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SECRET 44C /GS /GP Singapore May 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The bask unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter ferF.,at so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chaplars� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, he Economy, Military Geo3- rophy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and I Intelligence and Security, provide the primar NIS coverage. Some chapters, j particularly Science and Intelligence and Fa:urity, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only s minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one voI me. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence j and security organizations. i Although detailed sections or, many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- s viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels rrom the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING i This document conteins information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the 1 meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of Its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by low. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 1th52 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 58 (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. i I i f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 3 r WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to Nation.! Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions ares (U/OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only A Confidential (S) Secret y y f' "A i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 ;r a'. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by January 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 SINC;APORE CONTENTS This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1968, copies of which should be destroyed. A. Summary and background 1 Path from colonial status to merger with Malays ;a and eventual self -rule; domination of Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party; implications of pullout of British defense forces; possible de- tenents to present stability and prosp -city. B. Structure and functioning of the government 4 1. Constitution 4 British influence; changes resulting from separation from Malaysia; civil rights pro- visions. 2. Executive 4 a. Structure 4 Ceremonial role of President; Prime Min- ister and cabinet the locus of power; no provisions for successor. SECRET No FOREIGN DIssEM i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Page b. Administration 5 Ministerial responsibilities; civil servants; role of Public Service Commission. 3 I.,egislature 8 Unicameral Parliament; membership rnd ses- sions; domination by ruling People's Action Party. 4. Local government 6 Citizens' Consultative Committees. 5. Judiciary 6 Centralized, efficient system based on English common law; structure of court system. C. Political dynamics 1. The political context Growth of political awareness and popular participation in government; domination of People's Action Party. 2. People's Action Party History of party; division between English. speaking moderates and Chinese speaking extremists; leftists' formation of rival party. a. policies Nondoctrinaire socialism within entrepre- neurial system. b. Organization and leadership Makeup and role of senior Central Execu- tive Committee; close control of party branches. c. Membership Qualifications; concern for youth; middle class nature of party. 7 i7 7 0 0 V, d. Finance 8 Sources of income; major categories of expenditures. 3. Bartsan Sosialis Singapura BSS) 10 Formed in 1961 by leftist dissidents from People's Action Party. a. i olicies 10 Dissension and vacillation over whether to take legal o. extralegal course; election results and parliamentary tactics. b. Organization and leadership 11 Conflict between party chairman and vice chairman over basic policies; resultant lack of action in Centrai Executive Com- mittee and party branches. c. Membership 11 Size and qualifications. d. Finance 11 Meager financial resources. ii Page e. Publicity 11 Weekly pubilcation in Chinese ant' Eng- lish; clandestine "Voice of Malayan Revo- lution" broadcasts; classes it rural arras; direction and thrust of propaganda themes. 4. United National Front Only opposition party with multiracial base; leaders, memberchip, and goals. 5. Wcrkers' Party Leadership and policies. 6. Peoples Front Platform; purges and arrests of leaders. 7. PEKEMAS Chief spokesman for Malay minority; objec- tives and setbacks; leadership and organiza- tion. 8. Interest groups Close government regulation of labor unions and student groups; influent of individuals and organizations with investment capital. 9. Elections Suffrage, participation, and results. D. National policies 1. Domestic Economic goals the main preoccupation; steps to boost the economy; tight political and so- cial controls; attempts to foster multiracial nationalism. 2. Foreign Relations with Malaysia and Indonesia; sup- port of regional cooperation organizations; ties with China, other Communist nations, United ,"hates, and Commonwealth nations. E. Threats to government stability 1. PY*- content and dissidence Paucity of issues which feed d+scontent; gov- ernment measures to assuage any communal tensions. 2. Subversion a. Communist movement History of communism on Malay Penin- sula; activities during Emergency; ineffec- tiveness of illegal Communist organization today. b. Subversive activities Subversien mainly Chinese Communist in origin; leftwing provocations and incidents generally ineptly managed. 12 12 12 1.2 13 13 16 16 17 19 19 19 19 20 F. Maintenance of internal security 21 Development of internal security structure since independence; role of Joint Intelligence Com- mittee. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 A6VV%Pf W%01 I W. Page 1 Police 22 Organization, strength, competence, and mo- rale. 2. Intelligence and security 23 Organization and responsibilities of Internai Security Department of Police Force; role and importance of Security and intelligence Division of Ministry of Defense as foreign in- telligence am. Page 3. Countersubversivo and counterinsur- gency capabilities 24 Effectiveness of police and security organs; measures used to neutralise student and labor groups in 1960's; attempts to control external Communist influence; regime policies aimed at building popular support, G. Suggestions for further reading 25 Chronology 27 Glossary 28 28 FIGURES iii MA it APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090010-5 Page Page Fig. 1 Singapore indopendence�two views Fig. 6 Results of Singapore elections (chart) 15 (photos) 3 Fig. 7 Anti-long hair poster (photo) 17 Mg. 2 Structure of government (chart) 5 Fig. 8 Commonwealth heads of state meet- Fig. 3 PAPs "inner cirnle" (photos) 9 ing, 1971 (photo) 18 Fig. 4 BSS chairman (photo) 10 Fig. 0 Intelligence and security structure (chart) 22 Fig. 5 1970 by-elections (photos) 14 Fig. 10 Police officers (photo) M iii MA it APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090010-5 Government and Politics A. Summary and background (C) The tiny but s,rategically located Republic of Singapore! is one of Asia's ,youngest nations, having become independent only in August 1965, It is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary system modeled on the British pattern, and has been governed since 1959 by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party (PAP). Although Singapore is in effect a one -party state dorninated b the strong willed Lee and the PAP, the government's success in fostering economic prosperity, effective government, and modern social services has given it it wide base of popular support. Ever since the founding of Singapore by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles in 1819, its governmental structure bas been heavily influenced by British institutions. For over a century the island was p ;irt of the Straits Settlements, together with Malacca and on the Malay Peninsula. Frorn 1826 the Settlements were a Msidency of the British Nast India Company; in 1867 they became a Grown Colony under the jurisdiction of the British Colonial Office. When Malacca and Penang were detached in 1946 to become part of the Malayan Union �later the Federation of Malaya� Singapore remained a (;town Colony and the Brith;h initiated the first steps toward limited internal self government. The British allowed Singapore's first legal political party to be formed in 1947, and the first popular elections, for a few seats in the hitherto all- appointed Legislative Council, were held the next year. In 1951 elections were authorized for a slightly larger Count,;;, but most seats remained appointive, and only a fraction of the eligible voters bothered to go to the polls. By the 1955 elections the British pressured by continuing demands for self- government �had promulgated the 'ttendel Constitution, which provided for a new legislature, the Legislative Assembly, in which most seats would be elective, and for the leader of the strongest party to be named Chief Minister and in turn name six of the nine cabinet members, the British crown continued to retain ultimate power through the Governor. The existence of the 1955 constitution prompted i t large, election turnout, as the British'wd hoped. It also surfaced a disquieting political unrest, largely leftist, that had seethed Blaring the years of nonrepresentative government and fanned popular sentiment among all groups for total self- government, I'll(! long- proscribed Communis! underground saw its best hope of success in supporting PAP, which though not then the stable vch;cic that now rules Singapore seemed the party of the future. PAP rallies accordingly drew large crowds of trade unionists and Chinese students who shouted anticolonial slogans and sang pro Communist songs; Communist influence in PAP was strung until the left wing split off and formed the A -isan Soxialis Singapora in 1961. Also leftist was the Labour Front which, though the lead party in the 1955 elections, was a loosely organized group of socialists and trade unionists whose mercurial leader, David Marshall. became Singapore's first Chief Minister. Rivalries among these and several lesser parties created a turbulent political scene it, the late 1950's. The British granted independence to the Federation of Malaya in August 1957 but refused to consider it for Singapore chiefly because of the island's strategic value, as a military base and commercial center but also because of the above- mentioned aggressive leftist movements. During 1958, however, Britain took the final steps toward granting Singapore Full autonomy in domestic matters. In June 1959, following elections in which Lee K.uan Yew's PAP won a large majority in the legislature, a revised constitution was imple- mented granting Singapore full control over its internal affairs except for security; a tripartite Internal Security Council composed of British, Malayan, and Singaporean representatives was charged with monitoring Singapore's internal security situation. Defense and foreign affairs continued to remain British responsibilities. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 A major plank of lh. PAP's 1959 platform advocated independence through merger with Malaya, Federution leaders at first firmly rejected this idea for fear that the incorporation of Singalwre's predominantly Chinese population would threaten the ethnic Malays' traditional political paramountcy. Lec Kuan Yew nevertheless pressed for merger, arguing that uch a move would contain the Communist -led leftist movement in Singapore and warning that the likely alternative might eventually be a Communist- dominated independent Singapore on Malaya's doorstep, Convinced by these, arguments, Malaya's Prime Minister Abdul Rahman in May 1961 publicly advocated an enlarged federation that would encompass not only Malaya and Singapore but also the British territories in Borneo. flis inclusion of the latter territories populated largely by Malay -type tribal groups �was obviously aimed at providing an ethnic counterweight to Chinese.- domin. 'ed Sin gapore. Once Rahman focused attention on it, the "Malaysia concept" became the subject of extended negotiations among the governmer, :s concerned, These talks culminated in lh Malaysia Agreement of July 1963, signed by the United Kingdom, Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah. Despite, bitter apposition by Communist oriented groups in Singapore, who saw the move as a sellout to the conservative, Malay dominated regime in Kuala Lumpur, a popular referendum held in Singapore in mid-1963 resulted in a 71 vote in favor of merger. Thus, on 16 September 1963 the British flag was hauled down in both Singapore and the Borneo states, and Malaysia came into being. In the enlarged federation Singapore was given a considerable, measure of internal autonomy, but as a quiet pro quo its representation in the federal parliament in Kuala Lumpur was substantially smaller than the size of its population would warrant. A continued British military presence in Singapore was assured by the 1957 Anglo- Malayan Defense Agreement, which was extended to all of Malaysia. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had ardently backed merger as a way for Singapore �with its largely Chinese population �to avoid economic and political isolation and, hopefully, as a way for the Singaporean people to join with the various ethnic and cultural groups of the other member states in a truly multiracial society. After merger became a reality, Lee, so as to further promote these goals, attempted to extend his political base beyond Singapore. In 1964 he fielded PAP candidates in elections in the Malay P and in May 1965 he set up the Malaysian 2 Solidarity Convention to press for a "Malaysian Wddysia the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia," in which there would be political equality for ali, regardless of ethnic background, la!a's efforts to inject his party into national politics alarmed leader' of the Malaysian Alliance- -the political coalition that dominates the Kuala Lumpur federal government. 'These leaders were already upset by the extent of local Chinese econoinic control in Malaysia. The prohlcm was worsened by a pronounced personality conflict between Lee and several Malaysian leaders. In early August 1965, Rahrnan bluntly told Lee that Singapore must withdraw from Malaysia. The result was a separation agreement and the declaration of Singapore's independence on 9 August 1965. At the time of separation Singapore's leaders were concerned about their nation's ability to survive independently, heavy depew.!-rice ou Malaysia for both raw materials and markets and the loss of a lucrative trade with Indonesia, because of Sukarno's determination to break up the Malaysia federation, appeared to threaten Singapore's economic viability. Malay- Chinese friction that had erupted into communal rioting in 1964 seemed likely to recur, and Lee was also disturbed by the tendency of many Malay and Cionese Singaporeans to look to Kuala Lumpur arn1 Peking, respeAively, for political and cultural guidance. Moreover, ail Singapore leaders feared for the long range security! of their small state, surrounded by Mu,ays and a natural target for Peking's subversion becausc of its largely Chinese population, London's announcement in 1988 that it was moving up to 1971 the date for withdrawing its military forces from Malaysia and Singapore added further to Singapore's unease. Figure I depicts two divergent viewpoints in Singapore with regard to independence. Since the mid- 1960's, however, apprehension over Singapore's future has been supplanted by growing confidence. Fears that Britain's military pullout would spur unemployment by adding thousands of Briish- ha,e ernployces to an already large unemployed force have been dispelled, as expanded business, service industries, and foreign- investment projects actually caused a labor shortage (tiring 1972 and required the import of about 70,000 laborers, mostly from Malaysia. As a result of its expanding economy, Singapore now has the second highest standard of living in Asia surpassed only by Japan. Concern over the security implications of the British pullout has been partly alleviated by Singapore's participation since 1971 in a Five Power Defense APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Arrangement, tinder which the United Kiugcfonn, Australia, acid New "Zealand irtaiiitaitl a modest rniiiiary prescuce ill Singalitm and Malaysia. In late 1972, hcwevk r, both Australia and New Zealand carne under Labor Party leadership which max remove most or all of their units in 197.9. Singapore has bolstered its own security and defe..:r forces through national conscription and the acquisilion of more modem cyuii3ment. Also in tiiv roame of security, the government passe.(] a .,cries of laws in the late 1960's providing stiff penalties for imauthorircd political activities. Singapore's success in achieving stability and prosperity rests with Lev Kuan Yew aril it small group of intimate collCagues, here has served as Prime Minister ever since the island acquired internal self government in 1959. A brilliant Cambridge- educated lawyer, Lee continues as the dominant figure in both the PAP art(] the government and has demonstrated his ability to chart and navigitte an intricate txliiical course. Among his able and trusted advisers, the most influential is Defense Minister Coh Keng Swee. Prime Minister Lee has won grudging acceptance from many who form.rrly questioned his motives. PAP urges "Build a Vigorous Singapore" FIGURE 1. Singapore independence �two views (U /OU) Leftist union opposes idea Conservative domestic elements an(] Western observers who deemed Lee it dangerous radical during his rise to political power in the 1950'� now accept Itim as a staunch defender of Singapore's essentially capitalistic, entrepreneurial system. While much of the poorer sector of the population educated in Chinese- language schools and still strongly attached to Chinese culture �still suspects Lee as a member of t',te 1?11glish- educated elite, the size and imponancc� of this sector has been reduced by goverow. ntal programs stressing i ?nglish- language education and Singaporean national identity. Moreover, economic prosperity. firm security and political controls, and the lack of effective leadership among the chauvinistic Chinese !rave combined to undercut the latter'% opposition to Lee 's administration. H;arlicr fears among the Malay and indian population that they would be severely handicapped by discriminatory measures have largely been allayed by the government's evenhanded comnitinal policies. (laving .von a clean sweep in parliamentary elections in both 1966 and 1972, and lacking any apparent internal or external threat, the well entrenched Lee government seems assured of .3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 dominating the political scene for the foreseeable. future. Nevertheless, problems are oil the horizon. The growing prominence of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for example, is rekindling a sense of ethnic and cultural pride among Singapore's Chinese citizens and is bolstering those who resist government policies designed to create an Anglicized Singaporean natio i al identity. China's rising status is expected to force Lec to accelerate his timetable for developig relations with Peking and could result in Borne increase in Chinese Communist subversive activities. Moreover, the continuance of Singapore's low %vage level �which until May 1972 was arbitrarily controlled to make: Singapore attractive for industrial investment �could create discontent in the face of the high level of business prosperity. A critical test for the Lee government will be whether it can raise wages without at the same time losing for Singapore an asset that has made po; ible its current industrial buildup. B. Structure and functioning of the government (U'OU) 1. Constitution The Republic of Singapore is a constitutional democracy based on the British parliamentary system. In Singapore, however, the executive branch enjoys greater power than in the British model, primarily because of the lack of meaningful political opposition to Lee Kuan Yew. The ec iistitution is basically the same as that drawn up for the State of Singapore while a member of Malaysia, except for amendments necessitated by separation on 9 August 1965. Separation forced Singapore to reorganize its administration, assume responsibility for its foreign relations, and provide for its own defense particularly after Britain's an- nounced plan for a military withdrawal in 1971. Parliament accomplished the initial constitutional changes through the Constitution Amendment Bill and the Republic of Singapore Independence Bill which it passed in December 1965 and made retroactive to the separation (late.. The constitution says nothiiig about civil rights as such but states that it is the government's responsibility "constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities." With regard to the Malty minority, the constitution specifically enjoins the government "to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language." The minuscule 4 Indian minority (7r:0') is not mentioned by name. Amendment of the constitution requires a two- thirds majority vote by Parliament. 2. Executive a. Structure Executive authority is vested formally in the President as head of state, but his duties are largely ceremonial and circumscribed. He ci,n convene, adjourn, and dissolve: Parliament, and the legislation it enacts must have his approval to become law. fie can also make numerous appointments within govern- ment, but only ore the advice and recommendations of other government leaders, councils, and commissions. Parliament appoints the President to a 4 -year term, and it may remove him by a two thirds majority vote. Because the presidency is devoid of real political power. Parliament customarily chooses a nonpolitical man for the office. Benjamin Henry Sheares, the i=ncumbent since January 1971, is a semiretired gynecologist with no history of active involvement in political affairs. In accord with Singapore's multiracial emphasis, Dr. Sheares is a Eurasian, and his predecessor was a Malay. Real executive power is centered in the Prime Minister and his cabinet. The individual the President appoints as Prime Minister must be a member of Parliament who commands the confidence of its majority; in practice this individual leads the majority party. The Prime Minister selects his cabinet from members of Parliament, with formal appointments being made by the President. The total number of cabinet positions is not fixed by the constitution; in early 1973 there were 13 ministries (excluding the office of the Prime Minister), filled by 12 ministers.' Lee Kuan Yew works very closely with the cabinet, all of whose members he handpicks for their loyalty and capability. Lee sounds out their views, but his own predominate. Like most other government bodies, the cabinet reflects Singapore's racial mixture; there are nine Chinese, one Malay, one indian, and one Eurasian. If the Prime Minister loses the confidence of Parliament or gives up his membership in it, the cabinet must resign; however, the President may reject its resignation and instead dissolve Parliament and force new elections. Figure 2 shows the structure of government. 'For a current listing of key government official.; consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Presidential Council CABINET Prime Minister Ministers: Communications Culture Defenue Educativ+ Environment Finance Foreign Affairs Health Home Affairs Labor Law and National Development Science and Technology Social Affairs PRESIDENT (Head of State) PARLIAMENT CS Sears COURTS Supreme Court: Court of Appeni Court of Criminal Appeal High Court 5ubot dtnnt. Courts: District Mldistratei Juvenile Coroners Shoria (Islamic Law) FIGURE 2. Structure of government (U /OU) The co Tstitution does not provide regular deputies for the prime ministership or the presidency. In the event of illness or absence, the President may appoint "any other minister" as acting prime minister, and the cabinet may appoint us acting president someone who "would be qualified to be president." A� deputy prime ministership existed for a time despite the lack of constitutional authorization, but it has not been filled since April 1968. In May 1968 Parliament- concerned over the illness of then President Yusof� authorized itself to name a vice president, but it did not do so; its speaker took over as acting president during Yusof's illness and following his death in 1969. The possibility of Lee's exit has never had to be considered, since he is firmly in control and also relatively young (49) and healthy. Lee says, however, that he may be ready to turn power over t.f a new group by the late 1970's or early 1980'x, and Le seems to be building up a coterie of younger party men capable of tackling the job. Should Lee die or for some reason vacate his position, his successor would likely be one of PAP's inner circle, such as Defense Minister Gob Keng Swee. b. Administration For nearly a century under the British, Sin, .pore's administration was conducted by a number of executive departments supervised by the colonial secretary, who in turn was responsible to the. governor. Since the Rendel Constitution 1955, however, the various executive departments have been apportioned, sometimes arbitrarily, among the cabinet ministers. The Prime Minister may charge any minister in writing with responsibility for any department or subject, may revoke or var any of these assignments at will, and may retain in his own charge any department or field he chooses. Each ministry has a permanent secretary and/or a parliamentary secretary, and some ministries have political secretaries as well. 'rhe permanent secretary is the only one of these offices provided for in the constitution, however; the others are Prime Ministerial appointments designed to expand party involvement in government prograrns. The permanent secretary the top ranking civil servant in each ministry �is appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister from a list of names submitted by the Public Service Commission. Each permanent secretary is assigned to a particular ministry by the Prime Minister but, once appointed, he serves under the direction of the minister concerned. The Public Service Commission, formed in 1951, advises the President on appointments, promotions, and other civil service matters an,, also serves as a central agency for planning and administering scholarships, training awards, and grants. The Commission consists of a chairman and no fewer than two nor more than four other members, each appointed by the President on the Prime Minister's advice. It is served by it secretariat consisting of career civil servants. In 1970 there were 66,899 civil service employees 54,493 "monthly- rated" staff and 12,406 "daily rated" workers. With the exception of judges and police officers below the rank of inspector, all appointments and prornotions to monthly -rated posts are made by the Public Service Commission or the 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Legal Service Commission, its counterpart for legal positions, The civil service is organized into four divisions: I� administrative and professional grades; II� executive and nonprofessional grades; III clerical and allied grades; and IV� mainly unskilled workers. No more than 300 Singaporeans, however, hear the main burden of planning and administration. "If all the 300 were to crash in one jumbo jet speculates the Prime Minister, "then Singapore will Aisintegratf 3. Legislature Parliarent is a unicameral body responsible for enacting laws for the "peace, order and goud government of Singapore," Until the September 1972 election it consisted of 58 members from the carne number of electoral constituencies. In that election, seven new seals raised the total to 65. Prior to the election, 21 of the 58 constituencies had been redivided to account for population shifts. Members of Parliament must be 21 years of age or over and are chosen by compulsory universal suffrage. A full parliamentary term is years; if Parliament is dissolved, a new election must he held %vilhin 3 month~. An earlier rule that interim vacancies be filled within 3 months was abolished by the Constitution Amendment Act of 1967. Parliament convenes periodically but has no scheduled meeting dates. Proceedings may be conducted in English, Malay, Mandarin, or Tamil, with si nultaneous translations provided. Parliament is dominated by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the ruling People's Action Party. PAP has held most of the seats in Parliament since 1959; since 1968 :t has occupied all of them. This has enabled Lee to see to it that Parliament's membership is balanced racially in proportions about equal to the numbers of Chinese, Malays, Indians arid others in the population. Although the President has certain theoretical restraints over Parliament, theso have had no practical significance. The President's required approval of legislation, for example, is largely pro forma, since he is chosen by Parliament and must answer to it. Similarly, a Presidential Council appointed by the President in 1969 to review legislation for possible infringement of minority rights has been largely disregarded: since 1970 Parliament has withheld from the council prior perusal of any legislation on defense, security, public safety, "peace" or "good order." 4. Local government Local government is not provided for in the constitution. However, Citizens' Consultative Committees were set up in 1966 in all electoral IN constituencies to inform the government of the people's needs and the people of the government's actions and policies. For administrative purposes, the 65 committees are grouped into three Rural District and five City District Citizens' Consultative Committees, each having a civil servant as the ex offiJo secretary responsible to the Prime Minister's Office. 5. judiciary Singapore has a highly centralized and efficient judicial system which is based on F,nglish common law but modified to suit local conditions. The Chief Justice, appointed by the President on the advice of' the Prime Minister, heads the judiciary aril exercises administrative judicial system. The highest tribun.! is the Supreme Court, consisting of a high Court, Court of Appeal, and Court of Criminal Appeal. The Iligh Co�t has unlin0ed originai jurisdiction in serious criminal and civil cases and also has appellate, general supervisory, and revisionary jurisdiction over tlic Subordinate Courts. Two High Court judges (one of them the presiding judge) have ruled on capital offenses since 1970, when trial jury for such offense:- was abolished; all other trial by jury was ended a decade earlier. Appeals of high Court decisions go to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Criminal Appeal. Supreme Court decisions nay be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Singapore's ultimate appellate court, which sirs in London. Singapore's Subordinate Court system includes district and magistrates' courts, juvenile court::. coroners' courts, and a Sharia (Islamic law) Court which handles cases involving only Muslims and usually concerns Muslim marriages. Both the district and magistrates' court:. have original criminal and civil jurisdiction. District courts try criminal cases, imprisonment for which must not exceed 7 years, and civil cases involving a maximum of S$5,000. Magistrates' courts try criminal cases for which prison terms do not exceed 3 years aril civil offenses involving no more than S$1,000. juvenile courts handle cases similar to those in district or magistrates' courts, except that the offenders are children. Coroners' courts hold inquests into the circumstances where there is reason to suspect a violent or unnatural death has occurred. Although justice is administered fairly, many Singaporeans are concerned over the lack of civil liberties. They deplore the jury system's demise and such laws as the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance� allowing the government to hold a person APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 without trial up 2 years �and the Criminal Law Tetnporar;� Provision' Ordinance, which enabled the government ill the lute 1960's to ja;l without trial over 6(K) "criminal detainees" (many in the ntaxintunt security Cliangi Prison). Prince Minister Lee Ktan Yew justifies such actions on what he considers pragmatic grounds, but he once admitted to the Advocates' and Solicitors' Society �one of his chief critics: "W have departed in quite a number of material aspects from the principles of justice and the liberty of the individual in order to maintain norm tl standards.. This is a heavy price." C. Political dynamics 1. The Political context (U /OL1) Singapore's political system, thanks to British tutelage, is fairly sophisticated but lacks the bal:uce of the British model. PopuL-r interest and involvement in politics date hack to essentially 1953 (when Singaporeans first elected a majority of representatives in the legislature) but took on major significance only during the 1959 elections, just prior to Singapore's acquiring antononty over its internal affairs. Political awareness monuted with, the formation of Malaysia in 1963 and Singapore's forced withdrawal from it 2 years later. Government efforts since separation to Protect the rights of its Malay minority (15� of tit(. population) by retaining MuLny es the national language and by grunting equal ennployrnenl rights, citizenship guarantees, and special educational stipends, have quieted Malay fears of heco second lass citizens lint have antagonized Chinese chauvinist elements, .yho accuse the government of demeaning Chinese culture and bowing to Malay pressures. By and large, wider participation in and responsibility for government have helped Singapore's several rti:nle groups identify more closely with the national government. Mandatory voting forces everyone to the polls, even for minor by- elections, but nebulous issues and a Paucity of choices often make such events perfunctory. Most Singaporeans have no tradition of participatory democracy or the protection of civil rights through such legal tools as habeas corpus, and are therefore satisfied to settle for the PAP government, whose effective, forward- looking leadership for overa decade has far outweighed its sometimes brusque treatment of political and newspaper critics. The opposition has intermittently boycott (.d the legislature since 1963 and is bogged down in intrrparty and interparty feuds. Deprived of distinctive issues and divided over policies, most x ()[)position parties simply lie low iuitil election time. Of -I opposition parties registered in Inid -1972, for instance, ,one was represented in Parliament and only five were active in tile sense that the public knew they existed usually through newspaper reports ridiculing their stands or highlighting their disputes. One citizen compared the minor opposition parties to "idlers in the c�offeeshops who will rush out in the streets on hearing the sound of drug s, cymbals, and gongs and will immediately retire to their seats when the show has passed... Despite PAP's influence and its record of impressive achievement, its IeadershiP is aware of important vulnerabilities. The extreme left however chaotically run identifies store closel with lower class Chinese, who arc edu i schools where Chinese is the medium of instructio, that does PAP, whose senior leadership is closely linked with the more Westernized (;hinese Middle and upper class. Any serious reduction in popular support for PAP over such issues; as one party rule, the dotrtinant role (if English in schools, Singapore's nonaligned foreign Policy, authoritarian restraints on the nations political life, or it protracted economic slump could give, opposition elements an opportunity to rally their weak forces and again challenge PAP for political snpremacv. 2� People's Action Party (C) The uoderately socialist PAP %vas formed in November 1954. Its leadership called for it democratic government responsive to it `-alv elect( legislative assembly, which London granted in 19-59, and for the union of Singapore with the federation of Malaya, which took place in September 1963. At the start PAP was marked by dissension bet%Veer moderate and extremist clements. The former were led by Lev Kuan Yew representing the British- educated, English- speaking sector of Singapore's largely Chinese society; tile latter were led by leftist Lim Chin Siong on behalf of the Chinese educated, Chinese- speaking conpouent of the trade -union ntovennclt. After these rival elements jockeyed some 7 years for party control, Lee Kuan 1'(.w launched an open attack on the radical opposition and tried to prove its Communist affiliation. The leftists responded by withdrawing from PAP in 1961 and organizing the Badsan Sosialis Singapura (BSS, or Singapore Socialist front). PAP decisively heat its leftist opponent in the 1963 elections, when the chief issue was Singapore's merger into Malaysia, and it woo all the seats in the elections of April 1968� which the BSS bo �and those of September 1972, in which the BSS and four other opposition parties took part. I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 a. Policies PAP, whose political philosophy is rooted in British socialists, describes itself as a non Communist, democratic socialist part\,. It emphasizes honest, efficient government and the expansion of education, industry, and social welfare services such as medical care, health, and public housing. PAP's leadership is not doctrinaire in its socialist beliefs, however, and does riot seek public ownership of the� means of production. Party policies thus satisfy low- income citizens who might otherwise be receptive to Communist overtures, while at the same time thev do not threaten the capitalistic, entrepreneurial system that buttresses Singapore's economy. b. Or and leadership The PAP is very tightly rrganired, thanks to Lee Kuan Yews close personal supervision. Its senior policvrnaking authority is the 12 -roan Central Executive Committee (CEC), whose members also hold key government jobs. The composition of the CEC is largely English- educated or oriented Chinese but conforms generally to the islands racia distribution. The CEC: in turn is ruled 'av it camarilla or inner circle made up of four nen who have worked closely togeth( r since before the part\ was formed, have generally acted in concert, and are held in awe by practically all PAP members. headed by Lee, who is PAP secretary general, the group (Figure 3) includes party chairman Dr. Tot) Chin Chye (Minister of Science arid 'Technology); deputy chairman Dr. (;oh Keng Swee (Minister of Defense); and director of the political bureau Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (Minisicr of Foreign Affairs), The CEC: is chosen by PAP's cadre or staff offic -rs (roughly 391, of the party), who thersselves are picked by the CEC �a kind of reciprocity which Lee says must have "some merit," since the Vatican's similar system of the Cardinals appointing the Pope and the Pope appointing the Cardinals has lasted nearly 2,000 years. The CEC directly controls the editorial board of Peiir (Lightning), the party organ, which is published in the four official languages, and it appoints the members of the seven party bureaus: Malay Affairs, External Affairs, Women, Welfare, Culture, Publicity and Propaganda, aril Political. PAP has a branch in each electoral constituency and it few subbranches in the larger ones; some sizable branches exist where population is small but recruitment intense. The branches independence is greatly curtailed by Singapore's compactness and by the fact that communication with the CEC is almost entirely one way: downward. c. Membership In the late 1960's PAP claimed 30,000 rncrnbers, but this total included many who had resigned, had been expelled, or had allowed their membership to lapse. A more realistic figure was about 15,000, of whom from 300 to 500 were cadre members, the party's elite arid its backbone. Regular membership is fairly easy to obtain. although the CEC must pass oil all applications. Ilowever. cadre members reportedly rust have made a 2 -year "special" contribution to PAP, been nominated by it CEC member, and been examined and finally approved by Prime Minister Lee himself. L ve hopes in this way both to choose the party's hest talent and to prevent its penetration by subversive elements. Lee's major concern since at least 1971 �when he saw to it that youth sections were introduced in most branches �has been to infuse new blood into PAP and to develop it strong second echelon of well educated cadres to lead the party and the country in the 1980's. Lee wants PAP nominees drawn from it broad cross section of society, but he specifically seeks professional people, intellectuals, and labor leaders from unions affiliated with the government controlled National "Trades Union Congress. Members of the exclusive and prestigious Pyramid Club� self styled as "people who arc making an effective contribution to society, or are capable of doing so" �arc so often tapped for PAP membership that the (-hit) is an unofficial PAP adjunct. Most Pyramid Club members are from the English- speaking elite that provides leadership for the PAP and most of the government. Overall, however, PAP is it middle -class party, three- fourths of whose members joined it to improve their chances for employment or for other factors such as prestige. d. Finance PAP headquarters has three sources of income: membership fee. assessed contributions from members of Parliament, and private donations. Membership fees ($2 it year) comprise the smallest amount, particularly since headquarters takes only one eighth of the fee and allows the branch to which it is paid to keep the rest. This is the oniv subside received by the branches, which otherwise support themselves. Branches raise further funds by running kindergartens, carnivals, fun fairs, and large dinners to which prominent philanthropists and millionaires outside the constituencv are also asked; those invited invariably feel obliged to pay something. Contribu- tions from members of Parliament (MP) total about S$150,000 a year at fixed monthly rates of at least $50 for an MP, $100 for parliamentary secretaries, and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Lee Kuan Yew FIGURE 3. PAP's "inner circle" (U /OU) 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 ioh Chin Chye Goh Keng Swee Sinnathomby Rajorotnam $500 for ministers; totals vi according to family financial circ�unistances. Large privotc contributions probably arc made directly to the (:f and the amounts are not generally known. PAP's expenditures are r,inarkably Iow for it nutjc�r party because of the branches' virtual self support and because of fringe benefits deriving from the party's link \witlr the gowrnnu�nt. The major expense is for salaried party officiais and rental of the building at beadcpuarters. Expenses for publicity are few, since PAP has full access to all govvrnincnt- u\\ned and controlled c0mnl11nicrttions media� filrns, radio, television, and publications, such as the weekly magazine� The Mirror -as well as to civic or- ganizat ons, the armed forces, and paramilitary forces. Election year expenses ca n be kept low, brc ause compulsory voting obviates the need to induce people to go to the polls, inotor vehicles pray not be its(�(I to convey voters to the polls. most workers are volunteers, and donations in cash or foodstuffs are easy to extract front most ethnic Chiucse, who view such gifts as a wit v of avoiding tronblo rather than as support for the party or its platforn. :3. Barisan Sosialis Singapura (S) The pro- (:ornniunist BSS (Singapore Socialist front) is Singapore's leading but probably most disorganized opposition party. The only major goal its leaders have agreed on since they left PAP and formed the BSS in 1961 is that Singapore and West Ivialaysia should forrt a single political unit, Malaya." In their view Singapore's independence is "phony" and Malaysia is "an artificial colonialist creation." In late 1971, however, party chairman Lee Siew (:hull (Figur, -1) admitted that the BSS could no longer struggle for ij "truly independent, united, and detnocratic Malaya" because it \was pantlyzed by ideological differences, lack of' cohesion, financial difficulties, low moral,, and falling rnembership. a. Policies BSS leaders and rnenib,rs have never agreed on whether to act within Singapore's legal framework or to try for power by subversive means, and most stands or steps finally taken by ;t majority are criticized or countered by other party members. As a result, the party's positions on important cpuestions like its representation in Parliament and the nature of its antigovermnent "stnlgg1v� have vac�illat,d widely over the \cars. BSS canc!idales \von 13 parlianu�niar,. scats (i3 of the popular vote) in the 1963 ,leclion, but tiles, assemblymen soon began obstructionist tactics and then in December 1965 began it boycott of legisiativv sessions. Finally in 1966, after the part launched a series of but "constitutional" antigovernment activities� entailing mass rallies. house -to -house campaigning and the threat of strikes �BSS legislators resigned, were imprisoned, or went underground to avoid arrest. Between 1966 and 1972 the BSS boycotted most m elections and fro tine to time turned to activist tactics. The government has promptly qu,lled all BSS protests. but the Malayan (:otnnrunist Party's Voice Of the Malayan Revolution" (broadeasting from South China) has been urging the BSS s lrc, 1970 to wage "arined struggle" in Singapore before stressing the "Malaya" issue. The BSS is serious!\ divided over these attempted, current, or suggested policies. The party chairman, \who is leftist but non- (.oniit [ill ist, decries talk of 1. arnu�d struggle" in the city or the surrounding countryside as "just not practical" for Singapore, and in any event unsuitable for a supposedly non Communist party which instead should he inyolv,cl in struggle." Party vice chairman Chun Koh Meng ;111(1 substantial number of BSS nienihers, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 FIGURE 4. Lee Siew Choh, BSS Chairman (U /OU) however, strongly support the "armed struggle" idea. The party chairman further believes the BSS weakened its own position by denying itself the use of the parliamentary forum for so long; he was the guiding force behind the party's decision to enter candidates in the 1972 parliamentary elections. This decision, too, was opposed by the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution," by the party vice chairman, arid by a suable portion of the BSS membership. The party received only 4.55b of the total vote in the elections, not enough to win a seat in Parliament. b. Organization and leadership The two top BSS officials are at loggerheads over basic ideology as well as party policies. Lee Siew Choh calls Chua Koh Meng the "e.ctreme leftist most destructive to party unity,' but Lee himself is no unifier. His inflexibility and ineptiwde would probably have meant his ouster long ago, except that he meets the party's need for it well known. _,n- Communist at the t;)p and there appears to be no one to replace him. The most competent and popul: r leader the BSS ever had was Lim Chin Siong, who led the leftist group that split from PAP to form the BSS. Linn retained his post as BSS secretary general during his entire 6 -year imprisonment (1963 -69), losing it only after he dealt his BSS followers a major blow in 1969 by renouncing communism. In July 1969 he was released and permitted to go to England. Lim's replacement as secretary general, Lim Hock Siew, is still detained 'nor political reasons. A 15 -man Central Executive Committee responsible for making BSS policy decisions is harastrung by the split between chairman Lee and vice r.hairman Chua and by the fact that only seven of its members are active. Liaison cadres link the committee with its 30 branches, which are grouped in;o two urban and two rural divisions. Most branches are in the more outlying, rural parts of the island, and only 17 of the total 30 are active. c. Membership Recruitment policies are determined largely by chairman Lee who, in the party's early years at least, stressed the need for it tightly organized, highly motivated group of party professionals. He worked toward "strengthening" rather than "expanding" membership. In 1971 there were from 1,000 to 2,000 dues-paying members, of whom about 500 constituted a dedicated hard core. Labor unions and educational institutions have furnished some of ific membership, but most grassroots support comes from the backward and illiterate segments of the population. Instead of becoming mobilized into the committed cadres Dr. Lee envisioned, the membership is dwindlin� in interest and size. There have been many resignations, some members leaving to join the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya, whose broadcasts have sparked some illegal activities by BSS members. Few mernbers have given the C:EC their active support or have shown an interest in becoring party officials. The vice chairman commented in 1971 that most BSS branch officials were in hiding, were ender arrest, or were "agents of reaction.' d. Finance BSS financial resources are meager. They derive chiefly from membership dues and fees, donations from private individuals, fund raising drives such as anti-Vietnam war concerts, financial support from left-wing labor organizations an business enterprises, and profits from business and financial investments. Although the BSS is Peking oriented, there is no indication that funds are being received from the Peoples Republic of China or any other external source. e. Publicity Sparse financial resources dictate a fairly modest publicity program. ,SS's main publication, the weekly Chinese language Chen Hsien Pao (Front Line News), has a circulation of only about 11,000; its English language Plebeian is much strivPer. Inexpensive handbills distributed to the public through houso -to- house canvassing discuss general Communist themes and announce the times and frequencies of "Voice of the Malayan Revolution's broadcasts. The kindergar- ten and literacy classes which the BSS holds in rural areas are probably self- supporting. The party also avails itself of free publicity. It can, for instan%c, usually count on having its major statements covered by Singapore's Chinese language and even English language newspapers. Moreover, the BSS car, use for propaganda purposes the facilities of edti- ational and labor organizations it has penetrated, arid it benefits from exhibitions and concerts staged by several pro Communist organiza- tions. Recurrent propaganda themes include denigration of Malaysia and the Five Power l?efeise Arrange- ment, charges that Lee Kuan Yew and PAP serve the interests of foreign capitalists and colonialists at the People's expense, claims that the government illegally silences critics and political opponents and mistreats APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 25X1 G tew fi A Honorable Sid Sen, an unopposed P,4 P victor r PAP Chairman cusis ballot FIGURE 5. 1970 byelections (U /OU) In April 1972 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew turned down an electoral reform appeal by six opposition parties. T his appeal called for appoirtment of an independent election commission, a minimum 30 -day campaign period, the right of prisoners to vote, a relaxation of rules on political meetings and provision H of sites for them to be held, allocation of "rvasonably ade(Iuate television and radio time for opposition parties, and facilities for close surveillance of ballot boxes by agc nts of all contesting parties. In its refusal the government reminded opposition parties that the election laws had been enacted in 1954 "before PAP APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 R. Vetrirekt (it t';NF' rullr Multiracial citi =cans litre ul to rote Lee Kuan Yew at PAP rally Manclutor.r rote brings out ever.rone 1559 ELECTIONS Percentage of Popular Vey People's Action Singapore People's Alliance 20.7 Party 53.4 Liberal- Socialists 8.1 0 UMNO -MCA (Alliance) 6.3 Other Parties and Independents 11.5 1963 ELECTIONS Percentage of Popular Vote People's Action Barisan Sosialis Singapura 33.0 Party 47 United People's Pary 8.0 1 UMNO -MCA (Alliance) 8.0 0 Other 4.0 Seats in Parliament FIGURE 6. Results of Singapore elections (UlOU) Action Party 87.0 Workers Party 4.0 Independents 9.0 51. I' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 t'Ar 1964 ELECTIONS Percentage of Popular Vote Seats In Parliament Seats in Parliament Seats in Parliament took office." Unmentioned was the fact that the British had devised these stringent rules expressly to keep Singapore's fledgling parties in line in the 1955 election, when they chose a parliamentary majority for the first time. PAP's resort to such overkill in 1972, when it appeared assured of an overwhelming victory, seemed unnecessary but reflected Lee's propensity to leave nothing to chance. The results of Singapore's four parliamentary elections are compared in Figure 6. Few significant conclusions on voting trends or changes in the relative standings of parties can be drawn from these results, since the political complexion and orientation of some of the parties have :hanged, others have merged or split, and many have disappeared. Even PAP, the only p:.:ty involved in all four elections, changed from radically leftist in the late 1950's, to centrist in 1963, and to slightly right of center in 1968 and 1972. Over the years, PAP has so consolidated its control that there is now no significant challenge to it. In Singapore's first election, in 1959, the island was still under the watchful eye of the British and made a conscious effort to conduct a model election. In that contest PAP's victory �by no means a landslide �was facilitated by its militantly leftist image and the support received from the large Peking oriented "Chinese Chinese" part of the electorate. In 1963, after PAP's pro Communist faction had split to form the BSS, the latter received almost one -third of the total vote, and PAP's following was :educed to less than half the electorate. Moreover, since the 1963 election was held the same month that Singapore joined Malaysia, the multiracial Malaysian Alliance and other factions linked with Malaysia drew off some votes that might otherwise have gone to PAP. By 1968 Singapore had been a separate, independent republic for 3 years and PAP, by dint of its capable leadership and popular policies, was firmly in the saddle. Under these circumstances the BSS doubted its ability to make a good showing and boycotted the elections, believing it might do better in 1972 should PAP have trouble coping with problems stemming from the British military pullout. Singapore's burgeoning economy in the following years helped instead to consolidate the PAP's hold, however, and completely dissipated any earlier prospects the BSS and the other opposition factions may have had. The result in 1972 was an almost 70% popular vote for PAP and a victory in every constituency. The fact that some 30% of the electorate went against PAP in 1972 has been of some concern to PAP leaders. They were disappointed that despite their 16 efforts to woo the Malay minority, the. predominantly Malay PEKEMAS party succeeded in getting 46% and 48% of the vote in the two constituencies in which it ran. Moreover, the 12% vote of the hitherto weak WP was unexpected; Lee attributed this "protest vote" to personal dislocations stemming from industrialization, urbanization, and urban renewal. D. National policies (C) 1. Domestic Economic matters are a major preoccupation of the. Lee Kuan Yew government. The "new mandate" sought through dissolving Parliament in August 1972 arid calling for new elections predictably stressed economic goals. "For the next 5 years," said the official statement, "the government's main aim is to raise standards of skills and technical competence, and to improve professional, management, and technolog- ical expertise. Only higher standards can enable Singapore to achieve more sophistication in her industrial, commercial, and service sectors and enlarge her role as an international banking and financial center, providing a home for the Asian dollar." A willingness to diversify has brought striking economic gains since the mid 1960'x, when Indonesian hostility, the split from Malaysia, and Britain's military withdrawal could have caused a major slump. The gradual shift in emphasis from entrepot trade� Singapore's traditional mainstav� and servicing of British installations to a more varied economy stressing industry, tourism, and domestic consumption have made Singapore less vulnerable to Malaysian and Indonesia. tmlicies of building direct trade links to worlo" markets and bypassing Singapore middlemen. Singapore's policy shift prompted the creation of so many more jobs that a labor shortage has developed in the more skilled categories. Workers are being certified for employment at an even younger age; married women are being encouraged to join the labor force; and at least 70,000 foreign workers. includ- ing 60,000 Malaysians, have been allowed to work in Singapore. During the 1960's the economic growth rate was on a par with that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea; since 1968 the gross national product (GNP) has increased, on the average, nearly 15% annually and per capita GNP has become second only to Japan in Asia. The most rapid growth is now in the manufacturing sector, which employs one -third of the work force and attracts wide foreign investment. The appeal to foreign firms has stemmed partly from the government's restriction on workers' rights to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 strike arid its restraints on wages, bormses, and other fringe benefits. To counter labor's growing discontent with these restraints, however, the government created a National Wage Council in early 1972 and later agreed to its suggestions for a general 8% wage boost in the private sector, including a 2% increase in contributions by both employers and employees to the "entral Provident Fund (a pension plan for workers), and relaxation of some restrictions on workers' rights. The government deems its policy as one of "walking a tightrope" between labor's demands and the need for keeping labor costs down so to continue attracting foreign investment. In the Prime Minister's view, an increase in the workers' share of the "national cake" makes it "in their interest to help increase the size of that cake." Lee Kuan Yew believes that tight political and social controls are necessary if Singapore is to flourish. There are informal but effectjve restraints on the press. Students, especially at the university level, have little freedom compared with their American counterparts. The extreme left is closely watched by the police arid quickly suppressed if it resorts to illegal activity. Emergency security laws established by the British remain in effect and are frequently used. In May 1971 they were utilized to jail, without trial, offi: ials of a leading Chinese- language newspaper for following a pro- Peking "Chinese chauvinist" line. In related incidents two English language newspapers were forced out of business, one because it mildly criticized the government and the other because its owner allegedly had received vast sums from "foreign sources," widely assumed to refer to the People's Republic of China. There are stiff fines for air Pollution by automobiles, littering (including foreign vessels' discharge of oil or garbage into the harbor), begging, and even penalties for men wearing long hair (Figure 7). Both opponents and proponents of these hardline policies agree that they have helped to maintain Singapore as one of the best organized, cleanest cities in Asia. Another major policy has been the decision to encourage the growth of a "Singaporean" identity by fostering multiracial nationalism among the diverse ethnic groups. The chief barrier to a truly mixed cniture has proved to be the Chinese community itself, which represents 76% of the total population but suffers a deep cultural division. The upper :und much of the middle classes are educated in English language schools, while the lower class receives its education in Chinese- language schools. The result is a basic difference in values, customs, and prejudices; those educated in Chinese language schools branc Prime ILL Il It -JA FIGURE 7. Anti -long hair poster (U /OU) Minister Lee's efforts to produce a new Singaporean identity "anti- Chinese." By 1972, however, the government's stress on English language education had brought a larger proportion of Chinese students into contact with Western concepts. The government has attempted to assuage the Chinese culturists by insuring that a majority of the PAP electoral candidates have been educated in Chinese language schools and by recruiting an increasing number of Nanyang (the major Chinese language university) graduates into the civil service. It also has been more willing to permit media statements favoring the People's Republic of China if these are balanced with tributes to Singapore. The government has tried to placate the Malay population (15 providing scholarships for Malay students and even retaining Malay as the official national language after the 1965 split from Malaysia. Many local Malays still resent the far greater economic success of the Chinese "interlopers," however, and clearly showed their pique during the 1972 elections, when many voted for the all -Malay PEKEMAS. By and large, however, the multiracial Policy is a success. 2. Foreign Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been concerned over Singapore's lonely role as a Chino city -state perched between Malaysia and Indonesia �two ethnically and religiously similar states, both potentially hostile to Singapore. By 1972, however, relations with both were better than they were when the Singapore Malaysia split, communal rioting within Malaysia, and armed infiltration by Indonesia prevented normal dealings. Although Singapore still 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 distrusts Malaysia and is unsure of Indonesia, Lee nevertheless paid an official visit to Knala Lumpur in 1972 and hopes to be invited to Djakarta during 1973. Singapore cooperates with its two neighbors in various efforts at regional cooperation. In 1971 it concurred in a formal declaration that the three states are exclusively responsible for the safety of navigation' through the Malacca Strait, but only took note" that Malaysia and Indonesia did not accept the international status of the Strait. Singapore belongs to such regional organizations as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMF,O). Singapore has no diplornatic or consular relations with either the Peoples Republic of China or the Republic of China, as Lee is fearful that links with either might hamper his efforts to redirect loyalties and create a national identity. However, the gov- ernment does allow Peking's Bank of China and several emporiums controlled b\ China to operate locally, and during 1972 it permitted a Chinese table tennis team to visit and a private Singaporean trade mission to attend the Canton fair. The government backed China's entry into the United Nations but felt the: U.S. -China rapproc}ternent in early 1972 came about 5 years too soon" for Singapore. The government nevertheless is moving slowly in the wake of its fellow members of ASEAN to develop a more positive China policy. Y 18 Since being independent, Singapore has promoted trade and cultural relations with the Soviet Union, Comrrtunist countries of Eastern Europe, and North Korea; b\ 1972 it had diplornatic relations with all 1':uropean C 0 111111 ("list states but Albania and East Gernn ity. The So\i,�t l nio!t has it bank and aidim- and shipping offices in Singapore in addition tip ils embassy -and trade mission, and its naval vessels are allowed to use Singapore's repair facilities. Singapore's relations with the European Cotnnnunist :;talcs reflect its nonaligned foreign police and it:, belief that its security is better assured if' it has relations with countries of varying political persuasious. Singapore's relations with the United Stales are generally good but have vacillated with the personal attitudes of Prime Minister Lee. Lee has appeared to support U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, which he felt diverted Cornrnunist pressure front Singapore. Front tirne to time, how(ver, he has xl)ressecl doubts about the Nixon Doctrine and American staving power. In nid -1972 Lee stated that he favored U.S. maintenance of "a sufficient economic and strategic presence in the area to prevent any other single power, or group of powers, from gaining complete hegenu,rty over Southeast Asia." Singapore has mixed feelings toward its British Commonwealth allies. Britain formally ended a 150 year role of providing defense for Singapore and Malaysia at the end of October 1971 when the Anglo- Malayan Defense Agreernent was permitted to lapse; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 FIGURE 8. Commonwealth heads of state meeting, 1971 (U/OU) by that time the great bulk of the British land, sea, and air forces had already departed. Economic and cultural ties remain very close, however, and Singapore is active in Commonwealth affairs. Singapore hosted a meeting of the British Common wealth leaders (Figure 8) during 1971 and wartrly entertained the British royal family in early 1972. Singapore frankly questions the effectiveness and duration of the Five Power Defense Arrangement, which replaced Britain's military commitment to Malaysia and Singapore. The arrangement, signed in April 1971 by Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, calls for five power consultation in the event of an armed attack or externally aided insurrection and the stationing of token Commonwealth military forces in West g Malaysia and Singapore. (In late 1972 these forces had a personnel strength of some 8,000, of which about 7,000 were based in Singapore.) Singapore's skepticism stems from a belief that neither Australia nor Malaysia oas shown a strong sense of commitment to the mutual- defense idea, and from a feeling that Malaysia possibly aided by Indonesia �would be the most likely source of a conventional military attack on Singapore. Prime Minister Lee therefore leans toward building a self- defense f ->rce capable of dissuading any potential aggressor. Singapore has stepped up its defense expenditures �it allocated more than 25% of its total FY1972/73 budget to defense� and is acquiring increasingly modern equipment. E. Threats to government stability I. Discontent and dissidence (C) Singapore, to an extent greater than in most countries, has either solved its major domestic problems or so minimized them that discontent and dissidence have less and less to feed on. Pro Communist elements are hampered by being divested of social issues that spur the growth of communism elsewhere. Having led the independence movement, the PAP government is obviously no "imperialist puppet," and its provision of more jobs, welfare services, and inexpensive housing for low- income groups has robbed pro Communists of the poverty issue. Above all, the apparent lack of official corruption and "squeeze," so widespread in Asia, has convinced most Singaporeans that government decisions are made to benefit citizens as a whole and not to line the pockets of any favored group, clique, or social class. The extreme left continues to have some appeal for Chinese chauvinists, however, as does Malay nationalism for a small number of Malay extremists. A slight majorit of the total population does have Chinese concepts of culture, law, interpersonal relations, morals, and dress and think of China as the "homeland" despite their Singapore citizenship, Thev benefit from the nation's general prosperity, but their inability to speak English has forced them into the lower social and economic groups and the lower echelons of both the party and the bureaucracy. The government's policy of emphasizing Sing' ingapore's multiracial character �an effort to erase fears that Singapore could become a bridgehead for Chinese Communist interests and hence a threat to its neighbors� intensified their sense of inferior treatment and their conviction that the government has "sold out" their Chinese heritage. Chinese- speaking students and labor -union members were ardent left wing activists over the years until the government defused both groups through a series of effective measures in the 1950's and 1960's. This element of the Population is still a potentially dissident one, but the government seems able to handle it effectively for the present. A substantial part of the Muslim Malays (15% of the total population) consider their forebears the original inhabitants of Singapore, resent the success of the Chinese "interlopers," and bemoan their own place on the bottom rung of the ladder. However, the government's evenhanded racial policy and the Malays' relative prosperity compared with that of their Malaysian or Indonesian brothers, have helped preclude serious outbreaks of communal violence. Nevertheless. the Malays in Singapore remain sensitive to communal tensions across the johore causeway in Malaysia. 2. Subversion (S) a. Communist movement From its beginning during the 1920'x, communism in Singapore was an integral part of the Communist movement that embraced the Malay Peninsula. 'Today, links between the two groups are tenuous. Although the Communist movement in Malava and Singapore prior to World War II was responsive to policies set by the Soviet Union, from the outset it was largely tinder the operational control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Through its Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, the Comintern took advantage of Kuomintang (KMT)- Communist cooperation in China between 1923 and 1927 to introduce experienced Chinese agents into Malaya and Singapore under cover of the organization of the KMT. The work of the Chinese Communists in night schools and with small labor unions and craft guilds ID APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 resulted in the formation of the Nanyang (South Seas) Federation of Labor in 1924 and the Communist Youth League in 1926. Bath organizations were centered in Singapore but had branches elsewhere in the peninsula. When the KMT purged itself of its Communist elements following the KMT -CCP split in 1927, the Comintern was unable to use KMT cover among the. Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Apparently on Comintern orders, the South Seas Communist Party, or Nanyang party, was organized in Singapore during the winter of 1927 -28 to fill the gap. This party was accorded jurisdiction over Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, and the Riau Islands of Sumatra. The almost totally Chinese composition of the party met with heavy Comintern criticism, however, and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was formed in 1930, principally to base the: party's appeal on nationalist rather than communal principles and to reduce domination by the CCP. The Communist organization in Singapore has from the beginning been under the jurisdiction of the CPM, but since 1954 the CPM's headquarters and principal leaders have been in the jungles of the Thai Malaysian border area and are preoccupied with maintaining their existence in the face of Malaysian and Thai operations. Thus, the CPM's influence over its Singapore comrades is probably highly tenuous. Denied a rural base from which to operate, CPM forces in Singapore were even less fortunate than their Malayan -based comrades. After the Communist triumph in mainland China in 1949, as many as 60% of the party members in Singapore are believed to have migrated to China. Others joined the guerrillas in Malaya. During the 12 -year (1948 -60) Emergency, the CPM apparently continued to conduct most of its Singapore operations through a so- called Singapore Town Committee, but the latter was broken up by the Singapore authorities in 1956. Investigations in early 1963 led to the arrest of several persons associated with the partially revived Town Committee, which subsequently has been incapable of significant subversive activity. The Moscow Peking idiological dispute has also contributed to Communist fragmentation. The number of hard -core Communists in Singapore is currently estimated at between 200 and 500 almost all of them ethnic Chinese. They have only a very rudimentary level of formal organization, and lack effective and dedicated leadership. A few Communist cells and "Communist- type" cells may be functioning, but they apparently have no firm plans for political action. Nonetheless, Communist 20 influence in Singapore still exists because of the infiltration of Communists into other organizations. b. Subversive activities Subversion today in Singapore is almost entirely Chinese Communist in inspiration. There is no evidence of attempted subversion (in the sense of clandestine operations aimed at overthrowing the government) by Eastern European diplomatic or trade representatives. In any event, subversive activities on the part of the Soviets would probably be ineffective in view of Singapore s predominantly Chinese population. Leftwing, Indonesia oriented elements were once influential within the Malay community, but they had become inconsequential even before the abortive Communist co ip in Indonesia in 1965 and the subsequent suppression of the Indonesian Communist movement. Small Malay extremist groups associated with or ideologically oriented toward similar groups in Malaysia have on occasion been involved in anti Chinese communal incidents, but they have at no time constituted a significant threat. Since the phasing out of the Cultural Revolution in China at the end of the 1.960'x, and particularly since 1971, Peking itself has increasingly downplayed the role of sub ersion in Southeast Asia� Singapore included �as an element of national policy and has instead placed greater emphasis on promoting state to -state relations. Because Singapore does not officially recognize Peking, Chinese nationals cannot get visas to work there even though four companies incorporated in the PRC have Singapore branches under lozal management, and even though nine Singapore department stores sell mostly mainland Chinese. products. The Bank of China comes the closest to an official PRC presence and is the only enterprise that tries to use its facilities to disseminate Communist propaganda. The Bank may also be a source of clandestine funds. From China itself, the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" (Suara Revolus7 Malaya) provides general ideological guidance and often broadcasts anti- Singapore or pro -CPM propaganda in Chinese, Malay, and Tamil, and both Radio Peking and the New China News Agency quote from publications of the BSS, the major leftist party. There is no evidence that China or any other foreign country or organization finances or otherwise controls the BSS or any other leftist group in Singapore. The failure to devote more attention to these groups stems in part from policy considerations �the PRC's deemphasis on subversion �as well as from the realization that the groups are ineffective and are penetrated by the Singapore authorities. There is APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 25X1 that Communist states might use trade with private Singapore concerns for subversiv or economic w arfare purposes, the government established a state trading company and gave it responsibilit for handling all commercial transactions with countries in which trade is a government monopoly or is under direct government control. More important than these specific c-- untersubver- sive measures to the government's success in coping with subversion and promoting stability are the sophisticated, broadly based system of social welfare and its complementary political action program. Just as expanded welfare services are basic to PAP philosophy, so are they equally basic to the party's efforts to broaden its political base and consolidate its power. Within this unified approach to nationbuild- ing, the main thrust of governmental efforts has been to foster nationalism, improve living standards, reduce unemployment, and encourage the populace to organize at the grassroots level, largely through voluntary associations. Consequently, by a combina- tion of both specific and general measures, the government has kept the forces of subversion off balance and has eroded their bases of popular support while steadily adding to its own countersubversive capabilities. G. Suggestions for further reading (U /OU) Arasaratnam, Sinnapah. Indians in Malaysia and Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Universih� Press. 1970. 214 pp. An account of the settlement and naturalization of Indians in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore from the cnid -19th century to the end of the 1960'x. Bellows, Thomas J. The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System. New Haven: Yale University. Monograph Series No. 14, SEA Studies, 1971. 194 pp. This detailed study focuses on the People's Action Party, but also includes good sections on the rise and eclipse of the political opposition and on Singapore's changing party system. "The Singapore Party System," Journal of Southeast Asian History, VIII, No, 1, March 1967. Boyce, Peter. Malaysia and Singapore in Interna- tional Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries. Sydney, Australia: Sydney university Press. 1968. 268 Pp. This book centers on Malaysia's quest for world acceptance, with an emphasis on the Indonesia Malaysia Konfrontusi, but includes Singapore because of its role in Malaysia for part of the period under review. Buchanan, lain. Singapore in Southeast Asia: An Economic and Political Appraisal. London: G. Bell and Sons. 1972. :336 pp. An interesting, but rather dyspeptic, view of Singapore's political, economic, and social situation in the early 1970'x. Chan Heng Chee. Singapore.: The Politics of Survival 1965 -1967. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971. 65 pp. A slightly revised MA thesis (Cornell University, 1967) on problems confronting Singapore after it split from Malaysia in 1965. Chong Peng Khaun, ed. Problems in Political Development: Singapore. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp. 1968. 114 pp. Contains a historical account of political parties in Singapore, speeches and other assessments by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, and articles by several American specialists on Southeast Asia. Josey, Alex. Democracy in Singapore: The 1970 By- Elections. Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1970. 104 pp. A thorough discussion of why PAP decided to prime its "deadwood" in the 1970 bv- elections and how it went about it. Lee Kuan Yen;. Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1968. 657 pp. An appr�vi but balanced, biography of Singapore's Prime Minister; contains some biographic detail, a chronological account of Lee's career from the start of self- government (1959) through 1968, and an assessment of his strong views on multiracialism. Lee Kuan Yew and the Commonwealth. Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1969. 112 pp. A full account of the 17th Meeting of the Commonwealth of Natio,is, held in London in January 1969, with excerpts from interviews and speeches involving Prim(- Minister Lee. "Singapore Socialism," Pacific Com- munity, No. -1, Autumn 1970. Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding, eds. Modern Singapore. Singapore University of Singapore. 1969. 285 pp. The University of Singapore's contribution to the 150th anniversary of the founding of Singapore in 1819. Each of the 15 chapters �which cover many Political and sociological aspects of Singapore's life is written by a past or present professor or lecturer at that university. Pang Chong Lian. Singapore's People's Action Party: Its History, Organization and Leadership. Singapore: Oxford L.400 Press. 1971. 87 pp. A thorough discussion 4 WAN, with good tables on membership breakdown, by age, education, and race, as well as on Singapore's v, is elections. Pelzer, Karl J. West Malaysia and Singapore: A Selected Bibliography. New Haven: Human Relations Area files Press. Behavior Sciences Bibliographies. 1971. 394 pp. 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Rogers, Marvin I.., "Malaysia and Singapore: 1971 Developments," Asian Survey, Vol. X1I, No. 2. February 1972. Ryan, N. J., The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore: A History from Earliest Times to 1966. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1969. 283 pp. A good historical account of Malaysia and Singapore, showing the influr;nees on these two areas of neighboring and foreign countries, geopolitical factors, wars, and world events. Singapore. Ministry of Culture. Singapore 1971. Singapore: Government Printing Office. 1971. 299 pp. An excellent, informative yearbook giving up -to -date information on every aspect of Singapore's life. Tae Yul Nam, "Singapore's One -Party System: Its Relationship to Democracy and Political Stability," Pacific. Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Winter 1969 -70. 26 The Communist Movement in West Malaysia and Singapore. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Short Paper No. 54. February 1972. 61 pp. Traces the development of the Communist movement in West Malaysia and Singapore, discusses various counter- measures employed by the two governments to contain it, and assesses the movement's chances of success in the future. Tregonning, K. G., "Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: A Politico- Geographical Contrast," Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1.966. Van der Kroef, Justus M. Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey. The Hague: Marfinus Nijhoff. 1967.268 pp. A general study of the Communist movement in the Malaysia- Singapore region as well as in surrounding areas through the mid 1960's. Chronology (W/ou) I 1819 British settlement is establis'.ei by Sir Stamford Raffles. 1867 April Straits Settlements Sirgapore. Penang, and Malacca) become Crown Colony. 1942 February Singapore succumbs to Japanese attack. 1945 September British wer Singapore. 1146 April Singapore becomes a separate British crown colony. 1959 May People's Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew, wins general election, capturing 43 of the 31 seats in Parliament and receiving 53.4% of the popular vote. June Singapore is granted internal self government; defense and foreign relations are retained by United Kingdom. 1963 September Malaysia is formally inaugurated; confrontation with Indonesia follows. People's Action Party wins general election, capturing 37 of the 51 seats in Singapore Parliament and receiving 47% of the popu- lar vote. 1964 July Communal riots erupt between Chinese and Malays. September Further communal disturbances flare up but are kept under con- trol by police and security forces. 1965 August Singapore is forced to withdraw from Malaysia and becomes an independent nation. 1967 July United Kingdom announces plan to withdraw its military forces from Southeast Asia by the mid 1970'x. August Singapore is one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 1966 January United Kingdom ad- vices to late 1971 the date for withdrawal of its militan forces fr...0 Southeim Asia. April People's Action Party wins all 58 seats in Parliament. 1971 April Five Power Defense Arrangement (Singapore, Malaysia, Aus- tralia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) signed. October Departure of last British forces (less Five Power contingent) ends 150 years of British provided defense. 1972 September People's Action Party wins all 65 seats in Parliament. 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 SECRET i Glossary Wou) ABBREVIATION FOREIGN ENGLISH Angkatan Islam Islamic Movement BSS.......... Barisan Sosialis Singapora.......... Singapore Socialist Front CCP.......... Chinese Communist Party CEC.......... Central Executive Committee (PAP) CPM Communist Party of Malaya ISC........... Internal Security Council ISD I Internal Security Department (police) JIC........... Joint Intelligence Committee KMT......... Kuomintang Nationalist People's party (Taiwan) PAP People's Action Party Parlai Rakyal Singapura............ Singapore People's Party Malaya People's Socialist Party PEMAS....... Persetuan Alelayu Singapura......... Singapore Malay Union PEKEMAS.... Perlubohan Kebangsaan Alelayu Sing- Singapore National Malay Organization apura PF People's Front PRC People's Republic of China SID. Security and Intelligence Division (!Min- istry of Defense) UNF United National Front WP........... Workers' Party t r 28 S ECRET SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET T ,'.n] i n SI1i F a ,Yy U a ^'N k T 'C` t` .t .i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090010 -5 Y 1: