NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 33; IRAN; THE SOCIETY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070038-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORTS

CONFIDENTIAL
33 /GS /S
Iran
May 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
CONFIDENTIAL
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NATIONAL IN (ELLMNCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
fhe oosic unit of the HIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bota+d*-chopter format to that topics of greater per.
Mobility can be updated on on individual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
ro`hy, Tronsportowon and Tekcommllmicotions, Armed forces, Science, and
Intelligence ood Security, provide the primary NIS coveroge. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, ore produced selocfively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplemenfing the General Survey is the NIS Basic intelligence Fact.
book, a ready reference plrblication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense faces, and the intelligence
and security orgoni:otWns.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Progralr., production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
clossified Foctbook. The Inventory lists oil NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well vi, their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys con be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
TAN dempow q0~1 Woorwas4 ofoov ,AO wotiowol do1MN of the uni -iths" /la
wye+o.me Al ,.rlo It M4M04 M W M 00 0 *0 Ys to&. t� oW404od its tfo.Nm :ffion or re.obrion
at in mnbnM M M fees r Vr fn wV0W-%W'1#d porfow n ro%Ao. d by h.
CIAW0110 t/ 01%41 1>` to-
ward unit'.
B. Structure and characteristics of the society 2
Clcawaste between rich and poor; unifying four
of Islarn.
1. Ethnic and linguistic groups 2
Ethnic traniarts; 1'crsians. Kunls. I.nn. Bakh-
Hari. Baluchi. C- ilani. Nfivambrani: 'Turkic:
Turkonum. Qashfpti; Qajars: Arab�: 'Ar.
uenians; Assyrk-m; Jcsws; phy %ical charar-
trristics; L.u,,ua>;fs spokcu.
CO",'V FN -T1A1.
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Raga
ilr Social clAsses 4
Ilirtatchical "r-irty.. royal family, elite new
cvataterrial and industrial Woup, luban
rrticklM c{m, urban Irwer class. rural society;
landlanh, vit6or leaelrtr; small farmers; im-
part of agricultural reforms; tribal class
structure.
I Family and kinship groupings 8
11w traditional family; role of women; mar
rieve cmom divorce.
4. Social institutions and customs 9
The dacrrk, the zurkhanek, the bazaar; rural
social centers: the mosque, the hammam,
teahouses; torero f
5. Values and attitudes 11
Traditional vahres: family. Islam; individ-
ualiun; kwit"hip qualities; effects of ed-
ucation; trend toward secularism; national
symbols: the moruarchy; opposition to mod-
ernization; attitudes of minorities, tribes;
kynkism; attitudes toward U.S., U.S.S.R.,
U.K., Arabs, others; lack of militarism.
C. Population 15
Factors behind population growth.
1. Size and distribution 16
Population density; decrease in nomadic
population; rise in urban population; popu-
lation of Tehran.
2. Age -sex structure 19
High proportion of young people; differences
in urban, rural population underenumera-
tion of females.
D. Living and working conditions
Unequal distribution of wealth; average incomes
In 1972; disparities in rural, urban incomes,
admin!xtrative ranks; fringe bent :s; rise in in-
comes. prkes; average family expenditures; in-
cidence of crime, drug addiction, suicides; meas-
ures against drug addiction, smuggling.
1. health and sanitation
Progrr�s since 1950's; expansion of public
heald. facilities; Health Corps; traditional
medicine; sanitation; water supply and waste
disposal; types and prevalence of diseases;
medical, paramedical personnel; medical ed-
ucation, facilities.
Page
3. Housing 27
Typical dwellings; urban housing shortage;
Mortgage Bank of Iran; government financ-
ing; types, sizes of houses, persons per room;
shortage of amenities.
4. Work opportunities and conditions 29
a. The people and work 29
Poor rural working conditions; migration
to cities; urban, rural employment, under-
employment; opportunities for women;
opportunities in government, industry, con-
struction, commerce; need for skilled per-
sonnel; conditions in small firms.
b. Labor legislation 32
1959 Labor Law: working hours, compen-
sation, employment of women and chil-
dren, prohibition of dismissals; minimum
wa;:e legislation; 1963 Profit Sharing Act;
enforcement of legislation; health and
safety standards; civil service legislation.
c. Labor and management 34
Workers' syndicates, "unions member-
ship in ILO; participation in other organi-
zations; Communist activity; government
surveillance; syndicates, Iran Workers
Organization; labor management relations;
employers' syndicates, Chamber of Com-
merce, guilds.
5. Social security 36
a. NVelfare services 36
Tawdir; eukaf; role of imperial family,
Red Lion and Sun Society, Imperial
Organization for Social Services; Pahlavi
Foundation, other agencies availability of
services; High Council for Social Welfare.
21 b. Social insurance 1 1 36
1960 Social Insurance Law, participation
statistics; civil service schemes; Iran Joint
Stock Company program for villagers.
E. Religion 37
Representation in Mailis; Shia Islam: origin,
23 Ismailis, Shaikhis, Sufi orders, religious holidays,
clerical hierarchy, theological schools, clergy
guvernment relations, Religious Corps; minor-
ities: Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Bahaists.
2. Diet and nutrition 26
Unbalanced diet, nutritional deficiencies; per
capita caloric intake; basic diet; Fond and
\utrition Institute.
F. Education 43
Shortcemings; statistics on illiteracy, educational
levels, schools, enrollment; Literacy Corps; tradi-
tional schooling; education as means of social
advancement; cost of education; teacher short-
age; structure of education; universities; "brain
drain."
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Page
G. Artistic and intellectual expression 48
Importance of culture; government support;
emigration of artists, writer..
1. Literature and drama
Classical Persian poetry: Firdausi, Saacli
Ilafez, Rumi, Omar Khayyam; prose: Sandi,
other; modern literature: Ifedayat, Alavi,
Chubak, Ahamad, Afghani; theater, the
tazieh.
2. Music and dance
Classical music; modern, Western influenced
music; popular, folk music; Iranian rtt,sic
and Folk Dance Company.
48
Page
3. Architecture and the fine arts 51
Architrctural styles: Acharmrnid, thr taint,
Parthian, Sassaniart, Safavid; painting, the
Timurid petiml, l9th century; calligraphy;
sculpture, Saditli, Tauavoli.
4. handicrafts
Ceramics, carpets.
54
H. Public information 55
50 Communication media control; im �act of press,
dailies; news agencies, p�; riodicals, lxxtks, ii-
brarics, radio, television, nrotion pictures.
I. Selected bibliography 59
FIGURES
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Page
Page
Fig.
1
Principal ethnolinguistic groups
Fig. 22
Poor housing near Hamadan photo)
29
(table)
3
Fig. 23
Yamut woman baking bread out
Fig.
2
Representative Iranians photos)
5
doors photo)
29
Fig.
3
Principal languages and tribal peo-
Fig. 24
Primitive agricultural practices
ples map)
6
photos)
30
Fig.
4
Qashqai shepherdess (photo)
8
Fig. 25
Petroleum refinery workers (photo)
32
Fig.
5
Sayyid drawing up a marriage
Fig. 26
Child labor photos)
33
contract photo)
10
Fig. 27
Religious affiliation of the popula-
Fig
6
Illiterate woman registering to
tion table)
38
vote photo)
10
Fig. 28
Representative mosques photos)
39
Fig.
7
Wrestlers performing gymnastics
Fig. 29
A mullah lecturing in Islamic law
(photo)
10
(photo)
40
Fig.
8
Men passing leisure time in tea-
Fig. 30
Armenian Orthodox church, Tabriz
house (photo)
11
(photo)
42
Fig.
9
Rural social centers photo)
12
Fig. 31
Zoroastrian temple photos)
42
Fig.
10
Iranian Kurds on the :clove photo)
14
Fig. 32
School plants photos)
44
Fig.
11.
Population density (snap)
17
Fig. 33
Litorate population, age 10 and
Fig.
12
Population, area, and population
over chart)
45
density table)
18
Fig. 34
Enrollment, by type of school table)
45
Fig.
13
Growth of cities of 100,000 or more
Fig. 35
A roadside musician playing the
table)
19
kamancheh, a native instrument
Fig.
14
Estimated population by age group
photo)
51
and sex table)
20
Fig. 36
Rudaki Hall in Tehran. photo)
52
Fig.
15
Age -sex structure, Iran and the
Fig. 37
Papi tribal dancers in native cos
U.S. chart)
20
tumes photo)
52
Fig.
16
Age -sex structure by urban -rural
Fig. 38
An Iranian dancing girl photo)
52
residence chart)
21
Fig. 39
Typical columns from Persepolis
Fig.
17
Consumer price index chart)
22
photo)
53
Fig.
18
Posters on personal hygiene photo)
24
Fig. 40
Dome chamber of an Esfahan
Fig.
19
]ube, which serves as a source of
mosque photo)
53
water photo)
25
Fig. 41
Senate building in Tehran photo)
54
Fig.
20
Per capita consumption of calories
Fig. 42
Ceramic bottle, earlv 17th century
(chart)
27
(photo)
54
Fig.
21
Representative housing photos)
28
Fig. 43
Kerman carpet weavers photo)
55
iii
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t
A ll
,I
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The Society
A. Introduction (0
1
1
l
14
In 197 1 Iran. mice it great empire. entered its 26111
century of existence as a nation of disparil% betm-4-n
tlrc 111MIN poor and the few rich, the, rttztnx illiterlte
and the few crudite, boween traditional ,old modern.
nind and urban, religious and seculam democratic,utd
antoc The peasants, arnong hom %�list holdings
Of I1111d had drvwly Keen (list rihtlted. needed the
tcchnolcrl;Y to till the land succ�essfull. illiterates, %%lm
hall come into the cities from the rural ,Yeas in
increasing numbers, needed training to take their
'The countrc waN kno\cn as Persia until 19.15 \chen "1nm" seas
adopted as the official name.
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I4. str u'lure :end rll: Ir: Irri.li�. ul 11�
01114 W 4�1 1 11 1 I

FIGURE i. Proncipal ethnol;n9vistic groups (U /OU)
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1�I II, 111 t;f1IIt11 .1 IIII IIII� I IIIk 111 \11.111 .11111 fill l 111
IIw \/I 111.1\11 /11.111 11x11111 111 1111 1 11 if r11u,1
11111 "1ff.1 fit I Iltkit tll1 1,1) Lf 1 11 Ill If.lII .I fl' Ilia
'I' llfkgbII .111 .41141 (1a 1 Ix I- 'fill, I� 11 111111'
1 11.4 ,1 101.1 11.1 .11141 f.0fmc1 to �111, Ill II
,'141%11111 .41111 IlH' 4'.1 14.4. ,�1 1. 11.11111.1'. 1 II
,'!11%11111 4, Il 1 11 ill IIll It/I\It f 1 ,11� .!till
\Icll.l 111 1.111 Iht 1 11.1 1141.11 art, II litcllt I if] ill. I ill\
lit ar l'1 till 111 I@ Ifmi 1 11 x11 111x\
0-111141114 1 111,- IntI1!, �1 ,r It11.i11:111.11 I 1.01#111� 1 i .Ih\
trlll.11 ;;11111{1 III Ir.,u T\%,, w.illct 11�11,.ulix trilx, ,irc
till� 511.111 "1\.Ir1 .,11,1 tilt \I 1114l �t \\11,1111 in11.111it
I.i \/.Irl,.11j.lf! In !Ix ItiII ccntnn Illy O.Ijar
11\11, 1\ \\a II II lit,lt�41 I,\ I'11rl,ix Qajar Iriht, trll11l
M../andar.ul hill 1111�\ .irl. n11m i11si-IIiIiI.% I
f I11 I.I\
II1, third I /x1,11 -tll11lx St-witit, \r.Ih
11t1�rxll Iln� .1r1�.1 1111 rIII th,� r.11lill t,\IlaII III II \lane
111 tlx �'\11111 I tit 111\ II \1 I' tll,ltl�11 II, it l\t� Iill
.I I ill! i l IIII' 11,,I 1 111.111� 11. III�\ l It l It lilt till�
Ill,lifmt\ nl t [if !1111.11 ;t,1111 K {Ili I'll I\i11xt,,itill
.11,!111\ I'll IiI I .it ,111d kli Ir,1 pro \1111'1� 111 IItcc iI it,\
1 1 .1 /11 ,11111 k .11111 .II m; tIiI l�II. 111 t lit-
I 'I�I.III (.till 1� 111 Iit tit trill.il \I,Ib .Irc 11,1fllalllt�.
Ioflxr ,Irx xlll ii1.Ir\ lam if'r
\IIIIaI �It 1.111 l 111.111 %:if11111 ,11 fI 1 ,Irl'
1'.1 t o II I I I I I, 11 I i. I 1 It III I I I II t\ lilt, 11n 11111111 r I,i iI
!lit \rinxiIIIII nau IiI jx\\ ('I III11ri
11 lli.IiI 1,1 lit, I)IIIIIII,I IIIiI t lit \I� Illllit oft tll'\ rt,
i I\ III IIx 1-111x Ilar11t,11Llrl\ fxllr.IiI..IIIIII,IIt:I a
t \IIII �III.I 1 .11111 naII I11.1VI., ,In 111111 ill in rlIr.II
1fI III /.I 1111 111i1111riI\ 1;11 I1,: \t�
111, 11111, 11111 11 I1 i ir clh im II II�tI i I\. I /I'.11.i 111; IIi( ir I)\ \11
111'z 11. I 4' .11 IIN ,�11i I1 111 t, 11.1 ra II 11 It 1 11 i 1 I I i l i t il' 11r
114 1.1\,- 1114 \IIItx111.tI1 111 11,III1l'lll,ir, i,�xl 1111 t,ll��
�t ,IIII \\itI IIII I flat i, oil
I'll \.II.II t I.lr. III xn 1111agm, Ir.l11i.iii Ir\
a14 off Itlit! Ill ,-1111111' I iiI .III It( iti ;ll cciII llric lit
IutxrlrxxlII11c 1.1\1� Lir- l�I\ tit( off iIixll lit� tnn
19
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pronocnnc�ed (I iffereucc�s (Figure 2). FtImic Iranians are
characterized by moderate to tall stature, strung
features. dark hair and eyes; and olive skin coloration.
Except occasionally anxing the Kurds and Lars, there
is little trace of the blondness and other Nordic�
characteristics of the original r \ryan invaders. The
Turkic peoples are somewhat taller and heavier than
the ethnic Iranians� their coloring often darker, and
their features more coarse. \longoloid characteristics
are occasiornally found among the 'I'rnrkonnan and
other 'Turkic tribal groups, notably the I lazaras on the
Afghan border. The latter 'Aave 1) ro: fa, es.
prominent cheekbones, the epic�antbic eyefold, and
yellowish to brown skin coloring. Main of the Arabs
resemble their counterparts in neighboring tract, but
some have physical characteristics so modified by
intermarriage that they cannot be distinguished from
ethnic Iranians. Ry and large, in rural areas the
numbers of the yariodns ethnic and tribal groups can
best be differentiated by their traditional style of dress.
Western clothing, however, is standard in the urban
centers and is also appearing more frequently in the
countryside.
In general, language is closely associated With
ethnic origin. Nlost ethnic Iranians speak standard
Persian, or Farsi. the official language of Iran and the
second{ language of a majority of' non Persians.
Promoted by the government to foster the unification
of the country's diverse ethnic groups, it is the
language of the government, the military, and the
schools. Indeed. it person wishing to participat "Idly
in Iranian national life must be literate in Persian. An
Indo European language. Persian is written in it
variation of the Arabic alphabet and contains a large
Arabic yocabntlary, as \yell as some 'Turkish words.
especially military terms. Spoken Persian has several
dialects, ranging from the speech of 'Tehran and other
urban centers to the rustic dialects of the peas,unts.
Shir zi is especially admired for its purity. Persian is
mere like English in pronunciation and grammar than
,any other language of the X East, and hence is
usually easier for English speaking people to learn to
speak. Literary Persian. on the other hand, is difficult
to learn to read and write.
Otber Indo European languages spoken b\ ethnic
Iranians include Kurdish, Gilaki, Mazandarani, Luri.
,and B,ddnchf, each of which has several dialects. Luri.
Gilaki, and Nlarand,trani are sometimes described as
dialects of Persian, although the latter two are
virtually unintelligible to speakers of Farsi. Except for
Kurdish, these non Persian languages are rarely
written because of the great prestige of literary Persian.
The Turki dialects of Iran, belonging to the Altaic
family of languages, differ from standard 'Turkish but
are mutually intelligible to it considentblc degree.
\zarbaijani, or Azeri, the most important (if' the
Turl dialcc�ts, is brtsicalfy similar to the yerutc�ular of
Soviet An�rbaydzhan, except that the latter is written
in the (:yrillic alphabet and contains it large infusion
of Russian \yords. \yhile the� former is \yritteu in Arabic
script and incorporates man\ .cords borro\ked from
I'trrsian. The Qashctai dialect is closely related to
lzarbaijaui. In the northeast, however. the Ttirkonian
speak it different 'Turki vernacular that is nearly
idenlival with that spoken by their counterparts across
the border in the Soviet Union. Originally complete) -1-
different fro n the Indo European Iangdn,tges in
structure and vocabulary. the 'Turki dialects in Iran
have borro\yed extensively from Persian and are
written in the Arabic alphabet.
.)rabic dialects spoken in Iran are modern variants
of the older Arabic that formed the base of the
classical literary language and all dialects from
.Moroc�c�o to ludia. The dialect spoken in Khuzestan
I'royim.: is similar to that of' Irml. but the vernaculars
of the I'ersiau Gulf coast have not been studied. Arabic�
is it member of the Semitic language fannil\ and has no
linguistic relationship to any of the Indo- F.untpean
languages. Most Iranian Muslims, ho\yeyer, have
sums familiarity with it as the language of the Koran.
I urther, as noted above. Persian contains it large
yoc�abulary of Arabic cords.
Armenian is spoken b the minority of the same
name. Like Persian. it is an Indo European language:
however, it is unintelligible to Persian speakers.
Members of the country's small Assyrian minority
.peak Syriac. it Modern variant of Aramaic, the
ancient Semitic language Iran's Jews speak Ilebrew
cuxl Persian, the small (;yhsy population speak
Rowimy, originally it language of northern India.
Eddnc�ated Iranians arc often literate in one or mere
Western languages. primarily French. English. and
German. For many years French ryas the principal
European language, but English has been gradually
replacing it in diplomacy and commerce, and is most
often selected by secondary school students to meet
their requirement for foreign language stud. Russian
is widely understood as it second language in Gilan
and Mazandanm provinces (Figure i).
Social classes
Iranian society is in transition. Social change began
early in the century with the introduction of Western
Ideas and t it was accelerated by Reza
Shahs modernization program: and is being further
speeded up by the present Shahs policies, espcc�ialk
the agrarian reform progrann begun in 1961.
Nevertheless, Iranian society remit iits basically
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r
PW .Owl
w
Farmer with tasseled turban, the
distinctive headgear of the
Kurds (U /OU)
Bakhtiari woman (U /OU)
X1
fe
L row T 1
t 1 1
JI,
iiq 1,. r
gj ti
Persian working man (U /OU) A Mazandarani family (C)
Baluchi herdsman wearing tur-
ban and rob like those of his
counterparts on the Indian sub-
continent; camels are shown in
the background (U /OU)
FIGURE 2. REPRESENTATIVE
IRANIANS
5
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Qashqai women (l /0U)
;�.`w Cal
Turkoman wearing typical
headgear(C)

Turkic Peoples
(AiarbNlani)
Kurds
w
L Turki,: Peoples
I (Turl,uman) 1
Kurds
I
�;t! lit
r b
PkEOMNaT' "lit, ri
ANG'.iaGES arvD l
te EC'S W AREZ Arabs L
TYIMK Peoples
i (Oashaai)
N.,
L..J ti.1:.1' .1 tom .r
I
rr
Baluchis
IR j
K Y-
/Y 1.1 1 1 111 11 \r
FIGURE 3. Principal languages and tribal
peoples (U /OU)
Iiil�r.lrt�I it�.11 Do -pill im-r1�.i%i z ooppilrtimilio- 111r
%I I('i.11 mllllilitl w%oillinl; bill 1 111�%1 :111�1II
.11111 .111 vy.111(him 1 prtll:ram Ill1� 1;.111
Ii�t% %1 (III la mo Itl%ll'r 4'1A t 1111111rINlit:I1 %!�r SofI'r III
1114� I), t1)ill.1t14 Ill. .VIII fill- 41111� Lr111111 .l ll lll %1111 (111�
%;rimit11; middle- 1'1.1 /1 N'.If cr4�.111�r (ll.m 1� %1�r I14
\t 1h1' .114�\ 411 Iii movi.11 p %r.11111d .1 r1' fill- '%It.I I1. Ili%
lami1\, mid lit I 1111rt \I alm4N1 flit x.11111' II� %1�I .lit Ili�
I�lifl� L11111111 LIfLt'I% I %%1111 .117� 1111111 ill .1
l�111r 11 )II�\ \1'11 111 rI'Lll it 4 44.41411. \16i -mit11 fill�\ 111.1\
imitilit�r ,nl\ .IhOnf 219i. flit -t� 1 imli'� .Irl- Olivia
rulvi Ili .I% flit- Ilwoo ml L.lnulily OI Irmo
iin-bill� landiOnI mid Itlrni�r lamll-m1% lit �fill
11a1i111.1in Ilwir mwi.Il 1)41 %Ifitm lirlt 14111 .11%%.1%. Own
1N4 \44 \l 4'.111II% If111.11 II'.1 /11'1. 11i11N1rl.1111
high-r.111kimZ milil.ir\ i1111 .11 l�i%iI 'tl \1'rllllll'lll
llllil'ial': II�adille wit l"l.lf alld 11r"It wil.11 mull. .111d .1
h' rl�IIr1 %1�% lit flit \Itrlll Mvitili�r� hip
Ili f_ I�lilt� i% II.�a 41 On kin�1111). %\t .Illh. pollilit'.11
illlllll�111'1�. .1 kaill�I 4�Ilow.l'iOn. .41141 lli%;II 411
cc
Ili 1111 art Mam meiiIIwts 1)(14li t tO 41r :Ii�
lil�w1�ulli-d Imm Ili� It irmvr r111inu O:lj:Ir (1\tiiot..
IIIvh r.,itki11'..1rim Ottwur Iwt -.l lilt I),mt
ri %I. Ot lil�i.1 sh.1li ill Ili' 1922', Priomitivia Ianlilil
%%Ili, mit'1' prmitli -d kt�% nlilit:lr\ :411� ivm
r4 pr1'N'1111 ill Ili� .1rni'11 tllrt'1� ill :1 lv�wr cll
Ilm%1 %4 r. .oil 111.111\ Olti(v�n rkiiit; to i1111u1.11tial
111Lih1111. (1.1%4' .1 p1(�hi:ul tlriijii iirk mid Kur(1 lit)
11u.Ihl\ li1.Im1 111 flil�ir \%t.11lIt. t�(lut�.1timi, famil\
t'It11111'1'tiimN. nr I10lilll�:Il :iry 11111\ :I--NIlllll:lt(�(1
mlip Ili� 1�li1t� .oil :I n' iu(Ii Irimi Otl1(�r
11i�n)li�r
1..11141 11.1- .11%\.1%. 1 Ihl� tr.11hlimlal 11:1.1� (if
%%t-.11th Ninty� flit- limi lot Olt 11 ntnn. h4'%\4 c( r. 11r\\
�Ourtll" O1 %%4�.(1111 ill lin:ll v�.
.11111 to 1- 1.1It %p4 111.1tiOn 11.1\1� l�rl�:Ited it II/� \1\
t'1t1111111�rt'1.11 .x111 ill(bi i;rmip -:1 114�%%
11111N�r I id(Ilt� 4 i4w.114�(I ill flit IIf11 m t�(�nt(�r�. 1 lik
1oromp. \%hiull oi'hill�� 111 im in(li\ idisa ,I middle Or
limi middle- t1is% Ori6ii. lia, iiwrl�11a�d 'nhNtallti:lll\
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its it result of the extensive er.cuontic cleyelopnu nl that
zIec�ontp ;cued the expaut,;uu of tit( oil industry after
World \Var II. The group inc�lucles Weslc�rtized
importers, industrialists bankers, nmerc�hatt, high
government officials, join professional nee. rimy of
wyhom are aiming the \wealthiest people in Iran. But
\wculth alone clues not opsn the door to political
power. Few have case access to the Shah, and nest are
separated from the elite b\ social and edfc�alioual
differences. No stignia, ho\weyer, attaches to the recent
acquisition of \wealth, and favorable marriages or the
right c�oufec�lions enable some nl' the newly rich to
enter elite groups \witl access to the throne. Non
Muslims, whose representation among the ne\%I\ rich
is disproportionately high, seldom bec�ote ntentbers of
the elite. In fact, men belonging to religious ninoritics
are restricted in political activities, discriminated
against in promotion to command position., in the
armed forces, and prevented fron acquiring
polic�ynrtking positions in the goycnunent. They nuts
be tcc�cpted, however, by educated Westernized
\Irtslints, ustually in business or tit(- professions, un the
basis of their cduc�ation, \\calth, profession, or business
connections.
The urban middle class, based on the bazaar
('coil() MY of the cities and market towns, once
consisted solely of petty merchants. craftsmen, lower
level \luslim clergy. and teachers. Since the early
1950's. however, as a result of economic development
and increased educational opportunities, the middle
class has expi-ided substantially. Urban middle
income groups nm\ ilicletele industrial nuuu,gers,
engineers, technicians, anti skilled workers, as \well as
government employees and inlellcc�tnals. In general.
the power of the middle class is growing: influential
members of the middle group in I arliameut and in
fairy' high positions in the government ministries play
an important role in the formation of public opinion.
Demands for rcvOlulionary change in the existing
social order have been voic�cd mainly by middle class
intellectuals.
At the bottom of the urban class structure are the
street vendors, service wworkcrs, day laborers, and an
increasing number of ifidefstrial \workers. A clear
(list ifiction in social status is mule between it casual
clity laborer and, for example. it comparatively
affluent semiskilled \%orkc�r in the Abadan oil refinery.
The urban lo\wcr class, moreover, is constantly growing
as large numbers of neas:mts migrate to the c�itics in
search of industrial employment. The incidence c;f
unemployment, however, is high, and their economic
plight is often desperate. Because of their poverty,
illiteracy. lack of political sophistication, and sense of
alienation, urban workers are highly vulnerable to
denrtgoguery. Tbey are. bo,%v\er. receiving ;m
increasingly larger share of the ,ovemmcnt's
attention.
Imrel society has always Item less stratified than
urban. \eyertheless, it w\icle gap has existed bet\eeu
the \%caltby landlord!; and the lowyer class ten ;mt
farmers and day laborers at the bottom of the village
social scale. Traditionally the landm%ncrs freelueully
o\\ned whole or parts of villages; mae% \\ere absentee
landlords residing ill the cities. Thee exercised quasi
feudal authority dyer their tenaoets through at,ents \ybo
were normally rested \with the ,elTice of village
headoan b\ the provincial gmentnfeut. �I'oclay. in
addition to the beadutan, the mullah and the
schoolteacher or member of the Iiterac\ corps
c�onslituty a village Icader,bill of sorts. Some
c )III Ill u Ili Iics have a hwall} elected i I lat,
c court called
it house of justice. and it fe\y have yillat;c councils.
Both groups are composed of five members. There is
also a small middle group of landowners \%ith
nu limn- sized holdings ho lease their land to tenant
farmers in returi for cash refits. Sonic have become
absentee la nd(mners, migrating to the cities and
entering government service, business. ur the
professi� a.
Since the enactment of land r-lorm ill 1962. the
rural class strnc�lure has been significantly altered in
those areas %whc the legislation has been fully
intplenu�nled. As of 1972. acenrding to go\crmnent
sources. I-S) million peasatnt farmer, had acquired.
ur \%cre in the process of acquiring small plots of laud.
but it remains to be seen Mwther t6c program \\ill be
seccessful in creating a ne\\ rural middle class based
on private land (mnership. (h\ners Of ntcclitim -sized
landholdings wyith no resources other than farm
income base suffered beawy losses as a result of lend
reform.
Meanwhile. because of concern over the unec�ononl-
ic� fragmentation rtf the land in sOme areas. the
government has sponsomd hw types of large scale
fanning \yitlt consolidated mimagenu�nt. By early
1972. 0 sc c�alIC( farm corporations had been
established encompassing 5.100 sbamholders and
8,900 acres. Srpposedlw initiated by it majorit of the
snullbolders in it village or group of villages, the
corporation allots shares to the participants based on
the value of their land and implements. \nOther form
Of corporate fanning is the agribusiness, launched in
1968. In this type of enterprise the villagers in at
specified area are compelled to sell their land to the
government which then leases it to dOmeslic
companies or to foreign concerns British or American)
N
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for large -wall� nit-cll ;utized 1ar111ing. Srlbst'll11cnll\. llll-
illagers are eniplu\cd as (1a\ laborer�. It is It 1.111\ 141
assess the ecnnonlic cl�fccti\rncls of Iht'se I\\u Imms 411
corporate farming and their illwacl on the rural cl:Iss
slructurv. but t1u� atgribusincss MITI( uI1t11:ar to ullllif\
to some� e\lcnl the advantages to lilt- peasant ul 111111
reform. I�:1r1\ in 1972.. \r snmallhold4.rs in norlhcnl
Klitizestan c \pressed considerable disconit-nl o\cr tilt
confiscation of their land fur agribusiness opt'rations.
which \%as fullo\\rel It\ a short:lgv of cillplo\ 111cilt
opportunities.
'I�hc 11MMIdic� anal scnlilmilladic clehe111s of the
tribal minorities h.a\c Iargcl\ retained lilt- tradition.Il
tribal class stn clurc. hicil in than\ respects mirr,,rs
that of rural \Magi. socieI\ (Fit;nrc I'. On t l� out-
limed arc the \\caltlt\ tribal chick. or khans. and on
the other the mass of inlpo\rrisht'tl Iriht'speoplc.
long -range tran. hImmants. the moist I;rospcnuls of lilt
nommis, c�an perhaps be cmisidcrell a middle I!runll.
'I�hc position of the tribal chief. lmmr vr. is hcredil:lr\,
an(I the social status of tilt� Iri:le is ranked
acc�u!ding to his kinship to the (ri )it I Ivader. Most
c�hicfs reside in urban centers. although solve rclIIrn I
their people to lead the aluaual nliglatiIlll to tilt'
so lit nwr ,gruring gr41nnds. \nlonl: 1111` .cult-( la Ill Iing
groups. the t\ I)ical kh:ln 11:11 1 WCI 1 1lit' a lit rgr
landoancr. c�Illlcctitl: Irulit tenants in the %milc
manner as other laudlor(k. Ill fact, the major khans
are \\cll n`presentccl \\ithin the clilt- in the capital.
Many tribcspcuplc ha\c jlcen assimilated :uad .arc
\irhuall\ uulislinguishable from their counterparts in
tilt- vilLiges and to ns. althon� i tilt- m a\ rul;am
certain tribal customs and attitadcs.
:3. Family and kinship groupings
In Iranian soc�ict\. the fatnil\ is the laasic� social Inlil.
the reciprocal obligations and ilrkilcgcs that (It�fint'
relations bct\\ccn kinswen superseding ill olht'rs
FIGURE 4. Qashqai shepherdess prods her goats and
fat tailed sheep. The Qashqai are one of several
seminomadic tribes. (U /OU)
8
I'II Iit I111 ie.II. .II1d Ill III r %I11 'I.II .11'11\ 1I 11's .1 If
I:Irgl'I, 1.II1li1\ .111 1'fs .I IIf1 1.111111, 11111111/ 11 /4 I 111s1\
I rII11111II. II. .11111111 Ir1111'�I)I't Il.ltl' \1't-
Its el IIIIic. It lit! In%lso'. Ilf (1111.11 .1111li'lIioil 111Ilfr41 \4.r the
I tat lit II I I1;d I nail,. �IIII II' 1'\ 1't' I It I 1 111 i 1'0'I1fil-d
I I;Ilriarcll:d. pal rllllll'.11 I�IIIIIIg.1nitllls. .111114o1
11111\ g\ 114111 1111111 Ilit� I.1111d\ .11111 s ,1 -if 'I\ .It I.I II:I�.
1,\4111lt�II IN'1�III1\ .1 II I if m I it II II must I III'
st Il II I 1111` .11111 l�11 lit �sl \1.11,'1. 111 (111� I. 11 1 I if n.Il I.IimIl
I I \I r. .1 r1� III�i .1I t IIII 11\ Ilr1 1,1 ill /alit 111.
i l ill list riall /.It 11111. .111(1 (111� 14.1, hills 111 Ills' \\III II'
lit% 4111 It i1111. I aitit 1 .1(t� gl \1118 \a\ t41
I sill )I rs1Isla I 1org.l Ili /,II lit IwasaI b1 1,s .1 t1�
tnis:r.IIiill! 111 Ibe citIt's. Ir. 'lit! I will ill I tflr v�I�Iitil, 411
the lailli1\ circle. �11.111. If .4-11 11. it IIIiIlU- IltIrIll4.d
I:Ith t- rs end W,.%tI rt1�t-dfl .Itell 11tH..Ire IIi Ihr
sIlh II.I ill\ ill lamik IIII'. .11111 \\I .I If helm.'
.11'1'1 It I I'I .III IIH l l III rI I� Ill Iviz.11 4'1111.1 lit \It
1111`11. I II 1t' l hell's.. IIII� I.I I ld\ tt�t11,1111` Ilic 1111 IS1 11.11 Ill�
.1 1111 I111111attll mist 411 1 11 1'11'1\ t' t IIII\ ,1114111 Ills'
1, 1%% class mud (bc Iril )cspr41p14.
l h4. I\ pleat r\lrlldrll 1.11:111\ I Ill is) .l� 111 the
hnsh.Ind. Iris \\111 tIr \\i\t Ins m artird sons .call Iheir
I:Itnilic" .Ind It's Inanla'rird rhdfIwII \1IIr11 .1
datidilcr harries she Is .IILorht d 'tilt, the 1,111111\ 111
her hllsbaud I 'hr latnil\ Ilit Ina Iolnprise
do /ell or mwo mi gt'lletall\ rf -idt�s III imc hops-
for It-W or In .a mmil1I`r of mliacr,l d\(rlh it:
tttictiIl Ili lIt! .1s all reolll Init� 111111. 1.a1lt1I\ ill, ml wt .ato
)4.(.l I I to sllpp e It 411114 it all 1�n Ica 4111
\I111Itit! s41t11r IIrIr.011 Lrlllllts Ille a \11 Iat1U1
Iifit swill l( 1 is 1 w nit relflac4.d \,Ith dw nnclrar null
1111118 peasant Iltigtaills and I1lII% �rV1\ I!radlialr s, lilt
r\.Inlplr. Irrlpa�11tl\ Ii%I. 111 wliar.al4. dotnicill .Ind
lili ;ll 41blig.,tion. \(hill still strong. h41 .1811. 111
-.Ikl�rling
In Ih4. Iradilioll.al lmtri.tt,-kil .ind palrilc11ral lamik
tilt` t'ld +'s1 nl.dt- is the ti11dislnl -d rnlrr II tilt� rn11ro-
groltp. acting at time% io .111 .arbilrar\ or t\ immic.1
mamirr. Ill� ass1l m it-p41tlsilrl111\ Im tilt' \\4.11.Ire Ill
.111 1.111111\ IIII tltlts I41 po,lIlllgl -41
drprndent rcIatimi%hips \It Ill tigll (�i% it 1.1\\ .1.111 I11.11
I r 11,undation of tilt- I.111li1 is b.isrd 1111111 till�
lia rim miiits ccic\i�-Irnrt� 411 ill ill ai111 .111d \\ilr. religiIlll%
1a\\ spi Ibat Ilit� Ile rIlle Is 41tlr 111 s1Iiiiiii im to
her husband (:hildren art- (-Im0 ill\ adtronished to
obc\ :Ind rt-spt-c't Ih4.ir chlrrs i�sprciall\ Iheir 1-11h4.rs
ti4111s art` pl'rlllit greater Ir4.1�dtrill Ihall tlll�ir %1.11
lilt ,I rl� a \Iwcicd to lll� ill will \11 mm lilt tipper l
.111d (h4. \es(rnli /cd 4.1enu�11Is of IIII� uliddic class.
hime\cr. palriarchal .oll{tori(\ is ou fill- aanc. .Is
111 ;111\ \4111118 1111'11 relllsl� Ill sl�t'k pamlll.d II1
Illr their acti\itirs
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I)(1+c�(1ItI i% paIriIi twit l. based fill the blood
relati0n+hi1) of nail- I�Idel,d. Ilit� irnlmdifnc�f� fit
agnatic kin is rell(1cled in tie dulcrc�ncc ,It,mif Ibl,
pat --mal grandfather ;Intl nncl(1s :Intl in the wolidarit%
cif I)14itIicr%. Irch(1ril.Uc�e enstffn,-. ;olio%% Ir.ulitifru:II
I%l:unic directi%r% %%hich fit%,r %on+ and paternal
relati%es. Shi:c \Ili +lines. ho\%c�%er. recognize pri fill pgen-
itfire tc it greater t-0-W Ihall Sunnis.
succession to if position of leader --hip and pimer is
inwked. In tribal suci(1h. tic� indi%idiml f:tmilt forums
the basic ullil of it larger umil that ent�finlpasse%
immermis lineage% and clans. Blood fei ills itrc�
report(1cll\ .till common Iet\%(1en diffcrcnt families fif
tilt� same tribe.
Parents g(1n(1rall\ arrange tie marriage (if both sons
Mid daughters. F.udogaim is strictl% obs(1r%'l,d itillmfs
tbc� totter class and the trulitimi oriented eletnenh of
Ihl, middle class alto fit %vr cousin rnarriat;e%.
particularl\ beatl,en it son and the ding flcr of Ili%
father% brother. In such marriut;e%. the Irid(1 price,
Maid b\ the gnom to the famil\ of the bride. is not as
large�: Limil\ tie+ are Arf�nglhened and. ammit; tie
poor, diwpersal of scant\ farnil\ resourcl-w is a\oided. In
\lest(1rnized middle and upl;er class circles ill Tebran.
ho \%l� \vr. marriage ciistmw. are chatittillg ;1% \wmg
11)(11 .111(1 %comvii .Ire allo%%ed to ,-xp1)�w% their
ltmfemnce in the choice of future ltfate (:ofriif
marriages ar� lest fre(pient, although marriage fi11tsid(1
mic s %;rout% is discuuragcd. Sometimes. tie bride's
famil\ floes not reclflir(1 pa\ ment (if the bride price fir
dlo%%s the groom to pa\ it on the installment plan.
\rnong ail classes it marriage coutrac�t is signed before-
a notim or religious official Figure 3). This conlract.
negotiated b\ tie parents (if the I)roslec�ti%v bride and
groom wvvral weeks or months before the %\eddhig
f(1� tit ities. stipulates the anunult of the bride price :uul
the mahr. it sum of mono\ to be paid to the \%ife if her
bnsband. thrmigh death or divorce. no longer support%
ber.
Under Koranic lim it hnsbaml can divorce bis \\ife
al will. In 196 bom the go\enimcnt enacted the
FamiI\ I'r()tec�tion I.a\% \%Ificb Ai lit ilates that divorce
proceedings 11111\ not b(1 initiated %%ilhout the consent
of till. %%'if(. and that the� husband rata\ not take if
second wife \%ithoul tie permission of the court. In
addition. the wife may institute divorce action and
may use the taking of if second wife as ground% for
divorce. Mthough formerl\ the� father was automali-
calk gi\ l,1) c�ustod\ of the c�hihlrl,n, lie court now
specifics the� arrangements to be made for their care
and support. Since (if( cnaetm(1nt of the Fa tit il\'
I'rotec�tion Lim. the ratio cif divorces to marriages has
dec�lim�d c�onsiderabl\. F.c�onomic� considerations lum
al%ta\% limited life nimilc�r and Irl-fluenc\ of plural
nlarri;lge 'oda\. l-\cn \%eallIf Iruli:ul%. If Ali milit!
I)1: c�licv. g,-ner:dlt r,-%Iril-t tlit-m eI %,-w (o fill,-
%if(. al it time.
\\�onu�II are also mal,;ng limiled primrf�++ to%%ard
I,-gal l-climlit\ %%iii mvii in fither sphere% It 1963
fl(1crce. Im ,-\ample. graull-d mplill-n %ulfrag,- I Figrlre
tit. In practicc. bfmv%cr. the right too \fit,- low.
e\erOwd primaril\ ht middle and upper class \%mm -m
in tic� largl- cities. \Ilifiugh 14 11 -1igilpit for
vfilllo\ iltc�lit in gti\vmm�nt :Intl other lieldw. edrlc:llcd
%%0111(111 find it diflicull In realize Ilwir prfplc%sion.11
anlbitiml%.. \along till, loner claw.. particularl\ in Ili,-
cfiuntn +id,-. %%onu n %(1111 :Till conlplelelt +tlbordinatf� tip
111(111 :Ind are largl,l\ denied tic pri%ilcgf off %oting
4. Social institutions anti customs
an( ifis 11114oniial %IICl:fI imif11) ifiuI Ilstllnhfitl%wer\e
for the vwhang,- of ne\%w. rnnuir. :.till gowwip fir Ifir
rtc�realion. I.argl�I\ voillilled If, 1111:Ill %fpl'll1 It.%\
become center+ for diw+ident ach�in becauwl- the
i!mvr11mvn1 maiiitain% clipse wimeill.owe rater vioup
acti%itie% that conitl concl-kabl\ (le\l,lop into politic:ll
oppo%itiml.
TllV (I(; ti reh cliche. is i ocial organisation
cmimion to tle urban middle and iippf�r claw.,-..
particularl\ Ih(1 hodlecht.fls. Getivralk cmi\ fin
a \%veld. or monlhl\ basiw. duu'relts normall\ haw 12
t0 Iii mi-mbers %%ho di +cu%% busin(1ww. 1o116cw. and till-
arts mer game, of card%m chess. Sinc,- an Iranian \%ho
lead-, a a(111- rouudl-(I social life belong+ If, %e\cral
doturehs. matters di +ell %scd in fill,- don reh can Ill-
transmitted to if larger gnmp r:Il)ic It :Ind pritatl-l\.
Ilea% amt political \i,-\\s an� n%uaiF\ :un�d freel%. and
\t bile them is tnucll gossiping and criticism of (bow,- ill
imthorlt\, there I'. aI+I scrim.%. com%trilOke dl%cii -loll.
Miurehs can s(r\,- a% political inter�%% groups, but
most freyuend\ their purpose is apolitical.
\noth(1r \%ell- kno\%n h 1)l, of social group is till
traditional alrkhanch dwilse of %trengthf. Immd it,
prac�ticallc e\r�r\ cit\ and ill man\ %Haller tfi%%ns. In
1970. Tehran had 13 sites bosses. pb%%ical chits�
stifle%\
mainly atlracliml till- lo%%cr classes. Iltl,
zurkhuneh is helieced to Ila%'(1 originated at till, tint(- fif
the Arab occupation in div s(1%enli femur\. 'fill,
exercises, perfornu�d to the acc�ompanimetft off if drimi
and chanted 1)fi(1tr\, am ritualized n- prewntatiom (if
martial mc\l,tnf�Hts. Till, main objects ll%e(I are
stylized war clubs fit great %%l-ight. shields of metal fir
heav\ wood. and metal boa% \\'ith strides made of
chain. lit some respect till, ritual is n1\%tic or
Willirc�ligious in nature. Wrestling is also polmlar
9
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dl
FIGURE 5. Soyyid (descendant of the Prophet)
drawing up a marriage contract during betrothal
ceremony (U /OU)
'qW AV
bilk:
FIGURE 6. An illirerate woman registering by
fingerprinr for her first vote (C)
1 1111,' I I1, ;III 11-11 1-11-1- 111.1\ `1'1 \1 .1` .I 1 �'1.11 (.IIII)
1111! 11 11 I .I` .1 �''llt,'1 I 'll 1111111 .11'11 \IIII'`
I IIIU' .:r4. 11. ,',11 t I'I 1.1111.1 111. \\IIr I` 111 IJ,'I. ill
Ir,1111.1t1 I �IkI "r, th, :rllkl aitc 1 1 1.111,1 l` kite 11 .I
Ill" 111-1 ,II Ill \\.�.,k ,1',,1111 `f flit '1ppi4 (1i
III lilt 1 1111 .11111 f'1- tl` flit 1 41/.1.11 Il 11.1
(l.lrllfl II\ 11111( I II'tl,'( I .I .1 Iwl.11 Ill II)r I III'
Illt''fill.11l(.11 I'l,llll'111. .111(1 111
Ili III litlll_ flit 111 "111 .IIIII fill (Ill! \.1\ 1 lilt 11,
flit nl(rtll.11lf` 1111 1.1(! I.illllrt� \1111, ;Ithvr
S .In11 11 it
_1u4.r.It' .I In,llli(.11 IIn(I ll t� 1,1 rl,(1,11nl,(I \\ill) In
II �(11111 (111,'. Iik- 1111ra11 .1 I(1 \I,.ulall
1,.1/.1.11 a` .111 Ill t lt lltl II I 1�'111� Illrl,at1111'(! 1,\
I I 1 1 11.1 l\ Ill lei 114.� Ill;ll'lI(.,�� ,11111 lV 1111(,11.
4. i(II.11(.4.(I I,\ yl,nluu�rti :11 ,li,l ri(.l \\i111 r(1 .II
111 \l lily :lily\ 1�,l Ill' 11 11;1 r Ill ;11111 1' \1 :1
Ii 11 Ir;ltl II:1 liltl4. tO I,Ilyr iu Ihr \\I OI
i 11 t iI Iit il111; IIi /1'(I 11( 1;11 III ;I(1(liti( tit 11:4
I1 11I lllll', 111114. 111 Illy 1:1 rIl'r ill;ll', l' �Iltlill .1
(.1 Ill 11111111111 1, .It lilt 111 1'. IIr IIa In 111a rll. .IIld )1l, 1 .1
\1( 111f III,� lIri 11 I, iI1; 11 Ilk ll \;I (III 1 .111
1 :l If( ,I1�l It if Ira\( l Ii I
1;111\ (11 Ol4. f;l(.(4.rl ll' Il!;lullcl, 1 :111(1
1111 )(14. l,,1 111(' 11;1 \y 114.(.11 II I,t4.1( I)\ tll(. 11111.1lchi(,11
tlll(.tlin 111 Ir;ltll:lll \(.I] ;I I)l
ilid 1(111;11 lt. ;111(1 111)Iltll';I! III t I'III
1111111(', tIf(- I Ma I 1 1'II11 III:1 1 I)(Illtl�111
\\IIi( 1 )di(' 1) (.l�I;11 LI y ;III(I 111-111 III
-11- 11( I)lll\ (.,toII]idit ryLlti\I I IIik IIII ;11
\4.I'I); IIIIII I to ;I \I)Ill ,u �IIII n (.riIi(.i
.Illli ill I'l11' -;11 t1, II I(I(1t ll III(. 11.1111111 1 )vial i tl'II III t'.
I II' 11111(!1' 1 li ;11 r "1I 1'(.t :I 1'114. 11f 1'II -11 I'1 111'.'I it Ill.
1114. \\.Ill Ilrr(Ilmdiw- 4. \('ll thr 1)(,(irr 11( I11;1rh
(I .I Iu1i11114. IanliI\ :Ir(.;1: I:Ikill in I)II;11 r IIr 1
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FIGURE 7. Wrestlers performing gymnastic exercises
with clubs, each weighing 50 pounds (U /OU)

FIGURE 8. Men passing leisure time
in a teahouse. Rather than chairs,
benches covered with brightly col-
ored rugs are customary. Tea is
sipped from small glasses. (U /OU)
M)"Id he an imllossihie cmice pt fur tradition- minded
Iranians.:kn% number cf relatives. friends. or sc�rx:urts
nr:ry be housed. bllt til t- idea of pa%ing to lit- in a
bona %%ould %vrge osi the inconipreh'�nsible.
5. Values and attitudes
The \al:u�s of the Iranian lxolrlt- as a \Nhole are
nndonbtedly changing, but the rate of change \arit-s
anumt, tilt-
diverse elt-nx nts of tilt- so ietx. In gt-ut-r:rl.
traditional valrrt-s continue to be inrlxrrtanl among the
rural sector of the p(q)rrlatie whether settled or
nonrulic. %%bil(� conteurlrorarN Western values ha\c
gained considerable currenc�\ among urban lx olle.
I'he u1)1)(� end rnieldle e I:rsu s, in partie�rtlar, hart- been
slrongl\ ii menc�ed b\ Western thought.
I.o\:tlt\ to Tamil\ and dv\� tion to Islam form tilt-
basis of the traditional value s\slerrr. For roost ibc first
allt-gianct- is to the inrnre�eliate kinship group, then, in
lessening degrees, to more distant relatives, to tilt-
comrnunity or tribe, and finall\ to the nation. 'rhe
entire culture is so pernu�ated \\ith tilt- c�oncvpt of
farnil\ I()\ that the term "I'amilisin is often used
r
r
in describing it. 'I'll( \aluc attributed to fanrik
cohesion is n�(lected in the nelwtisin \chic�h c�crntinues
to perxade go\rritwell and c�onrnrercc. although it
bt-ing c�riticir.eel nran\ 4- d Ica ted ersons.
FarniI\ relalionshiIis. along \cith nurst other aspects
of life, a re fargek regulalc;I b\ the preccpts of Islam.
Islamic \:dues are puritanic.+. cinpliasiiing good
clet-ds in unticilm0on of a final judgnu�nt :rod stressing
resign:,licrn to the v.iI1 of Cool. While asi iring tee a
better life to come. the deg ont Door are cone inced thac
lilt- dixision of %curlcllc goods is ordained b\ the
\InrigIItx �a belief Inch has helped the a\enIge
itnI) Irani:ut to accept th gross t-e�onunric
ineelucrlitie" that hat- long afflicted the society. \lost
nrernbt-rs of the urban upper and middle c�lasws
adht-re only nonrinall\ to Islamic beliel's and practices.
finding tlrenr inconrinrtible \\ith lilt- partially
Westernized lift- stsles and secularistic \;dues cshic�h
the\ are adopting, \tan\ of the urban boor, on the
other panel, re�rnain elexout to tilt- lxrint of fanaticism.
Rural people in the traditional mold tend to accept the
premises and proscriptions of Islam to the extent that
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,.N
FIGURE 9. Ruial Iran has little to offer in the way of
inst4utionalized social centers. Above, reading from top
to bottom: A bathhouse near Tehran; a village teahouse;
travelers at a rest house along the Asian Highway near
the Caspian Sea. (C)
they are familiar with then,, but thcv are not rigid in
their religions pnlctic�e.
Irulians regard themselves ;IS un illdivi(lualistic�
people, and illdivi(lualisnl is consldewd to foster a
strong sense of personal worth mid an extreme
12
seusitixih to insult or iack o! respect Skillful
Imlitic�ian, :uul others h lac f rom linrl� to tiun� heen
able to ;.roust� nulhs expioitint
ap1mi nt readiness to rl�.I if ii it] to ren l rks or ,lc�tiiml
decrlu�d to hr insulting and thus in\okin, %Irit is
kno%%n it s ;/u�rlrul. fir /cal in defcnsc of honor. Ir,,lli.ln
individualism hcls helped t(, fwtcr h;lhitu:l! dislrvs!
of "outsiders. a dcsign;lliou hick is IrelIr to ntI\
coustnu�d to Haan all except I:lnlil\ incrIhers. �I'Flis It
tarp has inlpcdc�(I the de%elopnu�nl :11 any deep sl use
of conununih or team spirit. Il it csl\ is I i II
wgiIr(II�cl as ;oI i (If al. arld there is consi If rAhle r spec t
for a II lit o %\Iif \oI11llt:lyd\ restraius Ili IIi (II front
making illicit gains. I it \er. dire:%chlcs is t:ducd ;u
it wcap)it ill irlterperson:d struggles Iii eid\iu- tllc
explui fill if )it nr it lit uillu lit t if rl of others alld nl:ols
diyll:l\ it certain mI Ili irat if it for tlu� idolit rasc;t
\lrllfeas:ulce in oflic�c. conlnulnplACC thrllugholit the
governtnerlt. recci%es little I )it hlic cclrsure. 'I'I it re
il Illicit rs to he ;ul iul;rliIit c�\ Ilicisit re,;lydin( if f if i;II
nI(itivcs and the prllcessesof I;o\crnnlcnt. I-', rcef rllrless
and strength arc sccn as the I lit st iln if rLult (I amities
for leadership. 'I'hc forc�eiol 111;111 enl(�rging in the role
of Icmler has hccrl Ircllucnt Iva ture of Im Ili :ul
history. lies. Shahs r,eteoric rise to pu\\cr it, the
I920's \\ati in this tm(lith'll.
'i'hc vuhu s relating to f;llnil\ and rcligiou arc those
most affected hs nmdernizing Western influence.. In
the case of rlpper ;oat nlicldle clas.>;roup. in the cities.
furnil\ life :Intl pollens of heha\ior ha\e I,mtg hccr,
changing as it result of the ahsorplion rlf m�\\ nulres
through \1�ctcrn -stile c(lucalion ;Intl contact" \(ith
I�'uropean :Intl l .S. nationals Moth al honr(� and
abroad. \luny of tod;l\ s \mItIt educated in tf,c
Western tnr(lition IIucstion the nature ;Intl necessity Ilf
;dleglal,ce to trlldltrllllal concepts mid t:dk 111
repudiating the h all ];IIisn, and authoritarianism of
socict\. \le:olwhile. in urban areas nlodenl education
has achic\ed it .embolic value of its o\% II as :l sign of
"llr(nuess'' it ,cl it instrument of social I if hiIIt for
those� \\ho have access to it. O I the other hand. the
rery idea of progress. dclined ;IS nlatcri;d advance-
ment. is wit;lydcd_ssith some suspicion h\ dc\out
\luslirl,s since it is ;llnlost iIIc\itahl\ follo\\cd h\ :1
c4-cline in religions ohsl�reancc and it hrcach in
traditional Islamic values. 1 more fanatical
orthodox aclflercnts. including nitraconser\atis
religious I Iders. \iew anv change as anathenul.
condenuling all Actions not hosed firmly on Islamic
principles.
'he rIIr:ll top IIIiIIII is not intn,unc to the
transition values taking, place. In nnuly areas the
pressure for c�hangc is collslantl,, rising its it result of
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land reform and other government programs,
technological innovations, and the increasing
orientation to i t market economy. The substantial
movement of rund people, particularly the young,
from the villages to the urban centers is also having an
effect, reflected in the frequent breakup of the
extended family. diminution of parental authority,
and weakened family loyalties. This in turn fosters it
trend away from the old Islamic values in the direction
of the new secularistic ideas.
Only in recent tinges have Iranian leaders begun to
create it modern nation state out of the varied ethnic
groups \%ithin the country's borders, and strong
integrative forces are needed to overcome it tendency
toward internal disunity. Among suet forces are the
Islamic religimis bonds linking most of the population,
it pride- in the glories of Persian history and culture
de�epl\ felt by educated Iranians, and it general feeling
of loyalty toward the monarchy. Despite these positive
factors, some observers are convinced that large
segments of the Population as yet have no clear
concept of Iran as it nation. During recent decades the
guyC;nnu�nt has attempted to expand national
consciousness by stimulating pride in Iran's imperial
greatness. These efforts reached a climax in 1971 with
tile spectacular ce�lchration at Persepolis commemorat-
ing the 2, 00th anniyersar, of the founding of the
Persian Empire by Cyrus the� Great.
The most ;mportant national symbol is the
institution of the monarchy as embodied in royal
tradition and in the person of the present ruler,
Mohammad Ileza Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran. ;X
legal emtit' defined fly the Constitution, tile monarchy
forms the apex of it highly stratified social systenl, and
most Iranians can hardly conceive of any other type of
government. In official circles. it is fregvently cited as
the only form of rule which accords with national
tradition and the Iranian character, although there is
evidence of some dissatisfaction with the� imperial
family and many educated Iranians believe that the
Shah's power should be limited.
Despite the personal popularit\ of the Shah and his
family, there is some resistance to government policies
in many sectors. For example, although tenant farmers
are eager to obtain title to land of their own under the
.grarian reform program, they are likely to show little
interest in changing their methods of land use, they
distrust the modern techniques introduced by the�
government and cling tenaciously to age -old ways.
Those opposing modernization are frequently
supported and even guided by conservative Muslim
clergy who have taken v stand against technical
innovation and reform programs in general on the
grounds that they violate teachings of the Koram.
Dispossessed landowners, for their part, are unhappy
over the redistribution of land and ocher measures that
they fear may jeopardize their interests. Meanwhik,
certain elements of the urban lower class show
susceptibility to demagogic appeals,
unconvinced that the government �s working to
improve their condition. Neve the� wide
disparity that exists between the conspicuous wealth of
the rich and the overwhelming poverty of the� bulk of
the populations ha, not engendered organized protest,
not only because such protest needs leadership which,
under the conditions of tight control exercised by the
regime. has not arisen, but also because of th Shah's
visible efforts to improve living conditions.
In the past, many of the ethnic minorities, and
particularly the nomadic tribal groups, hayc been a
source of difficulty to the governtlent. Until the
1920'x. most tribal leaders exercised it large measure of
independence, controlling entrance nd egress routes
to their respective areas, extorting payment from
anyone who traverser! their territories, and indulging
in various degrees of pillage and banditry. When Rc�za
Shah Pahlavi came to power in 1921, he tried to solve
the problem by undermining tribal organization and
by attempting to convert the nomads into sedentary
farmers. The plan %\as put into operation without
adequate preparation and was carried out by
establishing martial lacy in tribal areas and subjecting
the inhabitants to more or less systematic oppression.
Some of the groups rebelled and were put down with
brutality by the regime. By executing, exiling, or
imprisoning tribal leaders, the government seriously
disrupted traditional tribal life and organization and
in the process brought economic clkaster to the tribes.
Toward the� end of his reign Reza Shah was forced by
economic considerations t.i modify his approach, and
after his abdication in favor of his sun in 1941, tribal
grovps were able to resume their traditional way of
life, although most never fully recovered from the
effects of tit( repression. In 1946, serious disaffection
occurred antc)ng the Kurds, the Bakhtiari, and the
Qashgai, who staged open rebellions which were
suppressed only \yitIt considerable bloodshed.
Previously. jest after the end of World War 11,
leftwing Azarbaijani separatist grout,:. with the aid of
occupying Soviet forces, had succeeded in establishing
.111 cutononious republic which survived about it year
before being reanucxed by Iran after it formal protest
againsi Soviet action had been presented to the newly
forined United Nations. As late as 1963 there occurred
it limited and unsuccessful uprising among elements of
the Qashgai.
l
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Sill Illc mill III. ill s 1111� ,-nr1,11 Illlh(-\ 111 lilt-
11,1' hccll :;1.11111..11\ III Ird Ice (111�
1111111111'111.(klll II(itclllial 1 fill- t11I41�s II\ 61N�Irllllllt;
Ih,-nl �Intl allcil11llill' lit s4-lllr till- n111n,lllil' ".rinllls in
\1'll dl'1i 111'll .111'.1. I'i 1;1III III 11111 I)I(1141( II.Is III
In.11 l(� ill till� s,-I t If II I I II IIrU 1- 1,1111. I,II>;4-l\
\\111 t'111111i111 I I s ,I r(' I( 11. 1111\ 1.1 \411 .11111 1
.I, rl l�I 1111 l I (11 ICI II .11) 111',1 Mat till� 1111
Ini I111 rl t irs 11'1'1 i1; 111 /1'(1 .1 n(I itt t /'1111'lI (111 .1 I 1 11111 riI\ 111
t 111� l'1�III1.11 :;11\111111 it III (If'.pilc 1111' II slasl l 1 11141.1 111
tIll n It'll III11 IIUII fall� 1111 II IIt�i 4�111' 11 I. II IIi(III
I IIII(�1 *;ItiIifI 111 111(� tl IIit IIII() .11(�11 Is IIf�Itl1;
I.II'II d II\ \tl'lllllniti 1111� ,1(tir.III,I I IcI ir111 IIII lti r.11II
111111 t rII1II ((�IIi )I 1110 11\ I) I'41 Illln' I sItIIII� :Isslsl.II1 1
iu I� (1I 114-.1 I (-.l r,-. (�du(-ati4ll,. al Id (-4111tt1IIIitI
d,- \l'If11)III,-111 ssilllil,ltinll II.I Iwcll Inn.1 1 \I
anl(n1( 1111� Iknf(Is. lilt, laI t IIIIIi IIIiI11)ri1\. \\I,()
r,- Itn1 II it I 1111 I wiI IIIililanrr cull r4-1wIli111Mills
1'1111,\. Kinds 11ri,min1�nt I141sili4nls in 11 14
FIGURE 10. Iranian Kurds on the move near Nahabad.
These women rest against rugs lashed around their
belongings. WOW
11I \c Ill I III 111 as \vll as in c(fl11inct and Ilic
l lidl \I0141111JI 11111.1 ln(1h.1116 .1111 14-,;,11
III'lllsl'1\1�s .Is killds I1rsl :111(1 Ihllll,llls st-cillid tilt�\
:111111',11 inl�rr.l \11111111; 111.11'1 till' last 111.11 1111�\
111 11,111 111 lh,- Ir.111i:u1 11,11(111
r cl. I.. Ii.l hills. port lt'Ida r1\ Iltl� \:1St rural
IIIllnllatillll. \it�\\ till- \\1111(1 11111x111� IIIv ki11s11ip v rillip.
111 al 11141st 111,- 111,�.11 (-Ilnlnllulit\. \\till c(n1sidl-t.lhl4-
distrust :11111 �IINpicilln .11141 11.1\1. 111111. 11n111�Isla11dinl~ Ill
it f IU' attilmi1�s III c(hi �,ily iiplicr mid ti,iddll� cl.lss
Iralli.lns. In(lsl Ill \\1111111 11:1\1. had �111111. 1llnlat,t �.0111
111'111111� Ir11111 F111 alld fill I Ilik ,Litt�. ,Is \�ll is
\011 II,Ilifili'lls Ill 114-11;IIhI)rllll; (1lillilnrs. 11'111'1 If .1
111sidcG l dllc c0ci their n�slutnsr to aclimis 111 Ills�
p.irlil'tllar Iflrrioi ctmiitn ctpmcrn;nl; Ir:ln.
III till ldr�I11 tirlic'. till stral4-i.ic lut,.11iull ,II Iran .Ind
its rich 4lil IIrposits Ila\r callsi'd irltern.1tiiiiia I ri\.II r\
.I Ili( it11; Illy trrral IifI\\t,rs If) r IIIII114-11(-r� III 1111� :Ire ,I. .1
sit 11:ltilIll high 11.1 Ilrr(I c\:licix11 :111(1 s11s11icifill
.11 1111111;
Ill ditit-.Ill\ cI)II%l'illlls 1�11'111clits 1 111.1 it If'a't
�111141111; 1!(I \I if lt,rs. Il14�rt, is ,1 Ir.�11d t(l\% Ir(I
11,-111raliI\ in IIln ,lil.lIrs. stI.11ur(in, Ir(IIII flit Isar
that III 4 (m ill r\ 4-411 41Ilic r \is4' Iwc(11111' .111 :I rciia Ill
\:I r. .1 lld .I ki Ir11111 Ills� cl lit iclilfit IIto I II Is Iif1- i 1)11' 111
1)1.1\ 1111 1111 t;ti Iu1\\t,ts at!.li11st r.lrh ()1lit r I11 (ht,
h(-Iif 111 Ir,ul. \i t -rlllrlrss. f111ici:iI n�lIIif)11s Iwt\\rt,n
Irall .111(1 tilt l nited `tall'. rciiiain (�11 1.4-. klx�d 1 i .I
irir11ddiiiI ticll ,-11c(1n11111sx�. IllltIt c, tics -I fill
III fit ii,II sccijriI\ itrraIIvrr11(�Ills. 1111141111;11 \fIIIIm
iitIclIr(-tnals -riIi(-in� Illl- I ri11,- in irtn:lrn. .l )d
I4- I t ist ch-111,-rlts Ill( )n1; Ih,-nl :I s il;:l l4-
inlllrri.IIists. Illy Ilrt i,!4- Ili t11,- l 11itcd ,tads is
r111'r.III Ili1[II. rl�IIt' (-1iI1i all ill lllir.11iIitI il,r its
ad \:111(-,-(1 lr(-1111fl1.l .111(1 ;111 .III )r((-I.It14111 111 Its I() III!
rcci Ir(I Ill .l ssist:l 11( \dditi4nlall\. 111(� fait that 111a11\
I l l f l i t, slit,- .Irr t;radIl lt,-s Ill 1 IIII rsitirs h,-111s tt1
cr,- a ll� :III it I I I I is I) l lt' r l' ill hick I .Ill %icc is `4llicited
1111(1 acci
Whilt� nl.Jiitaitii111; chis(� n�la lit ms \\ills Ihr l it it ,-d
,1:111.. tut ~11.111 :1114 his rninisturs ha\c bt-vil
a l Icily! int! a rat I ll l n l(-h,-1114�nt \\i111 1111� ,(I\it't I IIiu11.
lIcsl ;1 cllllllll IiIIQ 11�:Ir Ill (:1 it III Ili st sllll \ersii
Ill :r>rlilllrit III linssian .Iiz 1, r;111llii,-n14.11t at 1111
r\11l-ns4- ul Ir ;III III(-rl-:lsint it undwrs ill Ir.III Its
r,- if lrt,-d l\ Ila\I. (-(1111(� lit 1,-,-1 th.lt Ir.ul and 1111
I .ti. 5. II. h.l\I- sill iicienl interests in c(mltillm t()
\\arra11l chlsrr li4�s I let \\,-r�n lit,- t\% I n:ltiolls
lillitnde t11\\ard 1111 l'11iIcd Kint;dotil art,
a11116illent. (�41111hininh it n1i\lure (II dislike and
susllici(m (lit till- fill(- baiid .Ind respect :uld ijiul6tiv
adnliratilln 1111 till- flth,-r. 'this anlhi\all-n is 11,(-,-:1111,-
lit Iranian cycrience \\ilh British 1)()lil-\ tu\\ard Iran
111r more than II111 \cars -:I llfllic\ \\hick has
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fluctuated from intense iniemst to n(-ar indifference.
(rcan intervention to negluct, and from support of
revolutionary movctncttt� to the defense of established
authority.
ficligiotts affinities not"ithstanding. Iranians iaye
shown little solidarity %%ith %rab peoples and have
tcndcd to remain aloof from :1rah- Israeli disputes
There is considerable resentm nt of anti Iranian
manifestations on the Dart of E pt and Iraq. and of
.%rah states in southern :1rtbia. one factor in this
situation is iran�s desire to assume it protective role in
the strategic Persian Gulf area. Good relations prevail
with neighboring Nluslint non -:l rabic cations.
specifically :l,fghanistan. Pakistan, and Turkey.
Favorable attitudes toward Pakistan and 'Turkey are
enhanced by mutual membership in the (ventral
Trvaty Organization (CENTO). Iran is also it charter
member of the United Nations and most of its
specialized agencies, several of which have sponsored
programs in the c�ountrx.
Iranians are not it militaristic people and can claim
tit) significant military victories since the Pith century.
Popular attitudes toward the military have shifted
over the past several decades. During tic reign of Reza
Shah the army was highl r:�arcd among the bulk of
the population because of its harsh measures to secure
internal order. The present Shah has made a
determined effort to improve the image of the military
-lid to it large extent has suec�eedccl, mainly by
emPloying it in various civic action programs.
C. Population U /MT)
With it high birth rate and a IIit;li but dechIling
death rate. Iran's population. estimated at r
trillion al the beginniut; of 197:'), ias clonbled since
lit(- bcginning of the 191 0's. syillt Most of the increase
oc�c�urring since 1555, The rapid population t;ro%\th
since 1033 bas resulted in an inc�reasingl\ youthfrtl
population and in an age structure highly conducive
to accelerated grosytit in the future. With the muncher
of \omen ent(-riug the principal reproductive years
inc�rcasing each \ear, the population ciao be expected
to continue to grom rapidly during the remainder of
the 1970's and during the I9511's Mietherorm t ;rains
nascent fancily planning program succeeds in lowering
tit(- birth rate. Xt the current rate of r r ;ass th�
approximately ).0'( per atimmi- -the population is
increasing b, about I trillion persons each year and. if
this rat(- persists. \\ill reach aU million in 199). The
burgeoning population absorbs a sit ;nific�ant portion of
15
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the econoinic gain being realized and, unless curbed,
threatens to retard the Shah's plans to further develop
the economy and case the pervasive poverty.
Moreover, because of the large number of children
who must he supported by those ie the productive
the dependence burden also serves as it major
drag on efforts to raise levels of living.
Population growth has resulted almost wholly from
natural increase, the volume of both immigration and
emigration being insubstantial. Because births and
deaths, especially the latter, are underregistered,
official vital rates do not accurately reflect these
events, and it is difficult to ascertain pa:vailing birth
and death notes precisely. During the 1950's and the
1960's the birth rate apparently was fairly stable,
ranging between 45 and 48 per 1,000 population. For
1971, it \\-its placed at 45. The death rate, responding
to improved access to health and medical f:.tcilities,
declined from about 25 per 1,000 population in the
1950's to an estimated 15 per 1,000 in 1971. Better
health conditions also are the major factor in the
decrease ;n the infant mortality rate, which fell from
about 217 deaths of children under age 1 per 1,000 live
births in 1950 to approximately 160 in 1970. Despite
improvement, the infant mortality rate is still very
high. The death rate, too, is high, given the age
structure of the population. A large proportion of the
population is in the younger ages where death rates arc
low. If Iran had the same age distribution as the
United States, for example, the death rate would be
even higher.
As a result of the declining death rate, life
expectance at birth has risen about one -half year
during each of the last 20 and is presently about
50 years. It is higher than in neighboring Afghanistan
and Pakistan, brat lower than in the adjacent countries
of Iraq, Turkey, and the U.S.S.11.
Since 1966, the Iranian Government has sponsored
a family Planning program, seeking to stem rapid
population growth. In mid -1970, the government
adepted the ambitious goal of reducing population
growth to I ii per year be 1990. The program is
coordinated by a High Council of Family Planning
within the Ministry of ;lvalth, which operates more
than a third of the 1,:300 clinics offering family
planning services. Almost one- fourth of the clinics are
operated by the Health Corps, one of the several
government- sponsored revolutionary developnuvnl
corps. The others are run be a variety of public and
private entities, including the Ministries of Defense
and Labor, social service organizations, private
industrial firms, and Iran's Family Planning
Association. In conjunction with an educational
16
program designed to make the Populace aware of the
implications of rapid population grc,\%th, the clinics
provide advice one faunily planni ,g matters and
acquaint clients with it range of birth control methods.
In practice, they emphasize the its,- of oral
contraceptives, which are taken by approximately
80'7 of all new acceptors. Pills are also available
through commercial channels. Despite it trend toward
sruHer families ill urban areas. rural parents, largely
unfamiliar with birth control methods, still \%;ant
nany children, and the success or failur of the fancily
planning program has vet to be determined.
1. Size and distribution
Iran's most recent census, conducted in November
1966. recorded it population of 25, 7 55,210, it (iS('
increase over the 18,95-1,704 enumerated it decade
earlier. By 1 January the population had grown
to an estimated :30,505,000. Thus, Iran had more than
three limes the population of Irani and 1.7 times the
population of Afghanistan, but its Population "as
only four fifths as large as that of "Turkey, slightly
more than one -half as large its Pakistan's. and only
one eighth as large as ill(- Soviet Union's.
Iran is one of the lec:st densely settled Countries in
Asia. At the beginning of 1977, it had a population
density estimated at 18 persons per square mile. it
figure lower than that of aty of its neighbors. except
the Soviet Union, and some 171 below that of the
United States. The national average, however. masks
the markedly uneven distribution of the population.
More than two- thirds of Iran's inhabitants live on
about one fourth of the land, that is. north and west of
it line drawn roughly between Gorgan. near the
Caspian Sea, and Bandar -e Shahptir, on the Persian
Gulf. In general. population concentrations are
heaviest in the northwestern tip of the country. along
the fertile Caspian coastal plain. an area of dense rural
settlement, in the region surrounding the capital city
of 'Teheran. and along the sloPes of the "Zagros
Mountains (Figure I I Density declines toward the
cast and southeast, w ith much of central and eastern
Iran, \which consists largely of mountainous or desert
terrain. haying a small population. The three
easternmost Provinces� Bit lu ell eslan va Sistan,
Kerman, and Khorasan comprise 41.7 of the total
area of Iran, but in 1966 accounted for only 15.0f of
the total settled population (Figure 12). In contrast,
The census repotted 25,078,923 settled residents. 2.1.1,141
"unsettled" persons, and 162,146 nomadic tribespecrpie. In t,encral,
data on the characteristics of the population have been published
only for the settled residents.
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TURKEY U.S.S.R.
M
N
Jolfa
is T
f
x 1
SPA
t
MAZAN
i 4
halos
TEHR M
00
Kashan
Semnan j
SEMNAN
U. S. S. It.
Birland�
Kerman
KERMAN
1 AFGHAN15rA'S l
I
Zahedan
S:W D! \B1A
Bushir A J j
S.fNEil.. rE I AZA
LOREST%3N
`r`
y
SFAHAN
VA 9ANADER -C -1i At r
�Es :ahan
IRAQ I
9A ria'
CNANAR .Yazd
NA) (AL[
E
RO1CR
aHnmm re
Abadan 4
Gaehs ra x nuirH
NEUTRAL
'LONE /�KU \'AIT
L
�Shirtz
U. S. S. It.
Birland�
Kerman
KERMAN
1 AFGHAN15rA'S l
I
Zahedan
S:W D! \B1A
Bushir A J j
S.fNEil.. rE I AZA
`r`
VA 9ANADER -C -1i At r
FARS VA DARYA -YE OF f.14
1
t
BA! UCHESTAN 1
'VA S I S AN
Persons per square mile
200J
f 1 Bandar 'At?bas
0 25 50 100
r
Bandar�e Len6eh
r r
BAHRAIN
i
1
Jask Chah
0 50 1,0 IS, Y.
QATAR
�Bahar
500135 L71
1
FIGURE 11. Population density, 1966 (U /OU)
the four provinces of the fur norlh\vest� Azarbaijan -e
Gharbi. Azarbaijan Sharcli, Gilan, and Kordeslan�
constitute only of the total area but inade up
-i.9i of the population in 1966. \djacvtit 'Tehran
Province�, containing the seal of the national
government, accounted for almost ouc -fifth (19. 19.7 of
tilt total settled population in 1966, on 5.6'1 of the
land. :\Wrong the administrative divisions, ;\zarbai-
jan -e Shimli. `'lazandrun, and Tehran provinces. as
well as Hamadan Governorate, all recorded densities in
1966 in cxc�ess of 100 persons per square toile. with
some local densities within these administrative
divisions being mangy tinic�s higher. Seinnan
Governorate had the lowest density in 1966 -6.6
persons per sduarc� mile. Density was also lo\v in
Baluc�hestan \a Sistan, Kerman. Sahcli vc jazayer va
Banadc'r -e Khulij -c� Fars \a Darya ye Oman (Coastal
Province), and Khorasan. In all of these divisions large
areas arc virtually uninhabited.
,Most of the population of Iran is sedentary, but the
1966 census recorded store than 2- 10.000 persons of no
fixed abode and over 160,000 nomadic tribcspcople.
1lthongh the 1966 re nomads i>, believed to
represent it rather sizable undercount, them is no
question but that the nomadic sector of the� population
is declining numeriCillly, as more nomads settle do\yn.
The scaled population of rural Iran lives primarily in
compact villages. Villages, of \\hick there are more
IN
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KJJORASAN

FIGURE 12. Population, area, and population density, by administrative division,
1966 (U /OU)
(Area in square mile;)
than 50.000, are t\ pic�all% small and c�omist of it cluster
of dwellings surrounded b\ farmland. Location is
highly dependent upon the availabilils of 1111
adequate supple of useable \\ater. Where the supple
of water has been generally plentiful. villages often
have expanded into small towns. sphere it has been
exhausted, villages hair been deserted.
Although the population is still predontinantly
rural, the proportion of the population living in urban
centers (localities of 5.000 or more inhabitants and
those, irrespective of population, that are xhuhreslan-
c�ount scats) has risen steadily. Whereas the urban
population was estirutted to have ac�c�onnted fur about
'1 1 7i of the total population in 19- 10 -�1I, the proportion
IS
had increased to in 1956 and to S.O`(' in 1966.
It was estinmted at -1 in 1971. Daring the 1956 -66
intercensal decade. the urban population grew it an
average annual rate of 5.1 `1, while the rural
population (including nomads) increased at an
average rate of 2.1 ci annually. Tlw proportion of the
population considered urban in 19(7(7 ranged from a
low of 9AI7i in Boyer Admadi -yv Sardsir va
Kohkiluyeh Governorate to it high of 10. 3S(' in 'Tehran
Province. Three provinces- Esfahan. Khuxestan, and
Tehran- registered larger urban than rural popula-
tions in 1966. In contrast. rural residents outnumbered
city (kellers by margins of more than three to one in
nine administrative divisions.
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PEW ENT
1
I'F:It
tot T1ITA1.
01 '1'11�r AI.
Ill l�:1 It t:
A I'MINISI'll VIII f. III %ISInN
PIII.1A.A1 IN
Pu PI'LATI(IN
AIt EA
A R KA
M11. f:
1'ro�ince:
Azarbaijan -e (iharhi.......
I,IIS7, 111
I1;,, \57
l.1;
G1.5
iWi-st Azarloaij:ut)
Azarbaijatt l� Nllaryi........
2,6116,31 1
In..;
25,9115
;.l
11111.6
N.a. Azarlmijan
13altlt�hlrslan ca sitatl......
:412,621;
,ll
ill, 107
7.2
I'la11 -4. sa v Aa/ac4�r a
liaadar -e KIMIij -1-
t�a Darva ve Onian....
Ii111,511
2.4
:36,37:7
16. S
1CWLS al I'nniare.*
(�entrtl T
I,9SI,S2S
1:1.;
:35,:3:31;
;.I;
111.1
E
1 7113, 1S3
6. i
55,6112
a.!
29. 1
Far
1.162,711
.S
51,11il;
X.1
28.4
Gilail
I .755,391i
1;.:1
11, 115
121.-1
Kerman
772. 711:3
3. 1
71 509
11 .7
10.1
KvrwanAhahan............
7S9, S117
1
11, 17S
1.:;
5:3.3
Khorasan
2, 51S.521i
4.4
1 211,979
171.11
20.8
Khttrr..tan
1,617,02.1
G. A
21,96:3
3_
I;I.S
Kort
619,796
2.1
9,652
1.5
61.2
Ma zandaran
I,S15.270
i.,i
IS,2SS
!.4
111(1.9
Goventorate:
Bak litoari ca (�hahar
Maha!l
:31111,571;
1.!
5,722
11.4
52.5
F;u nl:uld:u I -c I K`11 lip t IT
AhInadI SurdIr I
Kohkilttcell... 1111....
IIi1,91S
U.;
5,506
Il.;l
311.11
Ilatnadall
SS9,S92
i.
i,iSS
1.2
111.:3
IlaIII
2111,
0.8
7,I112
1.?
28. S'
Lon�slan
691,791i
!.7
122.117
1.71
57.1
setrtttan
207.907
u.'s
:31,5115
;.II
6.1;
All IM II
25,326,;412
/1111. (J
6:36,255
1w). f)
:39.5
N(YI�I�: I�:xelade.. nonladie tnIwe
people. Total
population
figure differs from that gieeo in text.
No explanation for this diserepaney
is available.
*Forno�d after 1966 hY a nu�rl;er
of teo governorates.
than 50.000, are t\ pic�all% small and c�omist of it cluster
of dwellings surrounded b\ farmland. Location is
highly dependent upon the availabilils of 1111
adequate supple of useable \\ater. Where the supple
of water has been generally plentiful. villages often
have expanded into small towns. sphere it has been
exhausted, villages hair been deserted.
Although the population is still predontinantly
rural, the proportion of the population living in urban
centers (localities of 5.000 or more inhabitants and
those, irrespective of population, that are xhuhreslan-
c�ount scats) has risen steadily. Whereas the urban
population was estirutted to have ac�c�onnted fur about
'1 1 7i of the total population in 19- 10 -�1I, the proportion
IS
had increased to in 1956 and to S.O`(' in 1966.
It was estinmted at -1 in 1971. Daring the 1956 -66
intercensal decade. the urban population grew it an
average annual rate of 5.1 `1, while the rural
population (including nomads) increased at an
average rate of 2.1 ci annually. Tlw proportion of the
population considered urban in 19(7(7 ranged from a
low of 9AI7i in Boyer Admadi -yv Sardsir va
Kohkiluyeh Governorate to it high of 10. 3S(' in 'Tehran
Province. Three provinces- Esfahan. Khuxestan, and
Tehran- registered larger urban than rural popula-
tions in 1966. In contrast. rural residents outnumbered
city (kellers by margins of more than three to one in
nine administrative divisions.
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In 1956, there were 91
conuounitie�s in Inin that
were classifie
as urban;
in 1966, there were 271,
divided by size class as
shown in the
following
tabulation:
ANNUM.
PUI'C1..1'1'UI\
HATE: OF
PERCENT OF
N UMBER OF
AGGREGATE
TOTAL URBAN
SIZE CLASS URBAN PLACES POPULATION
POPULATION
500,000 and Over
1
2,719,730
27.8
100,000-500,000
13
2,947,285
30.1
50,000 100,000
15
1,068,042
10.9
30,000- 50,000
22
853,804
8.8
20,000- 30,000
22
539,746
5.5
Under 20,000
198
1,665,639
16.9
As indicated, in 1966 sonic 27 .8% of the total urban
population lived in 'Tehran. The population of Tehran
made up 10.Wi of the total population of the country
and was grossing faster than that of an%� other major
urban center (Figure 13). Such growth confronts the
government with serious problems in areas such as
housing, transportation, food distribution, and public
services.
Although migration from the countryside is not yet
of great magnitude, it accounts for much of the
growth in urban centers. It was resealed by the 1966
census that 862Si Of the settled population were
residing in the district in which they were born and
another 4.915 were living in the same province but in a
different district. Persons born in a province other than
that of their residence in 1966 constituted it significant
proportion of the settled population only in Tehran
(22.8"1 Mazandaran (12.3 ii 1, and Khuzestan
(1 1.7 1, all areas of prime economic opportunity. The
proportion of residents born outside they city of "Tehran
was 48.9ii. According to official Iranian calculations,
Tehran's growth during 1956 66 derived from an
average annual rate of natural increase of 2.6% and an
average annual rate of in- migration of 3.4 ii Migrants
to the capital tend to settle in the populous
southeastern and southwestern pasts of the city. These
vast slums are characterized by wretched Overcrowd-
ing in substandard housing which lacks most of the
basic amenities.
Age -sex structure
Iran has a very young population. Furthermore, the
median age has been falling, primarily as the result of
the high birth rote and a declining infant mortality
rate. Whereas the median, age was 202 years in 1956,
it had dropped to 17.:: gars in 1966 and was
estimated at 17.0 years in '970. The figure for 197)
was nwre than 11 years loser than the median age in
the United States.
Of the total estimated population of 28.7 million at
midyear 1970, approximately 13 million, or 45.7
were under age 13 and 16.2 million, or 56.6ii, were
under age 20 (Figure 14). In contrast, only 1 million,
or 3.5"i, were age 65 or older and only 3.1 million, Or
10.9 %i, were age 50 or older. All together. 49.2 of the
population were in the dependent ages (convert-
FIGURE 13. Growth of cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1966 (U /OU)
19
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AVEHAOt:
ANNUM.
PUI'C1..1'1'UI\
HATE: OF
GROWTH,
CITY
I9:ili
1966
1971
1956- 66
Tehran
1,512,082
'3,719,7:311
*3,230,000
6.(1
f's fall .In
2:;4,708
12.;,0.1:;
1.1(1,(1(1(1
5.2
Mashh :ul
211,',489
�1(19,(;1(;
42 :5,000
5 -1
Tabriz
289,99(;
�10:3,413
�120,000
:3.4
Abadan
220,083
272,962
380,000
1.9
Shiraz
170,6:;9
269,86:)
280,000
�1.7
Ah %-az
120,098
3(16,:37:1
215,0011
5.0
Kermanshah
125, 1:39
187,930
19(1,0()O
4. 1
T:k jrish
nu
157.18(;
170,000
Kasht
109,491
1.1:3,5:17
1:50,0(10
2.8
tom
96,495)
1:31,292
1.1(1,(1(10
3.4
llulnadan
99,90!
121,167
1:30,011(1
2
Ilezaiveh
67,605
110,749
120,000
13. n�
na
102,28
110,006
na Uata not .miilable.
Not pertinent.
*Official Iranirn estimate.
*Other estimates of the population
of "Tehran range u1mird to �1 million.
19
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FIGURE 14. Estimated population, by age group and sex, midyear 1970 (U /OU)
(Population in thousands)
tionall\ defined as 0 -1 -1 and 65 or older), compared
with 50.5`,'(' in the working ages 15- 1;-1). The resulting
ratio of 968 persons in the de�pvtident ages per 1,000 in
the working ages \\as appro.xinnttelc 5 `i higher than
that of the Vnited States. In countries snc�h as Irani,
however, the formal dc�pendciw% ratio tends to
o\ershtte the actual degree of dependency, as nuts\
children under age 15 are engaged ill some form of
work ac�ti\it\ and man\ persons age 65 or older
continue to work hec�ause of ec�onontic uecrssit\.
Iran's population profile for 19 0, c�onnpared \\ith
that of the United Stales (I`igtre 151, sllo\\s that the
proportion of the poptdation tinder age 5 \%,is more
than double that of the United States, attesting to
Iran's much higher fertilit\ rate. In fact, Iran had it
larger proportion of persons in all age groups under :all
than the United Stales. Con\'c�rsel\, the proportion of
the U.S. population in the middle and older ages \\as
nunrkcdl\ higher than that of Iran. I or eminiple. tit,
proportion of persons age 65 or older almost three
tirncs higher in the United States than in Iran.
Although later information is unavailable. the 1966
census rt significant differences in the age
structures of the settled urban and rural populations
(Figure 16). Children under age 10 comprised :36.W('
of the rural population but onl\ 31.5`1 of the urban
population, it reflection in part of the higher fertility
rate in the countryside than in the cities. Persons in the
10 -29 age group constituted :3 of the urban
poptlalion a 31.5' /1 of the rind population. This
0
phenonu�non steins front tit(- ntocenient of \oungslers.
especial)\ bo\s. front rural to urban areas for schooling,
and front the migration of \oung adults to the cities in
search of etnploy ment. 'There \%its little difference in
the age striictures of the urban and rural population in
age groups :30 and o\er. although rural areas had it
slightly higher proportion of smc�h persons than the
cities. The dependenc�\ ratio in urban areas wits 9.16:
in the countnside it was 1.061.
According to the 1966 c�cusus. there� \\vre 107.3
males per 100 females 10S.2 in urban areas and Illti. l
Age
60 and over
75 -79
70 -74
65-69
60-64
55 -59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10.14
5 -9
0-4
J:
t:
United States
1
t
f RAJ a
10 8 6 4 2 0 Percent O 2 4 6 8 10
FIGURE 15. Age -sex structure, Iran and the United
States, 1970 (U /OU)
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plfN L.\T10%
rr:IWEVI
PIS �I' 111111 'I io\
MALES
B
Bol II
1q.It 11111
u; t: l;elu'1�
\Intl-
I'l-nlall-
sl-\l-..I
Mall-
Pl-nlalf.
VXVs
1. K%I A1. Ks
11 I
2,60S
2,5;11
5,1511
l8.1
li.:f
IS.l,
1112.2
5 4
2,178
2,121
1, 2911
1_1 1
i.:l
l:%.o
102.7
111 1.1
I,SaI
I, Slit i
a,l ;ill
12.1
l.'.;
i!.i
101.1;
15 19
1,571;
;.515
:3,1
I0.9
Ifl.lf
llf..'f
1111.1
20 2.1............
1,2 :32
1.2111
2, 131;
N.:%
s.:%
102.3
2 5 2 /1,
111 1;
111
1 U6:3
f; 5
C
f;
111:3.2
all :31............
77
7 7I
1,515
11111.11
35 :311............
I;ss
654
I a 17
S
f1
I
101. 1
111 II............
57.1
57:3
1,111;
,.0
IIli).0
1:5 lit
IS7
IS7
1171
i.
i.,l
d. i
11111,11
:ill 51............
1311
1:311
Still
f.11
i.11
i.0
11111,11
:55 511�...........
:III
311
I;SS
11111.0
611 1;1.....
2S7
28S
575
.'.0
".0
1,
114.7
fi:i G9
''201
22211
1:311
1
S7 s
70 and ocl-1
25S
31.5
573
1..\'
!.0
S1 .4
All ages.
I I, IIli
1, 211;
2 S, tit; 2
j00.0
/00.0
1ofl
1(11.2
tionall\ defined as 0 -1 -1 and 65 or older), compared
with 50.5`,'(' in the working ages 15- 1;-1). The resulting
ratio of 968 persons in the de�pvtident ages per 1,000 in
the working ages \\as appro.xinnttelc 5 `i higher than
that of the Vnited States. In countries snc�h as Irani,
however, the formal dc�pendciw% ratio tends to
o\ershtte the actual degree of dependency, as nuts\
children under age 15 are engaged ill some form of
work ac�ti\it\ and man\ persons age 65 or older
continue to work hec�ause of ec�onontic uecrssit\.
Iran's population profile for 19 0, c�onnpared \\ith
that of the United Stales (I`igtre 151, sllo\\s that the
proportion of the poptdation tinder age 5 \%,is more
than double that of the United States, attesting to
Iran's much higher fertilit\ rate. In fact, Iran had it
larger proportion of persons in all age groups under :all
than the United Stales. Con\'c�rsel\, the proportion of
the U.S. population in the middle and older ages \\as
nunrkcdl\ higher than that of Iran. I or eminiple. tit,
proportion of persons age 65 or older almost three
tirncs higher in the United States than in Iran.
Although later information is unavailable. the 1966
census rt significant differences in the age
structures of the settled urban and rural populations
(Figure 16). Children under age 10 comprised :36.W('
of the rural population but onl\ 31.5`1 of the urban
population, it reflection in part of the higher fertility
rate in the countryside than in the cities. Persons in the
10 -29 age group constituted :3 of the urban
poptlalion a 31.5' /1 of the rind population. This
0
phenonu�non steins front tit(- ntocenient of \oungslers.
especial)\ bo\s. front rural to urban areas for schooling,
and front the migration of \oung adults to the cities in
search of etnploy ment. 'There \%its little difference in
the age striictures of the urban and rural population in
age groups :30 and o\er. although rural areas had it
slightly higher proportion of smc�h persons than the
cities. The dependenc�\ ratio in urban areas wits 9.16:
in the countnside it was 1.061.
According to the 1966 c�cusus. there� \\vre 107.3
males per 100 females 10S.2 in urban areas and Illti. l
Age
60 and over
75 -79
70 -74
65-69
60-64
55 -59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10.14
5 -9
0-4
J:
t:
United States
1
t
f RAJ a
10 8 6 4 2 0 Percent O 2 4 6 8 10
FIGURE 15. Age -sex structure, Iran and the United
States, 1970 (U /OU)
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D. Living; and working conditions
Age
80
and ove
75 -79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55 -59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35 -39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15 -19
10-14
5-9
0-4
MALE Percent FEMALE
NOTE: Exciudes unsettled population (numbering 244.141 for both sexes)
and nomadic tribes (numbering 462.146 for both sexes) for
whom age data were not recorded.
FIGURE 16. ;age -sex structure, by urban -rural residence,
1966 (U /OU)
in rural a:c�asl. The ratio, is high and appears to have
resulted from an underennnleration of females.
especially in the 0 1 1 and i0 --19 age grr.�ups. ;ks
calculated by the United Nations. \\hick ��corrected�
the census results for an nnderenumeratiou of females
as \\'eft as for apparent errors in the reporting of ages.
the Iranian population at mid\car 1970 comprised an
estimated 14, nudes and 14.2 16,000 fenulles.
or a ratio of 101.2 males per 100 females. dales
predominated in all age groups under 30. fennales in
all agc groups fill or (wer.
6 1
N
c, Z
N
U
Having benefited c,nl\ a little from their natiuu's
remarkable economic growth of the past 2 decades.
most Iranians, notabl\ the peasants. live in extreme
po'crl. I or therm� vmplc,cmcnt opportunities arc
scarce. housing conditic,us arc poor. malnutrition and
serioms illnesses arc contnunnplac, ,and cself:are scr\ ices
are culler inaccessible ;;r inadequate. While
industrialization and the cxplc,itatiun of petroleum
resources have added impressive souls to the value of
national output, the conditions under which most
people live havc not improved ipprvc�iably user the
centuries. :end, although soc�iet) middle sector has
grown sontcMiat in response to industrial expansion.
inequities in the distribution of wealth have ac�tuall\
\\idened the gulf \%hick has long separated the masses
c,f poor fro the small group of urban residents who
live in luxurs. Conc�on,it.ontl\, awonng people in the
middle sector. the utlaiutiu nl of higher living lei els
Bas lagged behind expectations. a Circumstance that
c�au be ascribed inn u rge measure to the inadequac�\ of
personal incomes. (C
In 1972. the Fast Bulk of \\:age and salarn earners.
including sirtu all Blue collar csurkers card n1an\
white- collar cmplu\ces� were Being paid at a yearlc
rage of less than I11s200.000. or l'S82,640. 11cf1ec�ting
among other things the conlparatiscls loss rate of
participation in the labor forc�c. notably in its \cage
sector, and the vers Nn iuc�otnc of the agric�a1tura1
labor force. average personal earnings \\erc imic�h
Iuwer than that figure on a national basis. I la\ ing
doubled during the period 19 11 -72, the average
owmal per capita inc(mw w is equivalent to t'SS125 ill
21
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10 8 6 4 2 0
0 2 4 6 8 10

the latter year. ;ks indicated by the Ifullowing
tabulation of earnings (in U.S. dollars), however, gross
disparities existed in the levels of annual incouu
unung %%orkers in the cash ec�ononuy during 1972.
111tic collar workers:
Unskilled
4(i0 -790
Semiskilled
920 -1,190
Skilled
1,190 -1,980
White-collar workers:
Lower level
1,320 1,900
Mid -level
2,640-:3,960
upper level
4,520-7,590
White- collar workers generall\ earned three times the
atnount earned by their blue collar cotuuterparts �a
differential that is largely the basis for the prestige
accruing to those who engage in nonnwnnal
occupations. Pay rates for blue collar workers in the
private and public sectors have generally been
comparable, but the earnings of civil servants have
lagged behind those of white collar workers in private
industry. Thus, despite its preeminence as an
employer. the governnivnt, which paid an estimated
of total ,personal earnings during 1969, has not
been it trendsetter in wages and salaries. The greatest
inequities in income. however. are eyidencet, by
comparing the earnings of urban and rural workers.
t(:)
While it large segment of the rural population lives
outside the money e cortonty, the income of wage
earners in agriculture is said to be one- fifto. or perhaps
even one sixth, that of the typical turban wage earner.
Slll)Staliti;d disparities in IM 11SO exist in the
administrative ranks, blue collar supervisors having
been paid at a niinirtunt rate of L'SS1.980 perannl3tn
in 1972. individuals in the uppernwst echelons
of managenwnt, whether in government or private
industry, earned between LIS$9? -10 and L'SS1.'3,200.
In addition to cash, most salary and wage earners
receive several types of fringe benefits, in cash and in
kind, which increase the value of earnings by as much
as Wi. Family allowances and year -end bonuses. as
well as the awarding of special grunts in the event of it
marriage, birth, or death within the entployec's
irrtmcdiate family, it re c�ustonutry. In addition to
housing and schools, some of the larger employers
provide health, transportation, and recreational
facilities for workers and their dependents. U OL'
Personal incomes have risen by about 51(* it year
since the late 1960's, hot the consumer price index
(Figure 1 which is based on the needs of low and
moderate income urban families, has increased at a
Some what lower rate. Inflation has been controlled by
J2
130
120
110
Index 100
90
I
I
I
I
I
n.a.
I
n.a.
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
Food
All Items
Clothing
Housing
FIGURE 17. Consumer price index (U /OU)
goyerntnent tneasnres, including price controls and
st3lsidies, designed to stabilize the cost of certain itellis
of prime necessity to the consumer. (,onsequenlly,
price increases have probable posed more of it
hardship for middle and upper income fantilics, whose
aspirations for higher levels of living are predicated on
Obtaining improved housing (during it period of
spiraling rents and construction costs) and acquiring
grc a%-r gtt�.:Intities of durable goods (niony of which are
intp(,1,rd and costly). To offset this, it has beconx
increasingly necessary for more than One mcniber of
each household to obtain ctnployinent, a practice that
also has been c�ontnunnplace anunlg lower class
fantilics wishing to improve their iot. The intense
competition for joins resulting front this trend, which
has been by the heavy migrations of rural
inhabitants, has contributed to widespread uneniploy-
ntent and tindervinploymenl in the cities.
;kccording to it survey of household e)penditures
conducted in 1969, roughly four- fifths of urban
families spent the equivalent of US$2.640 or less per
year. 0 to the predominance of logy illconle
famfli,,, More recently. the International Labour
Organisation (fi.w estimated that families compris-
ing the top I0!7 of inconte� earners accounted for 405c'
of the nations private expenditures. Conversely,
families in the bottonn 30'o were responsible for only
about 8o7r of total private expenditures, proportions
which illustrate the logy levels of consutt'ption that
prk�viil anurug most wage earners. Whether in urban
or rural areas. most wage earners devote the bulk of
their inc�oniv to food purchases, although rural
dwellers channel a substantially higher proportion of
family funds for that purpose than do urban families.
llortsing costs, which constitute the second most
important item of expenditure among urban working
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class families, require only it small traction of the� rural
wage earner's funds, as indicated by ti follo%%ing
percentage distribution of household expenditures
during the years 1969 -70: (c)
URBAN RURAL
Food 51.4 66.5
Housing 17.0 3.3
Clothing 6.4 6.0
Other 25.2 24,2
All items 100.0 100.0
The prevalence of poor living conditions and high
unemployment, combined with a weakening of famil%
ties that has attended urbanization. have brought
about change in the nature and pattern of social
problems. \Vllile the incidence of violent personal
crimes is low and that of crimes involving properly,
such as theft, fraud, and pickpoc�kcting. has evidenily
tended to decline as it result of effective police
countermeasures, drug addiction is it pressing
problem, and the number of psychiatric disorde -rs and
suicides �most of which are related to family
conflicts �has risen. l'!OI I
Drug addiction is officially regarded as the ,lost
pressing social problem. Flavin been as high as
million prior to the imposition of a 14-year ban on the
cultivation of poppies in 1955, the number of" opium
smokers has been greatly reduced, albeit other forms of
drug addiction have spread. Drug addicts, host of
them users of opium and its derivatives. were
estimated at 200.000 to '00.000 as of October 1971
Prior to the prohibition of poppy growing, opiu,i
smoking was widely practiced in rural areas, mainly
by older rnen who met to indulge their habit on an (jail%
basis. By the late 1960's, addiction to opium and other
drugs was more prevalent in urban areas than
elsewhere, and most of the addicts were young people
with higher than average schooling. The new
generation of users reportedly has preferred heroin
over opium: there ma% have been as mail\ as 50.000
heroin addicts in 1971, the hulk of then" c�otwentrated
in Tehran and other large cities. Toting persons in the
capital have also begun smoking hashish. (C)
Mainly in response to the large-scale snuggling of
opium into Iran from 'Turkey and Afghanistan, in
1969 the government rescinded its ban on poppy
cultivation. Strict acreage and harvesting controls
were established and severe Puiishments were
promulgated for those convicted of illegally trafficking
in opium arr(I other narcotics. The Opium Monopoly,
it government unit which ostensil )ly neaintains
complete control over the processing and disposition of
the drug, was also established. The agency distributes
opiunt to pharmacists for resale to registered addicts,
estinateel al 105,000 in 1972. The death penally "my
be inflicted for trafficking or possessing more than 10
grams of heroin or 2 kilograms of opium. lid ti end of
1972, 1:3 offenders had been executed and nunermis
others imprisoned. During 1969 -70, moreover, one
third of all court cases dealt with naireotic�s e,ffenses.
ICI
Under the iron rule of' Reza Shah- the inc�idenc�e of
crime was kept at it low le%vI. During World War II
and the� i"unediale� post%%ar period, ho; %ever- the
relaxation of police powers coupled with the effects of'
inflation and the scarcity of goods caused all upsurge
in criminal acti% lilies, cspee�iall\ in tile cities. Urba"
crime was gradnall\ brought under control during the
1960's, although the depredations of Landils and other
tinned gangs operating ir, rural areas c�ontinue(l into
the early 1970's. While there is little iofonnation uu
it%cnile deli "quenc Y, "lost young offenders ha\ been
apprehended for petty large%. V Ol'
Prostitution is ille.9al in most cities, but ",any
brothels arc tac�itl% permitted to function, presunably
because of bribes to the police. Str eh%alkers, however.
are subject to arrest. Since it sizable uuniber of urban
residents have no fix(�d abode, agranc is widespread
ill the larger cities. Authorities periodically round ill)
yagrunts and beggars and send then, to go%enunent-
operated labor camps, where sonic yovational training
is offered. Ca,bling, it popular fora, of recreation. is
ggncrally eonejueteef ill private ho Wes, making its
curtailment difficult. J' O
While street crimes by and large are tinder control,
the government has been preoccupied with c�ornption
and disho"esty in official circles, activities %chic�h are
not popular 1% construed as offensive or serious.
Similarly, income tax evasion among the wealthy. a
common practice. is not regarded as it criminal acct,
and few cases are prosecuted. U Ol
1. Ilealth and sanitation (U /0U)
Considerable progress has been achieved in the
fields of health and sanitation since the 1950's. New
health and medical care facilities fna%e been built- and
the proportion of villages in which medical services are
available has risen. litc�reasing numbers of nedical
and paramedical personnel have been trained.
Moreover, the government, with the cooperation of
foreign and international agencies, has instihnted
programs aimed at the control or eradication of such
diseases as malaria. tuberculosis, sc�hisloso ;niasis, and
smallPox, and it has mounted indoc�trinational
c�amPaigns designed to (ipgrdcle Personal hygiene and
environmental sanitation (Figure IS). Nonetheless,
2
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Sri t'"
77
w
aw
FIGURE 18. Educating the public. Posters illustrate
recommended habits of personal hygiene. MOU)
public and private efforts in the fields of health and
sanitation have been inadee{uale un relation to the
need. Dietar deficiencies, contaminated water and
food supplies. overcrowded housing, poor personal
hygiene. ignorance, and insufficient medical and
sanitation services continue to cnutibute to low' levels
of health and to it high incidence of preventable
discuss. Budl4ctur\ limitation, conrbinc with the
countr\'s rugged and arid terrain to slo\c the extension
of nucicrn nuqlical facilities and to hinder the
implementation of disease ^outrol measures.
Until the 20th cenlur\, almost net organized health
services existed in Iran. Virtually the only r,wdic.d
practitioners in the ronutr} were herbali nd
?.1
traditional religious healers. Since the earl\ 1900's,
fuo\\;�\er. it public health service bus been established.
augnu�nted I,\ prkaty eleu\or, and ntedic;tl and
nursing scfuools ha\e been opened. During the 1950's,
the govenouenl begun an e�\pausiou of hc:dth
facilities, with assistance front agencies of the United
Nations and the U.S. Government. and this e\pansion
has c�outinued wider the intpc�tus of the go\ernnu�nt
ecoucuttic and social devehtpnu nt programs. Des pite
the extension of health c�.re facilities into the
countreside. utodent utedical care is still uua\ailable
to large segments of the aural population. Whereas I
million rur Iranians had uc�cess to health cure
facilities in 1962, b\ 1971 the number had c�linibed ;o
ti trillion� bet\\een 43`( and St)`; of the rural
population� according to it statement b\ the Shah.
TllC goal of the Fourth Development Plan in this field
is to pro\ idc such access to 65'( of rural re b\
March 1973.
Since the ndd- 1960's. official efforts to extend
modern medical care to rural areas ha\e been greatly
facilitated by the I lealth Corps. establislu�el ill 1964 as
ors of several revolutionary de\elopmenl corps. Most
cif its personnel are sec�ondar\ school gracicuates ho
fulfill their militar\ obligation b \\orking in health
and sanitation in Iran's villages: others are ph\sici:uus
drafted for 2 vears' sea ice. total of approxintatel\
6.600 Ilealth Corps members \\orkecl ill rural areas, iut
the period 1964-71. serving in c linics and dispensaries
and ruuuuing mobile health units.
Despite improved a\ailabilit\ of' health cure. the
typical villager depends in hale or in port on
traditional wedic�ine. hich involves reliance on
herbal remedies pussed (1()\\ ii from generation to
generation. and on incantations, 111a;ic� formulas.
and Koranic verses that are thought to ward off illness
and effect cures. I serious illnesses. rural residents
tnuv consult both modern and traditional prac-
titioners. Nlost villagers, :ud nuou\ lo\\nsfolk its \\ell.
arc fatalistic about sickness, viewing the suite of their
health as Gocl*s \\ill: those in the more remote areas
continue to attribute plt\sicul and other misfortune to
c\ it spirits. Traffic in talismans is common. e\ en
among elements of the population in Tehran. Dental
services generally are uua\ailabls in rural areas. Imc�al
barbers normally extract teeth: the\ also routinely
perform circunicisions.
Ir:uuians in general show little concern about
en\'ironme sanitation. and most are basical!\
ignorant of the relationship bet\\esu personal hygiene
and good health. Throughout much of the cuuntr\ the
\viler supply is inadeeluale, and w;tter shortages are
frequent. Moreover. water pollution is it major health
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problem, most sources being contaminated. :\s of
1970. piped %cater scstenls %ere )perational in parts of
'I'e�hran and 29 other urban centers and ill more than
600 %illages. Oulu in "!'el ran. `'Iirti, and four other
cities. ho%%v%er. %kvre %%aler Ireatment facilities
it%ailable. \lust of the� rural population continue to
rely on rivers. springs, irrigation ditches, or (yc;uts
(series of dvi4 %ell shafts and inlerconuec�ling tunnels)
as sources of %cater fur(I rinking. c,)tking. and battling.
In urban areas %%itho -,t pipe (I %cotter s%sten(s,
inhabitants drit %%r their %cater fr )tit open c�onduils
knox%n as jubv (Figure 19). Inasmuch as both urbaut
and rural sources of eater also ate conurlonk used fur
\%ashing, clothes and the disposal of hilmau waste, they
are a u(acjmr factor in the high inc�idenc�e of dim-ase. In
nonce Villages. deep \cells that provide potable \cater
are no\c in use, acid it is official poiic\ to increase and
improve the supple of seater to the population. Liirge-
scale projects. representing public, pricale, and
international commitment. are nucc uudemit to
ac.hicce this goal.
In general. \caste disposal in both urban :ucd rural
areas is unsz!tisfactorc. 'I'ehra n :alit other large urban
centers hate s vectge s\stens serving the ncudenc
sections. but mill\ \had:ut has a modern sec ;ege
treatnet -nt I'd itIit, Flse\chere. untreated \caste from
Sewers is discharged into ne.crbs ricer; or It
:esspools and latrines also are Itself, particularlc in
snall cities and to\\its and in the older sections of the
major cities. In some cities, the saline jubes \chich are
FIGURE 19. Jubes in Tehran. These open conduits serve
as sources of water for drinking, cooking, and bathing.
They are also used for washing clothes and for the
disposal of waste. (C)
used for \%atcr supply are also list-(! for disposal of
Immim \casle. \'Illagers relie\e themselves in-
discriuinatelc b\ roadsides or Streams. 'I'll( larger
cities I a%v routine garbage imd trash collection ill the
modern sections, ccilh the material disposed of by
dmnpiceg outside the c�it\ limits In other parts of tic,
larger cities, ill the� smaller rrhaut centers, and ill the
illages. garbage and trash is Immed. buried. or left to
rot in c�ommimit\ (himps.
Sa nitim cuadilions ill food processing facilities.
markets. dairies, and slaugIiterhuuse> are poor.
Co\ernnce,It iuslwction of all ne t is required I lay\
but is orcic spora(Ii( -it eI11'orce,i. I smnu� ut' the
modern facilities in "I'ehran, food is processed and
packaged under h\ givnic onditions. but these
operations are the exception to th(� rule. 1 rinciti\e
marketing conditions in most areas are it major health
problem. kith foodstuffs nornmllc being displaced ill
the open air, subject to c�ontamhuition be dirt, insects,
and i andling be customers. Poor sanitarc conditions
in nearlc all parts of the counlrc contribute direc�tic to
the high incidence of' gastrointestinal auul other
ailnceuts.
1 he registration of diseases nocchern� approaches
completeness. but health authorities list gastrointes-
tinal disorders. infiuvimi, trachoma and outer eve
infections� malaria. tuberculosis. sync� real diseases.
measles, ncunps, and whooping, cough as major Health
problems. Other \\idespread diseases include lcp lJoid
and paratyphoid fever, diphtheria. scarlet fever.
pohom\ mviiingitis. leprosc, and bviminthiasis.
:\(cording to health officials. childhood diseases \.ere
the leading cause of death in the late I960's. follm\vd
be gastrointestinal ailments and n spiratorc diseases.
mthough therc has been a substantial increase in
the muncher of ncedica and paramc(lic�al personnel
since 1960. lhec arc still in short sup>p!\. except in
Tehran. \(�cording to it press account. earl\ ill 1972
the c�ountn had nonce 8.970 phcsic�ians. or rouglik I
for (�cerc i. )00 inhabitants. In 1960. the ratio \vas 1 for
ecerc I.100. \Ilnost half of the c�onntrc's nu�dic�al
doctors are located in the 'Fehran area. ho\\ecer. and
auodwr 25`'i practice in other major cities. No more
than one (mirth lice in s :hall towns and villages, but
even this proportion indicates signific�alit progress in
,Ific�ial efforts to bring mvdic�al care to the conntrc's
rural residents. Ice 1962. for exancple, onlc an
estimated iii of all physicians prac�ticvd in the
nation's Small towns and villages. Financial
incbic�ements to those killing to practice in the
comitreside having met with limited response� the
government rcm\c drafts doctors for service in rural
areas or makes such service a requirement for those
echo obtain their medical schooling at government
y5
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expense. Not all ph in the rural areas are
happy with these arrangements, and some are reported
to be lax in the performance of their duties as it result.
As of 1970, ubott 439r* of Iranian physicians haul
been educated within the country, the rest being
graduates of medical schools in at least 19 different
countries. In general, locally trained doctors lack the
professional Qualifications of those trained in the
\Vest. \Medical training in Iran is regarded as poor;
classrooms are crowded, and the curriculttu
emphasizes lectures with little practical application.
Few students are able to read foreign-language
medic;d literature, 1111( little medical literature is
available in Persian. Each year. a number of Imni;n
students pursue medical studies abroad, but nnuv of
those who graduate remain in the country ill which
they were trained. It reported in 1970, for
example, that there. were Nearly 2,500 Iranian
physicians practicing in the United states and West
Germany ;done.
According to World Health Organization (WIIO)
statistics for 1970, there were 1,630 dentists. 1,002
veterinarians, 3,166 pharmacists, I,571 midwives,
2,888 nurses. 609 assistant midwives, and 5.97 -1
assistant nurses in Iran.
During the gars 1958 -69, the number of hospitals
in [ran more than doubled and the number of hospital
beds rose from 20,345 to 27,424. Nonetheless, new
construction during the period no more than kept pace
with population growth. the bed -to- population ratio
(1.0 per 1,000) being the same in 1968 as it was in
1958. According to at statement by the shah early in
1971, however, the number of beds at that tine
approximated 35,000, or 1.2 per 1,000 population, and
the Fourth Development Ilan calls for 45,000 beds by
,March 1973 If this goal is reached. the bed -to-
population ratio will be 1.3 per 1,000, it figure still
inferior to that of :1(l and of Turkey, but far superior
to the ratios prevailing in I'akistan ;ud Afghanistan.
As of 1968. almost Al of Iran's ho -itals were
located in trba n centers, and over -10''(' of the total
number of beds were in the Tehran area alone. (+1_' v
27 hospitals were designated as rural, and these
institutions had an average of only 20 beds each. The
(list ri bit tion of hospital beds by type of hospital
facility for 1968 is shown in the follmving tabulation:
26
Hospitals are operated by various govenu,e(jt
entities, including the Social Insurance Org mizaliou
(sl()), andl also by universities, private firms. and
religiodu and welfare organizations, including the lied
Lion aTtdl still Society (I1I.ss). Iran's eOuivalent of the
Red Cross. Conditions in Iran's hospitals vary \yidely.
sonic of the larger facilities, particularly those
affiliale(1 with a universih, arc generally well
eOUippe(I ull(1 adlecluately staffed. \lost smaller
hospitals, however, lack many of the basic necessities
and are overcrowded and understaffed.
According to the Shah. Iran had some 2.500 health
clinics and dispensaries early ill 1971, as compared
\yith 1.100 in 1962 and 550 in 1958. \Moreover, there
are some 5O0 mobile health units. \-tally of the health
facilities in rural areas are staffed in part b numbers
of the health Corps.
2. Diet and nutrition (U /OL')
The production of foodstuffs has kept pace with the
increase ill the population since the ,id- 1950's, but
the nutritional levels of the Iranian people have risen
only slightly. \Moreover, such improvement as has
been effected has been prinwrily Odantilaliye rather
thou Oualilalive. Although starvation is not a
problem, of the population is malnourished and
the typical diet is unbalanced, being Iigh in
carbohydrates and low in such protective u,trients as
protein. yitansins, and ,inerals. Deficiencies in
protein of animal origin, vitamin A. yila,in C.
riboflavin, calcicn and iron are particularly marked.
Poor nutrition comtbilles with popular ignorance of
food values to produce a high incidence of infant
a(jenia, night blindness, pellagra, rickets, and scurvy.
Chronic malnutrition is a major cause of Io\V
productivity among logy- income families.
In general, persons lining in the northwestern part of
the country have a more varied and nutritious diet
than those \yho live ill the food deficit areas of central
and southeastern Iran. \Middle and upper class
elements in the northwest have access to many kinds
of food. and their diet is generally the hest in the
country. In rural .areas, the diet varies with the seasons.
the intake of calories dleclining from it high in late
summer to it Irny in late inter and early spring. Near
fa,sine conditions often occur aniong rural residents in
Baluchestam vu sistan and in areas along the Persian
Gulf. The noma(lic population subsists almost wholly
ot cereals and products from their herds.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, which has set the food rcquirenu for countries
like Iran at 2,400 calories per day, per capita
consumption of calories in the country stood at 1.950
in the mid- 1960's. it is believed to have risen slightly
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N v.nsex
TYPE OF FACILITY
NumnEn
OF 111i1)s
General hospitals
331
18,846
Tuberculosis sanatoriums
9
3,516
Mental institutions
10
2,090
Maternity hospitals
1:3
1,046
Leprosariunss
677
552
Pediatric hospitals
8
Rural hospitals
27
552
Narcotics addiction center
1
145
26
Hospitals are operated by various govenu,e(jt
entities, including the Social Insurance Org mizaliou
(sl()), andl also by universities, private firms. and
religiodu and welfare organizations, including the lied
Lion aTtdl still Society (I1I.ss). Iran's eOuivalent of the
Red Cross. Conditions in Iran's hospitals vary \yidely.
sonic of the larger facilities, particularly those
affiliale(1 with a universih, arc generally well
eOUippe(I ull(1 adlecluately staffed. \lost smaller
hospitals, however, lack many of the basic necessities
and are overcrowded and understaffed.
According to the Shah. Iran had some 2.500 health
clinics and dispensaries early ill 1971, as compared
\yith 1.100 in 1962 and 550 in 1958. \Moreover, there
are some 5O0 mobile health units. \-tally of the health
facilities in rural areas are staffed in part b numbers
of the health Corps.
2. Diet and nutrition (U /OL')
The production of foodstuffs has kept pace with the
increase ill the population since the ,id- 1950's, but
the nutritional levels of the Iranian people have risen
only slightly. \Moreover, such improvement as has
been effected has been prinwrily Odantilaliye rather
thou Oualilalive. Although starvation is not a
problem, of the population is malnourished and
the typical diet is unbalanced, being Iigh in
carbohydrates and low in such protective u,trients as
protein. yitansins, and ,inerals. Deficiencies in
protein of animal origin, vitamin A. yila,in C.
riboflavin, calcicn and iron are particularly marked.
Poor nutrition comtbilles with popular ignorance of
food values to produce a high incidence of infant
a(jenia, night blindness, pellagra, rickets, and scurvy.
Chronic malnutrition is a major cause of Io\V
productivity among logy- income families.
In general, persons lining in the northwestern part of
the country have a more varied and nutritious diet
than those \yho live ill the food deficit areas of central
and southeastern Iran. \Middle and upper class
elements in the northwest have access to many kinds
of food. and their diet is generally the hest in the
country. In rural .areas, the diet varies with the seasons.
the intake of calories dleclining from it high in late
summer to it Irny in late inter and early spring. Near
fa,sine conditions often occur aniong rural residents in
Baluchestam vu sistan and in areas along the Persian
Gulf. The noma(lic population subsists almost wholly
ot cereals and products from their herds.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, which has set the food rcquirenu for countries
like Iran at 2,400 calories per day, per capita
consumption of calories in the country stood at 1.950
in the mid- 1960's. it is believed to have risen slightly
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Eggs
Milk
Fats and oils
Fish
Meat
Fruits and nuts
Vegetables
Sugar
Wheat
Rice
Other grains
Grains 62.5
).2
Insignificant
FIGURE 20. Per capita consumption of calories (U /OU)
since that time. Grains account for almost fi i'i of the
total caloric intake, yvill, wheat alone making up
almost in contrast, meats comprise about `Vi of
the total (Figure 20). Protein intake in the ntid- 1960's
%vas estimated at 52.1 grants per capita per day, only
2251 yyas of animal origin.
The basic diet for most Iranians consists of wheat
bread, goat cheese or yogurt, and sugared tea,
supplemented in season by fruits and vegetables. In
the Caspian Sea area, rice is custoinarily substituted
for bread. Per capita consumption of rlleat is N W.
N1 utton and goat nu�at are most c�oninumly consumed,
although sonic beef. veal. and poultry is eaten.
Because of the Islamic proscription, pork is rarely a
part of the diet. Fish is normally consumed only by
persons living near the Caspian Sca or the Persian
Calf, and not in large quantities. I rails and nuts are
popular, the foriner include apples, melons, oranges,
grapes, dates, and figs. Cucumbers. tom a
atoes, bens,
and peas ;re c�omnion vegetables.
The I ood and Nutrition Institute, established ill
1961. is charted with responsibility for raising the
dietary level of the poptilalion. Sonic� of the irstitrrtc's
programs are designed to make Iranians aware of food
values: others seek to alleviate nutritional deficiencies
by enriching foods, such as w1wat flotir.
3. Housing C' /OC')
Iran's housing stock ranges front the rustic to the
luxuriotis (Figure 21 but only a small segment of the
population is adetluatel\ housed. Tlly typical clyvelling
unit is built of primitive inulcrials, is overcrowded,
lucks ventilation, and is larger' devoid of modern
sanitary and other conveniences. furthermore, the
shortage of housing is acute in urban areas, where
borne constructions has not kept (lace with population
growth. Iran's housing problem is of such magnitude
that official efforts to alleviate it have bud almost no
impact. The government has built homes for civil
servants, hits constructed it I'cw love -cost housing
projects, and has increased funds it vai l bi,� to the
Mortgage Rank of Iran, but it relies heavily on private
initiative for home construction. In some areas where
no potential for private iti estnit�nl exists, however, the
goycrnmu�nl has agreed to finance a limited uriniber of
honks. Operating through the Ministry of {lousing
and Developinent. established in 196 -1, it is also
atlen,t,ting to pronio le higher standards in home
construction and to enc�utirage the building of larger
dwellings (I-'inure 22).
-lost of the nearly -1 million dwelling units counted
in the 1966 census were made of brick, usually kiln
(ired brick in urban areas :tr.d sun -dried rnndbrick in
the cotrnlrvside. I ewer than I of all units were nt
of rvinforced concrete but this construction r? �d is
becoming inure popular for new house iiic cin
Wood or stone construction is euc, ,ect in some
rural areas. 'traditional urban honks are one- or lyvo-
story dwellings, illevitably with it walled courtyard.
Two or more families, each ith its oven private room
or roonis. may share the same unit and u the
common courtyard. Windo%\s and doors in the
dwelling open only onto the courtyard, whoa�
entnutc�eway is secured by heavy yvooden doors. Many
urban residents, partictilarly recent ntis, rants front the
countryside, live in shacks which then have built for
themselves of whatever scrap material was available.
The typical rural house is it simple stnic�ture,
c�onunonly built of mudbric�k or wood and straw orals.
Mudbrick dwellings are the norm in those arid areas of
the c�ourltry where limber is scarce. Mong the Caspian
coast, houses are conslrtic,ed of wood. niudbrick. or it
c�oritbinatiou of the two. Thalc�h roofs are coninion in
this area. Near Tabri brick homes predominate. The
nomadic peoples live in tents. lu the west and south
these tents are usually rectangular; the 'hirkonian of
the northeast and the Shahs,tvan of the northwest
cfvvell in yurts, circular structures, easily disassembled,
that consist of felt strips stretched over a disntotnttable
Wooden intinew'ork.
Overcrowding is customary except in the Domes of
the well- to -do. Houses are tvpic�ally small. with rural
homes being smaller than those ill the cities� as silo\vn
ill the folluvying tabulation which gives the percentage
2;
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1007,

Typical mudb, ick and thatch but of the Caspian area (C)
iK w:' -rte:.
r
-�r
Typical village housing in the southeast. Roofs are
vaulted because of the scarcity of timber. (U /OU)
/k?r` .T a
Circular y u t o; the nomadic Shahsavan iribespeople (C)
Rectangular tent of Kurdish nomads. Tents normally
are woven of goats' hair. Reed mats are used as room
dividers and to create storage areas adjacent to the
tent. (C)
a--
Modern housing in Tehran. Multistory apartments do
not yet have wide appeal. (C)
1 ZIUIWIEPI O' 111015MW AW JIMNOEWc,5' o
Traditional urban dwellings, Ahvaz. Courtyards, which
provide a degree of privacy, are used for cooking and
other family activities. (U /OU)
FIGURE 21. REPRESENTATIVE HOUSING
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Brick and thatch d=welling and outbuildings, Gilan
Province (U /OU)

FIGURE 22. Poor housing in Hamadan (U /OU)
distribution of total permanent dwelling units in 1966
by number of rooms:
In 1966, Iranian households ayeragcd five persons.
The average nun)ber of persons per roon) was 2.3. hilt
this figure masked the fact that about two- fifths of all
households lived in one -roon structures and that
another one -third lived in two -room d\yellings. More
than 9,000 fanlilics of eight or snore nuvmbcrs lived in
one -roon) houses. In both urban and rural areas,
kitchens are unc�onunon. Cooking is clone outdoors
(Figure 23).
"I'hc nuljority of hones in Iran have few amenities.
In 1966, only 25.4" of all permanent dwellings
(68.6 /o in urban areas and in the countryside)
were served by electricity. As shown in the fo slowing
tabulation, 13.1 9 of all units had piped water within
the d\\�ciling; most of these were in urban centers:
U lMAX
RURAL
ALL
Roofs
C \ITS
UNITS
t: NITS
1
9.8
30.1
23.3
2
26.5
30.9
29.5
:3
20.6
15.S
17.�1
4
18.8
9.8
12.:S
5
9.9
4.8
6.5
6 or more
1.1.4
8.6
10.5
In 1966, Iranian households ayeragcd five persons.
The average nun)ber of persons per roon) was 2.3. hilt
this figure masked the fact that about two- fifths of all
households lived in one -roon structures and that
another one -third lived in two -room d\yellings. More
than 9,000 fanlilics of eight or snore nuvmbcrs lived in
one -roon) houses. In both urban and rural areas,
kitchens are unc�onunon. Cooking is clone outdoors
(Figure 23).
"I'hc nuljority of hones in Iran have few amenities.
In 1966, only 25.4" of all permanent dwellings
(68.6 /o in urban areas and in the countryside)
were served by electricity. As shown in the fo slowing
tabulation, 13.1 9 of all units had piped water within
the d\\�ciling; most of these were in urban centers:
Household furnishings are spartan; household
equipment is limited to necessary utensils for cooking.
Only in the homes of the well-to-do arc such iten)s as
refrigerators and electrical labor- saying appliances
found.
4. Work opportunities and conditions (C)
a. Ae people and icon:
Despite rapid urhao gro\\tll and industrialization,
the singly largest c�ontingcnl of \\orker, (cstim- tcd al
nearl\' 1i`,r of' the labor force ill 19 2) remains in
agric�ulturc or stoc�kraising. onc�c the nations le;ldiug
economic actiyilics. Largcl\ hecause of the rugged
terrain, meager water supplies, and pour and crodiug
soil, c�onditio ns of \cork and of life ill general .irc harsh
in the rural sector. In an effort to print; ahoul
improvenuvut while sinlultaneousl\ disulanding an
archaic pattern of laud tcnurc, the goycnnncul has
enacted a program of land redistrihntion: additional
I\', it hasextended the irrigation net\\ork. intro(Inc�ed a
limited amount of mechanization, and I)ro\'ided Soule
technical assistance to farmers. \oncthcicss, the land
reform program has not proved to he a panac�ca and
primitive niethods of cultivation :Intl aniulal
husbandry t)crsist (I`igurc 2 -1). Thus, in overpopulated
agricultural districts, adjustnnents in land tcnllrc and
applications of technology hays not signific�antl\
altered a situation in MiiCll most falrnliug families
nlllst choose pct \Veen o \'erellltl \':ltloll, \\'hleh over lht'
long nun is attended h\ a stagnation or decline ill
production, and migration to the to\vus and cities. A
third alternative. the cultivation of spcc�iaiicd crops
for distant markets, is largclN' infeasible ill vie\\' of the
inadequac�., of the natio!-'s transportation and
":r L
FIGURE 23. Because most homes lack kitchens, food is
commonly pre,ared outdoors. The Yamut woman above
is baking bread, T;.a staple of the Iranian diet. (U /OU)
29
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U
RURAL
ALI.
UNITS
UNITS
UNITS
Piped water \vithin dwelling
37.5
0.7
13.1
Piped water outside dwelling
M6
1.6
7.6
No water source on premises
�12.6
97.7
79.3
Household furnishings are spartan; household
equipment is limited to necessary utensils for cooking.
Only in the homes of the well-to-do arc such iten)s as
refrigerators and electrical labor- saying appliances
found.
4. Work opportunities and conditions (C)
a. Ae people and icon:
Despite rapid urhao gro\\tll and industrialization,
the singly largest c�ontingcnl of \\orker, (cstim- tcd al
nearl\' 1i`,r of' the labor force ill 19 2) remains in
agric�ulturc or stoc�kraising. onc�c the nations le;ldiug
economic actiyilics. Largcl\ hecause of the rugged
terrain, meager water supplies, and pour and crodiug
soil, c�onditio ns of \cork and of life ill general .irc harsh
in the rural sector. In an effort to print; ahoul
improvenuvut while sinlultaneousl\ disulanding an
archaic pattern of laud tcnurc, the goycnnncul has
enacted a program of land redistrihntion: additional
I\', it hasextended the irrigation net\\ork. intro(Inc�ed a
limited amount of mechanization, and I)ro\'ided Soule
technical assistance to farmers. \oncthcicss, the land
reform program has not proved to he a panac�ca and
primitive niethods of cultivation :Intl aniulal
husbandry t)crsist (I`igurc 2 -1). Thus, in overpopulated
agricultural districts, adjustnnents in land tcnllrc and
applications of technology hays not signific�antl\
altered a situation in MiiCll most falrnliug families
nlllst choose pct \Veen o \'erellltl \':ltloll, \\'hleh over lht'
long nun is attended h\ a stagnation or decline ill
production, and migration to the to\vus and cities. A
third alternative. the cultivation of spcc�iaiicd crops
for distant markets, is largclN' infeasible ill vie\\' of the
inadequac�., of the natio!-'s transportation and
":r L
FIGURE 23. Because most homes lack kitchens, food is
commonly pre,ared outdoors. The Yamut woman above
is baking bread, T;.a staple of the Iranian diet. (U /OU)
29
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s.
r
Peasants harvesting potatoes on a semiarid plain (U /OU)
c
1
4
i
Bakhtiari tribesmen turning the soil. The wide black
trouser is a distinctive item of male apparel among
these seminomadir, people. (U /OU)
FIGURE 24. PRIMITIVE AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES
Because of the poor quality of pastureland, nomadic
herdsmen must forage their livestock over a wide
area (C)
0
nmrketing s\stvws. 'Fliv grneriim ut, uunru'er. hus
given less emphasis to rural cic�\c�lOptnvnl prognuns in
order to cortcculratc its resources ()it nrl,an l)uhlic
\%orks and on e\pmiding the petroleum and :cllied
in(luslrics.
Numerous lunn families ha\c cho�,crt to migrate Hc,
the cities in hope of finding \cork and bctler lining
conditions. Taint\ as a result of this n to vrn let l.
It( \ce\er, the ctrl)im labor pool fits groa ;it it
subst:utt iii ll\ faster rate than job ni)I)orhntilies. \citlt
lfte result Hutt rtnempio: menl and unclrrvncl)lo ment
ha\v soared. Official Ir,tniau estinr,ctcs of the nrhmt
u wmplo\tiwnt ralc in 1972 ranged lwt\svcn 5.5'; to
12.0'(* Imt e%rn the latter prol)orlion is thought to
understate the nmgnihule of the problem.
'['It( rural to iii-ban migration, moreo\rr, has not
sttuslantiall\ relieved unentl1O\meut and ciu-
derentl)lo\tnent in the countnsidc. Acc�or(ling to it
reporf preparccl b. the 11.0 earl\ in 1972. from 2T.S`(
loaf.('' of all igricnlltiral \\orkcrs unentl)lo\(-d.
The extent of rural ctnderemph)c menl. \c hick
fluc�tuiites \cidel\ in .u�cordiiiw \%ith the :cgricttltttral
c�\c�le. isccluall\ lurkc. it not larger. t'nd(
is not ottl\ acme in the rural sc�c�tor. brit it also is
idesl)rcad in (trb:ut areas, us most l)ri\alc c(ntnrc�rc�ial
and service firms are t)vcN.cffcd: it surl)lus of s\orkers.
Imi in the ranks ul the unskilled and
semiskilled. also is hmnd in the civil sere ice ;out in
t;rnerttntcnt ctticrl)rkes. On it uatiotucl u:csis. ;uul
taking into account the impact of both ttnemplo\ nwill
and uncicretnl)lo\nu nt Hincln(ling the large nundwr
persons ,\Ito are on it c�asnal basis it
l'.S. authorit\ has estimated Hutt. as of mid the
1)rot)ortiou of \corkcrs lit \ccre prod ticti\cl\
entl)Ioyed on it lairls regular basis l)roual)Is nu,uuted
to bet\cvvn (ill'; and ,5'c of the labor force.
I.argel\ because of the high rate of Iml)nlation
t;ro\clh and limitations in the c�alr.acit\ of agricullnrc
sfic.1' �n y:' yam.
1.7 w
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tc, abso rb nose workers, prospects fur reducing
runemploX'nteut in the inu11ediate future are dint. :Is
acknowledged in the government's Fiftlt I)eyeloptnent
Plan (21 March 1973-20 March 1978). between 1.3
and 1.5 million jobs, or as many as 300,000 jobs per
year, would have to be generated during the period to
accommodate nc�w entrants into the labor force.
Inasmuch as the preceding plan's goal of creating
200.000 jobs annually appears to have fallen short, it
Can be concluded that full enuplov 11e;t is not %%itbi11
reach and that the rates of unemplu% ment and
underemploy theist %%ill remain high.
In view of it severe competition forjobs among unen
with dependents, the expansion of entplrnnent
opportunities for women, another objective nl'
government planners, nut\ also be elusi\e.:1s of 1972
tncn in the labor force outnumbered women by almost
7 to 1, it ratio that had remained essentially
unchanged since the 1966 census, albeit n,anpc,wer
surreys and censuses alike grossly miderenumente the
extent of participation b\ women, especially as unpaid
family workers in agricultiure and in cottage industries.
While there are more women than nten il it fe%y
occupations, namely nursing. \caving. laundering,
and domestic service, couisiderable opposition exists to
file employment of wonen in jobs outside those fields.
The expansion of modern industries and services,
however, has somewhat undermined this resistance by
creating it de nand for women trained in secretarial
and other office skills or ill social work, and the gro\\fit
Of the educational system has increased opportunities
for women in teaching: nonetheless. as of 1970 abutut
tiOir of all primary school teachers \(-re Wren. ()it the
Other hand, few women have -ittered professional
occupations ill medicine and enginceri ;tg. and 0111\ it
scant number serve as judges, mayors, or village
leaders. Largely reflecting the log\ rate of participation
by women ill blue- collar occupations. m,men
comprised only -Vi of the total number of workers
covered under the S10-administered social insurance
program in 1969.
N'lost of the growth in job oppertunilies during the
1960's and early 1970's occurred in the go\enument
service and in the industrial, construction, and
commercial sectors of the economy. In the \Cars 1966-
72, the government work f()rCe, Comprising all
categories of Civilian eml)1oyees as %-v as ntibtary and
police personnel, increased b\ an average of about
19,000 persons annually, with ratan\ of the mew
entrants placed ill public enterprises and construction
projects. In the latter year, some 955,000 workers, or
almost I 1 3r of the national labor force, \orked for the
government; about two- thirds of these were civilians.
Even thought the low levels of skill that prevail in the
labor force have probably tended to slow the rate oh
industrial expansion, the gre,\th of job opportunities
in certain modern industries bas been similarly
dramatic.
Semiskilled and unskilled personnel conslttute
upward of 90 of the industrial work force.
Na( iou\ide. roughly one -half of' the vmphdo\cd
population is estintu;ted to be illiterate. Ilfiterttes,
however, are more beayil\ concentrated among the
nutks of the unemployed and imdercmpl()yvd;
according to the 1966 census, about 771 of the
unemplo\ed \ere illiterate. LimilAicnts it, the
availabilih and yualit\ of domestic technical "fal
vocational instniction bays forced nunu�rous Irauiahs
to seek such training abroad. Rut, once trained. ntutu\
have failed to return to their homeland. 'Pius. in order
to partially satisfy the need for technicians and other
skilled personnel. fit(- gover tact has found it
necessary to relax its policy of barring the entry of'
alien workers. ;1s of March 1971, some 15.000 aliens
were vmploycd in the country, the vast hulk of them in
positions officially categorized as essential."
Foreigners in "essential" jobs are obliged to train their
Irani.ut Counterparts. While striving to combat
illiteracy acid to oipgrade and expand technical and
vocational training programs, the governincnt and
some of the larger private employers have also
liberalized fringe benefits and instituted other
incentives, including profit sharing and worker
cooperatives. "these measures, designed to increase
productivity, afa) have the purpose of overcoming the
antipathy toward manual labor which is shared b\
many urban workers. cspcciall\ the more highly
educated (Figure 25).
The trend toward modem industrialization
notwithstanding, it majority of mo lit gricrtltural
workers continue to be employed ill small firths,
including cottage industries, where conditions of work
are substandard and the length of the workday often
exceeds statutory limits. Despite its importance, the
petroleum industry, for example, employed only
10,000 workers i1 1972. or about 0.5`,r of the national
labor force. 'Three years earlier. nearly two thirds of all
workers engaged in the manufacturing and processing
industries ;worked in firms having fever than 10
cmployecs, as indicated by the following distribution
of places of employment and workers according to
plant size:
NUMBER PEMC?NTACE PEttCE\TACE
OF WORKERS OF PLANTS OF WORKERS
9 or less 97.1 63.7
10 -49 2.5 12.5
50 or more 0.4 23.5
All workers 100.0 100.0
31
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The poor working, conditions that prevail in the small
establishments, combined with widespread inef-
ficiency, it lack of worker discipline. the use of
antiquated ecluipnu�nt, and high rates of ennployee
absenteeism. result in low productivity. kcc()rdinQ to
an analysis of produc�tiyit\, snore than t\%o- thirds of
the nations industrial output enrtnales from the
larger hrnns k 1 or nwre work(-rs), \yhich cmuI)rise OitI
;,bout :'Vi of the total number of plants and ennploy
li of the total industrial labor force.
h. labor legislation
Although it applies to only it small segment of the
work force, Iran's labor legislation is progressive. The
Labor Law of 1059. which has been amended to
broaden provisions concerning conditions of work,
especially as lhcy relate to industrial safety, is the basic
piece of' labor legislation. Essentially applicable to
Brits in the industrial and fim(lern (-oil unercial sectors
i2
e:1
ui,l\ the last does not corer agricultural \t
einpaid Ifaniil\ \corkers, the self- cnnple,\ed, and civil
servants. Mtho sigh it provides for it 6 dat. 18 hour
\\()rk\teek, moist \%hite cull.(, erniplu\ees (Irk 5 i'l
dais, the length ul' the \tork(Liy living viirtailcd mi
Thursdays. Mau\ unskilled blue cellar \torkers, un the
other hand. Mork 60 hours or more per \\cek, while
semiskilled \\orkers average about 5 -1 hours. Frid.t\ is
the day of rest, and 1:3 legal holidays ore obsenecl
\early. Up to .1 hours of (wertime \\c,rk per da) are
atitborized. at 35"1 abosr the basic %\age. Exccpt for
\%esk(-rs in the petroleunn industry, then, arc no
1)rovisions for ad(Icd connpensaliou fur uighlttork.
Workers must he granted a maxitnum of 12 dais of
paid leave per var, and, here clinrttic conditions are
h arsh. workers receivv t\\ic�e that antomit. FI nplu\ers
are obliged to provide adequate sanitation facilities
and enu�rgcnc\ nu�clical treatment. to practice, sums
(,f the lurgr culerprises provide orkerenefits bcnn(I
those required b\ law; the petroleunn c�ontpa nics. for
example, pad IS5'(' above the regular wage rates for
overtime work and provide 120 days of annual leave.
:unverscly, mane ()f the smaller concerns do not abide
by the reclttirctuents, particularly insofar as working
hours and safety practiecs ore c�unc�enied.
Pro isions pertaining to the ennplovm(�nt of wonnen
and children are ills(, contained in the Labor
Persons tinder 18 and wonn�n are nut authorized to
engage in nighhvork, and children raider 12 cannot be
legally eniph)\vd. iolations of the latter regulation
have been cununonplace. hoverer. ,.ZIt' -r11v in the.
privately owned c�arpet\\cavitng and r. -xtiIc c
Inents. many of which haye brenl�r� k k lited loll �Ile
infractions. While the I,va) IIIlllill MI, a_1e tc
ntenls and stipillatinm` t'ttlll4 \orkiti; cnrv"'1(ills
are generally n Ise r\ciI III ;I \t,1'llllli'0l workhtII H �sl
carpet it textile prod "Itiir-,1 fro iii ;I\alc
establishments, including (:unlit 41( If),- a I.o child
labor is an ;ancient and widespreaq,pr.tc.ti(.v "Ith il"ll
they are particularly c�onspic�nons Ili (iic %%vvving
industries, minors also arc employed in IIunneroIis
other act iyitics trquiring it wide range of skills (Figure
26). :fin estimated 8-8.000 children age 10 -11, a
substantial proportion of therm tinder age 12. were
employed in 1972.
The� Labor Lary c�nntains an unusual provision
which prohibits worker dismissals unless the ennpl(, er
is able to place the discharged worker in it job
providing equal or better pay and other benefits. The
provision has given rise to nunnerotis disputes between
labor and managenicnt. 'I'c, avoid compliance.
vniploycrs often hire workers under short term
contracts or for probationary periods. Although
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FIGURE 25. Petroleum refinery workers. Such workers
represent one of the most highly skilled and best paid
groups. (U /OU)

FIGURE 26. CHILD LABOR (U /OU)
govern 11)(.nt- operrted employnwnt exchanges were
establish(.d ill the main cities in accordance with the
law, mast recruiting and hiring is done by word of
mouth, oftefr using the services of labor brokers and
recruiters who frequent the bazaars.
Millirnum wage legislation was first enacted ill
1946, but was not enforced until 1969, when wag(.
schedules v;ere proniirlgated. Inasmuch as skilled
workers nornially are paid wags abov the ncinincunc
levels, unskilled laborers outside fancily enterprises
constitute the hulk of those be11(.fiting franc the law. In
fact, at the lime the wage schecicrles went into effect
about 75Si of all workers earned wages higher than the
ncinimum rates. Taking into account regional
variations ill the cost of living, the joinincunc \yuge
schedules are reviewed and adjtcsted every 2 years if
necessary. As of `larch 19i I, following thv first
increase in minimunc wages, the rats were fixed al
Ills60, Ills65. and Ills70. respectively, in (.uch of the
nations's thine wage zones. 'I'lle highest ncinimum
wage applies to worker, in /,on(. 1, which comprises
the capital and other major urban areas; second;nry
cities are generally covered render Zone 2, while Zor4c
mainly contains provincial towns and yill;tbe..
In accordance with the Profit Sharing Act of 1963,
industrial workers other than railroad and public
utility (.mPIMT('s 111(1 those in the petrolvurn
cornpa11ics ncusl share in employer profits uP to it
R
T
I
maxincum of 20Si of each cslablishrnenl's 11(.t
earrings. The goyernrn(.cct has esti11urt(.d that as of
acid -1972 nearly 280,000 workers in both the public
a11d the private sectors shur(.d in profits. Although
governn ent officials have widely publicized the
i Ill plernerrtaliorc of the act. there have been
indications that many workers were not receiving the
frill anunnrts to Nyhich they were (.mined. Mainly
because of this, it 11(.w hill designed to tighten the
regulations a11(1 to broaden the scope of the basic ;.let
was being prepared in 1972. Under the proposed
legislation, workers in establishments haying 10 or
more eniplovees would he entitled to share in profits.
I'll(- goveru11enl has estimated that 500.000 workers
Will b(. affected by the new law. Another provision of
the la\y authorizes the goyernncent to sell shares in the
ownership of public enterprises to individual workers.
T1Iv IMinis Iry of Labor and Social Affairs is
responsible for (.nforcing the labor legislation.
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Many youngsters perform simpie tasks, such as sooing
tobacco at a curing barn
'Young boy engraving a silver vessel with the aid of
a primitive type of lathe. Whether in silversmithing or
carpet weaving, children's small fingers are said to
facilitate the elaboration of intricate designs, despite
the use of crude working tools.

Compliance with health and safely sta id; rds is
superyise(I by the Ministry's inspection corps, the
effcctiyeuess of which is said to be hampered by it
shortage of adequately trained personnel. Before they
begin operations all ne\yly organized firsts must be
approved by inspectors. The fey qualified inspectors
carry out their work mainly in the lame� modern
establishments, where the\ focus on compliance with
industrial safety practices. Working conditions are said
to be good in such concerns, especially in those
operated by foreign companies. In many of the small
shops, on the other hand, conditions are poor, largely
because the operators are unable or unwilling to abide
by the health and safety rtsgljl;otions. In addition, the
Workers' logy level of edut-Mil It is a handicap to them
in understanding the complex provisions. Collective
bargaining over profit sharing, for instance, is
frequently delayed because workers and managers
alike are (enable to apple the formulas used in
determining each worker's share. Employees,
moreover, are generally not safety conscious an(I
frequently violate existing rules.
Civil service legislation haw tad for10 years, but
regulations concerning tht L-tus anel rights of
government workers are (hPivially acknowledged to be
chaotic." Part of dtr problem result, from the
numerous categories and subeategorics of vrnplos ment
contained within the wirvice. Five hills designed to
reform and rationalize the t :tv it Service were
introduced in parliament during the 1960'x. One of
these, known as the cavil Service Code, was
conditionally approved in 1966 and delivered for use
on an experimental basis prior to receiving final
sanction. A lengthy and comprehensive document. the
code at last report had not been fully implemented or
finally approved. :Among other provisions, it
recognizes two categories of employment, est:abdishe(I
and contractual; prescribes the use of entrance
examinations in recruiting; re(li ires at uniform pay
schedule: stipulates that salaries shall be adjusted in
accordance with changes in the cost of living: and lists
various types of fringe benefits, the cumulative value
of which is not allowed to exceed the amount of salary.
c. Nibor and management
Although not permitting the emergence of if
genuinely free labor movement, the government, in
keeping with its (development objectives, has allowed
sorne workers to organize into syn(licates wbi(�h
represent their interest before management. Tltc
syndicates, evolved from ancient guilds of craftsmen,
artisans, and tradesneii, generally represent workers
employed in the sane occupation or in it single place
3-1
of enrploynu�nt. In surer� instalices, individual
organizations have combine(] to fern, regional
"unions," which are also structured along oc�c�upa-
tional lines; it addition, the government has held out
the possibility of alloying the formation of labor
federations \yhicli would operate at the national level.
Althou gh Iron is it charter nu nrbcr of Hit 3 1 1 .0 and
some of the c�onntry's labor organization 1k. r been
affiliated with international lades entities ,q;tr past,
lire government has restricted labors c�xterimI
acliyitics since t1le late I950's. Labor delegates
selected by the government attend I I.O nreetirtgs 111)(1
serve as nonmember observers at activities of such
groups as the International Confederation of Free
Trade l'nions (ICFT1.I) zi nc] the International
Federation of Ictroletim and Chcntic�al Workers. The
government also maintains close surveillance over the
domestic activities of labor groups, and only those
certified with the National Intelligeuc�e 1111(1 Security
Organization (SAVAK) are permitted to function.
The government's police toward labor organizations
has been conditioned by its experiences with the
Con,n,unist oriented unions thin funned during and
after World War II, when Soviet forces occupied
r�rthern Irma. At that time. the svildic'i'lle" t;!'lo;l
into the G.; once] Councc4r rr) l l'lllt' lliutts,
which was suppressed as part Iti:a geuvral l'I'UCto \t1
nn leftist elements (lurira.g the years 19. 1-) 1
Unaffiliated Communist t,\ Iltlicales, lro\xrxet
continued to operate for it few )!rrti f1wreafler. dun'9
which time the government enc�our iler, the worker. and the
Ministr of Labor and Social Affairs. Collec�'iye
.lisp(tt(.s arc subject to prelinci lit r negotia n
tios
bOween representatives cf labor and nt:uutgement: if
the parties are unable to arrive at i t seftlrrnent, the
dispute is referred to i t tripartite arbitration board. The
terns of settlerment are ultinutte�ly sufj(.e�t le the
approval of the Xlinistry of Labor and Social Affairs.
In practice, the neinistr usually intcnenes and
dictates a settlement When :ut industrial dispute-
tim-itens !fie public interest or wli. -n the issues at hand
affect workers throughout an entire sector of industr.
Since 1964 the government has been Icgall\
empowered to ass(tnu� the nucu:cgetment of concerns
that are shirt down by strikes or industrial disputes.
At the initiative of the more active syn(lic�ates, labor
lisputcs have tended to concentrate on issues designed
to bring about the enforcement of the labor statutes.
As a customary tactic. syndicate spokesmen proclaim
their support e >f the Shahs rnodcrnization goals ill the
face of opposition by 'reactionar' c�ntplowers.
usually attempting to apply remedial nuasur (.s to the
grievances expressed by organized workers, tit(.
government generally uses forceful inferv(.ntion only
its it last resort, or to curb unauthorized political
activities, flaying condcnrrud labor unrest. in 1971
the governuceut annouue�ed that se�ve�re� r:u�asures
would be tak (.t :(.gains! facture cpercturs who
interfered with the itnplenrc�ntaticn of its socioeco-
uoncic' prcgr:urs, its atutcntuceuetct %%acs prontptc�(i b\
it series of costly labor stoppages. scrtcc� of then
attended by yicleuc�c. lu some instances, such as the
strike by textile ncill enplMees ill April 1071, the�
govencmcvtl bas order(�(] management to tncv t the
wcrkc�rs' major demands. Government intercession ill
that particidar episode followed it yioleut cmdrenta-
liou bctweeu the strikers and local police and resulted
in the arrest of the plant manager ou of
inc�ititg a riot. In an earlier strike, whicl, invoked
petr(deum workers at the :Abadan refiner. tie
goyernmenl threatened workers with severe conse-
quences if the y did not call off the strike and ordered
nc:uiagetneut to provide full pa> for all workers during
the 2-week duration of the stoppage. lit addition to
these major strikes, there It ne been numerous lesser
Mills. inc�lucling some that were nut authorized b\
syndicate leaders. \4ost have been pnmptk settled
i Ahming intervention by officials of the Minisin of
Labor and Soc�i:d `\ffairs. The ministry's intercessions,
mo reoyer, have tended to favor the workers, whose
demands are almost always al least partially met.
Employers' syndicates. which numbered (i0 in 1971,
represent the interests of uuutag(.mc nt. The Council of
Owners of Induslrics and the Truck Owners and
Transportation Synclic�atc. both of wbic�h operate in
Tehran. as w(.II as lit(. I ?sfuhan "Textile Indnstn
Syndicate� are among the must important. Entre-
preueitrial interests are represented by tlu� approx-
imatel} 4,000- 11em1wr Chamber of (:mntnerce,
Ind list ries, aucl dines whicfi operates at the national
Ic y(.I and bas offices in the capital and 18 other cities.
Small- scale tradesmen, shopkeepers, and artisans have
traditionally belonged to guilds, the nu�mbership of
which bas been declining. Neither the chambers nor
the guilds, however, usually become entangled in the
problems of labor relations. The c�barnbers serve as
fonurts for exchanging business and technical
information, \fill(. tic guilds represent th(.i; members'
interests before the gc vvnum�nt and the� public;
additionally. the guilds establish standards of yualit\
and provide welfarc and burial services for their
numbers. In 1970 sonic� 1 10 guilds, representing about
1:20,000 members. were affiliated with Tehran's lligb
Ceuncil of Guilds. Although the guilds are ostensibly
apolitical, they arc said to wield considerable
influence in politics, especially at the local Iey(.I. klosl
officials rf guild high councils, in Tehran Mid other
cities, are Iran Novin supporters.
i:5
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S. Social security
a. Welfare services (1701
Although tilt- govenant-nt is gradually extending
modern wt-lfare servic�t-s, progress is retarded, ill part.
by it popular disposition to ascribe personal hardships
to fate, or lagdir, and by the paramount role the
family plays in attt-nding to needy individcals,
including the infirm, elderly, orphaned, and dt-stitute.
According to tht- Islamic faith, moreover, alnsgiving is
cnnsidewd a ft-ndamentall olligation. Consequently,
much charitable work is supported through it network
of trust funds, or vukaf, operating within the
institutional franw of Islam. lm times of natural
disaster. Iranians of all classes have responded readily
to appeals for collective assistance to rclievt- the plight
of victims.
Tliv government began to establish sonu� welfare
programs in tht- 1920's, during t1w reign of lieza Shah.
Since that tint-, members of the imperial family have
been personally involved, as sponsors and donors, in
various welfare activitit-s. Much of the crowns support
for those endeavors is c�hannt-wd through the fi1.SS
and the Imperial Organization for Social St-mices
(loss), although the� latter of the two agencies derives
most of its mvenue from the proc�evds of it nalionwidt-
lottery. Largvly because of lht- imperial family's
longstanding involvement in charity work and welfare
projects, mane people have cunt- to regard all public
sociot-c�onomic bclterment as personal gifts from the
Shah. In addition to being endowt-d directly by the
crown, many private charitable organizations receive
subsidies from the� central govenaraent. [n the public
sector, nmnic�ipalities are le �dly required to pt-rforn
certain welfare functions, including th.� operation of
orphanages, nurse�rie�s, and winter hostels for the
indigent. In 1970, 10 such facilities were operated by
the municipality of 'Tehran.
Founded in 19.12 as the first secular organization of
its type. the RLSS, whost- honorary pmsident is (ht-
Shah. is t1w nation's most important welfare and
charity ageru�y. Besides administvring hospitals and
lwalth dispensaries, the soc�icty operates it variety of
other facilities, including child wvlfary centers, it
whabilitation center for traraIyzed children,
orphanages, and it workshop for manufacturing
artificial limbs. The Association for Protection of Deaf
and Dumb Children is supported by the RLSS, as is u
south wrvice club which had it nt-tnbc�r: hip of X30,00(1
in 1970. An affiliate of the Internatioual lied gross
and Red Crescent Societies, the RLSS played a major
role� in coordinating and t-fft-eting relief operations
6
foll(ming, the earthquakes ill Khorasan (116S) and
Fars (1972) and the floods in Kbuzestan (191=9).
'rhe loss, an agency upe-atirrg under the patroragre�
of Princess Ashraf, the Shah's sister, Specializes ill
providing health care and guiclanev un sanitary
practices to hm- itcume families through it network of,
hospitals, c�linic�s, atd dispensaries. Additionally, it
maintains two rehabilitation r +r, for opium
addicts. Established in 00-11 IN, ;tlicn also
operates several so.hwlh bit If- surcu� nurses,
underprivileged (.11110 pp �'11d i aocl
administers the largest f411111 111 4KH
country Another entity Ilk; lj,jjF,e% I ce11111111111111 a t*
established and perpelulli\ 11w 41 /'A+ani
1 The foundaliva, l of
t-duc�ational mid cultural actiy+tu some of them
revenue producing, as well its the Farah Pahlavi
Charity Organization, which, in turn, operates 70
child ,%elfare institutions of various types. A nunl r of
additional agencies specialize in cl :'d care. These
include the National Association Protection of
Children. %%hich maintains centers for the care and
instruction of retarded or otherwke handic�appc�d
youngsters and. in collabora witl t1w R.SS and
CAIIE. supports it school lunch program; the Mother
and Infants Protection Institute-, %%hich receives it
substantial portion of its income from a special tux on
motion picture tickets. and the Association for the
Guidance and Support of Deficient Children. Other
leading wdfare agencies incline the Society for the
Protection of Lepers, the Anti Tuberculosis Soc�it-th.
the National Societe for Campaign Against Cancer,
the� National Society for the Protection of t1w Agcd.
the� Association for the Support of Inyaalid Persons, and
the Soc�ivt for :kid to Prisoners.
Conct-rttratcd in the capital and other large cities,
the welfare institutions are not readily acct-ssiblc to u
large wginent of the population. Rehabilitation
services for the bandic�apped, for instance. are
unavailably outside Tehran. and onc- fourth of all
fanily counst-ling agc�ncit-s arc located in the capital.
,lidditionally, the quality of welfarc services is
deficient. Whether public or private, t1w effectivt-ness
of wvlfarc seryiues is hampered b\ poor planning and
burvauc indecision. In order to facilitate
coordination behsren public and private agenc�ics. as
wt-ll as to raise� t1w qualih of t1w serviet-s Hwy purvey,
the govenanent plans to establish it Iligh Council for
Social Welfare sometime during thc� 1970's.
b. Social insurance (C)
In accordance with the So cial Insurance La\% of
1960, the national social insurance program provides
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c(miprelwnsi\e coyerege. albeit lc, it stall segmeid u1'
t e� population. Being ess�ntiallc comfiued to age
:Intl sit Iar carriers in i11 (It stri:l and certain
conunerc�ial occupations- the program is administered
by the� SIO, an agent_ of the Ministr\ of Labor and
Social Affairs. Benefits are pro%idcd fur sickness,
maternity, tcmporar and permanent disabilit\
retirentelit, and death: family allm%ances :Ire also
it tit Imrized. TIIc program is supported bs it
contribution e(Iui\ -it lent to 18'i of the insured stiorker
ages. I:i"i coming from the employer and 5`' front
the emplo\vc, the goyeri,me tt does not contribute.
Insured persons are entitled to it minintunl of 6 months
of free medical service. although tit period can be
extended upon certification b\ the SIO's Medical
Board. (:were.,? 11n�n are eligible to retire at age till,
\%omen at age 55, provided contributions bare been
made for at least 10 years: the minimum age
reyuirenic�nt is lowemd to 55 for men ho ha\e
cmitributed to the fund for 30 years or more and for
those emplo \rd in "unhealthy regions" for 0 t 25
gars. The pension is edui\aleut to a ntininunt of 5`i
of the average earnings during the years preceding
retirement, while the maximum is eyui\alenl to 100
of earnings. Wives and children of itisumd workers are
eligible for survivor benefits. The cost of' family
allowances. which amount to R1s100 per month for
each child after the first, is borne entirely by the
employer. In addition to administering nume rolls
hospit �6 and clinics, its of 196( the SIO operated -12
bi %c .,-n i "iccs mid 21 agencies.
k 1972, about 8:35,000 workers, or 8.- "1
of titl� t: ,or force. plus an estimated 2.5 million
(I peodei)' were covered under the program.
indicating; .'i ;d the governments goal of insuring a
million s l,.,;, ,�rs by 19; 1 had fallen far short.
Reflecting the Concentration of insured workers in the
capital as well as it poor (list ribution of welfare services
elsewhere in the nation, ill 1969 roughly 58" of the
SIO's personnel were assigned to facilities in Tehran
I'roviIIcc. Although 96'(' of all employers who
participated in the program in that \c�:ir were in the
private sector. 32( of the insured were government
workers (other than established civil servants),
suggesting that the employves of public enterprises
participate it) the program to it greater degree than
those ill private industry.
Establislivd civil servants employed on it frill -timc
basis are insured under separate sellenu's, nanu�ly the
Civil Servants Iension Nuud and the Civil Servants
lusur11ce Organization. the latter of' which provides
health coverage. Bach plan embraces roughly one -half
of all government workers. a substantial proportion of
them teachers, and but it have been plagued b
IiIIamc�ial deficits and Ita\e required hcav\ gu\enunent
sctbsidies lc, keep from fomuderimg.
:1s all adjunct of the rnrll cooperative program, the�
Inin Joint Stuck Cmiipat\ has administered a life;urd
accidental disabilih insurance program fur villagers
since 1968. ;\Ithough the animal premimn amomnls to
(1111\ Ills -too and the slim payable to smr\i\ors of the
insured breadwitmu�r is IZIs10.000. fe�s\er than 5,000
persons had enrolled in the plan s\ithin the First 2 \ears
of its (peralion.
E. Religion (U /OtT
Islam is b\ far the most imimi religion in Iran,
and Islamic precepts constitute a important force
uniting Iranians of varied racial and cultural origins.
Ntuslims cmnprise over 98 "1 tits coctntry s
inhabitants. N1ore than 90'(' of the poptlation.
including the various Persian speaking peoples and
r
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i' F'�
1
e
c'
f')p
1
0 rd T
Islam is b\ far the most imimi religion in Iran,
and Islamic precepts constitute a important force
uniting Iranians of varied racial and cultural origins.
Ntuslims cmnprise over 98 "1 tits coctntry s
inhabitants. N1ore than 90'(' of the poptlation.
including the various Persian speaking peoples and
r
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the Azeri- speaking Turkic groups, belong to the
heterodox Shia branch of Is.him, while no more than
S% of the total, mainly Kurds, Ttirkontai,s. Balucltis,
and Arabs, arc orthodox Sunni Muslims. Since the
l6th century, Iran has peen the citadel of the Sh ?a
world, which comprises perhaps 8 of all Muslims.
The Shia faith has tended to isolate Iran from the rest
of the Muslim Nyorld, and pain Islamic sentiment
accordingly has not been widespread. In the past,
friction between Shiites and Sunnis was pronounced,
but it has subsided during the 20th century. \/lost non
Muslini Iranians profess belief in one of the Christian
denominations ar in Bahaism, J udaism, or "Zoroastrian-
ism. Although these religions have few adherents, they
have had a significant impact on the religious fabric of
Iranian society.
The Constitution formally recognizes the dominant
Inianii sect of Shia Islam as the state religion and
specifics that the Shah, who rules in the name of the
12th and last Shia Imam, must promote Imami Shia
doctrines. According to the Constitution, all
parliamentary legislation must be in harniony with
Islamic principles; Cabinet officials are required to be
\Muslims; and, with it few exceptions, parliamentary
deputies must also be Muslims. Although there has
always been some prejudice against non Muslim
minority groups, freedom of worship is guaranteed its it
civil right, and the Constitution formally recognizes
Zoroastrianism, Jitclaism, and Christianity as minority
religions. (Bahaism has not been so recognized.)
Accordingly, one seat in the Majlis has been set aside
for a representative of the Zoroastrian community, one
for the Jews, one for the Assyrian Christians, and two
for the Armenian Christians (Figure 27).
Shia Islam originated in the political struggles
involving the successors to the Prophet Muhanimad,
who died -ill 632. The dominant faction of the
Prophet's followers, the Sunnis (after Sti ntrth �the
FIGURE 27. Religious affiliation of the population,
1966 (U /OU)
(Number in thousands)
'3S
practices of the Proph(-t) insisted that the caliphs
succeeding Mtnhauu,a(] be selected by cottse,sus of
the \/Muslim community or its representatives. ()it the
other hand, the Shiites (after Shiul Ah �party of Ali)
held that the Prophet had designated Ali, Ifis S011-ill-
law and cousin, attd, by implication, Ali's descendants
as successors, call(.(] Innanas. Bitter conflict ensued
lwkveen the two parties, marked by civil war and
assassinations of the rival leaders, imclIIding Ali
himself. Dwing the centuries following Ali's death in
661, the Shiites fragmented into countless sects and
subsects. Xlost Shiites, including the Itnamfis (also
known as Jafaris, after Jafar A- Sadiq, the sixth lntant.
who died ill T65), recognized Ali's descendants as their
Imams, of whom there were 12. The murderofseveral
finams by the Sunni caliphs provided the Shiites with
saints and martyrs, the most important after Ali
himself being lltisayn, Ali's second son.
At the heart of Shia doctrine is the primacy given to
the role of the Infants. who are considered to be
infallible and the appointed successors of Muhanu,ad
to guide the Muslin, elinm,tnnity. In contrast to the
Sunnis, who believe that olivine revelation ceased \yitit
Mulianitnad, the Shiites regard the Inwnis as
completing Cods revelations. According to the Shiites,
only the Imams know the inner, hidden ,leaning of
the Koran, and they will serve as intercessors on
Judgment Day bvk\een Cod and the believers. Imami
Shiites believe in the existence of tilt immortal I lidden
lntatn, the 12th, who went into concealment as a child
in about 8i -1, tut(] who will reappear one day as the
Mandi (rightly guided on(1) to establish peace and
justice throughout the world.
On the more practical level, the Shiites espouse the
doctrine of lagb1ah (dissimulation). which permits
those in clanger of religious persecution to deny their
faith. Although the doctrine is not unique to the
Shiites, it has been most frequently invoked by them
because of their persecution by the Sunni majority.
The Shiites also permit mutah, or tenipc�rary marriage.
provided that it dower is specified and that a tints
period for the union (usually less than I year) is fixed.
The Sunnis regard ntnlah its adultery. Mulnh ill Iran.
however, was outlawed by the Family Protection Law
of196.)
Besides the predominant lin amis, there arc two
other small Shia sects in !ran. neither of \yhich has
more than a few thousand adherents. The Isntailis.
sometimes known as Seveners, recognize only seven
Imams, the last of whom they consider the Mandi.
Since 1957, their international spiritual head has been
Aga Khan W. Fewer in number than the Isntailis, lh(-
Shaikhis are followers of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsai. vdio
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rFau�F:NT
Nt'MBBtt OF
OF TOTAL
It ELIG ION
ADIIF: It ENTS
POPULATION
Want
25,:962
98.3
Christ ianit
234
0.9
Judaism
tiff
0.3
Bah:tisnt
titl
0.2
/,uruastri.utism
21
0.1
00wr
4(1
0...'
Total
�1:5,78:,
100.0
'3S
practices of the Proph(-t) insisted that the caliphs
succeeding Mtnhauu,a(] be selected by cottse,sus of
the \/Muslim community or its representatives. ()it the
other hand, the Shiites (after Shiul Ah �party of Ali)
held that the Prophet had designated Ali, Ifis S011-ill-
law and cousin, attd, by implication, Ali's descendants
as successors, call(.(] Innanas. Bitter conflict ensued
lwkveen the two parties, marked by civil war and
assassinations of the rival leaders, imclIIding Ali
himself. Dwing the centuries following Ali's death in
661, the Shiites fragmented into countless sects and
subsects. Xlost Shiites, including the Itnamfis (also
known as Jafaris, after Jafar A- Sadiq, the sixth lntant.
who died ill T65), recognized Ali's descendants as their
Imams, of whom there were 12. The murderofseveral
finams by the Sunni caliphs provided the Shiites with
saints and martyrs, the most important after Ali
himself being lltisayn, Ali's second son.
At the heart of Shia doctrine is the primacy given to
the role of the Infants. who are considered to be
infallible and the appointed successors of Muhanu,ad
to guide the Muslin, elinm,tnnity. In contrast to the
Sunnis, who believe that olivine revelation ceased \yitit
Mulianitnad, the Shiites regard the Inwnis as
completing Cods revelations. According to the Shiites,
only the Imams know the inner, hidden ,leaning of
the Koran, and they will serve as intercessors on
Judgment Day bvk\een Cod and the believers. Imami
Shiites believe in the existence of tilt immortal I lidden
lntatn, the 12th, who went into concealment as a child
in about 8i -1, tut(] who will reappear one day as the
Mandi (rightly guided on(1) to establish peace and
justice throughout the world.
On the more practical level, the Shiites espouse the
doctrine of lagb1ah (dissimulation). which permits
those in clanger of religious persecution to deny their
faith. Although the doctrine is not unique to the
Shiites, it has been most frequently invoked by them
because of their persecution by the Sunni majority.
The Shiites also permit mutah, or tenipc�rary marriage.
provided that it dower is specified and that a tints
period for the union (usually less than I year) is fixed.
The Sunnis regard ntnlah its adultery. Mulnh ill Iran.
however, was outlawed by the Family Protection Law
of196.)
Besides the predominant lin amis, there arc two
other small Shia sects in !ran. neither of \yhich has
more than a few thousand adherents. The Isntailis.
sometimes known as Seveners, recognize only seven
Imams, the last of whom they consider the Mandi.
Since 1957, their international spiritual head has been
Aga Khan W. Fewer in number than the Isntailis, lh(-
Shaikhis are followers of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsai. vdio
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Typical small rural mosque. Most villagers in central
and southern Iran attend weekly religious services in
these simple brick or mud structures. (C)
Large mosque in Esfahcn. Dome is elaborately adorned
with mosaic. (U /OU)
FIGURE 28. REPRESENTATIVE .MOSQUES
c�laitne direct contact with the Ilidden In;un. 'I'le
Shaikhis Venerate all 12 Imams, Litt diverge 1'rom the
nutin bodv of Shiites cm 111111% points of theology.
Islamic mvsticisn (Sufism) has flourished in Iran
among both Shiites and Srtmiis. Sufi brotberhoods
emphasize a personal, direct approach to God, and
mystics who app to be the most siwecssfil in
reaching God are viewed as saints. The brotherhoods
have included mendicant orders, such as the famous
whirling dervishes, and organizations of middle or
upper class Muslims seekim untenplatioi and
meditation. "I'hose orders still ac�ti\(- to Iran reporlc dl
include the Gonabadi. the Nehm atollahi, the
I "b:ahind, and the Na \vshahbandiva. Sufi poets have
I ade significant c�ontribudons to Persian literature.
Like all Muslins. the Shiites accept certain basic
articles of faith and religious practice. These include
belief in one eternal God. ::Ilah; recognition of
Mihanmad as the special Prophet of Cod and of his
teachings as recorded in the Doran and the Ila( it i
traditions): and observanc�e of the "five pillars" of the
faith recital of the creed, "There is no God but God
and Nluhanuoad is his Prophet.' to which Shiites add,
and Ali, Gods friend": performance of prayer and
ritual; almsgiving; lasting; and pilgrimage (hajj) to
the holy cities of Nlecca aid Xledina.
Devout Iranian vluslins observe the prescribed
prayers at qpocific intervals, preceded b\ cleansing of
the hands, arms, and teet. 1'rayers are nornudly spoken
in Arabic, the language of the Koran. The Shiites offer
prayers three times a da\ �at sunrise, noon, and
sunset� rather than five tiies, as is the Sunni practice.
Although the illiterate peasant tnay have little
c�onc�eplioi of their meaning_ prayers are an integral
part of his clail\ life Zuul punctuate the da\'s labor.
Shiites arc less inclined than Sunnis to pray in
congregation in tnos(lues or in other corporate groups.
There are about 20.000 tnosclues in Iran. ranging
from relati\cf\ primitive and unadorned nucl or brick
structures in the rural areas to elaborate domed
edifices in the cities 11 figure 25). \'illage mosques
frequently serve as local con,niunih centers, \vhile
religions schools are often c�oncfucted ithin both rural
and urban mosques. Mosque I'mmc�tionaries v�ar\ in
number froth one for each village mosctue or group of
nosque, to several in each of the larger urban
mosques.
All Muslins are expected to give part of their
income to the poor. 'I'hev are also supposed to donate
a fixed portion of their income to a mosque or religious
organization in tie forni of a tithe. Among the Shiites.
this "inanc's sh comprising one -fifth of their
income. is to be donated to descendants of the Prophet
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for chariahle works and assistance to the destitute.
Only wealthy or exceptionally devout Iranian
Imuslinas actually pay this tithe ill full, however.
Iranian iVluslins celebrate 16 religious holidays, 10
of them unielue t the Shiites. The most important
Shia holiday is Ashura, commemorating the
martyrdom of I-tusayn. which falls on the IOth day of
the lunar month of Muharran, it 3 30 -day period of
mourning. This period is observed by processions of
mourners, acts of self flagellation, and the reenact
nent of the tragedy th=ough the tazieh, a sort of
passion play. During Ramadan, the ninth ntonth of
the lunar calendar, both Sunnis and Shiites are
required to abstain from food, drink, and all pleasures
of the flesh front dawn to dusk. The breaking of the
fast each night is it festive family occasion. Hamadan
concludes with the three -clay celebration of Id al- Fitr.
As elsewhere, pilgrimages to Mecca and other holy
places are prominent aspects of Iranian Islam. h
1972, X0,299 Iranians made pilgrimages to Mecca,
thereby earning the title of hajji. Shiites also accrue
special merit in visiting the shrines at Karbala and An
Najaf in Iraq where Ilusayn and Ali are buried,
respectively; at Qom in Iran where the sister of the
Eighth Imam is buried; and at Mashhad, dedicated to
the Eighth Imam. The annual number of pilgrins to
the major Iranian shrines is estimated at over I
million. Of more immediate significance in the daily
religious life of the population are the numerous lesser
Shia shrines called inuantzaclelts, which commemorate
local religious personalities, mostly Sufi mystics. Such
shrines are within easy reach of ainutst every village.
For many Iranians, the five pillars represent only
the formal aspect of Islam. The popular religion of the
peasants and urban lower classes combines supersti-
tious beliefs and rites, many of them pre- Islamic, with
Islamic tenets and practices. Shiites, for example,
believe that spirits of the deceased Imams are capable
of performing rniracl s, and Sunnis hay(- similar
beliefs. Many peasan +s wear charns and amulets to
counteract the influence of the eye." In contrast,
neither formal Islam nor folk beliefs seem to have
much appeal to the better educated ,urban Iranians.
Most Westernized Iranians appear to be only nominal
Muslims, but they generally avoid displaying their
failure to observe fasting during Ramadan.
The Shia clerical hierarchy is more highly stratified
than that of the Sunnis. At the base of the religious
establishment are the mullahs, a term usually applied
by Shiites to members of the lower clergy, mane of
them poorly educated and drawn from the lower social
stratum. Numbering approximately 10,000 in Iran
they conduct prayer services in the rnosques, teach at
40
FIGURE 29. A mullah lecturing in Islamic law. Mullahs
are generally bearded and wear turbans and long,
flowing gowns. (C)
religious schools, and preside at various ceremonial
functions (Figure 29). Religious leaders, teachers, and
scholars, on the other hand, are normally referred to as
ulatna. to whom the Shiites grant greater doctrinal
authority than do the Sunnis. Anamg the ulatna, those
who adjudicate questions of religious conduct are
classified as nujtahids (estimated by the government
to number about 100): a few especially Iearitvd
ntttjtuhids carry the honorific title agatollah. Heading
the religious establishment is a paramount leader
known as the pisltca- ye- nustein Ch by the
ulanut through it form of consensus, oste:isibly for his
piety and religions scholarship, he rust be acceptable
to the governments of both Iran and Iraq, which also
has a large Shia conutunity. The position has been
vacant since the death in 1970 of Ayatollah St-Ned
X-lohsen Hakim.
Religious training is still conducted prini arily in the
traditionalist Shia theological schools (madrasalts).
most of then secondary and postsecondary institutions
affiliated with prominent mosques. Enrollment in
these schools is believed to number well over 10.000.
The curriculums of the madrasahs include Arabic
ganimar, mathematics. jurisprudence. and philosoph\.
and have chanLr little throughout the centuries.
g ed Large seminaries are located in Mashhad, Tabriz,
Fsfahan, and Shiraz. The largest and nwst important
seminary, the School of 'Theology at Qom. with about
5,000 students, stresses conservative political and
religious attitudes and role learning of the Koran. By
contrast, the Facttlh of Theology (Divinity College) at
the University of Tehran, with an enrollment of about
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750 and it faculty of 20 in 1970. offers prtgnuns for
both Shiites and Sunnis in foreign languages and
scienct- in addition to theology. Its professors attempt
to follow it middle road between reform and tradition.
By and large, however, graduates are not esteemed by
the traditionalist clergy, who consider them to be too
subservient to the government.
There are three major sources of financial support
for the Shia establishment in Iran: income from the
utcyuf (charitable foundations or endowments).
donations from the faithful, and gov ^rninent aid.
Charitable foundations have been established by
devout Muslims who bequeath funds, land, or
business property for religious and charitable
activities, generally in the name of it shrine or
prominent cleric. Relievers also donate money to the
ulama for general religious or other purposes specified
by the benefactor. The ulana way engage in private
economic� ventures, v.ith the result that before the
agrarian reforms many had acquired considerable
landholdings. On the
village level, the mullahs
depend on their congregations for support, but
occasionally they receive government assistance. A
National Endowments Organization under the Office
of the Prime Minister is responsible for supervision of
endowments, assistance to religious scholars, all(]
upkeep of hole places.
Most Shia clergy have been conservative, if not
reactionary, in political religious outlook and at titres
opposed both Reza Shah and the present Shah. "There
has been considerable religious opposition to certain
asPec�ts of his White Revolution, especially the lane]
reforms and the Family Protection Law. Extremist
Shia Muslim factions have violently opposed the
government; in 1965, Prime Minister Rasa -Ali
Mansur was assassinated by it religious fanatic.
(According to the government, Sunni clerics did not
join the Muslim clerical opposition during the 1960's.)
Although clerics still exercise considerable social and
political influence, they do not enjoy the privileged
position which they once had; particularly before
Reza Shah curtailed their powers in the educational
and judicial fields.
Since the late 1960's, the Shah and his government
have attempted to suppress religious opposition
without alienatiig Muslin sensibilities. To prevent
religious leaders from obtaining an active political
following the government has resorted to bribery and
threats, control of the Shia shrine at Mashhad,
supervision of all public activities by clerics, as well as
detention by the police of clerical opposition figures.
At the same time, the royal family has maintained it
poshre of public piety. Although the Shah has h et 11
unable to appoint it it(-%% partrnount religious leader
who would be acceptable to the traditionalists, he has
taken care to solicit clerical approval of parliamentary
legislation. Moreover, since 1967 the government has
supported programs for the restoration and
refurbishing of Shia religious centers.
In August 1971, the Shah issued it decree
establishing it Religious Corps, to be drawn fron those
with it background in religious studies who are eligible
for military service. Modeled after utber revolutionary
corps, it is designed ill part to provide moral and
religious guidance, particularly in the meal areas.
Corps members are to receive basic military training as
well -is specialized religious instruction. While serving
in the military, corpstnen nay be appointed as
instructors in religious schools, religious affairs officers
in the army, marriage counselors, and officials in the
National Endowments Organization.
The Popular base of support for the clergy vis -a -vis
the government remains in the traditional bazaar
areas of Tehran arc! other large cities. The piety of
sonic shopkeepers and artisans has bordered oil
fanaticism, and occasionally their zeal has been
exploited by extremist clerics against the government
or other vulnerable targets (such its the "British
imperialists" during the 1950'x). Witbin the capital
city, however, these elerments are declining in number
Mid influence as modern education and economic
progress erode the traditional bazaar as it distinct
urban community. Nloreoyer, clerics are tinder
pressure to accommodate the government, particularly
as its programs for social reform and economic
development are proving successful. Nonetheless, most
clerics in the early 1970's were said to be critical of the
government because of the reduction of their political
influence and the secular nature of the reginic.
Adherents of Iran's minority religions�Christian-
ity. Judaisn, 'Zoroastrianism, and Bahaism�
altogether number no more than ?S(' of the total
population. The great majority of Christians are
members of the Assyrian and Armenian minorities.
Assyrians are divided among the Nestorian. f:athoL',,
iand Protestant churches, while most Armenians
belong to the Armenian Orthodox, or Gregorian,
Church (Figure 5 )0). The Gregorian Church serves as
the center of each Armenian conununity in the
country, preserving popular consciousness of the
Armenian cultural heritage and historical traditions.
In 1958. the Iranian Government forced the Armenian
church to serer its longstanding tics with the
Catholicate of Etchmiadzin in Soviet Armenia, and
since then the church has been affiliated with the
Catholicatc of Antilvas to Beirut, Lebanon. The
41
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WA
ck
FIGURE 30. Armenian Orthodox church, Tabriz. Church
is constructed in style typical of Armenian churches in
the Middle East. (U /OU)
\c >turi;ut riatt (:hurcft i ;d,o kn(mit a the
\srrian (:hunch of the I.::tst I is the tiolc rc�tnnaut in
Iran of the sect \%IIicit flouri.he(I in
north\ceslern Iran Ilet\ \eel! the fifth :uu1 1_ th
c�( ntttric�s. "I "Iti church is t;ra(luall d\cindliucq" irtlo
olhlirion, itu\cerer. kci(11 it pri(��tho)(1 nuednealed ill cl
fin:utc�ial resource. loo limited to st;ppoct au\
:(c�tirities. Iratti;ut (:atholic lollo\% either I.atin.
\n it ni;rtt. ,r aialdean t. .s\ ri;ut (:alholi(� rites. cash
of \rhieh is headed In it s(�p;t fit le bishop. In 141; I.
('it t lit lic, operated 16 schools and eight iii rilal)Iv
irtstilrtlions. and \\cre t�slin(;tic d to lace :iI1.111ct
r.-J
M",
12
adlivi i no. �ludiii; nucr(� I lit n ou(� third of the
ri;tns. \htt(, all III thr ').500
1rani;nc 1' rutes tioits are all ihat(�d of 1 S.
I'rotc�stanl dvii(iminalions. "I hc� ut((sl ;tc�lirc� 1'ro test utl
kroult has hc�c�n the 1�:\;ultehc�al (:humlt of Iran.
,ultltorted Its l .ti. 1'reNh.\ ic�ri;uts; in 196-1. i! had 11
c�hurc�hvs and mAnlaiiied sc %vral school" ;utcl
ho.ltitids. ()thc-r a(�tire dc�nontivatious iuc�lude the
I:lticoltal Church of Iran. the 1c�%(�1Ith -DiI\
\clrcntil. an(1 the \ss(�utltlic of Gilt!.
'I�hc Irani ;ut 1c\cish conununil ill "fchr;ut
Shinn.. Ilant:ulau. I-:4;th;ut and \Itadan. \%ith shriller
nuuthers in olftcr urh:ut centers �i, one of the oldest in
the ccorld. diihin buck (-%er;tl l It( tnalid c�ar. Irim'�
Ic\\s arc ccrlhu(Ict\ iii rclitJ(ms prac�tic�c�. and !heir
conununitics :(r( erncd Its ral,l,i, a(Intini.tIring
\lo.aic it their quasi jctclic�i;tl p(Isilious arc
r(�cv(illi/ed h\ the o_ nt. I, tiI the I iI iI of
the 20th ccnlnr. Ir:uti:ut 1c lircd in 01etlos. and
only in recc�nl \c�ars ha\c thc�\ keen ;a1mitt-d to
professions. ntcdicinc. tiirtc�c lhc� uticl- 1950'0,
hulk l S. jilt! intern :(lional Jecih aniz:,liuu
pruridcd nu�dical ;uul edctc;cti(Irtal assistance to
intl)o\c�ri.hc�c1 1ecu. \\ith the re.rtlt that the
c�ontntttnit\ Iuda\ is \itivall\ 100 litc�ratc. ;tnd
`nppc,rts its me 4ehmils. niedical facilities. aucl
religions personnel. Interuatiou ;(I Jec ilt ur( ;utizalion
hav also assisted Iranian desiring (o c�tnit;r.(ty to
Israel: since NIS :drool 50.000 such lm\c
emigrated. "I "Ite Ie hart� freyuentic Ix�c�n clenounc�ed
h\ \lttslim realol. for "Zionist intrigue s.''
?i
I
M
T" r
FIGURE 31. Zoroastrian temple, exterior (left), and
interior view showing altar (right) (C)
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Zoroastrians live ill close-knit communities in
Tehran, Yazd. and Kerman. Their contemporary
religious tenets and practices are similar to those that
prevailed in the past. The prophet Zuroaster, who
lived in the seventh century B.C., propounded it
dualistic theology based on the principle of it constant
stniggle i)etWeet gout! Mid evil. TIis cunflic�t is
represented ill Zoroastrian temples by an eternal flame
oil the altar which symbolically confronts the pomyers
of darkness (Figure 331 lopular during the
Achaemenid period. Zoroastrianism became the state
religion of the Sassauian Empire. During the period
between the� ;kral conquest and the 70th centun,
Zoroastrians were it persec-tted minority. required to
.year distinctive dress, forced to live in prescribed
areas, and excluded from certain occupations. Under
Reza Shah, the Zoroastrians were accorded it more
favored status and they are nosy cmpkyed in business
amd banking its well as farming. During the late
1960'x, Zoroastrians financed emistntction of one of
TehrcuCs modern middle class suburbs.
Bahaism, whose following is estimated to number
about 60,000, is tile only minority religion not
recognized by the government. It originated during
the mitt -19th century in Iran as an offshoot of the
Persecuted Babi sect. which ryas itself an mitgros 11 of
the Shaikhi movement. Bohai doctrines emphasize
personal etltic�s and have the ultimate aim of bringing
about universal peace through conversion to Bahaism.
The tnoyertuent ryas persecuted by Shiites fnmt the
period of its inceptio3t through the early 70th century.
Today the government tolerates the Bahaists, but
officials still urge then, not to pro self tine. Fanaticail
`luslims e,flen denounce the Bahaists along with .the
Jews for exercising an "insidious influence" on
government polic\' and Iranian society in general. The
urbanized Bohai community is relatively weII
educated, and most of its adherents arc engaged in
business r the professions.
F. Education (U /OU)
l
M
:Although significant progress flc:s b made in the
field of education since the end of \i'urld War 11,
particularly since the� inception of the \Hite
Beyolntion. illiteracy remains widespread and the
educational system continues to be plagued by serious
shortcomings. Iranian education at all IevcIs is
c�hantcterized by inadequate physical plant. poorly
trained teachers, and curriculums and teaching
methods ill spited to present clay needs. Xloreoyr. r, the
persisting aversion to maimal labor ou the part of
those with any schooling is it major obstacle :n the
fulfillment of basic manpower requirements.
Ovenyhelming,ly. secondary school and uniyersh',
students aspire to \white- collar employ nu�nt. Because
of the limited demand on the part of students,
vocational and technical training has been largely
4
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neglected. :ouseyuvutlN, no level of the school system
is producing graduates with the technical or
vocational proficiency appropriate to the deyelopnu�nt
objectives of the government. Al the saute lirne, the
system is tenting out an oversupply of academically
oriented secondary school graduates. Only about one
third of those who (lo not continue their studies at the
level of higher edecation find immediate entploy
nient: the rest, fre(1tently disilbrsioned, are often
susceptible to the blandishments of anligoyerurnent
agitators (Figure 32).
Despite a near doubling of the literacy rate between
1956 and 1966, occasioned by increased access to
schooling and by the progr ni carried out by the
literacy Corps, the level of literacy renctius logy, with
the number of illiterate persons age 10 and over
actually risi .g front almost 11 million in 1956 to
nearly 12 million in 1966. Overall, 28.1 1 1 of the
Population age 10 and over werc recorded as !iterate in
1966, compared with 11.9 in 1956. Because large
numbers of those claiming literacy in 1966 had less
than the 4 gars of schooling norniall% dvenwd
necessary to impart functional literacy, the rate for
functional literacy in 1966 %vas probably in the 15'1 to
20 '/1 range. literacy rates for 1966 varied significauttly
by sex and urban -rural residence Figure 3). 'they
Aso varied according to age, younger elenu�rtts within
the Population being much more likel\ to be able to
read and pyrite than older persons. The highest rate of
literacy occurred among young ntcn in the cities, the
lowest among elderly wonicn in the countnside.
'k -lire: Province, 19.5Si of whose inhabitants age IO
and over were literate, had by far the highest rate (if
literacy of any of the a(Intinistrative divisions.
Because most Iranians, especially those over age 25,
have had little or no access to schooling, the Ivyel of
educational attainment is very logy. As implied b the
1966 census, about T2S(' of' the� Population :rge 10 and
over had never attended school, I i ha(I attended but
failed to complete the prinetry cycle, 5Si Ftad
terminated their studies with the completion of the
primary grades, and 41 had entered i)ut failed to
finish secondary school. ()ill\ ?i had completed
secondary training, and less than one -third of those
had any college or university experience. Ina nation of
over 25 million inhabitants in 1966, there were but
7 -1,000 university graduates. all but 2?00 of Miotn
resided in urban areas. Alrurst 9 out of every 10
Wren.
lit its efforts to raise levels of literacy and
educational attainment and at the saute time produce
the bo(ly of skilled manpower rcc{nisite for econ:unic
(levelopntent, the government has opened narty ney
1 1
1
Village primary school built by the Literacy Corps (C)
FIGURE 32. SCHOOL PLANTS
School for nomad children (U /OU)
iitM!!
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49.1
FIGURE 33. Literate population,
age 10 and over, 1956 and
1966 (U /OU)
39
22.2
1966
1946
MALES
schools and has provided encouragement for the
establishment of additional private schools. The
number of primarN schools, both public and private.
rose, for example. from about 3.400 in 1930;'51 to
nearly 24,000 in 1969/70. :ks a c�onsegI,ence of this
expansion, enrollment in all kinds 'of schools has
soared (Figure il), primar% school enrollment
increasing by nearly 150'(' in the 20 \ear period and
that of academic sec�ondar% schools rising more than
te nfold. Yet the systen has been unable to cope %ith
the vast inc�mase in the school age populationl, and
c�ompnlsory prinrlr\ training. long it professed
objective of the government, has not been ac�hie\ecl
except ill it few major cities. In 1969; 70, no more than
1 i7i of the relevant age group were enrolled in
primary school; for sec�octdury schools, the proportion
about 22i. Although these figures represent it
significant improvem over those for 1950151 (2SSi
and -I respec�ti\el% the\ point up the formidlible
ta sk confronting Iran*s educational authorities.
In 19119/10, some 67,000 students were pursuing
higher education in Iran, 39,000 in the� c�otmtry's eight
universities and 28,000 in nunivrous technical colleges
and other �higher education centers." Addition,111N,
there were more than 25,000 Iranian students abroad,
about one -third of them in the United States. The
FIGURE 34. En- ollment, by type of school (U/OU)
16.5
7.3
L
FEMALE
33.3
URBAN
13.7
6.0
m
RURAL
19(19/71) enrollment figure for Iranian instilutions %\as
more than 12 times larger than that of 1950/51. but
evert expansion n
of this nlgnitu lilts as failed to keep
Pace %%ilh the gro%%ing dentancl for universitv training.
In 19119/10, for example, marl\ 15,000 sceondar\
school graduates competed in ex.,minulions for 5,:325
entrance Places in the %,,rious institution of higher
learning.
I?nrollment statistics at all levels continue to reflect
the a V111tagr rnjorcl b urbuu child mu and,
particularly, boys. City children. although the\ may
not complete Pritmir\ school. now generally have
access to such schooling. and most boys, at least,
attend classes for or -1 years. F,ac�h \car the 111mi crof
girls enrolled in schools Throughout the c�onnlr\ has
risen. The proportion of girl students to total
enrollment bas also increased, but as of 1969/ girls
still were outnumbered by boys by almost t\\o to one
at the primary level, b\ more than two to one at the
secondary lcvCl, and b\ three to one ut the level of
higher education. Som rural Parents, as \ell its the
more Conservative families in urban arras, see little
value in educating their daughters and therefore keep
them out of -uI despite official eneminlgemenl that
all c�hildret. -lit.
TYPE of 5c'11001.
1951151
1905 +11;
1111111;61
1965 66
1967 6S
19119 711
Ki11derg :u'tr'11
:3,773
11,1177
:2,11116
1:3,711
I,1,20S
20,211
Primary school.
6:10,3:1:1
52:3,953
1, rm, Ilill
2,208,671
2,575,667
2,916,266
Secondary school
8'x,097
112, 11:3
281,928
5511,829
67.1.055
597, 11:3
Vocational school
1, 1111
1,611
9,315
Iri, 11;11
16,273
2:3.:33:1
Teacher training ;school
nn
2,181
1,:193
1,735
6,693
9,275
un Data not available
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The Literacy Corps, founded in 1962 by the Shah, is
;I facet of the governntent's effort to combat illiter ev
and lack of educational opportunity. Composed of
selected men of draft age who fulfill their military
obligation by leaching in rural areas, the corps offers it
program designed to bring illiterates up to second
grade level. It operates in villages in which no formal
school has been established, teaching both children
and adults. Considered one of the most stic�cessfel
progrants initiated by the government, the Literacy
Corps as of 197 1 had trained nearly 1.4 million persons
to read and write simple texts; functional literacy is
rarely imparted, however. Between 1962 and 1971,
more than 70,000 corpsmen had served in various
parts of the .-ountry. A women's wing of the corps was
established in the late 1960's.
Despite: widespread illiteracy, learning traditionally
has been held in high esteem. Fmm earliest times,
scholars, poets, philosophers, and ph.: served as
advisers and confidants of kings, ar:,d early Persian
institutions of learning and their schol rs were known
throughout the Middle East and in Europe.
"Traditional schooling w'is based chiefly on Islamic
theology. Higher education c�onsi.,ted of years of
studying theology, philosc:phy, n lilt hcnatics, and the
Arabic language. A lesser education was provided to it
few \s ho might become clerks, scribes, or storekeepers.
These persons were taught to react and pyrite, learned
to use the abacus. and memorized the classic Persian
epics and passages (irl Arabic) from the Koran. This
pattern of education persisted until the mid -19th
century when some attempt was made to provide
Western -type training for future military officers, but
it was not until the reign of Reza Shah that education
was even partially secularized and gradually Megan to
be regarded as it government responsibility. The
current Shah has provided the main impetus for a
coinplete reform of Iranian schooling, his ai:a being to
expand ar;d modernize educational facilities in order
to support the country's industrialization and to avoid
student unrest and alienation.
Education is the prink means of social adyanc�e-
rnent in Iran, and is generally so recognized by most
Iranians. Wilk few exceptions, parents encourage their
sons to attend school if it is economically feasible.
Increasing numbers also enroll their daughters. Some
parents, however, prefer to send their sons to it Koranic
school (muktah). 'These institutions concentrate
mainly on traditional studies: they are operated by
Muslim functionaries and receive no government
support. Other private schools, which nn v or may not
receive subsidies, are supervised by the government:
these schools, which play an especially important role
46
at the level of secondary education, are operated by it
variety of sponsors. including Christian missionar
groups, private firms, and the Armenian, Assvrian,
and Jewish eonlinunities. Generally, these private
schools follow the official Iranian Government
curriculum but have supplementary courses in foreigil
languages.
The cost of public education i, borne primarily by
the national government. with local funds son,etitucs
being used to defray the cost of constructing and
maintaining a schoc;l Imilding. Since 1968, the-
government has deyctc, iween Wi and 27`ii of its
total current expenditures to education, and these
funds have been augniviRvd by grants and loans from
various U.N. agencies and from foreign governments.
Despite the anxnnl spent oil education, it has been
inadequate to the needs. Many villages still have no
school, and existing schools are overcrowded, often
necessitating two slifts. Older buildings are commonly
in need of repair, and few schools even approach those
in developed countries with respect to equipment and
amenities. Although the supple of textbooks has been
greatly expanded, they are still in short supply.
F trthermore, many texts are irrelevant to the world of
the rural child. At the secondary level, equipment is
limited, laboratories and libraries being particularly
deficient. Most vocational schools are also very poorly
equipped, it situation which reflects c!;rcctls on the
qu:tlity of training received in such schools.
Altbo -igh there has been it substantial expansion of
teaching staff there is still an acute shortage of
qualified teachers, particularly in the primary grades
and in the vocational schools. Many primary school
teachers have had little schooling beyond the level at
which they teach. Morcover. pupil- teacher ratios are
very high, classes of :50 to SO students being (�onunon.
Because of these handicaps, teachers tend to conduct
classes in an a,ithoritarian manner and to emphasize
rote learning.
The low salaries which arc paid to teachers
discourage many young persons from entering the
teaching profession and thus contribute to the teacher
shortage. higher salaries are ayailitble in other
occupations, it fact that has tended to lower the social
status of teachers, the prestige traditionally accruing to
the teacher in the conlimil))) t Illllwithstallding. In
1971, in ;,n effort to make tcwe)limg more attractive.
the government announced that it would seek to
provide such fringe benefits as bontnses, housing,
access to cooperative stores, and increased oppor-
tunities for further training at government expense.
The structure of Iranian education is in the process
of reorganization. When measures decreed in 1968 are
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fully implemented, the system will provide for 1 year
of preprimary (kindergarten) training, 5 years of
primary schooling, 7 years of secondary education
(divided into it 3 -year junior cycle and it 4 senior
cycle), and higher education offered in universities,
institutes, and technical colleges. In addition, certain
vocational programs are offered. Primary school
graduates are eligible for admission to a I- or 2 -year
"simple" vocational program that is terminal.
Graduates of the junior secondary cycle, also known as
the educational guidance cycle. may enter a 2 -year
terminal program designed to train semiskilled
workers. The preparation of teachers is conducted in a
variety of programs at special schools offering either
sec ondary or postsecondary curriculums, or at the
universities. Farsi (Persian) is the official language of
instruction. although some university courses,
especially those of a scientific or technical content, are
given in English. Educ ation is tuition -free in the
primary and junior secondary schools. The school year
extends from mid- September to mid -june, with classes
normally meeting 6 days a week.
The primary and junior secondary curriculums are
standard. At the senior secondary level, however,
students may choose academic studies that are
preparatory for university training, or they may select
technical courses (agriculture, commerce, and
industrial arts) that prepare them for admission to
technical colleges.
Unlike the nation's primary and secondary schools,
which are operated or supervised b\ the Ministry of
Education, Iran's institutions of higher learning,
except for the private National University of Iran,
come under the purview of the Ministry of Science
and Higher Education. Four of the eight universities
were established before 1950, beginning with the
University of Tehran in 1934, Total enrollment in
each of the eight for the 1969/70 school year was as
follows:
University of Tehran
17,079
National University of Irv
5,054
Tabriz University
4,336
Esfahan University
3,594
Pahlavi University
3,116
Mashhad University
2,095
Arya Mehr Industrial University
1,530
Condishapour University
1,250
"Thousands of other students, as indicated, were
pursuing postsecondary studies at technical colleges,
teacher training schools, and other centers of higher
education in 1969%70. dales accounted for 7Yi of
the total en roll nu�nt.
With the exception of Pahlavi Universit in Shiraz
and the National U!:;versity of Iran in Teleran, Iran's
universities are modeled after the traditional French
university, and, according to observers, suffer from
mail\ of the same shortcomings that U.S. educators
attribute to French higher education. 'roo much
emphasis is said to he placed oil nemorizatiol- and
repetition rather than creativity and the year end
examination is all important Faculties and schools arc�
largely autonomous, with it resulting duplication in
course offerings and library holdings. In general, the
basic difficulties of Iranian universities have been
administrative chaos, overspecialization, and too
heavy emphasis on humanities and the arts, with little
priority given to original, independent scholarship.
The National Universitv of Iran ail(] Pahlavi
University are helping to provide it new pattern, both
are influenced by progressive areas of U.S. higher
education, with full time� professors, frequent
examinations_ faculty interest in the students, and
active student participation iu the learning process.
Pahlavi University has received U.S. Government
support.
Because of restricted enrollment opportunities anti
because some fields are not full\ covered in Iranian
universities, man\ Iranians continue to seek higher
training abroad. Of the more than 250M students
pursuing advanced education in foreign lands in 1969-
10, about 6,000 were in the United States, 5,000 in
West Germany, 309) in the United Kingdom, 1,- W
in Austria, 1,2:00 in France, and 1,100 in Turkey. A
high proportion of those trained abroad fail to return
to Iran, resulting in i f "brain drain" that the country
can ill afford. The loss of professional manpower has
been particularly acute in such fields as nuxlicine.
`-tan\ are deterred fron returning because of fear of
conscription, lack of job opporllities. better salaries
and facilities outside Iran, or the acquisition of i t
foreigu wife. Other reasons include it lack of rcearch
facilities at home, as well as inefficiency, favoritism,
discrimination in hiring, and it strongly enforced
seniority sv .tem which takes little note of ability.
Governme authorities have long been concerned
about the drain of talent and have sought to induce
graduates to return by exempting then from the draft
and by promising to employ the most able as teachers
in the universities. The problem persists, however.
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G. Artistic and intellectual expression
(U /OCR)
Iran is foremost among the MtIslinn nations of the
vliddIe East in artistic and culturd expression.
"Throughout the centuries. the strength and richness of
Iran's culture h:ns, in large part, preserved the nations
ethos in the face of immerous invasions. In the t-arly
centuries, the intruders, vvht-ther �Turk. Mongol, or
Arab, were rapidly Per.Aanizcd and, since the lot(. 19th
c�enturv, c�ulhnml clements borrowed from lbe West
{(eve been giv'rn a distinctly Pt-rsisun cast. Manny arts
and crafts, however, have suffered front an avvkvvard
imposition of Wvstern styles oil native forums.
13c12a11sc� of stagnation in the arts over the past tvyo
centuries, Rt-ra Shah initiated a program to encourage
it cultural revival, aun vffort vvhicli has been grcatk
expanded by tht- present Shah. In 196 -1 the Minisln of
Art and Cult it re vvas established to c�enlrnlize cultural
activities and to promote official objectives. In I971
the Fourth Development Han allocated Rls 1.5 billion
to the Ministry for the support of moseunns, c�ttlturtl
15
centers, and libraries: training in the arts am] ill
cineuuatugrtph\: publications ott cultural affairs:
c�ullural relations with other countries: and related
artistic activities. Houlirre fu.nc�tious of the Ministry
inc�ludc� the promotion of art festiv:ds. exhibits, and
tautens: the corntiuuation of urc�hac�ulugic�uI
excanalic,os: oust the prc,visic,u of training ill the fine
arts. music, and lanes at a nonnber of secondar
schools. ;1 Iligln Council of Art it it(] :allure is
responsible for the c�oordiu.nlic,n of c�ttltural pr+,grants
bt-Neen the Ministry and other government agencies,
such as the Mitistr\ of I�:(luc�ation a nd the \linistry of
lufonuation. In addition. the Ministry of Art and
(:ttltttrc� has rt-vived tic� Imperial Foun(lalion of
Iranian :cadennit-s (the Farluntrslunl, founded ill the
I9� b\- Beza Shah to make Iranians more aware of
tbt-ir historical beritage and to preserve the I
language front the enc�roac�bmeos of* Arabic.
There are 22 must oms in Tehran and lbe pro\ inecs,
hot the largest and finest coll of I'e�rsian
auliquitics are located abroad. Ilovvev(�r. it lave u(,\%
inquires that 50 of the antiquities (�\(�malt�(! by
foreigncrs be lrunsfered to the Iranian Gmernnu�nl.
As a resttlt. nunnv nnrnselims have expanded their
collections, particularly the Arc�hacological Mitset,nn
in "Tehran, founded in 1 935.
Despite gmernmenl eneuuragemenl c,f the arts, f(�vv
c�ontemporan artists and vv riters can earn a living from
the sale of their w orks, although the\ enjoy a social
status similar to that of their c�omiterparts in the West.
Lacking financial security and dissatisfies{ with
gove rn met II policies Iimiting freedom of expression.
most of the hetler krnovv it vv rilers {nave either fads( to
return to Iran after completing their education abroad
or have left the c�ouutry fur s�If- impos(-d exile ill
Ftirope. Man\ pace !teen altrac! nc
novel haying it major impact syas I/aji Baba of
I:.sfahan by janu�s 'Oorier, an Englishman with long
experience in Iran. First published in 1825, Ilaji Baba
is it humorous satire. The Persian translator, it
traditional scholar and fierce critic of the� religious and
Political establishments, used his translation to attack
these powerful institutions. The book apparently had
uune itrlluence oil the Iranians who later staged tine
Constitntioual Revolution of 1906. I/(iji Baba is still
popular in f ran and its style is followe(I by many
authors.
Prose Ill's become the preferred form, )I' literary
expression during the 20th century. Developed in close
accord with contemporary social and political trends.
most novels and short stories are concerned syith
themes of social protest. Governmental c�orr(nptiou and
tvrim y, social irresponsibility and opportunism. the
inferior status of womu�n, and the hypoc�ris\ of' the
\luslimt clergy have been fruitful subjects for moony
writers, particularly during the period 190.3 -:20. Little
intaginatiye I,rose was published during the next i v
decades, however. mainly because of the despotic�
nature of the reign of Reza Shah. The v.riters who
retrained in Iran generally produced chronicles or
second -rate historical novels relating to the natiotn
past glories or con(lucted studies of folklore.
Modern Iranian literature is little known in the
West, but it few short stories and at least one novel
have been translated into English. French, and
German. Many works. however. have appeared in the
Soviet Union, perhaps because they often reflect
discredit on the Iranian establishment. "I'he best
known modern Iranian author in Iran unc] abroad is
Sade(i I fe dayat 1902 -51) whose writing career
'Vanned three decade Before his suicide in Paris,
Ifedayal produced 90 stories and reviews in both
Persian and French ranging from surrealist talcs and
scholarly works on 'Zoroastrianism to it tract on
vegetarianism. Nlost of his works were written in
France becaltse of his disaffection with the regime of
Reza Shah. The most widely publicized is his novel.
The Blind Ou�l, published in '.937. Indirectly a self-
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revelation, the book portrays the tragic existence of an
impoverished minor artist with an unfaithful wife and
his escape into a drug induced dreamworld. Although
a translation received critical acclaim in France, the
novel aroused less interest in the English- speaking,
world. liedavat's other works show all amiable and
rather mild satirical approach to Iranian society,
except when he is dealing with the themes of
corruption, superstition, and religious cant.
Of several contemporary authors who have sought
to emulate Hedayat, one of the most notable is Boz(tr,;
Alavi (1).1904) whose reputation is based on three
collections of short stories written between 1934 and
1952. One of the founders ok the Communist Todeh
Party in Iran, he has been a proof- -ssor at Ilunll' �Idt
University in East Germany since 1950. Sadeq
Chubak (1 191s), an employee of the National Iranian
Oil Company in "Teheran, is also known for his short
stories. Most of his characters are drawn from the dregs
of Iranian society and their most repellent qualities
emphasized. Chubak has also translated Lewis
Carroll's Alice in litlonderland �an indication of his
versatility. Another prominent writer is Jaial Ali
Ahmad whose novel, The Corse of the Soil, provides
insight into the problems of village society. In 1961 a
hitherto unknown author, Ali Mohammad Afghani,
published Mrs. Abu's Husband, considered by Iranian
critics as a landmark in modern Persian literature. Set
in Kermanshah in the 1930's, the novel concerns the
problems of a polygynous household and handles it
wealth of characterizations with great skill. The hook
has been turned into a highly regarded film.
The: Iranian theater, largely confined to "Tehran, is
inspired almost exclusively by Western drama.
;uropean and American plays are popular, as \yell as
original Persian plays which are similar to Western
productions, including those of the avant- garde. A
number of professional playwrights, unknown outside
of Iran, have had their plays produced, but sonic of
the most successful dramas have been written by
amateurs. In sum, the modern theater seems to lack
self confidence and to be striving for a modus aiuendi
between foreign influences and traditional values.
One strictly Persian dramatic production, however,
is the tazieh, a religious dr nia usually performed
during Muharrarn the Islamic month of mourning.
This popular play usually depicts the martyrdom of
Irian Husayn on the plains of Karbala in Iraq some
1,2W years ago. More than 20(1 different versions are
known, including sonic that indicate pre- Islamic roots.
The Opponents of Ilusayn, for example, sometimes
appear as Roman legionnaires, Frankish knights, or
Ottoman Janissaries; one play has no religious content
50
at all hilt recounts the victory of r Pc: :ian army over a
Roman army led by Crassus. :one remote parts of
the country, the tazieh is the Tragedy of Siawosh, a
play about one of Iran's pre Islamic Mythological
heroes.
2. Music and dance
Traditional Persian Music classical, popular, and
folk �is widely enjoyed. although in urban areas,
particularly Tehran, Western music has it considerable
following. the support of the Ministry of Art and
Culture, Iranian musicians are endeavoring to
preserve and promote traditional music as well as to
develop indigenous forms based on Western styles.
Classical music, known as musighiye assile (noble
music) or dastgah, originated in antiquity. Described
as similar to
arly Greek music, some works Iavc
survived front the 'Zoroastrian hvntlu, logy of the pre
Sassanian era. Following the Arab invasions, however.
classical music was performed infrequently because
Islamic theologians f.ondennn;d all music not played
for religious purp(,ses. Neverlh M4a-
tolol, or eohmned porlrco. be @Whw We M OUI
Aht-r If". 1 In 10 wrrv^ nwlvevir 'll I.v I;rlvlr�vllse� lu lit.11I% Ira/ �h %11141x111.
111+1, %IIH1% w�nllllnrr .11 1114� I$ "4 .�1 1 itM %#I.
I'.ta11a11 .t� :.411 .1� .11 lilt- i ni1,rr�111, al Irht.ltl 6-11 All
se�111pi11r� Ill .111. �1.110111- ha1,r 1 1610 11 11114 11 Ifw$#
r11 let-at it'll alortud
4. lintldirnil1%
Fl1r t-1�Illuril��. It.111i.11t� I1.,v4 Iwo- 11/.a0�i41ka.l hithl1,
�killr:l :Irli�.ul J11414111- Ilia 1�11141+ tL n 1 OIL
tnrt.lktifk. Ir%lilt at,ll 111 4t1 1rd1 /1141.4111\ ..1111
eu�.igll. F:%antl/it-. too 1H111t-n ,1141 1/nglw� v1,v.1f� Lent/
%%vall+ar +till tit11H of .1111110.11� �Ist1,nr Inv" 11 14
i �t-hi.tllnt, rra 111hllrltb 1114. 111011% 111 111.0101, 01.111�
I;ra ditall% drditird allt-r Ilse� I %111 1ru111t1, u6se
WI-Arrll illf lurl14-1�� urrr uui11�tf1.1111, .rd lilt IAItll h41th
slandarlh %%vr1� t1� /9l elllrillt III men vvl W r x '11.. 1"
11141:1 \..Ir1k.111% 11l �Itise�11111t 1.1181111% �lilt 101.54 114/ IIW1t
51
1+.0-114 r vr!Mirvvinitrt /1M 0-i /fwr 1y I r0MW0 .r= I!I1 r 1
r 9 NIt th 1 of tiller+Aw smalls 4pewn.141
h -:14 Inlorr +ilh floor vwitioul tvultil" ltm -h thr
lini -tht oil Inlrrtnral :4+11 .lull Ilrr lilliaitt of %t1 .ltlol
(:111111ty 1itv+111nv t0n�enttr Idn" M 0ir-Ir mv.
�111N�litln- +rr11 its Iv�11111rrhiall 111ralrh 1�ll .l "flow
Ulle�11 �houif ill 11NO1A0� 111111't atfol one 111'1i+irge
I. Selected bibliography f v, /o �i
\r.l�lt-h. 1 li1v.1 /slln *rNs,n fins/ blrwv rl.ln arrI n
its Innn. NUP 11MA. 1.1�iefoll I' IltiCi leftist 1
1111sh1101 �Ilnit te111�tillst list- 1ih�ir1t.111,N1 41111
��rtat11� :11111 Ir.11�Iff." violv1 ll.-Il loll .11NN1 :11111 le'l vu
If.gi�lation cvl.crrninlL 1.111nati��u
Alan still/ Norow- Irl_/ in Inn. 11011. h U: J
Brill. c,lnlpn�lu�11�it, rullllltl.11lfin Off Illy
�t.tf.nl. tahn-, ated culJllrf.. 1'f.r�ian 111t.lici -bnr..11111
vollh�ng(rart lifv.
lvf.rt. h -lo�r. Atimirm Iran. \f.a loll fiat -urr
14Ni5. \n f.u�e�IIf.m1 IlWooric.11 �11141%
Harf.clf. WiIIia Ill Prolrb�nl of r'rnlrlolnr. ill
(:n�ation its Iran. (:f.nf..a: Inlf.rn.11ion.11 1.111111
Organi /:lion. (Hill. :lmt.lin� 11�4.1111 d.1L1 111 tiff. f.%lf.ml
of unf.111041%mu�ml and ollicr n1:u11umo-t fmdtlrnm
International Rank fior 1i1.1�on.1 ru/�lion a01d
I)eveloprnemt. 1'hs� Fourth I)rrrlrgmt�nl flan fins/ lit�
Economic Prospc�s�ls of Iran: t ilanu l: Erroll 1 Ira
Wilshimgtoll: Inlc malinlull 11-ml, for Hi-v rn�Ir11c�lioil
and Dm-doplof.mt 1971. Inc ��..nuns
of the implf.nu ntati(uf of the Fooirlh \aliftiml
1)evelopnu�nt Plan.
Iran. Ham Organization. Fourth Nalionull)rrrlop-
nu�nt Plan: 19(A -72. 'I'c hraw Offset f Inc�. IfNiti.
Valuahle inforrnatiorl arid statistical data on 114111 %ing.
education. health, and social mvifare.
Plan Organization, Iranimi Slati.tic:l
Cvntc�r. National Ccnstcs of Population and /lousing.
Novernher 1966. 'I'c bran. 'I'll(- demographic, f.duc :l-
tional, occup:lticnai. and other social and economic�
characteristics of the settled population.
Iran Almanac and Rook of Facts: Tehran:
Echo Pr(�ss. 1971. A tvwfd cnm)en(li ill, of f :lets om
rnar.v aspects of Ir:ulian life, first published in 19(il
and updated annually.
lhra 11Mdr artfd Wool rqr. �.�t 14:1 I *4rtrr of
1rl�rrr. got fife 11 230 j owl -r 1q.
Iz vlrrtlet- inf,wwr>rlivrn wt lwertaitow lw 1w� om
tCewrtmnw Iw169, Iv,a,v"l &ou -v V,4 6 r4lls
Ilvvt,lir ilLi 1( It.rwirw 14rwlrt 1rrlo hot. .troll
%o 9:rt f :h,tlrtr 14111- 1 %n f heir/ irrl lair mw-
ftrrllMd ff' .Nnwd rrl 1I WA 1 ;wa1, V111u1v+. tv�I 1 life 1-
sh1 IMf`1 1 vvvwtlarltr ivr +omvo, .4 IIw- v 1lo m11inx
Ivestil .r tomii.rl 4t1001111r-
I atml.lom \ntr A M. 1 'rnlaa land no r Corm
If ff' Ir1,1i (hlrrhl L� rrv-114410 Ntr. Ielr fe,�iv
.rrvv,lrof ,d L.r elof h-f,wnv
%lil0�t- \1 Mimi# Alovitlost at hx,l ydr lfi.ws its Itch
1 tr t nrll lot 0%olifir d 1 1'.1t1 1 /hr 1ltdrll,
la +f j �naal- *0 !i. Ipi f.'tR1 -I i lit ilrt 1 1 alert
ilthlt tlr.11wwr ,111 imf.�tnl.rl low i.11 e/rNihrli,sr+ 001 mrl.,lrr
�1r,r1t
li'rrtra l,/ aflrnlal lalrmortmov- /non. tot lw, 1.
slirint 110 \rN loll W 1.4001. 1 nttrt� \v
1tolk 1110� i�.nt- 111 It"- h.sltm.11 0. 11rt1�Iovl rl11etrlt to
It.ltli.ln lilf.r.�Irlh-
I111,0111r11. lmtbw the /.lens/ 1:, J �fir 1'rr.gtanr Itt
Innl filet/ h� 14111111181 Ineldslalt�n. \1.1�hiteC1,111 llr,
%not hrUl I nitel'il� 147 1 1�r frll r1111
Note soot list rilm It fit Latest of-loins fib t IL1 4r �11'10
Its 111.1. ):111 111�110rp Iranian 1.1trafnrr
Ihlnit,�/ -hl. 111,� VilvelLooml- V lil�it0�I Posl4s4sinc
(:onllilm IfIlis ��0111.1rl% uml, 1111011 �.111/.Ihlr
111.614-6.11% fill "�crnf dt-ts�Io1 11.1110.110 111cl.111s
S.1I ,Pn1.111. P hilip "\.110,111.1 1011f. 1(ral0on of Ills�
Tlilf.� ill 11040�nt It-too. Piss Middle- last Jnnnal.
tot _�i. 111). 311) All Smmnit-r 19: l 04��r "�1.111.111�
la� ;ttrvol file- Ir.uu.lh nt .Ind 11 11.1r1wdil
Willu�r. I)omald Inns: Past anti Prr�rnt 1'tonevion
Prim vloit l'nitf.r.Nt life leNi. (:onci hhlort fh1n1
pn�Ilkloric tint�� 111hn1r.11 III,- 111�riod of 1111. 1.111
redWrilmliou pnlgr.un 011 dw I!NO%
har�`lialer. 1�:h..u1 lf.cl Inn/ Farr. dw No
xvu fork: Prleter 1 110 1. aluahlt-
informalion in arlicll�% amll% /ilic n�cti�111 dt-tt-lopnl,�n1�
in m:�� media. 1.11114alion. lit 1111� art�
%oui�. Mar%i11. The 1' Aliral taus� of Iran.
Princ�,�lon: Princ�f.lon I nitf.rilt 14; Ih�I :1i0v1
allaltsis of life- dWrilmlioll ,f political luo'ki -c ailh
mseful imfonmali(mo on the �c�ial vitill mitioll of Ila�
political cliff... :Ind fill lhf.ir talu,�.:uill allil01de�.
.041
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