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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090027-7 SECRET 42/GS/GP Thad April 1974 NATIOtl/ SECRET NO FOREIGN Vj APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090027-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 WARNING The NIS is National intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to rep.esentatives of any foreign govern ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Ceritral Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of Naticnal Security Council Intelligent' Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- r poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel c i' provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or. the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- w" tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential 3A; (S) Secret C �.e i.:.,i�'a:: lifi+3`e'!..'J'.::.wJ; CJAi.:� i� 4; [k'.Y:'wha:ms�J:nus:M -�..FV :rIA....'+am'Fa? ":duvr.G,"ti ii34A "`A.7.`I i'k�rr',i� ..:A:.:.'S. ir. 'Jiv.r vMl'4. C".N: .w.a_..:e .ii...a r..r..:.:.a.. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 s v r s VI l ;,err }stipS e+ p f K r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090027-7 ti ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090027-7 Page Page 3. Politics: Thanorn to Sanya 13 c. Communist fronts 28 4. Political parties 17 d. Communist Party of Malaya 29 S. Interest groups 19 20 3. Insurgeitcy a. The Northeast 29 29 6. Elections b. Tribal insurgency in the north 31 D. National policies 20 c. The mid-soutb and far south 32 F. Maintenance of internal security 33 1. Domestic 21 2. Foreign 22 1. Police 33 a. Administrative Affairs 33 E. Threats to government stability 24 b. Special Affairs 33 c. Suppression 34 1. Discontent and dissidence 24 2. Countersubversive and counter-insurgency 2, Subversion 26 measures and capabilities 34 a. Origins and development of the G. Selected bibliography 36 Communist movement 26 b. The Communist Party of Thailand 27 Chronology 38 FIGURES Page pagc Fig. I Prime Minister Sanya (photo) 2 Fig. 6 Former Deputy Prime Minister Fig, 2 Structure of government�(chart) 3 Praphat (photo) 14 Fig. 3 King Phumiphon and crown prince, Fig. 7 National Executive Council ph oto) Fig, 8 General Krit Siwara (photo) 15 le December 1972 (phelo) 4 Fig. 9 Colonel Narong Kittikachorn (photo) 16 Fig. 4 The royal family (photo) 4 Fig. 10 Thai official in Peking (photo) 22 Fig. 5 Former Prime Minister Thanom. Fig, 11 King Pbumiphon with hill tribesmen (photo) 13 (photo) 25 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090027-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 a Government and Politics A. Introduction (C) (n early 1974 'rhailand's ei.iilan caretaker guvcrnOlCut availed mew conslitution Which was to set np a parliamentary democracy form of government tried and terminated severll limes since the 1932 clop ended absolute monarchy. In the uleatltime the form of government in mid -1974 was Still loosely fixed by the interim C011Stiluli011 of December 1.972 which calls for execoUve primacy, '.,'Ilh art amininted parliament and it king ticsignatel head of slute. 'Nhe King is a strong and unifying national symbol who exerts considerable influence. The executive branch d(lntinalCS all ICYCIS of government, makes anti carries out policy, cmtrols the legislature, and wieids some power over the judiciary. .1 'lie Prime Minister heads the executive branch, aided by lite bureaucratic elite who tradilionally have included military and police officers as well asa cadre Of civil servants. As u unitary state witit a strong central 90vermlerit, the coutltry has no tradition of strong local government institutions. All key agencies are concentrated ill Bangkok, and governinen! direction !lows from the center out and front [lie top down through a network of officials in the provinces, districts, communes, and villages. Western political and legal ideas and forms have been selectively adopted sine; the late 19th century. in the 1932 coup d'etat, a small military-civilian group ended the monarchy's absolute power and transferred sovereignty to the people through a constitutional government. Thailand has since had nine constitutions and is awaiting a tenth, but the usually bloodless coup d'etat has been the chief instrument for political change. All autional elections have been held to sanction existing regimes rather than to choose leaders. Military control over civilians �long a fact except briefly after 11'orld It +ar 11 and now again singe late 1973 �was formalized vben the arrm seized complete power in 19.17, and Military cliques ruled from then until the ']'I u regime's upset in October 1973. The continued presence in the government of arm)- chief fait Siwara and other high officials of the ousted regime in early 197 -1 seers to point to continued military influence. While active participation in politics is Itsnited, most people. until recent months, generally concurred with whatever the government did. '#This attitude stenimed from the strong Buddhist faith and traditional culture �with its respect ftor.1trthority an(] strong sense. of national identity �from complacency derived from at least tolerable economic cmditiorts, and front political apathy rooted ire Thai political histury. Since govcrnulcnt before 1932 was the exclusive domain of tits King and court officials, there was little mason to agonize over its subsequent nt(tnopoly by public officials, curecreivil servants, and Politicians in Bangkok, Traditionally the government WaS expected to act without aloe peoples assistance, participation, or involvement, and Since state affairs concerned only public officials, the people accepted official decrees and disregarded events that did not involve them personally. Any law or obligation that was too abusive or demanding was ignored or evaded. Only in extrertle cases, as in October 1973, have the people rebelled against authority. At the same time those who govern have always beat expected to be just, to publicly reflect certain moral virtues, and to justify their rule by effectively performing their political duties, [loth the monarchy `4 1 It R; 3;' t;. xc+ w. rm� a': aaste _'W'.rr^r.^:vrea..:e;s.r.,:= era.. x.. e= ranswmra; aaa.. sa. a>., a.. Fw. s.. a.-: roF.�..s �.a...,+r Krong Chantawong Beall a major blow to secessionist aspirations. Afterwards, dissidence in file region hocalne increasingly Coal] III till ist�spotlsored. Discontent is also found alliong tin� estimated 33,000 to 40.(00 Vietnamese refetgccs- -there were originally 75,000�who have remained in the northeast since french Indochina hostilities ended in 195A. The govern,' +ant's refusal to let theme bosoms resident allied; or Thai citizens (except ihrouglt marriage with 'Thai nationals) and its stringent travel and registrltiou restrictions. coupled with the Thais deep anti- Vielnamese prejudices, have promptest wide support among these Vietnamese fo: 11anoi which maintain :e strong degree of control (over diem. Discontent and dissent also is found among the peoples of Thailand's mountainnits northern provinces, ticre the main disaffected groups ore various non -Thai hill frihes, Elie Mims heing the most aggressive and }ac prink largo fur C :amnnmist recruitment. Antigovernment feeling uniting tiie tribes sterns primarily born government attempts to restrict their trulitional opium production and trideand their destructive slash- and -bunt agricultural practices. Despite efforts to offset hostility through a dill Tribe Development and Welfare Program, many tribesmen are receptive to Communist appeals and some leave become active in Communist -led insurgency. The King leas taken a particular interest in lite hill tribes and visits them to �ictnonstratc the regimes t.Ymcent for their well-being and security (figure 11). Some 850,000 Muslim Mal:! s who comprise about 75% Of the people in the southern provinces bordering Malaysia� Sullen, Patlani, Pala, and Naralhiwat� have Cultural, religious. and economic tics with Malaysia and are only nominally loyal to Bangkok. They arc mostly sniall rubber planters, farnims, and fishermen. Ahhourli the Thai Government has made modest efforts to assimilate this nl; :nority, the Malay language and Muslim religion predominate. A few Muslim Malays have become involved in the Malaysian Conmiunist rot *.cement or in separatist activity. Tile rest elf the population� Snarly of them rubber growers and merchants �is largely Chinese, and many c woperate either willingly or under duress with the Malaysian Communists, whose ctlutic makeup is also ritastly Chinese. Although the Chinese comprise the largest ethnic group and have supplied many of the lop Communist leader, in Thailand, the great majority appear to In. loyal. Most are 'engaged in urban husiuess Und acre Thai citizeim Well -ciff ccon.nni ^all), they have a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 4 Y FIGURE I). King Phvmiphon with hill tribesmen (U /OU) %lake it tile c�ourtr%'s stability and prsperil). Moreover, there is little (if the cultural or social Friclioll bet cell like 'Thai and Chinese eVlnllnurlitivs that prevails ill ;n mother [if 11eighhoriog countries. Intermarrlagv is cons ion and over lite t�e:Ir% Ila, resulted io creating a large Sino- Thai group whow cultural trail~ are mostly '11616. The Inure wea)th Chiraeae and Siuo- Thais are pronlim�nt within tile political- economic� power Mite, The doutimilit cenlml Thai populatiou remains strongly loyal, hilt (here are potential sour vs of ius(:dtlily 111A COtrld I)MOIlae aclive ill the event of it major national crisk. Chief among lheso is the mounting economic gulf het %vecn residents of the greater Bangkok urban area and the pourer outlying rural districts, 'There is also a Lrge population of urban poor it Bangkok. Other irrituils �at least until the Thation) regime's demise --v, m endemic official corruption, both nalinraP and local, and the governnicrit's aidlioritarinu awl sontelintes arbitrary rt:ature. Students anti intcllcruuis� particularly in Bang- kok �have been Communist targets because of their liberal :Intl lcflisl orienl:Uion, but close govcrtrraenl scrutiny and the fact thin most nllivenity stllrlcuts .van( g0vcrluI1CII1 jobs have severely cuncwd leftist lendencies. Until the Thaooin gore rument's overllerow is October 1973 most students (licl a..)t respond readily to political agitation, ;and tile government effectively controlled 111INVrsitics through the surveillaiwe of potential provocateurs and the cullivation of strident leaders with scholarships and job g.: Irmk". However, doling 1973. a groundswell of dissatisfaction with the regime� triggered by several strident ineidenls hilt supported by labor groups. like hnre;ulerlcy. and eitizeus in general-- prompted violent student deruuustratiuns 66th ltd to the regime's overthrow. While the slndents have� quieted clown, they uoeloltbtedly could be provoked to deulwlstrate again given a similar set of circum- stances. They continue to look for guidance to the King, Who favored both their objec�tiyeS in October If)73 and their eoncenlrattioo on sludies in early 1974, 'I'hatimtd's labor movoutent is stilt argauiiatiunllh weak. II is, however, no longer polill"My impulcot. although the Saliva government early in 197.1 had yet to lift (lie restrictious whercb labor ussoriations banned completely froin 1953-4.68 and lrom 1971 until ,I arch 1972 �could not contribute to political Funds or get involved in politic~. Before Thanom's overt Iirow these restrictions had created souse frustration and ellemiraged clandestine Communist recruilmen( Within the urban labor form� but for a long lithe g0�arrlllletlit SCCtlrit' measures combined with labor inherent Weakness, largely nullified the impact of labor disconteat. During 1973, howvvcr, labor groups promoted several successful strikes amt supported the studenb in the final ollStcr of the 'I'llattot)i government. If Saraya does not :alter Th;mout's restrictive labor lavs. Ihesc graalps height well Feel inclined to act against his government [is well. i in late thickly populated central lowlands havo traditionally accepted v hatrvergovernnicnt is it poser, but many farmers llovi grievances� corruption arc( ill4feelivellM of local go�errnlrnt, =K wet! as poor schools and health facilities �that eoatld I)c exploited by dissident denienls. Farmers and villagers living nearest to Cnnnnunist irsurgeul areas, 2; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 particularly in llre north central provinces, have hmn pmselylcd since [be late 1960's and by early 197.1 a srmlll number had joined the insurgency. A serious deterioration in the economy Or in govertlnreot st-c116ty cotitrols in these areas could prompt further dissent and g;rcater Cu1nt1ll -111 t illroads. -Iaily juniorofficers in dw't at military �the main repository of power --are Aisconlented with their lot anI vith the military leadership. Rea-On. iilciucle [be slow rate of promotions, the basing; of promotions on political favoritism rather than professional merit, corruption among; senior officers, and the negative infhlence of politiCaI1%' preoccupied ,eaior officers oil Ilse development Of on effective military force. Some navy. air force, and police Officers are also mnllappy as a result of the army's lrlditionally predombmant position. With possiNe rite exceptions, however. these military criffievrs world not favor a radical dring;e hi government Organization or policies. 2. Sahversion (S) Communist elements ---in the forth of political parties, front groups, and insurgent forces �have horn the brill' sobversie force of any signiflcanee ill Thailand shim lire all *ohite inonalrchy wall OVCrthmcl1 in '1932. Although a munber of military droops have occklur l since them, the coup groups have all spruli from the power elite who accepted the legitimacy Of the monarchy, the precillinence of'litlddhist .'alli es, and the maintenance of [lie: sucioccollonlicstatils quo. Moreover. regional dissidence in Thailand- -will, the possible exception of separatist activity ill the northeast after !World War ft ---was not it sigrlifieant problem until it carne under Communist leadership in the mint- 1960 a. Origins and development of the Comnnarr'st mocenrent Comtnimism was introuticccl into 'Thailand ill talc nlid-i920's by exiled revs ittionarics front China, Java, and Indochina who organizecl' small study cells, prinnarily among the Chinese in Bangkok. The precise origins of subsequent, larger Coninlnnist organizations are obscure. Chinese cadres reportedly first farmed an organization in '1927, directly after the Kuomintang (KNIT)�Conimnnist split in China, which in 1.931 was formalized as the Thailand branch of the Chinese Cornnminist Party (CCP -'1'). Other reports also point to tht formation in 1977 of the Communist Yotith of Siam, which remained active until it least 1934, In July 1929 the Nat Yang (South Seas) Comitiunist Party, which had been established in Singapore in 26 1927 -28 as the lurk of Chinese Colnnrtlnist activity in Southeast Asia, doimtA that a Communist Party, a Cnnmmunist Youth Organization. a Gcncrll 1Vurkers Union. and a Yonut! Work-r-, General Labor Union existed in Thailand. another Comrimmist orgatliziltion reported in "Thailand around this time vas .1 Chiovso. Ann:mmile, and Siamese lied Cross Society. For the most part these early organinAtions were led by, and had the hulk of iheia following anmmg, Chinese and alien minority groupsa most of their ener*' was directed ai rlcigthboring colonialist rcg;inlcs. Cmmedialely after the 1932 coup, C:ominkloist activists began to exploit rile liberal polivies of the llev gOVernrmeiit, bill Were quickly comitered by enactincmt Of [lie Arili- Communist Law of 19 -va making; adherence to comirunism punishable by fine :Ind imprisonment, The haul v +as generally effective. althotig;h Thai Communist% defied it by sending delegates to the Seventh Congress Of (lie Comintern in Ntoscnv in 1937 and by holding the First Assembly Of Ilse All Siam Communist Dclegtatiou in Thalila"d in December 1942. At this assembly the Ptesenl Communist Party of 5 (CPT) was formally inaugurated. I)ttriug World War hl CPT groups actively i participated in the underground Free Tbai movement led by Pridi Phanomyo ig; and orgaltizit:i, with U.S. and Rrilish assistallm-to work against the Japanese Occupation forces. As with the Piet Milli) in Victilanl. C:omrnunisl cells in upeomlrtr� villages formed the nucleus for g ierrilla bands, bell coulllllinist influence was less gier'asiVV'thatl ill Vietnam. [n 1916 (lie governm ant, as a price for U.S.S.R. agreement on 'Thailand's admission In the United Nations, reerognized the S�viet Union iind abolished the 1933 Anti- Communist Law. A mnttber of Comilliulists reemerged, On the political sc'ellc ill late 19-tti, publishing propiganda in varieiwi newspaprcrs and periodicals and advancing; a 10 -point program calling for liberal reforms. Many others, however, remained underground, operating through fronts and infiltrating existing corganiratiuiis: The (TT. together with the cxclw- ively'diitlese, CCP -T, some ccontrollcii ranch of organized labor in Bangkok anti developed e illfinence in the press: After the'_ [94 h nliliiair' coup by Phibcin,111OW vcr, the Comtnunisis,wcir asg:liti largely driven underground. Coniir-lied'. eioverl Communist activity, including the holding, of the CPT''s Somml ,k- ,scml)ly its the ;spring' of 1952, culminated in the passage :later that year of :i nev Anti -C milinarl st Law which leas since mimuirled ill, effect, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 /_1 �:ZOIU 41];10 N =1 4 =F_F9 =W41111: 111.1i [WGI /_d:I1] llli QtItf Lty /:ltItItYtItItYItItY61 r The party's 19 -52 assembly heralded as m ajorchange With a strt +egi I a Maoist nsn orlon slutin g Ihat arnlyd strriggle was Hr Ilc the principal path lu suciullsm in I'b:hiLand and shat the peasantry Was to be the main source Of s(rcltgtll for the rt-valutionary army. Flowever, vigorous suppression following enactment of the 19-52 Anli- Cmullellnist LaW severely 'ilurt the organization and forced it further an the defensive. The CCP -'1' 11;EJ Virtually destroyed at (Ills tnae and disappeared as a separate entity 7" 1956, with most of its remaining nlcrnben joining the CPT. In the early 196()'s the (;i,'T, acting ou the (lee-,mon of (lie Third Provisioual Ilevolutionary :Issenihly held at 111011 Bari in 19111, began to step Rig its subversive activities in remote border regions-- p:arliculari lire iwrlheasl. Cninrnuaiist agents organized party cells, indoetrinaIed villatgm. and sent cadre to Maas, Cnrnnunrist China, and North Victnana for Enlining. The erealion Of two Peking -based Front organizations in late 1964 and early 1,465�ihc 'I'llailand ludependence 141ovemerrt 6 also] [lie 'Thailand Patriotic Front ('!'PF1� lse;*aatl, el ha shift in Cannrnunist IacliCs to active insurgency. in early 1965 guerrilla forces begun a series of Clashes with gtES patrols 7ls the norliteast which peaked in early 1967. The government then Ilcgan it cYronterinsurgcuey effort that improved security in Ilse area and urgency (he itsurgents' weaknesses notably their failure to huilt! a base of popular support in the villages. I)-hr foot] and inedicine Supplies coupled hvith nuoun:ivig defections and government security operations, rapidly erotlecl Conlnramlist strength, By the sprint; of 19(ii the high level Of irlSorgcnl incidellls dropped 4iarply and. by and large, continued at lower levels into 197 -1. M the same little, however, an easing in government pressure allowed the Co"Emunists to Shift to a more can(ious, painstaking and successful Strategy for bttiltlitig up it r irtl support base. :After being forced in 1967 to lower the level Rif vio)INK -e in the northeast, the insurgents then shiflcd their focus to the norill, -where Communists had Iscen PrOselYting atrnnng the Mcus and otter hill tribesmen since the early l9 io's, Tile security forces' lteavv- handed mpremion of the tribes in those years land stirred tip tradiliona! atolipunities and cliccturagcd the tribes En accept Cotnrthunist :assistance, training; and leadership. By mid-M.7 it full fledged insurgency had develnpecl. The tribal guerrillas made dramatic Military gains and government control River the area quickly deteriorated. In late 1968 Ilse goternment wags also Wnfrmtcd with an upsurge of Communist -led tribal insurgency in tide north- centrul "Iii- pnwincc" area stroddling Phitsannlok. Phetchabun, and l,:tei pnvinces. '((lore guerrillas managed to seriously harass sectlrily forces and disrupt rudimentary development programs. By 1972, however, it was Obvious that the C(Prinnuolst political base among fie Meos was Shallow, will) (lie Iribe inen inereaMiagi disturbed by lite CPT's inslstellve upon imposing its political stamp on their life, Other but less sig"ificant areas of COUttnunisl strength have lice" Ilse "raid south" �the interior parts of Surat Thatli, Nakhon Si Th:untnarat, and "prang provinces in the Kra peninsula �;and the "far south," the Provinces borderhig on Afala Unrest in the former area was originally based on depressed ccwlamdc condiliuns in Ilse rubber plantation areas and hus been kept alive by continuing governmcn, neglect and corruption. 0,}xrt trtsurgclscy in this urea bcgau ill 1967 but never attained the viratlence of the lnsorgency of tie northeast and north, in part b.eausc of its distance front logistic sotiroes. In the farsonth the Conlnnmist cletttems ore organizationally part of the Corntthamisl Parly of ,Viuluva, are pritnaril oriented toward Nlallaysia, and have oniy tenuous tics with the CPT, 'These elements first hegau moving into lire Thai horder provinces ill 19 ?1 to escape B ritish suppre ssion. Since 'they have generally followed a Policy of avoiding comaet with lice 'Thai Buddhist Population :and the 'i'llai security forces. Ilatlgkok has tint taken vigorous counterinsurgency mc;rsurcS against Item, b. The Carnninnist Purdy of Thailand Little is kuowit about the current OFgani7ational structure of the highly covert Communist Part' Of Thailand(CPT). Mlrch,Of tile available ;nn11601i nuldated or derives from mireliable CPT defectors. Before (lie outhreak Of the instirgellev the party's hcadcluarters were in Bangkok, but since then they have shifted 111countn' with the insurgent forces. Sonic CPT rncnlhers continue to operate out Of Bangkok, wherc they collect funds fur the imurgerrcy atad engage ill limited urban operations, UPcuunin Else leading members of the party's top cellelon, the Central Committee and Politburo, are apparelitly scattered among the main insurgent IhUSeti �Ill the Pi tta Pllan (hills? In tile northeast, file tri- Pmvince area in north- cential 'I'haimoid, and the utirthem border area straddling Nan province and adjacent Sayaboury province in Laos. CPT dead= (loaners prtbalily consist of no more than the Secretary General and a few niter senior CPT figures, with its locatols shifting from time to time as the insurgent situation necessitates. CPT headquarters are believed to he sOmewhere in the tri- Pmvitlec area. Presumably members of the Central Committee or 27 L APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 F- t IMMOIN 4 1 11 0 1:,:, =1 4 =F_" =W*1 [W /mod N 1 1:1 1 i Q ]�LI]/ /:ZrIIIIYIIIIIIIIhY61 Politburo manage to mee occasionally to coordinate policy and tactics. The party leadership remains slironded in mystery, +with no c of their ie.mlily or whereabuuts since 1968. The chief figures are almost certainly Si oo- 'I'hais, hot yomt; er leaders may well he druwtt from ethnic Thai elcrnenis lit 1967 Wirat Angkhathawwan, also known as Nai Sean, reportedly becanie Secretar Ceneral of the party and tike rucking insurgent leader in the northeast following the arrest and execution of his pr.decessor. [it its Ihecretical structure tite CPT follows orthodox lines, with supreruc authority nonrinally vested in a liepresentative Assembly which is known to satve met only three limes; in 19 -12, 1932� and 1961. '['his assembly Outlines general :tires and policies and selects lite Central Committee (CC). '['Ile latter ill Will Selects a Secretary General and Politburo from antong its uwwn inembership. In the late 1960's the CC was reported to number `30 mcnihcrs and Cite Politburo 11, including the Secretary Central. 'rite Politburo appoints the assembly and in actual praclicv controls party policy and administration, Tile Secretary Gencral is the principal figure [it Cite party hierarchy-, chairing both the CC and Politburo. In 1962 the Politburo decentralised control of party administration by creating four regional branches of [lie Central Committee (Northeast, North. Central and S(;ith), better known as Regional C_ om mittees, At cite, same tittle it created a Jungle District, with headquarters in Na Kae district of Nakhon Phanom province, as the field headquarters of the planned insurgency. CPT activities in the Bangkok area remained directly under CC jurisdiction, The N",rtheaast ,Regional Committee is believed to he At. in the Phu Phan (hills), probably in Na Kac. 'Ale r atlicrn Regional Committee is probably looted in northwestern Sayaboury province of latos, The Central headquarters, also referred to as Nest Central or Area 7, was reported in the late 19Ws as being either in Suplran Buri or Nakhon Pathom provinces west of Bangkok; since then little has been heard of this unit. The Srtuth Regional 6)mmittee is with the small insurgent force in the mid -south region of the Kra Peninsula. Below the regional level tite party organization as of the late I9Ws called for provincial committees, whose membership is appointed by the regional committees, as well as district and subdistrict committees farmed along the same pattern. Below thesc:,are unit committees, which can be formed w herever there are more than seven CPT members, and, at lite base of the structure, the three- to seven -marl party cell, Since '1972 the covert 28 cell slr.cltne in the northeast provinces has been supplanted by more overt "village conurti(tees," 5 Which ore intended as forerunners of a future local Communist administration. The CPT in the late 1960's had an estimated 1,000 members of -whom about W) were dedicated hardeore personnel. Xlernbership has probably increased since then, although information is lacking; it does not reflect the extent of aruted insurgent strength which involved 'front 6.800 to 7,0i11) men in ea r[y 197.1. I.inaneial and logistic support for the CPT and the imsorgents derives from both forrcign and [ocirl sources. Peking fnm1e15 spine .honey. arms, and othersupplics through Utos, provides idcauai;ical and guerrilla warfare training -[n China, and gives propaganda support through the China -based voice of the People of Thailand. Hanoi's training and logistics support increased during I 73, and limited assistance ww, provided by the Nthet I.= Itowever, the CPT forces :ire largely self- sustaining since :arms, food, and other suprlies arc readily obtainable locally and in the Laos border areas. C. Cvmrnrlrniaf fronta Front time to time the Cornrmuttists have sponsored a or exploited u large number of smaller parties or front gro ups Within Specific ethnic and functional groups and in various geogruphic regions of Thailand. Many of these parties and fronts have been shod lived, others have beery marked by ch anges in name and %inicture, and sonic have existei! more in name than in fact. In the period of increased Communist activity which began in late 1961, the Thailand Independence Movement (TIM) and the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF) were the preeminent front organi7 ations for the insurgency. In November 1961 the establishment of the TIM was announczj by the 1 of the People of Thailand. This ww -as followed in January 1963 by a similar announcement of the formation of the TPF, and both organisations were immediately given propaganda support by Peking. In Nove 196 the TIM was :alisorbeil by the TPF1 The TPF rwas to have been exploited chiefly for psychelogicul objectives, on both the Thai domestic and the international scene. Repetitive'propugan lu. and international activity, such-us, the'dispateli of delegates to conferences, have hi�en intended to provide it with u veneer of authenticity. tile official_ TPF manifesto included the following }bjcrtives;.to fight for 'nittional independence (fronl', the: United f Stifles and the"Thantim- Praphat clique'); tai fight i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 /_1�:ZOIU 41];10 N =1 4 =F_F9 =W*1 [WGI /_d:I 11 :1 1 i QtIlf Lay :llItItYtItItYIIItY61 the democratic rights of the people; Uo implement a foreign Policy based on peace and neutrality: to develop the national ectm omy. to reorganize the living conditions of the people; and to develop education and health services. The dozen or so other front org;utlriliom announced under the "ITF hanner� covering such fnnttionul groups as tcachcrs, yOtrths, fanners, and plantation workers �have appeared will; fete e.eeptions to he no more than paper Organizations. Conuounist propaganda indicates that the TPh 'e as intended as the political arrn of TL;lilanti'l insurgent nlovement, acti[ag as interna- tional spokesman for the movement much as the National Liberation Front does in South 1'ietuarri. Sing: the late INV.%. CPT pntpagauda 11.31 paid increasingly less lip service to the TPF and to the general concept of a united Goat, d. C aninh r ppti st Party of Malaya Driven from \lalaya in the mid- 1950's, the Communist Party of Malaya (UNT), whose membership is predominantly ethnic Chinese, has since rnaitilained a skilled. lightly disciplined and wV11- eitttipped guerrilla force in Thailand's south- ernrnosl provinces. Clainilltg that it oluts Only to return mid liberate Xlalaysia and Singapore, the CP \9 h as plot initiated all active insurgenet' against the 'Thai Covernmenl. Except for the training of Thai cadre by CPI elements in southern 'Thailand, there has beau little evidence of conlact between the CPM anti the "Thai insurgents, There have been reports, bowever, of mixed bmuls operating iii Songkhla province. The Cl'Nl has tried to capitalize fill the anti-Thai and pall- Nialay sepliinent prevailing aniong the Ntalay population who comprise the dontina, it Clinic group in these. provinces. 1111 1) orantilitary army of the C lIm� colilmonly called the C minionist 'Terrorist Organization (CTO) or. officially, the "ladayan National Liberation Army--hats an estitnalcd strcngt,t Of ahau( 2,1N1t), of whom a few hundred are Mala ys. It has also Organized the 4ladayart Conlmullist lbuth League to serve as a recntitlnt pool, training organiz :tlion, and reserve military forge. Members. for the must. hart "are Chinese youths and litunher at least 2;5110, The C: TO is militarily t�ulreuehed in trite south and' has fortified its position through Peltetnatic9s and bribery of the police and lot glri'CElilllent officials. Although the government has agreed to increase its emperttion with Mulaysiitn f6rcrs, it has neither the ve ourms�nor the desire It) mount any effective rnilitan' or econoitlie develttpntent pr,ogrttns which cotald np .wt 1111 Cl'N1's. ccnttrti over the border area, :1. Insurgency (S) Coninumist insurgency in Tll.lil:uid as of early 197.1 clues not appear au immediate thm:u to 1langkok, but statistical iodic :aura point to grulually increasing ICVelS Of Contrm111W- iaitiI[Ld attacks, afollushe assassinations. and propagaittla. 'rite growth it, the slumber of irisorgent iticidentl Countrywide is reflected in ihC following tabmilalion: 1965 45 1986 $65 1987 921 1968 1,039 1909 1,981 1970 2,550 1971 eat. 3,500 Became of regional differetims in topography, population, Communist leadership, and goveroinent adnttnistration, the growth of the insurgency has bean uneven varying atnsiderthly between the itorllt, northeast, and south. In Carly 197.1 there were an estimated 6,891) to 7,000 arrned insurgents, ahual 3,000 coon: than in 1969, not itichuliog the estimated 2,0W CPM insurgents in the far south. Their military c;tpa'htlitp' ba, Inounted as it result of better training, more eslxrrience, and, above all, better weapons. a, The northeast me northeast, where touch of 'm ailamrs leftist licrilagi.: is rooted. fins a long history of political dissidence. The Conlrnunist Pally of Thailand apigrenth� decided on armed Slrttggle in the northeast as i�arly as 1952 and org;ani�ritional work, although periodically disrupted by government repressive operations. proceeded during the 1950's. The Cornlntniists claim the first shot lrl [lie revolutionary armed struggle was fired in the northeast's Nakhon Phitimi t province in August 1965. Since 1964 tile Communist% have located most of their important base camps in the Phu Than. These hills stretch intermillently (turn Laos Satttlt grid east though Worn and western Saakon Nakbon and then cast into Nakhon Phanom� Although covered ill part by bctnw Vegetation, the hills are by no means impenetrable. The Communists have tried to exteittl their influence over the villages in for Phu Tharp arld into outyiog areas. They have been trust active in the Na Kae district of Nakhon Phannin province, which Ims load the greatest utmtbe.rnf violent iacideids in the country. The government admits that arrned insurgents have considerable influence over 100 of the district's 115 villages. 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 /_1 �:ZOIU 41];10 N =1 4 =F_" =W*111: 11 -lit [WGI /_d:I1] 11i QtIly Lty :llIlIlYtIIItYIIIlY61 Since 1972 the Communists have tried to tighten control over villages already miler sonic form of Cormunss, influence, primarily through setting up villag-V ]nilitury units and political coutmtltecs. The formation of village militia units represents a change in emphasis front 1964 -67 whti villagers usually were incorporated into the ranks of guerrilla units. The strttcgy nuts� is to recruit villagers and Use theill initially in Ihcir local areas, after the pattern used effectively in Indochina. Although evidence is still sketchy on the size of this effort, there are at least CON villagers organized into such units li the provinces of Kalasin, Sakon i\aklrou, enal l\`akluon hthanorn. The Clt'I' hopes to upgrade line capabilities of these militia units to the point where they taut fight alongside the 1,800 regular guerrilla forces. This is bring acc nip6lied by integrating the militia with full time soldiers lit limited operations such as short range patrols, as ;assinations, and propaganda discussions. Recently militia elements have begun to assutric greater military lasks such its attacking governatenl defense posts. Although lite militia's primary purpose is to scrveas an auxiliary force, the ClIT has not ignored their political potential. For example. militia units have been used to organize public demonstrations agAnst tine Royal Thai Covernmetrt in Khan %Vongsubdislrict of Kalasin provinc -e and in Na Kae district of \akhou Phanorn province, More intpOrtant,11OWMr, has been the party's use of the militia to form the backbone of its newest mait ifeslalioils of political conlrol �the village committee. These organs are replacing or supplementing "tile covert cell structun- that served as lice initial source of Communist i�,i l+ tncr }tt the villages. The establishment of th6w coma ;ities� which are now in evidence in the pn;�s�iik(,w of ,tiokhon Phanorn, Sakon Aiakhon, and Kalasi,. t.Yc village, district, and province levels �is meant to be tile forcruiiner of it future Incal Communist administra- tion. District committees have also been established in westent Worn province but to date there is nO evidence of village -level political control, Since committees by nature. are more sophisticated and less clandestine political instruments than cells, their formation marks a significant step forward by the CPT in its attempt to create u political following in the northeast. A conservative estimate, based in part on captured Communist d ocumetits, indicates that a nascent Communist political apparatus, ranging from covert cells to full -blown committees, us reached into some 200 villages affecting a populotiva base of some 100,000 people.' These figures, however, represent Icss than I o of the total population of lute northeast and 30 the apparattis ren..ins confined to the nturc remote areas of Nakhon PhawOtn, Salton Nakhon, and Kalasin provinces. The Only other area io the narthcast that loans seen a unlit of Conlinoltist progress is t cStent Udorn province., a -here a revitalized party leadership appears la lie pressing hard to establish village -lercl conitolittecs. Tlw C.onrtntini5ts have [teen singularly unsuccessful in budding either a viable militar} or political apparatus in Ilse neighboring provinces Of Ubon, Kor,t, Bodrant, and Prachin Iluri, despite years of effort. 3 lie failure of the insurgents to expand significatilly bevond their traditional base areas of tilt� northeast can be attributed to a fundamental weakness of lilt That Communist apixratm �a chronic shortage (if ideologically motivated and experienced political cadre. This shortage, coupled with the Communist Party's rigid ideological upproach to its ptopagantla campaigns, has been a major factor behind the Communists' inability to better exploit the needk and gri^_vunces of the local populace. Although the Communists have addressed theinsclves to sonic local is -ties. they still tend fo forte; their propaganda against U.S. "irnperialisini and the Sanya government, hoth Of which have little rcleV slue to Tllat farrucrx. Moreover, z' trmnttist political gains in the northeast may Irc on]}' superficial. Sustainer{ government pressure against the Communists political and support apparatus in northeastern Kalasili province, for instance, seriously eroded their infhtetice at the village level. This may he otil.y an isolated cast, but it dues raise questions about the viability of the Communists village level political base in the northeast. The vigorous, but short term, sappression zant- paigns that have characterized government counterin- surgency in the northeast have had only a temporrrp effect on the siluutiort. Persistent military patrolling has led to a mark-Ld decline in trtsury;cut- initiated incidents in certain areas such as Sakon `akhote, province, but tilt: Thais have not brought 01tmsdvc5 to uliply this lesson to tine insurgent core area in iNakhon Phanom. Insorggent organizutional work, aimed at the eventual resumption of a "liberation struggle,' goes on there, largely 'Onimpeded except during the governinent's ;sporadic suppressive operations: lit; these argus the villager often faces the simple choices :betnren amOrnmodatlow to Gain- mimist P`Olitiial ceintrol, abut.. his home, or. death. for years ,vhllagcts in the Na Kuc' d istrict of blakhein Phandm prtiviree^c :wh .have:; reftisreI o a cooperate with the insurgents have been ronitint Is shot. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090027 -7 I MMOI l 4 1 11 0 1:,:, =1 4 =F_m =W*1 [WGI F-MI 1 1:1 1 i Q ]�LI]/ /:ZtIIIIYIIIIIIthY61 w... r.... .w......- ,.s:.r,a .:rte .:f r-�, ir; r