NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 32B; SOUTHERN YEMEN (ADEN); ARMED FORCES

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100023-0
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SECRET
328/GS
;i
Yemen (Aden)
July 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
.f
SECRET
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y r
1.
YEMEN (ADEN)
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the armed forces coverage
in the Southern Yemen portion of the General
Survey on Southern Yemen /Muscat Oman dated
Scptcmher 1969.
A. Defense establishment 1
1. Historical 2
2. Command structure 5
B. joint activities 5
1. Military manpower 5
2. Strength trends 6
3. Training 6
4. Military budget 7
5. Logistics 7
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,Page
C. Army 7
L Organization 8
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 8
3. Training 9
4. Logistics 9
D. Navy 10
1. Organization 11
2. Strength, composition, and disposition... 11
3. Training 11
4. Logistics 12
Page
E. Air Force 12
1. Organization 13
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 13
3. Training 1.4
4. Logistics 14
F. Paramilitary 15
1. Public Security Force 15
2. Revolutionary Security Service 15
3. Popular Forces 16
4. People's Militia 16
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1 Defense o.-ganization chart) 4
Fig. 2 Armed forces personnel strengths
(table) 6
ii
Page
Fig. 3 SO.1 -class small submarine chaser
(Photo) 10
Fig. 4 At Tawahi Naval Base photo) 11
Fig. 5 BAC -167 Strikemaster photo) 12
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A. Defense establishment
1�he arrnt�d forces of tilt, Ice(ple's beruocr:itie
ltepubliv of Yernrn (1 1 .11MLY.)t consist of t 1?,t11N1-
r)tan arum a nays with a compterneut ctf nine .mall
�vsscls and about 3 0) persoiutt� 111d an air forcc with
i? aircraft and ,tit eslimated 23.3.pc�nonnel: 'There are
forts paramilitary. intelligence, or militia or-
"1'liv Riel,le'% Demoeratie� Itettnhtie�ed vem+�ie k itl�o n�tc'twel tu:u
1'1.111rei 4,114.01:
ganizalions: tilt- 50X0 -tium I'nblic Svetiri(A For.w: this
small 11eolutiomi.q Security Service: the Popular
Forces. around ?ANA strong: acid tilt- :3.tttK1-lojMIt)-
ill an I'vople s Militia. (S)
The primary mission (if the� atillutl forces is natiot,;ll
defetlse and dw mailitelialu- of internal secnrit.
Since the British ill November 1967, the
armed forct's ability to Carr mil their mission It:ts
liven tv"Ird list au11HIMI .11 1 MMons I" dissident trib(�s.
exiled political factions, anti depust�ti sheikhs. Iit 1971
nsilitar forces efIvelivelr repelled a sma[I arj'd ill
pl:utnml invasion by it etntlilion of dissident ferves
5nl)p0tted -b' the armx and air force of tilt- Yvss,en
Arah Iiepabhc (Y.A.'R l," Horder hostilities luji e
ucctured sra�r:d limes. with I'. D.B.I. 'forces i1jx jdiTqt
Y.A.H. territory and don Avilhdrit inn. Confron-
kdionr of Ye�111cri (.�Aden l with its neighbors are tilt
resirlls t.f the gcwvrimivw radical Marxist
urienlalion. .Inch it frv()uent1v atlenspts to export to
other states of t)lv Arabian 1'el dasitla. (C)
The :trrtrt�d forc�cs coakl /tut suctcsslnllc deft�ild
:tgaisi.st a major p(mer. They hare- howevi r.:pelled
incim-ions from tilt- Y.A.R. and prolt:clsly could
ithstaud a militar :ttl:u�k In tiandi Andlia, lint
slit pro11ir pl:oulim! aitd (.xrcrttiolt. it 01131Wne�d
invasion by VAIL Sandi Arabian. am) dissident
forces 'would possibly succeed: bowet�er, such a threat
is arllikeiv ill the� mar terns, (ti)
Ar m� leadership has displayed iraat;inalicm and
resourcefulness ill crnnbalhig t�nernies of the re,Liuse
:And in dq)loying forces rapidly to widely separaled
trolibly six)a. It leas also cnndaeted well- planned joint
cij)erstieIns. and dcrl)iI(- lli emisidtrahle strain
imltosvd by combal aperations. no scrimis breakdown
livVein�tlAtaitIIvIitl[> tie i, ;it %Uiri�rnY1laa a
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in the arm's li system has octn 'I IIV air
force' Iia% expanded ill six!- e}'e'r flit' pas[ several years.
Air cress cais now flu operational gromi altack
InissiorlS :1, �ell as lr; supplies :itld a +(lrtil)ineul
to arin� imils. T w link is t air dt,fcttse
Nk.%tcrlt, Which is scaltvred' :md imi inlegralvd. '11m
oay�'s capability waters
slid providing iifnited scalilt as to tilt, atnry.
Although tilt! govi-rmnent Iris. %'itll Soviet Support.
apparcudy increased the development of the slat y.:It
Will probably rrtmlin tiltdeast importasil of the regular
armed forces. (S)
The primary weaknesses of the armed forces are the
votllplov dependetsue on foieigrt; primarily Soviet.
militory assistance, tilt, low exloca'tiotsal lecl of the
persiumei, and friction re�.gAtiieg 'froth llolitic.tl aied
tribaldifferviicvs. By Noveniber 1979, ill ;ill aticlmpl It.)
discourage tribalism. ito tribal flames %ere! being Itsed
by members if the awned forces. (E:)
Since independullue, the arum forcers have not
greatly interfer with the civiliarl oi of tilt!
goyernmetil, altitoogh ma ny armed forces� persomiel
are lilt fill lers of the ailing Nitionill front (NF)
organizatiorl. usually ,nct-n grtrmblitig :end. intefluil
dispiltes have reached: a lxsint here intemelitioil by
the arintid forces might he t;;xlxctecl, alt external t1ireat
against the KD.R.Y. has dVVeluped hiulr#sas lend the!
effect o f urtiting t he comitry. (C)
Prior to its establishmew its an independent immitry
in \oveneber 1967, the states exte�rmil dcfeose acid
internal security were the resimusibility of the United
Kingd which provided till expanding ill ligenolls
ground forces with all materiel. Since. imlep nc�
eudce
tine P.1).1i.1'. has swills torard.the Coimllunist state.
for assistance. "IIiiere are uo known bilateral military
:llliatrces or treaties, but `lcuhtlieal and militar
;essistatsce agreements have liven concluded wit the
U.S.S.R., Fast. CCrI1lal y. Ilmigar�, and \'firth Korea
and lxsssibIV With lilt, Peop)ic" S RrI)llblic Of 041141 and
Syria. (5)
Of prime importaittue is Soviet aid. The fits! Iwo
Stsyiet 1',1:11.1'. military rid pact, were eouchide f ill
February and August W8, and otlu�rs have bcrit
reached si nce. U nd er art a grcernent signed ill 197 1,
whose value is an estimalml ILMIO million. medintll
lacks, Ila�;il craft, light jel borldiers. ated heiicoplerr'
are to lx, provided. Unity talks hoween tilt� two
Yemens in November 1977 were prece by
ll. 1).R.Y.- Lt.S.S:R. a)osultations in filoseow. at whic#1
time the Sovie's pledged' to co ntinue to [fell)
strenf"theu f'.1) :St.l', defellses. Since late 1969 the
U.S.S.R. bas llad permission to use sconige facilities ill
Aden. but it has never been allowed to use Aden as a
1. liitactricsl
l #tc.,,listesr :.erf tlir�; :irrn� geies ks:1c�k:tu 11'irlc# It'ar.:l,
ncllat batl'aliotsc)f iilfuntry l'as fezriiied ikh lualiy
e�tili,lrt# :Ir. :lsto e:1)nfrout t'urki +ii tr[uslrti lltre:ticliirii;
the port city cef Advil. The! unit, was cli� lsandt1l i ll 1925
bit! re- fisrntrtl in .li}K as lilt, tldt�tt l 'roilect dictioil
of the Fedvrt of So tth ;Ilrabia Coverminent and
%viis r ede.,ign ate d "ti Fedend ltes;ula Army (FRA B%
1964. [lie t=RA compriwd five :ilil"witty bultalinns. atI
a rmore d ca sc ltiadrots, and a signal ryiwdroti. lit Dime
Mil four 1xittaliotis of tine Federal Gmml (National
Guard) were a ;ith the FRA. Shorty
tbere.4ter. a lentil battalion s+ rt,eroited, anti early
ill MiS the three battalions of [lie Hadrami lkedoitiri
Legion. an internal security forue ill the former
Eastern Advil Protec torate. ere a dded 't(r tilt' artily.
(1 I OU)
Under British tutelage uut�il irrclependentv-. the
arts %%-as well traiutxl its moquitaiis warfare� tactics.
i lie[ udiug :lielicopter- Inmit� of)vrations. S011le tulitS also
nx're trained along British lines For tirinm 'iutertral
security operations. '!Willi Soviet assistance., nitivii
begatl ill 1%S. lilt art,.y has expanded to six "lerigades
and continues to improve its cap abilitie,. Since
itidelmidence it lt:ls been effectively cxsmbating
clissidetit o1wrrtiotis dinrcted from the Y.A.R. and
Sawli Arabia. 'Elie ariti s otilr military setback
occurred on ?ti \ovendie'r 1969: approxim :tlely two of
its infantry h uttahlnis su pported by armor ca
crossed into Satich Arabia allot captured f(le �hosier
host at Wittlay`a Ill but were repulsed by Satidi arnied
forcers, particularly by the Roval Saiul Air Form (S)
'rhe P:1.R.Y. Navy was farmed in 1466 as the.Siiuth
Arabian Mow, :allot the United Kingdom age. :exl to
'Far diacritics 4m plocr nauxcs, wx the� list ut n:itne's oil) the aptoll
Of fill' 514111MI ry Mill) ill flier (:nllrltrr I'rtllifir chajw2r, aim the !nail
it ridW three .in�hire:ailinrsvex�Ixrti us well :s 11.
training Inil .r :trldt'd ::rid
ma he :ipproaching plainicd strt�Ili;tlls.
:3. Training (S)
Armed forces Irainilig has inttrvast d S�L1riflC :nki'I+
since l by fir:�t soviet w ee tjlttos were ir1lrad:kcK (l ill 1965.
The Soviet \liMai F%dVisor% C T001), the 11`jll(Jj)JI
will's are advisers to the :srinr(l farces, is he:tdcluarlewd
ill Adel) and ciituUnl Ill :k uaajorg "nee :d. Tr,lil ailltz.
(�olrl'ses :lr.* conduct d 1(061' ill 'fin� 1'.17,111'. Mid ill
forcign .ctiointria., primarily 0tv U.S.S.R. In 1971 and
I972.1 alt ;ariueil (owes traitives
:ven� scut to and mill.ow 1 frotli the U.S.S.,K.
Soviet n t issioll 1 1ec:Illic (Illite distre�sse'd Ill 19i l toyer
the arrival io eusert ;den) iu 15); l ef :ij;lil arn1S rind
eight air force :Idvisers front life Peoples kc1 iiblic of
.FIGURE 2. aerminei sit ngths of the armed forces W
*^Thie lair ftura was �ttittwit�ui ail foreign,! nctrart. onnr
'during 11107'niad 1pfis.
li
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,salt
1i:.tt
\t
'rEYr .+t
.(HMl' M1W
m
15
illi('t
*11
INS........
9.1mill
50
Tel
0,w it)
s'l
life
}I tti
1i171i...._......
,ITlNI
!4141
i_'11
1971....
111, 1IHl
lilll
146
lu. 3:3(1
I',i7
12.000
:scoot
*^Thie lair ftura was �ttittwit�ui ail foreign,! nctrart. onnr
'during 11107'niad 1pfis.
li
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C106.1. l?aex't] WWII Ills thrral, thr5ovk-1 mission
a 1) Irently: forut rm.11.Y. [:overmavrit to .rersd
tlte:C:hincse military advi3Os house.
Secend Tither 6Ymntnes� such as I rail and Syria. have
In ide I i:m in the arined farces nn a ulpelr
rIIaller Belle: Six 1 :I ?:ita`. mililary officers wem
eyx_Mvd fruiii the Siul: liies, Military Avadeni
!4)i,, l, apjrirenili. fcir' liolitiCal rcasolls; lit n4. have
nIurn[d -Easi C4 tray al becinidiicti
military Iriiaini; ifi ailditiim to its training of 1'.1).11.1".
secnmv forces.
NI OS r. in- Countri lrainiill; is Y:irductc[l a! :Idcst,
r
althrni uciits ;Nsir._I liri ill th field: The armed forces
11.IVV: eyinldurtcei jciiot traittiul exercises daring 19 l
aril IS}7?. In a the urine Itas frequently
i mm ded: training; iii lkiraiI il;tary forces.
I'ihttc:t] iriiloctricrtiioil isotie:asp ctof training;
has been. recc i'in increasing; rrttphasisMirmi Bout lilt!
armed forces. 1tr Xiarchv 14711 the. [mist of Depot;
Minister of Defi?nse for Moral and Political 0iidaIic r
was created thus refleeling; the eMenl of the
i overmliefiCs concern fea the "po litical cnlig;htcn-
iii_rtifi of Ase armed forces,
Based oil effectiv e >f the v:uious components Its
aetlud, ctatnlrat olxrr:iiiins,, ar trai seems to be
effective. chile naval iutd air force '.raining needs
itgiprovenunt, This is eslfeciaiiv true for the air forcY..
liecayse of its Igig;her technical requirentcnls. Soviet
advisory assistittice to :ill lhrev serviix+s is expected: to
increase.
4. Military budget {C)
The himiget for the repilar armed forces of the
l'eoplc`s Democratic Rep"Iblie of verrrc�ri {P.i):Fia'.) is
prepared by the finatice Office of the Ministry of
befeuse,::11111 estimates of expenditures for the. Pnhfic
Sectirity I ei[eY.' arc formulated. within the Mitlistm of
Interior. After review :usd cxxir[liit.atiou.:the sr,lsudetls
arc cilnbined to form the defense: Budget, vvi'lirh is
[lien presented In the vhhistr y of Fitumee awl
iucorlx into the! national budget. The I xeclitive
Committee reviews the- national huket ancl,
following approval. passes if 611141 1116 National frill
Command which in practice uu�reh' approvirs it as
presented_ Annual defense bticipts for fiscal, \4.0'rs
1967 tllri 1971 ate. show lit- Informatienl is
not available its tic formulation or aniotuiiti I>uel};eted
for the lievolutiomsry Security Service Popular'i'orces,
or People's Militia..
S. Logi stics
The paoeity of natural rosourevs umd Iv lmolo ;ical
skills in the I'eolle s Oemocralic Republic of 1't�uus11
prceludes all but marginal economic support for the
cullntrv's annex: for(v,%. The loss If liriti I midget
support and trump expent]ilores, combirted Wit the,
decreas its kink cring attivily at the port of Aden
because of the closure o f f iltc Suez Call-al ill 11x17, has
remilled in a cowsiti 7nhle dcclllie' ni itatimial income.
Ill addition, the defense budgets Itawc cMnsisUrrtily
accounted for to l: tge portion of the total iialion:il
himigeL absorbinv funds nc'ed(A for cconrmtie
developrtieat (C:)
'1114. 1'.I):R.l', is totallydelmident foreign sources
for military inatrrriel. Prior to itiderpeudersce ill
\owniher b)67 lilt- country relied exchisively on the
United Kingdom for armed forvvs e[luipmew and
training;. S ince them several military aid ag;reemerit,.
:allied at a total of $27 riiillion, have been cortelilded
with the `Soviet Union. Equipuiceil provid4A. by the
U.S.S.R. has irtcltuled infatilry weapons. artillery,
;irntor4.d vclticics� trucks� landing; craft.. submarine�
chaser, lielicoptcm; awl aircrafl., inchiditig I.S. fight,'
Mid transports. Lesser ;uaiuslts of grou nd forces
utat,riel have been supplied b Alge East
Gerin:uiv. I lmigary. Iraq. ;lilt] C:hiiia. M
Mil itary,eciuipnietit routinely arriS, at the port' of
Aden in merc"harit vessvk 'Flier, \�as :1. sigpificalit
imevIa,e in Soviet military truttslr.;rf'flit;hts lo Aden in
the fah of 1972 dildlit; the hostilities cilli the 1':11.11.
This: is indleative: (if thor iinporhm,x! tiler Stviert hnioti
attaches to its military support of and iireseucxr ill the
(S)
A1vii is t primary story r depot for nili:ar'
vile ipment and stipplies., which are trarisportud by
g;romid and ,,tir to units thntughoiit the..: c-mi ttry ay.
needed: Paramiliiary forces r(�(x�i\�c logistic suplzort`
frr'ni the wg;ula arrned forcc 1hspite the relative
lntsopliistic ;ilii>i.of lilt~istics. nn: major lircakdo�'ris ;lie
kyumit� to have occurred: "'hen weapuits or s0pplics
we iNeeded fur.sltecifie volubal iilksious in either parts
of the comarv. the are s 0 it %vithiu undu d elay. A
:u example. iii'Xila If)7
;uiumuiiliotY tvas flour fror
Melt itilo lliv airfield a1: Al C:havdah for lise again 1
Chtl:usi force s.- N
P.D.R.Y. DFwF%s :8uhcm_. C. ,rm- S
Milllnna of U:S dnitaR
1967 4968 190 1970,' 1
Wense butlg r:t M7 30.1 21 10.6 15.8 Ord tri 4.d ill its presenit Form earl in 14x15, the
Defense budget as a PJM l', Arrny is the preeminciit military firev in (lie
1wrcent of rrttion I c'ountr% Its p rom. Iss I is ;En'ttl Ill ".11111 ;li E1 itgil'rnnl
1udget Q0;8 49.0: S51, 52.9' 394 .ecI rity and tlitfend tile ikttkm's hound tries against
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foreign aggression. In its short hnl stortmv history. t
army has demonstrated its capability to preserve tht�
stalus (pia.
Althmigh uu ntalch against a major power, tltc
army has proved itself capable of conducting (incited
military oper:llions int Y.A.R. territory. and during
the attempted iovasion ill the fall of 1972 it was able
to pe! the 1'etneui fort of army repilars, tribal
InerCC'IlatICS. Natimial Uoily Front forces. Thv
atirn' is well trait +ed for the ;Iranian 1 has all
effective logistics system.' and is nurbile cluligh to
deploy rapidly to Iroubled areas, it also has condticttxl
well- planned joint operations with air and paraud!i-
tar� forces and }las advantageously utilired ;kit
effective intelligence System based on both Illutiall
and technical wsotin es.
\{itch of the credit for this effectivenc% must he
}tired to the U.S.S.R.. which has provi(h�cl advisers and
most of the etluiprncol. In addition to the advisers
stationed in the country, Soviet military delegations
have visited the P.D.R.Y. and inspected :utlly
brig; eele�s.
The are.. greatest %wakilvms lies in the threat of
intuoul conflict over political and tribal differences.
The 1xililical (ltiatrel, hetwreu Chairtium `Ali, who has
pre. o -C hitiesc Ivaoings, and National Front Svvrelary
General ISM il. who suPports the U.S.S.R., leas
penctraled the army. Several times during 1972, [lie
army refused to Cant halt order, from the. Natio
Front. 'In earls� 1972 C:linirman 'Ali abolished the
I.eptiblican G lard. .I Force of re u lar airmv troops o
slxcial duty. because Ile had evidimev that a laige
pnrlx)rtion of its officers here of northern 1'eincni
origin a ltlyal' to his rival, IsioXil. a northertier. 11
appears that many army officers .Art.: slo%'fly turning
against Isiuii it h ec ruse of Iris t -SoviO leanings arts!
his northern regio mil ties. Ailotlicr 5otirve of friction ill
tIkV artiM is the 'aritKl tribal makersp of its nteioliers.
'I "lie army has opt soveriNireasiom heeii on the verge of
opeli internal conflict: hilt eaelt little it has managed
to maintain its integrity. As l o t h; :I it re�tltains a
cohesive trait, it s 11011 be all t4feetiye forec ill
umthern Arabia.
1. Or} anheitihn
The Armed :horc�cs Ceneral 1leath darters at Alto
t
U. b.lvdall also filoctfow. as the :Irlliv Cencral
f leachplartt r+.. With army- persotm sen�itrg ;in ln
roles. The contrnauder of ilic :arnty. eidIl tf the Land
Foe es, mIditiollally smes as Depith� 1 rolse�
N'Iinister; lie^ .is sti6 (linate :to. the. .,CommaiM e�r .i
chief of the dm k al'.so c9livillk -till
Prime N'linistcr and Minister of Def( its i.
S
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The geller.11 staff. which appears to be tt+rile strtall.
ittclutlt's .I chief of staff :ind a del >ut% chief of general
staff. with addilimiul positions for o1wratiulls.
ititelligeoce. tnliriini;, supplies, alld adn tiIlistr(tion.
'1'lle arnlortX{ corps commander :slut artiliery corps
corlrtn.nider list) are on'the Aelleral sta 'i1w depoty
Chief of staff for intelligence supervises the Military
Intelligence Service. whwh is respoitsible f(%r militurt
inforlro collection. luiliury security, and control
of imnrgeticy.
The Artily Cener l Ilvad(luartvrh directly controls
the six brigades. which are tilt primary Welk-al units.
Although cac�h regional govertlor may have slime
dri;ree of control over, or at !(east coordination wilh.
the military omits within Itis juristliction, alt military
orders are issacd froth Abo ul):I%�tlab is the halm� of
the arms conilliatid.
0 Strength, comtlposilion. and d i sposition
Strength of the army is altproxilnateiy I?,fNtt} Allen
oritanized into six infatilry brigades of three battalioris
each, Brigade strengths. trhiclA also iilclticfe support
unit persomid, vary betweeti l.2(9} and I;fiW Ilreoa
battalion strengths ustiallr are between if H1 and .300.
Each battalion has dirve eompattics. Ili additioteto the
brigades. the army als i nelitcles a sigliz It �tt:tliolt, a
.trailling battalion. a tnilitare aade.iny. a military
police unit, it mmrher of am of vd and ,Artillery unit..
and support units. Atiny brigades are located
throltghout the ccitlntry, with troop l'nneerttratiots': ill
the cities of :Advil. Bayllan al Qukayris, Al
'Anal. Al "Ahr, and Al \'lukalla. Each .bri}t.Icle is
n�sixlnsible for crtducting military operations ill its
ttslrectitc region. As :Ili exatttple, tht :a}th Brigadc's
area of responsibility is fhar mttlring Fif6i and Sixth
govemoratesa however, the army's r1mree of effective
control is considerAlly less in these far easterly
gover1norates than ill those areas elosvr to the Neat of
power. Battalions are 1wriocltc: rotated froul 011ie
govenorate�.(und one brigsidv) :to amlther, Dorittg the
7 "rlitni ltilstilities in the fall of 1972. battalions leerc
rapidly deployed to the noft }sera liorders of the
Sevolld. 'Third, and Feuirth oventoratts. Armored
aticl artilier\ un'lt inti grits is usoally wit niaintaiite�cl:
Ajtli(wglt lure are detac litieents llnl rA >;ho lit t
ceitin 6% site uti the artillery dei.whinerit inn A lit� "ist ilul.
of Socotra. most zirt itor artd artillery are allocated IW
the'airmy command to battalions as tw(ld
+tour ci+nrlEt. d+t4Eilr�tt i:+F+iimutiarr u�r !1Er�;tliJFtant !at i 1161tl' rtldlnll'litary,
w ith' l ittle. iidrniuistritive'documentulinn. Althiwrh
this" cvttcni -rnati' have nctll lF1'rtlhilp1)rpriitioll of
collie) g()verninent snort's, .no seri oiis sliortages[if arms.
arrntsttiitiini. nr riiions 1inr bixti uotd:'iriva[I= till
9
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FIGURE .3.'Soviet SO 1= class' si
r
II1
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monne chaser erg route to Aden' in t 972 lC)
L
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ant crltiiplitel.t. Sillev t he fall if 1969. (lie soviet
l`116,11 halls had Ix rtuissioli to Ilse stora facilitiv% ill
Aden: kiln jkvllission has. never hewn itr:uilctl for the
U3 S.S:Ii: tri Ilse� :Idea as a naval' base. Fnrlher
exFi;'io,ilii of the rlavv is_expecled, bill it. will cotililloe
lu,remairl the Ir ast I of the regular forces. (S)
l ioroid1aliou, (C)
`l'hi�; na' is liticftr flit� cxintrol of Armecl 1eircr�
Genera[ tie�adeltiarten. N. Forces Coirnn:nld is
heath Fell It; At Tilwahi :Na%;11 Miss ire lilt- port of
Aden (I 1). The eudire fli-et is 1ascd :it Aden.
Ifecatise (if its sui:dl size there .lppe:Irx to lit- Ito
lreaf dii �il iflt {gxr;ttioilcll` c(III1111 ;aids or floral
districts.
2. Strength. v niprlsitiun and dispositiall' f.S)
i'lie entire. rz;ivy (if Yellielt (:Idea) c�ciilmWs of 1 i
small eissi +ls: t 'ii snhularine chasers. three in5liore.
riiitier tlY�Ix�F,'st�etrl,)tldiift; raft uini onir lirckiltai
Itr 1967 t ircn tonne r l3ntisli'ftoval`Navy Ifarll-cl :iss
iiishore nlinesu �c�cI>tr: 'are imerlianled and trlrisferrcd.
t'o -tile tle%viv iidept�llde nt l'etiNe' Republic� of SiirttII
1'6nicti. Melt iitics dicrrt a!' niiitor gunboats: The other,
U vessels have been provided "by the T.S.o',R. 'I�hrie
Sriv -.0 T-4 class uterha craft (I.CNI amb'
olic Pozharnyy -1 chiss small firchiiat were delivi-red
'Fat carmrol irifflimatiori ml srmrigIti: c -limpmilil ;Fuel
di +114hiliuli. 49' O bli&iry :all-no- Sraimuinr aucl the
Aulorrlefed Nural Older of f&r i". 1"5119 IillMikil.-d lit OIL! 044'rIsc
hiltdhittoict- Agi.iicr.
2009/06/16:
chtriog November- Oveciiiber I +.ll#, I uor uddi(iirnal.
l ;tnctiitg cr o't oriknoau type err, delivered fly the
Sovicis irrcacly 1972. 'l'he Isite >t sliitselr�Ii�cr% oe.ti.oxnrd.
ill April 1972 rltcu two sLuldard tii'1.1 �cl;t'ss slitoll
sidilnarine clfavers ere lowed Ito Advri from the Black
Sea. 'I'hcse %esm-k ar(- hcliered to by earl of all arras
agreement sigried ill \lo umv in Ovtobvr .1971. Al
craft we hasrd at Advii. with oolr oveasional patrols
;long lilt- co.isttioc� ti, Al Mitkal i >r N-6111 Island,
both -of %loch crnild he used as temporary o1wraling
bast-s. In. M.irch 19 coitslroclioti aas midurway oil
nic extrlttsion of the fa.7ililies at Al Miskalla. IncrI :rI I',
iri 411 attempt to the Ii.ty :rl [Fill W the trn
outlying eastern g ivertiorttvs.
Navy strerig1h is nei' estilleatt�d :1t hi'tween '_':Al and.
31111 risen. ohnost all of lhetu assiglied; 14) At Tavahi
N;n Rase�. 'I'Iie proliiirtitin crf prreui 111.1 servi.l Ig
ashore and` atliiul is utfkilnru. althriiie if (lie
statidard compli�menl for each vessel is vo6il�m�d. Ili(-
1il rl crews ovi-ded tvotild he a ppro,\htv0t,1N- Zia
offivers alld scame�n.
:1. 1'raiuing-(S)
As with Ilie ot her services; the P.D. Y.'s expaudifig
itaval lraiiling proirmilt is iiqu-11ifelit olr5oriet s+ipporl
oral adviwrs. Qnly over the bast several years have
si riiia :ittellipts been made, Iii inithIle wr vffcctive
tiaval traiiiing program in tiles II'.!),It;l': b additiorrto
British contract 0'iffict7r i most of the: few linlish
trained scanicn ill Adcii were ahrn released iir Wliti. Ire:
19(il) some lt;iitiirig. :s cowlucttd 'Itr IIdi:r a I'M 'almb

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by the U.A.H. in Aden, hat training b y bolh countries
h :u ceuud.
Si11cv h)(59. liav;d persoillid liars tra l to the-
U.S;S.H. to attend seallial Id kill rushes. \lost iraillevs
have hcen rver,iiled direcll' from school. while rite
reittainder hae hes�ti active riot persoliticl. \Itu�lt of
tiles training is geaed to%%ard developing ;It i officer
corps. The sviveWes are told That sitcccasfol candidates
will he prom to officer rank upoii their return.
Soviet advisers and tcchnivians first arrived ill the
Y.1111A. ill 1970 to assist the oavv. A school for the
Ir dahil; of naval s1weialisis was sc�hedoled 10 oltert in
Aden in March 1972; five Soviet instntctor% were
programed to assist ill (raining kill tat 31X) stiltie
Thew is tit) info rmation ott any on the -jolt training
that mar exist. hot it k assumed that tho Soviets have
initiated such :t program. lit Dvem berof cash Fear.
maneuvers are c�ndIte(ed 1) [lie oav .I t
completion of their Ve :ir p rogrcm.
The o verall elltahty of tilt traitlilig program is
difficult to assess. The Soviets are wit ho11l doubt
experie:twing
e same frttstratiolts rxperieec�d by
those engaged in tether naval training pro grartts
throlighout the Middle last. such as thIow
ediwational level of the average sailor, btorewieritic
red tape. and large a tttoutits of Money retluired to gel
results. On llte positive side. the na�v's i 1pparetit
olieratiotial ability gives credit to its training ltro};rsm.
4. logistics (S)
T Slay is Capable of trtaitltaining its sma force
with assistance from Soviet mh'isor persottm�l. The
two National Shipyards Compam' varcls ill the Aden
port area caul lwrfittin hull, inaelliliery, and fioaling
repairs t(t naval vessels. Supplies and equipment arc
procured through Ilse Nl iuistry o Defease. All eeigium,
replace tttent.parts and outer ship contpnuckils must lx!
itrijxorted. The U.S.S.R. is the pritne supplier. thus
helping Io insure ;tit adecliialc ui; +toll ounce prttgrani
for the Soviet�delivvred vessels. 'I'll(- three forincr
British hishore mincsveepers are prohabl% ill pour
e�oudition, however, itlt their radar :411(.1 oth
cicc�trodies `�.uipertlivv.
C. Air: Force (S)
T he P.Imn'. Air borer has t'Imilded rapidly since
receipt of it) first aircraft ill IW It is charged with
defe�uding the co11ntry's ;lick }tae�(.. pro�ufnie, tactical
snppairt for it grotmd forties. and inert
:uid materiel. During 1971 and 19 air force. ith
Soviet soltporl, stilistatili;dly improved ils Capabilities
and vollihat w adiness. Al#hough relatively ,mall, it is
now large rn ougli to be a threat In the 1'einett :halt
Itepul,lic and tile� St[Itallato of Urtiart. ;v well as to
caetse addilional colicern to Saudi :Amble. The
dcliven of eight F lr car, \1iC- 1.7's) to 1'etnen (AdeW
ill November I971 dotililed ill(- oltrratimiul strength of
its "'JiC, stpiadron. 'i'Itese airerafl wore part of ;kit arrns
at;reetnoit with \loscov% ill April of that ve ;ir. Since-
that HIM' Ildicol)ters grid four jet bombers have been
reex�ived from lite Soviets, and ;iddilnnl:ll deliveries are
pro }able.
Fighter irvrifl have lccit s4:cressfu11% used in It
gro1111d attack role in conjimetniri with ;trill% mtils ill
border areas adjacent In Comma and 1'cinen. ,tot (lit-
post, tvo \I1C -I :ltd four Ii :1C l(i''. hae h4 tilt
standing al art to male air strikes against dissident
fours (l figure 5). 'l low�ever, forward grotind control
te chnique -s have toot I}ertl develop d. Pilots are lrtiefvd
prior to takeoff. Once ill the air, fitrlher target
itiforrnation is not received and there is ,ao
coordin with ground' force.-,, frequently leading to
less than aiitisfactory rvallts. The (eliver hi 1.972 of
\1i _S (IilP) and Ka- tl'Issuott;tvi) hclicolitt�rn
deni mistrates a devdop interest ill he l ibo rn e
'FIGURE S. People's Democratic'.Re-
public of Yemen Air Force SAC -167
'Sfrikernaste (U jOU}
1?
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operiliclus. The arrival during the s:emlc year of four fl-
28 011 �ca.0 jet bombers will rlit�;hl a significant
increase in offensive capability w hen P.D.R.1'. cress
become proficirut ill using 111ese aircraft. Laimclic�d
front Kh6pilaksar. thu 11 25's could bomb Saii'a' ;grid
return: or reach ..Salandi iir Un1;ut slid ore over a out- t)f
Ilse Pc1).R.Y.'s eastern airfields.
With Soviet advice. the lratesporl flee.l has provided
valuahl see vive to armly tlllits through its delivery of
slipplle�.s alldallimilllltioll.
'flit:: air force's weakest litik is its poor air defecise
Capability. Two radar office who had completed
trai ning Cou ill \1as -ow were' a (o f or m
the nucleos of :c radiir section in July 1971. tfobile
radar units of 'an unkll[nvn lype have beciideploycc! to
BaylIwit, 'Atael, aad Al Chtlraf airfields; bill lit)
ititeg!aled air clefctl c systeiil exists.
All lrlining is ila,der Soviet supervision. Proficiency
is Ilindered hcecitme Ilirofficercorps isaplxiinled more
fords political reliability than its combat poleuliol. Im
additimi to their advisor:' st.tttlS. tile, Soviets fl' tlu!
An-24 transports. They have mot. llowever, flown
operati,o al rlti 'ssiolis against the 1�.A.11. or dissidol
forces. ";'he air force, shcald bee mite more proficient as
Soviet training; cotltirilles.
L Url-arlitation
The eviller of virtually all air force activities is
Adert /Khorutaksar airfield, which is also the
chief commerci.if airport. The present air
force organization was drawn tip according (o
reel Mill Wilda Iiolis pr epared ill IW91)y Soviet advisers
.ittarlled to the 1'.11.11.1'. Ministry cif 1)e4cnse. It
includes un air force, commander and hcadelliarlerti, a
NI C -17 fighter /bomber s(luadron, a. Jet Provast
altack /training; siluadron, a transport milladrom an air
base mtaimtcoamce l,altaliou, aircraft repair %wrkshops,
and a [raining, miler. 'this establishment was desig;ncd,
to serve as a hale For exptatsion after the lrlining; of
permanel and arrival of new aircraft slid .-cpnprrlcl)L
A homber stloadron has been formed following, the
delivery of four 11 -25 light llnnthers in June 1972,.bmt
as of carlc' 197 tilt- unit was proflalthy liol op ralimial
1)Cc all'1C of the la ck of q ualifie d. pilots:
Air force headtluarlers is. located at Shahid' Radr
camp. Khormaksar. 'I'll( air fore c ccmiirugder rciN)rls
directly to the Armed Forms Cencr l l I le,adquarlers in
ell. Ilis headeluartcrs slaff is tltrite small. hie hiding
ill addilioll to the tmlit LYiltllllaildt'rs all adjutaloi all
operations officer, at admiieistrati ofliccr. :lit
armaments Officer, r. housing.and ~billies officer: a
terhuieal stores officer, it sccurily offici r; and '04
111unber of m)llcoruntissimuxl., nffuer and .1iiiacrf
laersorlmcl.
During vwnib:lt ollera(ions a 'Tac�lical Air Ftirm
(:cullrl1;r11e1 is estahlislied. wit11 to tic�al colilrli:urds set
tit) al 'Alael mul tliyan airfields, the two major fields
used fow deployulemt of tactical aircraft. The Army
01111r11tilld al Abu *Ubaydah frccluently requests Ilw
bead of the tactic;d vonlltland at 'Aral or Riyao
airfields In care (lilt sper�ified riiiss. tits in .atditioo to
those laid on Ilv the air fol.�e t�ommandcr. This agaitt
illllstrales the doalillatire� of Ilw arnr in lla service
Arocicltc. Coordillatiolr if' task with (fleothersurviuvs
is a fnitetiva of the Arms -ti Forces 0- iteral
11(�add i la ricrs,
2. Strenx composititin, and dislimiticin
The air force has expanded rapidly in bolls aircraft
Mid I)t'r%rllllle since rllid-'`,HK There ate 52 aircraft (if
Soviet :old British origin: .1 bolm111.6L 1.1 fighter
boinhers. -1 attack aircraft, y tr:lilsports. 12 helicuplers,
6 trainers. aild �1 olilitr aircraft. Ilowever, tlol all of
tln-se aiwraft are hi operatioll:d mnits.
The Fifllt Fighter /liondier Squadron Im, 13 \1i(
1 7 l i sco :cold oac MiC -13 F.c:or jftt aircraft. The
penc)linel positions in the srluadrotl itlelude the
conllnuitdrr, deputy commander. adjiilunt, operations
officer. traiuins; officer. and IlWintt'llall i� officer. 'Thu
org;artiiatiou (if the oilier mpeadroms is probably
similar. The attack /trtiuing; stluadreul comlprist-s Gill
R 161 and six Jet Provosis left over from British
days. 'The lramporl mpiadrom consis(s of fire An -2.1
:tml Iwo C47 li, lit transports, four ,N1i 7S lraosport
Ilelieoptcrs, t'WO Ka 26 utility helicoplers. and two
Reavc-l light ulility air(jaft. Of the four Il -?S light
halnlmrs. two are the traitiii)g; version (U -11-
2S /M.sc ail) and two are of tilt- -ilseration:ll version
tl3ata.t;). The bomber sliu:tdrmll should become
colnbat read' whim talc initial,aircrems axe lrlioed; Ali
II 25 aircrew comprise, it pilot. .1 navigator, and a
witmer. As of I)rcemhcr. 1972, pilots were being
haired ill Yemen (Aden) and tilt- U.S.S.ti.
As of ilcccrrib;r; 1972. at least 235 persomalel were
;issigiicd to the air force. approm-irmatcly 20 of tllem
piliils. There also area se pilots lit servicu from the
1 FrOi t fo r the Liberati(n.of Palestine (l'1'l
who hold Ir p 6iasspods..tuul'.it least.cm� Syrian pilot.
all flYing wilh the mpiadmit. ftctause of the lack
elf: tluali fieel pilots, the air force is making; :t concerted
effort lit iiicre ase(lioir mmiliher.. Duspile Soviet training
prog;raim. thcair force is r(hiricted by a severe shortage
of elualificd persc)nmel'irr. all riliks.
The National F'rorrt h;ts aiplloimted leading members
of its organfxalimi: to'kev Ix}silions ill the air force. The
air fi)rcc ce rnni; alder. ,Maj. Ahlo d Salim 'i bagel: lias
hail