COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003) (2003-7123-IG)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 5856717
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 161
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: May 7, 2004

Ar
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Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
SPECIAL REVIEW
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123-IG)
7 May 2004
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Copy 42-9
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
1
SUMMARY
2
BACKGROUND
9
DISCUSSION
11
GENESIS OF POST 9/1/ AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION
ACTIVITIES 11
THE CAPTURE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITs 12
DOI LEGAL ANALYSIS 16
NOTICE
OFFICIALS
(b)(1) GUIDANCE
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE
ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION
AND CONGRESSIONAL
23
24
25
DCI Confinement Guidelines
27
DCI Interrogation Guidelines
29
Medical Guidelines
31
Training for Interrogations
31
(b)(1)
DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT
(b)(3) NatSecAct
33
34
(b)(1)
Staffing
(b)(3) NatSecAct
and Operations
34
Videotapes of Interrogations
36
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
37
Background
and Detainees
38
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Staffing
39
Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines
40
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques
41
Handgun and Power Drill
41
Threats
42
Smoke
43
Stress Positions
44
(b)(1)
Stiff Brush and Shackles
44
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Waterboard Technique
44
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActDETENTTONAND
INTERROGATION
ACTIVITIES
46
47
(b)(1)
48
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Headquarters Oversight
48
(b)(1)
Facility and Procedures
50
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Site Management
54
Interrogators and
Linguists
57
(b)(1)
Medical Support
58
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61
(b)(1)
65
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Death of Gul
Rahman
67
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques
69
Pressure Points
69
Mock Executions
70
Use of Smoke
72
Use of Cold
73
Water Dousing
76
Hard Takedown
77
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Abuse
Program
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at Other Locations Outside of the CTC
ACCOUNTING FOR DETAINEES
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS
EFFECTIVENESS
78
80
82
85
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 9/
Policy Considerations 92
Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program 94
ENDGAME 95
CONCLUSIONS 100
RECOMMENDATIONS 106
APPENDICES
A. Procedures and Resources
B. Chronology of Significant Events
C. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the
Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an Al-Qa'ida
Operative, 1 August 2002
D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees,
28 January 2003
E. DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September
2001,28 January 2003
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F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on Medical and
Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, 4 September
2003
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
(T-S/
SPECIAL REVIEW
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123-IG)
7 May 2004
INTRODUCTION
1. On 17 September 2001, the President
4gned a Memorandum of Notification (MON) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
One of the key weapons in the war on terror was the MON
authorization for CIA to "undertake operations designed to capture
and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence
or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist
activities."
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 2. Trs.i, In November 2002, the Deputy Director for
Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
that the Agency had established a program in the Counterterrorist
Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC
Program"). He also informed OIG that he had just learned of and had
? dispatched a team to investigate the death of a detainee, Gul
(b)(1) Rahman, In January 2003, the DDO informed OIG
(b)(3) NatSecActthat he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used
unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee,
'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that
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OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that some
employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an
overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of
human rights. In January 2003, OIG initiated a review of Agency
counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities and
investigations into the death of Gul Rahman and the incident with
Al-Nashiri.1 This Review covers the period September 2001 to mid-
October 2003.2 Results of the Gul Rahman and Al-Nashiri-related
investigations are the subject of separate reports.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct SUMMARY
3. rfS4 After the President signed the
17 September 2001 MON, the DCI assigned responsibility for
implementing capture and detention authority to the DDO and to the
Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC). When U.S.
military forces began detaining individuals in Afghanistan and at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
4. tTS,4) Following the approval of the MON on
17 September 2001, the Agency began to detain and interrogate
directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial
Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1 es" ttelF4 Appendix A addresses the Procedures and Resources that OIG employed in
conducting this Review. The Review does not address renditions conducted by the Agency or
interrogations conducted jointly with the U.S. military.
2 (U) Appendix B is a chronology of significant events that occurred during the period of this
Review. (b)(1)
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in March 2002, presented the Agency with a significant dilemma.4
The Agency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent
additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu
Zubaydah was withholding information that could not be obtained
through then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials
believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat
information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior
Al-Qa'ida high value detainees.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
5. (TS/ ) The conduct of detention and interrogation
activities presented new challenges for CIA. These included
determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be
securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing
qualified personnel to manage and carry out detention and
interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa'ida
personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques,
another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that
Agency personnel could lawfully use to overcome the resistance. In
this context, CTC, with the assistance of the Office of Technical
Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to
use on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place against
the backdrop of pre-September 1.1, 2001 CIA avoidance of
interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning
torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners
and detainees in the international community.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
6. (TS/ The Office of General Counsel (OCC) took
the lead in determining and documenting the legal parameters and
constraints for interrogations. OGC conducted independent research
4 cffil The use of "high value" or "medium value" to describe terrorist targets and
. detainees in this Review is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC. CTC
distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be
able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United States. Senior Al-Qa'ida
planners and operators, such as Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fall into the
category of "high value" and are given the highest priority for capture, detention, and
interrogation. CTC categorizes those individuals who are believed to have lesser direct- -
knowledge of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as "medium value"
targets/detainees.
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and consulted _extensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) and
National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working with
DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), OGC determined that in most
instances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and
interrogation activities under the MON, the criminal prohibition
against torture, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal
constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. In
August 2002, DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which it
determined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques"
(EITs) would not violate the torture prohibition. This work provided
the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide
(b)(1) the. CTC Program.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
7. US,/ By November 2002, the Agency had Abu
Zubaydah and another high value detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim
(b)(1)
A
(b)(3) NatSecAct Nashiri' in custody at an overseas facility
.
In December 2002, the Agency rendered these two detainees to
(b)(1) another country to a facility Until
(b)(3) NatSecAct 2003 when it was closed was the location for
the detention and interrogation of eight high value detainees.5
(b)(1) Agency employees and contractors staffed
(b)(3) NatSecAche Directorate of Operations (DO) provided a Chief of Base (COB)
and interrogation personnel, the Office of Security (OS) provided
security personnel, and the Office of Medical Services (OMS)
(b)(1) provided medical care to the detainees. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
8. ef-S79 In addition to
(b)(1)
b)(3 NatSeau:.? September 2002, the Agency has operated a detention facility in
()
known as has 20 cells and is
guarded by has served a number of
purposes. functions as a detention, debriefing, and
interrogation facility for high and medium value targets.
(b)(1) serves as a holding facility at which the Agency assesses the potential
(b)(3) NatSecAct
6 `Threm6W-rs.Z...
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9. MS' With respect to site management and
Headquarters oversight of the Program, the distinctions between the
b 1) detention and interrogation activities at Dn
()(
(b)(3) NatSecAct the one hand, and detention and interrogation activities
on the other, are significant. The Agency devoted far
(b)(1) greater human resources and management attention to
(b)(3) NatSecAct
From the beginning, OGC briefed DO officers
assigned to these two facilities on their legal authorities, and Agency
personnel staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the
condition of detainees in cables.
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value of detainees before making a decision on their disposition. It
served as a transit point for detainees going to M(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
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10. (TS,/ There were few instances of deviations
from approved procedures with one
(b)(1) notable exception described in this Review. With respect to two
(b)(3) NatSecAct detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the
waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as
originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured
oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for
(b)(1)
(b)(1) purposes of Dors legal opinions.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
11. (-TS/ By contrast, the Agency's conduct of
detention and interrogation activities in
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActm articular, raises a host of issues. The first Site Manager at
was a first-tour Fofficer who had no experience or
training to run a detention facility. He had not received
(b)(3) CIAAct
interrogations training and ran the facility with scant guidance from
(b)(1)
(b)(6) Headquarters
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(b)(7)(c)
12.
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13. (4S-/ During the period covered by this
(b)(1) Review, 4id not uniformly document or report the
(b)(3) NatSecActatment of detainees, their conditions, or medical care provided.
Because of the lack of guidance, limited personnel resources, and
(b)(1) limited oversight, there were instances of im rovisation and other
(b)(3) NatSecActIdoctunented interrogation techniques In November
2002, one individual?Gul Rahman?died as a result of the way he
(b)(1) was detained there.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
14. (-TS-/ There is no indication that the CTC
Program has been inadequately funded. Across the board, however,
staffing has been and continues to be the most difficult resource
challenge for the Agency. This is largely attributable to the lack of
personnel with interrogations experience or requisite language skills
and the heavy personnel demands for other counterterrorism
(b)(1) assignments.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
15. (4-8-/ Agency efforts to provide systematic,
clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention
and Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have
improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems
have been identified and addressed. CTC implemented training
programs for interrogators and debriefers.6 Moreover, building upon
(b)(1) merational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DCI
(b)(3) NatSecAct
6 (1?/ Before 11 September (9/11) 2001, Agency personnel sometimes used the
terms interrogation/interrogator and debriefing/debriefer interchangeably. The use of these terms has
since evolved and, today, CIV more clearly distinguishes their meanings. A debriefer engages a
detainee solely through question and answer. An interrogator is a person who completes a
two-week interrogations training program, which is designed to train, qualify, and certify a
person to administer EITs. An interrogator can administer EITs during an interrogation of a
detainee only after the field, in coordination with Headquarters, assesses the detainee as
withholding information. An interrogator transitions the detainee from a non-cooperative to a
cooperative phase in order that a debriefer can elicit actionable intelligence through , _
non-aggressive techniques during debriefing sessions.-An interrogator may debrief a iletamee
during an interrogation; however, a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee.
5
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on 28 January2003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions
for CIA Detainees" and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted
Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of
17 September 2001." The DCI Guidelines require individuals
engaged in or supporting interrogations pursuant to programs
implementing the MON of September 2001 be made aware of the
guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them.
The DCI Interrogation Guidelines make formal the existing CTC
practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquarters
approvals prior to the application of all EITs. Although the DCI
Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI
Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for
misinterpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and
(b)(1) interrogation activities.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
16. (T* The Agency's detention and interrogation
of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the
identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of
terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world.
The CTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of
individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the
counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military
(b)(1) commanders.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
17. (S,5/ The current CTC Detention and
Interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal review and
Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency
policy and rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law
enforcement officers. Officers are concerned that public revelation of
the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers' personal
reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency
(b)(1) itself.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
18. MR/ recognized that detainees may
be held in U.S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate law
enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has been _ .
ongoing discussion of the isSue inside the Agency and among NSC,
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Defense Department, and Justice Department officials, no decisions
on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior
Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the U.S. Government
rather than a CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the
endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be
(b)(1) prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
19. r&S./ The Agency faces potentially serious
long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC
Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of ETTs and
the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately
(b)(1) do with terror-ists detained by the Agency.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
20. (Vol This Review makes a number of
recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management
and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities.
Although the DCI Guidelines were an important step forward, they
were only designed to address the CTC Program, rather than all
Agency debriefing or interrogation activities.
(b)(5)
the Agency should evaluate the
effectiveness of the EITs and the necessity for the continued use of
each.
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21. (-S-/
the General
Counsel should seek an updated legal opinion from DoJ revalidating
and modifying, consistent with actual practice, the legal authority for
the continued application of EITs. If such approval is not
forthcoming, the DCI should direct that EITs be implemented only
within the parameters of the existing written DoJ authorization. The
DCI should brief the President on the use of EITs and the fact that
detainees have died.
(b)(5)
BACKGROUND
22. 15), The Agency has had intermittent involvement in the
interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of
the United States. After the Vietnam War, Agency personnel
experienced in the field of interrogations left the Agency or moved to
other assignments. In the early 1980s, a resurgence of interest in
teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several
methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political
sensitivities the then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)
forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation." The
Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE)
training program designed to train foreign liaison services on
interrogation techniques.
23. 15`),In 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on
the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interrogations
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecARd the death of one individual
Following that investigation, the Agency
took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on
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interrogations?debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters
sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance
to the field.
24. MI In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training program
because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
DO Handbook 50-2
(b)(3) CIAAct
which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation
policy:
It is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage
interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane
treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 25. (Tet/ The statutory basis for CIA's involvement
in detentions and interrogations is the DCI's covert action
responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.7
Under the Act, a covert action must be based on a Presidential
"finding that the action is necessary to support identifiable foreign
policy objectives and is important to the national security."8 Covert
action findings must be in writing and "may not authorize any action
that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United
States."9 These findings are implemented through Memoranda of
Notification.
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DISCUSSION
GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION
ACTIVITIES
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 26. (%,,
(b)(1) The 17 September 2001 MON
(b)(3) NatSecAct
authorizes
the DCI, acting through CIA, to undertake operations "designed to
capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of
violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning
terrorist activities." Although the MON does not specifically mention
interrogations of those detained, this aspect of the CTC Program can
be justified as part of CIA's general authority and responsibility to
collect intelligence.10
27. TS1-7(N-F4 The DCI delegated responsibility for
implementation of the MON to the DDO and 1J/CTC. Over time,
CTC also solicited assistance from other Agency components,
including OGC, OMS, OS, and OTS.
7 (U/ tree()) DoJ takes the position that as Commander-in-Chief, the President independently
has the Article II constitutional authority to order the detention and interrogation of enemy
combatants to gain intelligence information.
8 (U/ /O0) 50 U.S.C. 413b(a).
9 (UHEGage) 50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1), (5).
10 (UHEQUO) 50 US.C. 403-1, 403-3(d)(1).
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28. (NIA To assist Agency officials in
understanding the scope and implications of the MON, between
17 September and 7 November 2001, OGC researched, analyzed, and
wrote "draft" papers on multiple legal issues. These included
discussions of the applicability of the U.S. Constitution overseas,
applicability of Habeas Corpus overseas, length of detention,
potential civil liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act and
employee liability actions, liaison with law enforcement,
interrogations, Guantanamo Bay detention facility, short-term
detention facilities, and disposition of detainees. OGC shared these
"draft" papers with Agency officers responsible for implementing the
MON.
29.1
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THE CAPTURE OF ABU. ZLIBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITs
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 30. cF64 The capture of senior Al-Qa'ida operative
Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the
opportunity to obtain actionable intelligence on future threats to the
United States from the most senior Al-Qa'ida member in U.S. custody
at that time. This accelerated CIA's development of an interrogation
program and establishment of an interrogation site.
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Zubaydah suffered upon his capture, the Agency provided him
intensive medical care from the outset and deferred his questioning
for several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembled
a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah using non-aggressive,
non-physical elicitation techniques. Between June and July 2002, the
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was placed in isolation. The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah
was withholding imminent threat information.
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32. MV Several months earlier, in late 2001, CIA
had tasked an independent contractor psychologist, who had
experience in the U.S. Air Force's Survival, Evasion,
Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training program, to research and
write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques.13
This psychologist collaborated with a Department of Defense (DoD)
psychologist who ha 0 SERE experience in the U.S. Air
Force and DoD to produce the paper, "Recognizing and Developing
Countermeasures to Al-Qaida Resistance to Interrogation
Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, the
two psychologists developed a list of new and more aggressive EITs
that they recommended for use in interrogations.
12 .(5) CTC had previously identified locations for "covert" sites but had not established facilities.
13 (UHFOTie) The SERE training program falls under the DoD joint Personnel Recovery
Agency (JPRA). JPRA is responsible for missions to include ,the training for SERE and Prisoner of
War and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation. SERE Training is offered
by the US. Army, Navy, and Air Force to its personnel, particularly air crews and special
operations forces who are of greatest risk of being captured during military operations. SERE
students are taught how to survive in various terrain, evade and endure captivity, resist- _ _
interrogations, and conduct themselves to prevent harm to themselves and fellow prisoners of
war.
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33. (T-S,4 CIA's OTS obtained data on the use of the
proposed EITs and their potential long-term psychological effects on
detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicite4 from
a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area
of psychopathology.
34. M.? OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its
SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students.
DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted
from use of the ErTs, including the most taxing technique, the
waterboard, on SERE students.14 The OTS analysis was used by OGC
(b)(1) in evaluating the legality of techniques.
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35. ('W Eleven EITs were proposed for adoption
in the CTC Interrogation Program. As proposed, use of EITs would
be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological
state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed
technique?the mock burial?after learning from DoJ that this could
delay the legal review. The following textbox identifies the 10 EIT's
the Agency described to DoJ.
14 ZS), According to individuals wfth authoritative knowledge of the SERE program, the
waterboard was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in a class.
Except for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued because of its dramatic
effect on the students who were subjects.
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Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
? The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with one
hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the
same motion as the grasp, the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator.
? During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled forward and then quickly and
firmly pushed into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. His
head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash.
? The facial hold is used to hold the detainee's head immobile. The interrogator
places an open palm on either side of the detainee's face and the interrogator's
fingertips are kept well away from the detainee's eyes.
? With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. The
interrogator's hand makes contact with the area between the tip of the detainee's
chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe.
? In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined space, typically a
small or large box, which is usually dark. Confinement in the smaller space lasts
no more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours.
? Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a harmless insect in the box
with the detainee.
? During wall standing, the detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet from a wall with
his feet spread approximately to his shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in
front of him and his fingers rest on the wall to support all of his body weight. The
detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet.
? The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor
with his legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms _raised above his
head or kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle.
? Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time.
? The application of the waterboard technique involves binding the detainee to a
bench with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized
and an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee's mouth and nose while
pouring water onto the doth in a controlled manner. Airflow is restricted for 20 to
40 seconds and the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation.
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36. (151 CIA's OGC sought guidance from DOJ
regarding the legal bounds of Errs vis-?is individuals detained
under the MON authorization. The ensuing legal opinions focus on
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention),1s
especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 2340-
2340A.
37. (UI/FOUQ) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits
"torture," which it defines in Article 1 as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanction. [Emphasis added.]
Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to the
Convention are to ensure that all acts of "torture" are offenses under
their criminal laws. Article 16 additionally provides that each state
party "shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in
Article 1."
15 (U/IFOUQ). Adopted 10 December 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20(1988) 1465 U.N.T.S..85
(entered into force 26 June 1987). The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States -
on 20 November 1994.
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38. (U/L70130) The Torture Convention applies to the United
States only in accordance with the reservations and understandings
made by the United States at the time of ratification.16 As explained
to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification:
Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law. The phrase
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is a
standard formula in international instruments and is found in the
Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on
Human Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the
context of those agreements, "cruel" and "inhuman" treatment or
punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or
punishment barred in the United States by the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 'Degrading" treatment or punishment,
however, has been interpreted as potentially including treatment
that would probably not be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.
[Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's
gender change might be considered "degrading" treatment.] To
make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be
coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment, the following understanding is
recommended:
"The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,' as used in Article 16 of
the Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."17 [Emphasis added.]
16 (U) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force 27 January 1980). The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on treaties, but
it generally regards its provisions as customary international law.
17 (U/ /'O? S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16.
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39. (LW/fable) In accordance with the Convention, the
United States criminalized acts of torture in 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a),
which provides as follows:
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control."18 "Severe physical
pain and suffering" is not further defined, but Congress added a
definition of "severe mental pain or suffering:"
[T]he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from?
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration
or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality..
These statutory definitions are consistent with the understandings
and reservations of the United States to the Torture Convention.
18 (U/7Felt39).- 18 U.S.C. 2340(1).
19 (U/PrEQQ) 18 USC. 2340(2).
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40. (U//70f40) DoJ has never prosecuted a violation of the
torture statute, 18 U.S.C. ?2340, and there is no case law construing
its provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevant
issues under U.S. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the summer
of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the
torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002
OLC legal memorandum set out OLC's conclusions regarding the
proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that
"Section 2340A proscribes acts inflicting, and that are specifically
intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental or
physical."20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extreme
nature" and that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading,
but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to
fall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." Further
describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated:
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely
mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it
must result in significant psychological harm of significant
duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.21
OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the
infliction of severe pain be the defendant's "precise objective." OLC
also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify
interrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340A.22
The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other
provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatment, and
interrogation of detainees outside the United States.23
20 (U/TPOT4Q) Legal Memorandum, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (1 August 2002).
21 all new) Ibid.,
p. 1.
22 (U//15V3WO) Ibid., p. 39.
23 (W/RNIG) OLC's analysis of the torture statute was guided in part by judicial decisions
under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 28 U.S.C. 1350, which provides a tort remedy
for victims of torture. OLC noted that the courts in this context have looked at the entire course
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41. (U//P0159)-A second unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC
opinion addressed the international law aspects of such
interrogations.24 This opinion concluded that interrogation methods
that do not violate 18 U.S.C. 2340 would not violate the Torture
Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court.
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42. (TSA In addition to the two unclassified
opinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at
the request of CIA.25 (Appendix C.) This opinion, addressed to
CIA's Acting General Counsel, discussed whether the proposed use
of EITs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah would violate the Title 18
prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use of EITs on
Abu Zubaydah would not violate the torture statute because, among
other things, Agency personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to
inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in fact inflict severe
pain or suffering.
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43. (TS/ This OLC opinion was based upon
specific representations y CIA concerning the manner in which EITs
would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. For
example, OLC was told that the EIT "phase" would likely last "no
more than several days but could last up to thirty days." The EITs
would be used on "an as-needed basis" and all would not necessarily
be used. Further, the ETTs were expected to be used "in some sort of
escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard though not
necessarily ending with this technique." Although some of the EITs
of conduct, although a single incident could constitute torture. OLC also noted that courts may
be willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the level of "severe pain and
suffering." Ultimately, however, OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts "of an
extreme nature have been redressed under the TVPA's civil remedy for torture." White House
Counsel Memorandum at 22 - 27.
24 (UURYI4Q) OLC Opinion by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC
(1 August 2002).
25 mil Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central -
Intelligence gency, 'Interrogation of al Qaida Operative" (1 August 2002) at 15.
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might be used wore than once, "that repetition will not be substantial
because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several
repetitions." With respect to the waterboard, it was explained that:
. . . the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench . . . . The
individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the
forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it
covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and
completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This
causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood.
This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort
to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of
"suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning.
The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those
20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12
to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the
individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full
breaths. The sensation of &owning is immediately relieved by the
removal of the doth. The procedure may then be repeated. The
water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can
with a spout. . . . [T]his procedure triggers an automatic
physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot
control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not
drowning. [I]t is likely that this procedure would not last more
than 20 minutes in any one application.
Finally, the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile of
Abu Zubaydah and with the conclusions of officials and
psychologists associated with the SERE program that the use of EITs
would cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these
representations to support its conclusion that no physical harm or
prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the
(b)(1) EITs, including the waterboard. 26
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26 According to the Chief, Medical Services, OMS was neither consulted nor
involved in the initial analysis Qf the risk and benefits of EITs, nor provided with the OTS report
cited in the OLC opinion. In retrospect, based on the OLC extracts of the OTS report, OMS
contends that the reported sophistication of the preliminary EIT review was exaggezatelLat least
as it related to the waterboard, and that the power of this EIT was appreciably overstated in the
report. Furthermore, OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE psychologist/interrogators on
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44. (Ts.) OGC continued to consult with DoJ as the
CTC Interrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the production of
an undated and unsigned document entitled, "Legal Principles
Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured
Al-Qa'ida Personnel."27 According to OCC, this analysis was fully
coordinated with and drafted in substantial part by OLC. In addition
to reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute,
the analysis concludes that the federal War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C.
2441, does not apply to Al-Qa'ida because members of that group are
not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that "the
[Torture] Convention permits the use of [cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment] in exigent circumstances, such as a national
emergency or war." It also states that the interrogation of Al-Qa'ida
members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
because those provisions do not apply extraterritorially, nor does it
violate the Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons
upon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the
analysis states that a wide range of EITs and other techniques would
not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were they to be
applicable:
The use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved
techniques does not violate any Federal statute or other law, where
the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the
detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(i.e., they act with the good faith belief that their conduct will not
cause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (so
long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of
the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white
the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is
so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently,
according to OMS, there was no a pricri reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the
frequency and intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either
efficacious or medically safe.
27 (Ts./ "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of
(b)(1) Captured Al-Qaida Personnel," attached toL (16 June 2003).
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noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the
detainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement,
wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, the use of
diapers, the use of harmless insects, and the water board.
According to OCC, this analysisembodies DoJ agreement that the
reasoning of the dassified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extends
beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions that
were specified in that opinion.
NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WTTH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL
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45. (FS/ At the same time that OLC was reviewing
the legality of EITs in the summer of 2002, the Agency was consulting
with NSC policy staff and senior Administration officials. The DCI
briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the
proposed Errs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership
of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of
both standard techniques and Errs.
(b)(1)
46. (Tai In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging
of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration
officials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight
Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The
Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the
Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions.
The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with White House
Counsel and others at the NSC, as well as Dors Criminal Division
and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed
them on the scope and breadth of the CTC's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
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47. (Ez5 Representatives of the DO, in the
presence of the Director of Congressional Affairs and the General
Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence -
Oversight Committees on the use of Errs and detentions in February
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and March 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the
participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the
(b)(1) Program.
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48. (Fs/ On 29 July 2003, the DCI and the General
Counsel provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on
CIA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value
detainees," to indude the expanded use of EITs.28 According to a
Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel
following that meeting, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ
approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple
applications of the waterboard.29 The General Counsel said he
believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was
doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of
the effort. According to OGC, the senior officials were again briefed
regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the
Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September
2003. Again, according to OCC, none of those involved in these
briefings expressed any reservations about the program.
(b)(1) GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION
(b)(3) NatSecAct
49. (TS Z Guidance and training are fundamental
to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally,
politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and
Interrogation Program. Soon after 9/11, the DDO issued guidance on
the standards for the capture of terrorist targets.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
50. (NI, The DCI, in January 2003 approved
formal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees"
(b)(1) (Appendix D) and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted
(b)(3) NatSecAct
28 frgy The briefing materials referred to 24 high value detainees interrogated at
CU-controlled sites and identified 13 interrogated using EITs.
29 (U/(l% Memorandum for the Record?(b)(3) CIAAct (5 August 2003).
24
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Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of
17 September 2001" (Appendix E), which are discussed below. Prior
to the DCI Guidelines, Headquarters provided guidance via informal
briefings and electronic communications, to include cables from CIA
Headquarters, to the field. Because the level of guidance was largely
site-specific, this Report discusses the pre-January 2003 detention and
interrogation guidance in the sections addressing specific detention
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
51. (T-gt, In November 2002, CTC initiated training
courses for individuals involved in interrogations. In April 2003,
OMS consolidated and added to its previously issued informal
guidance for the OMS personnel responsible for monitoring the
medical condition of detainees.30
52.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
53.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
30 (U//F94J0) OMS reportedly issued four revisions of these draft guidelines, the latest of
which is dated 4 September 2003. The guidelines remain in draft.
?
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
55.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
56.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
?
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) DCI Confinement Guidelines
(b)(3) NatSecAct
57. (TS/ Before January 2003, officers assigned to
manage detention facffities developed and implemented confinement
condition procedures. Because these procedures were site-specific
and not uniform, this Review discusses them in connection with the
review of specific sites, rather than in this section. The January 2003
DCI Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA
detainees held in detention facilities
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
31
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
"I'Inrreetawsw
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58. (-T-S/ The DCI Guidelines specify that D/CTC
shall ensure that a specifi.c Agency staff employee is designated as
responsible for each specific detention facility. Agency staff
employeesresponsible for the facilities and participating in the
questioning of individuals detained pursuant to the 17 September
2001 MON must receive a copy of the DCI Guidelines. They must
review the Guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have
done so.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
59. ZTS.Z The DCI Guidelines specify legal
"minimums" and require that "due provision must be taken to protect
the health and safety of all CIA detainees." The Guidelines do not
require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities
conform to U.S. prison or other standards. At a minimum, however,
detention facilities are to provide basic levels of medical care:
. . . (which need not comport with the highest standards of medical
care that is provided in U.S.-based medical facilities); food and
drink which meets minimum medically appropriate nutritional and
sanitary standards; clothing and/or a physical environment
sufficient to meet basic health needs; periods of time within which
detainees are free to engage in physical exercise (which maybe
limited, for example, to exercise within the isolation cells
themselves); for sanitary facilities (which may, for example,
comprise buckets for the relief of personal waste). . .
Further, the guidelines provide that:
Medical and, as appropriate, psychological personnel shall be
physically present at, or reasonably available to, each Detention
6
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Facility. Medical personnel shall check the physical condition of
each detainee at intervals appropriate to the circumstances and
shall keep appropriate records.
DCI Interrogation Guidelines
60. (515NE). Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC
disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case
basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques.
Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations
to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or
agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency
maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been
briefed on interrogation procedures.
61.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
The DCI
Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged
in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these
Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation,
and have completed the applicable acknowledgement.
62. (375441E) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define
"Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless
otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other
personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible
Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques
consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced
(b)(3) CIAAct
32 ts75944.9. see
for relevant text of DO Handbook 50-2.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
"Trila-CriCZELT' /
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
Techniques."33_ XITs require advance approval from Headquarters, as
do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document
the use of both standard techniques and EITs.
63. .(TSI The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define
"standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not
incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These
techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of
questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military
interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques
are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,
reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to
maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading
material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level
calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use of
diapers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours, or
during transportation where appropriate), and moderate
psychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not
specifically prohibit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has
said, however, that no one may employ any technique outside
specifically identified standard techniques without Headquarters
(b)(1) approval.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
64. (114S,Q EITs include physical actions and are
defined as "techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological
pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve
the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only
by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee
and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the
process.35
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
33 (S), The 10 approved ETTs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review.
34 ers.4. According to the General Counsel, in late December 2003, the period for
sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours.
35 mi Before ETTs are administered, a detainee must receive a detailed
psychological assessment and physical exam. Daily physical and psychological evaluations are
(b)(1) continued throughout the period of EIT use.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
Medical Ggidelines(b)(3) NatSecAct
65. ("R.5 OMS prepared draft guidelines for
medical and psychological support to detainee interrogations. The
Chief, Medical Services disseminated the undated OMS draft
guidelines in April 2003 to OMS personnel assigned to detention
facilities. According to OMS, these guidelines were a compilation of
previously issued guidance that had been disseminated in a
piecemeal fashion. The guidelines were marked "draft" based on the
advice of CTC/Lega1.36 These guidelines quote excerpts from the
DCI Interrogation Guidelines. They include a list of sanctioned
interrogation techniques, approval procedures, technique goals, and
staff requirements. The OMS draft guidelines also expand upon the
practical medical implications of the DCI Interrogation Guidelines,
addressing: general evaluation, medical treatment, uncomfortably
cool environments, white noise or loud music, shackling, sleep
deprivation, cramped confinement (confinement boxes), and the
waterboard. According to the Chief, Medical Services, the OMS
Guidelines were intended solely as a reference for the OMS personnel
directly supporting the use of EITs and were not intended to be
Agency authorizations for the techniques discussed. OMS most
recently updated these draft guidelines in September 2003, and,
according to the Chief, Medical Services, they were disseminated to
all OMS field personnel involved in the Detention and Interrogation
Program. (Appendix F.)
(b)(1) Training for Interrogations
(b)(3) NatSecAct
66. (R5/ In November 2002, CTC/Renditions and
Detainees Group (RDG) initiated a pilot running of a two-week
Interrogator Training Course designed to train, qualify, and certify
individuals as Agency interrogators.37 Several CTC officers,
36 (U/MILIQ) A 28 March 2003,Lotus Note from C/C'TC /Legal advised Chief, Medical
Services that the "Seventh Floor'. "would need to approve the promulgation of arty further formal
guidelines.. . . For now, therefore, let's remain at the discussion stage...."
37 (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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including a former SERE instructor, designed the curriculum, which
included a week of classroom instruction followed by a week of
"hands-on" training in EITs. In addition to standard and enhanced
interrogation techniques, course material included apprehension and
handling of subjects, renditions, management of an interrogation site,
interrogation team structure and functions, planning an
interrogation, the conditioning process, resistance techniques, legal
requirements, Islamic culture and religion, the Arab mind, and
Al-Qalcla networks. Training using physical pressures was
conducted via classroom academics, guided discussion,
(b)(1) --nonstration-performance, student practice and feedback.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
67. (TS./ Three of the 16 attendees of the pilot
course, including a senior Agency interrogator and two independent
contractor/psychologists, were certified by CTC/RDG as
interrogators.38 Their certification was based on their previous
(b)(1) operational e ? erience. The two psychologist/interrogators, who
(b)(3) NatSecActre at during the pilot course, were deemed certified
based on their experience as SERE instructors and their
interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri. Once certified, an
interrogator is deemed qualified to conduct an interrogation
employing EITs. Seven other individuals were designated as "trained
and qualified," meaning they would have to apprentice under a
certified interrogator in the field for 20 hours in order to become
eligible for their certifications.
68. (S71NE4 By September 2003, four Interrogation Training
(b)(1) Courses had been completed, resulting in trained interrogators.
(b)(3) CIAAct Three of these are certified to use the waterboard. Additionally, a
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
38 (64-/-4F) These certifications were for "Enhanced Pressures," which involved all of the EITs
except the waterboard. Only the two psychologist/interrogators were certified to use the
waterboard based on their previous JPRA/SERE experience. Subsequently, another independent
contractor, who had been certified as an interrogator, became certified in the use of the
waterboard.
32
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
? number of psychologists, physicians, Physician's Assistants,39 and
COBs completed the training for familiarization purposes. Students
completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign in
acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and will comply
(b)(1) with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
69. ("Rii In June 2003, CTC established a debriefing
course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in questioning
detainees after they have undergone interrogation and have been
deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train
non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value
detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize
non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation
Program, to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the DCI
Interrogation Guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of all who
interact with a high value detainee. As of September 2003, three of
these training sessions had been conducted, with a total of
(b)(1) Dndividuals completing the training. CTC/RDG was contemplating
(b)(3) CIAAct establishing a similar training regimen for Security Protective Officers
(b)(3) NatSecAct
and linguists who will be assigned to interrogation sites.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 70. ffSi The detention and interrogation activity
examined during this Review occurred primarily at three facilities
encrypted as was the
facility at which two prominent Al-Qa'ida detainees, Abu Zubaydah
and Al-Nashiri, were held with the foreign host government's
knowledge and approval, until it was closed for operational security
reasons in December 2002. The two detainees at that location were
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
39 (U) Physician's Assistants are formally trained to provide diagnostic, therapeutic, and
preventative health care services. They work under the supervision of a physician, record
progress notes, and may prescribe medications.
? 33
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
then moved to located in another foreign country. Eight
individuals were detained and interrogated at including
Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
Staffing and Operatiom(b)(3) NatSecAct
71. Er-S./ CTC initiall established to
detain and interrogate Abu Zubaydah. as operational
between December 2002. had no
permanent positions and was staffed wi duty (TDY)
officers. Initially, Abu Zubaydah's Agency interrogators at
included an kofficer, who also serve as
COB, and a senior Agency security officer. They were assisted by
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecWcri?us security, medical, and communications personnel detailed to
-i
to support the interrogation mission. An independent
contractor psychologist with extensive experience as an interrogation
instructor at the U.S. Air Force SERE School also assisted the team.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
72 Once the Agency approved the use of
EITs in August 2002, a second independent contractor
(b)(3)
(b)(6) CIAAct
psyc o ogis wi flyears of SERE experience joined the team. This
(b)(7)(c) followed a determination by the CIA personnel involved in
debriefing that the continuation of the existing methods would not
produce the actionable intelligence that the Intelligence Community
believed Abu Zubaydah possessed. The team was supervised by the
COB and supported by the on-site team of security, medical, and
(b)(1) communications personnel.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
73. (r-Si The responsibility of the COB
was to ensure the facility and staff functioned within the authorities
that govern the mission. In conjunction with those duties, the COB
was responsible for the overall management and security of the site
and the personnel assigned to support activities there. The COB
oversaw interrogations and released operational and intelligence_
1711,446PC?P?UT /
3b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
cables and situation reports. The COB coordinated activities with the
Station and Headquarters and reported to the CTC Chief of
(b)(1) Renditions Group.40
(b)(3) NatSecAct
The two psychologist/interrogators at
led each interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri
where EITs were used. The psychologist/interrogators conferred
with the COB and other team members before each interrogation
session. Psychological evaluations were performed by both
Headquarters and on-site psychologists. Early on in the
development of the interrogation Program, Agency OMS
psychologists objected to the use of on-site psychologists as
interrogators and raised conflict of interest and ethical concerns. This
was based on a concern that the on-site psychologists who were
administering the EITs participated in the evaluations, assessing the
(b)(1) affectiveness and impact of the EITs on the detainees.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
75. k J
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2002 Jul
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2002 Aug
DpJ concludes that use0110,EfTej.nOleigtihnit,,O.i.CJA",:.'41. i
'4i6uics:iloi violate'.i.i 't iiiill,i..i6.',: -;::-.-. i? '... - :',Li-.?,:.= '.1. ' .r..': ','-.:: :*:?'-i
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2002 Se t;?.:!',::,=i?.,'',',-,.-;;.m.-;?;?,
','4?.?;.:?;..? 2,;5ittsVtit'rt4:.'",:t17:t '''':,t,'."'r.?.''?
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2002 Fall
.?CIAlineffleanaqhin of Cbligfdtleinatnithi*Ignr. :-..-,-!..-j , :,?,,5'?,:'''.''',"',,.,
:4iiiiiiiiiii-eit,J,:',:,.14,: 4.;iiii.',J,Iii.ini:::?:.:t:::1::.:':) ,.i.,:',.;.:::i,',,.,,,ir'..
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t!'),i,iiio.",',:ii, -.1',,i':5;?:',,:l),,1,!,:-.f,,,;?,i,i,,, ril;i,
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7., r?.?.,,,I,..1,.., ? .,???:7?.4.?:-;..n '.. ;"' L,'? ::,1?.,. '.i..:.5,,rt.P.:11;,r,t!'. r'.,:',!'?1 .7.,!:.:
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US. Department of JustiCe
Office of Legal Counsel
Office of die Assistant Attorney General Washington. D.0 20530
August 1,2002
? Memorandum for John Rizzo
Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative
You have asked for this Office's views ori whether certain proposed conduct wopld
violate the prohibition against torture found at Section 2340A of title 18 of the United Mates
Code. You have asked for this advice in the course of conducting interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah. As we understand it, Zubaydah is one of the highest ranking members of the al Qaeda
terrorist organization, with which the United States is currently engaged in an international armed
conflict following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001. This letter memorializes our previous oral advice, given on July 24, 2002 and July 26,
2002, that the proposed conduct would not violate this prohibition.
I.
Our advice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also
understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here,
and this opinion is limited to these facts'. If these facts were to change, this advice would not
necessarily apply. Zubaydah is currently being held by the United States. The interrogation team
is certain that he has additional information that be refuses to divulge. Specifically, be is
withholding information regarding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and
information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests
overseas. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of treatment and displays no signs
of willingness to disclose further information. Moreover, your intelligence indicates that there is
currently a level of "chatter" equal to that which preceded. the September 11 attacks. In light of
the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of threat you believe now 'exists,
you wish to move the interrogations into what you have described as an "increased pressure
phase."
As part of this increased pressure phase, Zubaydah will have contact only with anew
interrogation specialist, whom he has not met previously, and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance,
Escape ("SERE") training psychologist who has been involved with the interrogations since they
began. This phase will likely last no more than several days but could last up to thirty days. In
this phase, you would like to employ ten techniques that you believe will disloare-Mt -
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expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive and encourage him to disclose
the crucial information mentioned above. These ten techniques are: (I) attention grasp, (2)
walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall stancling,
(7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the
waterboard. You have informed us that the use of these techniques would he on an as-needed
basis and that not all of these techniques will necessarily be used. The interrogation team would
use these techniques in some combination to convince Zubaydah that the only way he can
influence his surrounding environment is through cooperation. You have, however, informed us
that you expect these techniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating with
the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this technique. Moreover, you have also ?
orally informed us that although some of these techniques may be used with more than once, that
repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after
several repetitions. You have also infoimed us that Zabaydah sustained a wound during his
c,apture,which is being treated. ?
Based on the facts you have given us, we understand each of these techniques to be as
follows. The attention grasp consists of grasping the individual with both hands; one hand on
each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the
grasp, the individual is drawn toward the interrogator.
For walling, a flexible false wall will be constructed. The individual is placed with his
heels touching the wall. The interrogator pulls the individual forward and then quickly and
firmly pushes the individual into the wall, It is the individual's shoulder blades that hit the wall.
During this motion, the head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a
c-collar effect to help prevent whiplash. To further reduce the probability of injury, the
individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have orally informedus that the
false wall is in part constructed to create a loud sound when the individual hits It, which will
further shock or surprise in the individual. In part, the idea is to create a sound that will make the
impact seem far worse than it is and that will be far worse thanany injury that might result from
the action.
The facial hold is used to hold the head immobile. One open palm is placed on either
side of the individual's face. The fingertips are kept well away from the individual's eyes.
? With the facial slap or insult slap, the interrogator slaps the individual's face with fingers .
slightly spread. The hand makes contact with the area directly between the tip of the individual's
chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. The interrogator invades the individual's
personal space. The goal of the facial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting.
Instead, the purpose of the facial slap is to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation.
Cramped confinement involves the placement of the individual in a confineihpace, the
of which restrict the individual's movement. The confined space is usually dark.
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The duration of confinement varies based upon the size of the container. For the larger confined
space, the individual can stand up or sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the subject to
sit down. Confinement in the larger space can last up to eighteen hours; for the smaller space,
confinement lasts for no more than two hours.
Wall standing is used to induce muscle fatigue. The individual stands about four to five
feet from a wall, with his feet spread approximately to shoulder width. His arms are stretched
out in front of him, withhis fingers resting on the wall. His fingers support all of his body
weight. The individual is not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet.
A variety of stress positions may be used. You have informed us that these positions are
not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather,
somewhat like walling, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with
muscle fatigue. Two particular stress positions are likely to be used on Zubaydah: (1) sitting on
the floor with legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms raised above his head; and
(2) kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle. You have also orally informed
us that through observing Zubaydah in captivity, you have noted that he appears to be quite
flexible despite his wound.
? Sleep deprivation may be used. You have indicated that your purpose in using this
technique is to reduce the individual's ability to think on his feet and, through the discomfort
associated with lack of sleep, to motivate him to cooperate. The effect of such sleep deprivation
will generally remit after one or two nights of uninterrupted sleep. You have informed us that
your research has revealed that, in rare instances, some individuals who are already predisposed
to psychological problems may experience abnormal reactions to sleep deprivation. Even in
those cases, however, reactions abate after the individual is pennitted to sleep. Moreover,
personnel with medical training are available to and will intervene in the unlikely event of an
abnormal reaction. You have orally informed us that you would not deprive Zubaydah of sleep
for more than eleven days at a time and that you have previously kept him awake for 72 hours',
from which no mental or physical harm resulted.
You would like to place Zubaydah in a cramped confinement box with an insect. You
have informed us that he appears to have a fear -of insects. In particular, you would like to tell
Zubaydah that you intend to place a sting-mg bisect into the box with him. You would, however,
place a harmless insect in the box. You have orally informed us that you would in fact place a
harmless insect such as a caterpillar in the box with him. Your goal in so doing is to use his fears
to increase his sense of dread and motivate him to avoid the box in the future by cooperating with
interrogators.
Finally, you would like to use a technique called the "waterboard." In this procedure, the
individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is approximately four feet-by-seven feet.?
The individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water-
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is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it
covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth
and nose, air flay/ is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This
causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon
dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the
perception of "suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning. The individual
does not breathe any water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously
applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and
the individual is allowed to breathe =impeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of
drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be
repeated. The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout
You have orally informed us that this procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of
drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not
drowning. You have also orally informed us that its likely that this procedure would not last
more than 20 minutes in any one application:
? We also tmderstand that a medical expert with SERE experience will be present
throughout this phaseand that the procedures will be stopped if deemed medically necessary to
'prevent severe mental or physical harm to Zubaydah. As mentioned above, Zubaydah suffered
an injury during his capture. You have informed us that steps will be taken to ensure that this
injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods and that adequate medical
attention will be given to ensure that it will heal properly,
B.
In this part, we review the context within which these procedures will be applied. You
have informed us that you have taken various steps to ascertain what effect, if any, these
techniques would have on Zubaydah's mental health. These same techniques, with the exception
of the insect in the cramped confined space, have been used and continue to be used on some
members of our military personnel during their SERE training. Because of the use of these
procedures in training our own military personnel to resist interrogations, you have consulted
with various individuals who have extensive experience in the use of these techniques. You have
done so in order .to ensure that no prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these
proposed procedures.
Through your consultation with various individuals responsible for such training, you
have learned that these techniques have been used as elements of a course of conduct without any (b)(6)
reported incident of prolonged mental harm. of the SERE school,
has reported that, during the seven-
year period that he spent in those positions there were two requests from Congresafor
information concerning alleged injuries resultingfrom the training. One of tliesWiluiries war?
prompted by the temporary physical injury a trainee sustained as result of being placed in a
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confinement box. The other inquiry involved claims that the SERE training caused two
individuals to engage in criminal behavior, namely, felony shoplifting and downloading child
pornography onto a military computer. According to this official, these claims were found to be
baseless. Moreover, he has indicated that during the three and a half years he spent as
of the SERE program, he trained 10,000 students. Of those students, only two
dropped out of the training following the use of these teclmiques. Although on rare occasions
some students temporarily, postponed the remainder of their training and received psychological
counseling, those students were able to finish the program without any indication of subsequent
mental health effects.
You have informed ni that you have consulted with
ears of .erienee with SERE trainin
who has ten
He stated that, during those
ten years, insofar as he is aware, none of the individuals who completed the program suffered any
adverse mental health effects: He informed you that there was one person who did not complete
the training. That person experienced an adverse mental health reaction that lasted only two
hours: After those two hours, the individual's symptoms spontaneously dissipated without
requiring treatment or counseling and no other symptoms were ever reported by this individual.
According to the information you have provided to us, this assessment of the use of these
procedures includes the use of the waterboard.
? (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Additionally you received i memorandum from the
iwhich you supplied o vs.
has experience with the use of all of these procedures in a course of conduct, with the exception
of the insect in the confinement box and the waterboard. This memorandum confirms that the
use of these procedures has not resulted in any reported instances of prolonged mental harm, and
v few instances of immediate and temporary adverse psychological responses to the training.
reported that a small minority of students have had temporary adverse
psyc o ogical reactions during training. Of the 26,829 students trained from 1992 through 2001
in the Air Force SERE training, 4.3 percept of those students had contact with psychology
services. Of those 4.3 percent, only 3.2 percent were pulled from the program for psychological
reasons. Thus, out of the students trained overall, only 0.14 percent were pulled from the (b)(6)
program for psychological reasons. Furthermore, a1thougl indicated that surveys.
of students having completed this training are not done, he expressed confidence that the training
did not cause any long-term psychological impact. He based his conclusion on the debriefing of
students that is done after the training. More importantly, he based this assessment on the fact
that although training.is required to be extremely stressful in order to be effective, very few
complaints have been made regarding the training. During his tenure, in which 10,000 students
were trained, no congressional complaints have been made. While there was one Inspector
General complaint, it was not due to psychological concerns. Moreover, he was-aware of only?
one letter inquiring about the long-term impact of these techniques from an individual trained
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over twenty years o. He found that it was impossible to attribute this individual's symptoms to
his training. oncluded that if there are any long-term psychological effects of the
United States orce g using the procedures outlined above they "are certainly,
With respect to the waterboard, you have also orally informed us that the Navy continues
to use it in training. You have informed us that your on-site psychologists, who have extensive
experience with the use of the waterboard in Navy training, have not encountered any significant
long-term mental health consequences from its use. Your on-site psychologists have also
indicated that WRA has likewise not reported any significant long-term mental health
.consequences from the use of the waterboard. You have informed us that other services ceased
use of the waterboard because itwas so successful as an interrogation technique, but not because
of any concerns over any harm, physical or mental, caused by it. It was also reported to be
almost 100 percent effective in producing cooperation among the trainees. lso
indicated that he had observed the use of the waterboard in Navy training some ten to twelve
times. Each time it resulted in cooperation but it did not result in any physical harm to the
student.
You have also reviewed, the relevant literature and found no empirical data on the effect
of these techniques, with the exception of sleep deprivation. With respect to sleep deprivation,
you have informed us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours and
still perform excellently on visual-spatial motor tasks and short-term memory tests. Although
some individuals may experience hallucinations, according to the literature you surveyed, those
who experience such psychotic symptoms have almost always had such episodes prior to the
sleep deprivation. You have indicated the studies of lengthy sleep deprivation showed no
psychosis, loosening of thoughts, flattening of emotions, delusions, or paranoid ideas. In one
case, even after eleven days of deprivation, no psychosis or permanent brain damaged occurred
Infact the individual reported feeling almost back to normal after one night's Sleep. Further,
based on the experiences with its use in military training (where it is induced for up to 48 hours),
you found that rarely,if ever, will the individual suffer harm after the sleep deprivation is
? discontinued. Instead, the effects remit after a few good nights of sleep.
You have taken the additional step of consulting with U.S. interrogations experts, and
other individuals with oversight over the SERE training process. None of these individuals was
aware of any prolonged psychological effect caused by the use of any of the above techniques
either separately or as a course of conduct. Moreover, you consulted with outside psychologists
who reported that they were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred as a
result of these techniques.
Moreover, in consulting with a number of mental health experts, you have learned that
the effect of any of these procedures will be dependant on the individual's personal-history, ------
cultural history and psychological tendencies. To that end, you have informed us that you have
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completed a psychological assessment of Zubadyah. This assessment is based on interviews with
Zubaydah, observations of him, and information collected from other sources such as intelligence
and press reports. Our understanding of Zubaydah's psychological profile, which we set forth
below, is based on that assessment
According to this assessment, Zubaydah, though only 31, rose quickly from very low
level mujahedin to third or- fourth man in al Qaeda. He has served as Usama Bin Laden's senior
lieutenant: In that capacity, he has managed a network of training camps. He has been ?
instrumental in the training of operatives for al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jiliad, and other
terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ile acted as the Deputy Camp Conunander
for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, personally approving entry and graduation of all
trainees during 1999-2000. From 1996 until 1999, he approved all individuals going in and out
of Afghanistan to the training camps. Further, no one went in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan
without his knowledge and approval. He also acted as al Qaeda's coordinator of external
contacts and foreign communications. Additionally, he has acted as al Qaeda's counter-
intelligence officer and has been trusted to find spies within the organization.
Zubaydah has been involved in every major terrorist operation -carried out by al Qaeda.
He was a planner for the Millenniuni plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets during the Millennium
celebrations in Jordan. Two of the central figures in this plot who were arrested have identified
Zubaydah as the supporter of their cell and the plot. He also served as a planner for the Paris
Embassy plot in 2001. Moreover, he was one of the planners of the September 11 attacks. Prior
to his capture, he was engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.
Your psychological assessment indicates that it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qaeda's
manual oiresistance techniques. You also believe that his experiences in al Qaeda make him
well-acquainted with and well-versed in such techniques. As part of his role in al Qaeda,
Zubaydah visited individuals in prison and helped them upon their release. Through this Contact
and activities with other al Qaeda mujahedin, you believe that he knows many stories of capture,
interrogation, and resistance to such interrogation. Additionally, he has spoken with Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and you believe it is likely that the two discussed Zawahiri's experiences as a prisoner
of the Russians and the Egyptians.
Zubaydah stated during interviews that he thinks of any activityoutside of jihad as
"silly." He has indicated that his heart and mind are devoted to serving Allah and Islam through
jihad and he has stated that he has no doubts or regrets about committing himself to jihad.
Zubaydah believes that the global victory of Islam is inevitable. You have informed us that he
continues to express his unabated desire to kill Americans and Jews.
Your psychological assessment describes his personality as follows. He is "a highly self-
directed individual who prizes his independence' He has "narcissistic featureel-SVhich are
evidenced in the attention he pays to his personal appearance and his "obvious 'efforts' to
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? demonstrate that he is 'really a rather 'humble and regular guy.'" He is "somewhat compulsive"
in how he organizes his environment and business. He is confident, self-assured, and possesses
an air of authority. While he admits to at times wrestling with how to determine who is an
"innocent," he has acknowledged celebrating the destruction of the World Trade Center. He is
intelligent and intellectually curious. He displays "excellent self-discipline." The assessment
describes him as a perfectionist, persistent, private, and highly capable in his social interactions.
He is very guarded about opening up to others and your assessment repeatedly emphasizes that
he tends not to trustpthers easily. He is also "quick to recognize and assess the moods and
motivations of others." Furthermore, he is proud of his ability to lie and deceive others
successfully. Through his deeeption he has, among other things, prevented the location of al
Qaecia safehouses and even acquired a United Nations refugee identification card.
According to your reports, Zubaydah does not have any pre-existing mental conditions or
problems that would make him likely to suffer prolonged mental harm from your proposed
interrogation methods. Through reading his diaries and interviewing him, you have found no
history of "mood disturbance or other psychiatric pathology(,]" "thought disorder-CO . . . enduring
.mood or mental health problems." He is in fact "remarkably resilient and confident that he can
overcome adversity." When he encounters stress or low mood, this appears to last only for a
Short time. He deals with stress by assessing its source, evaluating the coping resources available
to him, and then taking action. Your assessment notes that he is "generally self-sufficient and
relies on his understanding and application of religious and psychological principles, intelligence
and discipline to avoid and overcome problems." Moreover, you have found that he has a
"reliable and durable support system" in his faith, "the blessings of religious leaders, and
camaraderie of like-minded mujahedin brothers." During detention, Zubaydah has managed his
mood, remaining at most points "circumspect, calm, controlled, and deliberate." He has
maintained this demeanor during aggressive interrogations and reductions in sleep. You describe
that in an initial confrontational incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous system
arousal, which you think was possibly fear. Although this incident led him to disclose
intelligence information, he was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and
his "strong resolve" not to reveal any information.
Overall, you sununarize his primary strengths as the following: ability to focus, goal-
directed discipline, intelligence, emotional resilience, street savvy, ability to organize and
manage people, keen observation skills, fluid adaptability(can anticipate and adapt under duress
and with Minimal resources), capacity to assess and exploit the needs of others, md ability to
adjust goals to emerging opportunities.
You anticipate that he will draw upon his vast knowledge of interrogation techniques to
cope with the interrogation. Your assessment indicates that Zubaydah may be willing to die to
protect the most important information that he holds. Nonetheless, you are of the view that his
belief that Islam will ultimately dominate the world and that this victory is ineYita6le may-
provide the chance that Zubaydah will give information and rationalize it solely as a temporary
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setback. Additionally, you believe he may be willing to disclose some information, particularly
information he deems to not be critical, but which may ultimately be useful to us when pieced
together with other intelligence information you have gained.
ILL
Section 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person "outside Of the United States
[to] commit? or attempt[] to commit torture." Section 2340(1) defines torture as:
an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifiCally intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody of physical
? control.
18 U.S.C. ? 2340(1). As we outlined in our opinion on standards of conduct under Section
2340A, a violation of 2340A requires a showing that: (1) the torture Occurred outside the United
States; (2) the defendant acted under the color of law; (3) the -victim was within the defendant's
custody or control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to inflict' severe pain or suffering; and
(5) that the acted inflicted severe pain or suffering. See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney -
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.0
?5 2340-2340A at 3 (August 1, 2002) ("Section 2340A Memorandum"). You have asked us to
assume that Zubayadah is being held outside the United States, Zubayadah is within U.S.
custody, and the interrogators are acting under the color of la*. At issue is whether the last twci
elements would be met by the use of the proposed procedures, namely, whether those using these
procedures would have the requisite mental state and whether these procedures would inflict
? severe pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute.
Severe Pain or Suffering. In order for pain or suffering to rise to the level of torture, the
statute requires that it be severe. As we have previously explained, this reaches only extreme
acts. See id at 13. Nonetheless, drawing upon cases under the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), which has a definition of torture that is similar to Section 2340's definition, we found
that a single event of sufficiently intense pain may fall within this prohibition. See a. at 26. As
a result, we have analyzed each of these techniques separately. In further drawing upon those
cases, we also have found that courts tend to take a totality-of-the-circumstances approach and
consider an entire course of conduct to determine whether torturehas occurred. See hi at 27.
Therefore, in addition to considering each technique separately, we consider them together as a
course of conduct.
Section 2340 defines torture as the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or
suffering. We will consider physical pain and mental pain separately. See 18 U.S.C. ?
With respect to physical pain, we previously concluded that "severe pain" within the meaning of
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Section 2340 is pain that is difficult for the individual to endure and is of an intensity akin to the
pain accompanying serious physical injury. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 6. Drawing
upon the TVPA precedent, we have noted that examples Of acts inflicting severe pain that typify
torture are, among other things, severe beatings with weapons such as clubs, and the burning of
prisoners. See id at 24. We conclude below that none of the proposed techniques inflicts such
pain.
The facial Bold and the attention grasp involve no physical pain. Insthe absence Of such
pain it is obvious that they cannot be said to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. The stress
positions and wall standing both may result in muscle fatigue. Each involves the sustained
holding of a position. In wall standing, it will be holding a position in which all of the
individual's body weight is placed on his finger tips. The stress positions will likely include
sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front and aims raised above the head, and
kneeling on the floor and leaning back at a 45 degree angle. Any pain associated with muscle
fatigue is not of the intensity sufficient to amount to "severe physical pain or suffering" under the
statute, nor, despite its discomfort, can it be said to be difficult to endure. Moreover, you have
? orally informed us that no stress position will be used that could interfere with the healing of ?
. Zubaydah's wound. Therefore, we conclude that these techniques involve discomfort that falls
far below the threshold of severe physical pain.
Similarly, although the confinement boxes (both small and large) arc physically
uncomfortable because their size restricts movement, they are not so small as to require the
individual to contort his body to sit (small box) orstand (large, box). You have also orally
informed us that despite his wound, Zubaydah remains quite flexible, which would substantially
reduce any pain associated with being placed in the box. We have no information from the
medical experts you have consulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kcPt in
the boxes causes any substantial physical pain. As a result, we do not think the use of these
boxes can be said to cause pain.that is of the intensity associated with. serious physical injury.
The use of one of these boxes with the introduction of an insect does not alter this ?
assessment. As we understand it, no actually harmful insect will be placed in the box. Thus,
though the introduction Of an insect may produce trepidation in Zubaydah (wfich we discuss
below), it certainly does not cause physical pain.
? As for sleep deprivation, it is clear that depriving someone of sleep docs not invOlve
severe physical pain within the meaning of the statute. While sleep deprivation may involve
some physical discomfort, such as the fatigue or the discomfort experienced in the difficulty of
keeping one's eyes open, these effects remit after the individual is permitted to sleep. Based on
the facts you have provided us, We are not aware of any evidence that sleep deprivation results in
severe physical pain or suffering. As a result, its use does not violate Section 2340A.
?
Even those techniques that involve physical contact between the interrogator and the
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individual do not result in severe pain. The facial slap and walling contain precautions to ensure
that no pain even approaching this level results. The slap is delivered with fingers slightly
spread, which you have explained, to us is designed to be less painful than a closed-hand slap.
The slap is also delivered to the fleshy part of the face, further reducing any risk of physical
damage or serious pain. The facial slap does not produce pain that is difficult to endure.
Likewise, walling involves quickly pulling the person forward and then thrusting him against a
flexible false wall. You have informed us that the sound of hitting the wall will actually be far
worse than any possible injury to the individual. The use of the rolled towel. around the neck also
reduces any risk of injury. While it may hurt to be pushed against the wall, any pain experienced
is not of the intensity associated with serious physical injury.
As we understand it, when the waterboard is used, the subject's body responds as if the
subject were drowning?even though the subject may be well aware that he is in fact not
drowning. You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict actual physical harm. Thus,
although the subject may experience the fear or panic associated with the feeling of drowning,
the waterboard does not inflict physical pain. As we explained in the Section 2340A
Memorandum, "pain and suffering" as used in Section 2340 is best understood as a single
Concept, not distinct concepts of "pain" as distinguished from "suffering." See Section 2340A
Memorandum at 6 n.3. The waterboard, which inflicts no pain or actual harm whatsoever, does
not, in our view inflict "severe pain or suffering." Even if one were to parse the statute more
finely to attempt to treat "suffering" as a distinct concept, the waterboard could not be said to
inflict severe suffering. The waterboard is simply a controlled acute episode, lacking the
corpotation of a protracted period of time generally given to suffering.
Finally, as we discussed above, you have informed us that in determining which
procedures to use and how you will use them, you have selected techniques that will not ham
Zubaydah's wound. You have also indicated that numerous steps will be taken to. ensure that
none of these procedures in any way interferes with the proper healing of Zubaydah's wound.
Youliave also indicated that, should it appear at any time that abaydah is experiencing severe
pain or suffering, the medical personnel on hand will stop the use of any technique.
Even when all of these methods are considered combined in an overall course of conduct,
they still would not inflict severe physical pain or suffering. As discussed above, a number of
these acts result in no physical pain, others produce only physical discomfort. You have
indicated that these acts will not be used with substantial repetition, so that there is no possibility
that severe physical pain could arise from such repetition. Accordingly, we conclude that these
acts neither separately nor as part of a course of conduct would inflict severe physical pain or
suffering within the meaning of the statute.
We next consider whether the use of these techniques would inflict severe mental pain or
suffering within the meaning of Section 2340. Section 2340 defines severe mental-pain or _ ---
suffering as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" one of several predicate
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acts. 18 18 U.S.C. ? 2340(2). Those predicate acts are: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat
that any of the preceding acts will be done to another person. See 18 U.S.C. ? 2340(2XA)-(P),
As we have explained, this list of predicate acts is exclusive. See Section 2340A Memorandum
at 8. No other acts can support a charge under Section 2340A based on the infliction of severe
, mental pain or suffering. See id. Thus, if the methods that you have described do not either in
and of themselves constitute one of these acts or as a course of conduct fulfill the predicate act
requirement, the prohibition has not been violated. See id. Before addressing these techniques,
we note that it is plain that none of these procedures involves a threat to any third party, the use
? of any kind of drugs, or for the reasons described above, the infliction of severe physical pain:
Thus, the question is whether any of these acts, separately or as a course of conduct, constitutes a
threat of severe physical pain or suffering, a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses,
or a threat of imminent death. As we previously explained, whether an action constitutes a threat
roust be assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the subject's position.- See id at
,9.
No argument can be made that the attention grasp or the facial hold constitute threats of
imminent death or are procedures designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. In
general the grasp and the facial hold will startle the subject, produce fear, or even insult him. As
you have informed us, the use of these techniques is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat
of severe physical pain or suffering. To the extent that these techniques could be considered a
threat of severe physical pain or suffering, such a threat would have to be inferred from the acts
themselves. Because these actions themselves involve no pain, neither could be interpreted by a
reasonable person in Zubaydah's position to constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering.
Accordingly, these two techniques are not predicate acts within the meaning of Section 2340.
? The facial slap likewise falls outside the set of predicate acts. It plainly is not a threat of
imminent death, under Section 2340(2)(C), or a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality, under Section 2340(2)(B). Though it may hurt, as discussed above, the
effect is one of smarting or stinging and surprise or humiliation, but not severe pain. Nor does it
alone constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering, under Section 2340(2XA). Like the facial
hold and the attention grasp, the use of this slap is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat of
further escalating violence. Additionally, you have informed us that in one use this technique
will typically involve at most two slaps. Certainly, the use of this slap may dislodge any
expectation that Zubaydah had that he would not be touched in a physically aggressive manner.
Nonetheless, this alteration in his expectations could hardly be construed by a reasonable person
in his situation to be tantamount to a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. At most, NS
technique suggests that the circumstances of his confinement and interrogation have changed.
Therefore, the facial slap is not within the statute's exclusive list of predicate acts.
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? Walling plainly is nbt a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality. While walling involves what might be characterized as rough handling, it does not
involve the threat of imminent death or, as discussed above, the infliction of severe physical pain.
Moreover, once again we understand that use of this technique will not be accompanied by any
specific verbal threat that violence will ensue absent cooperation. Thus, hie the facial slap,
Walling can only constitute a threat of severe physical pain if a reasonable person would infer
such a threat from the use of the technique itself. Walling does not in and of itself inflict severe
pain or suffering. Like the facial slap, walling may alter the subject's expectation as to the
treatment he believes he will receive. Nonetheless, the character of the action falls so far short of
inflicting severe pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute that even if he inferred that
? greater aggressiveness was Co follow, the type of actions that could be reasonably be anticipated
would still fall below anything sufficient to inflict-severe physical pain or suffering under the
statute. Thus, we conclude that this technique falls outside the proscribed predicate acts.
Lilo walling, stress positions and wall-standing are not procedures calculated to 'disrupt
profoundly the senses, nor are they threats of imminent death. These procedures, as discussed
? above, involve the Use of muscle fatigue to encourage cooperation and do not themselves
constitute the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering. Moreover, there is no aspect of
? violence to either technique that remotely suggests future severe pain or suffering from which
such a threat of future harm could be inferred. They simply involve forcing the subject to remain
in uncomfortable positions. 'While these acts may indicate to the subject that he may be Placed in
these positions again if he does not disclose information, the use of these techniques would not
suggest to a reasonable person in the subject's position that he is being threatened with severe
pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that these two procedures do not constitute any of
the predicate acts set forth in Section 2340(2).
As with the other techniques discussed so far, cramped confinement is not a threat of ?
imminent death. It may be argued that, focusing in part on the fact that the boxes will be without
light, placement in these boxes would constitute a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the
senses. As we explained in our recent opinion, however, to "disrupt profoundly the senses" a
technique must produce an extreme effect in the subject. See Section 2340A Memorandum at
10-12. We have previously concluded that this requires that the procedure cause substantial
interference with the individual's cognitive abilities or fundamentally alter his personality. See
id at 11. Moreover, the statute requires that such procedures must be calculated to produce this
effect. See id at 10; 18 U.S.C. ? 2340(2)(B)..
With respect to the small confinement box, you have informed us that he would spend at.
most two hours in this box. You have informed us that your purpose in using these boxes is not
to interfere with his senses or his personality, but to cause him physical discomfort that will
encourage him to disclose critical information. Moreover, your imposition of time limitations on
the use of either of the boxes also indicates that the use of these boxes is not design_d.or
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. For the larger box, in which he can
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both stand and sit, 1;e may be placed in this box for up to eighteen hours at a time, while you .have
informed us that be will never spend more than an hour at time in the smaller box. These time
limits further ensure that no profound disruption of thesense.s or personalit5r, were it even .
possible, would result As such, the use of the confinement boxes does not constitute a
procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
. .
Nor does the use of the boxes threaten Zubaydah with severe physical pain or suffering.
?-? While additional time spent in the boxes may be threatened, their use is not accompanied by any
express threats of severe physical pain or suffering. Like the stress positions and walling,
placement in the boxes is physically uncomfortable but any such discomfort does not rise to the
level of severe physical pain or suffering. Accordingly, a reasonable person ii the subject's
position would not infer from the use of this technique that severe physical pain is the next step
in his interrogator's treatment of him. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the confinement
boxes does not fall within the statute's required predicate acts. ?
In addition to using the confinement boxes alone, you also would like to introduce an
insect into one of the boxes with Zubaydah. As we understand it, you plan to inform Zubaydah
.that you are-going to place a stinging insect into the box, but you will actually place a harmless
insect in the box, such as a caterpillar. If you do so, to ensure that you are outside the predicate
act requirement, you must inform him that the insects will not have a sting that would produce
death or severe pain. If, however, you were to place the insect in the box without informing him
that you are doing so, then, in order to not commit a predicate act, you should not affirmatively
lead him to believe that any insect is present which has a sting that could produce severe pain or
suffering or even cause his death. While placing the insect in the box may certainly play upon
fears that you believe that Zubaydah may harbor regarding insects, so long as you take either of
the approaches we have described, the insect's placement in the box would mit constitute a threat
of severe physical pain or suffering to a reasonable person in his position. An individual placed
in a box, even an individual with a fear of insects, would not reasonably feel threatened with .
severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar was placed in the box. Further, you have
informed us that you arc not aware that Zubaydah has any allergies to insects, and you have not
informed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in that same situation to
believe that an unknown insect would cause him severe physical pain or death. Thus, we
conclude that the placement of the insect in the confinement box with Zubaydah would not
constitute a predicate act.
Sleep deprivation also clearly does not involve a threat of imminent death. Although it
produces physical discomfort, it cannot be said to constitute a threat of severe physical pain or
suffering from the perspective of a reasonable person in Zubaydah's position. Nor could sleep
deprivation constitute a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses, so long as sleep
deprivation (as you have informed us is your intent) is used for limited periods, be fore
hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses would occur. Tobe sure, sleep
deprivation may reduce the subject's ability to think on his feet. Indeed, youi that thisir---
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the intended result. His mere reduced ability to evade your questions and resist answering does
not, however, rise to the level of disruption required by the statute. As we explained above, a
disruption withinthe meaning of the statute is an extreme one, substantially interfering with an.
individual's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hallucinations, or driving him to engage in
uncharacteristic self-destructive :behavior. See infra 13; Section 2340A Memorandum at 11.
Therefore, the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the required predicate
acts.
We find that the use of the waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death. As you
have explained the waterboard procedure to us, it creates in the subject the uncontrollable
physiological sensation that the subject is drowning. Although the procedure will be monitored
by personnel with medical training and extensive SERE school experience with this procedure
who will ensure the subject's Mental and physical safety, the subject is not aware of any of these
precautions. From the vantage point of any reasonable person undergoing this procedure in such
circumstances, he would feel as if he is drowning at very moment of the procedUre due to the
uncontrollable physiological sensation he is experiencing. Thus, this procedure cannot be
viewed as too uncertain to satisfy the imminence requirement Accordingly, it constitutes a
threat of imminent death and fulfills the predicate act requirement under the statute.
Although the waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death, prolonged mental harm
must nonetheless result to violate the statutory prohibition on infliction of severe mental pain or
suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 7. We have previously concluded that prolonged
mental harm is mental harm of some lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years.
See id. Prolonged mental harm is not simply the stress experienced in, for example, an
interrogation by state police. See id. Based on your research into the use of these methods at the
SERE school and consultation with others with expertise in the field of psychology and
interrogation, you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental harm would result from the use of
the waterboard. Indeed, you have advised us that the relief is almost immediate when the cloth is
removed from the nose and mouth. In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental
pain or suffering would have been inflicted, and the use of these procedures would not constitute
torture within the meaning of the statute.
When these acts are considered as a course of conduct, we are unsure whether these acts
may constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. You have indicated to us that you
have not determined either the order Or the precise timing for implementing these procedures:It
is conceivable that these proCedures could be used in a course of escalating conduct, moving
incrementally and rapidly from least physically intrusive, e.g., facial hold, to the most physical
contact, e.g., walling or the waterboard. As we understand it, based on his treatment so far, ?
Zubaydah has come to expect that no physical harm will be done to him. By using these
techniques in increasing intensity and in rapid succession, the goal would be to dislodge this
expectation. Based on the facts you have provided to us, we cannot say definitively that the
?
entire course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to believe that he is being threatened
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with severe pain or suffering within the meaning Of section 2340. On the other hand, however,
-under certain circumstances?for example, rapid escalation in the use of these techniques
culminating in the waterboard (which we acknowledge constitutes a threat of imminent death)
accompanied by verbal or other suggestions that physical violence will follow?might cause a
reasonable person to believe that they are faced with such athreat Without more information,
we are uncertain whether the course of conduct would constitute a predicate act under Section
2340(2).
? Even if the course of conduct were thought to pose a threat of physical pain or suffering,
it would nevertheless?on the facts before us?not constitute a violation of Section 2340A. Not
only must the course of conduct be a predicate act, but also those who use the procedure must
actually cause prolonged mental harm. Based on the information that you have provided to us,
indicating that no evidence exists that this course of conduct produces any prolonged mental
harm, we conclude that a course of conduct using these procedures and culminating in the
waterboard would not violate Section 2340A.
? Specific Intent To violate the statute, an individual must have the specific intent to
inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is an element of the offense, the absence '
of specific intent negates the charge of torture. ? As we previously opined, to have the required
specific intent, an individual must expressly intend to cause such severe.pain or suffering. See
Section 2340A Memorandum at 3 citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267 (2000). We
have further found that if a defendant acts with the good faith belief that his actions will not
cause such suffering, he has not acted with specific intent See. id. at 4 citing South Ad. Dna
? Ptrshp.? of Tenn. v. Rein, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002). A defendant acts in good faith
when he has an honest belief that his actions will not result in severe pain or suffering. See id.
citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991). Although an honest belief need not be
reasonable, such a belief is easier to establish where there is a reasonable basis for it. See id. at S.
Good faith may be established by, among other things, the reliance on the advice of experts. See
id at 8.
Based on the information you have provided us, we believe that those carrying out these
procedures would not have the specific intent to inflict severe physical pain OT suffering. The
objective of these techniques is not to cause severe physical pain. First, the constant presence of
personnel with medical training who have the authority to stop the interrogation should it appear
it is medically necessary indicates that it is not your intent to cause seveic physical pain. The
personnel on site have extensive experience with these specific techniques as they are used in
SERE school training. Second, you have informed us that you are taking steps to ensure that
Zubaydah's injury is not worsened or his recovery impeded by the use of these techniques.
Third, as you have described them to us, the proposed techniques involving physical
contact between the interrogator and Zubaydah actually contain precautions to prevent any
serious physical harm to Zubaydah. In "walling," a rolled hood or towel will be used to prevent
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whiplash and he will be permitted to rebound from the flexible wall to reduce the likelihood of
injury. Similarly, in the "facial hold," the fingertips will be kept well away from the his eyes to
ensure that there is no injury to them. The purpose of that facial hold is not injure him but to
hold the head immobile. Additionally, while the stress positions and wall standing will
undoubtedly result in physical discomfort by tiring the muscles, it is obvious that these positions
are not intended to produce the kind of extreme pain required by the statute.
Furthermore, no specific intent to cause severe mental pain or suffering appears to be
present As we explained in our recent opinion, an individual must have the specific intent to
cause prolonged mental harm in order to have the specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or
suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 8. Prolonged mental harm is substantial mental
harm of a sustained duration, e.g., harm lasting months or even years after the acts were inflicted
upon the prisoner. As we indicated above, a good faith belief can negate this element.
Accordingly, if an individual conducting the interrogation has a good faith belief that the
procedures he will apply, separately or together, would not result in prolonged mental harm, that
individual lacks the requisite specific intent. This conclusion concerning specific intent is further
bolstered by the due diligence that has been conducted concerning the effects of these
interrogation procedures.
The mental health experts that you have consulted have indicated that the psychological
,impact of a course of conduct must be assessed with reference to the subject's psychological
history and current mental health status: The healthier the individual, the less likely that the use
of any one procedure or set of procedures as a course of conduct will result in prolonged mental
harm. A comprehensive psychological profile of Zubaydah has been created. In creating this
profile, your personnel drew on direct interviews, Zubaydah's diaries, observation of Zubaydah
since his capture, and information from other sources such as other intelligence and press reports.
You found that Zubaydah has no history of mental health problems. Your profile further
emphasizes that, in addition to his excellent mental health history, he is quite resilient_ Not only
is Zubaydah resilient, but you have also found that he has in place a durable support system
through his faith, the blessings of religious leaders, and the camaraderie he has experienced with
those who have taken up the cause with him. Based on this remarkably healthy profile, you have
concluded that he would not experience any mental harm of sustained duration from the use of
these techniques, either separately of as a course of conduct.
As we indicated above, you have informed us that your proposed interrogation methods
have been used and continue to he used in SERE training. It is our understanding that these
techniques are not used one by one in isolation, but as a full course of conduct to resemble a real
? interrogation. Thus, the information derived from SERE training bears both upon the impact of
the use of the individual techniques and upon their use as a course of conduct. You have found
that the use of these methods together or separately, including the use of the waterboard, has not
resulted in any negative long-term mental health consequences. The continued use of these
methods without mental health consequences to the trainees indicates that it is highly improbaiiii-
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that such consequences would result here. Because you have conducted the due diligence to
determine that these procedures, either alone or in combination, do not produce prolonged mental
harm, we believe that you do not meet the specific intent requirement necessary to violate
Section 2340A.
You have also informed us that you have reviewed the relevant literature on the subject,
and consulted with outside psychologists. Your review of the literature uncovered no empirical
data on the use of these procedures, with the exception of sleep deprivation for which no long-
term health consequences resulted. The outside psychologists with whom you consulted
-
indicated were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred as a result of these.
techniques.
As described above, it appears you have conducted an extensive inquiry to ascertain what
impact, if any, these procedures individually and as a course of conduct would have on '
Zubaydah. You have consulted with interrogation experts; including those with substantial
SERE school experience, consulted With outside psychologists, completed a psychological
assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on this topic. Based on this inquiry., you believe
that the use of the procedures, including the waterbbard, and as a course of conduct would not
'result in prolonged mental harm. Reliance on this information about Zubaydah and about the
effect of the use of these techniques more generally demonstrates the presence of a good faith
belief that no prolonged mental harm will result from using these methods in the interrogation of
Zubaydah. Moreover, we think that this represents not only an honest belief but also a
reasonable belief based on the information that you have supplied to us. Thus, we believe that
the specific intent to inflict prolonged mental is not present, and consequently, there is no
specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that on the
facts in this case the use of these methods separately or a course of conduct would not violate
Section 2340A. .
Based on the foregoing, and based on the facts that you have provided, we.co.nclude that
the interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 2340A. We wish to
emphasize that this is our best reading of the law; however, you should be aware that there are no
cases construing this statute, just as there have been no prosecutions brought under it.
?
Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.
S. By
ant Attorney Gneral
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)NatSecAct
lee?F=1E14F
Guidelines on Confinement Conditions For CIA Detainees
These Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for
CIA Detainees, who are persons detained in detention
facilities that are under the Icontrol of
CIA ("Detention Facilities') .
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
These Guidelines recognize that
environmental and other conditions, as well as particularized
considerations affecting any given Detention Facility, will.
vary from case to case and location to location.
L. Miniinuais
Due provision must be taken to protect the health and
safety of all CIA Detainees, including basic levels of
medical care (which need not comport with the highest
standards of medical care that is provided in US-based
medical facilities); food and drink which meets minimum
medically appropriate nutritional and sanitary standards;
clothing and/or a physical environment sufficient to meet
basic health needs; periods of time within which detainees
are free to engage in physical exercise (which may be
limited, for example, to exercise within the isolation cells
themselves); and sanitary facilities (which may, for example,
comprise buckets for the relief of personal waste).
Conditions of confinement at the Detention Facilities do not
have to conform with US prison or other specific or pre-
established standards.
2. Implementing Procedures
a. Medical and, as appropriate, psychological
personnel shall be physically present at, or reasonably
available to, each Detention Facility. Medical personnel
shall check the physical condition of each detainee at
intervals appropriate to the circumstances and shall keep
appropriate records.
ALL PORTIONS OF
? THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED Tee?SEGREZ
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees
b. Personnel directly engaged in the design and
operation of Detention Facilities will be selected, screened,
trained, and supervised by a process established and, as
appropriate, coordinated by the Director, DCI
.Counterterrorist Center.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
3. Responsible CIA Officer
The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall
ensure (a) that, at all times, a specific Agency staff
employee (the Responsible CIA Officer') is designated as
responsible for each specific Detention Facility, (b) that
each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of
these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached
Acknowledgment, and (C) that each Responsible CIA Officer and
each CIA officer participating in the questioning of
individuals detained pursuant to the Memorandum of
Notification of 17 September 2001 has been provided with a
copy of the "Guidelines on Interrogation Conducted Pursuant
to the Presidential Memorandum of 17 September 2001" and has
reviewed and signed the Acknowledgment attached thereto.
Subject to operational and security considerations, the
Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, or visit, each
Detention Facility at intervals appropriate to the
circumstances.
4.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
APPROVED:
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ral Intelligence Date
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.(b)(3) CIAAct
"1"011-5BeRA(b)(3) NatSecAct
Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for -CIA Detainees
, am the Responsible CIA Officer for the
Detention Facility known as . By my signature
below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand and will
comply with the "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA
Detainees' of , 2003.
ACKNOWLEDGED:
C.
Date
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4
?
Guidelines on interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
Presidential MAmprandtm of Notification of 17 September 2001
These Guidelines address the conduct of interrogations of
persons who are detained pursuant to the authorities set
_forth_itheAttemorandum of Notification of 17 Sentember 2001.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
These Guidelines complement internal Directorate of
Operations guidance relating to the conduct of
interrogations. In the event of any inconsistency between
existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions of
these Guidelines shall control.
1. Permissible interrogation Techniques
Unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA
officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use
only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible
Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard
Techniques and (b) Enhanced Techniques.
Standard Techniaues are techniques that do not
incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressute.
These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful
forms of questioning employed by US law enforcement and
military interrogation personnel. Among Standard Techniques
are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed
72 hours, reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is
calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee),
deprivation of reading material, use of loud music or white
noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the
detainee's hearing), and the use of diapers for limited
periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours, or during
transportation where appropriate).
.ALL PORTIONS OF ? ?
THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED TOP?SEetET
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Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
Presidential Memorandaum of Notification of 17 September 2001
enhanced Techniaues are techniques that do
incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond
Standard Techniques. The use of each specific Enhanced
Technique must be approved by Headquarters in advance, and
may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with
the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and
psychological participation in the process. These techniques
are, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped
confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep
deprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolonged
periods, the use of harmless insects, the water board, and
such other techniques as may be specifically approved
pursuant to paragraph 4 below. The use of each Enhanced
Technique is subject to specific temporal, physical, and
related conditions, including a competent evaluation of the
medical and psychological state of the detainee.
2. Medical and Psychological Personnel
Appropriate medical and psychological personnel shall
be either on site or readily available for consultation and
travel to the interrogation site during all detainee
interrogations employing Standard Techniques, and appropriate
medical and psychological personnel must be on site during
all detainee interrogations employing Enhanced Techniques.
In each case, the medical and psychological personnel shall
suspend the interrogation if they determine that significant
and prolonged physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering
is likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended.
/n any such instance, the interrogation team shall
immediately report the facts to Headquarters for management
and legal review to determine whether the interrogation may
be resumed.
3. Interrogation Personnel
The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall
ensure that all personnel directly engaged in the
interrogation of persons detained pursuant to the authorities
set forth in the Moblf have been appropriately screened (from
the medical, psychological, and security standpoints), have
reviewed these Guidelines, have received appropriate training
in their implementation, and have completed the attached
Acknowledgment.
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Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant .,to, the
Presidential Memorandaum of Notification of 17 September 2001
Approvals Required
Whenever feasible, advance approval is required for
the use of Standard Techniques by an interrogation team. In
all instances, their use shall be documented in cable
traffic. Prior approval in writing (e.g., by written
memorandum or in cable traffic) from the Director, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the Chief,
CTC Legal Group, is required for the use of any Enhanced
Technique(s), and may be provided only where D/CTC has
determined that (a) the specific detainee is believed to
possess information about risks to the citizens of the United
States or other nations, (b) the use of the Enhanced
Technique(s) is appropriate in order to obtain that
information, (c) appropriate medical and psychological
personnel have concluded that the use of the Enhanced
Technique(s) is not expected to produce "severe physical or
mental pain or suffering,' and (d) the personnel authorized
to employ the Enhanced Technique(s) have completed the
attached Acknowledgment. Nothing in these Guidelines alters
the right to act in self-defense.
5. Recordkeeping
In each interrogation session in which an Enhanced
Technique is employed, a contemporaneous record shall be
created setting forth the nature and duration of each such
technique employed, the identities of those present, and a
citation to the required Headquarters approval cable. This
information, which may be in the form of a cable, shall be
provided to Headquarters.
APPROVED:
Dir tor o
INIONAMOktgl
Intelligence Date
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Gi.lideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
Presidential Memoranda= of Notification of 17 September 2001
, acknowledge that I have read and
understand and will comply with the 'Guidelines on
. Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential
Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001" of
2003.
ACKNOWLEDGED:
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DRAFT OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO
DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS
September 4, 2003
The following guidelines offer general references for medical officers supporting
the detention of terrorists captured and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency for
interrogation and debriefing. There are three different contexts in which these guidelines
may be applied: (1) *during thpetiod of initial interrogation, (2) during the more . ?
suitained period of debriefing at an interrogation site, and (3) the permanent detention Of
? ?
captured terrorists in long-term facilities.... ?
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INTERROGATION SUPPORT?
.f..? Captured terrorists turned over ta the C.I.A. for interrogation may be subjected to
a Wide range of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which are also used on U.S. military
pejsonnel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically "dislocate"
the detainee, maximize his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or
eli,minate his will to resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence.
Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by
t4 Director, CTC in the case of each individual case. They include, in approximately
ascending degree of intensity:
.;
v
Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure)
Shaving
Stripping
Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours)
Hooding
Isolation
White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing)
Continuous light or darkness
Uncomfortably cool environment
Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain
general health)
Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position
Water Dousing
Sleep deprivation (up to 72 hours)
Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above)
Attention grasp
Facial hold
Insult (facial) slap
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Abdominal Slap
Prolonged diapering
Sleep deprivation (over 72 hours)
Stress positions
?on knees, body slanted forward or backward
?leaning with forehead on wall
Walling
Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)
Watexboard ?
In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact, and
not some physical effect, with a specific goal of "dislocat[ing] his expectations regarding
the treatment he believes he will receive...." The more physical techniques are
delivered in a manner carefully limited to avoid serious physical harm. The slaps for
example ure.designed "to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation" and "not to inflict
physical pain that is severe or lasting." To this end they must be delivered in a
specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is only against .a
springboard designed to be loud and bouncy (and cushion the blow). All walling and
most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject's head solidly supported with a
towel to avoid extension-flexion injury.
OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency
detainees subject to "enhanced" interrogation techniques, and for determining that the
authorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or
permanent harm.' "DCI Guidelines" have been issued formalizing these responsibilities,
and these should be read directly.
Whenever feasible, advance approval is required to use any measures beyond
standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced"
measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological persomael2 confirming
from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to
produce "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." As a practical matter, the
detainee's physical condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting
1 The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mental
harm," i.e., "mental harm of some lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years."
"In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been
inflicted." Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p. 15.
2 "Psychological personnel" can be either a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist
Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use of the
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effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will
result.
The medical implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below.
General intake evaluation
New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with a complete,
documented history and physical addressing in depth any chronic or previous medical
problems. This should especially attend to cardio-vascular, pulmonary, neurological and
musculo-skeletal findings. (See the section on shackling and waterboard for more
specifics.) Vital signs, and weight should be recorded, and blood work drawn ("tiger" top
[serum separating] and?lavender top tubes) for CBC, Hepatitis B and C, HIV and Chem
panel (to include albumin and liver function tests).
Documented subsequent medical rechecks should be performed on a regular basis,
? .the frequency being within the judgment of the medical representative and the Chief of
? Site. The recheck can be more focused on relevant factors. The content of the
documentation should be similar to what would ordinarily be recorded in a medical chart.
Although brief, the data should reflect what was checked and include nerti,,,.
All assessments should be reported through approved (b)(3) NatSecAct
communications channels applicable to the site in which the detainee is held, and subject
to review/release by the Chief of the site. This should include an A
copy of the medical findings should also be included in an electronic file maintained
locally on each detainee, which incorporates all medical evaluations on that individual.
This file must be available to successive medical practitioners at site.
. Medical treatment
It is important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees, even those
undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chronic Medications should receive
them, acute medical problems should be treated, and adequate fluids and nutrition
provided. These medical interventions, however, should not undermine the anxiety and
dislocation that the various interrogation techniques are designed to foster. Medical
assessments during periods of enhanced interrogation, while encompassing all that is
medically necessary, should not appear overly attentive. Follow-up evaluations during
this period may be performed in the guise of a guard or through remote video. All
interventions, assessments and evaluations should be coordinated with the Chief of Site
and interrogation team members to insure they are performed in such a way as to
minimize undermining interrogation aims to obtain critical intelligence.
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Medications and nutritional supplements may be hidden in the basic food provided
(e.g. as a liquid or thoroughly crushed tablet). If during the initial phase of interrogation -
detainees are deprived of all measurements of time (e.g., through continuous light and
variable schedules), a time-rigid administration of medication (or nutrition) should be
avoided. There generally is ample latitude to allow varying treatment intervals.
The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable,
but should include adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should be .
. monitored and recorded. Liquid Ensure (or equivalent) is a good way to assure that there
is adequate nutrition. Brief periods during which food is withheld (24-48 hours) as an
.adjunct to interrogation are acceptable. Individuals refusing adequate liquids during this
stage should have fluids administered at the earliest signs of dehydration. For:reasons of
staff safety, the rectal tube is an acceptable method of delivery. If there is any question
about adequacy of fluid intake, urinary output also should be monitored and recorded.
Uncomfortably cool environments
Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortably cool environments for varying
lengths of time, ranging from hours to days. The length of time will depend on multiple
factors, including age, health, extent of clothing, and freedom of movement Individual
tolerance and safety have to be assessed on a case by case basis, and continuously
reevaluated over time. The following guidelines and reference points are intended to
assist the medical staff in advising on acceptable lower ambient temperatures in certain
operational settings. The comments assume the subject is a young, healthy, dry, lightly
clothed individual sheltered from wind, i.e., that they are a typical detainee.
Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of
10?C/50?F. At this temperature increased metabolic rate cannot compensate for heat
loss. The WHO recommended minimum indoor temperature is 18?C/64?F. The
"thermoneutral zone" where minimal compensatory activity is required to maintain core
temperature is 20?C/68?F to 30?C/86?F . Within the thermoneutral zone, 26?078?F is
considered optimally comfortable for lightly clothed individuals and 30?C/86?F for naked
individuals. Currently, D/CTC policy stipulates 24-26?C as the detention cell and
interrogation room temperatures, permitting variations due to season. This has proven
more achievable in some Sites than others.
If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral
range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented. Occasionally,
as part of the interrogation process they are housed in spaces with ambient temperatures
of between 13?C/55?F and 16?C/60?F. Unless the detainee is clothed and standing, or
sitting on a mat, this exposure should not be continued for longer than 2-3 hours.
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At ambient temperatures below 18?C/64?F, detainees should be monitored for the
development of hypothermia. This risk is greatest in those who are naked or nearly so,
who are in substantial direct contact with a surface that conducts heat away from the
body (e.g., the floor), whose restraints severely limit muscle work, who have
comparatively little muscle mass, who are fatigued and sleep deprived, and are age 45 or
over.
Wet skin or clothing places a detainee at much greater risk for hypothermia, so if a
partial or complete soaking is used in conjunction with the interrogation, or even for
bathing, the detainee must be dry before being placed in a space with an ambient
temperature below 26?C./78?F.
Signs of mild hypothermia (body temp 90-98?F) include shivering, lack of
coordination (fumbling hands, stumbling), slurred speech, memory loss, and pale and
cold skin. Detainees exhibiting any of these signs should be allowed some combination
of increased clothing, floor mat, more freedom of movement, and increased ambient
temperature.
Moderate hypothermia (body temperature of 86-90?F) is present when shivering
stops, there is an inability to walk or stand, and/or the subject is confused/irrational. An
aggressive medical intervention is warranted in these cases.
White noise or loud music
As a practical guide, there is no permanent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hours-
a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18 hours a day; 90 dB for
up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hours, and 100 dB for 2 hours. If necessary, instruments can
be provided to measure these ambient sound levels. In general, sound in the dB 80-99
range is experienced as loud; above 100 dB as uncomfortably loud. Common reference
points include garbage disposer (80 dB), cockpit of propeller aircraft (88 dB), shouted
conversation (90 dB), motorcycles at 25 feet (90 dB), inside of subway car at 35 mph (95
dB), power mower (96 dB), chain saw (110 dB), and live rock band (114 dB). For
purposes of interrogation, D/CTC has set a policy that no white noise and no loud noise
used in the interrogation process should exceed 79 DB.
Shacj_gclin
? Shackling in non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development
of pressure sores with appropriate treatment and adjustment of the shackles as required.
Should shackle-related lesions develop, early intervention is important to avoid the
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development of an interrogation-limiting cellulitis. Cleaning the lesion, and a slight
loosening of the shackles may be all that is required.
? If the detainee is to be shackled standing with hands at or above the head (as part -
of a sleep deprivation protocol), the medical assessment should include a pre-check for
anatomic factors that might influence how long the arms could be elevated. This would
include shoulder range of motion, pulses in neutral and elevated positions, a check for
bruits, and assessment of the basic sensorimotor status of the upper extremities.
Assuming no medical contraindications are found, extended periods (up.to 72
hours) in a standing position can be approved if the hands are no higher than.head level
and weight is borne fully by the lower extremities. Detainees who have one foot or leg
casted or who lost part of a lower extremity to amputation should be monitored carefully
for the development of excessive edema in the weight-supporting leg. If edema
approaches knee level, these individuals should be shifted to a foot-elevated,seated or
reclining sleep-deprivation position. In the presence of a suspected lower limb cellulitis,
the detainee should be shifted to a seated leg-elevated position, and antibiotics begun.
Absent other contraindications, sleep deprivation can be continued in both these
circumstances..
NOTE: An occasional detainee placed in a standing stress position has developed lower
limb tenderness and erythema, in addition to an ascending edema, which initially have
not been easily distinguished from a progressive cellulitis or venous thrombosis. These
typically have been associated with pre-existing abrasions or ulcerations from shackling
at the time of initial rendition. In order to best inform future medical judgments and
recommendations, the presence of these lesions should be accurately described before the
standing stress position i; employed In all cases approximately daily observations
should be recorded which document the length of time the detainee has been in the stress
position, and level of any developing edema or erythema.
More stressful shackled positions may also be approved for shorter intervals, e.g.
during an interrogation session or between sessions. The arms can be elevated above the
head (elbows not locked) for roughly two hours without great concern. Reasonable
judgment should be used as to the angle of elevation of the arms.
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Periods in this arms-elevated shackle position lasting between two and four hours
would merit caution, and subject should be monitored for excessive distress. The
detainee should never be required to bear weight on the upper extremities, and the
utilization of this technique should not exceed approximately 4 hours in a 24 hour period.
If through fatigue or otherwise the detainee becomes truly incapable of supporting
himself on his feet (e.g., after 36,48 hours, etc.), and the detainee's weight is shifted to
the shackles, the use of overhead shackles should be discontinued.
Sleep deprivation
Sleep deprivation (with or without associated stress positions) is among the most
effective adjuncts to interrogation, and is the only technique with a demonstrably
cumulative effect?the longer the deprivation (to a point), the more effective the impact.
The standard approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard to shackling position)
is 72 hours. Extension of sleep deprivation beyond 72 continuous hours is considered an
enhanced measure, which requires D/CIt prior approval. The amount of sleep requited ?
between deprivation periods depends on the intended purpose of the sleep deprivation. If
it is intended to be one element in the process of demonstrating helplessness in an
unpleasant environment, a short nap of two or so hours would be sufficient. Perceptual
distortion effects are not uncommon after 96 hours of sleep deprivation, but frank
psychosis is very rare. Cognitive effects, of course, are common. If it is desired that the
subject be reasonably attentive, and clear-thinking during the interrogation, at least a 6
hour recovery should be allowed. Current D/CTC policy requires 4 hours sleep once the
72 hour limit has been met during standard interrogation measures.
NOTE: Examinations paformed during periods of sleep deprivation should include the
current number of hours without sleep; and, if only a brief rest preceded this period, the
specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded.
Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)
Detainees can be placed in awkward boxes, specifically constructed for this
? purpose. These can be rectangular and just over the detainee's height, not much wider
? than his body, and comparatively shallow, or they can be small cubes allowing little more
than a cross-legged sitting position. These have not proved particularly effective, as they
may become a safehaven offering a respite from interrogation. Assuming no significant
medical conditions (e.g., cardiovascular, musculoskeletal) are present, confinement in the
small box is allowable up to 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8
consecutive hours, up to a total of 18 hours a day.
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Waterboard
'N
This is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The
historical context here was limited knowledge of the use of the waterboard in SERE
training (several hundred trainees experience it every year or two). In the SERE model
the subject is immobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered with a cloth.
A stream of water is directed at the upper lip. Resistant subjects then have the cloth?
lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water continues to be applied, fully
saturating the cloth, and precluding the passage of air. Relatively little water enters the
mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removal
of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water
directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for several
minutes, and involve up to 15 canteen cups of water. Ostensibly the primary desired
effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily
occluding the nose and mouth, and psychological impact of the continued application of
water after the cloth is removed. SERE trainees usually have only a single exposure to
this technique, and never more than two; SERE trainers consider it their most effective
technique, and deem it virtually irresistible in the training setting.
Our very limited experience with the waterboard is different. The subjects were
positioned on the back but in a slightly head down (Trendelenburg) position (to protect
somewhat against aspiration). A good air seal seemingly was not easily achieved by the
wet cloth, and the occlusion was further compromised by the subject attempting to drink
the applied water. The result was that copious amounts of water sometimes were used--
up to several liters of water (bottled if local water is unsafe, and with 1 tsp salt/liter if
significant swallowing takes place). The resulting occlusion was primarily from water
filling the nasopharynx, breathholding, and much less frequently the oropharynx being
filled?rather than the "sealing" effect of the saturated cloth. D/CTC policy set an
occlusion limit of 40 seconds, though this was very rarely reached. Additionally, the
procedure was repeated sequentially several times, for several sessions a day, and this
process extended with varying degrees of frequency/intensity for over a week.
While SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain psychological '
resistance to the waterboard, our experience was otherwise. Subjects unquestionably can
withstand a large number of applications, with no seeming cumulative impact beyond
their strong aversion to the experience. Whether the waterboard offers a more effective
alternative to sleep deprivation and/or stress positions, or is an effective supplement to
these techniques is not yet known.
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The SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (single
exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications
without significant or lasting medical complications. The procedure nonetheless carries
some risks, particularly when repeated a large number of times or when applied to an
individual less fit than a typical SERE trainee. Several medical dimensions need to be
monitored to ensure the safety of the subject.
Before employing this technique there needs to. be reasonable assurance that the
subject does not have serious heart or lung disease, particularly any obstructive airway
disease or respiratory compromise from morbid obesity. He also must have stable
anterior dentition, no recent facial or jaw injuries, and an intact gag reflex. Since
vomiting may be associated with these sessions, diet should be liquid during the phase of
interrogation when use of the waterboard is likely, and the subject should be NPO (other
than water) for at least 4 hours before any session. The most obvious serious .
complication would be a respiratory arrest associated with laryngospasm, so the medical
team must be prepared to respond immediately to this crisis; preferably the physician will
be in the treatment room. Warning signs of this or other impending respiratory
complications include hoarseness, persisting cough, wheezing, stridor, or difficulty
clearing the airway. If these develop, use of the waterboard should be discontinued for at
least 24 hours. If they recur with later applications of the waterboard, its use should be
stopped. Mock applications need not be limited. In all cases in which there has been a
suggestion of aspiration, the subject should be observed for signs of a subsequently
developing pneumonia.
In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce
new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation,
the subject may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of the airways and loss of
consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the
interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to restore
normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. Any subject who has
reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the
waterboard, and the physician on the scene can not approve further use of the waterboard
without specific C/OMS consultation and approval.
A rigid guide to medically approved use of the waterboard in essentially healthy
individuals is not possible, as safety will depend on how the water is applied and the
specific response each time iris used. The following general guidelines are based on
very limited knowledge, drawn from very few subjects whose experience and response
was quite varied. These represent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are
operative and may be more restrictive.
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A series (within a "session") of several relatively rapid waterboard applications is
medically acceptable in all healthy subjects, so long as there is no indication of some
emerging vulnerability (such as hoarseness, wheezing, persisting cough or difficulty
clearing the airways). Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed without
apparent medical complication. The exact number of sessions cannot be prescribed, and
will depend on the response to each. If more than 3 sessions of 5 or more applications
are envisioned within a24 hours period, a careful medical reassessment must be made
before each later session. .
By days 3-5 of an aggressive program, cumulative effects become a potential
concern. Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages of this
? technique, we believe that beyond this point continued intense waterboard applications ?
may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive use of the waterboard beyond ?
this point should be reviewed by the IIVT team in consultation with Headquarters prior to
any further aggressive use. (Absent medical contraindications, sporadic use probably ?
carries little risk.) Beyond the increased medical concern (for both acute and long term '
effects, including PTSD), there possibly would be desensitization to the technique. Sleep
deprivation is a medically less risky option, and sleep deprivation (and stress positions)
also can be used to prolong the period of moderate use of the waterboard, by reducing the
intensity of its early use through the interposition of these other techniques.
NOTE: In order to best inform future medical judgments and recommendations, it is
important that every application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented: how long
each application (and the entire procedure) lasted, how much water was used in the
process (realizing that much splashes off), how exactly the water was applied i f a seal
was achieved, if the naso- or oropharynx was filled, what sort of volume was expelled,
how long was the break between applications, and how the subject looked between each
treatment.
POST-INTERROGATION DETENTION
[this section is still under construction]
OMS' responsibility for the medical and psychological well-being of detainees
does not end when detainees emerge from the interrogation phase. Documented periodic
medical and psychological re-evaluations are necessary during the debriefing phase
which follows interrogation, as well as during subsequent periods of custodial detention.
Absent any specific complaint, these can be at approximately monthly intervals. Acute
problems must be addressed at the time of presentation. As during the interrogation
phase, all assequnentc_ examinations, and evaluations should be'reported through
approved (b)(3) NatSecAct communications channels applicable to the site in
which the detainee is held, and subject to review/release by the Chief of that site.
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Detainee weights should be recorded on at least a monthly basis, and assessed for
indications of inadequate nutrition. As a rule, of thumb, "ideal".weight for height should
be about 106 pounds for an individual 5 feet tall, and six pounds heavier for each
additional inch of height Terrorists incarcerated in the Federal prison system whose
weights fall below this level are given nutritional supplements. Those falling to 90% of
these levels who are unwilling to take nutrition orally (through hunger strikes) have
forced feedings through a naso-gastric tube. While to date this has not been an issue With
detainees, should significant weight loss develop it must be' carefully assessed. It is
possible that a detainee will simply be of slight build, but true weight loss in an already
slight individual?especially in association with deliberately reduced intake?may require
some intervention.
Additionally, if there are sustained periods without exposure to sunlight, the diet
will need to be further supplemented with calcium and vitamin D. Simply increasing the
use of multi-vitAming will give too much of one substance but not enough of another.
The OMS recommendation for this situation is two 500 mg tables of plain calcium a day
(such as two Os-Cal 500 mg tabs) with one capsule of the prescription Rocaltrol; or
alternatively two Centrum Silver tablets (slightly less than the recommendation for
vitamin D) with an additional 500 mg of a plain calcium table.
As the period of interrogation or intense debriefing passes, detainees may be left
alone for increasing periods of time before being transferred elsewhere. Personal hygiene
issues likely will emerge during this time, with the possible development of significant
medical problems. It is particularly important that cells be kept clean during this period
and that there be some provision for regular bathing, and dental hygiene, and that
detainees be monitored to insure they are involved in self-care.
Psychological problems are more likely to emerge in those no longer in active
debriefings, especially those in prolonged, total isolation. The loss of involvement with
the debriefing staff should be replaced with other forms of interaction?through daily
encounters with more than one custodial staff member, and the provision of reading
materials (preferably in Arabic) and other forms of mental stimulation.
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