NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 35; INDIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070032-3
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

-anno me rn c.
f
.a highly di+rersif" multi 3s
I. sacral drvrlapmrnt rcIorg westem�influeaoed Ilnr s Ifs *ills 0 the shuriural wlgllnevvine. chat snot,
The Fula, jea"ip oevwv do of lhitrsperisrient system brings to os pailimawnlaty spleen a
e': has tended to be buttaacrsltr: m[
l rater,, pewee Xoverrtmenl. >J
20
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

wo
k;
z
C)
f.
2
i
y
FIGURE 4. Party positions in parliament (U /OU)
LOX RAJYA
SABHA, SABHA,
NAME OF PARTY 1971 1972
Ruling Congress Party
350
116
Organization Congress Party
16
20
Jana Sangh
22
15
Swatantra Party..
8
9
Socialist Party
8
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)
3
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)
2
*1
Communist Party of India
24
11
Communist Party of India /Marxist........
25
7
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
23
12
Major regional parties
13
3
Independents
12
9
Indian Revolutionary PL rty (Bharatiya
Kranii Dal� BKD)
1
5
Others
16
11
Nominated
3
12
Vacancies..............................
3
4
Total 521 243
Not pertinent.
*The SSP and PSP merged in August 1971 to form the
Socialist Party.
*A few dissident PSP leaders in several states refused to
accept the merger and retained their identity as PSP.
The Congress Party's victories in the 1971 general
election in 1971 and the state elections in 1972
virtually decimated the political opposition in India.
Opposition parties of widely varying ideologies as well
as those with specific regional, religious, or communal
appeals still exist but, at least temporarily, are on the
decline. The Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh, for
example, lost ground to Congress in the general
elections and the conservative Swatantra Party did
even worse. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the
Congress Party have emerged as primary national
representatives, but there is still room for parties that
appeal to a clearly defined regional minority, such as
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu.
Such groups do not aspire to national omminence and
represent no direct challenge to the Congress or Mrs.
Gandhi. These opposition organizations can be
expected to remain viable by attracting the loyalties of
particular local groups, albeit in limited areas and
with limited effectiveness. In order to foster the
interest of the central government and to help preserve
ties with New Delhi, the Congress Party has
maintained a presence in those few areas where these
regional groups are dominant. As long as a regional
group does not overstep what Mrs. Gandhi considers a
reasonable level of political activity, she appears to
tolerate it, content with attempting to dilute its
strength over a period of time.
A few parties have confronted Congress with clearly
delineated programs within a secular, noncommunal
democratic framework, but none has had much
success. In fact most have lost ground, especially since
1971. The Socialists, whose policies have been hardly
distinguishable from those of the Congress Party, have
not generated much mass appeal and, due to their
apparently interminable squabbling, have been forced
to unite in order to survive as a national organization.
The Communists have also faired poorly, obtaining
limited election victories, largely as the result of prior
accommodations reached with Congress.
Opposition parties were unable to take advantage of
the unique opportunity for closer cooperation either
nationally or locally during the days of Congress
Party's decline. With the Congress Party's reemer-
gence, the outlook for most cf the opposition appears
bleak. Opposition will not totally fade away but for
the foreseeable future it appears unlikely that any
party is in the position to mount a significant
challenge to the Congress. Most opposition parties
have sought, generally unsuccessfully, for ways to
recoup their losses. Should the Congress fail, however,
to implement at least some of its promises of
"progressive" measures, radical parties on the left and
communal and nationalist parties on the right could
gain new life. In either event, newly structured parties
or alliances could spring up to mount some
coordinated opposition to the Congress Party and to
counter any attempts by Mrs. Gandhi to further
weaken or destroy the remaining opposition parties.
b. Congress Party
The Indian National Congress, commonly referred
to simply as the Congress, is India's oldest surviving
political party. Founded in 1885 by Indian and
reform minded British professionals and civil servants,
the Congress was converted into a broad -based
agitational movement in the early 1920's under the
leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, called by his
followers the Mahatma (Great Soul). The party's
initial petitioning for greater Indian participation in
policy councils gradually evolved into agitation for
internal self government and finally into a full -scale
independence movement characterized by massive
civil disobedience campaigns.
The Congress was highly successful at maiang the
difficult transition from an agitational movement for
independence into a modern nationwide political
21
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

organization capable of securing enough of the
popular vote to dominate the political life of the
country. Like the major U.S. political parties, the
Congress became an aggregative organization seeking
to hold together a maximum range of interests, with
access to power and the perquisites of office providing
the binding force. As such, Congress has always
included left and right wings, its organizational
leaders have often been at odds with the party's
representatives in government at the state and
national levels, and local interests have often
conflicted with national party objectives. Under the
charismatic leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the
Congress remained essentially intact despite
occasionally conflicting regional loyalties and
disparate political views ranging from Western
inspired socialism to indigenous Gandhian conserva-
tism. In fact, the ability of the Congress to
accommodate such wide diversity under the same
organizational roof, stunted the growth of moderate
opposition parties. These competitors were so
fragmented that the Congress was able to win
sweeping victories at the national level and in almost
all of the states in the general elections of 1952, 1957,
1962, and 1971, even though its share of the overall
popular vote never exceeded 48% (Figure 5). The
fourth general election in February 1967, however,
dealt a sharp blow to Congress Party fortunes, one
from which the party was not able to recover for about
4 years.
The stunning setbacks in 1967 were attributable to a
number of related causes. The opposition parties
enjoyed unprecedented success in forming reasonably
effective anti Congress electoral alliances, especially
for state assembly contests, at a time when voter faith
in the Congress was weakened as a result of economic
stagnation, rising prices, and serious food shortages.
The Congress was also hurt by growing disunity within
its own ranks, as intraparty squabbles were
increasingly aired in public and provided the
opposition with effective campaign ammunition.
Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, had become Prime
Minister in January 1966, but she had neither the
personal following nor the political muscle and appeal
of her father and appeared unable to pull the party
together. Factional feuds that had long raged in
Congress Party organizations became even more
intense, resulting in a large number of defections and
the rise of small regional splinter parties in several
states, drawing voters away from the parent
organization.
Roughly coincident with the 1967 elections, the
long -time leaders of the party came under attack from
a small, vocal group of younger members of
Parliament �the so- called "Young Turks" �some of
whom were over 50. The members of this amorphous
group were characterized by their distance from the
seats of power, the fact that they were too young to
have participated in the struggle for independence,
and by their strong inclination to see radical socialism
as the cure for the party's and the country's problems.
Following defeats in the national elections of 1967
and again in state elections in 1969, disagreements
grew stronger between Mrs. Gandhi and other party
leaders mainly the powerful group of senior party
"barons" or "bosses" and the informal caucus within
it popularly known as the "syndicate." These men
controlled the party organization and had chosen Mrs.
Gandhi for the post of Prime Minister in 1966. They
resented her increasingly imperious approach, her
efforts to strengthen her position by encroaching on
their domains, and her attempts to restrict their
exercise of power within the national government.
The smouldering situation within the Congress
finally burst into flame in July 1969. In a direct
Challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's power and possibly as a
first step in a plan to oust her, the bosses, over the
Prime Minister's objection, pushed through the party's
Parliamentary Board their nominee for Congress
candidate to succeed the deceased President of India.
Mrs. Gandhi refused to support the party's choice and
backed V. V. Giri, who ultimately won a narrow
victory in the presidential election. Following the
elections, instead of the usual attempts by the
leadership to paper over party differences, the struggle
between Mrs. Gandhi and the bosses for party
supremacy continued and intensified. Finally in
November, after a tumultuous few months of
maneuvering and consolidation by Mrs. Gandhi, the
party formally split into the Organization Congress
Party (OCP), dominated by the "syndicate," and the
New or Ruling Congress Party. Mrs. Gandhi emerged
as the dominant force in the latter and immediately
began to fill party vacancies, including the position of
party president, with her own supporters. In the
subsequent vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha,
which she won, Mrs. Gandhi was opposed principally
by the OCP and two rightwing parties Swatantra
and Jana Sangh. Her support came from her own
Ruling Congress, from leftists including Com-
munists �and from regional parties, and indepen-
dents. For a period of about 2 years she depended on
support of these groups as she slowly, methodically,
and shrewdly began to consolidate her personal power
and to rebuild the Congress Party in her image.
k
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

1'"ST."CR"SYv... TSft Fi.
4iHSR1M3M1RY. C" s1. nAt.
R'1a;3'Rtl7i?44PR4. +,'b'P.FAq. Y7Rt1M9QAbLt'Ilvry. CAM'!: R4S?!'.' Y. dR!�. IM,� I` yM'1.3tt;M)!4^. "'p1ilMACry'dl
4
P I
Pi:
I
t.
o Q N
di N
I tD
S�
ea
z m
p M G
o
G m
O Co 00 N V M N M
N N N
M N
M
f
W
O y
a
M .y
N t
N
C d
z` V' %4 Ql O 00 O
O
c
dornuvv� a�;o
o
j'
U W
O c7 C
z
td .7
�J a
B a 0
M M .-a N .�r
7 O
w
m a
'O
wo
n
m
o d
t. v oo IN -t�
v v
6
L
d
Q as
a
.1 p
0
s
3
O
li
N
Ln
U
`o
a
O
0
O
f
3
O
d
C
C
d
O
0
d
O
N
o
W)
W
ad
t_} D
e
m
o w
U W
n m a
A
.w O
n
to
w
O
e
d W O
U
N m w
yi W Qi
Q W
w
O
c w w
a
C4 F M x
0 0 U
o
a w
w
`3 E O w i m
0 P 0
m
a m
d
o
o
m
ab
o
4J
O p
�a
p y
.a
4 a
O
w
d
d
a
d V
w d
d>
C 4)
cu
o 4o d
O O
7 td L t t0
w G O a
a ti
c
mo
Q a m
f/1 ce
Q D be y a
O
Sod b m
a o'
M a m V
m
ry N a+ v OLOOd
N Lo
L a a a
Lo �ai
w d
ri w G w
q v
C p G td N w
d w ti .�m' m w m
8 d,,, ^�a
o
N m.a C
V
w V o G
a w a� m� o a
m V d d O d m C
aS m C a0 g a m N
a m
d 0 w U
O p a O
c a Q w y d
o�R gU. a
d c m aao a k
d N a ,G
E. 00 w E r}
d C
23
:L+iil ii;.,.0 kJ n -.,.rt...ti, f, qua..�_ f ......x.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3
L
o d
o Q N
a 0
wMO42m Lo a
N M M N N N 10
o
a
N
ce 0
z
z` V' %4 Ql O 00 O
O
c
dornuvv� a�;o
�o
N w
L
o
n
B a 0
M M .-a N .�r
7 O
m a
'O
wo
t ;N mot� W oo
m
�1. GJ o2 o
F o
L
Q as
3
n
M N n
o
e
p
z Q
V
oo
w> o
:e
S
o
04 o
L
c o
d O w w
M tD O to
O)
G a C
a m o
M N M
oo
o
d
o
w
ww
:v
x w
d
m
m ld d
c y o
N L L
m
0
a o a
m V N w tl a a o
to
Uow 0uglacn o
m
a m
d
o
o
m
ab
o
4J
O p
�a
p y
.a
4 a
O
w
d
d
a
d V
w d
d>
C 4)
cu
o 4o d
O O
7 td L t t0
w G O a
a ti
c
mo
Q a m
f/1 ce
Q D be y a
O
Sod b m
a o'
M a m V
m
ry N a+ v OLOOd
N Lo
L a a a
Lo �ai
w d
ri w G w
q v
C p G td N w
d w ti .�m' m w m
8 d,,, ^�a
o
N m.a C
V
w V o G
a w a� m� o a
m V d d O d m C
aS m C a0 g a m N
a m
d 0 w U
O p a O
c a Q w y d
o�R gU. a
d c m aao a k
d N a ,G
E. 00 w E r}
d C
23
:L+iil ii;.,.0 kJ n -.,.rt...ti, f, qua..�_ f ......x.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

The single most important member of the Ruling
Congress Party remains Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
(Figure 6). She is India's only truly national figure and
is recognized throughout the nation. She is charismatic
and projects an aura of power, independence, self
confidence, and determination. Although she has
surrounded herself with a coterie of congenial younger
advisers who advocate left -of- center policies, she is
dependent on no one. She has shown loyalty to her
friends, but she has not hesitated to remove them
when she considered it expedient to do so. 1Jnli4e her
father, who relied heavily on the advice of others, Mrs.
Gandhi appears to use her advisers primarily '.o
enhance her own political ends. Her advisers are
generally characterized by intelligence and the ability
they have developed in specific fields, but even more
by their lack of any personal political base and
complete loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi. Key advisers in-
elude Minister for Industrial Development, C.
Subramaniam; Minister of Planning, D. P. Dhar;
Ambassador- designate to the United States, T. N.
Kaul; Secretary to Mrs. Gandhi, P. N. Mar; Minister
of Home Affairs, U. S. Dixit; and Mrs. Gandhi's
retired former Secretary, P. N. Haksar. All are
important to her, but none are indispensable, and no
one person is her confidant on all matters.
FIGURE 6. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (C)
The Congress Party's landslide victories in the 1971
general and 1972 state elections were personal victories
for Mrs, Gandhi. She gambled that chances of
winning a parliamentary majority would be best in
1971, a year before the constitution required elections.
She campaigned vigorously throughout the nation and
won a two thirds majority in Parliament and a 5 -year
mandate to improve the lot of India's masses. Her
success in the gamble resulted in an almost
unassailable position for her in both aty and
government. The 1972 state elections put the icing on
the cake. The Congress Party, riding the crest of Mrs.
Gandhi's personal popularity, which had been
heightened by her handling of the 1971 Indo-
Pakistani crisis, won over 70% of the seats and control
of all but 3 small entities among the 16 states and 2
union territories electing assemblies (Figure 7). The
comparatively slight increases in representation
achieved by the Communist Party of India (CPI) and
minor regional parties were largely accomplished as a
result of arrangements with the Congress Party or
agreement by the Congress not to contest certain seats.
All other national parties suffered a substant. d
reduction in seats held.
The OCP, perhaps the hardest hit by Ruling
Congress Party election victories, has virtually
collapsed. Its strength in the lower house was reduced
in 1971 from 65 to 16 seats, while it only won 86 seats
in the 1972 state elections, a considerable drop from
the 217 seats previously held. Many ambitious OCP
members, including some party leaders, have defected
to the Ruling Congress Party since it appears there is
little future in the OCP, presumably diluting its
organizational strength and presaging its eventual
dissolution.
These sweeping state victories gave Mrs. Gandhi
virtually unique domination over India's politics.
Most incumbent Congress state chief ministers, as well
as new appointees to those posts, owe their jobs to Mrs.
Gandhi's favor and not to their base in the state party
organization. Presumably, center -state relations could
now become more pliable, with differences being
reconciled at the party level. Under the stimulus of
Mrs. Gandhi's success, Congress has broadened its
appeal, especially to the underprivileged and youth,
and at the same time it has centralized and revitalized
its control over the nation. General support for both
party and government has halted the trend toward
splinter politics dominated by regional and local
interests. Once again the Congress' Party has become
the principal arena for political competition.
Enhanced national authority has somewhat inhibited
the politically inspired violence and divisive
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3
24
The Congress Party's landslide victories in the 1971
general and 1972 state elections were personal victories
for Mrs, Gandhi. She gambled that chances of
winning a parliamentary majority would be best in
1971, a year before the constitution required elections.
She campaigned vigorously throughout the nation and
won a two thirds majority in Parliament and a 5 -year
mandate to improve the lot of India's masses. Her
success in the gamble resulted in an almost
unassailable position for her in both aty and
government. The 1972 state elections put the icing on
the cake. The Congress Party, riding the crest of Mrs.
Gandhi's personal popularity, which had been
heightened by her handling of the 1971 Indo-
Pakistani crisis, won over 70% of the seats and control
of all but 3 small entities among the 16 states and 2
union territories electing assemblies (Figure 7). The
comparatively slight increases in representation
achieved by the Communist Party of India (CPI) and
minor regional parties were largely accomplished as a
result of arrangements with the Congress Party or
agreement by the Congress not to contest certain seats.
All other national parties suffered a substant. d
reduction in seats held.
The OCP, perhaps the hardest hit by Ruling
Congress Party election victories, has virtually
collapsed. Its strength in the lower house was reduced
in 1971 from 65 to 16 seats, while it only won 86 seats
in the 1972 state elections, a considerable drop from
the 217 seats previously held. Many ambitious OCP
members, including some party leaders, have defected
to the Ruling Congress Party since it appears there is
little future in the OCP, presumably diluting its
organizational strength and presaging its eventual
dissolution.
These sweeping state victories gave Mrs. Gandhi
virtually unique domination over India's politics.
Most incumbent Congress state chief ministers, as well
as new appointees to those posts, owe their jobs to Mrs.
Gandhi's favor and not to their base in the state party
organization. Presumably, center -state relations could
now become more pliable, with differences being
reconciled at the party level. Under the stimulus of
Mrs. Gandhi's success, Congress has broadened its
appeal, especially to the underprivileged and youth,
and at the same time it has centralized and revitalized
its control over the nation. General support for both
party and government has halted the trend toward
splinter politics dominated by regional and local
interests. Once again the Congress' Party has become
the principal arena for political competition.
Enhanced national authority has somewhat inhibited
the politically inspired violence and divisive
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

C4 f)
4
0
a
0
C
5
0
C4
P
O
O
vr
cp
OC
0
LU
01
U
z LO
0
ol
t- cl C4 Lo cl m
Go
14 10 0 o "1 *0
z z
0
Z
4 z
86
0
0
z- CA -0 .0 v3
c2 c
go
Z
0 16
oo to to t-
0
x w CV
I Go
z A.
0
o
Id
O
V. a
d
ds
S6
O t m
25
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070032-3
\I

tendencies which characterized the late 1960's in such
states as West Bengal.
With consolidation of power, personnel changes in
the Congress Party arid government have been
initiated. The process of recasting the national party in
the image of it more tractable, youth- oricntrd, and
reform minded organization has bcgun. It is through a
newly structured party that Mrs. Gan:lhi apparently
hopes to engage the masses :(n(] move India forward
economically arid socially with direction from the
center, while at the same time serving national and
local political interests as she perceives them.
Although Congress hegemony exists over the states,
Congress Party Politics are likely to remain fluid.
Ilowever, the Ruling Congress for the time being must
rely at the state level on local "fat cats," particularly
wealthy farmers. At the local level, most Congress
Party branches are characterized by factionalism,
regionalism, and caste considerations. Factional
tension, to some extent ideologically motivated, as
well as compromise could color Congress Party Politics
until the new chief ministers consolidate their
Positions. It is riot likely, however, that factionalism
will grow to unmanageable prolxrtions as long as
Congress Party direction flows from the center.
The Indian people expect Mrs. Gandhi to fulfill her
campaign promises to provide forceful "progressive"
leadership and to initiate dynamic and pragmatic
programs for dealing with India's highly visible
problems. These include a burgeoning population,
widespread unem loyment, economic stagnation, an
antiquated tax system, land reform, social injustice,
labor strife, and inadequate education. Constrained
by political and economic considerations, she
Probably will not be able to institute the sweeping
reforms she desires and will likely continue her
basically pragmatic but moderately left-of-center
approach to these massive problems. Failure to at least
begin to solve these problems could rapidly dissipate
the present Power of the Congress Party. In India,
efforts to bring abut change, even when done on it
nationwide basis arid utilizing millions of dollars,
often may riot even make a dent in the problem. The
bureancracy is cumbersome and talent is short. Even
with Congress Party control at the center, the ability of
the states to implement policy varies w id ly.
Additionally, imaginative planning, should it come
about, can be thwarted I.y traditionalism and
resistance to change at every level.
The Congress Party had about I I million member%
according to figures available in the late 1%. 0's, some
2013,000 of whom were con -idered "active member,"
i.e., those having the right to hold party office. The
26
party is the tnost broadly based political organization
in India, drawing its metnbership,from all regions and
levels of society. Finances :Ire obtained from
membership does and public contributions, largely
frorn wealthy landowners and industrialists who have
considerable behind the scales influence.
The Congress Party is a many tiered organization
that includes several small but extremely important
party organs. Overlapping membership in organiza-
tions within the party in(] the government �in both
executive and legislative branches assures that party
control resides in the hands of the Prime Minister::nd
a few other top Congress leaden aril tha; the dialogne
between party and government continues. In
descending order of subordination, the All -India
Congress Committee (AI(:(.), Pradesh Congress
Committees (PCC), r)istriet Congress f.ommittees
(DCC) aril Bloc (Mandal) Congress Committees form
the basic Party units at the national, state,
administrative district and local levels. In addition,
(here may be committees, subordinate to the DC( "s,
above or below the bloc committees as determined by
the PCC concerned. Bloc committees and DCC's are
directly elected by the active members at each level,
while the PCC's and AI( are indirectly chosen by
their respective sulordinate units. All committees
include members coopted from functional groups
representing labor, youth, peasants. and castes.
The Working (;e)mmittee (WC) is the supreme
policymaking arid executive authority of the party.
The formal structure of authority is highly centralized
and oligarchic. Nominally responsible to the AI(:(:,
the WC carries out the policies aril programs of the
party, has the lower to direct and control all
subordinate Congress committees. and is the final
authority on all matter regarding interpretation and
:Ipp IIC'atleln of the 0nigrrss Party constitution. It
consists of 20 members plus the part president who
are either memblcn of the AI( or, as in the ea of
appointers, are elected to It within 6 months of their
aprmintment. A number of permanent "special
invitees ninr in 1972 �arc app o)inted (o the WC by
the party president. This device serves to expand the
mernbenhip beyond the official limit of 21 and
provides a place for other leading party ncmlmn at
top party deliberation WC mretiugs are alu
:attended by chief minister of (ongrm% -Ird states,
thereby facilitating communications brtw(-rn national
and state leaden. In practice, the WC is an instrnment
of the Prime Minister, sine' 10 of its member% are
app o)intrd by the party prmident in consultation with
the Prime Minister. The president, in turn, has been
elected by the AI(:(:, which has perfunctorily ratified
N
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

"1 the Prime Minister's choice. The WC includes it
s Parliamentary Board, which frames rules for the
regulation and coordination of the party's legislative
activities, and it Central Election Committee (CEC),
which has the final authority over selection of
candidates for cent r and state legislatures. The CF.0
may riot only overrule recommendations of lower
committees but may nominate it candidate who ha
i not even applied for a ticket.
Although riot mentioned in the Congress Party
constitution, the Congress Parliamentary Party (C;PP),
composed of Congress members of Nab houses of
Parliament, performs several important functions.
Assuming the Congress either is the majority park. in
Parliament or leads the governing coalition, the
elected CPP leader becomes Prime Minister. An
Executive Committee, whose members may also be on
the WC, controls the C;PP, monitors major legislation,
and c(mrdinates ministerial and party programs so that
they conform to basic party lines. A plenary session of
AICC is ordinarily held Nanpually, at which time
state -level committee deleg debate and approve
the Congress' basic policy and program.
The Congress Party ideology in the immediate
post independence era was shaped largely by
Jawaharlal Nehru, and many of his ideas continue to
be influential. Nchm, the son of a prominent and
wealth-. Western ed icated lawyer and himself a
i graduate of Harrow and Cambridge, urged the
application of Westerii Hcialist concepts to the
massive problem of improving the living standards of
the Indian people. Thus, the party formally .adopted
as its goial the establishment of it "ra cialist state"
based on parliamentary democracy. It championed
secularism in government and equal rights and
opportunities for all citizens regardless of race.
religion, caste, or sex. Among its economic goals were
rapid industrialization throngh a mix-ure of
government and private undertakings, a more
equitable distri bution of wealth. redistribution of land
j to accommoxlate the landless, and increased food
production. These and other objectives have been
incorporated into the government's successive
economic plans, which beltan with the inauguration of
the First Five fear Plan in April 1931 Dogged
adherence to socialist ideological objectives, however.
has sometimes resulted in policim that are politically
and ideologically sound but often inefficient in the
I Indian context. Despite the urgent need for
pragmatism, recent pm-,ures have causal Congress
leadenhip to seek more "progressive" socioeconomic
l reform programs to dead with India's multifarious
problems. In order to retain her txlitica grip on the
party, however. Mrs. Candhi must be it moderating
force. Site has had to balance the ideological
differences witliBn the Congress Party's broad -based
membership by selectively nodertaking xmc socialist
programs �such as hank nationalization �along with
more practical economic measures. The result has
often been slow economic progress overlaid with
inefficiency. Apparently wedded to its ideology.
entrenched in politics, and mired by a series of
persistent contradictions, the Congress Party's
leadership seems unable to prevent ideological
disputes from blocking many of the practical steps
which many democracies and developing economies
ha.. accepted and used effectively. Political and
ideological constraints have kept the Congress Party
from advocating policies which would compromise the
goad of achieving economic self sufficiency. Such
constraints have prevented the effectiv, exploitation
of either the public or private sectors of Indian
industry as a force to promote technological change
and capital acumi.datinn. In addition, these
constraints retard the use of foreign capital.
technology, and management skills. �olitically
attractive calls for "progressive" reorientation of the
party, accordingly, have met with more favor than
calls for the hard measures a strictly pragmatic
approach rntails. Nevertheless, 0)ngress leaden
realize that foreign capital is desperately needed. They
have been unable. however, to develop a satisfactory
policy which can reconcile the apparent inconsistency
of accepting massive foreign capital and advocating
self suf ficiency.
Internationally, the party has advocated nonalign-
ment between the West and the Communist world,
hot there have been considerable shifts in the thinking
of party leaden as they have grappled with the
problem of winning great power aid to cope with
India's econom ;c problems and to meet the threat
from China. Despite the Congress Party's noticeable
tilt toward the Soviet Union and away from the
United States in 1971 �in line with Mn Gandhi's
policy �and despite its endorsement of the Indo-
Soviet treaty of friendship and coxpo� ration signed in
August of that year, the Congress staunchly
maintained its adherence to nonalignment. r;onxress
leaden assert that the treats was in India's national
interests and that India can and will assert its own
coupe in international affairs. By 1972 many party
leaden seemed to favor it policy that would keep aid
flowing from Ixth the Soviet Union and the West,
while preserving enough independence and flexihilih
on international .iuestions to ward off charges of a sell-
out to the major powen. The party has been divided
27
1.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

over the years in its attitude toward Pakistan. Many
leaders have favored firmness toward the neighboring
Islamic state, but others have encouraged easing of
Indo- Pakistani tensions. Divisions became sharper
throughout the 1971 East Pakistan crisis, but Congress
leaders generally favored Mrs. Gandhi's efforts in
supporting Bangladesh.
c. Rharatiga Iona Sangh
One of the few parties to emerge intact, albeit
weakened, from the sweeping election victories of the
Congress Party in 1971 find 1972 has been the Hindu
nationalist Bharattya Jana Sangh (Indian People's
Part) often simply called the Jana Sangh. Until
recently, its electoral record had been one of sustained
gro- Although its success was spotty in 1971 -72, the
Jana Sangh managed to win 22 seats in the L.ok Sabha
and 105 seats in the state legislative assemblies �a loss
of 11 and 100 seats, respectively. Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh, and Rajasthan (where the party slightly
increased its state legislative seats), however,
accounted for well over 75% of its victories in both
national and state elections. Traditional Hindu
sentiment is strong in these areas and, in the latter two
tates, former princely rulers Flocked to the party in
reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to abolish their
special privileges. Without the backing of the princes,
it is likely that the Jana Sangh would not have done as
weii since it lacked a strong popular base and the
organization to support its efforts. The Jana Sangh's
now discredited F,971 opposition alliance with the
Organization Congress Party, the conservative
Swatantra Party, and the radical socialist Samyukta
Socialist Party (now merged into the Socialist Party)
thus gained only marginal results in the national and
state elections.
The Jana Sangh was founded in 1951 as the
political offshoot of the Rashiriya Suwyamuoak
Sangh (National Volunteer Corps �RSS), a militant
and xenophobic cultural organization that was
banned from political activity after Gandhi was
assassinated in 1948 by a former member. The Jana
Sangh is structurally separate from the RSS, but in
many important respects the RSS provides the party's
organizational backbone and ideological inspiration.
Overtly. RSS activities are now cultural in
character, but in reality the organization remains
politically active through the Jana Sangh. Most of the
Jana Sangh's political leadership has come from the
highly indoctrinated RSS ranks, and RSS cadres, many
of whom are also Jana Sangh party members, are
essential to that party's organizational work and
electoral campaigns. In marked contrast to Hinduism
generally, the RSS is a tightly organized, proselytizing
movement with strong martial overtones. It recruits
widely among younger people and maintains a high
sense of commitment and cohesion among its
members through drill sessions, uniforms, army -style
summer cs-rnps, and emphasis on physical fitness and
disciph:ie. The RSS rejects all foreign ideology and
technology, arguing that the far richer Hindu cultural
ho .i age contains all the ingredients for creating a
strong, modem state. RSS members are often accused
of stimulating communal violence, partly because
they tend to inflame Hindu passions that can be
turned against Muslims. from the RSS point of view,
all non Hindus are essentially foreigners and should be
allowed to stay in India only if "subordinate to a
Hindu nation, claiming nothing and deserving no
privilege." Pakistan, the RSS asserts, should be
reincorporated �by force if necessary.
Public positions taken by the Jana Sangh have been
less extreme than those of the RSS and, especially since
the 1967 general elections, there has been a trend
toward moderation on domestic issues. At its 1968
annual congress, the Jana Sangh backed away from its
longstanding demand for Hindi as the sole official
language and agreed that civil service examinations
might be taken in regional languages. As a symbol of
its change of mind, the party congress itself was held
in the southern state of Kerala, rather than as usual in
the northern Hindi- speaking heartland. The former
Jana Sangh President, A. B. Valpayee, was one of the
principal architects of the party's slow evolution from
extreme nationalism to relative moderation, at least on
the national level. A. L. Advani has led the party
further from its communal, petit bourgeois origins
since becoming party president in January 1973.
Internationally, the Jana Sangh program is
ultranationalistic, sometimes even bordering on
xenophobia. It calls for greatly expanded defense
preparation against Pakistan and China, including the
manufacture of atomic weapons, and takes a very
hard line against these adversaries. The Jana Sangh
also urges that India remain aloof from all world
power blocs, although its hostility toward Communist
co untries is greater than that toward the West. Its
policy of nonalignment is tempered by a willingness to
enter into bilateral accords if they clearly serve India's
strategic interests. The party asserts that it would
discourage foreign capital in all but the highest
priority industries, and it favors a reorientation of
development programs to phase out foreign aid. The
party has deplored the concentration of economic
power in the hands of the state or even of a few
individuals. It maintains, however, that the state
r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070032 -3

r
should par!icipatc in basic industries necessary for
defense and economic development, but should seek
the cooperation of private enterprise in the interest of
i more efficient and cheaper production.
The trend toward moderation of the Jana Sangh's
domestic program results from the party's desire to
expand its base of popular support outside northern
and central India. There also appear to be many
within the party who no longer identify close y with
the RSS's traditionalist and north India Ifindu
nationalist concepts and who world prefer that the
party move toward reducing its Brahmin image by
becoming a moderate, broad -based political force.
There are still, however, definite limits as to how far
the Jana Sangh can move away from its RSS moorings.
Beyond the fact that the RSS provides the party with
organizational muscle, J,na Sangh support has
traditionally come mair,ly from the Hindu urban
middle class of salaried workers and retail tradesmen,
and small landowners in the Hindi speaking areas of
central and northern India. The party's greatest
support has been in Hindi speaking northern states
such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Delhi,
and among Hindi- speakers in Bihar, Rajasthan,
Punjab, Haryand, and southern Jammu and Kashmir.
Outside of the Hindi heartland, it has done well only
in Maharashtra, one of its early strongholds. Despite
all its talk abeut national unity, the Jana Sangh is still
I basically a potentially important regionalist parity
based on high caste, middle class, north Indian Hindu
concepts and ideals.
The Jana Sangh is far from united on the wisdom of
collaboration with rightist parties and individuals not
bound by its own tight concepts of discipline and
program. Nevertheless, in the late 1960's it
investigated the prospects for merger with like- minded
parties. The results were inconclusive. The party can
be expected zealously to protect its identity regardless
of any cooperative arrangements it may enter. The
Jana Sangh's distinct gradualist approach in past
merger discussions has led many observers to believe
that the party could be developing a calculated plan
eventually to absorb weaker parties rather than to
effect mergers between theoretical equals.
legislative assembly elections in 1972 were even more
disastrous, with the party retaining only 16 of the 175
seats gained at the last poll. Prior to June 1972,
Swatantra led a fragile cr,alition government with the
regional Utkal Congress Party in Orissa, but the
government fell under Congress Party pressure that
month. Swatantra's potential for winning votes among
the non- privileged majority �a crucial sector to
electoral success in India �has been severely limited
by its image as the party of industrialists, princes, and
guardian of upper -class interests. Internal differences
among the leadership over the party's conservative
philosophy threatens to destroy it as a viable
organization. The party is unlikely to benefit either
nationally or locally from Congress Party short
comings.
The Swatantra Party was formed in 1959 to contest
the Congress Party's welfare state program. It deplores
t he "statism" toward which it sees the country moving
render Congress Party rule. Frankly espousing the
cause of the middle -class businessman and private
enterprise generally, the Swatantra Party calls for a
maximum of individual freedom and minimum
interference by the state. It favors private ownership of
land as opposed to cooperative farming, incentives for
higher production in industry, the relaxation of
governmental controls over business, the continuation
of government -owned enterprises only when they can
be run profitably, and the elimination of monopolies,
both public and private. On foreign policy the party is
pro-West.
Swatantra is led by disaffected former Congress and
Socialist Party leaders�the most notable of whom was
the late former Governor General of India, C.
Rajagopalachari�as well as by some prominent
industrialists and financiers. H. M. Patel, a member of
Parliament, was elected President in September 1971,
but he was succeeded in late 1972 by Piloo Mody, also
a member of Parliament. Swatantra is also actively
supported by a number of the maharajas of former
princely states, many of whom still enjoy the loyalty of
their erstwhile subjects, and on whom the party is
heavily dependent for electoral support. As of 1972.
Swatantra was still topheavy with leaders but short on
rank- and -file support outside the states of Orissa,
Gujarat, and Rajasthan. Even in Orissa, Swatantra
strength rests !argely on the appeal of former Chief
Minister Singh Den's locally rooted Ganatantra
Partzhad, which flies the Swatantra Flag but which
pays little real attention to "national" Swatantra
affairs. Organizationally. Swatantra has had a rather
flimsy structure, has been riven with high -level
disputes, and has lacked real cohesion. In contrast to
d. Swatantra Party
The conservative Swatantra (Freedom) Party,
largest opposition party after the IR67 general
election, was virtually eliminated as a national party
in the 1971 general election. It lost all but S of its 3:i
Lok Sabha seats and was further humiliated by the
defeat of its co- founder and president, M. R. Masani,
who resigned the presidency under fire. The state
29
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

most other Indian political parties, SwatanIra
organizational activity since the 1967 elections
appears to have slackened rather than increased in
tempo.
The Swa .antra Party also has a serious image
problem. Its ideology is too Westernized to attract it
broad -based national following, and it has failed in
practice to present a sharply differentiated alternative
to the Congress. At the same time, Swatantra's appeal
to disgruntled conservatives faces strong comn:�tition
from more vigorous regional parties, while unhappy
nationalists are more likely to tuirn to the Jana Sangh
or the Socialists.
e. Socialist parties
India's socialist parties have always had a difficult
time competing with the Congress Party and in mid
1972 were on the decline. The Congress Party's own
socialist line particularly since 1935 �has upstaged
their efforts, sapped their vitality by stripping them of
many i,ues, and deprived there of many potential
adlien :sty. More importantly, socialists have been so
beset with internal leadership struggles, splits and
mergers, and tactical disputes that they have been
unable to offer a credible alternative to the socialism
of the (ongress Party. The socialists, in the general
election of 1971, managed to retain only 5 of the 32
Lok Sabha seats previously held by the two major
socialist parties -1" by the Samyukta Socialist Party
(SSP) and 15 by the Praja Socialist Part (PSP). These
parties were forced in late 1971 to merge once again,
as they had nearly 20 years before, in order to survive
as a national farce, but even this could not prevent a
few dissident PSP anti SSP members from retaining
their identity. The combined socialists, under the
banner of the Socialist Party, retained only 50 of 160
seats in the 1972 state elections, 33 coming from Bihar
where the SSP had limited strength. The new party
incorporated the SSP, most of the PSP, the Indian
S;cialist Party of Kerala, and small socialist splinter
groups from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.
After a period of ferment, characterised by intense in-
fighting among a multiplicity of individualistic
leaders, none predominant, the socialists split once
again in April 1972 into several groups, each claiming
to be the "real" Socialist Party.
The socialists have had disproportionate strength
among students and labor. They have capitalized on
the a; ti- establishment, idealistic, and theoretical
tendencies of students. Their youth groups have
effectively challenged other party youth organisations
of all political stripes. In the labxr field, the socialists
30
form a significant component of the non Communist,
non Congress oriented trade union unnement.
The SSP and I'SP have played major roles in the
complex history of socialism in India. Factions have
tended over the yeas to group around the basic tenets
espoused by the SSP or the PSP. Even these general
groupings, however, have not prevented dissident
suhfactions and splinter groups fr.m forming to
further muddle the situation.
The SSP has tended to be the larger and more
radical group. Beyond its adherence to socialism, the
SSP has taken an exaggeratedly anti- Congress posture
and h as been even more fundamentally committed to
unseating Congress wherever, whenever, and with
whatever means possible. Its appeal is aimed at the
downtrodden, especially the so- called "backward
class" elements, and is enriched by invective, a :strong
dose of reckless iconoclasm, and a northern Indian
ccmmunal bias. Its leadership has tended toward
opp ontunism, as illustrated by it:: willingness to join
alliances �such as a rightist oriented one during the
1971 general election and to participate in coalition
state governments where, because of the relative
strength of the parties, the SSP had little chance of
influencing policy. SSP leadership and organization
never recovered from the death of its founder, Ram
Manohar Lohia, in 1%. 7. Competition for his mantle
has preoccupied the SSP since then. Raj Narain,
George Fernandes, and Madhu Limaye carry I ohia's
brand of socialism into the 1970'x.
Despite its pretense to be a national party, most of
the SSP's strength is in the northern Hindi- speaking
states, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In that
area, the SSP is very influential in student politics. The
party's major affiliated front organizations, except for
its trade union organization �the /find Mazdoor
Panchayat (Indian Labor Council). exist mosth� on
paper.
The PSP, in contrast, has been relatively moderate
in its socialism, and national rather than regional in its
approach. Intraparty squabbling, especially over
ideology and tactics, has divided the party and
threatened to destrov it from within. Now under the
leadership of N. G. Goray and M. Dandavate, the PSP
has never fully recovered from the defection of its most
prominent leader, Asoka Mahta, and his followers in
1964. Many PSP members believe that their goals are
best served by foregoing compromise, mergers, or
coalitions, no matter how much this might consign
their party to an isolated, permanent opposition role.
Realistically, however, many PSP units are in favor of
and have engaged in limited cooperative agreements
over the years. Individual members, and at times party
r
INC
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

leaders, have found "areas of agreement" with the from both the upper middle -loss population as well as
Congress Party, but trafficking with Congress has
usually resulted in added strength for the Congress
Party rather than the PSP. The PSP's policy of
"meaningful dialog" with Congress prior to the 1971
general election ended in PSP isolation and near
extinction as a parliamentary force. PSP organizations
in K,!rala, Bihar, aad West Bengal, where the party
had participated in coalition governments, and in
Orissa, where it had hoped to participate, were dashed
when the renewed Socialist Party decided to forego
governmental alliances with other parties. Dissident
PSP unit.; in several states, in fact, refused to go along
with merger of Socialist parties and retained their
identity as PSP.
Unsullied by political power and position, the PSP
has had significant influence in the labor field through
its affiliate trade union, the /find Mazdoor Sabha
(Indian Labor Congress). PS" youth organizations
have also been effective in engaging student
sympathies. Party revitalization, which is imperative
for PSP survival, could be sought from these sectors.
f. Communist parties
India's organized Communist movement �one of
the first outside the Soviet Union �began with the
formation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in
l early 1921. The party was first affiliuied with the
Communist International in 1921 and, after a break of
an undetermined period, reaffiliated in 1930. The
i Communist movement struggled through uncertain
f years characterized by organizational difficultie�c and
repression from Anglo- Indian authorities, but t grew,
albeit slowly, until 193.3. In that year Indian
Communists adopted the Communist International
policy of cooperation with legal, liberal, and non
Communist radical organizations while simul-
taneously infiltrating them in order to gain control. By
espousing an anti- imperialist line which was attractive
o the Indian people, the Communists gained
influence in the trade union movement and even in
the Indian National Congress. The CPI acquired legal
status as a political party in 1942. The Communists'
appeal in India is limited, both geographically and in
terms of mass popular support. Although the
Communists have managed consistently to win the
backing of 8% to 10% of the Indian electorate, they
k have been unable to expand their following
significantly for over a decade.
Mo,. Communist support comes from poorer
sections of the population, but many members are
drawn from the middle class and from the educated
unemployed. Radical factions have recruited heavily
from the ranks of professional thugs Me largest
Communist constituencies are usually found in West
Bengal, Kerala, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
and 'Tamil Nadu, where high population density and
poverty make life a constant struggle. In West Bengal,
for instance, the Communists are heavily supported by
Calcutta's middle class clerical wo :ers, in Kerala by
h. v caste landless agricultural workers, and generally
in Maharashtra by industrial workers in the Bombay
area. In Andhra Pradesh much of the Communist
leadership comes from the kamma caste, whose
members are predominantly landowning peasants
living in the Krishna and Godavari river deltas, but
the party also draws considerable support from the
unpropertied tenant farmers and agricultural laborers
in the same general area.
Communist strategy in India has varied consider-
ably over the years. The German attack on the Soviet
Union during World War 11 resulted in open support
by Indian Communists for the British war effort. The
simultaneous imprisonment of many Congress Party
leaders because of their noncooperative attitude gave
the Communists ereater latitude in building `heir
organization and cadres. After India achieved
independence in 1947, the Communists, with
Moscow's support, felt strong enough to incite violent
rev( )'ution but were able to sustain a rebellion only in
the Telengana area of what is now Andhra Pradesh.
By 1(,51 this effort had clearly failed, and the party fell
back on its stronghold among the labor unions in
urban areas. Despite the party's post- rebellion
disorganization, it became the largest opposition party
through a skillful placing of candidates in the general
election of 1952.
The hard -line Communists were unreconciled to the
shift to parliamentary tactics, but its value appeared
to be borne out in the 1957 elections, in which the
Communists gained control of the newly constituted
State of Kerala, the first time that the Communists
had come to power by popular ballot anywhere in the
world. The subsequent collapse of the Communist
Kerala government in 1959, following Congress Party
inspired disorders, rekindled the intra -party dispute
between the moderates and the militants. The party's
activists, who were sympathetic to Maoist militancy
without fully supporting the Chinese tactics, argued
that the Congress Party reactionaries would never
permit a peaceful Communist takeover and that the
parliamentary approach was dulling the Communists'
rapacity for more forceful action. Party moderates, for
their part, were restricted by their loyalty to Moscow,
which was even thin attempting to cement close ties
31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

with the Congress Party government. The 1962
Chinese attack on India further embittered the
quarrel, when the moderates strongly backed the
Indian Government and many of the militants were
arrested.
The final split came in 1964 when the militants,
with about half of the membership of the CPI, broke
off from the parent organization to form the separate
Communist Party of India /Marxist (CPM). The CPM
fot d itself in control of the movement in West
Rengal and Kerala, the two states where the united
party's organization and leadership had been the
strongest. The factions were about equal in two other
traditional areas of Communist strength, Andhra
Pradesh and Mad as (later renamed Ta-nil Nadu).
The CPI had the edg in most other states, but none of
these had ever been a Communist stronghold. The
CPI and the CPM eaLh have an estimated 80,000 to
100,000 active members, although each claim many
more.
Both Communist parties contested the fourth
general election in 1967. The CPI, which had
abandoned its earlier policy of cooperating with
"progressives" in the Congress Party, decided on total
opposition to the ruling party. The CPM leadership,
despite its rejection of the parliamentary approach to
power, opted to participate in the elections on the
grounds that Indian conditions required participation
in the constitutional system while mass support was
gradually being developed for future revolutionary
activity. The degree of electoral cooperation and
competition �often bitter� bet'Neen the two major
Communist parties varied widely from state to state.
The CPI fared slightly better in Parliament than the
CPM, whereas in state contests the CPM had the
edge. The CPM victories were concentrated in Kerala
and West Bengal, however, giving the part} a far more
decisive role in those states than the CPI had
elsewhere. In the post- election period the CPI joined
in anti Congress coalitions in the state governments
wherever possible (Kerala, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh). Following the failure of most coalitions,
however, the party reverted to its earlier policy of
cooperation witE the Congress. This posture
heightened the antipathy between the CPI and the
CPM.
Although the two major Communist parties, when
taken together, received less harsh treatment at the
polls in 1971 and 1972 than other opposition parties,
their limited successes distort their actual mediocre
performance. The two parties combined increased
their Lok Sabha seats only slightly from 43 to 49 (173
candidates entered) and managed to retain only 146 of
32
203 seats previously held in the state assemblies. A
significant number of CPI victories in both elections
were actually achieved, however, as a result of
Congress largess. Of the 24 seats the CPI retained in
the Lok Sabha �the same number it held before
elections �all but two resulted from prior noncom
petition arrangements with Congress. Although the
CPI, with 112 seats, emerged from the state assembly
elections as the largest opposition party, the story of
victory was much the same as the previous yes,r. The
party benefitted where it had arrangements with
Congress, i.e., Bihar, West Bengal, Punjab, Mysore,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Delhi, gaining 95
seats through this partnership. Bihar and West Bengal,
however, accounted for 35 seats each. In states where
the CPI ran in opposition to Congress it managed to
win only 19 seats. In 1971 the CPI claimed a
membership of about 232,000.
The CPI's position in Indian politics was weakened
by Mrs. Gandhi's refusal to enter into national
election agreements in 1971 which would place her in
debt to the CPI, and her decision to enter agreements
in 1972 only where Congress supposedly needed either
pooled organizational and voting strength or a united
leftist vote against rightists. Mrs. Gandhi's
overwhelming control of Parliament ^nd almost all
state assemblies has rendered CPI s port far less
necessary than in previous years when her position was
more vulnerable. The CPI's partial alliance with
Congress has limited its agitational capability and
revolutionary potential. On the other hand, the
agreement has served the interests of the CPI as well as
of the Congress against the CPM in the latter's Kerala
and West Bengal bases.
The CPI has been torn by dissension over the
direction the party should take in the immediate
future. At its Ninth Party Congress in October 1971,
the leadership seemed to recognize that the party's
best means of survival rested on its continuing close
association with the Congress Party, despite the
danger of losing the party's identity in such a liaison.
A dissenting minority opposed both the alliance and
adherence to the parliamentary process while urging
closer cooperation with the CPM and the adoption of
more revolutionary methods. To placate them CPI
leaders retained the right to criticize the "wrong
policies" of the Congress and to explore avenues for
joint action with the CPM. Nevertheless, in mid -1972,
the CPI was too emasculated to criticize Congress with
any vigor and remained ideologically alienated from
the CPM.
The CPM was the only party other than Congress
which increased its Lok Sabha seats in 1971, growing
s
o
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

P
from 19 to 25, but its overall position has deteriorated.
The party had run 88 candidates. Twenty of the
victors came from West Bengal, where the Marxists
were a very strong political force. This limited success
in 1971 was soon offset by the staggering defeat the
CPM suffered at Congress' hands in the 1972 state
assembly election. The party retained only 34 of 129
seats it formerly held. Most importantly, the CPM lost
almost 100 seats in West Bengal and managed to
salvage only 14 seats in a state which the party had
dominated since 1967. The only other sizable CPM
victory was the 16 seats it won in Tripura, where the
party had built up modest strength over the previous
two years.
The defeat in West Bengal was particularly crushing
for the CPM. Prior to the state assembly election, the
party had good organization, leadership, and finances
and was the only significant political force in the state
other than the Congr -ss. Mrs. Gandhi, however, was
determined to end CP:d- inspired instability in West
Bengal �the 1972 elections were the fourth in five
years �and install a government responsive to her
programs. This determination amounted to a resolve
to destroy the CPM as an effective political force. In
order to insure victory, the Congress entered into a
formal written electoral agreement with the CPI �the
first time in India iistory that a written agreement
bound political parties *called the Progressive
Democratic Alliance (PDA). The election took place
amid election irregularities, political killings and
gangsterism �the way politics is usually played in
West Bengal. The PDA proved its ability to meet and
better the Marxists at political violence. Pro -PDA
"goondas" (goons) reportedly harrassed CPM
candidates, intimidated voters, and tampered with
ballots. Additionally, Mrs. Gandhi exploited her
emotion charged appeal as liberator of Bangladesh.
When the dust had settled, the CPM was a heavy
loser. Even CPM leader Jyoti Basu lost by a huge
number of votes in his own constituency to a CPI
adversary. The CPM's task of rebuilding its strength in
strategically important West Bengal to pre election
levels could be severely hampered by Mrs. Gandhi's
apparent determination never to willingly relinquish
control.
The CPM has followed a fairly pragmatic policy
over the years, more influenced by the rapidly
changing Indian political situation than by dogmatic
ideological considerations. The party has always
recruited selectively, preferring to keep a low, active
membership �about 107,000 claimed in 1972 �in
order to maintain strict organizational control. From
its inception, the CPM has been burdened with severe
intraparty friction over the use of parliamentary versus
revolutionary methods. The success scored in the 1967
elections actually strained party unity to the breaking
point by Touching off a fresh round of debate on this
issue. Most of the revolutionary extremists were either
purged or had pulled out of the party to form parallel
units in some of the states. In fact, prior to 1972 little
distinguished the. CPM from the CPI in terms of
immediate tactics, although the CPM, unlike the CPI,
continued to tout violent revolution, abandonment of
the constitution, and "mass struggle" outside the
parliamentary process as part of its longer range
strategy. Ironically, the party has continually
participated in the democratic political processes it
seeks to destroy, especially in Kerala and West Bengal
where it led coalition governments. Prior to the
imposition of President's Rule in West Bengal in late
June 1971, it held the largest number of seats in the
legislature. However, significant numbers of CPM
cadres apparently began to go underground prior to
the state assembly elections in anticipation of electoral
defeats in 1972. Additionally, there apparently had
been considerable agitation within the party to
employ more revolutionary methods. Following the
1972 state assembly elections, the CPM boycotted
both the West Bengal assembly and the by- elections
held in two West Bengal districts, charging election
irregularities.
By early 1973, the CPM had not yet abandoned the
parliamentary process, but there was much debate
over the direction the party should take and the
methods it should employ. While the CPM has lost its
former level of political power, its leaders probably
believe that a low profile, including legal politi �I
activities in legislatures, labor organizations, and front
organizations, would better serve party interests than
going underground or taking a more violent approach.
Some nominal concessions may have to be made to
more radical elements, however, and the party might
have to seek support from the Maoists, who form a
third group within the Indian Communist movement.
In May 1969, some revolution- minded defectors
from the CPM announced the formation of another
Indian Communist Party, the Communist Party of
India /Marxist- Leninist (CPI /M -L). CPI /M -L mem-
bers are known as "Naxalites," a name derived from a
region in West Bengal where they led an abortive
guerrilla and terrorist uprising in 1967. The CPI /M -L
castigates both of the older Indian Communist parties
for trying to achieve power within India's
constitutional system. It plans to prepare for
revolutionary guerrilla activities along Maoist lines;
favors stirring. up peasant and tribal revolts rather than
r:
33
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

V
trouble in the cities; and permits participation in mass
movements only for the purpose of sustaining tension
and recruiting new members. Many of the extremists
were previously joined loosely in a national
coordinating committee, but this organization was
unable to provide cohesion for the disparate extremist
groups that had proliferated within the individual
states. The CPI /M -L has continually faced the same
problem. In early 1973, ideological and organizational
differences were so deep that no agreement could be
reached on any concerted course of action.
India also has a number of mini Marxist parties,
including among others the Forward Bloc, the
Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Peasants and
Workers Party, that are primarily splinter or front
groups with ultimate aims similar to those of the
CPI /M -L. Recent attempts to unify Communist
extremist groups, particularly in Kerala have failed.
The CPI /M -L has shown some willingness to take
others into its organization but has refused to
compromise its ideology or leadership. The major
point of contention within the CPI /M -L and among
extremist groups has been whether to engage in
guerrilla action immediately or to build a stronger
guerrilla organization for action in the future.
Disorganization, defections, and repression �as the
result of Mrs. Gandhi's desire to end extremism in
India� threaten all such groups with extinction.
g. Other parties
Numerous other parties dot the political landscape
in India, most of which operate almost exclusively
within individual states or regions and many of which
are based on linguistic, religious, caste and other social
distinctions. A few have achieved considerable success
within their restricted localities and will probably
continue to play an important role in local Indian
politics on selective issues, but they face a period of
reduced participation and influence in state
governments following the return of Congress Party
political domination. Despite their persistence in
Indian politics, other parties have tended to disappear
as a charismatic leader dies, or as a primary goal is
either achieved or co -opted by a national party.
(1) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam �The largest and
most influential of the regional parties is the Dravida
Mun. tetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Feder-
ation �DMK) which is based essentially on regional
loyalties of the Tamil- speaking people of southern
India, chiefly in the state of Tamil Nadu. Appealing
to the Tamils' long- standing resentment of what they
regard as high -caste Brahman domination and north
34
Indian discrimination, the DMK stands against the
imposition of Hindi as the sole official working
language of the central government and is strongly
anti- Brahman and anti north. The party has an
enthusiastic following among urban poor, both rural
poor and landowning castes, and youth and students,
and has been growing steadily since its inception in
1941).
The DMK contested the 1967 general election in
coalition with several other parties of various
ideological stripes. To its surprise, it routed the
Congress from its former stronghold in Tamil Nadu.
The party's successes carried over to the national level
where the DMK Lok Sabha delegation, entirely from
Tamil Nadu, became the fourth largest, with more
members than either of the two Communist parties or
the two socialist parties. Since then the DMK, faced
for the first time with the practical problems of
governing a state and of having to compromise some
of its principles while maintaining the zeal of its
following, has had remarkable success. The DMK
overcame a leadership struggle occasioned by the
death of its popular founder leader, C. N. Annadurai,
in 1969. In New Delhi, it allied with Mrs. Gandhi's
minority government late that year and won favors in
return, particularly Congress' pledge not to make an
all -out effort in Tamil Nadu in the 1971 elections. In
what turned out to be a masterful political maneuver,
party leader and Chief Minister, M. Karunanidhi,
against the wishes of Mrs. Gandhi, insisted on holding
both Lok Sabha and state assembly elections
simultaneously. By agreement, Congress refrained
from contesting any assembly seat as a quid pro quo
for DMK support for Congress candidates in nine
selected Lok Sabha constituencies. As further
insurance, the DMK allied with several minor parties
as it had in 1967, but extreme rightists and leftists
remained outside. Impressive as the 1967 victory had
been, it paled in comparison with 1971. The DMK
gained 183 of 234 state assembly seats (DMK allies
won 26 more) and 23 of 39 Lok Sabha seats. The
magnitude of the state pries indicated that the
party could have won on its own. An increased
confidence diminished the DMK's feeling of
indebtedness to allies, and led to a break with
Congress in February 1972. In late 1972, M. G.
Ramachandram, a popular film star and treasurer of
the DMK, left the party to form a splinter group, the
Anna -DMK, so named in honor of the DMK's
founder, Annadurai.
The very popular DMK posed a formidable regional
challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's all -India supremacy. The
party has traditionally espoused liberal causes and has
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

t:
M
6
r
no need to join the Congress' "progressive"
bandwagon. It apparently has no national ambi-
tions� indeed its pre -1971 national leverage is gone
and will likely continue to espouse regional themes,
especially calls for greater autonomy. Although Mrs.
Gandhi may attempt to maneuver the DMK out of its
commanding position, it would be very difficult to
loosen the DMK's hold on its constituency, and any
concerted attempt to compete with or to wrest control
from the DMK could prove counterproductive.
(2) Shiromani Akali Dal �In the Punjab, the
Shiromani Akali Dal (Army of the Servants of God)
claims to speak for the state's Sikh religious
community. A 10 -year campaign by the Akali Dal for
a Punjabi- speak state culminated in the 1966
partition of the state in such a way that the Sikhs now
comprise a slight majority in the reconstituted Punjab.
The new Punjab's voters showed no overwhelming
gratitude in the 1967 elections, and the splintered
Akali Dal won less than a quarter of the state assembly
seats. The Congress Party, however, failed to gain a
majority of assembly seats and as a result the Akalis
were able to join an ill -fated anti Congress coalition.
After a spell of "President's Rule" following the
collapse of representative government in the Punjab,
new state assembly elections were held in February
1969. The Congress Party was again unable to get a
majority and, although the now united Akalis did not
do as well as they had expected, the Akali Dal did
emerge at the head of a new coalition state
government. Despite leading the Punjab government
prior to the 1971 Lok Sabha elections and receiving
almost one -third of the popular vote, the party won
only one out of 13 seats. Akali representatives in the
Punjab assembly deserted to the Congress Party,
causing the government's fall and the institution of
"President's Rule." In the 1972 state assembly
elections the party repeated its mediocre 1967
performance; Congress won a solid majority and was
to form a government. The Akali Dal has never been a
power outside the Punjab. Although the party has
ample funds from the Sikh religious community,
unless its members can cease bickering and unite
behind a secular program which can appeal to a wider
electorate, the Akali Dal could decline even further.
(3) Bharatiya Kranti Dal �The initial success of a
number of dissident groups which broke away from
the Congress Party in early February 1967 encouraged
some of their leaders to launch a new all -India party,
the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (Indian Revolutionary
Party �BKD) in May of that year. The BKD, made up
of separate organization:, formed as a result of local
p.:rsona! and caste -based conflicts, lacks any real
cohesion and is little more than a loose confederation
of semiautonomous rebel Congress groups. The most
successful BKD unit, that in Uttar Pradesh, lost nine of
its 10 seats in the 1971 Lok Sabha poll, including that
of its popular leader Charan Singh. BKD leaders have
apparently recognized that the party lacks the
resources to compete on a national scale and have
begun to concentrate efforts in selected local areas
where major parties are not well entrenched.
Significant numbers of BKD politicians in Uttar
Pradesh have been defecting to the Congress Party.
Continued large -scale defections would further reduce
the BKD's political strength, perhaps beyond recovery.
(4) Communal parties �A number of small
communal parties thrive in India, some of which are
important in local politics but none of which has
significant influence on the national level. One of the
better known of these is the Muslim League, which
was founded in 1906 and agitated successfully for the
creation of a separate state of Pakistan in 1947. Today,
the Muslim League's remnants in India survive as a
significant political force only in northern Kerala and
Bombay. Although anti Marxist, the Muslim League
opportunistically joined the CPM- dominated electoral
front that fought the 1967 election in Kerala and later
joined in the coalition government that this group
formed; it also joined the CPI -led coalitions in 1969
and 1970. The Muslim League participated in the last
coalition in West Bengal� before the initiation of
"President's Rule" in June 1971 �but had very little
strength in comparison to the other parties there. The
Muslim League won two of Kerala's 19 seats in the
1971 Lok Sabha elections. The M uslims have not been
successful in forming an all -India organization,
although efforts have been made to organize a
national Muslim group which might establish a
consensus on political and practical matters. Although
the Muslim League contested the 1972 state elections,
seeking adjustments where it could in order to gain
strength, its victories were almost negligible.
The Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha (Greater India
Hindu Assembly), a rabidly communalist party, was
formerly a major rival to the Jana Sangh but has faded
considerably since the mid- 1950's. The Republican
Party of India, which seeks to become the political
voice of the "scheduled castes," i.e., untouchables and
other deprived groups, is of marginal importance,
although it does exert some influence in a few areas,
such as Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh.
The Telengana Praia Samiti (TPS) was formed by
separatists from the Telengana region of Andhra
Pradesh who rebelled against the Congress Party's
35
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3
R

s
state unit which opposed any division of the state. The
TPS contested the 1971 Lok Sabha elections, won 14%
of the Andhra Pradesh vote, and secured 10 seats. Due
to Mrs. Gandhi's astute political maneuvering in 1971,
however, the Telengana separatist issue was largely
defused, with almost all TPS leaders reintegrated into
the Congress and supporting the Prime Minister.
Former TFS members in the Andhra Pradesh Congress
Party, however, will likely press for special measures
for Telenganans in order to allay charges of
discrimination against Telenganans in the distribation
of govemmei. .it jobs and development resources, an
issue which is still alive and a source of popular
dissatisfaction. The Supreme Court's review and
approval in later 1972 of the "Mulki Rules" rules
under which Telenganans are favored for low -level
state jobs �led to an upsurge of violence among
coastal Andhrans, many of whom seek bifurcation of
the state. Because of growing disaffection and revival
of the demand for a separate Telengana state, Andhra
Fradesh was put under "President's Rule." Talks on
the state's future were underway in early 1973, but the
outcome is still not clear. The Congress Party has
suffered heavy although probably only temporary�
losses over the bifurcation issue. Many other caste and
communal organizations tend to take on aspects of
political parties, especially when their direct parochial
interests are threatened and when elections are held.
(5) The Senas �Since the 1967 elections more than
60 militant and chauvinistic organizatio? is styling
themselves as senas have proliferated in Inc: Most of
the senas claim to be nonviolent, although the Hindi
word "sena," meaning organization or army, includes
a sense of militancy. The tivities of these
organizations have frequently been marked by
violence, particularly since the causes with which they
are involved are usually laden with emotion. At least
one of the senas, the Shiv Sena of Bombay, has
gradually taken on the trappings of a political party,
and most of the others are performing essentially
political functions in expressing special regional and
local discontent. The Shiv Sena unsuccessfully ran five
candidates in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections but
retained a position as a local party when its candidate
was elected mayor of Bombay in April J W.I. Although
it only won one of Maharashtra's 270 state assembly
seats in 1972, the party's core strength in Bombay and
its voice in politics there were reinforced when it
retained 35 of its 41 seats in the 140 member Bombay
Municipal Corporation elections. In early 1973, it
improved its position to 39 seats and ranked second in
number to the Congress Party. Although the party has
shown strength among younger Maharashtrians, who
36
presumably are taken with its commitment to find
jobs for Maharashtrians, its influence outside of
Bombay is negligible.
3. Electoral system (U /OU)
Supervision and control of all elections and related
matters are vested in a nonpartisan, independent
Election Commission, appointed by the President of
India, with membership subject to parliamentary
approval.
There is one general voters' list for each
parliamentary or state constituency, and no person is
denied the franchise solely because of religion, race,
caste, or sex. Electoral rolls are revised before each
general election and before each by- election in a
constituency. Elections to the lower house of the
national Parliament and the state legislative
assemblies are by adult suffrage, all citizens 21 years of
age or over being eligible to vote. General elections are
held every 5 years, but by- elections may be held
whenever necessary. The number of parliamentary
seats allocated to each state is reviewed and readjusted
after every decennial census. A similar provision
applies to state legislative assemblies. The entire
country is divided into a number of territorial divisions
for electoral purposes called constituencies. While
each constituency elects a representative to the state
legislative assembly, five or more state assembly
constituencies are grouped together to form a
parliamentary constituency. A 1961 law stipulates that
all candidates are to run from single member
constituencies. Candidates for the national Parliament
need not be residents of the state in which they run.
State assembly candidates must be state residents.
Easily recognizable voting symbols for each
candidate and his party are used to overcome the high
illiteracy rate among voters. Much electoral
campaigning consists of familiarizing voters with the
symbols and identifying these with the party. While
established parties may reserve symbols, new parties
may obtain symbols by applying to the Election
Commission.
All five general elections have been r. itively
peaceful. Voting in some states is spread over several
days because of transpot,ation difficulties and the
limited availability of election officials. Polling booths
are located generally so that no voter has to travel
more than 3 miles to vote. The polling stations are
manned by civil service personnel acting as agents for
the Election Commission. Poll watchers may be
assigned by interested parties. A voter may cast his
ballot only at the polling place assigned to him. An
indelible ink mark is applied to the forefinger of each
3 1
4
0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

a
voter to prevent double voting. The voting is secret
a
and the voter is required to put a mark with an inked
y
rubber stamp next to a candidate's name or symbol on
a ballot. He then folds and inserts the ballot in a
sealed ballot box under the scrutiny of the presiding
officer.
The election machinery appears to operate
a
honestly; charges of malfeasance on the part of
t
election officials are rare. Most parties indulge in vote
s
buying during election campaigns, but this practice
appears to be geared exclusively toward influencing
the voter before he enters the polling station. In May
1969 Y. B. Chavan, then Minister of Home Affairs,
announced in the Lok Sabha that an Intelligence
Bureau investigation revealed tha' 'there is reason to
think that funds obtained from foreign sources were
used in the last general election." Despite charges of
both Western and Communist meddling, no firm
evidence exists of foreign interference. Replying to a
parliamentary question in April 1971, Deputy
Minister of External Affairs Surendra Pal Singh
exonerated Soviet and other diplomatic missions from
charges of interfering in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections.
A limit is prescribed on election expenses and all
candidates, successful or not, must file a statement of
expenses with the district election officer within 30
days after election results are declared. To discourage
frivolous nominations, candidates are required to post
a specified amount with authorities which is
refundable only upon securing one -sixth of the valid
votes in the constituency.
The verdict of the voters has been accepted nearly
always with good grace by both the Congress Party
and its opponents. In the state where the Congress
Party could not form a government, the party has
allowed opposition coalitions to take control.
The electorate which numbered 173 mi?iion in 1952
had grown to 271.8 million by March 1971. In the
1971 parliamentary elections, 145.8 million voters, or
54% of the qualified electorate, actually cast valid
votes. Voter participation appears to be greatest at the
village level, where often virtually all adults vote in
local elections; it is somewhat less for state elections or
for candidates to the national Parliament.
D. National policies
1. Domestic (U /OU)
The Indian Government since independence has
been strongly committed to political, economic, and
social development within the context of parliamen-
tary democracy. These broad goals have been most
vigorously promoted and supported by the propor-
tionately small, Westernized, and educated elite. The
implementation of specific programs related to these
goals has generated considerably less enthusiasm,
L
owever, from the still largely tradition- oriented rural
masses.
To turn their goals into reality, many of the top
decisionmakers and opinion molders have been trying
for many years to eradicate traditional behavior
patterns in favor of more modern values and attitudes
that can support their Westernized concepts of what a
modern Indian state should be. This effort at social
engineering has not been outstandingly successful,
and often it is characterized by a large gap between
what the government claims it has accomplished
through legislation of its objectives and what has
actually occurred in the process of implementation. In
some areas where national policy runs directly counter
to deeply held local convictions and vested interests,
the national elite has not placed overwhelming
priorities on its implementation. Such items as land
reform and the abolition of untouchability are
prominent examples of unenforceable and largely
unenforced legislation. In other areas where national
policies are congruent with local interests, programs
have been successful, but not always in the way
originally envisaged. Community development, for
instance, was started as a production- oriented
program but actually evolved into a social benefit
program for the privileged of the rural communities.
The Indian Government for over two decades has
been attempting to create an integrated national
community. The first essential step was to forge
territorial unity. By September 1948, with the
exception of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir
which is still in dispute with Pakistan, over 560
semiautonomous princely states of British India were
successfully incorporated into the independent Indian
Union through cajolery, financial inducements,
political pressure, and in two instances by armed
"police action." The five small French enclaves were
absorbed peacefully on a de facto basis by agreements
reached between 1952 and 1956, though de jure
ratific: of the agreement by the French Assembly
was delayed until 1962. The three small Portuguese
territories were taken by force, beginning with portions
of Damao (now Daman) and Diu in 1954, and
concluding with Goa and the remainder of Damao
and Diu in December 1961. The small, strategic
Himalayan mountain kingdom of Sikkim came under
Indian suzerainty by treaty in December 1950, after
that country's ruler requested the Indian Government
to send troops to help quell popular unrest. Sikkim is
now an Indian protectorate with no independent
37
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

foreign or defense policy and with extensive Indian
involvement in its administration. Neighboring
Bhutan remains an independent kingdom, but it is
bound by an August 1949 treaty to be "guided" by the
advice of India in the conduci of its foreign policy.
The Indian Government is heavily involved in
developing Bhutan's economy and is prepared to
defend this small Himalayan country in case of attack
by China.
Having achieved nearly complete territorial unity,
the Indian Government has turned to the even more
complex and difficult task of forging a sense of
national identity and loyalty. The bureaucracy has
been greatly expanded over the years, and it has taken
on an increasing range of public services very largely
programed to replace traditional, religious, and
familial ties with loyalty to secular oriented
institutions. The extension of regularized legal norms,
the increased density of police posts, and the spread of
the road system are all part of this pattern, as are the
more obvious symbols of nation building in the
economic sphere. Paradoxically, however, while the
government refuses to accept local rivals for authority,
the democratic system tends nevertheless to give power
to local leaders who sometimes fail to inspect the
national bureaucracy and thereby perpetuate the
historic pluralism of authority in the country.
Parochial authority is being eroded in many areas, but
traditional beliefs die slowly since they are central to
the individual's identity. New roles can be created and
filled much easier than old identities, and beliefs can
be changed to support the nation -state concept that
the Western influenced elites are trying so hard to
create.
From the beginning, the government has vigorously
tried to instill a sense of national identity in the people
of India, and high officials frequently rail against the
evils of regionalism and communalism. They are
highly aware that India as a nation is an artificial
concept, evolved during the independence struggle,
and is yet to be fully achieved. In June 1968, after a 6-
year hiatus, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi revived the
National Integration Council in an effort to achieve
fuller integration of India's multicultural and
multilingual society and to examine the major
impediments to this end. There had been a marked
upsurge of communal violence and regional
chauvinism after the 1967 general election, and it was
felt that there was a need to focus attention on these
serious problems in a broader context than that of the
continuing stream of ad hoc measures, gestures, and
recriminations. Mrs. Gandhi set the government's
policy line and expressed the council's consensus in
38
stressing the need for "purposeful action" against
communalism, regionalism, and lack of equal
opportunity, the main impediments to genuine
national integration.
Having consolidated her power following the 1971
and 1972 election victories, Mrs. Gandhi has
cautiously begun to attempt needed reforms. By mid
1972 the most notable endeavor was the Indian
Government's effort to reduce ceilings on land
holdings. Land ceiling legislation, a prerogative of the
states, has been in force in India for years, but it has
been circumvented by a variety of legal and illegal
means. As a key to meaningful socioeconomic change
in India, land reform was one of Mrs. Gandhi's most
fervent pledges in the elections and has become a
significant test of her political credibility and
performance. While the trend toward achieving other
reform measures has been growing, strong opposition
from those who favor the status quo is likely to inhibit
the pace of change in land policies.
Because of the effects of the drought and rapidly
rising food prices, in late 1972 the government asked
the state governments to take over the wholesale trade
in foodgrains in 1973. This massive program, designed
to keep foodgrain prices within reasonable limits, will
test the political will of the Congress Party and the
administrative capabilities of the bureaucracy to the
fullest. Most state chief ministers tacitly oppose this
takeover.
Limiting India's massive population remains a
critical issue for Indian leaders. Programs to raise
living standards and the concomitant problems
involved with resource allocation have been and will
continue to be conditioned by the government's
ability to deal with this problem. Family planning has
been an integral part of developmental plans since
1951, but it was not until 1964 that comprehensive
program was launched. The government continues to
offer incentives for adopting birth control techniques,
and has expanded its family planning services,
including information programs and clinics. In April
1972 a comprehensive Termination of Pregnancy bill,
which legalized abortion, became effective. Indian
leaders realize that, as health measures become more
effective and life expectancy is improved, checking
population growth, becomes an even more crucial
problem. Recognizing the danger of a letdown in the
population control effort, the government is working
to develop a more effective population policy to deal
with the problem. (See chapter on The Society,
Section C, Population)
The Congress Party governments have always been
deeply committed to doing something constructive
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

'q�
7
r
about India's staggering problems of population,
poverty, inequality, hunger, disease, and ignorance.
Their efforts, which in many areas have fallen short of
the needs, have been mainly channeled into a series of
comprehensive 5 -year development plans, the fourth
of which was launched in April 1969. The strong
socialist strain in the Congress ideology has led to the
public ownership of a considerable number of key
industries and to a reluctance to use the free market
mechanism as an instrument of economic policy.
Congress Party socialism, however, is not doctrinaire
and has a considerable degree of pragmatism that
generally makes an allowance for political and
economic realities and provides for considerable
leeway in the making of specific policies. Thus, the
earlier heavy emphasis on building up the heavy
industrial sector has largely shifted to increasing
agricultural production, and checking the population
explosion.
The Fourth Five Year Plan (I April 1969 -31 March
1974) reflects the Indian Government's latest
orientation in development policy. The Planning
Commission took good advantage of a 3 -year hiatus
(1966 -68) in 5 -year planning to make a fundamental
reassessment of the economy's capabilities and
requirements after 15 years of planned development
effort. The most striking difference from past plans
and performance is the increasing attention to
agricultural development programs and to reducing
dependence on external aid and deficit financing. The
redirection of effort and realignment of priorities was
most clearly seen in the increased attention given to
raising food production to the level of self- sufficiency.
Other significant changes in comparison with earlier
development planning in India were a curtailment of
public sector investment in industry and mining, and
within this sector, a deemphasis on heavy engineering
and coal, accompanied by sharply increased
investments in fertilizer production and nonferrous
metals, and greatly increased attention to newl-/
recognized needs for family planning, improved
nutrition, and storage facilities for agricultural
products. In general, the plan, which aims "to step up
the tempo of activity to the extent compatible with
maintaining stability and progress toward self
sufficiency" has been pragmatic and fairly realistic.
The mid-term Appraisal of India's Fourth Five Year
Plan, a government report released in mid -1971,
indicated that the plan had thus far achieved mixed
results. Overall growth rates for the agricultural,
defense, and public administration sectors as well as
some other sectors of the national product were
satisfactory. In contrast, the overall performance of
industry was unsatisfactory, due largely to the
expected failure to achieve the plarmed levels of
production. Despite overall growth of agriculture, it
too was expected to achieve lower outputs than had
been planned. Accordingly, many goals were revised
downward. Despite shortcomings of the plan, Indian
leaders have shown a better understanding of their
economy and have continued a pragmatic approach
designed to break bottlenecks and to achieve realistic
goals, particularly in industrial growth. The economy
made modest progress in 1971, despite the influx of
about 10 million Bengala refugees and the war with
Pakistan. While there had been some previous grounds
for optimism in New Delhi, the annual Government of
India Economic Survey for FY1972 -73 reported that
overall growth of the Indian economy has been
unsatisfactory since 1971. Issued in February 1973,
this survey was generally more pessimistic than the
earlier mid -1972 appraisal. The poor economic
performance was attributed to the shortfalls in
agricultural production resulting from the 1972
drought.
2. Foreign
Since independence the basic tenet of Indian
foreign policy has been nonalignment, an ambiguous
term that the Indians have continuously redefined to
meet the changing requirements of the country's
foreign policy. As originally developed and expanded
by Jawaharlal Nehru, nonalignment involved staying
scrupulously aloof from the "cold war" and building a
"third force" grouping of Afro -Asian states that could
serve as a bridge between the Communist and Western
power blocs. It involved considerable international
moralizing at the United Nations and in other
international k rums, and it included the dominant
themes of neutialism, anti imperialism, and peaceful
coexistence. India was suspicious of most Western
policies, believing them in one way or another to be
aimed at regaining a foothold in South Asia or at
retaining power in Southeast Asia, the Far East, and
Africa. Leadership of the Afro -Asian states was
actively pursued, and China was approached as a
brother Asian state with which peaceful coexistence
was desirable and possible. The dominant aims were
to create an atmosphere of world peace in which India
could devote its energies to achieving self- sustaining
economic development and to secure a place in world
affairs for India, a goal desired for its own sake, apart
from any relationship it might have with economic
development. (U /OU
Nonalignment is still the publicly proclaimed
cornerstone of Indian foreign policy, but in the 1970's
39
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

it has come to have quite a different meaning in
several important contexts. A subtle redirection of the
concept has evolved as a result of the Indian leaders'
appreciation of the changing nature of world
conditions and international relations as well as of the
increasingly more complex domestic economic and
security situation. Mrs. Gandhi's pragmatic style and
guiding influence have increasingly become the bench
marks for action. Faced with two hostile neighbors�
Pakistan and China �and preoccupied with serious
social and economic problems at home, Indian
policymakers for years assiduously sought a balanced
relationship with the Soviet Union and the United
States that could maximize diplomatic, economic, and
military support from both superpowers. This balance
was upset by deterioration of relations with the United
States in 1971 resulting from the events of the Indo-
Pakistani war. Moreover, by 1972 India had
developed a greater sense of self confidence, and a go-
it- alone attitude had become pervasive in foreign
policy considerations. Achieving self reliance by 1979,
has become an important goal. India currently defines
self- reliance as "zero net foreign aid," a concept that
assumes India will continue to receive foreign aid to
cover debt repayments. According to Mrs. Gandhi,
nonalignment has come to mean the pursuit of
national interests in total freedom from outside
interference. The new view implies that cooperation
with any nation is possible as it becomes necessary and
clearly alters the concept of neutrality that
nonalignment formerly suggested. Mrs. Gandhi and
most Indians still retain a strong emotional and
intellectual dedication to the old concept, at least in
the abstract. Although new decisions continue to be
clothed in the garment of nonalignment, the term has
been redefined to fit into the circumstances of the
1970's. Indian policymakers still regard themselves as
spokesmen for the developing countries, although the
demonstrated lack of tangible benefits from wooing
Afro -Asian states resulted in a decline of interest in this
kind of activity following Nehru's death in 1964.
Indian policymakers today believe that they can still
follow a middle course, albeit more involved and
active than that followed in recent years, which will
serve to convince the big powers that they can no
longer exert pressure on smaller countries. (C)
The Indians have come to realize that the Soviet
Union and the United States will always pursue their
own changing interests and that these will not
necessarily coincide with what India perceives to be in
its vital interest. This was evident, for ins* ince, when
India opposed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
essentially on the grounds that signature was
40
detrimental to its long -range security interests �and
for the first time found itself on the side opposite both
superpowers. (U /OU)
India favors, at least in principle, worldwide nuclear
disarmament and an effective ban on all nuclear
testing. The government has declined to sign the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty, however, as it is
concerned about the Chinese nuclear testing program
and Peking's refusal to sign the treaty. India has
continued a program of nuclear development.
Although India possesses the technical capability of
testing a crude nuclear device within a short period
after the decision to do so, it has not yet detonated a
nuclear device, apparently preferring to keep its
options open for the future. India probably sees its
ultimate defense against a potential Chinese nuclear
threat as resting primarily on its ability to gain the
support of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States,
and it has thus far relied on developing conventional
capabilities. There has been considerable public
discussion of developing a nuclear capability, but
security considerations and the very high cost of an
effective nuclear deterrent, including a delivery
system, are strong inhibiting factors. The Indians are
relatively advanced in the development of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes, however, and under the
aegis of their Atomic Energy Commission have
ventured into applications of nuclear power to such
fields as agriculture, biology, industry and medicine.
Ir addition to an advanced atomic energy program,
India has an active space research program and hopes
to develop a domestic satellite launcher by 1976. (S)
India's military victory over Pakistan in 1971 and its
emergence as the dominant power on the subcontinent
has revived the ebullience and self assurance of the
Nehru period. Mrs. Gandhi pledged in early 1972 to
make India strong enough to influence world events
and to shape a foreign policy which would accomplish
that goal. The confidence on which such a promise
was based reflected a new -found nationalism, possibly
tinged with xenophobia, and at the same time
demonstrated the Indian leaders' decreasing tolerance
of outside direction. The Indians are increasingly
sensitive about recognition and acceptance of what
they believe to be their new role in regional and
international affairs, a role commensurate with India's
size and potential. Indian leaders have shown a
growing ability to resist pressures from the big powers,
which appear to them as impediments to achieving
their objectives or slurs on their self- respect. Despite
the Soviet- Indian Friendship Treaty of 1971, India has
indicated that it will not be the camp follower of any
power and has apparently disagreed with the Soviets
L
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

'yM!g1 7.�, t M. fr141� w- rw. y!* wp TMP' 71g.'.. r,+., e.-. .TM+f'o`RfY.r;S...n.ePK �giia!W rtvMtr.. mn7 �:.!L.n.. le! aM* r'+.^ sY! rT� m" Le� qN"^ n. ri. c%+ TigR! SIAe'^ i; Y d77V1 't:..M'1't4!HkNF!1!rl!''
Y
4
over policies affecting its primacy in the Indian Occan
area and its relationship with Bangladesh. Indeed,
New Delhi has shown it growing interest in increasing
its influence in Asia and in concluding bilateral or
multilateral treaties with other Asian nations. (U /OU)
a. Indo- Pakistani relations (C)
India's relations with neighboring Pakistan have
been consistently antagonistic since these two
achieved independence in 1947. In the months
following the December 1971 Indo Pakistani war,
however, both governments seemed sincerely
determined, for the first time, to turn their embittered
history of confrontation in the direction of lasting
peace and friendship. Although efforts to mach a
modus vtvendi hogged down, leaders of both countries
remained optimistic that positive results csauld
eventually be achieved. Following the December war,
the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, historically a
major point of contention, has been defused as a
burning issue because of India's clear military
superiority and Pakistan's apparent agreement to solve
outstanding disputes by peaceful means. A final
settlement of the Kashmir issue, however, is still
crucial to peace and stability in the subcontinent. The
dispute, whose roots go deep into the turbulent
political and communal history of the Indian
subcontinent, is much more than a normal territorial
dispute over a strategic area.
The partition of India in August 1947, intended to
ease traditional Hindu- Muslim tensions by creating a
Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan, acted instead to
perpetuate this basic problem. Immediately after
partition, the mass migrations of Hindu and Muslim
minorities from the new countries �at least 10 million
persons were involved �were accompanied by
massacres on both sides of the borders that left as
many as two million of the fleeing migrants dead. The
sizable minorities which remained in each country,
however, have often home the brunt of mob violence
and discrimination stemming from the lingering
animosity created by those days of terror.
Under the terms of the partition agreement.
Kashmir, along with 600 princely states, had the right
to join either India or Pakistan. When independence
came, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir delayed his
decision, apparently hoping to achieve substantial
autonomy. By mid October 1947, however, a revolt
had broken out among the overwhelmingly Muslim
population, several thousand Pathan tribesmen had
invaded Kashmir from Pakistan, and a provisional
Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) government, supported
and recognized by Pakistan, had been established.
The ruler acceded to India on October 26 and
immediately sought assistance from New Delhi to
suppress the local agitation and to expel the Pakistani
invaders. The subsequent intervention by Pakistani
army troops intensified the first military confrontation
between newly independent India and Pakistan.
When a cease -fire halted fighting in 1949, India
controlled about two thirds of Jammu and Kashmir
an area with a population that now numbers over 4.6
million people, of whom some 70% are Muslims.
Included tinder Indian control was the highly coveted
Vale of Kashmir, a level to gently rolling fertile valley
some 85 miles long and 25 miles wide. Srinagar, the
largest and by far the most important political and
commercial center, dominates the Vale. India also
controls the more densely populated (mostly by
Hindus) plains to the south and about 75% of the
forests �the state's most important natural resource.
The remaining one -third under Pakistani control has a
population of about 1.2 million and is a mountainr�us
area of little economic value. The Pakistanis ha
organized a part of their area of the disputed territory,
called Azad Kashmir, under a separate provisional
government, the "Azad Government of Jammu and
Kashmir," but actually it is controlled by Islamabad.
The Indian -held portion of the dispute territor, has
been incorporated into the Indian union as a regular
state, although constitutionally it has somewhat more
autonomy than the other Indian states.
As Indo- Pakistani relations deteriorated in 1964 and
early 1965 due to worsening developments in Kashmir
and increasing East Pakistan border incidents, an
accidental encounter led to military clashes on the
desolate salt marshes of the Hann of Kutch. British
Prime Minister Harold Wilson prevented the conflict
from spreading to general war by arranging a cease-
fire and persuading both powers to submit the dispute
to international arbitration. Militarily Pakistan had
actually beaten India, but the hostilities only further
increased frustrations on both sides over ancillary
issues such as Kash.
Pakistan's frustrations over its inability to wrest the
Indian -held portion of the disputed territory�
especially the prized Vale of Kashmir �from India
through the auspices of the United Nations led to the
risky decision to send infiltrators into the area in early
August 1965. The ensuing 3 -week war in September
1965 quickly spread from the 1949 cease -fire line
down to the established international border in the
Punjab. Until the outbreak of the 1965 hostilities,
economic and political relations between India and
Pakistan functioned largely within the overall
framework of normal diplomatic and commercial
41
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070032 -3

practice. Enmity, suspicion, fear, arid hostility, which
had accumulated over IS years of bitter controversy
about Kashmir, distorted day- to -d�ty relations, but
there remained real, if diminishing, willingness to
maintain those ties of trade, travel, and communica-
tion that had existed since the partitioning of the
subcontinent in 1947. The September war, however,
destroyed virtually all these important links. 'Trade
and payments came to a halt, telecommunications
and postal services were suspended, property
belonging to the nationals of the other country was
seined, and air, rail, and road services were completely
suspended.
A U.N. resolution brought an end to the war in late
September 1965, and in January 1966 Prime Minister
Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan met
under the auspices of the Soviet Union at Tashkent.
Under considerable Soviet pressure, the two leaders
agreed to a series of measures designed to begin the
process of restoring normal relations. The list of actual
Indo- Pakistani accomplishments through early 1971
concerned relatively minor issues, and in many cases
represented only qualified success.
In late January 1971 the hijacking and subsequent
destruction of an Indian airliner in West Pakistan
soured Indian relations with Pakistan but, despite an
emotion charged atmosphere, both countries sought to
avoid confrontation. However, the attempt that West
Pakistan began on 25 March to re- establish
government authority in East Pakistan �now
independent Bangladesh precipitated a series of
events which ultimately led to the Indo Pakistan war
in December.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, India was
basically concerned about two major issues in East
Pakistan that New Delhi believed threatened its vital
interests. Ten million refugees had crossed the border
into West Bengal and other states on India's northeast
frontier, creating an unacceptable burden and great
domestic pressure for action. Even more important
was New Delhi's fear that a radical left regime would
emerge on the borders of West Bengal, traditionally
India's most unstable state. Following months both of
increasing border violations and Indian support of
Bengalec independence fighters, a 2 -week war
erupted.
India emerged the victor and the dominant military
power on the subcontinent. Pakistan lost some 9:3,000
military and civilian prisoners of war: about 6,000
square miles of territory along the border of India and
West Pakistan; and East Pakistan, which became the
new nation of Bangladesh. Indian prisoner and
territorial losses were minor in comparison.
42
After several months of p. liminary sessions, Prime
Minister Gandhi met in early July 1972 with Pakistani
President Bhutto in Simla, India, for the first bilateral
peace negotiations at the summit between India arid
Pakistan since partition in 1947. Although the Simla
Agreement made progress on a number of issues
especially affirming what amounted to a no -war pact
between India and Pakistan� little movement
occurred in the following months. India's charges of
Pakistani violations of the spirit of Simla �which to
them implied, among other things, speedy Pakistani
recognition of Bangladesh �have been met with
Pakistani countercharges that India has failed to
execute the letter of the agreement. Meanwhile, apart
from the issues raised by the war, the basic issue of
Kashmir, which has poisoned the diplomatic
atmosphere in the past, remains unresolved.
India has held steadfastly to its position affirming
the legality of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to
India effected by the Hindu Maharajah in 1947. Since
1956 New Delhi has also maintained that it no longer
considers itself bound by its agreement to conduct a
plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as called for in U.N.
resolutions. The Indians assert that the demilitariza-
tion of all of the territory� another element of the
resolution bus never taken place and that this was to
be a necessary prerequisite for a plebiscite. They also
hasten to point out that five "free" state and national
elections have been conducted in the Indian -held
portion of the territory, giving the Kashmiris ample
occasion to express their will. Actually, strong -arm
tactics and legal maneuvering have governed the
outcome of all five elections. Strong and growing
Indian nationalist sentiment opposes any settlement
with the Pakistanis that would involve compromise.
Pakistan's position from the beginning has been
based primarily on extending to the disputed territory
the principle of religious separation underlying the
1947 partitioning of the subcontinent. Pakistanis
argue that the people of the Indian -held portion, who
are predominantly Muslim, should have a free
opportunity to incorporate their land into Pakistan.
Pakistan's argument is not altogether altruistic. If so
predominant a Muslim area were to remain
uncontested in the Indian union, the principle behind
the original partition would be undermined. As in
Ind;. no government in Pakistan could abandon
entirely a strong stand on Kashmir and survive.
Following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war, however,
President Bhuttoi s options may be limited.
In the peace negotiations following the hostilities in
1971 it became clear that neither side was prepared to
abandon its claim, but the new cease -fire line in
2
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

Kashmir that emerged from that war began to look
more and more like it de facto international boundary.
Indian leaders have long admitted in private that they
would be willing to accept such a resolution of the
dispute. The Pakistanis, of course, cannot publicly
accept any such ending to their quest for Kashmir but,
in the light of the results of the 196.5 and 1971 wars,
they appear unable to change the status of the
disputed territory by force and may decide quictl} to
let the issue fade. In August 1973 one thorny issue was
resolved when India and Pakistan agreed to release
most of the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in
detention in India since December 1971.
Over the years, India's relations with Pakistan have
been adversely affected by Pakistan's adherence to
western military pacts �The Central Treaty Organiza-
tion (LENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) �and its relations with China.
India has regarded multilateral military pacts
incompatible with its own as inimical to its
nonaligned position and hostile to the principles of
making the subcontinent a "zone of peace." New
Delhi has been deeply suspicious of Chinese i;itentions
toward India, especially since the 1962 hostilities, and
fears Chinese Pakistani collusion. New Delhi believes
that prospects of improving Sino- Indian relations have
been impeded by Pakistan's relations with Peking.
Additionally, as long as the close relationship between
China and Pakistan continues, India cannot discount
the possibility of another Chinese military attack and
has been forced to divert money and manpower which
are needed elsewhere to the defense against China.
b. Bangladesh (C)
India is, in effect, Bangladesh's sponsor and
together with the United States �one of its two
leading benefactors. Following the West Pakistani
crackdown on what was then East Pakistan, India's
involvement with the Bengali independence
movement grew steadily. As a result of its extensive
military and political support, India exercised
considerable control over the Bengali resistance
movement. Despite continuing support, particularly
economic, once the People's Republic of Bangladesh
came into existence on December 16, 1971 it became
increasingly clear that the degree of control inevitably
had to decline and that strains would develop in the
relationship.
India has sought to maintain a low profile while still
playing a major role in Bangladesh's rehabilitation
and future. One of India's early moves was to sponsor
Bangladesh for membership in the United Nations.
Indian troops who had provided assistance in
maintaining law and order were withdrawn from
Bangladesh by early March 1972, vlith New Delhi
apparently even more anxious than Dacca for the
soldiers to depart. An Indian Army contingent that
returned to help suppress unrest in the remote
Chittagong Hills border region had left Bangladesh
territory by mid -May. Some Indian military and
technical advisers have remained in Bangladesh to
assist in the restoration of communication and
transportation facilities, but no combat units are
known to be in the country.
In late March 1972 the two countries concluded a
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty
provides for immediate consultation between the two
governments if either party is threatened with attack
by another country. It -also provides that neither party
will enter into alliances directed against the other, that
regular contacts will be maintained on major
international problems affecting both, and that they
will cooperate in science, culture, economics, trade
and water usage. A subsequent trade agreement seeks
to facilitate trade and transportation between the two
countries, long obstructed by unfriendly relations with
previously united Pakistan.
Although Indian popularity was still high in the fall
of 1972, an undercurrent of discontent flowed through
Bangladesh about some aspects of its relations with
India. Some Bengalees have alleged that the Indians
have aggravated the new country's difficulties.
Businessmen have complained that the trade
apreement is weighted in India's favor, and some
Bengalee leftists have excoriated India for allegedly
failing to inhibit rice smuggling to India and for
foisting shoddy consumer goods on Bangladesh. Many
Bengalees probably fear that Indians might regain the
predominant position in Bengalee commercial affairs
that they held before partition in 1947. The charges of
general Indian domination of the Bangladesh
Government and its military forces, as well as other
anti- Indian sentiments, are probably rooted more in
the Muslim suspicions and antipathy against Hindus
that smoulder beneath the surface than ;to any
situation which has actually materialized. The
teiidency among Bengalces to blame foreign powers�
especially India �for the country's massive difficulties
seems to have increased as problems remain unsolved
and reinforce fears of future domination.
New Delhi would prefer a stable Bangladesh on its
eastern border, and Indian troops would probably be
called upon to return to Bangladesh should events
occur which Dacca's security forces could not handle.
The Indians recognize, however, that Prime Minister
Mujibur Rahman's ability personally to hold the
43
1
5
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

v
government and country together in the face of severe
internal pressures could be affected by their own
actions. Indian leaders, therefore, have gone out of
their way to avoid the appearance of excessive
interference. Despite Indian sensitivity V) the domestic
situation in Bangladesh and genuine efforts to allay
Bengalce fears, deep seated mutual suspicions could
inhibit smooth future relations.
e. The Himalayan buffer states and Sr! Lanka (C)
India has devoted considerable attention to its
relations with neighboring Nepal. This sovereign but
economically primitive and geographically com-
partmented nation has strategic importance as a
buffer between India and China along some 500 miles
of its border with Tibet. India has extended economic
and military aid to Nepal, but this has been partially
offset by Chinese aid and diplomatic initiatives. The
Nepalese are suspicious of both Indian and Chinese
intentions but have been particularly resentful over
their depen4ence on Indian trade and aid.
Additionally, earlier Indian tacit support for
antigovernment activities by dissident Nepalese
politicians residing in India has been a source of
friction.
New Delhi has been fairly successful in convincing
Kathmandu that India intends to exercise its
predominance on the subcontinent �at least t4s -a -Ws
Nepal �in a restrained and reasonable manner. At one
time, India maintained intelligence gathering posts on
the Tibetan border of Nepal, but at Nepalese
insistence it had removed its troops from these posts by
early 1971. Moreover, Indian leaders appear to regard
King Birendra �who ascended the throne in January
1972 �more favorably than his autocratic father.
They have assured him that they will try to increase
aid, will act to prevent subversion by dissident
Nepalese politicians in India, and will not permit
Nepalese insurgents to operate from Indian territory.
Although relations had entered a new stage of
cordiality by late 1972, King Birendra was still
extremely wary of India's past preference for a
"democratic" or, at least, a more liberal regime in
Nepal.
Bhutan is a vulnerable link in India's frontier with
China and, as such, poses a potential threat to Indian
security which New Delhi has sought to minimize.
According to the Indo Bhutanese treaty of 1949,
Bhutan conducts its own foreign relations but is
required to follow Irdia's advice when given.
Although India has no responsibility for defending
Bhutan, New Delhi considers Bhutan's irtemal
security and territorial integrity essential to the defense
of northern India and, accordingly, provides
substantial military aid. India established the Indian
Military Training Team, with a staff of several
thousand, to assist in training the Bhutanese army, but
this organization also could he used to stem internal
disorders. Additionally, several thousand Indian
troops are responsible for most of the extensive
roadbuilding projects in Bhutan and presumably
could be called upon in an emergency. Bhutan is
almost totally dependent on India for economic
assistance and developmental aid. The Bhutanese
Government has been uncomfortable over the very
visible Indian presence, fearing that it was risking its
image of independence and running the possibility of
provoking the Chinese. Relations are also somewhat
easily inflamed by the fact that Bhutanese consider
Indians racially and culturally inferior. Despit^
considerable resentment by some Bhutanese toward
the relatively large number of Indians engaged in
Bhutan's economic, administrative and military
affairs� especially in the ebullient period following
Bhutan's admission to the United Nations in 1971
the Bhutanese Government apparently does not feel
that India threatens its special brand of sovereignty. In
time, Bhutan could perceive the need to demonstrate
its independence by occasionally voting differently
from India in the United Nations or by pressing India
on small matters related to its sovereignty. While
modifications in the symbiotic relationship can be
expected over the long term, relations in late 1972
were developing satisfactorily for both partners, and
the King of Bhutan �who ascended the throne in July
following his father's death� claimed no desire to
revise the Indo- Bhutanese treaty arrangement.
The small but strategically located Himalayan
border state of Sikkim is closely tied to India. It
became a protectorate of British India by a treaty
negotiated in 1861, and this status was continued by a
treaty between newly independent India and Sikkim
signed in 1950. The treaty provides that Sikkim's
external relations, defense, and communications are to
be conducted solely by India, and it permits the
placement of Indian officials in prominent positions
throughout the Sikkimese Government. In exercise of
its defense responsibility, India maintains about
27,000 troops in Sikkim to guard against Chinese
incursions along the Sikkim -Tibet border.
In May 1973, the already limited powers of Sikkim's
titular ruler, Maharaja Paldem Thondup Namgyal,
the Chogyal of Sikkim, were further curtailed as a
result of a new agreement with India. A month earlier,
India responded to the Chogyal's appeal for help in
curbing civil disorders fomented by the ethnic Nepalis,
44
C 7
J
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

who constitute a majority of the population. The
Nepalis have long sought democratic reforms in the
government and an end to various discriminatory
practices against them. New Delhi stepped in, ended
the disorders, and quickly mediated a new agreement
that enhances both its own position and that of the
Nepalis. Although the Chogyal remains titular head of
Sikkim, he retains direct control over only palace
affairs and the small palace guard.
Indian control over Sikkim's internal administration
has been tightened by creation of an Indian "chief
executive" appointed by New Delhi. He is required to
seek the Chogyal's consent for decisions, except in
emergencies when the situation will brook no delay.
Conflicts between the Chogyal and the chief executive
are to be resolved by New Delhi. The new agreement
also provides for the creation of an expanded
legislature, the State Council, elected every 4 years on
a one -man, one -vote basis. This replaces the previous
system of government that was weighted in favor of
the Bhutia- Lepcha ethnic minority which supports the
Chogyal. An executive council, similar to a cabinet,
will be selected with Indian approval by the State
Council. An independent judiciary will also be
established.
The new agreement should mute, at least
temporarily, the Chogyal's determination to seek
greater autonomy for Sikkim in its relationship with
India. He has desired a revision of the 1950 treaty,
membership in international organizations, and
greater control over Sikkim's internal and external
affairs. The Chogyal and his American -born wife (the
former Hope Cooke of New York) have long resented
India's role and probably will continue to complain
privately of what they consider Indian meddling.
Over the long run, India may face problems in
controlling the Nepalis, particularly the youthful
extremists who seek a Nepali- dominated government
without a hereditary monarch. Trouble may also
develop along communal lines, reflecting religious
differences and economic disparity between the
Buddhist Bhutia- Lepchas and the poorer Hindu
Nepali laborers in southern Sikkim. In any event, New
Delhi is unlikely to tolerate prolonged political
instability and, if necessary, will use force to prevent
it.
India has maintained a traditionally relaxed policy
toward Sri Lanka (Ceylon). The main point of
contention in the past has been the Ceylonese
Government's treatment of its Tamil minority
descendents of south Indian laborers and merchants
who migrated to Ceylon over a period of several
centuries. Both governments are aware that Sri
Lanka's restive 'Tamils have many sympathizers in
south India. The accords reached in 1965, providing
for repatriating to India the "displaced" 'Tamils and
more equitable treatment of those who chose not to
return, have not been implemented to the satisfaction
of either country and the issue remains an irritant.
Indian leaders fear the development of any insurgent
movement in Sri Lanka which could create trouble in
south India or give any foreign power an excuse for
entering into the affairs of its southern neighbor.
Indeed, New Delhi aided Colombo's efforts to
suppress the 1971 insurrection by youngsters of the
country's Sinhalese majority, and favors efforts to
contain young Tamil extremists. India's enhanced
power position in South Asia, as a consequence of the
Indo Pakistani war of 1971, has heightened Ceylonese
fears that India might interfere in its domestic affairs,
possibly by fomenting Tamil unrest. The depth of
Ceylonese suspicion of Indian intentions is shown by
the concern of some Ceylonese officials over improved
relations between New Delhi and Moscow. The
Ceylonese apparently believe the Soviets somehow
abetted the 1971 insurrection, despite a lack of
concrete evidence. New Delhi has sought to allay
Colombo's fears about the Indo Soviet relationship
and to convince it that India intends no interference in
Sri Lanka's internal affairs.
d. Sino Indian relations (S)
Until the outbreak of serious hostilities along the
Sino- Indian border in October 1962, India had
doggedly followed a policy of accommodation and
conciliation toward China. Despite territorial and
border problems, Nehru relied primarily on moral
suasion and compromise to protect India's interests
vis -a -vis the Chinese. Since the Chinese military
attack in 1962, however, Sino Indian relations have
been characterized by mutual animosity, periodic
flareups along their long border, and little real
movement toward a substantive settlement of their
differences. There is, however, a growing inclination
on the part of the Indian Government to normalize
relations with Peking.
Until the 1962 attack, India was often the chief
backer of the Chinese in their efforts to gain
acceptance in the international community. Despite
formerly close tics with Chiang Kai -shek, India
extended diplomatic relations to China in 1949 on the
grounds that the Communists controlled the country
and that India vas more concerned with a strong,
stable, united China than with the government's
ideology. India pushed for the seating of the Chinese
Communists in the United Nations and was against
45
i
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070032 -3

the General Assemb,y resolution branding them as
aggressors in the Korean war, Nehru visited Peking
and Chou En -lai several times went to India.
Despite lire Indian willingness to be accommodat-
ing, border problems between the two countries
loomed almost from the beginning of their
relationship. India formally protested when the
Chinese first invaded Tibet in 1950 but settled in 1954
for a nonaggression agreement, which expressed the
lofty principles of coexistence as Nehru saw them, and
for a treaty virtually eliminating India's influence in
Tibet. Minor boundary differences only rippled the
otherwise placid waters of Sino- Indian relations until
the end of 1958, when the Indians belatedly
discovered that in 1956 -56 the Chinese had
constructed a road through the Aksai Chin area of
Ladakh without their prior knowledge. An even bigger
problem arose in January 1959 when the Chinese
asserted that the so- called McMahon line (Figure 8),
which India claimed was the border in the North East
Frontier Agency (NEFA) (now Arunachal Pradesh)
was illegal. Shortly thereafter (March -May 1959) the
Chinese suppressed the abortive Tibetan rebellion, but
not before the Dalai Lama had fled to India, where he
was given political asylum but no official recognition
for his cause.
Negotiations over the boundary dispute, including
direct talks between Nehru and Chou En -lai in April
1960, continued inconclusively until 1962, with the
Indians insisting on Chinese acceptance of the
McMahon line in NEFA. The McMahon line had
been worked out by the plenipotentiaries of the British
Indian Government (Sir Henry McMahon), Tibet,
and China in 1914 at Simla, where all three had
initialed a draft convention. Later, however, the
Chinese Government refused to ratify the agreement
on the grounds that it was unfair and was imposed on
them. The draft convention, with a map attached, was
signed only by the British and by Tibetan
representatives, who recognized the overlordship of
the Chinese. Therefo e, the Chinese contended in
1960 -62 �and for that matter still maintain �that no
central Chinese government ever recognized the
McMahon line and that Tibet had no right to enter
into any agreement with a foreign power. India's main
argument is that the McMahon line "merely
formalized the traditional and customary boundary
between India and Tibet." The United States has also
recognized the McMahon line.
Against this background, the Chinese launched a
full -scale attack on two fronts, in Ladakh and in
NEFA, on 20 October 1962 and rather quickly seized
92�
93�
91'
95�
.96 97�
K�J�y.r.,,
TIBET
TIBET
0 70
to to an
I Yiln 1pperwnM�1
I
Q
s.
26
KLOKMI
11
C.
P
a 1'e
PASIGMAT
TEJU s
28'
nu.R
r ,.,p,,r.
P G
SADIYA
T`
j BURMA
.s�
ROM IA
BHUTAN
RUPA�
27'
�DOIMARA
Road constructed try Chinese
27�
Road (Indian)
Chinese attack in October 1962
T E2PUR
12...�
McMahon line
eaeeaaaer
1960 Chinese claim line
Area of difference in the Chinese riterpretion of McMahon Line
Area of demilitarization, 20 kilometers on either side of the actual
control, as proposed by China
92'
93�
91'
95�
96� 97�
FIGURE 8. Area of Sino- Indian dispute over the McMahon line In northeastern India (C)
46
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

7 lwdi .Jrw� i h..� c�1v� ra .nrx�t...,. o.. .J...,....
much of the territory they had claimed. After giving
the Indian troops a severe thrashing, the Chinese, with
the oncoming winter threatening to disrupt their lines
of communications and logistics, withdrew voluntarily
behind the positions which They had actually
controlled on 7 November 1959, calling at the same
time on India to negotiate. A diplomatic impasse
developed, however, since the Indians insisted that the
Chinese pull back beyond the line of control as of 8
September 1962, which reflected gains India had
made by that time in regaining previously lost territory
in Ladakh (Figure 9).
In December 1962, six nonaligned states Ceylon,
Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, the United Arab
Republic, and Ghana �met in Colombo to seek ways
of resolving the border dispute between India and
China. With regard to the "Western Sector"
(Ladakh), these states appealed for the withdrawal of
Indian and Chinese troops to positions 20 kilometers
(12.5 miles) behind the line of actual control which
existed on 7 November 1959, as proposed by Chou En-
lai to Nehru in November 1962, thus leaving China in
control of much of the territory it had seized in late
1959. The administration of the demilitarized zone
was to be bilaterally controlled by both governments
through civilian checkposts. As for the "Eastern
Sector" (NEFA), the Colombo conference's vague
HAJI LANGAR
KARAKORAM �i-
I
PASS
.J
CHIP CHAP
1
s
o
0
1
SAMZUNGLING
LANAK LA
LEH
KONGKA LA
PHOBRANG
"J
TIBET
LADAKH
CHINA
1960 Chinese Claim
CHANG LA
Une
404 Chinese attack in
October 1962
Area of demne
Non, 20 kilometers on
either side of the line of
actual control, as proposed
by China
FIGURE 9. Ladakh sector of the China -India
border area (C)
proposals were later clarified to mean that the Indian
forces would be free to move right up to the
McMahon line. With regard to the "Middle Sector"
(Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh), the Colombo
conference requested that the status quo in this area be
maintained, since there had been no hostilities there.
India accepted the proposals after clarifying them
sufficiently to meet its minimum demands, despite
strong opposition in Parliament castigating the
Colombo proposals as offensive to the country's honor
and dignity. Peking's response was so conditional as to
amount to virtual rejection. Apart from the Colombo
proposals, Nehru suggested that India was prepared to
refer the frontier disputes with China to the
International Court of Justice or to impartial
arbitration.
Since the 1962 conflict, India's approach to China
has become increasingly complex. India has
maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese,
and as of mid -1973 had a charge d'affaires accredited
to Peking. New Delhi consistently supported and
voted in favor of granting Peking the Chinese seat in
the United Nations. On the other hand, India still
views Peking with deep suspicion and is convinced
that China remains essentially hostile. The Indian
Government's concern has been especially focused on
China's virulent anti- Indian propaganda, its small
scale material support to dissident tribal elements in
strategic northeastern India, and on what it cons' 'ers
to be Sino- Pakistani collusion against India. New
Delhi is also apprehensive about the Maoist bent of
some Indian Communist extremist groups and the
possibility of clandestine Chinese backing for them.
The immediate fear of another Chinese military attack
similar to that of 1962 has receded, but the
government believes that it must be fully prepared for
such an eventuality and continues to maintain strong
forces along the Sino- Indian border.
Indian leaders have apparently concluded that the
bleak relationships that have existed with the Chinese
since 1962 eventually must be normalized, especially
in view of improving relations among the superpowers.
A favorable accord with China would give India more
maneuverability in its dealings with both the Soviet
Union and the United States and would enhance its
regional and international position.
Domestic political risks� influenced by Chinese
support for Pakistan during the India- Pakistan crisis of
1971 �and the lack of Chinese encouragement have
inhibited the Indian Government from taking a clear
initiative to improve relations with China, but Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi has hinted publicly that she is
47
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070032 -3

e. Indo- Soviet relations (S)
Indo- Soviet relations, which have almost steadily
improved since the early 1950's, reached an important
milestone with the signing of a Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, and Cooperation on 9 August 1971. The
treaty was concluded on the basis of mutual interests
which came to the fore during the Indo- Pakistan crisis,
but divergent long term goals make it uncertain
whether each party can obtain the advantages it
sought by formalizing the relationship. In time,
fundamental differences, complicated by India's
48
almost paranoid security concerns and its dislike of
power blocs, could impair the cooperative relationship
which existed in mid -1973.
Mutual suspicions kept Indo- Soviet relations cool in
the early years after Indian independence, but in the
mid- 1950's they began to improve. Nehru, who had
long been sympathetic to Marxism but strongly
opposed to Stalinist methods, found it easier to deal
with Stalin's successors. They in turn, as the United
States pursued its policy of "containment," came to
recognize the advantages to be gained from a close
relationship with a nonaligned India.
Following the deterioration of India's relations with
China and the Soviets' own rift with the Chinese in
the early 1960's, Indo- Soviet relations gradually
blossomed into a special relationship in which India
became the keystone of Soviet policy in South Asia.
Large -scale economic and military aid programs have
served to lessen Indian dependence on the West and to
strengthen India's lagging public sector. Moscow may
have made the effort primarily because it considers
India a valuable foil to the Chinese, but India's sheer
size and location also weighs heavily in Soviet
calculations.
Moscow's views on important issues have for
sometime been generally accommodated if they do
not run counter to India's foreign policy interests.
India, for example, abstained in 1968 on the U.N.
Security Council resolution condemning Soviet
military intervention in Czechoslovakia, despite a
storm of protest at home and support for liberalism in
Eastern Europe. On the other hand, India has
continued to take an independent position on major
foreign policy matters when they touch on India's
special interests. Indian leaders endorsed the Soviet
United States summit held in Moscow in May 1972
but, to the displeasure of Soviet officials, the Indians
characterized it as limited in scope and inferred that
the summit was against the interests of the small
powers. The tendency of Indian officials to label both
the United States and the U.S.S.R. as "big powers" is
irritating to the Soviets, since the statement is usually
linked with a negative assertion about great power
domination of small countries. For several years India
resisted Soviet urging to establish diplomatic relations
with East Germany, fearing that such an act prior to
the accommodation between the two Germanies
might threaten the substantial amount of foreign aid
received from West Germany. New Delhi also has
resisted Soviet pressure to sign the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty which it feels might threaten its
long range security interests.
41
aL"" +_i vs 4 a