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CONFIDENTIAL 32A /GS /CP Yemen (Sanla) April 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY CONFIDENTIAL APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 i t NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS I The basic init of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated nn an individual basis. These chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selecti. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense htelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Commiltee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence AgL-rcy. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. It, transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. 4 CLASSIFIED By 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 58 (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- Mcliive No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secrot 9 t4 i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 CENFRAl. SUIWEA (JIAI''I'I�RS COUNTRY PROFILE Inte+;ratecl perspective of the subject country Chronology Area brief Summary nap IIE SOCIETY Social stru6tire Populaliou I ?mployntcnt Living conditions Social problems I lvalth Religion 0 hdi -ation A listic cxpres- sion Public inf(nnation. GOVERNAIEN'I ANI) 1'0111"CS I"llitic�al evolu. lion of thr state �Govcrnr�ru�nlul strength and s u!ility Struclurc and function Political dynamics National policies Threats to stability Tliv police Intelligence and secrity Com,wrsibversion and c�ouotcriusurc;cncy rupahilities THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its structure� agricull ire, fisheries, forestrv, fuels and Dower, metals and minerals, manufactiring and con- struction I)ornestic� trade I:conornic policy and development Manpower International ec�ouonric relations 'I'llANSM)HTATI()N ANI) TlONS Appraisal of systems Strategic mobility Iiighways Poris Civil air Airfields The telecom system :1III.ITARY GEOCHAPHY Topography and climate Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes Approaches: land. sca, air AICMEI) I ORCES The defeise establishinent Joint activiVes *Ground forces Naval forces Air forces ParaniiIit;ery This general Survey supersedes lle one dated Junc 1970, copies of which should he destroyed. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 YEMEN (SAWAY) Unfulfilled Revolution in a Medieval Society 1 I'hr jc of Isolation The Tenacity of 'Trib- alism Illiteracy, Suivrstition, and Oat liope for the Fragile I?conomy N( Republic, Old Problems Can the New Structure Survive? 0 The Search for Aid Chronology 12 Area Brief 14 Summary Map follows 15 This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS under the general superclision of the Central Intelli- gence Agency by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, I)e- partment of Commerce. Research was substantially completed by fanuary 1973. CON F I DENT 1A 1. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 .�,go r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 Unfulfilled Revolution in a Medieval Society IT An extremely poor country with apparently limited natural resources and isolated it) southwestern :Arabia away from the main centers of Arab civilization, Yemen' has rarely played all active role in the history of the Middle East, Its greatest glary was achieved during ancient times when, from roughly 12W B.C. to the sixth century A.D., the various kingdon;s oc- cupying the region were extensively involved in inter- national commerce. Yemen's period of prosperity was based on trade, most notably in frankineens? and invrrh, and on an agriculture largely supported by an elahorate, carefully tended irrigation system depend- ent oil the great dam at Ma'rib, Overland caravan routes to Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia �the "incense trail originated in Yerrren, while ships plying ill( Red Sea and the Indian Ocean used its ports. 111 24 B.C, the Romans failed in their attempt to subjugate the region. In the sixth and early seventh centuries, however, first Ethiopian and then Persian invaders succeeded in asserting hegemony over Yemen. After the Ma'rib dam finally burst (sometime between A.D. 542 and 570), rendering arid a large area of 'In antiquity the souther: edge of the Arabian Peninsula was the Yemen, an area which now includes the Yernen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.' and the western portion of the People's I)onocradc� Republic of Yemen (P. 1). R.Y. 'Throughout this General Survey, the word WITIC11 in discusoons of history desigoutes the entire area, but in all other contexts it refers only (u the Y.A.R. Historically, effective power in most c!' this part of the Arabian Peninsula has rested with local tribes H chieftains. However, the Imams, who reigned in what is now 'he Y.A.R. until 1962, had considerable authority, sometimes exere.:ed under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Turks. The present division of the arer. dates from IST) when the British captured Aden, suhsequently established treaty relationships with nearby tribal states, and in 1963 formed the Federation of South Arabia, of which the P.D.R.Y. is the historical descendant. "he Imams claimed that this territory was part of Yemen, calling it "South Yemen" or "Occupied South Yemen.' Now the antipathetic�Y.A.R. and P. D. R. Y. gay :mnlents have agreed oil "unification." but actual merger i% unlikely. hitherto fertile land, yerlielt settled into obscurity and much of the country was reoccupied by Bedouin tribes. (U Yemen's adoption of Islam in the sew--nth century did not reduce the country's political and intellectual isolation from the rest of Arabia. in fact, by endowing )'(.men with a comprehensive It-gal and social ardor "ordained by God," Islam contributed greatly to the deve!opntent of a closed sociopolitical system. Yemen remained apart from the flourishing civilizations of Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo and in any case was too poor to support more than minimal cultural standards. (U %GU) Until the revolution of 1962, Yelinen was essentially u medieval Islamic state, ur,tcsuched by the 20th century and, in the view of foreign critics as :well as domestic dissidents, backward and primitive. Its theocratic rulers, the schismatic Imams who sought refuge in Yemen late in the ninth century, had gradually scaled off the region from outside influences and from foreign visitors. This isolation was deliberate Iv intensified by the imams of the 19th century, Contact with the more progressive Aral) countries was extremely limited; neither the Arab national awakening nor the Muslim reform movements of the late l9th century reached Yemen. Western technology, except 'n the form of modern rifles, was hardly appreciated. 'I'elephones, for examp,e, were riot in- troduced until the late 1940'x, when a few were installed for the Imam's personal use, and paper money was riot issued until 1964. raved roads were unknown before the 1960's. Even the use of radios was severely restricted until the raid- 1950's, while modern newspapers were developed only after the revolution. Agriculture, the country's main industry, was based on techniques developed in pre Islamic times. A fexw, beginning in the 1930's, acquired some knowledge of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 the modern world through travel or Atidy :bn,ad, Imt they were closely snatched for po,si1Ac sttbsrr,ive inclinations. 61 Extenal forces, them, exerted or,l% a limited impact uu Yenn�n's intenal developnetat. Sporadic occupa- tion bs the Ottoman Turks bet%%evii 151- mid 1018 seerts to IMVC had altuost nu vffc�c�t on the country's s060% Mid Politics. The absence of' Etiropc�an penetrne- tion, except in the form of sm all trade missions, p- ec�lude�d the nerd for modernization of arty kind, and Tiirki,h iIIfluetice was too shallow to provide an e ffc c tix model. ,11thcugh it initially had little impact on Sar'a'.` Britain' conquest of Adett ill I8;1i) ul- tintately was to prove of great significance to 1'vlllon. ,1 century later, Advil began to attract large mindwrs of Yemeni laborers and merchants who were then a x posed, however stiperfic�ially, to Western idea, and rtu�lhods. These nlerl formed the nucleus of the revolutionary movement the helped overthrow the Imauuate in 1962. Moreover, Imam Ahmad Ifamid al -Din (INS fit) miwittingl\ helped undermine Ili, own position by accepting arms and tec�luiciatts from :olllmtillst states frr use in the straggle against "British impvrialisn'' in the "Oc�cupiecl South." Yemen's entry into the "rtodern'' era may Ie dated from 26 5vptetnber 1962, when a republican coi4p d'etaI led bs (;ol. ';1bcl :Xllah al ',chug (l,I I Imam Nitlltammad al -Radr. Mnnad's son, who had reigned for only a week. The coup precipitated a blood) civil war that was to last until 1970. lu order to shore up his revolutionary n�gime, which almost icrltnediatel' carne under attack frail the Iman's Saudi- backed tribal forces, Colonel Sallal requested the aid of E gyptian troops, who bore the brunt of the fighting on the republican side uud whose nu ;nbers at one point reached more than 60,000. :kltiotlgll the situation was in fact quite complex, supporters and opponents of Ole revolution tended to divide along sectarian lines. The'' /.aydis, members of tic schismatic Shia branch of Islam, generally supported their religious leader, the Imam, while tilt Shah'is, orthodox Sunni Muslims who c�ons.itrted a slight majority of Ifle poptllatir,n, backed the republicans. Despitc the un- popularit of Sallal, who was President of the Yclilen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) from 1962 until his ouster ill November 1967, his adlnittistration of the country resulted in teutdalnental political changes t1lA made it return to the archaic practices of the 1,000 -year -old Inuunaty virtually impossible. For a tinge, Yemen became identified with ti(� "progressive' Arab states, but contacts with the Arab world, except for E gypt. remained limited. W) �Fur diauritics un place tiamrti we thy� list of palm's on the aliron ul the tinnumim Map aml the mall itself APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 The Legacy of Isolation (u /ou) (;cography no less that, I,,,licy ac�cc!U11ts for Yemen's isolation and corriributes to its continuing insularity and underdevelopn(nt. The country is not easily approachable from any direction and is far frmrn an)" other center of civilization except for Aden, to the south. About t1w size of Illinois. Yernen is hemmed it) on the by the lied Sea, With its hazardous coasts; on the 1�ast by the vast desert expanse of the Empty Quarter (Ruh' al- ilhah) on the north b% the arid highlands :,f Asir in Su1:di Arabia; and on the south and southeast by the rugged foothills and desolate Ifadrama t plateau of Yemen (Adcn). The terrain within the country is divides! into hvo main parts: the Ti flit rna11, It hot and almost rainless coastal strip, whose clintutc is oce of the most r on earth and tilt' cooler, more dersc'I populated high ph,leae, with Sae'a', the capital, in its center. The sparsely settled eastern part of tf.c plateau slopes gently down and shades into desert. Water is roost Plectiful in the highlands, whicf catch the Indian Occan monsoons; vegetation is generall sparse in other areas. Whet the rains fail, massive f;unne snrnetirnc's results. The mountains, tilt' hight'st in Arabia, rise abruptlN from th(� coastal plain to inure than 1209) feet near S:.u1'a', ;:ud the}' huge profcundl divided the� country 'III(] its people, m;rry of whoa, rarely venture beyond the confines of their natiyt. yallcy floor or hillside. In contrast to the coastal dwelivrs, largely M -grot.s and Afric�alls of ,ni%cd descent, the Volatile Arab highlanders, whose mountain strongholds hove frc- clucntly discoeraged military expeditions, have seldom willingly sulrtitted to control by a c�cnh'al authority. The few bedoeins inhabiting the eastern desert border regions also have been reluctant to acknowledge t!u� suzerainty of an governntc'rt. Undcr them. conditions, the exercise of central authority has been extremely difficult, even in nodern tines, and the rise ar d fall of small principalities and tribal states hues been it prominent characteristic of 1'cnu ni history. Although the civil war between republicans and tilt. royalist followers of the I,narn during the 1962 -70 period jolted the Ye,tte,is out of their medieval lethargy, Yenu'n coutincc's to be an inward- looking and primitive land, now preoccrrpiccl svitlt its rtriny domestic problens and its unfinished sccial rcrol!Hon, 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 /n,atn's Palace near San'a' Aertueen San'a' and A/ flu&,ydah APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 25X1 shortage of mecl`r:,-,l personnel, the drought- induced famines, not to s of the ravages of war, have combined to meld a population that is generally inclined to accept the misfortunes of life as ordained by God. The typical villager is locked by ignorance into a timeless world of spirits or demons, called jinns, and of custom. Governed by superstition and fear, he is skeptical of change but not unreceptive if its advan- tages are clearly demonstrated. A serious impediment to development is the widespread habit of chewing qat, a mild narcotic shrub grown on the Yemeni hillsides. Between 75% 4.- 4, 7 ,k. pe #or ,#fie r file to BONY (c) r J, �L Y y.. yy, L t r r. r r e Antiquated social practices and a rigid social struc- ture intermesh with the country's fragile economic system to limit the prospects of development. There seem to be few economic initiatives that can have major impact in moving the country toward self sustaining growth, and economic viability is many decades away. At the equivalent of US$40 to US$50 per year, per capita income is one of the lowest in the Arab world, and unemployment and underemploy- ment are believed to be considerable. However, for the moment at least, the government seems intent on tackling the country's severe economic difficulties, foreign aid is coming in, and the private sector is being bolstered. The national budget represents only rough estimates of receipts and expenditures. The latter increased in FY71 to over US$35 million, but the expansion has been concentrated on defense and internal security. Other uses of budgetary funds are indicated by a remark of a former Prime Minister who likened the 6 and 90% of all adult males are said to be habitual users; some estimates place experiditure-. for qat as high as one -third of the cash income of the average Yemeni. Urban Yemenis, in particular, like to spend the afternoon chewing, smoking the water pipe, and exchanging gossip. Some of these gatherings last well into the evening, inducing a sense of euphoria in the participants but making work nearly impossible. Government efforts to eliminate the cultivation of the bush, announced in May 1972, are likely to prove ineffective, since qat is an important feature of Yemen social life and a lucrative cash crop. budget to "a fund for the relief of the unemployed, the disabled, and the needy, as well as the source by which the greedy ones get rich." Few people, however, get rich in Yemen. Although survey missions have located some deposits of copper, coal, and oil, these natural resources have not so far proved to be of commercial significance. In this context, industrialization is vir- tually out of the question. There are only about 8,000 industrial workers in Yemen, a quarter of whom are employed in the two factories run by the state -owned textile concern. The repubhe's first economic priority, then, is agriculture, accounting for about 90% of employment and providing an estimated 709c of the gross domestic product (GDP). Since ancient times, the Yemeni farmer, despite his limited technical knowledge, has ranked among the most skilled in the world. Almost every hillside on which cultivation is possible is elaborately terraced, and the irrigation systems are APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 carefully maintained. A variety of clops are produced, including millet, wheat, barley, corn, an assortment of fruits, date palms, and coffee. Nevertheless, under present ccndturns Yemeni agriculture can meet the country's demand for food only in unusually good crop years. 'l'he shortage of water is a prime reason for the inability to increase production, although ground- water reservoirs in the Tihamah could conceivably be tapped. Moreover, the land is not as fert;le as it once ryas; yields are fairly high oni% in relation to those elsewhere in Arabia. Combined with the farrner's ignorance of new griculturai techniques, these factors suggest that. e�yen \xith c\tensive� foreign assistance, Yemen's green revolution is years away. Aside frorn the difficulty of expanding the national product, the ability to augment revenues is severely hampered by an ineffective system of taxation and the public's traditional resistance to government authori- ty. Instead of being taxed, Yemeni tribes expect to be courted with handsome government subsidies. Moreover, for the person who pays taxes, rates often depend on his relationship with the tax collector. Financial support for development projects must come almost entirely from external sources. The U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China have been Yemen's major sources of aid, and West Germany has replaced the United States as the main Western contributor following the break in U.S. Yemeni diplomatic ties in 1967. The improved relations with Saudi ,Arabia since the end of the civil war have stimulated inflows of foreign capital, and many businessmen have fled the highly socialized Yemen (Aden) �the P. D. R. Y. �to come to the Y.A.R. The result has bee: a commercial surge in San'a' and Al Hudaydah. Yemen's ability to earn foreign exchange is limited, however, as it has an unfavorable balance of trade with almost every country with which it deals. Although imparts tripled during the 1964 -70 period, exports dropped, largely because of drought ;;ears. The stability of the rival, suc:, as it is, has been under- pinned over the years by substantial remittances (US833 million -350 million per y,ar) from thousands of Yemeni emigrants working abroad. Drawing well Mater Unless the economic situation improves, it will be extremely difficult to create modern political struc- tures. Operating as a closed system, the Imamate Nvas not required to satisfy economic demands, which were muted in any case. Maldistribution of income was hardly a problem in a country that boasted little in the way of wealth. Even the despotic Imams were not men of great wealth or given to Western luxuries. Main- taining the political balance was a relatively simple matter of playing off one faction againsi another and keeping the tribes in line by bribery, cajolery, or military force. So long as outside factors did not intrude, this was a reasonably workable system. Since the overthrow of the Imamate in 1962, the basic conditions governing political life have not changed substantially. Perhaps the main difference between the oid and new regimes is that Yemenis are, in theory, no longer subjects of the lmarn but citizens APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 25X1 overworked high officials to delegate authority. Moreover, the administrative machinery is corrupt and, in the swords of a former Prime Minister, characterized by "confusion, lack of discipline, carelessness, and irresponsibility." In the absence of a stabilizing officialdom, the frequent changes in government (some 21 cabinets in the 1962 -71 period) have had an immobilizing effect. This situation mould be far more serious, however, we re it not for the inertia of the rural areas and the tradition of local government which enables villagers and tribes to conduct their own affairs for prolonged periods without interference or supervision from San'a'. (The apparatus of modern government simply does not operate outside Yemen's three main cities) Furthermore, the Shar'a (Islamic law), still the coun- try's only regular code of law, serves as a weighty stabilizing factor. Recent events suggest not only a consolidatior of revolutionary gains but also a moderation of revolutionary excesses and a reassertion of tradition. An accommodation with the royalists, exclusive of the Imamic family, was achieved in May 1970. Since then, the Yemeni leadership has been engaged in a more or less systematic effort to restructure the political process and enlarge the framework of public participation. The Permanent Constitution, a rather conservative document declaring Yemen to be an Arab, Islamic state, was proclaimed in December 1970, and popular elections for the new parliament were held in early 1971. In theory, this assembly, the Consultative Council, is to represent all "national tendencies of thought," but it is dominated by tribal leaders, and the constitutional ban on parties severely inhibits expression of public opinion, particularly by leftwing elements. The decidedly stronger of the two branches of government is the executive, composed of a Republican Council and a Council of N inisters. The Republican Council, a three -man body aapointed by the Consultative Council and presided over by the President, is responsible for establishing and super- vising national policy. The Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, is responsible for executing government police. A third executive agency, an 11- member Supreme Council for Defense of the St was reportedly established in September 1972, its membership to include the Chairman of the Republican Council, ranking military officers, and prominent tribal leaders. It is impossible to de;ormine whether this new and rather awkward constioitional structure will survive. Yemen has had no experience with parliamentary government, and lines of authority between the ex- cutive and the parliament are not clear. drawn. All may ultimately be overshadowed by the Supreme "ouncil. As elsewhere in the Middle East, intervention in )olitics by the armed forces is always possible. In triking contrast to the situation which existed under he Imamate, the military has become an important orce in the workings of government. Under the nfluence of and with aid from the Egyptians and soviets, the army made great gains after 1962. Some of hose gains have now been lost, however; as the army disturbed by the same tribal and religious divisions Nch affect the rest of society, its operational and rganizational capabilities are limited. In short, the 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 Can the New Structure Survive? (c) militarN N%ould be unlikely to gove�m the cmintrc am more efficiently than the present civilian leadership ,ud mwndd be equally constrained b harsh economic realities. For many s ears, Yemeni political life s ill reflect the character of its deep1% cmiservatire Muslim socich. Modernization %%ill proceed unh fitfully, and ,.ipid transformations in any sector are not tee i,e expected. N1'c�re Marxist- oriented radical, of the Yenien iAdt-tl stripe to assume Imwer, it is doubtful whether their control could he imposed without stimulating the rebellious instincts of' the "anti- Cminnunut tribes and prejudicing the rappriwfn'rnent %%ith Saudi Arabia. Whose friendsllip is impt tlr Yt-rneni stabilit%. A radical pre,granl might also frighten ma\ the c(mmiercial interests urn v%li -w) the present g(wcrn rnent has mule� to depend for support. On the other hand, a more "right\\ ing" c(mrst- runs the risk of :lienating educated %mIths anxious to put it l v; Id to l crnen's back N artiness, as ell as important groups ill the militar\ and civil ser %ic�t-s. Dissident group, ha\c already elrnnu no. cd I'�esidcnt Irani ii> it rightist :ud war?ted against 'react ionan, ii plots agaitlst tilt- rexolulion. Ihlr"riiun rnrirtll: ill C'hill'i The Search for Aid (c) In line with changing domestic policies, foreign alignments also are beginning to shift. Yemen's primary international concerns are related to a search for foreign aid and the need to stabilize relations with its neighbors. According to the Foreign Minister in 1911, Yemen's police is to remain friendly Frith all countries, but in order of importance the Aral) states rank first, the socialist countries secon:1, and the Western powers last. With the partial exception of the 10 Arab countries, howe\er. Yemen has no natural affinity with un\ state or blow. Its people have little understanding of either democratic or Communist political systems. During critical stages of the civil war, the republicans leaned heavil on the Soviets, who lime since shown considerable less interest in the country, but acceptance of Soria aid was basically a tactical consideration, as was the imams flirtation with the Communist countries in the 1950�s. I3r the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 same token, Yemen's evening to the West beginning in the late 1960's and culminating in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in July 1972, implies no moral comr. fitment to Western patterns of development or politics, which are essen- tially inapplicable in any event. It does underscore the need for Western aid in the form of technology and equipment and the growth of a more pragmatic government outlook that stands in sharp contrast to past government policy, including that of the period Egyptian domination. Relations with other Arab nations have been characterized by suspicions only slightly less deep than those directed toward the non -Arab world. During the civil war, the royalists and tribesmen generally viewed the Egyptians as occupiers; ven many republicans resented their heavy hand. Yemen has traditionally viewed Saudi Arabia as an enemy, fighting and losing a war with it in 1934 and, as recently as early 1970, bombing border towns because of Saudi support of Yemeni royalists. With the end of the civil war, however, relations improved, and Saudi Arabia has become an important source of aid. After Yemen (Aden) formally the P.D.R.Y.� gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1967, relations with the south gre%, progressively worse, reaching a low point in October 1972 when Ader i dissidents, apparently encouraged by San'a', seized Aden's Kamaran Island and captured some Adeni soldiers. ;bon thereafter, how -ever, delega- tions from San'a' and Aden, meeting in Ca;;: at the behest of the Arab League, reached agreemc ia, on the settlement of most difference.> and worked uut a unification plan. The agreement according to which the two Yei.iens are to become one by the end of 1973 was s?g,ned by the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. presidents at a summit conference in Tiipoli, Libya, on 28 November 1972, but it is questionable whether the two countries. with divergent histories and political coloring, can ever achieve a tr,;e .ae -ger. Yemen's future will be determined by its ability to secure and utilize development assistance and, more importantly, by its success in accommodating the imperatives of the modern world with its ancient traditions. There is virtually no precedent for Yemen's contemporary situation. Although the country is no longer officially isolated, it is far rea Dved from the mainstream of world affairs. While it is beginning to educate its children, it has few employment oppor- tunities for there beyond traditional pursuits. Moreover, the country's prospects are overshadowed by its tendency toward divisiveness. The nation has a firm grounding in more than 3,000 years of history, but Yernen's revolutionary brand of nationalism has failed to bridge the gap between town and country, highland and coast, north and south, Zaydi and Shafi'i, tribe and nontribe. The revolution may have liberated the people from the yoke of the Imams, but the people have not yet decided where they are going or how they will get there. I1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 Chronology Wouj 628 Yemen is converted to Islam. 097 71 a Zaydi sect, which became the basis of 6e theocratic Imamate, is introduced. 1517.96 First Ottoman occupation of Yemen. 1840 -1918 Second occupation by Ottoman Turks. 1911 Treaty of Da an, between the Turks and the Imam, is signed, granting special rights to the Zaydi tribes. 1918 s Yemen becomes independent, except for a coastal strip retained by the United Kingdom until 1925. 1928 Yemen is recognized by the Soviet Union. 1934 Saudi Arabian -Yemen war is won by Arabia, which waives any territorial claim. 1946 Yemen is recognized by the United States. 1947 Yemen is admitted to the United Nations. 1962 September Imam Ahmad dies of natural causes and is succeeded by Imam Badr on 19 September. Eight days later a coup, led by Brig. Gen. 'Abd Allah al- Sallal and others, over- throws the Imamate and proclaims the Yemen Arab Re- public. Yemen is recognized by Egypt and the U.S.S.R. before the end of the month. Civil war between the republicans and the royalists begins. December The republican government is recognized by the United Nations, and its representatives are seated in the U.N. General Assembly. 1963 July U.N. Yemen Observation Mission begins its operations, which continue till September 1964. A 12 1964 March President Sallal tours European Communist capitals and signs a 5 -year treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R. June Sallal visits Communist 7hina, where he signs a treaty of friendship. October Pence conference is held in Sudan under auspices of the Arab states; a ceasefire is agreed to but not observed. December Serous opposition to Yemen's virtual occupation by Egyptians surfaces when "Abd al- Rahman al -Iryani and Muhammad Mahmud al- Zubayri resign from the govern- ment. 1965 August Egyptian P. rsident Nasir and Saudi Arabian King Faysal agree on a ceasefire in Yemen and begin plans for a peace conference. November First session of Yemeni peace conference held Y:t Harad fails to reach agreement and never reconvenes, 1967 June Yemen breaks relations with the United States over the Arab Israeli war. September Egyptian troops and advisers begin to withdraw from Yemen. November Pro Egyptian President Sallal is ousted. He is replaced by a "Yemen first" regime under a three -member Repub- lican Council headed by Iryani. December Egyptian withdrawal is completed. 1968 February The royalist seige of San a' is lifted with the reopening of the Al Hudaydah road. August Mutiny of predominantly Shafi "i shock troops is broken by tribal forces. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 v b 1969 MU& December s Provisional National Council, which serves as a con- New rnnsti:ution is promulgated. sultative quasi -legislature, meets, attended by tribal chiefs 197.1 and other notables. March-April September-December Saudi Arabia temporarily resumes aid to royalists who ody t3tive Council is elected, first elective legislative eventually regain Sa`dah. 1970 1972 Mamh July October Peace agreement between republicans and royalists finally Dissident forces from Yemen (nden) --the P.D.R.Y.� s achieved at conference in Jidda. spark military engagements; San'a' takes Kamaran Island. May November The government adds ex- royalists to the Republican Coun- P.D.R.Y. and Y.A.R. Presidents meet in Tri cil, cabinet, ails the National Council. poli, Libya, and rati a greement to unify countries in 1973. i i k Sz 13 F CONFIDENTIAL, Area Brief Now LAND Size: About 75,000 sq. m� (parts of border with Saudi Arabia and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen un- defined) Use: 20% agricultural, 1% forested, 79% desert, waste or urban Land boundaries: 950 mi. WATER Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. Coastline: 325 mi. PEOPLE Population: 6,074,000 (mid -1972 est.); average annual growth rate, about 2.9% Ethnic divisions: 90% Arab, 10% Afro -Arab (mixca) Religion: 100% Muslim Language: Arabic Literacy: 15% (est.) Labor force: Almost entirely engaged in agriculture and herding, about 8,000 in industry, 400,000 in commerce and construction GOVERNMENT Legal name: Yemen Arab Republic Type: Republic Capital: San'a' Political subdivisions: 8 provinces Legal system: Based on Turkish law, Islamic law, and local customary law; first constitution promulgated De- 1 nber 1970; has not accepted compulsory ICJ juris- dic. _'on Branches: President, Prime Minister, Republican Council, Consultative Council Government leader: President 'Abd al- Rahman al -Iryani Communists: Few known Member of: Arab League, FAO, ICAO, 1TU, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO 14 ECONOMY Agriculture: Sorghum and millet, qat (a mild narcotic), cotton, coffee, fruits and vegetables; self sufficient in food only in very good crop years Major industries; Cotton textiles, leather goods, cement, aluminum products Electric power: 4,000 kw. capacity (1970); 14 million kw. -hr. produced (1970), 2 kw. -hr. per capita Exports: About $6 million (1970) �qat, coffee, hides, rock salt Imports: About $88 million 1970 manufactured con- sumer goods, petroleum prod�cts, sugar grain, Flour and other foodstuffs Major trade partners: Trade with Aden 25% of total, others include U.S.S.R., Japan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, France Monetary conversion rate: 1 Yemeni riyal =about US$0.20 as of late 1972 Fiscal year: 1 July -30 June COD ri iCATIONS Railroads: None Highways: 2,160 mi.; 290 mi. bituminous; 270 mi. crushed stone and gravel; 1,600 mi. earth roads and motorable tracks Ports: 3 major, 2 minor Civil air: 8 major transport aircraft Airfields: 24 usable; 5 with permanent- surface runways; 1 with runway over 12,000 ft., 6 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 12 with runways 4,000 -7,999 ft. Telecommunications: Systems among Mideast's worst; consists of meager open -wire lines and low -power radio communication stations; principal center, San a', secon- dary centers Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz; 3,550 telephones; 25,000 radio receivers (approx.); 2 AM radio broadcast stations DEFENSE FORCES About 1,470,000 males 15 -49 (July 1072 est.); 53% fit for military service; about 31,000 in armed forces; ap- proximately 50,000 reach military age (18) annually CONFEDENITAL APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 4 I Places and features referred to in the General Survey (U /OU) COORDINATES o r o r,� o 1Yl o 1E Abu as Su'Gd, Saudi Arabia 17 28 44 06 Kirsh, Yemen (Aden).................... 14 37 46 45 A4 Pal i' 1:3 42 44 43 Ma4iq Kamaran (channel) 15 20 42 38 Aden, Yemen (Aden) 12 46 45 01 M afbaq. 15 07 43 54 A n: nadi 14 48 42 57 M anakhah 15 07 43 44 AI 3ay4:i 13 58 45 36 M a' rib... 15 30 45 21 Ba;;t al Fagih :4 31 43 17 M aydi.. 16 18 42 48 Allludaydah 14 48 42 57 Mocha.. 13 19 43 15 Al Lub ayyah 15 4:3 42 42 Najran, Saudi Arabia (oasis) I7 30 44 10 Al Luhayyah (port) 15 42 42 42 Perim, Yemen (Aden) (island)............ 12 39 43 25 Ar Rahidah 1 3 20 44 17 Qa'tabah................... 13 51 44 42 Asir, Saudia Arabia (region). 19 00 42 00 Qizan, Saudi Arabia...................., 16 54 42 32 As Salif 15 18 42 41 Ramlat as Sah'atayn (dunes).............. 15 30 46 00 At Ta'if, Saudi Arabia 21 16 40 24 Rida'... 14 28 44 53 At Turbah 13 02 43 54 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.................... 24 38 46 43 Az Z aydiyah 15 14 43 04 Rub' al Khali (desert) 20 00 51 00 Bab el Mandeb (strait) 12 30 43 20 Sa' dah.. 16 57 43 44 Bahrain (island) 26 00 50 30 Salif, Ra's as (point) 15 19 42 40 Baijil I...... 15 04 43 17 San' a'... 15 23 44 12 Balaq 15 19 �15 23 Ta' izz... 13 38 44 02 Banial lIarith 15 38 44 10 Tiha mah area),................ 14 03 47 55 Bani al Ilarith (tribal area). 15 38 44 10 Uqdah, Saudi .Arabia.................... 14 07 43 05 Karat 13 35 44 39 Wadi Zabid (wadi)....................... 14 09 43 18 Da'a n 16 01 43 50 I Z abid 14 12 43 I8 D hamiir 14 46 44 23 %ahriin, Saudi Arabia.................... 17 40 43 30 Dhofar, Saudi Arabia (region) 17 00 54 10 Selected Airfields fladhramaut (region) 15 0(1 50 00 liajjah 15 42 43 34 A] Bayda 14 06 45 26 l lara4 16 28 43 04 Al lludaydah New...................... 14 45 �12 59 I crib 14 57 45 30 I As Salif East 15 18 42 52 Ibb 13 58 44 12 I Qalat M arinaf 16 00 43 11 Jibl ah 13 56 �14 10 Ra wdah 15 28 44 13 Jidda (Juddah),Saudi Arabia 21 30 39 12 Sadah New 16 58 43 44 Ji� ayn 16 59 44 11 Sana South... 15 19 44 12 Kamaran, Yemen (Aden) (island). 15 21 42 34 Sukhne 14 48 43 26 K hawr Kathib (bay) 14 52 42 57 Tai New 13 41 44 08 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 -l 5a _i, fir ew sa v. ay. Ilk rysraq 400 yyad Hai r a rat, J' Al Matammah t r t I a Al Hazm r AI Luhayyah�,.`' a Az 2uhrab r r` 3,. rJf' t ;icY. b OH; r r f _a "r t J p 4 M tiY XaytlFyal +c' t,Salit j .1,i. I arhah: ytA r> aesi,l w t SANU. a Ranah Al Mariwt ah;._ ,+ir a j Ma'bar Al hudaydeh ty' IJ; �f: r! :r 7.,rt., sa a Dhamar *Beyt al Faq,h R Rr.y RPM, AI WVaAVniVa116 J aY arim Zabid OP An Nadif ah As Saddah -WA lbb s .4Mays R 1 J'dl abrah i t` v, _1 .a .:u..ya. '':at. l:r:. k� yJ.a. '.:.,8. d APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 Elm r q A l B 6 y;d a t Ohl Na'im f 3 t At 8aa� r fit X x,L +Y ...i:� F 4+ r, t. As APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100025 -8 $an'b' 120,000 At Hudaydah 90,000 Ta'izz 80,000 (1970 esfimide) M t f s �3281 Jawi RAMLAr AS SA'ArYN N r q A l B 6 y;d a t Ohl Na'im f 3 t At 8aa� r fit X x,L +Y ...i:� F 4+ r, t. 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