NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 44C; SINGAPORE; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090010-5
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SECRET
44C /GS /GP
Singapore
May 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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SINC;APORE
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
July 1968, copies of which should be destroyed.
A. Summary and background
1
Path from colonial status to merger with Malays ;a
and eventual self -rule; domination of Lee Kuan
Yew and the People's Action Party; implications
of pullout of British defense forces; possible de-
tenents to present stability and prosp -city.
B. Structure and functioning of the government
4
1. Constitution
4
British influence; changes resulting from
separation from Malaysia; civil rights pro-
visions.
2. Executive
4
a. Structure
4
Ceremonial role of President; Prime Min-
ister and cabinet the locus of power; no
provisions for successor.
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b. Administration 5
Ministerial responsibilities; civil servants;
role of Public Service Commission.
3 I.,egislature 8
Unicameral Parliament; membership rnd ses-
sions; domination by ruling People's Action
Party.
4. Local government 6
Citizens' Consultative Committees.
5. Judiciary 6
Centralized, efficient system based on English
common law; structure of court system.
C. Political dynamics
1. The political context
Growth of political awareness and popular
participation in government; domination of
People's Action Party.
2. People's Action Party
History of party; division between English.
speaking moderates and Chinese speaking
extremists; leftists' formation of rival party.
a. policies
Nondoctrinaire socialism within entrepre-
neurial system.
b. Organization and leadership
Makeup and role of senior Central Execu-
tive Committee; close control of party
branches.
c. Membership
Qualifications; concern for youth; middle
class nature of party.
7
i7
7
0
0
V,
d. Finance
8
Sources of income; major categories of
expenditures.
3. Bartsan Sosialis Singapura BSS)
10
Formed in 1961 by leftist dissidents from
People's Action Party.
a. i olicies
10
Dissension and vacillation over whether
to take legal o. extralegal course; election
results and parliamentary tactics.
b. Organization and leadership
11
Conflict between party chairman and vice
chairman over basic policies; resultant
lack of action in Centrai Executive Com-
mittee and party branches.
c. Membership
11
Size and qualifications.
d. Finance
11
Meager financial resources.
ii
Page
e. Publicity 11
Weekly pubilcation in Chinese ant' Eng-
lish; clandestine "Voice of Malayan Revo-
lution" broadcasts; classes it rural arras;
direction and thrust of propaganda themes.
4. United National Front
Only opposition party with multiracial base;
leaders, memberchip, and goals.
5. Wcrkers' Party
Leadership and policies.
6. Peoples Front
Platform; purges and arrests of leaders.
7. PEKEMAS
Chief spokesman for Malay minority; objec-
tives and setbacks; leadership and organiza-
tion.
8. Interest groups
Close government regulation of labor unions
and student groups; influent of individuals
and organizations with investment capital.
9. Elections
Suffrage, participation, and results.
D. National policies
1. Domestic
Economic goals the main preoccupation; steps
to boost the economy; tight political and so-
cial controls; attempts to foster multiracial
nationalism.
2. Foreign
Relations with Malaysia and Indonesia; sup-
port of regional cooperation organizations;
ties with China, other Communist nations,
United ,"hates, and Commonwealth nations.
E. Threats to government stability
1. PY*- content and dissidence
Paucity of issues which feed d+scontent; gov-
ernment measures to assuage any communal
tensions.
2. Subversion
a. Communist movement
History of communism on Malay Penin-
sula; activities during Emergency; ineffec-
tiveness of illegal Communist organization
today.
b. Subversive activities
Subversien mainly Chinese Communist in
origin; leftwing provocations and incidents
generally ineptly managed.
12
12
12
1.2
13
13
16
16
17
19
19
19
19
20
F. Maintenance of internal security 21
Development of internal security structure since
independence; role of Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee.
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1 Police 22
Organization, strength, competence, and mo-
rale.
2. Intelligence and security 23
Organization and responsibilities of Internai
Security Department of Police Force; role
and importance of Security and intelligence
Division of Ministry of Defense as foreign in-
telligence am.
Page
3. Countersubversivo and counterinsur-
gency capabilities 24
Effectiveness of police and security organs;
measures used to neutralise student and labor
groups in 1960's; attempts to control external
Communist influence; regime policies aimed
at building popular support,
G. Suggestions for further reading 25
Chronology 27
Glossary 28
28
FIGURES
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Fig. 1
Singapore indopendence�two views
Fig. 6
Results of Singapore elections (chart)
15
(photos)
3
Fig. 7
Anti-long hair poster (photo)
17
Mg. 2
Structure of government (chart)
5
Fig. 8
Commonwealth heads of state meet-
Fig. 3
PAPs "inner cirnle" (photos)
9
ing, 1971 (photo)
18
Fig. 4
BSS chairman (photo)
10
Fig. 0
Intelligence and security structure
(chart)
22
Fig. 5
1970 by-elections (photos)
14
Fig. 10
Police officers (photo)
M
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Government and Politics
A. Summary and background (C)
The tiny but s,rategically located Republic of
Singapore! is one of Asia's ,youngest nations, having
become independent only in August 1965, It is a
constitutional democracy with a parliamentary system
modeled on the British pattern, and has been governed
since 1959 by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the
People's Action Party (PAP). Although Singapore is in
effect a one -party state dorninated b the strong
willed Lee and the PAP, the government's success in
fostering economic prosperity, effective government,
and modern social services has given it it wide base of
popular support.
Ever since the founding of Singapore by Sir Thomas
Stamford Raffles in 1819, its governmental structure
bas been heavily influenced by British institutions. For
over a century the island was p ;irt of the Straits
Settlements, together with Malacca and Pen.ing on
the Malay Peninsula. Frorn 1826 the Settlements were
a Msidency of the British Nast India Company; in
1867 they became a Grown Colony under the
jurisdiction of the British Colonial Office. When
Malacca and Penang were detached in 1946 to
become part of the Malayan Union �later the
Federation of Malaya� Singapore remained a (;town
Colony and the Brith;h initiated the first steps toward
limited internal self government.
The British allowed Singapore's first legal political
party to be formed in 1947, and the first popular
elections, for a few seats in the hitherto all- appointed
Legislative Council, were held the next year. In 1951
elections were authorized for a slightly larger Count,;;,
but most seats remained appointive, and only a
fraction of the eligible voters bothered to go to the
polls. By the 1955 elections the British pressured by
continuing demands for self- government �had
promulgated the 'ttendel Constitution, which provided
for a new legislature, the Legislative Assembly, in
which most seats would be elective, and for the leader
of the strongest party to be named Chief Minister and
in turn name six of the nine cabinet members, the
British crown continued to retain ultimate power
through the Governor.
The existence of the 1955 constitution prompted i t
large, election turnout, as the British'wd hoped. It also
surfaced a disquieting political unrest, largely leftist,
that had seethed Blaring the years of nonrepresentative
government and fanned popular sentiment among all
groups for total self- government, I'll(! long- proscribed
Communis! underground saw its best hope of success
in supporting PAP, which though not then the stable
vch;cic that now rules Singapore seemed the party of
the future. PAP rallies accordingly drew large crowds
of trade unionists and Chinese students who shouted
anticolonial slogans and sang pro Communist songs;
Communist influence in PAP was strung until the left
wing split off and formed the A -isan Soxialis
Singapora in 1961. Also leftist was the Labour Front
which, though the lead party in the 1955 elections,
was a loosely organized group of socialists and trade
unionists whose mercurial leader, David Marshall.
became Singapore's first Chief Minister. Rivalries
among these and several lesser parties created a
turbulent political scene it, the late 1950's.
The British granted independence to the Federation
of Malaya in August 1957 but refused to consider it for
Singapore chiefly because of the island's strategic
value, as a military base and commercial center but
also because of the above- mentioned aggressive leftist
movements. During 1958, however, Britain took the
final steps toward granting Singapore Full autonomy
in domestic matters. In June 1959, following elections
in which Lee K.uan Yew's PAP won a large majority in
the legislature, a revised constitution was imple-
mented granting Singapore full control over its
internal affairs except for security; a tripartite Internal
Security Council composed of British, Malayan, and
Singaporean representatives was charged with
monitoring Singapore's internal security situation.
Defense and foreign affairs continued to remain
British responsibilities.
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A major plank of lh. PAP's 1959 platform
advocated independence through merger with
Malaya, Federution leaders at first firmly rejected this
idea for fear that the incorporation of Singalwre's
predominantly Chinese population would threaten
the ethnic Malays' traditional political paramountcy.
Lec Kuan Yew nevertheless pressed for merger,
arguing that uch a move would contain the
Communist -led leftist movement in Singapore and
warning that the likely alternative might eventually
be a Communist- dominated independent Singapore
on Malaya's doorstep, Convinced by these, arguments,
Malaya's Prime Minister Abdul Rahman in May 1961
publicly advocated an enlarged federation that would
encompass not only Malaya and Singapore but also
the British territories in Borneo. flis inclusion of the
latter territories populated largely by Malay -type
tribal groups �was obviously aimed at providing an
ethnic counterweight to Chinese.- domin. 'ed Sin
gapore.
Once Rahman focused attention on it, the
"Malaysia concept" became the subject of extended
negotiations among the governmer, :s concerned,
These talks culminated in lh Malaysia Agreement of
July 1963, signed by the United Kingdom, Malaya,
Singapore, and the Borneo states of Sarawak and
Sabah. Despite, bitter apposition by Communist
oriented groups in Singapore, who saw the move as a
sellout to the conservative, Malay dominated regime
in Kuala Lumpur, a popular referendum held in
Singapore in mid-1963 resulted in a 71 vote in favor
of merger. Thus, on 16 September 1963 the British flag
was hauled down in both Singapore and the Borneo
states, and Malaysia came into being.
In the enlarged federation Singapore was given a
considerable, measure of internal autonomy, but as a
quiet pro quo its representation in the federal
parliament in Kuala Lumpur was substantially
smaller than the size of its population would warrant.
A continued British military presence in Singapore was
assured by the 1957 Anglo- Malayan Defense
Agreement, which was extended to all of Malaysia.
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had
ardently backed merger as a way for Singapore �with
its largely Chinese population �to avoid economic
and political isolation and, hopefully, as a way for the
Singaporean people to join with the various ethnic and
cultural groups of the other member states in a truly
multiracial society. After merger became a reality,
Lee, so as to further promote these goals, attempted to
extend his political base beyond Singapore. In 1964 he
fielded PAP candidates in elections in the Malay
P and in May 1965 he set up the Malaysian
2
Solidarity Convention to press for a "Malaysian
Wddysia the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia," in
which there would be political equality for ali,
regardless of ethnic background,
la!a's efforts to inject his party into national politics
alarmed leader' of the Malaysian Alliance- -the
political coalition that dominates the Kuala Lumpur
federal government. 'These leaders were already upset
by the extent of local Chinese econoinic control in
Malaysia. The prohlcm was worsened by a
pronounced personality conflict between Lee and
several Malaysian leaders. In early August 1965,
Rahrnan bluntly told Lee that Singapore must
withdraw from Malaysia. The result was a separation
agreement and the declaration of Singapore's
independence on 9 August 1965.
At the time of separation Singapore's leaders were
concerned about their nation's ability to survive
independently, heavy depew.!-rice ou Malaysia for
both raw materials and markets and the loss of a
lucrative trade with Indonesia, because of Sukarno's
determination to break up the Malaysia federation,
appeared to threaten Singapore's economic viability.
Malay- Chinese friction that had erupted into
communal rioting in 1964 seemed likely to recur, and
Lee was also disturbed by the tendency of many
Malay and Cionese Singaporeans to look to Kuala
Lumpur arn1 Peking, respeAively, for political and
cultural guidance. Moreover, ail Singapore leaders
feared for the long range security! of their small state,
surrounded by Mu,ays and a natural target for
Peking's subversion becausc of its largely Chinese
population, London's announcement in 1988 that it
was moving up to 1971 the date for withdrawing its
military forces from Malaysia and Singapore added
further to Singapore's unease. Figure I depicts two
divergent viewpoints in Singapore with regard to
independence.
Since the mid- 1960's, however, apprehension over
Singapore's future has been supplanted by growing
confidence. Fears that Britain's military pullout would
spur unemployment by adding thousands of Briish-
ha,e ernployces to an already large unemployed force
have been dispelled, as expanded business, service
industries, and foreign- investment projects actually
caused a labor shortage (tiring 1972 and required the
import of about 70,000 laborers, mostly from
Malaysia. As a result of its expanding economy,
Singapore now has the second highest standard of
living in Asia surpassed only by Japan.
Concern over the security implications of the British
pullout has been partly alleviated by Singapore's
participation since 1971 in a Five Power Defense
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Arrangement, tinder which the United Kiugcfonn,
Australia, acid New "Zealand irtaiiitaitl a modest
rniiiiary prescuce ill Singalitm and Malaysia. In late
1972, hcwevk r, both Australia and New Zealand carne
under Labor Party leadership which max remove most
or all of their units in 197.9. Singapore has bolstered its
own security and defe..:r forces through national
conscription and the acquisilion of more modem
cyuii3ment. Also in tiiv roame of security, the
government passe.(] a .,cries of laws in the late 1960's
providing stiff penalties for imauthorircd political
activities.
Singapore's success in achieving stability and
prosperity rests with Lev Kuan Yew aril it small group
of intimate collCagues, here has served as Prime
Minister ever since the island acquired internal self
government in 1959. A brilliant Cambridge- educated
lawyer, Lee continues as the dominant figure in both
the PAP art(] the government and has demonstrated
his ability to chart and navigitte an intricate txliiical
course. Among his able and trusted advisers, the most
influential is Defense Minister Coh Keng Swee.
Prime Minister Lee has won grudging acceptance
from many who form.rrly questioned his motives.
PAP urges "Build a Vigorous Singapore"
FIGURE 1. Singapore independence �two
views (U /OU)
Leftist union opposes idea
Conservative domestic elements an(] Western
observers who deemed Lee it dangerous radical during
his rise to political power in the 1950'� now accept Itim
as a staunch defender of Singapore's essentially
capitalistic, entrepreneurial system. While much of
the poorer sector of the population educated in
Chinese- language schools and still strongly attached
to Chinese culture �still suspects Lee as a member of
t',te 1?11glish- educated elite, the size and imponancc� of
this sector has been reduced by goverow. ntal
programs stressing i ?nglish- language education and
Singaporean national identity. Moreover, economic
prosperity. firm security and political controls, and the
lack of effective leadership among the chauvinistic
Chinese !rave combined to undercut the latter'%
opposition to Lee 's administration. H;arlicr fears
among the Malay and indian population that they
would be severely handicapped by discriminatory
measures have largely been allayed by the
government's evenhanded comnitinal policies.
(laving .von a clean sweep in parliamentary
elections in both 1966 and 1972, and lacking any
apparent internal or external threat, the well
entrenched Lee government seems assured of
.3
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dominating the political scene for the foreseeable.
future. Nevertheless, problems are oil the horizon. The
growing prominence of the People's Republic of China
(PRC), for example, is rekindling a sense of ethnic and
cultural pride among Singapore's Chinese citizens and
is bolstering those who resist government policies
designed to create an Anglicized Singaporean natio i al
identity. China's rising status is expected to force Lec
to accelerate his timetable for developig relations with
Peking and could result in Borne increase in Chinese
Communist subversive activities. Moreover, the
continuance of Singapore's low %vage level �which
until May 1972 was arbitrarily controlled to make:
Singapore attractive for industrial investment �could
create discontent in the face of the high level of
business prosperity. A critical test for the Lee
government will be whether it can raise wages without
at the same time losing for Singapore an asset that has
made po; ible its current industrial buildup.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (U'OU)
1. Constitution
The Republic of Singapore is a constitutional
democracy based on the British parliamentary system.
In Singapore, however, the executive branch enjoys
greater power than in the British model, primarily
because of the lack of meaningful political opposition
to Lee Kuan Yew.
The ec iistitution is basically the same as that drawn
up for the State of Singapore while a member of
Malaysia, except for amendments necessitated by
separation on 9 August 1965. Separation forced
Singapore to reorganize its administration, assume
responsibility for its foreign relations, and provide for
its own defense particularly after Britain's an-
nounced plan for a military withdrawal in 1971.
Parliament accomplished the initial constitutional
changes through the Constitution Amendment Bill
and the Republic of Singapore Independence Bill
which it passed in December 1965 and made
retroactive to the separation (late.. The constitution
says nothiiig about civil rights as such but states that it
is the government's responsibility "constantly to care
for the interests of the racial and religious minorities."
With regard to the Malty minority, the constitution
specifically enjoins the government "to protect,
safeguard, support, foster and promote their political,
educational, religious, economic, social and cultural
interests and the Malay language." The minuscule
4
Indian minority (7r:0') is not mentioned by name.
Amendment of the constitution requires a two- thirds
majority vote by Parliament.
2. Executive
a. Structure
Executive authority is vested formally in the
President as head of state, but his duties are largely
ceremonial and circumscribed. He ci,n convene,
adjourn, and dissolve: Parliament, and the legislation it
enacts must have his approval to become law. fie can
also make numerous appointments within govern-
ment, but only ore the advice and recommendations of
other government leaders, councils, and commissions.
Parliament appoints the President to a 4 -year term,
and it may remove him by a two thirds majority vote.
Because the presidency is devoid of real political
power. Parliament customarily chooses a nonpolitical
man for the office. Benjamin Henry Sheares, the
i=ncumbent since January 1971, is a semiretired
gynecologist with no history of active involvement in
political affairs. In accord with Singapore's multiracial
emphasis, Dr. Sheares is a Eurasian, and his
predecessor was a Malay.
Real executive power is centered in the Prime
Minister and his cabinet. The individual the President
appoints as Prime Minister must be a member of
Parliament who commands the confidence of its
majority; in practice this individual leads the majority
party. The Prime Minister selects his cabinet from
members of Parliament, with formal appointments
being made by the President. The total number of
cabinet positions is not fixed by the constitution; in
early 1973 there were 13 ministries (excluding the
office of the Prime Minister), filled by 12 ministers.'
Lee Kuan Yew works very closely with the cabinet, all
of whose members he handpicks for their loyalty and
capability. Lee sounds out their views, but his own
predominate. Like most other government bodies, the
cabinet reflects Singapore's racial mixture; there are
nine Chinese, one Malay, one indian, and one
Eurasian. If the Prime Minister loses the confidence of
Parliament or gives up his membership in it, the
cabinet must resign; however, the President may reject
its resignation and instead dissolve Parliament and
force new elections. Figure 2 shows the structure of
government.
'For a current listing of key government official.; consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
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Presidential
Council
CABINET
Prime Minister
Ministers:
Communications
Culture
Defenue
Educativ+
Environment
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Health
Home Affairs
Labor
Law and National
Development
Science and
Technology
Social Affairs
PRESIDENT
(Head of State)
PARLIAMENT
CS Sears
COURTS
Supreme Court:
Court of Appeni
Court of Criminal
Appeal
High Court
5ubot dtnnt. Courts:
District
Mldistratei
Juvenile
Coroners
Shoria (Islamic Law)
FIGURE 2. Structure of
government (U /OU)
The co Tstitution does not provide regular deputies
for the prime ministership or the presidency. In the
event of illness or absence, the President may appoint
"any other minister" as acting prime minister, and the
cabinet may appoint us acting president someone who
"would be qualified to be president." A� deputy
prime ministership existed for a time despite the lack
of constitutional authorization, but it has not been
filled since April 1968. In May 1968 Parliament-
concerned over the illness of then President Yusof�
authorized itself to name a vice president, but it did
not do so; its speaker took over as acting president
during Yusof's illness and following his death in 1969.
The possibility of Lee's exit has never had to be
considered, since he is firmly in control and also
relatively young (49) and healthy. Lee says, however,
that he may be ready to turn power over t.f a new
group by the late 1970's or early 1980'x, and Le seems
to be building up a coterie of younger party men
capable of tackling the job. Should Lee die or for some
reason vacate his position, his successor would likely
be one of PAP's inner circle, such as Defense Minister
Gob Keng Swee.
b. Administration
For nearly a century under the British, Sin, .pore's
administration was conducted by a number of
executive departments supervised by the colonial
secretary, who in turn was responsible to the. governor.
Since the Rendel Constitution 1955, however, the
various executive departments have been apportioned,
sometimes arbitrarily, among the cabinet ministers.
The Prime Minister may charge any minister in
writing with responsibility for any department or
subject, may revoke or var any of these assignments
at will, and may retain in his own charge any
department or field he chooses.
Each ministry has a permanent secretary and/or a
parliamentary secretary, and some ministries have
political secretaries as well. 'rhe permanent secretary is
the only one of these offices provided for in the
constitution, however; the others are Prime Ministerial
appointments designed to expand party involvement
in government prograrns. The permanent secretary
the top ranking civil servant in each ministry �is
appointed by the President after consultation with the
Prime Minister from a list of names submitted by the
Public Service Commission. Each permanent secretary
is assigned to a particular ministry by the Prime
Minister but, once appointed, he serves under the
direction of the minister concerned.
The Public Service Commission, formed in 1951,
advises the President on appointments, promotions,
and other civil service matters an,, also serves as a
central agency for planning and administering
scholarships, training awards, and grants. The
Commission consists of a chairman and no fewer than
two nor more than four other members, each
appointed by the President on the Prime Minister's
advice. It is served by it secretariat consisting of career
civil servants.
In 1970 there were 66,899 civil service employees
54,493 "monthly- rated" staff and 12,406 "daily
rated" workers. With the exception of judges and
police officers below the rank of inspector, all
appointments and prornotions to monthly -rated posts
are made by the Public Service Commission or the
5
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Legal Service Commission, its counterpart for legal
positions, The civil service is organized into four
divisions: I� administrative and professional grades;
II� executive and nonprofessional grades; III clerical
and allied grades; and IV� mainly unskilled workers.
No more than 300 Singaporeans, however, hear the
main burden of planning and administration. "If all
the 300 were to crash in one jumbo jet speculates the
Prime Minister, "then Singapore will Aisintegratf
3. Legislature
Parliarent is a unicameral body responsible for
enacting laws for the "peace, order and goud
government of Singapore," Until the September 1972
election it consisted of 58 members from the carne
number of electoral constituencies. In that election,
seven new seals raised the total to 65. Prior to the
election, 21 of the 58 constituencies had been
redivided to account for population shifts.
Members of Parliament must be 21 years of age or
over and are chosen by compulsory universal suffrage.
A full parliamentary term is years; if Parliament is
dissolved, a new election must he held %vilhin 3
month~. An earlier rule that interim vacancies be filled
within 3 months was abolished by the Constitution
Amendment Act of 1967. Parliament convenes
periodically but has no scheduled meeting dates.
Proceedings may be conducted in English, Malay,
Mandarin, or Tamil, with si nultaneous translations
provided.
Parliament is dominated by Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew and the ruling People's Action Party. PAP
has held most of the seats in Parliament since 1959;
since 1968 :t has occupied all of them. This has
enabled Lee to see to it that Parliament's membership
is balanced racially in proportions about equal to the
numbers of Chinese, Malays, Indians arid others in the
population.
Although the President has certain theoretical
restraints over Parliament, theso have had no practical
significance. The President's required approval of
legislation, for example, is largely pro forma, since he
is chosen by Parliament and must answer to it.
Similarly, a Presidential Council appointed by the
President in 1969 to review legislation for possible
infringement of minority rights has been largely
disregarded: since 1970 Parliament has withheld from
the council prior perusal of any legislation on defense,
security, public safety, "peace" or "good order."
4. Local government
Local government is not provided for in the
constitution. However, Citizens' Consultative
Committees were set up in 1966 in all electoral
IN
constituencies to inform the government of the
people's needs and the people of the government's
actions and policies. For administrative purposes, the
65 committees are grouped into three Rural District
and five City District Citizens' Consultative
Committees, each having a civil servant as the ex
offiJo secretary responsible to the Prime Minister's
Office.
5. judiciary
Singapore has a highly centralized and efficient
judicial system which is based on F,nglish common law
but modified to suit local conditions. The Chief
Justice, appointed by the President on the advice of'
the Prime Minister, heads the judiciary aril exercises
administrative judicial system.
The highest tribun.! is the Supreme Court,
consisting of a high Court, Court of Appeal, and
Court of Criminal Appeal. The Iligh Co�t has
unlin0ed originai jurisdiction in serious criminal and
civil cases and also has appellate, general supervisory,
and revisionary jurisdiction over tlic Subordinate
Courts. Two High Court judges (one of them the
presiding judge) have ruled on capital offenses since
1970, when trial jury for such offense:- was
abolished; all other trial by jury was ended a decade
earlier. Appeals of high Court decisions go to the
Court of Appeal or the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Supreme Court decisions nay be appealed to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Singapore's
ultimate appellate court, which sirs in London.
Singapore's Subordinate Court system includes
district and magistrates' courts, juvenile court::.
coroners' courts, and a Sharia (Islamic law) Court
which handles cases involving only Muslims and
usually concerns Muslim marriages. Both the district
and magistrates' court:. have original criminal and
civil jurisdiction. District courts try criminal cases,
imprisonment for which must not exceed 7 years, and
civil cases involving a maximum of S$5,000.
Magistrates' courts try criminal cases for which prison
terms do not exceed 3 years aril civil offenses
involving no more than S$1,000. juvenile courts
handle cases similar to those in district or magistrates'
courts, except that the offenders are children.
Coroners' courts hold inquests into the circumstances
where there is reason to suspect a violent or unnatural
death has occurred.
Although justice is administered fairly, many
Singaporeans are concerned over the lack of civil
liberties. They deplore the jury system's demise and
such laws as the Preservation of Public Security
Ordinance� allowing the government to hold a person
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without trial up 2 years �and the Criminal Law
Tetnporar;� Provision' Ordinance, which enabled the
government ill the lute 1960's to ja;l without trial over
6(K) "criminal detainees" (many in the ntaxintunt
security Cliangi Prison). Prince Minister Lee Ktan
Yew justifies such actions on what he considers
pragmatic grounds, but he once admitted to the
Advocates' and Solicitors' Society �one of his chief
critics: "W have departed in quite a number of
material aspects from the principles of justice and
the liberty of the individual in order to maintain
norm tl standards.. This is a heavy price."
C. Political dynamics
1. The Political context (U /OL1)
Singapore's political system, thanks to British
tutelage, is fairly sophisticated but lacks the bal:uce of
the British model. PopuL-r interest and involvement in
politics date hack to essentially 1953 (when
Singaporeans first elected a majority of representatives
in the legislature) but took on major significance only
during the 1959 elections, just prior to Singapore's
acquiring antononty over its internal affairs. Political
awareness monuted with, the formation of Malaysia in
1963 and Singapore's forced withdrawal from it 2
years later. Government efforts since separation to
Protect the rights of its Malay minority (15� of tit(.
population) by retaining MuLny es the national
language and by grunting equal ennployrnenl rights,
citizenship guarantees, and special educational
stipends, have quieted Malay fears of heco
second lass citizens lint have antagonized Chinese
chauvinist elements, .yho accuse the government of
demeaning Chinese culture and bowing to Malay
pressures. By and large, wider participation in and
responsibility for government have helped Singapore's
several rti:nle groups identify more closely with the
national government.
Mandatory voting forces everyone to the polls, even
for minor by- elections, but nebulous issues and a
Paucity of choices often make such events perfunctory.
Most Singaporeans have no tradition of participatory
democracy or the protection of civil rights through
such legal tools as habeas corpus, and are therefore
satisfied to settle for the PAP government, whose
effective, forward- looking leadership for overa decade
has far outweighed its sometimes brusque treatment of
political and newspaper critics.
The opposition has intermittently boycott (.d the
legislature since 1963 and is bogged down in
intrrparty and interparty feuds. Deprived of
distinctive issues and divided over policies, most
x
()[)position parties simply lie low iuitil election time.
Of -I opposition parties registered in Inid -1972, for
instance, ,one was represented in Parliament and only
five were active in tile sense that the public knew they
existed usually through newspaper reports ridiculing
their stands or highlighting their disputes. One citizen
compared the minor opposition parties to "idlers in
the c�offeeshops who will rush out in the streets on
hearing the sound of drug s, cymbals, and gongs and
will immediately retire to their seats when the show
has passed...
Despite PAP's influence and its record of impressive
achievement, its IeadershiP is aware of important
vulnerabilities. The extreme left however chaotically
run identifies store closel with lower class Chinese,
who arc edu i schools where Chinese is the
medium of instructio, that does PAP, whose senior
leadership is closely linked with the more Westernized
(;hinese Middle and upper class. Any serious reduction
in popular support for PAP over such issues; as one
party rule, the dotrtinant role (if English in schools,
Singapore's nonaligned foreign Policy, authoritarian
restraints on the nations political life, or it protracted
economic slump could give, opposition elements an
opportunity to rally their weak forces and again
challenge PAP for political snpremacv.
2� People's Action Party (C)
The uoderately socialist PAP %vas formed in
November 1954. Its leadership called for it democratic
government responsive to it `-alv elect( legislative
assembly, which London granted in 19-59, and for the
union of Singapore with the federation of Malaya,
which took place in September 1963.
At the start PAP was marked by dissension bet%Veer
moderate and extremist clements. The former were led
by Lev Kuan Yew representing the British- educated,
English- speaking sector of Singapore's largely Chinese
society; tile latter were led by leftist Lim Chin Siong
on behalf of the Chinese educated, Chinese- speaking
conpouent of the trade -union ntovennclt. After these
rival elements jockeyed some 7 years for party control,
Lee Kuan 1'(.w launched an open attack on the radical
opposition and tried to prove its Communist
affiliation. The leftists responded by withdrawing
from PAP in 1961 and organizing the Badsan Sosialis
Singapura (BSS, or Singapore Socialist front). PAP
decisively heat its leftist opponent in the 1963
elections, when the chief issue was Singapore's merger
into Malaysia, and it woo all the seats in the elections
of April 1968� which the BSS bo �and those
of September 1972, in which the BSS and four other
opposition parties took part.
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a. Policies
PAP, whose political philosophy is rooted in British
socialists, describes itself as a non Communist,
democratic socialist part\,. It emphasizes honest,
efficient government and the expansion of education,
industry, and social welfare services such as medical
care, health, and public housing. PAP's leadership is
not doctrinaire in its socialist beliefs, however, and
does riot seek public ownership of the� means of
production. Party policies thus satisfy low- income
citizens who might otherwise be receptive to
Communist overtures, while at the same time thev do
not threaten the capitalistic, entrepreneurial system
that buttresses Singapore's economy.
b. Or and leadership
The PAP is very tightly rrganired, thanks to Lee
Kuan Yews close personal supervision. Its senior
policvrnaking authority is the 12 -roan Central
Executive Committee (CEC), whose members also
hold key government jobs. The composition of the
CEC is largely English- educated or oriented Chinese
but conforms generally to the islands racia
distribution. The CEC: in turn is ruled 'av it camarilla
or inner circle made up of four nen who have worked
closely togeth( r since before the part\ was formed,
have generally acted in concert, and are held in awe
by practically all PAP members. headed by Lee, who
is PAP secretary general, the group (Figure 3) includes
party chairman Dr. Tot) Chin Chye (Minister of
Science arid 'Technology); deputy chairman Dr. (;oh
Keng Swee (Minister of Defense); and director of the
political bureau Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (Minisicr
of Foreign Affairs),
The CEC: is chosen by PAP's cadre or staff offic -rs
(roughly 391, of the party), who thersselves are picked
by the CEC �a kind of reciprocity which Lee says
must have "some merit," since the Vatican's similar
system of the Cardinals appointing the Pope and the
Pope appointing the Cardinals has lasted nearly 2,000
years. The CEC directly controls the editorial board of
Peiir (Lightning), the party organ, which is published
in the four official languages, and it appoints the
members of the seven party bureaus: Malay Affairs,
External Affairs, Women, Welfare, Culture, Publicity
and Propaganda, aril Political.
PAP has a branch in each electoral constituency and
it few subbranches in the larger ones; some sizable
branches exist where population is small but
recruitment intense. The branches independence is
greatly curtailed by Singapore's compactness and by
the fact that communication with the CEC is almost
entirely one way: downward.
c. Membership
In the late 1960's PAP claimed 30,000 rncrnbers, but
this total included many who had resigned, had been
expelled, or had allowed their membership to lapse. A
more realistic figure was about 15,000, of whom from
300 to 500 were cadre members, the party's elite arid
its backbone. Regular membership is fairly easy to
obtain. although the CEC must pass oil all
applications. Ilowever. cadre members reportedly
rust have made a 2 -year "special" contribution to
PAP, been nominated by it CEC member, and been
examined and finally approved by Prime Minister Lee
himself. L ve hopes in this way both to choose the
party's hest talent and to prevent its penetration by
subversive elements. Lee's major concern since at least
1971 �when he saw to it that youth sections were
introduced in most branches �has been to infuse new
blood into PAP and to develop it strong second echelon
of well educated cadres to lead the party and the
country in the 1980's.
Lee wants PAP nominees drawn from it broad cross
section of society, but he specifically seeks professional
people, intellectuals, and labor leaders from unions
affiliated with the government controlled National
"Trades Union Congress. Members of the exclusive and
prestigious Pyramid Club� self styled as "people who
arc making an effective contribution to society,
or are capable of doing so" �arc so often tapped
for PAP membership that the (-hit) is an unofficial PAP
adjunct. Most Pyramid Club members are from the
English- speaking elite that provides leadership for the
PAP and most of the government. Overall, however,
PAP is it middle -class party, three- fourths of whose
members joined it to improve their chances for
employment or for other factors such as prestige.
d. Finance
PAP headquarters has three sources of income:
membership fee. assessed contributions from
members of Parliament, and private donations.
Membership fees ($2 it year) comprise the smallest
amount, particularly since headquarters takes only
one eighth of the fee and allows the branch to which it
is paid to keep the rest. This is the oniv subside
received by the branches, which otherwise support
themselves. Branches raise further funds by running
kindergartens, carnivals, fun fairs, and large dinners to
which prominent philanthropists and millionaires
outside the constituencv are also asked; those invited
invariably feel obliged to pay something. Contribu-
tions from members of Parliament (MP) total about
S$150,000 a year at fixed monthly rates of at least $50
for an MP, $100 for parliamentary secretaries, and
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Lee Kuan Yew
FIGURE 3. PAP's "inner circle" (U /OU)
9
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ioh Chin Chye
Goh Keng Swee
Sinnathomby Rajorotnam

$500 for ministers; totals vi according to family
financial circ�unistances. Large privotc contributions
probably arc made directly to the (:f and the
amounts are not generally known.
PAP's expenditures are r,inarkably Iow for it nutjc�r
party because of the branches' virtual self support and
because of fringe benefits deriving from the party's
link \witlr the gowrnnu�nt. The major expense is for
salaried party officiais and rental of the building at
beadcpuarters. Expenses for publicity are few, since
PAP has full access to all govvrnincnt- u\\ned and
controlled c0mnl11nicrttions media� filrns, radio,
television, and publications, such as the weekly
magazine� The Mirror -as well as to civic or-
ganizat ons, the armed forces, and paramilitary forces.
Election year expenses ca n be kept low, brc ause
compulsory voting obviates the need to induce people
to go to the polls, inotor vehicles pray not be its(�(I to
convey voters to the polls. most workers are volunteers,
and donations in cash or foodstuffs are easy to extract
front most ethnic Chiucse, who view such gifts as a
wit v of avoiding tronblo rather than as support for the
party or its platforn.
:3. Barisan Sosialis Singapura (S)
The pro- (:ornniunist BSS (Singapore Socialist front)
is Singapore's leading but probably most disorganized
opposition party. The only major goal its leaders have
agreed on since they left PAP and formed the BSS in
1961 is that Singapore and West Ivialaysia should forrt
a single political unit, Malaya." In their view
Singapore's independence is "phony" and Malaysia is
"an artificial colonialist creation." In late 1971,
however, party chairman Lee Siew (:hull (Figur, -1)
admitted that the BSS could no longer struggle for ij
"truly independent, united, and detnocratic Malaya"
because it \was pantlyzed by ideological differences,
lack of' cohesion, financial difficulties, low moral,,
and falling rnembership.
a. Policies
BSS leaders and rnenib,rs have never agreed on
whether to act within Singapore's legal framework or
to try for power by subversive means, and most stands
or steps finally taken by ;t majority are criticized or
countered by other party members. As a result, the
party's positions on important cpuestions like its
representation in Parliament and the nature of its
antigovermnent "stnlgg1v� have vac�illat,d widely
over the \cars.
BSS canc!idales \von 13 parlianu�niar,. scats (i3 of
the popular vote) in the 1963 ,leclion, but tiles,
assemblymen soon began obstructionist tactics and
then in December 1965 began it boycott of legisiativv
sessions. Finally in 1966, after the part launched a
series of but "constitutional"
antigovernment activities� entailing mass rallies.
house -to -house campaigning and the threat of
strikes �BSS legislators resigned, were imprisoned, or
went underground to avoid arrest.
Between 1966 and 1972 the BSS boycotted most
m
elections and fro tine to time turned to activist
tactics. The government has promptly qu,lled all BSS
protests. but the Malayan (:otnnrunist Party's Voice
Of the Malayan Revolution" (broadeasting from South
China) has been urging the BSS s lrc, 1970 to wage
"arined struggle" in Singapore before stressing the
"Malaya" issue.
The BSS is serious!\ divided over these attempted,
current, or suggested policies. The party chairman,
\who is leftist but non- (.oniit [ill ist, decries talk of
1. arnu�d struggle" in the city or the surrounding
countryside as "just not practical" for Singapore, and
in any event unsuitable for a supposedly non
Communist party which instead should he inyolv,cl in
struggle." Party vice chairman Chun Koh
Meng ;111(1 substantial number of BSS nienihers,
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FIGURE 4. Lee Siew Choh, BSS
Chairman (U /OU)

however, strongly support the "armed struggle" idea.
The party chairman further believes the BSS
weakened its own position by denying itself the use of
the parliamentary forum for so long; he was the
guiding force behind the party's decision to enter
candidates in the 1972 parliamentary elections. This
decision, too, was opposed by the "Voice of the
Malayan Revolution," by the party vice chairman,
arid by a suable portion of the BSS membership. The
party received only 4.55b of the total vote in the
elections, not enough to win a seat in Parliament.
b. Organization and leadership
The two top BSS officials are at loggerheads over
basic ideology as well as party policies. Lee Siew Choh
calls Chua Koh Meng the "e.ctreme leftist most
destructive to party unity,' but Lee himself is no
unifier. His inflexibility and ineptiwde would
probably have meant his ouster long ago, except that
he meets the party's need for it well known. _,n-
Communist at the t;)p and there appears to be no one
to replace him.
The most competent and popul: r leader the BSS
ever had was Lim Chin Siong, who led the leftist
group that split from PAP to form the BSS. Linn
retained his post as BSS secretary general during his
entire 6 -year imprisonment (1963 -69), losing it only
after he dealt his BSS followers a major blow in 1969
by renouncing communism. In July 1969 he was
released and permitted to go to England. Lim's
replacement as secretary general, Lim Hock Siew, is
still detained 'nor political reasons.
A 15 -man Central Executive Committee responsible
for making BSS policy decisions is harastrung by the
split between chairman Lee and vice r.hairman Chua
and by the fact that only seven of its members are
active. Liaison cadres link the committee with its 30
branches, which are grouped in;o two urban and two
rural divisions. Most branches are in the more
outlying, rural parts of the island, and only 17 of the
total 30 are active.
c. Membership
Recruitment policies are determined largely by
chairman Lee who, in the party's early years at least,
stressed the need for it tightly organized, highly
motivated group of party professionals. He worked
toward "strengthening" rather than "expanding"
membership.
In 1971 there were from 1,000 to 2,000 dues-paying
members, of whom about 500 constituted a dedicated
hard core. Labor unions and educational institutions
have furnished some of ific membership, but most
grassroots support comes from the backward and
illiterate segments of the population. Instead of
becoming mobilized into the committed cadres Dr.
Lee envisioned, the membership is dwindlin� in
interest and size. There have been many resignations,
some members leaving to join the outlawed
Communist Party of Malaya, whose broadcasts have
sparked some illegal activities by BSS members. Few
mernbers have given the C:EC their active support or
have shown an interest in becoring party officials.
The vice chairman commented in 1971 that most BSS
branch officials were in hiding, were ender arrest, or
were "agents of reaction.'
d. Finance
BSS financial resources are meager. They derive
chiefly from membership dues and fees, donations
from private individuals, fund raising drives such as
anti-Vietnam war concerts, financial support from
left-wing labor organizations an business enterprises,
and profits from business and financial investments.
Although the BSS is Peking oriented, there is no
indication that funds are being received from the
Peoples Republic of China or any other external
source.
e. Publicity
Sparse financial resources dictate a fairly modest
publicity program. ,SS's main publication, the weekly
Chinese language Chen Hsien Pao (Front Line News),
has a circulation of only about 11,000; its English
language Plebeian is much strivPer. Inexpensive
handbills distributed to the public through houso -to-
house canvassing discuss general Communist themes
and announce the times and frequencies of "Voice of
the Malayan Revolution's broadcasts. The kindergar-
ten and literacy classes which the BSS holds in rural
areas are probably self- supporting.
The party also avails itself of free publicity. It can,
for instan%c, usually count on having its major
statements covered by Singapore's Chinese language
and even English language newspapers. Moreover,
the BSS car, use for propaganda purposes the facilities
of edti- ational and labor organizations it has
penetrated, arid it benefits from exhibitions and
concerts staged by several pro Communist organiza-
tions.
Recurrent propaganda themes include denigration
of Malaysia and the Five Power l?efeise Arrange-
ment, charges that Lee Kuan Yew and PAP serve the
interests of foreign capitalists and colonialists at the
People's expense, claims that the government illegally
silences critics and political opponents and mistreats
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25X1

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25X1

G
tew
fi A
Honorable Sid Sen, an
unopposed P,4 P victor
r
PAP Chairman cusis ballot
FIGURE 5. 1970 byelections (U /OU)
In April 1972 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew turned
down an electoral reform appeal by six opposition
parties. T his appeal called for appoirtment of an
independent election commission, a minimum 30 -day
campaign period, the right of prisoners to vote, a
relaxation of rules on political meetings and provision
H
of sites for them to be held, allocation of "rvasonably
ade(Iuate television and radio time for opposition
parties, and facilities for close surveillance of ballot
boxes by agc nts of all contesting parties. In its refusal
the government reminded opposition parties that the
election laws had been enacted in 1954 "before PAP
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R. Vetrirekt (it t';NF' rullr
Multiracial citi =cans litre ul to rote
Lee Kuan Yew at PAP rally
Manclutor.r rote brings out ever.rone

1559 ELECTIONS
Percentage of Popular Vey
People's Action Singapore People's Alliance 20.7
Party 53.4
Liberal- Socialists 8.1
0
UMNO -MCA (Alliance) 6.3
Other Parties and
Independents 11.5
1963 ELECTIONS
Percentage of Popular Vote
People's Action Barisan Sosialis Singapura 33.0
Party 47
United People's Pary 8.0
1
UMNO -MCA (Alliance) 8.0
0 Other 4.0
Seats in Parliament
FIGURE 6. Results of Singapore elections (UlOU)
Action Party 87.0
Workers Party 4.0
Independents 9.0
51.
I'
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t'Ar
1964 ELECTIONS
Percentage of Popular Vote
Seats In Parliament
Seats in Parliament
Seats in Parliament

took office." Unmentioned was the fact that the
British had devised these stringent rules expressly to
keep Singapore's fledgling parties in line in the 1955
election, when they chose a parliamentary majority for
the first time. PAP's resort to such overkill in 1972,
when it appeared assured of an overwhelming victory,
seemed unnecessary but reflected Lee's propensity to
leave nothing to chance.
The results of Singapore's four parliamentary
elections are compared in Figure 6. Few significant
conclusions on voting trends or changes in the relative
standings of parties can be drawn from these results,
since the political complexion and orientation of some
of the parties have :hanged, others have merged or
split, and many have disappeared. Even PAP, the only
p:.:ty involved in all four elections, changed from
radically leftist in the late 1950's, to centrist in 1963,
and to slightly right of center in 1968 and 1972. Over
the years, PAP has so consolidated its control that
there is now no significant challenge to it.
In Singapore's first election, in 1959, the island was
still under the watchful eye of the British and made a
conscious effort to conduct a model election. In that
contest PAP's victory �by no means a landslide �was
facilitated by its militantly leftist image and the
support received from the large Peking oriented
"Chinese Chinese" part of the electorate. In 1963,
after PAP's pro Communist faction had split to form
the BSS, the latter received almost one -third of the
total vote, and PAP's following was :educed to less
than half the electorate. Moreover, since the 1963
election was held the same month that Singapore
joined Malaysia, the multiracial Malaysian Alliance
and other factions linked with Malaysia drew off some
votes that might otherwise have gone to PAP.
By 1968 Singapore had been a separate,
independent republic for 3 years and PAP, by dint of
its capable leadership and popular policies, was firmly
in the saddle. Under these circumstances the BSS
doubted its ability to make a good showing and
boycotted the elections, believing it might do better in
1972 should PAP have trouble coping with problems
stemming from the British military pullout.
Singapore's burgeoning economy in the following
years helped instead to consolidate the PAP's hold,
however, and completely dissipated any earlier
prospects the BSS and the other opposition factions
may have had. The result in 1972 was an almost 70%
popular vote for PAP and a victory in every
constituency.
The fact that some 30% of the electorate went
against PAP in 1972 has been of some concern to PAP
leaders. They were disappointed that despite their
16
efforts to woo the Malay minority, the. predominantly
Malay PEKEMAS party succeeded in getting 46%
and 48% of the vote in the two constituencies in which
it ran. Moreover, the 12% vote of the hitherto weak
WP was unexpected; Lee attributed this "protest
vote" to personal dislocations stemming from
industrialization, urbanization, and urban renewal.
D. National policies (C)
1. Domestic
Economic matters are a major preoccupation of the.
Lee Kuan Yew government. The "new mandate"
sought through dissolving Parliament in August 1972
arid calling for new elections predictably stressed
economic goals. "For the next 5 years," said the
official statement, "the government's main aim is to
raise standards of skills and technical competence, and
to improve professional, management, and technolog-
ical expertise. Only higher standards can enable
Singapore to achieve more sophistication in her
industrial, commercial, and service sectors and enlarge
her role as an international banking and financial
center, providing a home for the Asian dollar."
A willingness to diversify has brought striking
economic gains since the mid 1960'x, when
Indonesian hostility, the split from Malaysia, and
Britain's military withdrawal could have caused a
major slump. The gradual shift in emphasis from
entrepot trade� Singapore's traditional mainstav�
and servicing of British installations to a more varied
economy stressing industry, tourism, and domestic
consumption have made Singapore less vulnerable to
Malaysian and Indonesia. tmlicies of building direct
trade links to worlo" markets and bypassing Singapore
middlemen. Singapore's policy shift prompted the
creation of so many more jobs that a labor shortage
has developed in the more skilled categories. Workers
are being certified for employment at an even younger
age; married women are being encouraged to join the
labor force; and at least 70,000 foreign workers. includ-
ing 60,000 Malaysians, have been allowed to work in
Singapore. During the 1960's the economic growth
rate was on a par with that of Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea; since 1968 the gross national product
(GNP) has increased, on the average, nearly 15%
annually and per capita GNP has become second only
to Japan in Asia. The most rapid growth is now in the
manufacturing sector, which employs one -third of the
work force and attracts wide foreign investment.
The appeal to foreign firms has stemmed partly
from the government's restriction on workers' rights to
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strike arid its restraints on wages, bormses, and other
fringe benefits. To counter labor's growing discontent
with these restraints, however, the government created
a National Wage Council in early 1972 and later
agreed to its suggestions for a general 8% wage boost
in the private sector, including a 2% increase in
contributions by both employers and employees to the
"entral Provident Fund (a pension plan for workers),
and relaxation of some restrictions on workers' rights.
The government deems its policy as one of "walking a
tightrope" between labor's demands and the need for
keeping labor costs down so to continue attracting
foreign investment. In the Prime Minister's view, an
increase in the workers' share of the "national cake"
makes it "in their interest to help increase the size of
that cake."
Lee Kuan Yew believes that tight political and
social controls are necessary if Singapore is to flourish.
There are informal but effectjve restraints on the press.
Students, especially at the university level, have little
freedom compared with their American counterparts.
The extreme left is closely watched by the police arid
quickly suppressed if it resorts to illegal activity.
Emergency security laws established by the British
remain in effect and are frequently used. In May 1971
they were utilized to jail, without trial, offi: ials of a
leading Chinese- language newspaper for following a
pro- Peking "Chinese chauvinist" line. In related
incidents two English language newspapers were
forced out of business, one because it mildly criticized
the government and the other because its owner
allegedly had received vast sums from "foreign
sources," widely assumed to refer to the People's
Republic of China. There are stiff fines for air
Pollution by automobiles, littering (including foreign
vessels' discharge of oil or garbage into the harbor),
begging, and even penalties for men wearing long hair
(Figure 7). Both opponents and proponents of these
hardline policies agree that they have helped to
maintain Singapore as one of the best organized,
cleanest cities in Asia.
Another major policy has been the decision to
encourage the growth of a "Singaporean" identity by
fostering multiracial nationalism among the diverse
ethnic groups. The chief barrier to a truly mixed
cniture has proved to be the Chinese community itself,
which represents 76% of the total population but
suffers a deep cultural division. The upper :und much
of the middle classes are educated in English language
schools, while the lower class receives its education in
Chinese- language schools. The result is a basic
difference in values, customs, and prejudices; those
educated in Chinese language schools branc Prime
ILL
Il It -JA
FIGURE 7. Anti -long hair poster (U /OU)
Minister Lee's efforts to produce a new Singaporean
identity "anti- Chinese." By 1972, however, the
government's stress on English language education
had brought a larger proportion of Chinese students
into contact with Western concepts. The government
has attempted to assuage the Chinese culturists by
insuring that a majority of the PAP electoral
candidates have been educated in Chinese language
schools and by recruiting an increasing number of
Nanyang (the major Chinese language university)
graduates into the civil service. It also has been more
willing to permit media statements favoring the
People's Republic of China if these are balanced with
tributes to Singapore.
The government has tried to placate the Malay
population (15 providing scholarships for Malay
students and even retaining Malay as the official
national language after the 1965 split from Malaysia.
Many local Malays still resent the far greater
economic success of the Chinese "interlopers,"
however, and clearly showed their pique during the
1972 elections, when many voted for the all -Malay
PEKEMAS. By and large, however, the multiracial
Policy is a success.
2. Foreign
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been concerned
over Singapore's lonely role as a Chino city -state
perched between Malaysia and Indonesia �two
ethnically and religiously similar states, both
potentially hostile to Singapore. By 1972, however,
relations with both were better than they were when
the Singapore Malaysia split, communal rioting
within Malaysia, and armed infiltration by Indonesia
prevented normal dealings. Although Singapore still
17
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distrusts Malaysia and is unsure of Indonesia, Lee
nevertheless paid an official visit to Knala Lumpur in
1972 and hopes to be invited to Djakarta during 1973.
Singapore cooperates with its two neighbors in various
efforts at regional cooperation. In 1971 it concurred in
a formal declaration that the three states are
exclusively responsible for the safety of navigation'
through the Malacca Strait, but only took note" that
Malaysia and Indonesia did not accept the
international status of the Strait. Singapore belongs to
such regional organizations as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), and the Southeast Asia
Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMF,O).
Singapore has no diplornatic or consular relations
with either the Peoples Republic of China or the
Republic of China, as Lee is fearful that links with
either might hamper his efforts to redirect loyalties
and create a national identity. However, the gov-
ernment does allow Peking's Bank of China and
several emporiums controlled b\ China to operate
locally, and during 1972 it permitted a Chinese table
tennis team to visit and a private Singaporean trade
mission to attend the Canton fair. The government
backed China's entry into the United Nations but felt
the: U.S. -China rapproc}ternent in early 1972 came
about 5 years too soon" for Singapore. The
government nevertheless is moving slowly in the wake
of its fellow members of ASEAN to develop a more
positive China policy.
Y
18
Since being independent, Singapore has promoted
trade and cultural relations with the Soviet Union,
Comrrtunist countries of Eastern Europe, and North
Korea; b\ 1972 it had diplornatic relations with all
1':uropean C 0 111111 ("list states but Albania and East
Gernn ity. The So\i,�t l nio!t has it bank and aidim-
and shipping offices in Singapore in addition tip ils
embassy -and trade mission, and its naval vessels are
allowed to use Singapore's repair facilities. Singapore's
relations with the European Cotnnnunist :;talcs reflect
its nonaligned foreign police and it:, belief that its
security is better assured if' it has relations with
countries of varying political persuasious.
Singapore's relations with the United Stales are
generally good but have vacillated with the personal
attitudes of Prime Minister Lee. Lee has appeared to
support U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, which
he felt diverted Cornrnunist pressure front Singapore.
Front tirne to time, how(ver, he has xl)ressecl doubts
about the Nixon Doctrine and American staving
power. In nid -1972 Lee stated that he favored U.S.
maintenance of "a sufficient economic and strategic
presence in the area to prevent any other single power,
or group of powers, from gaining complete hegenu,rty
over Southeast Asia."
Singapore has mixed feelings toward its British
Commonwealth allies. Britain formally ended a 150
year role of providing defense for Singapore and
Malaysia at the end of October 1971 when the Anglo-
Malayan Defense Agreernent was permitted to lapse;
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FIGURE 8. Commonwealth heads of state meeting, 1971 (U/OU)

by that time the great bulk of the British land, sea, and
air forces had already departed. Economic and
cultural ties remain very close, however, and
Singapore is active in Commonwealth affairs.
Singapore hosted a meeting of the British Common
wealth leaders (Figure 8) during 1971 and wartrly
entertained the British royal family in early 1972.
Singapore frankly questions the effectiveness and
duration of the Five Power Defense Arrangement,
which replaced Britain's military commitment to
Malaysia and Singapore. The arrangement, signed in
April 1971 by Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom, calls for five
power consultation in the event of an armed attack or
externally aided insurrection and the stationing of
token Commonwealth military forces in West
g Malaysia and Singapore. (In late 1972 these forces had
a personnel strength of some 8,000, of which about
7,000 were based in Singapore.) Singapore's skepticism
stems from a belief that neither Australia nor Malaysia
oas shown a strong sense of commitment to the
mutual- defense idea, and from a feeling that
Malaysia possibly aided by Indonesia �would be
the most likely source of a conventional military
attack on Singapore. Prime Minister Lee therefore
leans toward building a self- defense f ->rce capable of
dissuading any potential aggressor. Singapore has
stepped up its defense expenditures �it allocated more
than 25% of its total FY1972/73 budget to defense�
and is acquiring increasingly modern equipment.
E. Threats to government stability
I. Discontent and dissidence (C)
Singapore, to an extent greater than in most
countries, has either solved its major domestic
problems or so minimized them that discontent and
dissidence have less and less to feed on. Pro
Communist elements are hampered by being divested
of social issues that spur the growth of communism
elsewhere. Having led the independence movement,
the PAP government is obviously no "imperialist
puppet," and its provision of more jobs, welfare
services, and inexpensive housing for low- income
groups has robbed pro Communists of the poverty
issue. Above all, the apparent lack of official
corruption and "squeeze," so widespread in Asia, has
convinced most Singaporeans that government
decisions are made to benefit citizens as a whole and
not to line the pockets of any favored group, clique, or
social class. The extreme left continues to have some
appeal for Chinese chauvinists, however, as does
Malay nationalism for a small number of Malay
extremists.
A slight majorit of the total population does have
Chinese concepts of culture, law, interpersonal
relations, morals, and dress and think of China as the
"homeland" despite their Singapore citizenship, Thev
benefit from the nation's general prosperity, but their
inability to speak English has forced them into the
lower social and economic groups and the lower
echelons of both the party and the bureaucracy. The
government's policy of emphasizing Sing'
ingapore's
multiracial character �an effort to erase fears that
Singapore could become a bridgehead for Chinese
Communist interests and hence a threat to its
neighbors� intensified their sense of inferior treatment
and their conviction that the government has "sold
out" their Chinese heritage. Chinese- speaking
students and labor -union members were ardent left
wing activists over the years until the government
defused both groups through a series of effective
measures in the 1950's and 1960's. This element of the
Population is still a potentially dissident one, but the
government seems able to handle it effectively for the
present.
A substantial part of the Muslim Malays (15% of
the total population) consider their forebears the
original inhabitants of Singapore, resent the success of
the Chinese "interlopers," and bemoan their own
place on the bottom rung of the ladder. However, the
government's evenhanded racial policy and the
Malays' relative prosperity compared with that of
their Malaysian or Indonesian brothers, have helped
preclude serious outbreaks of communal violence.
Nevertheless. the Malays in Singapore remain
sensitive to communal tensions across the johore
causeway in Malaysia.
2. Subversion (S)
a. Communist movement
From its beginning during the 1920'x, communism
in Singapore was an integral part of the Communist
movement that embraced the Malay Peninsula.
'Today, links between the two groups are tenuous.
Although the Communist movement in Malava
and Singapore prior to World War II was responsive to
policies set by the Soviet Union, from the outset it was
largely tinder the operational control of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). Through its Far Eastern
Bureau in Shanghai, the Comintern took advantage of
Kuomintang (KMT)- Communist cooperation in
China between 1923 and 1927 to introduce
experienced Chinese agents into Malaya and
Singapore under cover of the organization of the
KMT. The work of the Chinese Communists in night
schools and with small labor unions and craft guilds
ID
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resulted in the formation of the Nanyang (South Seas)
Federation of Labor in 1924 and the Communist
Youth League in 1926. Bath organizations were
centered in Singapore but had branches elsewhere in
the peninsula.
When the KMT purged itself of its Communist
elements following the KMT -CCP split in 1927, the
Comintern was unable to use KMT cover among the.
Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Apparently on
Comintern orders, the South Seas Communist Party,
or Nanyang party, was organized in Singapore during
the winter of 1927 -28 to fill the gap. This party was
accorded jurisdiction over Malaya, Singapore,
Thailand, and the Riau Islands of Sumatra. The
almost totally Chinese composition of the party met
with heavy Comintern criticism, however, and the
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was formed in
1930, principally to base the: party's appeal on
nationalist rather than communal principles and to
reduce domination by the CCP.
The Communist organization in Singapore has from
the beginning been under the jurisdiction of the CPM,
but since 1954 the CPM's headquarters and principal
leaders have been in the jungles of the Thai
Malaysian border area and are preoccupied with
maintaining their existence in the face of Malaysian
and Thai operations. Thus, the CPM's influence over
its Singapore comrades is probably highly tenuous.
Denied a rural base from which to operate, CPM
forces in Singapore were even less fortunate than their
Malayan -based comrades. After the Communist
triumph in mainland China in 1949, as many as 60%
of the party members in Singapore are believed to
have migrated to China. Others joined the guerrillas in
Malaya. During the 12 -year (1948 -60) Emergency, the
CPM apparently continued to conduct most of its
Singapore operations through a so- called Singapore
Town Committee, but the latter was broken up by the
Singapore authorities in 1956. Investigations in early
1963 led to the arrest of several persons associated with
the partially revived Town Committee, which
subsequently has been incapable of significant
subversive activity. The Moscow Peking idiological
dispute has also contributed to Communist
fragmentation.
The number of hard -core Communists in Singapore
is currently estimated at between 200 and 500
almost all of them ethnic Chinese. They have only a
very rudimentary level of formal organization, and
lack effective and dedicated leadership. A few
Communist cells and "Communist- type" cells may be
functioning, but they apparently have no firm plans
for political action. Nonetheless, Communist
20
influence in Singapore still exists because of the
infiltration of Communists into other organizations.
b. Subversive activities
Subversion today in Singapore is almost entirely
Chinese Communist in inspiration. There is no
evidence of attempted subversion (in the sense of
clandestine operations aimed at overthrowing the
government) by Eastern European diplomatic or trade
representatives. In any event, subversive activities on
the part of the Soviets would probably be ineffective
in view of Singapore s predominantly Chinese
population. Leftwing, Indonesia oriented elements
were once influential within the Malay community,
but they had become inconsequential even before the
abortive Communist co ip in Indonesia in 1965 and
the subsequent suppression of the Indonesian
Communist movement. Small Malay extremist groups
associated with or ideologically oriented toward
similar groups in Malaysia have on occasion been
involved in anti Chinese communal incidents, but
they have at no time constituted a significant threat.
Since the phasing out of the Cultural Revolution in
China at the end of the 1.960'x, and particularly since
1971, Peking itself has increasingly downplayed the
role of sub ersion in Southeast Asia� Singapore
included �as an element of national policy and has
instead placed greater emphasis on promoting state
to -state relations. Because Singapore does not
officially recognize Peking, Chinese nationals cannot
get visas to work there even though four companies
incorporated in the PRC have Singapore branches
under lozal management, and even though nine
Singapore department stores sell mostly mainland
Chinese. products. The Bank of China comes the
closest to an official PRC presence and is the only
enterprise that tries to use its facilities to disseminate
Communist propaganda. The Bank may also be a
source of clandestine funds. From China itself, the
"Voice of the Malayan Revolution" (Suara Revolus7
Malaya) provides general ideological guidance and
often broadcasts anti- Singapore or pro -CPM
propaganda in Chinese, Malay, and Tamil, and both
Radio Peking and the New China News Agency quote
from publications of the BSS, the major leftist party.
There is no evidence that China or any other foreign
country or organization finances or otherwise controls
the BSS or any other leftist group in Singapore. The
failure to devote more attention to these groups stems
in part from policy considerations �the PRC's
deemphasis on subversion �as well as from the
realization that the groups are ineffective and are
penetrated by the Singapore authorities. There is
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that Communist states might use trade with private
Singapore concerns for subversiv or economic w arfare
purposes, the government established a state trading
company and gave it responsibilit for handling all
commercial transactions with countries in which trade
is a government monopoly or is under direct
government control.
More important than these specific c-- untersubver-
sive measures to the government's success in coping
with subversion and promoting stability are the
sophisticated, broadly based system of social welfare
and its complementary political action program. Just
as expanded welfare services are basic to PAP
philosophy, so are they equally basic to the party's
efforts to broaden its political base and consolidate its
power. Within this unified approach to nationbuild-
ing, the main thrust of governmental efforts has been
to foster nationalism, improve living standards, reduce
unemployment, and encourage the populace to
organize at the grassroots level, largely through
voluntary associations. Consequently, by a combina-
tion of both specific and general measures, the
government has kept the forces of subversion off
balance and has eroded their bases of popular support
while steadily adding to its own countersubversive
capabilities.
G. Suggestions for further reading (U /OU)
Arasaratnam, Sinnapah. Indians in Malaysia and
Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Universih� Press.
1970. 214 pp. An account of the settlement and
naturalization of Indians in the Malay Peninsula and
Singapore from the cnid -19th century to the end of the
1960'x.
Bellows, Thomas J. The People's Action Party of
Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System.
New Haven: Yale University. Monograph Series No.
14, SEA Studies, 1971. 194 pp. This detailed study
focuses on the People's Action Party, but also includes
good sections on the rise and eclipse of the political
opposition and on Singapore's changing party system.
"The Singapore Party System," Journal of
Southeast Asian History, VIII, No, 1, March 1967.
Boyce, Peter. Malaysia and Singapore in Interna-
tional Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries.
Sydney, Australia: Sydney university Press. 1968. 268
Pp. This book centers on Malaysia's quest for world
acceptance, with an emphasis on the Indonesia
Malaysia Konfrontusi, but includes Singapore because
of its role in Malaysia for part of the period under
review.
Buchanan, lain. Singapore in Southeast Asia: An
Economic and Political Appraisal. London: G. Bell
and Sons. 1972. :336 pp. An interesting, but rather
dyspeptic, view of Singapore's political, economic,
and social situation in the early 1970'x.
Chan Heng Chee. Singapore.: The Politics of
Survival 1965 -1967. Singapore: Oxford University
Press, 1971. 65 pp. A slightly revised MA thesis
(Cornell University, 1967) on problems confronting
Singapore after it split from Malaysia in 1965.
Chong Peng Khaun, ed. Problems in Political
Development: Singapore. Berkeley: McCutchan
Publishing Corp. 1968. 114 pp. Contains a historical
account of political parties in Singapore, speeches and
other assessments by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew,
and articles by several American specialists on
Southeast Asia.
Josey, Alex. Democracy in Singapore: The 1970 By-
Elections. Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1970. 104
pp. A thorough discussion of why PAP decided to
prime its "deadwood" in the 1970 bv- elections and
how it went about it.
Lee Kuan Yen;. Singapore: Donald Moore
Press. 1968. 657 pp. An appr�vi but balanced,
biography of Singapore's Prime Minister; contains
some biographic detail, a chronological account of
Lee's career from the start of self- government (1959)
through 1968, and an assessment of his strong views on
multiracialism.
Lee Kuan Yew and the Commonwealth.
Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1969. 112 pp. A full
account of the 17th Meeting of the Commonwealth of
Natio,is, held in London in January 1969, with
excerpts from interviews and speeches involving Prim(-
Minister Lee.
"Singapore Socialism," Pacific Com-
munity, No. -1, Autumn 1970.
Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding, eds. Modern
Singapore. Singapore University of Singapore. 1969.
285 pp. The University of Singapore's contribution to
the 150th anniversary of the founding of Singapore in
1819. Each of the 15 chapters �which cover many
Political and sociological aspects of Singapore's life
is written by a past or present professor or lecturer at
that university.
Pang Chong Lian. Singapore's People's Action
Party: Its History, Organization and Leadership.
Singapore: Oxford L.400 Press. 1971. 87 pp. A
thorough discussion 4 WAN, with good tables on
membership breakdown, by age, education, and race,
as well as on Singapore's v, is elections.
Pelzer, Karl J. West Malaysia and Singapore: A
Selected Bibliography. New Haven: Human Relations
Area files Press. Behavior Sciences Bibliographies.
1971. 394 pp.
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Rogers, Marvin I.., "Malaysia and Singapore: 1971
Developments," Asian Survey, Vol. X1I, No. 2.
February 1972.
Ryan, N. J., The Making of Modern Malaysia and
Singapore: A History from Earliest Times to 1966.
Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1969. 283 pp. A
good historical account of Malaysia and Singapore,
showing the influr;nees on these two areas of
neighboring and foreign countries, geopolitical
factors, wars, and world events.
Singapore. Ministry of Culture. Singapore 1971.
Singapore: Government Printing Office. 1971. 299 pp.
An excellent, informative yearbook giving up -to -date
information on every aspect of Singapore's life.
Tae Yul Nam, "Singapore's One -Party System: Its
Relationship to Democracy and Political Stability,"
Pacific. Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Winter 1969 -70.
26
The Communist Movement in West Malaysia and
Singapore. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Short
Paper No. 54. February 1972. 61 pp. Traces the
development of the Communist movement in West
Malaysia and Singapore, discusses various counter-
measures employed by the two governments to
contain it, and assesses the movement's chances of
success in the future.
Tregonning, K. G., "Singapore and Kuala Lumpur:
A Politico- Geographical Contrast," Pacific Viewpoint,
Vol. 7, No. 2, 1.966.
Van der Kroef, Justus M. Communism in Malaysia
and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey. The Hague:
Marfinus Nijhoff. 1967.268 pp. A general study of the
Communist movement in the Malaysia- Singapore
region as well as in surrounding areas through the mid
1960's.

Chronology (W/ou)
I
1819
British settlement is establis'.ei by Sir Stamford Raffles.
1867
April
Straits Settlements Sirgapore. Penang, and Malacca) become
Crown Colony.
1942
February
Singapore succumbs to Japanese attack.
1945
September
British wer Singapore.
1146
April
Singapore becomes a separate British crown colony.
1959
May
People's Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew, wins general
election, capturing 43 of the 31 seats in Parliament and receiving
53.4% of the popular vote.
June
Singapore is granted internal self government; defense and
foreign relations are retained by United Kingdom.
1963
September
Malaysia is formally inaugurated; confrontation with Indonesia
follows.
People's Action Party wins general election, capturing 37 of the
51 seats in Singapore Parliament and receiving 47% of the popu-
lar vote.
1964
July
Communal riots erupt between Chinese and Malays.
September
Further communal disturbances flare up but are kept under con-
trol by police and security forces.
1965
August
Singapore is forced to withdraw from Malaysia and becomes an
independent nation.
1967
July
United Kingdom announces plan to withdraw its military forces
from Southeast Asia by the mid 1970'x.
August
Singapore is one of the founding members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations.
1966
January
United Kingdom ad- vices to late 1971 the date for withdrawal
of its militan forces fr...0 Southeim Asia.
April
People's Action Party wins all 58 seats in Parliament.
1971
April
Five Power Defense Arrangement (Singapore, Malaysia, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) signed.
October
Departure of last British forces (less Five Power contingent)
ends 150 years of British provided defense.
1972
September
People's Action Party wins all 65 seats in Parliament.
27
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SECRET
i
Glossary Wou)
ABBREVIATION
FOREIGN
ENGLISH
Angkatan Islam
Islamic Movement
BSS..........
Barisan Sosialis Singapora..........
Singapore Socialist Front
CCP..........
Chinese Communist Party
CEC..........
Central Executive Committee (PAP)
CPM
Communist Party of Malaya
ISC...........
Internal Security Council
ISD
I
Internal Security Department (police)
JIC...........
Joint Intelligence Committee
KMT.........
Kuomintang
Nationalist People's party (Taiwan)
PAP
People's Action Party
Parlai Rakyal Singapura............
Singapore People's Party
Malaya People's Socialist Party
PEMAS.......
Persetuan Alelayu Singapura.........
Singapore Malay Union
PEKEMAS....
Perlubohan Kebangsaan Alelayu Sing-
Singapore National Malay Organization
apura
PF
People's Front
PRC
People's Republic of China
SID.
Security and Intelligence Division (!Min-
istry of Defense)
UNF
United National Front
WP...........
Workers' Party
t
r
28 S ECRET

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
T
,'.n] i n SI1i F a ,Yy U a ^'N k T 'C` t` .t .i
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Y 1: