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SECRET 95A /GS /GP AU uyana June 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is not t published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters-- Co()ntry Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Gaog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intell +genre and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent t all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced wi!! continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classificurion and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The Gereral Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WAR \I \G This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. .q APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may bes made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U/OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use. Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by January 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 p l m CONTENTS This chapter supersedes the political coc- eragc in the General f uroey dated July 1969. A. Introduction 1 Evolution of the political processes; British in- fluence on political structure; political bifurca- tion along racial lines; governmental goals; racial tension: B. Structure and functioning of the government 2 Constitutional system. 1. Executive 3 Structure of the executive branch; ministries. 2. Legislative 4 Stricture and powers of the National As- sembly. 3. Judicial 5 Court system; right of appeal. SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 Page 4. Local government 5 Administrative districts; Local Government Board; Unions of Local Authorities. C. Political dynamics 7 Major aspects of Guyanese political history; bi- furcation along political lines; PNC and OF coalition. 1. Major parties 8 a. People's National Congress PNC) 8 Party organization; racial composition and attitudes; major problems encountered in retaining government control; inermri- 25 ence and unreliability of administrators. b. People's Progressive Party PPP) 10 Major historical aspects; power stru�gl� between Burnham and Jagan; problems encountered with the PPP in offia,; sus- pension of the Constitution; PPP out of office; Jagan placed under restriction by Bridsh; Jagan in total control of party; PPP publicly enrolled in World Commu- nist Movement; party organization and makeup. 2. Minor parties 12 a. United Force (UF) 12 Composition; historical aspects; OF and PNC coalition; sources of discord and fric- tion within the coalition; diminishing ef- fectiveness; party organization. b. Guyana National Liberation Front (GNLF) 13 Small, newly formed underground move- ment building up cadre for guerrilla war- fare. c. People's Democratic Movement (PDM) 13 Small, newly formed political party. 3. Pressure groups 13 Effectiveness of interest groups insignificant because of bifurcation of political parties along racial lines. 4. Electoral laws and practices 14 Citizenship qualification; registration and voting procedures; mechanics of elections. D. National policies 16 1. Domestic policies 16 Major goals of the Burnham administration. a. Race relations 16 Conciliatory policies of the government; policies toward the Amerindians. b. Economic development 17 Governmental attempts to solve economic problems; development plans; emphasis on economic nationalism; monetary and fiscal policies; foreign trade policies. ii Page c. The role of cooperatives 19 The "co- operative movement govern- mental control over the economy. d. Labor relations 20 Arbitration tribunals; worker's benefits; inflation checks. 2. Foreign policies 20 a. Relations ith other countries 20 Diplomatic relations with other countries; proposals for economic and political inte- gration of Caribbean states; expanded con- tacts with other Latin American states; U.N. activities. b. Boundary disputes 21 'territorial disputes with Venezuela and Surinam. E. Threats to government stability 23 1. Discontent and dissidence 23 Distrust and suspicion between the two dominant racial groups based on political, so- cial, and economic factors; racial tensions. 2. Subversion 24 a. Amerindians and white ranchers 24 Venezuela's clandestine campaign to foment subversive acts. b. Jagan and his followers 25 Subversive possibilities within the PPP. c. Non Communist subversive groups 25 Black powz -r movement; potential disrup- tive groups; nondisruptive aspects of youth groups. F. Maintenance of Internal security 26 1. Police 26 Development of the Guyana Defense Force; strength; morale. 2. intelligence and security services 27 The Special Branch, its functions and re- sponsibilities. 3. Countersubversive and counterinsur- gency measures and capabilities 28 Responsibilities of the CDF and police force for counterintelligence and counterinsurgency activities. G. Selected bibliography 28 Chronology 29 Glossary 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 FIGURES Page Fig. 1 Structure of government (chart) 3 Fig. 2 Electoral vote and parliamentary representation chart) 8 Fig. 3 Linden Forbes Burnham, Prime Min- ister, !Fader of the PNC photo) 9 Page Fig. 4 Cheddi Jagan, leader of the PPP (photo) 10 Fig. 5 Janet Jagan, secretary for interna- tional affairs of the PPP (photo) 10 Fig. 6 Territorial claims and boundary dis- putes with Venezuela and Sarinam (map) 22 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 Government and Politics A. Introduction (C) Guyana, known its British (:(iaua (a :rc,wrt Colon\) until it bccunrc independent on 26 \l;tv 19(j(j, has it parlianuentan fora) of gov- rnmcrtt. 'I'll(- :\frican- It'd adininistraticm currently ill p mer Professes to be working toward it multiracial detn,oc�rac% under contitiuiug African Ivadcrship. It is c�omiitted to improving the living standards of the people I,s devvioping a nixed (,c�ouon)v it, Which the role of private enterprise weilld be wduced in favor of state ownership and control of basic industry alric�h i C'tvarra could extend as tar as retail sides. Guyana's Politics hate become increasingly polarized, and racial tensions hit\(, become more' pronounced bchvecn the ?ast Indians and the Africans and \Iixed, %%bo comprise 51 ci itnd 4 S`i of the pop(rlatiou. respec�tivel. This has been particularly true since the 1968 general elections. (;t"'anese political parties have bevii organized largely along racial lines since 1955 tvh (,n Linden Forbes Burnham, the present Prime Minister tvho ryas also the co-founder of the NT. and his :lfrican followers challenge(I Chcddi jagan. the East Indian )nununist leader of the Peoples Progressive fart\ (1'PP), tyhic�h tt,.s then both African and fast ludian. Burnham founded the Peoples National Congress (PNC) in 19:r shortly after !easing the I'Pp. Ile gained power in the 196 -1 (,Icc�tiolls and has sill(.(, controlled the country's politics. Bec�acrse of tic racial tensions and th(, antilgOttisnt between Burnimin and jagart �and d(,spite the Guyanese respect for British institutions �the concept of' if emistmetive parliamcn- lary opposition has failed to d(,y(,lop. "I'hc pPN has not Cooperated with the Bimiliam government to any significant cxtcnt but instead has tried to thwart it at every opportunity. I'lie institutions provided I)y lilt British mule good government possible, and in the clays before self govcrimient th(, colony was fairly and honestly administered by its British overseers. Most of tb(, people were loyal to the British Crown, and if coherent and popular sentiment for full indepcndctrc( %sits l in cl (,velol)ing. In the rneantinic racial t(,nsiolls began to surface ,t, I bx 1955 the society had polarized into hostile car, of :kf'ricans aml 1� :ast ludi.ccts. "1'be scspic�ions and periodic ()if( breaks o1' violence bet\%eeu the two racial groups kept the colons in it state of tettsioo and prevented the dl-\vlopnu�nl of national rntit\. "I'he political parties. which b\ nosy %tore engaged in it bitter sln fur cold rn,l. there pre uc�cupiecl tyith their rivalry rather than working for th(, good of the colcnry. No compromise betttec�rt the two major parties was possible. and when the British fivallt grunted iudeper:denc�e. the guyernnu�ut to "lliclt they passed political putter nits if c�oalitiou lecl by the 1'N(: aucl sripporled by t;u� United Force (L'I it small wtiltirac�ial parh Mliclt had the h ��,�king of consertative�s and the :kmerindiims. During the first sears of inel(,peude nee Burnham headed au rntstead\ parliamentary coalition with the UF. tvbicb Itad formed after lie December 1961 ale- _tic,ll largely to keel) jagan (Mt of power. I c�onflic�ls beltveert l'F leader Peter I uiit r and Brrrnlarn led Burnham to become antagonistic toward the coalition. I) :lguiar hit ;erly opposed Burnham' electoral legislation and. %%!I( .i Burnham disregarded his tvisbes. I)' .\guiar resigned front the coalition in October 1965. largely because of thlegislation is le and fraudulent procedures. Burnham \vela un to \tilt it majority ill the lwis elec�lion and formed the goverimient without the need for coalition. Burnham's part% tvou 5(i`( of the seats ill the National :ssetnbly and c�onseyneutl control of� the colour\ for the next 5 gars. 13timban) claimed that his vic�tort was i t racial brvakibrougb and that the Fast Indians could no longer be considcrcd the properh of the I'I'I'. Ilowever. (chile there are indications that Burnbarn gained sonic I�:ast Indian support. particularly among the \11tslints, the inroads into the Fast Indian Note \sere not as impwssive as the election results might seem to indicate. "I'll( racial basis of Gcryanese politics hail not been c�hallged signific,oitlt and jagan still retained the support of most of the just Indians. Burnhanr'r, impressive electoral margin ryas core largel\ to voting regulations and ln-wi inert' which favored the MC. and to a political campaign which APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 fur exceeded thee combined efforts Of the I'I'I' and the L F. Burnham sought t cl(�I)icl his v ictor\ as u s inclirttion of the moderate and progressicr policies of his administration. B(nhan has sill(�(� tuainlaiued his deternination to cxclude jagan front per( and retain control of the government. In spite of the elec�lor:d mai ilmlalion. however, basic political freedons and it desux�ralic� form of govenum�nt at the national level, for the ;nost part. have been utaintained. liurnhatu has sludioctsly sought to avoid antagonizisl, the Fast Indian poptL�ction and has presented hinself as it ualional rather than it racial leader Neverthcless. the high lust Indian birth rate and the persistent tendenc\ Of most l� :ast Indians and Africans to rote ruc�iall\ and the fears of each group that the Other is determined to enutsc�ulatc it pOlilically h,,\ continual to keep racial and political tensions high. In September 1969 Burnh:un ant( moved lar,, ^I\ as ;t sv tnbolic gesture to increa national self- rc�hauc�e and ac�hie\ e econulltic deg elopnu�nt through the intw(Itiction of sone socialist measures �the creation of the Cooperative Republic of Gusuna. B\ I ebruar 19 Ctts.tua had x�( its ties with the British Crown and becanic the first Caribbean tnentberof the :osts,�nssrallh to become it republic. As clec�ted President replaced the GO erns General as titular head of State �f,ut the change was more s\ ntbolic� than sttbstanti\ c. 1'he Constitulimm of 1970 pro\ ided for it republican form of gmernment and the appointment of it President elec�le�I b\' it simple nuijorit\ vote of the elected nu�ntbers of the National :lssentbl\. Burnh:un then sought to clarify (Imnestic� policies aisu�d at the econont and b(tilding "a ne\t soc�i economic stntcture free of foreign influc ace, one that was neither cOnununist nor c Burnham attacked foreign aid. including sOn}e limited United Slates assistance. and strongl\ Criticized private fOreigu investment and banks. He demanded al least 51 e(Ittil\ participations in future foreign i(n�cstment projects ill forests and ntinerals� this \\'as later expanded to include Other industries. I'he next step in secttrisit, greater g0vvrnntent control Over the econc,m\ \\'as to impose c ontrols on imports and "similar transactions" and to establish cooperatives ill the insttram- fi.!(I. 'I'hc governsu�nl also Ordered all Official (economic entities to deal exclusivvIv through tlu� National Cooperative Bank. This stm"c etas to be ex,mildcd with the aim Of niniatttrizin, hrcign banks and staking the Cooperative Bunk dominant in the sociel\. The gOvernment's efforts to expand its role in the ecOnunM hay e ne�t \eith mixed success. Most sectors of I the lum. been lOrcal to accept iuereased regulalOr\ decree ;lit(] foresee nose stringent conlr,ls in the hotline. Objections to Ili� i4merntncids demmid lOr increased control in the (lug to -day operations Of the Dellit�rara Bauxfle COntpan\. it subsidiary of it Canadian firth, providcd the Ostensible rasun fur its lakeOver Im the gmenuseut in 1971. Nationalization Of other foreign firsts will follrnt. Nationalization ail its attendant problems of ntatn;tgentent b\ it relati\el\ inexperienced bureatcrac�\ lime added to the goveruuenl's basic ec�ouuntic� difficulties. Transpurt;t- lion and pimer facilities renutin illade(Iuale fur groMli. The countrc is still heav il\ dependent upon a relativel\ fe\c exports netinl bauxite. sugar. ;otd rice. the latter t\\o being especi:tll\ subject tO c\orld market 11uc�lu;(tiuns. Ne\\ foreign inveslnu�nt in Guiana has dropped signific�antl\ and the econonM has stugnatel. The serious unentplO nu nl problem bas not been reduced, and labor unrest. fueled in part bs the rising cost of liVing. continues. The population is increasing at ,it annu;tl average rate Of 2. adding to the (trgenc\ of snc�h problems as creating ness jobs and providing more hOusiug aid facilities. Racial tensions A limes ha\e it serious negative elfecl un producliVit\ Popular acceptance(� Of the Burnham adntinistrclion renntins c�IOCtded Im the c�uttntr\ 's racial dig ision. The tnajorit\ Of .\fric�ans continue to support Burnham and his policies and rcadil\ indentil'\ \\ith hill because he is black. Some of the more radical and militant blacks believe that he is nu,ving loo slo \%k. and the\ lime withdrawn their support front his gosrnunc�nt. The I�:ast Indians generally view Burnham \citlt indif- ference or resentment. largel\ because he is not one of theist. ;Otd because the\ bavc little� or no \oie�e ill the making Of gmc�nunenl policies. It appears that at least sonic vast Indians. frustrated \\ith being out 01' p(mer for so long and disc�OUraged orr the prospcc�ls of regaining their former role in the government through the electoral process. net\ he grayitaling toward evcntually resorting to violence. 'thus Burnham nta\ fin(I it (liffie�(t(t to continue� to giwern b\ (ICHIOCralic nu ells and may adopt extraleg:d measures to assure survival Of his go(rtnnu�nt and his black rule. B. Structure and functioning of the government (U /OU) Guan:t gainc(I independence on 26 \lu\ 1956 and bec�anu� it republic within the British Commonwealth on 23 February 1970. It has a parliamentun fottn Of government� patterned ;,;ter that of the United Kingdom� cOntpose(I Of a unicasu�ral legislature and 4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 it 5:1- nit -mber \atioual t l a liani�nt 1. Tht (:ollstitutinu. \c hick taunt� hilt, (41 �t on illdepcildvilc da). !nadv pro\ision for the \;Ititmal It, ((�elan� th(� country it r(�lruili(�. ill %\hidi line� Ihr British Monarch ;u h( I(I of Ntatc and Iol�;rlk r(�prvwnted h\ the (;m(�rnor (:cneral tca, replaced h\ it Presidcnl (�I(�c�tvd he it ,iinple ntajoriI gate of tie \Iti()n ;l :\�,cutil\ (I`il;IIrr I). Tllu (:on,tilnlioll pro\ ides for an appointed jntlic�iar\ ;Ind a unicanu�r if Ivilklature elected ht .(�c�rt�t iallot under it ,\,Ieul of priy,rtional reprvwnlation: the ntini1twin wlilll; ate is 2I war>. Thv major burden of t;o\ ernni�nt is earrie(I k the (:otiiwil fit Minister or (:aiinet. llm,ided (,\,�r l) the I'rinie Minister. \\ho,e ewculite Niip �ntac\ is nn(lueaiotu(1 ,u lomg :i, h(� n�tain a Iuai(Irit\ in the assenll,lc. The 0)IIStit(Ition (.ontain it Kill of Kidht,. chieh vinimenttes in detail if citizen', ritlits to v(ItialiI\. permnnal fn�edonl. and property. The constitution recognizes th(� role of the Leader of the Opposition and pro\ides forc-onsullation c\ith Ili ill h\ the I'riine \linister in it clumher of iitipirt inatlers. Provision fs al u, made for ;fit lae(tiou (:onuni \(hich has responsiiilih for the w of Doter� and IFte conduct of the elections. "111e (:onstitution can he amended b\ i t siniply ntaiorih vale of th(� a senlbl\ t ((l,t Ior oni� intltorlant luoci,ion \chi(�h rt�(luir(' ;t I 1( 1, \t it, or. i ,ouu :r�t a ro�It retidtlIli. I. 1� \cculive "I I'rt� (,I (:o\:tn ;l act, its lilttlal chid of I;Itc. 1� \t�(�Iitl \t to i\% r Iic \ciIII Iliv I'rini' '\IiIIi r a, Head of (:opt rnntrul. Thu I'n��itleid i cicctt (I to it ear t(�nn Its the \;itiou ;tl \Ilh(iligh it( Irt oIk ;I fi1;IIrt�Ilea(I. IIit I'I-(�si (If �nt foriIialI\ itI)p )it t-, the I'rini� \liIIi,ter. the Leader of I 1 Oppq )sit itill and the OIIIiII(kill;tll. "I�he,e ;tl,l,,)inle ho,\\(�\t�r. Inn be indi\idiiak tcio wt tt ;tll\ eonunand the ippwt of Ili� n lit jttriI\ oof tit� III(�tltht 1 of the \.,l i n i f eIIIIif\ and the iippo,ilion. r(,lI(�cli\�.'I. Ilu\\( ;I in the Britkh parhanivntar\ "tent. if it niot( (,f the a pa ��s a Ito lolnfi(!vII(�t� inolinn. the I'rini� Mini must either r( ur adki the President. \thc, nI ;I r(�\okv the al pohit- nient of the Prime \1inister. "I'he I'r(�,id(�nt max di ,md\e the asm -nthlt lthns (or(�iim ne\c elvOWn'. I. if the affil�(� of I'rilne \Iinister i \;((ant or held i\ an lIldi\idual \t ho hats received if rote o1 nu- eonfidenee turd there k no I/ro,lx�(�t of finding lu�rson aho (-;Ili (�onuuand the ipport of the Inajoril\ of the depities \tithin ;I reasonable amount of tittle. lu all other PRESIDENT Leader of the PRIME MINISTER Ombudsman SUPREME Opposition COURT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY Court 53 Members of Appeals 5 Years t COMMI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS High Court Elections Ministers Ministers selected Public Service selected by from outside Judicial Service Prime Minister National Assembly Police Service from (maximum 5) Amerindians Land National Assembly Attorney General Appointment upon advice of the Appointment Prime Minister (and for judges, the Judicial Service Commission) 0 Dissolution after consultation with Prime Minister FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U /OU) .0-- App I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 irt�tallue" III \t,%c�r. Iht, I'rc.ult,nl 11111%1 lirl 1 1laiit tbc ifppriI%;d of Ihl. 1'rirnc \linis(l.r ur mic ul oil dcsigliall-d minister 1white aclimt ;viivral direction amt contra! of tilt- i,mcrimiciii rc�t %sill) tilt Cminc�il ()I \l ini�tt,r.! cchicli is diructl\ re- -pon,iblc t() Ili(- it Till. cotnicil is conllnlad of tilt- \Ihirtiv\ Gviivial mid ninish�r� alI)inf��d b\ Ibc Prc.idcnl. actin%; lit acconlaucc %%jilt Ihc adk ict, of tilt, I'rimv \linish�r \111.4 ()1 Ihc� nllmlivrs :irt� dr .mii (ron %hl- Inaiurih parts iri the .1 Tilt, Iniui�tc�r� are alrloinit,d frmit Ihc� ciccicd mi-ml wrs of Ihc� ��c ntbl or ()rods ct Flo .4 rc 4piali lied to Ic� cicclt,d as .rcb nivildwr� "fill- mitidi rr t I mitiklcrs \cho art- nut n(Intbcr� of tfv a wml)lc ma\ nut I- \c�c�cl lour. mini.tcr� thus allitiintc�(I .Ito- tit lit cutiIIV mc�tnbc�r� Hit. 114 (wneraI. till- principal It,t,.il .ill%i'4�r to Ihc� i;o%!�ritnl-nl. is alInlntled b\ till- Pre In addition 'o Ilit I'd fill \linislcr mid Ihc \tt()rn4 N. ( tilt (:onncil of \lini�lvr� is cunilnsl-(1 ,I lit-ads 4'i Ibc lollm%Iint till ri.0ril- Coo1wrativcs and Community Development Ih�fcn.c Economic Development Education Finance and Trade Foreign Affairs I fealth Ilona� Affair. Ilousine Infornatiott, Culture and Youth Labor and Smial Security Local Cowrtunent Mines and Forests ,National Development and Acricultun� Public Affairs Works and Communications 11a included :Irc \linislt,rs ()f ~talc for \t;ricullim anti for I'll IAiv St,r\ice mid it \li lister Witb11nt I'ortfolin Since 1966 till Prime \lini bas rulaincd for biiii-wIf tot, p of Delcnsc The (:on.titntion sla�cifics that till- 1'rimv \lini.ler must cmititllt with Ibc Ivader of tilt (11ppo sili()II on iinl)ortaiit m :ttIvrs such as ct,rlain scnior appoinl- nn�n1s. bill this is it pro forma declaration of intent b\ Ihc Prirnc \1inistvr stud (Ines not iillph ilm delibcratio,I- rcic� or %clo pfmcr f()r Ibc I)Ilto� I.vader. 'I'll(- 1'rinic \lini�lvr is rv(piirvd In adtist, tot, I'residew ()n tot� appoiutincnt ill .u (hnbwlsntan wb() serves for .t I \car It and rata\ be rea1)p init,d. Tbis official. ;I v4 it Iit;un� in Scmidin;t\ian t;mcm- ntcnls. has jnri�di(tion (o imcstii!alc actiom taken b% For a 4 urn td 11 41f 1.vt L41� rnn1, rat Ih, 1.11' ,.n.ult ('lord, of Stato. arul l'alnrirt \(rrribrr4 ill Fnrr"n Gat cmrncnl i I I1.1hh4'4I nr1nIIII\ 114 flit I)1 r� to )1.11 ,d Int, 1h.. n� 1111.11 tilt, 111.4 n, 4 \V4'nr4 i, .ICilhorilil-s. c�illic�r on his (mll i11ili;l1kc or itlnlu rccck lilt ;c conildaint Iron, ill, ,1t! l-(I illiki( ()I fnnn ant nit�11ibl.r of Ilcc� \.1tional \�sl-tubk 'fill- I)nibudsnuut is 11411 4-1111( m l.rl.d to crilic�i /c (olio but ()ill\ facills in adniiiiislralimi a11d is n�slrivied Irfim ilvidim! \\itli such imiller ;IS iimicmul cic�Ic iiw. If)rc�it;ti refill if ()r I lit lsc casl.s \\iIIfiIf Ihv coiuln�Il-ncl- 1 i (ilt� c4mrts ()r Ipiasi- iudicial Im(lic�.. The (1im icellia ul Ihc� I:mirt ()f \I peal ;Ind till. (:bill (if%(ict Iry iip1wiuled b'\ Ihl- I'residc11l acliut, ii on Ihc� rcc tit the I'rimc� \linistcr. aftvr c()nl \citb Ibl- I.radcr(if Ih( ,Oplositioii. \111 ,tlItui fit munk in tin� incliciim. Iht, Ixllice. i f Ihl- tic it l :ire� madc in accimlancc scith Ihc� ad\icv ()f the J n(lit %il Scr\ ice. hilice tit,r icv�. ;n d Public til-r icc onunissions. ncl,llccti\ck. which. an speuilil-d ill Ihl. :omlitittiou. :Iry to by in(lrltc idviii. Deslile chano; be both Jiit;wi mid Bimiham that racial prcimhcl.s 11,1\ I- hand( cd t;u\vrnnivul lmii;iarns. till. civil scro,wc. which isa ppro\im ;ilck 65', lifrica it imd:ia', I:al Indian. bill t;cncrall\ maitatainl-d a Iroll.ssioiial if )it lloliIicad stTitus, ifppru\i mat iniz Ilit liriIkb Ir.idilion. Bclatimil hchti�cn memhcrs of the tcco mcl-1, h;i%c c,cncrall\ bccn t,00tl 011 11im�I\ c k it l ice kmvs. .�nd .1 I.iirl\ hivh esprit dl- cnrll hill, bccn m;cintuincd. 'I'bc� liar Intblcm of the burcauc�mc\ hail not bv iiep)til I)arlisandiil. or dislo\;ill%. but r.ithcr it low 14.\ 1-1 0l adrtiiuistr'OkI. anti I4-cl11tical (.4mi l-tellcl duv to inadt,tluatc cdiwalion. Irainine. Taal c\ltvricn(c. Legislative Member of till- 5: \alionad \..cmbl\ arc vlected to ;I 5 car term hick can be shortl.r if till. ,lsscnibl\ is Ilis�obcd, ('mididalcs ary clech�cl under if l of Iwimoiottal wpi 'I'hc ii,wmI)lc ittaf, c\pand its meml,crl,hilt bl-cond 5:3 and mop ails() 4 b.ucta the %\Acm ill prop4)rtion ;41 reprcl to Cliff' in wbicb ,()fill- call arc filled on ;4 conl,titucnc\ basis :Ind Ihc remaii0cr b\ allocation Itct-,\cc�n p.irh lists in l it \%air Ihatt till- mcraill coniltol of lilt \illinnal is in prcll11rtion till- uh s cast in Lwir 441 the resll-cli v lists. Oiialificiitions In rim Inclndc Ifni mimcallIf cili /vii residc�ncc in :n\an :i duriiw, Ibc prc%inus \ at IvivI 21 \cars of .it;t,. abilih to silt ill :ind read I�:11>dkli. and cerlain refli6rem �nts of lo\;dI\ and Irobil. In addition t() its rei;nlar legida(kv pmcrs lhl- issl-nt)lx cart \()1t, if stall- ()I cmvrgvnc�\ whl-rvb\ the itmeritmcnt rcc(-i%v% the aulh()rih t() detilin. willimit trial or cbarev. arts per in bow frec(lont is decined Inimical 141 Ibc bcst intervAs o1 Iht, c�onntr tate of vincri4enc is lintitt,d to 6 tnontlts 41111c" 4�\Icndcd b\ it resolntion of the asscnbl\. 'I�hl. caul- 11f .Ins perm APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 (I(-taincd uIIder crt It rg(-nc nu�asures is anlonraticall\ re\im%ed b\ an intlr,11tial tri )tit fill after the st ;,l(� 0f cnu�rgcr(�\ 1111( eyi1�( 1& "I'hc assenIbl\ can i I I I Ic I the cmIstitIItion h\ a nmjoril\ \olc� 1(F all its nrc�nlbcrs. \nwII(fr1( �1Its of provisions cleating \\i111 the I"III Irn(�nlal rights and fr(�v )IIIs 0f tII(� iII(Ii\i(lual. citiicnsIIip, ;1(,(I qualifications for (-Icc�tors a0cl Inc u(h(�rs of th(� assen11) l\ require (�ither it l\\o- thirds vote of all the asscrubl\ menlhers or approval k majorit\ vole in ;r refcrcnd((nr after a n( ajorit Not(- of the Is11( I d The provisiotrs defining the c�onslitution as the s11prenu� !a\\ outlining the territorial hounclarics of the c�ountr\, and declari(1g it to Ilea sovereign, democratic state are amendab1c 0nl\ b\ r(-f(-rcn(Iun1 after passag(- b\ the asscutbly. I'hc ilss(' is also given certain lur\vers to regIIlalc judicial 1)roc(-(IIIres. SI(-c�ific�ally. it (an regulate the making of iI catioII t lh(- courts and the procedure of the courts \\h(-rt determining constitutional (joestio0s th:(t are related to fundarlcn- tal rights and clec�lions :111(1 to the ntcnlhcrship of the National \sscmhl\. :3. Judicial La\\ in (;Mara. both civil and criminal, is based nturinl\ 011 tit(- conlnlou :out statute la%\ of the lit (-d Kingdom- 'I'll(- princ�ipics of' Homan I)111e11 lav\ it heritage from th(- pre British period �have been retained, however. with respect to the registration. c0n\e\ancc, and nlortkaging of' land. TIIere is ahsolrltc cgrtalitY of the secs before tit(- la\\ in all natters. including divorce. property. and inhcrilance. The constitution provides fora Court of \ppeal and if High Court. \vhic�h together constitute the S;rprenu� Court of Judicature of Guyana. The Court of \ppcal consists of the Cltanc�ellor. who presides: t 1 (thief Justice of the high Court: and such other justices as the National \ssembl\ prescribes� presentl lhrev. The high Court consists of the Chief Justice anc. as prescribed b\ the iss(.nrf)l\. nine :(d(litioual jr(li (vs. The Chance and Chief Justice arc appointed on the recommendatim, 0f the I'rinic Minister: the other judges of bode courts are appointed in accordance with the iId%ic�(� of the 6 -e1an Judicial Service COnuilissi0n, hid includes the Chancellor, th(- Chief Justice. and tit(- Ch of the Public Service Commission. OIICV appoinl(-(I. iIidg(-s serve until reti re! u�nt at age 65 i1( the (�a se of the (:h ;Incel to r, the CIIicf Justice. ;11I(I the justices of the Court of \11)(-,11: a age 62 in the case of* the jrclges of the I ligh Court. Ilowever, the Jrt(licial Scrvice Commission n,,I\ pernrit the Litter to continue ill olli(v until :1,�,c 65. \o judge caul be rcnro\ed In)III office c\ccpl for iIlabilil\ to I)vrI rI!I the fIIIIcIloII of 11i,, oflic�c or inr nri,,con(IIIcI. ;411(1 Ihc�n onl\ IItcr ;c tri!,nlud has rcconnncndc(I reference to tic lu(lici ;d Conrt41ittcc of the Pri\\ Council in I.orOou ;111(1 Ihal conuuittcc ha,, ,((lv iu�d rem( id. 1ppc ;(I 1('a\ he made front the IIivlr COUrt to the (.curt of :\pp(-;d and from the japer (o the Britkh Monarch i1( (:mmc�iI Prix (:ouuc�il) it case, relalinl to the cidorcenlcut of fundamen1:11 nigh(,, or the interprctalicnr of the t 11 ioO. \1!1,( it \v a,, aliticipalccl that this rigll( of app- \\111(1(1 he (-hancd hell ;11\mia bccan1( a rcnuhlic because it its con,,idcrvd all ifiidcsir; colonial \e,,ligc. the Burnham admini ,,lratiou �idcd i1( (arl\ I!) O to retain it. 'I'll( Suprcnu Court of 1ttdic;llurc ha,, unlirlitccl jllrisdic�lion in civil mattcrs, \\ilic�11 arc trial Iry a ,,irgh jmlgc \vithout ;t jute. V irtue Has jurisdiction i1( criminal n fit tl( r IrolrgIIt before i( I iIidic�tIIwiIt. \Iagistral (-s hold c(II of sun11n;11 jIIrisclic�tiou tIf roifaII IIt the (ornlr\ and nulkc I,rclinlivan inquiries info in(liviahlc (-vases. 'I'll(- rules of proc�c(lurc i1( all courh are suhslantiall\ the sank ;t in their British counterpart \n (Acc�lllive official. the Director of Pnhlic� I'roscculiou. is rc for institotinsg, dircc�ting, and disc�ontirl Ili n criminal proccc(ling,,. 4. Local government 1 of local gmernntcrlt Ira,, bcvii in c\islenc�c for nver a centrn in (;u\ana. 'I'll(- prescnl of lm- it government is lart(-ek confined t( the coo"tal pl ;tin :lid. duspit(- the large nrrnlhcr of kcal grncrnnucnt bo(lies. Icss than half of the popolaliou is rcachcd b\ the local m1horitic 101 the Imi -Im,,c of local government Cmima is divided into nine a(lntinislrali\c dktrict (three int(-rior .411(1 si\ c(asl;rl in hich there are if number of to\\n and village and c�omitr\ districts: ;111 I)ut t\\o of the to\%II and other c�alegoric arc in t 11 (�oast ,1l administrative (listric�ts. I�:acl1 of the nine adntiIli (I-a- Ii\e (list ric�ts is hcadvd b\ it I)isti-ict Con41ni ,,ioncr. \Iajor changes in Cu\ :1na s local gmvniment s\,tcm \\ere introduced (Irving 1970 un(I(-r the go el11l1 cnl local government reform progn41n based maim 011 t 1 NIC0111111CIl(atlons of Dr. A. II. Marshall to British consultant). The c�hangc,, im')ked lhc c\tcrsior of the boundaries of the evil\ of CeOrget(m if amt tltc to\\ 11 of' \vw \nlster(lafit and the crc :rI i )II 0f ne\\ to\\rt district councils. art(1 illuges. The 1,c\\ twits comprise larger gcogrophical ar(-as. in 111,111 c�as(-s old ill,19c districts \\erc merged to form m APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 the new units. chile sugar estates and man other areas came under local government for the first tuna�. about S i of the astr poptilaliou has been brought within the ambit of local govenument. In addition, the electoral s%sten %%its changed from %yard representa- tion to one of proportional representation on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Elcetions tinder the new systen sore held for else first time in 1970. After these changes. there arc, apart from the c�itx of Ceorgetoscn and the town of New Amsterdam, three to\tns. 0 district councils, village councils and one country authority. The re�veuue of the loc;)l unit is derived muainly from it rate levied on the appraised value of property x\ithin its boundaries. The responsibilities in addition to the nuun;agcncnt of local affairs ge nerdy, include the provision and maintenance of roads (other than public roads). the operation of markets, abattoirs and cemeteries. environmental sanitation, and cvrlain internal drainage and irrigation works. The Minister of Local Government is the central authority with respect to the city of Georgetown. the town of New Amsterdan, other towns. and district councils. I le is enpowercd to establish to\%us nd district councils, approve the annual budgets of such councils (exc�cpt Georgetown and N(-\y Amsterdam auth:lrize councils to borro\s mane\. approve b I;�� s made by councils, make 4ttaanc�ial regulations for councils, and order an inquiry into the functioning of it council where it is felt that it has abused its p(mers or defaulted in the perfornutince of its duties. Tll( Local Government Board is th� c�cntral authority with rest t to village and country districts. It is it corporate body and cmnpriscs 10 nu�mbers� threc cx- of fic�io and seven appointed by the government. N- lembers hold office for gars but are eligible for reappoh0ment. Tbc� Local Government 3oard exercises general supervision over the operations of village eenmrc�ils and country authorities, and among its functions is the approval of the annual budgets. Voluntary associations have been formed by local authorities within each coastal administrative dis'ric�t. These voluntary org anizations, called Unions of I. cal Authorities, nneet quarterly to discuss matters of c�ommor, interest and to decide on means of improving conditions in the towns, local govcrnnu�nt districts, and villages. The District Commissioners attend and address these meetings, reviewing the main events of the preceding quarter, and cotamenting generally on current aff airs and plans for the future. In the last few gars, there have been guest speakers, including ministers of the government and specialist officers in the public service. 'I'll(- voluntary Guyana Association of Local Authorities, which originated in 1905 as the 6 Village Chairmen* Conteremce, serves to coordinate the interests of the local private associations and public authorities. The capital c�il\ of Georgetown, \\hose boundaries were extended in 1970 from an area of about to about 15 square miles, is aebuimistered b\ it corporate bode, 'I'be Nlavor and Councillors of the Cite of "Phis body is ;tutouotnoets. apart from certain matters cchich require the approval of the Minister of Local Governnu�nl. The basis for its selec�tiom was broadened raider the tomcr ntnends local governnu�nl reform program, which abolished the former \\ard system of representation in favor of it systc�nn of proportional representation on thr basis of adult suffrage. In elections under the new system in Jtine 1970 for ?5 seats. the Peoples National Congress (I' NC) gained 21. the People's 1'rogressive Partx (I'I'I') three. and the United Forcc (C F one. The ne\y system proyidcd for tricrtttial elections for councilors bcgiuning in I)ec�entber 197?. :1 nnayor ;utcl depnt\ nztyor are elected anu lit lly front anurug the c�ounc�ilors. The m�venue of the council is derived from it general rate and a water rate levied on the assessed anneal rental valuation of property syilhin the cotimc�il are and from market and other fees. The to\yn of Nesc Aunstcrdamn, whose boundaries acre extended from 1'^ square Writes to 16 square moles in 1970, is administered by it similar corporate body. In the June 1970 elections for 12 seals the I'NC gained nine seats. the I'I'I' two, and the UF one. The tei\yu of I,inelem, also ill the district of Demerara \yith an area of approximuatcI\ 55 square miles, was transformed from it village district into it town in :April 1970. Its corporate bode, clec�ted in June 1970. has 15 councilors of the I'\(:, wlw were unopposed. The towil of Bose Ilall (in thc district of l3crbicc), fornu�rly u village district, was established in Septcnber 1970. Its corporate bode has 12 councilors, all of the I'NC. rlcc�tccl ill December 1970. The toxs n of Corriverton (also in Berbice) ryas transformed fron it village district into it to\yn ill September 1970. In the first elections in Dec�cinber 1970, 15 councilors Al of the PNC were une'pposcd. lu the coasta! areas there are six administrative districts: East Berbic�c, West Berbice. I ?ast Demerara. West Denm�rara, Essequibo Islands and Essequibo. In each district there is it district commissioner whose principal duties are to coordinate the activities of the various govc�rnmtenl departments and to provide advice and a.sistancc to the village comntimilies. The bulk of the c�ottntn*s population lives in the coastal districts in towns. local government districts, and villages with inhabitants numbering between 15.000 to ,30.000. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 interior districts of the North, West, Mazartuti- Potarc, and Iltptuttnti cover :tit area of some T0,000 square miles with it Population of tinder -10.000. Fac�h of these districts has a section of the international frontier as part of its boundary. "They are administered b\ the Ministry of Local Government through a commissioner with it senior staff of three district commissioners and six assistant district contutissioncrs. The overall commissioner is also responsible for the administration of ;kinerindian affairs: the Amerindian communities are scattered over ac very %tide area ill it great many "districts� and "reservatio its. A parliamenlar\ secretary was appointed for the first time ill IN- (-�ember 1911 1 to be ill chargeof;lnu rindian a ffairs. C. Political dynamics As self government was gradually extended to British G,ciaaut along with other British colonies in tIv late 19.10'x. aspiring Guianese political leaders started searching for it suitable platform f"rotn wlich to expound their proindependenc�e yi(-\ys :aid ntuhilizc- popular stcpport. 'I'll(- PPP, forne�d in 1950 by Cheddi japan and Forbes Burnham, was organized to provide such it platform. Ideologically, the PPP platform was intended to appeal to both of the major racial groups in the country by stressing nationalism and socialism. In 1953, after the British had suspended tit(- constitution, Burnham became concerned that the increasing) radical tone of' jagan's pronounc�cinents Might be seized upon by the British its an excuse to proscribe the party and dctcy the colony its independence. By 1955 Bit rn [tit ill's own misgivings over jagan's policie, and his desire fur party leadership caused hint to break with japan. Wlwn Burnham left the PPP to found the PNC in 1957, hc�claimcd thatt he had deposed japan as party leader and took most of his fellow Africims with hint. The hulk of the E ast Indians remained in the party with japan, tilts narking tit(- bifurcation along racial lines of domestic� political life. Otter political tics have since emerged. bnt in ['lost cases they have been organized to promote the interests of various cccial or religious groups rather than offering tIt(- voters it genuine� choice on ideological grounds. Racial hatreds have often flared into open violence. In 1962, 1963, and 196 -1 the nucchinations of political leaders, principally F ast Indians, led to serous rioting in which tnanv lives were lost and notch property was destroyed. The scars from these three upheavals have becu slow to heal and have done much to prevent it rapprochement between the two major political parties. (C) :kftcr 000 her 1962 (;tn:u:,'s pulitie�al history revolved arooaul the constitutional conferences held by the British in London ill their attempt to pave lhc- s\ay for independence by working, out a constitution acceptable to all political parties. Tics(- c�oid'erenc�es reflected the inability of the PPP and the PNC to compromise or to agree to :uty arrang(-nu�lit wlieh night put one or the other in power oil independence clay. From time to time efforts were made to hri,,g the two parties together in it coalition government, imt the racial split, the mutually antagoni-!ic� persun:,litie" .4 their leaders, and the Marxist character of' the PPP. made joint rill(- imp)ssible. "I'll( British concept of it loyal opposition was not well formed. "I'll(- PNC achieved power large) bec�:acse the� British. after a series of haul vxperivnces with PPP gov(-rntuents. decided to give the PNC it chance. The electoral systen based on proportional repre�scnt, (-ion \%hiCI1 allowed the PAC to come to power with the help of it snail third part, was imposed by the British after it typically stalemated c�onstit itio 'l�' c�onfercnce in 196.13. The PPP in the last preindependence election in 196 -1 gained -161(' of tit(' vote, bolt it boycotted the 1965 constitutional conference. N(yertheless. the PPP participated ill the government, despite its reservations about the constitution. "Thus, when the British granted irtdepertdenc�e to Guyana on 26 `lay 1966. political life in tit(- forne�r colony had already become polarized along racial lines. In the gars since independence tit(- polarization of Guyanese so(�i(-ty along racial lines has also been reflcc�tcd in the n:ction's political .c. with the African co Ill Ill unity. wIt ic�It has larger been urban. represented by the� PNC led by Ill miliaill, \Rile the great majority of lit(- Elast Indians from the largely rural areas have supported the PPI' led by jaga'l. Together these two parties have never ;tolled less than 5.1 of the vote in 1968 about 92`i (Fieure 2). A third party, the United Forc�e (U has drawn its major support from the white� conmunity� parlie�ularly those of Portuguese ancestry. This party has also attracted substantial :1nerindian support and, in addition, has appealed to those E ast Indians who did not approve of jitgan's Communist ideology !)tit would not vole fur Burnham. While the UP never Lyon more than 1 :3 r of the parliamentary scats or neon- than I(iS(' of tit(. vote, it suddenly found itself in a pivotal role in 196 -1 when neither the PPP nor the PNC \yon it parliamentary majority. Ideological considera- tions, particularly opposition to the Communist -led PPP, prompted the OF to joie: with the PNC to form it coalition government. "Though this coalition lasted until the eve of the 1968 elec�tioe,, the U F's power and a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2 Votes Rncelved 217.8 336.8 312.4 In Thousands 10FJ, 0.3 DUMP 1.4 7.4 .4 OF 16.0 4 12.4 7 36.S 43.0 36 45.8 24 I 41.0 II 4os 22 ss.e 130 FNC o wtlonal AssM+wr S"tswon 1961 1964 1968 "Others 0.97 "*Under a proportioned representational system FIGURE 2. Electoral vote and parliamentary representation (U /OU) prestige were illusory. Bttrnhani hardy concealed his distaste for the coalition: it was never more than an uneasy marriage of conv(nienc�e front which he was prepared to seek a divorce at the earliest possible elate. One factor it personality conflict with the former ieader I titer D'Agttiar, it wealthy businessman and chief spokesman for Guyana's conservative c�onuner- cial class. In additioni, both the PPP and tit(- I)NC tended to regard the UP as soinewhat of an anomaly in Guyanese politics, its shallow political bus( destined to be eroded by tat( larger parties. The 1965 elcc�tion confirmed the basic two party structure of the Guyanese political system and highlighted the weakness of the UI which obtained only 5`(' of the vote. It has since dec�lincd ill importance. Following the� resignation of D'Aguiar in 1969, the U F has been led by Marcellus Ficiclen Singh. (C) In addition to the probiem of racial di\ision, tit(' two parties are divided over ideological issues. Thus, while Burnhan, is a nationalist M:tr\ist, jagan is an avowed orthodox Communist who has Ion, advocated radical changes in tit(- political and economic systems and an abrupt turn toward it pro- Soviet position in foreign policy. jagan headed the government on two occasions during the preindependence period, but he was unable to remain in office of London's fears of it possible C:onununist takeover and civil strife. The first jagan government was installed after the PPP 4 wan the 1953 election, but his Conlnluuisl prunuuucenu�nts alarmed the British, who suspended the c�oastilutiun 111d s(nl in troops. During jag;ul's s(c�oud attvnipt to ,ovcrn-- Il(i1- 19(61 �lbc culon \\:ts rcek(d by blood\ rioting and general ,trikcs occ�asiun(d 1111611!\ b\ his policies. cspcci11l\ state control oI. truck unions. (C) The British in the pr(indcpendence period. and Burnlann since then. have becu an\ious to keel jagan nut of power. This nut\ Iru\c inc�rc�;tsingl\ difficult because the t ?asl Indians arc not only the largest racial grotty but also have the highest rate of natural increase. The principal d(yice 11,ccl to prc\enl the I'I'I' fronn ,\inning control of the Nation \ssvinbl, has been the rc\isiou of electoral ret41lations. The s\st(1l1 of the single- nn�rnber constitiw:w\. in effect Ihclore 19(i;i, henefitcd the PPI' bec�au its,tlpportcrs. 11111ikc those of the l)NC. were not c�oncenlrated in rlrb.m area. In !9(il jagan won only -1:3 of the \ote ;tgainst Wi for the I)NC and 16'1 for the l'F. but his part\ held 571 of the 11,seinbl\ seats. In 196 -1. after the British had replaced that s\stenn with one based on proportional representation, the PPP parliana�ntar\ strength dropped to -15`, of the total seats, bringing the party's seats in line with its proportion of tit( Note. In 1968 Burnham adroitl\ timed the elections to enable the I)NC to benefit front the cicc�toral regulations ,chich pro\idcd for \otirng !t, (;mane,( living abroad and the increased use of pro\i(s. ((:I The next general election Host be held be'ore March 197-1 but nut\ be called earlier. In nid -192 there was little doulti that Burnh:uu \could remmin in power. The fast Indian leadership, had bc�eol1W increasingly pessimistic about its c�h;ucc�e of success b\ peac�(ful electoral nu�an 'finis grotting frustration may increase the tcmptution to initiate it progrun of ornn�d struggle. hich jag ;tn ha stated is histuricall\ ine\itable in Gu\;cna. I-.ast Indian insurgency is rnnlikcl\, ho%e\er, in \ie\\ of the possibility that the Fast Indians world be deleated in an\ such ((fort. (C 1. Major parties (C) a. Peoplt :s National Congress WNC) Though 11t3niliam (Figure split \cith lie PIT in early 1955, it was not until after the 1957 election that all pretense of PPP affiliation \\as ahaudoned and he fornall, founded tie P\(:. Although Ile I)NC controls tit(- government. it rc�nains it minority part\ %lose main aim is to perpetuate its role and (Ien\ tae PPP and OF it role in the gov(rnnnent. The I)NC generally espoll,e, a nnoderate socialism. N%hile APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 r FIGURE 3. Linden Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister, leader of the PNC (U/OU) uppr(ru�hing national problems pragnutticall\. 'I'11c I'N( organisation. while looser than 111,1t of the I'I'I'. is controlled by liurnhani its the hart% lea(f.�r. l3urnh,1ni has tightened 11is personal cnntrol of the part, \\I:ilc at the same title lr\ing io c\tend its organization throtit!hout Ilic ccnntrv The annu;tl P \C c(mgre -s serves less :ts it decision nnakitit lm& t11an us it vehicle for nietnbers front outsi(Ic (:eori:c tux\ n to) nicet the national leadership and to voice cotnplairits. The clec�ted hart\ leadership inchides the part\ leader. c11airtnan. t\\o \ice ch;iirinen. gcnend :uul assistant scc,ct,1ri(�s, and tre ,1swer. 'these officials, joined k area and functional group n�pn�senlati\es. form the general (�onnc�il. L'n(Icr the part% organization the co(intr\ is divided into II areas. each v\ilh at least one regional represenIati\ e, v\ ho often rec�ei\es no sit litr\ Iwca(ise of it lack of part\ funds but is given it created government job in the district in \\hick tic serves. 'I'hcre arc 171 local groups, hilt some, partic�tilarl\ in the interior, are \er\ loosely organ a ized \\itli s fe\\ as Ill people. The PNC 11as it li\ -(�Iv widli grin �the young Socialist N1o\enient �;110 it \\cinen s aii\ifiar\. I'he part\'s official nc\\spaper is the .Fete Nation. '111c \fric�ans have strongly snitporte(I Hurnhani. v\hotn th(�\ regard as their c�hanpion. 'I'hc\ have tended to rcg :ircl his ictur\ ;is divirs :111(1 to delmin(I spoils Irunnt dic piing :ind the government. lorco\er. liunthunn has felt Iiinnself constrained (o re\\ard Irn;nl p :u�tc nu�nnbers ;lit(] ret :tin the enlhusiustic support the \fric;ui connnunit\. Hel'we the 1968 clecliou. the part% nuidc serious efforts to \\oo traditional folluv\ers of the 14' and lhc� I'I'I'. Il 11,1(1 suhstunlial success in \%inning over the ('I's nni\c(I \fric�an follu\\ing and c\en sonnc of t{u (:u\anese- Porlugucsc. It appireritl\ As() attr i(�t(-(l sonic of the \\e;dt11\ iii-kin 1 ?ast Indians ho \ulc(I for IIt(� I'F in Iwi.l. H�nrn lit lit 11as AtcriiWed to na inroad, into J.igan's 1� :ast Indian support b\ lasing to dri\e it \\edge het\\ecn Iliudci Mid \Itt,lim. Ilo\\c\er, while some of the ,lushit, Iv,id �rs ha\e bcc it altracted IO t11c Burnhann carnnp. t11c in:tjorit\ of lo\\er class NInslims, particularl\ those in the rand areas. ha\ c�ontinu(�ct t share \\ith other I�:ast In(liuus it deep (list nisi of tIt(� prcdontinantI \frican 1'NC and have continued to vote for the PIT. \s it nnAtcr of policy, the P\(: pa\s lilt service to nnillinu�ictlisni in go\ernmenl. bit in r(� ilih :\fric.ins :i re given prefcn ice over 1 ?ast Iit (lhills in a nuijnrik of citses. \\11ct11cr it be for jobs, 11ottsing, or public u�rviccs. This appar(�nll\ is perpetuated in hurt bcc�acis(� cf liurnhain's pi(ltc n\er t1w criticismn bis policies have been receiving front the various opposition sectors. Ile Ims staled that 11c does not intend to tolerate siich opposition an(I has begun to ;inpose harsh controls upon sonic of 11is most ontslanding critics. The nost \oc�al of these 11a\e been the opposition newspapers which havc found it difficult to t;et perinils to innporl ncwsprint. Some 11a\c ceuse(I scrvic�e. 13,,i It liurn11ant and the go\ernnu�nl have filed l ;r\\ suits u\er some of the criticism. The repressive nu�asures niiiy cause serious problems for all the parties and could be it nmitir lactor in the upcoming election. Mirnh;un rviniiins genenill\ optimistic that the PNC \\ill he returned to office after the next genc�rid election. \%hick must be held b\ M.irc�h 197-1. Some of Ili supporters, ho\\c\er. have c\pressed c�onc�ern that the PNC is in trouble bec�iinsc of the persistent nn(�ctplo\tu�nt, the serious shortage of 11ousing. and 111e sluggish economy. \nothcr factor is the rapid growth of the I :list Indian conun(inil\, %\bleb is n()\\ larger than the other ethnic� groups c�onnbiled. More(wer, liurnhani's attack upon 1?usi K avana. hack radical leader of the ;kfric�iin Society for Cultural lichitions with Independent \fric�a \SCHI; Ims produced scriotis c�onc�ern in t11c P \C that h\\ ;lit(] Iris follo\\(�rs \\ill not vote for the I' \C, thus re(Incing the thin margin of black votes the purtN holds over t11c PIT and its I 'last Indian supporters. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 Should the \omw M ac k, that fullocc I: cc:I :Ina \cithh(dd their poles Im the P \C: ;Inc nl;ulil)uLllious III \'tilt' eUllnlltl .Dell as (Icctil red ill tllc 196'6 clectioll, %\MIld Ile e\rll Moore c�\idenl. The I'\(: is 11la"'uecl \cith Inllraincd adlflill :Inc( some 1)uorlc (lualifiecl n illisters to st;lff the mernnrcrll. It is q)lit Ilelc\eell )ntit. radicals Intl older rlrOtlerates. B111 is therefore Im to ul ::ke host of the nlalur dcckiolls in bolll L;m(-rnnu'nl and part% acli\ities. Ile \corks 16- to 20- IIOIn in the Relief Mutt he must he (mink uttic a\ ;Iilalrl( to Acl) in Intl sole earn the si Ili pIcst 11robletils. 'There Ire ten fey\ I' tnenlhel that 13111 call rely lip n1. and he ul)11a' (loos not entirel\ lr(I t :ulcouc. Ile is ccnc�ernccl for hi t ;uul often ch:ull.s s II resicleII s III t notice. "I he oulc nl:ul ill the cabinet ..ho allluars t(1 hate :u: inllul.nce ulnnl I IIrnllcllII is SIIridatll S. I(anllllla1 \li 1ister of I ur( II Affairs ;Intl attorne\ Generid. Ili info I( e r- lias declined since he has ol)1xlse(I I number of [ill nlhanl podic�ics. Si mi l li 1-111,,, lea\e the scene. l)oliti( %lI iIIfithtill" ccoul(1 ensue inunec1i :ltcic. incc no heirallpawnt has been nauu�cl. I)c 1nll\ I'rinu \lillister Reid clues not appear to he c�apahlc of conlnlalldillt; the respect of the Inaioritx of tirn ernmc,,t official" aml of controllin>; the more militant element, i ti Sociel\. r h. Peoples Pro ressit�r Parn (PIT he I'I'I'. the o4lesl lr,Irt. hall cunsi�tell recl.iced a l)lnralitc of the elec�loral cute until I96S. "I'II 1)arl tr:lc�es its liI11i1c t1 the I'oliticaI AIIairs )Ili Inittee. the 1'ir I si"niIic�:ult lit)IiticaI organization It ill B ritish (:uialia. 'this i lum Ili ,t l to liIical e(luc;lIioII grout) Ica, formed in 19 16 1 (:hedcli JaLgaII c F igure 1 and Ili" AI n�rican \c ife..1mIct tiee li( 1sclIhcr' 1 I figure 5 he it ill I c) 1 \c hen he N% ;I detilal strldetit in (:hicag atill she %\a" a student II I II act ice in lelIist circles aml rel)ortcdI\ a number of the bung (.:M"Illtnlist I,vagne. In order to gi\c Ili group it mass II(m( r Imm'. Jagan bl.c�anle act i\ 'e in I III(ltitig the of the sit! ;rl \\orke rs.:I n( l c\ilh their sti I)p)rt cc ;I. electcd to the I,egisl;l(k( (:millc�il in 191 Ill JaIIII ;lrn 195(. loiIIII itIt I� lit IrnhaIII I)I(�si(lenl of the British Cuimi ;1 Labor I'nion. the Iagarls I'( )I the Its Imwrinl of inrine(liate reform, its abiIil to unite the mra Fasl Inchafis and the urban \corking class blacks- ;lit(] the nr, talents of Janet J:Igall soon Ina(le it the most p(m erfnl lu)lilic�al force in the colon. Shorn\ after the I'I'I's founding, a 1rn\ -key p(mer �,trtiggle broke out bctm-crl I?)nnb.tnt and Jagan. tit first because of Mirnhalu asl)iratious for leadership and later hecanse Btirnb:tln belic\cd that Jaigalt increasing inmolc'e)nent c\ith international (:mmmmist APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 FIGURE 5. Janet Jagan, Secretary for Inter- national affairs of the PPP (U /OU) FIGURE 4. Cheddi Jagan, leader of the PPP (U /OU) circles might be seized upon b% lbe British as it reaunt for proscribing the partN. The leadership fight did n become public. huwexcr. and the parh grey% in nu�nuhership. inning the 195:1 election with 51'i of the yule. OIce in office, the NT rejected tln� existing constitution as an i tit deeluate instrument fur ac�hitying independent government .uud atteruple I instead it intplentcul its 11 1),dicies (,f accelerated progress toward full self government aueef the establishment of it Marxist state. The part% crindians, among whom there are various tribal groupings with profound diversities in cui:um and social organization, but who nonetheless tend to ac�t politically as one tlentnl. Although accounting for only about -1`(' of the population, the \tnerindimtsare it pa\yn in lht :uyana \'enezuela b(rOcr dispute (discussed below tinder Foreign Policies). In addition, given the delic�:(te balance of Guvanesc politics, clue ;\merindian vote of about 1(1,11(1(1 assttntes c�onsidcr- ahlc significance. While in the past the OF has had the greatest success in attracting the Amerindian vote, both the I'1'I' and the I'NC have been increasingly seeking it. Pursuant to i t (Itcisiun malt at the 1965 Constitutional Conference in I.un(lon that the Amerindians should be granted Icgal ownership or r; 'its of oc�c�up, Bey in areas where they are wdinarily resident tit \mcrin(lian Lands Commission was set tip to ime0i9ate and rec�untmertd the awarding of suc�In lam(ls to individuals, families, village councils, or tribal groups. commission ryas also empowered to rec�omnu�n(I limits on the antnttnt of lun(I to be assigned to all individual or tribe, whether such title wmdd include subsoil rights, and ho\%. subscclutnt salts should be regulated in order to protect the Itss sophisticated Amerindians from unprincipled land speculators. No information is available concerning the conclusions reached by the c�ommjlission. I'll( govertnu�nds polic,\ lo%%ard the \meriudians is relatively culiglitcued, dressing improvcntc�ul c,f their material and social \cclfarc and their ,gradual integration into :u\aliese soc�iely. Innplentcn tit ti( u of this polic�\ has snffcrcd front ad ministrative dcfici(�II"'ics aucl. in the 196.1 6S peric,cl, front (I ifferviwes d ol)ittiou \%ithiit the parties of the goven ting coalition. 'I'ltcrs. \%Idle the l'F has (tphcld the rights of the \itwrindiaits as the original inhabitants, the I'N(: has tended to be more cuncemed \\ith promoting the rights of the \fric�ans: Bunnham has also tonsiclered Ile idea of settling the interior \\ith blacks from the eastern Caribbean islau(!s as one \1av of tuaintaining the balance beh .\fric�atns and baud Indians. While the l'F supports the :\nntrindiau claim to all the lands the\ have� traditionally oc�c�upie(1, including mineral rights. Burnham has tended to prefer a legalistic interpreta- tion that the interior is all :ro\yu laud. lit the� government s yie\y, the :Xmcrindians o\yu only those lands to which they were granted title by the Cru\yn� a relatively small portion of the area to \yhic h the \mcrilldiacns claim ownership. The Burnhann administration has yet to recouc�ile its advoc�ac�y of integrating the \nu�rindian con"nnunily into the larger Guyanese society \yitln the \nterindians� (Icterttina- lion to remain on large rescryations spcc�ific�aII\ designed to sustain it pntrcl\ \mtcriudian \\;ty of life'. 'I'll( \merindicnn question is tied to the large p>roblcn of settling aid dcycloping the interior� inc�Imding the (puestions of" the number of settlers to admit and llm� terms under which they should accpuirc land. h. Economic der elopment 1 major goal of the Burnham administration is to promote Guyana's cc�uuontic dcyelopment and raise the standard of living- although the cstablislntuent ()1'a socialist stale clontinates the ccunonty. In the prreindependence period runny :u\ancse began to yitW c�olouialism is the root cause of all national problems and iiidepcndcuc�e acs a panacea yhicln would !c'ad inuucdiately to at new prosperit\ for all. Beset by racial and i(leolugical tensions and \yith fey loyal and talented men available for gover incnl service. it fell to Burnham to seek to satisfy the inflated expectations of the ncwly in(Iepmaleut Guyanese. Political instability had eroded investor confidenc�c- while the lax stntc�ture proved to be an additi impediment to business and investment. G,nana's infrastructure had been neglected� roads required rttaintenalice, sea defenses were in disrepair, the international airport was badly it, need of reconditioning, and the conmrtrtnic�ations and pmver IN APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2 networks %%vrc� years behind in expansion programs. Urban imemplo%uu�nl %%as high a rural couditic,us primitive. In addition, sugar and rice, the maiuslays of the agricuIttiraI sector, were prof iud list rics. \\'arid sugar prices Wert- below the cost of prod(Ic�tion in Gcyana. and lilt- inchutry depended upon preferential markets tm survival. The rice industry was int-ffic�ieut. Plagued b\ low yields and poor (Iualitx, and had been distorted by Ja,g;uCs pulic\ of inflating I>rict-s to growers. From the beginning. lilt- administration sought to disc�uurage the unrealistic popnlarasstunption that the irmernment co(Ild inusediatek solve all problems ur that I'mvign assistance would obviate the need for sacrifice al home. Instvad. the goyenunenl stressed that independence brought \\ith it greater resp m- sibilities and that tlt!�re w as no substitute forsclf -help. Though under no ill(tsions concerning the tittle and investment which would be re(li ired to (levelly the c�ouutry, tilt- Mintham administration quickly took charge and enjoyed some varly success. Btrnhant's moderate tone and pro Western orientation slitim- lated international confidence and helped to attract foreign aid and investment. while his success ill ending the violence and lowering the It-yel c,f racial tensions helped to reverse the cc�onomic� dmvnturn of 19(i�i and 196 -I Although economic problems had previouslx received systenut!ie slrldy and analysis, tilt- 13unhant administration, with u.\. tvc�hnical assistance, drew Ill) it Seven fear Development flan 1966 -72), calling for better utilization of natural resources: increased agricultural and industrial productivity: development of ut-%y industries and additional agricultural exports: and construction proje such as sc�a cleft-nses, dams, private and offici;tl housing, schools, hospitals, roads, and facilities for air transport and for storage. Other goals inc�ludcd development of additional coastal fare acreage, provision of hydroelectric� power for an expanded alumimun industry, and improved access to the interior. The c�onstriwtion projects were expected to aid the campaign to reduce unemployment. This plan dropped before completion and the government is preparing it new 15 -year plan for 1972 86, including an operational 5 -year plan for 1972- I'olicytnakers accorded the highest priority to agriculture in the developntc�nt program, with t-rnphasis ou expanding sugar production atd improving rice cultivation and marketing. Other plans included diversification to re(luc�e dependence on imports of agricultural conunodities and to increase exports to the countries of the Caribbean Frce Trade Association ::1111F Dcvclopneml policy also IS encourages nulling, espec�iall\ bauxite. Scant-� gold aucl diconoucf delmsih art also being exploited, 111( a lf,v( l()gic�al survey has indicated that deposits of other nu.�tals and minerals ()f c�onunerc�ial value nl;ty be present. The gc,yenttu�rtt has iulroduccd changes in the lax system designed to stimulate sayings and investment and to enc�oumge priyatc enterprise. Other fiscal policies have sought to restrict nouessential inports, euc�ourage the (IM elopnu�ut of local industries, )it rticII!.I rl\ food processing, and improve the foreign each ;uge position. Ilowcycr, the limited sire of the (Imiwstic narkel prevents the dcyelopnt-ul of se11'- srtf7ic�ienc�y in a wide range of nanufactured goods. :1lthough the goyernntt-nt is moderately socialist. prior to 1970 the regime had (,fficially fa%wed a mixed econ(uny \yilh private enterprise playing;u important role it, national deyelc,pttettl. In reality the g(wvnimenl did little to attract significant foreign investment, even though a fesc approved c�ontpauies Wert- provided I,\ the gmernment with tax holidays and investment guarantees. It 19 government policies took it narked turn to the left in order to gain greater control mer the "commanding heights" of the t-cononty. :1 major action was the nalionalizatiou, with contpt-nsalion. ill Jule 1971 of the Demerara I1a11xitc (m.. it subsidiary of the MIIIIiuun Co. of Canada. The government has also indicated that it may be forced to nationalize the l'.S. -mvned Reynolds Guyana `lines, because the c�ontpany has expressed a desire to cut back operations which would result in laying off nearly ?5` of the cotnpany's work force. The c�otnpan\ Mantes the cutback on the depressed world market for ulu it iuu it t. 1'risu� Minister Burnham. meanwhile, claims that politic;d considera- tions do not alloy hint to permit the company to proceed with its plan, and he may have to take (wer the comtpan\ in order to prevent the layoffs. ;uruhani announced in 1970 that in any future deyclopt lent ventures f,y foreign owned firsts, majority control in basic industries would have to rest with the Guyanese Government or the cooperatives. lie added that while there remains it place in thee economy for foreign investment, success in developing G(tvana will be neasurcd by what the Guyanese can do for themselves. Foreign investment, he said, Can only be ;ancillary since it is controlled by external elenenls not necessarily influenced by what is best for Guyana. In line with its eutphasis oil economic nationalism. the government has also imposed restrictions on foreign -owned firsts and their right to repatriate profits from Guyana. In +9 It-gislation was enacted APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 requiring foreign instirance conpauies to reinvest 95; of their profits in Guyana. Prime Minister Burnham in 1972 disclosed a ut-\y polio under which all Guyanese pension foods presently invested abroad will be returned to Guyana and all future funds are to remain within the� 'I'll( government lilts opened discussions with various firsts at:d cooperatives operating pensio schemes, in order to snake these funds available for investment in various development sectors. In addition, the government \vas instrunental in tilt- formation of the National Cooperative Bank with the ultimate intention of' reducing tit,- influence of foreign barks making the Cooperative Bank dominant. This effort is being aided government pressure ot depositors to shift accounts from tot- five foreign banks to the National Cooperative Bank. This bank is curre estimated to bold about 7 of' commercial bank deposits. The governinvids monetary and fiscal policies have been directed toward encouraging savings, facilitating noninflationary financing of government deficits, n td stimulating economic growth. Public savings and investment have increased steadily; public invest- ment, including that financed through external grants and loans, now account for about one -third of total investment. N -lost of this public investment has been channeled into projects to improve and expand the infrastructure. At the same tine, tbere has been a decline in foreign investment resulting from the government's moves against foreign firms operating in Guyana. together with it flight of capital oil i t modest scale. Guyana's foreign trade is of crucial importance to the cottntry's economic well being. Its most hill tat trading partners are the United States, the United Kirtgdont, and Canada, and to it lesser extent the regional members of CARIFTA. Guyana bas also sought to expand its trade with the countries of Eastern Europe, Cuba, and, most recently, with East Germany and the Peoples liepublic of (:hina. Guyana's exchange and trade controls are somewhat less restrictive than those of the other Latin American countries. Government controls on imports and exports were tightened in 1970 when the External Trade Bureau (E,TB) was created. Despite its name the ETB is not limited to foreign trade matters. The ETB became the sole importing agency for a wide range of imported foodstuffs auc] drugs, and 100 items have subsequently been banned from the country. In creating the ET13, the government hopes to reduce prices while lit the same tints eliminating the private distributive chain. Hostility from tit(- business community lilts grown substantially since the� introdete�tion of the� ETB. He�tailers complain (flat prices have risen since the ETB took over and that savings, if anv. have not been Passed o to t c�onsurner. !n addition, shortages of' c'e'rtain foodstuffs, cement, and vital drugs have occurred. "Tile ETB has also been criticized by some members of CARIFTA which claim that the ETB discriminates against CARIFTA- manufacttired goods Ly subjecting theta to '*tit(- maladies of price control� distribution costs. profit margin dictates, etc. A related charge is that Guyanese manufacturers are privileged in hone markets where they do not have to distribute their products through Ills F.TB and are allowed free ac'ce'ss to other CARIFTA markets. c. The role of cooperatives Prints Minister Burnham has placed increasing emphasis on the co- operative movement" as the prinrry mechanisn for increasing the governments control over tits economy. In Burtharn's view, the cooperatives are to be the instrument for restructuring the economy and increasing the role of Guyanese in economic development. Unlike the consumer and producer cooperatives which developed it, Europe and the United States, the Guyanese cooperatives are under the direct control of the government. In theory, the cooperative sector is to coexist with the private and public sectors, but in reality the distinction between the public and cooperative sectors is becoming increasingly artificial because most cooperatives are government sponsored rather than voluntary. Government sponsorship of the cooperatives is deenm�d necessary because the Guyanese population lacks the skills and funds to establish anything m complex than small community services or self -help groups. Originall\. the cooperatives were to be involved primarily in the agricultural anel manufacturing areas, as well as to provide the investment nuchauisnt to Mobilize Guyanese savings for national development. In early 1912 the government announced plans to eventually expand the cooperatives into virtually every area of economic octivity. 'Tariff protection. monopole }privileges, and subsidies are to be used to make the cooperatives dominant. Two of the more important and successful cooperatives arc the Cooperative Bank and the Wholesale- Retail Coopera- tive, which was organized in 1972 with plans to operate nearly 100 cooperative supermarkets. Although members of the business comintinity are hostile to the cooperative movement because it is aimed at them, they have not given up or lost hope that they can hold on. UG APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 d. Labor relations Lab,rr I: :rest 1) r( to Iry an important ingredient in the 1) re; idepen (It ncc disorders it d, indeed. %%zis a tool used by political leaders, principally Fast Indiaut, ill racial and polilic�al antagonisms into several violent confrontations. \\'bile the level of political and racial tension (I in) inisluvd alter 1966, substantial labor unrest remained. Tlic Burnham administration lilts sought to case labor management tension by proposing arbitration tribunals to be used after normal conciliation and mediation procedures liavr failed. policies to assist labor include support of the principle of closed or union shops and conrperlsory union dues, as well as the adoption of tilt National Insurance and Social Security Scheme to provide at wide range of workers benefits, including medical insurance and it pension program: this plan was approved by the c�abinct in October 1965 and passed the National :\ssenrbl\ in 1969. I'ulicics to protect the \%�orkcrs' real wages and cheek inflation include it system of price controls instituted ill 1961 over such basic commodities its rice, sugar, floor, cooking oil, salted fish, milk, and butler. The Burnham administration lilts added such items as agricultural natchinen and tools, fertilizers, building materials, and drugs. 2. Foreign policies a. Relations with other countries Preoccupied largely with domestic issues, the government's concern in foreign affairs bus focused primarily on the promotion of Caribbean regionalism and on problems arising from border disputes with Venezucllt and Surinam. Because of the c�ountr\*s slender economic resources the sc�opc of its diplomatic activities has been limited. in the United Nations. however, enables Guyana to maintain Contact "ith many states, especially those in which Guyana cannot afford to maintain diplomatic missions. Guyana's major diplomatic tics are with the United States, the United Kingdom, Cautada, Venezuela, Brazil, and the Caribbean Commonwealth countries. Guyana lilts diplomatic and commercial tics with the larger trading nations of Western Europe, and more limited relations with the South and Central \rncrican stales and few nations in Asia and Africa. Guyana signed a trade agree nwnt with the I'cople's Republic of China in November 1971. harly in 1972 Peking established it seven -mall mission in Guyana and extended interest free credit of $26 million for industrial projects. Full diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic of China on 27 june 1972. Diplomatic relations with till. Soviet Union 20 m-re established in Dccendwr 1971. Imt Burnham diet uol all(m till. Soy icts to open a resident mission Iwcar(sc of sec((rit\ considerations :aid bccausc he felt that the Soviets \could increase their aid to jagan. lu Mardi 197 i, ho\\c\cr, Bimiliam agreed to all(m the Soviets to establish it sur.tll embassy in :ccrrgcicn%u. This agreement made after Buntham had 1wen assured that the t'. S. S. B. \%oi(Id (Iisc�orrtinnc (Iirec�t (I caIiugs witb jagan and \\ouIll c� ill uucl future assist it c�c tIIrcrc it! h the (:(mink.- Govcrnnu�nt instead. Ilya na also has diI>lonmIic relations ith Yugoslavia. although ucithcr country has eslablidied a resident mission: a number of other Eastern I�:uropean amt Asian nations have cspressed iutcrest in cithcr track or diplomatic eXclranges. Fornu:; diplomatic relations \%crc cstablisbcd \%itb Cuba in I)eccnrbcr 1972. Burnham has tried to crrharrce his standing ill the 'I'bird World by establishing ties with the :as Iro gO crnmenl. Burnham's iutcrest in contacts itli 'Third \eorld countries was indicated b\ his busting the \oualigncd Foreign MiniNtvrs* Conference ill \ngnst 1972. Mc\icu and Guyana established diplmnatic� relations ill Fcbnrary !971. Guyana bus been the urrl\ country ern the :1rnc ricun Continent with hich Mcxic�o bus not had .rip onialic relations. friendly to lftc l'nited States. Burnham bas described Guyanese foreign ;,topic y as one cif nonalignment. On I�:ust- 'es t i Gu :utat lilts generally adopted a pro Weston orientation. despile efforts by japan to have Guyana support anti l'.S. and pro- Cmimumist positions. In direct contradiction to the government positio tlw I'PP lilts c�orrdcntned the U.S. involycment in \'ietnam. srcpported the Soyiet- Icd invasion of CzccltosImakia. and favored the \rab position in the diddle East. :\Ithongb the I'I'I' has failed in its major crbjec�tivc of eroding U.S.- Guyaucu� relations. it lilts succ�ecdcd in tempering Guyana's pro Western orientation. Proposals fur the ccononric� a political integration of the Caribbean states appeal to the Burnham government because of the prospcc�ts of larger markets, enhanced bargaining powcr and increased foreign aid. The obstacles are I*wmidably. however, in view cif the wide1v varying size, population. wealth, and level of development of till- various states. In addition. there are ni nrcrous impediments resulting front pe political rivalries. relatively undvalevelopml trade and communications, and ec�unomies that are far more competitive than complementary �all cif which have hampered efforts to promote closer regional cooperation and integration. BUrrlham has also pushed regional cooperation for purely foreign polic�\ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2 re iIm)II, �to ease :u%;u lit 's political isolation alien gain stronger Conuuon\\eaIth Caribbca n support against Venezuela's ct'fort, ti, keep (:u\;uia oil of hennispherie olganizalions. T1iIis. mu I No\ennber 19; 1 tIic� :,IYanc�sc� Coverunncinl proposed an ambitious undertaking. the so- called IA�claration of Grenada \\hieh called fur it l()nse� federation oI \\ith the� British \ssocialed SL�otes of \nguilla. tit. :hrislopher- Ne\�is, Dmidnica, St. Lucia, tit. Vincent. and Grenada. \ntigua as rininterested. I'lans to establish the federation \\ere developed under the aegis of Burnhann, \vhc, pictured himself as the leader of it unified eastern Caribbean with Georgeto\vn as the capital. 'I'll(- smaller states \%ere under the uni sit pprchensioln that mice the agreement its reached, other independent states in the region Trinidad and T(d)ago and Barbados� \vuuld decide to join, thus offsetting dmnninance by Gclvana. The schcnu� lost its initial numu�nt[lnn after "Trinidad and "Tobago. Barbados, and Jamaica deckled not to join. Most of the smaller islands have now \vithdra\\n their support for the inmement. This effort. like that of the West Indies Federation (1955 -62), \vas doomed 1 the outset because of the insular attitncles and p t jealmelsies of the indlividrlal island leaders. Some progress. Iwwv\cr. has been made toward regional cooperation. III 1965 Gdlvana signed an agreem ent it It tigua andl Barbados setting up (:A111FT:1 it It its secretariat in Georgctm\vn. By august 1968 the original signers \were joined by Trinidad and 'Tobago. the West Indies :lssocialed States of St. Vincent. St. Fitts Nevis- \nguilla, I)unlinica, St. Lucia, and Grenada. and finally by Jamucica. The Guyanese Goycrnmu�nt hoped that C,- WlFT,\ \%mild provide it larger market fur local prodrlc�ts. but thus far the liberalized trade arrnngcnu�nts have not spurred the deyel( )mvilt locally ol light nuunufacturing industries to suppI% the C. market. In January 1970 Guyana also had it leading role in founding the Caribbean Develop- nu�nt Baulk (CI)B), the first international institention of its kind in the region. T11V (:I)B consists oI' four regional states (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados), 12 Caribbean territories, and t uunregionad nations (Cana(1 a and the l`niled hingdurn). The (:I)B Is initially c�apitalizcdl at L'SS50 million. Of the total capital, $20 million \vacs subscribed in equal shares by Canada and the United Kill gdonn and the remaining 530 million by the regional members. 'I'll( United States is not a nnennber, bolt has Houle it loan to the Bank. Guyana has not drawn upon its ac�connt. \Ito migli Gmalca (.1 -est cmntac�ls tr:ulitionalk ha\c been \\ith its English- speaking Caribbean n,�i,ghlmrs. siIICV independence the� Burllnunl aclnninistration hies dc\olccl c�omsiderablc attention to OW \fro :\si:In nations through CdI\aua's reprc�u�ul- ali\es at the� United Nations. Gu%aile. e allentivencss to these nations derives from both the gi illg impular interest among (;u\auu's i'ric�ans and Fast Indians in hat \\ere once their ancestral homelands and the desire to identif\ \\ith other developing states. Even greater efforts have been nlacle to cod Guyana's i.olation from Latin :1nu�ric�11. Gdnvana, hu\vcvcr. is barred front nnennIership in the Organization of :1nu�rican States (O \S) uulil the boundary dispntc ith Vcroezrncla has been ended. Guyana \vas extended permanent nbscrv�er status by the Permanent Council of tFle O: \S in February 19;�2 and has expadIulecl sonu�\vhat its c'ontac'ts \cit other Latin 11neric�an states. Ouc notable tri occurred in 19(i8 \when a Guvancsc \vas clec�ted president of the Latin :\nlerican t�.N. Group and as srlc�c�cssfulIv sponsored b\ the Latin :1lncric�an stales for tine election to tit(- vice presidcrlc�v of the U.N. General lsscnnbly in that year. Venezuela, lim%ever. has used its inllcnence to innpede closer relations bctvvecn Cln:cna and the Latin \nu�ric�an states. "There has. ho\vk ver, been it temporary relaxation of tension ill Guyana's relations With Venezuela and Surinam. dcspitc c�ontinuillg border disputes \vith both countries. The Governcncnt of Guv:uut takes its membership in the UnitvJ Nations very seriously and considers the United Nations it an important if not crucial factor in 01yan:t's security. The guyernment regards the l nitccl Nations as the principal forum in vchic�h it can international synnpathy and support in its territorial dispute's. and it counts hcalyily on U.N. pressures to deter Venezuela 1�rom militar action. Belated to this yic\ypoint is it keen interest in the U.N. role ill pcac�e- keeping and disarmament. The Goycrnment of Guyana is also active in Sc\ v ral specializeel agenc'ie's and attaches p,e Iocular importance to those U.N. ac�li\itics which bear un deyelopnnent problems. Guyana has had it strong U.N. dclegation, considering the linnited size� and inexperience of its cliplonnatic corps. b. Boundary disputes Upon independence Cnyana inherited boundar disputes with both Venczucla and Surinam. By far the more serious is the quarrel with \'enczucfa, \yhich has advanced claims to five- eighths of Goy territory. Surinam claims an additional 5.50(, square miles of Guyana's territory. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 'I'll( Venezuelan claim to 55,0II0 s(luarc� miles %%(-sl of the I�:ssequilm 11ker (I igurc 6) is based ou the c�outcntion that an international arhilncliou lrihuual imard in I899 \%as Mused through hrih(-n I)% the British of the liussiau chairman. 'I'll(- issue rt-mained relativel, quiet until the late 1960l's. In I chnrarc 1966, as Tina. preparations %%ere undema\ I'm Cu\:u,a independence, the l nited Kingdon), British Guiama. and Venezuela agreed to the cstahlidiment ()I' the Venezuelan� C,naursc \liscd (:onuuis,ion to discuss disputes arising out of the Venezraelan c�lain,s. 'I'hc conunission had little scac�c�ess. and Venezuela provoked se\eral incidents- including the seizure ill 1966 of lnkoko Island. a strategic border island. half of which is claimed b ;n\m a. 'I'hronghurat 1967 and 1968 Venezuela cuuduc�ted a semicial,destinc campaign to sulmcrt the .\mvrindians, in addition to encouraging the abmtke uprising in Jammr\ 1969 of white ranchers '.i the ttupummi District (see I:. I�l,reats to (;mcr;imcnt Stability� undcrSuh\er,i(nW. Although Burnham spoke out sharply against this 1 COLOMBIA II O 5 STATUTE MILFS prm(wation, he has treated the general i �ue circ un),pect.l. Brtzil appe to he mpathetic to the ;u\ane(� position. parll\ to counter \cnczucla' Imtcutial cconon,ic iriflueuc�(. ill the Ci,i:u,a, and parll\ to keel) dorma nt the hi,toric� i,sucs \\ith respect io its (mn I)ordcrs. \e\crlhcle,,. Brazil ,eem an\ious to a\oid direct hmikement. nearly I \cars o1 Imillcss ncgotiati(us the co mm-,ioii \%a, su,i)c,'d(-d. and I)s prior agreement the to settle the question h\ one of the mean, prm ided ill the ('sited Nations harter. In June 1970, home\er. rcpreseulati\es of the t\\o uatious aunt ()f the Hired Kingdom met iu 'Frinidad. at hich time Venezuela pledged not to assert its claim for a period of 1? \ear,. aid the parties concerned agreed to the c,,U!blishu,eut of a commission to c�vuniuc u Iva u� of a\ �i(IiIit! potential future border incidents. 'Phis akrcenwnt ha bec�onrc kmmn as the'�h -of -~pain Protocol... C,nana's harder dispntc +ith Surinam ha, hcconu entined in the kwai ;)ofitics of Imth -mintrie� mud i an impedinient to muluai c(m,peration. '1 h, dispute C. I AW1 t V 11:'.1 Caracas Boundary in dispute ,.1 /!,1' /?C rx1. VENEZUELA Ankoko Isldtd ti Rm i BRAZIL FIGURE 6. Territorial claims and boundary disputes with Venezuela and Surinam (U/OU) as Georgetown Springlands GUYANA SURINAM Rupununi District APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 has its origins in the colonial period %%lie�n nvitlu r lliv British nor the Mad agreed on it formal delineation of the boundary beh%eem the two c�olonics and instead accepted the left hank of the :ounutyu(' {liver as the frontier. The two colonial po%%ers agreed on the riser boundary as early ;.s I TW), bolt the difficulty arose because the cxac�t Iocatiom of the Courant n(' \%its I ewer established. It is fairly \y ('II del i Ica led forseycral hundred miles from tit(- :ktlantic Occim, but them divides into N tributaries �the Ne\y 11ker and the Upper Courantyne River. The latter is called the Coerueni River ill Surinam. and farther south it is known as the kiitari. For many years the Kutari \\its generally bclieyed to be the hea(kitters of the Coolruthne and thus the boundary. but xyitlt the discover\ of lbe Nei% River in 15; 1, the Dutch began to argue that it, rather than the Knlari. %was the principal tributary and should be the boundary. The British refused to concede the point and continued to oc�c�up\ and exercise jurisdiction over the disputed region hehy('en the Kuturi and \('.y rivers. In 1939 the United Kingdom and the Netherland negotiated a treaty which \+ould have resolved the dispute in tb(' former's favor. I tm\ever. the treaty x% it ne\er signed because of the outbreak of World War I1. Foll(ming the \y;.r, the Netherlands refused to accept the trc;,ty in-cause of opposition b\ Surinam. l'util Guyana independence the situation had r ('stained relatively quiescent. but in December 1967, elcnu�nls of the Guyana Police Force ejected it tc�an of Surimmmtese ftydrographic engineers from the contested area. joh;tn Pengel, who ryas Surinam's Minister President at the tune, threatened drastic reprisals but mvrvly expelled it small number of Guyanese from Surinam and established it couple of police posts in the disported region. Bentham, in turn, ordered his militan force, to move against the Surinamese police forcing their withdrawal from one key post follo\ying an anned clash. Tile situation was calmed after the l'nited States, the United Kingdom, mud the Netherlands urged both parties to exercise restraint. :though several border confrontations have aggravated tit( issue, the amicable discussions held in June and November 1970 behyeen lbe Prime \linisters of both ;,mtions appear to bavc eased tensions and paved the way for an eventual settlement. Ml Surinamese forces have been removed from the region as it result of these talks, and Guyana bills retained �'adnimislrativv' control over the area. For lbe present, howc�yer. mchieyement of it final settlement of the border disputes is expected to be difficult. Guyana is also engaged in a controversy with Surinam over the ownership of possible .)ffsltor( oil deposits at lbc muntth of tit,- Cou,,,ntyne. Surinam has cmIt('mded that Gncana's uffsIIrc rights om the contiucntal shelf should rum More or less straight out I rom the coas :l to\%n of Springlands. \%I iIv the ;uvant-se maintain that. in ac�c�ordamc�c with gc�rtenlly recognized tnodent methods of such calculations. the line should be equidistant from the nearest point in both countries; the disputed area is, tlm�ref'orc�, a triangle of coastal \emtcr "ith the ap('x al Sprimglands. :k simtilar qu arre I Wenczucla oyv pc :tend ;l offshore oil deposits renwims unsettled and irt\olyes \\alcrs off the disputed Fssceletib(i Icrrilorn. Whide there is eto definite cyidenc�c of oil. cmezuela has staled thu, any oil b('longs to it. an(I any coolcessiom 'ranted by ana \\ill not be respected. In lime \\itb its professed desire to pursue ;t nonaligned foreign policy. Gmana has refrained front becoming it part\ to major treaties or aj;rvcments of it strat('gic nature either bilateral or nultilateraI. In ('arl\ 197_�, bo\y eyer. Guiana ;utd the l'oited Stales signed an agreement that permits the t ailed State to overfly Git\ ill lit and utilize Ti Inchri InternaIi( maI airfield (formerly atkittson Ficld) fur the purpose of assuring lbc defense of the Western Ilcnispherc and t lit int IitIing intematiuual peace and sect riI\ "ithim lbe fratn('\york of tho (:Itarter of the ('nilcd \atioms. E. Threats to government stability (S) 1. Discontent and dissidence 'I'hc most serious threat to Gu\au(a's political and social order lies in the deep distrust and suspicion %yhicb bay(' historically divided the country's t\yo dominant racial groups �t{ie :lfric;uts aut(1 tit(' 1�;ast Indians. Tllc dispute is esSentiall'\ political and ec�ononic. and focus('s ()It such basic issu('s as \ybicb group \\ill \yi('Id political p(mer at:d hick \\ill have preferred access to the limited number of ('nplo\ ntcnt opportunities. B\ the time Guyana ac�biey('d independence in 1966 tbcre had dcy('loped wbal is essentially hyo -part) system polarized along racial lines. The black c�onummity has been represented by the PNC led b\ I'ritme Minister Bttrnitaut. Mille the great majority of' F,ast Indians have supported the NT. it Conntunist part\ forn('d by Buridmi Cheddi jagan, and his ;\nt('ric�an burn \yife. The PPI' leadership, frustrated by its failure to gain control of the goyentnaenl despite ih(' parl\ 's clec�toral strength, bas been nn(ler pressure b\ extremists in its ranks to raise tit(' bann of revolution, employ terrorism. and resort to strikes, economic bmc�olts and similar tactics 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 ;IS it Iueaus of gaining control. TIIcre is. II(mv\cr. idespread disagreement \sithin the ITI' over the isdonl of such tactics. perhaps reflecting the indecision Of the jagans thenlsekes as to Mlether the� part\ should seek to gm ern through the c�\istiug nutc�hinen o1- 1,1(l a revolutiuu. I'olrthernulre. all pulitic�al fac�timis rec ()gnize that disorder and turnw;l nlighl encourage Venezuela to assert its territorial c�laitns more vigorousiv. 'I'll(- future prospects fur Stability in (;u*\:uu! yill be determined to a cunsWerahle extent b\ whether the government a ill be able to meet the expectations of its citizens for a better life. The key to achieving this goal lies in acceleraliug the pace of ec�o11ontic develupnn�nl. but this III!tst he clone in the face of serious h:uldic�apS such as it narro\y resource hose. a Shortage of iuyestment capital, a lack of skilled nuutp(mer� and political pressure for nationalization of fore IgII enterprises that lends. at least ill d:: short run. to limit output and discourage Vital investnu�nt from abroad. Mso. the high rates of uItcII11) 111e11 1 and undereol!ployn let t cvmpoolnd the problems. \bout 20t7i of the population is mwmployed: the problem is most acute ill the major urban ce11lers \yhere it shortage of I()\v -cost housing and poor liyiug c�o11ditions ten(I to exacerbate the sitolatioll. The goyeronuvnt is keenly a\\ are (if' the needs of the people. but the lack ()f funds raises duolbts as to \yhetIIcr aIty significant progress c�au be made in the foreseeable future. Burnham apparentl\ believes his self -help sc�hentc to feed. clothe. and house every Gu\anese \yithin the next 5 scars is the answer to the festering i,roblcm. I)espitc the potential for political, so)ci,d� and economic instabilit\ extremist vicinc11ts enjoy little influence at present, either \yithin the two major political p�rt.ics or ill the country as a whole. 'There are shall groups Of extrcmists ranging from extreluc� leftist factions rec�eiviItg support from (:Mina to black p()wer advocate �hut they are ineffectual and do nut present a g direct threat t() overm, ill stability at this tiItU�. ;011mIgh elen!ents \yithi11 llle opposition ITI advocate violence as the only \yuy to achieve poser. the part\ capacity to momit guerrilla operations is virtually nonexistent. While the Burnham govenimenl's policies have done little to retn:wv or assuage the root causes Of Guyana's deep- scaled racial animosities� there has I een nothing approaching it rec'urrenc'e of the 1962 -1 c�iyil strife. and cunseyolently the level of racial and political tensions has becu sonu�what lowervd. "There are inclic�ations, however, that such tensions are on the ir�crease. It appears that the governnu�nt has (lec�ided o_I to dcliberatck harass the I11eliau ()rgaoliz:llio11s \\I!ie�li oppose so11le of its policies. 'There is also e�\ idc IIcc� that fiolrnhanl is gnmiug \\c m Of the collst�u1t c�rilic�istu of gOvernment policies and Ina\ take steps to press the Opp()siliou to reduce its criticism :uul opposition h\ inlinlidlali()n andl \(ithholding v\ vii more jOb oppurtonfties. I.ip scrvicv has I wc I I paid to e�el!!al upportuuilics for all races, boll prefereue�es are� gkell to the blacks in I Ica rl\ ever\ case iIt sehic�h the g()ver11ItU�nt has cmitrol. "There apparently is ace clear- cut c�unrsc Of action c�o11templated by th'� upposiliou. and the extent of disunity it nong the� diycrgent factions and groups Ina kes it unlikely that serious yiole11c�e ill develop in the� short 1 2. Subversion a. Amerindians and while ranchers The governinvids concern about subversion has related primard\ to the threat poised b Ve11ezolela's alleItlpts to uelyuuce its c�IaiIt1 to all 011yanese territory \yest of the Fsseyuilm Inver (disc�olssed above� mid er I ureini P(licies). enezolela's sentic�landestille c�anlpai,gII to \din the I( ill y of the GnyaItese \umrindians. especially those li%ing near the disputed border led to the expulsion of it Veuezueian diploItlat in early I96T The efforts of the VcIlez,Ielan (:ewcr11ntent to persuade the \ItU�riII(Iia11s that ,hey could exp,c�t better Ireatnlent from Venezuela have c�ontintu.�d. \'enc�zIlela helped) to establish. fin:utce. au(I direct a small bolt 11o\\ discredited \merindian political party the Guyana \ational fart\ \1'). I'he Venezuelans ills() (listributed free books. food. and other gifts: tried to teach the :tinw rindians Spanish: extended iuyilalious for then) to yisil Venezuela: and initiated parantililary training of several hundwd tribesmen. :\Ithough little was ac�contplished. these efforts \yere aided by the fact that the \mvrindians ignore national boundaries and haye always Illmed freer bclween the two c�oolntries. 'Pensions heightened in janu 1969 \yhe11 a stnall- scale insurmc�tion broke ()lit in the Soulllwestern area knuyn as the liuptimmi District, inhabited b \nucrindians and it small group Of cattle ranchers of mixed S and U.S. origin. 'These independenl- ntinde(1 ranchers, fearing it challenge from the government ill (:eorgelo\yn conce land to which lh(�y have Ito title. have alv.ays tended to have separatist Ica IliItgs. After recciyiItg Venezuelan encouragenu uL lrainiug� and arms, the runc�hers and some of their Amerindian encplo\ees, \\-h() were for the most part pawns, launched it surprise attack and momentarily seized the to\yn Of I,elhenl. the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 acbl)iuislratiye (�ester of the 11itp(tnnni District. I':Ienu�Its of the (:uy:ulit Defense Force, h( \\c\ r, \cere cluic�kl\ flo� n to the area, the hard-core relic Is fled, and the troops razed their ranches. M ost of the ranchers and souse Anwrindians fled to Brazil and Venezuela. Venezuela denied Guyanese charges of responsibilih and did not respond to rebel Calls for help, but it offered theta sanctuary and fin:utCial aid. Although the Burnham government spoke out sharpy against the rebels and their foreign supporters, it avoided staking it cause c cic bre of the issue. Guyana sought instead, within its listitvd resources, to strengthen the artned forces and to improve the capability of forces in the border area. luformatios is not available on the (current situation in the border aiea, particularly with respect to subversive activity there. b. fat;an and his followers Ched(Ii Jagatu�s PPP is the only political organization with a potential for undermining the government, but a, long as the PPP remains committed to achieving power by legal nicans the part) is unlikely to c�onstitiae a serious threat to political stability 'I'll(- PPI' drays its principal support from the larg; l ?list Indiall Col)ul)unity. most of Whortt are not Communist in orientation. The top leadership of the part, however, invariably follows the Soviet line and Jagan has publicly proClaisu�d his and tla� PPP's allegiance to 'Moscow. I'll( 1 enu�rgenc�e as the country's largest part\ �even before iudepencl- cnec� buo�,ed the leadership, and it has been farther encouraaged b\ the rapid growth of the East Indian c�onul)usity which has established itself as the largest ethnic group in Guyana. TIIc party leadership, therefore. has been disposed to follmy the electoral path to power. It has, however, I)CCosu� inc�reasisgl\ pessi mist ic� about the possibility of achieving power b\ peaceful means, and increasingly suspicious that Burnham woul(1 neither conduct honest elections nor surrender power to a (1(rly elected PPI' government. 111 party has charged that the British delayed granting the colony indepCl)denc�e, and altered the electoral system, in order to ensure that the 1 would not be in power at the time of independence. They contend further that Burnham has contin(red this policy, prevented a PPP victory in the 1968 election and, indeed, caused the party to fall below the PNC is electoral strength. "I'hcy accuse hint of nrutipululing the electoral regulations and rigging the election. 'I'll(- PPP's poor showing in 1965 was to some degree clue, however, to the part's dispirited campaign and Jagan's defeatist attitude. he gro%\ing frustration ill lltc� PPP nuay itic�rease the temptation of extremists to initiate it program of anued stnrggly, \%hick lagan has stated is historic ally inevitable for Cii\ana. Althoogh there are so clear indications that the part\ has made plans to take slich a COIIrsc of Ic�tiou, exlrel)tists within the party reportedly have stressed the need to train and arm PPP members for "the c�omiug conflict. Iic part\ 's capacity to moue( g(rc�rrilla opesatiuns is extremely limited. :1llhough behyeen 30 to 50 members of the PPP reportedly have received guerrilla tr:aiuiug ill (:ttba, and there have been reports of classes ill guerrilla tactics. the party lacks the uec�essim weapons and supplies to support it guerrilla mo \cnu�ul. c�. Non Communist subrersire groups The small bu', grow rag black power mm ena�ut presents a potential threat to (:uyatsa's iulernal security. The larger and uu,re it c�tiye Iditck poker group, the afric�ait Soc�iely for 'Jilt oral Relations \citIt ludependest :\fric�a (AS(:RIA), wits forsted in 196 prismril\ to emphasize the Afric�au heritage of I�lack Guyanese b\ developing educational progr:uns related to African histon, (culture. and language. In addition. there are programs for providing free ecluc�alion al Courses for some of AS( 'nvmbers :utcl promoting instruction in Swahili. :1SCI1I:\ present ac�knmyl- edgcd membership is about 2 200. but it is probably (considerably larger, and it has several thousand sympathizers. ASCRIAVs membership to sonic cxteut overlaps with that of othergroups: some I' :officials. for example, are mported to be members of. or to he its sympatb \pith. ASCRIr'.. Some of Buruhasi's supporters participate in blaCk power activities. Stich as special social evenings and lectures. Sil)c�c 1968 :1SCIII. Vs founder and present leader. Sydney King, who has taken the :\frican uanu� of F,usi K\\ayana. has tried to reorient the organization toward al) aggressive racist position, kith the avm %ed goal of destroying white iufluesce in the c�ouutry. I IC also takes a \Marxist line uu intentational and economic matters. Kwayu lit s former position as c�hainnar, of the Guyana Marketing Corporation gave hill) significant influence within the MC. Prime N-linisler Buntharn believed that it was good politics to have the popular Kwayaua in the administration, but only as long its he was able to maintain the tipper hand over the militant leader. This relationship had become strained by mid-1971. Burnham apparently becanu� annoyed with Kwaya- sa's sharp criticism of the goyernnunl, parlicul:uly his (charges of corruption in high places iu the ad- ministration. Kwayauaa�s insistence that 13tn ?5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2 draw up a code of bt-hayior for public officials appears to bast- been tilt- last stray and led to it contplelt- rupture of the once close relationship. Burnhamt is determint-d not to allow K%%ayatue to hold it position in either the PN(: or tilt- government and he I is moved to strip Kx %a%ana and ASCR1:k of .:II influence. Kwayatilt's popularity %%ilh the younger %fricans� nuuy of %%bom comprise an important part of Burnham's electoral support �could become it serious threat to continued PNC rule should they withhold their support for Burnham at the pulls. Another small black Po%yc�r group Is led b% Brindley Iforatio Benn. it Negro Ito served as chairman of the PPP for IO years until he fell out %%ith jagan in 1965. Betty has visited Peking and re�portedl% has received financial aid from the Chinese Communists. B and his handfcl of followers, ho%%ever� are only it nuisance factor and have not developed significant support. In October 1965, Beim founded the Afro- Asian- American Association (AAAA as it new Marxist Leninist front to demonstrate to jagan that ht- had all independent bast- of support and thus was it force to be reckoned with. Bens also registered !ht- National Union of %Yorkers composed of' it few workers in diverse trades i Georgetown. (An% group of seven caul legally be registered as a union. 'I'll( two organizations are minuscule and serve primarily as political vehicles for Beim. In December 1968, Bonn announced the formaHon of ��Gnyana first Communist part%. to be based upon the black poker principles of Stokely Carmichael and to be called the� Working Peopit-'s Vanguard Party. This also is an iit significa- I organization and probable represents an effort by Benn to obtain more funds from Peking. During 1970 it spate of potentially disruptive groups vinerged, especially the Guyana :1nti- Discrimination Movement (GADM Fundamental Rights Action Committee (1 RA(:), Movement Against Oppression N.W), and the Patriots. MI four groups represent themselves as apolitical and dedicated to preservation of democratic processes and safeguards. "Their avowed purpose is to awaken and mobilize public opinion on current issues. Although these groups do not pose it threat to the government at the present time, they are disruptive and one or more probable hope to develop into political parties. Thus the government must devote some time and emerge to monitor their activities. GADM, composed mostly of East Indian doctors and lawyers, is n�garded by many as a potential East Indian equivalent of AS(:IIA, which is purely African. GADM began its activities in November 1970 and is still bi ile.ling its organization. It may in time try to become it political party. CADM 26 le aders have rebuffed PPP efforts to draw them into an alliance with jag,et. F11,-X it smaller group, but ill till iracial in character. %vas launched in December 19711 and reportedl\ intends to become� it civil lihc rocs champion. MAO appeared in January 1971 and is probabh the most daugeronts of (it(- four. M.U) was inspired in part b\ radical university professors affiliated with an older dissident group knuien as Ratoort. (Ruloun. it local terns for the sharp stump left after sugarcane has bt-en Colt. was adopted as the synbol of GmaniCs exploitation by foreign economic iterests.) Hatoun appears to be \v r\ mot(-It alive: the Marxist orientation of the organization is reinforced I,\ its militant opposition to the government and .uiti- L .S. stand. \lAO is it peculiar aniahgant of uniyersit radicals and a number of toughs and kno%\ it crrintimals from the notorious "Tiger Bad shunt. Both the PPP and the PNC hays indicated publicly their interest in and concern for the welfare of m embers of AO. possible because they recognize MAO's potential for vioiviwe. 'I'll(- Patriots is the ne\%est of the four groups, and appears to be thy personal vehicle of it prominent local lawyer and \%ritcr� Clcvcland Ifanillon. Ilamtilton bas stated that the organization \%ill "contribute to the creation and mainic�nanc�e of it strung bode of public opinion, and undertake Icy various means some responsihihily for pnhlic education." Of" the four grenps. the Patriots probable has the least chance to deyeic,p into it significant force. :111 four evidently have it small membership and nininal organization. and for the near future, no mass bast-�. :111 call be expected to attack tie gmernment and any other element of the society that opposes their goals. Young people are not it major political ordismpliye force in Guyana al this time. Although each political part has it youth ann, the youth are not wt-ll organized ;utd del not generally play it separate role in political affairs. In part this is prubahl\ clue to the fact that Guyana has o very young population. and its leadership is also notstly quite young. Moremer, govern:� iii leaders have bt-eu i the forefront of efforts to accomplish radical change. Guyanese youth. therefore. do not in general feel alienated from their national leaders and the "establisltnwnt." F. Maintenance of internal security (S) 1. Police Tlty Guyana Police Force, established in 18:39, is charged with responsibility for the maintt-nance of lacy and order, the� prevention and detection of crime, the repression of internal (listurbanc�es, the protection of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 25X1 Chronology (u/ou) 1.198 Columbus sails along; coast of present -day Guyana (luring last of his three voyages. 1616 Dutch expedition establishes settlement on island in Es- sequibo River. 1621 Colony placed under direction of the Dutch '1Vest Indian Company. 1814 Three Dutch settlements of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice are ceded to the United Kingdom following Congress of Vienna. 1831 The three settlements unite to become the colony of British Guiana with administration centered in Georgetown. 1838 Emancipation of slaves sets off large -scale immigration of indentured East Indians. 1928 Full crown colony government is introduced, and women acquire the vote. 1950 January Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham organize the People's Progressive Party (PPP). 1953 April PPP wins overwhelming majority in general elections. 1955 February Burnham breaks with Jagan and forms the PPP(B) 1957 August PPP(.I), Jagan's faction of the party, wins eneral election. October Burnham drops pretense of PPP affiliation and forms the People's Nation.l Congress (PNC). 1961 August PPP wins general elections; Jagan becomes Premier. 1962 February A general strike degenerates into bloody racial rioting as the opposition tries to bring down the Jagan government. 1963 April �July General strike accompanied by violence paralyzes economy; state of emergency is declared; k uba aids Jagaeu financially to prevent his fall from power. 1964 May Increasing Moodshed and racial violence cause Q'.K. Gov- ernor to actiume emergency powers. December PPP gains slim plurality in elections, but Burnham takes over as Premier by forming it coalition with the smaller United Force party and gaining it parliamentary majority. 1966 February Venezuelan claim to territory west of Essequibo River is submitted to a commission established to reach it settlement within �1 years. May British Guiana becomes independent state of Guyana with Burnham as Prime Minister. New constitution establishes an appointed judiciary and an elected unicameral legislature. September Guyana becomes a member of the United Nations, the Inter- national Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. 1968 December Prime Minister Burnham's PNC gains parliamentary majority in general election. 1969 January Small -scale insurrection, encouraged by Venezuela, breaks out in southwestern area and is suppressed by the Guyana Defense Force. March Defense force becomes exclusively Guyanese when Col. Pope, British adviser, departs on 27 March. 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 April �June Venezuela renews and intensifies campaign to regain the Essequibo, raisin,,'Guyanese fears that Venezuela eventually intends to use force to recover the disputed area. July Cheddi Jagzsn publicly enrolls the PPP in the World Com- munist INIovement at the Rlosoew Conference of Worldwide Communist Parties. August Guyana Defense Force drives small contingent of Surinamese police from disputed border area. 1970 January Border tensions rise as both Venezuela and Guyana con- centrate troops on the border. February Guyana becomes a republic but remains within the Common- wealth (first Caribbean member of the Commonwealth to do so); officially known as the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. 1971 January Government alarms business community by imposing un- expectedly sharp tax increases and foreign exchange restric- tions. Outflow of funds of foreign firms also restricted. April Prime Minister announces new economic program with a strong nationalistic and socialistic bent. May Government moves to extend its control over existing foreign investments. Demands at least 51% equity participation in future concessions that exploit the nation's natural resources. June Venezuela and Guyana sign the "Port -of -Spain Protocol" for a 12 -year moratorium on the dispute. Surinam and Guyana agree to shelve their longstanding border dispute and promote better relations. Guyana retains "administrative control" of the disputed region. 30 July PNC sweeps local elections, captures SO of the 97 council seats contested. Opposition boycot -fn electic::s and Vharrg('s fraud. Government establishes the External 'Trade Bureau F.TB to serve as the sole importer of goods frone Communist countries, later expanded to handle all imports and experts. Government nationalizes the Demerara Bauxite Co. (DEbIBA), a subsidiary of a Canadian firm, after nearly months of bitter negotiations; company renamed the Guyana Bauxite Company (GUYBAU). November People's Republic of China and Guyana sign trade agreement. December Soviet Union and Guyana establish "non resident" diplo- matic relations. 1972 January Economic difficulties, attributable in part to world over- supply of bauxite and alumina, intensified by recent "Guyani- zation" measures by the government. "Permanent observer" status extended to Guyana by the- Permanent Council of the OAS. March Peking establishes seven -nurn trade mission in Guyana and extends S26- million interest -free credit for industrial projects. April Burnham pushes for increased government controls over the economy and reiterates intention to strengthen the coopera- tive movement. June People's Republic of China and Guyana establish resident diplomatic relations. Government -owned alumina plant temporarily closes because of the depressed international market for aluminum. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 Glossary Wou) ABBREVIATION ENGLISH AAAA........... Afro Asian American Association ASCRIA......... African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa CARIFTA....... Caribbean Free Trade Association CDB............ Caribbean Development Bank DEMBA........ Demerara Bauxite Company ETB............ External Trade Bureau FRAC........... Fundamental Rights Action Committee GADXI.......... Guyana Anti- Discrimination Movement GAWV.......... Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union GAY............ Guyana Assembly of Youth GCC............ Guyana Credit Corporation GDC............ Guyana Development Corporation GDF. Guyana Defense Force GIMPEX........ Guyana Import- Export Co., Ltd. GIS Guyana Information Service GMC........... Guyana Marketing Corporation GNP............ Guyana National Party GTUC.......... Guyana Trades Union Council DUMP.......... Guyana United Muslim Party GUYS........... Guyana United Youth Service MAO............ Movement Against Oppression MPCA.......... Manpower Citizens' Association NACCIE........ National Association of Clerical, Commercial, and Industrial Employees NU W National Union of Workers OAS............ Organization of American States PNC............ People's Nations. Congress PPP............ People's Progressive Party PY 0............ Progressive Youth Organization RDC............ Rice Development Corporation RMB........... Rice Marketing Board RWU........... Rice Workers' Union UF United Force WPO............ Women's Progressive Organization WPVP.......... Working People's Vanguard Party YD Young Democrats Places and features referred to in this Chapter (u /ou) COORDINATES SF.CHET V'O F'OHEIG.A' DISSE.11 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2 o I N. 1 11'. Ankoko Island k 'island) 6 33 61 08 Coeroeni Rivier, Surinam (stream) 3 23 57 36 Corriver ton 5 52 57 10 Courantyne River (stream) 5 57 57 06 Cuyuni River (stream) 6 23 58 41 Essequibo River (stream) 6 59 58 23 Georgetown 6 38 58 10 Kutari River (stream 2 22 56 52 Lethem 3 23 59 48 Mackenzie 6 00 58 17 Jlatthews Ridge 7 30 60 10 New Amsterdam 6 15 57 31 New River (stream) 3 23 57 36 Port -of- Spain, Trinidad 10 39 61 31 Rose Hall 6 16 57 23 Rupununi District 3 00 59 00 Rupununi River (stream) 4 03 58 34 Springlands 5 54 57 09 SF.CHET V'O F'OHEIG.A' DISSE.11 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2