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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDPOl- 00707R000200070023.3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R0002001 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a boun&by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that :ire not pertinent to all countries, ate produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key :,ta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains ir.formation affecting the national de:3nse of the United States, within the meaning of title 16, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of Its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited Ly law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES SB (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification!control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Poland TI'G ahs;r wwmfttm fie im Cho Go*" smwv MC4 St "be, 'am A. IdtrodawoA I slsw&" &a &WwwisHa d 10 wcwy 4 I. I'h}" 0�ractffhtkm and Impage 4 NIlna ddel 4 3, s0cw dukMacristics 6 4. N1110 MI kttiludw S G rgmkmlon 13 I. Ca" t,r�ds 13 2, DrWif LM dlsbiilritim Ib 3, luimgrotlon, emlgratio, and rn4Kvttks 10 4, WW tmids 10 Population policy and pm dtord it Dk sacNal aspacb of labor 43 f. The tudustdathSng sanely 22 2. Labor ss atslyg to ehaM 916 coarzm n" APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Page a. The anatomy of mismanagement 27 b. Labor and the new managers 29 3. Trade unions and labor relations 30 E. Living conditions and social problems 33 1. Material welfare 33 2. Social security and welfare programs 37 3. Social problems 40 a. Social strains 40 b. Crime 41 c. Social ills 42 F Health 43 1. Health conditions and medical care 43 2. Sanitation and utilities 46 3. Nutrition 47 G. Religion 48 H. Education 55 1. The national context 55 2. The educational system 57 Page a. Organization and reform 57 b. Programs and curriculums 59 3. Higher education 61 4. Extracurricular activities 63 5. Foreign students and exchanges 64 I. Artistic and cultural expression 64 1. Historical development 65 2. Development under communism 67 a. Literature and art 68 b. Theater, music, and folk art 69 c. Popular participation 71 J. Public information 73 I. The role of government 73 2. Radio and television 74 3. Press, publishing, and film 76 K. Selected bibliogrephy 78 Glossary 79 FIGURES Page Fig. 18 Female employment (chart) Page Fig. 1 Polish ethnic types (photos) 3 Fig. 2 The Polish Knight, a 19th century painting photo) 11 Fig. 3 Royal Castle, Warsaw (photo) 12 Fig. 4 Monument to Nazi war victims 28 Fig. 22 (photo) 12 Fig. 5 The Warsaw Nike photo) 13 Fig. 6 Selected population indicators (chart) 14 Fig. 7 Comparative population densities (chart) 15 Fig. 8 Population density map) 16 Fig. 9 Urban and rural population density 37 Fig. 26 (table) 17 Fig. 10 Internal migration (table) 17 Fig. 11 Comparison of vital rates (chart) 20 Fig. 12 Age -sex distribution (chart) 20 Fig. 13 Vital statistics table) 21 Fig. 14 Vital rates, Poland and selected 49 Fig. 31 countries (chart) 22 Fig. 15 Selected age -sex characteristics 50 Fig. 32 (table) 23 Fig. 16 Population by source of livelihood (chart) 23 Fig. 17 Shifts in working -age population (chart) 24 Page Fig. 18 Female employment (chart) 24 Fig. 19 Registered unemployment (table) 25 Fig. 20 Employrn;ant by educational level (chart) 26 Fig. 21 Index of money wages and real wages (chart) 28 Fig. 22 Consumer goods availability table) 35 Fig. 23 New workers' housing, Katowice (photo) 36 Fig. 24 Old and new housing, Warsaw (photo) 36 Fig. 25 Typical rural dwelling, central Po- land (photo) 37 Fig. 26 Health personnel per 10,000 popu- lation (chart) 45 Fig. 27 Hospital beds by categories chart) 46 Fig. 28 Per capita food consumption (table) 48 Fig. 29 Supermarket, Warsaw (photos) 49 Fig. 30 Typical self service grocery photo) 49 Fig. 31 Open -air peasants' market, Warsaw (photo) 50 Fig. 32 Religious procession photo) 50 Fig. 33 Members of Roman Catholic hier- archy (photo) 51 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Page Fuge Fig. 34 Roman Catholic ecclesiastical ad- Fig. 45 Wawel, the Royal Castle iri Krakow ministration (chart) 51 (photo) 65 Fig. 35 Church buildings photo) 55 Fig. 46 Nicolaus Copernicus photo) 66 Fig. 36 School buildings photo) 56 Fig. 47 Frederic Chopin photo) 66 Fig. 37 Educational statistics (table) 57 Fig. 48 Neo- Byzantine religious art (photo) 70 Fig. 49 Exhibition of posters, Warsaw (photo) 70 Fig. 38 Educational system (chart) Fig. 50 Palace of Culture, Warsaw photo) 71 Fig. 39 Elementary school curriculum table) 59 Fig. 51 Old Town square, Warsaw photo) 71 Fig. 40 Secondary school curriculum table) 60 Fig. 52 Mountaineers of southern Poland Fig. 41 Percentage of graduates in major (photo) 72 fields of study chart) 61 Fig. 53 Radio and TV statistics table) 74 Fig. 42 Students' camping trip photo) 83 Fig. 54 Radio and TV programing chart) 75 Fig. 55 Radiobroadcasts to and from Poland Fig. 43 Foreign students selected years (chart) 76 (table) 6- Fig. 56 Selected newspapers and period Fig. 44 14th century religious design photo) 65 icals table) 77 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 The Society A. Introduction (U /OU) Scarred by repeated foreign incursions from both east and west, Polish society has depended on a strong fusion of nationalism with Roman Catholic culture for the survival of its national consciousness and traditional social values. Despite domination since 1947 by a soviet- imposed Communist regime, the Poles have retained their Western social, cultural, and political roots. Although these traditional values survive, the institutional fabric of Polish soci,� r has been largely reshaped by wartime social upheavals and by rapid postwar industrialization and urbanization. The transformation of Poland's prewar, largely rural society� dominated by relatively small social elites into an increasingly urban, mass society was facilitated by the unprecedented political, economic, and ethnic changes brought about directly by World War II. The wartime extermination of the sizable Jewish minority by the Nazi occupiers, the postwar expulsion of Germans from the so- called Regained Territories (former German lands in the west and north), and exchanges with the U.S.S.R. of nationality groups as a consequence of boundary shifts, produced an ethnically and religiously homogeneous population about 98% Polish and 95 %Roman Catholic. Following the war, the surviving remnants of the traditionally influential landed gentry were im- poverished through land reform and removed from social leadership. The prewar middle class was also soon deprived of its economic strength through nationalization of industry, commerce, and most services, and its class consciousness and influence on society was destroyed by discriminatory Communist social policies. A massive postwar rise of a largely ex- peasant working class unfamiliar with the demands of urban society but ideologicaiiy courted by the Communist regime has contributed to social tensions. Because of postwar circumstances and subsequent totalitarian controls, the Polish regime has been successful in structurally transforming Polish society; it has not been successful, however, in imbuing it with its own value, and making it effectively serve Communist political, economic, and social goals. Strong attachment to individualism, resistance to imposed authority, deeply felt nationalism, and adherence to religious faith continue to be the main determinants of the national character. The political upheaval of 1956 marked a revolt against a Stalinist past and wrested from Poland's leaders a repudiation of terror and coercion as instruments of rule. But the initial liberalism and promise of a better life attributed to the Gomulka regime, which then came to power, were largely the illusions of an exuberant populace; the regime itself made few commitments. Indeed, its backsliding from initial reforms and the gradual atrophy of its leadership at all levels of the bureaucracy during the late 1960's intensified the strains between the rulers and the ruled. These strains, fueled by major economic blunders and sparked by ill -timed price rases, finally exploded in December 1970. The ensuing rapid political change represented the first instance of the proletariat overthrowing a Communist regime whose theory had failed in practice. More importantly, it ushered in a change not oniy of leadership but also of generations. The current regime of Edward Gierek is not based on concession and weakness; in fact, its stress on social progress and material abundance is matched by its insisteper.- on hard work and social responsibility. But, for the first time in Poland's history under Communist rule, the rulers have promised to consult their subjects and, more importantly, are pledged to the proposition that material and social development is the determinant of the validity of the guiding political and social theory. Gierek's rule by no means spells the beginning of a free society. As a tough but thoroughly pragmatic administrator, Gierek knows that the dominant position of the Soviet Union makes the basic elements APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 of the Communist system and its ideological imperatives virtually inviolable. At the same time he seems committed to removing those features of the past that for so long contributed to national weakness: the gulf between the people and the Communist rulers, lagging economic development, the willingness of the government to risk social friction to further its political and economic goals, and official unrespon- siveness to popalar aspirations. If he succeeds even partially, then the demonstrated capability of the people to unite in the pursuit of popular and attainable goals could substantially ease his task of improving material conditions and of giving Polish society a more dynamic image on the world stage. For most Poles it is difficult to shed the skepticism that has so often proved to be we!l- founded. Nevertheless, most of them appear to believe that their rulers now share to a greater degree than before the popular hope that improved living standards, reduced East -West tensions, and a deemphasis of doctrinal considerations will enable Poland to assume a more prominent role in European society. B. Structure and characteristics of the society Poland's geographical location� astride the flat plains of the north central European corridor �has been the principal factor governing its almost uninterrupted struggle for national identity and territorial integrity in the face of real or threatened domination by neighboring power. This overriding element of national history, in turn, has been the main determinant of the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and social characteristics of the people. (U /OU) A strong attachment to the land, so often thwarted by claimed as well as actual domination by foreign powers, has engendered a finely honed nationalism and a highly developed sense of the need to protect basic national interests. Active patriotism, born of the willingness to struggle against overwhelming authority, was thus historically raised to the level of the chief national virtue and became the most important force for social cohesion among the Polish people of all classes. (U /OU) The same historical conditioning which made for national cohesion in the face of a foreign enemy, however, held the seeds of internal discord, class divisions, and lack of clear national purpose when projected solely into a domestic context. Long periods of partition and domination by as many as three different foreign powers� Orthodox Russia, Catholic Austria, and Protestant Prussia �all with widely 2 differing philosophies of rule and social order generated among the Polish people inherently different views concerning the correct targets and methods of the struggle for the preservation of national identity. The long absence of indigenous domestic authority and the moral righteousness of resistance to foreign viceroys strengthened the native individuality of the people, but at the same time weakened their social cohesion and their ability to subordinate individual and group interests to social and political discipline. (U /OU) Despite the force of events which have engulfed Poland in this century, the social character of the Polish people has not been appreciably affected. The interwar interlude of weak civilian and military rule was followed first by the brutal rule of Nazi Germany and then by indirect domination by Soviet communism. Both forms of domination, although widely different in character, were initially fiercely resisted, and subsequently were punctuated by outbursts of popular resistance to Nazi brutality and Communist misrule �the Warsaw uprising in 1944, the quasi revolt of 1956, and the workers' riots of December 1970 resulting in the first instance in history of the overthrow of a Communist regime by the working class. Despite the strong efforis of the post 1970 Gierek regime to tvckle some of the root causes of the national malaise and to instill in the people both discipline and a new sense of viable national purpose, many ingrained elements of the national character continue to pose a danger to the stability and unity of the society. (C) 1. Physical characteristics and language (U /OU) Ethnically, the Poles are a highly complex people, being an amalgam of the Nordic, Neo- Danubian, East Baltic, Alpine, ai)d Dinaric physical types of the Caucasian race. Among the Poles there is no distinct national physical type, and most Poles could be takcii fog natives of almost any country in central Europe. Wartime dislocations and postwar shifts in population have contributed to further ethnic homogeneity. Based upon a sampling of military recruits in the mid 1960's, Poles have a mean Mature of about 5 feet 6 inches, the average for Europeans, a mean weight of about 140 lbs., and a moderately heavy build. Except in the south, the skin is almost uniformly light, the hair colors are commonly medium to dark brown and dark ash blond, and the eyes are predominantly light mixed, frequently with shades of grey. The dominant Nordic and Neo Danubian elements account for the blond pigmentation in most of the population. The APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 several more distinctive ethnic types are shown in Figure 1. Polish, the official language, serves as the mother tongue of about 99% of the country's inhabitants, ranking seventh among European languages in number of native speakers. Outside of Poland, it is used to some extent by several million Polish emigrants scattered throughout the world, representing one of their main ties with the motherland. In modern times the Polish language has achieved importance as an instrument of both literary and scholarly expression. Along with Czech, Slovak, and Lusatian (Wendish), Polish belongs to the Western division of the Slavic (Slavonic) language group, which is in turn a member of the Eastern division of the Indo- European family. Despite the considerable uniformity in vocabulary and grammatical pattern that characterizes the Slavic tongues, Polish is not readily comprehensible to other Slavic speakers. Its distinctive features include fixed accent on the penultimate syllable, frequent occurrence of palatal and sibilant sounds, and preservation of archaic Slavic nasal vowels. In common with other Slavic tongues whose speakers chose the Roman Catholic rather than the Eastern Orthodox form of Christianity, Polish in its written form uses the Latin alphabet. Regional dialects and subdialects, although numerous, cause few practical difficulties in intercommunication. The flat character of the country has been -Astrumental in checking the emergence of strong dialectal differences, while local language peculiarities have practically disappeared since World War I through such leveling influences as public education, mass media, urbanization, and internal migration. Authorities do not always agree on the classification of Polish dialects and subdialects, but all recognize three major groupings: 1) Great Polish (Wielkopolski), with Poznan' as the center; 2) Little Polish (Malopolski), with Krakow as the center; and 3) Mazovian (Maxout ecki), with Warsaw as the center. A transitional central area among these three groups is located north, west, and south of Lodz. The most distinctive dialect is Kashubian, consiuered by some scholars to be a subdiaiect of Pomeranian and by others to be a separate West Slavic language; it is spoken by a relatively small group (esr,mated between 100,000 and 250,000) inhabiting au area along the Baltic Coast west of the Vistula. In Silesia the older generation of indigenous people speak a highly Germanized form of Polish. 'For diacridrs on place names see the list of names at the end of the chapter. East Baltic Neo- Danubian Nordic vinaric FIGURE 1. Polish ethnic types (U/OU) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 In modem times literary Polish has been the standard speech of the educated upper classes in all Polish cities. Members of the urban lower classes, mainly of recent peasant origin, retain many of the characteristics of their regional dialects. Among the distinctive features of educated speech is the use of the third person singular, as in Italian and Spanish, in the polite form of address (i.e., for" you"); par is used to a man and pani (madame) to a w Before World War II, Yiddish, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, an(i .,rman were the principal non Polish languages ;y were spoken by nearly all of the minorities, wl, made up about one third of the total prewar population. Wartime decimation of the Jewish minority, postwar population and territorial shifts, and Communist policies of assimilation have reduced the use of non Polish minority languages to negligible proportions. Their use among the remaining minority groups totaling about 1.5% of the population is increasingly confined to the elderly, while the younge members of minorities are either bilingual or entirely Polish- speaking. German probably remains the principal Western language spoken by the older as well -as some members of the younger generation, although its use is resented and shunned by older nonprc.ressionals. The second language of most Communist party leaders, both -old and young, probably is Russian, although some among them shared in the general tendency of professional people and intellectuals educated in the interwar period to look to French as a vehicle for social, cultural, and political intercourse with other European peoples. Communist party leader Edward Gierek, for example, reportedly speaks only poor Russian but is fluent in French, havi spent much of World Wa: II within the Commun:st resistance movements in Frr.nce and Belgium. In the postwar period, knowledge of Russian has increased through compulsory teaching in the schools. Sin ^e 1956, however, English has become the most popular and widely studied Western language among the younger generation, followed closely by French ar!d German. Three fourths of all Polish students of foreigr languages other than Russian studied English in 1970. The result of this trend has become evident in the lower and middle levels of the party and government bureaucrLcy, where increasing numbers of the younger professionals possess a knowledge of English, German, or French. In line with the Gierek regime's avowed desire to increase Poland's political and economic role in Europe, it is likely further to give practical encouragement to the study and knowledge 4 of Western languages� especially English and French �by those engaged in diplomatic and commercial relations. 2. Minorities (C) Although insignificant numerically, the postwar ethnic minorities have retained their own special characteristics and have frequently had a social and political impact far beyond their numbers. The tiny Jewish minority has played a significant role in the shaping of Communist rule in Poland. The German group is at the center of the repatriation issue which played an important part in the conclusion of the Polish 1 7est German treaty of December 1970. Some of the minority groups are known to be antagonistic toward the Polish state, but because of their numerical weakness and their lack of cohesiveness and leadership none of them are regarded as a threat to national security. For the same reason, they have not become a serious problem in Poland's relation: with its neighbors, although the concentration of certain minorities along border areas has sometimes prompted rumors of border adjustments. The events of World War II and of the early postwar years helped to create the most ethnically homogeneous citizenry in the history of the Polish nation. The proportion of minority groups has continued to decline, constituting only 1.5% of the total population in 1969. Nonetheless, lingering animosities, including anti- Semitism, remain. Much of this animosity has historical roots, since Polish national consciousness has to a large extent been molded by resistance to foreign incursions on Polish culture and to the irredentist claims of Poland's neighbors. The generally unviab!c borders of the Polish state during the interwar period did little to reduce this feeling of national insecurity, particularly since they encompassed a significant and often restive non- Polish population. The census of 1931 showed that ethnic minorities accounted for 31.1 of the total population, the largest being the Ukrainians and Ruthenians (13.9 the Jews (8.6 the White Russians (3.1 and the Germans (2.3 Wartime losses, postwar territorial shifts, and population transfers might have been expected to eliminate ethnic frictions. Nevertheless, much of the former bitterness among ethnic groups was actually compounded in the immediate postwar period. Traditional Polish Ukrainian enmity boiled over in the late 1940's, stimulated by the existence of Ukrainian partisan groups in southeast Poland agitating for a free Ukraine. This resulted in the forced transfer of over 100,000 Ukrainians to northwest APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Poland, where faltering steps to relieve their cultural suppression came only after 1956. Anti German feelings were so much a part of Polish nationalism after the war that until the late 1950's harsh restrictions were levied on those Germans who remained within the newly drawn Polish boundaries. Even token emigration of individual Germans was not permitted although mass expulsion was an official policy. After 1956 a relatively lenient policy permitted Germans who had previously declared Polish nationality to profess their Germanism and allowed emigration for the purpose of "reuniting families." Thereafter, applications for emigration were dealt with on an individual basis, with wide variation in the ease with which such applications were granted. Denial was most frequently experienced by those possessing skills needed by the Polish economy. This factor. has greatly complicated the repatriation of ethnic Germans and has become something of a hindrance to the" normalization" of bilateral relations with West Germany. Poland's policies toward its Jewish minority, the subject of periodic international concern, is rooted in the country's political and social history. The drastic reduction of the Jewish population from about 3 million in the immediate prewar years to about 25,000 in the mid- 1960's was due to the wartime extermination policies of Nazi Germany and to extensive emigration in the postwar period. The postwar exodus of Jews was to a large extent attributable to the persistence of anti Semitism, despite grudging Polish respect for Jewish heroism in the famous Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1943 and the stirring of the national conscience over the question of possible Polish guilt in failing to help most Jews escape from wartime destruction. In prewar Poland, Jews were typically small merchants or industrial workers who spoke Yiddish as a native tongue and lived in a state of isolation in the cities and towns. About 10% deviated from this pattern, becoming members of the intelligentsia. They contributed greatly to Polish culture but were strongly resented not only by the landed gentry but also by the growing numbers of Polish intellectuals with whom they competed in the professions. Because of the wartime destruction of the Jews, anti- Semitism might have disappeared in the postwar period had not a disproportionately large number of the surviving Jews become Communists and had not many of them acquired responsible positions in those agencies of state authority associated in the public mind with Communist oppression, especially during the Stalinist era of the early 1950's. Moreover, most of the Jewish Con munists had spent the war years in the Soviet Union and were thus regarded as foreign "viceroys" not only by the non Communist population but also by the large nationalistic element within the Communist Party. Anti Semitism thus became a major issue in the party's factional strife after the assumption of power in October 1956 by the regime of Wladvslaw Gomulka, who had spent the war years as leader of the Communist underground in Poland. The political impact of anti Semitism was further complicated by the fact that many formerly Stalinist Jews rallied to the support of Gomulka in 1956, thus becoming identified with his rule, and by the fact that this rule soon forsook those liberal and national policies which characterized the immediate post -1956 period. Popular attitudes as well as factional rivalries brought about frequent, th )ugh limited, purges of Jews from various party and government positions during the years or Gomulka's rule, but it was not until the political crisis of 1968 that anti- Semitism became a major political tool openly used by Gomulka's opponents within the party. Spurred by the generally pro- Israeli attitudes of some leading Polish Jews during the Middle East conflict of June 1967 in contravention of Soviet and official Polish pro -Arab policies, the party's nationalistic wing combined lingering popular anti Semitism with anti-intellectual ism to form an essentially populist challenge to Gomulka's rule. Gomulka's survival of this challenge was due not only to his political skill and Soviet backing, especially after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, but also to concessions which resulted in wholesale purges of the Jewish element in the party and government apparatus and in cultural and economic life. These purges were accompanied by a policy of actively encouraging the emigration of those Jews "whose primary loyalty was not to Poland." Because of the formerly disproportionate impor- tance of the Jewish element in Poland's political and cultural life, the impact of the 1968 events was significant. More than one -half of the estimated 25,000 Jews in Poland before 1967 are believed to have left the country since then, reducing the Jewish minority to a core of some 8,000 to 10,000 mostly elderly persons who do not intend to emigrate. To many Poles, the purges and emigration of Jews have had the desirable effect of transferring some power and influence from an old and frequently discredited group to a generally capable younger generation, even before the demise of the compromised Gomulka regime. For the same reason, the leadership of Edward Gierek must have been privately relieved that the issue 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 of Jewish influence in Poland's political life was not one of the many ,problems which it faced upon assuming power. Because many of Poland's Jews were leaders in-the professions and in cultural and academic life, their departure has had ,a negative impact on society, at least in the short run. This was illustrated by the emigration to the West of leading members of the world famous Warsaw Jewish Theater, including its internationally known doyenne, Ida Kaminska, and such personalities as film -makers Jerzy Toeplitz and Alexander Ford, as well as by the less visible impact of personnel losses in Poland's scientific research and in general management. Poland's constitution of 1952, grants ethnic minorities the right to preserve and develop their own culture. This right, generally ignored during the Stalinist era, has been publicized and to a limited degree honored since 1956, although its implementa- tion has been confined to those segments of the existing minorities devoid of political importance. In general, however, minority members have some opportunity to receive school instruction and to read periodicals and books in their mother tongues. Serving as the main vehicles for cultural development �and enabling regime supervision �are the sociocultural associations for each of the significant minority groups except the Gypsies. Formed mostly in 1956 and 1957, these associations maintain for the minorities various regional recreational- cultural centers, libraries, and amateur theater groups. They also assist in the education of children in the schools for minorities, now slowly decreasing in number, within the regular Polish school system. In 1968, a total of 3,132 students (mostly in elementary school) attended these schools, which either provided all instruction in the mother tongue or used Polish as the language of instruction while giving lessons in the minority language. The latter type appears to be gradually replacing the former. 3. Social characteristics (C) Polish national identity coalesced in the 10th century as a result of growing external threats. Since then, the search for national security and the proper means to achieve it has been the chief factor in shaping the Polish people's view of themselves and others, as well as in shaping individual, group, class, and inter -state relationships. In A.D. 966 the Polish tribes of the Vistula and Oder river basins between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic were united into one state by Mieszko, the first historic ruler of the native Piast dynasty (966- 1370): In the same year, Mieszko was baptized and brought the Roman Catholic faith to Poland, which at the time was the most powerful state among the Slays. The fate of the church in Poland and that of the nation have since been inextricably intertwined, a relationship which has molded the cultural awareness and social orientation of the Polish people. Thus, the year 1966 marked the millennium of both the state as an entity and the dominant Roman Catholic Church. Both of Mieszko's achievements were urgently needed, since the Polish tribes were being threatened by the developing power of neighboring tribal unions and feudal states. On the West, the Poles were faced by the Germans; whose king had been Holy Roman Emperor since 962. At the same time, Poland's eastern neighbors had been united by the Norman Rus in the Kievan state, which accepted the Christian faith from Byzantium and soon began to invade the Polish border areas. Lying between these two rising powers, the Poles opted for cooperation N, ith the Latin West, but with independence from Germany and under the protection of the papacy. Subsequent centuries of struggle against incursions from both the east and the west religious conflict with the latter sharpened with the rise of Protestant Prussia� resulted in periods of national crisis and honed the national consciousness and pride of the Polish people. Inherent Slavic indiAdualism, the divisive tendencies of the nobility, and d iferences over whether the east or west posed the main danger, however, often eroded the strong nationalism conditioned by the Roman Catholic faith and contributed to the successive foreign partitions of Poland, culminating in the disappearance of the Polish -state in 1795. The new Polish state which reappeared in 1918 benefited as well as suffered from most of these same factors. Expansive nationalism, barred from outlets to the west, led to a successful military campaign in the early 1920's against a Russia weakened by internal upheaval. As one result, Poland's eastern frontiers in the interwar period encompassed sizable new minorities. The existence of these minorities and the struggle by different social groups for political dominance lel to marked social stratification, even though the dislocations of the initial post -World War I period had increased social mobility in some cases. Differences in levels of wealth, class, and cultural attainment were emphasized by the broad urban -rural division of society. Such social conflict as existed was primarily among the many nationality groups and within the ranks of the increasingly numerous and underemployed intelligentsia. Although the domi- 6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 nance of the Roman Catholic Church assured general religious concord, resentment against the large Jewish component of the lower middle class had economic and religious overtones. The dominant tradition of learning was German- and French oriented, and in general cultural relations with the West were avidly cultivated. All except the peasant class were literate, and urban cultural awareness was high. The landowning gentry, who for centuries set the tone of political and social life, had been undergoing a rapid decline since the beginning of the 20th century and had dropped to a mere one -third of I of the population, but they still retained a sizable measure of political and social influence. The peasants, numerically the largest group in the population and economically the most important, had little social and cultural influence. Their sense of inferiority and passive acceptance of a subordinate social role changed only slowly. The peasant movement, however. did become an important political force during the interwar period. The great majority of peasants, nevertheless, lived a primitive life of poverty and continued to use medieval agricultural techniques. The small middle class, which had been hampered in its development by the succession of partitions and foreign occupations of the country and by internal dissension and lack of economic opportunity, did not assert itself as a strong social force. It did, however, provide the ultimate base for the ruling military clique in the immediate prewar years. Though socially the most cohesive group in the population, the industrial working class was also limited by its relatively small size and by the regional character of heavy industry. Although no single social class dominated Poland during the interwar period, a loose social coalition of the clergy, the professional people, the bureaucracy, and the military officers corps exerted an authoritarian influence on social and political life. The broad social revolution following World War !I was accelerated but not initiated by the Communist regime. The factors which caused many of the postwar social changes had already begun to appear during World War II and affected the property- owning class most drastically. Many members of this group fled abroad; others were placed in Nazi concentration camps or deported to the U.S.S.R., never to return. Those who remained in Poland were deprived of influence in public life by police measures as well as by a basic reorientation of industry and trade. Economic changes that started with the expropriations and physical destruction during the war years were subsequently completed through nationalization, land reform, and reconstruction under state control. The middle class fared better. Although materially impoverished, the wartime destruction of its Jewish element left it more socially cohesive, and it adapted itself more easily to postwar conditions. During the initial postwar era of economic stabilization, the middle class actually increased in size and strengthened its economic basis. The subsequent elimination of nearly all private enterprise during the Stalinist period, however, reduced the major part of this class, composed mainly of small businessmen and other self employed persons, to the status of wage earners. Since 1956 the regime's varying degrees of encouragement for the expansion. of private handicrafts and services has again spurred the growth of a small middle class. This official encouragement has been particularly marked under the Gierek regime, and could result in a faster growth of the urban middle class. With the passage of time the character of this class is changing, however, as newly integrated elements from the lower levels of the inflated bureaucracy as well as the peasantry are absorbed into it. The material well -being and the social prestige of the middle class is generally only slightly above that of the lower classes. There are highly visible, and frequently officially criticized, exceptions to this :ale, however. In many urban centers, particularly in Warsaw, there has developed a distinct sub -class of highly successful individual entrepreneurs who, by providing needed services, garden produce, and specialty products, have often amassed personal fortunes. Because their services are undeniably needed, the government tolerates the existence of this small "neo- capitalist" sub group. The peasants enjoyed a relatively privileged position during and shortly after World War II. With foodstuffs at a premium, they were regarded as benefactors by all Polish society, and they gained significantly in self- respect and influence as a class. Between 1949 and 1956, however, the social and political pressures of collectivization, heavy taxes, and other discriminatory policies undermined the newly won social and economic position of the peasants. Subsequently, as a result of the Gomuika regime's more flexible agricultural policies, the peasantry as a class again prospered relative to many categories of industrial workers. ,Although the social position of the peasantry remains well below its immediate postwar level, the tenacious traditionalism of this class has played a central role in the regime's continued toleration of an essentially private agricultural system. Even during the peak of the collectivization drive, in the early 1950's, over 75% of Poland's farmland remained in private hands, and in 1970 the figure stood at 83.9 The bulk of the remainder (14.8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 was composed of state farms, generally in, the. former German territories, and only 1.3% constituted agricultural collectives. Tii1 Gierek regime, committed to improvinv consumer welfare in which food supply plays the key role, has courted the peasantry in many ways guaranteeing continued private ownership of land, abolishing compulsory deliveries and, especially important to the highly religious peasantry, moving toward normalization with the Roman Catholic Church. If the peasantry responds by. overcoming its past unwillingness to use modern agricultural methods and thereby improves production, it could earn the gratitude of other segments of society and thus somewhat improve its social standing. Working against this, however, are such trends as a continued flight from the countryside by rural youth, thus leaving the farms in the hands of the old and conservative generation. The industrial proletariat was especially hard hit during World War lI. Trade unions and oilier workers' organizations and their leadership were decimated, and, along with other strata of the urban population, the working class underwent a general pauperization. In the postwar period, however, the relative status of the skilled worker has been enhanced as a result of the movement of unskilled peasants into the lowest levels of urban society through the shift from agricultural to industrial employment. Also, the increasingly sophisticated requirements of a developing industrial economy have resulted in some upward social mobility for the technically skilled members of the industrial working class. During the stifling, later years of the Gomulka era, however, the industrial workers as a whole became increasingly aware of being only theoretically the backbone and the most favored component of Communist society, while in practice their material well -being was eroded by the regime's inept economic policies and their social standing was far beiow that of a domineering, inflated, and isolated state bureaucracy. This in turn fueled the workers' dissatisfaction which, sparked by the regime's folly of raising food prices and reinstituting harsher work rules just before Christmas 1970, resulted in the riots that swept the Baltic coast and toppled the Gomulka regime. Gomulka's successor as party leader, Edward Gierek, is by age (60 in January 1973), social class (a former Silesian miner), and inclination (a pragmatist), more in touch with the working class than any of his Communist predecessors. Moreover, it is this class that brought him. to power, a debt which in the public eye will have to be repaid. What effect this situation will have on the social status, as distinct from political and economic influence, of the average Polish worker is not yet clear. In addition to his other attributes, Gierek is a prime example of a new generation of administrators and efficient technocrats, less concerned with ideology than with performance. Discipline and hard work by the workers is the other side of the coin of Gierek's concessions to the working class which, still largely composed of former peasants, faces a difficult task in upgrading its social acceptability. The Gomulka regime, like its predecessors, strove to build a Polish society based on three main classes: workers, peasants, and the "working intelligentsia." It expected that of. these the last, which initially was not numerous, would evolve rapidly from the worker and peasant classes and provide a reliable Marxist leadership for the society as a whole. All measures of postwar social development show, however, that although these expectations were fulfilled in their sociological sense, the resulting class of young, educated workers and "intelligentsia" �even more than society as a whole- disregarded the underlying ideological premise. The outlook of the young intellectual class was no closer to the spirit desired by the regime than was that of their older colleagues; in fact, they actively sought alternatives to what they considered anachronistic Marxist concepts, favoring a blend of socialism and individual incentive characteristic of some advanced Western technologi- cal societies. The success of the Gomulka government in creating this class, while at the same time failing to imbue it with uncritical acceptance of Communist policies set by a ruling clique, was the main cause of the regime's downfall. That the dangerous sociopolitical situation which developed during the 1960's did not reach a climax before December 1970 is in part a measure of the persistent class divisions. The political crisis that shook but did not topple the Gomulka regime is 1968 was sparked by the elite intellectual class, whose traditional role as steward of the national culture was illustrated by a writers' revolt in the spring of that year against censorship and arbitrary restrictions. Their cause soon spread to the student milieu, leading to demonstrations initially against academic grievances but soon widening into the political arena. None of the issues, however, were of the economic "bread -and- butter" kind that might have engaged the workers or the peasantry, a fact skillfully exploited by the Gomulka regime to pit the workers against the students and intellectuals. When in December 1970 the workers on the Baltic coast, many if not most of them belonging to the younger generation, took to the streets in protest 8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA -RDP01 -00707 R000200070023 -3 against the regime's tangible economic blunders, they were not joined by either the students or the intellectuals in any significant numbers. This feature of the revolt, however, was a disguised blessing since the regime was prevented from once again exploiting class differences for its own ends, and was left for all to see as pitted solely against the class upon whose mandate Communist rule theoretically depended. This situation, untenable either in real or ideological terms, caused the internally chaotic, weakened, and isolated Gomulka regime�devoid of Soviet support to fall of its.own weight. The attributes of the Gomulka regime in its later years also bore witness to a long developing social split basically generational� within the Communist hierarchy. The fluid upper class which had emerged under postwar Communist rule consisted of the high party and government. leaders themselves, heads of mass organizations, managers of state enterprises, and others who owed their social ascendancy to the Communist regim The existence of this class, however, had little impact on the traditional standing of other social classes. Its control over national life and material well -being was resented, and it generally carried no real prestige within the society. Moreover, the rising age structure oii this class, internecine warfare within it, and its demonstrable policy failures opened its ranks to increasing inroads by the younger generation of tough but less ideologically hidebamd managers And technocrats.. The rise of this managerial and technocratic component of the ruling eiite� younger, more forward- looking, and in touch with social, political, and economic reality is symbolized by the Gierek regime. Cutting across class lines to include members of the middle echelon of the economic bureaucracy and other young professionals, this group had given evidence even before 1970 of developing into a new class in its own right, one based on administrative and technical competence rather than on political considerations. The Gierek regime's public commit- ment to precisely these attributes in all aspects of national life promises not only to foster the growth but also the self-identity of this incipient social class. Because this growing class has tended to give priority to national s-ff- interest and public welfare in general, to the detriment of both Communist ideology and institutional forms, it has earned the respect and increasing allegiance of other classes. This is particularly true of the educated youth of all class origins, a fact heavily counted on by the government in its efforts to engage the support of the new generation. This youth already forms the main component of the new technocratic class, having been absorbed into it at its lower levels. With the passage of time_ this class, in close alliance with the skilled workers, will probably become the dominant class of Polish society. 4. National attitudes (C) Polish national attitudes, both individual and collective have been formed through centuries of struggle formational survival and are characterized by strong nationalism, tenacity of purpose, and adherence to tho-e social and cultural traditions which have been instrumental in preserving the national identity. Together with the Roman Catholic Church, which has played a central, role in shaping and maintaining national consciousness, these factors have consistently militated against the achievement of Communist objectives in Poland. As a people, the Poles value originality in the individual but tend to be conservative when acting collectively. This contradic- tion, together with a chronic feeling of national insecurity, has long thwarted effective political rule. If the Poles were described in the interwar period as a people "charmingly impossible to govern, then even more so in the postwar period they must rank among the world's most unnatural Communists. These prevailing attitudes parallel the basic postwar conflict between the traditional value system of European humanism that emphasizes individual worth and the atheistic and collectivist orientation of Marxism. The confrontation in Poland between these two value systems has also been characterized by interplay and cooperation. In each system, apart from the highly antagonistic ideological mainstream, there is an articulate minority current which allows some convergence with the other despite irreconcilable differences. In the traditional system, for example, "open Catholicism" advocates cooperation with the regime on practical matters and seeks adjustment to social change, in contrast to the dogmatic, formalistic Polish Catholicism entrenched in the countryside and at the top of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Within the Communist system, various "revisionist" currents have long been concerned with creating a "socialist humanism" suffused with nonideological, technologi- cal efficiency which would focus on the problems and needs of the individual. Although untainted by revisionism in ideological terms, the new Polish regime of Edward Gierek typifies one such current. Probably the most fundamental task of the new leadership is to reassert the moral authority of the rulers vis -a -vis the ruled, and to bridge the gulf long separating the two with a new sense of participation 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 and mutual trust. Despite Gierek's evident good will and the willingness of the people to give his regime in its early years the benefit of the doubt, the task is formidable. The population is only slowly emtrging from the great social changes attendant upon rapid industrialization and urbanization. Against this backdrop, the postwar struggle for moral authority has produced general disorientation and a tendency to indict the system of Communist rule as a whole. The psychological state of uncertainty and confusion over permissible and impermissible behavior has created widespread moral disintegration. Under such conditions, the chief cohesive force in society has been Polish nationalism, combined with a desire to rejoin a European family of nations devoid of E.,.st -West ideological antagonisms. The impetus toward nationalism is being cautiously exploited by the Gierek regime with the awareness that these efforts must remain ideologically acceptable and within the limits of the Polish Soviet relationship. The national desire for becoming once again a part of the European family of nations simiiarly has been useful to the government in obtaining wide popular support for various proposals designed to spur European detente. Throughout the postwar period, even more so than in paFt historical eras, most Poles of all ages were chiefly concerned with national survival and the integrity of Poland's postwar frontiers. For this reason, they welcomed the conclusion of the 1970 Polish -West German treaty giving finality �in Polish eyes �to the country's western border. To most poles, this step marked the essential precondition for their own security as well as for general progress toward European detente. Though increasingly looking to their own future in an all- European context, the people realize there is no present realistic alternative to continued alignment with the Soviet Union. While most of them continue fundamentally to oppose the Communist regime, they are inclined to support those domestic and foreign policies and initiatives of the Gierek regime that are demonstrably in the national self interest. Moreover, the country's new leadership, aware of this potential for support, has sought to hamess it. Although the Gierek regime is as intent as its predecessor to prevent adverse popular attitudes from crystalizing into political opposition, it has opened the way� within the present institutional forms �for greater popular participation in the decisionmaking process, and has increased the flow of information between the people and those who lead them. Historically rooted anti German and anti- Russian sentiments continue to exist among all strata of the 10 population, tl former reinforced by the experiences of World War II and the latter by its identification with an alien Communist social or( mposed from the East. Although the postwr neration now assuming positions of leadership has '.een instrumen- tal in the gradual political reconciliation with West Germany and the German nation as a whole, most older adults still feel that the enormity of the wartime Nazi crimes in Poland will prevent social reconcilation between the two nations for at least another generation. In this regard, most Poles, including ranking Party members, make little distinction between West and East Germany. Ant:- Russian sentiments, mainly conditioned by a history of Russian and Soviet domination and brutality, also contain significant elements of cultural, political, and social disdain and an almost automatic rejection of virtually all material achievements and ideas of Russian origin. Almost equally well- rooted in national history and consciousness, however, is a persistence of good will for the United States, whose constitutional ideas and material well -being have traditionally inspired admiration. Moreover, heavy Polish emigration to the United States, especially at the beginning of this century, has engendered both real or claimed family ties with the United States on the part of most Poles. Despite varying degrees of Communist imposed isolation, these feelings among the Polish population appear to be unshaken, and have counterbalanced the regime's partial success, especially among the youth, in exploiting U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Despite the longstanding conflict with their German neighbors, the Polish people are traditionally Western oriented and pride themselves on being the oftzn unappreciated bulwark of Western European culture against encroachment by Eastern despotism. Poland won a reputation as the guardian of Christianity by stopping the westward advance of the Tatars in the 13th century and was responsible, through King Jan Sobieski, for the defeat of the Turks at Vienna in 1683, both events being popular examples of national heroism and of Poland's contribution to Western civilization. The symbols, heroes, and events which evoke national pride are for the most part connected with periods of struggle for the independence of Poland as well as of other nations. Poland's contribution to the American Revolution in the persons of Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746 -1817) and Count Kazimierz Pulaski (1748 -79) illustrated the historical motto of Poland's expatriate military leaders: "For our freedom and yours." The heroic figure of the Polish knight, as depicted by 19th century Palish painter APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 h a Aleksiineier Orlowski, symbolizes this aspect of the national spirit (Figure 2)." The decision by party leader Gierel; soon after coming to power to reconstruct the Royal.Castle in Warsaw (Figure 3), a move that had been avoided by all postwar Communist governments in Poland, shows, the willingness of the new regime to appeal to popular pride in the national heritage. As a seat of royal power, the castle dated to the late 16th century, when King Zygmunt III moved the court to Warsaw. The sufferings and losses of World War II have remained fresh in the national memory, not only because of persistent verbal propaganda disseminated >y the regime but also through the many national monuments dedicated to both native and foreign victims of Nazi policies who died on Polish soil (Figure 4). The most infamous of the many Nazi concentration. and extermination camps, Auschwitz (Oswiecim), has been maintained in its stark condition as a mute monument to an era.. Since the war, a reconstructed Warsaw has become the embodiment of FIGURE 2. The eolish Knight, by Aleksander Orlowski, 19th century painter (U /OU) Polish pride in national tradition and heritage and the Polish will to survive. The Warsaw Nike, a monument unveiled in 1964 (Figure 5), symbolizes the heroism of the city. In an effort to counteract foreign pressures during the interwar period, the Poles usually sought support from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 1939 Nazi Soviet pact, the French and British declarations of war against German; in response to its invasion of Poland in September 1939, and the subsequent occupation of the eastern part of the country by the U.S.S.R. further strengthened the average pole's predisposition toward the Western powers. Although the Communist regime places the origins of postwar Poland's military forces in the Polish contingents which fought alongside the Soviet army in World War II, it has given increasing recognition to the average Pole's stress on the contribution of Poles to the military effort of the Western allies. (For example, more than 10% of the German aircraft destroyed during the Battle of Britain were shot down by Polish 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE. 3.. The ,Royal Castle In Wa saw prior, to 1939. The struc- ture was badly damaged during the initial Nazi bombardment of Warsaw in September 1939, and was razed by the Nazis after the Warsaw uprising of .1944. (U /OU) airmen, and Polish contingents played a central role in the crucial battles of Tobruk in North Africa, and of Monte Cassino in Italy.) This willingness to be fair and objective with regard to the total wartime polish struggle is particularly true of the Gierek regime, which has gradually given recognition to the wartime non Communist underground by far more numerous and effective than its Communist counterpart. Moreover, Poland was the only country in Eastern Europe where the advent of postwar Communist rule was significantly resisted by force of arms. Most Poles take pride in military resistance, but the uneven struggle against Germany's "blitzkrieg" in 1939, the crushing of the Warsaw uprising m 1944, the ill -fated postwar armed struggle against communism, the failure of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the Soviet willingness to use overwhelming force to maintain hegemony in Eastern Europe illustrated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, have all had a cumulative impact on the national attitude toward armed conflict. Nevertheless, strong nationalism and patriotism remain powerful factors, especially when the nation is faced with a clear external threat. Although Polish youth remains largely apathetic to domestic politics and is unwilling to risk life or make other sacrifices for the sake of ideology, their w0lingness to come to the defense of human life, fai,;ily, and the "Fatherland" is undoubted. Given FIGURE 4. Monument to Nazi war victims of Maldanek, site of Nazi concentration extermination camp near Lublin (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 S I l ry a s 3 .N S a +Y 1Eb x q FIGURE 5. The Warsaw Nike (U /OU) these factors the reliability of the enlisted ranks of the armed forces must be considered as largely depende..t on the issues and circumstances of any future conflict, the nationality of opposing forces, and the magnitude of a direct threat to Polish territory. There were, for example, significant morale problems among Polish military units which took part in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, during the 1970 worker's uprisings along the Baltic coast, Polish regular army units (as distinct from the police and militarized internal security units) reportedly were neither ordered to, nor would have, fired on the workers. Indeed, the behavior of the military establishment of all yanks in 1970 appears to have mitigated the general postwar low esteem in which the military is held by the people, and opened the way toward somewhat greater military influence in national affairs. Despite the success oP the workers in 1970 in essentially overthrowing one Communist regime and seating another, most other elements of society are aware that the development resulted from the action of but one class and with the aid of fortuitous circumstances. While the people are newly aware that pon� 'ar opinion can effect change in the system� indeed, this. principle has been embraced by the Gierek regime �the 1970 events have not substantially increased the militancy of the society as a whole. The Polish outlook in the early 1970's is, therefore, hopeful but tempered by a down -to -earth realism which has been as prevalent in the nation's history as the more publicized bouts of romantic idealism. This is most acutely reflected in the attitudes of the youth. In terms of specific beliefs, educated Polish youth tend to favor the Western European type of social democracy as a political and social order, nonsec- tarianism in religion, and experimental freedom in art. They tend toward individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and toward supranationalism based on a combination of Polish nationalism and allegiance to Europe as an entity. Although the Gierek regime may be no more successfui than is predecessor in meeting the aspirations of the youth, it has acted 'on its commitment to bridge the generation gap by increasing the influence of ambitious and qualified members of the younger generation in policymaking and generally giving the youth a greater stake in the system. In doing so, it also hopes to eliminate the youth's remaining potential for revolutionary in contrast to evolutionary change. if the government succeeds in providing a tangible increase in living standards and maintains its rapport with the workers, the working class is unlikely to jeopardize its gains by new militancy. Moreover, the powerful Roman Catholic Church in Poland ceased in the late 1960's to ian the spirit of militant opposition to the regime. In 1968, for example, the church did not take a strong stand against the official anti- Semitic campaign, nor against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1970 it did not inject itself in any significant measure into the confrontation between the workers and the regime. With church -state relations progressing toward a pr- ,bable formal accommodation since the advent of the Gierek regime, the church in Poland appears no lo;:ger to be a force inducing anti Communist militancy among the people. C. Population (C) 1. General trends The characteristics of Poland's postwar population and its vital trends have been largely the result of wartime population and territorial losses and shifts, heavy postwar urbanization, and, since 1955, a steadily declining birth rate, at least initially encouraged by the government's policy of family 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 planning. These general trends are illustrated by the selected demographic indicators shown in Figure 6. The impact of World War iI on -the Polish population was of exceptional magnitude, the population decreasing by some 22%. during the 1938- 50 period. War- related deaths accounted for an estimated 12% of the prewar population,of nearly 32 million. This figure may be compared with the 16% loss rate experienced by.the U.S.S.R. and the 6% loss rate for Germany, the other countries which suffered most heavily. Voluntary and forced postwar population shifts further reduced the population density. The Potsdam Conference of 1945, which placed some 40,000 square miles of former German territories under Polish A �;t t. d 1 .t t. f I dary F0 a mints ra ion an orma tze ovle annexa fon o I I I I I i I i some 70,000 square miles of former Polish lands in the 1938 4546� 50' 55 60' 65 70R east, also sanctioned the transfer to occupied Germany of the German minority from within the redrawn Polish boundaries. The arrival of the Soviet .army in Poland in 1944, however, had already caused the flight of millions of. Germans from areas east of the R Oder and Neisse rivers. This movement continued until February 1946 when organized transfers began. 700 602 The German population of the territories gained by Poland dropped from an estimated 11.9 million at the end of 1944 to 5.6 million in the summer of 1945, a net loss of over 6 million persons. Large numbers of these persons died in the last stages of the war, but probably more than 5 million had fled by the time Polish authorities assumed control in July 1945. An 1938 1945 additional 500,000 had moved out before official transfers began. During the period of these transfers, Millions of persons from February 1946 to the end of 1949, an additional 35 2.3 million Germans left the territory of present -day Poland. 30 In contrast to these losses of population, agreements made in 1944 and 1945 between the Polish and Soviet 25 governments resulted in an exchange of large numbers 20 of persons which on balance added to Poland's population. Ethnic Poles and Jews in the U.S.S.R. who is had been Polish citizens in September 1939 could opt for Polish citizenship and be transferred to Poland, 10 while ethnic Russians. Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians living within the new Polish 5 boundaries could opt for Soviet citizenship and be transferred to the U.S.S.R. Some 518 ,000 of the latter 1938 45 46 50' 55 60" 6S 70� group chose to be repatriated to the Soviet Union, and Percent Cr7 tom 63.1 1 1 56.2 1 1 51.7 1 1 50.3 1 1 47.0 50' 55 60' 6S 70' the end of 19917. census years; other data are hosed on official 1,950,000 Poles returned to Poland by Polish demographic estimates. (Census of 1946 The number of returnees to Poland included about was oho "summary" nature and is not considered 170,000 Jews, most of whom subsequently emigrated derinnire.) i to Israel. In addition, some 1.5 million persons were FIGURE 6. Selected population indicators, 1938 and repatriated to Poland from other European countries, 1945 -70 (U /O!J) 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 mostly ethnic Poles from Germany where they had performed forced labor during the war. These small additions to Poland's population were far outweighed by the cumulative losses, and despite the postwar net loss of about 20% of the country's territory compared with the prewar period, it was only in 1967 that Poland's population reached the approximate total of persons residing in the same area in 1939. Present trends indicate that despite the initial postwar population boom, Poland's population will not reach the prewar total before 1975. The relatively rapid decline in the initial postwar growth rate was further confirmed by the results of the official census of 8 December 1970, which showed that since the first postwar "count" in 1946, the country's population had increased by 8,659,000 persons. Most of this growth (4,768,000 or 19.1 however, occurred during the 1950 -6G decade, with only a 2,813,000 or 9.4% increase during the decade that followed. 2. Density and distribution In January 1973 the population of the country was estimated at 33,146,000, and its territory comprised about 120,600 square miles approximately the size of New Mexico with a population somewhat larger than that of California and Texas combined. Excluding the U.S.S.R., Poland ranks sixth among European countries in population (after West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Spain), as well as in area (after France, Spain, Sweden, Finland, and Norway). It is second only to the U.S.S.R. in Eastern E u rope. Poland's overall population density, about 275 inhabitants per square mile at the beginning of 1973, is near the European average; nevertheless, it is considerably lower than such densely populated regions of Western Europe as the Lowlands, and much higher than the Scandinavian average. In Eastern Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., Poland's population density is exceeded by that of East Germany (406), Czechoslovakia (294), and Hungary (287). Poland's relative standing in this respect compared to selected countries in 1970 is shown in Figure 7. Heavy postwar internal migration has been the result of the government's vigorous policy of resettling the former German territories, generally with repatriates from the Soviet Union, and by simultaneous policy of urbanization, which caused a general movement of population from the countryside into existing urban centers or newly created cities. According to official Polish data, the former German territories in the west (excluding former East Prussia) had a prewar population of about 7.2 million Germans and 1.5 million Poles. According to the official claims, nearly 9 million Poles resided in these areas by 1970 including about 5 million persons who were born there. The population density of these territories in 1970, therefore, somewhat exceeded immediate prewar years. The sensitivity of the Polish Government throughout the postwar period to charges of underutilization of the former German lands indicates that the policy of encouraging population growth in these areas will continue. Although the population density in rural areas exceeds the European average by about one third, the static nature of the rural population compared with the consistently rising urban increments is widening the gap between urban and rural density patterns. The general population density patterns follow the pattern of urbanization and industrialization and reflect the lingering effects of postwar population shifts from former German territories in the north and west. A belt of low population density thus stretches across the entire northern third of the country, generally comprising less productive agricultural land (Figure 8). The province of Koszalin, for example, has a population density as low as that of Turkey. By contrast, concentrations of population are highest 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 7. Population and population density, Poland and selected countries, 1970 (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Persoot per square mile 0 155 207 259 389 0 60 BO 100 150 Perteet per tgaere kilsmeters (1968 estimate) FIGURE S. Population density (U /OU) along the southern border, ar area which contains the industrial complex of the Upper Silesian coalfields and the country's most productive agricultural land, where population density exceeds :Sat of the Netherlands, Europe's most densely populated country. Population density and urban and rural distribution by province is shown in Figure 9. Both the Polish Govenlment and the people ha +e taken pride in the relatively rapid urbanization which has taken place since World War II. Compared to the slow increase in the proportion of the urban population between 1900 (19.6 and 1946 (31.8 adjusted to the country's prewar boundaries), postwar growth has been nearly double that rate; on 14 December 1966 it was officially announced that as of that date the urban population had reached exactly 50% of the population tot2.1. By December 1970 this figuie had reached 52.2% of the total population. Although internsl migration from rural to urban areas has decreased in terms of absolute numbers since 1962, the net urban increase continued to rise rapidly through 1970. Shifts in rural and urban population since 1952, shown in Figure 10, continue to reflect this strong trend toward urbanization. Notably, the increase in the total population between the 1960 and the 1970 censuses, or abwit 2.8 million persons, is almost exactly equal to the net irban increase over the same period. Despite these achievements in urbanization, Poland in 1970 still ranked behind such Eastern European countries as East Germany (73.8%), Czechoslovakia X62.4 and Bulgaria (53.0 and the U.S.S.R. (56.3 Moreover, Polish criteria for urban as against rural areas are imprecise or do not correspond to Western standards. In 1970, official data indicated 889 localities considered as urban areas. Of these 834 were classified as cities and towns, but 359 were under 5,000 in population and only 24 exceeded 100,000 in population. These 24 major urban centers accounted for 22.6% of the total population, and 43.2% of the totai urban population. 16 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA -RDP01 -00707 R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 9. Urban and rural population and density by administrative area, 8 December 1970' (U /OU) PERSONS ARRIVING INDEX OF AREA POPULATION URBAN. RURAL DENSITY- GROWTH Square miles Thousands Percent Per square mile 1960-100 Provinces (Wo s- wodztwo): City side INCREASE 1952........... 1,386.2 620.6 Bia lystok 8,916 1,173 37.1 6$.9 131.6 107.6 Bydgoszcz 8,028 1,912 50.6 49.4 238.2 ?.11.9 G dansk 4,246 1,465 69.5 30.5 345.0 119.8 Katowice 3,667 3,691 76.7 23.3 1,006.5 112.7 Kielce 7,527 1,889 38.5 67.5 251.0 104.0 Koszalin 6,948 793 49.5 50.5 114.1 115.3 Krakow 5,905 2,181 30.3 69.7 369.3 109.6 Lodz 6,600 1,670 35.7 64.3 253.0 104.7 Lublin 9,572 1,922 30.8 69.2 200.8 106.7 Olsztyn...... 8,106 978 41.0 59.0 120.7 111.0 Opole 3,667 1,057 42. 57.4 288.2 113.8 Poznan..... 10,306 2,190 39.6 60.4 212.5 109.9 Rzeszow 7,218 1,757 27.5 72.5 243.4 110.8 Szczecin 4,902 897 66.6 33.4 183.0 118.3 Warszawa 11,348 2,514 35.5 64.5 221.5 108.8 Wroclaw 7,256 1,973 F5.6 44.4 271.9 109.3 Zielona Gora 5,597 882 54.3 45.8 157.6 112.8 Cities with provincial status: Warsaw 173 1,008 100.0 7,560.7 114.8 Krakow 88 583 100.0 6,625.0 121.2 Lodz 81 762 100.0 9,407.4 107.2 Poznan 85 469 100.0 5,517.6 114.9 Wroclaw 85 523 100.0 6,152.9 121.2 Total or average................ 120,300 32,589 53.3 47.8 270.9 109.4 Not pertinent. *Date of 1970 census. *Provinces bear the name of their respective capital cities. *Data for cities with separate provincial status is not included in data for provinces bearing the same name. FIGURE 10. Internal migration (U /OU) (Thousands) *lnOudes movement between cities and within the countrysid 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 PERSONS LEAVING PERSONS ARRIVING NET Country- Country- URBAN YEAR TOTAL City side City side INCREASE 1952........... 1,386.2 620.6 765.6 753.6 632.6 133.0 1954........... 1,458.7 684.1 774.6 786.1 672.6 102.0 1956........... 1,444.2 648.1 796.1 694.0 750.2 45.9 1958........... 1,323.4 513.2 810.2 622.2 701.2 109.0 1960........... 1,256.2 517.6 738.6 592.4 663.8 74.8 1962........... 1,034.1 403.8 630.3 499.1 535.0 95.3 1964........... 932.9 348.2 584.7 462.6 470.3 114.4 1966........... 840.3 298.5 541.8 419.9 420.4 121.4 1968........... 861.5 302.9 558.6 437.2 424.3 134.3 1969........... 898.5 310.6 587.9 455.8 442.7 145.2 '970........... 881.9 307.9 574.0 469.4 412.5 161.5 *lnOudes movement between cities and within the countrysid 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 3. Immigration, emigration, and minorities Available data on immigration and emigration of individual persons indicate a rapid rise in both categories in the immediate years after 1956, reflecting the simultaneous easing of Polish policy on exit visas and encouragement of repatriation from the West. Immigration to Poland rose from 8,500 in 1955 to a high. of 95,300 .in 1957, but had fallen to negligible proportions, some 800 persons, by 1970. Emigration, which increased from 2,300 in 1955 to a peak of 148,500 in 1957, fell to 10,300 in 1970. Official figures fot this period, however, do not include almost 250,000 persons repatriated from the U. S.��. R. between 1957 and 1959 on the basis of the 1956 Polish- Soviet repatriation ,agreement. The Gomulka regime had pressed the Soviet Union for a new repatriation agreement, mindful that the U.S.S.R. had never fully honored the previous agreements of 1944 and 1945 under which the bulk of the persons under consideration should have been repatriated. Various political motives played a role in this Soviet failure, including the fact that many of the potential repatriates were Jews. Most of the Polish Jews repatriated under the provisions of the 1956 agreement subsequently emigrated to Israel. A majority of the non- Jewish Poles repatriated at the same time were resettled in the former German territories in the west and north of Poland. Similarly, offtbial emigration figures exclude the 10,000 to 15,1.00 Jews who have departed since 1967, as well as the estimated 30,000 ethnic Germans repatriated since the signature of the Polish -West German treaty in December 1970. Despite the Polish regime's efforts to stimulate the return of expatriates, it continues to take pride in the contribution to other societies of ethnic Poles who emigrated in great numbers for economic and political reasons over the past two centuries. Official 1970 Polish figures, for example, list over 10 million Poles living abroad, including in this definition those of the first and second generation, as well as others reputedly claiming Polish as their mother tongue. The majority of Polish expatriates so defined, or about 6.5 million, reside in the United States. Other countries with sizable numbers of such persons include the U.S.S.R. with 1.2 million, France with 750,000, Brazil with 840,000, Canada with 324,000, West Germany and the United Kingdom with about 140,000 each, and Australia and Argentina with about 115,000 each. A nationality agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union concluded in March 1965 theoretically opened the way for the repatriation of the majority of 18 the 1.4 million Polish nationals who, according to the 1968 Polish data, resided in the U. S. S. R. in 1962. As of 1972 there was no reliable information concerning the number repatriated under this agreement. In the absence of corroborating evidence, it is doubtful that the difference between the Polish official figures published in 1968 (1.4 million) and those claimed to reflect 1970 data (1.2 million) is indicative of actual repatriation. Natural attrition, reclassification of such persons by loth Soviet and Polish authorities, and statistical correction are the more probable reasons. Wartime population losses and postwar territorial shifts transformed Poland from a prewar mosaic of ethnic minorities constituting nearly one -third of the total population into an ethnically homogeneous state. The size of the minority population of Poland is not accurately known, since Polish authorities ceased publishing this data in the early 1960's. According to available estimates, Poles constituted nearly 98.5% of the population in 1969, with the following distribution of the minority groups: Ukrainians 180,000 0.6 White Russians 160,000 0.5 Germans 75,000 0.2 Great Russians 20,000 Slovaks 20,000 Gypsies 18,000 Jews 12,000 0.2 Lithuanians 10,000 Greeks 9,000 Czechs 2,000 Total 506,000 1.5 The slow decline in the ratio of the minority population to total population has been caused by natural attrition and assimilation, as well as by sporadic spurts of emigration. This pertains particularly to Jews and ethnic Germans. Prior to the Polish regime's politically motivated encouragement of Jewish emigration after the Arab Israeli war of 1967, there were an estimated 25,000 Jews in Poland. This figure, which had been relatively stable earlier in the postwar period, had diminished to about 8,00 to 10,000 by 1972. Because most of those remaining are elderly, the absolute number of Jews is not expected to decline further except by attrition. Most Polish Jews continue to reside in urban areas. Prior to the 1969 bilateral moves that ultimately led to the negotiation and conclusion of the Bonn Warsaw accord of 1970, the Polish government consistently held to the grossly understated figure of 3,000 for the German minority in Poland. Conversely, West German estimates of as many as 1.2 million were APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 exagg: rrted. This discrepancy reflects fundamental differences in the criteria used in the identification of Germans and Poles, particularly as this relab: s to persons of mixed nationality. At the time of the Polish occupation of the former German territories, Polish authorities reclassified some 1.3 million inhabitants as Autochthonous (literally "sprung -from- the soil Poles, who were thereby exempt from being transferred to Germany. This group of persons, considered German by German sources, consists mainly of bilingual people of Polish- German ancestry. About 80% of them live in Silesia, with the remainder in Gdansk province and in Olsztyn province (the major part of former East Prussia). Over 300,000 Germans and /or Autochthons are believed to have left Puiand since about 1955 for both West and East Germany. Polish officials privately estimated that as many as 75,000 ethnic Germans were still residing in Poland in mid -1970. Near).y all of the 30,000 Germans repatriated by 1972 were probably from this category. The number of such Germans, together with persons of mixed ancestry in Poland in 1972 probably was under one million. The 180,000 Ukrainians in Polam! form the largest minority in the country and reside in 11 of the 17 territorial provinces of the country. Before the war, most [Tkrainians within present Polish boundaries lived in R tes ?Ow province in the southeast, but because of forcible resettlement after 1947 into the former German territories, the Ukrainian minority still residing in Rzeszow province accounted for only an esti..Mated 1% or 2% of the population in 1969. In Olsztyn and Koszalin provinces, however, they accounted for 5% to 7% of the population, with some isolated districts having a proportion as high as 25 In contrast to the widely distributed Ukrainians, most of the 160,000 White Russian minority resides in Bialystok province in eastern Poland. The remaining smaller minority groups are located chiefly along the periphery of the country: Slovaks in southern Krakow province, Lithuanians in northeast- ern Bialystok province, and Great Russians in Bialystok and Olsztyn provinces. Poland's Gypsy minority, residing mainly in the southern provinces, increased from about 17,000 in 1964 to 18,000 in 1967. During the same period, however, the percentage of nomadic Gypsies decreased from 50% to 4 according to official Polish claims. Most of the Greek minority, constituting in the main refugees from the Greek civil conflict in the late 1940's, are settled in the former German territories in western Poland, while the small Czech minority is concentrated in the southern portions of Katowice and Opole provinces. 4. Vital trends Despite heavy wartime losses among both sexes of all age groups, in the early postwar period Poland had one of the most rapidly growing populations in all Europe and was first among the countries of Eastern Europe (Figure 11). The postwar "baby boom" as well as the unusually heavy wartime losses of persons of childbearing age are illustrated by the fact that in 1970 the number of 20- to 24 -year olds was more than 30% above those in the 25- to 29- year -old category (Figure 12). Betweep. 1949 and 1955 the very high birth rate was accompanied by a marriage rate unsurpassed since the early 1920's, stimulated to some extent by settlement of the former German territories. An important factor in the overall population growth has b ,-n an almost steady decline in Poland's death rate from a high of 14.1 per 1,000 population in the immediate prewar period to a low of 7.3 in 1966. The slow increase since then, to 8.1 per 1,000 population in 1970, reflects the gradual, relative rise in the numbers of persons age 65 and over. Especially large reductions have been achieved in the infant mortality rate which, standing at 139 per 1,000 live births in 1938, was second only to Romania in Europe. Although this rate was reduced to a figure of 33.4 per 1,000 live births in 1970, it nevertheless remained among the highest in Europe. In Eastern Europe, Poland's infant mortality rate is exceeded only by Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary, in that order. Comparable rates in Western countries range from 20.8 in the United States, 18.8 in the United Kingdom, and 16.4 in France, to the world's lowest, 12.9 in Sweden. The relatively rapid decline in Poland's birth rate since 1955 has been the most significant aspect of the country's vital trends (Figure 13). It reached its lowest recorded level of 16.2 per 1,000 population in 1968. Over the same period, 1955 -68, Poland's rate of natural increase has shown an even more marked decline. In 1969 a somewhat increased birth rate of 16.3 per 1,000 population was outweighed by a higher death rate to produce the lowest rate of natural increase in the postwar period -8.2 per 1,000 population, or the same as that of the United States in that year. Although Poland no longer ranks among the fastest growing countries in Europe, its rate of natural increase still exceeds that of most other countries in Eastern Europe. Poland's relative standing in this respect compared to selected countries in 1969 is shown in Figure 14. the primary causes of the decline in the birth rate have been the slow but tangible improvements in the 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 M U:j:160 :1 M161 :4:1:1 /_d:,1111i QillyflyI:111l1lXlIl1lMIIIY *B1 f FIGILM 1 t. WW w rii, fakwA oral I'llm Euapsm C(Lwnfxo" calrwlN� 1950 h 1 90 Maul It t+ i� u[ 110111, to$p1d udl rnlrwlinn w 111t a n alts 4opil ti4';Ar111u>; nl ItW (:011I�11e riblr artwlult lltr Wiwi INK13 161NIll. 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Me �spr.ctntKti 41 1311tH h; LS slawlp riWn hl a1tJ4111011rn -Aids a rlrchealrix Idw,a nlrutulity rule, ct. In 1'9616 rrry,hlr+nvl fA.11 )rr.rt Gu rru$n arwl i." )rani I+Ir fc113JIM Plrlood mull tLRM lu 11atir Mir sr{ I Its 313s" Mriall sec rul li's 1I nIA-% !u (C:11:11f5 ilk F:uroIM, Illo Ild WS Whirs 3rer IM frurtln M ;K 0. 'Ilds lrinmut% un APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGUH 12. AV-son Mwft tr$ax, Pc&ond and it* United Stnw-% oomffa a 19n (U }GVI APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 13. Vital statistics (U /OU) NATURAL INFANT TOTAL BIRTHS DEATHS INCREASE MARRIAGE DIVORCE MORTALITY POPULATION Per 1,000 population Thousands 1936 -38 (prewar average) 25.3 14.1 11.2 8.2 na 139.0 *34,849 1955........ 29.1 9.6 19.5 9.5 0.49 82.2 27,550 1956 28.1 9.0 19.1 9.4 0.50 70.9 28,080 1957... 27.6 9.5 18.1 9.1 0.55 77.2 28,540 1958......... 26.3 8.4 17.9 9.2 0.55 72.1 29,000 1959 24.7 8.6 16.1 9.5 0.53 71.4 29,480 1960 22.6 7.6 15.r, 8.2 0.50 54.8 29,893 1961....... 20.9 7.6 13.3 7.9 0.56 53.2 30,133 1962 19.6 7.9 11.7 7.5 0.59 55.0 30,484 1963 19.2 7.5 11.7 7.2 0.64 48.5 30,940 1964 18.1 7.6 10.5 7.4 0.67 47.2 31,339 1965 17.4 7.4 10.0 8.4 no 41.5 31,551 1966 16.7 7.3 9.4 7.1 0.77 38.6 31,811 1967 16.3 7.8 8.5 7.5 0.85 37.9 32,163 1968 16.2 7.6 8.6 8.0 0.'11 33.4 32,426 1969 16.3. 8.1 8.2 8.3 1.01 34.4 32,671 1970 16.6 8.1 8.5 8.5 1.05 33.4 32,605 no "ta not available. *Per `.,000 live births. *1938, within prewar boundaries. improvement, however, from the postwar low of 88.4 males per 100 females in 1950, when male losses in the two world wars were most perceptible. Older age groups account for nearly all of the disproportion. While in the marriageable age group of 20 to 29 years the ratio is 103 males per 100 females, in the 40 to 44 age group the ratio declines to 94 men per 100 women and sharply thereafter to 5:3 males to 100 females at age 75 and over. The general sex ratio is expected to improve, however, to about 97 males per 100 females in 1990. 5. Population policy and projections From the end of World War II until the mid- 1950's, it was in the Polish regime's interest to accelerate the rapid natural growth rate in order to recoup wartime losses, populate newly gained territories, and provide the manpower needed for the planned extensive industrialization drive. During this period the government offered incentives in the form of special allowances for large families. This policy was particularly successful as it coincided with the sanctity -of -life concept of the dominant Roman Catholic religion in Poland. By about 1955, however, the government became aware of the economic need to slow down the natural growth and rising dependency ratio of the population because almost one -fifth of the industrial labor force was un- deremployed and constituted a major obstacle to planned increases of labor productivity. In addition, the concern of the regime over its ability to satisfy the material needs of future generations p�ompted the adoption of laws in late 1956 to legalize abortion on medical and economic grounds and the promotion of family planning. The 1956 laws, however, were subject to varying interpretations, the Catholic Church vigorously opposed them, and numerous doctors refused to observe them fully. For these reasons the number of abortions did not rise markedly until after 1960, when a modification of the laws made abortions more easily obtainable, church interference with this practice was specifically proscribed, and other measures to limit the size of families were instituted. The reported number of abortions reached a peak of almost 272,000 in 1962 but declined to about 220,000 in 1970. Since the birth rate has generally continued to decline throughout this period, it can be surmised that contraception, which has been promoted vigorously, has supplanted abortion as the principal device for implementing family planning. The marked and often unforeseen impact of fluctuating economic, social, and other factors on vital trends has produced a wide range of continually revised projections for future population trends in Poland. In 1965, for example, Western sources projected a population of about 41.2 million by 1985, providing fertility, mortality, and other trends then pertaining were maintained. Four years later, changes 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 vital "factors. By contrast, the least favorable set of assumptions produced projections of 34 million by 1975, about 36 million in 1985, and no more than 38 million by the year 2000. These latter figures were predicated largely on the assumption of a considerable slowdown of the natural increase of the population, not exceeding about 133,000 annually in the last 10 to 15 years. of this century. Assuming that the declining fertility of women, especially in rural areas, observed in the late 1960's will continue, Polish demographers indicate the possibility that by the first or second decade of the next centuiy,the rate of natural increase in Poland will be zero. The latest available projec,'.,ns by Polish demographers indicate a further adjustment, in which two assumptions concerning vital factors resulted in a projected population in the year 2000 of only 39.4 million and 38.6 million respectively. These projections reportedly will be subject to further change as a result of detailed study of the 1970 census data. There was no indication, however, that these projections might impel the Polish Government to revise its population policies, although a decline in publicity for family planning has been noted. The government apparently feels that, in the short run, measures to. encourage larger families are unwarran- ted. Some Polish authorities argue that the natural trend toward smaller families in industrializing societies is often reversed when a specific level of material affluence has been reached. D. Societal aspects of labor (C) 1. The industrializing society FIGURE 14. Vital rates, Poland and selected countries, 1969 (U /OU) in these and other factors, however, resulted in a lowered projection from the same sources of 39.9 million by 1985, and a population of 42.1 million by 1990. By mid -1972, Western estimates were adjusted still further downward, and posited a population of only 37.3 million by 1985. Polish demographic sources have long been even more markedly pessimistic. An official projection of October 1969 estimated that Poland's population would not reach the figure of 40 million until the year 2000. This study reportedly was based on the most favorable of three assumptions concerning operative 22 In post -World War II Poland, as in other rapidly industrializing' "societies, the social �and by deriva- tion, economic and political impact of changing occupational trends has been marked, and has presented the Communist rulers with a constant challenge to the theoretical underpinning of their system. The regime's drive during the postwar period to mold a large class of skilled industrial workers conscious of its role in society has, perhaps, been only too successful. In December 1970, this class� favored in theory but ignored in practice� ousted an inept and top -heavy regime and, though within the context of the Communist system, opted for efficiency, consumer welfare, and a role for itself in national life. The process of growth that transformed a predominantly conservative peasant society ruled by a thin crust of various elites �the military, clergy, aristocracy �into a postwar society predominantly nonagricultural �but still ruled by a similarly APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 15. Selected age -sex characteristics of the population (U /OU) DISTRIBUTION BY AGE GROUPS MALES DEPEND Ali 65 and MEDIAN PER 100 ENCY ages 0-14 15-39 40-64 Over AGE FEMALES RATIO* Percent Yeara 1950........... 100.0 89.7 89.8 85.6 5.4 26.2 88.4 542 1960........... 100.0 88.8 85.8 84.4 .5.9 26.9 93.7 660 1970........... 100.0 88.0 88.4 85.8 7.8 27.5 94.5 555 1990........... 100.0 85.8. 87.8 27.0 9.9 32.4 97.0 542 NOTE- Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. *Number of persona under age 15 and those age 65 and over, per 1,000 persons of ages 15 through 64. unrepresentative, ideological elite, has been gradual. Although in 1970 agriculture was still the single largest occupation in Poland, the chief characteristic of the postwar period has been the continued decrease in the proportion of the total population dependent on agriculture as a means of livelihood (Figure 16). Whereas at the beginning of this century about four fifths of the population depended for its livelihood on the land, this proportion fell to about two- thirds when Poland reemerged as an independent state in 1918, and to about one -half at the end of World War H. By 1970 this accelerating trend resulted in a population about 70% of which was drawing its livelihood from nonagricultural pursuits. This major shift in occupational orientation has gone hand -in -hand with urbanization, industrializa- tion, rapid and forcible changes in social patterns, and a politicization of virtually all aspects of national life. These developments have not only molded the social role and characteristics of Polish labor in the postwar period, but have also been influenced in return. Poland's actual labor force in the postwar period has been characterized by a markedly high participation rate -about half of the total population and about four fifths of the population within the working age of 15 to 64 years. The postwar growth in the labor force, however,' has been due primarily to demographic changes rather than to changes in the pattern of labor force participation. The growth was much more rapid in the 1960 -70 decade than before and closely paralleled the increase in the number of persons of working age. In contrast to Western usage, Polish criteria for working age are 18 to 64 years for men and 18 to 59 years for women. Although these criteria have been in use throughout the postwar period, they have become particularly useful to '.Se Polish regime in statistically minimizing the growing problem of providing new jobs for large increments to the working -age population in the Western sense (i.e., 15-64 years) since the mid- 1960's. This working -age population rose by almost 15% between 1960 and 1970 and will continue to grow rapidly as the members of the postwar "baby boom" enter the labor field. Providing employment, vocational training, and additional academic opportunities as ways of easing a labor surplus have been high on the list of commitments by the Gierek regime since 1970. Changes in the relative proportions of working to non working age population since 1950 is shown in Figure 17. The relatively rapid growth of the labor force as a whole- almost exclusively in the nonagricultural sector and coupled to a decline in agricultural employment -has resulted in little change in the proportion of women in the labor force despite a higher female participation rate. The activity rate for males has been about average for a European country, but the female rate has been substantially higher and 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 16. Total population by source of livelihood, selected years 1921-70 (U /OU) Other Total Political and socl organizations 1 Indust. ,I, Finance and I D C \Construalon insurance J(Y Public I W�) I I Agriculture* administration Public health Forestry and social welfare Edoation Transportation and culture and Communal services Trade communications ia9RI 1950 1970 *Socialized agriculture emplo s only about 10 to 207 of the agricultural labor 7orce. results chiefly from the classification of most rural housewives as economically active. Labor force participation rates for Polish women are much lower in the cities than in the countryside, since fewer married women with families find it possible to take jobs outside the home. A significant increase in the number of urban women in the labor force would require government attention to their general lack of skills and adequate training; to the relatively slow growth of the branches where women most easily find employment (handicrafts, services, trade); to the limited availability of pail -time work; and to overburdened child -care centers. Most women continue to find employment in those occupations that have traditionally had a high proportion of females, despite the official government policy of nondiscrimination by sex and marked postwar changes in traditional, conservative social attitudes toward female employment in the professions and in industry. The slow but steady increase in female employment among different occupations is shown in Figure 18. As in other Communist societies, unemployment in Poland has been either denied or underestimated for most of the postwar period. Indeed, during the initial postwar period, it did not appear to be a major problem. The relative importance of agriculture and construction resulted in a substantial degree of seasonal unemployment, and frictional unemploy- ment was also fairly high because of the Polish worker's tendency to change jobs frequently; the long- term unemployed were much less numerous. Employment problems are increasingly acknowledged in the press, however, for Polish manpower planners 24 FIGURE 18. Female employment in socialized sector, 1950 and 1970 (U /CU) have been plagued since about 1963 by the problem of creating sufficient jobs for youths entering the labor market. Official data on unemployment include jobseekers who have registered at government employment offices. Polish estimates suggest, however, that actual unemployment is about five times as great as registered unemployment, for many jobseekers fail to register. Most registrants, many of them women, have limited industrial skills. The ratio of vouths under 18 to total registrants is low and has declined since '965 despite the influx of young persons into the labor market. Even the official data reflect a situation that worsened markedly in the late 1960's and contributed to the labor unrest that culminated in the 1970 explosion of discontent. Official unemployment data for 1950 and 1965 -70 are shown in Figure 19. Some farming areas and virtually all industrial sectors suffer from excess employment. The formerly chronic problem of rural overpopulation is less acute as the result of the postwar territorial settlement and the steady rural -urban population trend. In the eastern provinces, however, the population on the land is considerably in excess of actual labor requirements, and nonagricultural job opportunities are relatively scarce. Polish occupational patterns differ from those of most other East European countries in that a substantial portion of the employed work in the private sector of the economy. Moreover, the bulk of this employment is in agriculture, which still constitutes the single largest branch of economic activity. The relative size of the private sector is declining, however, in favor of the nonagricultural, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 17. Shifts in working -age population, 1950, 1960, and 1970 (U /OU) FIGURE 19. Registered unemployment, selected years (U /OU) REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED Blue collar White Under YEAR Total Skilled Unskilled collar 18 Women AVAILABLE .JOBS For Total women 1960......... 67,309 4,396 26,070 4,294 2,606 29,943 46,452 6,751 1965......... 116,459 7,318 43,608 6,006 5,062 54,465 52,925 12,131 1966......... 109,517 6,932 41,283 5,936 3,505 52,161 64,229 13,626 1967......... 99,406 6,185 36,533 6,799 2,453 47,436 58,169 11,864 1968......... 102,355 6,311 35,260 8,841 2,687 49,256 76,664 15,852 1969......... 135,454 10,138 42,176 16,157 2,647 64,336 33,618 8,867 1970......... 150,698 12,770 49,798 14,588 2,207 71,335 39,492 8,539 predominantly socialized sector of the economy. This downward trend is expected to continue, chiefly because of the rapid expansion of the nonagricultural branches, which offer relatively few opportunities for private employment, and because of the gradual decline in private agricultural employment resulting from the death and retirement of older farmers and the exodus of rural youth. In the postwar period, Poland has made considerable progress in transforming a predominantly agricultural economy into one with a diversified industrial base. A substantial and continuing decline in the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture has resulted, but the absolute decrease in agricultural employment since 1950 has been moderate. It results chiefly from labor recruitment for industrial and construction projects during the early 1950's, and, more recently, from the attractions of urban employment and urban life. There has been no large -scale flight from the countryside such as accompanied the intensive collectivization drives launched in other Eastern European countries, because collectivization never assumed major proportions in Poland. Polish agriculture is characterized by a predominance of small, privately owned farms producing a wide variety of crops. Large, mechanized farms in the socialist sector, i.e., state and collective farms, occupy only about 15% of the land under cultivation. Since the mid- 1960's the government, by strengthening educational and monetary incentives, has sought to stem the migration of rural youth to cities and does not foresee before 1975 a decline much below the 1968 level of about 6.2 million engaged in agriculture. Most of those who have left agriculture have been in the younger age groups, and this is reflected in the aging of the agricultural labor force. The increasing proportion of females in agriculture reflects the tendency of men on small farms to take up nonagricultural jobs, leaving women to maintain the family holding. These trends, together with the emergence of the "worker- peasant" who combines part -time agricultural activities with full -time industrial employment, have had an adverse effect on the quality of the agricultural labor force. Employment in the nonagricultural branches of the economy nearly doubled between 1950 and 1970, standing at nearly 11 million in the latter year. Indeed, throughout the postwar period the nonag- ricultural branches have absorbed nearly all of the annual increment to the labor force, in addition to providing employment for those released from agriculture. The socialist sector, which accounts for approximately 97% of nonagricultural employment, sets the main employment trends outside agriculture. Within the socialist sector, the relative composition of nonagricultural employment has changed little since 1950. Industry (manufacturing, mining, and power production) employs the largest number. Services follow, then construction, transportation, and communications and trade. The private sector accounts for about 3% of total nonagricultural employment, and is relatively most important in industrial handicrafts and in services. Private shops are numerous in such service activities as cleaning and dyeing, photography, and hairdressing. The remainder of those in the private sector work mostly in the building trades. Private handicraft activity is much diminished compared with prewar Poland. The destruction of the Jewish population during the war and the suppression of the private sector in the early 1950's reduced handicraft employment drastically. Critical shortages of services and supplies developed, especially in the rural areas, and the government moved to encourage craft activities. Employment rose significantly until 1958, but then stagnated until 1964, when the government again moved to encourage private crafts. 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 In an effort to absorb the anticipated high annual increment to the labor force, the authorities reduced taxes on private establishments and provided favorable loans for craftsmen. Since 1970 the Gierek regime's commitment to consumer welfare, as well as the need to absorb large new increments into the labor force, has resulted in an expansion of such sectors as services, and the growth of private or semi private (state franchise) enterprises �most noticeably in catering and automobile service stations. Because a large proportion of the Polish nonagricultural labor force, particularly in industry, was recruited in the countryside; types and degrees of skills are generally below the standards of an industrialized Western country. To meet its needs for skilled labor, the government has appropriated sizable funds for general and vocational education. The educational qualifications of workers in the socialist sector have improved considerably since 1958 (Figure 20). Tt;c proportion of the work force with secondary school or university degrees in 1968 was highest in education (18 public administration (18 and health and welfare (13 Among workers in agriculture and forestry, over 30% had not completed primary school. Approximately 49% of the workers in industry had finished at least 7 years of primary education and 26% had received additional vocational training, while less than 8% were graduates of academic high schools or universities. This is characteristic of Poland's urban labor force, for the 8- 26 year compulsory schooling law is strictly enforced in the cities and vocational training accounts for much of the worker's background. The geographical distribution of the nonagricul- tural labor force is uneven. The highly urbanized Silesian basin, and especially the province of Katowice, constitutes the industrial heartland of the country. With barely 3% of the total land area, Katowice accounts for approximately 16% of the nonagricultural labor force and 21% of the industrial labor force. Other high concentrations of nonagricul- tural employment surround the cities of Warsaw, Lodz, Wroclaw (forme Breslau), Krakow, Poznan, and increasingly the shipping and shipbuilding centers along the Baltic roast� Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin (formerly Stettin). Lowest concentrations are found in the predominantly agricultural provinces bordering the U.S.S.R� Bialystok, Lublin, and Rzeszow. 2. Labor as catalyst to change When party leader. Edward Gierek took over the leadership of the country from his predecessor, Wladyslaw Gomulka, on 20 December 1970, it was after a week of the gravest political crisis in the history of postwar Poland. Although the workers' demonstra- tions and riots which toppled Gomulka were ignited by the folly of the former regime in raising the prices of food and other staples by some 15% to 20% just before the Christmas season, the workers were further embittered by the prevailing view that once again they were to bear the brunt of the economic and social inequities inherited from the past. The new leadership subsequently acknowledged in assessing the December events that the protests took such violent form as a result of social discontent which had been accumulating for a long time; it was caused by many factors, and particularly by the worsening economic situation of the country, serious neglect in social policy, the stagnation of real wages, shortages of supplies, and the rising cost of living.... The December events have shown that any disruption of the bond between the party and the working class can cause a serious political up- heaval in our country. Despite the Gierek regime's correct insight into and understanding of the causes of the December 1970 explosion, the initial months of his rule were spent in putting out the fires of discontent and taking stopgap measures to alleviate the most evident worker grievances. By early 1973 the leadership had taken many new steps to catalogue the errors of the past and to institute new policies earning the respect of the working class as well as of society as a whole, but the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 20. Educational level of employees in the socialist sector of the economy (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 social, economic, and particularly labor situation is still in a state of change. Fundarnentally, however, the changes initiated by Cierek'are a reaction to the situation that he inherited from Comulka, and understanding of. the present position of labor must be based on an examination of the situation in which the average Polish worker found himself on the eve of the becember 1970 events. a.. The anatomy of mismanagement In' the late.:1960's sor..e of Poland's endemic economic problems became more acute. In agriculture conservatism continued to be at cross purposes with efficiency, even though the drift of the population to the cities during the postwar period, combined with rising agricultural investment, had raised agricultural productivity above the prewar level. By 1970, however, several bad harvests had combined to produce a serious shortage of major food items� including meat, which in Poland is considered a staple. The nonagricultural sector fared even worse. Disorganized by sporadic reforms and 'conflicting directives, industry was unable to adapt its output to changing patterns of industrial and consumer demand. Uneconomic utilization of manpower was reflected in overstaffing and the assignment of workers to jobs for which they were over- or underqualiiied. In the economy as a whole this took the for, of simultaneous shortages and surpluses. Labor redundancy on the enterprise level was virtually built into the system, for fulfillment of production goals was encouraged even at the cost of exceeding the wage fund or the employment plan. Moreover, favoritism in hiring was rampant. Industry's problems were further intensified by the generally inadequate skill levels of the labor force, and the lack of labor discipline. The movement of the population to urban areas required farm workers to transfer to nonagricultural occupations, where they were inexperienced and unskilled, and many found it difficult to adapt to the demaiids for reliability, punctuality, and diligence necessary to an industrial production schedule. Despite major improvements, working conditions were poor in many branches of industry, and industrial health and safety precautions compared unfavorably with those in Western countries. Excessive heat, noise and vibration, poor sanitation and lighting, and inadequate ventilation ranked among the most frequently criticized safety problems in Polish. industry. Little advance was made in these basic areas of worker comfort and protection, despite a fourfold increase between 1955 and 1970 in expenditures to promote labor safety. There had been a gradual reduction of the workweek since 1968 to 46 hours (8 hours on weekdays and 6 hours on Saturdays) for most workers. but many workers� especially those in industries, such as shipbuilding, where delivery deadlines have a profound effect on the pace of work, habitually worked overtime at complex wage rates more often geared to output than to hours worked. Moreover, complex and often arbitrary wage rates became a focus of labor dissatisfaction. In assessing the economic background of the events of December 1970, the Cierek leadership in February 1971 admitted that: during the years 1966 -70, Poland had the lowest rate of increase in real wages of all the countr'es of CEMA Coup .il for Economic Mutual Assistance) There were some groups of workers which actually suffered a decline in their real wages. Indeed, although marked improvement took place after 1956, the low income level in Poland remained a source of intense dissatisfaction. A small group of public figures leading government and party officials, prominent scholars, scientists, artists, composers, and others received generous salaries and valuable fringe benefits. For the average worker, however, income was low relative to prices, and the purchase of a suit or a radio set required careful budgeting. Most families found it difficult to make ends meet on a single salary, and urban wives frequently worked out of economic neressi:y. Family income was supplemented in other ways: by moonlighting, renting rooms, or raising fruits and vegetables at home, and sometimes illegally, by operating a nonlicensed repair shop, engaging in currency speculation, or selling blackmarket goods. The minimum wage in 1970 stood fixed by law at 850 zlotys a month, although admittedly this legal minimum had little effect on prevailing wage rates and the average worker earned much -r- are. Wage scales favored workers employed in mining, construction, or heavy industry. Polish coal miners have been traditionally well paid. Since 1960 their earnings have been at least 50% higher than the average industrial wage, and in 1970 average monthly wages in coal mining were about 4,281 zlotys, compared with 2,515 zlotys for industry as a whole. Workers in metallurgy, too, by common practice are paid more than most other industrial workers, earning 3,200 zlotys monthly in 1970. Average monthly wages in construction were 2,986 zlotys and somewhat less in machine building, metalworking, chemicals, and other heavy industry branches. Wages in light industry ranged from an average 2,000 zlotys monthly (textiles) 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 to 2,300 zlotys (printing) in 1970. As is true in most industrialized countries, textiles and apparel were near the bottom of the industrial wage scale. Unskilled workers, many of them women, predominate in these branches, thus lowering the average wage level. In other nonagricultural branches, average monthly wages in 1970 were highest in transportation and communications and lowest in health and in trade, as shown below (in zlotys): Transportation and communications 2,479 Public administration and justice 2,423 Finance and insurance 2,395 Municipal services and housing 2,342 Education, culture, and art 2,187 Trade 2,094 Public health and welfare 1,841 In the 1960's, data on industrial wages by occupational grouping revealed the favored position of engineering- technical personnel, and showed a perceptible improvement in the earnings of administrative clerical personnel. In 1970 the average monthly wages of engineering technical personnel in industry were 3,847 zlotys, compared with 2,552 zlotys for administrative clerical personnel and 2,515 zlotys for blue collar workers. The indexes of earnings of each group, with these of blue collar workers as the base, are shown below: 1955 1960 1970 Blue -collar workers 100.0 100.0 100.0 Engineering technical personnel 156.5 159.5 153.0 Administrative clerical personnel 98.9 103.8 101.4 The slight decline in this favored position during the last 2 years of the decade reflected a policy of gradual leveling of earnings, as well as more than proportionate increases in blue- ::jllar wages. This is a trend to which the new Gierek regime is even more forcefully committed. Money wages rose steadily after World War II, but real wages rose much more s;:;wly. Money wages and real wages moved in opposite directions in 1952 -53 and again in 1960 (Figure 21), as sharply rising prices outstripped the average increase in pay. In 1965, a modest pay increase was wiped out entirely by higher prices, and real wages failed to rise. The annual rate of increase in both money and real wages fluctuated erratically during the 1950's, and until 1958 was frequently very high. Since 1960 both rates have tended to stabilize at a much lower level. Money wages rose at an average annual rate of 3.7% in 1960- 70, and real wages at a rate of 1.8 The ill -timed price rises of 13 December 1970 were, in fact, part of a series of economically defensible 28 attempts by the (Iomulka regime to initiate economic reform and to tackle the country's deep- seated malaise. Indeed, since taking power, the Gierek regime has not totally repudiated the general basis of Gomulka's reform program, but it is changing the scope, thrust, and emphasis of the reform and, above all, is seeking to avoid the errors of its predecessor: that of extreme insensitivity to the social and political context within which reforms must be implemented. This insensitivity was illustrated by the events of late 1970. Although in May 1970 the party had approved a new system of material incentives based on the principle that workers' earnings should reflect the economic performance of individual euterprises, Gomulka had postponed any wage increases until mid -1972 because of the unexpected food shortages ar,d the perennial shortage of other consumer goods. To the workers, especially those in the shipyards, the new system clearly seemed to be the same as a 2 -year wage freeze. When this explosive mixture of popular discontent was ignited by the December 1970 price increases, Gomulka looked on the revolt as a counterrevolution which should be suppressed by force. However, a coalition of certain members of Gomulka's own leadership, a portion of the party apparatus, and the army hierarchy opposed this APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 21. Index of money wages and real wages in the socialist sector of the economy (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 response and acted to remove Gomulka from office. Gierek immediately repudiated Gomulka's thesis of a "counterrevolution, called the events a justified protest movement of the working class, and unde -took to placate the rebellious workers with immediate material concessions and the promise of changes in the economic and social policies pursued by his predecessor. b. Labor and the new managers The first step taken by the new government was to freeze retail prices for 2 years, to "suspend" the controversial wage freeze, and to lift all employment restrictions. A week later the government announced a combination of measures designed to compensate low paid workers and low income families for the December increase in the cost of living. The statutory minimum wage was increased from 850 zlotys to 1,000 zlotys a month, and workers earning less than: 2,000 zlotys were to receive raises ranging from 30 to 80 zlotys a month, retroactive to 1 December 1970. Family allowances were raised for families having two or more children and a net per capita income wit exceeding 1,000 zlotys a month. Minimum pensions and disability payments were raised by 60 zlotys a month. According to the official announcement, the wage and pension increases affected 5.2 million people, and the increased family allowances benefited 4.7 million children. The essential defect of these initial measures was that they offered nothing to skilled industrial workers who already had a job and earned more than 2,000 zlotys a month. (By February 1971 the average monthly wage of industrial workers was 2,537 zlotys. Most important perhaps, the shipyard workers who sparked the riots earned between 2,800 and 3,400 zlotys.) Although the promised 2 -year price freeze and possible future wage increases would ultimately benefit them, the workers sought immediate relief from the December 1970 increase in their cost of living. As a result, the industrial workers continued to press for either across the -board wage increases or rescission of the Decrmber price increases, and a new wave of protest strikes swept across Poland. A 3 -day general strike occurred in Szczecin on 22 -24. January 1971, and on 12 February a general strike was launched in Lodz, a major textile center. The government responded with pleas for restraint and cooperation and with promises to improve the working people's standard of living. These promises, however, failed to budge the workers and the regime was forced to yield. On 15 February it was announced that Soviet credit obtained "during the last few days" permitted a total nullification of the December 1970 price increases. The simultaneous announcement of the price rollback and of the Soviet credit which had made it possible occurred while the Lodz strike was still underway, and there are reasons for believing that the firm stand of the Lodz workers may have had a decisive influence on the decisions reached in both Warsaw and Moscow. Lodz has occupied a special place in the fighting tradition of the working -class movement not only in Poland but in Russia (to which Lodz belonged untii 1918). A general strike in Lodz (bloodily suppressed by Tsarist troops) was a highlight of the 1905 Russian revolution. The concessions that the Gierek regime made to labor were not only expedient steps to quell popular discontent, but were also symptomatic of the new leadership's determination to develop a pattern of social and economic development based on a new relationship of trust between the working class and the government. The new 'socioeconomic philosophy rested on the precept that development of the national economy and the material welfare of the people are not mutually exclusive, and that one rests upon the other. In the words of a ranking member of the new party leadership in November 1971: increased consumption is an important and nec- essary factor in the process of economic growth, a factor which stimulates production and technological progress, improves organization, and results in greater labor productivity. This pragmatic, consumer oriented approach reflected the long -held personal convictions of the new party It, -der,' F,dward Gierek, whose concern for the material well -being of workers as a stimulant to economic performance was well- known. Following his early years as a miner and a trade union organizer in the Communist movement in France and Belgium, Gic:ek's outlook was further developed during his efficient stewardship from 1957 to 1970 as party chief of Katowice, Poland's key industrial province, where he demonstrated his belief that a just reward for-good work and close touch with the needs of labor generates a self sustaining cycle of economic development. In December 1970, the fortuitous circumstances that brought Gierek into power also made his deeply held socioeconomic views acceptable both to the Polish and parties. 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 The long -range improvements that the Gierek regime sought in its relations with labor began with a revision of the 1971 -75 economic plan in the light of new priorities. The revised plan, presented in m 1971, called for a 38% increase in personal consumption over the plan period, and a rise of 18% in real wages, i.e., an average annual growth of 3.4 twice the rate of the 1961 -70 decade. Housing construction targets were increased by 25 Finally, the regime pledged itself to find 1.8 million new jobs in the 1971 -75 period. This figure represents the net increase in the number of jobs necessary to absorb the total contingent of some 3.5 million workers entering the labor market during this period. In addition, th, regime is committed to create more jobs for womE and youth, and to take full advantage of the qualifications of workers already on the job. It has also undertaken a gradual but thorough revision of the wage and salary system basically designed to make take -home pay less dependent ov bonuses. Proposals put forward also call for a induction of wage disproportions among different classes of workers but wiihout eliminating monetary incentives; indeed, individual wage scales would be correlated with productivity, quality of work, responsibility, qualifications, and seniority. The peasantry, who would have to provide the food that the new regime had promised the workers, was not neglected. The new deal for Poland's private farmers was announced in mid -April 1971 in the form of an eight -point agricultural program. The main features of this new agrarian policy included: abolition, as of January 1972, of all compulsory deliveries; improved procedures and increased prices for the purchase of agricultural products by the state; the grant of property titles to "more than a million private farmers"; changes in existing land taxes to compensate the state for the end of compulsory deliveries, but also to facilitate expansion of private holdings by purchase of state land; and introduction of a comprehensive free health service for private farmers and their families. These measures gave the individual peasants a sense of security, economic respectability, and social usefulness that had not existed under Gomulka. In addressing the concrete issue of increasing the output of food, the new leadership had in effect futher consolidated private ownership in the countryside, as.d thus had exhibited a willingness to subordinate ideological to pragmatic considerations. The favorable response of the peasantry to these measures, in addition to heavy imports of food, 30 permitted the regime to improve living standards. Them were no persistent shortages of food or consumer good:t in 1971, although sporadic nonavailability of certain items in selected p ^rts of the country� blamed on distribution shortcomings continued to cause local irritation. More important in many ways than these tangible changes, however, is the regime's measured success in convincing labor, especially young workers, that communication between the people at the working level and the country's rulers has been restored and that they will continue to have a voice and a stake in national development. While most of the former institutional forms have been retained, Gierek's moves to streamline and energize the bureaucracy when possible, and sidestep it when not, appear to have convinced the majority of the initially skeptical and militant workers to participate in the "process of national renovation" that is the motto of the Gierek regime. 3. Trade unions and labor relations In a major sense, labor relations a d their institutional basis have been the most important and most sensitive aspects of the domestic policies of the Gierek regime since its assumption of power after the workers' revolt in December 1970. As a result of its success in overthrowing the former Gomulka regime, labor has remained acutely aware of its political clout. Gierek's conciliatory moves in raising wages, improving living standards, and promising a greater role for labor in shaping economic and social policy reflect the new government's awareness of its d( :pendence on the good will of the working class. Yet, the new regime has evidently no intention of meeting the demands for independent trade unions that were voiced by the striking workers in December 1970, and organizationally there has been virtually no change in the trade union structure since then. In 1970 there were 23 trade unions organized according to sector of economic activity, all under the central direction of a parent organization, the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). Regionally, the CRZZ supervises the work of the individual trade unions by administrative division down to the district (coeinty) level, as well as the activities of trade councils or cells in all major enterprises and places of employment. Total trade union membership in December 1970 was 10,101,700 members. Manual workers represented about 43% and women about 40% of the total. The following tabulation lists Polish APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 trade unions by size of membership, in thousands, in 1968: Nt mmm or TRADE UNION UnMERS Trade and Cooperative Workers 983 Engineering Industry Workers 935 Construction and Construction Materials In- dustry Workers 782 Miners 087 Agricultural workers (socialized sector only) 083 Textile, Clothing, and Leather Industry Workers 640 Communal Economy and Local Industry Workers 604 Cooperative Handicraft Workers 597 Teachers 573 Railway Workers 528 Health Service Workers 458 Chemical Industry Workers 430 State and Social Administration Workers 383 Food Processing and Sugar Industry Workers 350 Foundry Workers 320 Road and Transport Workers 274 Forestry and Wood Industry W- irkers 263 Communications Workers 208 Power Industry Workers 151 Mariners and Longshoremen 127 Culture and Art Workers 76 Typographical Industry Workers 54 Publishing, Press, and Radio Workers 33 The Communist regime has always regcriled the determination of labor policy, including the allocation of manpower resources, as falling legitimately within the purview of state economic planning, although the implementation of central planning in the field of labor has been more inconsistent in P :tnd than in some other Communist countries. After 1956, for example, the Forced and centrally directed allocation of labor along geographical and industrial lines of the Stalinist period was replaced by a flexible system permitting individual enterprises to do their own hiring; this has, in fact, resulted in persistent competition for skilled labor. Overall manpower planning is supervised by the State Planning Commission, with implementation devolving upon the various levels of local government in cooperation with specific enterprises and under the coordination of the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs. In addition to being assigned the task of implementing government policies in the areas of productivity, wages, norms, and working conditions, the trade unions have been given increasing responsibility for the administration of social security programs and, together with the public health service, wholly administer and supervise a system of recuperational institutions as well as workers' recreational activities. In December 1970, much of the workers' ire was directed at the trade union apparatus which, like other facets of the former regime's bureaucracy, had become authoritarian, inflexible, unresponsive to the popular will, and unrepresentative of its membership. These deficiencies were rotted in the basic concept of trade unions under communism. Claiming an identity of interests between the workers and the state, the government acted as final arbiter in all those fields of labor relations and legislation traditionally within the purview of the trade unions and management: hiring practices, wage scales, working conditions, and labor disputes. Polish trade unions, which during the interwar period had a record of effective internal democracy and promotion of the workers' interests, were thus transformed into instruments of state control over the labor force, implementing but not forming policy in the labor field. With both management and the trade unions being, in effect, component parts of the state machinery for the utilization and exploitation of labor, workers in postwar Poland have made little use of the formal trade union apparatus for raising and remedying their grievances. This appar_ nrnwlnt a Imlfrh�m 54 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070023 -3 H. Education (C) 1. The national context I automatic support (if rime policies, and second, the Jr expausiotl of mass t (ucation, combined with the The major educational goals of the postwar Communist regimes in Poland have been twofold: first, to mold it new "socialist man" whose strong ideological convictions would lead him to virtually reorientation of students in higher schools from the trati )nal academic disciplines �such as the lib art i,.w, and the social sciences toward techn, s udies and economic 01 or the wars, the government has succeeded in achieving the second goal, but its success, paradoxically, has been the main reason why it has failed to achieve the first. Historically, Poland's educational system has been deeply steeped in humanist tradition along French and German philosophical lines, decidedly influenced by religion, and supported by the state. Despite periods of internal turmoil and pre -World War I domination by Germany, Austria, and Russia, the interwar Polish Government succeeded in a renia kable assimilation of diverse educational principles, and on the eve of World War II Poland's academic system was regarded as one of the best in Europe. Despite the widened accessibility of educational opportunity, however, schools of higher learning during the interwar period were still characterized by a high degree of ingrown exclusiveness and overemphasis on legal and humanistic studies far exceeding the needs of the society. As it result, interwar Poland had problems with it qualified, unemployed, and often alienated intelligentsia long before the term became current elsewhere. In keeping with the rapid postwar industrialization and urbanization, the Communist government mounted a massive campaign to expand schooling facilities, to eliminate the exclusiveness of higher schools, and to put major emphasis on scientific, technical, and vocational education. The resultant virtual explosion in the numbers of educated youth within the framework of a social and political system unwilling and unable to satisfy either their material or spiritual demands has been central to the regime's conflict with the younger generation, and therefore, has been largely of its own making. The government's postwar educational goals were hindered by the unprecedented physical destruction of the wartime period, by the rapid rise in the numbers of school -age children due to the postwar baby-boom," and by the shortages of qualified teachers and pedagogues who, as members of the educated elite, were systematically eliminated by the Nazi occupiers. In general, the government has succeeded in all these sectors not only in overcoming the impact of the wartime period, but in creating a greatly expanded system of mass education. Consistently rising outlays for education including an extensive program of school construction and rapid 55 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 35. Conlrasting Myles in church architecture. A 17th century wooden church at Grywald, southern Poland `app), an d a new church at Drogomysl, also in southetti 0oland (bottom). (U /OU) strides in pedagogic training have resulted in generally good facilities in all but some rural areas. Adequacy of trained personnel has been a more persistent problem. In October 1969 the government announced that for the first time in the postwar period there was no shortage of teachers in Polish elementary schools; at the same time, however it was admitted that secondary education was short of some 20,000 teachers. Figure 36 shows postwar kindergarten and secondary school buildings, as well as traditional buildings flanking the main court of Warsaw University. The government's emphasis on mass education is illustrated by the data in Figure 37 showing the number of schools, students, and teachers in the prewar and postwar periods. Since the mid- 1960's about 10% of all children of preschool age have been enrolled in either creches (day nurseries) or kindergartens, although there is a wide discrepancy in this figure between urban and rural areas; in the latter case, there are indications that less than 1% attend such preschool centers. Greatest strides have been made in the compulsory stage of education �the 8- year basic school �which is attended by over 99% of children ages 7 through 14. School construction has been rapid and has often been inadequately reflected in statistical data. The decline in the absolute number of elementary schools in the postwar in contrast to the prewar period, for example, reflects not only wartime destruction and Poland's territorial losses, but also the elimination of 56 FIGURE 36. School buildings (U /OU) small, one -room, substandard rural schools which have been replaced by larger buildings with a larger number of classrooms. The rise in vocational and adult education has been particularly significant. This rise has paralleled the government's campaign to eliminate illiteracy between 1949 and 1951, when the problem was officially declared nonexistent. Latest official data show that in 1968 illiteracy amounted to less than 2 1;- of the total population. When measure 1 percentage of persons 15 years of age and c l( illiteracy rate averaged 4.6% during the di, ice 1960's. This is below the European avii%P tit &s K but somewhat above that of devifI1IIII) Westem European countries. The effective t Yl /lutlllrl (F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Warsaw University, inside main gate Modem kindergartens, Warsaw General secondary school, Grabowek, Gdansk province FIGURE 37. Number of schools, students, and teachers by type of school, selected years (U /OU) na Data not available. *Excludes both regular and vocational schools for the handicapped. In 1970171 there were 559 such schools with an enrolment of 86,200, and staffed by 5,800 full -time teachers. illiteracy, especially among working and peasant class adults, resulted in the marked decline in the number of elementary (basic) schools for adults in the 1960's (Figure 37). Increasingly since then, adult education has concentrated on the secondary school level, and on higher education where it is being integrated into regular evening, part -time, and correspondence courses conducted by established institutions. All public education, whether at the compulsory or the optional level, is tuition -free. In addition, full -time students of institutions of higher education who do not live within commuting distance are provided with free housing (dormitories) and with stipends for living expenses. Such stipends and other assistance was provided to 27% of the students of higher education in 1970/71. Elementary and secondary education is financed entirely through the central government. In 1970 state outlays for education represented about 9% of total budgetary expenditures. Virtually all teachers in the state system belong to the Polish Teachers Union, a component of the state controlled trade union movement. A majority of teachers are Communist Party members through necessity if not by conviction. 2. The educational system a. Organization and reform Public education is virtually a state monopoly. The sole exceptions are the Roman Catholic University of Lublin and a negligible number of lower level schools operated by religious and charitable institutions; all of these have been brought under increasing government control, and some have been eliminated entirely. Until late 1966 control over general elementary and secondary schools was vested in the Ministry of Education, and institutes of higher learning were administered by the Ministry of Higher Education. In November 1966 the government merged the two ministries into the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. This organizational move probably was designed primarily to achieve the stated purpose of more efficient use of state educational funds and better continuity of education through the coordina- tion of curriculums, but it also permitted the regime to put new life into its consistently flagging drive toward a "socialist" educational system via tighter central control of the entire structure. Following the coming to power of the Gierek regime, the educational system has come under serious scrutiny, with a major overhaul scheduled for completion by 1975. Az a first step, the governmental reorganization of March 1972 included the creation, once again, of two separate cabinet portfolios with responsibility for education. General education through the secondary level, including all vocational schools, is under the purview of the Ministry of Education and Training, while all higher education is administered by the new Ministt\ y)f Science, Higher Education and Technology. The nomenclature of the latter ministry graphically underscores the new regime's emphasis on 'the integration of higher education with the scientific and technical development of the country. Organizationally, the educational system has been in an almost continuous state of flux throughout the post -World War II period, prim.-) Ihc(`-* #ise of changing political, social, and e 6mk%v jde prey \fires. 57 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 1937/38 1955/56 1970/71 Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Thousands Thousands Thousands Preschrol 1,659 83.3 na 8,466 377.8 na 8,906 498.2 na Elementary 28,778 4,865.3 76.6 23,223 3,386.4 102.5 26,126 5,257.0 211.5 General secondary......... 777 221.4 na 799 201.4 10.4 858 401.3 17.5 Vocational- basic.......... na 207.5 J na 966 154.4 l 31.1 j 6,176 905.3 34.9 Vocational- secondary...... na J l na 1,348 348.6 J l 3,550 805.4 28.7 Adult basic 226 14.6 na 2,028 71.8 1.4 389 46.8 0.6 Adult- secondary........... na na no 189 53.8 0.6 317 135.5 1.6 Higher education.......... 32 49.5 na 78 157.5 18.3 85 330.8 31.9 Total 31,472 5,441.6 76.6 37,097 4,751.7 164.3 46,407 8,380.3 326.7 na Data not available. *Excludes both regular and vocational schools for the handicapped. In 1970171 there were 559 such schools with an enrolment of 86,200, and staffed by 5,800 full -time teachers. illiteracy, especially among working and peasant class adults, resulted in the marked decline in the number of elementary (basic) schools for adults in the 1960's (Figure 37). Increasingly since then, adult education has concentrated on the secondary school level, and on higher education where it is being integrated into regular evening, part -time, and correspondence courses conducted by established institutions. All public education, whether at the compulsory or the optional level, is tuition -free. In addition, full -time students of institutions of higher education who do not live within commuting distance are provided with free housing (dormitories) and with stipends for living expenses. Such stipends and other assistance was provided to 27% of the students of higher education in 1970/71. Elementary and secondary education is financed entirely through the central government. In 1970 state outlays for education represented about 9% of total budgetary expenditures. Virtually all teachers in the state system belong to the Polish Teachers Union, a component of the state controlled trade union movement. A majority of teachers are Communist Party members through necessity if not by conviction. 2. The educational system a. Organization and reform Public education is virtually a state monopoly. The sole exceptions are the Roman Catholic University of Lublin and a negligible number of lower level schools operated by religious and charitable institutions; all of these have been brought under increasing government control, and some have been eliminated entirely. Until late 1966 control over general elementary and secondary schools was vested in the Ministry of Education, and institutes of higher learning were administered by the Ministry of Higher Education. In November 1966 the government merged the two ministries into the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. This organizational move probably was designed primarily to achieve the stated purpose of more efficient use of state educational funds and better continuity of education through the coordina- tion of curriculums, but it also permitted the regime to put new life into its consistently flagging drive toward a "socialist" educational system via tighter central control of the entire structure. Following the coming to power of the Gierek regime, the educational system has come under serious scrutiny, with a major overhaul scheduled for completion by 1975. Az a first step, the governmental reorganization of March 1972 included the creation, once again, of two separate cabinet portfolios with responsibility for education. General education through the secondary level, including all vocational schools, is under the purview of the Ministry of Education and Training, while all higher education is administered by the new Ministt\ y)f Science, Higher Education and Technology. The nomenclature of the latter ministry graphically underscores the new regime's emphasis on 'the integration of higher education with the scientific and technical development of the country. Organizationally, the educational system has been in an almost continuous state of flux throughout the post -World War II period, prim.-) Ihc(`-* #ise of changing political, social, and e 6mk%v jde prey \fires. 57 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Numerous efforts from 1930 to 19.36 to bring organization and curriculum closer to Soviet models seriously reduced the quality of education on all levels. Thereafter the attempts of the Gomulka regime to place emphasis on qualitative improvements consistent with what it regarded as minimum ideological criteria suffered from periodic setbacks primarily as a result of the tendency of the system towp /d A backsliding. The major educa- tionj 04,F) N t. ,;14'Tnly 1961 affected primarily the clenrofi 'lary school system and atten #tqj I(( rater internal continuity. Similar 'II ttltti., ituted in other Eastern European 'aw (which was gradually implement4 63 and 1968) extended the length of compulSol' scuooling by 1 year. Elementary schools were expanded from seven to eight grades, and some courses in secondary schools were shortened from i to 4 years. By 1968, over 961 of all elementary school children attended schools with a full 8 -year syllabus. Higher education bore the brunt of the 1968 reforms, which were undertaken by Gomulka largely as a reflex action to the universitv student disturbances in March of that year. These changes represented a� ether attempt at reinvigorating ideological indoctrination in higher education, reducing the autonomy of university "chairs," and putting new stress on the preferential selection of students with worker and peasant backgrounds. Except for the organizational shifts, these changes have again been largely nullified by simple noncompliance or impracticability. (Discussed further h under Higher Education). The organization of the overall educational system is shown in Figure 38. The study lertaken by the government leading toward evetl%1� .4 i(l'orrn of the educational system was begun by tl� t ,.�Ick regime in January 1971 with the creation of a Committee of Experts, reporting directly to the government. The committee works integrally with the Polish Academy of Science's Committee for Research and Prognoses, which is officially dubbed Poland 2000 because it is tasked with drafting multitudinous proposals for the economic, social, scientific, educational, and sociopolitical development of the country up to the year 2000 and beyond. The work of the Committee of Experts on educational reform has been laid out in several phases. Its initial report, presented for professional review and discussion in late 1972, concerns primarily, though not exclusively, draft plans for the further standardization of curriculums in elementary and secondary tlucation. Subsequent phases of the study are slated _58 to include some organizational changes, long -range expansion plans, and detailed correlations between demographical projections, economic development, and educational needs. After a "public discussion," the initial proposals are to be submitted to parliament to be put into law. Realistically, however, whatever reforms are approved will probably not begin to be implemented before 1974; in mid -1972 the Minister of Education and Training stated that implementation depended on the general progress of other developmental plans subsumed in the work of the Poland 2000 committee. Published discussions of the scheduled educational reforms have not been adequate to determine the basic intent of the Givwk wginic t'nofficial comment, however, focushig on an analysis of the general shortcomings of the present system, reveals the probable direction of the reformers. 'Teacher training, for example, is still inadequate; there is built -in APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 38. The educational system (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 rigidity in the system's approach to teaching and learning methods; professional snobbery is still rampant; there is lack of cohesion between the basic schools and some kinds of vocational training; and insufficient organization and control parallels an unresponsive bureaucracy and inflexible administra- tion at all levels. Seeking remedies for all these ills appears to be t1,e main goal of the studies underway since 1971. Most importantly, however, new approaches to teaching involving the selective but not uncritical importation of Western ideas may be included in the reform. b. Programs and curriculums Preschool education is divided into two stages. Creches (nurseries) for children up to the age of 3 are normally provided by factories and similar enterprises. Children between the ages of 3 and 7 can enter kindergartens. Most of these are directly run by the state, but an increasing number are organized by local communities under the auspices of local branches of mass organizations. Despite steady expansion of facilities, demand is still greater than available space. Preference is given to children with both parents working, and account is taken of the size of families, housing, and income: Schooling is compulsory from the age of 7 through 14, and is provided in the basic 8 -year school (szkola podstawowa). It is divided into two phases; from grades one to four the curriculum (Figure 39) consists mainly of Polish and mathematics, with some music, physical training, and combined art and practical work, and is taught by general teachers. Some specific subjects are introduced during this stage, such as nature study and geography. ''_'he greatest change is in grade five, when teaching turns to subject specialization. Russian language study enters at this point, as does history; other subjects, like biology, physics and chemistry, come at'various points during the second phase, grades five through eight. Time is found for the additional subjects partly at the expense of others (Polish dwindles from 8 hours a week in the first year to 5 in the eighth), but mainly by the gradual increase in the number of teaching hours per week, from 18 in the first grade to 33 in the eigh."h grade. In the second phase it is also possible for a pupil to add extra subjects to his curriculum, such as sports, instrumental music, school choir, or a second foreign language �a choice of English, French or German. Compulsory education ends with the basic school, and it is possible to enter employment at this point although there are legal restrictions on the type of occupations for persons under the age of 16. The great majority of basic school graduates go on to some kind of further schooling. Of the 566,709 graduates in 1970/71, 87.2% went on to other schools; 53.6% to FIGURE 39. bask (elementary) school curriculum, In hours per week (U /OU) 59 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 GRADES evnJEcr I II III IV V VI VII VIII Total Polish language and literature 8 10 9 9 7 7 5 5 60 Russian language 3 3 3 2 11 History 2 2 2 2 8 Citizenship 1 2 3 Nature study 2 2 2 6 Biology 2 2 2 6 Geography 2 2 2 2 2 10 Mathematics 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 45 Physics 2 3 3 8 Chemistry.. 2 2 4 Practicalitechnical instruction i 2 2 J 2 2 2 2 3 3 16 Art J l 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 Music 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 Physical education 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 Class teacher's period 1 1 1 1 4 Tots' hours weekly 18 21 23 25 29 33 33 213 Additional subjects: Western European language 3 2 2 7 Schoolchoir 2 2 Music ensembles 2 2 Sports 2 2 59 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 basic vocational schools, 15.7% to secondary vocational- technical schools, and 17.9% to general secondary schools (lyceums). The general secondary lyceum is the only academic secondary school, with a 4 -year courso leading to a final certificate (matura), which entitles the holder to apply for higher education. In some cases, basic schools and lyceums are organized together as 12 -year schools, although this is rare and there is still a distinct break after the eighth grade. The 1961 reforms that extended the basic school to 8 years �in effect making what had been the first year in the lyceum into the last year of the basic school �also necessitated revised curriculums in the secondary schools. These charges emphasized updated teaching materials, the natural sciences, the polytechnical centert of the courses, and additional electives (Figure 40). The changes, however, were not designed to differentiate the school into separate arts and science sectors, as happens in many other European countries, but rather to make more time available to concentrate on chosen fields while retaining the basic course for all students. According to 1967/68 data, about two- thirds of all students who began general secondary schools successfully completed the final year with a certificate. The remainder was made up of repeaters (9 dropouts (5.5 and those who stayed to the end but failed to get the certificate. Of those who graduated with the matura, 63% went on to some form of higher education; 28% entered universities, and the rest enrolled in technical or other specialized institutions of higher leaming. Vocational and technical schools are of many types, but may be classified broadly under two categories according to the level of instruction. Basic vocational schools provide 3 -year courses of training for pupils leaving the basic school at age 15. Some general educational matter is included in the curriculum, but the emphasis is overwhelmingly on mastery of the theory and practice of a particular trade, augmented by practical work in factory and workshop. Agricultural schools, with 2 -year courses on average, could also be included in this category. More advanced vocational education is given in the secondary vocational- technical school, which is the equivalent of the lyceum and is also open to 15 -year old graduates of the basic school. This provides a 5- year course (though there are some variations) with a combination of general education and vocational training in over 100 special fields� engineering, agriculture, economics, administration, health service, communications and a host of others. The final FIGURE 40. General secondary school curriculum, in hours per week (U /OU) GRADES suaJECr I II III IV Total Polish language 4 4 4 4 16 Russian language 3 3 3 2 11 English, French or German 4 4 3 3 14 History 3 3 3 9 Social study 3 3 Biology 3 2 5 Hygiene 1 1 2 Geography 3 3 6 Mathematics 4 4 4 3 15 Physics S 3 3 2 11 Astronomy 1 1 Chemistry 2 u 6 Technical education 3 II 3 12 Art and music 1 4 Physical training Z 2 8 Premilitary training 1 2 5 Options 4 4 Total hours weekly 34 34 33 30 131 Additional subjects: Latin 2 2 2 2 Choir or ensembles �2 Sports '2 *Activities are organised in intergrade groups from Grades I to IV. 60 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 examination covers both the vocational qualification and the malura, and can lead to higher or further education. There are also technical and vocational schools for students who have completed the lyceum or equivalent, with courses of from 1 to 3 years, depending on the sprcial field. Unlike the vocational technical schools, they are solely concerned with vocational instruction. 3. Higher educ: lion There were 85 institutions of higher education in Poland in 1972, ranging from the 600 -year old Jagiellonian University of Krakow to the postwar universities at Lodz, Torun, and Lublin �the last of these a state university existing alongside the Catholic University which deals mainly with theology and canon law. The newest university, at Gdansk, was formed in 1970 from the merger of higher schools of pedagogy and of economics in the area. The total number of institutions has fluctuated over the years from 32 in the prewar period to a pear of 83 in 1951, then declining through a series of mergers to 75 in 1960, and rising again through new construction and upgraded accreditation of existing schools to the 1972 figure. Enrollment ui institutes of higher learning has increased even more significantly: from 49,500 in 1937/38 (a ratio of 11.1 per 10,000 population) to 330,800 in 1970/71 (a ratio of 101.4 per 10,000 population). The 1972 ratio is about 30% of the U.S. figure. The following tabulation gives the type and enrollment of the institutions of higher learning in the 1970/71 school year: By far the greatest number of Polish higher school students are enrolled in technical and related fields of study. The extent to which students have been reoriented from the prevalent prewar academic disciplines, as well as subsequent differences in emphasis on various courses, is shown in Figure 41. The annual number of graduates of universities and other schools of higher learning has fluctuated: from 21,722 in 1950/51 to a low of 16,114 in 1958/59 to a postwar high of 47,117 in 1970/71. Nowhere have the Communist regime's problems with "bourgeois morality" and the failure of its own indoctrination programs been more persistent than in the field of higher education, which has been the most rapidly expanding area of Polish education as well as a hotbed of periodic ideological dissent. Persistent dissent among university students in Warsaw and several other major university centers boiled over in March 1968 into open demonstrations and riots, which began as calls for the redress of genuine academic grievances and related issues of individual liberty but soon widened into broad political and economic demands. Caught off guard, the Gomulka regime took several long -range steps to reinstitute control and prevent a recurrence. Among the most important measures introduced were a newly revitalized point system for university entrance favoring children of worker, peasant and other "socially desirable" backgrounds; a new .law for higher schools designed to'strengthen party control at the exoense of faculty power and independence; an adminhIrative reorganization of some higher schools; 61 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 41. Graduates of institutions of higher learning by major fields of study, selected years (U /OU) NumBEa STnmENTs Universities 10 97,543 Higher technical schools 18 124,855 Higher schools of art 16 5,237 Medical academies 10 22,851 Agricultural academies 7 33,515 Higher schools of economics 5 25,021 Pedagogic institutes 3 11,098 Physical education institutes 6 4,965 Theological academies 2 1,145 Teachers colleges 6 3,657 Maritime academies 2 902 Total 85 330,789 By far the greatest number of Polish higher school students are enrolled in technical and related fields of study. The extent to which students have been reoriented from the prevalent prewar academic disciplines, as well as subsequent differences in emphasis on various courses, is shown in Figure 41. The annual number of graduates of universities and other schools of higher learning has fluctuated: from 21,722 in 1950/51 to a low of 16,114 in 1958/59 to a postwar high of 47,117 in 1970/71. Nowhere have the Communist regime's problems with "bourgeois morality" and the failure of its own indoctrination programs been more persistent than in the field of higher education, which has been the most rapidly expanding area of Polish education as well as a hotbed of periodic ideological dissent. Persistent dissent among university students in Warsaw and several other major university centers boiled over in March 1968 into open demonstrations and riots, which began as calls for the redress of genuine academic grievances and related issues of individual liberty but soon widened into broad political and economic demands. Caught off guard, the Gomulka regime took several long -range steps to reinstitute control and prevent a recurrence. Among the most important measures introduced were a newly revitalized point system for university entrance favoring children of worker, peasant and other "socially desirable" backgrounds; a new .law for higher schools designed to'strengthen party control at the exoense of faculty power and independence; an adminhIrative reorganization of some higher schools; 61 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 41. Graduates of institutions of higher learning by major fields of study, selected years (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 a strengthened system of mandatory classes in Marxist philosophy at the higher schools; and a compulsory manual labor program for students in higher education. In addition, influential liberal professors, many of them Jews, were purged immediately following the -government's suppressior, of the student demonstrations by the end of March 1968. Together with the general antiliberal and anti intellectual atmosphere which pervaded the 1963 political crisis, these measures had a cumulative deleterious effect on university students and faculty alike. The point system, which weights university entrance examinations in favor of students of peasant and worker origin, was a direct outgrowth of party concern over the persistently disproportionate number of higher school students who were of a white collar background. The point system as a concept in Poland was not new; what was new in 1968 was the regime's apparent determination to implement it in practice, as well as the heavy weighting given to the worker and peasant candidates. The system had never been as widespread in Poland as in the U.S.S.R. and some other Communist countries even during the Stalinist period, and after 1956 it virtually disappeared. In 1965 it was reintroduced, largely unheralded, but it ova!, soon generally circumvented by both the regime and the students in cooperation with willing faculty. One reason for the failure of the regime prior to 1968 to implement a system which was on the books appeared to be its own realization that in many ways it ran counter to government efforts to increase markedly the number of technically and professionally qualified personnel. The same overriding factors appeared to vitiate the system soon after 1968, and the stress now placed by the Gierek regime on skill whatever its origins suggests that these provisions have again become largely dormant. As early as 1969 there were sivn, of evasion of the point system, particularly since widespread opposition to it included party intellectuals who felt that their own children were unjustly deterred from pursuing higher education while untalented individuals were favored. In fact, data published for the first time in 1971 revealed that little change in the social background of students in higher education had occurred between 1965/66 and 1970/71, as shown by the percentages in the following tabulation: WMTE- WORKER PEASANT COLLAR 1965/66 27.2 17.0 50.4 1970/71 29.9 15.5 50.3 Organizationally, the October 1968 legislation on higher education was designed to implement the 62 party's resolve to establish control over the universities, and particularly to curb the power of the semi independent faculties to shape the character of a school through their control of the curriculum, teacher selection and development, and general supervision and discipline of the student body. The operative provision of the law was, therefore, the reversal of the power positions of the rector on the one hand and that of the faculty senate a,id those academicians holding the traditional "chairs" or katedry on the other. The rector and deans are now appointed by the government rather than, as previously, elected from the senate and faculty councils. In several academic areas, such as history and philology at Warsaw University, the traditional "chairs" have been abolished along with their prerogatives �such as ndependent hiring o assistants, direction of their graduate study, and budget control �and incorpo- rated as sections into newly created institutes under a party approved director. Although the stated reason for these structural changes was the fragmentation and overlapping of research condo -:ted by self serving professors (in some cases true), the main aim clearly was political control. Between 1967 and 197E the number of katedry in all institutions of higher education declined from 2,064 to 232, while the number of institutes rose from 62 to 598. This aspect of the 1968 reforms, although initially resisted and still unpopular among those who stood to lose their authority, seems tv have the support of younger assistants and instructors and is one part of the 1968 reforms that apparently has been successful on its own terms. The same cannot be said of ideological education and of the program of student labor. The regime decision in 1968 to revitalize ideological indoctrina- tion in the schools included the reintroduction of mandatory Marxist- Leninist philosophy studies in the higher schools, consisting of a 4 -hour, once -a -week lecture and seminar. This concept also is not entirely new; in late 1964 the regime called for the resumption at the university level of Marxist Leninist courses which had been discontinued in 1956. The course then introduced, entitled "Rudiments of Political Science," was soon virtually nullified by the massive apathy of the students and the lack of qualified teachers. At its fifth congress in November 1968, the party called for the introduction of compulsory, paid "physical labor" for higher school students during their first three summer vacations. Such student labor, to be accomplished at farms or in the factories, had not existed in Poland since shortly before World War II when certai., categories of students were obliged to work in the summer preceding their entry into a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 university. The 1968 concept apparently has been successful only in cases where the practical work has involved the students' own fields of study, such as K ork in medical clinics, laboratories, research centers, and similar institutions. Elsewhere, however, the concept has met circumvention and abuse in practice on the part of the students, as well as by mixed feelings on the part of farm and factory managers resentful of paying wages to inexperienced and frequently malingering students. Similarly, Marxist Leninist studies, though remaining a compulsory subject, are being vitiated by the poor quality of instruction (they are frequently given by nonprofessional party hacks) as well as by circumvention and the use of the idea of "flexibility of course content" by professional, nonparty instructors. 4. Extracurricular activities Because of the normally heavy demands of the formal curriculum at institutions of higher learning, extracurricular activities in the general Western sense are extremely limited. Moreover, except for the very affluent, the students cannot financially afford those activities requiring special clothing or equipment. Organized sports and school teams that so actively engage the imagination and energies of many American college students normally do not exist in Poland. Most students, therefore, tend to spend such free time as they have in apolitical recreational activity and in part -time jobs to supplement their stipends, Most extracurricular activity, whether purely recreational or more directly related to academic or practical experience, is conducted within the framework of one or another of the government sponsored mass vouth organizations. Often, such activities tend to parallel or are combined with the FIGURE 42. Weekend camping trips in areas near Warsaw proved popular with students when spon- sored by the now defunct Polish Students' Association (U /OU) requirement since 1968 of practical, physical labor during summer vacations. In general, the price paid by the students for the organizations' sponsorship or underwriting of simple recreational activities is a certain amount of "socialist" activity or ideological proselytization, which varies according to organiza- tion. Most students find membership in mass organizations �and later in the party� useful if not indispensable for future career advancement, but they have generally ignored the ideological content of the activities offered by these organizations. Immediately after the disorders of 1968, the party once again made strong efforts to increase the impact of these organizations on student activities and outlook, primarily under the guise of expanding the activities of student government bodies. The regime also purged the leadership of these organizations and installed the few Communist zealots available. This was particularly true of the Polish Students Association (ZSP), a university-level organization whose activities were the most ideologically barren of all and generally confined to catering to the student's material and recreational needs. Most Polish students belonged to this organization in preference to the wider -based Union of Socialist Youth and the small Union of Rural Youth. In early 1973 the regime took steps, in the face of some student opposition, to merge the student membership of all the existing youth organizations into the Socialist Union of Polish Students (SZSP), an organization designed to improve party control and pursue a more energetic and uniform ideological indoctrination program. The ultimate structure and effectiveness of the new organization remains to be seen, but it is expected that some of the more popular activities (Figure 42) will be continued in order to attract student support. 63 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 5. Fo- ;ign students and exchanges Since 1957 student exchanges with other Com- munist countries have been augmented by the operation of several educational exchange programs with non Communist countries, including the United States. The latter have been negotiated both on a bilateral government basis and on a direct basis by individual colleges, universities, and research centers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science, Higher Education, and Technology exercise joint supervision over these programs in Poland, although other ministries and government agencies cooperate in the selection of students for training abroad and in the sponsorship of foreign students in local institutions of higher learning. Figure 43 shows the fluctuations, but general rise, in the number of foreign students enrolled in Polish higher schools during the decade of the 1950's by selected countries of origin. Of the total of 2,576 foreign students acknowledged by the regime in 1970/71, 45% were said to be enrolled in higher technical schools, ;and 1.5% in medical academies. On the basis of published data, Poland's effort to train foreign students especially those of developing countries �and to reap political or other benefits thereby, has never been as extensive as that of some other Eastern European countries; even Bulgaria: for example, hosted over 3,000 foreign students in 1970 71. Nevertheless, the overall total as officially made public probably understates the number of foreign nationals undergoing some form of training and schooling in Poland by as much as 150 The total of 2,576 in 1970/71, for example is known to FIGURE 43. Full -time foreign students enrolled in Polish higher schools, selected years (U /OU) COUNTRY of ORIGIN 1961/62 1965/66 1970/71 Albania 13 0 0 Bulgaria 71 184 154 People's Republic of China.. 42 20 5 East Germany............ 14 20 135 Czechoslovakia............ 5 73 113 North Vietnam............ 60 43 725 France 11 25 19 Cuba 0 69 26 Nigeria 0 50 96 Sudan 25 87 118 Syria 30 73 129 U.S.S.R. 8 21 103 Other countries 369 699 953 Total 648 1,364 2,576 *Generally developing countries of the third world. M. exclude all vocational trainees, and certainly such categories as full -time students of Communist theory and practice sponsored by party -to -party programs. Moreover, a highly developed program for young North Vietnamese has been in operation since the mid- 1960's; this includes theoretical schooling as well as practical training in factories, shipyards, research institutions, and medical facilities. In 1970/71 the contingent of North Vietnamese trainees of all kinds was variously estimated at between 2,000 and 4,000. The total number of Polish students abroad is not available; the number of postgraduate students studying abroad has fluctuated from a high of 1,640 in 1956 to a low of 321 in 160. In the 1970/71 academic year there were 803 Polish students engaged in university studies abroad, the largest single group being in the U.S.S.R. I. Artistic and cultural expression Polish artistic and intellectual expression through- out the country's history has been largely the adaptation of Western European trends to national needs and aspirations. Polish culture reached the peak of its development in the first half of the 19th century, during the period of Partition, when writers and artists fused an intensely patriotic spirit with the principles of Western European romanticism. But in every century of the past millennium the major intellectual movements and artistic styles stirring the West have been the decisive forces in Polish art and learning. Shortly after World War II, the traditional pattern and structure of cultural development became threatened by a Communist regime determined to substitute Soviet for Western models in the arts and sciences, Marxism Leninism for Roman Catholicism and Western humanism, and regimentation for intellectual freedom. With the initial liberalization of Communist rule after October 1956, Polish artistic and cultural life reentered the Western mainstream. Seemingly, the creative intelligentsia were in a unique position to synthesize East -West views and so serve as a bridge between the two worlds. Although this concept of Poland's cultural role soon collided with Soviet reassertions of its own primacy in ideological matters, it has continued to inspire the work of much of the creative intelligentsia. The regime of Edward Gierek, in power since December 1970, has made no significant formal departures in cultural policy, but its liberal interpretation of standing "rules," willingness to harness cultural traditions in the national interest even when they clash with Marxism- Leninism, and a pragmatic attitude toward the creative intelligentsia APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA -RDP01 -00707 R000200070023 -3 all suggest that Polish artistic and cultural expression may be newly revitalized, at least in comparison with the deadening cultural impact of Gomulka's last years. (C) 1. Historical development (U /OU) The cultural history of Poland became part of the European mainstream in the 10th century with the nation's conversion to Roman Catholicism; the consequent adoption of the Latin alphabet and of Latin as the literary language provided the foundations for an ever increasing Western orienta- tion. Early growth was marked by the dominant influence of the church in all branches of art and learning. The Gothic style flourished in the architecture, sculpture, painting, and ornamentation of the 14th and 15th centuries (Figure 44), finding perhaps its finest expression in the work of the sculptor Wit Stwosz of Krakow; that city was the seat of the royal court until 1596 (Figure 45). The University of Krakow (later Jagiellonian University), founded in 1364, became a center of mathematical and astronomical learning and gave to Western science one of its greater astronomers, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473- 1543); major observances of the 500th anniversary of Copernicus' birth are scheduled for 1973 (Figure 46). In the 16th century, the growth of Poland's political might and economic prosperity and such impulses as Italian Renaissance humanism and Protestantism stimulated an artistic and intellectual_ development that marked the period as the "golden age" of Polish culture. Particular achievement took place in literature, with Mikolaj Rej (1505 -68) producing the first truly original writing in Polish and thus earning the title "father of Polish literature." The following century saw the gradual decline of Polish culture. Only architecture continued to flourish; the baroque FIGURE 44. These 14th century liturgical articles for the celebra- tion of Holy Mass show the skill of Polish artisans in the decorative arts (U /OU) style, introduced by the Jesuits, proved congenial to the Polish spirit and was used extensively in the construction of palaces and churches. Beginning in the mid -18th century an "age of enlightenment," inspired by close contact with France, brought a revival of intellectual life. As part of an extensive educational 65 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 45. Wowel, the Royal Castle in Krakow (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Copernicus 1473-1973 FIGURE 46. The United States also r joined in the festivities honoring Copernicus' 500th anniversary by issuing a commemorative stamp and by participating in a series of pres- tigious gatherings among the scien- 84LS tific community (U /OU) reform, Polish replaced Latin as the language of instruction in schools. An interest in drama led to the founding of the Polish National Theater in 1765. In poetry, two important trends in the classical tradition of the "golden age" appeared �one of a rationalistic nature under Ignacy Krasicki (1735- 1801), the other of a lyric sentimental nature under Franciszek Karpinski (1741- 1825). An awakening of national and social consciousness introduced Sweeping political reform, which came too late, however, to forestall the final partition of Poland in 1795. In the period of Partition, the continued existence of the national spirit manifested itself in a great creative outpouring, especially in literature. The first of three main literary movements of this period was inspired by the romanticism of Western Europe, where most of the Polish cultural elite lived in exile after the uprising of 1830 -31. Dominating the Polish romantic movement were three outstanding exiled poets whose work propagated a messianic role for Poland and a concept of patriotism that became the "religion of the fatherland" �Adam Mickiewicz (1798 1855), leader of the movement and Poland's greatest writer; Juliusz Slowacki (1809 -49), who was also a distinguished dramatist; and Zygmunt Krasinski (1812 -59). In Poland, the most representative figure was Jozef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812 -87), a prolific author of historical novels. Romanticism also produced Poland's greatest musical genius, Frederic Chopin (1810 -49), whose compositions are associated with such national musical expressions as the mazurka and the polonaise (Figure 47). After the abortive 1863 uprising against Russia, there developed a movement known as positivism, which renounced armed resistance for constructive work and generally gave voice to a rationalistic rather than romantic outlook. Typical of this view was the scholarly work of the Krakow historical school, which expounded the thesis that Poland's downfall was caused by its own shortcomings. In literature, numerous distinguished novelists appeared, among them Boleslaw P (1847 -1912) and Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846 -19. j), author of the internationally 66 known Quo Vadis and winner of the 1905 Nobel Prize. An historical trend in painting found its most illustrious representative in Jan Matejko (1838 -93). Toward the end of the 19th century, positivism gave way to a neoromantic movement called Young Poland, which developed in close association with Western European art and literature. The foremost literary personalities were Stefan Zeromski (1864- 1925), a novelist intensely concerned with social and national problems; Wladyslaw Reymont (1868- 1925), whose monumental epic, Chlopi (The Peasants), earned him the Nobel Prize in 1924; and Stanislaw Wyspianski (1869- 1907), almost equally gifted in poetry, drama, and painting. In painting, impres- sionistic and symbolistic trends modeled after the French dominated, but they were tempered by the rediscovery of native folk art and architecture of the southern Tatry mountains. Restoration of Poland's independence at the end of World War I released intellectual life from its almost exclusive preoccupation with political affairs. Freed from the "sacred burden" of pursuing national goals, writers in the decade of the 1920's focused their efforts on a lyric poetry which dealt with present -day life in the modern city and abounded in innovation and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 47. Frederic Chopin (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 experimentation. Among several poetic groups the foremost was Skamander (named after a literary monthly), whose main figures were Juljan Tuwim (1894 -1954) and Antoni Slonimski (1895- In the 1930's, the novel moved to the foreground, the human personality becoming the predominant theme. Representative of this period are the humanistic novels of Maria Dabrowska (1892 1965), whose masterpiece Noce i dni (Nights and Days) shows the influence of Western writers, including the Polish -born English novelist, Joseph Conrad (1857- 1924). Of all literary genres in the interwar period, drama was weakest. Many trends in painting appeared, almost all having ties with the various "isms" fashionable in Western Europe. Architecture, the most neglected of the arts during the period of Partition, tended towards a monumental style possessed of little inspiration or originality. In music, Karol Szymanowski (1883 -1937) won recognition as the greatest Polish composer since Chopin; like Chopin, he made use of native folk music, with which he blended modern idioms. Polish scientists and scholars contributed substan- tially to all branches of learning, perhaps most notably to philosophy and mathematics. The work of Kazimierz Twardowski (1866- 1938), Tadeusz Kotar- binski (1886- and others made Poland one of the most important international centers of research in logic, semantics, and the philosophy of mathematics. Leading scholars included Waclaw Sierpinski (1882- 1969), who headed a famous school of pure mathematics in Warsaw; Leopold Infeld (1898- 1968), a nuclear physicist who collaborated with Einstein; and Florian Znaniecki (1882 1958), head of a school of empirical sociology in Poznan and coauthor of a monumental study on the Polish peasant in the United States. 2. Development under communism (C) Since World War I1, artistic and intellectual life in Poland has passed through four stages related to the evolving political situation. The immediate postwar vears saw the revival of arts and sciences and the reestablishment of international ties. The second phase, the Stalinist era, established Communist Party direction and control over all branches of art and learning, and ideological doctrines of socialist realism and dialectical materialism were imposed on artists and scholars. Denied the possibility of open resistance, the creative intelligentsia responded with silence, compromise, and submission. The third phase began with the "thaw" following Stalin's death, which permitted increasingly outspoken intellectual opposition to the concept of party direction of culture. This opposition helped to prepare the political climate for Gomulka's return to power in October 1956, and prompted a subsequent but temporary upsurge in intellectual activity which many Western literary critics have termed as some of "the most graphic European literary work of recent years, revealing a bold and desperate imagination." The withdrawal from this early Gomulka policy after 1957 and the resulting relative cultural immobilism has constituted the fourth phase of postwar cultural development. Whether the Gierek regime's loosened reins on the intellectual community and its public embrace of cultural tradition symbolized in the decision to rebuild Warsaw's Royal Castle, which was heavily damaged by Nazi bombers in September 1939 and razed completely in 1944� signifies the beginning of a new phase in Communist cultural policy is not yet certain. In its evolution after 1957, Gomulka's cultural policy steered a middle course between the repressive regimentation of the Stalinist era and a complete freedom of artistic and scientific pursuit, a course that, with modification, is still pursued by Gierek. On fundamental goals and principles, the views of Gierek ani his predecessors are in general agreement. The prin,lry task of both the arts and sciences is said to be to ass:. t the construction of socialism: art, literature, and the 5oeial sciences must help shape the socialist consciousness of the nation, while the physical and technological sciences must advance the socialist economy. Inasmuch as the party regards itself as responsible for bringing about the socialist transforma- tion of the country, it cannot be "indifferent" to the methods and contents of artistic and scientific work. The party stresses its support of the methods of socialist realism in the arts and the methods of dialectical materialism in the sciences methods which allegedly in no way restrict the freedom of expression or research. Moreover it accepts "progres- sive and useful" work arrived at through other methods. In art and literature, the party calls for a content that focuses on contemporary problems and supports "the general trend of Poland's development mapped out by the Party." While disavowing any intention of dictating on matters of form and style, party spokesmen appeal for works that are "realistic" and intelligible to the general population. Althoiigh the Gierek regime now encourages scientific and cultural exchanges with the West, it still deplores instances of uncritical acceptance of Western styles and scientific findings. Unlike Gomulka, however, who soon resorted to strict censorship, various 67 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 economic pressures, and on occasion to arrest, demotion, and withdrawal of foreign travel privileges as means of taming errant intellectuals, the Gierek regime (while retaining censorship) has not only removed prominent writers from earlier blacklists, been more solicitous of their material welfare, and considerably eased restrictions on foreign travel, but has actively attempted to engage the cultural milieu in the process of "national renewal." Many Polish intellectuals, particularly of the older generation, seem to accept Gierek's terms for a new relationship. Indeed, these terms benefit from the contrast with those imposed by Gomulka during the decade of the 1960's. During that period, disillusioned and frustrated writers and creative artists manifested their opposition both passively and actively. Halfhearted compliance, evasion, and inactivity were used to counter dictated production of socialist art, while new artistic forms flourished, often suffused with allegorical political overtones. Clandestinely procured and circulated books, pamphlets, tape recordings, and other articles of cultural expression, produced in the West, enjoyed great popularity among intellectuals. Active expression of antiregime dissent included the March 1964 public protest by 34 leading writers against censorship, the intellectual turmoil of late 1966, and the protests or )th party and nonparty writers in early 1968 which led directly to the student demonstrations in March of that year and contributed to the general political crisis within the regime. The degree to which a relatively isolated event could unleash widespread cultural dissent which soon gathered its own social and political momentum was illustrated by the chain of events in the spring of 1968, which were triggered by the regime's closing in Warsaw of Mick' play Dxiady (The Fore- fathers) becar acclaim for the play's anti- Tsarist, Bless, anti- Russian senti- ments. The intellectual atmosphere accompany. itical crisis in Poland, to- gether with ,purges of leading academi- cians and artist. i the fields of film, theater, and literature ushered in what many Polish intellectuals regarded as another, although temporary, period of cultural "dark ages." By contrast, therefore, the Gierek regime's easing of restraints and, most importantly, its commitment to alleviate the social and political strains in society that fueled cultural dissent, does seem to most intellectuals to be shaping de facto a new, pragmatic cultural policy. h8 a. Literature and art Poland's postwar literature is largely the product of an irreconcilable conflict between traditional standards of artistic excellence and the Communist regime's ideological requirements. Although there has appeared no work of masterpiece caliber, either as judged by Western artistic criteria or by the values of socialist realism, much of the output has literary merit and much commands interest from a sociopolitical viewpoint. With some exceptions, the literature of the Stalinist era shows a high degree of adaptation to the required doctrine of socialist realism and is characterized by uniformity and stereotype. Most works of distinction belong either to the early postwar period or to the years of the "thaw" after Stalin's death, roughly 1954 to 1957. Many of them were harshly attacked by the Gomulka regime for having broken off "from the main current of the life of the nation," leaving unheeded appeals from the regime for a literature treating the contemporary man undergoing socialist transformation. Instead, they sought safety in historical themes, favoring in particular World War II and the German occupation. Postwar literature includes important contributions to the novel, short story, poetry, and drama, made by both an older and younger generation of writers. Of several well established prewar novelists writing in the postwar period, Jerzy Andrzejewski (1909- has probably become the best known, largely, but not exclusively, through his Popiol i diament (Ashes and Diamonds). Published in 1949 and later made into a successful motion picture, this much discussed novel deals in a skeptical manner with the clash between Communist and anti Communist forces at the end of the war. Other productive prose writers of the older generation include Adolf Rudnicki (1912- most of whose works explore the Jewish tragedy of World War II; Antoni Golubiew (1907- whose Boleslaw Chrobry is considered one of the best postwar historical novels; and Tadeusz Breza (1905 -70), whose works have attacked the bureaucracy of both the Polish state and the Vatican. Postwar poetry came to the forefront during the "thaw" of the mid- 1950's. The outstanding poets of those years were Mieczyslaw Jastrun (1903- and Adam Wazyk (1905- whose Poemat dla doroslych (Poem for Adults) played a significant part in the intellectual ferment of 1955 -56. The younger generation of writers achieved prominence after October 1956. They are chiefly associated with a "black" literature trend condemned by regime critics for being "an awkward imitation of existentialism" and featuring elements of brutality allegedly copied from the U.S. novelist Ernest APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 Hemingway and Erskine Caldwell. Some observers view this type of literature as a reaction against the rosy optimism that socialist realism calls for. The first of the Polish "angry young men" was Marek Hlasko (1934 1969), whose Osmy dzien tygodnia (The Eighth Day of the Week), a short story published in November 1956, won international fame. Hlasko's successors include Irencusz Iredynski and M. Nowakowski. Another member of the younger generation though not a follower of "black" literature, Slawomir Mrozek (1929- has distinguished himself in sea rral genres, especially drama. "Whatever form lie chooses," states a non Communist critic, "Mrozek's consistent aim is to lay life bare with a scalpel of virulent satire within a surrealist context." His best known play, produced in English as The Police, premiered in 1958 and later produced in various Western countries, probes with irony into the police system of an imaginary totalitarian state. As a playwright, Mrozek appears to owe something to Samuel Beckett, Eugene Ionesco, and others of the "theater of the absurd." As with other artistic forms, the painting produced under the socialist realism dicta of the Stalinist era was characterized by monotony, banality, and sentimen- tality. Of the younger generation of painters using the socialist realism approach, only one, Andrzej Wroblewski (1927 -57), achieved works of artistic distinction. With the lifting of cultural restrictions in the mid- 1950's, artists renewed contact with the prewar traditions of Polish avant -garde painting and almost overnight found themselves in the mainstream of contemporary Western art. Some artists have continued prewar postimpressionist trends, but the most dynamic groups appear to be those following various abstractionist styles, including abstract expressionism. Others, by contrast, are experimenting with a blend of abstractionist and traditional styles, such as the neo- Byzantine religious art shown in Figure 48. Polish abstract art has been acclaimed at international exhibitions and has been received with particular enthusiasm in the United States and Canada, where it has been purchased in some quantity. A particularly significant aspect of Poland's graphic art in the past two decades is its highly developed industrial graphics and poster design (Figure 49). Many Polish graphic artists turned to these forms for livelihood during periods when abstract painting was actively suppressed by the regime, and they have since developed a variety of innovative methods sought after by many other European countries, both East and West. Postwar architecture was dominated until 1956 by the Soviet neoclassical style, exemplified by the towering �and popularly resented (Stalin) Palace of Science and Culture in Warsaw (Figure 50), a "gift" from the Soviet Union. Post -1956 Polish architecture, however, has won international recognition for its functionalism and originality. The physical devasta- tion of World War II generally contributed to the national awareness of the material aspects of the country's cultural heritage, of which, it is estimated, some 40% to 60% was destroyed during the war. In the process of reconstruction, much attention was given to duplicating in minute detail numerous monuments and even entire sections of cities, such as the Old Town of Warsaw (Figure 51), that were deemed to be vital components of national culture. b. Theater, nusie, and folk art The theater, both professional and amateur, has always been a popular form of entertainment as well as a vehicle for the perpetuation of national traditions and values. Despite a shortage of outstanding native playwrights, contemporary Polish theater is flourish- ing. Since 1956, when the 1949 ban on plays of Western or "bourgeois" origin was lifted, the repertoire of Polish theaters has been among the richest in Europe, ranging from Greek tragedy to French and English avant- garde. In some seasons the percentage of plays translated from Western languages has run as high as 90% of the total repertoire. Postwar developments in music have also been characterized by a rejection of socialist realism and an intense interest since the mid- 1950's in extreme avant garde styles. In the Stalinist era, composers were encouraged to emulate Soviet achievements, rid themselves of Western influences, and make greater use of folk motifs. The esthetics of socialist realism, however, found no active followers among the leading composers and made no imprint upon the style and character of .Polish music. Rather, composers of both the older and younger generations continued to write in the Bartok- Stravinsky "modernist" idiom adopted in prewar Poland. Since about 1954, however, the most dynamic musical language has been the 12 -tone style of the Schoenberg Viennese school and its pointilliste interpretation, fathered by Anton von Webern. Younger musicians have also embraced electronic music and progressive jazz. Although critical of the extreme avant -garde Western trends in Polish music, the regime's cultural officials have not acted to suppress them. Such trends have become an increasingly prominent feature of the International Festival of Contemporary Music, informally called 69 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 I_1 �:16IT M M161 p l_F9 :W41I11:1bIs1li 1.9911 F_a:111 11111111 MIy1:iIIYIIfLIY 13 Y Y I r. 1 r�`Y,1.1.'*:(fin'. �'y 7'r r r MP 4 ip'.S .Y 1vr .f ,r.f {_v` 1 -.�f A. r.:f. -0. �AJ, +i tom':' {.R '.t'r l L FIGURE 49. EmhTblilan of po kers, w anes IUMUI 70 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE41LNwlrzw*lw @0 In Cohak4%yr at1olal, rwm HYwww IUfGU} APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 "Warsaw Autumn," which has been held annually in the Polish capital since 1956. Folk art is no longer a vital force in national expression but is artificially kept alive to serve propaganda and commercial ends. Traditionally important in peasant life, folk art in all its forms (song, dance, woodcarving, pottery, weaving, embroidery) was characterized by marked regional and local variation. Since World War I, such forces as urbanization, the development of mass media, and improved transportation have promoted a cultural homogeneity in which Western styles and customs are dominant. Although intent on eliminating regional and local differences, the Communist regime has fostered the development of folk art for commercial purposes and as a means of identifying itself with national values. Folk art and tradition is best preserved among the Gorale, highlanders of the central Carpathians, who lived in virtual isolation until the end of the 19th century. The fashionable holiday resort of Zakopane affords tourists an opportunity to see the Gorale in their folk costumes, enjoy their songs and dances, and purchase folk art wares (Figure 52). Of more importance, the rediscovery of the Zakopane style in the 19th century init;ated a widespread movement for the employment of folk motifs in the applied arts. This movement continued throughout the interwar period and still flourishes under the regime's encouragement. The regime, moreover, sponsors two folk song and dance ensembles, Slask and Mazowsze, both of which have given numerous performances abroad, including tours of the United States. c. Popular participation In carrying out its cultural goals, the regime is concerned not only with having a say in the character of contemporary artistic expression but also with broadening the cultural opportunities of the general population and shaping its esthetic tastes and values. Traditionally, the cultural product in Poland was made by the upper classes for their own consumption; it began filtering down to the emerging middle class at the end of the 19th century. Later, especially with the development of mass media after World War II, it became accessible to all social groups. In an effort to popularize culture, the Communist regime has provided an expanding network of theaters, music establishments, museums, and libraries, and has 71 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 50. Palace of Culture, Warsaw (U /OU) FIGURE 51. Old Town square, Warsaw, 1945 (top), 1965 (bottom) (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 FIGURE 52. Mountaineers near Zakopane preparing Christmas puppet shows (U /OU) sponsored an amateur artistic movement of a mass character. In 1970, there were 93 professional theaters throughout Poland, 20 of them in Warsaw. In addition, there were 39 concert halls and other facilities for musical performances, where the country's 19 symphony orchestras, nine opera and nine operetta companies perform, usually to full houses. The re -ime's effort in bringing culture to the people has been particularly marked in the postwar proliferation of so- called houses of culture, which range from well developed urban institutions combining such facilities as a theater, meeting hall, library, motion picture theater, and lecture hall, to modest rural clubs generally engaging in similar activities tailored to local interest. Moreover, the number of museums and exhibit halls (335 in 1970) continues to increase; over 18 million persons annually visit such institutions. In addition to the 32,195 school libraries in existence in 1970, there were 8,621 public libraries� including branches and mobile book centers �and 326 major state libraries and archives, including such prestigious institutions as the Jagiellonian Library in Krakow housing some of the original manuscripts of Copernicus. Rejecting the idea of two separate cultures �one for the general public and one for the elite �the regime has sought to provide a uniform product of "high ideological and artistic value" that at the same time would be comprehensible to consumers of widely differing experience. In theory, a uniform culture is 72 needed to achieve the Communist goal of eliminating social differences and class divisions. Traditional popular tastes and values appear to have undergone little or no change under commu- nism; if they sometimes clash with the regime's esthetic views, they also clash with some contemporary styles of expression. Interest in the avant -garde in painting and music is largely confined to creative circles. The average citizen neither understands nor cares to understand abstract art, preferring, like the regime, "good old realism." In music, most people are unaware of 12 -tone technique, but among the youth there is great enthusiasm for jazz and rock and -roll, which the regime tolerates lest it intensify interest. The theater has traditionally been popular among the Poles and now commands an annual audience of about 18 million, including a relatively large number of skilled workers. inasmuch as theater attendance, unlike cinema attendance, has not declined with the advent of television, audiences are presumably satisfied with contemporary theatrical fare. While the regime desires a reader interest in serious native literature concerned with contemporary problems, popular tastes run to the 19th- century novel, particularly the work of Sienkiewicz and Kraszewski; contemporary "escape" literature, such as adventure stories, crime thrillers, and stories about the German occupation; and the novels of leading contemporary Western authors. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 J. Public information (C) 1. The role of government The Communist regime controls all informational media �the press, publishing houses, radio, television, and films. Although the degree of control and its administrative channels vary, all media whether or not they are direct organs of the Communist party are ultimately subject to the same criteria of content and are, therefore, expressive of government policy. The party has relied heavily on all news media, especially the press, radio, and television, to further its political, economic, and social goals. Rapid postwar expansion of radio and TV broadcasting facilities, together with the increasing availability of radio and TV receivers, has made these the most important channels of public information. Newspapers, periodicals, and books are also major sources. As in other Communist countries, there is also a heavy reliance on word -of -mouth communication, with the prevalence of rumor and gossip being in proportion to the degree of censorship imposed by the party on formal media. Despite controls over the form, content, and dissemination of public information, the regime has had little success in curbing the anti- Communist attitudes of the people, and their desire to seek out unbiased information. As part of the de- Stalinization campaign after 1954, censorship controls waned and relative freedom of expression by the individual and the press� nourished by the political ferment of 1956- 57� emerged for the first time since the Communist takeover. Censorship control of all media was soon reapplied and became increasingly stringent during the 1960's. Party control of all media tended to become more direct but, in response to intraparty political fluctuations, more arbitrary and the content more unreliable. Nevertheless, when judged against the standards of control and objectivity existing elsewhere, for example, in the U.S.S.R., the Gomulka regime's policy toward the information media was relatively permissive. Most of the shifts in public information policy undertaken by the Gierek regime stem from the lessons learned during the workers' revolt of December 1970, i.e., that public trust rests on more honest information provided by the government to the people, coupled to evidence of governmental responsiveness to public opinion. Although Gierek has clearly retained firm control of the media, he feels that more open discussion of domestic problems serves as a safety +aive for popular dissatisfaction, a means to overcome public apathy, and a catalyst for constructive change. Soon after he took over, Gierek established a permanent cabinet -level post of Under Secretary of State for Information who regularly reports to the press on the proceedings of the government, and submits to questions �often pointed �by journalists. Gierek has also tolerated, and in some cases encc::raged, publication of mildly provocative articles in the press. Although the media do not question the role of the party or the permanence of the socialist system in Poland, they have prompted discussion of long -range social and economic options facing the country. In this way Gierek has brought public discussion to bear on the tasks that are being thrashed out within the regime. Moreover, the public dialog is open, and employs methods that are unique in the Communist world. For example, cabinet ministers, party leaders, and leaders of mass organizations have submitted to critical interviews on radio and television, including questions submitted by the listening audience while the program is on the air. Formally, however, the apparatus of control over the media has remained unaltered. Regime control over public information is exercised by a number of methods, the chief among them being the mandatory prior clearance of the contents of a publication by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications, and Public Performances, popularly known as cenzura (censorship) in Warsaw, and by its provincial and municipal branches throughout the country. Cenzura's powers also extend to all verbal and graphic media, i.e., radio, television, and films. The dominant source of current news distributed to all media is the official Polish Press Agency (PAP), constituting in itself a form of censorship. Film censorship is facilitated by the regime's control over all domestic film production and over the export and import of films. While cenzura is theoretically a government agency, in practice it is subordinate to the Press Bureau of the party's Central Committee, which sets the political line for all informational media. The basic themes and approach for the media in their role of supporting the regime's domestic and foreign policy goals are, therefore, decided at the highest party level. They are then further elaborated by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee and transmitted to key party individuals in the press, radio, television, government agencies such as the main censorship office, and various ministries and mass organizations. How well this detailed guidance is implemented is dependent on the competence of the individual responsible for such implementation within each organization, as well as 73 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 on the responsiveness of the organization's leadership to his dictates. This has been particularly true of �he editorial boards of the press and other informational media as well as of the many social organizations used by the Communist Party as transmission belts to specific interest groups within the population. Consistency, in terms of long -range objectives, and frequent tactical swings are dual features of the regime's propaganda effort. This is particularly true in domestic policy, where popular resistence to such long -term goals as socialized agriculture and the victory of the materialistic world outlook over religion has rendered direct propaganda on these long -term themes ineffective. Moreover, the Gierek regime, mindful of the increased sophistication and skepticism of the populace, is committed to rational persuasion on the basis of informed discussion, rather than the simple but massive distribution of predigested official views to an unquestioning audience. As a result, the task now facing the party's control apparatus and the public media is vastly more complex; it requires imaginative ideas and methods from a propaganda bureaucracy not accustomed to provide either, and responsible presentation by media personnel. The latter's well- developed capacity for self imposed control is in large part to be credited with the fact that the enlivenment of the public information system under Gierek has remained within ideologically acceptable limits. 2. Radio and television Radio and TV transmission facilities are owned, operated, and their output determined by the government through the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs, attached directly to the Council of Ministers (cabinet). In technical matters the committee cooperates closely with the Ministry of Communications, but in terms of policy guidance on programing it is merely the executive arm of the Communist party's Central Committee. The rapid growth in radiobroadeasting is reflected in the steadily increasing numbers of radio subscribers until the late 1960's, when the concurrent and even more rapid growth of television began to make inroads on the further expansion of broadcasting (Figure 53). The majority of listeners live in urban areas, especially in Warszawa province and in the urban centers of Silesia and the western parts of the country. In early 1973 there were 28 AM stations and 25 FM stations. The majority of these were regional stations rebroadcasting one or more of the three main program services originating in the studios of Warsaw radio, although many originate independent programs of local interest. Ownership of multiband radio receivers is rapidly supplanting the once widespread system of wired loudspeaker sets, which are limited to preset domestic reception; these account for only 17% of all subscriptions. Because all radio and television is noncommercial, subscribers must pay an annual fee determined by the type of set owned. Since the late 1960's transistor sets and automobile radios need not be separately licensed if the owner is already a registered subscriber. Although television is still not as widespread in Poland as in comparable Western countries, it has becn the most rapidly growing medium of public information in the country. In early 1973 there were 18 main TV stations and 26 relay transmitters in operation, covering between 80% and 90% of the country and approximately the same percentage of the population. The central TV studios in Warsaw originated over half of all programs, with studios in Katowice, Wroclaw, Gdansk, Krakow, Poznan, Lodz, and Szczecin �in that order accounting for most of the remainder; other cities, however, originate short FIGURE 53. Radio and TV broadcasting and numbers of subscribers (U /OU) 74 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 SUBSCRIBERS Per 10,000 YEAR Hours Thousands In urban areas population Thousands Percent Radio: 1960 42.3 5,268 68.5 1,760 1965 42.3 5,646 64.8 1,790 1970 52.9 5,657 66.8 1,735 Television: 1960 3.8 426 86.4 140 1965 4.1 2,078 88.9 660 1970 5.3 4,215 74.4 1,290 74 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070023 -3 I_1,,:16IT M M161,:, 4 111 1 im :W41111:711I.1` 1.99111 Fi l eN 111 111 Q1111111M:11111IN1111I1LIhY *s3 vmwifitm rd keatl irlttmi, fbi W, 0 waraw kcf"i'Nk q hl4wguruled a wow id duie nrl, de%oiled owitd} la Mwallolpwl ilml Al ialetnt ,'elmntmt The dr rliurng P"IM IuKc of tatul W srelncrilwn In utlxsn ptr.t IPkLcmtes dw r afei d 0 of tltr enc Burn In Om cwuntrj'skk, a 6doe u hieh, SJ e1 ET the IuIC tttl X Iu1 MOWJ a snwll e1cc1E1ec I thr nunelerr redid (e+civrrs rrxi� n d in turd utras. 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