-
Page 4
six such
"delegates" who will report di-
rectly to the interior minister
in Saigon are expected to be
named by 1 April. Some corps
commanders are already voicing
doubts about the workability of
the plan, and at least one has
implied that it represents a
scheme of President Thieu to
build a political party apparatus
in the countryside.
General Le Nguyen Khang,
III Corps commander, has report-
edly complained that popular sup-
port for the present government
is deteriorating. Khang asserts
that there is widespread dissatis-
faction at all levels of the of-
ficer corps over Thieu's failure
to mobilize the anti-Communist
sentiment of the public in the
wake of the Tet offensive. Khang
said that he knew of no coup
planning by the military, but
that certain supporters of Vice
President Ky were pushing the
idea of a constitutional amend-
ment that would permit Ky to step
in as prime minister.
Efforts to solidify the
country behind the anti-Commu-
nist struggle took a step forward
7Rrett-E4;
WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 Mar 68
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Nos'
on 10 March with the formal
launching of the People's Front
for National Salvation, under the
chairmanship of Senator Tran Van
Don. Although the front has at-
tracted a broad range of the
country's political and religious
groups, several prominent poli-
ticians and militant Buddhists
have apparently withdrawn active
support. Moreover, the front has
not received effective backing
from President Thieu and his sup-
porters--who are apparently or-
ganizing rival groups. Thus the
prospects are dim that Don's or-
ganization will play a signifi-
cant role in rallying forces
against the Communists.
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 Mar 68
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LAOS
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25
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KI,ornelers
69944 3-68 CIA
SOUTH
VIETNAM
Government-held town
Communist-controlled
area
Contested area
CAMBODIA
Pakse
BOLOVENS
PLATEAU
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'trod
COMMUNIST DRIVE CONTINUES IN LAOS
The Communists are continu-
ing to make progress in their
annual dry season offensive.
In the northeast, the Commu-
nists succeeded in overrunning
the important government base at
Phou Pha Thi on 11 March, in-
flicting 12 US casualties. The
loss of this base is a severe
setback for friendly guerrilla
forces in the area and is the
second US tactical navigation
installation to be taken this
year.
The Communists have fol-
lowed up their success at Phou
Pha Thi with the capture of a
number of small outlying bases
in an attempt to clear the area
of guerrilla forces. The next
thrust may be at the important
government base at Na Khang,
some 40 miles to the south.
Although this base has been
overrun in past years, given the
recent setbacks in the Phou Pha
Thi area, its loss would seriously
impair the government's ability
Page 7
to observe and harass the enemy's
lines of communication in the
northeast.
There are also signs that
a new round of Communist attacks
in southern Laos may be in the
offing. A significant enemy
build-up in the Bolovens Plateau
area appears to be under way.
At least four armored cars, in
addition to supplies and replace-
ment troops, were recently ob-
served moving into the Sedone
Valley.
These reinforcements appear
to be targeted against the gov-
ernment regimental base at Lao
Ngam, which came under heavy at-
tack on 23 February. The enemy
has launched numerous probing
and mortar attacks against out-
lying defensive positions in re-
cent days, suggesting that an
assault on the base itself is
imminent. Although Lao Ngam
appears to be the enemy's primary
objective, an attack against the
provincial capital of Saravane
itself cannot be ruled out.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Prifit
AUTONOMOUS REGION
69919 3-68
Status of Provincial Governments, 15 MARCH 1968
5 SINKIANG UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION
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*hdie
VIOLENCE DECLINES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The tide continues to turn
against militant Maoists, both
in Peking and the provinces,
and the level of disorders seems
to be dropping from the high
point reached in January and
February. New governing author-
ities called "Revolutionary Com-
mittees" are being established
in province after province.
They are staffed mainly by vet-
eran military and party cadres--
bureaucratic types who would
not be expected to have much
enthusiasm for "revolution."
Some appointees, who have been
heavily attacked by Red Guards,
were presumably named over mili-
tants' objections.
Sixteen provincial-level
committees have now been formed;
13 provinces still remain under
provisional military rule. The
makeup of the latest committee--
formed in Kirin on 6 March--is
typical.. Its chairman is a
local general. Two vice chair-
men are military men, and the
other two are former party sec-
retaries. One has often been
denounced by Red Guards as an
agent of Liu Shao-chi.
Political tensions remain
high, however. There are signs
that maneuvering continues among
leaders in Peking, that militant
forces in the provinces retain
considerable capability to create
disorder, and that political
problems persist in the military.
Page 9
Numerous posters attacking two
second-level officials have been
displayed in Peking in the past
month. Apparently officially in-
spired, the posters accuse these
individuals of working against
Premier Chou En-lai. Chou contin-
ues to be the most active and hard-
est-working member of the top
leadership. Japanese trade dele-
gates who met him on 6 March say
the 69-year-old premier never
looked so exhausted and for the
first time seemed to be a tired
old man. Chou has probably over-
worked in trying to push his mod-
erate policies in Peking and force
agreements in the provinces.
In a speech on 17 January,
Chou had indicated that his ef-
forts to keep the Cultural Revolu-
tion from disrupting military
weapons programs had been less
than successful. He told repre-
sentatives of defense-related fac-
tories and schools that military
industries were especially fac-
tion-ridden. He said that factions
had been fighting for a year and a
half, and had damaged equipment
in some factories, and he "im-
plored" them to stop. He singled
out the ministry believed to be
responsible for producing missiles,
and said its management was par-
ticularly chaotic. Work has, in
fact, continued in the advanced
program and in defense industries,
but it is increasingly clear that
disruptions have occurred in the
past year.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 Mar 68
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4immi
-SreR-14-T-
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Mar 68
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Nue
EUROPE
Events Events in Eastern Europe took a dramatic
turn during the week.
Student demonstrations in Poland have spread.
The regime has so far been able to prevent overt
support from the industrial workers. The hard-
line faction in the Polish party appears to be
attempting to use the student demonstrations to
advance its interests and influence in the party
to the detriment of Gomulka.
The struggle between liberals and conserva-
tives in the Czechoslovak party has become sharper.
New party first secretary Dubcek has still not con-
solidated his position. The public, apparently
hopeful that the liberals win out, has been cau-
tious, and students and workers have refrained
from demonstrations despite the example of Poland.
Pankow is apprehensive about the possible
impact in East Germany of events in both Poland
and Czechoslovakia.
Moscow is saying little publicly about events
in Czechoslovakia and has maintained total silence
on the Polish demonstrations but is clearly watch-
ing developments intently.
Soviet preoccupation with problems of the Com-
munist world and especially of Eastern Europe, had
already been amply demonstrated. In recent weeks,
Soviet leaders made a round of visits to East
European capitals. The party hierarchy is now back
in Moscow, however, and the long heralded meeting
of the central committee to deal with an accumulation
of domestic questions may be impending.
In Western Europe, unprecedented speculative
demand for gold sent markets reeling this week and
posed a new threat to the international monetary
system.
Th"Lte-R-E.T__
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411"14
USSR PROTESTS PROTESTS BONN'S TIES WITH BERLIN
Moscow publicly and privately
recorded its disapproval of last
week's West German parliamentary
committee meetings in West Berlin,
but did not reinforce these re-
monstrances by conducting harass-
ing operations. Despite some
Soviet preparations pointing to-
ward harassment, possibly in the
form of jet "buzzings" of the
Western sectors, the Russians did
not react. Although unfavorable
weather was an inhibiting factor,
it may be that the Soviets were
content to let the preparations
themselves make the point that
they objected to Bonn's "provoca-
tion."
In a statement issued as the
Bundestag "work week" began on
4 March, the Soviet ambassador to
East Germany warned that the event
was "sharpening tensions" in Berlin
and inviting "undesired conse-
quences." Similar language was
used in other recent complaints,
suggesting greater Soviet sensi-
tivity to such conspicuous dis-
plays of Bonn-Berlin ties. Pravda
alleged that these displays were
taking on "an increasingly chal-
lenging character." Indeed, the
Soviets' warnings were more urgent
and their protests more numerous
than was the case last October
when a previous "work week" took
place.
Page 12
Some of last week's prepara-
tions were reminiscent of those
that preceded a harassment cam-
paign at the time of the last
plenary session of the Bundestag
in Berlin in April 1965. The
present "work week" of committees,
however, was not expected to evoke
a reaction on a par with the 1965
event, which had ended a seven-
year abstention from plenary ses-
sions in the city.
To a far greater extent than
the meetings of parliamentary com-
mittees, which have occurred peri-
odically, the 1965 session chal-
lenged the Soviet position that
West Berlin is a separate entity
from the "two Germanies." Soviet
Embassy officials reportedly re-
minded members of the West Berlin
Senate last week that a Bundestag
plenary session exceeds the USSR's
"tolerance boundary," and that
Moscow would have been forced to
act if one had been convened last
week. Russian diplomats were at
pains, however, to disavow any
desire to precipitate difficulties
over Berlin. There was no sug-
gestion that the Soviets intended
to mount a crisis, but it was
made clear that Moscow was taking
the meetings seriously and was
monitoring them closely.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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(b)(3)
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Simre �4.1�i
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT AND YEMEN
The USSR has stepped up its
training effort in Egypt and is
continuing its extensive re-equip-
ment of the UAR armed forces.
Moscow also continues to provide
military aid to the Yemeni Repub-
lic Army.
Concerned over the poor
showing of the Arabs last June,
the Soviets probably wish to as-
sure themselves that the Egyptians'
ability to use Soviet equipment
is improving. The Soviets thus
appear to be placing special em-
phasis on their training programs
in Egypt. It is estimated that
as many as 1,500 Soviet advisers
and technicians are now there,
double the number present a year
ago. Since November, the Rus-
sians have taken particular in-
terest in Egypt's air defense
training.
Military aid deliveries,
consisting largely of transport
equipment, continue to arrive in
Egypt. More replacement equip-
ment is expected as the year pro-
gresses.
Moscow has replaced Egypt as
Yemen's chief supplier of mili-
tary equipment, and since last
November has furnished a basic
stock of weapons by airlift.
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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mrn
CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN TURMOIL
The struggle between conserva-
tives and liberals in the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party is coming to
a head, with more calls being heard
for the immediate ouster of former
party boss Novotny from the presi-
dency and the party presidium.
Press reports on the recently
completed annual party election
meetings in 66 districts through-
out the nation have brought the
struggle more into the open and re-
veal much about the feelings of
the party rank and file. Despite
opposition, virtually all of the
district party organizations have
endorsed the removal last January
of Novotny from his post as party
first secretary, and have called
for open and critical discussions
of problems in party forums. They
are pressing the party leadership
for details of the central commit-
tee and presidium proceedings con-
cerning the ouster of Novotny, par-
ticularly wishing to know who was
opposed and on what grounds. They
demand to be completely informed
about the current power struggle
and the details of the controver-
sial Dubcek "action program," which
has been billed as sharply reduc-
ing the influence of the party.
A majority of the district
organizations for the first time
elected their new officers and dele-
gates to forthcoming regional con-
ferences by secret ballot. Many
joined with the main party daily,
Rude Pravo, in calling for the
secret ballot to be mandatory in
the future. There is disagreement
in many districts concerning the
advisability of allowing the media
to wash dirty party linen in pub-
lic. Conservatives are charging
that the press is too one-sided in
favor of the liberals. This echoes
the argument that has emerged at
the party center, where the leader-
ship is casting about to establish
some palatable limits on the nearly
chaotic flow of public proposals
for changes.
In the meantime, party mem-
bers in the armed forces, the in-
terior ministry, the procurator's
office and other ministries have
called on their respective leaders
to take an open stand on the is-
sues currently confronting the
regime. In addition, they have
called on their bosses, as well
as Novotny, satisfactorily to ex-
plain their roles in the defection
to the US of Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna,
or to resign.
The Soviets and Poles, who
are no doubt watching these devel-
opments anxiously, have attempted
to put the best face possible on
their limited news coverage of
these events. The East Germans
are now becoming critical. In the
meantime, Prague students have
sent a resolution of support to
rioting Polish students in their
"struggle for democracy."
Czechoslovak press commentaries
are increasingly calling for a re-
evaluation of Czechoslovakia's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. They
put great stress on their alliance
with Moscow, but make clear that
Czechoslovakia should also exert
its options to establish better rela-
tions with Western Europe and the
rest of the world. The Russians
have clearly decided that, for the
moment, the less said by them
the better.
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*mai **ES
POLISH REGIME SHAKEN BY PUBLIC UNREST
Repressive measures taken so
far by the regime have failed to
curb the spread throughout the coun-
try of student demonstrations or to
prevent the students from organizing
to present antiregime demands. At
the same time, the unrest has inten-
sified factional struggles within
the party which may be weakening
party leader Gomulka's position.
For the moment, the party seems
to have forestalled a student-worker
coalition by employing heavy-handed
propaganda with an anti-Semitic and
anti-intellectual slant. At numer-
ous workers' meetings staged
throughout the country, the party
pushed through resolutions avowing
loyalty to the regime and condemning
the demonstrators. Few Poles, how-
ever, will accept the party's anti-
Semitic interpretation of the riots.
Moreover, the workers, many of them
parents of the youths involved, re-
portedly are increasingly sympa-
thetic to the student cause.
The students have rejected re-
gime charges that "Zionists" insti-
gated "teenage toughs" to riot,
stating that those involved were
persons "whose primary aim is so-
cialism and democracy." Student
demands now center on the release of
arrested demonstrators, condemnation
of police brutality, an end to
biased official reporting on the un-
rest, and a general democratization
of student-regime relations. The
reported willingness of some school
authorities in Warsaw to transmit
this platform to the government, and
this might give the regime an open-
ing to begin a dialogue with the
students.
Page 15
The focus of the crisis, how-
ever has moved to inner party
councils. The open appeal to
chronic Polish anti-Semitism seems
to signal a major effort by Inte-
rior Minister Moczar's hard-line,
nationalistic, and anti-Semitic
faction to rid the party of its
Jewish segment. The ouster of
those Jews who are pro-Gomulka mod-
erates would strengthen Moczar's
hand in factional infighting.
The official veterans' organ-
ization, one of Moczar's political
bases, has blamed "Zionists" for
the unrest, and called for their
punishment "irrespective of the
posts they hold." Three lesser-
ranking Jewish officials already
have been fired, and there are
rumors that some Jewish members of
the central committee have also
been ousted. More dismissals prob-
ably are imminent.
It does not appear as yet that
Moczar is using the unrest in an
attempt to unseat Gomulka immedi-
ately. At a minimum, however, his
faction will seek to exploit the
recent developments in hopes of
swinging to its views delegates to
the party congress scheduled for
later this year.
Gomulka has failed to provide
visible leadership during the cur-
rent crisis, while most of the
harsh antistudent propaganda is
being disseminated in his name.
He may still succeed in turning
the crisis against those who are
exploiting it, but continued pub-
lic unrest could lead to a major
power struggle even before the
party congress.
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WARSAW PACT SUMMIT MEETING ENDS IN DISAGREEMENT
The Warsaw Pact's Political
Consultative Committee (PCC) ad-
journed its 6-7 March meeting in
Sofia in open disagreement.
Rumania's refusal to endorse the
Soviet position on the nonpro-
liferation treaty (NPT and the
failure of the final communiqu�
to deal with other divisive is-
sues, notably the German ques-
tion, once more exposed the weak-
ness of the pact as a politi-
cally unifying mechanism. Dis-
cord within the committee has
never before been so openly
registered.
The communique issued by
the PCC, which is composed of
party and state leaders of the
seven active Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, suggests this meeting was
the least productive in the 13-
year history of the pact. It
did reiterate the bloc's unani-
mous support for the Vietnamese
Communists, but on the NPT it
noted only that each delegation
expressed its own position.
Rumania's refusal to join its
allies in signing a statement
endorsing the NPT was the first
time the PCC has publicized a
failure to reach agreement on
one of its agenda items. Refer-
ences to European security and
other topical issues normally
covered at these conferences
were omitted from the communique,
pointing to disagreement on these
issues as well.
It is not entirely clear
whether the meeting was called
by Rumania or by the USSR, but
there is little doubt that Moscow
was eager to have its Warsaw Pact
allies speak in unison on the NPT
question. The Russians' failure
to achieve this on the eve of the
Geneva conference deadline for
reporting the draft treaty to the
UN is an embarrassment to them,
and will be even more costly if
the Rumanian dissent contributes
to a loss of momentum in bringing
the NPT to a conclusion.
Failing unanimity at Sofia,
the Soviets evidently decided that
a statement from six of the seven
participants was better than no
statement at all. As at the meet-
ing of Communist parties at Buda-
pest a week earlier, the Soviets
chose not to accept the lowest
common denominator by making con-
cessions to the dissenting Ruman-
ians.
The Rumanian position is
that the draft treaty would divide
the nuclear "haves" and "have
nots" of the world. Bucharest
also apparently views the treaty
as yet another example of im-
pingement on the national sov-
ereignty of small nations by great
powers. This position is also
self-serving, however, as the
Rumanians are using NPT to point
up their resolute independence
of Moscow and their growing identi-
fication with the non-Communist
world.
Bucharest, nevertheless, is
expected eventually to sign the
�Ste-RUT_
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-SECRET-- NIS
treaty, reportedly on the grounds
that it is better than none at
all. Presumably the Rumanians
hope to profit from what prestige
there may be in finally signing
up at the General Assembly, whose
president at that time will be
their foreign minister.
The political cohesiveness
of the Warsaw Pact was undermined
to a degree at the last PCC meet-
ing in July 1966, when Rumania
successfully challenged Soviet
efforts to impose stricter con-
trols over the organization. The
failure at Sofia now calls into
question the value of convening
the PCC in the future.
COMMON MARKET LOOKS AT PREFERENTIAL TRADE OFFERS TO BRITAIN
Debate within the European
Community (EC) on Britain's bid
for membership has been diverted,
for the moment at least, to the
possibility of a purely commer-
cial "arrangement" with Britain.
The possibility of a com-
mercial arrangement was suggested
by De Gaulle as long ago as 1963.
He reiterated it last November
and on the occasion of Kiesinger's
visit to Paris last month. It
has subsequently been taken up
by Bonn. The Germans had origi-
nally held that any arrangement
ought to be consistent with the
community treaty's provisions
for admitting new members. When
the Council of Ministers met on
9 March, they had apparently
come around to the French view
that a commercial relationship
would be possible. Bonn main-
Page
tains that such a setup, how-
ever, should not be considered
a substitute for membership.
As a result the commission
has also had to shift ground,
although it is unclear whether
this is permanent. At the coun-
cil session on 29 February, it
had rejected a deal based on
commercial provisions (Article
111) of the Rome Treaty because
it ignored the applicants' pend-
ing membership bids. Last week,
however, commission president
Rey stated that although the
commission had always opposed a
free trade area, it would examine
the possibility of a preferential
trading area under Article 111.
The Italians and Dutch reminded
the council that this would run
counter to GATT obligations, but
both the Germans and French
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argue that this is not necessar-
ily so.
The French, in fact, are
suspicious that Bonn's proposals
aim at a comprehensive free trade
zone. Paris favors bilateral,
rather than multilateral, nego-
tiation of commercial preferences.
Couve de Murville did, however,
reverse a previous French posi-
tion by admitting on 9 March
that tariff reductions could be
either general (linear--as the
Germans wish) or product by
product (sectoral). In all prob-
ability, Paris would ultimately
agree to exchanging no more than
limited trade preferences with
European nonmembers of the EC.
At the moment, the French are
guided mainly by the desire to
divert attention from the Benelux
and Italian proposals for estab-
lishing consultations between
the community and the British.
Consideration of commeroial
schemes might, they would hope,
promote this diversion.
Benelux insistence on com-
munity cooperation with the Brit-
ish, particularly on technology,
produced an impasse with the
French on 9 March which resulted
in deferring further debate un-
til a commission opinion is sub-
mitted on the German, Benelux,
and Italian proposals on 5 April.
Belgium's presentation suggested
that the Benelux proposal was
now, however, a condition for
considering the German proposals.
The object of the French, pre-
sumably, is to head off the Bene-
lux-Italian approach while pre-
venting the Germans from becom-
ing enamored of free trade as a
solution to the community stale-
mate.
The Italians, Dutch, and
Belgians on 9 March deplored
that the membership issue was
absent from the German paper.
As long as the Five as a whole
are reluctant to stand up to the
French on this central question,
however, there will be a tend-
ency to seek a lower common
denominator in preferential
arrangements, despite the prob-
lems they raise.
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Nue
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Egyptian President Nasir's answer to recent
antiregime demonstrations and to the apparent fail-
ure of the Jarring mission has been a series of
militant speeches to army units, in which he ex-
pressed pessimism about a political solution of
the Arab-Israeli impasse and called for increased
Arab military preparedness.
The National Liberation Front government of
Southern Yemen has unequivocally and vociferously
aligned itself with the socialist world, espous-
ing liberation struggles throughout the Persian
Gulf - Arabian Peninsula area.
The Shah of Iran has returned to Tehran in
an uneasy frame of mind as he faced the annual
US-Iranian military consultations, a possible
showdown session with the Western oil consortium,
and suspected plotting by ex-premier Amini.
The Rhodesian regime, apparently seeking to
underscore its "sovereignty," has executed two
more African murderers, but has commuted the
death sentences of 44 other condemned men whose
clemency appeals had been addressed to the rebel-
appointed "governor" rather than to Queen Eliza-
beth. In various African capitals, anti-British
demonstrations were sparked by the executions,
and appeals for UN action are in the offing.
Cyprus President Makarios has taken the
first of his promised "initiatives" toward easing
intercommunal tensions, lifting the four-year-
old ban on Turkish Cypriot movements and economic
activity.
In the Nigerian civil war, the federal offen-
sive has made little progress lately. Through
Ghana's General Ankrah, the Organization of African
Unity has again been trying to find a common frame-
work within which negotiations could begin. Neither
General Gowon nor Colonel Ojukwu, however, has
made any moves toward compromisina his riaidlv
held position.
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_s-
JARRING MISSION NEARS FAILURE
United Nations special rep-
resentative Jarring will soon have
to report that he has been unable
to bring together the warring
parties in the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute, and the issue seems fated
for reconsideration by the US Se-
curity Council.
Jarring has seemingly failed
in his attempts to get the Arab
states and Israel to agree on any
kind of talks on how to implement
the Security Council resolution
on the Middle East. Egypt had ap-
parently hoped that the clauses
of the resolution could be imposed
on the parties concerned, thereby
avoiding any direct contact be-
tween the Arab states and Israel.
This was reflected in a recent
Egyptian editorial which suggested
that Jarring was not a mediator,
but was "charged with implementing
the resolution." Israel's posi-
tion, according to a statement at-
tributed to Foreign Minister Eban,
has been that "the final frontiers
will be settled in the course of
direct and peaceful negotiations."
Although there was some mo-
mentary speculation that the Arabs
might agree to send a delegation
to Cyprus for indirect talks under
Jarring's auspices, Egypt has now
completely rejected this idea.
According to Cairo radio, in a
recent address to Egyptian mili-
tary units Nasir accused the US
of working with Israel to "hu-
miliate the Arabs," and vowed
that they will not bow to this
pressure and "will never nego-
tiate."
A number of factors have ap-
parently played a role in causing
Egypt to adopt a tougher stand.
Recent Israeli actions in the
occupied territories, possibly
pointing toward annexation, have
convinced the Arabs that Tel
Aviv plans to keep at least some
of the territory it now holds.
Egypt's internal problems may
also have contributed to the
stiffening attitude in Cairo. The
recent unrest, stemming partly
from the frustrations of the con-
tinued Israeli occupation of Arab
territory, have worried the Nasir
regime, and apparently have
caused it to recoil from any ac-
tions that could be construed as
bowing to Israeli pressure.
Egyptian press reports are
now anticipating an early return
of the Arab-Israeli issue to the
Security Council, and are also
presenting Cairo's view that fur-
ther efforts to find a solution
"must be preceded by an Israeli
declaration of preparedness to
implement the Security Council
resolution on the Middle East."
-STC-IR4CE
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'SW
PRESIDENT MAKARIOS WOOS TURK CYPRIOTS
President Makarios late last
week issued the first of his prom-
ised "initiatives" by removing all
economic and travel restrictions on
the Turkish Cypriot community, in-
cluding those on the Turkish enclave
around Nicosia. Restrictions on
movement in other sectors of the is-
land had been lifted earlier.
The removal of the ban on in-
tercommunal contact could generate
an atmosphere conducive to useful
talks on the island's problems, but
Turkish Cypriot officials have re-
sponded to it warily and with re-
straint. Although a number of Tur-
kish Cypriots have been observed in
places barred to them since the out-
break of trouble in December 1963,
they must still obtain permits from
their own officials before leaving
Turkish enclaves. Turkish Cypriot
authorities have yet to remove lim-
itations on Greek Cypriot movement
in Turkish areas.
Unfettered intermingling of
Turkish and Greek Cypriots could
weaken the rigid control exercised
over the Turkish community by its
leaders and thereby degrade its bar-
gaining position with the rival com-
munity. Consequently, it seems
likely that the Turkish Cypriot
leaders, with the advice of Ankara,
will attempt to limit the degree of
intercommunal contact.
Not included in the "normaliza-
tion" was Makarios' earlier ban on
foreign ambassadorial contact with
Turkish Cypriot Vice President Kucuk.
Page 21
Initial reports on Makarios' consti-
tutional proposals likewise indicate
that he made no reference to a Tur-
kish Cypriot vice president. This
omission seems sure to draw an un-
qualified Turkish Cypriot rejection
of the proposals. Also missing is
any reference to the handling of
police powers, sure to be a sticky
point in any neogitations and a
factor in the tensions leading up
to the fighting in December 1963.
Secretary General Thant recom-
mended on 11 March that the UN peace
force (UNFICYP) mandate, due to ex-
pire 26 March, be extended until
26 June. He applauded Makarios'
normalization efforts, called on
the Turkish Cypriots to make simi-
lar gestures, and announced his in-
tention to call for intercommunal
discussions focused on Makarios'
pending constitutional proposals.
Although Ankara and the Turkish
Cypriot leaders probably will not
do much to rock the boat before ap-
proval of the UNFICYP extension,
their distrust of U Thant will prob-
ably bar any intercommunal talks un-
der UN auspices.
The rotation of a portion of
the Turkish mainland troop contin-
gent scheduled for 29 March is not
expected to produce the kind of
haggling that has occurred over some
past rotations. Permanent removal
of all foreign troops except the
UNFICYP, however, remains on of
Makarios' long-term objectives.
7gTT111+44
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Th'r6R-E
EXECUTIONS EMPHASIZE RHODESIAN "INDEPENDENCE"
The rebel white minority re-
gime in Rhodesia executed two more
Africans this week, but it commuted
the sentences of 44 others to life
imprisonment, apparently in a two-
handed attempt both to reassert
its sovereignty and to assuage hos-
tile world reaction to the execu-
tions.
The Rhodesian regime claims
that the execution within the last
two weeks of five Africans con-
victed of murder was a proper re-
sponsibility of Prime Minister
Smith's de facto government. None-
theless, the government had pri-
vately recognized the particularly
provocative nature of this step,
the most emotion-ridden of its two-
year series of acts of defiance
of British legal authority.
The government apparently
made a deliberate decision that
the added difficulty to negotiat-
ing a settlement with Britain,
which world hostility to the exe-
cutions would bring, was outweighed
by the need to reassert Rhodesia's
"independence." Extremist members
of the ruling Rhodesian Front (RF),
who have been pressing for a total
break with London, reportedly put
strong pressure on Smith during a
six-hour cabinet meeting. As many
as one third of the RF members of
parliament are said to have threat-
ened revolt against Smith if at
least some of the executions were
not carried out.
Smith's government doubtless
views its decision this week to
commute the death sentences of some
Africans as a symbol of the regime's
strength, especially since the Af-
ricans had appealed for mercy to
the RF-appointed "Governor" and not
to the British Queen, as did those
executed last week. The regime
must soon decide the fate of 40-odd
Africans remaining under death sen-
tence. This decision may cause ad-
ditional conflict within the RF.
Unlike the Africans recently exe-
cuted, many of those under sentence
were convicted under laws passed by
the rebel regime after it broke with
Britain. Some of them were con-
victed under a controversial "anti-
guerrilla" law that decrees the
death penalty for anyone entering
the country bearing unspecified
"weapons of war."
There
is little more that can be done with
sanctions, however, without direct-
ing them toward Rhodesia's trade
routes through South Africa and Mo-
zambique--a move Britain has spe-
cifically ruled out.
Meanwhile, several African and
other states are pressing for a
special meeting of the UN Security
Council to take up the Rhodesia
situation. Some African represen-
tatives, however, are pessimistic
about getting significant UN action.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Domestic political activity increased in Latin
America this week.
In Panama, the opposition timetable calls for
completion of impeachment proceedings against Pres-
ident Robles by the end of this month.
Campaigning for the national elections in
Ecuador on 2 June has caused several clashes, and
all concerned expect further violence, a usual ac-
companiment to Ecuadorean political activity.
Colombia will elect another congress on Sun-
day, but pre-election apathy suggests no signifi-
cant changes in the political life of the country.
In Uruguay, rumors of impending cabinet changes
persist. President Pacheco needs the help of as
many political factions as possible if he is to suc-
ceed in pushing vital economic legislation through
congress.
The governing coalition of Venezuela may soon
end its boycott of the senate. Considerable resid-
ual may color future debates, but the
pre-election image-consciousness of all parties will
enforce at least superficial cooperation.
In El Salvador, the leading opposition party
made strong gains in the legislative and municipal
elections on 10 March. The results will hamper im-
plementation of the Sanchez administration's reform
program.
Insurgency and terrorism continued in at least
three Latin American countries. Five Colombian sol-
diers were killed on 7 March by Communist guerrillas,
who were probably reacting to aggressive army patrol-
ling. Terrorist activity in Guatemala City has been
stepped u
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NIS �115+WEUL
PANAMANIAN ASSEMBLY MOVING AHEAD WITH IMPEACHMENT
Activity surrounding Pan-
ama's three-week-old political
crisis is focused on the impeach-
ment of President Robles by the
opposition-controlled National
Assembly, but a showdown prob-
ably will not come until late
this month.
On 11 March, Arnulfo Arias'
National Union (NU) bloc in the
assembly initiated formal im-
peachment proceedings against
President Robles for interference
in the electoral process. After
hearing the pro-Arias investi-
gating commission's recommenda-
tions that the charges against
the President be accepted, govern-
ment deputies requested that all
documentary evidence be read into
the record. This, and other
parliamentary blocking tactics,
have been delaying a vote to im-
peach Robles.
The news media of the NU
have publicized a timetable call-
ing for a trial beginning on
22 March andaniltverdict b
26 March.
The opposi-
tion prefers to await
the final verdict, at which time
the assembly would issue orders
to National Guard Commandant
Bolivar Vallarino to replace
Robles with the pro-Arias first
vice president.
The National Guard has been
on the alert to prevent violence.
Despite sensationalized press
coverage, however, the public
has generally remained apathetic
throughout the crisis. Many
Panamanians are disgusted with
the situation, which they see as
just another power struggle among
the families who have controlled
the country since independence.
Business leaders are concerned,
however, and some believe that a
take-over by the National Guard
is the only way out of the crisis.
All efforts at compromise ap-
pear to have collapsed because
of the hardening attitude of both
sides. Arias is reportedly in-
tent upon pushing the impeachment
all the way. He no doubt recalls
that deputy Marco Robles--now the
President--voted to impeach him
in 1951.
General Vallarino and the
National Guard will decide the
outcome. If Vallarino refuses to
enforce an assembly decision to
remove Robles, Arias and his fol-
lowers may stage street demon-
strations and possibly a general
strike. On the other hand, re- (b)(1)
specting the assembly's orders (b)(3)
could bring government support-
ers into the streets against the
Guard. There are increasing indi-
cations that Vallarino believes
he can evade the dilemma by in-
stalling himself as head of a
provisional regime--an action that
might cause postponement of the
elections scheduled for 12 May.
(b)(3)
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r^�it som,
.11r6i4.4t
CUBA PUSHES TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD
Cuba's efforts to match last
year's 10-percent increase in trade
with the free world are being ham-
pered by the prospect of a poor
sugar harvest. More than the usual
number of contracts are currently
under discussion with non-Communist
suppliers, and imports, partly on
credit, may continue to grow. Cuban
export earnings in free world cur-
rencies will probably decline un-
less sugar delivery commitments to
Communist countries are reduced.
Cuba apparently will receive
another substantial increase in
credits from the free world in 1968,
but mounting repayments obligations
may hold net borrowing this year
close to the 1967 level. Cuba's
debt to free world suppliers prob-
ably increased by about $50 million
last year,reaching an estimated
total of $150 million. Exports
have been adequate to service these
credits and keep repayments on
schedule. Although Cuba's credit
standing is fairly good, it may be
weakened somewhat by poor prospects
for the sugar crop and the rising
evidence of strain in its relations
with the USSR. Credits available
to Cuba from Soviet-controlled
banks in Western Europe have been
tightened, and some free world
creditors fear that general Soviet
support to the Cuban economy may
be cut back.
Cuban trade with free world
countries now accounts for nearly
one quarter of Cuba's total trade.
Exports to the free world in 1967,
principally sugar, were valued at
some $150 million, and imports
reached $240 million.
Imports from France last year
rose by more than $40 million;
Italy, Japan, and West Germany
also significantly increased de-
liveries. The increase was largely
accounted for by machinery and
equipment, including construction
and transportation equipment, and
fertilizer. The only sizable de-
cline in imports was from Spain,
where purchases fell by about $55
million following completion of
delivery of ships and other in-
dustrial equipment under large
credits extended several years ago.
Contract negotiations so far
this year cover a broad range of
items. Cuba has approached most
West European countries, as well
as Japan, seeking to purchase on
credit a large number of shrimp
trawlers and refrigerated fish
vessels. Cuba also is negotiating
for other industrial and transporta-
tion equipment in Western Europe.
Cuban trade prospects with
the free world in 1968 will be
influenced to a large degree by
the outcome of trade talks with
the USSR, which have been under
way in Moscow since October and
are more difficult than usual.
There is no sign yet, however,
that tensions have become so severe
as to cause the USSR to cut off
hard currency payments to Cuba
or to refuse to agree to another
cutback in its sugar allocation.
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11109 _&grEiRE-rr
COMMUNIST TERRORISM IN GUATEMALA
Terrorist activity under-
taken by the Communist Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR) during the past week
continues in Guatemala City, add-
ing further evidence that the FAR
may be gearing up for a new revo-
lutionary phase.
The organization has the
necessary men and weapons for an
extensive, although perhaps not a
sustained, campaign of violence
in the capital. Recently sepa-
rated from the Moscow-oriented
Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT),
the FAR reportedly now has the as-
sistance of Cuban guerrilla in-
structors working in Guatemala.
The residence of the US Ma-
rine guards was bombed on the eve-
ning of 12 March, but no one was
injured. Last week, three bombs ex-
ploded in the capital near police
headquarters, and a military base
on the outskirts of the city was
brought under bazooka fire on the
night of 7 March. Two soldiers
were killed and 25 wounded in the
attack. The previous night the
driver of a payroll truck was
killed in an armed robbery that
netted the attackers about $11,000,
and bus garages were bombed on
4 March. The FAR has claimed re-
sponsibility for the bombing and
probably was involved in the other
actions.
There may be further con-
fusion in the insurgency movement,
which is already complicated by
the division between the FAR and
PGT and by continued factionalism
within each group. The Maryknoll
missionaries--the Melville group--
expelled by the government for col-
laboration with the insurgents are
organizing their own "revolutionary
movement." Now based in Mexico
near the Guatemalan border, and
accompanied by 25 students from
well-to-do families, they appar-
ently plan to arm themselves and
re-enter Guatemala.
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ELECTORAL REPLAY IN ECUADOR
National elections set for
2 June offer no alternatives to
the personalistic politics that
have given Ecuador the Latin Amer-
ican record for unconstitutional
changes of government in the past
30 years.
Of three former presidents in
the race, charismatic 75-year-old
Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra has been
considered almost certain to win
although he lacks any real program
and has served out only one of the
four terms to which he has been
elected in the past. Camilo Ponce
is the candidate of conservative
forces, and Andres Cordoba repre-
sents the center left. Jose
Crespo Toral, a far rightist,
boasts that he is the only non
ex-president running.
Some violence usually accom-
panies Ecuador's elections, and
government officials fear that
lack of sufficient equipment may
hamper the ability of the security
forces to handle outbreaks. Sup-
porters of Ponce and Velasco have
already clashed several times,
even before Velasco returned from
abroad on 9 March to begin his
campaign. His homecoming, how-
ever, was uneventful, and the wel-
coming crowd fell so far below ex-
pectations--both in numbers and in
enthusiasm--that observers are re-
assessing his chances of election.
The evident apathy toward
choosing among the same old candi-
dates may encourage the maneuver-
ing of two younger men, cousins
whose short presidential terms
have whetted their taste for
power. Both would like to profit
from Velasco's popular appeal to
broaden their own political
bases. Velasco, however, has
spurned offers of support from
one, Interim President Otto Aro-
semena, and even charged his
government with planning elec-
toral fraud. The President
claims to be maintaining "sav-
age neutrality," apparently in
the hope that he can retain his
office if violence upsets the
election schedule.
Surprisingly, Velasco ac-
cepted support from the other
cousin, Carlos Julio Arosemena,
who maneuvered him out of office
in 1961 and was himself ousted
by the military in 1963. Com-
pletely discredited at that time,
Arosemena had regained enough
political influence by 1967 to be
elected to the Constituent Assem-
bly. He made his comeback by
engineering alliances with labor
unions, students, and extremist
groups--many of them hard-line
Communists--who see him as a use-
ful front. He is counting on
Velasco's influence to secure
the election of a group of legis-
lators whom he can lead in pass-
ing an extremist program and
later use to restore himself to
power when Velasco's age or a
repetition of his past excesses
leads to his removal.
Meanwhile, the generally un-
stable atmosphere of the pre-
electoral period may be height-
ened by a Latin American Commu-
nist labor conference scheduled
to be held soon in Quito with
President Arosemena's approval.
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