NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 21; YUGOSLAVIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100033-9
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• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 33
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B. Structure and functioning of the government
3
C. Political dynamics
15
1. Constitution
3
League of Communists of Yugoslavia as ultimate
Revision to provide for succession to Tito,
source of all political power, relative frank and
decentralization; constitutions of 1946, 1953,
open political life resulting from decentralize!
and 1963, the establishment of the socialist
ply structure, three major party factions �ultro-
federal state and the evolution to self -man-
liberals, hardline conservatives, Tito moderates;
agement, state presidency; constitutional sta-
ascendancy of Tito, interplay of politics and
tus of League of Communists of Yugoslavia,
regional rivalries, problem of succession.
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugo-
1. Party development
17
slavia, and Confederation of Trade Unions
Communist assumption of absolute control
of Yugoslavia; Constitutional Court; quali-
during and after World War I1, 1648 break
fied personal freedoms.
with Stalin and emergence of Yugoslav com-
2. Structure of the government
5
munism, decentralization of party organiza
Post -World War II totalitarianism under Tito
tion and separation of party and state activ-
after Soviet pattern; trend toward separation
ities, evolution of Yugoslav communism,
of executive, legislative, and judicial func-
continuing anti- Soviet sentiment.
tions and decentralization after 1963; con-
2. Organization
21
tinuing ascendancy of Communist party.
Democratic centralism with party majority
a. Legislature
6
decisions binding on all, provisions for dis-
Responsibility for legislation, selection
sent; Party Conference, Presidium, Executive
of membership of executive and courts;
Bureau, their functions and composition;
chambers, commissions, committees; mem-
dominance by Tito; Commission for Statutory
bership, representation; legislative process;
Questions, Supervisory Committee; infusion
increasingly free debate, principle of ex-
of younger members into leaderships; republic
ecutive responsibility to parliament.
party organization parallel to federal party;
b. Executive
9
party conference and committee at local level;
(1) Presidency
9
party organization in the armed forces.
Device to accomplish succession to
3. Membership
24
Tito; composition and terms of
Eligibility, numbers and classifications of
office; functions.
members.
(2) Federal Executive Council
10
4. Other major political organizations
25
Executor of Federal Assembly's
Regime preference for acting through front
policy; composition, state sec -e-
organizations, control through party mem-
taries; functions and powers; Coun-
bers kvho are also members of the other
cil of National Defense; Council of
organizations.
the Federation.
a. Socialist Alliance of Working People
3. Republic government
10
of Yugoslavia
25
]Responsibility for areas of authority not
Principal mass organization, successor to
granted federal government; structure gen-
Comintern-inspired People's Front; arena
,rally parallel to federal system executive
of public debate on social political mat
council, assembly.
ters, instrument of popular scrutiny of
4. Local government
11
government work, domain for voting; con
Increasing autonomy, basic responsibility for
ference principle of o- ganization; member
economic enterprises, social services, require-
ship trends, relationships to party, other
went to e:,.urce federal and republic legisla-
mass organizations, and foreign groups.
tion; assembly, administrative departments;
b. Federations of youth and students
26
clash between communal interests and those
Transmission belt for party directives,
of the republic or federation, party's role in
membership and hierarchy, reorganiza-
assuring compliance with policy.
tion to overcome ineffectiveness; Federa-
5. Judiciary
tion of Students of Yugoslavia and its
Instrument of control despite comparative
parallel problem of yo..th disaffection;
liberal system in compari.;on with other Com-
general problem of youth unrest.
munist states, election and appointment of
5. Electoral procedures
28
party members to judgeships and legal posts;
Party supervision of elections through So-
Constitutional Court, courts of general juris-
cialist Alliance of Working People of Yugu-
diction for criminal and civil cases, spe-
slavia and party- controlled state electoral com-
cialized military and economic courts; public
missions; transition from single- to multipie-
prosecutors, criminal procedure, numbers and
candidate elections; qualifications of voters;
uneven distribution of lawyers.
nominating procedures.
ii
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National policies
30
E. Threats to government stability
40
Basic objectives of all policy to maintain Yugo
1. Discontent and dissidence
40
slavil s unity and independence and to develop
the country's economy; decentralization of gov-
Minimal discontent and dissidence because
ernment and economy as domestic means to these
of popular trust for regime and pride in
ends, nonalignment with Communist or non-
Yugoslavia's accomplishments, avenues for re-
Communist blocs as international policy.
lease of popular discontent; persistence of na-
1. Domestic
30
tionality rivalries linked with economic im-
balances, possible helpful effect of social
Perpetuat;-ra of Communist party rule and
mobility and internal migration; uncertainty
socialist system as major political objectives;
over succession to Tito; generation gap �im-
impermissibility of public questioning of legiti-
patience and aspirations of youth; churches'
macy of party rule, controlled public par-
opposition to Communist rule.
ticipation in political process; problem of
regional and nationalistic frictions; mixed eco-
2. Subversion
41
nomic system with goal of creating modern
Persistence o!: subversive activity, effective
technological society, decentralized economic
ness of government counteraction; great po-
decisionmaking, problem of uneven economic
tential because of national rivalries and tradi-
development; preponderance of private hold-
tional antip: thics; emigree groups, terrorist
Ings in agriculture despite efforts toward
acts abroad and in Yugoslavia; active Croatian
collectivization, goal of increased production;
groups, Slovenian and Serbian groups; govern-
high priority to efficient educational system
ment successes against subversives, wariness
designed to promote socialist ideals; accom-
toward potentials from Albania, Bulgaria, and
modation with religious groups; cultural free
the U.S.S.R.
dom within limitations of guidance by party
through all media; problem of encouraging
F. Maintenance of internal security
44
ethnic individuality which stimulated na-
Mission and general administrative structure at
tionalist rivalries.
intelligence and security services.
2. Foreign
33
"Active coexistence" as avoiding identifica-
1. Intelligence and internal security
45
lion with any political bloc but undertaking
Prime responsibility of Federal Secretary for
Initiatives; historical fluctuations depending
Internal Affairs, the State Security Service;
on relations with U.S.S.R.; affinity to Ro-
Administration XII of the Federal Secretariat
mania, coolness toward East Germany, good
of National Defense; Administration for Co-
relations with Hungary; neutrality in Sino-
ordination of the Federal State Secretariat
Soviet dispute; problems with Albania, Bul-
for Foreign Affairs; evolution of intelligence
garia, Greece; generally good relations with
and security services, their status and methods.
Western Europe and the United States; bene-
2. Police
47
fits of nonalignment; trade policy in support
of modernization and industrialization; popular
Public Security Service, its organization, func-
acceptance and international benefits.
tions, training, effectiveness.
3. National defense
38
3. Penal system
48
Strung military capability to discourage ag-
Administration, numbers of prisons, staff,
gression against Yugoslavia, policy of balance
treatment of prisoners.
between U.S.S.R. and United States also ap-
plicable to military, dependence on U.S.S.R.
4. Countersubversive and counterinsns-
for heavy military equipment; All- People's
gency measures and capabilities
48
Defense; army's educational and economic
Militia's ability to handle emigree- sponsored
tasks� avenue of political indoctrination and
activities; general trustworthiness and capa-
source of cheap labor for public projects,
bility of internal security forces.
symbol of national unity; displacement of
wartime partisan military leadership by post-
G. Selected bibliography
4J
war professionals, loyalty to state rather than
party, concurrent increasing general criticism
of defense spending; loyalty to Tito, prob-
Chronology
50
able stability in succession; universal liability
for military training, image of populace united
in eefense; civil defense: defense strategy.
Glossary
53
iii
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
Yugoslavia's political life is in the midst of
preparations for the evertttutl proble of succession.
Throughout the country's postwar history the
personality of President Josip Broz Tito has acted as a
guiding force and moderating influence on
Yugoslavia's diverse rationalities and theircentrifugal
tendencies. The time left for Tito, who was 80 in May
1972, to insure the survival of what he has wrought is
at hest limited. With this in mind, the nation, under
Tito's guidance, is mid -way through a sweeping
constitutional reform program and the Communist
party is seeking new ways to strrngthen its influence
and control. This dual process is designed further to
decentralize governmental authority, while insuring
that the park- remains the cementing force of the
Yugoslav federation.
Yugoslavia, in its slightly more than :50 years of
existence, has grown from a backward Balkan state
into it nation which exercises influence throughout the
world far out of proportion to its size and power.
Credit for this feat rests with one ratan, President Tito.
Tito, it corky, crafty, curious, restless, and gregarious
self -made man, possesses rare political skills. He knows
how best to use those around hire to achieve his ends.
But he also has an almost animal -like instinct for
sensing d anger; he knows how to exercise self control,
knows how to neutralize competing pressures, and is a
master at blurring issues. Largely as a result of Tito's
political prowess, postwar Yugoslavia has a record of
impressive political accomplishments Historians ma
differ on 'Tito, but all will continue to give him credit
for defying Stalin, and for parlaying ambiguous
political terms such as "self management" and
"nonalignment" into meaningful political concepts
that often capture world headlines. Because of its
success in combining Communist rule with
independence, Yugoslavia is the secret envy of other
Eastern European nations and it curiosity to the West.
In the less developed countries of Africa and Asia,
where 'socialism" is art attractive political term,
Yugoslavia's unique form of worker managed
economy liberally sprinkled wid small private
businesses is a powerful force.
Despite Yugoslavia's one -party political system, its
political life has a dynamic quality thanks to the
regime's efforts to induce democrati: procedures,
including open debate and the substitution of
persuasion for coercion. As a result, there is a great
deal of personal, physical, and intcCectual freedom
compared with most other East European Communist
states. The Communist regime, however, has set limits
to the growth of an open political order. No challenge
to the one -party system or to Tito's leadership is
permitted, and the Communist part (the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia �LCY) avowedly remains
the sole political authority in the country. In foreign
affairs Belgrade has tried to maintain a highly flexible
policy, which has permitted it to remain politically
and iavologically independent of both the Communist
and non- Communist power bloc:. Since the
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the balance of
Yugoslav nonalignment has shifted in favor of the
West.
In addition to Tito's charismatic personality and
political skill, the secret to Yugoslavia's independence
also rests with the fact that C ommunist rule was
established %with relatively little help from Moscow.
Tito's regime came to power at the close of World War
II with only minor assistance from the Soviet army.
The part' had been locally recruited and trained, and
although respectful of the Soviet leadership, a
successful guerrilla war made its leaders both popular
and confident in their ability to rule. As a result,
Yugoslavia showed none of the slavish fealty paid to
the Soviets by other Eastern European Communist
regimes. Although Yugoslav communism in the
immediate postwar years was built on the Soviet
model and followed Stalin's leadership, Tito's
independent attitude and political ambitions in the
Balkans quickly raised Stalin's ire. Tito's own dreams
and goals clashed with the Soviet dictator's intention
to dominate Yugoslavia's leaders and exploit the
country's economy. The clash led to the expulsion of
Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau
(Corninform) in 1943.
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Following its expulsion, Yugoslavia began
mod f%ing its domestic and foreign policies. The need
for popular support at limne in the face of Soviet
economic� and political efforts to thrpple the Tito
regime, its well as for policies which world encourage
economic growth, resulted in a search for nc�w socialist
forms. Marxism- Leninism was subjected to intense
philosophical scrutiny. Claiming that their interpreta-
tion rested on the real meaning of `lar:c and that
Stalin was the "revisionist," the Yugoslays seized upon
the Marxist theory that the state should "wither
away' as the basic doctrinal justification for their new
independent road to socialism. Regime leaders argued
that their new approach, consisting primarily of
decentralization of economic and political decision
making, accorded with the withering -away principle.
Conversely, Yugoslav theoreticians accused Stalin of
ignoring this principle in creating a repressive,
btireauc�ratic state which relied upon police
intervention and terror to make it work. This
ideological breach between Belgrade and Moscow has
never healed instead, further Yugoslav efforts at
decentralization launched in the mid- 1960's have
aroused deep misgivings in the U.S.S.R.
The regime has attempted to win support and
overcome popular apathy toward communism at
home through policies of moderation and persuasion.
Police controls are relaxed, greater emphasis is placed
on the government's adherence to its own lega
guarantees, and greater freedom is allowed in
religious, educational, and cultural affairs. The
leadership has encouraged increased popular
participation in political life through voluntary
Lictivity in mass organizations. As a result, the
attitudes of the Yugoslav people have gradually
changed from hostility to acceptance of the regime
and pride in its economic and political accomplish-
ments, particularly its independence from foreign
control. Above all, the policies of the "Tito regime have
produced it rising standard of living, although at the
cost of heavy foreign debt and considerable economic
inefficiency.
"Tito and company, however, have failed to win the
majority of Yugoslays to communism as a doctrine.
The regime's own efforts to spur economic
advancement through greater foreign investments and
permissiveness in the realm of private business have
dissaffected many you.:g idealists. For others, material
adcancernent is too slow. They want all the luxuries of
the West. and they want them now. The slowness of
communism �in their eves �to meet these demands
has disenchanted than with the system. If the nation's
leadership gets credit for improv. merits in national
life, it also gets `lie blame for the high level of
economic corruption, widespread social and economic
ine(pialiiy, aril the social ills typical of a rapidly
urbanizing and modernizing society. While mane
Yugoslays approve of such achievements us an
extensive social security system, low -cost socialized
medical care, and an improved educational system,
the regime's continuing control of all organized
political life is widely resented.
Although the regime has remained relatively stable
under Tito's leadership, factions have developed with
the federal party structure. The divisions are mostly
Tong nationality and republic lines, but conflicting
views also exist on centralization or decentralization as
the appropriate structure for the Yugoslav party and
state system. One of the most serious challenges to
federal party authority occurred in 1971 when
Croatian nationalism pervaded that republic's party
leadership. The Croats argued that the principle of
decentralization, already being implemented in the
government structure, should be extended to the party
apparatus. Such a move, which would have resulted in
splintering the party into six and possibly even nine
Communist parties, was unacceptable even in Tito's
pluralistic Yugoslavia. The result was a widespread
purge of nationalists firm the Croatian party
leadership, exceeding in scope and thoroughness even
'he purge that followed the ouster of former Vice
President Aleksandar Rankovic in July 1966.
A party reorganization, begun in October 1966
following Rankovic's ouster, culminated at the Ninth
Party Congress in March 1969, when new, liberal, and
federalized statutes were promulgated. It was under
these lenient statutes that the Croats began to
challenge federal party authority arid, as such, Tito's
own influence and power. The result of this challenge
appears to be at least a partial reversal of the liberal
trend in the LCY and a strengthening of internal
discipline and of the party's control apparatus. In late
October 1972, Tito again showed himself to be the
ultimate arbiter of the liberal- conservative tug -of -war
in the party. At that time, dissatisfied with the slow
implementation of his orders that the Serbian
hierarchy be shaken up, 'Tito moved against the
Serbian party leadership. Under fire, a number of
leading figures, including republic party boss Marko
Nikezic, resigned. As of December 1972, the purge in
Serbia (Serbija) had stopped far short of reaching the
magnitude of the events in Croatia (Hrvatska) in
December 1971. The basic question about Yugo-
slavia's future, however, still remains unanswered:
I -low will this system, which is obviously tailored to
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Tito*s own personality and methods, work in the
hands of those who follow the 80 -year -old President"
Ethnic, cultural, and national differences, coupled
with wide differences in economic development
among the country's nationalities, make the
achievement of unit difficult. Separatist sentiments
have not disappeared from Croatia and Macedonia
(Makedonija), and fear of domination by the Serbs
remains among the country's other ethnic groups.
"These longstanding ethnic and regional antagonisms
have been rekindled by economic rivalries and
exacerbated by the regime's policy of building up the
economically underdeveloped republics at the expense
of the more developed ones. An economic reform
program launched in Jule 1963 modified but did not
entirely abandon this policy.
Under a program of 23 constitutional amendments
eulopted in mid -197 1, a great deal of federal authority
has already been passed to the nation's constituent
republics and provinces. A second set of amendments
is scheduled to be introduced in late 1973. When these
are passed, many of the republics' responsibilities and
prerogatives will, in turn, be passed onto the shoulders
of the local communes, the lowest level of local
government. Plans also call for it complete revamping
of the nation's legislative system and redefinition of its
powers and rights. Completion of these reforms will in
effect mean it whole new constitution for Yugoslavia.
The� party is in the throes of redefining its own
position within the political system. Until the
Croatian political upheavals in late 1971 the LCY had
sought to divest itself of the daily running of the
country in favor of a policy- oriented role of providing
ideological leadership and "guidance." Former Vice
President Rankovic's opposition to this trend, as well
as to the economic reforms, was a key element in his
downfall. Widcr popular participation in the process
of govemrneiO and less direct party rule, however, led
to the nationalist crises in both Croatia and Serbia. As
a result, the problem facing the party is how to insure
the continued decentralization of governmental
authority, while simultaneously strengthening party
control over the implementation of that program.
Yugoslavia's international policies are designed to
keep the country independent and socialist. 'Tito has
attempted a balance of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, striving to extract
nmxinncrn economic c�oncess'ans from each. Ideo-
logically, Yugoslavia's communism provides a built -in
bias in favor of the U.S.S.R. This bias is counteracted,
however, by Yugoslavia's wariness of coming under
Soviet domination and Moscow's distaste for
Belgrade's ideological innovations.
A key clement in Tito*s international balancing act
is his doctrine of nonalignment. By assiduously
cultivating the underdeveloped countries of Asia and
Africa, Tito garners diplomatic maneuvering room
and moral support for Yugoslavia. This police has not
paid off in greatly increased foreign trade, however,
and the conflicting national interests of the
nonaligned countries have resulted in a lack of
cohesion among thern.
Although Yugoslavia's ideological bias has led to
periods of intense criticism of the West and of the
United States in particular, Tito has continued to
exhibit a desire for good relations. Yugoslavia still
looks to the United States and Western Europe for
considerable economic assistance, and about two
thirds of its foreign trade is with non- Comn...nist
countries. Yugoslavia maintains full diplomatic ties at
the ambassadorial level with the European
Communities (Common Market �EC). Belgrade also
has been successful in negotiating preferential trade
agreements wit.., the EC. In an effort to preserve and
expand its traditional markets, Yugoslavia has
associated itself �as an "observer," not as a member
with the Communist economic organization, the
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).
Yugoslavia's East -West balancing act is also evident
in its military policies. Tito has consistently refused to
associate with either the Warsaw Pa:�t of the
Communist nations or with the West's North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Yugoslavia has sono!lt, with
limited success, to diversify its sources of arms.
Nevertheless, it has come to depend on the Soviet
Union for most modern equipment. There are large
quantities of obsolete U.S. equipment in the Yugoslav
arsenal as a result of a large assistance program which
terminated in December 1937.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (C)
1. Constitution
Yugoslavia is in the midst of a major constitutional
reform. A first set of 23 amendments was adopted in
the summer of 1971 and it second set should be ready
for passage by the end of 1973. With the promulgation
of the second anrc�ndments, the nation will in effect
have a new constitution. The purpose of the reforms is
to prepare Yugoslavia for the succession period after
Tito.
The first set of amendments took major steps toward
creating a union of nearly autonomous socialist
republics, with the federal government's authority
3
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restricted mainly to conducting foreign policy,
providing for national defense, achieving a unified
economic system, and channeling funds from more
dv% eloped republics to backward regions Bosnia and
Ilercegoyina lBosna i Ilercegmina), Macedonia,
Montenegro (Crna Cora), and hosoyo. All other
functions, duties, and responsibilities, as well as
considerable financial resources, are to be passed to
the republics. The second group of amendments focus
ou restructuring and redefining the role of the
Yugoslav parliamentary system. In addition, the
process of decentral :nation is to take another step
forward, and sonic towers now held in the hand% of
the republic governments will be passed down to tit(-
kcal commune level.
The newly evolving Yugoslav Constitution takes
into account the wide variety of different elements
which make up the state and tries to give each
nationality not only a voice in running its own affairs
but in that of the country as a whole. The frank, open
discussion of ideas and interests beyond those of the
Communist party already taking place under the
evolving system is far more akin to that occurring in
Western political life 'ban to anything known in
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.
The old Constitution dates back to 1963 (with
major amendments in April 1967 and December
194111). Combining elements from socialist, syndicalist,
French, and U.S. political thought, the 1963
Constitution attempts to create it socialist democracy,
but by no means a political democracy in the Western
mold. Federalism, deeviitrnlization of political
administration, and workers' self management are the
central themes of the systern. Under Yugoslav socialist
theory these elements provide the mechanism for the
eventual "withering away of the state" and are
essential to any society. The 1971 -72 constitutional
reforms are designed specifically to apply these
theories to the practical realities of the Yugoslav
federation.
When completed, the new amendments will
represent the fourth constitution formulated by the
Yugoslav Communists since they carne to power in
1945. The first, in 19-16, closely resembled the Soviet
Constitution of 1936. The major innovation of the
19.16 document was the creation of a federal system of
six constituent republics and tvo autonomous
provinces in order to deal with the country's divisive
nationality question. Despite its federal structure,
however, power within the Yugoslav systern remained
highly centralized. Provisions to protect civil rights
(fr,�edorn of speech, the press, religion, and assembly)
\sere included, but with the limitation that it was
"illegai and punishable to make use of civil rights to
change or undermine the constitutional order for
antidemocratic purposes." In practice, the \\ord
"antidemocratic was interpreted to include any
opposition to tit regime.
The 19.53 (:onstit tit ion� kno \y officiall\ as the
Fundamental Lass radically modified the 1946
document to reflect the decentralization of authority
which had begun in late 1949. 'I'll(- federal structure
was retained, and the six constituent republics gained
greater administrative power. For the first time the
Constitution provided for a government of enumer-
ated and delegated powers. Both federal and republic
governments had only those rights arid powers
specifically delegated to them. All other power was to
he vested in "the working people" as a whole arid
expressed through local people's committees and
workers councils.
The 1963 (:euvstitution was promulgated in order to
realign the federal governmental system with the
development of self- management which Yugoslav
ideologists deemed to have taken place since 1953.
The federal system remained, but a complicated five
chamber legislature, which included four "occupa-
tional" chambers, replaced the old bicameral body.
The Constitution accentuated the socialist rather than
the multinational nature of the state by changing the
state's name from the "Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia" to the "Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia." The change also reflected the regime's
cairn to the achievement of the "socialist" stage of
communism. Of the other socialist countries, only the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, arid Romania claim to
have reached that level.
The 1963 Constitution formally introduced the
policy of limited terms arid rotation in office, mainly
in the elective posts, to foster the infusi.nr of new blood
into the political system and to counter "bureaucrat
ism" and "routinism." A complicated noinhation and
electoral procedure, heavily weighted in favor of
indirect election of most ass,mhly deputies, was
established at all but the lowest level of government.
The Constitution also heavily emphasized it new
leading role for the Federal Assembly, describing it as
"the supreme organ of power in(] organ of self-
government." The assembly's role in the Yugoslav
system is, however, undergoing basic change. A better
reacting on what duties, rights, and responsibilities it
will have, should emerge with the second set of
reforms.
One major change under the 1971 am: ndments is
the creation of it 23- member state presidency, made
up of three members from each of the nation's six
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republics and hvo each from the autonomous
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. 'Tito remains the
titular head of state, boa much of the dav -to -dav
business falls to the Vice President and others in the
presidency. The positions of head of state and head of
the government (President of the Federal Executive
Council� Premier) were separated in 1963. Until then,
the former autornatically assurned the latter office.
Under the new collective presidency, the president of
each republic or provincial assembly is, by virtue of his
office, it member of the presidency. The others are
elected for nonsuccessive, 5 -year terms by majority
vote in the assemblies. The Constitution gives the
President certain decree rights; he may declare war if
the Federal Assembly is unable to meet.
The Communist party (officially named the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia �LCY) was mentioned
in tl:e iext of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution for the
first time, and called the "leading force," "the
ideological and political guide," and the "initiator of
political activity." The party's status, heretofore
extraconstitutional, thus was cloaked with legality and
its monopolistic position trade evident. Mention was
also made of the important role of the Socialist
Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY),
the party's mass political front organization, and of
the Confederation of 'Trade Unions of Yugoslavia
(CITY). Indeed, both organizations have stirred to
new life in recent years: SAWPY as a genuine forum
for discussion and debate, and the CTUY as a
defender of worker interests. In the Marxist tradition,
there was, in the 1963 Constitution, continued
emphasis on the withering away of the state, although
the concept was not expressed explicitly in the text.
Also for the first time, a section on foreign policy was
included, enunciating President 'Tito's foreign policy
objectives.
In it particularly important innovation, the
Constitution created it Constitutional Court. The
court replaced the old Constitutional Commission of
the Federal Assembly and has the authority to pass on
the constitutionality of both federal and republic laws.
Personal freedoms �of speech, thought, abode,
religious conviction, press, association, Inovernent,
and assembly �first guaranteed by the 1946
Constitution, have only been allowed in practice since
the ouster of authoritarian Vice President Alcksandar
Rankovic in 1966. "These freedoms remain qualified to
the extent that they cannot he used "to overthrow the
foundations of socialist and democratic order" or to
openly appose the basic policies of the leadership. The
Constitution expressly guarantees that religions
confession shall be the "free and private" affair of the
citizen, and that religious communities shall be
separated from the state, free to perform religious rites,
and permitted to found religious schools. A checkrein
on church activities was provided, however, by
making unconstitutional any abuse of religious rights
for political purposes.
Increasing pressure from the republics particularly
Slovenia (Slovenija), Croatia, and Macedonia �for
greater authority, the decentralization of economic
decisionmaking under the economic reforms
inaugurated in 1965, and the fall from power in July
1966 of the centralist conservative leader, former Vice
President Alcksandar Rankovic, precipitated the
adoption of a series of constitutional amendments in
April 1967 which further diffused authority
throughout the system.
The 1971 -72 constitutional amendments are
intended to adjust once and for all the working
relationship between the federal and republic
governments. The decentralization taking place has
satisfied the vast majority of demands by the
constituent republics and provinces for greater
autonomy. The two exceptions are the republic of
Croatia and the province of Kosovo. In both instances
the greater freedoms allowed under the reforms have
led to increased demands. In the case of Croatia,
resurgent republic nationalism posed a major threat to
the Yugoslav system resulting in Tito's direct
intervention in December '971 and the purge of
nationalists from the Croat --v party.
2. Structure of the government
Yugoslavia's first post -World War II federal
government was patterned after the Soviet system.
Following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform
in 1948, and rapidly after 1950, Soviet forms were
abandoned and replaced by limited liberalization in
the governmental stnnctu �e. Partly as a reaction
against the Soviet mode' -and partly because of
concern over governmental inefficiency, the Yugoslays
abolished sonic ministries after 1948 and relinquished
many federal governmental functions to the
constituent republics.
In 1950 the regime introduced workers councils,
which theoretically were to cooperate in making
policy for their constituent economic enterprises,
formerly operated by government agencies. At the
same time "social management," or "self- manage-
ment" as it is noNv known, was introduced as the
"right of the working people to manage organizations
and institutions in all fields of social life through self
governing bodies."
5
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Despite various other changes designed to create at
least the .lopearance of greater democracy, the basic
political process in Yugoslavia was initially
totalitarian. The party controlled all government
activity, since members of its Central Committee filled
most of the key posts in the federal and republic
governments. Lesser party members exercised similar
control at the lower levels. Moreover, President "Tito
was the final arbiter in all matters. lie was
simultaneously Secretary General of the party,
President of the Socialist Alliance, President of the
Republic, President of the Federal Executive Council
(FEC), and Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav
People's Arrny.
In 1063, however, it new Constitution was
promulgated which sought to separate more clearly
the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of
government and to establish the Federal Assembly as
the supreme legislative and political body in the
federal government (Figures I and 2). Since late 1970,
the trend toward greater republic and provincial
autonomy, as well as toward greater personal
freedoms, has dramatically accelerated. The catalyst
for this movement was President Tito himself.
Cognizant of the problems which must accompany
the transition after his death or retirement, Tito in
September 1970 proposed the creation of it collective
presidency and a series of constitutional reforms
designed to create the machinery for the succession
period. The result has been the development of it
political system which includes frank, open discussion
of ideas and interests beyond those of the Commttaist
party, it political life far more akin to that of Western
parliamentary systems than to other one -party
Communist states.
The major constitutional reform of 1971 carried this
separation even further. Federal authority is now
I;mited to conducting foreign affairs, maintaining
national defense, and insuring a unified economic
system throughout the country. The role and makeup
of the Federal Assembly will not become clear until it
second set of constitutional reforms is adapted in lute
1973. It is likely that the new parliament will have no
inure than two chambers and that its authority will be
pared clown and tailored to reflect the reduced
authority and powers of federal organs. The assembly,
which has in the past been described as "the supreme
body of self managing enterprises,' may also now
include representatives of large self managing
enterprises. Expanding the consultative process in the
assembly also provides it formal framework for the
resolution of competing group interests.
6
'I'll( party is intent on retaining its controlling role.
The part\ already exercises its influence on the
legislature by using party members who sit in the
assembly� particularly in its key offices �and by
monitoring the national electoral process. The party
leadership, after considering the advice of its staff,
formulates the broad policy to be enacted into the law
by the Federal Assembly and to he carried out by the
executive and administrative bodies. The system serve
the regime's major airn of creating the image of public
participation in the governmental process, leaving the
day -to -day functioning of the government in the
hands of better trained administrators, while
permitting control of the c -erall process by the party.
a. Legislature
The Federal Assembly as of late 1972 was
empowered with full legislative initiative. A new sot of
assembly bylaws published in April 1967 widened the
ranks of persons and orgat a �ations having the right to
initiate bills in the assembly. Previously, this had been
the prerogative of the FEC (i.e., the government, or
cabinet), individual deputies, and other federal
organs. Now, economic enterprises, working and
social political organizations such as SAWPY, and
even individual citizens may do so.
In addition to its legislative duties, the Federal
Assembly has the responsibility of amending the
Constitution, calling for referendums, granting
amnesties for violations of federal laws, electing and
removing the President of the Republic, tl.c President
of the FEC, the president and judges of the
constitutional, supreme, and supreme economic
courts, fedetal state secretaries and federal secretaries,
and the federal public prosecutor. Nominations aril
dismissals are made by submission of the appropriate
proposal to the assembly's Commission for Elections
and Appointments, which returns its recommenda-
tions to the assembly. The assembly also is responsible
for declaring war, ratifying international agreements,
and deciding on altering Yugoslavia's boundaries.
The Federal Assembly's unique and complicated
structure of five chambers is under ;ntensive review
and will undoubtedly he streamlined into it
unicameral or bicameral legislature. Until then,
however, the Chamber of Nationalities remains the
most important house. It considers all legislation and
matters of foreign policy, national defense, state
security, and "affairs of general internal policy." It
also exercises the assembly's rights of appointment and
dismissal. An exception to this rule is the requirement
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r
JUOICUL LE01lLATIY[ E1IECUTIYE ADMINISTRAtIVE
Constitutional
Court
President
J osip Broz Tito
Chamber of ..ti National
Natlonolitles Vice President Defense
Supreme Court (140 members) Council
Supreme Economic r
Court Social- Political
Chamber
f (120 Members)
Supreme Military Standing Commissions
Court
Social Welfare and Health PREMIER Il) Foreign Affairs and Security
1 (2) Sociopolitical and Organization
:1
Chamber 3 Economic Policy
VICE PREMIER O Ec c cY
(120 Members
Federal Public VICE PREMIER 14) Foreign Economic Relations
Prosecutor SECRETARY'] 15) Budgetary Affairs
(6) Personnel and Acminisaative 7
Federal Secretaries far: i Affairs
5 ti Education and Culture F (7) Mobilization Preparation
I I) Economy P
Chamber
(120 Members) 121 Labor and Social Policy of Fed -rat Agencies a
(3) Finance "I Housing Questions
(4) Foreign Trade "I (9) Control of Federal Seamy
(5) Foreign Affairs q Service In Federal
r r
(6) National Defense
Administrative Organs
i Economic Chamber (7) Justice and General (10) Coordintollon and Cooperation
(120 Members) {s Administration between Yugoslavia and
r. 1 (e) Agriculture r 'f CEMA
internal
i (10) Transportation and
Communication .l
Infer�Republic Commdfees
(I) Development Policy
12) Mbnetary System
(3) Foreign Trade and
Currency Systems
F A d vi sory Counals s (4) Unified Market
m 1 (5) Financial Mothers
:5 Legal Council t
Economic Council J
IIVIILIC t P.
Repubiic Republic 1
Republic Courts .t.. Republic Assembly
Executive Council Secretariats
FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U /OU)
that the entire assembly elect or dismiss the President
of the Republic and the assembly's own president and
vice president.
Constitutional changes in December 1968 created
the Social Political Chamber, which is nearly equal in
authority with the Chamber of Nationalities. This,
chamber deals with questions concerning the
sociopolitical system, self management, the rights and
duties of citizens, general internal policy, budgetary
and fiscal policy, and national defense.
The other three chambers, whose continued
exisLance is in doubt in view of the progressive
limitations on federal authority, are specialized both
in vhcir composition and legislative focus. Designated
the Economic, the Social Welfare ,,nd Health, and the
Education and Culture Chambers, they deal with
6
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legislation primarily within their specialized fields.
Approval by the Chamber of Nationalities and at cast
one of the other appropriate chambers is necessary to
pass legislation.
The assembly as a whole and the individual
chambers have substantive commissions and
committees to carry out work on behalf of the Federal
Assembly. The commissions are autonomous, while
the committees only assist the organization to which
they are subordinate.
The membership of the Federal Assembly consists of
620 deputies. The Chamber of Nationalities has 140;
and each of the other four chambers has 120 deputies.
Most deputies maintain their r.rimary jobs elsewhere
and are only reimbursed for the time actually spent on
assembly business. This system has been the cause of
complaints that most deputies are too busy with their
outside jobs to carry out their assembly duties, and
that attendance at assembly and committee sessions is
often low.
Of the 620 deputies in the. assembly, 480 are elected
in proportion to the population on the basis of five
deputies �one in each chamber �to approximately
158,000 citizens. Electoral districts by law are to be as
nearly equal in population as possible. Of the 120
deputies in each chamber elected by lower assemblies,
50 are from the republic of Serbia, including i2 from
the autonomous province of Vojvodina and six from
the autonomous province of Kosovo, 27 from Croatia,
21 from Bosnia and Hercegovina, 10 from Slovenia,
nine from Macedonia, and three from Montenegro.
The 140 deputies comprising the Chamber of
Nationalities represent the republics and autonomous
provinces in the ratio of 20 deputies from each
republic and 10 from each autonomous province. The
overall distribution of deputies in the Federal
Assembly is as follows:
Serbia
240
Croatia
128
Bosnia and Hercegovina
104
Slovenia
60
Macedonia
56
Montenegro
32
On the basis of deputy strength, Serbia, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, and Montenegro, all with large
economically underdeveloped areas, dominate the
assembly. The increase in authority of the Chamber of
Nationalities partly counterbal..ances this domination,
since the more economically advanced republics of
Sloveria and Croatia and underdeveloped Macedonia
have 60 out of 140 votes in the chamber. So far,
however, bloc voting by republic delegations has been
rare. Party discipline insures that the overwhelming
majority of deputies will vote on any major issue as the
leadership demands.
The assembly does not publish information on the
party status of its members, but all the top hierarchy
and the great majority of the deputies belong to the
party. Since 1963 the regime has achieved some
success in its efforts to bring younger, better qualified
persons into 011c assembly. Most of the assembly's
leadership, however, remains in the hands of long-
time subordinates of Tito who started their climb to
prominence in the 1950's.
In carrying out its responsibility for "political
supervision" as-'provided in the Constitution, the
assembly decides on political matters and determines
the foundations of domestic and foreign policy,
establishes the duties of federal authorities and
organizations which enforce the laws, debates the
reports of federal courts and the Federal Public
Prosecutor concerning the enforcement of federal laws,
enacts declarations and resolutions, and makes
recommendations to federal organizations. In keeping
with the regime's efforts to extend the role of the
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FIGURE 2. The Yugoslav parliament, Belgrade (U /OU)

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republics in the policymaking process, the assembly
increasingly consults the republic legislatures before
making important decisions.
The Federal Assembly's first attempts to exercise its
authority under the 1963 Constitution were halting.
With the League of Communists' reaffirmation of
decentralization and self management at the Eighth
Party Congress in December 1964, however, the
legislature began to assert its authority. The social
plan for 1965 was returned to the FEC for redrafting
I l times before tue assembly accepted it, and adverse
reaction in the assembly has forced the government to
withdraw several bills from consideration since 1964.
By late December of 1970 the Federal Assembly was
flexing new political muscle. A government proposal
to limit personal income growth for 1971 to 22% was
resoundingly rejected by the assembly, which later
forced the government to compromise on the issue.
The legislative process envisages three stages. all of
which occur within the Federal Assembly: 1) the
determination of the need for adopting a law; 2) the
examination and adoption of a draft law; and 3) the
examination and adoption of the proposed law. In
practice, the Federal Executive Council drafts most of
the important legislation. Despite efforts to make
available to the assembly the services of legal and
substantive experts, the deputies remain at a
disadvantage vis -a -vis the executive in preparing
coherent alternative legislation or programs to those
offered by the government.
Debate in the Federal Assembly has become
increasingly free since 1963. Party leaders, such as
Kardelj, have emphasized the responsibility of the
deputies not only to the party but to their constituents.
After the fall of Rankovic, important party figures,
such as Milentije Popovic and Krste Crvenkovski,
pressed for more real exercise of authority by the
assembly. The attempt to bring foreign policy within
the purview of parliamentary debate, which started in
January 1966 with criticism of certain elements of the
periodic policy report of the Federal State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs to the assembly, was pressed forward.
Tito's independent executive action during the
Middle East crisis of June 1967 caused considerable
irritation within the assembly and the LCY, both
considering his move a deliberate disregard of the
pariiamentary right of consultation.
As part of the emphasis on the responsibility of the
executive to parliament, the 1963 Constitution grants
to deputies the right of interpellation of government
officials. Even more emphatic in the assertion of
parliamentary supremacy are the rules on FEC
resignations and votes of confidence contained in the
assembly bylaws. The must resign if it does not
agree with or cannot put into practice a policy fixed by
the assembly. Resignation of the FEC also is called for
if the assembly passes a bill not endorsed by the FEC,
or if the assembly votes down a government bill.
Resignations may be collective or individual. Provision
also is made for vc,tes of confidence initiated by the
assembly, 10 deputies being needed to ask for such a
vote. Upon losing a vote of confidence the government
must resign and act as a caretaker until a new one is
elected.
Although party discipline serves to keep the
deputies in hue on all important issues, the principle of
executive responsibility could lead to a more vigorous
parliamentary life, particularly after Tito leaves the
scene. In December 1966 the Slovenian republic
executive council forced the first government crisis
since the pre -World War II era by resigning after one
chamber of the republic assembly had rejected an
important bill. Although the breach was quickly
healed, a precendent had been set. In July 1967
Federal Executive Council President (Premier) Mika
Spiljak, under fire by critics of the high unemploy-
ment and economic stagnation resulting from the
regime's policies, asked for and received a vote of
confidence in the government's program for social and
economic reform. In mid November 1970 Vice
Premier Nikola Miljanic, in an unprecedented action,
resigned when he was unable to win backing for his
proposed policy of dinar devaluation.
b. Executive
(1) Presidency �The need to institutionalize the
succession process, rather than court chaos once Tito
leaves the scene, led to the creation of a collective
Presidency in 1971. The body is composed of three
representatives from each of Yugoslavia's six republics
and two each from the two autonomous provinces.
The president of each republic or provincial assembly
is automatically a member of this body. Other
members are elected for nonsuccessive, 5 -year terms by
a majority vote in the regional assemblies. Tito retains
the titular position of President of Yugoslavia for an
indefinite period. Once Tito is gone, however, a
president will be chosen from among the other 22
members of the Presidencv who are currently in charge
of day -to -day executive duties.
The collective Presidency retains considerable
powers in representing the country at home and
abroad: The titular President is commander and
chief of the armed forces; the Presidency has the
right to propose policy direction to the Federal
Assembly, and can initiate changes in the
9
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Constitution; the Presidency also has the right to
propose a candidate for the post of President of the
Federal Executive Council (Premier), issues decrees
proclaiming federal laws, proposes the election of the
President and the judges of the constitutional court of
Yugoslavia, nominates members of the Council of the
Federation and submits proposals for relieving them of
their duties.
(2) Federal Executive Council �The FEC is
responsible for executing the policy established by the
Federal Assembly in its laws and resolutions. The
Premier (President of the FEC) is confirmed by the
assembly following his nomination and is responsible
to the assembly.
As of late 1972 the FEC consisted of 28 memo -rs
including the Premier, two vice premiers, and a
secretary. There are 10 federal secretaries in the FEC.
The major ones are: Foreign Affairs, National
Defense, Economy, Finance, Foreign Trade, Labor
and Social Policy, and Justice and General
Administration. There are an equal number of
members from each republic and corresponding
numbers from the two autonomous provinces.'
The FEC has no decision making powers outside
those granted it in federal legislation. The FEC can,
however, propose internal and foreign policy to the
assembly ind prepare drafts of laws, the economic
(social) plan, and the budget. It also can ratify
international agreements riot within the jurisdiction of
the Federal Assembly.
In addition to the above duties, the FEC enforces
federal law, the federal economic plan, and the federal
budget. The FEC also supervises certain functions of
the federal administration not within the jurisdiction
of the Federal Assembly, proposes officers of the
Federal Supreme Court, and through its inter republic
committees works to resolve differences and disputes.
The heads of the different bodies are proposed by
the Premier and appointed or dismissed by the Federal
Assembly. The federal secretaries are appointed and
dismissed by the Federal Assembly on the proposal of
the Premier. Higher officials are limited to no more
than two consecutive 4 -year terms in office. Under the
theory embodied in the Constitution, second terms are
envisaged as exceptions to the rule.
The federal administrative apparatus has been
reorganized on several occasions. In 1967, eight
secretariats (justice, education and culture, health and
'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet ,Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
10
social policy, labor, information, industry and trade,
agriculture and forestry, and communications) were
eliminated and their functions distributed among
other federal bodies or passed down to the republics.
The National Defense Council has a special
position. Although characterized by one Yugoslav
authority as a body of the Federal Assembly, the Law
on the Yugoslav National Defense Council passed in
April 1967 describes it only as a "federal organ." The
council is headed by the President of the Republic,
who may propose one of the council's members to act
as his deputy.
The National Defense Council has no executive
authority; its function is to coordinate national
defense preparations. It must render opinions about
pertinent draft economic plans and regulations,
particularly Those involving funds for national
defense. Decisions of the council must be carried out
by the Federal State Secretary for National Defense.
The reorganized council is composed of 30
members, including the President, the Federal State
Secretary for National Defense, and the armed forces
Chief of General Staff. In terms of civilian
membership, the council is one of the most prestigious
groups within the government. All six of the presidents
of the republic executive councils are ex officio
members, thus insuring that the views of the republics
are adequately represented.
The Council of the Federation, first instituted under
the 1963 Constitution, is a consultative body with no
administrative, legislative, or executive powers. It is
supposed to consider the most important questions of
domestic and foreign policy and to advise the
President of the Republic, who is also its president.
Members of the Council of the Federation are elected
by the assembly upon their nomination by the
President of the Republic. There is no fixed number of
members; after the national elections of 1971 there
were 100, including Tito. The council serves as a pool
of elder statesmen upon which Tito can draw, and it
has been used as a place for honorable retirement for
older functionaries. Its members can be authorized to
represent the President of the Republic at home and
abroad.
3. Republic government
The relationship between the provincial and
republic governments and the federation is
undergoing extensive review and revision. The
republics and provinces have been granted increased
autonomy as the result of the 1971 constitutional
reforms. The federal government's authority is limited
to maintaining national defense, conducting foreign
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policy, the maintenance of it uniform economic
system, and the right to channel funds to less
developed regions. In theory all other powers pass to
the republics. Whereas under the 1963 Constitution
the republics could only legislate in areas where they
had been given specific authority, the federal
government now is bound by that restriction. In the
event of disagreements between republics or between
the federal government and the republics, there are
inter republic committees in the FFC designed to
resolve problems. Should it dispute go to court, the
federal Supreme Court has the power to resolve legal
disputes or to determine what is or is not
constitutional.
Under the 1963 Constitution the Federal Assembly
passed "general laws" in such fields as education,
culture, health, and social welfare. General laws are
riot directly enforceable by the federal government,
thus leaving room for genuine republic legislation, as
long as the legislation follows the basic policy set forth
in the federal general laws. The constitutional
amendments due to be published in late 1973 should
continue to give the Federal Assembly a guiding role
in passing general laws which in turn will be adopted,
modified, or adjusted to fit republic and provincial
needs.
Tht republic assemblies generally resemble the
Federal Assembly in structure and methods of
operation, with the exception that no republic has a
chamber of nationalities. Since the republics are not
truly sovereign entities, they have no chiefs of state
equivalent to the President of Yugoslavia, although
Slovenia has proposed the creation of a collective
executive body paralleling the federal collective
presidency. In each republic the top governmental
leader is the president of the republic assembly, and,
by virtue of this office, is an ex officio member of the
federal collective Presidency.
Each republic has its own executive council. The
basic structure of government administration is the
carne in each republic except for minor differences in
keeping with local conditions. The republic executive
councils perform all the functions falling within
republic jurisdiction as specified by the feder and
republic constitutions, laws, and decrees.
Republic executive councils are elected by the
respective republic chambers from among the
membership of the entire republic assembly. The
membership of the assemblies is elected by local
governmental assemblies for 4 -year terms.
The two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and
Kosovo have their own goveriv.nent structures, but
they are also tied to the republic of Serbia. Both passed
constitutional laws in 1969 institutionalizing the
increased autonomy granted them by the 1968
changes in the federal Constitution.
[n the past, federal supremacy over the republic
governments %vas insured by the power of the federal
administrative organs to stay the execution of acts of
the republic governments which conflict with the
federal laws. Under the 1971 -72 constitutional reforms
this supremacy has limitations and pertains to areas
where the federal government has specific authority,
such as in the realm of foreign policy and the
economy. Similarily, control over local governments
by the republics is undergoing revision and will be
altered by the constitutional reforms of 1973. In the
past it operated through the power of the republic to
oversee the organization and operations of local
administration.
4. Local government
Local government in Yugoslavia consists of only one
major level, the commune (opstina). A district (srez)
level, formerly intermediate between the commune
and the republic, was abolished throughout the
country by 1967. Larger cities, however, have special
arrangements. For example, Zagreb is one large
commune, with subordinate units similar to the wards
found in U.S. cities. In keeps,, with the regime's
efforts to streamline all levels of government by
reducing the number of separate jurisdictions, the
number of communes was reduced from 1,479 in 1956
V 501 in 1968, and may be reduced even further by
the 1973 constitutional amendments. This consolida-
tion was meant to give more decisionmaking power to
self- management bodies at the lowest levels.
A major aspect of the 1973 constitutional reforms
will be greater autonomy for the communes. Thus the
relationship between the communes and the republics,
as well as between the communes aril the federal
government, will be redefined.
As the basic territorial unit in Yugoslavia, the
commune is designed to be more than it device for
local self- government. Yugoslav officials describe it as
the "fundamental cell of future socialist society. it
structure removed from state control made up of
autonomous economic organizations (enterprises and
cooperatives) and these autonomous institutions
providing social services (schools, cultural and artistic
institutions, hospitals. hea establishments, and
community institutions)." The scope of the
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commune's varying activities has been summarized by
Yugoslav authorities as follows:
The commune is completely autonomous as
rega.ds the establishment of its economic plan
and budgtt and the setting up of enterprises and
communal institutions.
The commune adopts its own regulatory pro-
visions, which include administrative penalties.
The commune applies directly the laws, rules,
and regulations laid down by higher authorities;
it is also responsible for administrative proceed-
ings of first instance, and other administrative
functions in all matters, except when: the applica-
tion of laws, rules, and regulations has been en-
trusted to other lower organs.
The commune decides on the organization and
operation of its organs and institutions, appoints
its employees, and initiates proceedings for appeal
for the protection of the rights of self government
in cases where rule or regulation or any other act
of the higher organs of the state violates one of its
legal rights.
The commune may repeal or declare null and
void the unlawful acts of an economic organization
or autonomous institution.
Every commune passes its own statutes, based on
federal and republic constitutions. Constitutional
provisions bind the communes to enforce federal and
republic laws. The highest communal body is the two
house communal assembly, composed of a communal
chamber and a chamber of working communities.
Members are elected directly by local registered voters
for 4 -year terms. The communal chamber is elected by
all of the voters; the chamber of working communities
is chosen by workers in both business and
"noneconomic" enterprises. The communal assembly
elects its president from among its own membership.
The president in turn appoints a communal secretary
who is in charge of the communal administration.
Each commune has several administrative
departments concerned with carrying out the policies
and decisions of the communal assembly. Councils act
as intermediary units between the assembly and the
various administrative bodies, setting broad policy for
the administrative organs and the local specialized
professional agencies. The councils, composed of
members appointed by the assembly and by
organizations directly involved in the app- oprrate field
also monitor the activities of the various enterprkes
within the commune.
Each commune assembly plays a significant role in
administering the economy within its territorial
jurisdiction. The 1963 Constitution gives communal
delegates a position in the appointments commissions
which select the directors of economic enterprises after
12
preliminar: public competition for the jobs. The
commune also may supervise the legality of the acts of
workers councils and administrative committee, of
enterprises, as well as their performance of obligatory
responsibilities and financial operations. The
commune assembly, however, is not authorized to
interfere in the internal organization and daily
operation of economic enterprises.
Federal legislation in 1964 and 1965 attempted tc
curb the communes' investment making functions
which local authorities had fulfilled by draining cif
enterprise funds through taxation. The restrictive
legislation complemented the measures contained in
the 1965 economic reforms which left more investment
funds in the hands of the enterprises. Communal
investment was limited to nonecoromic" projects,
such as schools, housing, and public utilities.
A persistent and major problem in the Yugoslav
communal system has been the -lash between local
communal interests and those of the republic and the
federation. Control over the communes to insure
compliance with the policies of the central regime
usually has been exerted indirectly, through the
SAWPY, the trade unions, and federal investment
legislation. As a last resort, Communist party
discipline may be invoked to subdue recalcitrant
localists.
The institution of the communal system was meant
to provide a uniform system of local administration
sensitive to local peculiarities but still carefully
controlled. Differences in the level of economic
development among the communes, however, have
made their performance uneven. The wealthier
communes usually operate effectively. The per-
formance of those in the underdeveloped areas is often
poor. Some !ocal governments cannot offer minimal
health or utility services. The constitutional guarantee
of financial aid to such communes is often left
unfulfilled.
Low educational levels continue to handicap
communes in discharging their complicated tasks.
Many assemblies, especially in the more backward
rural regions, have been dominated by their
administrative apparatus, and particularly by the
communal secretary, who usually has high standing in
the local Communist party organization. The
development of autonomy among the communes and
their assumption of increased tasks also has produced a
sharp increase in the number of local government
employees. The economy drive, which started with the
economic reforms in July 1965, has not yet seriously
reduced this relatively large bureaucracy.
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5. judiciary
The Yugoslav judicial system was ecmpletely
revised and reformed under the 1963 Constitution.
The most important revisions were the establishment
of the Constitutional Court �to ruie on the
constitutionality of all laws and regulations �and an
attempt to create an independent court system.
Constitutional courts were also established in each
republic. The federal Constitution granted greater
autonomy and independence to lower court!, and
increased their authorit% to settle a wide variety of
cases.
Since the purge of Rankovic in 1966, the emphasis
in "ugoslavia has been on rule by law. Under this
sy cm the courts have steadily increased in
importance. Reforms initiated in the immediate post
Rankovie period increased the rights of the accused in
criminal cases and curtailed the authority of the secret
police.
Although the changes in the judicial system since
1963 represent a liberal trend, other factors continue to
make the legal system an instrument of control. The
regime still adheres to the tenet that loci ^list law is an
"instrument in the hands of the ruling socialist
forces." The Communist party maintains control over
the court system through the election and
appointment of its members to judgeships and other
legal posts.
Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court is an institution
not found in other Communist countries and differs in
important aspects from constitutional courts based on
English common law. It is composed of a :)resident
and 13 judges. In keeping with the policy of balanced
representation in all federal organs, the court's
members include two iudges from each republic and
one from each province. The Constitution specifically
grants them "immunity" from arrest and trial for
actions taken in performance of their duty. Although
the court has as one of its main functions the task of
insuring that laws and regulations conform to the
Constitution, the court is at the same time a political
entity with nonjudicial functions. These include the
responsibility to keep itself informed about matters
pertaining to "dw attainment of constitutionality and
legality." The Constitution also gives the court the
responsibility for protecting "the rights of self
government and other basic freedoms and rights
established by the Constitution." In performing these
tasks the court does not require that a case be brought
before it in order to render a decision. Not only may it
act on its own initiative, bot it has a responsibility to
do so.
In keeping with the court's advisory role, all draft
federal legislation is sent to it for informal inspection
and approval. The Constitutional Court also conducts
an extensive program of research, investigation,
conferences, reports, and negotiations on many aspects
of government.
The Constitution makes the court responsible for
deciding on the c rnformity of federal, republican, and
local laws with the federal Constitution, for resolving
disputes on rights and duties between the federation
and a republic, between republics, and between other
social- political communities on the territories of two or
more republics. The court also is responsible for
protecting the workers councils and self management
bodies from encroachment and arbitrary actions by
governmental organs.
In an attempt to open the court's activities to public
inspection, its rules of procedure provide that most
hearings will be public, that they may be televised or
broadcast, and that hearings need not be held in the
court's main offices in Belgrade. This stress on
publicity is consistent with the regime's emphasis on
publicity and public participation in all of Yugoslav
political life.
The courts early decisions /ere in favor of the rights
of individuals and workers councils. The court caused
small sensation in December 1964 when it annulled
governmental regulation �the first time this had
happened under Communist rule in Yugoslavia. The
court, however, bas never challenged the government
on an issue of major importance to the regime. Its most
usefu! `unction has been as a safety valve for the
grievances of the population and as an influence
toward the rule of law in a one -party state.
There are two broad categories of courts: courts of
general jurisdiction that deal with most criminal and
civil cases, and specialized courts military and
economic. The courts of general jurisdiction exist on
the communal, provincial, republic, and federal
levels, and include the Federal Supreme Court of
Yugoslavia and republic supreme courts. The republic
and provincial supreme courts are charged with
establishing and safeguarding the uniformity and
constitutionality of republic laws.
The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court in
the general juridical system and has the primary
function of nsuring the uniform application of law by
all courts, to review the decisions of republic courts, to
revise the decisions of lower courts which violate
federal law, and to adjudicate conflicts of jurisdiction
between republic courts. Matters of constitutional
interpretation which arise in the course of the Supreme
Court's proceedings are referred to the federal
13
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Constitutional Court. In this way the Federal Supreme
Court connects and unites all the other courts, except
the Constitutional Court, into one juridical system.
The lower courts of general jurisdiction deliberate
on three fundamental types of cases: r .imirwl, civil,
and administrative. Criminal cases are those in which
the courts pass judgment on criminal offenses and
carry out the laws and regulations which describe
which acts are punishable, under what conditions, and
according to what procedure. Civil cases primarily
involve litigation on propert family, and personal
rights. Administrative suits are those brought at the
request of a person who challenges the lawfulness of it
decision passed by an administrative bodv.
The economic courts have fundamental jurisdiction
over economic acts, damage suits, maritime suits, and
criminal suits pertaining to economic offenses. The
highest such court is the Supreme Economic Court.
Permanent arbitration boards, which act as courts,
handle n,nv economic disputes. Although not as
important as the courts of general jurisdiction,
c--onomic courts are growing in importance,
particularly at the local levels, where the self
management responsibilities of economic organiza-
tions have resulted in competition and rivalry. The
Foreign Trade Arbitration Board is responsible for
resolving economic and maritime disputes in the field
of foreign trade.
The military colut system is made up of the
Supreme Military Court and various courts at lower
levels. 'Their competence is limited to criminal cases
involving military personnel. Yugoslav military
personnel have the right to a civilian as well as a
military lawyer when being arraigned before it
military tribunal. The civilian may be excluded from
the hearings if military secrets are discussed.
Judges for courts of general jurisdiction are
nominated and elected I y the assemblies of the
appropriate sociopolitical communities, according to
the prescriptions of republic laws. Judgr cannot be
members of the assemblies which elect them, nor can
they perform other duties or functions which conflict
with their court functions. A Yugoslav citizen who is it
graduate lawyer can be elected as judge of general
jurisdiction.
Prosecution of criminal cases rests in the hands of
public prosecutors. Constitutionally their office is
autonomous, entrusted wi!'. criminal prosecution, and
responsible for assuring the uniform enforcement of
law and the promotion of legality. A separate military
prosecutor exercises similar functions in the arned
forces. The m;litary courts, in addition to trying
..0litary personnel, are authorized to try nonmilitary
I
persons for all criminal act:; committed against the
armed forces. Public prosecutors have the power to
demand information from state bodies and institutions
and from economic and social organizations. There is
a disciplinary court to try offenses committed by
prosecutors or their employees.
The ?'F;C nominates the Federal Public Prosecutor.
After discussing the nomination, the Federal Assembly
Commission for Elections and Appointments submits
it to the voto of the Federal Assembly. A constitutional
amendment passed in April 1967 invests the various
republic assemblies with the authority to appoint or
dismiss republic public prosecutors, thus widening
republic authority over law enforement. Previously,
the republic prosecutors had been named by the
Federal Public Prosecutor with the approval of the
pertinent republic executive council.
A new code of criminal procedure which went into
effect on 1 January 1968 is designed to better protect
the rights of the accused. The conduct of preliminary
investigations to secure evidence for indictments has
he,m taken away from the public prosecutors and
internal affairs organs and vested in the courts.
Previously the public prosecutor had held a privileged
position during an investigation and trial. Under the
new legislation, the defense attorney may examine the
records of the investigarion and cannot be prohibited
from communicating with his client if the latter is held
in custody. The accused must be informed of his right
to legal counsel during interrogations, and defense
counsel may submit questions at an interrogation.
Those summoned must attend an interrogation but
need not answer any questions. The time limits for
confinement during an investigation have been
reduced from 9 to 6 months, and the court or
appropriate organ of internal affairs is obliged to
notify the family of a person held in custody within 24
hours of his confinement.
The new code of criminal proceedings balanced the
extension of the rights of the accused, however, by
extending the legal obligat;on to report c�rimr,al acts
to include all working and other organizations, in
addition to state agencies.
The changes in criminal procedure have placed it
considerable strain on the Yugoslav judicial system
which is short of personnel, particularly the newly
important investigativ: judges. The new prerogatives
given to the defense have increased the willingness of
some lawyers to engage in practice, however, thus
partially alleviating the shortage of lawyers. There
were about 3,044 lawyers in Yugoslavia in 1970, more
than 700 more than in 1966. Lawyers tend to settle in
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the larger urban areas, however, leaving many rural
communes with no practicing la%%yers at all.
jury trial in the Western sense does not exist in
Yugoslavia. Instead, a system of lay judges is used in
association with the body of professional judges,
particularly in the lower courts. These laymen are
supposed to have an equal vote on the outcome of the
trial. Theoretically, the laymen can force an opinion
contrary to that of the professionals, although this is
almost unheard of in practice. The 1963 Constitution
encouraged an increase in the number of such courts
and in the types of cases to be tried in them.
Despite the regime's continued determination to
maintain control of the judicial appa!atus, the
Yugoslav courts have demonstrated some inde-
pendence from political control. In quashing one of
the government's charges against maverick intellec-
tual Mihajlo Mihajlov in 1965, the Supreme Court of
Croatia contradicted Tito's publicly implied desire to
jail the young man.
C. Political dynamics (C)
All political power in Yugoslavia ultimately rests
with the Communist party, officially the League of
Communist, of Yugoslavia (LCY). The fact that
Yugoslavia is a one -party state, However, has not
prevented the emergence of political pressure groups,
such as the trade union organization, which do
influence the country's political dynamics. The
decentralized structure of the LCY itself and the
party's decision io rule indirectly by influencing
various mass organizations L!:A self managing bodies
has led to a frank and open political life not known
anywhere else in Eastern Europe.
The process which has led to a political style st
atypical for a Communist state began in the years
following Yugosl. o via's expulsion from the Cominform
in 1948, when the party began drastically to alter its
original Soviet style of rule. The party was repeatedly
reorganized and reformed to reflect both in theory and
practice an increasingly decentralized and self
managed economic system. These changes, including
the removal of party hacks from direct administration
of the economy, were the nucleus for what was to
become extensive public participation in Yugoslavia's
political life. The trend became more pronounced
after the purge in Juiy 1966 of Aleksandar Rankovic,
Tito's long -tirne organizational chief aril leader of the
conservative, centralist wing of the party.
Until the early 1960's the LCY remained
remarkably stable. With the increased emphasis on
decentralization and democratization, however, three
distinct, but informal, groups have emerged in the
party. First, there are the ultraliberals who wish to
push for maximum democratization, even to the point
of advocating a multiparty system within a socialist
context. Opposite these ultraliberals are the hardline
conservatives, once led by Rankovic, who hacked a
more centralized party government and economic
system. The third major intraparty group, probably
the largest of the three, falls in the center, and L led by
Tito. It rejects both Western liberal democracy and a
tightly controlled centralist system.
Although these ideological differences have been
developed over many years, they have been reflected
in ruptures in the top party hierarchy only twice since
the break with Moscow. In 1954 Milovan Djilr-s was
politically excommunicated for having "revisionist"
ideas and advocating a multiparty system. In 1966
Aleksandar Rankovic was driven from his party and
government offices for engaging in a "power struggle"
to insure his succession to Tito and for leading the
conservative, centralist opposition to Tito's economic
and political reforms. In the cases of both Djilas and
Rankovic, relatively few members of the party elite
were immediately purged. After the fall of Rankovic, a
3 -year campaign, culminating in the Ninth Party
Congress in March 1969, brought a greater number of
younger, third generation Communists into the
leadership. Tito generally has b(. -n able to surround
himself with loyal subordinates, whose careers have
depended on his favor. Self- interest is reinforced by
the bonds of common Communist objectives. In
addition, mutual respect forged during the hardships
of the partisan struggle during Wr War II still plays
an important role.
The ouster of Rankovic has not ended the resistance
of the conservative centralists, who draw most of their
strength from the ranks of ex- partisans, middle and
lower level party officials, and ill educated older party
members. Although many such persons hack the
reforms, many prefer to insure the party's continued
domination by the more traditional methods of force,
pressure, and "political intervontion." Also involved is
the fear that many anti reformers have for their jobs
and economic and social status. Having lived on their
partisan merits for 20 years, many lack the skills
necessary to manage an increasingly sophisticated
-ociety and economy.
Cutting across ideological considerations and
breaching the solidarity of the LCY are growing
economic and nationalist rivalries among the
country's five major nationalities. The LCY is made
up of six republic and two provincial parties (the latter
two are under the suzerainty of the Serbian party
15
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organization). The interplay of party and government
reforms and the freer political climate which has
emerged in Yugoslavia have contributed to the
surfacing of bitter, deep regional rivalries. This
problem of maintaining the LCY as it unifying factor
continued throughout 1972. Tito's insistance on
bringing the regional organizations to heel, and the
Serbian party leadership's resistance to recentraliza-
tion brought the crisis to a head again in the fall of
1972. On 21 October Tito carried the day, and party
boss Marko Nikezic as well as his second in command,
Latinka Perovic, resigned.
The Serbian leadership's demands were more the
outcome of a dispute over what form the LCY should
take and how tightly it need be organized than one of
strong republic nationalist demands.
At the heart of the Croatian demands, however, was
the long- festering feud between the republic and the
federal government over how much of its foreign
currency earnings the republic should be allowed to
retain. The Croatian complaint characterizes only one
part of the nation's economic problem. In order to
overcome the economic disparity between the
underdeveloped republics Macedonia, Montenegro,
and parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Serbia �and
the more highly developed ones, the regime drains off
investment funds generated by the prosperous
republics of Croatia and Slovenia. even under the
1971 constitutional reforms which strip the federal
government of much of its former power and
aut!rority, Belgrade still retains the right to direct these
funds to regions such as the economically depressed
province of Kosovo.
Thee retically, progress toward complete socialism
and a high stage of economic development was to be
simultaneous, with all the republics reaching that
distant goal at the same time. Given the pragmatic
nature of the Yugoslav system, however, socialism and
economic development increasingly are not in step
with each other. Increasingly, the regime is giving
priority to economic performance over ideological
considerations. Businessmen as well as government
and party officials in Croatia an Slovenia resent the
imposed commitment to subsidize the often
economically irrational development of the poorer
regions of the country. The political and economic
reforms of the 1960's and early 1970's were in response
to these complaints. Conversely, many Communist
Serbs, Montenegrins, and officials in Bosnia and
Hercegovina fear that the increased emphasis on
profitability will eventually spell the end to federal aid
to the underdeveloped regions.
16
Intellectual ferment has given added momentum to
the movement toward political decentralization and
democratization in Yugoslavia. The intellectuals,
however, have also added to the nation's disunity. The
Zagreb University faculty was a center of Croatian
nationalist agitation which led to the crisis in
December 1971. Similarly, the faculty at Pristina
University in Kosovo province is sharply divided along
nationality lines, i.e., the Albanian majority versus the
Serb minority.
Despite fluctuations in Tito's popularity over the
years, he remains the most powerful and only widely
accepted leader in the country. His defiance of the
Soviet Union in 1918 �and subsequently his
condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary in 1956
and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 �have earned him the
respect of moss of his people. Tito has personally built
the party and personifies the system which now bears
his name Titoism. Having led the country through
the crucial W;>rld War II years, he was a national
figure by the end of the war, with a personal following
that extended well beyond the Communists. He
directed the unification and reconstruction of the
country after a bloody fratricidal war and provided
the leadership for the establishment of a new and
unique system of socialism. Tito has been called the
only true Yugoslav, and his efforts :.A emphasis on
"brotherhood and unity" have given the country an
aura of Yugoslav nationalism which had not existed
before.
Tito's position as the indispensable man in
Yugoslavia was reinforced again in December 1971
when he personally intervened to settle the Croatian
crisis. His indispensability, therefore, makes the
question of who will succeed him of crucial
importance. Although apparently in good health,
Tito's advanced age (80 in 1972) and occasional
illnesses periodically arouse speculation that he is
about to die or retire. Since the mid- 1960's he has
dealt less and less --vith the dav -to -dav details of
government, reserving his energy for the conduct of
foreign affairs and for acting as arbiter in party
factional disputes.
The succession of power in the government was
spelled out in the 1971 constitutional reform. A
collective Presidency of 23 men was created. From this
body it Vice President is chosen who will act for the
President if he should die or be unable to fulfill his
tasl.s. Once "Tito is gone, a President will be chosen
from this body to hold office for 1 year.
In the party, where the real power rests, the
succession is less clear. A 15- nernber collective body
called the Executive Bureau was created at the Ninth
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Party Congress in .969. This body, however, proved
unwieldy and became a forum for regional bickering,
for example during the Croatian crisis. As a result, the
bureau has been pared down to eight members: on
from each of the six republics and one from each of the
two provinces. Slovenian Stane Dolanc, as the
Executive Bureau's secretary, has emerged as the key
figure in this body. No single individual has emerged
as heir to replace Tito in the party. The creation of the
party Executive Bureau in fact suggests that a
collective party leadership will replace Tito.
Moreover, unlike Tito, no individual is likely to hold
both the offices of President of the Republic and
leader of the LCY. Among those who are likely to play
key roles in some form of collective leadership are
Executive Bureau members Stane Dolanc, Kiro
Cligorov, and Jure Bilic; Federal Assembly President
Miialko Todorovic; collective Presidency members
Krste Crvenkovski, Ilamdija Pozderac, and Vidoje
'Larkovic; Serbian part%- leader Marko Nikezic; and
Presidium member and chief ideologue Edvard
Kardelj (Figure 3). With local nationalism under-
mining the usefulness of the party as a unifying
element, the army and its leadership may wield
considerable political powershould Tito die in the first
half of the 1979's.
1. Party development
During and immediately after World War 11 the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (almost completely
domestic in origin, training, and experience) used
harsh police -state methods to insure its absolute
control. A People's Front was established as a
Com tit tin ist- dominated political grouping that
included fellow- traveling representatives of non-
Communist parties. Every mass organization was
dominated by Con�munist elements, and party cells
were established ui all public organizations. All
opposition was eliminated as reactionary or
collaborationist, and the party quickly took control of
the economy and the judiciary.
In mid 1948, however, the hitter argument between
Tito and the Soviet leadership over the question of the
subordination of national Communist parties to the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union resulted in
Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Corninform (successor
to the Comintern). Stalin hegan to apply an economic
blockade, threatened troop maneuvers on Yugoslavia's
frontiers, and issued propaganda calling for the
overthrow of the "Belgrade clique." The Yugoslav
regime, however, successfully defied Stalin and
embarked upon a thorough overhaul of the theory and
practice of cornrnunism as it applied to Yugoslavia.
Realizing the need for popular support, the regime
introduced a series of measures between 1950 and
1953 which increased its popularity. The activities of
the secret police were curtailed, legal procedures were
strengthened, compulsory deliveries of agricultural
produce were stopped, peasant collectives were
allowed to disband, and such Soviet trappings as
"socialist realism" in the arts were deemphasized. In a
surprise move the regime also called for the
elimination of special privileges for party members,
declaring that the legal position of Communists was
exactly the same as that of non Communists and that
party members were to use persuasion, not force, in
achieving their goals. Concomitantly, the regime
instituted a broad program of local self management
in the economy and decentralization of government
administration. Workers councils were instituted to
supervise the management of economic enterprises.
With these moves, the regime changed its tactics
toward the Soviets from defensive to offensive. Stalin's
"state capitalism" and "bureaucracy" were sharply
criticized anI compared unfavorably with the new
Yugoslav system of decentralization and social self
management. At the center of the Yugoslav attack was
its argument about the need for the state to begin
"withering away immediately" as called for by Lenin,
rather than having this postponed to some indefinite
time in the future. Moreover, at the Yugoslav Sixth
Party Congress in November 1952 Tito went so far as
to say that the part� itself would "wither away." By
1966, however, Tito and his lieutenants were denying
that the party or state bureaucracy would soon
completely vanish, asserting that both would be
necessary for some time in the development of
Yugoslav socialism.
The June 1952 directives of the Central Committee
established modifications in party theory and practice.
The secretaries of local party organizations were
ordered to give up their positions as heads of local
governmental institutions in order to eliminate the
"bureaucratic caste system." The directives also
ordered party officials to limit their interference in
economic operations, and gave local party units more
autonomy in order to increase intraparty democracy in
ideological and educational work.
The Sixth Party Congress put the stamp of approval
on these changes. Specifically, the congress
proclaimed that the party would confine its activities
to political and ideological education and would no
longer seek to impose its will on governmental and
other state activities by direct order. Party
deliberations were to he open to the public, and party
members were told to exert influence not by the
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President of Yugoslavia and
President of the party
(Croat) Age: BO
Secretary of the party
Executive Bureau
(Slovene) Age: 47.
Member of the party
Executive Bureau
(Macedonian) Age: 55
1h
Vice President of Yugoslavia
(Serb from Bosnia and
Hercegovina) Age: 56
FIGURE 3. Yugoslav
government and party
leaders (U /OU)
Member of the party
Presidium, Thief Ideologue
and dose confidant of
Tito (Slovene) Age: 62
Member of the party
Executive Bureau
(Croat) Age: 51
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JOSIP BR02 TITO
KRSTE CRVENKOVSKI
Member of the Collective
Presidency (Macedonian)
Age: 50
EDVARD KARDELJ
STANE DOLANC
JURE BILIC
RATO DUGONOVIC
KIRO GLIGOROV

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AUSTRIA
,1u\I\1\
ITALY
a, lt
O
D
HUNGARY
VII Rc Lci),'i
o
'9
VIDOJE ZARKOVIC
Member of the Collective
Presidency (Montenegrin)
Age: 45
ALBANIA
V1 \('I 1)l,Ai
GREECE
19
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(1211 \fl\
ROMANIA
001\
r 1t1.I 1RAUF.
Z
til Kit]
L
BULGARIA
MIJALKO TODOROVIC
President of the National
Assembly (Serb)
Age: 58
NAMDIJA POZDERAC
Member of the Collective
Presidency (Muslim from
Bosnia and Hercegovina)
Age: 49
VELJKO MICUNOVIC
Member of the Collective
Presidency and Chairman
of the Presidency's
Foreign Affairs Council
(Montenegrin) Age: 56
MILAN MISKOVIC
Member of the Collective
Presidency (Serb from
Croatia) Age: 54

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weigh* of their party position but by functioning as
influential individuals in society. To lessen the part's
direct control of state activities, the party reorganized
itself to include a network of party organizations based
on territorial subdivisions in addition to those
organized according to the functional principle.
The Sixth Party Congress also changed the name of
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia and replaced the Politburo
with an Executive Committee. In his speech to the
congress, Tito underlined the more restricted role of
the party by calling on the People's Front to take an
active part in various political activities that in the
past had been directly controlled by the party. He
suggested that the front's name be changed to the
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia
(SAWPY) to conform more closely to its new place in
the country's political, economic, and social
development.
I'hese chaluges in party practice and theory led to
confusion and political apathy among the party's rank
and file. Sonic members assumed that the changes
were mere propaganda, while others thought that the
attempts at intraparty democracy did not go far
enough. The trial and imprisonment of Milovan Djilas
in 1956 for his "revisionist" ideas underlined the
demand of top party leaders for unswerving
conformity despite the more liberal front they were
portraying. Djilas, who had been high in the party
hierarchy for nany years, was to remain in prison from
1956 until 1961, when he was again imprisoned, after
a brief period of freedom, this time for publishing state
secrets in his book Conversations with Stalin. There he
rernained until December 1966, when he again was
released but forbidden to be active in politics or
journalism.
Djilas is Yugoslavia's leading political heretic, and
party theorists still launch occasional attacks on his
criticisms of the Titoist system. The attempts since
1966 to open tip Yugoslav political life have partially
reconciled him to the regime, but his doctrines of it
socialist multiparty system and the existence of it "new
class" in the form of a privileged Communist
bureaucracy remain anathema to Tito. Most recentiv
he ran afoul of the regime following the publication of
The Unperfect Society in 1969. He was scheduled to
visit the United States in March of 1970, but Yugoslav
officials lifted his passport on the ground that Djilas
had not kept his promise probably a reference to the
order preventing him from publishing until 1972. The
move against Djilas may have been a smokescreen to
ward off Soviet displeasure at the release of Mihajlo
Mihajlov. Mihajlov, after having served 3 1 years for
20
spreading "false information about the Soviet Union
and publishing banned articles abroad," was released
from prison 1 day after the action against Djilas.
Although Djilas has publicly speculated that he may
return to political life, such a move is highly unlikely.
The regime has effectively isolated Djilas in
Yugoslavia to the degree that he is far better known
abroad than at home and has no power base or
following with which to stage a political comeback, at
least in the foreseeable future.
The program and statutes adopted at the Seventh
Party Congress in 1958 defended Yugoslavia's
"separate road to socialism" against its Sino- Soviet
critics. Regime spokesmen said that the program
contained the basic principles of Yugoslav state and
party theory, and, except for minor adjustments,
would serve as the guidepost for the country's future
political and social development. The party program
addressed itself to the future of capitalism, the
development of socialism, the revisionism of Stalin's
bureaucratic deformations, and Yugoslavia's route to
social democracy. It reasserted the basic need for the
state to begin withering away immediately. It also
included the concept that had created difficulties in
1952 �that the party too would ultimately wither
away.
The Yugoslays claimed then, as they do now, that
this program is only for them. Nevertheless, they are
more than willing to explain their brand of socialism
to all interested nations, in particular to those of the
third world. The Seventh Party Congress insisted that
Yugoslavia's was the only far reaching Communist
party program since that of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union in 1939. The congress contended that
the Yugoslav program had adjusted theory to conform
to the current life in Yugoslavia and that no other
party had attempted to do so.
The Eighth Party Congress, held in December 1964,
reaffirmed the liberal program adopted in 1958 and
called for its updating and application to fit the new
conditions in Yugoslavia. To this end, the part
amended its statutes to enforce the policy that the
party should become the "guiding" rather than the
"directing" force in society.
The revised party statutes provided that the
influence of party members on the decisionmaking
process in the government and economy was to be
determined by their individual ability to solve
problems. Greater internal democracy in the party was
stressed by adoption of the principle of rotation in
party offices: the statutes required replacement of one
fourth of the membership of the Central Committee at
each party election and periodic replacement of
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members of the Executive Committee. The statutes
also called for party members to follow democratic
procedures in dealing with other than party problems.
They stated, for example, that all decisions on other
than strictly party matters were to be the result of full
and democratic debate among all officials con-
cerned �both party and nonparty �and to be open to
public scrutiny.
The statutes also allowed for some degree of
independence for local party organizations, providing
that they should organize their own meetings and be
responsible for adopting party guidelines and
proposing solutions to problems to the next higher
body. Local party members were urged to be loyal to
party policies but were no longer called upon to
submit io party decisions without question.
In addition to adopting the new party statutes, the
Eighth Party Congress adopted guidelines which
called for further decentralization of the governmental
apparatus and greater attention to the relaxation of
economic controls in order to give market forces
greater influence over prices, wages, and investment.
President Tito was the first to endorse further
decentralization at the congress.
Despite some gains, the moderate and liberal forces
at the Eighth Party Congress were forced into
compromises. While the membership of the powerful
Executive Committee was expanded from 14 to 19
members, only one member of the committee elected
at the Seventh Party Congress in 1958 failed to be
reelected at the eighth. This old -line membership
included the conservative, centralist leader Rankovic.
Although the enlarged Central Committee underwent
a more thorough change in membership of nearly
50 Rankovic, as party organizational and security
chief, had to approve most of the new membership.
Between the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses an
important event took place which set the LCY on a
more liberal path. This event was the purge of
Rankovic in mid -1966. Rankovic and his followers
were the leading conservatives in the Yugoslav system
and their removal and enforced obscurity through
retirement paved the way for the events at the Ninth
Party Congress.
The Ninth Party Congress met in mid-March 1969.
The Soviet -led occupation of Czechoslovakia was
barely 6 months old, and against a backdrop of strong
anti Soviet sentiment the LCY strongly reaffirmed
Yugoslavia's independence in the Communist world.
The LCY categorically rejected the se- called Brezhnev
doctrine of limited sovereignty, as well as the concept
that one state, i.e., the U.S.S.R., can play a leading
role in the socialist movement.
Many prominent but aging party functionaries were
replaced by younger, capable, more liberal persons. In
addition to creating a party Executive Bureau, the
Ninth Party Congress expanded the Presidium from 35
to 52 members. The Central Committee %vas formally
abolished. Its functions have been assumed by the
Presidium or by the Party Conference, a new organ
created in 1969, which meets once a year. The statutes
adopted at the congress incorporated most of the
lorgstanding demands of the liberals: a greater voice
for the rank and file in party matters, strengthened
regional party organizations, no penalties for resigning
from the party, and permission for individuals and
organizations to criticize some of the party's policies.
The liberalizing trend which held sway at the Ninth
Party Congress has suffered a setback as a result of the
Croatian and Serbian crises. Expressions of discontent
with party programs, as well as republic nationalism
are closely watched in an effort to prevent a repeat of
the 1971 excesses. In October 1972 Tito moved against
the Serb party leaders who had balked at his demands
for tighter discipline. Several prominent Serb leaders
resigned, but, as of late 1972, the purge did not appear
to be reaching the magnitude of the Croatian
upheaval. Nevertheless, the basic tenets of the liberal
reform �a greater voice for the republic and provincial
party organizations not only in running their own
affairs but in deciding LCY policy, and the practical
adaptation of communism to the realities of its
environment and the peculiarities of Yugoslavia and
its people� remain intact as the basic premise behind
Yugoslav communism for the foreseeable future.
2. Organization
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia
traditionally has been organized on "Leninist
principles," with small party celC at the bottom of a
hierarchical structure. The principle of democratic
centralism based on the compulsory implementation
of decisions of higher party organizations by the lower
bodies provided the necessary unifying element. The
higher organizations had the right to annul the
decisions of lower bodies if they conflicted with the
program, statutes, aril line of the national party.
The principle of democratic centralism was
reiterated when the party adopted new statutes at the
Ninth Party Congress in March 1969. Decisions
adopted by a party majority are obligatory for all
members. The nc%v statutes strike a democratic note,
how by basing 'intraparty relations on "a
democratic method in the preparation and adoption
of views, on respect for scientific knowledge, on free
21
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expression, and on the confrontation and struggle of now by secret ballot. A supplementary provision was
1.
views through principled discussion..
Despite some potentially restrictive clauses, the new
LCY statutes are the most liberal ever adopted by a
ruling C'ammunist party. However, the prohibition
against criticism of the party's principles and platform
has been retained. Although a member may disagree
with party policy, he is still under pressure to agree
publicly and to carry it out. Failing this cooperation, a
member can he criticized or even expelled from the
party.
After the ouster of Rankovic, high -level party
afficials quickly denounced "false unity" in the LCY,
and the bolder among them, such as Macedonian
party chief Krste Crvenkovski, called for a new type of
democratic centralism which would allow open dissent
within the LCY as long as the dissenters did not thwart
the implementation of decisions agreed upon by the
majority. Tito, however, takes a more traditional view
of democratic centralism. While denouncing
usurpation of all decisionmaking by the leadership,
Tito in the last resort insists on complete fidelity to the
party line and party sanctions against those who
disagree too stubbornly.
The new party statutes widened the former
provision for rotation in office to insure the
replacement of one -third of the membership of party
organs at every level at regular elections, which are
added stating that no party member can simul-
taneously carry on executive functions in the LCY and
in a sociopolitical organization.
The statutes also provide for collective and
individual resignations from elective party organs if
the individual or organ cannot carry out assigned tasks
-)r is unable to accept assigned policies. Conversely,
members of the executive organs may be replaced if
they fail to carry out party policy or disregard the
views of those who elected them. Party punishments
run from criticism, disassociation from a member's
concepts or actions, Through reprimands, to expulsion.
Appeals are allowed to comradely courts. An
individual may resign from the LCY, and he has the
right to participate in hearings concerning his parry
status.
The federal party structure as of mid -1972 consists
of a 52 -man Presidium, an eight -man Executive
Bureau, and a 280- delegate Party Conference (Figure
4). With the exception of the 1971 reorganization of
the Executive Bureav and a reduction in its
membership from 15 to eight, this structure represents
the handiwork of the Ninth Party Congress. The
Presidium is the party's main policymaking body,
while the Executive F. ,eau is designed to give
executive guidance to the party apparatus and to carry
out policy.
FIGURE 4. League of Communists of Yugoslavia (U /OU)
22
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PRESIDENT
League of Communise
of Yugoslavia
(LCY)
r
r
Presidium*
Executive lureau
Members
52 Members
PARTY CONFERENCE
280 Member
Fleets
CONGRESS
314 elected by local
party organizations
114 appointed by
Party Congress
Commission
Supervisory
for Statutory p rY
Questions Committee
COMMUNIST
PARTY
+Parer conference may replace:
(elect) d'tAlid of Presidltlm
tween;'conEresse;
FIGURE 4. League of Communists of Yugoslavia (U /OU)
22
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According to the statutes, the congress is the top
authority of the LCY. It determines the party program
and statutes, elects the LCY President, and verifies the
composition of the Presidium. Congresses must he held
at least every 5 years. An extraordinary congress may
be convened by the Presidium on its own initiative,
upon the demand of the LCY conference, or upon the
demand of a congress of a republic party.
The 280 member Party Conference, which must
meet at least once a year, oversees party work and
determines LCY policy between congresses. It also
verifies changes made between congresses in the
membership of the Presidium and other high party
organs. Such changes cannot exceed one -third of the
total membership of the higher party organ concerned.
One fourth of the membership of the conference
serves the full 5 -year span between congresses. This
"permanent" group is appointed by the LCY congress
on the basis of elections in the republic and provincial
parties. No more than one -third of the "permanent"
membership of the conference can be changed
between congresses. The decision to convene a
conference is adopted by the Presidium, or taken at
the behest of the conference of a republic party.
Under the new party statutes the LCY Presidium
has assumed most of the duties of the defunct Central
Committee. It implements the policies determined by
the congress and conference, and may itself determine
policy and make political decisions. The composition
of the 52- member Presidium is determined on strictly
federalist lines �each republic party is entit;-d to
seven members, each provincial party to three. The
only exception to this pattern is the presence of an
"appropriate number" (three in 1972) of repre-
sentatives of the party organization in the army. The
remaining member is the LCY President. Included in
each republic delegation is its party chairman as an ex
officio Presidium member. Republic and provincial
congresses elect their Presidium delegations on the
basis of nominations by communal party conferences.
The LCY congress �or the conference between
congresses� verifies the elections.
The creation of the Executive Bureau at the Ninth
Party Congress was an attempt to give the party a
strong center. Executive Bureau members had to reside
in Belgrade and unlike ordinary members of the
Presidium, who may hold high office in other
sociopolitical organizations or government bodies
may not hold dual office. The bureau, ho.vever, did
not live up to Tito's expectations. Former Croatian
member Miko Tripalo refused to attend a number of
sessions; when he did attend, he adopted a Croatia
first attitude, insisting that the federal party be further
decentralized. His strong republic nationalism .:nally
spelled his political doom; Tripalo was the highest
ranking party official to be purged in December 1971.
President Tito is the guiding force in the party. This
fact was dramatically illustrated by his personal, direct
intervention in the purge of December 1971, when the
federal party proved unable to cope with Croatian
nationalism. As President of the LCY, Tito presides
over Presidium sessions, guides its work, and raises
issues for discussion.
The LCY also has a Commission for Statutory
Questions which acts as the party's "constitutional
court" in interpreting the party statutes. In addition,
there is a Supervisory Committee, which manages the
party's finances. The membership of both bodies is
based on the same principles as that of the Presidium.
The reorganization effected at the Ninth Party
Congress reflects an attempt to achieve a balance
between greater republic party authority and the need
for strong centralized leadership in a multinational
organization. Other major goals at the congress were
the creation of institutions to take the LCY through
the succession crisis which will follow Tito's departure,
and the infusion of younger blood into the upper ranks
of the party.
Use of the federal principle in organizing the
highest party bodies has increased the potential power
of the republic parties and has institutionalized the
previous informal Lalance within the hierarchy among
the various nationalities. The Executive Bureau is
designed to counterbalance tendencies toward
republic party separatism by moving entrenched
republic leaders to Belgrade, where they must deal on
an all- Yugoslav basis with the problems of party unity
and federal cohesiveness.
The Executive Bureau will also hopefully provide
the framework for the transition to collective
leadership in the post -Tito era. The position of
chairman of the i ureau has been abolished, instead,
there is a secretary. Tito remains the unquestioned
leader of the party and in this role oversees the
operation of the bureau.
While Tito retains a group of seasoned older
comrades around him, such as Edvard Kardelj,
Vladimir Bakaric, and Mijalko Todorovic, the
emphasis is on bringing younger people into the party
elite. Many of the old guard, such as former defense
chief Ivan Gosnjak, ex- Serbian party leader Jovan
Veselinov, and former trade union leader Svetozar
Vukmanovic -Tempo are now retired. Only 13
members of the previous 35- member Presidium
retained top positions after the Ninth Party Congress.
The personnel turnover at the republic congresses was
23
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even higher. For example, nearly 80 of all top
f:mctionaries in the Slovenian party are new, generally
younger people.
Prior to 1968, the six republic parties were organized
roughly along the same lines as the federal party. The
Slovenian and Croatian party congresses of late 1968
effected reorganizations of their parties to their own
liking. The republic parties attained increaseL'
autonomy under the policy of decentralization and, in
the case of Croatia, this new -found authority only
whetted appetites for more and stimulated long
smoldering Croatian nationalism within the party
leadership as well as the rank and file. The end result
was the c�isis and purge of December 1971. The
banner m those favoring greater regional party
autonomy then passed to the Serbian leadership. It
was not until the political turnover in Serbia in
October 1972 that Tito appeared to have carried the
day and to have firmly set the course for tighter central
party controls and discipline.
The convening of the republic party congresses
before the Nintai Party Congress in March 1969
marked the first time such congresses were held before
the all- Yugoslav congress. This new procedure allows a
fuller hearing for the views of the republic parties than
did the previous system, under which the republics
held their congresses after the LCY congress in order to
ratify the decisions of the central leadership.
11, he restructuring of the local communal party
organizations occupied most of the last half of 1967
and was largely completed early in 1968. The
changeover generally complied with th8 LCY theses
on party reorganization. The main communal party
body is the party conference, which is elected every 2
years and is composed of all the party members or
their delegates. The conference elects a communal
committee to act as its executive organ. The party
conference includes party members from locally based
array units. Party members in the military are enjoined
to participate fully in local party affairs.
During the early moi,ths of 1969 the LCY carried
out an extensive reorganization of the party apparatus
in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The move was
intended to restructure the armv's party organization
along lines parallel to the civilian party organization.
The basic policymaking body of the party in the
armed forces is the LCY conference, whose lib
members serve for 2 years. Delegates to the conference
are nominated at brigade, division, garrison, and
intergarrison conferences, and are elected at
conferences of the array, military -naval regions, the air
forces, and border units, and the Federa! State
Secretariat for National Drfense. The conferences in
2.1
the army districts elect committees, statutory
commissions, supervisory committees, and other
bodies. The central (x>mmittees of the republics where
the armies or other units are located send up to five
delegates to these district conferences.
The LCY conference for the JNA elects its own
executive political body of 35 members, called the
committee. The committee is roughly comparable to a
republic central committee. The LCY conference also
elects it statutory commission and supervisory
committee. The LCY Presidium empowers up to nine
of its own members to sit on the LCY conference in the
armed forces.
Under the new LCY statutes, the part) conference
in the JNA determines the organization of the LCY in
the military. The statutes also require the central
committees of the republics to maintain cooperative
ties with party organizations in army units. The major
change in the party organization in the armed forces
was the decision to allow Communists in the military
to choose their own party officials. Previously, the
main party organ in the armed forces was the
plenipotentiary committee, appointed by the LCY
Central Committee. Its successor, the conference, is
larger than the old 40- member plenipotentiary
committee, although its exact size is not known.
The reorganization is intended to strengthen the
role of the party in the armed forces, to integrate the
JNA into Yugoslav society, to bring the party
organization in the military more fuliv into the main
body of the LCY, and to insure that the armed forces
do not become a bastion of conservative opposition to
social and economic reform. Militating against the
achievement of these goals is the JNA's new authority
to elect its own party apparatus, which may increase
the army's consciousness of being a separate entity
within the party. With three members in the LCY
Presidium, the JNA already equals the representation
accorded the party of an autonomous province.
3. Membership
According to the party statutes, "The League of
Communists of Yugoslavia is the organized political
force of the working class and working people of
Yugoslavia," and anyone who endorses the program
and statutes of the LCY and its stand on all questions
of the building of socialism and the modern workers'
movement is eligible for membership.
D.-spite its assertion of working class origin and
interests, workers constituted sonic. 39% of the total
membership in April 1972 (Figure 5). The number of
workers who are members of the LCY has increased
from 71,177 in 1946 to 399,943 in 1972. No statistics
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FIGURE S. Claimed membership in the Yugoslav
Communist party from its founding in 1919 to
1971 (U /OU)
1 919
60,000
1 923
6,000
1928
3,000
1929
3,500
1931
1,500
1932
500
1933
1,500
1934
4,000
1940
6,000
1 941
12,000
1945
141,066
1946
189,558
1948
468,175
1950
607,443
1951
581,757
1952 June)
779,382
1953
760,030
1951
654,669
1 955
624,806
1956 June)
635,984
1957
687,000
1953
829,953
1959
935,856
1960
1,006,285
1961
1,035,003
1962
1,018,331
1963
1,019,013
1964
1,031,634
1965
1,046,202
1966
1,046,018
1967
1,013,500
1968
1,146,084
1969
1,111,682
1970
1,116,682
1971
1,025,496
NOTE� Except as indicated, all figures are believed to refer
to end -of -year membership.
have been released for 1972 oil the size of the white
collar group or the number of peasants in the party. In
1966, however, the number of white- collar members
stood at 408,378 and in 1967 the number of peasants
was only 77,134. In the latter case this was it sharp
decline from the 19 -16 figure of 130,157.
In the fall of 1968 party membership spurted by
more than 100,000 to nearly 1,150,000. The major
portion of this influx occurred immediately after the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslav
criticism of that action, and it probably was
patriotically motivated. Since then, however, it
downward trend has set in as it result of general apathy
and disillusionment on the part of many Yugoslays
over the LCY's inability to come to grips with the
nation's major economif- problems.
Membership in the party has been relatively
difficult to obtain, and there are indications that the
criteria for membership are being tightened even
further. In the past it has been necessary for a
candidate to have two or more sponsors Nvho had
known him for at least 2 years and who had been party
members themselves for 2 years. A candidate for
membership also had to he accepted by a basic
organization, which had the exclusive right to accept
or reject applicants. The criteria in the new party
statutes are vague, starting that candidates for
membership must accept the policy of the LCY, work
for its implementation, and have "won with their
social activity and moral- political qualities the
confidence of the community in which they live."
Requests for membership may be made directly by
individuals or on their behalf by LCY members, a
political or social organization, a work community, or
u self- management organization.
4. Other major political organizations
The Communist regime in Yugoslavia prefers to rule
indirectly through a network of organizations covering
all facets of political, social, and economic life. Party
control is exercised through party members who are
also members of these other organizations. Although
the system usuall: works smoothly, the regime's
decentralization program has raised some problems
the striking of a proper balance between outright party
control of the organizations, allowing them the
necessary freedom to assure popular support of regime
policies, and the growth of organizatimial interests
different from those of the LCY.
a. Socialist Alliance of Working People of
Yugoslavia
The regime's main mass organization, SAWPY,
traces its history back to the Comintern- inspired
popular front period of the 1930's. It retained the
name People's Front until 1953, when it was
redesignated. Since 1953 the regime has attempted to
make the SAWPY an important link in the system of
self- management, as it forum for public opinion.
In theory, the goal of Yugoslavia's Communists is a
"nonparty" system, not the single -party system they
now have nor the multiparty systems they denounce as
bourgeois frauds. The regime, however, has fostered
the concept of SAWPY as an arena for the clash and
eventual synthesis of opinions and interests. In 1971
SAWPY was entrusted with the responsibility of
handling the public debates on the constitutional
amendments. At the same time SAWPY began
actively seeking across the -board ties with the socialist
parties throughout the world as well as with
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Communist parties which find themselves in
disagreement with the Soviets.
The 1763 Constitution already enshrined the
alliance as "the b.oadest base of social political
activity and social self management of working
people." Through SAWPY, citizens are to discuss
social political matters, scrutinize the work of the
government, and exercise their voting rights. The
Constitution also states that the Federal Assembly's
Commission for Elections and Appointments must
contain members delegi. 4 by the alliance, which ha
an important role in organizing elections. The alliance
also controls most major newspapers in Yugoslavia.
The last SAWPY congress was the sixth congress
held in June 1966. That gathering effected a major
overhaul of the organization. The old federal board,
SA �VPY's central committee, was replaced by a federal
conference. A 43- member presidium replaced the
former executive committee, and an 18- member
executive committee replaced the old executive
committee secretariat.
Although provision was made for holding future
SAWPY congresses, it is envisioned that such
gatherings will rarely be held. Instead, the federal
:.unference is to meet at least once a year, or whenever
necessary to discuss topics of unusua! importance.
The conference principle has been extended all the
way to the basic units in the communes. Each
commune has its own SAWPY conference composed of
representatives from local organizations. Republic
conferences are comprised of delegates from the
communal level. In order to insure more direct
influence by republic SAWPY organizations the
federal conference is composed of delegations from the
republic -level organizations. A more formal note of
federalism was thus injected into SAWPY to replace
the old informal nationality balance which had been
effected when republic and federal SAWPY congresses
elected the old federal board from lists of candidates.
At least two- thirds of the members of the republic
delegations to the federal conference must he elected
by communal conferences, and only one -third by
republic conferences.
The last official figure (1969) for SAWPY
membership ;rut the total at 8,500000. Although this
represents the organization's peak membership,
SAWPY has not yet regained its earlier relative share of
the voting population, which was as high as 80% in
1919. After its initial membership gains in the early
postwar period, enrollment fell to around 5,000,000 in
the early 1950'x, or less than half the voting
population. By inid -196 -1 membership had risen to
7,545,000 or about 6.5% of the voting population.
26
The relationship of the allia.ce to the party is
ambiguous. Yugoslav theoreticians hope to make
SAWPY a vehicle for controlled dissent. the party is to
gain acceptance of its policies through persuasion
within SAWPY. The LCY, however, is to remain the
leading element in the alliance. The party leadership
turned aside suggestions made at the sixth SAWPY
congress in 1966 that the alliance have its own
political program and complete independence. The
leadership of the alliance is composed overwhelmingly
of Communists. Veljko Milatovic was elected
president of the conference at its fifth session in July
1969. Esad Ceric was elected vice president.
The principle of autonomy also is supposed to
underlie the relations between the alliance and the
other main mass organizations, such as the
Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia
(CTUY), the Federation of Associations of Veterans of
the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia, and the
Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia. Before 13136 these
organizations were "associate members" of SAWPY.
Since then they have not been included in SAWPY but
coordinate their activities with the alliance by sending
representatives to any meeting of interest held by a
SAWPY organ. These representatives participate in the
meetings with the saute rights as the regular SAWPY
personnel. The reg;me's mass women's organization,
the Conference on ti a Social Activity of Women, has
remained an integral part of SAWPY.
The alliance performs a useful function in foreign
affairs for the regime through its commission for
international relations, which is used to maintain
contact with non Communist political movements.
SAWPY and the other mass organizations send and
receive many delegations from similar organizations
all over the world. Although such contacts also are
maintained with the mass front organizations of the
other East European Communist states, SAWPY is
particularly engaged in maintaining contacts with
what the Yugoslays call "progressive" groups in
Western Europe and the less developed areas of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.
b. Federations of youth and students
The Yugoslav party has no youth auxiliary such as
the U.S.F.R. has in its Komsomol, but the regime
attempts to control the nation's youth through two
organizations, the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia
(SOJ) and the Federation of Students (SSJ). The
prewar Federation of Communist Youth, founded in
1919, combined in 1948 with the anti Fascist youth
group developed by the partisans during the war to
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form the People's Youth of Yugoslavia. The People's
Youth became the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia
in 1963. Both the SOJ and the SSJ were originally
created to perform as "transmission belts" for party
directives. Numerically, at least, the SOJ has been a
success; the last available figures on membership are
for December 1967 and show a total of 2,085,456,
which includes about two- thirds of all Yugoslays
between the ages of 14 and 25. Resentment over the
organization's inability to accurately reflect youth
attitudes has grown steadily o%er the years, however,
and much of the organization's membership is pro
forma. The SOJ has become a byword for careerism
and a haven for young party hacks.
The party's decision to change its role from a
directly ruling organization to one of ideological
leadership led to confusion about the role of the SOJ.
Many young people wanted the SOJ to reflect the
views and interests of its membership, not those of the
party. The SOJ, however, was not organized to
respond to pressure from below. Its leadership,
moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led to
overprofessionalization.
In Ohe aftermath of the Rankovic affair the
secretariat of the SOJ was dissolved for incompetence
and heavyhandedness. The federation was put into a
form of receivership in order to prepare for its
reorganization, which took place at the eighth SOJ
congress in February 1968.
To restore the federation's effectiveness, a new
statute was enacted to decentralize the administration,
presumably to render it more responsive to the
membership. The SOJ central committee was replaced
by a conference as the chief organ. The executive arm
of the conference is the 30- member presidium, which
is elected on a federal basis �three members from each
republic, one from each autonomous province �with
10 ex officio members. Presidium members are ex
officio members of the conference but cannot
comprise more than one -third of the total conference
membership. The other conference members are not
permanent; they are delegated by the republic
organizations for specific questions to be discussed at
the cruference meetings. The age limits for
membership in the SOJ were set at 14 to 27.
This attempt to revitalize the SOJ has fallen short of
its mark. The students and youth in both Kosovo and
Croatia are imbued with local nationalism, and,
unless officials of their liking control the local youth
organizations, they simply boycott SOJ gatherings. An
LCY conference was slated for July 1972, specifically
to discuss youth problems. The gathering, however,
was postponed until the fall of 1972 because youth
leaders claimed they needed more time to prepare
themselves.
The Federation of Students of Yugoslavia (SSJ)
suffers from much the same malady as the SOJ. The
last available :.L'atisties for SSJ membership show that
it had 110,000 members in 1966. The Zagreb wing of
the SSJ was particularly unruly in 1971, was taken
over by Croatian nationalist elements, and became a
prime force behind that republic's drive for greater
autonomy. The regime had granted the SSJ greater
autonomy in order to bolster sagging morale and
attract new members, but in the aftermath of the
Croatian crisis tighter controls are Leing reintroduced,
even at the expense of alienating future intellectuals
and technocrats.
Regime control of the students through the SOJ and
the SSJ temporarily broke down during the Belgrade
student riots in June 1968. Both organiz: were
reduced th, supporting ex post facto the student
demands for more jobs, more financial aid to students,
greater decentralization, and an end to economic and
social privilege. Although the SSJ and SOJ slowly
reasserted their influence with the young people by
siding with them, it is uncertain whether or not either
organization has recovered a firm gi:p on its
membership. The party's attempts to tighten its
control of youth activities at the universities in Zagreb
and Belgrade were facilitated by the Soviet -led
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. As a
result, the regime, appealing to patriotism, was able to
ouiet dissident student elements �at least until 1970
when opposition and discontent again surfaced.
Most students and nonstudents among Yugoslav
youth share a mutual desire for the better life and seek
to emulate American life styles. They continue to press
hard against the entrenched authorities, mostly on
local levels. Although there are a small number of
radical dissidents who are hostile toward both the
United States and Soviet Union and who look to
Peking for inspiration, they have no chance even to
influence the thinking of the majority of youth.
The Yugoslav leadership is well aware of the unrest
among the country's youth and the need to alleviate
student grievances. In most cases, however, the steps
taken only whet appetites for more. One factor that
works in the regime's favor and which keeps the
uneducated youth apolitical and committed to the
status quo is the continued chance the youth has to
work abroad for hard currency earnings. Nevertheless,
the regime still is faced with the problem of
stimulating support among the youth for party
programs, of harnessing the energies of the country's
youth, and, most important, of finding a place and a
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way to establish a dialogue with the students other
than in the streets.
5. Electoral procedures
Despite a one -party system and tight party control,
elections in Yugoslavia are characterized by a degree
of political contest and popular participation that
stands in sharp contrast to the sham electoral
procedures of other Eastern European states.
Moreover, the party attempts to exercise control over
the process by indirect means. For example, it works
through SAWPY, which organizes and supervises the
elections, and through state electoral commissions
(usually made up of trusted party members selected
from among the judiciary), which must finally
approve all candidates before they can stand for
election and conduct a campaign. In its search for
popular support the regime has made some
concessions to democratic procedure. Moreover, as the
leadership has perfected its techniques and become
more entrenched, it can afford to make concessions
without seriously jeopardizing its position. Thus, over
the years the regime has attempted to provide the
voters with a slowly increasing choice of candidates,
all of whom suppor? the Yugoslav system and the
party's basic program, but who may differ on
methods, emphasis on policy, claims to their own
effectiveness, and simple popular appeal.
The elections of t945 and 1950 were carried out
under the harsh features of Yugoslavia's early postwar
Stalinist period. The Communists assured their victory
by passing legislation restricting electoral freedom,
directly controlling the electoral machinery through
party organizations, and using violence and
intimidation. Since the party's mass organization was
the only one that could regi,ter a list of candidates, the
cowed electorate could either vote for this list �by
dropping a rubber pellet in the right box �or drop a
pellet into the opposition box. Since all voting was
closely observed by party and police officials, almost
all voters voted for the party list, although a few
abstained by staying away from the polls.
The elections of 1953 were held under a revised
election law that reflected Yugoslavia's turn toward
the concept of self- management. Nomination of
candidates was made less dependent on SAWPY
proposals and more open to the electorate at voters'
meetings. Paper ballots were introduced and voting
was conducted in separate closed booths. Reflecting
the new emphasis on liberalization, the law also
provided for more candidates than positions, and in
fact there were a f( :v instances where ranking
incumbents faced opposition. There was an
28
atmosphere of activ-- campaigning and competition.
The new law, however, continued strict party control
over the final selection o candidates, and the regime's
choices invariably won:
Although the electoral law of 1958 was %'.rtually the
same as that used in 1953, the party considerably
tightened its control of the entire electoral process to
avoid a repetition of the discomfiting features of the
more liberal 1953 elections. -lie preelection campaign
and the election itself indicated that the regime had
succeeded in reducing electoral opposition and in
increasing the number of voters. In spite of inclement
weather, the number of abstentions dropped almost by
half, compared with 1953, and the total opposition
vote decreased from 14.5% to 9.1
In November 1964 the Federal Assembly amended
the electoral law to allow for more than one candidate
to compete for each seat in the assemblies at all levels.
The election of March 1965 brought forth for the first
time an avalanche of nomination proposals from the
electorate. The party quickly evidenced its concern
that liberalization had gone too far and made clear its
desire to dampen the electorate's enthusiasm. This
concern proved premature when the elections passed
without mishap and with 93.1 %of the registered voters
voting. The decreased participcion rate compared
N:,th 1963's 95.2% was attributed by the Yugoslav
press to a new election law which no longer permitted
voting by citizens who were outside their home
districts on election day.
The 1967 general elections were held under the most
unrestricted circumstances since the Communists
assumed power in 1945. Starting with the registration
of candidates, there was an outpouring of potential
nominees� almost 2,000 for the 295 vacant Federal
Assembly seats alone. Voters' meetings then
nominated candidates for the communal chamber of
the local assembly, the republican or provincial
chambers of the republic or provincial legislature, and
for the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly.
Candidates for the corporate chambers were elected at
the voters' meetings in the enterprises.
For the !ections through 1967 the communal
assembly ac col as both a nominating body and an
electoral college. From the list of nominees prepared
by the workers' meetings, the assembly elected
deputies to the corporate chambers of the higher level
assemblies. From the list of nominees compiled at the
voters' meetings, the assembly prepared a final list of
candidates to the political chambers of the republic
and federal assemblies. These candidates were then
submitted to a general election. In 1963 and 1965
deputies for communal assemblies were elected in the
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first round of voting, and the new communal
assemblies el.-cted the deputies for the higher political
chambers. In 1967 the old communal assemblies
performed this function.
The 1967 elections saw an unprecedented number
of candidates and contested elections. The 60 vacant
seats in the Federal Chamber were sought by 81
candidates, the 325 vacant seats in all six of the
republic chambers by 428 candidates. There were
about
40000 candidates vying for about 20,000
vacancies in the communal assemblies throughout
Yugoslavia. Only Montenegro and Macedonia had no
more candidates than seats at the federal level. Some
elections at the republic level had to be repeated for
lack of a clear winner.
The 1967 election brought a turnout of 89% of the
registered voters, and also the defeat of several regime
backed candidates. In contested elections at the
republic level, approximately 30% of the regimes
candidates failed to win. The surprise winners
generally were older ex- Partisan heroes who opposed
the regimes economic reform program. In several
cases regime pressure resulted in the recall of some of
the more objectionable new deputies in 1968.
The experience of the 1967 elections led the party
once again to seek tighter control of the electoral
process. A new electoral law formally shifted the
responsibility for executing electoral procedures from
the communal assemblies to SAWPY. The 1969
elections, which involved all of the seats in all of the
assemblies at every level, took place in April and May
under an extremely cornplicated system. Elections
were held in four phases: l election of deputies for the
corporate chambers of the communal assemblies; 2)
election by direct secret ballot of deputies to the
Social Political Chamber of the Federal Assembly, to
the republican and provincial chambers of each
republic or provincial assembly, and to the communal
chambers of the bicameral communal assemblies; 3)
election of deputies to corporate chambers of the
federal, republic, and provincial legislatures (this
phase was conducted by the communal assemblies
plus delegates sent by working organizations; deputies
also were elected at this time to the repubice
equivalents of the Federal Assembly's Social Political
Chamber); and 4) election of deputies to the Chamber
of Nationalities of the Federal Assembly by the
republic and provincial assemblies.
The election laws may be drastically revised with
the introduction of the second set of constitutional
amendments in late 1973. As of late 1972, however,
the Constitution prescribes single- member constituen-
cies, based on population, at the republic and federal
levels. Each electoral unit is thus represer.,ed in the
Federal Assembly by four deputies, one in each
chamber, with the exception of the Chamber of
Nutior �.lities, which is composed of delegates from the
republics and provinces. Every Yugoslav citizen 18
years of age and over, except private fanners and
artisans, has two votes: one as a citizen, the other
based on his means of livelihood. As a citizen he votes
for deputies of the political chambers of the
legislatures, i.e., the Serial- Political Chamber of the
Federal Assembly, and the republic chambers and the
provincial chambers of those assemblies. As a
"workii ;g man,' he votes for deputies of the three
corporate chambers, i.e., the Social Welfare and
Health, Education and Culture, and Economic
Chambers of the Federal Assembly and their
counterparts in the republic: and provincial assemblies.
The nomination system continues to be the most
important part of the overall electoral procedure, for it
is here that citizens have been able to exercise their
greatest amount of choice. Prior to the promulgation
of the 1963 Constitution and the changes in the
electoral law in 1964, nominations were made either
by various SAWPY constituent organizations or by
groups of individuals at meetings of voters. This
procedure was amended in 1958 so that voter meetings
chose only delegates to nominating conferences, which
in turn nominated the actual candidates. The
nominees were then placed before the voter meetingF,
which approved or rejected them by a simple majority.
The successful nominees then had to be approved by
state electoral commissions. As of late 1972 the
nomination process was divided into three phases:
1) Prenomination meetings of citizens register
as many potential nominees as they wish. SAWPY
usually convokes these meetings when nominees
for the political chamber, i.e., the Social- Political
Chamber of the Federal Assembly or comparable
chambers of the lower assemblies, are to be dis-
cussed. The trade unions or enterprise workers
councils are in charge of the meetings to register
nominees for the corporate chambers. Any citizen
can propose a candidate at prenomination meet-
ings. The electoral authorities are forbidden to
interfere at this stage.
2) Nomination conferences of SAWPY cull the
list of nominees proposed by the prenomination
meetings. The nomination conferences are not
obliged to accept the nominees selected at the
earlier meetings and may substitute their own
nominees. Selection of nominees by the conferences
is by secret ballot. A majority of votes is necessary
for nomination. If no one receives a majority, the
nominating conference must propose new nominees
and vote again. The local electoral commission
must confirm the slate of nominees selected by the
conference.
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3) The next hurdle for potential candidates is
the voters' meeting, convoked by the local com-
munal assembly. A meeting can be held with any
number of local voters present. The voters' meet-
ing discusses the list of nominees for the Social
Political Chamber of the Federal Assembly sent
forward from the nomination conference, and may
add its own nominees to the list. Each voter may
move for the rejection of any nominee sent for-
ward. Such a rejection must be seconded by at least
nine persons at the voters' meeting. If a majority
vote by show of hands supports the rejection, a
nominee is stricken from the list. Such a rejection
is valid, however, only if one tenth of all the
locally registered voters participate in the voters'
meeting. The voters' meeting also may select its
own nominee, whose nomination is accepted if
seconded by four citizens at the meeting.
Nominations for deputies to the corporate chambers
are carried out in generally the same manner as those
for deputies to the political chambers. Nominations
for deputies to the Chamber of Nationalities are
proposed by republic and provincial nomination
conferences of SAWPY, which submit the lists to the
communal nomination conferences. The communal
conferences may not reject the lists but may add to
them. Those nominees receiving at least one -third of
the votes of all the communal nominating conferences
in a republic or province become candidates for the
Chamber of Nationalities.
D. National policies
President Tito, Yugoslavia's undisputed leader, has
forged a unique political structure, gradually
discarding some of the more doctrinaire tenets of
communism in favor of a more open, decentralized,
participatory /stem. The movement in this direction
was dramatically accelerated in September 1970 when
Tito �with an eye toward his eventual demise called
for the creation of a collective Presidency representing
all interests and invited nationwide discussions of his
proposal. (C)
The response was far broader than the then 78 -year-
old chief executive had expected. Tito's invitation to
talk about the implications of succession surfaced a
wide variety of long smoldering demands for political
reform, for greater republican and provincial
autonomy, and for an extension of personal freedoms.
The ensuing debates, arguments, and give- and -take
have resulted in formal moves to adopt a far- reaching
political reform that should streamline and
revolutionize the Yugoslav system. (C)
The frank, open discussion of ideas and interests
beyond those of the Communist party is far more akin
30
to the public dialogues occurring in Western political
life than to anything currently known in Eastern
Europe or the Soviet Union. If Belgrade succeeds in its
goal of creating a decentralized socialist state �one
that takes for granted wide- ranging freedom of
expression not only for individuals but for power
groups such as trade unions �the impact on the
Communist world will ultimately equal �if not
surpass �that resulting from the Tito Stalin break of
1948. Such a development probably would insure the
continuation of a democratized Yugoslavia no longer
dependent on Tito's presence for survival. (C)
In its simplest terms the basic objectives underlying
the domestic and foreign policies of the Yugoslav
Communist regime are to maintain and develop the
Yugoslav version of socialism, to maintain the
country's unity and independence, and to develop the
national economy. To attain these goals Tito since the
early 1950's has pursued policies of decentralizai ion of
governmental and economic authority, combined
with the development of economic and soci,- i affairs.
In foreign affairs, Yugoslavia has attempted to
maintain a nonaligned stance between Communist
and non Communist power blocs and aspires to a
leading role among the world's neutral nations. (C)
1. Domestic (S)
The major domestic political objectives of Yugoslav
policy are to perpetuate the rule of the LCY, create a
unique so .]ist system, and in so doing to assure the
survival of this system once Tito is gone.
Since 1952 the party has pursued these goals by a
combination of policies designed to make the party's
rule effective, but nc conspicuous, and to encourage
social and economic innovation. The permissible
limits of public discussion have expanded consider-
ably, to a point not known anywhere else in the
Communist world. Wide as the limits of public debate
and intellectual life have become, however, they have
not been allowed to extend to public questioning of
the legitimacy of the LCY's rule or the goals 4
socialism. Even the basic policies of the regime,
however, undergo critical scrutiny and have been
altered as a result of this criticism.
The purposeful decentralization of decisionmaking
has not lessened Tito's authority to make major
decisions and to have them enforced. Whenever his
position or policies have appeared endangered, either
by liberals, republic nationalists, or Rankovic -style
conservatives, Tito has been able to act decisively to
preserve his power. Moreover, decentralization, while
diffusing all power but Tito's. has not lessened the
party's ultimate grip on the country. Instead, it has
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helped foster the growth of a lively, and at times
cutthroat, political life wiihii the party, and it has
helped obtain mass backing for the regime by allowing
the public actively to participate in a carefully
controlled political milieu.
Tito's policy of balancing between rival groups and
factions has worked wel! for him, although it has
created potential difficulties for his successors�as
attested to by the Croatian and Serbian crises of
December 1971. The system has depended heavily on
his gifts as a leader and arbiter. In order to diffuse
power, Tito has instituted the rotation in officeholding
and has separated the holding of government and
party functions. This policy, however, did not prevent
the rise of republic nationalism within the ranks of the
Croatian and Kosovo party organizations in 1971. The
solution of the Croatian crisis necessitated Tito's
personal intervention and the purge of more than 200
republic party and government officials.
Regional and nationalistic frictions thus constitute
the major obstacle to Tito's goal of rapidly revamping
the system in order to insure its survival when he leaves
the political scene. The interplay of government
reforms, the nation's economic problems, and the freer
political climate have contributed to surfacing deep
rooted bitter regional rivalries and nationality
animosities. Dark events of the past have not been
forgotten. During the Nazi occupation of World War
11, for example, the Yugoslav peoples turned on each
other with a vengeance. Hundreds of thousands of
Groats and Serbs lost their lives in a civil war fought
over fascism, communism, and national hatreds.
Yugoslavia's overall economic policy goal is to
create a modern technological society which will
produce an abundance of goods and rapidly raise the
standard of living. As the vehicle for gaining this
objective, the regime has created a mixed economic
system which combines a relatively small amount of
central planning and control with decentralized
economic decisionmaking in a so- called free socialist
market. 'rhe scheme is meant to increase economic
efficiency by using the profit incentive to influence
enterprise business decisions. Wage leveling has been
renounced in an effort to stimulate labor productivity.
Although workers councils were created in the early
1950's to decentralize economic decisionmaking, the
main impetus for meaningful enterprise autonomy has
come from the economic reforms instituted in July
1965. Under the reform program the federal
government largely gave up its control of investment
funds and investment decisionmaking. Contributions
and taxes of various sorts levied against the enterprises
were reduced or abolished, leaving more money in the
hands of the workers councils and the newly
independent banking enterprises to dispose of as they
saw fit. A larger amount of private enterprise was
encouraged in handicrafts and in catering to tourists.
The reform program's emphasis on profitability and
economic rationality immediately clashed with the
precarious condition of the many politically inspired
but economically unsound factories in Yugoslavia.
Such enterprises are prevalent in the underdeveloped
regions of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Her-
cegovina, and Macedonia. Conversely, the reforms
were welcomed by the more advanced areas of
Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina. Demands for
government intervention and protective tariffs soon
poured in. The course of economic policy since 1965
has demonstrated that although Tito will continue to
pursue reform, the need to combat unemployment,
raise living standards, and protect infant industries (in
order to avoid more unemployment) means that
government intervention in the economy will continue
indefinitely. The basic means of governmental control
probably will continue to be monetary policy (with
occasional reliance on fiscal controls), the indirect
steering of major investment decisions, and indirect
wage and salary limitations.
Yugoslav agricultural policy has consistently aimed
at eventual complete collectivization, but the regime
has renounced the use of coercion to achieve it. The
break with the Cominform in 1948, severe droughts in
1949 and 1950, and Tito's need for peasant support
caused a reappraisal of collectivization policies.
Peasant resistance was so great by 1951 that the
government suspended forced collectivization. Under
a new policy peasants were allowed to leave the
collectives, and the equipment and land which they
owned previously v; re restored to them. Collectiviza-
tion had never left less than about 73% of the arable
land in private hands. About 85% of the land is now
privately owned. A 10- hectare limit on private
holdings is in force, although many peasant attempt
to evade it.
The regime seeks tc build socialism in the
countryside by encouraging private peasants to
cooperate with each other and with the remaining
large cooperatives. The cooperative farms also slowly
expand the socialist sector through purchases of land
from the peasants, particularly the elderly, whose
offspring have succumbed to the lure of the city.
Increased production has become a more important
immediate objective than further collectivization.
Policies designed to increase production include
increased prices for farm products, greater mechaniza-
tion (even if the farm machinery is privately owned),
31
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morn extensive use of fertilizers, land reclamation, and
the use of better seeds, livestock, and pest controls.
The tegirne also has given high priority to the
creation of an efficient educational system designed to
indoctrinate students with socialist ideals, induce
them to support the Titoist system, and develop the
skills and talents needed by a modern economy.
Although the commitment to free general education
remains a basic regime policy, financial limitations on
the part of both the state and the parents of many
children have hindered fulfillment of this goal.
Moreover, teaching assignments and the promotion of
students have often been governed by party rather
than educational criteria.
The policies of the government toward organized
religious groups are characterized by an effort to reach
an accommodation with them. The regime, having
failed to stamp out religious influence in the
immediate postwar years, now stresses the legal
guarantees offered to the churches �as long as they
refrain from critical public comment on the regime
and its policies. Regime spokesmen periodically
denounce increased church activity, especially in
heavily Roman Catholic Slovenia and Croatia. The
official view remains that religion is "spirtual
backwardness and it delusion." The regime is still
determined to keep religious activities under the
scrutiny of the state.
The Communists have allowed a growing amount
of cultural freedom in Yugoslavia, although the mass
communications media �the daily press, periodicals,
radio and television, and the cinema, all of which are
under party guidance �are supposed to foster the
regime's olrective of "socializing" mass culture. The
boundaries of the permissible have steadily expanded,
and with this expansion has come an influx of Western
influence. In Belgrade, for example, "Jesus Christ
Superstar" opened to packed audiences in mid -1972.
Whatever cultural policy guidance does exist is
formulated and controlled in Belgrade and
disseminated through various cultural- educational"
and "cultural- artistic" societies. The large role of the
government and SAWPY in subsidizing book
publishing and buying works of art helps the regime
exert some control, although it has not been able to
completely stop the publication of controversial works.
For example, Miodrag Bulatovic's novel A Hero on a
Donkey, although banned from publication in 1966,
was published by 1968.
The inclusion of all citizens in a comprehensive
system of health protection, unemployment com-
pensation, child allowances, accident insurance,
disability payments, old -age and survivors pensions,
'32
and death benefits is a basic objective of the regime in
the social welfare field.
The regime's most difficult police decisions concern
nationality relations within Yugoslavia. Nationality
antagonisms specifically the Serb -Croat rivalry
have threatened President Tito's efforts to build a
system that will promote the survival of an
independent, nonaligned Yugoslavia once Tito leaves
the scene.
In its simplest farm, the Yugoslav nationality
problem has been a struggle by nun Serbians against
Serbian hegemony. During the period between World
Wars I and 11, the monarchy treated Yugoslavia as an
extension of greater Serbia. The suspicion and distrust
resulting from that experience still color the outlook of
many l ugoslav minorities �most particularly the
Croats. At the close of World War lI the Communists
believed that the creation of a federal government of
six republics and two provinces would solve the
nationalities problem. The problem did in fact fade
during the first two decades of Communist rule, but
this was more the result of Tito's levdership than the
system. The upsurge of nationalism that rocked
Croatia in 1971 as well as the purge in Serbia in
October 1972 have set back Tito's efforts to create a
decentralized socialist state which would grant wide
ranging freedom of expression. An LCY already
shaken by the Croatian events was again rocked by
Tito's move against the Serbian leaders, whom many
viewed as capable and mature politicians operating
within the spirit of the reforms. Once again the partv is
looking for a way to enable the more than 15
nationalities within the Yugoslav borders to live and
worl together in harmony. The party, moreover, must
recognize the paradox in its past attitude toward the
nationalities: 'he encouragement of ethnic individual-
ity works at cross purposes with Yugoslav unity. As
long as this paradox exists, nationality tensions will
continue.
Local cultures are allowed to develop and, more
important, the Communists have pledged to develop
rapidly the economics of the underdeveloped areas. It
is usually in these areas, with their many "political
factories" (i.e uneconomic enterprises established
under political criteria) that opposition to economic
reforms is strongest. Indeed, as part of their price for
acquiescing to regime economic policy, the
underdeveloped areas in the early days of the 1965
reforms forced the creation of a federal fund for
investments in those regions. In the 1971 reforms, the
underdeveloped areas again insisted that the federal
government retain the powers to direct funds to these
regions.
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Most Slovenes and Croats do not support the
extremist separatist tendencies voiced by some
elements in Croatia in 1971. While demanding greater
republic antonotnv and resenting direction from
Belgrade, they recognize that their national
aspirations arc not attainable outside the Yugoslav
federation. :knottier nationality issue, and probably
the most sensitive one, is the status of the Albanians
living in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Having
been long repressed by the Rankovic- dominated
police, they are demanding improved living
conditions. Nevertheless, the desire for continued
union is general, fostered by the popular memory of
the bloody civil .war which accompanied the
disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1941.
"Those regime policies which result in it freer or more
prosperous personal life have been welcomed by most
Yugoslays. "There is no widespread popular sentiment
to return to the unitary state or economic system of the
prewar era. Policies limiting the power of the secret
police, increasing the availability of consumer goods,
and giving (yell it limited amount of political choice,
are generally well received. More mixed, and at times
hostile, is the public reception of policies resulting in
slower economic growth, unemployment, and
inflation. 'These are likely to he received coldly and at
times with outbursts of popular dissatisfaction
manifested in strikes, popular criticism of the
leadership, and occasionally, as in the case of stndents
in Belgrade in June 1968, riots.
2. Foreign (S)
Yugoslav foreign policy has reflected the difficulties
encountered by at small nation trying to maintain its
independence. Although the rise of the two
superpowers �the Soviet Union and the United
States �has %widened the stage of Yugoslav foreign
policy front Fnrupe to embrace the entire world, the
Communist regirne faces much the same geopolitical
dil(rnnuas as its royal predecessor. Yugoslavia
traditionally has sought safety either under the wings
of it more powerful patron or by balancing
precariously between competing powers.
Yugoslav foreign policy has been described by
President 'I'ito us "activ(coexistenc(! in practice, this
uneans that Yugoslavia has avoided identifying itself
formally with any political bloc. Convinced that
Yugoslavia's national interests �to remain independ-
ent and to prosper �can be hest served in it general
state of world peace, the regime has sought to establish
good working relations with individnal countries in
both the Soviet and Western blocs and with neutral
countries. 'Tito has argned that "bloc mentality" is an
underlying cause of world tension and has defended
Yugoslavia's close ties with diverse countries and
political movements by saying that advocates of peace
and progress are not found only in one or another
military- political camp. Active coexistence also means
that Yugoslavia takes initiatives on world issues, both
unilaterally and in conjunction with other neutral
countries.
Foreign policy has been greatly influenced by the
fluctuating status of relations with the Soviet Union.
Whenever Tito believes that he is threatened from the
Soviet side, he assiduously improves relations with the
West, particularly the United States, lid trumpets the
doctrine of nonalignment. When relations with the
U.S.S.R. are good, Tito increases criticism of the
United States as the leader of "imperialist
machinations" aimed at toppling "progressive"
regitmes. Since both the Soviet Union and the United
States and their allies are of considerable importance
to the Yugoslays in their efforts to modernize their
economy, 'Tito is continually involved in it balancing
act meant to extract the maximum gain from both
sides.
Yugoslavia has actively sought support for its
position among most of the nations of the world, and
ha established a network of diplomatic missions far in
excess of what one would expect of a small Balkan
state. As of March 1972 Yugoslavia had diplomatic
relations with 114 nations, although several of these
did not have resident ambassadors. 'Tito has especially
sought support among the newly emerging and
underdeveloped states in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Ailbough t ,oslavia's own economic
underdevelopwent militates against extensive
economic relations %vith many of these countries,
which have not developed into the lucrative markets
"Tito hoped for, their response to Yugoslavia as it fellow
neutral has been substantial.
Prior to World War 11 Yugoslavia's foreign policy
was conditioned by Enropean power relationships and
the fear of the territorial claims of its neighbors.
During the interwar period Yugoslavia joined
Czechoslovakia and Romania in the Little Entente, it
grouping aimed at forestalling Hungarian attempts to
regain territories lost to the three allies. The patron of
the Entente was France. By the amid- 1930'x, however,
Yugoslavia was oriented politically toward I- ranee and
the United Kingdom but economically toward
Germany and Italy. A side effect of I litler's triumph at
Munich in 1938 was the gutting of the Little Entente.
The attempt of Regent Paul to keep Yugoslavia ont of
World War 11 by granting the Axis concessions in
Mauch 1941 was undone by it military coup in
33
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Belgrade later the same month. By mid -April
Yugoslavia was overrun by Axis forces. Throughout
World War 11 a royal government -in -exile in London
followed an anti -Axis aoliev but was continually
the advantage of Tito's Partisans of being on the scene
within Yugoslavia, and the Communists, almost
without Soviet aid, were able to seize power.
In the immediate postwar period, Tito's foreign
policy sought to fulfill traditional Yugoslav claims
against Italy, Austria, and Bulgaria. Although
Yugoslavia failed to gain territory in Carinthia from
Austria, it did manage to make good its territorial
claims against Italy in Istria. Soviet reluctance to give
full backing to Belgrade's claim to Trieste, as well as
Tito's plans for a South Slav federation, were
important elements in the worsening of Soviet
Yugoslav relations, which culminated in Yugoslavia's
expulsion in 1948 from the Cominform. The Trieste
issue was finally settled in 1954, with Yugoslavia
receiving the hinterland around the port while Italy
regained the city itself.
Tito's emphasis on Yugoslav independence and the
ideological innovations of Yugoslavia's Communists
on the one hand, and Belgrade's efforts to maintain
good relations with Moscow and its client states on the
other, have led to a series of ups and downs in relations
with the U.S.S.R. From 1945 to 1948 relations were
close but slowly deteriorating. The period 1948 to 1955
was one of extreme hostility, barely short of war.
Moscow used economic pressure, attempted political
infiltration, vituperative propaganda, and menacing
military maneuvers in its attempt to bring down the
Tito regime.
The Khrushchev- Bulganin visit to Belgrade in 1955
inaugurated it brief period of rapprochement between
the two regimes. By 1958, however, differences over
the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Yugoslavia's
continued "revisionism" had led to increasing mutual
hostility. The latest era of good feeling between
Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. began in 1962 and came
to a close in mid -1968. The rapprochement was
marked by the closest Yugoslav- Soviet ties since 1948,
although Tito retained complete independence of
action. The first cooling of the new friendship
followed the inauguration of the Yugoslav economic
and social reforms in July 1965 and the ouster a year
later of Rankovic. Despite Rankovic's harsh repression
of Cominforrnists after 1948, the Soviet leadership
apparently regarded him as the most acceptable
candidate to succeed Tito. Thinly veiled criticisms of
the Yugoslav reforms appearing in the Soviet press
34
were followed by increasingly pointed Yugoslav
declarations of their intention to pursue their own
path.
The slight cooling in relations with Moscow
evidence of support for Egyptian President Nasir,
whose political demise, coupled with the earlier
political exits of such stalwarts of n malignment as
Nkrumah in Ghana, Sukarno in Indonesia, and Ben
Bella in Algeria, Tito feared would wreck the policy of
nonalignment. Sevict- Yugoslav relations became even
closer: Yugosla observers attended Warsaw Pact
exercises; So warships increased their visits to
Yugoslav ports; and Tito increased his propaganda
campaign, alleging a Western imperialist plot to
overthrow regimes such as his. Even at the height of
the rapprochement, however, Tito refused to move
closer to the Soviet bloc in any formal way. The
Yugoslays stayed away from the European Com-
munist conference at Karlovy Vary in April 1967 and
gave notice that they would not attend the world
Communist conference then planned by the Soviet
Union and subsequently held in Moscow in June
1969.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August
1968 ended that attempt at rapprochement. Tito
believed that the leaders of the Czechoslovak reforms
were kindred spirits and fully backed the Dubeek
regime. The Yugoslays went so far as to entertain
hopes for close cooperation among Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Tito denounced the
invasion and threatened arm:J resistance to any
similar move against Yugoslavia, rejecting the so-
called Brezhnev doctrine, which asserts the duty of the
U.S.S.R. to intervene in socialist countries it deems
endangered by "reactionary" forces.
Soviet Yugoslav relations remained cool until
September 1971, when Soviet party boss Leonid
Brezhnev paid an official visit to Yugoslavia. Neither
side gave ground on the basic issues that separate
them, but the visit did improve the atmosphere
considerably, as did Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in
June 1971. The Soviets have cleared the atmosphere
by granting sizable credits to the troubled Yugoslav
economy and have generally avoided raising
contentious issues in their dealings with Bc,,;rade.
The periodic improvements in vlations with the
U.S.S.R. usualiv have taken place when Tito believed
that Moscow was adopting his concept of independent
Communist countries cooperating voluntarily and on
an equal basis. Khrushchev's acceptance after 1955 of
Yugoslavia as a legitimate socialist country was an
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thwarted by strife among ethnic and religious groups abruptly ceased in the wake of the Arab- Israeli war in
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important concession in Tito's eyes. Tito's revisionist
domestic policies, however, and his efforts to exert
significant, if often indirect, influence in the
Communist world, particularly Eastern Europe, have
usually met with a suspicious response from the
Soviets. Moscow has never fully overcome its
misgivings about the effect of Tito's liberal
experiments on the rest of Eastern Europe.
Yugoslav relations with the other East European
states remain closely bound to the course of Belgrade's
relations with Moscow. Yugoslavia's closest associate
in the area since 1964 has been Romania. The driving
force behind this cooperation is their mutual fear
about Moscow's hegemonistic tendencies. The views
of Tito and Ceausescu, who were 80 and 54 vears of
age respectively in 1972, further coincide in their oft
expressed conviction that every Communist party and,
indeed, every nation is equal and the master of its own
house.
Committed to noninterference in the affairs of other
parties, the two Balkan states have demonstrated their
convictions by readiness to cooperate in resisting
Moscow's will. Although Yugoslav- Romanian
cooperation predates the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
that event markedly increased their apprehensions and
broadened their community of interests. Numerous,
frequent consultations between Tito and Ceausescu as
well as their representatives underscore this closer
cooperation. "These meetings usually have led to
agreement between the two leaders on most major
issues confronting the international Communist
movement.
Improved Yugoslav relations with Poland under
new party leader Edward Gierek culminated in Tito's
visit to Warsaw in June 1972. Belgrade's relations with
East Germany have remained frosty since the
occupation of Czechoslovakia. Relations with
Iltingary have remained good, partially because of the
Hungarian regime's obvious reluctance to take part in
the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and
Communist China, the Yugoslays have remained
neutral. Sino- Yugoslav relations were not warm
throughout most of the 1960's, but this did not prevent
Belgrade from defending China's rights to formulate
its own policies. In November 1969 Belgrade and
Peking announced their intentions to exchange
ambassadors. The subsequent improvement in
relations has centered mainly on expanded economic
t i es.
Yugoslavia's relations with Albania have unproved
considerably since the two exchanged ambassadors in
February 1971. Relations with Bulgaria appeared to
be on the mend in 1971 after renewed squabbling over
the Macedonian question in the late 1960's. In the
case of Bulgaria, however, Sofia's continued
reluctance to recognize the existence of an
independent Macedonian language, nation, and
culture, prevents any lasting, meaningful improve-
ment in relations.
Relations with Greece were very good until the
military coup in Athens in April 1967. Yugoslavia
attacked the "regime of the colonels" in its press and
was outraged when the new Greek regime abrogated a
border traffic treaty. The Greeks in turn were
suspicious of Belgrade's designs on Greek Macedonia,
which includes the area's historical cultural center,
Thessaloniki.z After the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
however, Greek Yugoslav relations improved as the
Yugoslays sought assurances for the safety of their
southern frontier.
Yugoslav relations with Western Europe are good.
The basic reason for Belgrade's improved relations
with the West is Yugoslavia's inability to reach a clear
understanding with the U.S.S.R. that the factors
which impelled Moscow to intervene in Czecho-
slovakia are not applicable to Yugoslavia. Traditional
quarrels with Italy and Austria have been pushed into
the background. Since the break with the Cominform,
economic aid and trade from the West have made an
irreplaceable contribution to the development of
Yugoslavia's economy, and its technology is based
primarily on equipment imported from Western
nations. i,s part of the economic reforms, the
Yugoslays dopted a law in 1967 permitting private
foreign investment in Yugoslavia. Although the new
legislation has not attracted a great number of
Western investors, the Yugoslays are hopeful that the
improving economic situation and continuing efforts
to heighten economic efficiency will bring more offers.
After nearly 2 years of uncontrolled inflation, the
Yugoslav economy has begun to show signs of
improvement. The United States and other Western
nations are providing the necessary assistance by
granting new hard currency credits and by
rescheduling existing debt repayments.
The most noticeable improvement in Yugoslav
relations with a West European nation has been with
West Germany. Relations with Bonn had been
troubled by a dispute over Yugoslav recognition of
East Germany in 1957, which caused the West
Germans to break off diplomatic relations, and by the
West Germans' refusal to pay certain war indemnity
claims. In January 1968 diplomatic relations were
'For diacritics on place names sec the list of names at the end of
the chapter.
35
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restored. The Nest Germans agreed to grant the
Yugoslays credits to approximately the amount of the
indemnity and also to enter into negotiations for an
agreement to regulate the status of the thousands of
Yugoslav workers temporarily employed in West
Germane. West German willingness to crack down on
various anti -Tito emigree organizations in the Federal
Republic also helped improve mutual relations. As of
mid -1972, however, war reparations remained the one
outstanding issue marring the otherwise good relations
between Belgrade and Bonn.
Because of the position of the United States as the
strongest economic and military power in the world
and its usefulness as a counterpoise to the Soviet
Union, Tito has been sensitive to his relations with
Washington. Periods of close alignment of Yugo-
slavia's policies with those of the Soviet Union have
occasionally threatened, but failed to interrupt,
Belgrade's efforts to maintain the good relations with
the United St ates that have developed since the early
1950's. U.S. complaints over sometimes virulent anti
American propaganda in the Yugoslav press have
usually been met with the argument th Yugoslavia
and the United States should nor allow different
points of view about world events to cloud their
mutual friendship.
Nevertheless, Yugoslav American relations have
mainly suffered when the Yugoslays have considered it
necessary in the interest of their overe!l foreign policy
objectives to criticize U.S. actions around the world.
After the Arab- Israeli war in June 1967, the Tito
regime launched a propaganda campaign alleging
that the United States was leading an "imperialist
counteroffensive" against all progressive regimes,
including Tito's. An officially inspired spy scare,
which included accusations of Central Intelligence
Agency involvement in espionage in Yugoslavia,
accompanied the propaganda barrage. In 'Zagreb in
December 1967 and in Belgrade in April 1968 reginc-
contrived demonstrations were directed against U.S.
diplomatic installations.
Yugoslavia has been particularly critical of U.S.
actions in Vietnam, claiming that the United States
has played into the hands of the Communist Chinese
by forcing the Soviet Union to come to the :-.id of a
"fellow socialist state" (North Vietnam) thu; Was
undtt r attack by "an imperialist power...
F rther irritants to U.S. Yugoslav relations were the
Con,re.sional decision to exclude Yugoslavia from
c�li; 0 f(!: ,v:rchase of surplus agricultural
commodities under the provisions of Public Law -180
and Washington' rclusal to reschedule Yugoslav debt
p,ivnients for '!167. Belgrade protested that both
36
moves undermined its efforts at economic reform and
hinted that tley were a form of pressure on Yugoslavia
to adopt viewpoints on international events more
pleasing to the United States. After the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, Tito's hopes for more financial aid
from the United States rose again as he portrayed
Yugoslavia as a potential victim of Soviet economic
pressure; later in 1968 Washington agreed to
reschedule Yugoslav deht payments due in 1969.
By 1970 U.S. Yugoslav relations were greatly
improved. President Nixon became the first U.S.
President to visit Yugoslavia when he stopped there
from 30 September to 2 October 1970. The following
year, in September, Tito paid his first official visit to
the United States. Yugoslavia welcomed the U.S.
Chinese and U.S. Soviet summits of 1972, but with
the qualification that these newly developed
relationships should not be allowed to be deterimental
to the small nations of the world.
Tito's effort to maintain good working relations
with hoth the Soviet and U.S. power blocs coincides
with his emphasis on nonalignment as the hasis of
Yugoslav foreign policy. The Yugoslav leader,
although denying that he seeks to mold a third,
nonaligned bloc, has long asserted that the
uncommitted nations can and should play a
significant role in international affairs, provided that
they coordinate their actions on major issues. Since the
mid- 1950's Yugoslavia has steadily promoted efforts to
develop such coordination. The Yugoslays owe a great
deal to nonalignment, since it has given the nation
influence and prestige in the third world far beyond its
size and power. Moreover, psychologically, nonalign-
ment has made it more difficult for Moscow to bring
overt pressure on Belgrade to rejoin the Communist
bloc.
As originally defined, the doctrine of nonalignment
included the concepts of peaceful coexistence among
countries with different social and economic systems,
solutions of international problems through the
United Nations, and opposition to colonialism.
Emphasis was placed on the independence and
equality of all states, with each state free from external
interference. Voluntary cooperation would provide
collective security.
Nonalignment originally meant that its adherents
belonged to no power bloc or military alliance, such as
the North Atlantic "Treaty Organization (NATO) or
the Warsaw Pact. Since the early 1960's Tito has
theorized that the great power blocs are in the process
of dissolution. French policies toward NATO and
Romania's attempt to achieve de facto independence
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within the Warsaw Pact are cited as proof of this
thesis.
The belief that the breakup of the power blocs was
close at hand in 1967 and 1968 led the Yugoslays to
refine the doctrine of nonalignment to account for the
changed situation. The definition of nonalignment
was altered to embrace all "progressive forces,"
regardless of their membership in it bloc. This
redefinition had the virtue of sanctioning Tito's
attempt to engage other socialist states more directly
in the struggles of the nonaligned world against the
"imperialist offensive."
The expanded concept of nonalignment also fit well
with Yugoslavia's increased interest in Western
Europe. Belgrade's attempts to sell nonalignment in
h:urope have met with only h miled success. Beginning
in 1966 the Yugoslays have sporadically, but
unsuccessfully, attempted to convene a pan- European
interparliamentary meeting. They also were among
the first proponents of the Rome conference of
"progressive movements" held in April 1968. Belgrade
had hoped that, by securing at this meeting the
attendance of both Communist and non Communist
organizations, the conference would serve as an
example of nonaligned principles in action. Instead,
the Yugoslays found their initiative seized by the
Italian Communists and the meeting dominated by
Communist and extreme leftwing elements. The
Yugoslays revealed their disenchantment by refusing
to sign the meeting's final communique because it
failed to call for the withdrawal of both the Soviet and
U.S. fleets from the Mediterranean, a statement
desired by the Yugoslays because of their alarm over
the increase in Soviet naval strength in the area.
In September 1971, after months of Yugoslav
prodding, the third nonaligned summit was held in
Lusaka, Zambia. Belgrade began preparing for the
nonaligned summit as early as 1968, and the push
coincided with renewed Yugoslav concern over Soviet
motives toward Eastern Europe. Prior to the 1971
Lusaka summit, two of Tito's major efforts to show the
world the vitality of nonalignment were the
nonaligned conferences which he arranged in Belgrade
in 1961, and in Cairo in 1964. It was not until 1971,
however, that Titc was able to attract interest in Latin
America. Eleven nations from Central and South
America attended the Lusaka summit as observers, but
only Cuba had it full- fledged delegate. Continued
Latin American interest in nonalignment was reflected
at the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers Conference in
Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972. Belgrade was
represented by For,.ign Minister Tepavac, who used
the forurn to express Yugoslav interest in the creation
of permanent nonaligned bodies. Trepavae's
statement was a reversal of Belgrade's previous
position against the institutionalization of the
movement.
Foreign trade policy is geared to foster the rapid
industrialization and modernization of the country,
and one of Yugoslavia's greatest fears is that of being
frozen out of its traditional markets by the policies of
the European Economic Community (EC) and the
Soviet dominated CEMA. To counter this danger,
Yugoslavia, in the fall of 1968, became the first
Eastern European nation to establish diplomatic
relations at the ambassadorial level with the EC. In
September 1964 Belgrade secured an agreement for
limited participation �as an observer �in CEMA.
Yugoslavia also is an associate member of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and a full member of the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
As in domestic policy, popular acceptance of foreign
policies depends heavily on their effect on the material
well -being and personal freedom of the individual
Yugoslay. Such measures as the abolition of rigorous
frontier and foreign travel controls are well received, as
are trade policies designed to add to the supply of
consumer goods and thus raise the standard of living.
For most Yugoslays, particularly those in Slovenia and
Croatia, policies which emphasize good relations with
the West are preferable to those which tighten
relations with the Soviet Union.
Tito's penchant for personal intervention in foreign
policy decisions and his pride of authorship of the
doctrine of nonalignment invest foreign policy with
great sensitivity in Yugoslavia Previously, public
criticism of the usefulness to Yugoslavia of a policy of
nonalignment, or its continued viability, was
considered public criticism of Tito himself, something
that was almost never done. Since the mid- 1960's,
however, public discussion of foreign policy has been
encouraged by SAWPY, although most of the
discussion is superficial and is aimed at creating the
illusion of public support for policy decisions that have
already been taken. Some Yugoslays have questioned
the necessity for Tito's grandiose foreign policies and
the usefulness to Yugoslavia of his expensive foreign
trips and farflung diplomatic establishment, but such
views are not publicized. Tito's sometimes abrupt
interventions in foreign policy decision making, such as
his hasty decision to go to Moscow in the wake of the
Arab defeat of June 1967, also have encountered
criticism within the party, reportedly much to his
discomfiture. Tito's extreme pro -Arab stand has not
been popular in Yugoslavia. Conversely, Yugoslavia's
37
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internationalism is obviously a source of pride for most
Yugoslays.
Tito's use of the idea of nonalignment, despite that
doctrine's shaky premises, has resulted in a net gain for
Yugoslavia. His policies have secured diplomatic and
moral support for his country, furnished Belgrade with
diplomatic maneuvering room for its balancing act
between East and West, and have made Yugoslavia
important out of all proportion to its actual size and
power.
3. National defense (S)
Yugoslavia's success in making credible its
determination to resist any invader by force of arms
has been a major mainstay of its independent
domestic and foreign policies. As a result, the role of
the Yugoslav military as a buttress to foreign policy, as
well as a major force for national unity at home, places
the armed forces �and their indirect political
influence �in a special position vis -a -vis national
policy as a whole, a position in sharp contrast to that
of the military in other Communist states.
It has been Tito's consistent policy to maintain a
sufficiently strong military capability to discourage
aggression against Yugoslavia from any quarter, while
shunning military commitments to either major power
bloc. In general, the policy of balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union is pursued in
defense matters. From 1963 to 1968, however, the
rapprochement with the Soviets was soon accom-
panied by increased military contacts. During that
period, due mainly to economic considerations and
nonavailability elsewhere, the Soviets became almost
the sole supplier of modern heavy or expensive
military equipment to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav- Soviet
military relations became particularly amicable after
the Arab Israeli war of 1967, but quickly ceased
following the Soviet -led occupation of Czecho-
slovakia.
In August 1968 Yugoslav defenses shifted from
concern about r .n "imperialist offensive" from the
West to the danger of invasion from the East. By the
end of 1968, Yugoslav fears of an immediate Soviet
attack had passed, and the army returned to its pre
August status. Belgrade moved cautiously to maintain
both its independence and correct contacts with
Moscow, and the Soviets did not terminate their
deliveries of military equipment.
Yugoslav determination to resist a possible Soviet
move, however, remained undaunted. In December
1968 the regime proposed the policy of total
mobilization to resist invasion, a defense strategy that
has become known as "all- people's defense." Under
38
this program, all Yugoslays between the ages of 16 and
65 may be assigned specific responsibilities. The first
real test of this defense strategy was highly successful,
according to reports on the" Freedom '7 1' joint army
all people's defense exercise held in September 1971.
In addition to its military defense role, the army also
has important educational and economic tasks.
Political indoctrination stressing the unique features of
the Yugoslav federation is an important part of
training. Armed services technical schools help provide
such personnel as medical technicians. The army is a
source of cheap labor for the construction of roads,
railroads, and public works, and performs important
rescue and relief duties in cases of natural disaster. The
army also is used as a symbol of national unity and to
inculcate in its personnel a belief in the "brotherhood
and unity" of the Yugoslav nationalities. This aspect
of policy was somewhat undermined by the decision
taken in late 1967 to allow 25% of all conscripts to do
their military service in their home republic.
Until the start of the economic reforms in July 1965,
the army had been the pampered pet of the Tito
regime. The financial retrenchment accompanying
the economic reforms was accompanied by the first
overt criticism in the Federal Assembly of the high
level of defense spending. The military did not get all
that it asked for in the 1967 and 1968 budgets,
although a large supplemental appropriation was
added to the defense budget in late 1968 to pay for
that year's partial mobilization.
Despite the grumbling in parliament about defense
costs, most Yugoslays probably approve the policy of
maintaining a large defense establishment. Memories
of fighting four wars and facing two invasions since
1900 have reconciled the man in the street to
conscription. Increasing prosperity has not led to more
complaints about compulsory military service, but has
reduced the influx of career volunteers from Slovenia
and Croatia. This has prevented the regime from
achieving the nationality balance it seeks in the officer
corps, since recruiting is not difficult in Serbia and
Montenegro, where prosperity is less widespread and
the military profession is traditionally held in high
esteem.
The new criticism of defense spending coincided
with the beginning of important changes in the nature
of the army. Communist leadership of the national
resistance during World War II had insured a tight
interconnection between the army and the party.
Many Communists who became important party and
government officials after 1945 had achieved high
rank in the Partisan army, upon which the new army
was to be built. For example, Tito himself emerged
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from the war a marshal; Koca Popovic, a wartime
Partisan general and Chief of General Staff from 1945
until 1953, later served as Federal State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs for 12 years until 1965. Over the years,
however, the proportion of wartime Partisan officers
still on active service has steadily declined; by 1967
postwar cadres comprised about 60% of the officer
corps. As in many aspects of Yugoslav life, a
generation gap is also developing within the armed
forces. Those who hold the most powerful positions,
such as Federal State Secretary for National Defense,
General Ljubicic, and Chief of General Staff, Gen.
Milos Sumonja, are ex- Partisans. But an increasing
number of lower ranking officers are postwar career
men who have a somewhat different outlook from that
of their seniors. The younger men are often less
ideologically motivated, even though party members,
and more inclined to view themselves as professionals,
pledged to fight for Yugoslavia, not necessarily for the
party.
During the investigation which furnished the
evidence to sanction Rankovic's downfall, there were
indications that Rankovic and his lieutenants had
attempted to widen their influence in the army. Some
Serbian generals, including Miloje Milojevic, who was
forced into retirement in late 1965 or early 1966,
probably had close ties to the Rankovic group. This
example of Serbian chauvinism in the military may
have increased Tito's resolve to dump Rankovic.
Despite occasional signs of clashes of viewpoint, there
is complete loyalty to Tito within the military. This
loyalty was an important element in Tito's relatively
easy ouster of Rankovic in 1966 and his purge of the
Croatian party leadership in 1971.
The years 1967 and 1968 saw several signs that the
Yugoslav liberals who helped bring down Rankovic
were attempting to insure friendly control of the
armed forces after Tito's eventual demise. A
reorganization of the LCY in the armed forces in early
1969 attempted to bring the structure and role of the
party in the military apparatus more in line with the
organization and function of the party as a whole, as
established at the Ninth Congress of the LCY. Party
discipline �about 93% of the officers and 76% of the
noncommissioned officers are party members �and a
series of pay increases since 1965 have helped keep the
army generally apolitical. The armed forces remain
aware, however, of their continued indirect
importance to national stability, and of the potential
increase in their unifying role after Tito's demise.
The national defense law of February 1969
established a two- tiered defense force and gave the
concept of all people's defense its legal basis. Great
emphasis is placed on the principle of the "nation in
arms," with both men and women liable for defense
duties. Everyone between the ages of 16 and 65 is
required to undergo training in military tactics, first
aid, and the use of weapons and the strategy of
collective defense. With the extension of all- people's
defense throughout Yugoslavia the regime builds the
image of the military and populace united in defense
of the homeland, and confronts the enemy with a
formidable force, at least in terms of sheer numbers.
Creation of an effective civil defense organization is
an integral part of the Yugoslav adoption of the all
people's defense concept. Under the 1969 law on
national defense heavy emphasis is placed on the civil
defense obligations of all citizens.
Although the old 1955 law on national defense
provided for an organized civil defense program,
large -scale preparations and mass public instruction in
civil defense techniques did not begin in earnest until
about 1963. The campaign was stepped up in 1967
after the military coup in Greece and the Arab Israeli
war, and it intensified after the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Civil defense comes under the jurisdiction of an
Assistant Federal State Secretary for National Defense
and the secretariat's Administration for Civil Defense.
Each republic also has a secretariat for national
defense with responsibilities in civil defense. The basic
civil defense organs are at the communal level, whe;c
each commune formulates a civil defense plan based
on the policies contained in directives from higher
levels.
There is a civil defense school in Belgrade offering
courses in such subjects as defense against atomic,
biological, and chemical warfare; medical and
veterinary services; and organization and tactics of
civil defense. Graduates are expected to 'improve civil
defense in their localities and to overcome popular
apathy. Successful completion of civil defense and
paramilitary training courses is mandatory in order to
receive a degree at a Yugoslav university. The SAWPY,
LCY, army, economic enterprises, and secondary
schools all cooperate in civil defense instruction and
propaganda.
Every Yugoslav from ages 16 to 65 is liable for civil
defense service and is supposed to receive instruction
in first aid, fire fighting, and atomic, biological, and
chemical warfare protection. Courses include
theoretical detail on types and effects of nuclear
bombs and on chemical and bacteriological warfare,
as well as instruction on how to survive an atomic
attack, how to build a radiation -proof bunker, and
how to perform personal decontamination. Yugoslav
0
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civil defense doctrine culls for evacuation of cities and
towns in case of attack. No large -scale program to
construct urban shelters has been undertaken.
The basic Yugoslav defensive strategy within the
context of all peoples defense is to use the more
heavily armed "operational forces" to defend
temporarily the frontiers and to conduct an orderly
and fighting retreat into the mountains. Defense
strategy is kept as flexible as possible, however, and
could allow initial defense well inside the frontiers in
some areas. The general aim is to prevent the enemy
from achieving a quick victory and hopefully to put
his armed forces in a difficult military and
psychological position when his technical and
numerical superiorities do not yield the expected
victory. Theoretically, enough time will be gained to
transport necessary government personnel and records
into the mountain redoubt and for the activation of
partisan units. Although coordination through the
supreme command in Belgrade is intended to keep
these units from becoming republic armies, i.e.,
committed only to regional interests �some officers,
particularly those who denigrate the effectiveness of
guerrilla warfare or who fear excessive decentralization
of the Yugoslav system, have opposed the scheme on
the ground that it would foster regional separatism.
Yugoslav military leaders have no illusions about
their ability to defend successfully all of the country
against an invasion by a major power and realize that
most of the plains and major industrial areas probably
would soon fall into enemy hands. Once secure in the
mountains, however, the retreating operational army
and the partisan units would cooperate in operations
against the enemy. Under the Yugoslav Constitution,
no one, including the chief of state, may sign an act of
capitulation to an invader.
E. Threats to government stability (C)
1. Discontent and dissidence
'I'lle flexibility with which the 'Tito regime has
approached Yugoslavia's multitude of problems has
instilled an element of popular trust. The regime has
-,ucceedcd in creating the image of genuine willingness
to listen to domestic criticisms and to meet objections
if they appear valid. This process of give- and -take,
which has become the Yugoslav modus operandi in
the 1960's and early 1970's, has kept popular
discontent and dissidence at a minimum.
There is popular dissatisfaction over the govern-
merit's failure to deal with rampant inflation and to
meet increasing worker appetites for consurner goods,
40
but at no time has ,'iis irritation seriously threatened
the regime. In general, there is a recognition of and
pride in the strides postwar Yugoslavia has made.
Moreover, Tito has kept his finger on the pulse of the
nation through popular opinion polls and frequent
contacts with special- interest groups. Tito also permits
a number of safety valves for incipient popular
discontent, including work stoppages, and con-
siderable freedom for the trade unions and writers'
organizations to voice the complaints of their
constituents.
Tito's intentions are generally respected by the
people and his grasp of the situation, despite his
advanced age, is good. This does not prevent
complaints about his solutions to substantive
problems, and Tito is still faced with the problem of
gaining widespread popular support for the system he
has built.
The regime is aware that there are several important
weaknesses in the political, economic, and social
fabric of the nation. First and most important are the
nationality rivalries with their underlying threat of
separatism. The Communists, who led the Partisan
resistance in World War II under the banner of
"brotherhood and unity," believed, perhaps naively,
that the creation of a federal government of six
republics and two provinces at the close of World War
I1 would solve the nationality disputes. More than a
generation later, however, the search for a Yugoslav
national identity which will permit the country's more
than 13 nationalities to live and work together in
harmony, is still going on.
Economic problems in recent years have severely
complicated matters. Enmities will persist as long as
there are economic disparities between the different
regions of Yugoslavia. The federal government
recognizes this and has beca, ae a clearing house for
redistributing capital from richer to poorer regions in
an effort to close the gap between the "haves" and
"have nuts." This policy has had only minor success,
creating as many problems as it has resolved.
Economically advanced republics such as Croatia
complain loudly that they are being bled dry of the
investment resources and foreign exchange needed to
modernize and expand their own industrial plant.
Even so, the provinces and the republics that do get
the money are dissatisfied.
The differing socioeconomic backgrounds, the
disparity in natural resources, find the varying rates of
population growth further complicate the nationality
question and remain a major source of discontent for
the immediate future. There is also a basic
contradiction in the national policy intended to close
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the income gap between the richer north and poorer
south: the political objective of closing the gap
conflicts wit'�i the economic goal of achieving a more
efficient, stable economy. The result is a compromise
and not much progress toward either objective.
There are forces at work, however, which augur well
for overcoming the nationality problem. Social
mobility and, to a lesser extent, internal 'migration
stemming from rapid industrialization are chipping
away at regional prejudices. This process of national
fusion is slow, but it has been speeded up since the end
of World War II and ultimately could save national
unity.
Another vital factor that bears upon stability in the
country is the length of Tito's tenure. There is a
widespread but natural uncertainty about who and
what will follow his passing. Sporadic, but evident
popular concern over Tito's health has inevitably
raised the question of whether "Titoism" as a system
can survive the man. The whole question of succession
and of possible Soviet attempts to use this period to
encourage Yugoslavia to return to the Communist bloc
has created an undercurrent of uneasiness.
A number of minor irritants arise from time to time.
Petty scandals involving embezzlement of enterprise
funds, lavish weekend cottages, and privileges due to
party positiein are a fairly frequent occurrence.
Moreover, the "new class" of party and government
bureaucrats demonstrates arrogant, exclusive social
attitudes; government bureaucrats in particular treat
their social inferiors in a classically patronizing
manner.
Another factor of potential instability is the
generation gap in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav youth
want a say in the future of their country. They are
impatient for the material benefits of the W
est, but are
not well disposed toward capitalism as a system. On
the other hand, the almost daily exposure of graft in
Yugoslavia, as well as chronic housing shortages and
high unemployment, tend to alienate them from the
self managing system. There is considerable official
concern about the nation's youth; the third party
conference scheduled for early 1972 was to be devoted
to this problem.
Although the Catholic and Orthodox churches have
reached a. sometimes uneasy modus aivendi with the
regime, both are hasically opposed to Communist rule.
The Serbian church is outraged at the regime's support
for the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which the
Serbs regard as schismatic. Although relations between
the regime and the Roman Catholic Church have
improved greatly, some Catholic priests reportedly still
sympathize with subversive emigree organizations.
One of the main elements in the Vatican- Yugoslav
agreement of 1966 to resume diplomatic relations was
the Vatican's pledge to disavow and curb the
subversive activities of emigree priests. The resurgence
of religious practice in Croatia is largely a result of the
traditional close links between Croatian nationalism
and Roman Catholicism.
The growth of liberal tendencies among segments of
the intellectual and student communities, particularly
at the universities in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubliana,
also has alarmed the regime. Although the liberal
intellectuals back the regime's reforms, some of them
wish to carry the reforms further than Tito has
envisaged, even to the point of calling for the creation
of a multiparty system. As long as the more moderate
reformists remain dominant within the LCY, the
ultraliberals probably will grumble at the pace of the
reform, but remain nonsubversive. Should the
conservatives regain control of the party machinery,
however, the ultraliberals might become more forceful
in their methods of dissent. In general, however, the
relative freedom in the intellectual community has
successfully prevented the rise of academic
malcontents. Failure to provide jobs and improved
housing for young college graduates, however, has
become a source of irritation.
2. Subversion
The Yugoslav Government has had to cope with a
great deal of subversive activity instigated both within
the country and abroad. The amount of such activity
has generally been greater than that encountered in
any other Balkan nation. On coming to power in 1945,
the regime used police -state methods to quickly
eliminate most anti- Communist groups and their
leaders. By 1948, following the expulsion of
Yugoslavia from the Cominform, it was sufficiently
entrenched to withstand Soviet efforts at subversion.
The government has effectively continued to combat
subversion, and has felt strong enough to allow a great
deal of intellectual freedom as well as freedom of
movement to its citizens.
National rivalries and traditional antipathies within
the ethnically diverse Yugoslav state provide the
greatest potential for subversion. Almost from the
foundation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the central
government has been threatened by the activities of
dissident ethnic groups. Fueled by ::onflicting
economic claims, national antagonisms have
reappeared and grown alarmingly since the early
1960'x. Most divisive is the rivalry between the
Western oriented, Roman Catholic, and more
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economically advanced Croats and Slovenes, and the
Orthodox, more traditionalFy Balkan, less advanced
Serbs.
The national aspirations of the Croats were partially
fulfilled by the formation of an independent state of
Croatia under Axis tutelage during 1941 -45. Ante
Pavelic, the leader of the Croatian Fascist Ustasi
organization, headed the short -lived state. A bloody
civil war between Croats and Serbs accompanied the
4 -year struggle against the Axis occupiers and revived
the tradition of guerrilla fighting. The struggle soon
produced a confusing welter of Croatian and Serbian
nationalist, Communist, royalist, and quisling units.
A large part of the total population became active
in two well- organized resistance movements �the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (popularly known as
Chetniks), under Gen. Draza Mihailovie, Minister of
War of the royal govemment -in- exile, and the
Communist -led partisans under Josip Broz Tito (Tito
was originally his Partisan name). The partisans
became the strongest force in the country and
established themselves in power. In 1946, Mihailovie
was captured anJ executed, and within a few years the
Communist regime had stamped out all organized
resistance. A number of hostile persons, including
Pavelic, managed to escape to the West, however, at
the end of World War I1.
Subversive activities against the Tito regime are for
the most part apparently planned abroad and
executed either abroad or by emigrees infiltrated into
Yugoslavia. The emigree organizations attempt to
Play on the anti- Communist and nationalist
sentiments of those in the homeland.
These organizations exist throughout Western
Europe, Latin America, Australia, and North
America, particularly in Austria, West Germany,
France, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Sweden, Canada, and
the United States. Every major Yugoslav nationality is
represented. Usually composed of those who fled
Communist rule during the early postwar years, the
emigree groups have made great efforts to recruit
followers among the large number of Yugoslays
temporarily working in Western Europe. Most of those
who have infiltrated Yugoslavia to perform terrorist
acts have been recruited in the West. Domestically
initiated subversive activity generally is limited to
isolated individuals and small groups which
occasionally distribute propaganda clandestinely or
scrawl antiregime slogans on walls.
Although the efforts of many of the emigree
organizations are limited to clandestine distribution of
antiregime propaganda, some of them engage in
terrorism. In 1968, Croatian emigree organizations
42
were responsible for three explosions in the Belgrade
railwav station and one in a movie theater, resulting in
one death and many injuries. Until then, such
terrorism had been directed mainly against Yugoslav
installations abroad. Sometime in 1968, however, a
shift in tactics occurred and Yugoslav officials became
targets. In June of that year the chief of the Yugoslav
military mission in West Berlin was critically wounded
by gunfire. On 10 February 1971 the Yugoslav
consulate in Goteborg, Sweden, was occupied by
terrorists who unsuccessfully attempted to ransom its
occupants for US$100,000 and the release of a fellow
terrorist, then on trial in Yugoslavia. The Goteborg
incident was followed by the assassination of the
Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic, in
April 1971. In January 1972 a bomb planted on a
Yugoslav airliner en route from Stockholm to Belgrade
exploded over Czechoslovakia, causing a crash that
took 27 lives. In July 1972 a group of 19 emigree
terrorists infiltrated into Bosnia and Hercegovina and
tried to incite armed rebellion. The attack failed, but
the incident shook Yugoslav security forces and has led
to a tightening of border security. Although the leaders
of this group were Yugoslav emigrants living in
Australia and were members of the "Croatian
Revolutionary Brotherhood," most others were guest
workers who had left Yugoslavia within more recent
years to seek employment in Austria and Germany.
Late in 1972, three other Croatian terrorists skyjacked
a Swedish airliner and obtained the temporary release
of the assassins of Ambassador Rolovic, taking them to
Spain.
Of the numerous emigree, nationalist, subversive
organizations, the Croatian groups are the most vocal
and active. One of the most notorious is the Croatian
National Committee (IINO) headquartered in West
Berlin. The HNO was founded in 1951 by Branko
Jelic, following a quarrel with Ustashi leader Ante
Pavelic. Frustrated by the marked improvement in
Yugoslav ties with the West, Jelic claimed to have
sought Soviet support for a free and independent
Croatia, a claim that carried with it implication of
Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs. Before his ties to
the Soviets could be proved or disproved, however,
Jelic suddenly died in May 1972, throwing the HNO
leadership into disarray. In September 1972, Dr. Ivan
Jelic, the brother of Branka and reportedly somewhat
more moderate, became the president of the HNO.
A second group is the Croatian Liberation
Movement (HOP), formed by Ante Pavelic in 1957
following several years of squabbling between Ustasi
factions. It is headquartered in Argentina. Following
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Pavelic's death in 1959, HOP came under the
leadership of Dr. Stjephan Hefer.
The Croatian National Resistance is a quasi
milita.y organization having branches throughout the
Western World. The Australian branch has emerged as
the dominant wing of this organization under the
leadership of Srecko Rover. A second Australian -based
organization is the Croatian Revolutionary Brother
1iood (HRB). This organization's main goal is to
infiltrate terrorist groups into Yugoslavia and to carry
out attacks on Yugoslav diplomatic posts. HRB's
existence was not known until 1968. Before that time it
carried out terrorist strikes against Yugoslavia from
secret bases in West Germany.
The only subversive Slovenian organization which
may be active is the Organization of Slovene Anti
Communists. In December 1962, three members of
this group were tried and sentenced in Ljubljana, the
capital of Slovenia, for subversive activities, which
may have included planning an assassination attempt
against Aleksandar Rankovic. According to the
Yugoslav Government, the three defendants pre-
viously had belonged to the pro Fascist Home Guard
Organization. They were also alleged to have received
supplies and orders from Slovene emigrees in West
Germany. Three more alleged members of the
Organization of Slovene Anti Communists were tried
and sentenced in Ljubljana in March 1964. One of the
defendants was caught while attempting to enter the
country from Austria, and the other two were
apparently already in Yugoslavia. Subversive activities
in Slovenia and Ljubljana since 1964 generally have
been confined to the dissemination of propaganda and
have been carried out by the students at the University
of Ljubljana.
There are a great number of Serbian emigree
groups, particularly in the United States and France.
One such organization was responsible for the
bombing in January 1967 of the Yugoslav consulates
in San Francisco and Chicago, and the embassy in
Washington. Most Serbian emigree organizations
have close ties to the emigree Serbian Orthodox
Church, which in many cases does not recognize the
a iMllltity of the patriarch in Belgrade. In the United
514 tf.1 Tome of the emigrees have given allegiance to
Archbishop Dionisje� of Libertyville, Illinois. Several
Serbian emigree groups, such as the Serbian National
Defense Council, led by Slobodan Drashkovic, have
their headquarters in Chicago.
Because of the clandestine character of the
subversive groups and organizations, it is impossible to
gage their strength. Several have demonstrated that
they have (at least outside Yugoslavia) a functioning
organization which is capable of committing acts of
terrorism both within and outside their homeland.
Some organizations publish newspapers and
propagandize other emigrees by radio. Money is
plentiful, with contributions coming from outside
Yugoslavia. Rich emigree businessmen apparently are
willing to donate large amounts.
Yugoslav authorities have been effective in
combating subversion. Although the effectiveness of
the secret police has been somewhat undermined by
the purges and reorganizations since July 1966, it is
able to cope with emigree activities. The regime is
sensitive to the efforts of the emigrees, and both the
military and civilian intelligence services are targeted
toward them. Most of the would -be terrorists are
caught shortly after entering Yugoslavia and before
they can do serious harm.
Other factors undermining the emigrees' efforts at
subversion include the grudging respect Tito has
earned since 1948, the support given his regime by the
U.S. and U.K. Governments since 1949, and the
regime's success in raising the standard of living of the
Yugoslav people.
There appears to be high correlation between
economic hardships and the incidence of domestic
subversion. There was a rash of expensive industrial
fires in Slovenia and Croatia in 1967, one of the
leanest years during the economic reform. More
recently, the Croatian emigrees took advantage of the
relaxed political climate in Yugoslavia in 1970 and
1971 to flood Croatia with separatist propaganda.
Although subversive threats from foreign govern-
ments have subsided in recent years, Belgrade is still
wary of the potential for meddling in Yugoslav
internal affairs by Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet
Union. With the collapse of the first Yugoslav- Soviet
rapprochement in 1957 -58, Albania, which had been
forced by the Soviets to moderate its policies toward
the hated and feared Yugoslays, quickly returned to a
sharply anti Yugoslav stance. Albania's siding with
Communist China as the Sino Soviet split deepened
further insured that Tirane would remain hostile to the
Yugoslays. This animosity continued through most of
the 1960's, but moderated somewhat after the Soviet
led occupation of Czechoslovakia, which was opposed
by Yugoslavia, China, and Albania.
Albania's ability to trouble Yugoslavia stems not
from any affinity among the Albanians in Yugoslavia
with the rigorous regime of Enver Hoxha, but rather
from their nationalist aspirations. Despite Tirane's
expressions of satisfaction over the conditions of the
Albanians in Yugoslavia, Belgrade is concerned over
Hoxha's failure to renounce his role as champion of
43
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Albanian nationalism. Concentrated in Kosovo, the
Albanians in Yugoslavia were repressed by the
Serbian- dominated Yugoslav secret police, cinder
Rankovic's command, with considerable brutality.
The improvement in the status of Albanians after
Rankovic's fall however, has not fully met their
demands. Moreover, the Albanians' demands have
stirred resentment among many Serbs, who retain a
romantic attachment to Kosovo as the center of the
medieval Serbian empire.
Like Albania, Bulgaria in 1957 began again to
disseminate propaganda with irredentist overtones
in this case pressing its claims to Macedonia. This
propaganda increased to such a point that in October
1957 Belgrade officially protested Bulgaria's "open
and rude interference" in Yugoslavia's internal affairs
and "hostile actions against the integrity of Yugoslavia
and the unity of its peoples." Bulgaria practically
ended its propaganda campaign in 1961, but friction
over Macedonia continued from time to time until
Tito's visit to Sofia in 1965 put Yugoslav Bulgarian
relations on it more friendly basis.
Polemics over Macedonia broke out again in early
1968, when the Bulgarians celebrated the 90th
anniversary of the short -lived Treaty of Sari Stefano
(1878), which had awarded most of Macedonia to
Bulgaria. Mutual recriminations over Macedonia
heightened as Yugoslav Bulgarian relations plum-
meted to rock bottorn following the occupation of
Czechoslovakia. Only in early 1972 were there again
signs of improvement between Sofia and Belgrade.
Plainly, however, as long as Bulgaria regards
Macedonians as Bulgarians and attempts to speak for
thern, the Yugoslays will consider Sofia as bent on
sowing disunite in Yugoslavia.
There is little concrete evidence that the U.S.S.R. is
conducting subversive activities against Yugoslavia.
After the worsening of relations with the Soviet Union
in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
however, the "Tito regime became apprehensive about
such it possibility. Mane Yugoslays believe that the
Soviets are behind the Bulgarian irredentist press
campaign. Protests in the Yugoslav press in januan
19119 about antiregirne, nationalist prop,:granda from
abroad directed at the Ilungarian minority in
Vojvodina revealed the Yugoslav co,icern that the
U.S.S.R. might play on the nationality pro;Olem to
bring pressure on Tito to moderate his domestic
reforms and end opposition to Soviet policy in Eastern
Europe. In December 1971 there were c
reports of Soviet meddling in the Croatian crisis.
44
F. Maintenance of internal security
The responsibility for intelligence and security in
Yugoslavia rests with the federal and republic
secretariats for internal affairs as well as the Federal
State Secretariats for National Defense and Foreign
Affairs (Figure 6). The supervisory leadership of the
intelligence and security services interlocks with both
the leadership of the Federal Executive Council and
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The mission
of the Yugoslav intelligence and security services is to
protect and perpetuate the regime and to engage in
those intelligence activities abroad deemed essential to
the protection of Yugoslav interests and the security of
the Yugoslav state. Although the security and
intelligence services are well able to fulfill their
mission, they have still not fully recovered from the
purges they underwent following the ouster in 1966 of
Aleksandar Rankovic, then Vice President of
Yugoslavia and Secretary of the LCY Central
Committee. S.me of the Rankovic men who were
retired in 1966 -67 have been returning to the internal
security service. The external services, however, are
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FIGUrE 6. Structure of Yugoslav Security and
Intelligence Services (U /OU)

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25X1

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basic components: municipal police and rural
gendarmerie. Under the Communists police duties
have been performed largely by the Public Security
Service (People's Militia), now called simply, the
militia. Since 1950, the militia has undergone a
number of structural changes, the latest stemming
from the Basic Law on Internal Affairs of December
1966.
The basic police element is the commune and its
police station. In cases of large communes, substations
are added. Each commune has its own department for
internal affairs, which supervises the local police. Most
militia funds come from communal budgets. The
militia deals with suppressing criminal acts, enforcing
traffic regulations, and maintaining public order.
Militiamen usually carry sidearms and, in case of riots,
use truncheons, rifles, submachineguns, tear gas
equipment, and steel helmets.
There is no information on the strength of the
militia, although it probably is below that necessary to
fully handle crime in large urban areas. The last
available figures (January 1967) indicated that of the
2,365 Belgrade militiamen, 1,003 had low educational
qualifications. In addition, it was revealed at that time
that the health of many militiamen was substandard;
only 406 of the Belgrade force were adjudged in good
health. Many militiamen were formerly peasants and
workers who participated in the revolution during
World War 11, and most of the officers are party
me- .rers. In January 1967, all insignia of rank were
abolished, and militiamen only wear devices
indicating their function� traffic police, marine
police, or penitentiary guards.
A new training curriculum for the police academy
was introduced in 1969. In addition to traditional law
enforcement skills, police cadets receive intensive
training in etiquette, proper social behavior, and
correct dress. Acutely conscious of its image among
Western tourists, Yugoslavia also has decided to
incorporate foreign language, photography, and some
medical training into the young cadets' studies.
Low pay, inadequate housing, and low social status
make recruiting for the militia difficult. An ambitious
plan reportedly is tinder consideration to recruit only
high school graduates for the militia and to require
university degrees for the higher ranks. Despite its
handicaps, the militia apparently is successful in
preventing large -scale violent crime. Most crime in
Yugoslavia is economic in nature, i.e., theft, bribery,
and embezzlement.
3. Penal system (S)
The federal and republic secretariats for internal
affa ;rs control Yugoslavia's prison system, except for
48
special military prisons. Most prisons and jails are
supposed to be financed by communal assemblies. As
a result, most prisons receive barely adequate
financing.
According to an official Yugoslav study, 230 prisons
in the country held 53,242 inmates in 1967. (The
number of prisons probably is inflated by an unknown
number of local jails.) In addition to being in ill repair,
many older prisons often are overcrowded, and
inefficient administration results in newer prisons
being underutilized. There is a shortage of prison
guards, who often are recruited from the ranks of those
rejected by the militia. The most progressive and least
onerous prison system is in Slovenia. Perhaps the
harshest prison in Yugoslavia is that on Otok Goli off
the Dalmatian coast in Croatia.
The prison system is supposed to engage in an
extensive rehabilitation effort, but lack of funds has
prevented its full implementation. A professional
counselor, supposedly trained in penology, assisted by
aides and guards, supervises the prisoners. The
counselor is a key man in the He of a prisoner, works
closely with the inmate until his release, and keeps the
prison director informed of the prisoner's progress. One
of his specific duties is to read the prisoner's mail.
Each Yugoslav commune is required by law to form a
committee to help prisoners find work and to adjust to
life after their release. Nevertheless, the last published
rate of recidivism was about 3l% in 1963.
Many inmates work at various jobs while in prison.
They are allowed to subscribe to newspapers, buy food
and clothing' and have individual beds and linens.
Some are permitted to work outside the prisons and
receive wages at a reduced scale.
No general differentiation of inmates on the basis of
nationality appears to exist. For the most part,
political and nonpolitical prisoners are accommodated
in the same institutions, although some prisons
maintain separate wards for various categories of
polit;: al prisoners. Men and women are housed in the
same insititutions but are required by law to be
separated. Alcoholics are placed in special wards, us
are recidivists.
4. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities (C)
The Yugoslav militia has proven itself capable of
handling emigree sponsored attempts at armed
insurgency. In early July 1972, for example, the local
security forces in the republic of Bosnia and
Heregovina quickly quelled an emigree sponsored
attempt to incite rebellion. Using Australian, Swedish,
and West German passports, and hiding automatic
weapons and sabotage gear in their luggage, 19
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terrorists organized by the "Croatian Revolutionary
Brotherhood" crossed the Austrian border, seized a
truck, and drove to the town of Mostar. In a
subsequent skirmish, 13 local security officers and
most of the terrorists were killed.
This incident was the first since the immediate
postwar years. Those emigrees who attempted to
foment rebellion include the remnants of the Fascist
Ustasi, who recruit disenchanted young Croats who
have sought work in the West. The terrorists also have
wealthy sympathizers among the established emigree
community.
There have been unsubstantiated reports that
Moscow clandestinely backs some of the emigree
groups. Soviet support, however, mainly consists of
granting asylum to emigrees who fled Yugoslavia at
the time of the Tito Stalin break in 1948.
There is no evidence, for example, to support the
claim by the late Branko Jelic, leader of the Croatian
National Committee, that in 1971 the U.S.S.R.
endorsed the creation of Lin independent socialist
Croatian state.
Belgrade has charged the Yugoslav security services
with neutralizing the emigree threat, apparently
including preventive operations mounted against
emigree centers in the West. In late 1968 and early
1969, for example, a number of emigrees who died
under mysterious circumstances in West Germany
apparently were the victims of Yugoslav counter-
measures. The Yugoslays have publicly stated that
foreign governments on whose territory terrorists train
and organize will be held responsible for any terrorist
attacks in Yugoslavia. Should 'Tito or his successors
need them, however, the internal security forces have
proven themselves trustworthy and capable of meeting
the challenge.
G. Selected bibliography (U /OU)
The best and most detailed examination of
Yugoslav foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the
third world, is Alvin Rubenstein's Yugoslavia and the
Nonaligned 11"orld (Princeton University Press, 1970).
For an account of the 1948 Tito- Stalin break, the
standard work is The Battle Lost by Vladimir Dedijer
(the Viking Press, 1970). For a more recent and well
written look at problems in Yugoslav- Soviet
relations stemming from the Soviet -led occupation
of Czechoslovakia �read the chapters on Yugoslavia
in Anatole Shub's An Empire Loses Hope (W. W.
Norton and Company, 1970).
There Lire two fairly good biographies of Tito. The
first is Phyllis Auty's Tito: A Biography Longman
Group Limited, London, 1969) and the second, giving
an insider's view, is Vladimir Dedijer's Tito (Simon
and Schuster, 1953).
Milovan Djilas is the best known Yugoslav political
theorist. His work, The New Class (Frederick A.
Praeger, New York, 1957) brought him international
recognition. Since then, his other works have included
Anatomy of A Moral (Frederick A. Praeger, New York,
1959); Land Without Justice Harcourt, Brace, 1958);
Conversations With Stalin (Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1962); and The Unperfect Society: Beyond the
New Class (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969).
Yugoslavia's complex nationality problems are well
examined in two standard works: Communism and
the Yugoslav National Question, by Paul Shoup
(Columbia, 1968), and Yugoslavia, A Multinational
Stage: Regional Differences and Political Response, by
Jack C. Fisher ((,handler Publications, 1966).
Additional, though somewhat specialized reading,
includes a critical analysis of Yugoslavia's political
managerial system in Yugoslavia, The New Class in
Crisis by Nenard Popovic (Syracuse University Press,
1968), while the impact on the international scene of
the unique U.S. Yugoslav relationship is examined in
Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in
World Politics, by John C. Campell (Harper, 1967).
49
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Chronology (u/ou)
1102
Croatia accepts a Hungarian king, losing its independence.
1331 -55
Tsar Stephen Dusan rules over a Serbian empire �the
golden age of medieval Serbia.
1389
Turks defeat the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo to begin
nearly 500 years of Turkish domination.
1527
Croatia passes under Habsburg sovereignty.
1718
The Turks withdraw from Croatia.
1804 -13
Karadjordje leads the first Serbian rebellion against the
Turks.
1815
Second Serbian rebellion, led by Milos Obrenovic, gains
concessions from the Turks.
1830
Serbia is granted autonomy by Turkey.
1867
Last 'rdrkish soldiers leave Serbia.
1878
Treaty of Berlin makes Serbia independent.
1882
Serbia is proclaimed a kingdom.
1885
Serbia is defeated in war against Bulgaria.
1912
The First Balkan War Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Montenegro defeat the Turks and expel them from
Macedonia and Albania.
1913
The Second Balkan War� Serbia, Greece, Montenegro,
Romania, and Turkey defeat Bulgaria.
1914
Archduke Francis Ferdinand is assassinated at Sarajevo,
resulting in Austrian declaration of war on Serbia and
the start of World War I.
1918
Yugoslavia is created as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes.
1941
April
German and Italian forces overrun Yugoslavia.
1943
November
Second session of Anti- Fascist Council of National Lib-
eration declares itself the 'supreme legislative and execu-
tive body of Yugoslavia."
1946
January
New constitution creates the Federal People's Republic
of Yugoslavia.
1948
June
Cominform pub' resolution condemning and expell-
ing the Yugosla ommunist Party.
1949
September
U.S.S.R. denounces 1945 treaty of friendship, mutual
assistance, and postwar cooperation with Yugoslavia.
1951
November
United States and Yugoslavia agree on military assistance
within framework of Mutual Defense Assistance Pact.
1953
March
Regime abandons efforts to collectivize agriculture.
1954
January
Third (Extraordinary) plenum of Party Central Com-
mittee removes Milovan Djilas from the Central Com-
mittee.
October
Dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy over Free Terri-
tory of Trieste ends with signing of Memorandum of
Understanding by Yugoslavia, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
1955
May
Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade and
seek reconciliation with Tito.
50
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1956
June
Tito visits the U.S.S.R.; party ties are reestablished.
September October
Khrushchev and Tito confer on Yugoslav- Soviet frictions.
November
Tito 'attacks Stalinist elements and Soviet role in Hun-
garian revolt.
1957
August
Tito and Khrushchev meet secretly in Bucharest.
October
Yugoslavia recognizes East Cerman regime; West Ger-
many breaks diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia.
November
Yugoslav representatives refuse to sign 12 -party Moscow
declaration.
1958
April
Seventh Party Congress meets and adopts new party pro-
gram conflicting with Soviet doctrine.
May
Pravda editorial asserts that the program of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia is revisionist and contrary
to Marxism- Leninism.
1960
February
Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, outspoken foe of Tito's Com-
munist regime, dies and way is paved for improved re-
lations between the regime and the Roman Catholic
Church.
1961
September
First conference of nonaligned states in Belgrade.
1962
December
Tito pays unofficial visit to the U.S.S.R.; hears Khru-
shchev declare that Yugoslavia is a socialist country.
1963
April
Yugoslavia adopts new constitution.
October
Tito visits the United States.
1964
September
Tito meets on separate occasions with Communist leaders
of Romania, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
October
Tito attends second nonaligned conference in Cairo.
December
Eighth Party Congress meets and reaffirms Yugoslavia's
domestic and foreign policies.
1965
April
Tito visits Algeria and the U.A.R.
June
Tito visits Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Soviet
Union.
September
Tito visits Bulgaria.
1966
June
Diplomatic relations are restored with the Vatican.
July
Tito ousts Vice President and Party Secretary Rankovic
from his party and government posts, accusing him of
engaging in a "struggle for power."
October
Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee starts the reform
of the party by reorganizing its leading bodies. Rankovic
is expelled from the LCY.
December
New Basic Law on Internal Affairs curtails the power
of the secret police.
1967
April
National elections are held; constitutional amendments
alter the structure of the Federal Assembly and the
executive, giving the republics more authority.
June
Tito attends Soviet bloc meeting in Moscow in the
wake of the Israeli defeat of the Arabs.
July
Federal Assembly adopts legislation allowing foreign
investment in Yugoslavia.
August
Tito visits the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq to sound out
possibilities for a Middle East settlement.
!968
January
Diplomatic relations are restored with West Germany.
January- February
Tito visits Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, India, South-
ern Yemen, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R.; calls for a Third
World nonaligned conference.
April
Tito visits Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and the U.S.S.R.
June
Students riot in Belgrade.
51
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1968
July
The Yugoslav economy is further decentralized.
August
Tito visits Czechoslovakia and endorses the Dubcek
regime; later denounces the invasion of Czechoslovakia
and orders partial mobilization of the Yugoslav army.
December
Constitution is amended to give more power to the re-
publics and reorganize the Federal Assembly.
Legislation is introduced in the Federal Assembly calling
for the creation of the "all people's defense" system.
1969
March
Ninth LCY Congress adopts new, liberal statutes and
reorganizes party.
April -Stay
Elections are held under new electoral law, which pro-
vides for elections every 4 years involving all assembly
seats.
September
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Yugoslavia in
an effort to patch up relations which have been poor
since the Warsaw Pact interv-ntion in Czechoslovakia.
1970
April
Ranking party leader Bakaric leads Yugoslav delegation
to the Lenin centennial in Moscow.
August
Yugoslavia and the Vatican raise diplomatic relations to
the ambassadorial level.
September
Tito leads Yugoslav delegation to third nonaligned summit
in Lusaka, Zambia.
Tito announces his intention to create a collective presi-
dency and revive the position of vice president.
September October
President Nixon visits Yugoslavia.
52
1971
February
Tito pays his first visit to Nasir's successor, Egyptian
President Sadat.
April
The Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden is murdered by
Ustashi terrorists.
May
Second Congress of Self Managers meets in Sarajevo.
July
Neu government is formed in Yugoslavia; Krste Crven-
kovski, a Macedonian, is chosen to rotating post of Vice
President.
September
Soviet party boss Brezhnev visits Yugoslavia.
December
Tito purges nationalists from Croatian party ranks.
1972
January
Ustashi terrorists bomb a Stockholm -to- Belgrade Yugoslav
airliner.
March
Soviet Defense Minister Crechko visits Yugoslavia.
June
Tito visits the Soviet Union.
July
19 Ustashi terrorists lead unsuccessful armed attack in
Bosnia and Hercegovina.
August
Rato Dugonjic, a Serb from Bosnia and Hercegovina,
replaces Crvenkovski as Vice President.
October
Tito purges Serbian party leadership.
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Glossary (u/ou)
ABBREVIATION SERBO- CROATIAN
CTUY........ Savez sindikaia Jugoslavije
FEC..........
Savezno izvrsno veee
JAT..........
Jugoalovenski Aerotransport..........
JNA..........
Jugoalovenska narodna armija........
KNOJ........
Korpus narodne odbrane
KOS..........
Kontraobaveatajna sluzba
LCY..........
Savez komunisla Jugoslavije..........
OZNA........
Odeljenje zastite naroda
SAWPY.......
Socijalisticki cavez radnog naroda
Jugoslavije
SDB
Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti............
SOJ..........
Savez omladine Jugoslavije...........
SSJ...........
Savez sludenata Jugoslavije...........
UDB (UDBa)..
Uprava drzavne bezbednosii...........
ENGLISH
Confederation of Trade Unions of
Yugoslavia
Federal Executive Council
Yugoslav Airlines
Yugoslav People's Army
Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia
Counterintelligence Service
League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Department for the Protection of the
Nation
Socialist Alliance of Working People of
Yugoslavia
State Security Service
Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia
Federation of Students of Yugoslavia
Administration for State Security
Places and features referred to in this Chapter (U /OU)
COORDINATES
o IN. E.
Adriatic Sea (sea) 43 00 16 00
Belgrade 44 50 20 30
Bosnia region 44 00 18 00
Dalmatia (region) 43 00 17 00
Dubrovnik 42 39 18 07
Hercegovina (region) 43 00 17 50
Istria peninsula 45 00 14 00
Kakanj 44 08 IS 05
Kovacica 45 06 20 38
Ljubljana 46 03 14 31
Maribor 46 33 15 39
NR 43 19 21 54
Novi Sad 45 15 19 50
Osijek 45 33 18 42
Pri3tina 42 40 21 10
Rijeka 45 21 14 24
Sarajevo 43 50 18 25
Skopje 42 00 21 29
Split 43 31 16 26
Thessaloniki, Greece 40 38 22 56
Zadar 44 07 15 15
Zagreb 45 48 16 00
SECRET
SECRET
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