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SECRET 50B/GS/cp N igeria February 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SU SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100002-3 NATIONAL INTE1 IGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Governmant and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, partict.larly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only min'Imal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updiatP-; key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some de *-ils on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many t�)pics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be avc, ilable as long as the major prrtion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Availaole NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. knits, or separate directly or through The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 58 -0001. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and grrephics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Officiul Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 General Sur%'ey Chapter, 'r. COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country Chrnnolog Area brief Summary map i s t F t THE SOCIETY Social structure Population Labor Health Living conditions Social problems Religion Education Artistic expression Public information GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Background and appraisal Structure and function Political dynamics National policies Threats to stability The police Intelligence and security THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its structure� agriculture, forestry, fisheries, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction Domestic trade Economic policy and developments International economic relations TRANSPORTATION AND IELECOMINIUNICA- TIONS Appraisal of systems* Strategic mobility Rail- roads Highways Inland wate7ways Pipelines Ports Merchant marine Civil air Airfields The telecom system MILITARY GEOGRAPIHY Topography and climate Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes Approaches,: land, sea, air ARTNIED FORCES The defense establishment Joint activities Ground forces Naval forces Air forces Paramilitary This General Svrvey supersedes the one dated Decem- ber 1969, copies of which should be destroyed. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 NIGERIA The Costly Struggle for National Unity A Nation of Contrasts w The Coknnio| Heritage The Richest of the pm.r w Lrcmi,, of the Crisis Y,un w New Directions Chronology 15 Area brie ,.'.,.^,....^..^..''.^^^'''`''`''`]6 Summary map follows 17 The Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by November 1972. Souoor NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-R0PD1-00707R0D0200100002-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 The Costly Struggle for National Unity (s) Nigeria is one of the most colorful and promising young countries in Africa; it has also been one of the most troubled. Although its political, social, and economic problems mirrored those of other emerging nations south of the Sahara, they were compounded by factors unique to the Nigerian scene and by the mistakes of well- intentioned men. (U /OU) Similar to Oregon in shape but nearly four times bigger, Nigeria is the largest coastal state in west Africa. It gained independence from the United Kingdom in October 1960 as a relatively loose federation of three unequal regions. Three years later it cut its remaining symbolic ties to the British crown, becoming a republic within the British Common- wealth. By far the most populous country in Africa, among the two or three most wealthy in terms of natural resources, and possessed� thanks to its varied climate �of an exceptionally broad agricultural base, Nigeria seemed to have all the prerequisites fcr viable and increasingly prosperous statehood except one. The critical missing ingredient was �and to some extent remans �the pervasive sense of national identity and pride needed to o- ercome tribal loyalties and to support the processes of modernization and reform. (U /OU) Unlike many African states, Nigeria underwent a gradual and relatively thorough preparation for independence. Following World War II, a series of constitutional reforms �based in part on the Australian federal system �gave Nigerian leaders fairly broad experience in internal self- government and fostered development of a competent corps of civil servants. In the absence of a British white settler population, the transition process was relatively smooth perhaps too smooth. There were no martyrs to a Nigerian struggle for independence. Had there been, perhaps dedication to the concert of "one Nigeria" might have been more widespread. (U /OU) As it was, the federal system originally adopted by the Nigerians simply perpetuated and reinforced the tribally oriented regionalism fostered by the British to facilitate indirect rule. Termination of colonial status thus brought virtually no change in the life or parochial outlook of the average Nigerian citizen. The situation was inherently unstable. And as the euphoria over independei. subsided, strong centrifugal tendencies began to reemerge. (U /OU APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 Nigeria is, of course, an artificial creation of the colonial era. Its borders group together highly diverse peoples, divided by language, culture, religion, and tribal animosities. Its original principal political subdivisions and parties reflected the influence of major ethnic groups, while the interests of lesser minorities were relatively neglected. Ethnic antagon- ism was exacerbated by the prospect of perpetual domination of the central government by a single group �the Hausa Fulani of the vast Northern Region �and by growing disparities in regional levels of economic development. Under these circumstances, Nigeria's initial experiment with multiparty democracy collapsed after only 5 years. (U /OU) The end of parliamentary rule was hastened by popular disgust with a system marred by bribery, corruption, nepotism, and the blatant rigging of everything from elections to census results. The coup that brought Major General Ironsi �an Ibo tribesman �to power in January 1966 marked the beginning of a quest for a new formula for unit`,ng and governing Nigeria's disparate peoples. However, Ironsi's solution �the establishment of a unitary {gate� showed little understanding for the strength and complexity of tribal rivalries. It was viewed in the north as a plot to impose southern domination over the entire country. And it cost Ironsi his life in it second coup led by northern officers in July 1966. (C) A member of a s;nall northern tribe �and, unlike most northerners, a Christian� Ironsi's successor as head of Nigeria's fledgling military government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, was a less controversial figure. But his efforts to find a wav to restore civilian rule once again within a decentralized framework �were severely complicated by the large -scale massacre of Ibo residing in the north which erupted in the fall of 1966. By May of the following year, it seemed possible that the whole federation might collapse. Gowon's dramatic move at that juncture in dividing Nigeria's existing regions (by then four) into 12 states thereby ending the monopoly of political power and patronage enjoyed by the nation's major tribes �was sound enough in conception. In fact, it was an action once advocated by the Ibo, among others. Yet in the atmosphere of mutual suspicion which prevailed in the spring of 1967, it simply precipitated the secession of the Ibo- dominated Eastern Region as the self- proclaimed Republic of Biafra. Civil war followed 2 months later. (C) 2 The war dragged on for 2 1 /2 years before Biafra capitulated to the superiority of federal weapons and manpower. Lagos' victory discredited the concept of secession, but it did not resolve the basic social and economic problems which at one time or another had fanned separatist sentiment among the leaders of all three major tribes �the Hausa Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo. Gowon was still faced with the delicate task of devising institutions which would ensure some measure of national unity and provide protection to the various mutually suspicious tribes. Moreover, the sudden end of the fighting in January 1970 had brought an array of new problems, including reconstruction, relief, and reconciliation. (C) Thus it would be unwise to attribute too much significance to the relative domestic calm which has prevailed in Nigeria since Biafra's surrender. In part, it is the result of general war- weariness. In part, it is imposed by the ban on all political and tribal organizations which has been in effect since 1966. And in part, it reflects the dampening effect of Gowon's announcement that there will be no return to civilian government before 1976 �and then only if the nine point prograin which he set forth in October 1970 has been implemented. (S) Nevertheless, the civil war and its outcome have provided the Nigerians with the opportunity to make a fresh start �and on somewhat sounder foundations than before. The hundreds I thousands of citizens who fought and suffered for the preservation of one Nigeria, and who saw the war prolonged as the result of foreign intervention, have emerged from their ordeal with a greater sense of national identity and patriotism. Conversely, ;bo bitterness toward Lagos has been mitigated by unexpectedly generous and sympathetic treatment. Furthermore, the exigencies of the conflict spurred the development of Nigeria's petroleum and manufacturing industries, thus providing Gowon with impressive and growing financial resources with which to tackle economic problems and grievances. Finally, the need to counter Biafran initiatives and to secure adequate supplico of military equipment and weaponry forced Lagos to break out of its relative isolation. Gradually, Nigeria developed a new image as an active and influential member of the nonaligned club. And this in turn, coupled with Gowon's efforts to play a leading role in African affairs, has contributed to the growth of Nigerian nationalism. (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 \igcri I cl(:utcc i uses iii nit -tIing it nt:u( I>r((1(len(, ar un co. rtaiif. \%o)u III:u( fur ;>(tIitic;(I rei() rn( mud I r re.haIIiu4 tlu cuuntrn' \culicii n(iIit;u\ I-,(:(hli,iuncnt arc ,till akuc '11 1(- o)rg:u(i /it tinnal ch:uikc, If(- ha i fit ro)duccd liar pct to I)c fldl\ lc in praclit lid a the hi,t(tr\ o)1 it uun(Iwi ((f other nali(ut, attc,t it i r\tr�tnt�1\ ditiicult to dc\ i A Nation of Contrasts (u /ou) Nigeria i, if gcugraphcr dream. 'I'll( cuuntr\ ph\,ic�a1. ,uciuingicaI, and cc()i nnnic� zunc, itrc I iii rl\ \%cII dchned. but their ninnhcr and \:(rict\ \c(mid c�hallcngc the anaI\ tical au(I t;nIi)IIic ,kill, I the n((),l i l l iuginati\r ,((c�i.(I a i(�nti,l. I r ti nu�, igcria di\ cr,i l c could p1 lu he the m irc�c ()f c�o)n,id( cco)no)n(ic n(ulu;tll, :(ti it,(Lut(c h(�tcccu iLc c(�niral and rcgiuu;(I autII ritic iu I I t-rn( IructiIr( het4rtkc if tu C:(ic. Thi i4,II %Nirtg di iun i Hier( r( n(nrc co)ncernc(I \citl( a (le,cril>ti( n (.1 tl(c fit l(tr \%IIich Iia\(� dialled th( \ike hit n ct ue III td \%Ific�h kill affcc�t the c�uuntr future t f it kith I r( l)hccc ti u1 p(litic ;tI \itaIil\. But far. at Ica,t. it, u(, hc(�n to ucatl\ c(tu(plicate the pr()blcn( t t c(un(In into) it in>;I( nati((n ,talc. Id (:co)kralilic ha I(la cd an ini )rtant i�rink it rcl pr(-,( n ink tir( hcicn)g(�n,tn, ;(n(I uicnlcd charactcr (tf \igcrian 'I'hc trnl(ical thro)((ghuul the cuuntn. but e ,Iilfcrcnce in tcnilx�rahir�. hun(idit\. II c I(l�t \e('II the no)rth :uid the ,(tut h. ticlr(rntc( l In)III tftc Iwachc itIld nuIIIJ (n :unl> o)f the c((a,t h\ if 100 -r(ilc ide I(clt u1 lr, )ic:(I rani Ikin-A, the IIplitud plain an(I gra �land a\:uui:( hccn(nc ,gracl fill I\ inure aricl to) the n((rtII \(tr!Iwrn kc((gral I facnn�cl the (lc\chyincnt (tf I) i (,lo)ral I>ursiiit c�ara\:ui trade. and larks but lu((,cl\ knit cn(pirc, (Icpendent nn ca\ah�\ to I,((lic�c their a,t clnnr,(in,. Wit11 ,()utimar(I tradc and cyall"i(ni APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 Starting in the mid -19th century, geograpFny hewn to lend it( veanomie dimensions to Nigeria's incipient regionalism. 7'h(- gradual introduction of cash crops and the� development of unevenly distributed natural resources sharpened the differences between north and south and. to a lesser extent. bchyeen east and west. The north concentrated on the production of peanuts and cotton, the west on cocoa and rubber, the east un palnn products. The hulk of Nigeria *s kno%%n inorganic mineral deposits lie in the north. while its t)d fields and timber reserves arc in the south. The P1 The \it_'erian, theimuke, are a, varied as their environment, although their tribal groups are divided more by imiguage. culture, and histon than by physical characteristics. Altogether, some 250 tr.bcs and an approximately equal number of separate languages or dialects I.lave been identified. In fact, there is still no single language %%Ilich is understood throughout Nigeria �not even the officiai one. English. inhibited by it tsetse fly- infested belt just north of the forests, the region had a natural orientation to the north. In fact, by the time the first 1?uropean ships appeared off the Niger Delta in the 13th century, trans Saharan trade links and the introd)iction of Islam had already made much of northern Nigeria heavil�. influenced by Arab culture. Heavy rainfall in the hot quid humid southern third of Nigeria permitted more intensive cultivation and, in consequence, the area has been able to support a higher density of population than in the north. The inhabitants of the south, however. were for a long time less mobile than the northern tribes. The tsetse fl\, dense vegetation, swamps, and a myriad of creeks and rivers made the area unsuitahl_ for horses. I)ifficulty of travel and the ready availability of adequate food supplies favored the development of smaller, urban based kingdoms as well as the proliferation of independent �and often mutually hostile �minor tribal groups with widely varying customs and languages. 4 Moreover, there is no substantial area in present day Nig:-ria in .which ethnic loyalties are unmixed. No matter hog% the country is ultimately divided up for administrative purposes, titer(- are certain to be potentially dissatisfied minority groups in yirtuall% every jurisdiction. But Nigeria's ethnic problem is less a function of the nnnnber of its tribes �some of which are very small indeed -than of the -ivalries and the social and economic differe��.ces \%hich generate friction ai,� g the larger and more important groups. Here, history has not been kind. For hundreds of years, tit(- impact of two major external influences, Islam; and Europe, indeed the divergence I- �tween northern and southern tribes. :1nd partly becatise of this, 20th century modernizatioi. has had a markedly eneyen� and therefore potentially disnptke� effect. There arc perhaps 10 tribes in Nigeria which number more than 500,000 members. But of it population which may now exceed 58 million, nearly two- thirds belong to one or another of the three major groups cited earlier. T1ie largest of these, the predominantly Muslim Ifausa- Fulani amalgam. is centered in the far north. The Yoruba, the most urbanized and religiously mixed (animist, Muslim, and Christian) of the major tribes, live in the southwest. The homeland of the third major group, the largely Christianized Ibo, is in the southeast. The three, each of which came to dominate one of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 .Sucannu Vegetation hopirul Vegetarian EEEPP t lk Nigeria's original postindependence regions, are very different. In fact, both the Yoruba and the Hausa Fulani show closer cultural similarities to major groups outside Nigeria than they do to tine Ibo or to each other. The colorful history of the Nigerian peoples is marked by centuries of tribal warfare and slave raiding and by the rise and fall of numerous po;yerfrtl kingdoms. By the 18th century, the general contours of the country's current regional and tribal rivalries were beginning to emerge. By that time, most Yoruba %%care united within the Kingdom of Oyo. The Ibo, while disinclined to form political units above the level of a grouping of villages, controlled the east through the enterprise and ingenuity of the priests and traders of their Aro cian. However, the Hausa �still distinct from the Fulani tribesmen who had begun to filter into the north about 400 years earlier �held sway only in the far northwest. In the early 19th century, the religiously zealous city dwelling branch of the Fulani tribe rose in holy 5 1 4 t i war (jihad) against its less devoutly Muslim Hausa overlords. Victorious, the Fulani established a feudal theocratic empire of emirates owing allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto. Intermarriage produced a Hausa Fulani aristocracy, and extension of the holy war soon brought most of the pagan tribes of the so- called Middle Belt under its control. In 1808, the Hausa Fulani defeated and temporarily occupied the great Bornu Kingdom of the Muslim Kanuri tribe. For the first time in Nigeria's history, almost the entire north was dominated by a single group. The approaches to the southeast blocked by the determined resistance of the Tiv tribe, the Hausa Fulani then pressed their attack to the southwest, cutting deep into Yoruba territory. Their progress was eventually arrested by the advent of the British, but the Hausa Fulani continued to raid at harass their southern neighbors until well into the 20th century. It is little wonder that some southerners feared that the departure of the British in 1960 had opened the way for the resumption of the jihad. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 The Colonial Heritage (u/ou) Trading expedition on the Niger in the earl' /8(N)'.c Nigeria's experience with British colonial rule was brief �and almost accidental. Attracted by the lucrative slave trade inaugurated by the Portuguese around 100, British vessels were visiting the coast of Nigeria in some number by the 17th century. But it was the Dutch, not the English, who soon thereafter wrested preeminence in the area from the Por- tuguese �only to be challenged in turn by a half dozen or so other European powers. By the 18th century, Britain and France had emerged as the principal competitors in west Africa, with the British dominant in the Guinea coast area. Throughout the long period of unrestricted slave trade, however, no European nation attempted to bring any part of Nigeria under its control. The climate and terrain were too inhospitable. For nearly 400 years, then, Europe's impact on the Nigerian scene was largely indirect. Fear of disease and attack led even the most venturesome traders to anchor in harbors and river mouths along the coast and to conduct the bulk of their business through African middlemen. Efforts to explore the hinterland were not pressed until the mid- 1800's, when discovery of the prophylactic qualities of quinine vastly improved the chances of survival. Thus, beyond the confines of such major trade centers as Lagos and Old Calabar �where the inhal;'tants were long exposed to a wide assortment of European merchants and mission- aries- -the white man's influence was felt primarily in the disruptive effects of the slave trade. Not that 6 this type of c_ ninerce was a European innovation in West Africa, but he increased demand for slaves made this trade so profitable that it diverted whole tribes from their normal pursuits and trigg red the interne- cine warfare which was largely responsible for the de- cline and breakup of the great forest region kingdoms. While very active in the slave trade, the British did not play a particularly distinctive or critical role in Nigerian history until the early 19th century. At that time, sentiment was running high in England against both slaver and imperialism. Ironically, it was London's new determination to bring an end to traffic in human cargoes which set the English on the road toward adding Nigeria to their empire. British warships bent on halting the slave trade began patrolling off the Nigerian coast, occasionally bringing force to near on local chieftains. 'The reassuring presence of the Royal Navy brought English traders (now seeking palm oil and other "legitimate" commodities) and missionaries to the area in greater numbers. Pressure for providing additional protection for British lives and business interests began to grow. English involvement in the affairs of the coastal tribes assumed a more formal and continuous character In 1819 with the appointment of a British Consul for the Bights of Biafra and Benin with headquarters on the island of Fernando P6o.* Twelve 'For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the neap itself. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 years later, this official acting on London': instructions and backed by the Royal Navy occupied Lagos and annexed it as a British colony. By then, the mood in England was changing. Anti imperial Sentiment was beginning to abate, and concern over French and German colonial ambitions was mounting. The race to carve up Africa was soon in full swing. And in 1885, Nigeria's fate was sealed when Britain's claim to an exclusive sphere of influence in the area around the Niger Rive- aid some smaller rivers to the east �then referrer; the Oil rivers was recognized by the Berlin Congress. London quickiy established a coastal protectorate extending from the Niger Delta to Old Calabar, subsequently expanding it to include all of southern Nigeria except the colony of Lagos. By early 1900, havin settled the last of a series of local I -order disputes with France and having formed it separate Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from lands theretofore administered under charter by the Royal Niger Company, the British Government had assumed direct responsibility for nearly all the territory enclosed within the borders of present -day Nigeria. Nigeria was then not one but three separate entities: the colony of Lagos plus the southern and northern protectorates. Moreover, 50 years of increasingly active British involvement in the area had widened regional divergencies. By 1900, effective British control extended beyond the borders of Lagos to the far reaches of the old southwestern kingdoms of Oyo and Benin. Recalcitrant chiefs had been deposed. African middlemen had been squeezed out, and the Yoruba had been Christianized in considerable numbers. In the virtually unexplored wilds of the southeast, however, the Ibo still retained their autonomy and their traditional customs. And the north, except for the Middle i3elt emirates of Ile,in and Nupe which had fallen before the Royal Niger Company's private army, was a British possession in name only. The treaties which the Royal Niger Company had negotiated with a fey Hausa Fulani emirs in an effort to block French expansion had resulted in no practical dimunition of those local leaders' sovereignty. Nor had they brought an end to the slave trade in the area. London's initial approach to the problem of consolidating its control over its new and disparate Nigerian possessions was to give its principal representatives in the field free rein to seek the: o%yn solutions. In the north, British High Commissioner Frederick Lugard established an effective system of indirect rule based on the existing Muslim emirates. Pa�tly because of this and partly because declining revenues from trans Saharan trade limited the funds available for modernization of local services and facilities, the extension and consolidation of British control brought little social change to the area. For example. the power and activities of the emirs were left largely undisturbed, and since Lugard discouraged Christian penetration of Muslim areas in the belief that it would disrupt the indigenous culture, the norti, did not profit from the educational and medical services (offered by missionaries. In contrast, Lugard's counterpart ip the south, Ralph Moor, was moved both by personal inclination and by the fragmented nature of many of the societies in his region to establish a more direct form of rule. Moreover, Moor did not share Lugard's concern about the potentially destabilizing effects of Christianity. Missionaries penetrated deep into Yoruba and Ibo territory, winning -onverts and establishing schools as they went. At the same time, funds derived from customs duties and the growing palm oil trade permit- ted the construction of roads and railways, laying of telegraph lines, and dredging of harbors. Growing commercial activity advanced the process of urbani- zation, and comparative economic well -being began to further differentiate the south from the north. Lagos was joined to the southern protectorate in 1906, and the merger of Britian's remaining two Nigerian jurisdictions was effected �under Lugard's guiding hand �in 1914. But while unification opened the way for faster economic development in the north, the policies pursued by Lugard and his like minded successors tended to reinforce Nigeria's regional dif- ferences and rivalries. With a view to minimizing the disruptive effects of economic progress and "modern" southern values on the feudal northern emirates, the boundaries of the former northern and southern protectorates were pre- served and the two administrations were kept sepa- rate. The ban on missionary activity in Muslim areas of the north was continued, and tribal jealousies grew as disparities in levels of education widened and as better trained southerners particularly members of the Ibo group �began to fill key civil service and commercial positions throughout the country. Furthermore, efforts- to extend indirect rule to the south were only partially successful. 'Vest of the Niger, the British managed to resurrect a rather pale version of the long defunct Oyo Kingdom of the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 Yoruba. But east of the river, attempts to manufacture hierarchies of "warrant chiefs" out of village elders of the decentralized Ibo and Ibibio tribes met with considerable resistance. And in 1939, the British gave formal recognition to the differing nature of Ibo and Yoruba- :ontrolled lands by dividing southern Nigeria into separate eastern and %%estern FoIbwing World War 11, Nigeria*s three existing administrative regions became the hasis for planning for independence as a federal state. As Nigeria moved closer to self government, tribally based parties emerged to contest regional and national elections. Inevitably, the political Beene in each region was The Richest of the Poor (c) MEMO- While British police frequently tended to aggravate centrifugal forces Operating within Nigerian society. Lagos cOlomial legacy also included an impressive S nxnupolized by the- part\ dominated bN tile major tiibe in the area. Morcoye r, the pace of political development in the three constituent states of the emerging federation continued to be uneven. The Eastern and Western Regions became self governing shortly after Nigeria gained almost complete autonomy in August 1957. The Northern Region, however, did not request similar status r %r another years. 'thus, while all three regions adhered to parliamentary forms and enjoyed equally seniautono- mous relations with the central government in Lagos when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, there were still numerous differences of detail among their systems of administration. economic infrastructure, well developed administra- tive institutions, the most sophisticated financial middlemen south of the Sahara, and widespread entrepreneurial shills. Even before independence. these assets had combined with Nigeria's abundant natural and human resoi.rccs to yield the highest GD1) in black Africa. And up until the outbreak Of the c�iyil war, the country's economy continued to grow at all average rate of Oyer 5'r' a year. Agriculture is still the backbone of the Nigerian economy. While no longer the principal source of export earnings, agricultural pursuits account for nearly half of the country's (;DI' and furnish emplo\ meat for nearly W(' Of the labor force. Crop remain low because of the continued use of primitive methods, but even with less than half its arable land under cultivation, Nigeria is nearly self- sufficient in food and agricultural racy materials. Moreover, Nigeria is anong the worlds leading exporters of peanuts, pale products, cocoa beans, and rubber. Cotton and sesame seeds also rank anumg its principal agricultural exports. Some 1?0.000 square miles Of forest support foreign sales Of some two dozen varieties of hardwood logs, plywood. and sawn timber. And while meat products are not exported in appreciable quantities, the million or so cattle slamghtered annually in the north sustain a valuable trade in leather and racy hides. But agricultural production has been increasing relatively slowly, and for the past fey �gars, mining and manufacturing have been the principal engines of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 F 1 t i economic growth in Nigeria. Here, too, the country has bener`ited both from the experience and physical facilities inherited from the cc period and from the wealth of its natural resources. Nigeria is the only west African country that has all forms of primary energy in excess of internal consumption requirements. Its chief mineral resource include petroleum, natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, and limestone. Tin ingots and, to a lesser extent, columbite have long been substantial earners of foreign exchange. Small scale enterprises predominate, but the ready availability of raw materials has encouraged both the construction of a number of large cement, glass, and textile factories. Despite the relatively high phosphorous and sulfur content of Nigeria's iron ore, active consideration is being given to the possibility ci establishing a steel industry. Far and away the most important development, however, has been- the rapid growth of the young oil industry. It is now unquestionably the most significant single dynamic force in the Nigerian economy. The scope and pace of the oil boom have, in fact, come as somewhat of a surprise to everyone. Nigeria's oil has the advantages of being light, relatively sulftn free, and convenient to major European markets. But it was not discovered in comraercial quantities until 1956, and actual production did not begin until 193 Moreover, the proven reserves established during the course of sub,equent surveys were small by world standards. Thus, while 11 foreign firms were involved in developing Nigeria's original fields in the coastal areas adjacent h: Shell -BP's 1956 Niger Delta find, it seemed unlikely that oil receipts would soon do much more than offset the losses Lagos had suffered as the result of a sharp decline in cocoa prices. In June 1967, the last full month before the outhreak of the civil war seriously disrupted the activities of all but one of the foreign oil concerns operating in Nigeria, production had reached 467,000 barrels a clay. I-lad that level been sustained throughout the remainder of the year, Lagos' net annual foreign exchange earnings from petroleum would probably have been in the neighborhood of $130 million. Fortunately for Nigeria, the civil war did not result in a total moratorium on new foreign investment. On the contrary, it spurred development of new onshore and offshore oilfields outside the general area of hostilities. In consequence, prewar levels of petroletlin were regained by the spring of 1969. "Then, in 1970, when the older fields ,vere brought back into full production and the refinery at Port Harcourt was reopened, Nigeria): oil boom began to gain momentum. By mid -1972, Nigeria ranked eighth among the world's oil producing nations with a daily output of 1.8 million harrels. As the result of reneg, tinted price and payment schedules, earnings had increased even more dramatically than production figures. By the end of 1971, net foreign exchange receipts had risen to over $1 billion, i.e., more Than double the receipts from 0 export of all other forms of goods .tnd services. Oil's contribution to government revenues had jumped frorn $38 million, or 9% of total revenues, in 1966 to $983 million, or well over half of total revenues in 1971. And it is now expected that by 1973 production will reach at least 2.4 million barrels a day and that oil's contribution to government revenues will have increased by approximately 40, But Nigeria is not another Libya. Even by the most conservative estimates, it has a population of over 50 million, and oil revenues, while very important, will not provide a financial panacea. Per capita GDP is currently estimated at about $100. Even if, as seerns likely, Nigeria's economy expands to three or four times its prewar dimensions by 1985, the country will not he rich by any standards other than those of the underdeveloped world. Moreover, the oil industry is still a largely exogenous factor in the Nigerian economy, with top management, policy direction, technical know -how, and sales revenues being for the most part derived from outside the country. The Nigerian Government can, of course, affect oil revenues by demanding price or taxation revisions or more participation in the running of the industry. But growth prospects for Nigeria as a whole including employment prospects �will depend more heavily on achievements outside the oil sector and on the efficiency with which government revenues are disbursed to meet federal and stale requirements than on the sheer size of the country's net income from petroleum. While Nigeria's GDP grew at above plan rates in both 1970 and 1971, Lagos has encountered some difficulty in implementing its 1970 -74 development program. It has been faced with it number of economic and related social problems �some old, others stemming from the civil war �which have strained the treasury, impeded foreign trade, upset investment schedules, and threatened to rekindle regional discontent and animosities. The older M APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 25X1 Secondly, the Yoruba took adva.tage of the involuntary departure of Iho officials to occupy an increasing number of lower and middle level civil service jobs in Lagos and in the north. All this has raised fears of Yoruba domination and of a return to big -tribe politics. As a result �and also because of factional strife among 'lie Yoruba themselves �there has been agitation for dividing Western State into two or more separate jurisdictions. Moreover, there has been a growing and somewhat startling tendency in the north to hire non Africans or even Iho, rather than readily available Yoruba, to fill vacancies for which there are no qualified northern candidates. The impact of the war on Nigeria's world outlook was also quite marked. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Nigeria played a modest role s:; African affairs, even less on the world scene. While officially it member of the nonaligned club -it abrogated its defense pact with the United Kingdom in 1962 and soon thereafter opened diplomatic and commercial relations with a number of Communist countries� New Directions (s) 12 Nigeria maintained a moderate and generally pro Western posture. But the unwillingrness of Western powers to furnish aircraft and .other major military items to the Gowon regime in its time of need left this field open to Moscoxy. While Soviet aid was limited to sales of equipment and provision of technical assistance, all paid for in hard currency, the Soviets were able to trade on Nigeran gratitude to enlarge their pesence and influence to Lagos. At the same time, the airing of their dirty linen and effective Biafran propaganda at the United Nations and in the world press heightened the Nigerians' sensitivity to slights by foreigners. Lagos' wartime experier:e al,.o thrust it more directly into the mainsLwam of African affairs. In consequence, Nigerian pronouncements bega. io take on a more sharpl,r nationalistic and xenophobic tone �less pro- Western and more pro- African. And while Gowon has been careful to avoid overly his Western creditors. he has preserved Nigeria's wartim� -lift toward militant e_crnalignment as a basic element in Lagos' current foreign policy posture. In the space of 6 short years, Gowon has developed into a confident and charismatic leader. fie has bvdi a constituency among th.� many small tribes in Nigeria particularly those in the north and the cast �and he also has strong support from one faction of the Yoruba tribe. Despite his many titles �he is chief of state, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, and President of the Federal Executive Council �he continues to live a comparatively_ simple life and to avoid identification with the blatant corruption characteristic of much, :;f the military and political hierarch\ He seems to view himself as it mediator who operates by consensus. But while he is known to have been successfully pressure(; to change his position on i t few specific issues, Gowon generally determines what the consensus will he on subjects about which he feels strongly. He respects the views of tie predominantly civilian Federal Executive Council, and he presents all decrees to the more powerful Supreme Military Council for its approval. The key decisions, however, are either made by Gowon himself �with the help of a group of unofficial advisers who occasionally meet APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 I with him in closed session at Lagos' Dodan Barracks or are left, with Gowon's concurrence, to senior civil servants. Gowon's blueprint for Nigeria's future rests on his dedication to what he views as the inseparable concepts of a multistate federation and a strong central government in which minor tribesmen play a key role. And while his repeatc a disavowals of any personal political aspirations may be genuine, he has made it abundantly clear that there will he no hasty return to civilian rule. Even his announced target data of 1976 remains in doubt, becai it rests on prior fulfillment of nearly all of the objectives contained in the nine -point program he set forth in October 1970. This program, which extended-the existing bans on strikes and political parties, covers 1) reorganization of the armed forces, 2) implementation of the Seco�id Natioual Development Plan (1970 -74), 3) eradication of corruption in political life, 4) settlement of the question of the creation of more states, i) preparation and adoption of a new constitution, 6) introduction of a permanent revenue allocation formula between the federal and state governments, 7) conduct of a national population census, 8) organization of genuinely national political parties, and 9) organization of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states and at the center. Gowon's program has generated some dismay among Nigeria's sidelined civilian politicians, wbo, naturally ene,:igh, would prefer to see the military step aside without much further delay. His critics� citing, inler ultra, the govvniment's failure to inure more resolutely against corruption and the deliberate deferral of the sensitive additional states issue until 1974� maintain that Gowon is avoiding difficult or potentially unpopular decisions and is seeking to divert attention from pressing problems through grandstand plays in the foreign police area. And it is true that progress toward achievement of the military government's stated objectives has been almost imperceptible in some fields. Moreover, the pace of change has suffered to some extent from Gowon's frequent trips abroad. Although the Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters, Major General Ekpo, reportedly is empowered to act for him during his absences., in practice all important decisions must await Gowon's return. On balance, however, Gowon's deliberate approach to his country's domestic problems seems well suited to Nigerian circumstances. While he has not spelled it out in every case, Gowon has worked his objectives int.) a relatively firm order of priorities. For the present, his primary objectives are to maintain internal stability while strengthening the economic anc: psychological foundations of national unity. Hence i ::iplementation of the 4 -year development ,Ian, consolidation of the new state bureaucracies, and cultivation of patriotic fervor take precedence over the removal of corrupt �but influential and hard to replace� officials. Each of Gowon's nunvs has been carefully tailored to promote the idea of one Nigeria. An interim formula for a more equitable distribution of federal revenues was adopted in April 1970. Coordination of the economic plans produced by the individual states was effected at the federal level later that vev r. For its part, the federal development pla-i stresses >xpendi- ttires on infrastructure, new industry, and agricultural l.rojects which are either of c, ;vious cornmon benefit e;r which promise to narre.nv the gap between the richer and poorer states. And all this has been combined with a strong dose of economic nationalism. By joinin tile Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and through a series of unilateral e; actments and tough negotiating sessions, the Nigerians have underscored their intent to secure a much greater degree of participation in foreign business than exists A present. The same spirit is reflected in Lagos' decision to further distance itself from its colonial past by decimalizing its currency and system of measurement. Like his domestic policies, Gowon's approach to foreign affairs has been conditioned by his desire to develop Nigerian unity and economic independence. Although his extensive travels �he has visited some 20 African countries in the past 3 years �have occasioned a good bit of grumbling within the political and military elite, his overall performance has yielded some gratifying results. Western investment and loans continue at high levels. The Soviets, while under something of a cloud since they were caught funding the activities o; a number of leftist labor leaders last year, have extended a $6.7 million credit for, and are currently busily engaged in conducting, an exl ,ive geological survey in the north. Further financial assistance has been tendered by China. Prospects for obtaining petroleum technology from India, the U.S.S.R., Romania, France, and Japan have been opened up. Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbors have improved to the point where it seems possible that Lagos may eventually surmount existing 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 currency zone barriers and join with French- speaking states in some form of regional economic grouping. Within the OAU, Gowan has won acclaim for the vigor of his anticolonial rhetoric and for his efforts to mediate disputes both within and beyond the borders of Africa. And the publicity accorded his words and a- -tions has had its desired effect at home. The Nigerian public is evidencing a growing pride in their country's new and brighter image. Nevertheless, Gokvfm' firm plans probably extend no farther than his second priorih objectives, e.g., the holding of an impartial census (now scheduled for 16)73). For even if he negotiates those hurdles, how and when he tackles his final reform goals seem likely to depend upon the degree of success he has by then achieved in meeting his economic targets, in developing popular confidence in the central government, in dampening pressure for an unwieldly proliferation of states, and in building a broad consensus on the proper direction of constitutional changes. Gowon's position is not threatened at the moment, but the relative stability of Nigeria's postwar domestic scene is still fragile. Given the delicacy of the problems he will be facing by 1974� particularly with respect to 14 developing truly national political parties in an environment characterized by a lack of strong ideological currents and the persistence of strong tribal allegiances �Gowan is undoubtedly concerned by Yoruba factional infighting, the growth of anti Yoruba sentiment in the north, the emergence of shadow organizations based on the old political parties, and the existence of discontented factions in the army. Thus, while he has established the general parameters of Nigeria's future political evolution, it seems doubtful that he will soon abandon his current cautious and flexible approach to reform. In fact, no matter ho%% happy the solutions which Gowan ultimately may find to the problems entailed in reshaping Nigeria's political system, it is quite possible that he will need more time to effect an orderly return to civilian rule than his c:)untrvmen have been told to expect. And even %%-her) the handover does take place, the army will probably not bow out completely. Whether or not Nigeria's projected new constitution makes temporary provision for some members of the c rmed forces to he ex officio members of the government, it seems likely that the army will long play the role of an alternative government which could appear from the wings in the event that the political process once again threatens to break c:oxvn. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 7 Z'1'1'fi'1'f l'J'1 Chronology (U /OU) 1553 First English ships reach Bight of Benin. 17th century Nigeria becomes a center of west African slave trade. 1849 First British consul appointed for Bights of Biafra and Benin. 1861 Lagos is annexed as British colony. 1886 Royal Niger Company is granted royal charter. 1912 Frederick Lugard named goveroor of Nigeria. 1914 Lagos colony and interior protectorates amalgamated as Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Firs; Legislative Ctmncil established. 1923 First elected members join Legislative Council. 1947 Ho� ses of Assembly created for each province. 1954 Federation of Nigeria created. 1958 Oil production begins. 1959 December First direct elections for House of Representatives are contested by the Northern People's Congress INPC), the National Conven- tion of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG). 196(p October Nigeria becomes independent under NPC -NCNC coalition government. 1962 First National Development Plan adopted. 1963 August Mid Western Region formed out of eastern part of Western Region. 1964 February Government announces controversial results of 1963 census. December Parliamentary elections held; boycotted in Eastern Region. 1965 March Government formed including representatives of all regions and all major parties except Z. October Western Region parliamentary elections held, followed by violence over election irregularities. 1966 January Army coup led by Ibo; parliament is dissolved and Federal Military Government is established; political parties are abol- ished. July In military coup against II)o leadership, minority tribesmen gain power. 1967 January Federal military leaders meet in Ghana in an effort to agree on powers of federal and regional military leaders. May Federal government decrees 12 states will replace former four regions; state of emergency declared. Eastern Region secedes as Republic of Biafm. July Federal forces invade Biafra and civil war begins. 1968 July France announces support for Ibo "right to self determination." 1970 January Civil war ends with Biafran surrender. October General Gowon reveals "nine -point program" and sets 1976 as target date for return to civilian rule. November Second National Development Plan announced. 1971 July Nigeria joins Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. October General Gowon appoints reconstituted Federal Exec Coun- cil. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 AREA BRIEF* LAND Size: 357,000 sq. mi. Use: 24% arable (13% of total land area under cultivatio,), 35% forested, 41 desert, waste, urban, or other Land boundaries: 2,507 mi. WATER: Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 30 n. mi. Coastline: 530 mi. PEOPLE: Population: About 58,020,00^ average annual growth rate 2.7% (current) Ethnic divisions: 250 tribal groups, of which most important are Hausa- Fulani (north), t.,u and Yoruba (south); these 3 groups total over 60% of population; about 27,000 non- Africans Religion: 47% Muslim, 34.5% Christian, 18.5% other Literacy: Est. 25% Language: English official; Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo also widely used Labor force: Approx. 22.5 million, about 41% of total popula- tion; only about 700,000 are wage earners, of wiiom 8% are in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing; 7% in mining and quarrying; 8% manufacturing; 22% construction; 2% electricity; 8% commerce; 8% transportation and communication; 37% services Organized labor: About 530,000 wage earners belong to some 700 unions GOVERNMENT: Legal name: Federal Republic of Nigeria Type: Federal republic since 1963; under military rule since January 1966 Capital: Lagos Political subdivisions: 12 states, 11 headed by a military gover- nor and one by a civilian administrator Legal system: Based on English common law, tribal law, and Islamic law; new constitution to be prepared Branches: Federal Military Government, administered by Su- preme Military Council and largely civilian Federal Executive Council 'The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973 issue of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is unclassified /official use only unless otherwise indicated. 16 Government leader: Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of Federal Military Government and Commaader in Chief of Nigerian Armed ?-orces Suffrage: Universal adult suffrage (except for women in former Northern Regen) Elections: Promised for 1576 Political parties and leaders: Political parties and politically active tribal societies were dissolved by decree on 24 May 1966; some sub rosy political activity continues Communists: The banned Socialist Workers and Farmers Partv and the Nigerian Trade 'lnion Congress have a limited political following Member of: Commonwealth, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, OPEC, IMF, ITU. OAU, Seabeds Committee, U.N. UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, Lake Chad Basin Como::ission, Niger River Commission, EC:A, African Development Bank ECONOMY: GDP: $6.8 billion(FY71 -72 est.), about $100 per capita; 12% est. growth rate FY71 -72 Agriculture: Main crops peanuts, cotton, aarr� rubber, yams, cassava, sorghum, palm oil and kernels, millet, corn, rice; live- stock; almost self- sufficient Fishing: Catch 1,.56,0(10 r:etric tons (1970 est.); imports $4.1 million (1970) Major industries: Processing industries �oil palm, peanut, cot- ton, rubber, petroleum, wood, hides, skins; manufacturing industries textiles, cement, building materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, printing, ceramics; mining �crude oil, natural gas, coal, tin, columbite Electric power: 1,11 ;,000 kw. capacity (1971); 1.7 billion kw.-hr. produced (1971), 30 kv -hr. per capita Exports: $1,659 million 'f.o.b., 1971); oil, peanuts, palm prod- ucts, cocoa, rubber, cotton, timber, tin Imports: $1,507 million (c.i.f., 1971); machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, textiles, chemicals Major trade partners: U.K., EC, U.S. Aid: (received) U.S. (economic) 1949 -71 $338 million author- ized; Poland, $28 million extended (1971); Czechoslovakia, $14 million credit extended (1965); U.K. (1964 -68) est. $99.4 million; other donors include IBRD, West Germany, Nether- lands, Italy, Japan, U.S.S.R.. U.S. (military), $2 million (1962 -71); (extended) $3 million loan to Dahomey (1972) (S) Monetary conversion rate: 1 Nigerian pound US$3.04 (official) Fiscal year: 1 April -31 March APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 SECRET COMMUNICATIONS: Railroads: 2,178 route mi.; 3'6" gage Highways: 55,400 mi.; 9,500 mi. paved (mostly bituminous surface treatment); 45,900 mi. laterite, gravel, crushed stone, improved earth Inland waterways: 5,330 mi. consisting of Ni�P- and Benue rivers and smaller rivers and creeks; addi!;onally, the newly formed Kainji Lake has several hundred miles of navigable lake routes Pipelines: Crude oil, 580 mi.; natural gas, 40 mi.; refined prod- ucts, 3 mi. Ports: 2 major, 10 minor Merchant marine: 1 cargo ships (1,000 CRT or over) totaling 83,605 GRT, 122,340 D WT (C) Civil air: 13 major transport aircraft Airfields: 77 usable; 12 with permanert surface runways; 4 with runways 8,000 11,999 ft., 25 with runways 4,000 -7,999 ft.; 4 seaplane stations Telecommunications: Composed of radio -relay links, open -wire liw.., a radiocommunication stations; principal center Lagos, secondary centers Ibadan and Kaduna; 80,000 telephones; 1.3 million to 3 million radio receivers, 75,000 TV receivers; 25 AM, 6 FM, and 8 TV stations; 2 submarine cables DEFENSE FORCES: Personnel: Army 256,400, navy 2,200 (including 14 British advisers, 13 Indian officers), air force 5,500 (plus 28 Soviet, and 5 Egyptian technicians and pilots), police force 32,000; males 15 -49, 13,365,000; 6,473,000 fit for military service (C) Major ground units: 3 infantry divisions (24 brigades, 149 in- fantry battalions); 1 reconnaissance battalion; 1 field artillery battalion; I field engineer battalion; 1 signal battalion; 1 inde- pendent arriso.: command (S) Ships: 1 destroyer escort, 10 patrol, I mine warfare, 1 amphib- ious warfare, 5 auxiliary, and service craft (C) Aircraft: 95 (37 jet, 50 prop, 8 helicopters) (S) Supply: Army materiel imported primarily from Algeria, U.K., U.S.S.R., and West Germany; dependent for ships primarily on U.K. and U.S.S.R.; received aircraft from Czechoslovakia, Egypt, and the U.S.S.R. (C) Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 March 1973, $497,000,000; 18% of total budget (C) INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY: Special Branch of Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Army Intel- ligence Corps, and Research Division of Ministry of External Affairs, intelligence; Nigerian Police Foice, security (S) NO FOREIGN DISSEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 17 Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U /OU) I COORDINATES o iN o /E. Aba.... 5 07 7 22 Abeokuta 7 09 3 21 Abuja 9 10 7 11 Ado Ekiti 7 38 5 13 Afam... 4 49 7 19 Agbaja Plateau (plateau) 7 55 6 40 Alakiri 4 35 7 01 Alesa -Eleme (oil refinery) 4 45 7 06 Aliade 7 18 8 29 Apapa.. 6 27 3 22 Asaba 6 11 6 45 Awuru Canal (canal) 9 42 4 38 Bansara 6 27 8 33 Baro.... 8 36 6 25 Bauchi 10 19 9 50 Benin, Bight of (bight) 5 30 4 00 Benin City 6 20 5 38 Benin Province (former prov) 6 30 6 00 Benin River (strm) 5 45 5 04 Benue sirm 7 48 6 46 Biafra, Bight of (bight) 320 9 20 Bida.... 9 05 6 01 Birnin Kudu 11 27 9 30 Bodo... 4 37 7 16 Bomu... 4 38 7 18 Bonny 4 26 7 10 Bonny River (sirm) 4 23 7 06 Bornu Province (former prop) 12 00 12 30 Bugumt: Creek 4 36 6 59 Bukuru 9 48 8 52 Burutu 5 21 5 31 Calabar 4 57 8 19 Chad, Lake (lake) 13 20 14 00 Chanomi Creek (navig char) 5 23 5 27 Chari, Chad (strm) 12 58 14 31 Cotonou, Dahomey 6 21 2 26 Cross River (strm) 4 42 8 21 Dakar, Senegal 14 40 17 26 W. Degema 4 45 6 46 Ebeji (strm) 12 32 14 11 Ebocha 5 28 6 41 Ebubu 4 47 7 09 E bute Metta 6 29 3 23 Ede..... 7 44 4 26 Egbema 4 56 6 33 Ekulama 4 34 6 44 Elelenwa (oilfield) 4 51 7 04 Enugu 6 26 7 29 Eriemu (oil field) 5 35 6 02 Escravos River (distributary) 5 35 5 10 Esie.... 8 13 4 54 Fernando P6o, Equatorial Guinea (isl) 3 30 8 42 Forcados 5 22 5 26 Forcados River (strm) 5 23 5 19 Fort -Lamy, Chad 12 07 15 03 Funtua 11 32 7 19 Gam baru 12 22 14 13 Garoua, Cameroon 9 18 13 24 Gombe 10 37 11 10 Gongolo siren) 9 30 12 04 Ibadan 7 23 3 54 Idiroko 6 38 2 44 Idogo 6 50 2 55 Ife...... 7 28 4 34 Ifo..... 6 49 3 12 Ijebu Ode 6 49 3 56 Ikerre 7 30 5 14 Ikom... 5 58 8 42 Ila Orangun 8 01 4 54 Ilesha 7 37 4 44 Illel a 13 44 5 18 Ilorin 8 30 4 33 i Imo River (strm) 4 36 7 31 Iwo..... 7 38 4 11 Jebba.................................. 9 08 4 50 Jones Creek (deltaic watercourse)........... 5 42 5 19 Jos 9 55 8 54 Jos Plateau (plateau) 10 00 9 30 Kachia 9 52 7 57 Kaduna... 10 31 7 26 Kadu Junction (railroad station)......... 10 29 7 25 COORDINATES Selected Airfields 3enin City 6 lA 5 36 alabar 4 58 820 4nugu 6 .3 7 34 usau 12 10 6 42 badan 7 26 3 55 os 9 52 8 54 aduna 10 36 7 27 ano 12 03 8 31 ,altos 6 35 3 20 Iaiduguri 11 51 13 05 'ort Harcourt 4 51 7 01 okoto 13 00 5 15 Vawa 9 54 4 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 o 'N o 'E. Kafanchan 9 35 8 18 Kainji Dam (dam) 9 52 4 36 Kano 12 00 8 31 Kaura N amoda 12 36 6 35 Koko... 5 59 5 26 Kokori 5 40 6 04 Komadugu Yobe (strm) 13 42 13 20 Kontsgora 10 24 5 29 Korokoro 4 43 7 18 Krakrama 4 32 6 57 Kuru... 9 43 8 51 Kwa Ibo (strm) 4 32 7 59 Lagos 6 27 3 23 Lalate 7 36 3 27 Lokoja 7 48 6 44 Maiduguri 11 51 13 09 Makurdi 7 44 8 32 Mamfe, Cameroon 5 46 9 17 MBede 5 28 6 44 Midd.e Belt (region) 8 00 8 00 Minna 9 37 6 33 M ushin 6 32 3 22 New Bussa 9 53 4 31 Ngala 12 20 14 11 Nguru 12 53 10 28 Niger Delta (delta) 4 50 6 00 Niger strm 5 33 6 33 Nsukka 6 52 7 23 Numan 9 28 12 02 Obigbo 4 52 7 08 Odidu 6 06 6 57 Offa.... 8 09 4 43 Ogbom osho 8 08 4 16 Oginibo 5 23 5 50 Ogoja 6 40 8 48 Oguta 5 42 6 48 Okrika 4 44 7 05 Oloibiri 4 41 6 19 Onitsha 6 10 6 47 Ore..... 6 45 4 52 Oron 4 50 8 14 Oroni (oilfield) 5 20 6 10 Oshogbo 7 46 4 34 Owerri 5 29 7 02 Owerri (oilfield) 4 55 7 20 Owo.... 7 11 5 35 Oyo 7 51 3 56 Oza oilfield 4 55 7 20 Pambeguwa 10 40 8 17 Port Harcourt 4 46 7 01 Porto -Novo, Dahomey 6 29 2 37 Potiskum 11 43 11 04 Rumuekpe (gasfield) 4 59 6 45 Sapele 5 55 5 42 Shagamu 6 51 3 39 Shiroro Gorge (gorge) 9 59 6 50 Sokoto 13 04 5 15 Ughelli 5 30 5 59 Um u Etchem 5 01 7 02 Vom 9 44 8 47 Warri 5 31 5 45 Yaba 6 32 3 23 Yelwa 10 50 4 44 Yola 9 12 12 29 Zarin 11 04 7 42 Zinder, Niger 13 48 8 59 Selected Airfields 3enin City 6 lA 5 36 alabar 4 58 820 4nugu 6 .3 7 34 usau 12 10 6 42 badan 7 26 3 55 os 9 52 8 54 aduna 10 36 7 27 ano 12 03 8 31 ,altos 6 35 3 20 Iaiduguri 11 51 13 05 'ort Harcourt 4 51 7 01 okoto 13 00 5 15 Vawa 9 54 4 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 Vegetation okoto Bosoo Ksos n'. r Nsidugurl Montane vegetation Short -grass savanna Sudan savanna Tall -grass savanna High rain forest Fresh -water swamp Mangrove (salt -water swamp) Noon APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 is sdool Bauchi n'. r Nsidugurl Montane vegetation Short -grass savanna Sudan savanna Tall -grass savanna High rain forest Fresh -water swamp Mangrove (salt -water swamp) Noon APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 Economic Activity z INDUSTRY efinery Plywood giant it it Sugar mill owerplant i Textile mill AGRICULTURE Peanuts Sesame seed Oil palm r Cotton Cocoa J Rubber 's.* .:r I`. s eat... `"Yr r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 s Tin ore and columbite Coal Iron ore ZUUU/Ub/I b: Population APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100002-3 ti APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 i Tribal Groups KANUR! Makltgrri 1 1 Keinrr 1 NUPE brin, Y O R U B A Lokoi>i e Ibadan w 1 Enugu 1B PRINCIPAL TRIBES =Hausa and Fulani I (inter mingled) Port Harcourt Calabar Ibo Yoruba MINOR TRIBES Kanun Edo Ibibro -Efik I Nupe Try Ilaw Other Summary Map APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 E Maradi Wurno Isa Dosso i 1030' Sokoto Shinkafi Katsina .z38 aura SOK O 0 0 PLAINS Ta Kaura a s Namoda j Mafara Birnin Kabbi y Je g a Yash P `,r� Gummi usau 12 311 e a Kan 1ppear .o� ,922 Vo 2797 r\ chat I F I Funta orth- Ilestern d Kan di 31 aria Yelwa O r t h- n V r I r D homy 2 Kainli Kaduna Lake 41 Kontagora J 870 0 ai 1S Oli Waw Da \J 2ungeru r J O S 36 Yashikera Cain 3015 Minna afanchan Par kou C 1} P A T Mokwa Abuja S Jebba Wuya Bids `iagi j Shaki A K w a r a Baro Ila y I f I x.159, n OgbO n osho Off ,9 61 e r Lq Benue Iseyin p O y e Ede Oshogbo kcja 1 Ferry p Iwo Ilesha i Makurd Lalate Ikerre Okene 1620 L ..2 Ibadan ife Wes e 5 Akure Owo Abeokuta V I .J Oturkpo Ondo PobA 7 /ICIILL 090 Ito Shagei, /Nsukka Ijebu r 1 v Obe 633. 1873* Ig orto r mal a ovo Ado .r pa L (Okitipupa Enu u p Benin Cif Q Cotonou r' J Asaa t entral bakaliki M i W s t e r n onitsha Koko eoa Af o pt �SS I Sapele e PS Okigwi ri Kokori 0 I L q ES OtsJO Warri Ughelli y 1 Mbede Owerri Umuahi r 6 0 5 U. c FO tc a Forcados y p Ikot APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 j Gurnmi us'. j ow Tala a Namoda Mafar, Birnin Kebbi V Yash usau 211 aya K an upper o 922 Volta P 2797 P C hal I i Funtba North estern Kandi 31 aria i Yelwa o r t h ntr D homey Ka Kaduna Kamp Lake 42 Kontagora J ainji i 11 Oli wow Dam Zungeru 0S Yashikera &in J6 3015 t Minna J afanchan Parkou P A T ZA 1 Mokwa Wuya Abuja Jebba i Bida J Laiiagi� Shaki A T E .Q K W Baro Ilort F a r a j Lafia 1 y J Ogbo n osho 1661 Off B e n e r Sav Q Benue Iseyin l 41 J p'F Oy Ede Oshogbo k01� O9 0 r erry Iwo Ilesha i Makurdi Lalate Ikerre Okene 1620 Iba He 5 Akure Owo J Abeokuta U Oturkpo Ondo Pob6 Sha r'il a Idogo Ifo g Ijebu r 533. v Nsukka 1873' Ig j malq, -t Obe o oko 'a �1 .0 f IOVO Ado J Pe L Okilipupa J C Enu U p Benin Cif Q "Olonou akaliki s M i W s t e A a a nitsha t antral Koko ss eo Afi o G Sapele PC, Okigwi 951 T i Kokori r 0 e 2 ti E SCtaJO Warr Ughelli 1 Mbede Owerri muahi r f y l 01C Force o Force os cf G Q\a 'r Ekpene Bight of Benin F' Abal SO h a e v l r kw Uy� Y agoa e a 6 Calabar o Y Oron Q err ibiri Deg me rt He rt omu Bight of B Names and boundary representation iafra �4 are n ot n aufhor I 4 100&94 12 -72 a C entral Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 tdombe Kurno J K u z5as i A Pain 1 80 1805 Y r Shendarn .t Jalingo e 6700' ue. Piatea Wukari ot �rte Serti 2 t Ttllcum'" K 5905 Al Banyo Ogoja Nkambe 597 Wum a Nkongsamba Ku Ekon Foumban 7 Dschang Cameroon Yaou liiret tV a m to -0 p n t r e Chad M' Jimetat Garoua `l 1 Yola eeO u tl- Ngaound6r6 Nigeria International boundary State boundary National capital Calabar State capital Railroad Surfaced road Unsurfaced road y Airfield .L Major port Populated places O Over 100,000 O 40,000 to 100,000 Under 40,000 Spot elevations in feet Scale 1:2,950,000 0 25 50 75 Statute Mlles 0 25 50 75 Kilometers 5 ell APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3 SECRET NO FORE1CN DISSEM SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3