NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 50B; NIGERIA; COUNTRY PROFILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100002-3
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
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• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
50B/GS/cp
N igeria
February 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SU
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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General Sur%'ey Chapter,
'r. COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the
subject country Chrnnolog Area brief
Summary map
i
s
t
F
t THE SOCIETY Social structure Population Labor
Health Living conditions Social problems
Religion Education Artistic expression Public
information
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Background and
appraisal Structure and function Political dynamics
National policies Threats to stability The police
Intelligence and security
THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its
structure� agriculture, forestry, fisheries, fuels and
power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and
construction Domestic trade Economic policy and
developments International economic relations
TRANSPORTATION AND IELECOMINIUNICA-
TIONS Appraisal of systems* Strategic mobility Rail-
roads Highways Inland wate7ways Pipelines
Ports Merchant marine Civil air Airfields The
telecom system
MILITARY GEOGRAPIHY Topography and climate
Military geographic regions Strategic areas
Internal routes Approaches,: land, sea, air
ARTNIED FORCES The defense establishment Joint
activities Ground forces Naval forces Air forces
Paramilitary
This General Svrvey supersedes the one dated Decem-
ber 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
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NIGERIA
The Costly Struggle for National Unity
A Nation of Contrasts w The Coknnio| Heritage
The Richest of the pm.r w Lrcmi,, of the Crisis
Y,un w New Directions
Chronology 15
Area brie ,.'.,.^,....^..^..''.^^^'''`''`''`]6
Summary map follows 17
The Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by November 1972.
Souoor NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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The Costly Struggle for
National Unity (s)
Nigeria is one of the most colorful and promising
young countries in Africa; it has also been one of the
most troubled. Although its political, social, and
economic problems mirrored those of other emerging
nations south of the Sahara, they were compounded
by factors unique to the Nigerian scene and by the
mistakes of well- intentioned men. (U /OU)
Similar to Oregon in shape but nearly four times
bigger, Nigeria is the largest coastal state in west
Africa. It gained independence from the United
Kingdom in October 1960 as a relatively loose
federation of three unequal regions. Three years later
it cut its remaining symbolic ties to the British crown,
becoming a republic within the British Common-
wealth. By far the most populous country in Africa,
among the two or three most wealthy in terms of
natural resources, and possessed� thanks to its varied
climate �of an exceptionally broad agricultural base,
Nigeria seemed to have all the prerequisites fcr viable
and increasingly prosperous statehood except one. The
critical missing ingredient was �and to some extent
remans �the pervasive sense of national identity and
pride needed to o- ercome tribal loyalties and to
support the processes of modernization and reform.
(U /OU)
Unlike many African states, Nigeria underwent a
gradual and relatively thorough preparation for
independence. Following World War II, a series of
constitutional reforms �based in part on the
Australian federal system �gave Nigerian leaders
fairly broad experience in internal self- government
and fostered development of a competent corps of civil
servants. In the absence of a British white settler
population, the transition process was relatively
smooth perhaps too smooth. There were no martyrs
to a Nigerian struggle for independence. Had there
been, perhaps dedication to the concert of "one
Nigeria" might have been more widespread. (U /OU)
As it was, the federal system originally adopted by
the Nigerians simply perpetuated and reinforced the
tribally oriented regionalism fostered by the British to
facilitate indirect rule. Termination of colonial status
thus brought virtually no change in the life or
parochial outlook of the average Nigerian citizen. The
situation was inherently unstable. And as the euphoria
over independei. subsided, strong centrifugal
tendencies began to reemerge. (U /OU
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Nigeria is, of course, an artificial creation of the
colonial era. Its borders group together highly diverse
peoples, divided by language, culture, religion, and
tribal animosities. Its original principal political
subdivisions and parties reflected the influence of
major ethnic groups, while the interests of lesser
minorities were relatively neglected. Ethnic antagon-
ism was exacerbated by the prospect of perpetual
domination of the central government by a single
group �the Hausa Fulani of the vast Northern
Region �and by growing disparities in regional levels
of economic development. Under these circumstances,
Nigeria's initial experiment with multiparty
democracy collapsed after only 5 years. (U /OU)
The end of parliamentary rule was hastened by
popular disgust with a system marred by bribery,
corruption, nepotism, and the blatant rigging of
everything from elections to census results. The coup
that brought Major General Ironsi �an Ibo
tribesman �to power in January 1966 marked the
beginning of a quest for a new formula for unit`,ng and
governing Nigeria's disparate peoples. However,
Ironsi's solution �the establishment of a unitary
{gate� showed little understanding for the strength
and complexity of tribal rivalries. It was viewed in the
north as a plot to impose southern domination over the
entire country. And it cost Ironsi his life in it second
coup led by northern officers in July 1966. (C)
A member of a s;nall northern tribe �and, unlike
most northerners, a Christian� Ironsi's successor as
head of Nigeria's fledgling military government, Lt.
Col. Yakubu Gowon, was a less controversial figure.
But his efforts to find a wav to restore civilian rule
once again within a decentralized framework �were
severely complicated by the large -scale massacre of
Ibo residing in the north which erupted in the fall of
1966. By May of the following year, it seemed possible
that the whole federation might collapse. Gowon's
dramatic move at that juncture in dividing Nigeria's
existing regions (by then four) into 12 states thereby
ending the monopoly of political power and patronage
enjoyed by the nation's major tribes �was sound
enough in conception. In fact, it was an action once
advocated by the Ibo, among others. Yet in the
atmosphere of mutual suspicion which prevailed in
the spring of 1967, it simply precipitated the secession
of the Ibo- dominated Eastern Region as the self-
proclaimed Republic of Biafra. Civil war followed 2
months later. (C)
2
The war dragged on for 2 1 /2 years before Biafra
capitulated to the superiority of federal weapons and
manpower. Lagos' victory discredited the concept of
secession, but it did not resolve the basic social and
economic problems which at one time or another had
fanned separatist sentiment among the leaders of all
three major tribes �the Hausa Fulani, the Yoruba,
and the Ibo. Gowon was still faced with the delicate
task of devising institutions which would ensure some
measure of national unity and provide protection to
the various mutually suspicious tribes. Moreover, the
sudden end of the fighting in January 1970 had
brought an array of new problems, including
reconstruction, relief, and reconciliation. (C)
Thus it would be unwise to attribute too much
significance to the relative domestic calm which has
prevailed in Nigeria since Biafra's surrender. In part, it
is the result of general war- weariness. In part, it is
imposed by the ban on all political and tribal
organizations which has been in effect since 1966. And
in part, it reflects the dampening effect of Gowon's
announcement that there will be no return to civilian
government before 1976 �and then only if the nine
point prograin which he set forth in October 1970 has
been implemented. (S)
Nevertheless, the civil war and its outcome have
provided the Nigerians with the opportunity to make a
fresh start �and on somewhat sounder foundations
than before. The hundreds I thousands of citizens
who fought and suffered for the preservation of one
Nigeria, and who saw the war prolonged as the result
of foreign intervention, have emerged from their
ordeal with a greater sense of national identity and
patriotism. Conversely, ;bo bitterness toward Lagos
has been mitigated by unexpectedly generous and
sympathetic treatment. Furthermore, the exigencies of
the conflict spurred the development of Nigeria's
petroleum and manufacturing industries, thus
providing Gowon with impressive and growing
financial resources with which to tackle economic
problems and grievances. Finally, the need to counter
Biafran initiatives and to secure adequate supplico of
military equipment and weaponry forced Lagos to
break out of its relative isolation. Gradually, Nigeria
developed a new image as an active and influential
member of the nonaligned club. And this in turn,
coupled with Gowon's efforts to play a leading role in
African affairs, has contributed to the growth of
Nigerian nationalism. (S)
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\igcri I cl(:utcc i uses iii nit -tIing it nt:u(
I>r((1(len(, ar un co. rtaiif. \%o)u III:u( fur ;>(tIitic;(I
rei() rn( mud I r re.haIIiu4 tlu cuuntrn' \culicii
n(iIit;u\ I-,(:(hli,iuncnt arc ,till akuc '11 1(- o)rg:u(i /it
tinnal ch:uikc, If(- ha i fit ro)duccd liar pct to I)c fldl\
lc in praclit lid a the hi,t(tr\ o)1 it uun(Iwi ((f
other nali(ut, attc,t it i r\tr�tnt�1\ ditiicult to dc\ i
A Nation of Contrasts (u /ou)
Nigeria i, if gcugraphcr dream. 'I'll( cuuntr\
ph\,ic�a1. ,uciuingicaI, and cc()i nnnic� zunc, itrc I iii rl\
\%cII dchned. but their ninnhcr and \:(rict\ \c(mid
c�hallcngc the anaI\ tical au(I t;nIi)IIic ,kill, I the n((),l
i l l iuginati\r ,((c�i.(I a i(�nti,l. I r ti nu�, igcria di\ cr,i l c
could p1 lu he the m irc�c ()f c�o)n,id( cco)no)n(ic
n(ulu;tll, :(ti it,(Lut(c h(�tcccu iLc c(�niral and
rcgiuu;(I autII ritic iu I I t-rn( IructiIr(
het4rtkc if tu C:(ic. Thi i4,II %Nirtg di iun i
Hier( r( n(nrc co)ncernc(I \citl( a (le,cril>ti( n (.1 tl(c
fit l(tr \%IIich Iia\(� dialled th( \ike hit n ct ue III td
\%Ific�h kill affcc�t the c�uuntr future t f it kith
I r( l)hccc ti
u1 p(litic ;tI \itaIil\. But far. at Ica,t. it,
u(, hc(�n to ucatl\ c(tu(plicate the pr()blcn(
t t c(un(In into) it in>;I( nati((n ,talc.
Id (:co)kralilic ha I(la cd an ini )rtant
i�rink it rcl pr(-,( n ink tir( hcicn)g(�n,tn, ;(n(I
uicnlcd charactcr (tf \igcrian 'I'hc
trnl(ical thro)((ghuul the cuuntn. but
e ,Iilfcrcnce in tcnilx�rahir�. hun(idit\.
II c I(l�t \e('II the no)rth :uid the ,(tut h.
ticlr(rntc( l In)III tftc Iwachc itIld nuIIIJ (n :unl> o)f
the c((a,t h\ if 100 -r(ilc ide I(clt u1 lr, )ic:(I rani
Ikin-A, the IIplitud plain an(I gra �land a\:uui:(
hccn(nc ,gracl fill I\ inure aricl to) the n((rtII \(tr!Iwrn
kc((gral I facnn�cl the (lc\chyincnt (tf I) i (,lo)ral
I>ursiiit c�ara\:ui trade. and larks but lu((,cl\ knit
cn(pirc, (Icpendent nn ca\ah�\ to I,((lic�c their a,t
clnnr,(in,. Wit11 ,()utimar(I tradc and cyall"i(ni
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Starting in the mid -19th century, geograpFny hewn
to lend it( veanomie dimensions to Nigeria's
incipient regionalism. 7'h(- gradual introduction of
cash crops and the� development of unevenly
distributed natural resources sharpened the differences
between north and south and. to a lesser extent.
bchyeen east and west. The north concentrated on the
production of peanuts and cotton, the west on cocoa
and rubber, the east un palnn products. The hulk of
Nigeria *s kno%%n inorganic mineral deposits lie in the
north. while its t)d fields and timber reserves arc in the
south.
The P1 The \it_'erian, theimuke, are a,
varied as their environment, although their tribal
groups are divided more by imiguage. culture, and
histon than by physical characteristics. Altogether,
some 250 tr.bcs and an approximately equal number
of separate languages or dialects I.lave been identified.
In fact, there is still no single language %%Ilich is
understood throughout Nigeria �not even the officiai
one. English.
inhibited by it tsetse fly- infested belt just north of the
forests, the region had a natural orientation to the
north. In fact, by the time the first 1?uropean ships
appeared off the Niger Delta in the 13th century,
trans Saharan trade links and the introd)iction of
Islam had already made much of northern Nigeria
heavil�. influenced by Arab culture.
Heavy rainfall in the hot quid humid southern third
of Nigeria permitted more intensive cultivation and,
in consequence, the area has been able to support a
higher density of population than in the north. The
inhabitants of the south, however. were for a long time
less mobile than the northern tribes. The tsetse fl\,
dense vegetation, swamps, and a myriad of creeks and
rivers made the area unsuitahl_ for horses. I)ifficulty
of travel and the ready availability of adequate food
supplies favored the development of smaller, urban
based kingdoms as well as the proliferation of
independent �and often mutually hostile �minor
tribal groups with widely varying customs and
languages.
4
Moreover, there is no substantial area in present
day Nig:-ria in .which ethnic loyalties are unmixed. No
matter hog% the country is ultimately divided up for
administrative purposes, titer(- are certain to be
potentially dissatisfied minority groups in yirtuall%
every jurisdiction. But Nigeria's ethnic problem is less
a function of the nnnnber of its tribes �some of which
are very small indeed -than of the -ivalries and the
social and economic differe��.ces \%hich generate
friction ai,� g the larger and more important groups.
Here, history has not been kind. For hundreds of years,
tit(- impact of two major external influences, Islam; and
Europe, indeed the divergence I- �tween northern
and southern tribes. :1nd partly becatise of this, 20th
century modernizatioi. has had a markedly eneyen�
and therefore potentially disnptke� effect.
There arc perhaps 10 tribes in Nigeria which
number more than 500,000 members. But of it
population which may now exceed 58 million, nearly
two- thirds belong to one or another of the three major
groups cited earlier. T1ie largest of these, the
predominantly Muslim Ifausa- Fulani amalgam. is
centered in the far north. The Yoruba, the most
urbanized and religiously mixed (animist, Muslim,
and Christian) of the major tribes, live in the
southwest. The homeland of the third major group,
the largely Christianized Ibo, is in the southeast. The
three, each of which came to dominate one of
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.Sucannu Vegetation
hopirul Vegetarian

EEEPP
t
lk
Nigeria's original postindependence regions, are very
different. In fact, both the Yoruba and the Hausa
Fulani show closer cultural similarities to major groups
outside Nigeria than they do to tine Ibo or to each
other.
The colorful history of the Nigerian peoples is
marked by centuries of tribal warfare and slave raiding
and by the rise and fall of numerous po;yerfrtl
kingdoms. By the 18th century, the general contours of
the country's current regional and tribal rivalries were
beginning to emerge. By that time, most Yoruba %%care
united within the Kingdom of Oyo. The Ibo, while
disinclined to form political units above the level of a
grouping of villages, controlled the east through the
enterprise and ingenuity of the priests and traders of
their Aro cian. However, the Hausa �still distinct
from the Fulani tribesmen who had begun to filter
into the north about 400 years earlier �held sway only
in the far northwest.
In the early 19th century, the religiously zealous
city dwelling branch of the Fulani tribe rose in holy
5
1
4 t
i
war (jihad) against its less devoutly Muslim Hausa
overlords. Victorious, the Fulani established a feudal
theocratic empire of emirates owing allegiance to the
Sultan of Sokoto. Intermarriage produced a Hausa
Fulani aristocracy, and extension of the holy war soon
brought most of the pagan tribes of the so- called
Middle Belt under its control. In 1808, the Hausa
Fulani defeated and temporarily occupied the great
Bornu Kingdom of the Muslim Kanuri tribe. For the
first time in Nigeria's history, almost the entire north
was dominated by a single group.
The approaches to the southeast blocked by the
determined resistance of the Tiv tribe, the Hausa
Fulani then pressed their attack to the southwest,
cutting deep into Yoruba territory. Their progress was
eventually arrested by the advent of the British, but
the Hausa Fulani continued to raid at harass their
southern neighbors until well into the 20th century. It
is little wonder that some southerners feared that the
departure of the British in 1960 had opened the way
for the resumption of the jihad.
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The Colonial Heritage (u/ou)
Trading expedition on the Niger in
the earl' /8(N)'.c
Nigeria's experience with British colonial rule was
brief �and almost accidental. Attracted by the
lucrative slave trade inaugurated by the Portuguese
around 100, British vessels were visiting the coast of
Nigeria in some number by the 17th century. But it
was the Dutch, not the English, who soon thereafter
wrested preeminence in the area from the Por-
tuguese �only to be challenged in turn by a half
dozen or so other European powers. By the 18th
century, Britain and France had emerged as the
principal competitors in west Africa, with the British
dominant in the Guinea coast area. Throughout the
long period of unrestricted slave trade, however, no
European nation attempted to bring any part of
Nigeria under its control. The climate and terrain were
too inhospitable.
For nearly 400 years, then, Europe's impact on the
Nigerian scene was largely indirect. Fear of disease
and attack led even the most venturesome traders to
anchor in harbors and river mouths along the coast
and to conduct the bulk of their business through
African middlemen. Efforts to explore the hinterland
were not pressed until the mid- 1800's, when discovery
of the prophylactic qualities of quinine vastly
improved the chances of survival. Thus, beyond the
confines of such major trade centers as Lagos and Old
Calabar �where the inhal;'tants were long exposed to
a wide assortment of European merchants and mission-
aries- -the white man's influence was felt primarily
in the disruptive effects of the slave trade. Not that
6
this type of c_ ninerce was a European innovation in
West Africa, but he increased demand for slaves made
this trade so profitable that it diverted whole tribes
from their normal pursuits and trigg red the interne-
cine warfare which was largely responsible for the de-
cline and breakup of the great forest region kingdoms.
While very active in the slave trade, the British did
not play a particularly distinctive or critical role in
Nigerian history until the early 19th century. At that
time, sentiment was running high in England against
both slaver and imperialism. Ironically, it was
London's new determination to bring an end to traffic
in human cargoes which set the English on the road
toward adding Nigeria to their empire. British
warships bent on halting the slave trade began
patrolling off the Nigerian coast, occasionally bringing
force to near on local chieftains. 'The reassuring
presence of the Royal Navy brought English traders
(now seeking palm oil and other "legitimate"
commodities) and missionaries to the area in greater
numbers. Pressure for providing additional protection
for British lives and business interests began to grow.
English involvement in the affairs of the coastal
tribes assumed a more formal and continuous
character In 1819 with the appointment of a British
Consul for the Bights of Biafra and Benin with
headquarters on the island of Fernando P6o.* Twelve
'For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron
of the Summary Map and the neap itself.
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years later, this official acting on London':
instructions and backed by the Royal Navy occupied
Lagos and annexed it as a British colony. By then, the
mood in England was changing. Anti imperial
Sentiment was beginning to abate, and concern over
French and German colonial ambitions was
mounting. The race to carve up Africa was soon in full
swing. And in 1885, Nigeria's fate was sealed when
Britain's claim to an exclusive sphere of influence in
the area around the Niger Rive- aid some smaller
rivers to the east �then referrer; the Oil rivers
was recognized by the Berlin Congress.
London quickiy established a coastal protectorate
extending from the Niger Delta to Old Calabar,
subsequently expanding it to include all of southern
Nigeria except the colony of Lagos. By early 1900,
havin settled the last of a series of local I -order
disputes with France and having formed it separate
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from lands
theretofore administered under charter by the Royal
Niger Company, the British Government had assumed
direct responsibility for nearly all the territory enclosed
within the borders of present -day Nigeria. Nigeria was
then not one but three separate entities: the colony of
Lagos plus the southern and northern protectorates.
Moreover, 50 years of increasingly active British
involvement in the area had widened regional
divergencies. By 1900, effective British control
extended beyond the borders of Lagos to the far
reaches of the old southwestern kingdoms of Oyo and
Benin. Recalcitrant chiefs had been deposed. African
middlemen had been squeezed out, and the Yoruba
had been Christianized in considerable numbers. In
the virtually unexplored wilds of the southeast,
however, the Ibo still retained their autonomy and
their traditional customs. And the north, except for the
Middle i3elt emirates of Ile,in and Nupe which had
fallen before the Royal Niger Company's private
army, was a British possession in name only. The
treaties which the Royal Niger Company had
negotiated with a fey Hausa Fulani emirs in an effort
to block French expansion had resulted in no practical
dimunition of those local leaders' sovereignty. Nor had
they brought an end to the slave trade in the area.
London's initial approach to the problem of
consolidating its control over its new and disparate
Nigerian possessions was to give its principal
representatives in the field free rein to seek the: o%yn
solutions. In the north, British High Commissioner
Frederick Lugard established an effective system of
indirect rule based on the existing Muslim emirates.
Pa�tly because of this and partly because declining
revenues from trans Saharan trade limited the funds
available for modernization of local services and
facilities, the extension and consolidation of British
control brought little social change to the area. For
example. the power and activities of the emirs were
left largely undisturbed, and since Lugard discouraged
Christian penetration of Muslim areas in the belief
that it would disrupt the indigenous culture, the norti,
did not profit from the educational and medical
services (offered by missionaries.
In contrast, Lugard's counterpart ip the south,
Ralph Moor, was moved both by personal inclination
and by the fragmented nature of many of the societies
in his region to establish a more direct form of rule.
Moreover, Moor did not share Lugard's concern about
the potentially destabilizing effects of Christianity.
Missionaries penetrated deep into Yoruba and Ibo
territory, winning -onverts and establishing schools
as they went. At the same time, funds derived from
customs duties and the growing palm oil trade permit-
ted the construction of roads and railways, laying of
telegraph lines, and dredging of harbors. Growing
commercial activity advanced the process of urbani-
zation, and comparative economic well -being began
to further differentiate the south from the north.
Lagos was joined to the southern protectorate in
1906, and the merger of Britian's remaining two
Nigerian jurisdictions was effected �under Lugard's
guiding hand �in 1914. But while unification opened
the way for faster economic development in the north,
the policies pursued by Lugard and his like minded
successors tended to reinforce Nigeria's regional dif-
ferences and rivalries.
With a view to minimizing the disruptive effects of
economic progress and "modern" southern values on
the feudal northern emirates, the boundaries of the
former northern and southern protectorates were pre-
served and the two administrations were kept sepa-
rate. The ban on missionary activity in Muslim areas
of the north was continued, and tribal jealousies
grew as disparities in levels of education widened
and as better trained southerners particularly
members of the Ibo group �began to fill key civil
service and commercial positions throughout the
country. Furthermore, efforts- to extend indirect rule
to the south were only partially successful. 'Vest of
the Niger, the British managed to resurrect a rather
pale version of the long defunct Oyo Kingdom of the
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Yoruba. But east of the river, attempts to manufacture
hierarchies of "warrant chiefs" out of village elders of
the decentralized Ibo and Ibibio tribes met with
considerable resistance. And in 1939, the British gave
formal recognition to the differing nature of Ibo and
Yoruba- :ontrolled lands by dividing southern Nigeria
into separate eastern and %%estern administrti.ms.
FoIbwing World War 11, Nigeria*s three existing
administrative regions became the hasis for planning
for independence as a federal state. As Nigeria moved
closer to self government, tribally based parties
emerged to contest regional and national elections.
Inevitably, the political Beene in each region was
The Richest of the Poor (c)
MEMO-
While British police frequently tended to aggravate
centrifugal forces Operating within Nigerian society.
Lagos cOlomial legacy also included an impressive
S
nxnupolized by the- part\ dominated bN tile major
tiibe in the area. Morcoye r, the pace of political
development in the three constituent states of the
emerging federation continued to be uneven. The
Eastern and Western Regions became self governing
shortly after Nigeria gained almost complete
autonomy in August 1957. The Northern Region,
however, did not request similar status r %r another
years. 'thus, while all three regions adhered to
parliamentary forms and enjoyed equally seniautono-
mous relations with the central government in Lagos
when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, there
were still numerous differences of detail among their
systems of administration.
economic infrastructure, well developed administra-
tive institutions, the most sophisticated financial
middlemen south of the Sahara, and widespread
entrepreneurial shills. Even before independence.
these assets had combined with Nigeria's abundant
natural and human resoi.rccs to yield the highest GD1)
in black Africa. And up until the outbreak Of the c�iyil
war, the country's economy continued to grow at all
average rate of Oyer 5'r' a year.
Agriculture is still the backbone of the Nigerian
economy. While no longer the principal source of
export earnings, agricultural pursuits account for
nearly half of the country's (;DI' and furnish
emplo\ meat for nearly W(' Of the labor force. Crop
remain low because of the continued use of
primitive methods, but even with less than half its
arable land under cultivation, Nigeria is nearly self-
sufficient in food and agricultural racy materials.
Moreover, Nigeria is anong the worlds leading
exporters of peanuts, pale products, cocoa beans, and
rubber. Cotton and sesame seeds also rank anumg its
principal agricultural exports. Some 1?0.000 square
miles Of forest support foreign sales Of some two dozen
varieties of hardwood logs, plywood. and sawn timber.
And while meat products are not exported in
appreciable quantities, the million or so cattle
slamghtered annually in the north sustain a valuable
trade in leather and racy hides.
But agricultural production has been increasing
relatively slowly, and for the past fey �gars, mining
and manufacturing have been the principal engines of
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F
1
t
i
economic growth in Nigeria. Here, too, the country
has bener`ited both from the experience and physical
facilities inherited from the cc period and from
the wealth of its natural resources. Nigeria is the only
west African country that has all forms of primary
energy in excess of internal consumption requirements.
Its chief mineral resource include petroleum, natural
gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, and limestone. Tin
ingots and, to a lesser extent, columbite have long
been substantial earners of foreign exchange. Small
scale enterprises predominate, but the ready
availability of raw materials has encouraged both the
construction of a number of large cement, glass, and
textile factories. Despite the relatively high
phosphorous and sulfur content of Nigeria's iron ore,
active consideration is being given to the possibility ci
establishing a steel industry. Far and away the most
important development, however, has been- the rapid
growth of the young oil industry. It is now
unquestionably the most significant single dynamic
force in the Nigerian economy.
The scope and pace of the oil boom have, in fact,
come as somewhat of a surprise to everyone. Nigeria's
oil has the advantages of being light, relatively sulftn
free, and convenient to major European markets. But
it was not discovered in comraercial quantities until
1956, and actual production did not begin until 193
Moreover, the proven reserves established during the
course of sub,equent surveys were small by world
standards. Thus, while 11 foreign firms were involved
in developing Nigeria's original fields in the coastal
areas adjacent h: Shell -BP's 1956 Niger Delta find, it
seemed unlikely that oil receipts would soon do much
more than offset the losses Lagos had suffered as the
result of a sharp decline in cocoa prices. In June 1967,
the last full month before the outhreak of the civil war
seriously disrupted the activities of all but one of the
foreign oil concerns operating in Nigeria, production
had reached 467,000 barrels a clay. I-lad that level
been sustained throughout the remainder of the year,
Lagos' net annual foreign exchange earnings from
petroleum would probably have been in the
neighborhood of $130 million.
Fortunately for Nigeria, the civil war did not result
in a total moratorium on new foreign investment. On
the contrary, it spurred development of new onshore
and offshore oilfields outside the general area of
hostilities. In consequence, prewar levels of petroletlin
were regained by the spring of 1969. "Then, in 1970,
when the older fields ,vere brought back into full
production and the refinery at Port Harcourt was
reopened, Nigeria): oil boom began to gain
momentum. By mid -1972, Nigeria ranked eighth
among the world's oil producing nations with a daily
output of 1.8 million harrels. As the result of
reneg, tinted price and payment schedules, earnings
had increased even more dramatically than
production figures. By the end of 1971, net foreign
exchange receipts had risen to over $1 billion, i.e.,
more Than double the receipts from 0 export of all
other forms of goods .tnd services. Oil's contribution to
government revenues had jumped frorn $38 million, or
9% of total revenues, in 1966 to $983 million, or well
over half of total revenues in 1971. And it is now
expected that by 1973 production will reach at least
2.4 million barrels a day and that oil's contribution to
government revenues will have increased by
approximately 40,
But Nigeria is not another Libya. Even by the most
conservative estimates, it has a population of over 50
million, and oil revenues, while very important, will
not provide a financial panacea. Per capita GDP is
currently estimated at about $100. Even if, as seerns
likely, Nigeria's economy expands to three or four
times its prewar dimensions by 1985, the country will
not he rich by any standards other than those of the
underdeveloped world. Moreover, the oil industry is
still a largely exogenous factor in the Nigerian
economy, with top management, policy direction,
technical know -how, and sales revenues being for the
most part derived from outside the country. The
Nigerian Government can, of course, affect oil
revenues by demanding price or taxation revisions or
more participation in the running of the industry. But
growth prospects for Nigeria as a whole including
employment prospects �will depend more heavily on
achievements outside the oil sector and on the
efficiency with which government revenues are
disbursed to meet federal and stale requirements than
on the sheer size of the country's net income from
petroleum.
While Nigeria's GDP grew at above plan rates in
both 1970 and 1971, Lagos has encountered some
difficulty in implementing its 1970 -74 development
program. It has been faced with it number of
economic and related social problems �some old,
others stemming from the civil war �which have
strained the treasury, impeded foreign trade, upset
investment schedules, and threatened to rekindle
regional discontent and animosities. The older
M
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Secondly, the Yoruba took adva.tage of the
involuntary departure of Iho officials to occupy an
increasing number of lower and middle level civil
service jobs in Lagos and in the north. All this has
raised fears of Yoruba domination and of a return to
big -tribe politics. As a result �and also because of
factional strife among 'lie Yoruba themselves �there
has been agitation for dividing Western State into two
or more separate jurisdictions. Moreover, there has
been a growing and somewhat startling tendency in
the north to hire non Africans or even Iho, rather than
readily available Yoruba, to fill vacancies for which
there are no qualified northern candidates.
The impact of the war on Nigeria's world outlook
was also quite marked. Prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, Nigeria played a modest role s:; African
affairs, even less on the world scene. While officially it
member of the nonaligned club -it abrogated its
defense pact with the United Kingdom in 1962 and
soon thereafter opened diplomatic and commercial
relations with a number of Communist countries�
New Directions (s)
12
Nigeria maintained a moderate and generally pro
Western posture. But the unwillingrness of Western
powers to furnish aircraft and .other major military
items to the Gowon regime in its time of need left this
field open to Moscoxy. While Soviet aid was limited to
sales of equipment and provision of technical
assistance, all paid for in hard currency, the Soviets
were able to trade on Nigeran gratitude to enlarge
their pesence and influence to Lagos.
At the same time, the airing of their dirty linen and
effective Biafran propaganda at the United Nations
and in the world press heightened the Nigerians'
sensitivity to slights by foreigners. Lagos' wartime
experier:e al,.o thrust it more directly into the
mainsLwam of African affairs. In consequence,
Nigerian pronouncements bega. io take on a more
sharpl,r nationalistic and xenophobic tone �less pro-
Western and more pro- African. And while Gowon has
been careful to avoid overly his Western
creditors. he has preserved Nigeria's wartim� -lift
toward militant e_crnalignment as a basic element in
Lagos' current foreign policy posture.
In the space of 6 short years, Gowon has developed
into a confident and charismatic leader. fie has bvdi a
constituency among th.� many small tribes in
Nigeria particularly those in the north and the
cast �and he also has strong support from one faction
of the Yoruba tribe. Despite his many titles �he is
chief of state, Head of the Federal Military
Government, Commander in Chief of the armed
forces, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council,
and President of the Federal Executive Council �he
continues to live a comparatively_ simple life and to
avoid identification with the blatant corruption
characteristic of much, :;f the military and political
hierarch\ He seems to view himself as it mediator who
operates by consensus. But while he is known to have
been successfully pressure(; to change his position on i t
few specific issues, Gowon generally determines what
the consensus will he on subjects about which he feels
strongly. He respects the views of tie predominantly
civilian Federal Executive Council, and he presents all
decrees to the more powerful Supreme Military
Council for its approval. The key decisions, however,
are either made by Gowon himself �with the help of a
group of unofficial advisers who occasionally meet
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I
with him in closed session at Lagos' Dodan Barracks
or are left, with Gowon's concurrence, to senior civil
servants.
Gowon's blueprint for Nigeria's future rests on his
dedication to what he views as the inseparable
concepts of a multistate federation and a strong
central government in which minor tribesmen play a
key role. And while his repeatc a disavowals of any
personal political aspirations may be genuine, he has
made it abundantly clear that there will he no hasty
return to civilian rule. Even his announced target data
of 1976 remains in doubt, becai it rests on prior
fulfillment of nearly all of the objectives contained in
the nine -point program he set forth in October 1970.
This program, which extended-the existing bans on
strikes and political parties, covers 1) reorganization of
the armed forces, 2) implementation of the Seco�id
Natioual Development Plan (1970 -74), 3) eradication
of corruption in political life, 4) settlement of the
question of the creation of more states, i) preparation
and adoption of a new constitution, 6) introduction of
a permanent revenue allocation formula between the
federal and state governments, 7) conduct of a
national population census, 8) organization of
genuinely national political parties, and 9)
organization of elections and installation of popularly
elected governments in the states and at the center.
Gowon's program has generated some dismay
among Nigeria's sidelined civilian politicians, wbo,
naturally ene,:igh, would prefer to see the military step
aside without much further delay. His critics� citing,
inler ultra, the govvniment's failure to inure more
resolutely against corruption and the deliberate
deferral of the sensitive additional states issue until
1974� maintain that Gowon is avoiding difficult or
potentially unpopular decisions and is seeking to
divert attention from pressing problems through
grandstand plays in the foreign police area. And it is
true that progress toward achievement of the military
government's stated objectives has been almost
imperceptible in some fields. Moreover, the pace of
change has suffered to some extent from Gowon's
frequent trips abroad. Although the Chief of Staff of
Supreme Headquarters, Major General Ekpo,
reportedly is empowered to act for him during his
absences., in practice all important decisions must
await Gowon's return. On balance, however, Gowon's
deliberate approach to his country's domestic
problems seems well suited to Nigerian circumstances.
While he has not spelled it out in every case, Gowon
has worked his objectives int.) a relatively firm order of
priorities. For the present, his primary objectives are to
maintain internal stability while strengthening the
economic anc: psychological foundations of national
unity. Hence i ::iplementation of the 4 -year
development ,Ian, consolidation of the new state
bureaucracies, and cultivation of patriotic fervor take
precedence over the removal of corrupt �but
influential and hard to replace� officials.
Each of Gowon's nunvs has been carefully tailored
to promote the idea of one Nigeria. An interim
formula for a more equitable distribution of federal
revenues was adopted in April 1970. Coordination of
the economic plans produced by the individual states
was effected at the federal level later that vev r. For its
part, the federal development pla-i stresses >xpendi-
ttires on infrastructure, new industry, and agricultural
l.rojects which are either of c, ;vious cornmon benefit
e;r which promise to narre.nv the gap between the richer
and poorer states. And all this has been combined with
a strong dose of economic nationalism. By joinin tile
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and
through a series of unilateral e; actments and tough
negotiating sessions, the Nigerians have underscored
their intent to secure a much greater degree of
participation in foreign business than exists A present.
The same spirit is reflected in Lagos' decision to
further distance itself from its colonial past by
decimalizing its currency and system of measurement.
Like his domestic policies, Gowon's approach to
foreign affairs has been conditioned by his desire to
develop Nigerian unity and economic independence.
Although his extensive travels �he has visited some 20
African countries in the past 3 years �have occasioned
a good bit of grumbling within the political and
military elite, his overall performance has yielded
some gratifying results. Western investment and loans
continue at high levels. The Soviets, while under
something of a cloud since they were caught funding
the activities o; a number of leftist labor leaders last
year, have extended a $6.7 million credit for, and are
currently busily engaged in conducting, an exl ,ive
geological survey in the north. Further financial
assistance has been tendered by China. Prospects for
obtaining petroleum technology from India, the
U.S.S.R., Romania, France, and Japan have been
opened up. Nigeria's relations with its immediate
neighbors have improved to the point where it seems
possible that Lagos may eventually surmount existing
13
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currency zone barriers and join with French- speaking
states in some form of regional economic grouping.
Within the OAU, Gowan has won acclaim for the
vigor of his anticolonial rhetoric and for his efforts to
mediate disputes both within and beyond the borders
of Africa. And the publicity accorded his words and
a- -tions has had its desired effect at home. The
Nigerian public is evidencing a growing pride in their
country's new and brighter image.
Nevertheless, Gokvfm' firm plans probably extend
no farther than his second priorih objectives, e.g., the
holding of an impartial census (now scheduled for
16)73). For even if he negotiates those hurdles, how
and when he tackles his final reform goals seem likely
to depend upon the degree of success he has by then
achieved in meeting his economic targets, in
developing popular confidence in the central
government, in dampening pressure for an unwieldly
proliferation of states, and in building a broad
consensus on the proper direction of constitutional
changes.
Gowon's position is not threatened at the moment,
but the relative stability of Nigeria's postwar domestic
scene is still fragile. Given the delicacy of the problems
he will be facing by 1974� particularly with respect to
14
developing truly national political parties in an
environment characterized by a lack of strong
ideological currents and the persistence of strong tribal
allegiances �Gowan is undoubtedly concerned by
Yoruba factional infighting, the growth of anti
Yoruba sentiment in the north, the emergence of
shadow organizations based on the old political
parties, and the existence of discontented factions in
the army. Thus, while he has established the general
parameters of Nigeria's future political evolution, it
seems doubtful that he will soon abandon his current
cautious and flexible approach to reform.
In fact, no matter ho%% happy the solutions which
Gowan ultimately may find to the problems entailed
in reshaping Nigeria's political system, it is quite
possible that he will need more time to effect an
orderly return to civilian rule than his c:)untrvmen
have been told to expect. And even %%-her) the
handover does take place, the army will probably not
bow out completely. Whether or not Nigeria's
projected new constitution makes temporary provision
for some members of the c rmed forces to he ex officio
members of the government, it seems likely that the
army will long play the role of an alternative
government which could appear from the wings in the
event that the political process once again threatens to
break c:oxvn.
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7 Z'1'1'fi'1'f l'J'1
Chronology (U /OU)
1553
First English ships reach Bight of Benin.
17th century
Nigeria becomes a center of west African slave trade.
1849
First British consul appointed for Bights of Biafra and Benin.
1861
Lagos is annexed as British colony.
1886
Royal Niger Company is granted royal charter.
1912
Frederick Lugard named goveroor of Nigeria.
1914
Lagos colony and interior protectorates amalgamated as Colony
and Protectorate of Nigeria.
Firs; Legislative Ctmncil established.
1923
First elected members join Legislative Council.
1947
Ho� ses of Assembly created for each province.
1954
Federation of Nigeria created.
1958
Oil production begins.
1959
December
First direct elections for House of Representatives are contested
by the Northern People's Congress INPC), the National Conven-
tion of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG).
196(p
October
Nigeria becomes independent under NPC -NCNC coalition
government.
1962
First National Development Plan adopted.
1963
August
Mid Western Region formed out of eastern part of Western
Region.
1964
February
Government announces controversial results of 1963 census.
December
Parliamentary elections held; boycotted in Eastern Region.
1965
March
Government formed including representatives of all regions and
all major parties except Z.
October
Western Region parliamentary elections held, followed by
violence over election irregularities.
1966
January
Army coup led by Ibo; parliament is dissolved and Federal
Military Government is established; political parties are abol-
ished.
July
In military coup against II)o leadership, minority tribesmen gain
power.
1967
January
Federal military leaders meet in Ghana in an effort to agree on
powers of federal and regional military leaders.
May
Federal government decrees 12 states will replace former four
regions; state of emergency declared.
Eastern Region secedes as Republic of Biafm.
July
Federal forces invade Biafra and civil war begins.
1968
July
France announces support for Ibo "right to self determination."
1970
January
Civil war ends with Biafran surrender.
October
General Gowon reveals "nine -point program" and sets 1976 as
target date for return to civilian rule.
November
Second National Development Plan announced.
1971
July
Nigeria joins Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
October
General Gowon appoints reconstituted Federal Exec rt.ve Coun-
cil.
15
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AREA BRIEF*
LAND
Size: 357,000 sq. mi.
Use: 24% arable (13% of total land area under cultivatio,),
35% forested, 41 desert, waste, urban, or other
Land boundaries: 2,507 mi.
WATER:
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 30 n. mi.
Coastline: 530 mi.
PEOPLE:
Population: About 58,020,00^ average annual growth rate
2.7% (current)
Ethnic divisions: 250 tribal groups, of which most important
are Hausa- Fulani (north), t.,u and Yoruba (south); these 3
groups total over 60% of population; about 27,000 non- Africans
Religion: 47% Muslim, 34.5% Christian, 18.5% other
Literacy: Est. 25%
Language: English official; Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo also widely
used
Labor force: Approx. 22.5 million, about 41% of total popula-
tion; only about 700,000 are wage earners, of wiiom 8% are in
agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing; 7% in mining and
quarrying; 8% manufacturing; 22% construction; 2% electricity;
8% commerce; 8% transportation and communication; 37%
services
Organized labor: About 530,000 wage earners belong to some
700 unions
GOVERNMENT:
Legal name: Federal Republic of Nigeria
Type: Federal republic since 1963; under military rule since
January 1966
Capital: Lagos
Political subdivisions: 12 states, 11 headed by a military gover-
nor and one by a civilian administrator
Legal system: Based on English common law, tribal law, and
Islamic law; new constitution to be prepared
Branches: Federal Military Government, administered by Su-
preme Military Council and largely civilian Federal Executive
Council
'The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973
issue of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is
unclassified /official use only unless otherwise indicated.
16
Government leader: Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of Federal
Military Government and Commaader in Chief of Nigerian
Armed ?-orces
Suffrage: Universal adult suffrage (except for women in former
Northern Regen)
Elections: Promised for 1576
Political parties and leaders: Political parties and politically
active tribal societies were dissolved by decree on 24 May 1966;
some sub rosy political activity continues
Communists: The banned Socialist Workers and Farmers Partv
and the Nigerian Trade 'lnion Congress have a limited political
following
Member of: Commonwealth, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ILO,
IMCO, OPEC, IMF, ITU. OAU, Seabeds Committee, U.N.
UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, Lake Chad Basin Como::ission,
Niger River Commission, EC:A, African Development Bank
ECONOMY:
GDP: $6.8 billion(FY71 -72 est.), about $100 per capita; 12%
est. growth rate FY71 -72
Agriculture: Main crops peanuts, cotton, aarr� rubber, yams,
cassava, sorghum, palm oil and kernels, millet, corn, rice; live-
stock; almost self- sufficient
Fishing: Catch 1,.56,0(10 r:etric tons (1970 est.); imports $4.1
million (1970)
Major industries: Processing industries �oil palm, peanut, cot-
ton, rubber, petroleum, wood, hides, skins; manufacturing
industries textiles, cement, building materials, food products,
footwear, chemicals, printing, ceramics; mining �crude oil,
natural gas, coal, tin, columbite
Electric power: 1,11 ;,000 kw. capacity (1971); 1.7 billion kw.-hr.
produced (1971), 30 kv -hr. per capita
Exports: $1,659 million 'f.o.b., 1971); oil, peanuts, palm prod-
ucts, cocoa, rubber, cotton, timber, tin
Imports: $1,507 million (c.i.f., 1971); machinery and transport
equipment, manufactured goods, textiles, chemicals
Major trade partners: U.K., EC, U.S.
Aid: (received) U.S. (economic) 1949 -71 $338 million author-
ized; Poland, $28 million extended (1971); Czechoslovakia,
$14 million credit extended (1965); U.K. (1964 -68) est. $99.4
million; other donors include IBRD, West Germany, Nether-
lands, Italy, Japan, U.S.S.R.. U.S. (military), $2 million
(1962 -71); (extended) $3 million loan to Dahomey (1972) (S)
Monetary conversion rate: 1 Nigerian pound US$3.04
(official)
Fiscal year: 1 April -31 March
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SECRET
COMMUNICATIONS:
Railroads: 2,178 route mi.; 3'6" gage
Highways: 55,400 mi.; 9,500 mi. paved (mostly bituminous
surface treatment); 45,900 mi. laterite, gravel, crushed stone,
improved earth
Inland waterways: 5,330 mi. consisting of Ni�P- and Benue
rivers and smaller rivers and creeks; addi!;onally, the newly
formed Kainji Lake has several hundred miles of navigable
lake routes
Pipelines: Crude oil, 580 mi.; natural gas, 40 mi.; refined prod-
ucts, 3 mi.
Ports: 2 major, 10 minor
Merchant marine: 1 cargo ships (1,000 CRT or over) totaling
83,605 GRT, 122,340 D WT (C)
Civil air: 13 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 77 usable; 12 with permanert surface runways; 4 with
runways 8,000 11,999 ft., 25 with runways 4,000 -7,999 ft.; 4
seaplane stations
Telecommunications: Composed of radio -relay links, open -wire
liw.., a radiocommunication stations; principal center Lagos,
secondary centers Ibadan and Kaduna; 80,000 telephones; 1.3
million to 3 million radio receivers, 75,000 TV receivers; 25 AM,
6 FM, and 8 TV stations; 2 submarine cables
DEFENSE FORCES:
Personnel: Army 256,400, navy 2,200 (including 14 British
advisers, 13 Indian officers), air force 5,500 (plus 28 Soviet,
and 5 Egyptian technicians and pilots), police force 32,000;
males 15 -49, 13,365,000; 6,473,000 fit for military service (C)
Major ground units: 3 infantry divisions (24 brigades, 149 in-
fantry battalions); 1 reconnaissance battalion; 1 field artillery
battalion; I field engineer battalion; 1 signal battalion; 1 inde-
pendent arriso.: command (S)
Ships: 1 destroyer escort, 10 patrol, I mine warfare, 1 amphib-
ious warfare, 5 auxiliary, and service craft (C)
Aircraft: 95 (37 jet, 50 prop, 8 helicopters) (S)
Supply: Army materiel imported primarily from Algeria, U.K.,
U.S.S.R., and West Germany; dependent for ships primarily
on U.K. and U.S.S.R.; received aircraft from Czechoslovakia,
Egypt, and the U.S.S.R. (C)
Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 March 1973,
$497,000,000; 18% of total budget (C)
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY:
Special Branch of Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Army Intel-
ligence Corps, and Research Division of Ministry of External
Affairs, intelligence; Nigerian Police Foice, security (S)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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17

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U /OU)
I COORDINATES
o iN o /E.
Aba.... 5 07 7 22
Abeokuta 7 09 3 21
Abuja 9 10 7 11
Ado Ekiti 7 38 5 13
Afam... 4 49 7 19
Agbaja Plateau (plateau) 7 55 6 40
Alakiri 4 35 7 01
Alesa -Eleme (oil refinery) 4 45 7 06
Aliade 7 18 8 29
Apapa.. 6 27 3 22
Asaba 6 11 6 45
Awuru Canal (canal) 9 42 4 38
Bansara 6 27 8 33
Baro.... 8 36 6 25
Bauchi 10 19 9 50
Benin, Bight of (bight) 5 30 4 00
Benin City 6 20 5 38
Benin Province (former prov) 6 30 6 00
Benin River (strm) 5 45 5 04
Benue sirm 7 48 6 46
Biafra, Bight of (bight) 320 9 20
Bida.... 9 05 6 01
Birnin Kudu 11 27 9 30
Bodo... 4 37 7 16
Bomu... 4 38 7 18
Bonny 4 26 7 10
Bonny River (sirm) 4 23 7 06
Bornu Province (former prop) 12 00 12 30
Bugumt: Creek 4 36 6 59
Bukuru 9 48 8 52
Burutu 5 21 5 31
Calabar 4 57 8 19
Chad, Lake (lake) 13 20 14 00
Chanomi Creek (navig char) 5 23 5 27
Chari, Chad (strm) 12 58 14 31
Cotonou, Dahomey 6 21 2 26
Cross River (strm) 4 42 8 21
Dakar, Senegal 14 40 17 26 W.
Degema 4 45 6 46
Ebeji (strm) 12 32 14 11
Ebocha 5 28 6 41
Ebubu 4 47 7 09
E bute Metta 6 29 3 23
Ede..... 7 44 4 26
Egbema 4 56 6 33
Ekulama 4 34 6 44
Elelenwa (oilfield) 4 51 7 04
Enugu 6 26 7 29
Eriemu (oil field) 5 35 6 02
Escravos River (distributary) 5 35 5 10
Esie.... 8 13 4 54
Fernando P6o, Equatorial Guinea (isl) 3 30 8 42
Forcados 5 22 5 26
Forcados River (strm) 5 23 5 19
Fort -Lamy, Chad 12 07 15 03
Funtua 11 32 7 19
Gam baru 12 22 14 13
Garoua, Cameroon 9 18 13 24
Gombe 10 37 11 10
Gongolo siren) 9 30 12 04
Ibadan 7 23 3 54
Idiroko 6 38 2 44
Idogo 6 50 2 55
Ife...... 7 28 4 34
Ifo..... 6 49 3 12
Ijebu Ode 6 49 3 56
Ikerre 7 30 5 14
Ikom... 5 58 8 42
Ila Orangun 8 01 4 54
Ilesha 7 37 4 44
Illel a 13 44 5 18
Ilorin 8 30 4 33 i
Imo River (strm) 4 36 7 31
Iwo..... 7 38 4 11
Jebba.................................. 9 08 4 50
Jones Creek (deltaic watercourse)........... 5 42 5 19
Jos 9 55 8 54
Jos Plateau (plateau) 10 00 9 30
Kachia 9 52 7 57
Kaduna... 10 31 7 26
Kadu Junction (railroad station)......... 10 29 7 25
COORDINATES
Selected Airfields
3enin City 6 lA 5 36
alabar 4 58 820
4nugu 6 .3 7 34
usau 12 10 6 42
badan 7 26 3 55
os 9 52 8 54
aduna 10 36 7 27
ano 12 03 8 31
,altos 6 35 3 20
Iaiduguri 11 51 13 05
'ort Harcourt 4 51 7 01
okoto 13 00 5 15
Vawa 9 54 4 29
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3
o
'N o 'E.
Kafanchan
9 35
8 18
Kainji Dam (dam)
9 52
4 36
Kano
12 00
8 31
Kaura N amoda
12 36
6 35
Koko...
5 59
5 26
Kokori
5 40
6 04
Komadugu Yobe (strm)
13 42
13 20
Kontsgora
10 24
5 29
Korokoro
4 43
7 18
Krakrama
4 32
6 57
Kuru...
9 43
8 51
Kwa Ibo (strm)
4 32
7 59
Lagos
6 27
3 23
Lalate
7 36
3 27
Lokoja
7 48
6 44
Maiduguri
11 51
13 09
Makurdi
7 44
8 32
Mamfe, Cameroon
5 46
9 17
MBede
5 28
6 44
Midd.e Belt (region)
8 00
8 00
Minna
9 37
6 33
M ushin
6 32
3 22
New Bussa
9 53
4 31
Ngala
12 20
14 11
Nguru
12 53
10 28
Niger Delta (delta)
4 50
6 00
Niger strm
5 33
6 33
Nsukka
6 52
7 23
Numan
9 28
12 02
Obigbo
4 52
7 08
Odidu
6 06
6 57
Offa....
8 09
4 43
Ogbom osho
8 08
4 16
Oginibo
5 23
5 50
Ogoja
6 40
8 48
Oguta
5 42
6 48
Okrika
4 44
7 05
Oloibiri
4 41
6 19
Onitsha
6 10
6 47
Ore.....
6 45
4 52
Oron
4 50
8 14
Oroni (oilfield)
5 20
6 10
Oshogbo
7 46
4 34
Owerri
5 29
7 02
Owerri (oilfield)
4 55
7 20
Owo....
7 11
5 35
Oyo
7 51
3 56
Oza oilfield
4 55
7 20
Pambeguwa
10 40
8 17
Port Harcourt
4 46
7 01
Porto -Novo, Dahomey
6 29
2 37
Potiskum
11 43
11 04
Rumuekpe (gasfield)
4 59
6 45
Sapele
5 55
5 42
Shagamu
6 51
3 39
Shiroro Gorge (gorge)
9 59
6 50
Sokoto 13 04
5 15
Ughelli
5 30
5 59
Um u Etchem
5 01
7 02
Vom
9 44
8 47
Warri
5 31
5 45
Yaba
6 32
3 23
Yelwa 10
50
4 44
Yola
9 12
12 29
Zarin 11
04
7 42
Zinder, Niger 13
48
8 59
Selected Airfields
3enin City 6 lA 5 36
alabar 4 58 820
4nugu 6 .3 7 34
usau 12 10 6 42
badan 7 26 3 55
os 9 52 8 54
aduna 10 36 7 27
ano 12 03 8 31
,altos 6 35 3 20
Iaiduguri 11 51 13 05
'ort Harcourt 4 51 7 01
okoto 13 00 5 15
Vawa 9 54 4 29
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

Vegetation
okoto
Bosoo Ksos
n'.
r
Nsidugurl
Montane vegetation
Short -grass savanna
Sudan savanna
Tall -grass savanna
High rain forest
Fresh -water swamp
Mangrove (salt -water
swamp)
Noon
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3
is
sdool
Bauchi
n'.
r
Nsidugurl
Montane vegetation
Short -grass savanna
Sudan savanna
Tall -grass savanna
High rain forest
Fresh -water swamp
Mangrove (salt -water
swamp)
Noon
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

Economic Activity
z
INDUSTRY
efinery Plywood giant
it it Sugar mill
owerplant i Textile mill
AGRICULTURE
Peanuts Sesame seed
Oil palm r Cotton
Cocoa J Rubber
's.* .:r I`. s eat... `"Yr r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3
s
Tin ore and columbite
Coal
Iron ore

ZUUU/Ub/I b:
Population
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100002-3
ti

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3
i
Tribal Groups
KANUR!
Makltgrri
1 1 Keinrr 1
NUPE
brin,
Y O R U B A Lokoi>i e
Ibadan
w
1 Enugu
1B
PRINCIPAL TRIBES
=Hausa and Fulani
I (inter mingled)
Port
Harcourt Calabar Ibo Yoruba
MINOR TRIBES
Kanun Edo
Ibibro -Efik I Nupe
Try Ilaw
Other
Summary Map
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

E
Maradi
Wurno
Isa
Dosso i
1030' Sokoto Shinkafi Katsina
.z38 aura
SOK O
0 0 PLAINS Ta Kaura
a s Namoda j
Mafara
Birnin Kabbi
y Je g a Yash
P `,r�
Gummi usau
12
311
e a Kan
1ppear .o� ,922
Vo
2797 r\
chat
I
F I Funta
orth- Ilestern d
Kan di 31
aria
Yelwa O r t h- n V r I
r
D homy 2
Kainli Kaduna
Lake 41 Kontagora J
870 0
ai 1S
Oli Waw Da \J
2ungeru r J O S
36
Yashikera Cain 3015
Minna afanchan
Par kou
C 1} P A T
Mokwa
Abuja
S Jebba Wuya
Bids
`iagi j
Shaki
A K w a r a Baro
Ila
y I f I
x.159, n
OgbO n osho Off
,9 61 e
r Lq Benue
Iseyin
p O y e Ede Oshogbo kcja 1
Ferry
p Iwo Ilesha i Makurd
Lalate
Ikerre Okene 1620
L ..2
Ibadan ife
Wes e
5 Akure Owo
Abeokuta V I .J Oturkpo
Ondo
PobA 7 /ICIILL
090 Ito Shagei, /Nsukka
Ijebu r 1 v
Obe 633. 1873* Ig
orto r
mal
a
ovo Ado
.r pa L (Okitipupa Enu u
p Benin Cif Q
Cotonou r'
J
Asaa t entral bakaliki
M i W s t e r n onitsha
Koko
eoa Af o pt �SS I
Sapele
e
PS Okigwi
ri Kokori 0
I L q
ES OtsJO Warri Ughelli y 1 Mbede Owerri Umuahi
r
6 0 5 U. c
FO tc a Forcados y p
Ikot
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

j
Gurnmi us'. j ow Tala a Namoda
Mafar,
Birnin Kebbi V
Yash
usau
211
aya K an
upper o 922
Volta
P
2797 P
C hal I
i Funtba
North estern
Kandi
31
aria
i Yelwa o r t h ntr
D homey
Ka Kaduna
Kamp
Lake 42 Kontagora J
ainji i 11
Oli wow Dam
Zungeru 0S
Yashikera &in J6 3015 t
Minna J afanchan
Parkou
P A T ZA 1
Mokwa
Wuya Abuja
Jebba
i Bida
J Laiiagi�
Shaki A T
E .Q K W Baro
Ilort F a r a
j Lafia
1 y J
Ogbo n osho 1661 Off B e n e
r Sav Q Benue
Iseyin
l 41
J
p'F Oy Ede Oshogbo k01�
O9 0 r erry
Iwo Ilesha i Makurdi
Lalate
Ikerre Okene 1620
Iba He
5 Akure Owo J
Abeokuta U Oturkpo
Ondo
Pob6
Sha r'il
a
Idogo Ifo g Ijebu r 533. v Nsukka 1873' Ig j malq, -t
Obe
o oko 'a �1 .0 f
IOVO Ado J Pe L Okilipupa J C Enu U
p Benin Cif Q
"Olonou
akaliki
s
M i W s t e A a a nitsha t antral
Koko
ss
eo Afi o G
Sapele
PC, Okigwi 951
T i Kokori r 0 e
2 ti
E SCtaJO Warr Ughelli 1 Mbede Owerri muahi
r f y l
01C Force o
Force os cf G Q\a 'r
Ekpene
Bight of Benin F' Abal SO h a e
v l r kw Uy�
Y agoa e a 6 Calabar
o Y
Oron Q err
ibiri Deg me rt He rt
omu
Bight of B
Names and boundary representation iafra
�4 are n ot n aufhor
I
4
100&94 12 -72
a C entral Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

tdombe
Kurno
J
K u
z5as
i A Pain
1 80 1805
Y
r Shendarn .t Jalingo
e
6700'
ue. Piatea
Wukari
ot
�rte
Serti
2 t
Ttllcum'"
K 5905
Al
Banyo
Ogoja Nkambe
597
Wum
a
Nkongsamba
Ku
Ekon
Foumban
7 Dschang
Cameroon
Yaou
liiret tV a m to -0 p n
t
r
e
Chad
M'
Jimetat Garoua `l
1
Yola
eeO
u
tl-
Ngaound6r6
Nigeria
International boundary
State boundary
National capital
Calabar State capital
Railroad
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road
y Airfield
.L Major port
Populated places
O Over 100,000
O 40,000 to 100,000
Under 40,000
Spot elevations in feet
Scale 1:2,950,000
0 25 50 75
Statute Mlles
0 25 50 75
Kilometers
5
ell
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3

SECRET
NO FORE1CN DISSEM
SECRET
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100002 -3