REPORT OF INVESTIGATION - UNAUTHORIZED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AT (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6541525
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: October 29, 2003

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kOTORNIDO
Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
tS) UNAUTHORIZED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AT
John L. Helgerson
Inspector General
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(2003-7123-IG) (b)(1)
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29 October 2003
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(b)(6)
Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations
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(b)(6)
Investigators
Copy 0-.6
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION 1
SUMMARY 2
BACKGROUND V 4
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PROCEDURES AND RESOURCE(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED (b)(7)(c) 10
(b)(7)(f)
9
FINITITIVC_C 10
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11
(b)(1) (Sil WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION
(b)(3) NatSecAct AND DEBRIEFING OF DETAINEES BY CIA? 10
I
(T-Ni WHY DID THE AGENCY SEND TO
(b)(1) WHAT GUIDANCE DID HE RECEIVE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS
(b)(1), NatSecAct RESPONSIBILITIES?
AND
12
(b)(1) (TV) WHY DID THE AGENCY SEND TO
(b)(3) NatSecActAND WHAT GUIDANCE DID HE RECEIVE BEFORE HIS DEPLOYMENT 18
(b)(1),
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(b)(6)11
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
1
(8/INT) DID 4SE UNAUTHORIZED TECHNIQUES AND, IF SO,
WHAT TRANSPIRED? 20
(SIINT) WHEN AND HOW DID HEADQUARTERS LEARN ABOUT THE USE
OF UNAUTHORIZED TECHNIQUES AND WHAT ACTION DID
HEADQUARTERS TAKE?
24
(SI/Ni') DID THE USE OF UNAUTHORIZED TFrFINIQUES VIOLATE
(b)(1)
FEDERAL STATUTES OR AGENCY POLICY: 25
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CONCLUSIONS (b)(6) 26
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
RECOMMENDATION 28
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Ve----RN-{-79E1
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(S) UNAUTHORIZED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AT
(b)(1)
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(2003-71234G)
29 October 2003
(b)(1)
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1. (?Sd In response to the 11 September 2001
(9/11) terrorist attacks, President Bush signed a Memorandum of
Notification (MON) on 17 September 2001,
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It authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), acting through the CIA, to undertake capture and
detention operations. Subsequent to the signing of the MON, the
Agency developed a program to capture terrorists and detain them at
facilitiPc PQfnillichcerl and overseen by CIA overseas.
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2. (S-/ /NF) In March 2002, the Agency detained a
senior Al-Qa'ida official and initially interviewed him using
non-aggressive, non-physical elicitation techniques. However, the
Agency determined the detainee was withholding imminent threat
information. The Agency then determined to move to new and more
aggressive interrogation techniques. In July 2002, CIA requested an
opinion from the Department of Justice (Dop on whether enhanced
interrogation techniques (EITs) proposed by the Agency would
violate the criminal prohibition against torture found at Section
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2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code. DoJ determined that the
application of ten particular ErTs would not violate the prohibition
against torture. The Agency began employing ErTs in August 2002.
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3. (af 71.1F) On 23 January 2003, the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) initiated a review of Agency practices regarding the
interrogation of individuals for counterterrorism purposes. That
review is nearing completion and OIG will publish a report of
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Apart from that
review, OIG is investigating specific allegations of misconduct by
individuals involved in this program.
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/NE) This Report of Investigation examines one
allegation that operations officer serving
(b)(1) in the Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations (DO/CTC),
(b)(3) CIAAct employed =authorized interrogation techniques on a detainee with
(b)(3) NatSecAcihe approval of the
(b)(6) OIG referred the matter to the
(b)(7)(c) Criminal Division of DoJ for a determination of whether or not
(b)(7)(f) may have violated any federal criminal laws. On
11 September 2003, DoJ declined to prosecute after reviewing the
findings of this investigation.
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SUMMARY
(b)(3) NatSecAct 5. (TS/ hi the Agency readied an
II overseas site, to serve as a facility to
interrogate certain individuals believed to have potentially
(b)(1)1 significant information about terrorism threats against the U.S. These
(b)(3) NatSecActindividuals came to be known as Hi :h Value Targets (HVTs). On
LiDecember 2002 traveled to accompanied by an
(b)(1) interrogation team trained and certified in EITs. CTC rendered two
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActHVTs, including 'Abd al-Rahman Al-Nashiri, to from
(b)(6)I another location o ecember 2002. After initial interrogations, in
(b)(7)(c) ?
(b)(7)(f)
1
which the team employed a roved standard and
. enhanced interrogation techniques
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reported that
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Al-Nashiri was not actively resisting and was responding to
(b)(1) questions directly. Headquarters officers disagreed with
(b)(3) NatSecAct assessment because Headquarters analysts thought Al-Nashiri was
withholding imminent threat information. Consequently, on
11 (b)(1) ecember 2002, CTC management held a meeting to discuss the
(b)(3) CIAAct , issue of Al-Nashiri's cooperation at which it was decided to send ,
(b)(3) NatSecAct tci to debrief Al-Nashiri. was to determine
(b)(6)I if Al-Nashiri was being truthful and cooperative, or lying and
(b)(7)(c) withholding ?in(b)(1)afion? (b)(1)
(b)(7)(f) (b)(3) NatSecAct
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Li
6. (TS/, arrived at on
Iecember 2002. After initial debriefings, assessed (b)(1)
(b)(1) Al-Nashiri as withholding information. Accordingly, (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct reinstated sleep deprivation, hooding, and handcuffing.
(b)(1)[ 7. (TS/, At one point between 28 December 2002
(b)(3) CIAAct and 1 January 2003, decided to use an unloaded hand un as
(b)(3) NatSecActa prop to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information.
discussed his .lan to use a handgun in advance with ho
concurred. ntered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled
and racked' an unloaded handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's
head.
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8. (TS/ On what was probably the same day, but
(b)(1) after the use of the handgun, decided to use a power drill to
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ri hten Al-Nashiri, also in furtherance of obtainin information.
Although the drill was an impromptu idea
(b)(1) proposed use wit1 who gave his consent.
(b)(3) CIAAct Al-Nashiri's cell with the drill, which he later said did not house a bit,
(b)(3) NatSecAct ad revved it while AI-Nashiri stood naked and hooded. did
(b)(6) not touch Al-Nashiri with the drill.
(b)(7)(c)
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11
I.
id broach its
ntered
(U) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber a bullet or simulate a
bullet being chambered.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 9. . (TS-/-/ and ? id not report their
(b)(3) NatSecAcatt_ tent to use, or their use of, the handgun and power drill.
(b)(6) 3ubsequently reported
(b)(7)(c) (b)(1)
(b)(7)(f) the incidents to Headquarters.
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BACKGROUND
10. tS-) After the Vietnam War, Agency personnel experienced
in the field of interrogations left the Agency or moved to other
assignments. In the early 1980s, a resurgence of interest in teaching
interrogation techniques developed as one of several methods to
foster liaison relationships. Because of political sensitivities, the
then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), John N. '
McMahon, forbade Agency officers from using the word
"interrogation." Hence, the Agency developed the Human Resource
Exploitation (HRE) training program designed to train liaison on
interrogation techniques.2
1 11. (S) Following a 1984 OIG investigation into allegations of
(b)(1) misconduct on the part of two Agency officers involved in
(b)(3) NatSecActinterrogations of individuals
1 the Agency began to take proactive steps to
I ensure Agency personnel understood policy on interrogations,
debriefings, and human rights, issues. The Agency sent officers to
brief Stations and Bases and provided guidance to the field in the
Iform of DO Station and Base cables.
12. (S) Circa 1986, the Agency terminated the HRE training
program because of allegations of human rights abuses.
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2 -($) ? Paragraph 27 Of OIG Report (1G-14/88), dated 24 August 1988.
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DO
Handbook 50- documents the Agency's interrogation policy:
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It is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage
interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane
treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation.
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13. (T-S/
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On
8 October 2001, the DCI delegated responsibility to the Deputy
Director for Operations (DDO) and the Director of CTC (D/CTC).
(b)(11) CTC initially assigned management of the interrogation program to
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NatSecAct tsUsama Ladin (UBL) and groups
?
and called on a number of Agency components for support,
including the Office of General Counsel (OCC), the Office of
Technical Service (OTS), the Office of Security (OS), and the Office of
Medical Services (OMS). OGC was responsible for developing legal
guidance, and OTS was responsible for providing expert advice and -
resources relative to the use of EITs. At HVT sites, OMS monitors the
medical condition of detainees whom the Agency subjects to EITs,
(b)(1) and OS monitors and secures detainees.4
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4 ( OIG will publish additional information on the roles of these offices in the report on
the overall review of the interrogation program.
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14. (TS/ The capture of anHVT in Lahore,
Pakistan, in Marc I I astened the need for CIA to develop an
interrogation program. The Agency put together a team that
interviewed the detainee using non-aggressive, non-physical
(b)(1)
elicitation techniques. However, between Tune and July 2002, the
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActteam at which point the
Agency determined the detainee was deliberately withholding
imminent threat information. The Agency then determined to move
to new and more aggressive interrogation techniques. This
determination led to consultations with DoJ and other officials in the
Executive Branch to determine if EITs could lawfully be used without
subjecting Agency officers to the vulnerability of violating the ?
((bb))((31)) NatSecAct prohibition against torture as defined in Section 2340A of Title 18.
k
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15. f-T-S/ DoJ determined that, based on facts
provided by CIA, ten specifically described EITs would not violate
Section 2340A.6 The mildest of the approved EITs is the attention
grasp, which is a technique used to hold the detainee's head
immobile by placing an open palm on either side of their face while
keeping the fingertips well away from their eyes., An interrogator
generally applies EITs in an escalating fashion culminating with the
waterboard, although an interrogator might not use every technique
on each detainee. The waterboard is the severest of the ten
techniques. In this procedure, the detainee is bound to a bench with
his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobile and
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
6 (S//NP) The ten interrogation techniques are: (1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold,
(4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions,
(8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.
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an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee's mouth and nose
while pouring water onto the cloth in a controlled manner. Airflow
is restricted for 20 to 40 seconds and the technique produces the
sensation of suffocation. DoJ cautioned that Dors opinion would not
necessarily apply if the Agency deviated from the techniques as
proposed by CIA and approved by DoJ.
16. fS-/-/-134E?)- In September 2002, CTC put into operation the
1(b)(3) CIAAct
111 and transferred responsibility
for the interro ation ro ram to Renditions and Detainees Group
(RDG) RDG developed a two-week interrogation
program a emp oyees or independent contractors must
successfully complete before the Agency will approve their use of
EITs. (b)(3) CIAAct
17. S/ /NF) Before 9/11, Agency personnel used the terms
interrogation/interrogator and debriefing/debriefer interchangeably.
The use of these terms has since evolved and, today, the Agency
more clearly distinguishes their meaning. An interrogator is a person
who completes the two-week interrogations training program, which
is designed to train, qualify, and certify a person to administer EITs.
An interrogator can administer EITs during an interrogation of a
detainee only after the field, in coordination with Headquarters,
assesses the detainee as withholding information. An interrogator
transitions the detainee from a non-cooperative to a cooperative
phase in order that a debriefer can elicit actionable intelligence
through non-aggressive techniques during debriefing sessions. An
interrogator may debrief a detainee during an interrogation; (b)(1)
(b)(1) however, a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)i) NatSecAct
18. (-T-&-/-/
overseas encrypted a to serve as an interrogation facility
for HVTs. Before the establishment of the Agency
operated two facilities in two other countries. CIA established
interrogation and debriefing procedures at one of these two facilities
following the capture of the first HVT. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
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2002, the Agency readied a site
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111 19. (TS/ i 'Abd al-Rahman Al-Nashiri. Al-Nashiri,
the second HVT detained by the Agency, is a Saudi Arabian national
and recognized senior UBL lieutenant. Al-Nashiri is associated with
the planning of the attack on the USS Cole, the 1998 East Africa U.S.
Embassy bombings, and a 1997 attempt to smuggle Sagger anti-tank
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct missiles into Saudi Arabia to attack U.S. forces based there. The
investigation of the USS Cole bombing attack revealed Al-Nashin
oversaw an Al-Qa'ida cell based in Yemen. Following his capture in
the United Arab Emirates o November 2002, CIA held him briefly
(b)(1) in two other countries before moving him to (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ecember 2002. -(b)(3) NatSecAct
1
JL JRN//X1
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PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
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22. (S-/ /-14F9 An Investigator and an Inspector, assigned
to the OIG team responsible for the overall review of CIA practices
regarding the interrogation of individuals for counterterrorism
purposes, conducted this investigation. The OIG review team led by
the Deputy Inspector General supported this investigation.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
MON,
notes,
and official
interviews
including
and working
23. -(S1
legal authorities,
briefing
files_
(b)(3)
24. (S1
of
senior
all who
/11F) The investigation team reviewed the
relevant DoJ opinion, cables, memoranda,
detention facility records, photographs,
personnel and security records.
/-14F) The investigation team conducted
Agency staff employees and contractors,
officials, managers, interrogators, s chologists,
Those interviewed included
the application of the unauthonze
and all or most of those involved in
e-mail,
and
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
books,
including
NatSecAct
the
current
CTC
level officers.
witnessed
techniques,
interrogation
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
decision-making process surrounding the events.
(b)(1)I
(b)(3) CIAAct and because
(b)(3) NatSecActndistinguisha
(b)(6)1
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
25. (-TS/
In May 2003, OIG traveled to the Station
and for discussions with the COS, COBs (incoming and
outgoing), debriefers, an interrogator, a linguist, a communicator,
CTC Security, and and to examine the acility.
OIG did not interview Al-Nashiri because of his lack f credibility
(b)(1)
accounts of events were nearly
e om those reported by credible witnesses.
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? 26. ff-S--/
(b)(1) following questions:
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(b)(1)
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
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1
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(b)(6)
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(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1
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(b)(6)1
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
1
1
Mr) WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION
(b)(1) AMY) DEBRIEFING OF DETAINEES BY CIA?
(b)(3) NatSecAct
This Report of Investigation addresses the
? What are the procedures for the interrogation and debriefing
of detainees by CIA? (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
? Why did the Agency send to and what
guidance did he receive in connection with his (b)(1)
responsibilities? (b)(3) NatSecAct
? Why did the Agency send to and what
guidance did he receive before his deployment?
? Did
transpire
use unauthorized techniques and, if so, what
? When and how did Headquarters learn bout the use of
unauthorized techniques and what action did Headquarters
take?
? Did the use of unauthorized techniques violate federal
statutes or Agency policy?
(b)(3) NatSecAct
FINDINGS
27. crsti Immediately after the signing of the
MON, the Agency did not provide written guidelines for the
interrogation and debriefing of detainees. After the Agency detained
the first HVT, Agency personnel at the first detainee facility
(b)(1) 10
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documented proposed interrogation or debriefing plans in advance
in detailed cables to Headquarters. Agency personnel at the first
detainee facility also documented the execution of approved plans in
(b)3) NatSecAcable traffic.t
28. (Mb By the tim ecame
Ioperational, the Agency had established a precedent of detailed cable
traffic between the first detainee facility and Headquarters regarding
II the interrogation and debriefing of detainees. Headquarters also .
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAc-t-itablished procedures in a cable to that provided
with guidance on approvals and limitations of any specific
approval granted. Headquarters remindec to seek
Headquarters' approval in advance before employing techniques
other than those that Headquarters had approved in that cable.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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8 -(971-744F) The four standard techniques are: (1) sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,
(2) continual use of light or darkness in a cell, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise (background
hum).
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N6r-, -JRNI-tfX1 ?
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b
(b
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)(1)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(T-S/ WHY DID THE AGENCY SEND 0
WHAT GUIDANCE DID HE RECEIVE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS
RESPONSIBILITIES?
(b)(7)(f)
1
32 (SI /NT) Responsibilities.
AND (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
of a detainee
facility is to make certain the facility and staff are functioning
properly and within the authorities that govern the mission. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
33.
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(f)
9 (S//NT)
Ter-SECXF1"/
dated
Oecember 2002. (b)(1)
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(b)(6)
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(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
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(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAc(b)(1)
IOF S(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
35. (?Si said he received three separate
briefings before he deployed to none of which provided
guidance on the use of props. According to briefed him
I on the legalities of EITs. He stated that
RDG, and RDG, provided him with
operational 'dance. said he also met briefly wit1
(b)(7 and ut that their briefing was short and not substantive.
(b)(3) CIAAct told OIG that he understood what he was told at each of the
((bb))((63))1 NatSecAct
briefings and he understood the content of the documents he read in
(b)(7)(c) connection with those briefings, also told OIG that he read .
(b)(7)(f) ,-.-1-,le traffic from the firs(b)(1)f flpfainee facility before he deployed to .
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
1 36. (4S1 CTC/Legal Guidance. According to
during briefingj gave him three documents to read. These
(b)(1) included the statute prohibiting torture; a document that identified,
(b)(3) CIAAct A r4.... believed
(b)(3) NatSecAceelineuA ' and explained EITs; and another document
(b)(6) might have been the DoJ authorization for EITs. said he
(b)(7)(c) understood he could not authorize anyone to employ EITs, and EITs
(b)(7)(d) had to be approved by Headquarters in advance forirtdividuals
(b)(7)(f)
11 specifically identified and trained to administer EITs on detainees.
According to informed him duringnbriefing that he
I could approve standard techniques without conferring with
Headquarters. According to 4escribed standard
I techniques to him as a gray area of interrogation techniques that fall
below EITs, but did not otherwise. describe these techniques. because
they were vague and not documented.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 14
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
T-AP-SEeith
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 1.K1'j / /X1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
M
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
I 39. (-T-SJ, .
demonstrated his understanding of
procedures when on December 2002, as he rP1Pn Red
Ithe following cable,10 the subject of which is (b)(3) NatSecAct
Confirmation of Authority to Use Employ Enhanced Measures."
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
10
11 -(e)-This Report substitutes true names for the pseudonyms used in the cable.
(b)(1) 15
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1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1 40. (15./,
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOP-S ? ,
G. )RN/ /X1
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b) (7X0
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b) (7X0
1
responded to request on
r?Oecember 2002 with limited approval for the application of the
requested techniques.12 lit reSponsePThrote: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) (b)(5) (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) CIAAct
12 (s/44?1,p)
TOP SECRET
dated
December 2002. MO )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) 16
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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I.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1
101' StLKL
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
I\TC?Ittd71-71--X-1?
41. (TS/ Notwithstanding the guidance he
(b)(11 received ? id not request additional guidance or approval for
a andgun or power drill in cable traffic or during daily .
or
(b)(3) CIAAct
the use o
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)I telephone conversations with
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)_
(TS/
b WHY DID THE AGENCY SEND TO (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecActGUIDANCE DID HE RECEIVE BEFORE HIS DEPLOYMENT?
()(1).._.m.,
(b)(1)
1 42. (TS/ Selection. By mid-December 2002(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) Headquarters and were at odds regarding
(b)(3) NatSecActIssessment on Al-Nashiri and how to proceed with his interrogation
or debriefing. On several occasions throughout December 2002,
reported via cables and secure telephone calls tha(b)(1)
Al-Nashiri was not actively resisting and was res sonding
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActi
uestions directly. Headquarters disagreed with
assessment because Headquarters analysts thought Al-Nashiri was
withholding imminent threat information. Consequently, CTC
management held a meeting on December 2002, to discuss the
issue of Al-Nashiri's cooperation and the next steps in his
interrogation or debriefing.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(11)I
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6).
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)Z
43. (TS/
selected him to go to
said
said he was supposed to "interrogate"
(b)(1) . ig
(b)(3) NatSecAct ,NeFeit1177X1
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NC TN//X1
(b)(7)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActAl-Nashiri and assess whether or not Al-Nashiri was cooperative, or
(b)(6) lying and withholding information about imminent threats.
(b)(7)(c) said he had not completed the two-week interrogations training
(b)(7)(f) program and he turned down three opportunities to attend the
I interrogations training program because he is opposed to the use c(b)(3) CIAAct
EITs. said he believes more information is obtainable (b)(6)
(b)1(111 ) through psychological means than the application of EITs. (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Guidance. aid a riefed him
(b)(1) once approximately two or three months before his
(b)(3) CIAAct This briefingr7spronriplby to anot er etamee
(b)(3) NatSecActaciiity. aid rovided an oral briefing without much
(b)(6) detail and did not give him anything to read or review. According to
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
briefing touched on guidelines of EITs, but not in
detail.
explained that mentioned confinement in a box .
Iand that Headquarters approval was needed before EITs could be
(b)(6) used; however, did not provide any guidance on measures that (b)(6)
b)(7
(b)(7)(c) could or could not be used outside the criteria of a few EITs. ( )(c)
NI said he never saw written guidelines before he went to d
b 1) no one ave him s ecific guidance on how to accomplish his task at
()(
(b)(3) NatSecAct said the only guidance he received
as muted to comments from and
reportedly said, "We are depending on you," and "Go wi o
respectively, also said he did not receive any guidance
regarding the use of props, to include handguns, drills, or other
equipment.
44. (--T-S/
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 19
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(b)(1)I
(b)(3) NatSecAct session with Al-Nastiiri that evening. By the following evenin
reported to Headquarters in cable traffic13 that
assessed Al-Nashiri as withholding information and tha
R.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
/X1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
ESifilr) DID
TRANSPIRED?
48. (-TS/i
USE UNAUTHORIZED TECHNIQUES AND, IF SO, WHAT
(b)(1) (b)(1)
_(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
December 2002 and, after
arrived at on
scussions with the COB, held his first
was keeping Al-Nashiri hooded and h
(b)(1)
Al-Nashiri was also initially kept nude.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
iirected that Al-Nashiri's clothing be remove
(b)(6) withdraw all the privileges he had given Al-Nashiri, during which
(b)(7)(c) Al-Nashiri's cooperation had declined. On December 2002,
(b)(7)(f) "eported to Headquarters in cable traffic14 that Al-Nashiri
had
uffed to the wall.
told OIG that he
because he wanted to
was again kept hooded and handcuffed to the wall overnight. On
nDecember 2002, reported that, after multiple sessions
Iwith Al-Nashiri between and December 2002, he was becoming
(b)(1) submissive and iad
begun to improve his standard of
(b)( NatSecAcitivin b iving him things, including additional layers of clothes.13
then reported having given Al-Nashiri another article of
clothing onnDecember 2002.16
ecember 2002. (b)(1)
December 2002. (b)(3) CIAAct
December 2002. (b)(3) NatSecAct
ecember 2002.
(b)(1) 20
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1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct handgun to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information.
(b)(1)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
T-eia-stertt-
\101
RN//x (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.....(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
49. (T-S.I./ At one point betwee December 2002
and January 2003, proposed a plan to to use a
(b)(3) NatSecActexplained t that he had seen a handgun used at another
(b)(6) facility to frighten a detainee. According to at that facility, a
(b)(7)(c) Station officer with managerial responsibilities used a handgun .
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f) during a staged incident to frighten a detainee whom the field
1
assessed as withholding information. The Station officer reportedly
openly discussed the staged incident at the Station without
consequence.17 (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
50.
(--T-S71/ pproved the plan on the
basis that
(b)(:151
said he had seen a handgun used elsewhere and hE
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActthought
the use of a handgun, and later the power drill, fell
into the
(b)(6) gray area of standard techniques, which he could approve.
(b)(7)(c) believe-d-i-handgun and poWer. drill, used-as props, were less
fear
(b)(7)(d) provo
than EITs, in particular, the waterboard. .lso
said he
(b)(7)(f)
assume ?
ad Headquarters' approval because Headquarters
sen o resolve
the matter of Al-Nashiri's cooperation.
said e ma ? e a judgment call that, in hindsight, was incorrect but
(b)(1) was based on the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain
(b)(3) CIAAct imminent threat information from Al-Nashiri on 9/11-style attacks.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)I
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecA
(b)(6)1
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
both said they did not intend for Al-Nashiri to fear
for his life; their intent 1-D get Al-Nashiri to cooperate and
(b)(1)
provide information. (b)(3) NatSecAct
51. (F&// Because secure the detainees
and control all ? etamee movements, lpriefed them on the plan
to use a handgun. He instructed them to clear a
handgun and move Al-Nashiri to another cell in a rougher manner
ct
intended to mentally jolt him from the previous routine.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)_21
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
111(b)(1)
(b)(1) . (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct ? 52. (T)37 roughly moved Al-Nashiri to
(b)(3) NatSecActnother cell where he sat hooded, naked, and shackled. said
(b)(6) he entered the cell and racked the unloaded handgun close t(b)(1)
(b)(7)(c) Al-Nashiri's hooded head. said he instructed (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(d) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(f) remove Al-Nashiri's hood after he racked the handgun so th(b)(6)
Al-Nashiri could see the handgun. (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
NG,--ftN/IX1
I.
53. (15/
said they observed point the barrel of the handgun
A(3) CIAAct at Al-Nashiri s right temple.
(b)(3) NatSecAct said either pointed the handgun at Al-Nashiri's head
(b)(6) or laid it alongside s head; he could not tell from his angle. One
(b)(7)(c) said he thought Al-Nashiri was u_nhooded when the handgun
(b)(7)(d) touched his head. said Al-Nashiri began to cry when
(b)(7)(f)
I racked or ointed the handgun at his head, a point disputed
by e enied pointing the barrel of the handgun at
1 Al-Nashiri or otherwise touching him with it.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 54. (Ts/
On what was probably the same day, but
Iafter the use o e an. gun decided to use a power drill to
frighten Al-Nashiri, also in furtherance of obtainin information. It
Iwas an impromptu idea, but one he proposed to who
consented. ntered Al-Nashiri's cell while were
(b)(1) shacldin hun in standing position. He revved the power drill,
(b)(3) NatSecActatching by surprise. According to Ind
who was in the cell during the power drill incident, the power drill
did not house .a bit.
1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct said the power drill housed a bit or had an attachment that looked
(b)(3) NatSecActlike a screwdriver. During the power drill incident, Al-Nashiri stood
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
1
naked and hooded; he flinched and shook, but did not cry. By all
accounts did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill and
Al-Nashiri could not see the power drill.
(b)(1)
_(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 55. (TS/ said he justified the use of the
(b)(3) NatSecActhandgun and ower drill becaus oncurred when asked; and,
(b)(6) because he had seen a han gun used as a prop during a
(b)(7)(c)
staged incident at another detainee facility. also said he did
(b)(7)(f)
?10. RN//X1
not receive any guidance regarding improvisation with props and he
thought the use of props for psychological effect fell below the Err
threshold.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
0 SECRET,
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
NC PRN//X1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
HOW DID HEADQUARTERS
TECHNIQUES AND WHAT
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
ACTION
said
he thought
did
he did
he
said
LEARN
he did
not receive
not
or the
assumed
DID
not
their
report
subsequent
and
ABOUT THE
HEADQUARTERS
report the
use fell
guidance
the proposed
USE OF
use. of
below
on
had
WHEN AND
UNAUTHORIZED
TAKE?
58. (T5/ /
the handgun or
the EIT reporting
reporting requirements.
plan to use the
implementation
Headquarters'
instructed him
power cliill because
threshold, and
he
said
drill,
because
also
reporting.
handgun or power
of these tools,
approval,
to scale back on
According
to he did
(b)(1)I
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)I
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)1
not give guidance on the use of props during an interrogation;
however, no one may threaten a detainee with death, including
pointing a handgun at them. said the field must document new
techniques in a cable and receive approval before implementation.
said he instructed_ to report important information and
limit minutiae to avoid lengthy cables, however, it was unreasonable
for to infer from his.briefing that he should not report the use of
a handgun or power drill because their use _qualifies as important and
reportable. According t ? he tok to provide specific .
and detailed reporting.
59. (TS/
In early January 2003,
,and
(b)(3)_NatSecAct arrived at
and
(b)(11
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1?
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
to replace
told
and power dri11.18
who had also recentl arrived at
incidents t January 2003.
interviewed who were on duty during the incidents and
forwarded the results of their interviews to
about the use of the handgun
conferred with
they reported the
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
18 (S//NF) Lotus Notes from
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
to
dated 22 January 2003.
(b)(1)_9,1
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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for
Release: 2016/06/10
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NC
oRN//X1
return to
NatSecAct
and
60. (TS, tdJpon
Head ? uarters, interviewed
and
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct accountability board;19 however, Pavitt subsequently suspended the
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) board's review pending completion of OIG's investigation.
interviewed
and
documented
and
those interviews in memoranda. Their memoranda report
denied that pointed the hand un at Al-Nashiri's
head. On instructions, e-interviewed each
who remained at on the issue of whether or not
pointed the handgun at Al-Nashiri's temple; their accounts
remained consistent with their original interviews. On January
2003, James Pavitt, DDO, agreed with a recommendation from
Associate DDO (ADDO), to convene an
(SI/NT) DID THE USE OF UNAUTHORIZED TECHNIQUES 'VIOLATE FEDERAL
STATUTES OR AGENCY POLICY?
(b)(1),
(b)(3) NatSecAct 61. -(FS/ In response to the authorities granted by
the MON after the terrorist acts of 9/11, the Agency developed an
(b)(1 interrogation progra71. associated policies for the direct conduct
(b)(3) CIAAct of interrogation, (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(6)I
The DCI
did not formally codify those policies until January 2003; however,
interrogation policies were in effect before
deployed t and CM r' iisseminated them through briefings
(b)(1)
at Headquarters and cables (b)(3) NatSecAct
62. f-T-S/ Although said CTC/Le al did not
(b)(1),
(b)(3) NatSecActclearly identify standard interrogation techniques
acknowledged that CTC/Legal briefed him and gave him copies of
the torture statute and DoJ o inion, which he said he read and
(b)(1 understood. Likewise acknowledged CTC/Legal briefed
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct on legal guidelines of enhanced interrogation techniques, but
hi
(b)(6)I without much detail.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
19 (0- Lotus Notes from the ADDO to the DDO, date
(b)(1)
anuary 2003. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) 25
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
-120P-SE-C-R-R-
NC ;RN/ /X1
63. MI-14F) On 6 February 2003, OIG referred this matter to
Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division at
. DoJ, for a determination on whether or not or violated
(b)(1)
CIAAct any federal statutes. Subsequently, OIG briefed DO, provided Dor
(b)(3)
(b)(3) NatSecAct with access to Agency records, and responded to DoJ's requests for?
(b)(6)1 additional information. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to
(b)(7)(c) prosecute and
(b)(7)(0
(b)(1)
CONCLUSIONS
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)_ 64. (--TS7 actions in suggesting and .
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct implementing the use ot a handgun and power drill to frighten
, -
(b)(6). Al-Nashiri went beyond anything approved by or consistent with
(b)(7)(c) Agency policies. He failed to confer with Headquarters and failed to
(b)(7)(f) report the use of the handgun and power drill to Headquarters.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(11
(b)(3) CIAAct ? .
(b)(3) NatSecAct guidance he had received at Headquarters.
(b)(6)11 authorities and failed to make certa
(b)(7)(c) authorities that govern the use of interrogation techniques.
(b)(7)(f)
66. (-T-6/ Before the incidents involving
unauthorized interrogation techniques, Agency policy existed in the
form of legal and operational briefings, and cables to hat
(b)(1)_ contained Headquarters' guidance and discussed the torture statute
(b)(3) NatSecAct and DO opinion. Guidance was not comprehensive, however, and
? did not document the four standard techniques nor address
improvisation with props that could reasonably constitute a physical
threat. There were no mechanisms in place to ensure that the Agency
had adequately briefed personnel and no records of individuals who
had been briefed.
65. (57 ?W.F.) actions in approving use
of the handgun and power drill, and failure to report their use to
Headquarters, were inconsistent with Agenc olicies and specific
xceeded his
perated within the
(b)(1)_9_A
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(b)(1)
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Xl(b)(1)
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67. (-T-S-/OIG found no evidence to suggest
(b)(1) Headquarters officers knew Or ntended to use
(b)(3) CIAAct unauthorized interrogation techniques on -Nashiri. The use of
(b)(3) NatSecAct unauthorized interrogation techniques at resulted from
(b)(6)'
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
1
two Agency employees.
? (b)(3) NatSecAct
acting independently.
68. (FT/ 744F) On 30 January 2003, the DCI formally
codified interrogation policy, however, that policy does not address
improvisation utilizing props during interrogation or debriefing of
detainees.
ET/
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(1) 27
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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RECOMMENDATION
,RW/X1
-(e) The Deputy Director for Operations should request that a
Personnel Evaluation Board (PEB) be convened to review the actions
of and 20 Alternatively, if
compartmentation concerns suggest that the regular PEB should not
be used for this case, an accountability board appointed by the
Executive Director should consider the actions of and
CONCUR:
(b)(6)
hn L. Helgerson
Inspector General
o/z.-
Date
20 (e) Recommendations related to processes used for ensuring proper briefings and guidance
are given to Agency officers involved with interrogations and debriefings will be addressed in
OIG's forthcoming report on the Agency's practices regarding interrogation of individuals for
counterterrorism purposes.
(b)(1)
TOP SECR (b)(3) NatSecAct
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-1201)-SteRETA (b)(3) NatSecAct
NetFelt:Mt/XI
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOP7SEC-AIE ITCYrOftN1PCI.
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