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SECRET 4d /GS /CP Morocco March 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 W, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Surrey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication tnnt semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will contin-e to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country Chronology Area brief Sum- mary map THE SOCIETY Social structure Population Labor organization Living conditions Social problems Health Religion Education Artistic expression *Public information GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolu- tion of the state Governmental strength and sta- bility Structure and function Political dynamics National policies Threats to stability The police Intelligence and security Countersub- version and counterinsurgency capabilities THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its structure agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction Domestic trade Economic policy and development Government finances Man- power �International economic relations TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICA- TIONS Appraisal of systems �Strategic mobility Railroads Highways Inland waterways Fipe- lines Ports Merchant mar-he Civil air �Air- fields �The telecom system MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes �Approaches: land, sea, air ARMED FORCES The defense establishment joint activities Ground forces Air forces Para- military This General Survey supersedes the one dated January 1969, copies of which should be destroyed. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 orocco The Lion of the Maghreb No Longer 1 The Geographic and Cultural Amalgam The Weight of HistorN- Plus c'est la Meme Chose The Poor Not Enriched With or Without tho King Chronology .............................15 Areabrief .............................20 SummaryMap follows 21 The Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub stantially by November 1972. SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200080024 -1 r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 The Lion of the Maghreb No Longer Moroccan National Emblem The Arabs have an ancient saying that Algeria is the man of the Maghreb, Tunisia its woman, and Morocco its lion. Probably the proverb originates from Algeria's central location in '.North Africa, with smaller, weaker Tunisia on one side and, on the other, the more rugged, untamed Morocco �the country that is Al Maghreb al Aqsa, or the Far West of the Arab world. As Algeria strives to become a strong nation through industrialization and as Tunisia struggles for a better life for its people, the record of the independent Maghreb countries validates pats of the proverb, but not in the case of Morocco. The promise of pride and strength implied in the analogy to a lion has not been fulfilled, for Morocco has become economically the least progressive and politically the most troubled of the Maghreb states, resembling less and less the image of the proverb and its own national emblem. (U /OU Morocco is unusual among the Arab countries in that it has known no total eclipse of its statehood. When the Ottomans held most of the Middle East and North Africa in the 17th and 18th centuries, Morocco retained its separateness and royal succession. Even during the years of the French Protectorate (1912 -:56), the sultanate *vas preserved. (CI /OU) Today Moroccan society includes a sophisticated, French speaking elite and large numbers, particularly the youth, who look toward Westernization and mpdemization. At the same time, the past is evident in the rl?Et,ect for Islamic piety and traditional culture paid by both the learned and the uneducated. The past is also evident in the Moroccan Go%ernment, which is in many ways a medieval anachronism. King Hassan 11 has ruled the country since his investiture in 1961 as a personal fiefdom. As a result, serious endemic economic and social probiems have worsened. The gap bet%veen the rich and poor has not been narrowed, and the people on the whole have a little les; than those in the rest of Maghreb. (C) The gross domestic product (GDP) of Morocco on a per capita basis is equivalent to about US$170 a year �more than $100 below Algeria's and almost $40 under Tunisia's. The sectoral distribution of the CDP remained practically unchanged thro the 1960'x. Manufacturing consistently contributed only about 12% of it, while that sector of the Algerian and the Tunisian economies grew substantially. Morocco's average economic growth rate of 4% a year in the 1960's lagged behind those of the two other countries, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 and it was in fact largely erased by the high yearly 2.9% growth rate of the population. (U /OU) Because of the population increase, inflation, and declining purchasing power, the standard of living of most of the people has actually been falling. In rural areas, where about 65% of Morocco's 16 raillion people live, subsistence agriculture has become increasingly difficult. Thus, ever growing numbers of peasants flock to the cities in search of a better life. They live in bidonvilles (literally, tin -can towns) on the outskirts of the cities, and they swell the ranks of the unemployed. (U /OU) The job market is expanding much more slowly than available manpower or skills. Despite the great strides made in education since Morocco recovered it's independence in 1956, the literacy rate (about 20 is the lowest in the Maghreb, and the type and quality of training bear little relationship to national manpower needs. Many secondary school graduates are among the unemployed, who comprise almost 28% of the urban and 19% of the rural labor force. Morocco has made some effort to alleviate the unemployment problem probably the greatest one it faces �with a public works program, but it has been less successful in this endeavor than Tunisia, which has cut the unemployment rate to about 15 (U /OU) Until 1971 a laver of political stability covered these fundamental economic and social concerns. Then King Hassan joined that dwindling group of Middle Eastern monarchs whose staying pomyer is speculative. A number of high- ranking officers in July 1971 led 1,500 cadets of the noncommissioned officers' school in an attack on the palace at Skhirat, where the King, his senior advisers, and the diplomatic corps were celebrating his birthday. Just 14 months later, air force pilots tried to shoot down the Boeing 727 that was bringing the King home from France. Behind this attempted regicide was the Minister of Defense and head of the armed forces General Staff, Maj. Gen. Mohamed Oufkir. It was officially reported later that he had committed suicide, but it is more likely that he was summarily executed on the King's orders. As the officers involved in the earlier unfuccessful coup either were among the some 100 persons killed during the storming of the palace or were executed soon thereafter, the specific motives of the rebels may never be known. Their distinguishing characteristic seems to have been a common distaste for the corruption in the government and for the patronage systern by which the King runs the country. (C) 2 Since the attempted coup in August 1972, King Hassan has taken over personal command of the army and apparently seeks to maintain his regime by balancing the various military and security forces. He has made it plain that he will deal ruthlessly with dissident elements and that he is not prepared to make meaningful concessions to the demands of the political parties. 'they still hope to share Hassan's power, but they have become increasingly ineffective since parliament was dismissed in 1465 and they were ex- cluded from participation in government. Convir. A of his own rghteou3ness, Hassan seems unwilling to relate the attempts on his life to his failure to effect improvements in the welfare of his people. (C) The apathy with which the public responded to the attempts on Hassan's life reflects the general dulling of political interest throughout the country. It indicates as well that Hassan has squandered the legacy of popularity left him by his father. The throne has become shaky in Morocco only recently, as the country's problems have mounted. (U /OU Upon independence in 1956, Morocco's prospects seemed better than Tunisia's, although not so promising as Algeria's. The country is not well endowed with natural resources, but it does have more cultivable land than any other Maghreb state. Moreover, the relative ease with which independence was achieved gave the country an advantage. After the Algerian rebellion broke out and the Moroccan resistance began to tie down troops that France could ill afford because of its preoccupation with Algeria, I was granted to Morocco more quickly than even the most optimistic nationalists had anticipated. It was not accompanied by revolutionary upheaval as in Algeria, nor by the sharp divisions in the nationalist movement and crises with France that marked the Tunisian strug (U /OU) The Moroccan nationalist movement was distinguished from those of most other countries in that it came to center around the ruler of the land. Because the French Protectorate was built on the fiction that Sultan Mohamed V� Hassan's father �was the sole authority qualified to speak for Morocco, he .vas exiled in 1953 when his sympathies turned to the nationalists and he refused to sign decrees drafted by the protectorate authorities. Enthusiasm for the deposed sovereign then rose to near idolatry. He was restored to his throne in 1955, following the French change of policy, and he was supported by the important Istiqlal party as the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 national leader. Symbolizing his intention to introduce a more modern type of government, he changed his title from Sultan to King and convoked a constitutional assembly. The way toward constitutional monarchy seemed to be paved. (U /OU Developments throughout the Maghreb in the mid 1950's and early 1960's conjured up an image of a united region. It was argued by Western political scientists, and some of the nationalists too, that the three countries shared an identity derived from Berber, Arab, and French influences. If they became a single nation, they could be supported largely by Algerian resources (oil and natural ,as), led by Tunisia's dynamic Habib Bourguiba, and inspired by Mohamed V, who �as the heir to a 300 -year -old dyr =asty which claims descent from the Prophet �was the acknowledged religious leader in 'the area. It soon became apparent, however, that widely differing political systems and philosophies and methods of economic organization and management far outweighed common interests. Although a slow trend toward bilateral collaboration is now emerging, the dream of Maghreb unity has been put aside. All of the states have their special problems, and the stable future of none is assured. Yet Morocco in the 1970's has more political and economic troubles than the others. (U /OU) Some of the reasons for Morocco's relatively poor record are obvious. It lacla Algeria's ail, which has given that country the capability of industrializing, and it has not had Tunisia's Bourguiba, who has literally talked his nation into modernizing. Observers also point to the King's enthusiasm for golf and to the chicanery of government ministers, and they blame the state of affairs in Morocco on the frivolity a.1d cornption of its leaders. Underlying these all too valid explanations, however, is a blend of historical, sociological, and geographic elements that has rendered the process of modernization particularly difficult. (C) Throughout history Morocco has been a hard land to conquer and, once conquered, to control. Although the sultanate dates from the eighth century, national unity is a relatively recent phenomenon, for many of the tribes and regions of the country were brought under central government control only at the time of the French Protectorate. Moreover, many Arab lands have had longer and more pervasive contact with the West than Morocco has had, despite its proximity to Europe. The country is heir to a modernizing trend introduced by the protectorate and also to centuries old attitudes and customs. In this situation, the old often proves more influential than the new. (U /OU) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 The Geographic and Cultural Amalgam (u/ou) Even in a continent outstanding for its geographic diversity, the contrasts in Morocco are striking. It is the massive mountain complex of the Middle, High, and Anti Atlas, with the desert in the south and the Atlantic and the Mediterranean on the west and north, that gives the country its variety. Beyond the Middle Atlas, the land is a great red plain, colored by its weathered sandstone. Towering above it are the peaks of the High Atlas, which reach over 13,000 feet and are the highest and most rugged in North Africa. To the north, these mountains are snou or covered with forests of evergreen oaks and conifers, while palm groves rim the foothills and the southern slopes are barren and sunbaked. South and cast of this Atlas chain, and plains extend into the Sahara. Many of the settlements in the south �only about 500 miles from :u the tiled -roof villages of Morocco's Mediterranean shore �are walled and battlemented citadels. These are the call ,hs, the elaborate mud forts that served as redoubts during tribal wars. Later the term casbah came to be applied� somewhat erroneously �to the old sections, or the nwdinahs, of the cities. With their mazelike streets, these walled and ancient urban casbahs seem to bring the Middle Ages into this century, and they are proving an important attraction in the tourist boom. Morocco is intermediate in size between Algeria and Tunisia and is far more mountainous than either. In the north, the Rif mountains, which are the southernmost extension of Europe's Alpine system, rise steeply from the Mediterranean coast. Just to the east of 'rangier �that cosmopolitan city which commands the point where the Mediterranean meets the Atlantic and which was long under international control �port towns, including Spanish -held Ceuta and Melilla, 4 perch on mountain ledges; and all of the cities and towns of the coast are oriented toward Eprope. Inland, the villages are more isolated. Elaborate terracing procedures make agriculture possible, but the crops often are not sufficient to feed the local population. South of the Rif are the Middle Atlas mountains, flanked by Morocco's two principal rivers: the Own er Rbia and the Moulouya, which flow, respecti to the Atlantic and the Mediterrancium As these mountains merge into the High fl-as, every cultivable patch of ground at the low r elevations is lutilized to grow wheat, barlt sorghum, almonds, and vegetaules. Irrigation ditches, cut into the slopes, bring water to the fields from mountain streams. T e next anti losre :,f the 'Moroccan ranges is the Anti Atlas. SoutF of this area the desert begins, and lack of rainfall p%nnbits :-agriculture except in the oases And in the riverbeas, whose subsurface moisture is t.:.pped when the rivers dry up in summer. The Atlas Mountain. ensure Morocco a more plentiful water supply than any other North African state. Although all the country is hot and dry in summer, winter storms blowing from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean drop unoistd on the coasts, on the Atlantic lowland, and on the Rif and Atlas slopes facing the sea. Rains are ctiiaracteristically irregular, violent, and brief, however, and drought years are not uncommon. 1'i �cipitation always decreases sharply from north to south, antil semiarid and eventually desert conditions prevail. Morocco's heartland lies between the Atlantic Ocean and the great are formed by the foothills of the Rif and Atlas mountains. It is a rich argicultural area. The coastal plain, known as the Rharh, and the basin of the Sebou River produce citrus fruits, the country's APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 main commercial crop, and farther inland cereals, sugar beets, grapes, and olives are grown. This central and coastal area ;s also the most densely populated and economically advanced part of the country. It contains the important phosphate mines, and its agriculture supplies the food processing industries. Casablanca All the country's major cities are in this area. The old imperial capitals of l Meknes, and Marrakech, together with the former garrison cite of Rabat, describe a triangle between the coast and the Middle and Iligl Atlas mountains. In 1912 the French began to restore Rabat �the cite the Sultans bad founded as a stronghold (or rihut) against unfriendly tribes �and it is today the political capital of the country, wbile Casablanca remains the commercial capital. The different character of Morocco's cities reveals the varying impact of foreign influence. Sea, mountain, and desert did not isolate the land, but they did limit and direct the extent to which it ryas penetrated. Despite its proximity to Europe and long coastline (roughly 800 miles on the ltlautic and 300 on the Mcditerrancan). Morocco was never really open to the commerce of the seas. Spanish and Portuguese at various limes in history disputed for control of the shores, but the very regularity of coastline, providing no natural shelter, acted as it barrier to maritime influences. Casablanca, Morocco's largest port, did not develop until the French built costly breakwaters, and the other harbors of the 'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 i N 3 1 4 i country are manmade, with the exceptions of Spanish held Ceuta and Melilla. Land access to Morocco has also been difficult. To the east, the narrow Taza corridor, separating the Rif and the Atlas, stil.' affords the only easy route from Algeria. And to the south, the historical route of the caravans from deep Africa into Marrakech winds tortuously through desert and mountains. Migration into Morocco was never very great. French and Spanish settlers at the time of the protectorates numbered only about 500,06, as contrasted to over 1 million Frenchmen in Algeria. Once inside the country, all newcomers throughout history tended to concentrate in limited areas, forcing the indigenous peoples back into the mountains and out of the best Land but never themselves permeating the country. Thus the French imprint is very strong in Casablanca and Rabat and the modern sections of other cities. Trees lire the streets, and the high white buildings resemble those the French built in Indochina. Spanish influence, coupled with the stronger French imprint, inclines some observers to call Morocco the most diverse of Arab lands. Tetouan, once the capital of the Spanish zone, is indeed a Sp: ;nish city with crenellated stone %valis and iron grill work. Spanish influence is evident in Morocco's heartland too, for it entered the country centuries before the protectorate and through another path. As the Christians regained Spain in the Middle Ages, the Moors from Andalusia settled in Morocco. Many were employed as artisans and craftsmen, particularly in Fes, where they emulated the Alhambra at Granada, combining in Al Qarawivin University, for example, Spanish grace and elegance with African austerity. The European mark in Morocco is indelible, particularly among the small core of the elite who are as much at home in Paris as in Casablanca. French is still the main language of instruction in most postprimary schools. This European influence, however, has been small compared to the Arab transformation of the land. The invasion of Arabs from what is now the Syrian area in the seventh and eighth centuries and the larger one they mounted from Egypt in the 11th century were far more pervasive than the coming of the Europeans in the 19th century. Yet historians doubt that the Arab invaders reached Morocco in large numbers, and they too had their main impact on the cities. It is the cities that are the core of Arab Morocco Arabic in language and in values �for Islam gave its style of living to every 0 region -f easy access. In the mountainous areas, better defended by nature, it impressed its influence on beliefs but had marginal effect on manners and customs, which retrained faithful to the past. The dominant threads of rural life in many parts of Morocco are still Berber. Living in settled communities, the Berbers retain tribal ties and follow, to so:- degree, customary laws. In striking contrast to the veiled women in the Arab cities, the Berber women go unveiled and wear colorful dress. According to some observers, the way of life is more open and democratic in Berber communities than it is in Arab settlements. The population consists of the Arabized majority and a Berber minority. Language is the dividing line. Although Berber is not a written language and no standard form of it exists, estimates of numbers speaking a Berber dialect in Morocco range from 25% to almost 50% of the people. Many of them, however, know Arabic as well and have become Arabized Berbers. Intermarriage between Arabs and Berbers has been frequent, and physical characteristics are not distinguishing. Speaking of the dilution of the bloodstrain of the Arabs as they spread from the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 The old quarter of Fes, a medieval, Arab city. The pyramidal roofed building is the tomb of Idriss II, who fortified Fes about A.D. 809. Arabian Peninsula throughout the Middle East and North Africa, former U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare once commented that anyone is an Arab who says he is an Arab. While an exaggeration with regard to mankind as a whole, the remark is perhaps valid for Morocco. Historically, Berbers could become Arabs by learning the language and identifying thernselves as such. Over the centuries many of the Berber tribes did just that. Despite the blending of the two peoples, Arab Berber differences are real. The French :Wade much of them in pursuing their policy of divide and rule. They operated separate schools for the Berbers in attempts to Gaulicize them; they packed the army with Berbers; and they tried to establish special courts based on Berber customary law rather than on the Islamic Sharia. This division of the society was opposed by Arabs and Berbers alike, but most Moroccans today nonetheless identify themselves as one or the other. W;rile many Berbers share all the privileges of the Arabic- speaking elite, those removed from the towns did not learn Arabic, and they became the more iso- lated, poorer elements of the society. As the country has developed, ethnic identity has been reinforced by the rur.:l -urban division, and ethnic problems have been aggravated by the gap that exists between the elite and the masses. Thus many impoverished Berbers blame Arab domination for their plight. Yet these differences should not be overemphasized. The two peoples have coexisted, for the most part peacefully, for over 1,000 years. Perhaps because the Berbers in some ways resemble the Kurds (both are mountainous people living 'in Arab or other foreign lands and speaking a different language), observers have expected them to share the Kurdish desire for independence. However, no separa`:5t movement has ever developed among the Berbers with the exception of the uprising against the Spanish and the French led by Abdel Krim in the 1920's, and that revolt appeared to be a drive for local autonomy in the Rif rather than an effort to unite the Berbers. Recently attempts have been made to read meaning into the fact that the at- tempted coups of 1971 -72 were led by Berber officers, but for various reasons the ethnic identity of the rebels seems simply incidental. As a lingering result of the French practice of recruiting Berbers into the army, almost all of Morocco's high- ranking officers are Ber- bers. Although more of the younger officers are of Arab origin, the domination of the Berbers is still such that they would be involved in any army plans or ma- neuvers. Moreover, Berber officers were among the 1.1 loyalists as well as the rebels, and a number of them on both sides lost their lives at Skhirat. Cleavages and animosities among Berbers are often as severe as between Berbers and Arabs. The basically pluralistic Moroccan society revolves around family, tribe, and region, with Arab or Berber identity only one factor in the complex of loyalties. Many Berbers, in fact, do not identify themselves as such but use instead regional names. The Shluh, for example, are the Berber agriculturalists of the High and Anti -Atlas mountains. In this diverse land, the great unifying factor is Islam, the official religion of the state and the faith of almost all the people. Even Islam, however, is marked by variations in belief and practice throughout the country, for the Berbers were quick to embrace the religion of Arabs, but they evolved their own forms of it. In the countryside particularly, the animism of ancient times found sustenance in Muslim beliefs. Nature worship persisted, and religious observances included magical practices. In addition, cults of .saints, or marabouts, developed, based on the concept that certain persons possessed special holiness (barakah) and were able to perform miracles. Later a type of popular mysticism spread under the guise of religious brotherhoods. Some of these brotherhoods carne to extend over a large part of North Africa and established networks of lodges called zawiyahs. In periods of weak central government, they fulfilled social and political functions as well as religious ones. Meanwhile, the cities stood as centers of Muslim orthodoxy, and eventually reform movements grew up in them. In Fes in the 20th century one such movement set out to purge the country of unorthodox practices, of which the zawiyahs were considered the protagonists. Connected with this movement was a new Moroccan nationalism; a tacit alliance had developed at the time of the protectorate between the zawiyahs and the French, who gave the brotherhoods a degree of autonomy in return for their loyalty, and the nationalists thus attacked them for their connection witn the French and their divisive influence. Opposition to the brotherhoods has continued since independence and has resulted in the disintegration of most of them. Dilution of spiritual concerns undoubtedly has taken place among the urban educated. At times, there is tension between the more permissive way of life imported from Europe and the Islamic code, for religion is still a strong influence in Morocco. The popularity of the pilgrimages to holy sites and the well- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 kept wartbouts' tombs that dot tilt' couutr\ side give evidence of the importance of faith to most of the people. I1eligious and temporal authurit\ arc condbined in the institution of the nonarc�h if not iu the person of the King, and those associated \sith Want through descent or scholarship contiune to command respect throughout the socielc. For nam of the people, religion remains intermi\cct ccith belief in IIistoric�aI c�onti it ii t\ prevaiIs in \lorocco as in no other Maghreb country. Its past is one of the rise and dismemberment of enpires. :1t times one or another of them spread into Spain or spilled over into :1lgeria. although central control of the domains that no\\ constitute tit(- country \\as often tenuous. The thrmw nonetheless nr,(cle possible it measure of ,tnit\. for the earring tribes (suallk subscribed to lbe religious �if not the temporal� a tit horit\ of the S,tltan. Officially, the Country remains today the Sharifian Empire of Morocco, meaning that it is rule bs it Sharifian fatnil, i.c., one of the slrtn�afa Mho claim desccrt from the Prophet Muhanimad. In(lcpendenc�e was lost unl\ during the I I sears of the protectorate, and cveu then the slItauate "ill malc\oleut or benewleut mud beings Rich tntut I,e hectored, 1 :ro )it iated, ur a\oicled.:1u(I earn the puritanical turn that Islas, took it. Morocco hits nut lost its cffec�t. In contrast to lilt ru,s(lues of !,lost .krah countries \\Rich arc freer open to the public�, those in \lorocco are closed to it( ill- usliills. '1'1Ic onl\ cweption is one nrt,ulue in Rabat, opened b�, special permission of the King to further tourism. retained as an institution. l the rest of the :grab ssurld, Morocco its ne\cr part of the (Roman Pntpire. In the I ;lh cent ur\. hen and T unisia ,gem token b\ the "lurks. Morocco u:uutged to stale them off. using as it counlenseight Spanish and Portugmcsc interest in its coastal areas. Certainl\ "Turkish domination as in none of the conquered lands an enlightening influence, but in North .\fric�a it did implant it neasure of administratke control that it lacking in Morocco. The French did better than the "larks in \\inning Morocco. In 1912 tit,- Trcat\ of Fcs its signed making the country it French I'rotec�lorate. and subse(luentl\ Spanish zones \\ere established in its northern and southern extremities. Occupation b\ the French, m APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 The Weight of History (u/ou) however, was of relatively short duration, end its accc.mplishment was a long and bloody affair. They had come to Algeria in 1830, completed its conquest about 1880, and had held Tunisia since 1881, but despite the Fes treaty� effective control over all of Morocco was not established until 1934, after fighting that resulted in almost 50,000 French casualties. Most Arab countries have had at least three or four generations of contact with industrialized nations; and their Westernization �which is largely a matter of education �has be ^n phased out over a longer period than har Morocco's. For that country, independence meant isolation. Not content with holding out against political seizure in the mid -19th century, Morocco strictly limited its commercial exchanges with the outside world. Closed against outside influence, the country became engrossed in internal struggles, for Berber tribes, the soldiers of the Sultan, religious personages, and town bourgeois were in frequent collision. These convulsions resulted in social stagnation, just when Europe was evolving at increasing speed. This 19th century isolation was, in a ser_se, a continuation of the past, for Morocco was left more alone than many eastern lands throughout history. Even the Roman occupation was confined to parts of the north. The first Moroccan ruler about whom firm data exist way Juba I1, son of a Berber chieftain iii t he Algerian area whom the Romans educated and placed in control of Moroccan territory about 25 B.C. lie married the daugater of Anthony and Cleopatra and established a court of evident sophistication at Volubilis. Traces of this rule remain only in this limited area, indicating �in comparison to far more extensive ruins in the rest of the Maghreb �that Morocco was only lightly held by the Romans. Not until the Arab invasion at the end of the seventh century did Morocco begin to assume its present character. Whatever the strength of Arab Berber differences today, history records a truly remarkable degree of accommodation between the two people. Although the Berber tribes initially resisted the Arabs, less than 50 years later (in 711) they were fighting as comrades in Spain. Appealing to the religion of the newly converted people or, perhaps, to their lust for booty, the Arabs were able to lead Berber forces to invade Europe, and they penetrated as far into Gaul as Poitiers. Essentially, the invasion was Berber, commanded by the Berber general Tariq �who gave his name to the Rock (Jabal in 10 Arabic) of Gibraltar �but it was an Arab operation, directed from Damascus. Spanish lands were allotted to the Arabs and, in the end, the% came to contr -t the principalities that developed there. Morocco at that time was a province of the Arab Caliphate. The first truly independent Moroccan Kingdom grew from the arrival in Tangier in 788 of Moulay Idriss, a descendant of 'Ali and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. He had escaped from the Arab eost after compromising himself in a rebellion against the Abbasids in what is now Iraq. As a sharif, he was able to assume command of Berber tribes in the neighborhood of Volubilis, where he had settled. With their aid, he soon established the city of Fes as his headquarters and began to carve out in rudimentary form the type of Moroccan Kindgom .hat has existed ever since. This basic nature of the government remained unchanged, although the dynasties that followed that of Moulay Idriss �the Almoravid, Almohad, the Merinid, and the Saadian �came not from the Arab east but from the Berber south. The present Alaouite (Alawite) dynasty also came from the south. Although the Alaouites claim to be a Shari;ian family, coming originally from a town on the Red Sea, they had lived for centuries in Tafilalt near modern Erfoud. The founder of the dynasty was Moulay al- Rashid, who succeeded in wresting Fes from Saadian control in 1667. The succession of these dynasties n Morocco, however, did not mean unification. Throughout the centuries, the country remained an amalgam of tribes, very loosely bound together by the link of religion. It was divided into what came to be known as the bled al- makhzen, or lands of government, and the bled al- siba, or lands of dissidence. The latter was free o: nwkhzen taxes and military levies, and the tribes that composed it maintained that status as long as th -v could repel the forces of the sultan. Usually makhzen comprised the lowlands between the Rif, the High Atlas, and the Atlantic, and the siba was a phenomenon of the mountains and the dese. t, but the distinction between the two was sharp neither in time nor in geography. The makhzen itself represented essentially medieval and feudalistic control, emanating alternately or concurrently from Fes, Marrakech, and Meknes. 'Literally, the word makhzen means storehouse. Its application to the government points to the fact that the main purpose of the sultanate administration was the collection of taxes. Bled indicates the Moroccan pronounciation of the Arabic word bilad (country). APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 Alliance- building was its kry element. The sultan used diplomacy and the gra9ting of privileges to ?n the cooperation of local officials �the caids and the pashas. (Indicating historical continuity, these titles are still used for the agents of the Ministry of Interior, who administer modem Morocco.) Originally, they were members of the tribal groupings they administered, supposedly in the name of the sultan. Some of the caids of the larger southern tribes were only nominally subordinate to the makhzen. In fact, they often presided as lords over territories defended by their own armies, and at times they joined the siba. With the coming of the French. the tribes lost military pa! ":y with the central authority, and the siba was eliminated. At the same time maily elements of makhzen administration were retained. General (later Marshal) Louis Lyautey, who presided over the pacification of Morocco, developed the concept of indirect administration. He found it easier to control the country by using local chiefs, and also this policy conformed to official desires to preserve indigenous institutions. The caids and pashas were subordinate to the French chefs de region, but they were allowed a considerable degree of autonomy. In some cases, their positions were bolstered by augmenting their property rights. Thus much of the tra ditional government and political system survived the French rule relativelv intact. The medieval quality of this system of government was brought before world press and television in 1953 �just 3 years before Moroccan independence when Thami El Glao the Pasha of Marrakech, collaborated with the French in deposing the Sultan. As a rival and enemy of Mohamed V, the Pasha supported the French when the Sultan began to oppose them. Subsequently, he organized a demon- stration of tribesmen to protest the rule of Mohamed V and to justify the French scheme to replace the monarch with a little known but docile member of the Alaouite family. Two years later, persuaded that the French were about to restore Mohamed V to the thr ne, Thami El Glaoui went to him, kissed his feet, and asked his pardon. The scene was reminiscent of 1076, when Henry I1' of Germanv submitted to the Pope at Canossa. Reflecting the nature of the society, the nationalist movement in Morocco was conservative and religious origir It grew frorn the coming together of urban it '!eetuals who called themselves Salafists and who s r' for Islamic reform and the purging of the brotherhoods. One of the leaders of this group was the tutor of Allal El Fassi, the present head of the Isti--lal party. El Fassi himself first won prominence in the 1930's by opposing the so- called Berber dahir (decree), by which the French attempted to limit the application of Sharia lacy. These defenders of Islam naturally opposed administration by a Christian power, so the transition from a religious orientation to one that was overtly political and from reformism to separatism was an easy one. It resulted in the founding of the Istiq!al party in 1943. The independence struggle was also in the beginning largely an elitist affair, Arab and urban in origin, but its goals came to be supported by resistance groups Nyho fought the French in the countryside and by the growing labor movement. All this while, the society was changing pi,.foundly. The modern infrastructure was being established, modern medicine was contributing to the population growth, and peasants were being dra%yn off the land by the lure of wages in development work. 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 This latter part of the Drench aphorism ("The mure things change, the more they stay the same." is often quoted by observers to describe the palace politics of Morocco. Using techniques reminiscent of those of the old nwkhzen, King Hassan manipulates his senior officials and acts to prevent the formation of any group powerful enough to threaten him. In a sense, the real politics of the country is the competition for patronage among the ministers, the trusted advisers of the King who form what is known as the Royal Cabinet, and other members of the military and civilian bureaucracy. Changes in tile society and government are promised and some are initiated, but fundamental reform hay yet to take place. The p-wers of the monarchy grew gradually after independence. In the early governments. Istiqlal party members held most of the important ministerial posts, and they were in a position to bargain with Mollarned V for it constitution and the holding of elections. Disagreements within the party, however, soon gave the King the upper hand. At a time of labor pretests and clashes between the tribes an remnants of the Array of National Liberation, the Istiqlal was unable to form it government. 'thereafter the King appointed ministers answerable to him "personally' and not to the party. The army responded to his appeal to halt the fighting in the countryside, and the piocess of reforming it into it national force that would serve as an appendage to the palace was initiated. In the absence of a popular mandate through elections or legal rights under a .written constitution, political parties were iielpless. King H .scan has made gestures toward participator\ democracy. Under his rule, three constitutions have been promulgated and two national elections hw, e been held. The 1962 constitution esiablished a bicameral legislature and granted limited popular representation. In 1965, however, in the wake of riots in Casablanca and disagreements among members of the King's coalition in the House of Representatives, the King accused the parliamen- tarians of irresponsibility and dismissed the leg- islature. He then reverted to personal rule through courtier governments. Another constitution was not put forth until 1910, and the elections for which it provided were boycotted by the important political parties and were apparently rigged. Reform measures taken after the Skhirat massacre included vet another constitution, but it also places no meaningful restrictions on the Kings authority. He retains his rights to appoint and dismiss ministers, to declare a 1? APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 Hassan rides to Friday prayer, 1971. 1 state of emergency, to control in large measure the composition of any legislature that might be elected, and to dissolve it at will. The division of the opposition and personal rivalries within the political parties have consistently ,abetted the monarchy's exercise of unrivaled power. The Istiqlal, which upholds traditional values but advocates a constitutional monarchy and such measures as land reform, was badly weakened in 1959, when the younger, more liberal elements broke off to form the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). Representing the non Communist left, the UNFP has been harrassed by the government since soon after its formation. Like the Istiqlal, it has atrophied because of its long exclusion from power, and in addition it lacks unified leadership. Other parties, such as the Popular Movement, continue to function in Morocco, but they have never had a signifi �ant following. Despite the weakness of the parties, the King continues to consult with their leaders. In 1970 the Istiqlal and the UNFP formed the National Front of Opposition in an attempt to wrest some power from the King; and Hassan has offered them participation in government but on h s own terms. He held 28 meetings with party leaders in late 1971 and early 1972 to discuss with them their assumption of ministerial portfolios. In the end, the talks turned out to represent perhaps an exercise in political theatrics. A new government was formed in April, comprised once more of the King's men and of apolitical technicians. Overtures made again to the parties in late 1972 had the same result. Much has been made of the corruption of the men who surround the King. It is true that a number have used their offices for material gain, that bribery smooths the working of the bureaucracy, and that patronage and favoritism are components of the system. Moreover, the King has in the past dealt lightly with offenders Only one minister had been removed from office for corruption before 1971. Then the Ministers of Finance, Commerce, and Tourism and the Director General of the Bureau of Mines were dismissed, tried, and sentenced after General Medbouh, who was executed for his part in the 1971 wup attempt, discovered they had tried to get $1 million from Pan American World Airways in return for supporting a bid for a hotel site. Yet it is also true that many of the King's supporters are honorable men and well intentioned. Why have they accomplished so little in bringing about economic growth and an equitable distr;' -rtion of income? Analysts have argued that use ol power in Morocco tends to be defensive, that it is seldom considered a means to chart a new course. Behind this theory is the obvicus fact that the King has followed the technique of bui:ding up clientele groups, and he has found it easier to govern in this way and with the support of the military than to deal with political parties or with individuals representing constituencies. These clientele groups are drawn from the Moroccan elite, which itself is small. Members grew up in the protectorate years, and they belong to the prominent families of old Morocco. (As many trace their origins to Fes, complaints about the power of the Fassi �as the bourgeoisie of Fes are called �are commonly heard throughout the country.) They benefited from independence because they were the ones w ith the money to buy the property the French wanted to sell, and those with the power to arrange transfer of the funds got bargain prices. The fortunes they subsequently amassed, while by no means great ones by Western standards, are sufficient to encourage maintenance of the status quo. The elite, moreover, is characterized by an elaborate system of mut;al obligations. Often commercial, marital, and social ties cut across political differences. Allal El Fassi of the Istiqlal, for example, is a personal friend of the King as well as the leader of the opposition to him. Most members of the elite or their associates have participated in the King's patronage system, and thus they tend to feel powerless as the monarchy distributes rewards and privations. The attempted regicides of 1971 -72 indicate that the elite is changing, perhaps drastically. But in the past, few of its members have been willing to endanger their well- being or that of their colleagues to achieve the goals they may sincerely hold for the society. The result seems to be a sort of shifting and col- lective leadership, always controlled by the King, in which no one is responsible. There is no lack of planning and activity, but very little happens. A case in point is the family planning program. It was established in 1966, and in the Five Year Plan of 1968- 72 it was cited as a national priority objective. One measure of the program called for employing and training 600 full -time family planning field workers a: the rate of 120 a year. Special funds were allotted to the Ministry of Health for the purpose. In 1968 a group of 33 was trained to do family planning information work, and they began their activities in various parts of Morocco. No additional workers were trained, and in 1970 the Ministry of Health disbanded this small group. Unless the birth rate declines, the population will double in 24 years. 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 We have often said that our socireconomi.: polio% is aimed at enriching the poor without impoverishing the rich. Unfortunately, for reasons there is no need to set forth nos%, we have seen that .chile the poor have not been enriched, the rich have increased their fortunes. Thus the A aP between the tvo categor,es has onl% widened. This situation is intolerable in a country like ;Morocco. King Hassan, 4 August 1971 The reasons which the King declines to set forth for not enriching the poor are various, and manv have economic logic behind them. With limited resources, the government has been reluctant to take measures to endanger production levels or to disrupt the rural sector. Its Policies have emphasized economic growth and long -term benefits rather than measures to achieve a more equitable distribution of the gains. Little attention has been given to that Problem, although fewer than Wr' of the people reportedly receive more than half the national income. In agriculture, which has been receiving about half the government investment, most of the projects 14 undertaken are those with long gestation periods, such as dam construction. The benefits, moreover, accrue mainly to the modern sector, which consists of tie lands confiscated by the government after independence or sold by Europeans to Moroccans, together with some farms still owned by Europeans. This sector provides nearly all the agricultural exports (mainly citrus fruits and vegetables), but it employs only about a quarter of the rural population. Investment would benefit the small farms, on which most of the people live at a subsistence level, supplying there with fertilizers and introducing modern techniques through extension services. however, the disparity in efficiency between the large and small farms is very great, and the government is eager to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 The Poor Not Enriched (c) increase the exports that the former provide. These exports finane: the import of capital goods and also a significant part of the food supply. Once an exporter of wheat, Morocco now must import enough to feed its population even in good crop years. Underlying agricultural problems is the antiquated hand tenure system. Most of the pasture land is still under tribal ownership, a fact which discourages individual development effort,. An estimated 7% of the farmers own over half of the cultivated land, 60% own less than an acre, and 33% have no land at all. The government has distributed about one -sixth of the land it nationalized after independence, but the large estates particularly those of the wealthy Moroccans �have not been disturbed. Public de- mands for land distribution are mounting, and land reform is an important issue of the political opposition. Meanwhile, the government is caught between these demands and its reluctance to jeopardize the high production levels of the large farms. This dilemma and other problems of the government were aggravated throughout most of the 1960's by an economic standstill. Midway in the decade the government curbed spending to relieve inflationary pressures. Then drought years cut inputs to the food processing industry and caused a slump in consumer demand, reinforcing the depressing effects of the reduced government spending. The result was a sharp increase in unemployment. Moreover, the mining industry has been in trouble. Outputs of iron, lead, and zinc ores have declined as mines have been depleted. Morocco has held its place as first or second in world exports of phosphates, depending oil the level of U.S. sales in a given year, but that industry is threatened by falling market prices and new foreign competition. Since 1968 the econciny nonetheless has been healthier, largely because of several good crop years. Sharply increased government investment and revived consumer demand resulting from the good harvests prompted a resurgence of eco.,omic activity throughout the country, and it has beer reflected in rising private investment. Moreover, Morocco has succeeded in putting itself on the world tourist map, thus creating work and bringing in foreign exchange. Both tourism and the relatively high level of private investment, which the government has encouraged, are threatened by the political instability evident since 1971, but to date its effect does not appear to have been serious. Although the Moroccan economy relies heavily on assistance from the West, it is not without development prospects. The returns from investment in irrigation projects are just forthcoming and will reduce dependence on rainfed agriculture, while production can be further increased by new efforts to obtain higher yields. An agreement has been concluded with the European Economic Community which gives Moroccan production preferential entry into the Common Market countries, and it may serve as an inducement to foreign investors to establish factories there. The textile industry is meeting domestic needs, new industries such as automobile assembly have been established, and there is room for great expansion of tourism. Cautious efforts are being made to achieve a more equitable distribution of income, although they by no means approach the bold initiative suggested by the King's oratory of August 1971. A progressive tax on incomes amounting to the equivalent of over US$10,000 was instituted in that year. Moreover, indirect taxes which, together with customs duties, have accounted for about half of budget revenues been reduced. Distribution of government land to the peasants has been speeded up, and measures have been taken to encourage labor intensive industries with hopes of reducing unemployment. While the best of governments could find no quick or easy solutions to the problems of Morocco, evidence of concern for the welfare of the people may assuage discontent. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 With or Without the King (s) After t%%:, attempts on the life of the King within 14 months, a "wait- and -see" mood prevails in Morocco, and it permeates as well all comment on the future of the monarchy. Hassan owes his life to the ineptness of the coup plotters; and now the officer corps, which had been the throne's main prctp, no longer supplies reliable backing. His purging of senior officers, some of whom undoubtedly have their own supporters both in the military arid among the civilian elite, and his sharp criticisni of the armed forces must have increased the numbers of those antagonistic to him. Moreover, students, teachers, and laborers have not lost the disruptive capability they demonstrated in riots of 1965. Hassan has assumed control of the military and strengthened his supervision of government administration, but his record as a dilettante does not augur well for efficient and effective rule. 16 Yet the King is a shrewd man who has proved himself adept at rranipulation, and assessment of his rule is not wholly negative. Holding a law degree from Bordeaux University, he combines the style of the West with the traditional Nay of life in a manner perhaps *sell suited to his country. As he moves his court to his numerous palaces in an aura of privilege, wealth, and luxury, he preserves an aloofness that may be expected by the nass of people who regard him as their religious leader. At the same time, he ;s the leader of the Westernized elite Li ,d he holds press conferences which occasionally have the give- and -take quality of those in Europe and the United States. Hassan's maior achievement is in the age -old art of statecraft, anc: his foreign policies have benefited his country. Maintaining a posture of nominal nonalignment but actual pro Westernism, Morocco since independence has obtained about $860 million in U.S. aid, approximately half as much from France, and almost $120 million from Communist countries. Despi!e the opposition of the Istiqlal and the UNFP, the King has permitted the United States to retain naval communication facilities in and near Kenitra, probably seeing in the informal agreement an assurance of U.S. aid. This arrangement i:: threatened by the possibility that Hassan may seek to end it in order to strengthen his credentials among the nonaligned states or to allay domestic citicism. And he has another issue �that of the Spanish Sahara �whose activation would serve the same purposes. Hassan occasionally speaks out strongly against continued Spanish control of this territory, and he also a,L, for the return of Ceuta and Melilla, but he takes no action in these directions to seriously aggravate Madrid. While maintaining good relations with the West, Hassan has worked to build his image among Arab and African countries. He was elected chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at a summit meeting of that organization Ire hosted in Rabat in June 1972. Although he has kept his country relatively removed from the contagion of the Arab -Is: ,eli conflict and has not been inclined to sacrifice Morocco's U.S. ties to Arab solidarity, he is on good terms with all the Aral) states except Libya. Those relations were naturally chilled when the Libvan radio called on the coup plotters to try again after the 1971 attempt on the King's life failed. One of the most important objectives of Hassan's foreign policy has been the development of a corn munity of interests with his Maghreb neighbors. The APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 major irritant in relations with Algeria had been Mo- rocco's claims to a !arge part of the Algerian Sahara, and they led to a brief border war in 1963. Evidently recognizing Morocco's inability to press these claims, Hassan downplayed them, and in 1972 an agreement was signed for demarcation of the disputed area. Moroccan relations with Algeria and Tunisia are presently low key, and the parameters of meaningful economic cooperation are limited by the lack of complementary resourses. Nonetheless, the leaders of these states have exchanged friendly visits, resulting in agreements calling for the denunciation of any pact or force directed against another and for increased cooperation. In domestic affairs, Hassan has been autocratic but not, for the most part, repressive. His crackdowns on the opposition have, to date at lease, been sporadic. Morocco is rare among the Arab and African states for a multiparty system; and the right of criticism, though restricted, is unccmmon for that part of the world. The Istiqlal continues to put out the leading Arabic language daily newspaper, Al Alam (The Banner), and has used. it to denounce such measures as the 1970 and 1972 constitutions. In August 1972 the paper carried a statement blaming the King's policies for the attempt on his life. These issues were confiscated, but no further action was taken against the paper. In fact, if one of the attempted coups had succeeded, Moroccans would almost surely have less opportunity to express dissent than they do now. Morocco also has one of the few independent trade union organizations in African and Arab countries. The Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), with some 200,000 members, is an influential group, which supports but is not allied with the leftist UNFP and openly criticizes the monarchy. Although the power of the UMT has been hurt by the great extent of unemployment in the country, it has pressed hard for wage increases and had some success. Perhaps seeing in the UMT a counterweight to army influence, Hassan has not been willing to use force to curb its extended strikes and periodic walkouts. For several months after the Skhirat massacre, Hassan did succeed in creating a sense of an impending better future. He promulgated a new constitution, promised elections, proclaimed a fight on corruption, raised sal. r:zs, and lifted the tax on sugar �an important item in the diet of the Moroccan poor. However, as he postponed elections, appointed another cabinet with -at party participation, and relied increasingly on the army, it became apparent that the main lesson Hassan had learned from Skhirat was to give more intimate and protected birthday parties. There have been few real indications that the lessons learned from the second attempted coup have been more profound. Yet it is not too late for the throne to become an agent for change in Morocco. The King could institute meaningful land reform, develop a new class of technicians to guide the development of cooperatives and other projects, shift the tax burden to those able to bear it, and expand the civic action and public works programs engaging the army and the unemployed. In short, Hassan could lead a campaign for social and economic betterment, and he is in a better position to do so than any successor would be. He is less likely to be troubled by regional and other divisive tendencies in the society, for his position still commands respect, especially in the countryside. Such a campaign has been led by the Shah of Iran, whom Hassan is said to admire. And at various times during his reign Hassan has pledged reform and an "agrarian revolution." If change does take place in Morocco and if it is directed by the palace, it will be healthy for King and country. 17 r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 CHRONOLOGY (U /OU) c. 146 B.C. -A.D. 400 Roman influence and subsequent control replaces that of the Carthaginians. A.D. 429 Invasions by Vandals and Visigoths begin. c. 685 Arab raiders enter Morocco through the Taza gap. 711 Forces under the leadership of the Arab governor Musa Ibn Nusayr and his Berber subaltern Tariq invade Spain. c. 788 Moulay Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet, establishes the first Moroccan dynasty and extends hegemony over most of the northern part )f the country. c. 1000 Arab tribes of the Hilal invade Morocco. 1062 Berber tribes from the south make Marrakech the new capital and found Almoravid dynasty. 1147 New confederation takes Marrakech and its leaders become the Almohad rulers. 1212 Almohad forces are defeated in Spain, and Muslim power there begins to wane. c. 1216 The Beni Merin tribe enters Morocco, defeats the Almohads, and eventually establishes the Merinid dynasty. 1549 Capture of Fes marks beginning of control by the Saadians, who had previously defeated Portuguese forces. c. 1576 Sultan Abd al -Malik is influenced by the Ottoman Turks, who then controlled the rest the Maghreb, but he resists their domination. 1664 Moulay al- Rashid becomes the first strong ruler of the Alaouite dynasty, which started to rise to power about 1660. 1787 Morocco and the United States sign the Treaty of Marrakech, settling differences resulting from pirate seizure of U.S. ships. 18 e. 1912 Treaty of Fes establishes the French Protectorate; Spanish zones are recognized in the north and south and the existing international status of Tangier is accepted. 1956 March Formal independence is granted by France to French Protector- ate of Morocco. April Spain relinquishes control over Spanish Protectorate of Morocco. October International status of Tangier is revoked; zone is integrated into Morocco. 1958 April Spain relinquishes control over the southern Spanish zone of M -)rocco. 1960 June U.S. military assistance program is initiated. 1961 February King Mohamed V dies. March Mohamed's son is enthroned as King Hassan II and mainta?ns royal control of the government, acting as his own Prime Min- ister. 1962 December Morocco's first written constitution becomes effective, following approval by popular referendum. 1963 October Moroccan territorial claims lead to 3 -week border war with Algeria. December U.S. Strategic Air Command completes evacuation of three bases in Morocco. 1965 March Student demonstrations in Casablanca escalate into violent antigovernment riots joined by the unemployed and by young militants from opposition factions. Violence spreads to Fes but not to other cities. About 250 are killed, 4,000 injured, and 850 arrested. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 1985 June King declares a State of Exception (Petat dexception), dis- misses parliament, and promises a revised constitution and new elections. October Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled UNFP leader, is kidnapped in Paris. Facts of his disappearance remain unclear, but case leads to a deterioration in Morocco's relationship with France. In January 1966, France recalls its Ambassador to Morocco, and Morocco recalls its Ambassador to France. 1966 October Hassan visits Moscow. Four conventions are signed, including a general economic aid agreement. 1969 January Spain and Morocco sign the Treaty of Fes in which Spain agrees to return to Morocco the enclave of Ifni. Morocco and Algeria sign the 1frane Treaty of Friendship. December France and Morocco agree to reestablish full diplomatic rela- tions. 1970 August King Hassan promulgates a new constitution and lifts the State of Exception. Elections are held for a new unicameral legis- lature. 1971 July High ranking army officers lead an unsuccessful coup attempt against King Hassan at his birthday celebration at Skhirat Palace. Loyal forces under the diwvtion of Gen. Mohamed Oufkir restore order within a few dui' 1972 March King Hassan promulgates a new constitution but makes no firm promise on a date for new elections and the establishment of parliament. August The King escapes another attempt on his life when three Moroccan Air Forev F -5's try to shoot down the plane bringing him from France. 19 J APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 c AREA BRIEF* LAND: Size: 158,100 sq. mi. Use: About 32% arable and grazing land, 17% forest and esparto, 51% desert, waste, and urban (1965) Land boundaries: 1,240 mi. WATER: Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. (fishing, 12 n. mi.) Coastline: 1,140 mi. PEOPLE: Population: 15.8 million (July 1972 est.), average annual growth rate, at least 2.9 Ethnic divisions: 99.1% Arab Berber, 0.2% Jewish, 0.7% foreign, mainly French Religion: 98.7% Muslim, 1.1% Christian, 0.2% Jewish Language: Arabic (official); several Berber dialects; French predominates in business, government, diplomacy, and post primary education Literacy: 20% Labor force: Almost 5.9 million (1970 est.); 69% in agriculture, 10% in industry and mining, 10% in commerce and govern- ment Organized labor: About 5% of the labor force, mainly in the Union of Moroccan workers (UMT) GOVERNMENT: Type: Constitutional monarchy Capital: Rabat Political subdivisions: 19 provinces and 2 prefectures Legal system: Based on Islamic law and French and Spanish civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitu- tional Chamber of Supreme Court; has not accepted compul- sory ICJ jurisdiction Branches: Constitution provides for Prime Minister and min- isters named by and responsible to King; King has paramount executive powers; unicameral legislature (two thirds to he directly elected, one third indirectly 1; judiciary independent of other branches Government leaders: King Hassan II Suffrage: Universal overage 20 Elections: Last parliamentary elections held 21 and 28 August 1970; elections for new parliament created by the constitution adopted 15 March 1972 have not been held Political parties: Istiqlal party, National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), Popular Movement (MP), Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD), Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS), estab- 'The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973 issue of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is Unclas- sified /Official Use Only unless otherwise indicated. 20 lisped in June 1968 and banned Septemlrr 1969, is front for Moroccan Communist Party (MCP), which was proscribed in 1959; Istiqlal and the UNFP formed a National Front in July 1970 to oppose the new constitution Voting strength: August 197 elections were nonpolitical; 1 March 1972 constitutional referendum tallied 98.7% for new constitution, 1.25% opposed, and National Front abstained from voting Communists: 300 est. Member of: Arab League, ECC (association until 1974), FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, ILO, IMC, IMCO, IMF, ITU, OAU, Seabeds Committee (observer), U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO ECONOMY: GNP: $2.7 billion (1970, constant 1966 prices), about $170 per capita; average annual growth 5.4% during 1968 -71 (C) Agriculture: Cereal farming and livestock raising pre4domi- nate; main crops wheat, barley, citrus fruit, wine, vegetables, olives Major industries: Mining and mineral processing (phos- phates, smaller quantities of iron, manganese, lead, zinc, and other minerals); food processing, textiles Electric Power: 748,000 kw. rapacity (1971); 1.9 billion kw. -hr. produced (1971), 116 kw. -hr. per capita Exports: $488 million (f.o.b., 1970), food products 51 phos- phates 23 other 26% (C) Imports: $686 million (c.i.f., 1970); food 17%, raw material and semifinished goods 43%, equipment 24%, consumer goods 16% (C) Major trade partners: Exports �France 36 U.S. 2 imports �France 31 West Germany 9 Italy 5 Benelux 5 U.S. 14%(C) Aid: Economic Includes about $720 million from the United States through June 1970; Communist countries, about $80 million Military�U.S., $67 million; France, $41 million; and Com- munist countries, $33 million delivered through June 1970(5) Monetary conversion rate: 4.59 dirhams= US$1 (selling rate) Fiscal year: Calendar year COMMUNICATIONS: Railroads: 1,100 mi. standard gage, 93 mi. double track; 493 mi. electrified Highways: 32,180 mi.; 11,200 mi. bituminous, 3,250 mi. gravel, crushed stone, or improved earth, 17,733 mi. unimproved earth (C) Pipelines: Crude oil, 85 mi.; refined products, 307 mi.; natural gas, 18 mi. Ports: 8 major (including Spanish controlled Ceuta and Mel lila), 12 minor APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 SECRET c: Merchant marine: 13 ships (1,000 g.r.t. or over) totaling 36,900 g.r.t., 48,400 d.w.t.; includes 11 cargo, 2 specialized carrier (C) Civil air: 10 major transport aircraft Airfields: 143 total, 87 usable; 23 with permanent- surface runways; 2 with runways over 12,000 ft.; 10 with runways 8,000 11,999 ft., 40 with runways 4,000 -7,999 ft.; 4 seaplane stations Telecommunications: Superior system by African standards composed of open -wire lines, coaxial multicorductor and sub- marine cables and radio -relay links; principal centers Casablanca and Rabat, secondary centers Fes, Marrakech, Oujda, Sebaa Aioun, Tangie! and Tetouan; 170,000 telephones; about 1 mil- lion radio and 300,000 TV receivers; 24 Moroccan AM, 1 Voice of America AM, 3 FM, 17 TV station 11 submarine cables DEFENSE FORCES: Personnel: Army, 49,000; navy, 1,600; air force, 3,100 (130 pilots); Mobile Maghzen of Auxiliary Forces, 6,000; royal gen- darmerie, 3,500; Mobile Intervention Companies of the SECRET national police, 2,500; Males 1549. 3,827,000 (January 1973 est.), of whom about 68% fit for military service; about 175,000 reach military age (18) annually (S) Major ground units: 1 light security brigade, 1 parachute brigade, 9 infantry battalions, 1 heavy mortar battalion, 4 cavalry battalions. 1 Royal Guard battalion. 2 motorized infan- try brigades, 1 mechanized infantry brigade, and 1 armored brigade which were disbanded in late 1972 consisted of 9 in- fantry battalions, 4 iiiiery battalions, 4 tack battalions, 3 re- connaissance (armored infantry) battalions, 1 assault gun battalion, and 1 antitank gun battalion; sts tus of these units has not been determined (S) Ships: 17 (15 patrol, 1 amphibious, 1 service) (S) Aircraft: 182 (52 jet, 113 prop, 17 helicopters) (S) Supply: Produces some small arms and ammunition; dependent on U.S., France, Czechoslovakia, and U.S.S.R. for other ma- teriel (C) Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1971, $143.9 million. 16.5% of total budget 21 .d.r,.......Y ..a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 0 Places and features referred to in the General Survey (U/OU) COORDINATES APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 W. a r .N. PW. Abda (tribal area) 32 15 8 55 M oha m media.......................... Agadir 30 24 9 36 Moulouya, Oued xtrm).... 33 42 7 24 'ill Agadir (admd) 30 00 9 00 Moyen (Middle) Atlas (mountain range)... 35 06 33 30 2 4 30 Ahermoumou 33 50 4 24 Na dor................................ 35 11 2 56 Ain el Aouda 33 48 6 47 Na :or admd).......................... 35 00 3 00 Aft Ammar 33 05 6 10 Ouarzazate............................ 30 55 6 55 Aft Melloul 30 21 9 30 Ouarrazate (admd) 31 00 6 30 Al Hoceima 35 15 3 56 Oued el H eimer........................ 34 27 1 54 A] Hoceima (admd) 35 00 4 15 Oued Sous (siren)....................... 30 22 9 37 Anti -Atlas (mis) 30 00 8 30 Oued Zarjoune 35 44 5 27 Asil ah 35 28 6 02 Oued Zem 32 52 6 34 Atlas Mountains (rots) 32 00 2 00 GlIjda....... 34 40 1 54 Azilal 31 58 6 34 Oujda admd) 33 00 2 00 Azrou 33 26 5 13 Oum er Rbia, Ou:d (sirm) 33 19 8 20 Ben Slimane 33 33 7 07 Penmarch, France...................... 47 49 4 20 Benguerir 32 14 7 57 Rabat.. 34 02 6 50 Beni Idir (area) 32 52 6 47 Rabat -Sale (admd) 34 02 6 50 Beni Mellal 32 20 6 21 Ras el Aswad (cape) 35 41 5 17 Beni Mellal (admd) 32 30 6 30 Rharb (tribal area) 34 30 6 02 Beni Oukil, Station de (rsta) 34 38 2 02 Rif, Er (mountain region) 35 00 4 00 Berrechid 33 16 7 36 Safi.... 32 18 9 14 Bine el Ouidane 32 06 6 26 Safi admd 31 55 9 00 Bleida ruin 30 22 625 Sale... 34 04 6 48 Bou Arfa 32 32 1 57 Sebaa A ioun........................... 33 54 5 22 Cap Spartel (cape) 35 48 5 56 Se.bou, Oued (strm) 34 16 6 41 Casablanca 33 37 7 35 Settat admd) 33 00 7 30 Casablanca (admd) 33 37 7 35 Sidi Allal Taxi......................... 34 31 6 20 Ceuta (Spanish possession) 35 .52 5 20 Sidi Bou Knadel....................... 34 08 6 44 Chaouia (tribal area). 33 12 7 20 Sidi el Aidi, Gare de (rsta) 33 07 7 38 Chefchaouene 35 10 5 16 Sidi Ifni 29 23 10 10 Djebel Jeer (gasfield) 31 25 9 14 Sidi Kacem 34 13 5 42 Doukkala (tribal area) 32 55 8 25 Sidi Rhalem (oilfield)................... 31 25 9 35 Draa, Oued (strm) 28 40 11 07 Sidi Slimane 34 16 5 56 El Guefaf 32 55 6 46 Sidi Yahy du Rharb.................... 34 19 6 19 El Hajeb 33 42 5 22 Skhirat. 33 52 7 03 ElJabha 35 13 4 40 Souk el Arba du R harb................. 34 41 5 59 El Jadida (admd) 32 54 8 30 Sous, Oued (siren)...................... 30 22 9 37 El Kelaa des Srarhna 32 03 7 24 Tadla plain 32 30 6 20 Erfoud 31 26 4 14 Tafilalt 32 23 4 30 Essaouira 31 31 9 46 Tafilalt( oasis)......................... 31 18 4 18 Fes 32 02 4 59 Tanerhift 32 24 4 49 Fes admd 34 00 5 00 Tanfit. 30 56 5 49 Figuig 32 06 1 !4 Tanfit. Plaine de....................... 32 57 5 00 Gara Djebilet, Algeria (mine). 26 45 7 2Q Tanger (admd) 35 45 5 45 Got- limine 28 59 10 04 Tangier 35 48 5 48 G u.�. duds 34 29 2 03 Tan- Tan....... 28 26 11 06 Guercif 34 14 3 22 Tarfaya 27 57 12 55 Haouz (p lain) 31 30 8 00 'Tarfaya (admd 28 00 11 00 Hassi Bellal 34 18 2 11 Taza admd 34 00 4 00 Haut (High) Atlas (mountain range) 32 00 6 00 Taza, Trouee de (pass) 34 15 4 00 Helmer, Oued el (foundary) 34 27 1 54 Temara 33 55 6 55 Ifni (area) 29 15 10 08 Ifrane 33 32 5 06 SELECTED AIRFIELDS Imi n -Irfi (mine) 30 04 8 24 Imini 31 06 7 17 Al Hoceima -Cote du Rif................. 35 11 3 50 Jerada 34 19 2 09 Casablanca /A nfa....................... 33 34 7 40 Kaaba Tadda 32 36 6 16 Casablanca/ Nouasseur.................. 33 22 7 35 Keehoulah (gasfield) 31 31 9 20 Fes/ Saiss 33 56 4 58 Kenitra 34 16 6 36 Kenitra 34 18 6 36 Kenitra (admd) 34 00 6 00 Marrakech 31 36 8 02 Kettara, Mine de (mine) 31 52 8 10 Meknes 33 53 5 31 Khemisset 33 49 6 04 Rabat Sale 34 03 6 45 Khenifra 32 56 5 40 Tangier /Bouk half....................... 35 44 5 55 Khouribga 32 53 6 54 Tetouan 35 34 5 22 Khouribga (admd) 32 56 6 36 Tetouan (admd) 35 35 5 30 Ksar el Kebir 35 00 5 59 Tindouf, Algeria............,,.......... 27 42 4 09 Ksar es Souk (admd) 31 00 4 00 Tit Mellil 33 34 7 29 Lugar, Spain 36 47 3 24 Tiznit.. 29 43 9 43 Marrakech 31 38 8 00 Tleta Sidi M barek Bou Guedra.......... 32 16 8 59 Marrakech (admd) 32 00 8 00 Touissit 34 29 1 46 Mechra Bel Ksiri 34 34 5 57 Volubilis (ruin) 34 04 5 33 Mediouna 33 27 7 31 Youssoufia 32 15 8 32 Meknes 33 54 5 33 Zafo... 34 57 2 44 Meknes (admd) 33 00 5 30 *%ouia Ahanesal 31 51 6 07 Melah, Oued (sirm) 33 43 7 24 fAda..... 32 49 4 57 Melilla (Spanish possession) 35 19 2 57 Zellija- Botlbeker............. 34 29 1 43 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 0 Morocco International boundary Province or pr6fectunl boundary C National capital GQa ablanca Province or pr6fecturn capital --F- Railroad Surfaced road Unsurfaced road or track Airfield .l, Major port Populated places 8 Over 100,000 0 25,000 to 100,000 e Under 25,000 Spot elevations in feet Scale 1:2,430,000 0 25 5 0 75 100 Statute Miles 0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers Mohammedis Sidi Said 71 w*ou (damJ Atlantic 32 Ocean COP C tinit APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 Q r a k 13 wo Chd e 1 i S FernaMo I Eatepona Spain Igeciras La Linea M e d i t e r r a n e a n Gibraltar Tarifa Strait of Gibraltar S e a Punta Almine I Sp vo Uta s Ras el Aswed Tang Cap des I Asilah Trois %urches 1 J a Pen6n de Alhucemas Ida Islay U D Pen6n de Vdlez (sv. v Al t de la Gomera Ho N,t Cnafarinas i (spa Larache O Chettl ene t hazao er ary b r 4" o eg Ye 4� 0 nen:uud' i Mehdiya 5 on to A f I L t y {1 1463 Sidi Bouknadel o yputey) idi Lana \\cutp0 t y 'e pro Raba Rab El Kanse a 'd t j i w a 1 Y (dam) Ip1 ti.,� Y O o S a oumo 191iane tt 4ii4 Moh (Fbdala) El Hajeb r Casablanc �'Y c x i Itran' x k Q Po. r a is C errechid d 1 S 76 r .3968:., 4L' r �i a v Sidi Said Sidi r d',4 �w t 1 Tendrara rachou(dam) el Atdi ,rs J r"a r tat Alt Ammar 20.38 Settat uribga l s henifra _`Edf/ �7 5-35 ued 2sm IM i dpi .-.f Mideft a 1 1 J ..yyY�: j' fi Tadla asba Ap o Be r t a r y 1263 Me lla a a R an bit g- e 3 r,.'�:- 4072 8,74 6 Asa us ea; es_Sou 3 -68 OY am a I w 2789 k i ip echar rekech Alf Adel d ate. ri a rev d F Rhetfb I c. r a Y i Am s k 0 ,1 e e396 A- rc z .3396. 1' n ad o 0 j 7060 rr �lA rx' a`^ }C i i ce! 1 3748 Beni r, "AA a' Abbe r A A aeo Tagounit I M1 Ir y 4r F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 SOWS WOW Algeria Ethnol 7- r F 1 101 Population Persons per squire mb 0 20 10 130 0 Persons per square kbmster 9ased on 1960 census APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 Beddouz f A t /v J anti S..' mm Jr 6ou ui en Mina da Ketfra a 4, O Q 'r _JS r,a� Ea aouira kech ador A i J a r a Cap Rhrr Aaa_ w 83 0. r an it .r w` sa Sidi I k L Al Cap Drda r ifs ..p' S 28 Cap Juby de Tindouf Seb Q ut J i Spanish Sahara 500977 1.73 r olsr% Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 i Population Portent per two allt a UI Penes per pears kbmbr Ballad on IWO consus 28 Econanic AGRICULTURE Principal agricultural and lip ama (cereals, citrus, olives sheep and goats) Irrigated areas MINING Fe Iran Pb Lead and zinc Ph Phosphate Q Chemical complex APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1 a Summary Map T w SECRET r z�Y s r a h \A (i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200080024 -1