THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF GERMAN CITIZEN KHALID AL-MASRI

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6541725
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RIPPUB
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109
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June 13, 2016
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F-2015-02400
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July 16, 2007
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? 01, su_Ktio.kpproved for Release: 2016/06/10 C0,6,54:1725N//mR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA/OIG Loan Copy Do Not Copy Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General REPORT OF INVESTIGATION .(SitilF) THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF GERMAN CITIZEN KHALID AL-MASRI (2004-7601-IG) 16 July 2007 John L. Helgerson Inspector General Copy (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Assistant Inspector General for Investigations (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Special Agent (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct -Telt-SECRET/ /N FO N R Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 10E SELRE 1 /kIJA I ) NOFORN/ /MR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 2 SUMMARY 2 CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 7 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecActINDINGS NatSecAct AL-MASRI 11 11 12 DETAIN KHALID (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 12 17 (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 19 (b)(1) FURTHER EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AL-MASRI 21 (b)(3) NatSecAct ? RENDITION OF AL-MASRI 24 ALEC STATION PLANS TO RENDER AL-MASRI 24 CIA's AUTHORITY TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN 25 CTC 'S JUSTIFICATION FOR RENDERING AL-MASRI 26 THE STANDARD REQUIRED BY THE MON 27 (b)(1)i (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA's DETENTION OF AL-MASRI AND TRANSFER 29 EFFORTS TO DETERMINE AL-MASRI'S COIVNECTIONS 3/ (b)(1) 33 (b)(3) NatSecAct TOP SECRETi(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 ki?-'/? I / TOP SECRET/ (b)(3) NatSecAct NOFORN/ /MR CIA LOAN COPY (b)(1) DO NOT COPY (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) 34 -(b)(3) NatSecAct- CONCERNS RAISED BY 35 DISAGREEMENTS DELAY RELEASE OF AL-MASRI 38 IMPLEMENTATION OF REPATRIATION PLAN 41 NOTIFYING CONGRESS 42 CIA's TREATMENT OF AL-MASR1 42 EPILOGUE 50 COMMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN AL-MASRI'S RENDITION AND DETENTION 51 ALEC STATION MANAGERS 51 CTC MANAGERS CTC LEGAL ADVISERS OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL MANAGERS 57 60 70 DFFICERS 74 OFFICERS 78 81 81 83 CONSULTATIONS WITH DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 91 km- Sr.C.KtT/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ITORN//MI Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN/PvIR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY APPENDIX A CABLE, DICTC APPROVAL FOR THE RENDITION OF KHALID AL-MASRI TO US CUSTODY APPENDIX (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) REPORTED CLAIM OFA PRIOR EXPLANATION FOR CONCURRENCE ON THE KHALID AL-MASRI RENDITION CABLE T-9P-SE-C?RET (b)(1) _(b)(3) NatSecAct /1VerfretRN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SteltET )(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct T r SECRET (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct Nut-oRN/ /MR CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY /NOF RN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 /(b)(1) Nefttticr771VI1< (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (S/INT) THE RENDITION AND DETENTION OF GERMAN CITIZEN KHALID AL-MASRI (2004-76014G) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 16 July 2007 INTRODUCTION 1. / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAcItlemorandum of Notification (MON) On 17 September 2001, the President signed a One of the key weapons in the war on terror was the MON authorization for CIA to "undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities." (b)(1) 2. (S-H-N,F) In May 2004, the CIA Office of Inspector General (b)(3) NatSecActmG)? received information that a naturalized German citizen of Lebanese descent, Khalid al-Masri, had been rendered from (b)(1) by CIA and detained because he was wrongfully _ (b)(3) NatSecActieved to be an al-Qa'ida terrorist traveling on a false German I passport.' Based on this allegation, OIG initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding al-Masri's rendition and detention. In late August 2004, the Inspector General (IC) reported this issue to the Ithen Acting Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as a "particularly serious problem" within the meaning of Section 17 of the CIA Act. 1 (S//NF) In a subsequent debriefing session with CIA officers on 11 February 2004, al-Masri advised that his full name was Khalid 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Masri. This Report refers to him as a I- Masri TOP SECRET/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct \1014URN//MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(7)(e) Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRET (0)(1 ) L11.43F49Ribi-ttfc4R (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 3. (U//rett:30) OIG reviewed operational files, CIA cables, memorandums, e-mail messages, photographs, medical reports, and other documents and materials related to the matter under investigation, interviews were conducted with current and former employees of CIA, and some employees were interviewed more than once. SUMMARY (b)(1 (b)(3) NatSecAct 4. (S//NF) On detained Khalid al-Masri, a German citizen, (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct . f57L-7LNIF) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Officers in CIA's CounterTerrorism Center (b)(1) (CTC) were determined to hold on to him, however, and decided (b)(3) NatSecAct almost immediately to render him into US custody.2 On January 2004, the Agency issued a cable that provided the approval of the 2 (U/ ) During this investigation, the name of the Counterterrorist Center was modified to the CounterTerrorism Center (CTC). The Directorate of Operations (DO) became known as the National Clandestine Service (NCS) on 12 October 2005. This Report will use the DO whenever referring to what would now be called NCS. TOP SEC(b)6 /NOP \I/ /MR (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct* ?n Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (DM) i (b)(3) NatSecAct eFett11717R CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY Director of CTC to render al-Masri and cited the justification for doing January 2004, al-Masri was transferred to where he was held until the end of May 2004. 6. (57tiNiF) The al-Masri operation was characterized by a number of missteps from the beginning that were compounded by subsequent failures of both legal and management oversight. CIA did not have al-Masri's German passport examined by Agency (b)(1) experts until early March 2004, when it was found to be genuine. By (b)(3) NatSecAct7f anuary 2004, before he was rendered, CIA knew that al-Masri was not questioned al-Masri in English, which he spoke only poorly, making the issue of his responses to (b)(1) miestions problematic. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct insisting that they knew he was "bad." When they subsequently questioned him in they quickly concluded that he was not a terrorist. Most importantly, the purported connections to the al-Qa'ida operative in Sudan, which served as the underpinning for the rendition, were tenuous, circumstantial, and produced no further incriminating information. Nonetheless, the two Agency officers primarily involved in al-Masri's rendition justified their commitment to his continued detention, despite the diminishing rationale, by ( 7. (-T-S/ /rflt, The Agency's grounds for capturing and detaining al-Ma sri did not meet the standard specified in the Presidential MON of 17 September 2001. According to the MON, the individual in question "must pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or must be "planning terrorist activities." The Agency never documented or established grounds for concluding that al-Masri posed such a threat. Furthermore, the language used in the cable of justification did not meet the standard specified by the MON. The cable claimed only that al-Masri might know key information that could lead to the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives. Virtually all of the Agency lawyers interviewed by OIG for this investigation confirmed that possessing such knowledge would not constitute sufficient grounds for rendition. TOP SECRET! (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct IleffeRN4-4412_ Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Tp)(1) NeferItc17717R (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY (b)(1) DO NOT COPY (b)(3) NatSecAct 8. (S/ /NF) Although raised concerns in early February 2004 that al-Masri should be released because there was a lack of compelling intelligence information to detain him, CTC disagreed and al-Masri remained in detention. It was not until mid- March 2004 that CTC determined the Agency did not have sufficient grounds to continue holding al-Masri. Agency officers then struggled for more than two months with the problem of how to return him to Germany. Bureaucratic differences accounted for some of this delay. Another obstacle was the desire on the part of senior Agency managers, from the up to the DCI, to accomplish al-Masri's repatriation without notifying or damaging relations with the German Government. In the end, al-Masri was released, and the German Government was notified at the direction of the US National Security Advisor. 9. (-Si-4W) As a result of Agency inaction, for over two months after the Agency had determined that there was no justification for his detention, al-Masri continued to be held. Al-Masri was not given any information about the status of his case until the week before he was returned to Germany in late May 2004. During this time, according to the report of an Agency psychologist, al-Masri appeared desperate and depressed and prone to thoughts of suicide. Al-Masri conducted at least one hunger strike during his detention and lost 50 pounds. 10. (S/ /NF) OTC's investigation found no evidence that al-Masri was subjected to physical abuse while in CIA custody. The investigation also found that al-Masri's rendition was conducted consistent with Agency protocols. During his confinement in CIA (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct custody, al-Masri was isolated from contact with his family. He was held in a small cell with some clothing, bedding, and a bucket for his waste, and provided with adequate medical attention. Al-Masri ended his hunger strike when faced with the possibility of being force- fed. TOP SECRET! (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 'NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRET/M(1) 10F,L(4RI144-7LikeiR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY? 11. (S/ /NF) Al-Masri's rendition and prolonged detention logically raises questions about the system the Agency created to conduct and oversee its rendition and detention process. The lack of rigor in justifying action against an individual suspected of terrorist connections; the lack of understanding of the legal requirements of detention and rendition; the lack of guidance provided to officers making critical operational decisions with significant international implications; and the lack of management oversight suggest that a review of the Agency's rendition and detention processes should be undertaken. 12. (ilv+) This Report concludes that there was an insufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri and the Agency's prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified. His rendition and (b)(1) 1-ng detention resulted from a series of breakdowns in tradecraft, (b)(3) NatSecAct ? process, management, and oversight. CTC and failed to take responsible steps to verify al-Masri's identity. ALEC Station exaggerated the nature of the data it possessed linking al-Masri to terrorism.3 After the decision had been made to repatriate al-Masri, (b)(1) implementation was marked by delay and bureaucratic infighting. (bI3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) 13. (FS/, '41-F) The Report also concludes that advisers failed to provide adequate legal review and oversight of the al-Masri case. They failed to ensure that one of the most sensitive activities ever undertaken by CIA?the capture, detention, and rendition of individuals?was conducted in accordance with the terms of the Presidential covert action authority.4 Finally, the Report finds that the Agency did not inform Congress of the mistaken rendition of al-Masri until after his repatriation and after the German Government had been informed. The Agency has 3 MI CTC's Usarna Bin Ladin Station, also known as ALEC Station, was a virtual station located in the Headquarters area. Throughout this Report it will be referred to as ALEC Station. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct SECRET/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct \IOF RN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 006541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SPCRET1(0)(1) DICAF-C4Z4144-74eIR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY never informed Congress that CIA had failed to meet the standard required by the Presidential covert action authority to justify al-Masri's capture and detention. 14. (u//rertte) This matter was referred to the Department of Justice (DoJ) for prosecutive merit. Subsequently, the US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA) reported, by letter, that his office declined to pursue federal prosecution in this matter. 15. (57'--/-14) This Report recommends that the Associate Deputy Director of CIA (ADD/CIA) direct that those officers involved in capture, detention, and rendition operations be made aware of the legal threshold for doing so. The Report also recommends that the Director of CIA convene an Agency Accountability Board to review the performance of three individuals regarding their actions in the capture, detention, and rendition of Khalid al-Masri. The remainder of this page left blank intentionally. TOP SECRET (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct /NOF /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 1 (b) (b) Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 DF GECRET/b3 NatSecAct 1IOECW.4144-744R CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY ;1) ;3) NatSecAct CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS Khalid al-Masri, a naturalized German citizen of Lebanese descent, was detained (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct This box is classified as T-S/, ADZ (b)(1) 7 TOP SPCR(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct NOPO MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TICIF Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 RLT/ Ne NatSecAct NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (continued) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct an 2004: Jan 2004: Jan 2004: Jan 2004: (b)(1) L--(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct rendition to approved al-Masri's detention facility, under CIA authorities as set forth 3f the 17 September 2001 Presidential Memorandum of Notification (MON). (b)(1) AI-Masri was taken into CIA custody and transported fror(b)(3) NatSecAct aboard an Agency aircraft. Al-Masri arrived at and was processed into detention, officers conducted a custodial interview of al-Masri, and he continued his claim that he was innocent of any terrorist affiliation. This box is classified asTS-/ T P SECRET/(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 8 NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRETP)(1) -11,149FeRN-f7171R (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecActI. - (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (continued) Feb 2004: Feb 2004: Feb 2004: Feb 2004: Feb 2004: b)(1) b)(3) NatSecAct Feb 2004: (b)(1) rjeb 2004: (b)(3) NatSecAct Feb 2004: (b)(1) nIVIa r 2004: (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) Mar 2004: Mid-Mar 2004: CTC officers ALEC Station requested that al-Masri's personal effects de-briefed al-Masri. forward to Headquarters advised ALEC Station/CTC Headquarters there was a lack of compelling intelligence information to warrant.al-Masri's continued detention as a terrorist. requested ALEC Station/CTC Headquarters concurrence to release al-Masri. ALEC Station replied tc reminding them that al-Masri was being detained because they "could not resolve the issue of his terrorist affiliation ALEC Station suggested additional areas of questioning. officer and a Headquarters-based CTC officer interviewed al-Masri, but al-Masri steadfastly denied any terrorist affiliation. reported to ALEC Station/CTC Headquarters that it had forwarded al-Masri's personal effects, as requested ebruary 2004. Agency records confirm that CTC Headquarters received pouch sent by with al-Masri's personal effects. A CTC officer, who had interviewed al-Masri located al-Masri's passport and other personal effects inside an unopened box on the desk of ALEC Station officer The officer delivered al-Masri's passport to experts of the CIA who promptly determined that al-IVIasri's German passport was geni(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ? ALEC Station reported the results CIA determined that it had no basis to justify the continued detention of al-Masri. (b)(5) This box is classified as-TS/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct - 9 TMSECRET/ (b)(1) NOFORN/ /MR (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 101.- St.C.Kr, (0)(1) NQFGR-N-frfrfvtR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (continued) (b)(1) pr 2004: (b)(3) NatSecAct May 2004: Mid-May 2004: (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct CTC Headquarters reported to the field that there was no longer a justification to continue to detain al-Masri under MON authorities. Agency components continued to disagree about the exit strategy. A Headquarters meeting that involved senior CIA officials and managers, including then DCI George Tenet, met to discuss the al-Masri matter. (b)(5) Shortly after the May 2004 meeting of senior CIA officials, DCI Tenet reportedly informed then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice of the al-Masri situation. Both indicated that al-Masri should be repatriated quickly, and the German Government should be briefed. n\ilay 2004: ALEC Station sent a five-oave ca le to the field reporting that CTC completed esearch on al-Masri but did not find any information linking him or his customers with known terrorist individuals or organizations. A follow-up meeting of senior Agency officers held on the optimal date to start al-Masri's release operation was that the situation Would be briefed to appropriate Natio officials. Headquarters advised the field and instructed could inform al-Masri to help mitigate his frustration and a (b)(1) b)(3) NatSecAct May 2004: ? May 2004: May 2004: 2 June 2004: 6 Dec 2005: 12 May 2006: .24 July 2006: 2 Mar 2007: 30 May 2007: ay 2004 decided May 2004, and uncil nger. Al-Masri was released and clandestinely returned to Germany The US Ambassador to Germany and informed German Interior Minister Otto Schily of the al-Masri situation. CIA sent a Congressional Notification to the Congressional Intelligence Committees advising about al-Masri's detention. Al-Masri filed a civil lawsuit in US District Court against former DCI Tenet, and the owners of three aviation companies. A US District Court judge dismissed al-Masri's lawsuit citing national security grounds. Al-Masri filed an appellate brief of the US District Court's ruling with the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia. A panel of the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of al-Masri's lawsuit by the US District Court. Al-Masri petitioned the US Supreme Court to review his case. TOP SECRET!, This box is classified as'TS('b)(1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct 10 (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct \JC)FORN/ /MR /Nf? Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRET/ (13)(1) 40?FeRi1/41-7'tki-R (b)(3) NatSecAct FINDINGS DETAIN KHALID AL-MASRI CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 11 TOP SECRET!, (b)(1) \JOFORN/ /MR ?(b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP-SECRET,(/3)(1) 4iefiefiticrt71VIR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOP SECRET (b)(1)?" (b)(3) NatSecAct /Nut- RN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 ? (0)(1) I"' Sh(-1"" r, (b)(3) NatSecAct Voi-ORN?T/VIR CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOP SECRET/ (b)(1)-1-1 (b)(3) NatSecAct \101-01(N/71VIR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (0)(1 I"' 5LLIKET/(b)(3) NatSecAct INOPURN/TIC4R CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) "RR SECKET/ (b)(3) NatSecAct / N 0 FIC-71M77-1 / MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP ECRET/(0311((31)) ?TfeJr07177717R NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct The remainder of this page left blank intentionally. Tor'SECIZET/ (b)(1) 15 (b)(3) NatSecAct NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECkc I ( b ) ( 3 ) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct "Fef"r5EeftET/ (b)(1) 16 (b)(3) NatSecAct NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRP3/(13)(1) 14F49WittIMR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(f) T P SECRET/ (b)(1)-1-7 (b)(3) NatSecAct NOFORN/ / MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 RET (b)(3) NatSecAct NeterirsrircfR CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(f) TOP-SEC?RE-T/03)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 18 \10FORN//MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECRET/(I))(1) 414FORN/ /MR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(f) SPrRET/ (b)(1)-19 (b)(3) NatSecAct \I0F0 f-MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Dr Approved NatSecAct p(rrood)for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 +.ieferitIrrIVIR b)(3) CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(f) Tep-steRET/ (b)(1) 20 (b)(3) NatSecAct /NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 T/(I))(1) 40aFORNI77VIR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct FURTHER EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AL-MASRI 40. (S/ /NF) During early January 2004, Headquarters and several CIA field stations participated in additional efforts to determine who al-Masri was and the nature of the threat he posed. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOP SECRET/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct \10.FURN/ (MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP S-ECRET(13)(1) 4443FeritilR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY 42. (6-ttICIT3 Responses to the requests for information came back to Headquarters rapidly. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOP SECRET (b)(1)_,, (b)(3) NatSecAct /NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (0)(1 TOP SECRET/ (bp) NatSecAct 101-0.1441i4-44R CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct T-03P-SfeRfT/ (b)(1)-12 (b)(3) NatSecAct \JOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct RENDITION OF AL-MASRI (b)(3) NatSecAct ALEC STATION PLANS TO RENDER AL-MASRI (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) 1 50 (b)(3) NatSecAct - '-ou RDG to discuss how to take custody of al-Masri planned to meet with otficers from CTC's Renditions and Detainee (S/ /NF) In an e-mail o January 2004, ALEC Station indicated that ALEC Station personnel (b)(1) Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (0)(1 TOP SECRET,(b,,3, A NatSecAct Nefelt17-71717 CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) I. (b)(3) NatSecAct 51. (S Oi January 2004, in a cable originated by to ALEC Station outlined three possible outcomes regarding al-Masri. The first was that, if al-Masri were identifiable with (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ? TOr stA_RET/ If he was not 74 (b)(1) _(b)(3) NatSecAct but was nonetheless NOFORN/ /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 GLCRET/ 40F+4,Rif,t,..ittR (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Finally, if al-Masn was not identifiable with but nevertheless appeared Ito have links to al-Qalida and his demeanor during recent debriefings"), he could be deemed a force I protection threat." In that case, he could be turned over to the US military and could be questioned further by the Agency. On January (b)(1) 2004, suggested to Headquarters that al-Masr46 ) 1 (b)(31) NatSecAct transferred to the US military (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) 52. (Si/N ) Bflanuary 2004, however, ALEC Station had (b)(3) NatSecActdecided it did not want to transfer al-Masri to the US military. I Explaining its reasons in a cable to ALEC Station argued that the military would have to brief its chain-of-command, which might expose the involvement of Such a Imove could complicate matters if it was decided to transfer al-Masri or move him to an undisclosed location because the IUS military would register al-Masri and notify the Red Cross of his detention. ALEC Station added that, until al-Masri's identity was I established and "his role within al-Qa'ida identified/confirmed," the US military would have no grounds on which to detain him and "he could be a free man within hours . . (b)(1) CIA's AUTHORITY TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN (i)(3) NatSecAct 53. (TS7 /NF) Since 17 September 2001, CIA efforts in the US global war on terrorism have been operating under authorities of a Presidential MON. The MON, signed by President George W. Bush on 17 September 2001, authorized the DCI, acting I. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOP SECRET/ (b)(1)-25 (b)(3) NatSecAct WIF-Oitt-h`MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 TOP SECPET/(1))(1) 44eFeitIckt71v1R (b)(3) NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY through the CIA, to undertake various activities against international terrorists and terrorist entities. According tc(b)(i ) of the MON: (b)(3) NatSecAct The DCI acting through the CIA may undertake operations ? designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Agency officers carry out these clandestine activities, known as rendition operations. The MON is the legal authority for CTC's capture, rendition, detention, and interrogation program. (b)(1) CTC's JUSTIFICATION FOR RENDERING AL-MASRI (b)(3) NatSecAct 54. (SI /NF) ALEC Station provided both authorization and (b)(1) justification for the rendition and detention of al-Masri on January (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 2004, in a cable ALEC "D/CTC Approval for the Rendition of Khalid al-Masri to US Custody." In pertinent part, the cable reports: Since his detention (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 1 we believe al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning terrorist activities. [Emphasis added.] [See Appendix A for full text of cable.] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ? TOP SECRET/ (b)(1) ?(b)(3) NatSecAct Nrirt17177?/MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 EC ET/(13)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct IterrORIVMVIR CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY (b)(3) NatSecAct 55. csy The cable specified that D/CTC had authorized the rendition of al-Masri into CIA custody for onward transfer to (b)(1) Al-Masri was to be detained at (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (til)(3) NatSecAct according to ALEC Station: We will continue efforts to verily his true identity and continue debriefing him re his links to known al-Qa'ida operatives and obtaining from al-Masri his knowledge regarding future planned attacks. THE STANDARD REQUIRED BY THE MON 56. (157, iiiirtr) The attorneys in CTC were conversant on the legal authorities and standards connected with the 17 September 2001 MON. They routinely briefed new personnel into the security compartment and provided guidance orally, in e-mails, ? (b)(1) and in cables. One particular cable, ori inated by a CTC attorney and (b)(3) NatSecAct ent broadly to CTC elements and to in April 2003 was entitled, "Guidance on Scope of Capture and Detention Authorities." This cable provided a. review of the scope of the authority and the standards applicable to such operations. It specified that CIA: Was authorized to undertake capture/detain operations only against those individuals whose actions pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities. As a result, there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a "continuing serious threat" of violence or death to US persons or interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity. 57. (7T-S/ /ticlf) The cable provided examples of (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct situations that met the MON authority, and then noted: The nature of our capture and detain authorities under the CT Memorandum of Notification is unprecedented, hut even so, the TOP SECRET/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct NR_M-ORN / /MR Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct however, is that the individual himself poses a serious threat. Thus, (b)(3) NatSecAche language used in the justification cable did not meet the standard (b)(6) required by the MON. b)(7)(c) Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541725 ) NefentT1771M 1 OF SU-1