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SECRET 328/GS ;i Yemen (Aden) July 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY .f SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that care not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NISii Publications, which is also bound 'into the concurrerri classified Far book. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNI \C This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. C:ASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-' leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, 9ne portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nonclovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the De- fense Intelligence Agency. Research was substan- tially completed by January 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 y r 1. YEMEN (ADEN) CONTENTS This chapter supersedes the armed forces coverage in the Southern Yemen portion of the General Survey on Southern Yemen /Muscat Oman dated Scptcmher 1969. A. Defense establishment 1 1. Historical 2 2. Command structure 5 B. joint activities 5 1. Military manpower 5 2. Strength trends 6 3. Training 6 4. Military budget 7 5. Logistics 7 SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 ,Page C. Army 7 L Organization 8 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 8 3. Training 9 4. Logistics 9 D. Navy 10 1. Organization 11 2. Strength, composition, and disposition... 11 3. Training 11 4. Logistics 12 Page E. Air Force 12 1. Organization 13 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 13 3. Training 1.4 4. Logistics 14 F. Paramilitary 15 1. Public Security Force 15 2. Revolutionary Security Service 15 3. Popular Forces 16 4. People's Militia 16 FIGURES Page Fig. 1 Defense o.-ganization chart) 4 Fig. 2 Armed forces personnel strengths (table) 6 ii Page Fig. 3 SO.1 -class small submarine chaser (Photo) 10 Fig. 4 At Tawahi Naval Base photo) 11 Fig. 5 BAC -167 Strikemaster photo) 12 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 A. Defense establishment 1�he arrnt�d forces of tilt, Ice(ple's beruocr:itie ltepubliv of Yernrn (1 1 .11MLY.)t consist of t 1?,t11N1- r)tan arum a nays with a compterneut ctf nine .mall �vsscls and about 3 0) persoiutt� 111d an air forcc with i? aircraft and ,tit eslimated 23.3.pc�nonnel: 'There are forts paramilitary. intelligence, or militia or- "1'liv Riel,le'% Demoeratie� Itettnhtie�ed vem+�ie k itl�o n�tc'twel tu:u 1'1.111rei 4,114.01: ganizalions: tilt- 50X0 -tium I'nblic Svetiri(A For.w: this small 11eolutiomi.q Security Service: the Popular Forces. around ?ANA strong: acid tilt- :3.tttK1-lojMIt)- ill an I'vople s Militia. (S) The primary mission (if the� atillutl forces is natiot,;ll defetlse and dw mailitelialu- of internal secnrit. Since the British ill November 1967, the armed forct's ability to Carr mil their mission It:ts liven tv"Ird list au11HIMI .11 1 MMons I" dissident trib(�s. exiled political factions, anti depust�ti sheikhs. Iit 1971 nsilitar forces efIvelivelr repelled a sma[I arj'd ill pl:utnml invasion by it etntlilion of dissident ferves 5nl)p0tted -b' the armx and air force of tilt- Yvss,en Arah Iiepabhc (Y.A.'R l," Horder hostilities luji e ucctured sra�r:d limes. with I'. D.B.I. 'forces i1jx jdiTqt Y.A.H. territory and don Avilhdrit inn. Confron- kdionr of Ye�111cri (.�Aden l with its neighbors are tilt resirlls t.f the gcwvrimivw radical Marxist urienlalion. .Inch it frv()uent1v atlenspts to export to other states of t)lv Arabian 1'el dasitla. (C) The :trrtrt�d forc�cs coakl /tut suctcsslnllc deft�ild a major p(mer. They hare- howevi r.:pelled incim-ions from tilt- Y.A.R. and prolt:clsly could ithstaud a militar :ttl:u�k In tiandi Andlia, lint slit pro11ir pl:oulim! aitd (.xrcrttiolt. it 01131Wne�d invasion by VAIL Sandi Arabian. am) dissident forces 'would possibly succeed: bowet�er, such a threat is arllikeiv ill the� mar terns, (ti) Ar m� leadership has displayed iraat;inalicm and resourcefulness ill crnnbalhig t�nernies of the re,Liuse :And in dq)loying forces rapidly to widely separaled trolibly six)a. It leas also cnndaeted well- planned joint cij)erstieIns. and dcrl)iI(- lli emisidtrahle strain imltosvd by combal aperations. no scrimis breakdown livVein�tlAtaitIIvIitl[> tie i, ;it %Uiri�rnY1laa a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100023 -0 in the arm's li system has octn 'I IIV air force' Iia% expanded ill six!- e}'e'r flit' pas[ several years. Air cress cais now flu operational gromi altack InissiorlS :1, �ell as lr; supplies :itld a +(lrtil)ineul to arin� imils. T w link is t air dt,fcttse Nk.%tcrlt, Which is scaltvred' :md imi inlegralvd. '11m oay�'s capability waters slid providing iifnited scalilt as to tilt, atnry. Although tilt! govi-rmnent Iris. %'itll Soviet Support. apparcudy increased the development of the slat y.:It Will probably rrtmlin tiltdeast importasil of the regular armed forces. (S) The primary weaknesses of the armed forces are the votllplov dependetsue on foieigrt; primarily Soviet. militory assistance, tilt, low exloca'tiotsal lecl of the persiumei, and friction re�.gAtiieg 'froth aied tribaldifferviicvs. By Noveniber 1979, ill ;ill aticlmpl It.) discourage tribalism. ito tribal flames %ere! being Itsed by members if the awned forces. (E:) Since independullue, the arum forcers have not greatly interfer with the civiliarl oi of tilt! goyernmetil, altitoogh ma ny armed forces� persomiel are lilt fill lers of the ailing Nitionill front (NF) organizatiorl. usually ,nct-n grtrmblitig :end. intefluil dispiltes have reached: a lxsint here intemelitioil by the arintid forces might he t;;xlxctecl, alt external t1ireat against the KD.R.Y. has dVVeluped hiulr#sas lend the! effect o f urtiting t he comitry. (C) Prior to its establishmew its an independent immitry in \oveneber 1967, the states exte�rmil dcfeose acid internal security were the resimusibility of the United Kingd which provided till expanding ill ligenolls ground forces with all materiel. Since. imlep nc� eudce tine P.1).1i.1'. has swills torard.the Coimllunist state. for assistance. "IIiiere are uo known bilateral military :llliatrces or treaties, but `lcuhtlieal and militar ;essistatsce agreements have liven concluded wit the U.S.S.R., Fast. CCrI1lal y. Ilmigar�, and \'firth Korea and lxsssibIV With lilt, Peop)ic" S RrI)llblic Of 041141 and Syria. (5) Of prime importaittue is Soviet aid. The fits! Iwo Stsyiet 1',1:11.1'. military rid pact, were eouchide f ill February and August W8, and otlu�rs have bcrit reached si nce. U nd er art a grcernent signed ill 197 1, whose value is an estimalml ILMIO million. medintll lacks, Ila�;il craft, light jel borldiers. ated heiicoplerr' are to lx, provided. Unity talks hoween tilt� two Yemens in November 1977 were prece by ll. 1).R.Y.- Lt.S.S:R. a)osultations in filoseow. at whic#1 time the Sovie's pledged' to co ntinue to [fell) strenf"theu f'.1) :St.l', defellses. Since late 1969 the U.S.S.R. bas llad permission to use sconige facilities ill Aden. but it has never been allowed to use Aden as a 1. liitactricsl l #tc.,,listesr :.erf tlir�; :irrn� geies ks:1c�k:tu 11'irlc# It'ar.:l, ncllat batl'aliotsc)f iilfuntry l'as fezriiied ikh lualiy e�tili,lrt# :Ir. :lsto e:1)nfrout t'urki +ii tr[uslrti lltre:ticliirii; the port city cef Advil. The! unit, was cli� lsandt1l i ll 1925 bit! re- fisrntrtl in .li}K as lilt, tldt�tt l 'roilect dictioil of the Fedvrt of So tth ;Ilrabia Coverminent and %viis r ede.,ign ate d "ti Fedend ltes;ula Army (FRA B% 1964. [lie t=RA compriwd five :ilil"witty bultalinns. atI a rmore d ca sc ltiadrots, and a signal ryiwdroti. lit Dime Mil four 1xittaliotis of tine Federal Gmml (National Guard) were a ;ith the FRA. Shorty tbere.4ter. a lentil battalion s+ rt,eroited, anti early ill MiS the three battalions of [lie Hadrami lkedoitiri Legion. an internal security forue ill the former Eastern Advil Protec torate. ere a dded 't(r tilt' artily. (1 I OU) Under British tutelage uut�il irrclependentv-. the arts %%-as well traiutxl its moquitaiis warfare� tactics. i lie[ udiug :lielicopter- Inmit� of)vrations. S011le tulitS also nx're trained along British lines For tirinm 'iutertral security operations. '!Willi Soviet assistance., nitivii begatl ill 1%S. lilt art,.y has expanded to six "lerigades and continues to improve its cap abilitie,. Since itidelmidence it lt:ls been effectively cxsmbating clissidetit o1wrrtiotis dinrcted from the Y.A.R. and Sawli Arabia. 'Elie ariti s otilr military setback occurred on ?ti \ovendie'r 1969: approxim :tlely two of its infantry h uttahlnis su pported by armor ca crossed into Satich Arabia allot captured f(le �hosier host at Wittlay`a Ill but were repulsed by Satidi arnied forcers, particularly by the Roval Saiul Air Form (S) 'rhe P:1.R.Y. Navy was farmed in 1466 as the.Siiuth Arabian Mow, :allot the United Kingdom age. :exl to 'Far diacritics 4m plocr nauxcs, wx the� list ut n:itne's oil) the aptoll Of fill' 514111MI ry Mill) ill flier (:nllrltrr I'rtllifir chajw2r, aim the !nail it ridW three .in�hire:ailinrsvex�Ixrti us well :s 11. training Inil .r :trldt'd ::rid ma he :ipproaching plainicd strt�Ili;tlls. :3. Training (S) Armed forces Irainilig has inttrvast d S�L1riflC :nki'I+ since l by fir:�t soviet w ee tjlttos were ir1lrad:kcK (l ill 1965. The Soviet \liMai F%dVisor% C T001), the 11`jll(Jj)JI will's are advisers to the :srinr(l farces, is he:tdcluarlewd ill Adel) and ciituUnl Ill :k uaajorg "nee :d. Tr,lil ailltz. (�olrl'ses :lr.* conduct d 1(061' ill 'fin� 1'.17,111'. Mid ill forcign .ctiointria., primarily 0tv U.S.S.R. In 1971 and I972.1 alt ;ariueil (owes traitives :ven� scut to and mill.ow 1 frotli the U.S.S.,K. Soviet n t issioll 1 1ec:Illic (Illite distre�sse'd Ill 19i l toyer the arrival io eusert ;den) iu 15); l ef :ij;lil arn1S rind eight air force :Idvisers front life Peoples kc1 iiblic of .FIGURE 2. aerminei sit ngths of the armed forces W *^Thie lair ftura was �ttittwit�ui ail foreign,! nctrart. onnr 'during 11107'niad 1pfis. li APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 ,salt \t 'rEYr .+t .(HMl' M1W m 15 illi('t *11 INS........ 9.1mill 50 Tel 0,w it) s'l life }I tti 1i171i...._...... ,ITlNI !4141 i_'11 1971.... 111, 1IHl lilll 146 lu. 3:3(1 I',i7 12.000 :scoot *^Thie lair ftura was �ttittwit�ui ail foreign,! nctrart. onnr 'during 11107'niad 1pfis. li APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APP ROVED FOR R 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 C106.1. l?aex't] WWII Ills thrral, thr5ovk-1 mission a 1) Irently: forut rm.11.Y. [:overmavrit to .rersd tlte:C:hincse military advi3Os house. Secend Tither 6Ymntnes� such as I rail and Syria. have In ide I i:m in the arined farces nn a ulpelr rIIaller Belle: Six 1 :I ?:ita`. mililary officers wem eyx_Mvd fruiii the Siul: liies, Military Avadeni !4)i,, l, apjrirenili. fcir' liolitiCal rcasolls; lit n4. have nIurn[d -Easi C4 tray al becinidiicti military Iriiaini; ifi ailditiim to its training of 1'.1).11.1". secnmv forces. NI OS r. in- Countri lrainiill; is Y:irductc[l a! :Idcst, r althrni uciits ;Nsir._I liri ill th field: The armed forces 11.IVV: eyinldurtcei jciiot traittiul exercises daring 19 l aril IS}7?. In a the urine Itas frequently i mm ded: training; iii lkiraiI il;tary forces. I'ihttc:t] iriiloctricrtiioil isotie:asp ctof training; has been. recc i'in increasing; rrttphasisMirmi Bout lilt! armed forces. 1tr Xiarchv 14711 the. [mist of Depot; Minister of Defi?nse for Moral and Political 0iidaIic r was created thus refleeling; the eMenl of the i overmliefiCs concern fea the "po litical cnlig;htcn- iii_rtifi of Ase armed forces, Based oil effectiv e >f the v:uious components Its aetlud, ctatnlrat olxrr:iiiins,, ar trai seems to be effective. chile naval iutd air force '.raining needs itgiprovenunt, This is eslfeciaiiv true for the air forcY.. liecayse of its Igig;her technical requirentcnls. Soviet advisory assistittice to :ill lhrev serviix+s is expected: to increase. 4. Military budget {C) The himiget for the repilar armed forces of the l'eoplc`s Democratic Rep"Iblie of verrrc�ri {P.i):Fia'.) is prepared by the finatice Office of the Ministry of befeuse,::11111 estimates of expenditures for the. Pnhfic Sectirity I ei[eY.' arc formulated. within the Mitlistm of Interior. After review :usd cxxir[liit.atiou.:the sr,lsudetls arc cilnbined to form the defense: Budget, vvi'lirh is [lien presented In the vhhistr y of Fitumee awl iucorlx into the! national budget. The I xeclitive Committee reviews the- national huket ancl, following approval. passes if 611141 1116 National frill Command which in practice uu�reh' approvirs it as presented_ Annual defense bticipts for fiscal, \4.0'rs 1967 tllri 1971 ate. show lit- Informatienl is not available its tic formulation or aniotuiiti I>uel};eted for the lievolutiomsry Security Service Popular'i'orces, or People's Militia.. S. Logi stics The paoeity of natural rosourevs umd Iv lmolo ;ical skills in the I'eolle s Oemocralic Republic of 1't�uus11 prceludes all but marginal economic support for the cullntrv's annex: for(v,%. The loss If liriti I midget support and trump expent]ilores, combirted Wit the, decreas its kink cring attivily at the port of Aden because of the closure o f f iltc Suez Call-al ill 11x17, has remilled in a cowsiti 7nhle dcclllie' ni itatimial income. Ill addition, the defense budgets Itawc cMnsisUrrtily accounted for to l: tge portion of the total iialion:il himigeL absorbinv funds nc'ed(A for cconrmtie developrtieat (C:) '1114. 1'.I):R.l', is totallydelmident foreign sources for military inatrrriel. Prior to itiderpeudersce ill \owniher b)67 lilt- country relied exchisively on the United Kingdom for armed forvvs e[luipmew and training;. S ince them several military aid ag;reemerit,. :allied at a total of $27 riiillion, have been cortelilded with the `Soviet Union. Equipuiceil provid4A. by the U.S.S.R. has irtcltuled infatilry weapons. artillery, ;irntor4.d vclticics� trucks� landing; craft.. submarine� chaser, lielicoptcm; awl aircrafl., inchiditig I.S. fight,' Mid transports. Lesser ;uaiuslts of grou nd forces utat,riel have been supplied b Alge East Gerin:uiv. I lmigary. Iraq. ;lilt] C:hiiia. M Mil itary,eciuipnietit routinely arriS, at the port' of Aden in merc"harit vessvk 'Flier, \�as :1. sigpificalit imevIa,e in Soviet military truttslr.;rf'flit;hts lo Aden in the fah of 1972 dildlit; the hostilities cilli the 1':11.11. This: is indleative: (if thor iinporhm,x! tiler Stviert hnioti attaches to its military support of and iireseucxr ill the (S) A1vii is t primary story r depot for nili:ar' vile ipment and stipplies., which are trarisportud by g;romid and ,,tir to units thntughoiit the..: c-mi ttry ay. needed: Paramiliiary forces r(�(x�i\�c logistic suplzort` frr'ni the wg;ula arrned forcc 1hspite the relative lntsopliistic ;ilii>i.of lilt~istics. nn: major lircakdo�'ris ;lie kyumit� to have occurred: "'hen weapuits or s0pplics we iNeeded fur.sltecifie volubal iilksious in either parts of the comarv. the are s 0 it %vithiu undu d elay. A :u example. iii'Xila If)7 ;uiumuiiliotY tvas flour fror Melt itilo lliv airfield a1: Al C:havdah for lise again 1 Chtl:usi force s.- N P.D.R.Y. DFwF%s :8uhcm_. C. ,rm- S Milllnna of U:S dnitaR 1967 4968 190 1970,' 1 Wense butlg r:t M7 30.1 21 10.6 15.8 Ord tri 4.d ill its presenit Form earl in 14x15, the Defense budget as a PJM l', Arrny is the preeminciit military firev in (lie 1wrcent of rrttion I c'ountr% Its p rom. Iss I is ;En'ttl Ill ".11111 ;li E1 itgil'rnnl 1udget Q0;8 49.0: S51, 52.9' 394 .ecI rity and tlitfend tile ikttkm's hound tries against APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 foreign aggression. In its short hnl stortmv history. t army has demonstrated its capability to preserve tht� stalus (pia. Althmigh uu ntalch against a major power, tltc army has proved itself capable of conducting (incited military oper:llions int Y.A.R. territory. and during the attempted iovasion ill the fall of 1972 it was able to pe! the 1'etneui fort of army repilars, tribal InerCC'IlatICS. Natimial Uoily Front forces. Thv atirn' is well trait +ed for the ;Iranian 1 has all effective logistics system.' and is nurbile cluligh to deploy rapidly to Iroubled areas, it also has condticttxl well- planned joint operations with air and paraud!i- tar� forces and }las advantageously utilired ;kit effective intelligence System based on both Illutiall and technical wsotin es. \{itch of the credit for this effectivenc% must he }tired to the U.S.S.R.. which has provi(h�cl advisers and most of the etluiprncol. In addition to the advisers stationed in the country, Soviet military delegations have visited the P.D.R.Y. and inspected :utlly brig; eele�s. The are.. greatest %wakilvms lies in the threat of intuoul conflict over political and tribal differences. The 1xililical (ltiatrel, hetwreu Chairtium `Ali, who has pre. o -C hitiesc Ivaoings, and National Front Svvrelary General ISM il. who suPports the U.S.S.R., leas penctraled the army. Several times during 1972, [lie army refused to Cant halt order, from the. Natio Front. 'In earls� 1972 C:linirman 'Ali abolished the I.eptiblican G lard. .I Force of re u lar airmv troops o slxcial duty. because Ile had evidimev that a laige pnrlx)rtion of its officers here of northern 1'eincni origin a ltlyal' to his rival, IsioXil. a northertier. 11 appears that many army officers .Art.: slo%'fly turning against Isiuii it h ec ruse of Iris t -SoviO leanings arts! his northern regio mil ties. Ailotlicr 5otirve of friction ill tIkV artiM is the 'aritKl tribal makersp of its nteioliers. 'I "lie army has opt soveriNireasiom heeii on the verge of opeli internal conflict: hilt eaelt little it has managed to maintain its integrity. As l o t h; :I it re�tltains a cohesive trait, it s 11011 be all t4feetiye forec ill umthern Arabia. 1. Or} anheitihn The Armed :horc�cs Ceneral 1leath darters at Alto t U. b.lvdall also filoctfow. as the :Irlliv Cencral f leachplartt r+.. With army- persotm sen�itrg ;in ln roles. The contrnauder of ilic :arnty. eidIl tf the Land Foe es, mIditiollally smes as Depith� 1 rolse� N'Iinister; lie^ .is sti6 (linate :to. the. .,CommaiM e�r .i chief of the dm k al'.so c9livillk -till Prime N'linistcr and Minister of Def( its i. S APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: The geller.11 staff. which appears to be tt+rile strtall. ittclutlt's .I chief of staff :ind a del >ut% chief of general staff. with addilimiul positions for o1wratiulls. ititelligeoce. tnliriini;, supplies, alld adn tiIlistr(tion. '1'lle arnlortX{ corps commander :slut artiliery corps corlrtn.nider list) are on'the Aelleral sta 'i1w depoty Chief of staff for intelligence supervises the Military Intelligence Service. whwh is respoitsible f(%r militurt inforlro collection. luiliury security, and control of imnrgeticy. The Artily Cener l Ilvad(luartvrh directly controls the six brigades. which are tilt primary Welk-al units. Although cac�h regional govertlor may have slime dri;ree of control over, or at !(east coordination wilh. the military omits within Itis juristliction, alt military orders are issacd froth Abo ul):I%�tlab is the halm� of the arms conilliatid. 0 Strength, comtlposilion. and d i sposition Strength of the army is altproxilnateiy I?,fNtt} Allen oritanized into six infatilry brigades of three battalioris each, Brigade strengths. trhiclA also iilclticfe support unit persomid, vary betweeti l.2(9} and I;fiW Ilreoa battalion strengths ustiallr are between if H1 and .300. Each battalion has dirve eompattics. Ili additioteto the brigades. the army als i nelitcles a sigliz It �tt:tliolt, a .trailling battalion. a tnilitare aade.iny. a military police unit, it mmrher of am of vd and ,Artillery unit.. and support units. Atiny brigades are located throltghout the ccitlntry, with troop l'nneerttratiots': ill the cities of :Advil. Bayllan al Qukayris, Al 'Anal. Al "Ahr, and Al \'lukalla. Each .bri}t.Icle is n�sixlnsible for crtducting military operations ill its ttslrectitc region. As :Ili exatttple, tht :a}th Brigadc's area of responsibility is fhar mttlring Fif6i and Sixth govemoratesa however, the army's r1mree of effective control is considerAlly less in these far easterly gover1norates than ill those areas elosvr to the Neat of power. Battalions are 1wriocltc: rotated froul 011ie govenorate�.(und one brigsidv) :to amlther, Dorittg the 7 "rlitni ltilstilities in the fall of 1972. battalions leerc rapidly deployed to the noft }sera liorders of the Sevolld. 'Third, and Feuirth oventoratts. Armored aticl artilier\ un'lt inti grits is usoally wit niaintaiite�cl: Ajtli(wglt lure are detac litieents llnl rA >;ho lit t ceitin 6% site uti the artillery dei.whinerit inn A lit� "ist ilul. of Socotra. most zirt itor artd artillery are allocated IW the'airmy command to battalions as tw(ld +tour ci+nrlEt. d+t4Eilr�tt i:+F+iimutiarr u�r !1Er�;tliJFtant !at i 1161tl' rtldlnll'litary, w ith' l ittle. iidrniuistritive'documentulinn. Althiwrh this" cvttcni -rnati' have nctll lF1'rtlhilp1)rpriitioll of collie) g()verninent snort's, .no seri oiis sliortages[if arms. arrntsttiitiini. nr riiions 1inr bixti uotd:'iriva[I= till 9 P01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 FIGURE .3.'Soviet SO 1= class' si r II1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE monne chaser erg route to Aden' in t 972 lC) L 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 ant crltiiplitel.t. Sillev t he fall if 1969. (lie soviet l`116,11 halls had Ix rtuissioli to Ilse stora facilitiv% ill Aden: kiln jkvllission has. never hewn itr:uilctl for the U3 S.S:Ii: tri Ilse� :Idea as a naval' base. Fnrlher exFi;'io,ilii of the rlavv is_expecled, bill it. will cotililloe lu,remairl the Ir ast I of the regular forces. (S) l ioroid1aliou, (C) `l'hi�; na' is liticftr flit� cxintrol of Armecl 1eircr� Genera[ tie�adeltiarten. N. Forces Coirnn:nld is heath Fell It; At Tilwahi :Na%;11 Miss ire lilt- port of Aden (I 1). The eudire fli-et is 1ascd :it Aden. Ifecatise (if its sui:dl size there .lppe:Irx to lit- Ito lreaf dii �il iflt {gxr;ttioilcll` c(III1111 ;aids or floral districts. 2. Strength. v niprlsitiun and dispositiall' f.S) i'lie entire. rz;ivy (if Yellielt (:Idea) c�ciilmWs of 1 i small eissi +ls: t 'ii snhularine chasers. three in5liore. riiitier tlY�Ix�F,'st�etrl,)tldiift; raft uini onir lirckiltai Itr 1967 t ircn tonne r l3ntisli'ftoval`Navy Ifarll-cl :iss iiishore nlinesu �c�cI>tr: 'are imerlianled and trlrisferrcd. t'o -tile tle%viv iidept�llde nt l'etiNe' Republic� of SiirttII 1'6nicti. Melt iitics dicrrt a!' niiitor gunboats: The other, U vessels have been provided "by the T.S.o',R. 'I�hrie Sriv -.0 T-4 class uterha craft (I.CNI amb' olic Pozharnyy -1 chiss small firchiiat were delivi-red 'Fat carmrol irifflimatiori ml srmrigIti: c -limpmilil ;Fuel di +114hiliuli. 49' O bli&iry :all-no- Sraimuinr aucl the Aulorrlefed Nural Older of f&r i". 1"5119 IillMikil.-d lit OIL! 044'rIsc hiltdhittoict- Agi.iicr. 2009/06/16: chtriog November- Oveciiiber I +.ll#, I uor uddi(iirnal. l ;tnctiitg cr o't oriknoau type err, delivered fly the Sovicis irrcacly 1972. 'l'he Isite >t sliitselr�Ii�cr% oe.ti.oxnrd. ill April 1972 rltcu two sLuldard tii'1.1 �cl;t'ss slitoll sidilnarine clfavers ere lowed Ito Advri from the Black Sea. 'I'hcse %esm-k ar(- hcliered to by earl of all arras agreement sigried ill \lo umv in Ovtobvr .1971. Al craft we hasrd at Advii. with oolr oveasional patrols ;long lilt- co.isttioc� ti, Al Mitkal i >r N-6111 Island, both -of %loch crnild he used as temporary o1wraling bast-s. In. M.irch 19 coitslroclioti aas midurway oil nic extrlttsion of the fa.7ililies at Al Miskalla. IncrI :rI I', iri 411 attempt to the Ii.ty :rl [Fill W the trn outlying eastern g ivertiorttvs. Navy strerig1h is nei' estilleatt�d :1t hi'tween '_':Al and. 31111 risen. ohnost all of lhetu assiglied; 14) At Tavahi N;n Rase�. 'I'Iie proliiirtitin crf prreui 111.1 servi.l Ig ashore and` atliiul is utfkilnru. althriiie if (lie statidard compli�menl for each vessel is vo6il�m�d. Ili(- 1il rl crews ovi-ded tvotild he a ppro,\htv0t,1N- Zia offivers alld scame�n. :1. 1'raiuing-(S) As with Ilie ot her services; the P.D. Y.'s expaudifig itaval lraiiling proirmilt is iiqu-11ifelit olr5oriet s+ipporl oral adviwrs. Qnly over the bast several years have si riiia :ittellipts been made, Iii inithIle wr vffcctive tiaval traiiiing program in tiles II'.!),It;l': b additiorrto British contract 0'iffict7r i most of the: few linlish trained scanicn ill Adcii were ahrn released iir Wliti. Ire: 19(il) some lt;iitiirig. :s cowlucttd 'Itr IIdi:r a I'M 'almb APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 by the U.A.H. in Aden, hat training b y bolh countries h :u ceuud. Si11cv h)(59. liav;d persoillid liars tra l to the- U.S;S.H. to attend seallial Id kill rushes. \lost iraillevs have hcen rver,iiled direcll' from school. while rite reittainder hae hes�ti active riot persoliticl. \Itu�lt of tiles training is geaed to%%ard developing ;It i officer corps. The sviveWes are told That sitcccasfol candidates will he prom to officer rank upoii their return. Soviet advisers and tcchnivians first arrived ill the Y.1111A. ill 1970 to assist the oavv. A school for the Ir dahil; of naval s1weialisis was sc�hedoled 10 oltert in Aden in March 1972; five Soviet instntctor% were programed to assist ill (raining kill tat 31X) stiltie Thew is tit) info rmation ott any on the -jolt training that mar exist. hot it k assumed that tho Soviets have initiated such :t program. lit Dvem berof cash Fear. maneuvers are c�ndIte(ed 1) [lie oav .I t completion of their Ve :ir p rogrcm. The o verall elltahty of tilt traitlilig program is difficult to assess. The Soviets are wit ho11l doubt experie:twing e same frttstratiolts rxperieec�d by those engaged in tether naval training pro grartts throlighout the Middle last. such as thIow ediwational level of the average sailor, btorewieritic red tape. and large a tttoutits of Money retluired to gel results. On llte positive side. the na�v's i 1pparetit olieratiotial ability gives credit to its training ltro};rsm. 4. logistics (S) T Slay is Capable of trtaitltaining its sma force with assistance from Soviet mh'isor persottm�l. The two National Shipyards Compam' varcls ill the Aden port area caul lwrfittin hull, inaelliliery, and fioaling repairs t(t naval vessels. Supplies and equipment arc procured through Ilse Nl iuistry o Defease. All eeigium, replace and outer ship contpnuckils must lx! itrijxorted. The U.S.S.R. is the pritne supplier. thus helping Io insure ;tit adecliialc ui; +toll ounce prttgrani for the Soviet�delivvred vessels. 'I'll(- three forincr British hishore mincsveepers are prohabl% ill pour e�oudition, however, itlt their radar :411(.1 oth cicc�trodies `�.uipertlivv. C. Air: Force (S) T he P.Imn'. Air borer has t'Imilded rapidly since receipt of it) first aircraft ill IW It is charged with defe�uding the co11ntry's ;lick }tae�(.. pro�ufnie, tactical snppairt for it grotmd forties. and inert :uid materiel. During 1971 and 19 air force. ith Soviet soltporl, stilistatili;dly improved ils Capabilities and vollihat w adiness. Al#hough relatively ,mall, it is now large rn ougli to be a threat In the 1'einett :halt Itepul,lic and tile� St[Itallato of Urtiart. ;v well as to caetse addilional colicern to Saudi :Amble. The dcliven of eight F lr car, \1iC- 1.7's) to 1'etnen (AdeW ill November I971 dotililed ill(- oltrratimiul strength of its "'JiC, stpiadron. 'i'Itese airerafl wore part of ;kit arrns at;reetnoit with \loscov% ill April of that ve ;ir. Since- that HIM' Ildicol)ters grid four jet bombers have been reex�ived from lite Soviets, and ;iddilnnl:ll deliveries are pro }able. Fighter irvrifl have lccit s4:cressfu11% used in It gro1111d attack role in conjimetniri with ;trill% mtils ill border areas adjacent In Comma and 1'cinen. ,tot (lit- post, tvo \I1C -I :ltd four Ii :1C l(i''. hae h4 tilt standing al art to male air strikes against dissident fours (l figure 5). 'l low�ever, forward grotind control te chnique -s have toot I}ertl develop d. Pilots are lrtiefvd prior to takeoff. Once ill the air, fitrlher target itiforrnation is not received and there is ,ao coordin with ground' force.-,, frequently leading to less than aiitisfactory rvallts. The (eliver hi 1.972 of \1i _S (IilP) and Ka- tl'Issuott;tvi) hclicolitt�rn deni mistrates a devdop interest ill he l ibo rn e 'FIGURE S. People's Democratic'.Re- public of Yemen Air Force SAC -167 'Sfrikernaste (U jOU} 1? APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100023 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100023 -0 operiliclus. The arrival during the s:emlc year of four fl- 28 011 �ca.0 jet bombers will rlit�;hl a significant increase in offensive capability w hen P.D.R.1'. cress become proficirut ill using 111ese aircraft. Laimclic�d front Kh6pilaksar. thu 11 25's could bomb Saii'a' ;grid return: or reach ..Salandi iir Un1;ut slid ore over a out- t)f Ilse Pc1).R.Y.'s eastern airfields. With Soviet advice. the lratesporl flee.l has provided valuahl see vive to armly tlllits through its delivery of slipplle�.s alldallimilllltioll. 'flit:: air force's weakest litik is its poor air defecise Capability. Two radar office who had completed trai ning Cou ill \1as -ow were' a (o f or m the nucleos of :c radiir section in July 1971. tfobile radar units of 'an unkll[nvn lype have beciideploycc! to BaylIwit, 'Atael, aad Al Chtlraf airfields; bill lit) ititeg!aled air clefctl c systeiil exists. All lrlining is ila,der Soviet supervision. Proficiency is Ilindered hcecitme Ilirofficercorps isaplxiinled more fords political reliability than its combat poleuliol. Im additimi to their advisor:' st.tttlS. tile, Soviets fl' tlu! An-24 transports. They have mot. llowever, flown operati,o al rlti 'ssiolis against the 1�.A.11. or dissidol forces. ";'he air force, shcald bee mite more proficient as Soviet training; cotltirilles. L Url-arlitation The eviller of virtually all air force activities is Adert /Khorutaksar airfield, which is also the chief commerci.if airport. The present air force organization was drawn tip according (o reel Mill Wilda Iiolis pr epared ill IW91)y Soviet advisers .ittarlled to the 1'.11.11.1'. Ministry cif 1)e4cnse. It includes un air force, commander and hcadelliarlerti, a NI C -17 fighter /bomber s(luadron, a. Jet Provast altack /training; siluadron, a transport milladrom an air base mtaimtcoamce l,altaliou, aircraft repair %wrkshops, and a [raining, miler. 'this establishment was desig;ncd, to serve as a hale For exptatsion after the lrlining; of permanel and arrival of new aircraft slid .-cpnprrlcl)L A homber stloadron has been formed following, the delivery of four 11 -25 light llnnthers in June 1972,.bmt as of carlc' 197 tilt- unit was proflalthy liol op ralimial 1)Cc all'1C of the la ck of q ualifie d. pilots: Air force headtluarlers is. located at Shahid' Radr camp. Khormaksar. 'I'll( air fore c ccmiirugder rciN)rls directly to the Armed Forms Cencr l l I le,adquarlers in ell. Ilis headeluartcrs slaff is tltrite small. hie hiding ill addilioll to the tmlit LYiltllllaildt'rs all adjutaloi all operations officer, at admiieistrati ofliccr. :lit armaments Officer, r. housing.and ~billies officer: a terhuieal stores officer, it sccurily offici r; and '04 111unber of m)llcoruntissimuxl., nffuer and .1iiiacrf laersorlmcl. During vwnib:lt ollera(ions a 'Tac�lical Air Ftirm (:cullrl1;r11e1 is estahlislied. wit11 to tic�al colilrli:urds set tit) al 'Alael mul tliyan airfields, the two major fields used fow deployulemt of tactical aircraft. The Army 01111r11tilld al Abu *Ubaydah frccluently requests Ilw bead of the tactic;d vonlltland at 'Aral or Riyao airfields In care (lilt sper�ified riiiss. tits in .atditioo to those laid on Ilv the air fol.�e t�ommandcr. This agaitt illllstrales the doalillatire� of Ilw arnr in lla service Arocicltc. Coordillatiolr if' task with (fleothersurviuvs is a fnitetiva of the Arms -ti Forces 0- iteral 11(�add i la ricrs, 2. Strenx composititin, and dislimiticin The air force has expanded rapidly in bolls aircraft Mid I)t'r%rllllle since rllid-'`,HK There ate 52 aircraft (if Soviet :old British origin: .1 bolm111.6L 1.1 fighter boinhers. -1 attack aircraft, y tr:lilsports. 12 helicuplers, 6 trainers. aild �1 olilitr aircraft. Ilowever, tlol all of tln-se aiwraft are hi operatioll:d mnits. The Fifllt Fighter /liondier Squadron Im, 13 \1i( 1 7 l i sco :cold oac MiC -13 F.c:or jftt aircraft. The penc)linel positions in the srluadrotl itlelude the conllnuitdrr, deputy commander. adjiilunt, operations officer. traiuins; officer. and IlWintt'llall i� officer. 'Thu org;artiiatiou (if the oilier mpeadroms is probably similar. The attack /trtiuing; stluadreul comlprist-s Gill R 161 and six Jet Provosis left over from British days. 'The lramporl mpiadrom consis(s of fire An -2.1 :tml Iwo C47 li, lit transports, four ,N1i 7S lraosport Ilelieoptcrs, t'WO Ka 26 utility helicoplers. and two Reavc-l light ulility air(jaft. Of the four Il -?S light halnlmrs. two are the traitiii)g; version (U -11- 2S / ail) and two are of tilt- -ilseration:ll version tl3ata.t;). The bomber sliu:tdrmll should become colnbat read' whim talc initial,aircrems axe lrlioed; Ali II 25 aircrew comprise, it pilot. .1 navigator, and a witmer. As of I)rcemhcr. 1972, pilots were being haired ill Yemen (Aden) and tilt- U.S.S.ti. As of ilcccrrib;r; 1972. at least 235 persomalel were ;issigiicd to the air force. approm-irmatcly 20 of tllem piliils. There also area se pilots lit servicu from the 1 FrOi t fo r the Liberati(n.of Palestine (l'1'l who hold Ir p 6iasspods..tuul'.it� Syrian pilot. all flYing wilh the mpiadmit. ftctause of the lack elf: tluali fieel pilots, the air force is making; :t concerted effort lit iiicre ase(lioir mmiliher.. Duspile Soviet training prog;raim. thcair force is r(hiricted by a severe shortage of elualificd persc)nmel'irr. all riliks. The National F'rorrt h;ts aiplloimted leading members of its organfxalimi: to'kev Ix}silions ill the air force. The air fi)rcc ce rnni; alder. ,Maj. Ahlo d Salim 'i bagel: lias hail