NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 20; ALBANIA; GENERAL SURVEY

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110034-6
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 141
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

Albania
GENERA! SURVEY
AUGUST 1971
,.SECRET.NO FORE /6N DSSEM
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TABLE OF CON'TENT'S
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
June 1987, copies of which should be destroyed.
Page
Glossary
xi
Chronology
xii
Albania: Maverick in the Communist World
1
Land and People
3
A. Background
3
Interaction of geography and history in fostering personal self sufficiency and
independence, as well as distrust for outsiders, nonlocal compatriots together
with foreigners; the Communists' socioeconomic revolution: the beginnings of
modernization and industry through compulsion.
B. Geography
3
Location and extent of the country, contrast of rugged terrain of hinterland
with relatively smaller coastal plain, prevalence of Mediterranean climate;
natural resources, agricultural production, basic industries; characteristics of
territorial waters.
C Population
5
I 1. Size, composition, and distribution
5
Population figures, essentially homogeneous nature, varying density, heavy
viral concentration, migration to coastal lowlands.
2. Vital statistics
5
Rapid population growth, high infant mortality.
3. Composition by age and sex
6
Low median age, unusually high male to female ration, high marriage and
low divorce rates.
4. Population policies and trends
7
Encouragement of high birth rate, prohibition on emigration, stemming
of movement to urban centers.
D. Structure and characteristics of the society
8
1. Ethnic composition and languages
8
Albanians as descendants of Illyrian, preponderance of ethnic Albanians,
deemphasis of minority distinctions; prevalence of Geg and official Tosk
among Albanian dialects, Greek as single important minority language, little
local knowledge of foreign languages.
2. Social structure
10
Traditional tribal relationships in highlands and feudal overlord- peasant
relationships in coastal areas, Muslim aristocratic overlay during Ottoman era,
King Zog's control through local leaders, Communist grip through liquidation
and replacement of family heads and tribal leaders; vertical social mobility;
three -tiered class structure with Communist elite at top, bureaucracy, pro-
fessionals, and artisans in middle, and peasants and industrial workers at
bottom.
3. Family ties and traditions
11
Pahiarchal family and customary law as traditional bases of society, con-
timing influence of clan mentality in Communist party organization.
4. National attitudes
12
Clash between traditional nationalistic individual independence and foreign
bom centrally authoritarian commuaism; Yugoslavia and Greece as hereditary
enemies.
SECnEr
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
i
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E. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor relations
13
1. Size and characteristics of the labor force
13
Statistics on sin, growth, and sex composition of working population; dis-
tribution among economic sectors; underemployment; controls over labor
mobility; manpower shortages; skills and qualification of workers, vocational
training and educational levels of workers.
2. Productivity and working conditions
18
Indifference of labor force as cause of low productivity; legal regulations on
hours, safety, worker benefits, pay; "voluntar/' campaigns.
3. Labor relations and legislation
17
Trade unions as an arm of Communist party; legislative regulation of workers;
managr�.nent as a party government function.
F. Health and welfare
18
1. Principal diseases
18
Highest tuberculosis mortality rate in Europe; claimed elimination or re-
duction of venereal diseases, malaria, dysentery, and typhoid fever.
2. Medical facilities
18
Inadequate numbers of personnel and facilities despite dramatic increases,
disparity between urban and rural care.
3 Sanitation
19
Generally inadequate water supply, waste disposal, and food handling
practices.
4. Levels of living
20
Lowest dietary level in Europe, pressing housing problem, scarcity of
consumer items.
5. Social welfare programs
20
State social insurance, health, family assistance, education and culture; eol-
lective farm funds.
8. Social problems
23
Tension between regime and populace, juvenile delinquency, theft of state
property, prostitution.
G. Religion
23
Influence of Christianity and ascendancy of Islam; Communists' efforts to
reduce, then eliminate, public religious practices.
11. Education
25
L: Summary and background
25
Efforts of Communist regime to reduce illiteracy, improve accessibility and
quality of education, provide pool of trained workers; pre Communist system
and role of foreign supported schools; influence of Soviet model; numbers
of schools and their enrollment; shortages of teachers and classrooms; party
and state controls; 1970 reform's emphasis on polytechnical and military
training.
2. Educational system
28
Four -stage preschool, general, secondary, and higher education system; cur-
riculum content, part-time schools for workers; Albanians studying abroad.
I. Artistic and cultural expression
30
Traditional indigenous mountain folklore and stirring of national culture; theater,
music, painting, and sculpture; cultural expression as tool of Communists.
J. Public information
33
Information media as means of control; principal newspapers, the Albanian
Telegraph Agency; Radio Tirane s central position in radiobroadcasting limited
TV exposure; films, libraries, museums.
K. Suggestions for further reading 34
1. General works 34
2. Basic reference works 34
ii
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Government and Politics
35
A. Summary and background
35
Protracted emergence as nation- state, Yugoslav and Greek irridentist claims, in-
effective central government; Italian occupation and Communists as most
effective in resistance; successive Yugoslav, Soviet, and Chinese Communist
44
tutelage; Albanians' acquiescence to most oppressive regime in Europe.
B. Structure and .functioning of the government
36
1. Constitution
36
Legitimisation of Communist created institutions patterned after those of
Soviet Union; popular apathy toward governmental processes; perpetuation
of Ojn -dnant role of Communist party and subordination of all individual
46
rights to public interest.
2. Structure of the government
38
Government agencies as executive and administrative bodies of the Com-
46
munist party; unitary government, with regional and local administrations
merely adjuncts of central regime.
47
a. Council of Ministers
38
Organ for implementing party decisions; composition and scope of
responsibility.
b. Presidium of the People's Assembly
40
Primary instrument for enactment of legislation; judicial and executive
48
functions.
e. Peoples Assembly
41
Body with largely theoretical functions only.
d. judiciary
41
Defender of the Communist regime; Supreme Court, district courts, and
village, city, and city district courts; Prosecutor General, district prosecu-
tors, peoples prosecutors.
e. Legal codes and judicial procedures
42
"Protection of the socialist state definitions of crimes, penalties; legal
procedures.
f. Local government
42
Peoples councils with virtually all- inclusive responsibility in their ter-
ritorial domain.
C. Political dynamics 43
1. Party history
43
Yugoslav directed consolidation of Communist control over resistance to
Italian and German occupation; Albanian Communist Party as branch of
Yugoslav party; Albanian Workers Party and ascendancy of Hoxha.
2. Party organization
44
Selection of officials by top leadership for automatic approval by member-
ship; territorial organization paralleling government administration.
a. Natior:al level
45
Party Congress; Central Committee, Politburo of Cenral Committee as
real locus of power, Secretariat.
b. Local levels
46
Responsibility to central apparatus; guide to and regulator of local
governments.
c. Membership
46
Eligibility, numbers, qualifications.
3. Mass organizations
47
Propaganda instruments for political control; Democratic Front of Albania,
Union of Working Youth of Albania, pioneer organizations, Central Council
of Trade Unions, Union of Albanian Women, Society for Aid to the Army
and Defense, Committee of Albanian War Veterans.
4. Electoral procedures
48
Device for gaining apparent popular endorsement of regime; automatic
approval of regime candidates.
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D. National policies 48
1. Summary and background
48
Influence of Albania's small size, economic underdevelopment, and geo-
graphic isolation on both foreign and domestic policies.
2 Domestic
48
Continuing consolidation of Communists' central political and economic
control; stability of ruling elite, control over every facet of society, post-
1966 "cultural revolution" and efforts to harness national consciousness and
popular support for socialist modernization; steady economic progress under
Communists, dependence on foreign aid, predominance of agriculture, rudi-
mentary industry; education.
3 Foreign
51
Heavy reliance on foreign sponsors to protect territorial integrity and
maintain independence; gradual emergence from isolation beginning in mid-
1960's; official reverence for Stalin, evolution of Albanian relations with for
eign countries; absence of diplomatic relations with United States.
4 Defense
55
Dependence successively on Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Communist
China for guarantees of integrity; armed forces strengths and budget;
civil defense.
E. Propaganda programs
58
1. Organization, purpose, and control
56
All- pervasive propaganda mechanism under party Central Committee's Direc-
torate of Agi ration and Propaganda; no forum for dissent.
2. Domestic propaganda
56
Promotion of a Communist society and regime programs, limitations on
effectiveness, apathetic attitude of populace; press, radio films, and public
lectures as media.
3: Foreign propaganda
57
Presentation of foreign policy views; press, radio, missions abroad, pro-
Albanian organizations, publications as media.
4. Propaganda directed from abroad
57
Radiobroadcasting from the Soviet Union and Yugoa',tvia, from the United
States, the Vatican, Italy, Monaco.
F. Subversion
58
Occasional internal dissidence; clandestine activity by U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia,
Greece.
1. Internal subversion
58
Continuing passive unorganized resistance by all classes; disaffection among
peasants, workers, younger intellectuals, armed :orces.
2. Subversion from abroad
59
a. Greece
59
Declining influence of Greek irredentist agitation over northern Epirus.
b. Yugoslavia
59
Reduced infiltration of Yugoslav agents.
c. U. S. S. R
60
Disclosure of 1960 Soviet attempt to overthrow Hoxha; Soviet economic
pressure.
G. Police and intelligence services 60
Responsibility of Ministry of Internal Affairs for public order and suppressing
opposition; strengths of po1=2e and security forces.
1. Police system 61
Functions and organization; effectiveness.
2. Security and foreign intelligence 61
Directorate of State Security (Sigurimi) responsibility for ir.' eenal security
and foreign intelligent secondary rule of Ministry of People's Defense.
3. Penal system 62
Administration of penal institutions by Ministry of Internal Affairs, prisoner:'
obligation to work, possibility of parole.
H. Suggestions for further reading 62
iv
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The E'conor.
63
A Summary and background
63
1. Introduction
63
Traditional peasant economy, predominance of agriculture; natural resources,
including hydroelectric potential; rapidly growing but still meager industry;
low level of economic development and dependence on imports.
2. Growth and structure of the economy
64
Steady growth of both industry and agriculture.
a. Industry
65
Production of foods, textiles, timber, construction materials, petroleum
products; increasing employment and productivity.
b. Agriculture
65
Production of grain, root crops, tobacco; increased size of cultivated area
and use of fertilizers; sheep and goats.
c. Foreign trade
65
Dependence on imports for capital goods and foodstuffs, reliance on
foreign credit; displacement of U.S.S.R. by Communist China as principal
trading partner; major imports and exports.
B. Sectors of the economy
66
1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
66
a. Agricultural production
66
Unfavorable natural conditions and primitive practices as limitations on
output; statistics on production and distribution.
b. Agricultural problems and policies
68
Low level of technology, insufficient industrial input; benefits from greater
use of fertilizer; increased state control through collectivization, regula-
tion of worker mobility and work norms, required farm work by profes-
sionals and military.
c. Forestry, timber processing, fishing
69
Significance of forests, important share of timber processing in industrial
I output, poorly developed fishing industry.
2. Fuels and power
69
Crude oil as primary source of energy, pipelines, self sufficiency in solid fuels,
plans for increasing relatively unexploited hydroelectric potent'al.
3. Minerals and metals
71
Chromium and iron nickel ores as major export:; single small steel rolling
mill, ambitious but dubious plans for steel industry; copper industry, Commu-
nist China's role in development.
4. Construction materials
72
Approach to self- sufficiency, data on output, Communist China's assistance.
5. Manufactured goods
72
Predominantly food processing and light industry.
a. Agricultural processing
72
Increasing factory production, continuing hand and small-shop operations;
tobacco and tobacco products as leading products.
b. Light industry
73
Provision of most simple needs by growing textile and clothing industries;
rubber, paper and paper products; Communist China's assistance.
c. Machinery and equipment
74
Production of spare parts and simple machinery.
d. Chemicals
74
Utilization of natural resources, reduction of fertilizer imports, Communist
China's assistance.
6. Construction
74
Growth and distribution of funds among sector: of economy.
C. Economic institutions and policies 74
1. Economic institutions 74
Close state control through socialization and centralized planning, economic
organization, reforms to eliminate inefficiency and waste.
V
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I Economic policy and plans
a. Planning and administration
75
Goats of rapid industrialization, self ::efficiency in grain, increased state
control, and freedom from foreign interference; emphasis on extractive
and electric power industries; rates of growth and effectiveness of plan-
ning; foreign assistance from U.S.S.R. and then Communist China.
b Finance I..........
77
State control through Ministry of Fftwoe s authority in economic planning
and comprehensive financial management, banking institutions, budgets.
3. Factors in economic development
78
Obstacles �low level of income and savings, rapid population growth, limited
area of arable land, small market, unskilled labor force; Assets reservoir of
labor, favorable climate, good mineral resources, hydroelectric potential.
D Trade
80
1 Domenic
80
Noncommercial nature of production and marketing, state planning and
allocating of goods.
2 Foreign
80
a. Development of foreign trade
80
Dependence on imports for sustenance and development, reliance on for-
eign credit; Communist China as major trading partner.
b. Organization and control of foreign trade
81
State control of trade enterprises and organs; divorce of foreign trade and
domestic v,aces.
e. Geographic distribution of foreign trade
81
1981 shift from U.S.S.R. to Communist China as major trade partner,
continuing trade with East European countries except U.S.S.R., growing
trade with non Communist world.
d. Commodity composition of foreign trade
82
(1) Imports
82
Machinery and equipment, wheat, rolled steel, chemical fertilizers.
(2) Exports
83
Chromium and iron nickel ores, crude oil and refined asphalt, tobacco
and cigarettes.
e. Balance of trade
86
Chronic large anus: deficits financed by U.S.S.R. and Eastern European
countries prior to 1961 and by Communist China since.
Transportation and Telecommunications
87
A. Summary
87
Bare sufficiency in meeting limited needs of agricultural economy; concentra-
tion of transport facilities in south central coastal area; road network as primary
means of transportation.
B Railroads
87
Miler ge and technical characteristics of four lines.
C Highways
89
Most important mode of surface transportation; principal characteristics and ad-
ministration of system; dependence on imports for all vehicles.
D. Inland waterways
90
Four navigable waterways at border:; local, primarily passenger traffic.
E Ports
90
Location of four significant ports; shipping, harbor, and berthing characteristics.
F. Merchant marine
91
Types and tonnage of fleet elements; administration and services.
G Civil air
92
Military- government domestic service only; dependence on foreign carriers,
both Communist and ,non Communist, for international service.
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H. Airfields 93
Predominantly military- oriented air facilities; post -1985 improvements; charac-
teristics of operational airfields.
I. Telecommunications 93
Government ownership and operation, limited service to public; location and
characteristics of telephone, telegraph, radiobroadcast, and TV facilities; inter-
national services; heavy dependence on foreign equipment.
Military Factors 97
A. Military geography
97
1. Location and description
97
Small country on southeast shores of Adriatic Sea.
a Topography
97
Predominantly hills and mountains inland, plains along seacoast; scattered
settlement.
b Climate
97
Mediterranean -type; seasonal variations in temperature, humidity, pre-
cipitation, cloudiness and storms, winds.
2. Military geographic regions
97
Affect of environmental conditions on operations by conventional or irregular
forms for each of the following regions:
a. Wes'ern Lowland
100
b. Albaidan Highlands
101
3. Strategic areas
102
Analysis of the site, ;population, key transportation and industrial facilities,
military installations, and petroleum storage for each of the following areas:
a. Tirane Dunes
102
b. 'lore-Ishulli i Sazanit
102
c. Other significant urban areas
102
Shkoder....................
102
Korge......................
102
Elbasan....................
102
4. Internal routes
104
Terrain, road, and railroad characteristics and offroad dispersal and cross
country movement potentials along land routes to and between strategic
areas.
5. Approaches
104
Lengths, legal status, and physical features of Albania's land and water
boundaries.
a Land
104
Approach conditions by road and effect of terrain on offroad dispersal and
cross- country movement.
b Sea
104
Conditions of offshore approach to mainland and Ishulli i Sazanit, data
on most suitable amphibious landing areas.
c Air
107
Four air approaches, terrain and likely weather conditions en route.
B. Strategic mobility
109
General inadequacy of transportation and telecom systems in sustaining signifi-
cant military operations; support potential of merchant fleet; general military
adequacy of air facilities system.
C. Armed forces
109
1. Defense establishment
109
Summary data on components, their strengths, and their missions.
a. Historical
109
Background from which evolved Army of National Liberation; shift from
Soviet tutelage to Communist Chinese; development of the navy and air
force.
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b. Defense organization 110
Control by Communist party through Council of Ministers on Soviet pat-
tern, the General Staff and operational and support directorates.
c. Military manpower and morale 111
(1) Manpower 111
Breakdown of male population by age group and fitness; terms of
service and qualities of personnel.
(2) Morale 112
Generally only fair morale because of poor conditions of service life.
d. Reserve and mobilization 112
Compulsory reserve officers' school for all fit male university students
not entering armed forces; close organization and training of reserve units;
strengths and capability of rapid mobilization.
e. Strength trends 112
Varying strengths of components up to 1960, relative stability since 1962.
f. Training 113
Failure to develop ;high level of proficiency under either Soviets or Com-
munist Chinese.
g. Economic support and military budget 113
(1) Economic support 113
Dependence on foreign supply; augmentation of Soviet materiel by
Communist Chinese.
(2) Military budget 113
Announced annual.defense` budgets 1965 -69.
h Logistics 113
Communist China as source of procurement, bases of supply and control
WPM; limited maintenance capacity.
2. Ground forces 114
General description and capability.
a Organization 114
Lines of control and types of equipment.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 114
Numbers of officers and enlisted men and unit strengths; territorial de-
ployment of units.
c. Training ............................115
Description of training cycle.
d. Logistics ............115
Location of storage areas; sources of equipment by type.
3 Naval forces ............................115
General description, mission, and capability.
a. Organization ..............115
Dual role of senior officer; command structure.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 115
Numbers of officers and enlisted men and their allocation by type of
duty; locations of facilities and craft; Maritime Frontier Guard.
c Training 117
Training sites and nature and duration of training.
d. Logistics 117
Description of support capacity and dependence on foreign facilities.
4. Air and air defense forces 117
Type of units and their capabilities; dependence on Communist Chinese
supply.
a. Organization 118
Line of control.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 118
Numbers of personnel and their allocation among types of units; inventories
of aircraft and missiles.
c. Training 118
Training sites and type of training; premilitary training.
d. Logistics 119
Centralized system on Soviet pattern; dependence on Communist East
European countries other than U.S.S.R. and on Communist China for spare
parts and major maintenance facilities.
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5. Militarized security forces 119
Reliability and effectiveness; availability in wartime..
a. Frontier troops 119
Ministry of Internal Affairs control; strength and responsibility.
b. Interior troops 119
Ministry of Internal Affairs control; strength and function.
ArecBrief ............................120
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1
Population and population density, Albania and selected
countries (chart)
5
Fig. 2
Population distribution by administrative division (table)
6
Fig. 3
Vital rates, Albania and selected countries, 1968 chart)
7
Fig. 4
Infant mortality, Albania and Eastern Europe (chart)
8
Fig. 5
Age -sex distribution, Albania and the United States (chart)
8
Fig. 6
Population by major age groups, projection for January 1969 chart)
9
Fig. 7
Births, deaths, marriages per 1,000 population, 1938 -68 (chart)
9
Fig. 8
Ethnic types (photos)
10
Fig. 9
Lingering traditional dress in three principal cities photo)
12
Fig. 10
Agricultural and nonagricultural distribution of labor force chart)
13
Fig. 11
Distribution of employees in nonagricultural sectors table)
14
Fig. 12
Nonagricultural labor force by sex, 1967 (table)
14
Fig. 13
Students working on Elbasan Prenjas railroad (photo)
15
Fig. 14
Children at public water faucet in Berat photo)
19
Fig. 15
Market place in Durres (photo) I...........
20
Fig. 16
Rural and urban housing (photos)
21
Fig. 17
Stalin Avenue, Tirane (photo)
21
Fig. 18
Levels of living in selected world countries chart)
22
Fig. 19
Former houses of worship; today's `historic mo mments" photos)
25
Fig. 20
Numbers of teachers and ;students at all levels chart)
27
Fig. 21
Educational system chart
29
Fig. 22
Students in higher edicational courses (table)
30
Fig. 23
Palace of Culture, Berat photo)
32
Fig. 24
Principal newspapers and periodicals (table)
34
Fig. 25
Party control of governmental structure chart)
39
Fig. 26
Mehmet Shehu photo)
40
Fig. 27
Haxhi Lleshi photo)
40
Fig. 28
Enver Hoxha (photo)
44
Fig. 29
Structure of Albanian Workers Party (chart)
44
Fig. 30
Politburo and Secretariat members in government and mass
organizations (chart)
45
Fig. 31
Albania's population and border problems map)
54
Fig. 32
Weekly foreign broadcast schedule (chart)
57
Fig. 33
Organization of intelligence and security services (chart)
62
Fig. 34
Comparative economic indicators table)
64
Fig. 35
Strategic supply position table)
64
Fig. 36
Economic growth (chart)
65
Fig. 37
Harvesting grain on a cooperative farm photo)
66
Fig. 38
Land use (chart)
66
Fig. 39
Production and yields of principal crops (table)
67
Fig. 40
Numbers of livestock table)
67
Fig. 41
Production of fuels (table)
70
Fig. 42
Selected pipelines (table)
70
Fig. 43
Production of metals (table)
71
'Fig. 44
Agricultural processing and light industrial production table)
73
tr
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Fig. 45
Growth and structure of gross fixed investment (chart)
79
Fig: 46
Distribution of gross fixed investment (chart)
80
Fig. 47
Growth of foreign trade chart)
81
Fig. 48
Geographic distribution of foreign trade chart)
82
Fig. 49
Value of foreign trade by geographic area (table)
83
Fig. 50
Imports of selected commodities table)
84
Fig- 51
Exports of selected commodities table)
85
Fig. 52
Volunteers building rail line photo)
88
Fig, 53
Diesel- electric locomotive (photo)
88
Fig. 54
Gravel- surfaced two -lane road photo)
89
Fig. 55
Road- building brigade (photo)
90
Fig. 56
Port of Durres (photo)
91
Fig. 57
Major ports (table)
92
Fig. 58
Selected airfields table)
94
Fig. 59
Principal telecom facilities map)
95
Fig. 60
Characteristics of the climate chart
98
Fig. 61
Military geographic regions and terrain map)
99
Fig. 62
Coastal terrain in the Tirane- Durres strategic area (photo)
100
Fig. 83
Mountains in southern Albania (photo)
101
Fig. 64
The Mat river valley in northern Albania photo)
101
Fig.. 65
Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches map)
103
Fig. 68
Tirane- Durres strategic area map)
104
Fig. 67
Vloredshulli i'Sazanit strategic area map)
104
Fig. 68
Internal routes (table)
105
Fig. 69
Boundaries (table)
107
Fig. 70
View southeast across Lake Ohrid (p: oto)
107
Fig. 71
Land approaches table)
108
Fig. 72
Landing area southeast of Durres (photo)
108
Fig. 73
Armed forces high command (chart)
111
Fig. 74
Personnel strengths (table)
113
Fig. 75
Military budgets (table)
114
Fig. 76
Chinese -built 107 -mm rocket launcher on Bj 212 vehicle photo)
x16
Fig. 77
Chinese -built tracked armored personnel carrier photo)
116
Fig. 78
Chinese hydrofoil motor torpedo boat under construction photo)
117
Fig. 79
Summary Map follows
120
This General Survey. was prepared for the NIS under the
general direction of the NIS Committee. The military geography,
transportation and telecommunications, and armed forces coverage
was prepared under the general supervision of the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the introductory material and the sociological,
political, and economic coverage were prepared under the general
supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. A scientific dis-
cussion was not prepared in view of the relatively limited develop-
ment of science and technology 'in the country. Research was
substantially completed by March 1971.
The NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook provides semiannual
updating of basic data of the type appearing in the Area Brief
of this General Survey. A listing of all NIS units dealing with this
and other areas is in the CIA prepared Inventory of Available NIS
Publications, issued quarterly and also bound into the concurrent
Factbook
Z
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Id
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GLOSSARY MOM
AswAWMTioN
ALBAMAx
Eats m
ATA
Agknia Telegralike Showtare
Albanian Telegraph Agency
BRPSh
Boahkimi i Rinise se Puna se Shgiperise
Union of Working Youth of Albania
NLM
Lani:* National Chrbntar
National Liberation Movement
PPSH
Partia E Punta E Shgiperise
Albanian Workers Party
I
Bash kimet Profnknale ig Shgiperise
Central Council of Trade Unions
Sigoirimt
Directorate of State Security
BaUi Kornbefar
National Front
Shogerira per Ndihme td Ushtrise dhe
Society for Aid to the Army and
Mbrojtlea
Defense
Komifeti i PIw* W Shf ft
State Planning Committee
Bashkimi i Grave to Shgiperise
Union of Albanian Women
Id
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1385 -1912 Albania is under Turkish suzerainty.
1444 -1468
Skanderbeg leads resistance against Ottoman rule.
1878 -1881
Albanian leaders form Albanian League for the Defense of
the Rights of the Albanian Nation (League of Yrimen) to
promote Albania's interests at the Congress of Berlin. The
league strongly influences Albanian political thought and
revolutionary activity for the next several decades.
1908
Conggess of Monastir (Bitolj) adopts standardized Latin
alphabet.
1912
National assembly of notables at Vlore on 28 November
proclaims the independence of Albania from Turkish rul,3
and establishes provisional government.
1913
Treaty of London accords international recognition to uni-
lateral Albanian action. Deliberations conclude on 30 May
with the appointment of an international commission to
determine Albania's boundaries.
1914 -1918
World War I� Albania is occupied by Serbians and Greeks,
later by Austro- Hungarian and Italian troops.
1918 -1920
New national assembly, elected on still very limited suffrage,
has to elicit international support to eject Yugoslays from
the north and Italians from the. south, both having re-
entered Albania after the defeat of the Central Powers.
Italians do not leave Vlore until September 1920.
1920 August
U.S. President Wilson vetoes plan to partition Albania
between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy.
1920 December
Albania is admitted to the League of Nations.
1921 November
Conference of Ambassadors redesignates frontiers of 1913�
with some slight further concessions to Yugoslavia. �as
national boundaries of Albania.
1921 -1925
Period of unstable governments� certain Western political
institutions are introduced, but political life centers on
two personalities Ahmet Zogu and Bishop Fan S. Noli.
1925 January
Ahmet Zogu becomes President of Albanian Republic after
staging coup against Fan Noli government.
1928 September
President Zogu proclaims Albania a monarchy with himself
as King Zog.
1933 -1939
King Zog tries to resist mounting Italian influences while
enforcing modernization. Policies lead to several confronta-
tions with Italy, with the Albanians inevitably backing
down.
1939 April
Italians land army which after some fighting quickly over-
runs the whole country. King Zog flees and Albanian
Constituent Assembly votes personal union with Italy
and King Victor Emmanuel accepts the Albanian crown.
xli
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1941 November
Albanian Communist Party is formed under auspices of
Yugoslav Communist emissaries.
1944 November
Communist- dominated National Liberation Movement (NLM)
installs itself in Tirane as the government of Albania, with
Enver Hoxha as Premier.
1946 March
New constitution, patterned on that of Yugoslavia, estab-
lishes People's Republic; collectivization begins.
1948 July
Albania breaks with Yugoslavia and becomes a Soviet
satellite.
November
First Albanian Workers Party Congress is held as Communists
rename their party and purge pro Yugoslav elements.
1949 February
Albania becomes member of Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance.
1952 March
Second Congress of the Albanian Workers Party is held.
1954 July
Hoxha resigns as Premier, retaining his position as First Sec
retary of the party; Moscow trained Mehmet Shehu
becomes Premier.
1955 May
Albania signs Warsaw Pact.
December
Albania is admitted to the United Nations.
1958 May
Third Congress of the Albanian Workers Party takes place.
1980 June
Hysni Kapo leads Albanian delegation to Romanian Com-
munist Party Congress and conference of Communist bloc
leaders. Kapo's speech to congress fails to praise Khrushchev
and follows the line taken by Chinese delegate. Albania
is only European Communist country not represented by
its party leader.
September
Albania announces purge of leading pro Soviet party members
Lid Belishova and Koco Tashko.
November
Hoxha denounces Khrushchev at Moscow conference of 81
Communist and Workers Parties. Hoxha and Shehu walk
out of conference.
1961 February
Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party� Hoxha
discloses attempt to overthrow regime in summer of 1960.
April
Albania and Communist China sign long -tern trade and
aid agreement under which China grants Albania US$125
million in credit.
May
Ten conspirators are tried and found guilty of assisting U.S.,
Greek, and Yugoslav intelligence services and of planning
to overthow Emilia regime in summer of 1960.
October
Twenty- second Soviet Party Congress is held in Moscow.
Soviet and Eastern European leaders publicly denounce
Albania's leaders and policies. Chou En -lai publicly rebukes
Khrushchev for bringing the dispute with Albania into
the open. Albania is not represented at the congress.
December
Soviets announce decision to suspend diplomatic relations
with Albania.
1963- December-
Chinese Premier Chou En -lai leads visiting delegation to
1964 January
Albania.
1964 February
Albanians seize Soviet Embassy building in Tirane.
:iii
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1981, Tirane formally withdraws from pact followmg Soviet
occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November Albania and Communist China sign trade and aid agreement
but do not announce amount.
1989 April Article in party daily Zeri i PopuUit pledges Albanian support
to Yugoslavia and Romania in the event of Soviet aggres-
sion, contrasting sharply with previous 20 years of vitupera-
tion against neighboring Yugoslavia.
December Tirane State University and Albanian language University
of Pri3tina in Yugoslavia enter cooperation agreement.
1970 Starting to move from self imposed isolation, between April
and November Albania concludes agreements providing for
diplomatic recognition with six countries.
May Hoxha's landmark speech declares Albania's favoring "con-
stant improvement" of relations with Yugoslavia.
October Communist China and Albania sign 1971 -75 trade and aid
agreement without disclosing amounts.
3dv
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1988 March
.18th Plenum of Central Committee calls for reorganization
of party and state apparatus at center and local levels.
Radio Tirane broadcasts an Open Letter from the party to
the populace containing the plenum's instructions for the
elimination of bureaucracy and '"bourgeois influences."
Political commissars are reintroduced into armed forces.
Post of First Deputy Premiar is abolished, and the number
of ministers is reduced.
May
Military rank Warmed forces is abolished.
November
Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party convenes.
1987 February
Hoxha launches campaign attacking 'bureaucracy," initiates
abolition of all religious institutions, and starts campaign
for emancipation of women. Campaigns involve controlled
use of young people and employment of wJI posters.
November
Decree abolishes statutes on religion and formal religion in
effect becomes illegal. Propaganda touts Albania as world's
first atheist state."
1988 September
Having been an inactive member of the Warsaw Pact since
1981, Tirane formally withdraws from pact followmg Soviet
occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November Albania and Communist China sign trade and aid agreement
but do not announce amount.
1989 April Article in party daily Zeri i PopuUit pledges Albanian support
to Yugoslavia and Romania in the event of Soviet aggres-
sion, contrasting sharply with previous 20 years of vitupera-
tion against neighboring Yugoslavia.
December Tirane State University and Albanian language University
of Pri3tina in Yugoslavia enter cooperation agreement.
1970 Starting to move from self imposed isolation, between April
and November Albania concludes agreements providing for
diplomatic recognition with six countries.
May Hoxha's landmark speech declares Albania's favoring "con-
stant improvement" of relations with Yugoslavia.
October Communist China and Albania sign 1971 -75 trade and aid
agreement without disclosing amounts.
3dv
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Albania: Maverick in the Communist World (C)
The most backward and impoverished nation in
Europe, Albania has only recently begun to make
tentative moves to end a quarter century of isolation.
During most of this period the regime of Communist
party boss Enver Floxha has been preoccupied with
maintaining Albania's independence against the threat
to national existence posed recurringly by more powerful
neighbors and the pressures engendered by the open
ideological warfare within the Communist camp. The
Communist leadership has achieved its limited scope for
independent action only by means of radical shifts in
alliances which have reflected a timely exploitation of the
varied cracks and splits in the Communist world.
Throughout its 2,000 -year history, Albania has been
overrun by warring armies, the Turks alone occupying
the country for more than half a millennium �from 1389
to 1912. Despite the resulting strong streak of xenophobia
and fierce nationalism in its inhabitants, the Communist
regime has constantly had to seek support from more
powerful states to enable the nation of some 2 million
people to survive. Immediately after World War 11 the
Hoxha regime had no choice but to accept Yugoslav
hegerony, but following Tito's rupture with Moscow in
1948 Hoxha threw his support to the more distant Soviet
Union in order to break the now suffocating Yugoslav
embrace and to guarantee the economic assistance
necessary for survival. The orthodox Stalinist Albanian
party leaders, however, shortly thereafter became
apprehensive about the implications for themselves of
Khrushchev's repudiation of the Stalinist system of rule,
as well as over new Soviet efforts at domination. The two
countries finally broke relations in 1961 after Khrushchev
attempted to organize a coup in Tirane.
The Albanian regime then decided that its only hope
for national survival lay in strengthening ties with
Communist China, which itself had caused such
consternation in the Communist world by opposing the
U.S.S.R. at two major Communist conferences in 1960.
From the Albanian point of view this is tan ideal
arrangement. The Chinese Communists are not a
military or political threat to the regime, their rigid
ideology is compatible with that of Albania's leaders,
and, as long as Chinese economic and military aid is
forthcoming, Albania can afford to pay for it in political
terms by harassing the U.S.S.R. and its anti Chinese
allies. Since 1969, Albania has also been gradually
improving relations with various neighboring states
even longstanding foes like Greece and Yugoslavia, but it
apparently is not ready to take steps to seek resumed ties
with such major powers as the United States and the
United Kingdom, which were more than once involved in
attempted coups against the Communist regime.
As the direct threats to Albania's independence have
receded in recent years, the regime has turned to the
problem of transforming Albania from a backward, rural,
patriarchal society into a modern state with the
beginnings of an idustrial base. The country is run
absolutely by a small Communist elite, ostensibly with
Stalin's Russia as a model, but in fact drawing on many
repressive systems, inc:uding that of the Turks, and
substantial elements of Mao's zealot philosophy.
Albania's Communist leaders, many of whom received
their formal education and Marxist orientation in
Western European universities, had to start from scratch
to build a viable government. The country they took over
was organized around clans that had only limited contact
with each other or the government in Tirane. The
Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, and Roman Catholic
religions played a somewh,,i divisive and secondary role
in the feudally struc,ured society. Organized transpor-
tation and communications were poor anc. in many areas
virtually nonexistent. Education was restricted to a small
minority; there was virtually no industry, and
agriculture, the major source of income, was at the
subsistence level.
During the period of Communist rule, the power of the
clans has been broken and the importance of the family
in the fabric of society has declined. Women, long denied
the most elemental rights in the patriarchal tribes, are
now, at least in theory, equal to men. The formal practice
of religion has been banned, and instead there is official
insistence on a new form of worship: of nationalism, of
technological progress, and of the Communist system and
its rulers. Universal education has been stressed, and
illiteracy reportedly has been wiped out among those
under the age of 40. A pool of scientific and skilled
workers has been produced, but it is still far from
fulfilling requirements. Great strides have been made in
improving the state of public health, which as recently as
the interwar years ranked the lowest in Europe. The
incidence of disease has been greatly reduced, the death
rate has declined, and life expectancy has risen markedly.
The major source of national income changed from
agriculture to industry during the early 1960's, but
approximately two- thirds of the people were still living in
rural areas and more than half were engaged in
agriculture. "Socialization" of the economy was
completed in the late 1960's; nearly all of the agricultural
land has been collectivized. Albania, however, must still
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pie nx
import :food to feed its rapidly growing population. and coercion, which remain instruments of national
Economic 'planning ".and development are, rigidly policy. The Albanian Armed Forces, constituting a threat
r
coritro&& by the regime. Transportation and communi- to no one, are incapable even of maintaining a sustained
cations networks� -have been developed, .and the defense of the country; however, the country's leaders
completion of nationwide electrification was celebrated feel assured about Albania's continued national existence.
with great pomp'in,1970. and recently have sought more normal relations with
Albania's Communist leaders, so solidly entrenched their neighbors. Given Albania's present situation and
that it would probably require armed intervention to sufficient external support, the regime has a chance �if
dislodge them, have brought the country a long way into individual leaders continue to work together �to bring
the modem .world. They have frequently relied-on terror the country fully into the 20th century.
2
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Land and People
A. Background (U /OU)
Albania's proximity to the traditional sea routes of the
Adriatic and the Mediterranean has over the centuries
invited successive invasions by foreign powers seeking to
use it as a base from which to derive military or
commercial advantages in adjacent areas. Albania itself
has always been poor and largely devoid of natural
wealth; its hilly and mountainous hinterland constitutes
80% of the country and was until the mid -20th century
the abode of the majority of the population. The steep
mountain walls and the deep gorges cut by the numerous
westward flowing streams before they emerge onto the
coastal plain long impeded communications and cultural
integration among the small villages and towns in the
intermontane valleys and basins. Geography and history
thus fostered a society characterized by the strongly
independent and self- sufficient nature of its constituents
along with their distrust not only of foreigners but of
nonlocal compatriots as well. These factors also account
for the fact that Albania's recorded past has been until
recent years one of almost uninterrupted turmoil and
violence, replete with foreign conquests and exploitation
as well as interminable domestic blood feuds and
insurrections.
The Albanian people, now numbering just over 2
million, living in an area the size of Vermont, have
retained through the centuries a persistence bordering on
obstinacy, and their ethnic identity, linguistic base,
traditions, and customs have remained virtually
unchanged for about 2,000 years. The one important
cultural import was the Muslim religion, introduced by
the Turks during five centuries of rule beginning in 1385.
By making Albania an alien s aient in Christian Europe
during a period in which religious identity was of
overriding importance, Islam itself .helped to isolate the
peopie from the rest of Europe. At the time of the
Communist takeover in 1944 some 70% of the population
was Muslim.
The Communist regime has been unable to change
significantly the deeply ingrained customs and habits of
the majority of the population. The Communists did,
however, launch a socioeconomic revolution with the
objective of modernizing the country and molding the
people according to the concept of a Communist society
as determined by the Albanian Workers Party. The
regime has reshaped the educational and welfare systems,
the public information media, and the labor
organizations, and it attempted first to reorganize and
then, starting in 1967, to abolish the traditional Muslim
(70% of the population), Orthodox (20 and Roman
Catholic (10 religions. The regime is firmly committed
to industrializing the country, but existing industries are
for the most part rudimentary and have not yet had a
great impact on the essentially rural way of life. It has
only been since the completion of large drainage projects
in the coastal regions in the 1950's and -the subsequent
decline of malaria that substantial numbers of Albanians
have moved from the interior to the coastal plains and
begun to recognize the sea as a potential natural resource.
The Communist regime has yet to encourage the
development of large -scale fishing or other seafaring
activities.
Despite the country's favorable location in the highly
commercial Adriatic area of the Mediterranean, it is
unlikely that Albania's poorly developed resources will
supply products which could find ready markets in the
West without politically motivated concessions. The
large majority of the population continues to eke out a
livelihood on the land, although enforced collectivization
is slowly altering traditional ways. Except for the gradual
breaking down of the tight family structure in a few
urban areas, family life is still closely knit and seems
largely centered on assuring self sufficiency- in family
needs. The new drive in 1966 -69 to root out old and
backward habits, in addition to outlawing all public
religious worship, featured denunciations of the
traditional patriarchy.
The present regime probably has very little popular
support. Traditional values based on attachment u) the
land, respect for private property, strong family and local
tribal ties, and the Muslim religious orientation have
clashed directly with Communist ideology. Accustomed
for centuries to a peasant economy and semiautonomous
local government, Albanians resent the highly centralized
political authority and tightly controlled socialized
economy imposed upon them; the unpopular collectivi-
zation of agriculture and infringement of individual
freedom have caused widespread distaste for the
Communist system. It appears, however, that most
Albanians have resigned themselves to the Communist
regime, in part, perhaps, because of the effectiveness of
the o,nnipresent secret police.
B. Geography (U /OU)
Albania is a small, predominantly mountainous
country situated on the western side of the Balkan
Peninsula (Summary Map, Figure 79). It extends from
north to south about 215 miles and from west to east
3
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some 50 to 90 miles inland from the Adriatic Sea. The
southwestern coastline lies only 45 miles from the heel of
the Italian Peninsula, from which it is separated by the
Strait of Otranto. Most of Albania's border with
Yugoslavia to the north and east, and with Greece to the
east and south, lies in the mountainous areas. A coastal
lowland, although occupying only about ow-fifth of
Albania's territory, is the dominant economic and
political area of the country. In some places the
mountains rise sharply above the plains and hinder
movement into the interior. In oth, places fingers of
lowland extend quite far into the in.,.rior, especially in
the southern half of the country. From the earliest times
these lowlands have been used as routes into the interior
of the Balkan Peninsula.
In spite of Albania's small size, its climate varies
widely. The coastal plain is hot and dry in summer,
making irrigation necessary for agriculture. Winters are
mild and damp. The interior region has colder
temperatures in the winter because of its higher elevation
and its exposure to cold continental air masses. Interior
elevations receive more summer rainfall from thunder-
storms, but winter precipitation is still greater. The
Albanian mountains receive some of the heaviest
precipitation in Europe, as much as 100 inches annually
on the west- facing slopes. The northern interior receives
heavy snowfall in winter
The mountains of Albania are a southern extension of
Yugoslavia's Dinaric Alps and lie in northwest to
southwest ridges extending into Greece in the south.
Two large highland areas, the North Albanian Alps
which rise in the Yugoslav border area and the (;ermenik6
Highland which divides Albania in ho- north of the
Shkumbin river, interrupt the general trend of the interior
ranges. Both highlands are rugged, of difficult assess, and
sparsely populated, and they divert major rivers, the Drin
and the Shkumbin, from their general northwestward
courses to the southwest. The most rugged mountains in
Albania, the North Albanian Alps are a thick limestone
formation, deeply eroded by streams. Largely
unproductive, their lower slopes are heavily forested up to
about 6,000 feet and their alpine pastureland above the
tree line is devoted to raising sheep and goats; their
summits rise above 8,000 feet.
Sowh of the North Albanian Alps, three long parallel
mountain chains extend southeastward. Their inter-
mountain valleys generally contain a series of basins,
connected b narrow gorges and arranged steplike down
the length of the river valley. These basins contain most
of the Albanian highland population, which is
overwhelmingly agricultural.
The largest of these interior valleys is occupied by the
Drin i Zi river, Lake Ohrid, and the Plain of Korge. Both
ends of this valley lie in Albania, but the middle section is
in Yugoslavia. Lake Ohrid, in the southeast, occupies a
large high basin on the Albania- Yugoslavia border. Still
higher, and farther south, is the densely populated basin
called the Plain of Korge, which is about 25 miles long
and 6 miles wide.
In the southwest the high mountain ranges, generally
referred to as the southern coastal ranges, extend to the
4
Ionian Sea. Their valleys continue into corthern Greece.
With the e ception of the Drin and Delvine river basins,
the valleys are narrow.
Low sandstone and limestone hills mark the transition
between the interior mountains and the coastal lowland.
In some places this zone is narrow, and steep mountains
fall sharply to the coastal lowland. In other places, hills
that are extensions of the interior mountains continue to
the sea. The soils of the hill country are shallow, and their
natural vegetative cover consists of the low shrubs
characteristic of Mediterranean coasts. Areas of native
shrubs are gradually being replaced by olive and citrus
groves and vineyards.
The Albanian coastal 'owland is not continuous, being
interrupted in several places by low hills. At its widest
point the lowland extends 30 miles up the Shkumbin river
valley to Elbasan. Swift rivers rush down to the lowland
from the high mountain valleys, bringing sediment that is
deposited along the lower river courses, where deltas are
constantly building. The sediment clogs the channels,
causing riverbeds to shift and lagoons and marshes to
form behind coastal dunes. Stagnant water provides a
breeding place for mosquitos and makes much of the
coast a malaria zone. The soils adjacent to the river
channels are fertile, but severe annual flooding has
curtailed agricultural production.
Important mineral deposits are found in intrusive
geologic formations of the north. The largest deposits are
those of chromium, copper, iron, and nickel. Their full
exploitation is, however, handicapped by a poor
transportation network. In spite of this limitation,
Albania is the largest producer of chromium ore in
Eastern Europe. The important chromium deposits near
Bulgiz6 are the most accessible from the coast. They are
connected by road with the port of Durr6s. An important
copper mine and a copper smelter are located at Rubik in
the westernmost of the interior ranges. This area is also
connected by road with Durr6s. An iron nickel ore
mining area has been developed around Pogradec in east
central Albania. This area is located on the main road
along the Shkumbin river into the interior from Elbasan.
Fuels have been found in the sedimentary formations
of the southern basins. High quality lignite coal is mined
in the Korg6 and Vijose basins and at Krrabe, situated
between Tiran6 and Elbasan. Oil, gas, and bitumen
deposits are exploited in the river basins of the southern
lowland area.
The southern interior supports more agriculture and a
greater population than the north because the mountains
are not so rugged, the valleys are wider and more
accessible, and the climate is warmer. Lumbering is more
important in the north where the greater rainfall results in
richer forest stands. The Plain of Korg6, an important
agricultural area producing wheat, sugarbeets, apples,
and grapes, is an example of the wide, fertile southern
basin as contrasted to more northern downstream basins,
which are deeper, narrow, and less fertile. In the valley of
the Drin river, corn, tobacco, and dairy products are
produced. In the Delvin6 basin, on the southwestern
coast, and on the mountainsides overlooking the
southwestern seacoast, olive and citrus trees are
cultivated.
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The lowland contains the greatest concentration of
population. The people are traditionally and predom-
inantly farmers, but they are becoming more urbanized.
Tirand, the capital and largest city, is located about 17
miles inland on the higher ground of the transitional hill
country. Here industry is dominated by textiles and food
processing. Other important lowland cities are Durres
and Vlore, the main ports; Shkoder, a northern
agricultural center; Elbasan, an important lumbering
center; and Cerrik and Stalin, located southwest of
Elbasan, the sites of oil refineries based on the oilfields in
that area.
Beyond the coastline, Albania claims a 12- nautical-
mile zone of territorial wat ^r. Twelve miles are also
claimed for fishing. Most of this offshore territory lies at
depths shallower than 100 meters, where the coastal plain
continues submerged before dropping off into the
Adriatic trough. The exception to the shallow marginal
sea occurs along the southwestern coast, where the
mountains drop sharply to the sea, and depths at 12
nautical miles range from 500 to more than 1,000 meters.
C. Population (U /OU)
1. Size, composition, and distribution
The population of Albania on 2 October 1960, the date
of the most recent census, was 1,626, 315. By 1 January
1971 the population was estimated by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census to have reached 2,154,000, reflecting an
average annual growth rate of 2.8% �the highest in
Europe and one usually associated with the less
developed non European countries.
The population is essentially homogeneous �about
96% ethnic Albanian. The largest minority consists of
some 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Greeks (perhaps 3 with
Vlachs, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Gypsies making up the
remainder.
With an area of about 11,100 square miles, Albania is
estimated to have a population density of 194 persons per
square mile. It has one of the smaller populations of
Europe (Figure 1), although the population density is
rowuTaN POP{ILATION ociisrtr
MNINs.N hnMS
about average for the rugged Balkan a-.,a. Within
Albania, density varies greatly between regions
(Summary Map, Population and Administrative
Divisions inset, Figure 79). The densely settled west
central coastal districts of Durres, Kruj6, Lushnje, and
Fier, together with the most populous district of Tirane
averaged over 365 persons per square mile in 1968. The
three northern districts of Tropoj6, Puke, and Mirdite and
the southern district of Kolonj6, all marked by difficult
mountainous terrain and a relatively harsh climate, have
the lowest densities, ranging from 60 to 84 persons per
square mile.
Albania is the least urbanized country in Europe.
Before World War II about 80% of the population !ived
in rural areas, a proportion which, even by the optimistic
Albanian reporting practices, decreased to only 69% in
1960 (census) and 66.7% in January 1968. Regime claims
of an increase of some 13% in the urban population since
World War II must be treated with circumspection,
because official statistics classify as an urban area a
locality with a population of 400 or more. In fact,
virtually all communities of less than 1,000 residents are
little more than primitive agricultural villages; they offer
few, if any, of the amenities normally associated with
urban living. Population distribution by district and
rural -urban breakdown is shown in Figure 2. Only two
districts (Tirane and Durres) in 1968 officially recorded a
majority urban population, and seven districts
acknowledged at least a 90% rural population. The major
urban center is Tirane �the capital and largest city; its
population increased from 25,000 persons in 1938 to
about 170,000 in 1968. By early 1968 only three other
cities had a population of more than 50,000 persons
(Durres, 80,000; Vlore, 57,700; Korg6, 53,500).
Internal migration lias increased markedly since 1950,
stimulated by the "economic rationalization" of the
Communist regime. Much of this movement has been
from the highlands to the coastal lowlands. Thus, a
society which traditionally referred to its domain as the
"land of the eagles," and whose history has emphasized a
strong mountain psychology., is in the process of a basic
transformation. About 60% of the population now lives
in the lowland districts which face the Adriatic.
Improvements in health and sanitation have made the
previously malaria- stricken lowlands more hospitable to
agricultural and industrial development. The regime's
emphasis on rapid industrialization has encouraged large
numbers of peasants to leave the primitive, mountainous
rural areas for the new industrial centers along the coastal
plain.
2. Vital statistics
FIGURE 1. Population and population density, Albania
and selected countries, 1970 (U /OU)
Albania's rapid population growth stems entirely from
natural increase �a traditionary high birth rate and a
declining death rate. Statistical data released by the
regime reveal that the birth rate of 35.5 per 1,000
population in 1968 approximates the rate of 34.7
registered in 1938. During the 30 -year period, external
forces, such as war and deprivation, or official pronatalist
policies caused periodic fluctuation �from a probable
near low of 27 births per 1,000 in 1946 to about 43.5
births in 1955 and again in 1960. The death rate has
5
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Perim OW-111111M MIM
53.5
011
00 5
'352,
TwYq
1190
about average for the rugged Balkan a-.,a. Within
Albania, density varies greatly between regions
(Summary Map, Population and Administrative
Divisions inset, Figure 79). The densely settled west
central coastal districts of Durres, Kruj6, Lushnje, and
Fier, together with the most populous district of Tirane
averaged over 365 persons per square mile in 1968. The
three northern districts of Tropoj6, Puke, and Mirdite and
the southern district of Kolonj6, all marked by difficult
mountainous terrain and a relatively harsh climate, have
the lowest densities, ranging from 60 to 84 persons per
square mile.
Albania is the least urbanized country in Europe.
Before World War II about 80% of the population !ived
in rural areas, a proportion which, even by the optimistic
Albanian reporting practices, decreased to only 69% in
1960 (census) and 66.7% in January 1968. Regime claims
of an increase of some 13% in the urban population since
World War II must be treated with circumspection,
because official statistics classify as an urban area a
locality with a population of 400 or more. In fact,
virtually all communities of less than 1,000 residents are
little more than primitive agricultural villages; they offer
few, if any, of the amenities normally associated with
urban living. Population distribution by district and
rural -urban breakdown is shown in Figure 2. Only two
districts (Tirane and Durres) in 1968 officially recorded a
majority urban population, and seven districts
acknowledged at least a 90% rural population. The major
urban center is Tirane �the capital and largest city; its
population increased from 25,000 persons in 1938 to
about 170,000 in 1968. By early 1968 only three other
cities had a population of more than 50,000 persons
(Durres, 80,000; Vlore, 57,700; Korg6, 53,500).
Internal migration lias increased markedly since 1950,
stimulated by the "economic rationalization" of the
Communist regime. Much of this movement has been
from the highlands to the coastal lowlands. Thus, a
society which traditionally referred to its domain as the
"land of the eagles," and whose history has emphasized a
strong mountain psychology., is in the process of a basic
transformation. About 60% of the population now lives
in the lowland districts which face the Adriatic.
Improvements in health and sanitation have made the
previously malaria- stricken lowlands more hospitable to
agricultural and industrial development. The regime's
emphasis on rapid industrialization has encouraged large
numbers of peasants to leave the primitive, mountainous
rural areas for the new industrial centers along the coastal
plain.
2. Vital statistics
FIGURE 1. Population and population density, Albania
and selected countries, 1970 (U /OU)
Albania's rapid population growth stems entirely from
natural increase �a traditionary high birth rate and a
declining death rate. Statistical data released by the
regime reveal that the birth rate of 35.5 per 1,000
population in 1968 approximates the rate of 34.7
registered in 1938. During the 30 -year period, external
forces, such as war and deprivation, or official pronatalist
policies caused periodic fluctuation �from a probable
near low of 27 births per 1,000 in 1946 to about 43.5
births in 1955 and again in 1960. The death rate has
5
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FIGURE 2. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION, JANUARY 1968 (U /OU)
DISTRICT
Berat
Dibre
Durres
Elbasan
Fier
Gramsh
Gjirokanter
Kolonje.......................
Korge
Kruje
Kukes
Lezhe
Librazhd
Lushnje
Mat
Mirdite
Permet
Pogradee
Puke
Sarande
Skrapar
Shkoder
Tepelene
Tirane
Tropoj6
Vlore
PERSONS
PER PERCENT
LAND SQUARE OF TOTAL URBAN RURAL
AREA POPULATION MILE POPULATION POPULATION PERCENT POPULATION PERCENT
104,390
253
5.31
37,385
35.8
67,005
64.2
93,812
155
4.77
9,145
9.7
84,667
90.3
155,780
469
7.93
80,066
51.4
75,714
48.6
130,430
224
6.64
49,095
37.6
81,335
62.4
139,175
303
7.08
27,056
19.4
112,119
80.6
24,095
89
1.22
1,945
8.1
22,150
91.9
49_,170
112
3.50
15,590
31.7
33,580
68.4
18,685
60
0.95
4,385
33.5
14,300
76.5
159,115
189
8.09
53,563
33.6
105,552
66.4
55,325
234
2.82
13,395
24.2
41,930
75.8
58,880
97
3.00
4,795
8.1
54,085
91.9
33,225
182
1.69
4,560
13.7
28,665
86.3
42,730
109
2.17
3,515
8.2
39,215
91.8
81,595
297
4.15
17,545
21.5
64,950
78.5
45,340
114
2.31
4,317
9.5
41,023
90.5
22,465
84
1.14
3,598
16.0
18,867
84.0
30,340
84
1.54
5,565
18.3
24,775
81.7
42,775
153
2.18
9,702
22.7
33,073
77.3
27,568
74
1,40
3,841
13.9
23,727
86.1
58,135
137
2.96
14,371
24.7
43,764
75.3
23,035
83
1.17
2,178
9.4
20,857
90.6
150,350
154
7.65
49,830
33.1
100,5,`')0
66.9
30,350
98
1.57
7,745
25.1
23,105
74.9
241,900
528
12.31
170,603
70.5
71,207
29.5
25,570
63
1.30
2,145
9.4
23,155
90.6
119,995
193
6.11
57,745
48.1
62,250
51.9
Square
miles
412
606
332
581
460
270
439
316
842
236
604
182
391
275
397
269
362
280
374
424
278
978
315
458
403
621
Total 11,100 1,964,730 177
NOTE Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
dropped steadily from 17.8 per 1,000 in 1938 to 8.0 in
1968. The decline in the death rate stems entirely from
improved health and sanitation and a somewhat
improved diet, and it has been accompanied by a life
expectancy increase of almost 30 years since the pre
World War II period. According to official Albanian
estimates, the life expectancy of a child born in 1968 is 66
years, compared with a life expectancy of 38 years in
1938. Nevertheless, the 1968 figure remains the lowest of
any European country. The rate of natural increase of
27.5 per 1,000 population in 1968 was more than twice
that of any country in continental Europe (Figure 3),
even though this represented a decline from the rate of
32.9 registered in 1960, and it is slightly below the
average rate of 28.8 reached during 1960 -68. A total of
69,261 live births and 16,565 deaths was registered in
1967.
Despite the general increase in life expectancy, the
infant mortality rate of 75.2 deaths per 1,000 live births
in 1968 is by far the highest of any East European
country (Figure 4). Infant mortality rates are a sensitive
indicator of social well -being and provide a valid
measure for international comparisons, since they are not
affected by differences in age structure.' The extent of
recent progress in Albania may be gaged by the marked
6
100.0 653,950 33.3 1,310,780 66.7
decline in infant mortality fr.im the high rates prevailing
in all East European countries in the early 1950's.
In 1967, 77% of the infants who died were under 6
months of age. Of the total population, 66.7% resides in
areas officially defined as rural, where about 78% of the
infant deaths occurred in 1968. This illustrates the
hardships of life and the lack of adequate medical
facilities in isolated back country areas. The urban infant
mortality rate was 65.7 deaths per 1,000 in 1968.
3. Composition by age and sex
Compared with other European countries, the median
age of the Albanian population has remained low.
Although the United States is also considered a young
country in the demographic sense, the base of the
Albanian pyramid is even broader, highlighting the very
large section of the population under 15 years of age. The
age -sex distribution of the Albanian population is
compared with that of the United States in Figure 5.
Between 1960 and 1969 the proportion of the Albanian
population under age 15 decreased from 42.7% to 42.4
The proportion of the population in the economically
productive ages (by Albanian definition 16 -59 for men,
16 -54 for women), which was 47.6% in tue fall of 1960,
decreased slightly to. 46.8% at the end of 1967. People
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longevity. The phenomenon could stem from greater care
given to male infants, or it could be in part a paper
disparity caused by the reluctance of peasants to report
female births in this still strongly patriarchal society.
Since the early 1950's the marriage rate in Albania has
been slightly above the European norm, averaging 8.4
per 1,000, population from 1950 -67. There was an
unaccountable upsurge in the year 1961, when a rate of
11.3 was reached, and the 1967 rate of 8.6 was the highest
since 1961. Betwesn 1960 and 1966 the marriage rate
averaged about 7.4 per 1,000. During the 1970's �when
the very large segments of the population born in the
years 1954 -63 begin to reach marriageable age �the
marriage rate is likely to increase. Divorce rates have been
low because of strict traditions and close family ties. In
1967 only 1,415 divorces were officially reported. In that
year there were 16,853 marriages. Trends in the birth,
death, and marriage rates, 1938 -68, are shown in Figure
7.
beyond the productive ages decreased by 0.5% (from
9.5% to 9.0 in the 9 year period. A breakdown of the
population by broad age groups in January 1969 is shown
in Figure 6.
The sex ratio since 1950 has remained relatively
unchanged -105 males to 100 females �and official
Albanian estimates for 1967 listed almost 106 males for
every 100 females. The 1960 census revealed that there
were 835,300 males and 791,000 females, or a ratio of
105.6 males to 100 females. U.S. estimates for 1969 cite
an estimated ratio of 106.3 males for each 100 females in
Albania. In 1969 males were in a majority in almost all of
the age groups under 55, reflecting the universal excess of
boys over girls among newborn infants. The officially
reported excess of males in Albania, however, is unusually
marked, a feature characteristic of the population well
before improved medical practices increased male
4. opulation policies and trends
Although the regime has not been able to provide
much more than the necessities of life for its population,
it promotes population growth by encouraging a high
birth rate and prohibiting emigration, which in the past
had been considerable because of the poverty of the
country. As do other Communist regimes, the Albanian
places greater confidence in the future support of the
younger generations that have known only communism.
Additionally, the rulers apparently believe that the long
range potential of an expanded labor force outweighs the
short -term disadvantages. Maternity and child care
benefits, designed to encourage a high birth rate, are
granted to all female citizens. Benefits include cash
stipends of 280 leks (5 leks equal US$1) per live birth (to
unwed mothers as well), paid maternity leave of up to 98
days, and early retirement. Working mothers who have
given birth to and reared six or more children up to 8
years of age may receive an old -age pension at age 50 (5
years early), after having worked a minimum of 15 rather
than 20 years. Kindergartens and creches have been
established for children of working mothers, and work
breaks are granted to nursing mothers. Partial pay (up to
10 days during each 3 -month period) is also given to
mothers to care for sick children under the age of 2 years.
Until 1966 the government encouraged migration of
the rural population to industrial centers in the cities. A
shortage of urban facilities including housing and
health and sanitation facilities �and a desire to
decentralize the government structure probably
motivated the regime to stem the movement to urban
centers. Recent indications hint at a government policy of
establishing production centers outside the major urban
areas.
Population growth will probably continue at a high
level because of the declining mortality rate and the
propc large younger age groups moving into the
reproductive period. U.S. Bureau of the Census
projections indicate that Albania's populat. �i may reach
about 5 million by July 1990. The population is expected
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FIGURE 3. Vital rates, Albania and selected countries,
1968 (U /OU)

D. Structure and characteristics of the society
FIGURE 5. Age -sex distribution, Albania and the United
States, 1969 (U /OU)
to maintain its demographically young profile. The
median age in 1990 is projected to be 23.8 years
(compared with 18.3 in 1969), and the proportion of the
population in the 15 -39 age group in 1990 is expected to
be greater than that in 1969. In 1990 a substantially
smaller proportion of the population is expected to be in
the oldest age group.
1. Ethnic composition and languages (C)
The precise origin of the Albanians has not been
determined with certainty. Present -day Albanians dwell
in the West Balkan region, part of which was known in
antiquity as Illyria, and they generally desire to be
regarded as the descendants of the ancient Illyrians.
Historical and anthropological evidence suggests that, of
the two Albanian subgroups, the Gegs of the northern
highlands are descended more directly from the ancient
Illyrian tribes than the Tosks of southern Albania.
Largely because of centuries -long isolation in the rugged
mountainous interior, the Gegs seem to have preserved
much of the Illyrian heritage. The Tosks have a more
heterogeneous lineage but are principally a mixture of
Illyrian and Thracian, which reflects the traditional
Greek and Vlach presence in the coastal lowlands of
southern Albania. Some philologists focus on the proto-
Romanian phonetics of the Albanian language and the
absence therein of signs of any significant Greek'
influence. These authorities suggest that the Albanians
originated in the northeastern part of the Balkan
Peninsula and thus may be descended from the
Thracians.
The two major ethnic groups �Gegs and Tosks�
together make up about 96% of the Albanian population.
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FIGURE 4. Infant mortality, Albania and Eastern Europe, 1950 -68 (U /OU)

FIGURE 6. Population by major age groups, projection for
January 1969 (U /OU)
The differences between these two groups are observable
in physical appearance, dialect, religion, and social
customs, but the differences are not pronounced and
permit Albania a degree of homogeneity uncommon
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The remaining 4% of the
population is made up of Greeks, Vlachs, Bulgars, Serbs,
and Gypsies. The Greek minority is the largest
approximately 40,000 to 50,000 persons in the
southwestern coastal area and the border areas south of
Gjirokast&. This minority has adopted many Albanian
folkways and dress, is bilingual, and has long been a
source of friction between Greece and Albania. Albanian
authorities continue to discourage Greek culture and
traditions in this area and may indeed have moved some
ethnic Greeks north, away from the border areas. The
other minorities are insignificant both because of their
small numbers and the official policy of playing down
minority distinctions in an effort to focus popular
attention on common economic and political goals. The
Vlachs� migratory sheepherders of Romanian origin
whose itinerant life -style has been changed by
collectivization of their herds �are most numerous in the
Pindus mountains and in the Fier, Korg6, and Vlor6
areas. Persons of Bulgar origin live mostly in the border
areas of Lake Prespa. A few persons of Serb derivation
live in the Shkoder area, and Gypsies are scattered
throughout the country. Perhaps 1 million ethnic
Albanians live in Yugoslavia, of which about 70% live in
Kosovo province, contiguous to the northeast section of
Albania. This area is held by irredentists to be part of the
motherland. The numerous Albanian communities
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
Rate per 1,000 Persons
FIGURE 7. Births, deaths, marriages ;ier 1,000 population,
1938 -68 (U /OU)
abroad include perhaps as many as 250,000 ethnic
Albanians in Italy and Sicily, 350,000 in Greece, and
80,000 in the United States, with indeterminate numbers
also located in Bulgaria, the United Arab Republic,
Romania, and Turkey.
Differences among ethnic Albanians� mainly between
the Gegs and Tosks� have been noted and measured by
qualified observers. Physical anthropologists place the
Gegs of the north in the distinctive Dinaric grouping,
while the Tosks of the south most prevalently are of the
Alpine groupings. Gegs average 5 feet 6 inches in height
and tend to be lean and muscular, with a hawklike facial
appearance. Tosks are shorter, with rounded features,
and have low- bridged noses markedly unlike those of the
Gegs. Physically, the Tosks appear to be more closely akin
to the Greeks than to the Gegs (Figure 8).
The Albanian language, of Indo European origin, is
the only surviving language of the early Thraco- Illyrian
group. Throughout 'the centuries, Albania has been
influenced by Roman, Greek, Slav, and Turkish invaders,
merchants, and settlers. The present -day Albanian
language in its mechanics is reminiscent of Serbian,
modern Greek, and Latin; in its sounds the language
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1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965.
Source: VJETARI STATISTIKOR 1 REPUWdS POPULLORE
Ti SHQ1F&SE. 196740

n_:;.
resembles Hungarian and Romanian. A standardized
alphabet of 36 letters .established in 1908 and given
official, appioval in 1924 continues in use.. Prior to this
standardization, more than a dozen different alphabets
had developed -based variously on Latin, Greek, or
Turko Arabic.
The two main dialects are Geg and Tosk, with minor
variations widespread. Since the accession to power of the
Communists, most of whose leaders .came from southern
Albania,, the Tosk dialect has become the official
language of the country. During the 1920's and 1930's
the government tried unsuccessfully to establish the
dialect of the Elbasan area as the official language. Local
dialects still persist but present no communication
barriers. Greek is the only significant minority language,
and it is confined for the most part to southern Albania,
and even there its use is reportedly decreasing. There is
relatively little local knowledge of foreign languages.
Italian is probably understood in urban areas along the
Adriatic coast and reportedly is widely used in the
diplomatic circles of Tirane. The use of French and
English, which during the period between the two world
wars were known to a small section of the literate elite,
has declined since the Communist takeover.
2. Social structure (U /OU)
The structure of Albanian society has been greatly
influenced by topography and historical traditions. Apart
10
from the narrow strip of coastal plain along the Adriatic,
Albania is divided into numerous restricted highland
valleys separated by steep mountain barriers. Among the
inhabitants of the highlands, most particularly in the
north, a tightly knit tribal structure developed and
endured for two millenia of recorded history, while the
coastal lowlands permitted domination by powerful
overlords and the growth of large estates worked by
tenant peasants. Isolation and a meager economic base
provided the backdrop for the development of a tough
independence and a strong sense of local autonomy
among the highlanders. Loyalties belonged first to the
family and then to groupings of families �the tribe or
clan. Because each family was ruled by the senior male
member along strong patriarchal lines, so the clan was
headed by the leading patriarch of the group, called
under Turkish rule the bajraktar (standard bearer). The
head of the clan, whose powers were extensive, had
authority to arrange marriages, settle disputes between
clan members, and decide courses of action in such issues
as blood feuds and political alliances.
Because of greater accessibility and cultivability, the
coastal lowlands came much more firmly under Turkish
control. During the centuries of Ottoman rule the large,
independent families were replaced by semifeudal
Muslim aristocrats, with their own retinues, fortresses,
and estates worked by peasants. These landowning beys
and pashas �whose life styles contrasted markedly with
those of the highland chieftains predominated in the
lowlands until well into the 20th century. Ahmet Zogu�
who was later proclaimed King Zog I and effectively
ruled Albania from 1925 until the Italian invasion of
1939 controlled the country largely through local
leaders. Zogu was from a major bey family of Geg
background in the central lowlands, and secured the
loyalty of the tribal north by investing 240 bajraktars
with military rank, complete with government stipends.
The accession to power of the Communists led to
profound changes in the traditional social and political
structure as a result of the exile or liquidation of family
heads and tribal leaders, together with the expropriation
of the lands and property of the traditional ruling class of
beys and bajraktars. The regime was successful in
maintaining its grip on the country, but only by resorting
to brutal repression and terrorism in its efforts to
intimidate and extirpate dissident elements. The
Communists quickly installed a "new class" of
bureaucrats and administrators at every level of society
and charged them with implementing the decrees of the
party. Social dislocation was widespread because of the
complete replacement of officials at almost every level.
The government's drive to collectivize agriculture and
develop industries where none had existed uprooted
thousands of persons and led to increased migration from
the countryside to the crowded towns and cities.
Concomitantly, for the first time in recent Albanian
history, a pervasive vertical social mobility was brought
into being and rapidly developed through the
educational system. Officially, the Communist regime
has claimed that only two classes workers and laboring
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FIGURE S. Ethnic types (C) (a.) Geg gendarme from Puke.
(b.) Dinaric Geg from the Klementi tribe of northern Al-
bania. (c.) Dinaric Greek from GlirokostEr. (d.) Tasks in
native costume.

population as follows:
Total 1 ,626 ,315 100.0
Between 1967 and 1970 the private peasants, artisans,
and traders were substantially reduced or collectivized. In
1967 clergymen were stripped of their ecclesiastical duties
and responsibilities and sent to work in economic
enterprises.
Any effort to distinguish social groupings is, of
necessity, somewhat arbitrary, but three distinct social
groups seem to have developed since 1944. At the top is a
small party elite enjoying special privileges; next are the
professional people, government and industry officials,
and artisans. This latter group, which resembles a middle
class, is sometimes looked upon with suspicion by the
regime. Peasants, who make up the majority of the
population, and industrial workers, most of whom are of
recent peasant origin, are at the base of the social
structure.
With the stabilization of Communist rule, social
mobility has diminished. It is relatively difficult to
improve one's status without training and education.
Contrary to official assertions, educational opportunities
are not available equally to all and are especially
inadequate in rural areas. Moreover, children of the
former upper class continue to be openly discriminated
against in such matters as education and employment,
while those of the new ruling class enjoy some advantages
in both schooling and jobs.
Despite these impediments, vertical mobility continues
to exist. There is a growing demand for qualified
personnel to staff the administrative bureaucracy of the
government as well as the increasing number of industrial
enterprises established by the state. The turnover of
personnel in responsible managerial positions, attribut-
able in part to incompetence and ideological
unreliability, is considerable. Scholarships to capable and
politically reliable students from poor families provide
opportunities for social as well as economic advance-
ment, and rural -urban migration, even though now
much reduced, affords peasants an opportunity to
advance economically.
3. Family ties and traditions (U /OU)
For centuries the family has been the basic unit of
society. Especially among the Geg highlunders, who
seldom dwelled in villages or communities, the exteffdrys
communications, engendered the growth of a relatively
tightly knit extended family, which typically included
second and third generation relatives from the male side
of the family. A strong sense of hierarchy prevailed in the
patriarchal underpinnings of the family. All members of
the household� including other males� obeyed the
master of the house, who assigned household tasks,
arranged marriages, meted out justice, and represented
the household in all public dealings. At the evening meal
all talk, movement, and action flowed from and was
initiated by the head of household. If the master talked,
everybody talked; if the master wished to be silent,
everybody was silent. The master had only to ask and he
was entitled to procure for himself almost any item he
desired, frequently a horse or a fancy weapon. The other
members of the household did not resent this practice,
because his possessions were a source of pride to the entire
household and reflected the family's status.
Upon the death of the head of the household (usually
the father), the title passed to a previously designated
successor. Primogeniture alone did not determine
succession, even though respect for elders was an essential
part of society. An unexpected death of a household head
occasioned the selection of a successor at a meeting of all
household males. Ability and talent, as well as age, were
factors in the selection.
The women of the household occupied an inferior
position, being treated as creatures fit only to supplement
their reproductive functions with hard manual work. The
mistress of the household ruled over all the women, but
her authority usually was limited to assignment of work
tasks, with discipline left to the master. Child betrothals
were customary, and a girl ceased to be part of her family
upon marriage. Betrothals were rarely broken reneging
on contracts often being the pretense for a blood feud
and a recalcitrant young lady could avoid an arranged
marriage only by vowing "perpetual virginity." Women
did not share in the division of household property, which
often occurred as the result of the exodus of a nuclear
family from the extended family.
A comprehensive set of tribal laws and customs evolved
over the generations and became known as the
"unwritten law." This customary law, particularly strong
in the mountain areas, regulated many aspects of social
life in great detail, but its main feature was the principle
of "a life for a life." Custom dictated the taking of a life
for a myriad of offenses, ranging from rape.and murder to
an insult of honor, real or imagined. Frequently families
and tribes demanded yet another life in return, thus
perpetuating the interminable blood feuds which
characterize Albanian history. Honor was considered the
most precious commodity �as the oral literature well
demonstrates �and a blow to one's honor often was
returned with violence. Feuds, once started, often
continued for generations and were governed by intricate
rules. The taking of bloo( �a revenge murder �could not
be done anvwhere or �iny..ime; in mos' areas a man was
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peasants� exist, but in 1965 more than two social groups family was the main political, economic, and social unit.
were delineated. The census of 1960 classified the The meager economic base, as well as difficult
NUMBER
PERCENT
Workers
433,040
26.6
Employees
182,913
11.2
Collective farmers
670,422
41.2
Individual farmers
275,169
16.9
Collective artisans
35,056
2.2
Individual artisans............
8,950
0.6
Collective traders
2,328
0.1
Private traders
3,474
0.2
Free professions
889
0.1
Clergy
2,785
0.2
Unemployed and unknown.....
11,289
0.7
Total 1 ,626 ,315 100.0
Between 1967 and 1970 the private peasants, artisans,
and traders were substantially reduced or collectivized. In
1967 clergymen were stripped of their ecclesiastical duties
and responsibilities and sent to work in economic
enterprises.
Any effort to distinguish social groupings is, of
necessity, somewhat arbitrary, but three distinct social
groups seem to have developed since 1944. At the top is a
small party elite enjoying special privileges; next are the
professional people, government and industry officials,
and artisans. This latter group, which resembles a middle
class, is sometimes looked upon with suspicion by the
regime. Peasants, who make up the majority of the
population, and industrial workers, most of whom are of
recent peasant origin, are at the base of the social
structure.
With the stabilization of Communist rule, social
mobility has diminished. It is relatively difficult to
improve one's status without training and education.
Contrary to official assertions, educational opportunities
are not available equally to all and are especially
inadequate in rural areas. Moreover, children of the
former upper class continue to be openly discriminated
against in such matters as education and employment,
while those of the new ruling class enjoy some advantages
in both schooling and jobs.
Despite these impediments, vertical mobility continues
to exist. There is a growing demand for qualified
personnel to staff the administrative bureaucracy of the
government as well as the increasing number of industrial
enterprises established by the state. The turnover of
personnel in responsible managerial positions, attribut-
able in part to incompetence and ideological
unreliability, is considerable. Scholarships to capable and
politically reliable students from poor families provide
opportunities for social as well as economic advance-
ment, and rural -urban migration, even though now
much reduced, affords peasants an opportunity to
advance economically.
3. Family ties and traditions (U /OU)
For centuries the family has been the basic unit of
society. Especially among the Geg highlunders, who
seldom dwelled in villages or communities, the exteffdrys
communications, engendered the growth of a relatively
tightly knit extended family, which typically included
second and third generation relatives from the male side
of the family. A strong sense of hierarchy prevailed in the
patriarchal underpinnings of the family. All members of
the household� including other males� obeyed the
master of the house, who assigned household tasks,
arranged marriages, meted out justice, and represented
the household in all public dealings. At the evening meal
all talk, movement, and action flowed from and was
initiated by the head of household. If the master talked,
everybody talked; if the master wished to be silent,
everybody was silent. The master had only to ask and he
was entitled to procure for himself almost any item he
desired, frequently a horse or a fancy weapon. The other
members of the household did not resent this practice,
because his possessions were a source of pride to the entire
household and reflected the family's status.
Upon the death of the head of the household (usually
the father), the title passed to a previously designated
successor. Primogeniture alone did not determine
succession, even though respect for elders was an essential
part of society. An unexpected death of a household head
occasioned the selection of a successor at a meeting of all
household males. Ability and talent, as well as age, were
factors in the selection.
The women of the household occupied an inferior
position, being treated as creatures fit only to supplement
their reproductive functions with hard manual work. The
mistress of the household ruled over all the women, but
her authority usually was limited to assignment of work
tasks, with discipline left to the master. Child betrothals
were customary, and a girl ceased to be part of her family
upon marriage. Betrothals were rarely broken reneging
on contracts often being the pretense for a blood feud
and a recalcitrant young lady could avoid an arranged
marriage only by vowing "perpetual virginity." Women
did not share in the division of household property, which
often occurred as the result of the exodus of a nuclear
family from the extended family.
A comprehensive set of tribal laws and customs evolved
over the generations and became known as the
"unwritten law." This customary law, particularly strong
in the mountain areas, regulated many aspects of social
life in great detail, but its main feature was the principle
of "a life for a life." Custom dictated the taking of a life
for a myriad of offenses, ranging from rape.and murder to
an insult of honor, real or imagined. Frequently families
and tribes demanded yet another life in return, thus
perpetuating the interminable blood feuds which
characterize Albanian history. Honor was considered the
most precious commodity �as the oral literature well
demonstrates �and a blow to one's honor often was
returned with violence. Feuds, once started, often
continued for generations and were governed by intricate
rules. The taking of bloo( �a revenge murder �could not
be done anvwhere or �iny..ime; in mos' areas a man was
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peasants� exist, but in 1965 more than two social groups family was the main political, economic, and social unit.
were delineated. The census of 1960 classified the The meager economic base, as well as difficult

temporarily immune while escorting a woman. Feuds
could be postponed or ended only by an agreement of
clan chieftains and the taking of a solemn pledge (or
besa) by heads of the feuding families.
These tribal laws and customs- especially' the
prevalence of blood feuds -were weakened somewhat in
the interwar period. During the dozen years that Ahmet
Zogu was in power, first as President and later as a self
proclaimed monarch (Zog I, 1928 -39), a principal
objective of the government was to modernize and
civilize" the still largely primitive society. Under the
Communist regime improvements in communications
and transportation, the increasing accessibility of
education, enhanced social mobility, and other
socioeconomic developments have further contributed to
the decline of traditional mores. Many Albanians,
however, still cling stubbornly to their old folkways. Press
reports indicate that regime campaigns for women's
equality, marriage based on love, and an end to
patriarchy have not been unqualified successes. The clan
mentality has persisted not only in rural areas but also in
urban centers, where most of the residents are relatively
recent arrivals from the countryside. The enduring
strength of family ties and the traditional obligations to
relatives and the clan are evident even among the top
leadership, of the Communist party: 61 members of the
Central Committee are related by blood or marriage.
Party boss Enver Hoxha, Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu,
and party secretary Hysni Kapo all have placed their
wives in important positions. The Minister of Internal
Affairs, Kadd Hasbiu, is the brother -in -law of Shehu, a
former Minister of Internal Affairs.
The pervasive influence of patriarchy and clan
loyalties has been manifested at all levels of the party. A
press article of early 1970 criticized leaders of a local
party organization for their "unjustified selectivity" in
membership admissions. It seems the local leaders were
admitting to the party only those applicants who were
from their own clan in order to gain family control of the
Durres
party organization. Hoxha's complaint in 1968 that local
party and government positions often were considered
inheritable positions further underscores the vitality of
the old ways. Not atypical is the complaint of the man
who objected to the proposed candidacy of his sister -in-
law as a member of an agricultural collective's council.
His objections rested on her failure to obtain his
permission (he being head of the family) and, in any case,
the men of the family were not yet dead."
It has been said that Albania is one of the few
remaining countries in which what is known as peasant
costume is in fact worn by the peasants. City dwellers
commonly wear drab, Western -type clothing, but many
rural people still wear the white Macedonian tarboosh
and the enormous baggy pantaloons of the Muslim
highlander. The short full skirt (fustanella) commonly
worn by men in Greece is also a part of traditional dress in
southern Albania (Figure 9).
4. National attitudes (C)
Albanians are nationalistic and independent
characteristics fostered by isolation, rugged mountainous
terrain, and hostile neighbors. Communist ideology
clashes directly with the ancient Albanian traditions of
and belief in individual freedom and orientation to
family or tribe rather than to central authority. As a
result, many Albanians are still hostile to the Communist
regime because of its oppressive nature and the enforced
regimentation that has destroyed individual freedom.
Hostility toward the Communists also stems from the
identification of communism with the Serbs, traditionally
despised by the Albanians. The Communist movement
has for the majority of the population a definite Slavic
connotation as a result of the influence of the Yugoslav
Communist Party in organizing Albanian splinter groups
into a unified Communist party in 1941. During the
period from 1948 to 1961, when Albania was a loyal
satellite of the U.S.S.R. and a recipient of aid from that
country, Albanians came to resent the higher level of
Shkoder
Tirane
FIGURE 9. LINGERING TRADITIONAL DRESS IN THREE PRINCIPAL CITIES (U /OU)
IL_
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living enjoyed by Soviet technical and military aid
personnel and their attitudes of superiority. Since the
break with the U.S.S.R., officials have gained a measure
of popular support by a continuing propaganda barrage
aimed at inflaming the population against the U.S.S.R.,
appealing to nationalistic tendencies of the Albanians,
and blaming the U.S.S.R. for Albania's economic woes.
In addition, the very longevity of the regime, along with
other factors, such as the slowly improving levels of living
and the gradual assumption of power by the younger
generation educated under the Communist system,
suggests that there may be a growing acceptance of the
regime by the population.
Despite the close and cordial relations that exist
between Albania and Communist China at the national
level, there is little evidence that the majority of
Albanians share these positive feelings. Even the
replacement of the Soviet Union by Communist China as
Albania's principal source of economic aid and political
support does not appear to have greatly enhanced the
enthusiasm of most Albanians. Prolonging this apathetic
acceptance are the unfamiliarity of China and its culture
to most Albanians and the aloof behavior of Chinese
technicians in Albania.
Albanians have tended to regard their neighbors,
Yugoslavia and Greece, as hereditary enemies. These
traditional hostilities are kept alive, albeit with
diminishing intensity, by propaganda alleging Yugoslav
designs on Albanian territory and by Greek claims to
portions of southern Albania as rightfully belonging to
Epirus.
Although the official attitude toward the United States
is one of hostility, many older Albanians, particularly
those who have lived in the United States or who have
relatives there, regard the country favorably. The much
larger and constantly growing proportion of persons who
do not have ties to the United States, however, may be
susceptible to the official hostile and abusive anti -U.S.
propaganda.
E. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor
relations
1. Size and characteristics of the labor force (S)
Albania's labor force totaled 911,000 in mid -1969,
according to U.S. estimates, and it accounted for about
44% of the total population and almost 84% of the
population of working age (15 -64). Although the labor
force has steadily increased in size, it has not kept pace
with the rapid growth of the population. In 1960 it
comprised 722,000 persons and represented 45.4% of the
population; by July 1966 the labor force had decreased to
about 43.9% of the population, a level since maintained,
according r� official U.S. estimates.
Despite it continuing increase in the nonagricultural
work force, Mbania remains the only country in Europe
in which the bulk of the lal,,or force is still engaged in
agriculture. Three fourths of the labor force was
employed in agriculture in 1955, a proportion that
declined to 63.7% in 1967 and to 60.4% in 1969 (Figure
FIGURE 10. Distribution of the labor force between
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, 1955 -69 (U /OU)
10). Conversely, the number of workers and employees in
industry (manufacturing and extractive) has increased.
According to U.S. estimates, the 12.2% of the labor force
employed in industry in 1960 rose to 17.9% in 1969.
For the year 1967 the greatest proportion of the
nonagricultural labor force was employed in the
manufacturing and extractive industries and the smallest
proportion in credit institutions. Between 1960 and 1967
the distribution of nonagricultural workers among the
various economic sectors remained fairly stable. The
greatest changes were registered in the industrial and
construction sectors. During the 7 -year period, the
proportion of industrial workers increased by 6 while
the construction sector registered a decrease of 5 The
decrease in the proportion of workers employed in the
construction sector possibly could be attributed to the
high priority given to mechanization. Employment has
remained relatively stable in most other sectors of the
nonagricultural economy. The 2% increase in personnel
engaged in teaching and other educational endeavors
seems inadeyuah for the greatly increased whool
enrollment; the slight proportionate decline in the
number of public health workers, however, raises doubts
about the continuing effectiveness of the health
campaign. The distribution of the nonagricultural labor
force, 1960 -67, is shown in Figure 11.
The regime has made some progress in encouraging the
use of women in the nonagricultural labor force. Women
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TOTAL LABOR FORCE
(in thousands)
911
8211
781,,�
722 7.6,
677 701
Percent
74.9 73.1
71.1 69.9
67.4 66.4
60.4
39.6
26.9
32.6 33.6
28.9 30.I
25.1
r
1955 1957
1959 1961 1963 1965
1969
RM Agricultural F Nonagricultural
FIGURE 10. Distribution of the labor force between
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, 1955 -69 (U /OU)
10). Conversely, the number of workers and employees in
industry (manufacturing and extractive) has increased.
According to U.S. estimates, the 12.2% of the labor force
employed in industry in 1960 rose to 17.9% in 1969.
For the year 1967 the greatest proportion of the
nonagricultural labor force was employed in the
manufacturing and extractive industries and the smallest
proportion in credit institutions. Between 1960 and 1967
the distribution of nonagricultural workers among the
various economic sectors remained fairly stable. The
greatest changes were registered in the industrial and
construction sectors. During the 7 -year period, the
proportion of industrial workers increased by 6 while
the construction sector registered a decrease of 5 The
decrease in the proportion of workers employed in the
construction sector possibly could be attributed to the
high priority given to mechanization. Employment has
remained relatively stable in most other sectors of the
nonagricultural economy. The 2% increase in personnel
engaged in teaching and other educational endeavors
seems inadeyuah for the greatly increased whool
enrollment; the slight proportionate decline in the
number of public health workers, however, raises doubts
about the continuing effectiveness of the health
campaign. The distribution of the nonagricultural labor
force, 1960 -67, is shown in Figure 11.
The regime has made some progress in encouraging the
use of women in the nonagricultural labor force. Women
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FIGURE 11.. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY- (U/OU)
1960 1965
1967
ECONOMIC SECTOR
Industry.
Building.
Transportation and communications...
Trade and procurement
Communal
Education and culture..........
Public health
Public administration
Credit institutes......
Other
Number
employed
64,421
33,588
8,863
25,211
3,224
13,923
9,881
8,133
810
2,484
Percent
37.7
19.6
5.2
14.7
1.9
8.2
5.8
4.8
0.5
1.6
Percent
of Number
females employed
37.6 86,803
4.2 38,738
1.4 11,369
22.2 29,629
1.5 4,502
12.6 23,122
15.0 13,258
3.3 8,427
0.8 978
1.4 3,968
Percent
39.3
17.5
5.1
13.4
2.0
10.4
6.0
3.8
0.4
2.1
Percent
of
females
37.9
4.2
1.5
20.3
1.9
15.9
13.9
2.4
0.7
1.3
Percent
Number of
employed Percent females
110,858 43.4 44.5
38,157 14.9 4.2
12,087 4.7 1.6
33,083 12.9 18.6
4,299 1.7 1.8
26,201 10.3 13.7
14,370 5.6 10.9
8,299 3.2 2.1
976 0.4 0.6
7,194 2.9 2.0
Total 170,538 100.0 100.0 220,794 100.0 100.0 255,524 100.0 100.0
*Excluding military personnel and self employed individuals.
FIGURE 12. NONAGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE BY SEX, 1967 (U /OU)
ECONOMIC SECTOR
TOTAL
MALE /PERCENT
FEMALE /PERCENT
Industry
110,858
70,105 63.2
40,753 36.8
Building
38,157
34,307 90.0
3,850 10.0
Transportation and communications
12,087
10,601 87.7
1,486 12.3
Trade and procurement
33,083
16,034 48.4
17,049 51.6
Communal
4,299
2,616 60.9
1,683 39.1
Education and culture
26,201
13,640 52.1
12,561 47.9
Public health
14,370
4,434 30.9
9,936 69.1
Public administration
8,299
6,343 76.4
1,956 23.6
Credit institutes
976
447 45.8
529 54.2
Other
7,194
5,430 75.5
1,764 24.5
All comprise about 48% of the agricultural work force,
while, according to the secretary of the Central Council
of Trade Unions, they constituted 38% of the nonagricul-
tural labor force in July 1970. The latter proportion
represents a rise of 2% over regime estimates in the
summer of 1969 and a marked increase from the 26%
officially claimed in 1960. Although the female
participation rate (Figure 12) is not notably high in
comparison with other Communist states, the recent
increase of women wor ers in the nonagricultural sector
reflects a continuing departure from Albanian tradition,
by which women were expected to confine their activities
to the home and the farm.
Proportionately more women than men are employed
in the public health, education and culture, and trade
sectors of the economy (Figure 11). Relatively few women
are employed in the building, transportation, and public
administration sectors. The proportionate employment of
women in industry has increased slightly faster than the
Increase in industry's share of the total nonagricultural
labor force, a plwnomenon largely attributable to the
development of such sectors as textiles which
traditionally employ women.
Official statistics on unemployment are not published,
because theoretically there is no unemployment. The
inefficiencies of the economy -as aired in the press-
14
nevertheless point to persistent underemployment. A
breakdown of the labor force by population age groups is
not available.
The regime keeps close control over movements of the
labor force, although it does not publish statistics on
labor mobility. Traditional movements of the migratory
Vlachs and Gypsies- seasonally mobile as shepherds and
artisans, respectively -have been severely curtailed.
Article 55 of the labor code states that a worker may quit
his job only "for good reason," and worker- initiated
transfers are probably "of good reason" only if the
movement conforms to state needs or is in response to
government campaigns. Most worker transfers are
impl,^.mented at the direct behest of the local or central
government. The labor code contains several articles
governing enterprise initiated transfers and makes no
provision for worker agreement. Rather, the code allows a
worker to be transferred to a commensurate job in any
other enterprise, regardless of location. Transfers within
an administrative district are accomplished at the
initiative or with the approval of the district people's
council executive committee. Movements between
districts are handled through the appropriate economic
ministry or other central organs.
Prior to early 1966 the regime appeared to encourage
the movement of the labor force from the countryside to
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the cities as part of its industrialization campaign. The
resulting crush or, housing and other urban services,
however, subsequently required the regime to halt the
influx, and in some areas even to order a reversal of this
migration. The "rational location" of new regional
production centers closer to rural settlements and the
renewed recruitment of farm labor needed to increase
agricultural production on the largely unmechanized
farms have resulted in the resettling of peasant families in
their native villages.
Simultaneously the regime has attempted a partial
reordering and decentralization of the governmental
administrative apparatus. In March 1966 an Open Letter
from the party called for a reduction of "surplus
functionaries" and "bureaucrats" in the state
administration and party apparatus. In the space of
about a year, an estimated 8,000 government workers
were assigned from Tirane to regional production centers.
During subsequent years, new graduates of health and
education schools have "volunteered" to work in the
villages for periods of time varying from 1 to 5 years.
Temporary and seasonal labor movements are usually
the product of crash economic projects. Such projects as
cultivating virgin land, building railroad lines, and
digging irrigation ditches are implemented through the
mobilization and movement of work brigades selected
from all sectors of the population. Students often spend
their 2 -month summer vacations performing "voluntary"
work, often at remote construction sites (Figure 13). Work
on the Fier- Rrogozhine railroad in 1967, according to
press reports, involved the labor of 40,000 young people
working in 2 -month shifts. Similarly, press reports
throughout 1967 acclaimed the 20,000 youths who were
cultivating virgin lands and the 4,000 young people
building roads around Shkoder. During harvest time the
regime frequently shifts large numbers of urban workers
and youth to the countryside. An economic summary for
1967 points to the movement of 150,000 persons to the
countryside and notes that they contributed 850,000
"voluntary" workdays in aiding the harvest. The
educational reform of late 1969, by making production
work a requirement in the educational curriculum, has
placed further emphasis on the mobilization of students
for part -time work.
All segments of society, including the armed forces and
criminals, are mobilized to work on economic projects.
The armed forces are periodically enlisted for work on
emergency projects and purportedly played an important
role in the drive to fulfill the fourth Five Year Plan (1966-
70). In 1966 the army reportedly cultivated all land
within some military zones and opened new areas for
agricultural production, especially in mountainous
regions. Albania is one of the few Communist countries
that still resort to the use of prison labor for such state
projects as the construction of railroads, highways, and
irrigation systems, but the use of such labor brigades may
have decreased in the last several years.
Manpower shortages� whether skilled or unskilled
occur periodically, largely because of poor management
and the stopgap planning techniques of an overextended
economy. In addition to the fairly frequent movements of
large numbers of unskilled laborers, the regime must
occasionally shift skilled workers from job to job,
depending on the priority of various projects. Poor
compilation of manpower balances �part of the central
system of labor planning indexes �and competing
pressures on the limited pool of skilled manpower often
lead to disputes between economic enterprises and
district executive committees. To hedge against labor
shortages, enterprises frequently request more workers
than they need, thereby exacerbating the situation.
Statistics on skilled manpower needs and shortages are
not published. Periodic references to shortages contain
some statistics but provide no overall pattern. Press
reports in the fall of 1968 revealed manpower shortages in
the mining, construction, and lumbering sectors of the
economy. Koco Theodhosi, Minister of Industry and
Mining, asserted in late 1967 that a shortage of medium
grade engineering workers caused an inadequate
distribution of 3.8 workers for every 5.2 jobs. Politburo
member Spiro Koleka stated frankly in late 1969 that the
industrial construction projects planned for the fifth Five
Year Plan (1971 -75) require at least 500 additional highly
trained workers, 1,500 "medium trained" workers, and
17,000 skilled workers. He maintained that a solution to
the shortages could be found by upgrading workers' skills
and by recruiting young qualified and potentially
qualified "male and female workers primarily from the
city, and then from the village."
Albania has sought to improve the skills and technical
qualifications of its labor force, placing increased
emphasis on vocational training as one of the most
important elements in its educational system. An
extensive system of secondary vocational and technical
schools -70% of which are located at production
enterprises �turns out middle -grade workers, but not in
sufficient numbers. A network of lower vocational
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FIGURE 13. Students working on Elbasan- Prenias railroad
(U /OU)

schools� existing outside the formal educational
network�provides training, specialization, and qualifi-
cation courses for workers. Lasting from a month to a
year, the lower vocational courses train new entrants into
the labor force and upgrade workers' qualifications for
specific jobs. On -the -job training is provided for students
fulfilling production work requirements "students in the
economy") and for lower category workers trying to
upgrade their skills.
According to Sotir Kamberi, secretary of the Central
Council of 'Trade Unions, 7,000 workers were enrolled in
lower vocational training in the 1969/70 school year,
while 60,000 workers attended part -time schools at
various levels. One -third of the workers in the latter
category attended secondary vocational schools, and
15,010 workers took higher education courses (mostly
technical training) at night or by correspondence.
The improved educational level of the labor force is
difficult to document in any extensive fashion. One
available example, although perhaps reflecting a
generally higher educational level than the norm for the
nonagricultural work force, is the educational profile of
the employees of the Korge knitting combine, which in
mid -1970 was delineated as follows:
NUMBER
OF
LEVEL OR EDUCATION WORKERS
Incomplete 8 -year school 681
Complete 8 -year school 1,100
Incomplete secondary school 190
Complete secondary school 294
Higher education 16
Commentary accompanying these statistics indicat
that, although many workers have only 8 years of
education, the regime tends to regard completion of
secondary school (12 years) as comprising an "average
education."
Frequent press complaints point to the workers'
apparent lack of enthusiasm for work related training
courses. Campaigns to encourage attendance at the
various training schools open to the workers evidently
have led to forced enrollments. Consequently, the
workers' schools suffer from high dropout and absentee
rates. Reliable observers in late 1969 noted propaganda
which emphasized the "buddy system" approach to
technical training. Parading under the slogan of "two for
one," the campaign proposed that each technically
qualified worker raise the technical level of two friends.
2. Productivity and working conditions (C)
Shortcomings in labor productivity have been the
object of regime criticism in Albania, much as in other
Communist countries. An indifferent labor force
evidently is a prime cause of low productivity. The press
periodically bemoans such indications of worker apathy
as high absentee rates, late arrivals, early departures, and
slipshod work. Factors contributing to poor performance
include generally low, poorly differentiated wage levels, a
low level of worker training and education, the
pervasiveness of the artisan mentality, and lingering
16
dietary and other health deficiencies. 'i he regime's
general response to poor worker performance is to urge
greater discipline, to raise worker norms, to dole out labor
awards, and to enjoin trade unions, youth groups, and
party organizations to "mobilize" the population. The
low level of fixed capital also impairs efforts to achieve
higher productivity.
Statistical data on output per man -hour are not
available. Official statements on productivity are
infrequent and limited to generalized statements
pointing out, for example, that labor productivity
increased 6% from 1965 to 1966 or that in 1969 it was
3.64 times greater than in 1950. Every enterprise has a
quarterly planning figure for achieving an increase in
productivity, but targets and results seldom are
published. No estimate on the relative efficiency of the
economic sectors is therefore possible, but the admission
by Zeri i Popullit in the fall of 1968 that labor
productivity is lowest in agriculture probably still holds
true. No estimates on gross national product are
published.
The legal workweek is comprised of six 8 -hour days,
with exceptions to this norm set by the Council of
Ministers. Minors under 16 cannot work more than 6
hours, and workers performing difficult or dangerous jobs
work from 5 to 7 hours. Dangerous occupations include
certain mining operations, furnace cleaning, and work
around radi ^active materials. The workday is
periodically split into two segments by a decision of the
Council of Ministers. Premiums for night work (10 P.M.
until 6 a.m.) are paid either by shortening shifts an hour
or by granting the worker an hour of extra pay. The
normal workday may be increased for seasonal work,
theoretically with appropriate pay increases. Addition-
ally, workers may "volunteer" for overtime, but in no
case may a worker perform more than 180 hours of
overtime work a year. Payment for overtime work is only
one fourth of the worker's normal wage. Workers have
the right to at least 11 hours of rest between two
workdays, one weekly rest period of not less than 36
hours, a yearly paid vacation of 12 working days, and
unpaid leave up to 12 days. Women are entitled to paid
maternity leave, breaks during the day for nursing, and
up to 3 months of unpaid leave for child care.
The actual workweek is undoubtedly much longer
than the legal workweek, because the regime makes
extensive use of the labor force for "voluntary"
campaigns. Segments of the population are periodically
mobilized to accomplish certain projects. Aside from
large -scale projects, such as construction of roads and
railroads, the construction of urban housing and
"cultural" facilities has frequently occupied the spare
time of the Albanian worker.
The state Health Inspectorate is responsible for
insuring the implementation of hygiene and safety rules
at work centers, including the right to close temporarily
an enterprise and levy fines. Persons employed in
dangerous wo k- or in sectors where production could
facilitate the spread of contagious diseases must undergo
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periodic medical checkups and carry a health book issued
by the inspectorate. Although the trade unions were
relieved of formal responsibility for safety regulations in
1965, the unions are still charged with checking on li ,alth
and safety conditions at work. Concern with workers'
safety seems a periodic phenomenon at best, and reliable
observers have reported that such concern very rarely
takes priority over the fulfillment of production tasks.
The Council of Ministers sets rates of pay for all
occupations. Hourly wages are the exception rather than
the rule, and most pay is based on fulfillment of
production norms, which most often specify a number of
parameters� quantity, quality, or technical character
is�.ics of the work. Production norms often apply to a
collective of workers rather than to an individual.
Placement of all workers in specific graduated job
categories �which probably are rough reflections of skill
levels provides an additional criterion for calculating
wages. According to the revised wage scale of 1967, all
industrial workers are placed in one of five categories
(seven categories for the textile industry).
Information on actual wage differentials� either
according to job or geographical area �is practically
nonexistent. A narrowing of wage differentials,
implemented in the fall of 1967, reduced top wages and
selectively increased the wages of those in the lowest
categories. The avowed purpose of this reduction was the
"withdrawal of material incentives" and the promotion
in their stead of the more ideologically pure "moral
incentives," but the distribution of the %age increases
seemed to favor labor- scarce industries. Economic sectors
with supply shortages or quality- control standards (e.g.,
export items) were excluded from the reduction of
material incentives, as were some very senior skilled
workers. The regime sought to justify the wage reductions
by pointing out that the real income of the workers
included such benefits as social security, pensions, free
medical care, and educational and cultural benefits.
Agricultural earnings are probably much lower than
industrial wages, partly because the farmer is the last
claimant on the net income of the cooperative and state
farms. Additionally, in the past, farmers have had to
make social insurance and income tax payments at times
when most industrial workers received the social benefits
free of charge. Periodic reductions in consumer prices
over the last few years and the abolition of the income tax
in 1967 have probably increased the purchasing power of
both urban and rural wage earners, but the level of living
remains the lowest in Eastern Europe.
3. Labor relations and legislation (S)
As in other countries of Eastern Europe, trade unions
are merely an arm of the Communist party, and most
high -level union officials hold important positions in the
party. At the center of the trade union system is the
Central Council of Trade Unions. Formed on 11
February 1945 as the Provisional General Council of
Workers Syndicates of Albania, the council has met in
national congress seven times since 1945. The central
council is composed of about 100 members, ostensibly
delegates from constituent unions, but actually selected
by the party leadership. The council has a small executive
body, the presidium, and an extensive administrative
apparatus, both of which conduct daily business in the
name of the central council. The chairman of the council,
presumably designated by the party Politburo, is assisted
by a secretary general and several secretaries, who oversee
the administrative apparatus. Four main functional
divisions of the apparatus (education, culture, and
commerce; industry and mining; transportation and
construction; and agriculture) regulate the activities of
the appropriate local trade union organizations. The
central apparatus also has four "substantive" branches
(culture, foreign affairs, labor safety, and social security)
cutting across functional areas of responsibility.
The branches for labor safety and social security seem
to function, even though the trade unions were formally
relieved of administering safety regulations and social
security in December 1965. The foreign affairs branch is
responsible for relations between the Central Council of
Trade Unions and foreign trade union organizations.
Albania is still a member of the Communist dominated
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and in 1965
was reported to be at the top of the list of countries
delinquent in their dues to this organization. Since the
Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania
has boycotted many WFTU sessions and has often used
the occasion of WFTU meetings to level scathing press
denunciations of the Soviet Union.
Below the central trade union structure are 27 district
trade union councils, corresponding to the administrative
divisions of the country. The district councils also have an
extensive apparatus and are responsible for the activities
of all the trade unions within the district boundaries.
Every state enterprise and institution has a trade union
organization headed by a committee nominally elected
by the trade union members. The committee members,
notably their chairmen, are the guiding spirits of the
organization, and their responsibilities include
mobilizing the workers in production competitions,
implementing regime campaigns, enforcing safety
regulations, monitoring management, and settling
workers' grievances.
Only the skimpiest machinery has been established for
the regulation of labor- management relations. The
revised labor code of 1966 �the basic law governing labor
and manpower �sets down rules on work hours, wages,
working conditions, employment and transfer, and
grievance settlements that normally would be considered
part of a labor contract. No mention is made of collective
bargaining, and the criminal code treats would -be strikers
as criminals guilty of economic sabotage. The resolution
of worker grievances is relegated to the trade union
organization, but appeals may be addressed to the local
people's court. A workers liability for work damage
"intentional or careless is assessed by the director of
the enterprise, but again the regular court system is a
forum of appeal. Serious prolonged labor disputes appear
17
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to be unknown in Albania, and they would be regarded
as "manifestations of capitalism."
Since all industrial enterprises are the property of the
state and about 98% of agricultural land has been
socialized, management in the Western sense does not
exist. Officials appointed by the state are responsible for
the management of enterprises; they lack many powers
associated with true management. They do not have the
power to hire and fire freely, to set prices, or to make
other basic decisions. These prerogatives belong to the
government and the party. In many cases management
positions are given to persons who are loyal to the regime
rather than to those who have demonstrated related
professional competence; often the subsequent training
afforded new managers is inadequate. Criticisms in the
press reveal that in response to the government's
unrealistic production goals, management has permitted
the manufacture of shoddy merchandise and has not
infrequently falsified records.
F. Health and welfare (U /OU)
1. Principal diseases
The Communist regime continues to improve the
public health facilities that were totally inadequate prior
to World War I1. Progress generally has been erratic,
however, for officials not only must cope with deeply
ingrained primitive health habits among a population
basically hostile to government direction, but they must
also make their influence felt in many barely accessible
mountain communities.
Albania has traditionally suffered severely from
tuberculosis, malaria, syphilis, and a variety of dietary
and other ailments prevalent in very backward countries.
Tuberculosis remains a main public health threat despite
the advancements made in the battle against the disease
under the Communist regime. A diagnostic screening
program, using tuberculin tests and X -rays for the
population up to the age of 13, is conducted throughout
the country, and in many factories X -ray screening is
undertaken periodically. Nevertheless, the official
tuberculosis mortality rate of 14.7 per 10,000 population
in 1967 was still the highest in Europe, but it represented
a marked decline from the 53.1 deaths per 10,000
registered in 1960. Venereal diseases probably continue to
be .a serious public health problem, even though the
regime claims to have virtually eliminated syphilis. The
prevalence of the disease for centuries, coupled with the
relatively widespread illiteracy and inaccessibility to
proper medical care, makes this claim dubious. A public
health article of late 1969 claims that the last case of
syphilis contracted within the couptry was detected in
1960.
Malaria �one of the most prevalent diseases before
1950 �has been significantly reduced, but the disease
probably persists, partivularly in the lowlands along the
Adriatic. Health officials maintain that no cases of
malaria have been recorded since 1967. Albanian sources
also claim marked reductions in thn incidence of
dysentery and of typhoid fever, but the prevailing
18
inadequacy of sewage disposal, the widespread
contamination of foods and water, and the abundance of
flies require that such claims be treated with caution.
Albanian authorities have also made a concentrated
effort to combat typhus by immunization, but they have
been unable to control either the louse and flea vectors or
the rat population.
Epidemics since the advent of the Communist regime
include two measles epidemics in 1948 -49 and in 1954-
55, an Asiatic flu epidemic io 1957, outbreaks of typhoid
fever in 1945 and in 1950, and poliomyelitis in 1953 and
in 1955 -58. The measles epidemic of 1954 -55 afflicted
almost 14% of the population, and 1,712 children under
age 15 died. Children were vaccinated against measles for
the first time during 1965 with vaccine donated by
Communist China, and the authorities claim that
measles has been eliminated. During the height of the
polio epidemic of 1955 -58 an incidence of 4.3 cases per
100,000 inhabitants was reached. The regime has
imported Salk and Sabin vaccine and claims to have
vaccinated all children up to 4 years of age. Spokesmen
for the Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology claim that
the institute produces rabies and typhus vaccines and
purified serums against diphtheria, tetanus, and rabies.
2. Medical facilities
The Ministry of Public Health regulates the medical
facilities and public health educational programs.
Confronted with staggering medical problems in the
early postwar years� stemming from virtually nonexis-
tent medical and sanitation facilities in a society over
three fourths illiterate �the regime has made measurable
strides in improving the somber picture. The number of
physicians has increased from 102 in 1938 to almost 1,400
in 1969, according to official estimates. Thus, in the latter
year, there was one physician for every 1,500
inhabitants �a marked improvement over the ratio of
one physician per 3,600 inhabitants registered a scant 9
years earlier (1960). This approximate ratio of 6.8
physicians to 10,000 population (1969) still, however,
compares poorly with neighboring Yugoslavia (eight
physicians per 10,000 population), where facilities are
recognized as inadequate, and is well below the rates in
such advanced countries as France (13:10,000) or
Denmark and the United States (16:10,000). Many
physicians are specialists located in urban medical
facilities and probably have little contact with the
population. An Albanian health official's admission in
1968 that the country has only one physician for every
5,998 peasai.'s (or 1.7 physicians for every 10,000 rural
inhabitants) points up the wide disparity between rural
and urban medical care. The shortage of doctors has been
partially compensated for by the training of auxiliary
medical personnel. The number of medical aides,
midwives, and nurses has increased dramatically
having almost doubled between 1960 and 1969. Such
personnel appear to have only minimum medical
knowledge, bu they have helped raise the health level of
the population from the very low levels prevalent before
the Communist takeover. According to official statistics,
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the 8,967 medical cadres listed in 1969 were divided into
the following categories:
Physicians 1,396
Medical aides 725
Midwives 1,001
Nurses 4,100
Laboratory technicians 737
Other 918
Many of the auxiliary medical personnel have been
assigned to rural areas. Between 1962 and 1968 the
number of medical aides in rural areas more than
doubled, and the number of midwives increased almost
sevenfold. Official estimates in 1968 placed 50% of the
medical aides and midwives among the 60% of the
population classified as rural.
Health care facilities, according to 1968 statistics,
include 196 hospitals, 1,108 first -aid stations and
polyclinics, and 36 dispensaries and tuberculosis centers.
A total of 11,922 beds in all institutions throughout the
country in 1968 yields almost 60 beds per 10,000
population. The majority of these beds are reserved for
specialized ?ises, and only 53 hospitals (containing 522
beds) serve rural areas. Health care facilities for the rural
areas are comprised largely of traveling first -aid stations
and polyclinics. Permanent facilities are often
rudimentary first -aid stations or maternity "homes,"
each of which may fuPction as a maternity consultation
center, it first -aid station, or a nursery.
No information is available concerning medical
programs for disaster relief or civil defense. Albania has a
Red Cross and a civil defense organization called the
Society for Aid to the Army and Defense. Fragmentary
evidence indicates that the latter is responsible for all
aspects of civil defense, including measures against
bombing and gas attacks and all forms of first aid.
3. Sanitation
Water supplies are generally inadequate for the needs
of the population and are frequently contaminated and
unfit for drinking. Wells, springs, lakes, rivers, and
streams are the principal sources of water. During the
summer dry season their supply is often meager,
especially in the lowland regions. Water contamination is
common ii rural areas. Wells used by most villages are
located without any consideration for possible pollution
from nearby pit privies and manure piles. By Western
standards the water in most urban areas is neither potable
without further treatment nor adequate in quantity for
basic sanitation requirements. Only Tirane has a fairly
well developed municipal water system, which supplies
more than half of the city's buildings with water. Urban
homes not connected to municipal water systems and
virtually all smaller communities depend on private
wells, cisterns, and public fountains (Figure 14).
Efforts to upgrade water supply systems may be
documented in the press, but meaningful statistics are
rarely presented. It is evident that testing water sources, a
responsibility of the Institute of Health and Epidemi-
ology, has become much more prevalent during the
1960's. Similarly, the construction of simple water mains
and pumping facilities seems to have been given a high
priority. The regime claims to have constructed 187 water
mains in 1968 -69 alone, as well as to have continued
work, during the same period, on a major water
improvernent system in the Shkoder area.
Basic sanitary precautions considered normal in most
of Western Europe have not yet become widespread.
Only Tirane seems to be provided with an adequate
municipal underground sewerage system. Other
communities including such cities as Durres and
Shkoder probably dump untreated sewage into streams,
rivers, lakes, and the Adriatic Sea. In the rural areas most
of the villages still use pit -type open privies. Use of night
soil as fertilizer is believed to be practiced by much of the
peasant population despite a law which forbids it. The
regitue apparently has not yet taken strong countermeas-
ures in some areas. Only Tirane is known to have garbage
and trash disposal systems, though several other cities
probably maintain collection services which operate
infre(liwntly. Street cleaning operations are performed
regularly in Tirane; other urban centers do little to keep
their streets free of refuse.
Ina lequate storage, refrigeration, and transportation
facililies have contributed to serious problems in food
distribution. Correct food handling procedures are
understood by the authorities, but regulations are not
uniformly enforced, and in many sections of the country
contamination of food products occurs during their
processing, transportation, and sale at local markets
(Figure 15). Although the regime has made some progress
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FIGURE 14. Children at public water faucet in Berat (U /OU)

in constructing ric a food- processing plants near the
growing population centers, quantities of produce still
spoil en route to the consumer. Albanian claims of an 18-
fold increase in public refrigeration facilities between
1945 and 1969 provide scant evidence as to actual
progress achieved. In 1945 very little refrigeration
public or private� existed.
4. Levels of living
a. DIET
The dietary level of the population in both quantity
and quality is *the lowest in Europe. Although a member
of the United Nations since 1955, Albania has not
complied with requests by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization for
statistics on daily average per capita caloric consumption.
Collateral evidence indicates, however, that the daily
caloric intake averages about 2,100 calories per capita,
well below the Western European and North American
norm of more than 3,000 calories and the southern
European daily average of 2,800 calories. Frequent
shortages of food constitute the main factor contributing
to nutritional inadequacies. The diet remains deficient in
protein and other essential elements; an estimated 80% or
more of food intake is carbohydrates. Basic dishes, high in
starch content, are made from corn, wheat, rice, and
potatoes. Other fairly common foods, from which most of
the minimal protein requirements are derived, are yogurt,
cheese, and dried beans. Fruits and green vegetables
appear seasonally in limited quantities. Meat of almost
all kinds is still a luxury.
b. HOUSING
One of the most pressing problems is the improvement
of housing, which is characterized by overcrowding, poor
construction, physical deterioration, and inadequate
sanitary facilities. These deficiencies are acutely felt in
urban areas, where two or more families occupy a small
house or apartment and share toilet and kitchen facilities.
Although apartments are relatively inexpensive, their
allocation is strictly linked to the type of employment of
each worker. Since at least early 1968 the regime has
attempted to relieve the urban housing shortage by
promoting apartment construction with "voluntary"
20
labor. About 3,200 apartments were built using state
funds and voluntary labor airing 1968, and about 40
million Ieks were allocated for further such construction
in 1969. A reliable observer in mid -1969 noted, however,
that apartments are of generally shoddy construction and
poorly maintained.
The quality of housing has improved little in rural
areas since World War II. During the third Five Year
Plan (1961 -65), about :30,000 homes were built, most of
them in the villages, but peasant homes generally still are
primitive one- or two -room structures of stone.
Containing only the barest furnishings, the huts are
planned around a central hearth. The traditional
thatched roofs and earthen floors, however, are slowly
giving way to the use of more durable materials, such as
tile and stone. In some rural areas domestic animals are
kept inside the dwelling at night, but this practice may be
declining as a result of strong efforts to modernize the
countryside. Sanitary facilities are primitive in rural
areas, where dwellings frequently lack even outhouses.
According to official claims, every Albanian village had
been. supplied with electricity by the fall of 1970.
Nonetheless, few private rural dwellings have electricity.
The contrast between traditional housing and new urban
apartment buildings is shown in Figure 16.
C. CONSUMER 1' EIS
Despite improvements in many phases of life since the
end of World War II, the level of living of the average
family in Albania remains the lowest in all of Europe. In
addition to frequent food shortages, all consumer items
remain scarce and of poor quality. The daily sight of
queues in front of the shops affords visible evidence of the
hardships and difficulties of life. The ordinary citizen is
estimated to spend 90% of his earnings on food and rent,
while the remaining 10% must be parcelled out for other
necessities, such as clothing, linen, toilet articles (where
used), household furnishings, and transportation. Little,
if any, is left for the most meager entertainment, and
articles considered necessities elsewhere in Europe are
obtained with difficulty. A bicycle, for example, costs
from about 800 to 1,300 Ieks, which at the official
exchange rate (a rate that has little real meaning) would
be US$160 to $260. Automobiles are owned by such a
very small number of people that downtown Tirane little
resembles other European capitals (Figure 17). Figure 18
depicts the availability of specific consumer items in
Albania and other European countries.
5. Social welfare programs
Albania has a broadly based social insurance program
designed, in part, to further official aims to maximize
production, strengthen worker discipline, and reduce
absenteeism and labor turnover. Prior to December 1965
the administrative, technical, and financial functions of
the social insurance program were handled by the trade
unions. As a result of a reorganization, the Office of State
Social Security attached to the Council of Ministers
was charged with running the program through district
social insurance offices apparently attached to the district
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FIGURE 15. Market place in Durres after crowds have
dispersed (U /OU)

people's councils. Interpretations of the social insurance
law often involve the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry
of Public Health, and the court system.
Social insurance does not cover general medical care,
obstetric and pediatric services, or family assistance
payments made to households with children. The state
appropriates special funds for these various categories of
aid. The following tabulation depicts related budget
expenditures in millions of leks for 1967.
Soeial insurance 181.5
ivalth 189.0
Family assistance 117.0
Education and culture 338.0
Social insurance is financed by the state through
appropriations from the state budget and from
contributions made by enterprises, institutions, and state
and social organizations. Individual contributions are
made by members of certain cooperatives but apparently
not by the majority of workers and state employees. Any
deficits in the insurance fund are covered by state funds.
Budgeted social insurance expenditures increased from
100 million leks in 1961 to 120 million in 1965. The 1967
expenditures for social insurance of about 182 million
were allocated in millions of leks as follows, although
data on pension expenditures are contradictory and
outlays in 1967 might include an additional 8.9 million
leks:
Pensions 114.6
Temporary work disability 33.9
Maternity compensation 15.0
Childbirth assistance 7.2
Pesthomes 7.2
�Jther compensation 3.6
The state insurance program covers all government
employees, workers in state -owned factories and
institutions, servicemen, and members of certain
cooperatives (i.e., arts and crafts cooperatives and
fishermen's cooperatives). Collectivized peasants do not
21
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FIGURE 16. Rural and urban housing, Tirane District,
1969 (U /OU)
FIGURE 17. Tirane's main street, Stalin Avenue, during midafternoon. Automobiles
are absent and the avenue is used as a sidewalk. (U /OU)

participate in the system but receive benefits from a fund
created by setting aside a percentage of the total income
of the collective farms. Temporary workers often are not
entitled to all the benefits accorded permanent workers.
The Council of Ministers has the power to extend social
insurance coverage to other worker groups.
The state social insurance plan also provides
unemployment benefits for permanent or temporary
disability, various pensions, maternity leave benefits, and
allowances for births and deaths in a family. A major
portion of the fund allotted to social insurance is spent on
various pension programs. In 1967, according to official
statistics, 40,500 workers received pensions, compared
with 35,500 in 1966. Expenditures on pensions accounted
for some 60% of social insurance expenditures.
Four types of pensions are available under the social
insurance law: old age, permanent disability, family, and
military retirement. However, no more than one pension
may be received at a time. Old -age pensions are set at
70% of a worker's wage but must be between 350 and 900
leks a month. They are paid only upon retirement after a
certain number of years on the job. Depending on the
job, men can retire as early as age 50 with 20 years of
work or as late as age 60 with 25 years on the job; women
can retire as early as 45 or as late as 55. Because of the
shortage of qualified teachers, the regime "allows"
teachers to work until age 65. Partial old -age pensions are
22
granted to workers who have attained retirement age but
do not have the required number of work years. Most
people work beyond the age of retirement. Because of the
chronic labor shortage, part -time or "voluntary" work
continues well beyond the legal retirement age.
Payments for disability are highly differentiated
according to the degree and cause of disability and years
of service. Partially disabled workers can receive a
pension while working at another job, but the total
income from pension and wages cannot exceed the pay
on which the pension is computed. Family pensions are
granted to dependents of a deceased head of household.
Servicemen are eligible for a retirement pension after 20
years of military service. The amount paid increases after
25 years of service (from 35% to 60% of the basic wage),
but the pension is discontinued after a person is eligible
for an old -age pension. Special increments are paid to
those who participated in the revolutionary movement
and in the National Liberation War before 24 May 1944.
According to the revised social insurance law which
went into effect on 1 January 1967, a worker with less
than 10 years of service who is temporarily incapacitated
receives an insurance grant amounting to 70% of his
wages, while a worker with more than 10 years receives
85 Temporarily incapacitated miners with 5 years of
service receive 80% of their wages, and those with more
than 5 years of service receive 95 When inability to
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FIGURE 18. Levels of living in selected countries (U /OU)

work is the result of an accident on the job or is caused by
occupational illness, regardless of seniouty in work, the
insurance pays 95% of a worker's wages and 100% of a
miner's wages. The rates are presumably the same for
lengthy disabilities, and payment apparently continues
until the worker fllny again be gainfully employed.
Miscellaneous benefits granted ender the social
insurance law include cash payments of 280 leks for each
birth, a death payment of 200 leks to survivors,
temporary unemployment compensation for discharged
servicemen and students leaving school, and free
vacations in rest homes (built and administered by the
trade unions with social insurance funds).
Changes in the social insurance law in May 1970
reflect the use of the social insurance law as a tool for
molding behavior. Most notably, requirements for
student unemployment compensation were stiffened, and
the period of compensation was halved in an apparent
effort to encourage a swift transition from school to
gainful employment. The period of military service
required for a retirement pension was increased from 15
to 20 years. Under the new law the state was given further
powers to revoke pensions as a means of helping combat
an upsurge of petty theft and graft. Other changes
include extension of death benefits to families of
temporary workers, reduction of pension benefits for the
permanently disabled who are able to perform simple
tasks, and extension of some pension benefits to relatives
of workers in agricultural cooperatives.
6. Social problems
The social and political revolution which occurred
following the Communist takeover profoundly affected
the lives of a people who for the most part had been
agriculturalists and herdsmen. Such factors as the conflict
between Communist and traditional values, the enforced
collectivization of the land, and the intensive efforts to
industrialize led inevitably to tension between the regime
and much of the population.
Despite relatively effective isolation from develop-
ments elsewhere in Europe, there are indications that
Albania is beginning to face some of the social problems
that have become common in other European countries.
Juvenile delinquency, practically unheard of in Albania
prior to World War 11, has become a matter of some
concern. Th antisocial behavior of youth may be
attributed to the breakdown of respect for authority, as
well as to the social uprooting which occurs when the
rural population begins to move to growing urban
centers. In addition to the kinds of actions normally
termed "delinquent" in Western countries, youth has
been charged with failure to produce satisfactory goods,
violation of work discipline, and manifestation of
"improper attitudes" toward the regime and its
objectives. Theft of state property �which stems largely
from the traditional Albanian attitude that, although it
might be wrong to steal from an individual, there is
nothing wrong with stealing from the government �has
become a major problem. As the state has gradually
assumed control of all production, its vulnerability to
peculation has risen proportionately. Another social
problem is prostitution, which, although illegal, exist in
production centers which employ large numbers of
women. The regime attempts to explain away these
persisting social problems by maintaining that they are
residues of "old ideas" or products of "fri'HIW pressures."
G. Religion (C)
Prior to the Communist takeover the majority of
Albanians were followers of Islam, a legacy deriving from
some five centuries of Turkish rule. A Christian minority
(Orthodox and Roman Catholic) traced its origins to the
missionary activity of the apostles in the first century.
High priority aims of the regime have been to eliminate
as expeditiously as possible both religious traditions and
to supplant them with a holy dedication to the state.
Christianity, according to some accounts, came to
Albania with Saint Paul, when the apostle visited Durres
in the seventh decade of the Christian era. Albania was
the scene of missionary activity from both Rome and
Constantinople, even after the division of the Roman
Empire in A.D. 395 placed Albania in the eastern part of
the empire. The schism of 1054 returned northern
Albania to the jurisdiction of the Roman church, and
during the subsequent three and one -third centuries
Albania became one of the borderlands between the
eastern and western branches of Christianity. The
fortunes of the competing polities with interests in
Albania largely determined the boundaries of the Roman
Catholic and Orthodox Churches, but by the time of the
Turkish invasion in 1385 Roman Catholicism genu:raiy
predominated among the tribes in northern Albania,
while Orthodoxy was strongest in southern Albania.
During more than 500 years of Turkish rule, about 70%
of the population adopted the Muslim religion.
Religion �not nationality provided the basis of the
Ottoman Empire, and the opportunity for a fighting
career with the famed Janissary Corps or the material
advantages of a successful career in the Ottoman
bureaucracy led many Albanians to pledge their sons or
themselves to accept Islam. A number of Albanians
distinguished themselves in the service of the empire and
became provincial lords, pashas, governors, and even
viziers; one of these Albanian administrators founded the
Egyptian dynasty, which lasted until the 1950's. As
suggested above, many Albanians were forced to adopt
Islam upon being drafted into the Ottoman structure
through child tribute or manpower levies. Attempted
forced conversions of the general population however,
were infrequent and not consistently applied because of
the rugged terrain, the scattered population, and the
power of local lords. The occasional instances of mass
coercion coincided with periods of warfare between the
Ottomans and the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian city
states, or Russia. During the more protracted periods of
peace, the established Christian religions were not
molested. Thus, the Orthodox Church even enjoyed
official protection through most of the period up to the
Russo- Turkish wars of the middle 18th century.
23
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According to some authorities, many mountain
highlanders adopted the Muslim religion because the
Muslim concept of the Holy War (jihad) was compatible
with their tightly knit family groups which emphasized
the blood feud and retribution. Evidently many
conversions were entirely pragmatic, however, because
scattered groups of crypto- Christians persons who
publicly avowed Islam and privately practiced
Christianity� continued to survive throughout the period
of Turkish rule.
It is estimated that just prior to the Communist
takeover 70% of the population was of Muslim
background, 20% Orthodox, and 10% Roman Catholic.
Most of the Muslims belonged -either to the majority
Sunni sect �a conservative, orthodox group �or to the
minority liberal Bektashi sect. During the period between
the two world wars Albanians of Orthodox belief
belonged to the independent Albanian Orthodox
Church founded in 1909 in Boston by Albanian
nationalists to combat longstanding Greek influence.
Catholic orders active in Albania prior to World War 1I
included the Franciscans and the Jesuits. Religious
harmony has generally prevailed among the three
religions, although the protracted existence of crypto-
Christianity suggests that there were pressures to conform
to the majority faith. Religion was nearly always
secondary to the traditional 14i404 feuds as a divisive
force; obligations to clan anP v ery- pgarded as more
important than any sense o''cxlmmitmclil'Is particular
religious group.
The Comraaaalists Aryl made a com*ed effort to
reduce the 1t+ IIUi1111Y t41111111unities to nt, amenable
appendages of the stilly, The campaiLn as climaxed in
the early 1950's 1 y aeries of labs ant. decrees which
legalized the churches, mass orga- i Vations financed
and directed by the state. I'Jltimateiv in the late 1960'x,
the regime inaugurated a campaign looking to the final
elimination of all public religious practices and in 1967-
68 rescinded all legislation recognizing organized
religion.
Between 1945 and 1952 clergymen of all three major
religious communities were persecuted, and many church
institutions were closed or confiscated. The first target of
the regime was the Roman Catholic clergy, which
suffered ruthless persecution because it was probably the
best organized and best educated and enjoyed close ties
to the West. During 1945 -46 almost all church leaders in
the top levels of the hierarchy were imprisoned or
executed for "treason," the Vatican's representative in
Tiran6 was deported, and a substantial portion of the
lower clergy was imprisoned, executed, or transferred to
remote parishes. Acting under the land reform law of
1945, the regime closed all Catholic schools, orphanages,
and relief institutions, as well as most of the monasteries,
convents, seminaries, and perhaps one -half of the
churches.
Persecution of the Orthodox Church �while not
unknown �was very mild, not only because of the
proregime sympathies of part of the clergy, but also
probably because the Albanian church had been
24
recognized as an independent church by the Orthodox
Patriarch of Constantinople in 1937. Replacement of
higher ranking clergy was not effected until 1949, when
Archbishop Kristofor Kisi, head of the Albanian
Orthodox Church since 1935, was replaced by a
proregime cleric chosen from the lower ranks. Although
several other leaders of the Orthodox Church were
replaced at the same time, no widespread persecution of
the clergy seems to have occurred.
The most moderate approach was taken toward the
majority Muslim community. Using the classic tactic of
divide and rule, the regime in 1945 granted the Bektashi
sect full autonomy from the majority Sunni Muslims, a
goal sought by the Bektashi during King Zog's reign.
Many Bektashi were sympathetic to the Communists,
having fought with their partisan forces during World
War II, and consequently the regime was able to install
acknowledged Communists in the upper levels of the
Bektashi hierarchy with little difficulty. However, after
the unexplained death of three Bektashi leaders in 1947,
including two important proregime clerics, the regime
initiated a wide -scale purge of the Bektashi sect. By 1950
the Bektashi clergy at the diocesan level had been
completely reshuffled through transfers or arrests. Among
the Sunni Muslims, a number of the leaders seem to have
been liquidated or imprisoned, but there is little
information on the extent of these purges.
The climax of the campaign to first subordinate all the
religious communities to the will of the state is
symbolized by the 1949 Decree on Religious Communi-
ties. The decree� passed as law in 1950� provided for the
separation of church and state and added that the
religious communities could organize and function only
in accordance with statutes approved by the government.
Furthermore, all church bylaws, public statements by
religious leaders, and nominees for spiritual leadership
had to be approved by the government. The law enjoined
churches from operating any philanthropic, welfare, or
public educational institutions. All contacts with foreign
religious communities had to be channeled through the
government, and religious communities which had their
headquarters outside the country (i.e., Jesuits) could not
operate in Albania. The statutes of the four religious
communities were formulated on the basis of the 1950
law and were approved by the government in 1950 -51.
The Catholic Church in its statutes severed its ties with
the Vatican and established the Independent Catholic
Church of Albania. All the religious communities
assumed as their greatest responsibility the inculcation of
patriotic feelings and the promotion of loyalty to the
People's Republic of Albania.
Although the regime for the next 1.5 years or so applied
strict authoritarian restraints on the churches, it adopted
a relatively moderate approach toward personal beliefs,
realizing the difficulty of forcibly changing the customs
of the people. Party lectures in the schools, collectives,
and factories, and appeals calling for continued emphasis
against" proreligious prejudices" were designed to restrict
religion to the older generation and to raise a new
generation whose only loyalty was to the party.
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A change in the relatively moderate attitude occurred
in early 1967 with the initiation of it spirited antireligious
drive. The spark for this campaign was a speech in
February 1967 by Iloxha. Urging all mass organizations
to struggle against religious beliefs and old customs,
Floxha asserted that henceforward "the only religion for
art Albanian is Albanianism." The movement
publicized as an initiative of the people and
implemented largely by youth organizations� attacked
religious institutions and beliefs. Virtually all churches,
jiosques, and ancillary buildings were closed or
nvcrted to secular use, such as museums, restaurants, or
'ernity centers. A number of church buildings were
illy destroyed. A few churches and mosques
-;fitly were retained because of their historical value
F 0 But the 19th century Et'hem Bev mosque in
I lmj( closed, and the Franciscan cloister at Shkoder,
I, the Albanian national poet Father Gjergj Fishta
lived, reportedly was destroyed. In September 1967
L Albanian newspaper asserted that 2,169 religious
buildings had been seized by youth groups during the
first 6 months of 1967. Clergymen reportedly were
defrocked and then drafted into the army, given jobs on
public works, or forcibly retired.
Perhaps the climax of the attack on religious
institutions came in late 1967 with the abrogation of all
laws governing church -state relations. The November
decree annulled the 1950 law and all subsequent decrees
recognizing the statutes of the religious communities.
Formal religion became an extralegal institution, with no
rights, privileges, or obligations �which in a Communist
state means that it became essentially illegal. In the fall
of 1967, propaganda articles claimed that Albania had
become the "first atheist state in the world."
Concurrent with the banning of religious institutions
the regime instituted it concerted attack on all
manifestations of religious belief. The campaign attacked
the observance of religious holidays, fasting, praying,
separation of graves in cemeteries on the basis religious
belief, and the celebration of name. days. Efforts have
been made to substitute national for religious holidays, to
draw up a list of approved names for children (excluding
foreign and religious names), and to redesignate cities
hearing religious names.
The regime has recognized and 11oxha has stated that
the destruction of formal religion does not mean the
disappearance of religious belief. Evidently, religious
beliefs and practices have been forced out of the public
square into the relative privacy of the family. But even
here there is pressure to abjure the traditional faith. The
regime has recently asserted that intrafamily relations
have a political social meaning. Critical press articles
indicate that the new generation is not entirely immune
to i.s parents' religious views. In a society with a long
tradition of fierce independence and still largely rural
and primitive, periodic resistance to official intrusions
into religious privacy is likely to continue.
H. Education (C)
1. Summary and background
The Communist regime has made considerable
progress in reducing illiteracy, and by its own standards
has greatly improved the accessibility, quality, and
relevancy of education. A campaign mounted in the
1950's to teach all persons in the 12 -40 age group to read
and write is reported to have raised the literacy rate from
about 20% in 1945 to an estimated 70% or 75% in recent
years. A national educational system is in the process of
25
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FIGURE 19. Former houses of worship; today's "historic monu-
ments" (U /OU) (above) Bachelor's Mosque, Berat. (right) Saint
Nicolas Church, Mesopotam, Sarande District.

consolidation through intensive =44ing of school
teachers, building schoolhouses, t%P "lg enrollments,
and gradually upgrading standard. The regime has
inaugurated a system of higher education comprising the
country's first university and an expanded network of
higher technical and professional institutes. In its
approach to developing an educational system to meet
what it sees as Albania's needs, the regime has
consistently placed high priority on the mass education of
a "people's intelligentsia," a term which denotes a
politically loyal mass of workers whose technical
proficiency and willingness to work are rivaled only by
their loyalty to the regime. By Western standards the
education system is still rudimentary and unsophisti-
cated, but it has made large strides in providing the
country with a pool of trained workers, even though
chronic shortages of skilled workmen testify to the
system's continuing deficiencies.
Education in pre Communist Albania was confined
largely to foreign supported schools in urban areas. These
schools, nearly all of which were i'n+ +'ii1hll during and
aft W-� 'd War 1, served 4 Very 61/1111/ "NIXUsiV mainly
the of local chieft1 ull(l 1)(Ts ilUu u6tchildren
from the small urbAl middle class. Recatusl of the
prevalence of espeiully restrictive attilmit. toward
women throughout the primitive soeieh. few girls
attended school. DurirWgtllc last century of lttoman rule
(which ended in 1912) tltrare had been a handful of
schools sponsored by the Ivl uV1n s; t 1St V"lox, and Roman
Catholic religious institution instruction in the
Albanian language, however, was prohibited until the
mid -19th century. Instead, Turkic, Latin, and Greek, and
later French and English, were among the languages of
instruction. Any rise in nationalist pressures during the
years of waning Turkish rule, such as accompanied the
first standardization of the Albanian language in 1909,
often led to the closure of the few Albanian language
schools, whatever their rel' 'ous affiliation.
With the formation of a national government in 1920,
the foundation of a national school system was laid. For
the next decade or so political instability inhibited efforts
to consolidate the system, despite the priority given to
building schools in a country still some 90% illiterate.
The nationalization of almost all schools in 1933 was in
part an initial attempt to incorporate them into one
system so as to make education compulsory throughout
the country. The measure was, however, at least equally
concerned with stopping the spread of foreign sponsored
schools� especially those supported by Italy. Foreign
schools proliferated during the interwar years and played
an important role through their education of middle class
Tosk youths, many of whom participated in the
Communist takeover �among them Hoxha and Shehu.
By the time of the Italian invasion in April 1939, some
slight progress had been made; illiteracy had been
reduced to 80% and an increasing number of women
were enrolled in various schools. In March of that year
there were some 650 primary schools with 38,500 male
and 17,000 female pupils, and 18 secondary schools with
5,000 male and 1,500 female pupils. The secondary
schools included, in addition to the prestigious lyccfe in
Korge and the technical school in Tirane, a normal school
26
for boys in Elbasan, a normal school for girls in Tirane,
schools of agriculture at Lrrshnje and Kavaje, and a
commercial institute.
Education in pre- Communist Albania owed much to
the foreign supported school, and developments in the
school system under Communist rule have also strongly
reflected foreign influence. Shortly after the Communist
takeover, the educational system was completely
overhauled so as to conform to Soviet educational
experience. Yugoslav influence, which at that time was
primarily a reflection of Soviet techniques, predominated
in the schools from 1945 to 1948 and was followed by
direct Soviet hegemony in the education field between
1949 and 1960. Soviet influence was I manifvstpll ill dw
daily activity of the school systvili Ilittlllgli textbooks,
compulsory Russian- language courses, and training
teachers in the U.S.S.R. Soviet educators attached to the
Albanian Ministry of Education "advised" their
counterparts on pedagogy and curriculums, and the
growth of the education system often proceeded from the
planning and initiative of these advisers. The 2 -year trade
schools (teknikums) and the higher technical institutes,
established in the early 1950's, followed Soviet patterns,
as did the State University in Tirane, which was founded
in 1957. Soviet influence has remained strong since the
formal Soviet Albanian break in 1961, despite official
efforts to reduce it. Two educational reforms since 1961
appear to reflect in part a desire that Albanian schooling
not mirror the Soviet system. The durability of practices
instilled under Soviet tutelage is shown by the usage until
late 1969 of Soviet nomenclature such as teknikume and
politeknikume. Reports in the fall of 1970 indicated that
Russian is still the prevalent foreign language taught in
the school system, simply because the number of teachers
of that language is greater than for others. Many texts
used in higher education apparently are Soviet texts,
either translated or in Russian.
Progress in education is documented by only a
minimum of statistics, but available data suggest that it
has made great gains. The enrollment of students in all
educatic nal institutions has grown from about 65,000 in
1938 to 499,000 in the 1967/68 academic year. This
almost eightfold growth in the student population
occurred during a period in which the total population
doubled. Of the 499,000 students in 1967/68, some
443,100 attended day -time classes, while approximately
55,900 persons were enrolled in evening or correspond-
ence courses. During 1967 about 25% of the population
was enrolled in educational institutions of all kinds,
representing a 6% proportionate increase over enrollment
in the 1960/61 academic year. The number of schools in
1967/68 offering full daytime courses, their enrollment,
and educational level was as follows:
Primary schools (grades 1- 4)
Eight -year schools (grades 1-8).
Twelve -year schools (grades 1-12)..
Pedagogical schools
Teknikums
Higher education
SCHOOLS PUPILS
2,629 260,630
871 152,025
61 11,961
5 1,853
20 8,493
6 8,141
Total 3,592 443,103
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The pedagogical schools and teknikums (which since
have been renamed according to their specialties) are
secondary technical and vocational schools, and the last 4
years of the 12 -year schools prepare the student for
admission to institutions of higher education. A majority
of students in higher education attend Tirane State
University (5,237 daytime students); the total enrollment
figure includes students in the five polytechnical
institutes. A trend toward consolidating schools reflected
by data for the 1967/68 academic year reveals that the
number of schools declined by about 220 compared with
1964/65.
The fundamental need both to train an adequate
number of teachers and to provide the facilities for the
c -)ntinually expanding educational system constitutes the
most severe challenge facing the educational system.
While detailed information is lacking, a fairly accurate
overview may be gleaned from public utterances by
Albanian leaders and from press accounts. About 18,000
teachers were employed in 1967/68, of whom almost one
half (46 were women. More than 60% of the women
teachers had completed their education in the secondary
pedagogical schools and were employed as teachers in
both the primary and the 8 -year schools. Ultimately the
regime hopes to be able to train a corps of teachers
adequate in number to permit upgrading de facto
training requirements. Such upgrading would demand a
certificate from the Higher Pedagogical Institute for a
permanent teaching post in grades 5 through 8 in the 8-
year schools. This certificate or a degree from one of the
other higher educational institutions is required at
present for teaching at the secondary level. Grades nine
through 12 of the 12 -year schools and the academic and
technical courses in the united and general secondary
schools will ultimately be taught by teachers trained in
the university faculties, notably the Faculty of Arts and
Social Sciences and the Faculty of Natural Sciences. Such
levels of professional training for the teaching staffs have
not yet generally been attained. It was stated reliably
that in the academic year 1969/70 more than 80% of the
students attending the Shkoder Higher Pedagogical
Institute were part -time students teachers already on
the job in the 8 -year schools or in secondary education
but still in the process of finishing the alleged prerequisite
pedagogical training. Other reliable evidence indicates
that vocational schools employ as teachers experienced
workers with practically no pedagogical training, while
girls in their early teens who have completed only the 8-
year primary course are undergoing "crash training
courses" so as to teach in the growing number of
preschool centers. Figure 20 depicts the increase in
students and teachers at various educational levels since
the mid- 1950's.
The shortage of classrooms has led to the use of
factories and buildings owned by cooperatives as
emergency teaching facilities. These shortages have
hindered the development of the educational system
beyond the required 8 years. In the fall of 1969 the
Minister of Education and Culture admitted that
secondary education was confined largely to urban areas.
TEACHERS
Preprimary
STUDENTS
(Thousands)
1955156
(Thousands)
1.07
Secondary
23.10
0.15
195556
4.38
063
1961 62
17.50
1.03
1964 65
2980
0.91
1961 68
1990
Vocational-
039
1955:56
9.00
0.59
1961 62
17.00
0.75
1964.65
2200
0.64
1967;68
21.00
Primary
4.30 1955,56 145.40
5.87 1961162 197.00
12.20 1964;65 328.80
8.67 967;68 268.50
*includes 2.708 students _nd IIS teachers in secondary
keel pedagogical schools (1967/66).
FIGURE 20. Numbers of teachers and students at all
educational levels, 1956 -68 (U /OU)
His remarks also acknowledged the difficulties of
providing adequate schooling in the more inaccessible
mountain regions, difficulties compounded by the
prejudices of a rural population that still sees little value
in education.
Under the terms of the constitution, all citizens enjoy
equal rights with respect to education, regardless of
ethnic identity, sex, and economic and social standing. In
actual practice, however, children whose parents have
been labeled "enemies of the people" and students whose
political loyalty is in doubt are often denied an
education. With the possible exception of preschool
training in kindergartens and day nurseries, education is
provided free of charge through the university level. All
citizens who have completed secondary schooling are
theoretically entitled to free higher education, subject
only to meeting certain work and academic requirements.
Additionally, scholarships are provided for many full
time students at higher educational institutions to help
pay for room, board, and other expenses. Workers
attending school part time are given paid leave for study
sessions and examinations.
As in all Communist countries, education is under
complete party and state control, with the entire system
administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture.
The ministry approves all plans, programs, and
textbooks, controls all schools in the educational system,
and directly administers all schools of higher learning.
Even the "voluntary classes" set up by workers in
factories and cooperatives come fairly promptly under
the "sympathetic" purview of the ministry. A hierarchy
of administrative and supervisory bodies extends from the
27
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Preprimary
0.60
1955156
15.90
1.07
1961 !62
23.10
1.11
1964;65
23.00
1.12
1967168
26.00
*includes 2.708 students _nd IIS teachers in secondary
keel pedagogical schools (1967/66).
FIGURE 20. Numbers of teachers and students at all
educational levels, 1956 -68 (U /OU)
His remarks also acknowledged the difficulties of
providing adequate schooling in the more inaccessible
mountain regions, difficulties compounded by the
prejudices of a rural population that still sees little value
in education.
Under the terms of the constitution, all citizens enjoy
equal rights with respect to education, regardless of
ethnic identity, sex, and economic and social standing. In
actual practice, however, children whose parents have
been labeled "enemies of the people" and students whose
political loyalty is in doubt are often denied an
education. With the possible exception of preschool
training in kindergartens and day nurseries, education is
provided free of charge through the university level. All
citizens who have completed secondary schooling are
theoretically entitled to free higher education, subject
only to meeting certain work and academic requirements.
Additionally, scholarships are provided for many full
time students at higher educational institutions to help
pay for room, board, and other expenses. Workers
attending school part time are given paid leave for study
sessions and examinations.
As in all Communist countries, education is under
complete party and state control, with the entire system
administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture.
The ministry approves all plans, programs, and
textbooks, controls all schools in the educational system,
and directly administers all schools of higher learning.
Even the "voluntary classes" set up by workers in
factories and cooperatives come fairly promptly under
the "sympathetic" purview of the ministry. A hierarchy
of administrative and supervisory bodies extends from the
27
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ministry into each school. The education and culture
sections of the district people's councils have direct
jurisdiction over almost all the schools. The sections
report to the executive committees of the district councils
and are responsible for inspecting schools, implementing
educational plans, improving teachers' skills, collecting
teaching materials, and improving school buildings.
Every school director, who is responsible to the district
executive committee, is assisted by a deputy director and
a pedagogical council. The pedagogical council
supervises the implementation of the curriculum and
provides a forum for the pol'tical and professional
evaluation of teachers. The party exercises control
through the school's basic party organization or through
the local branch of the Union of Working Youth of
Albania, one of the party's front organizations. Many
teachers in lower schools belong to the party or the youth
organization, and a majority of teachers in secondary
schools and higher institutes holds membership in the
party.
Party controls in education extend directly into the
student body through several mass organizations for
young people. The pioneer organization (for children
ages 7 to 14) and the Union of Working Youth (ages 15 to
26) have branches in every school. These junior party
organizations are headed by full -time organizers
appointed by the party, and, although not enrolling the
entire student population, serve as focal points to enlist
all students in a variety of extracurricular activities. Such
activities can range from voluntary work on a railroad to
closing religious institutions (as in 1967). The youth
organizations are also held responsible for such classroom
functions as insuring discipline and preventing
unnecessary absenteeism or student dropouts.
After a 2 -year "mass discussion" on "revolutionizing"
the schools, an educational reform was passed in late
1969 and went into effect on 1 January 1970. By the
autumn of 1970 it was in the initial stages of
implementation. This reform undertakes the second
reorganization of the schools in about 10 years and seems
intended to build upon and develop the reorganization
undertaken in 1963. Emphasizing polytechnical training
much like the previous reform, the current law lays down
a three -part curriculum of "academic (classroom) study,
productive labor, and military and physical training."
This new program is held to be applicable for all levels of
the educational system, but stress seems to be placed
clearly on its immediate implementation in all secondary
and higher education courses. Both secondary and higher
education graduates must perform 8 to 9 months of
production work �the former to qualify for higher
education work and the latter to receive their degree.
Military training begins in the first year of the secondary
school curriculum, continues throughout higher
education, and is supplemented by a 3 -month course
after graduation. Secondary school curriculums are to be
standardized by adopting a single 4 -year course, which
purportedly will balance general and vocational training,
but the traditional emphasis on vocational/ technical
28
course work will probably continue� encouraged by the
more stringent production work requirements. Other
specifics include lowering the school entrance age from 7
to 6 years of age and establishing a unified 8 -year school
which incorporates the still separate primary and
intermediate schools.
Factors behind the reform include an apparent desire
to reduce a lingering pervasive Soviet influence (the
Soviet system of naming secondary schools was finally
dropped) and an attempt to inject more polytechnical
and military training into the "academic" atmosphere of
general secondary and university courses. The increased
polytechnical training is intended to better serve the
needs of an economy short of skilled labor, while more
military training may reflect continued concern over
Soviet intentions, particularly in the aftermath of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
2. Educational system
The educational system, as out!hied in the law of 1
January 1970, is divided essentially into four stages:
preschool, general 8 -year, secondary, and high.:r
education. A program of adult education for workers,
which has been steadily expanding in recent years, is also
incorporated within the system (Figure 21). Preschool
education is provided in kindergartens and in day
nurseries (creches) for children in the 3 -5 age group.
Although the regime claims teat all education is free, a
revised 1967 fee, rate for child care in nurseries and
kindergartens has never been repealed. Charges for
preschool care range from 70 to 200 leks a month,
depending on family income. Dt�spite the burden of such
fees, 26,021 children (at least a third of the preschool age
children) attended 417 kindergartens in i967/68. Nearly
all these facilities were located in cities and towns. A
recekit drive to expand kindergartens in rural areas
increased :attendance in 1970/71 to 40,257 children in
928 separate facilities. An obligatory 8 years of general
education for children (ages 6 -13) is to be conducted in a
unified 8 -year school. The 8 -year schools provide the
pupils with the basic elements of academic, ideological.,
moral, physical, and military education. Until the
transition period is completed, separate primary schools
(grades 1 -4) continue to exist, especially in the more
remote rural areas, but the regime is giving high priority
to making compulsory 8 -year primary schooling available
throughout the country as rapidly as possible. After
completing the compulsory 8 years of basic education,
normally at age 13, a student may continue at the
secondary level for 4 more years.
Officials maintain that all secondary schools provide
equivalent levels of general education. Such statements
have the essentially propagandistic intent of reinforcing
the concept of a classless society. In practice certain
disciplines and programs are more demanding �and
ultimately more rewarding �than others, and there are
clear differences in the emphasis accorded vocational as
opposed to general education. All secondary schools have
the same general structure: 6'/2 months' classroom study,
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FIGURE 21. Educational system, January 1970 (U /OU)
2 months' production work, 1 month's military
training, and 2 months' vacation. The united secondary
schools provide both general and vocational/ technical
training, as do the general secondary schools. The fi. 4
years of the 12 -year school, however, probably offer more
work in the theoretical sciences in preparation for
matriculation into one of the university faculties. All
three types of secondary schools prepare the student for
continued study in an institution of higher education.
The vocational secondary schools specialize in specific
vocations, such as construction, mining, trade,
paramedical work, or pedagogy. The graduates of such
schools are classified as middle -grade cadres and work as
low -level accountants, agmaomists, teachers, assistan_
physicians, technicians, and veterinary specialists.
Often �but not always �the phrase "middle- grade" is
prefixed to these titles to distinguish them from people
with more education. Multibranched secondary schools
provide under one roof several vocational, technical, and
lower professional courses. These latter categories of
vocational secondary schools are all, in one form or
another, the apparent successors of the Soviet teknikums.
Higher education courses are from 3 to 5 years'
duration, and, like the secondary schools, entail the triad
of classroom study, production work, and physical and
military education. All secondary school graduates must
complete 8 or 9 months of production work to be eligible
for higher education, and workers who complete
secondary school through attending part -time classes
must take a 1 -year preparatory course in general
education before admission to higher educational
institutions. Graduates of higher education must undergo
an 8- or 9 -month probationary period in production work
and a 3 -month military training course.
Higher education in Albania is relatively new. There
were no facilities for higher education before World War
If, and young people who wanted to continue their
studies had to go abroad. Tirane State University, the
only university in Albania, was organized in 1957 by
consolidating four institutes established in the postwar
period. The State University functions under the
direction of the Ministry of Education and Culture and
has seven faculties and two institutes. Higher education is
also provided at the State Higher Agricultural Institute-
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13 14; 1s 16 1i
Is to 20 21 22`
#1raf1 xa a
11 1 1S
16 -17 16 19 20.
k
S KI a A t v SLtafAEII;.
NOW
iy4 1
1
lAoedale 76d 7,
1 1
AyTt .4k
SdaneRle/Tadr4eal)
I!t'RYFRSItY
Jt
5/y&
i +Y tf f h I C 1"11.
7 K
Uasd(c and
w�r-.
r;
Vaasllawl/Tidriml)
W41MITE
w4
12 -YEAR SC110015
NKM WSTITUfE
F....
4Yaa Sdnek
Sdwrl6ctTadrimU
(CAngrhery Edaoa7on1
WWI! PASTIME OF
MIYSICAL CULTURE
5600
I SN61a vecallald paclaNp
Y
1a
NSTIME
AlUL116R/dICID
n I
SECCMOAW fC110015
w. (S..ual vomrton01 +p,Cj0W l
r
t:
'WahYq thdpnt who canp4ta raooM011d srmdory
1di0ol and 1vM b purwe Inulf
oengMa a'1 -raoi cauiia m 6 a111W 4
FIGURE 21. Educational system, January 1970 (U /OU)
2 months' production work, 1 month's military
training, and 2 months' vacation. The united secondary
schools provide both general and vocational/ technical
training, as do the general secondary schools. The fi. 4
years of the 12 -year school, however, probably offer more
work in the theoretical sciences in preparation for
matriculation into one of the university faculties. All
three types of secondary schools prepare the student for
continued study in an institution of higher education.
The vocational secondary schools specialize in specific
vocations, such as construction, mining, trade,
paramedical work, or pedagogy. The graduates of such
schools are classified as middle -grade cadres and work as
low -level accountants, agmaomists, teachers, assistan_
physicians, technicians, and veterinary specialists.
Often �but not always �the phrase "middle- grade" is
prefixed to these titles to distinguish them from people
with more education. Multibranched secondary schools
provide under one roof several vocational, technical, and
lower professional courses. These latter categories of
vocational secondary schools are all, in one form or
another, the apparent successors of the Soviet teknikums.
Higher education courses are from 3 to 5 years'
duration, and, like the secondary schools, entail the triad
of classroom study, production work, and physical and
military education. All secondary school graduates must
complete 8 or 9 months of production work to be eligible
for higher education, and workers who complete
secondary school through attending part -time classes
must take a 1 -year preparatory course in general
education before admission to higher educational
institutions. Graduates of higher education must undergo
an 8- or 9 -month probationary period in production work
and a 3 -month military training course.
Higher education in Albania is relatively new. There
were no facilities for higher education before World War
If, and young people who wanted to continue their
studies had to go abroad. Tirane State University, the
only university in Albania, was organized in 1957 by
consolidating four institutes established in the postwar
period. The State University functions under the
direction of the Ministry of Education and Culture and
has seven faculties and two institutes. Higher education is
also provided at the State Higher Agricultural Institute-
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with its three faculties of agronomy, forestry, and
veterinary medicine �and the Higher Institute of
Physical Culture, the Higher Institute of the Arts, and the
year Higher Pedagogical Institutes in Tirane and
Shkoder. The Higher Institute of the Arts comprises three
former institutes (figurative arts, dramatic arts, and the
conservatory). According to official Albanian statistics,
7,300 students attended Tirane State University in
1970/71. Over 80% of the students at institutions of
higher education reportedly receive financial grants
covering their room and board. In certain branches of
study, such as mathematics, physics, and the life sciences,
all students hold state scholarships. They are also covered
by the state social security systems, and they receive free
hospital treatment. Enrollment in higher education in
1967/68 is shown in Figure 22.
Albanian is the official language of the school system,
but in Creek speaking villages Greek is used in the first
four grades and Albanian is taught in 1 -hour daily
sessions. Beyond the fourth grade, Albanian becomes the
only language of instruction throughout the country, and
one foreign language� Russian, French, or English �is
offered students in the fifth through 12th grades. One
secondary school specializing in languages has courses in
German and Italian, and university courses (mainly in
the philology faculty) include other languages. Russian is
the most widely taught second language, in part because
of the large number of Russian- speaking teachers. Italian,
however, is still widely spoken and is the chief means of
communication for diplomats in Tirane.
FIGURE 22. S'T'UDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL
COURSES, 1967/68 (U /OU)
Total 5,237
2,717
PART -TIME
Higher Agricultural Institute:
CORRE-
TOTAL
839
DAY
SPOND-
ENROLL
150
TIME
ENCE
MENT
Tirane State University:
0
324
Total
Economics
437
838
1 ,275
Geology
25.5
0
255
History and philology..........
984
960
1,944
Engineering
1,102
157
1,259
Political science and jurispru-
tute (2 years)
dence
163
341
504
!Medicine
1 ,034
0
1,034
Natural sciences
1,262
421
1,683
Total 5,237
2,717
7,954
Higher Agricultural Institute:
Agronomy
839
395
1,234
Forestry
150
24
174
Veterinary
324
0
324
Total
1,313
419
1,732
Higher Institute of the Arts......
232
7
239
Higher Institute of Physical Cul-
ture
169
22
191
Tirane Higher Pedagogical Insti-
tute (2 years)
331
782
1,113
Shkoder Higher Pedagogical Insti-
tute(2 years)
859
347
1,206
Grand total 8,141 4,294 12,435
An extensive network of part -time schools for workers
and peasants has been established in an effort to upgrade
the educational level of the work force. Any level of
schooling from a primary education to university course
work is, in principle, available.. The employed worker has
the theoretical advantage of acquiring a general
education while improving his job related skills, but in
practice the emphasis is almost exclusively on the latter.
Working students can complete the 8 -year school in 6
years and secondary school in the normal 4 years but
must study at schools of higher learning a year longer
than normal. Workers' secondary schools, both
vocational and general, have been set up in enterprises,
farms, or as adjuncts to regular schools. Evidently, the
curriculum is more limited in these secondary schools
than in regular secondary schools, and is determined
largely by the specialty of the sponsoring economic
enterprises. Graduates of these secondary schools must
take a 1 -year preparatory course in "general education"
prior to entering a :'Agher educational institution.
Branches of the higher educational institutions have been
set up around the country, and workers theoretically may
complete their studies while still on the job. By early 1970
the regime claimed to have established 22 branches of
Tirane State University and seven branches of the
Shkoder Higher Pedagogical Institute in various parts of
the country. Each branch evidently offers advanced
training in a single subject area (i.e., mathematics
physics, agronomy, hydrotechnological construction)
rather than a general education.
Economic enterprises have often been expected t,
expand the network of workers' schools. The state has
looked to economic enterprises as a source of "reserves" in
order to overcome temporarily the nationwide shortage of
qualified teachers, adequate facilities, and suitable
teaching materials. Teachers in these schools are usu:aiy
the better educated production workers, and spare rooms
in factories and other enterprises can be used as
classrooms. Not surprisingly, the enterprises often have
not implemented the workers' schw program
satisfactorily. The schools suffer because of p y trained
teachers and the high absentee and drop- rates of
undermotivated students dragooned into the ,ssroom
by overzealous organizers anxious only to mee; quotas.
Enrollment remains substantial, however; officials assert
that 60,000 full -time workers were enrolled in schools
during the 1969/70 academic year.
There is no reliable information on the number of
Albanians studying abroad. just prior to the break with
Moscow in 1961 Tirane claimed that about 1,200
Albanians were enrolled in Soviet institutions. Prior to
September 1966, when Peking announced that all foreign
students were to be sent home, a number of Albanians
were known to be studying in Communist China.
Albanian press reports in the fall of 1970 alluding to
Albanian "trainees" in China suggest that Peking is
again training some Albanians.
I. Artistic and cultural expression (U /OU)
The evolution of a native Albanian culture was long
impeded by geography and foreign domination. Settling
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in the hilly interior rather than along the unhealthful
coas'al lowlands throughout most of their history,
Albanians exhibit the inbred culture typical of mountain
folk. But until the 20th century they could not experience
an integrated cultural growth. Numerous small villages in
the valleys and clusters of dwellings on the lower slopes
were isolated, one from the other, by deep gorges and
chasms and steep mountain walls. Thus, notwithstanding
the small area occupied by ethnic Albanians, local tribal
customs and cultural expression were slow to meld into a
national culture. Such melding was probably further
obstructed by long established blood feuds (vendettas),
the vigor of which rivaled any in the Mediterranean area.
Even the Albanian language, reflecting this cultural
divergence, evolved over the centuries in two distinct
idioms, each encompassing several dialects. Geg was
spoken in the north and Tosk in the south, areas
separated roughly by the Shkumbin river. Only since
1908 has there been a conscious effort to reconcile these
idioms and dialects into a national Albanian language.
Four centuries of Ottoman domination, terminating in
the early 20th century, isolated Albania from the
intellectual and artistic currents of Europe. Permanent
cultural legacies derived from the Ottoman occupiers
seem to have been largely confined to the Muslim
religion, which in a modified form was adopted by nearly
70% of the population. Numerous Albanians, in turn,
made distinctive contributions to the administrative and
military leadership of the vast Ottoman Empire. The
cultural tradition which continued to develop in the
"eagle's mountain fastness" remained essentially
indigenous and largely parochial, if not tribal. It
consisted primarily of a fund of lyric and heroic songs,
proverbs, and other folklore. This material was
complemented by a few hooks from the wilder Ceg area
produced in the 16th and 17th centuries reflecting
almost exclusively Roman Catholic missionary activities,
some 18th century Tosk poetry produced by exiles in
Italy, and 19th century nationalist writings originating in
both the exile communities across the Adriatic and in
neighboring Serbia and in the Albanian homeland.
The oral folklore was first collected and transcribed in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Since Geg and
Tosk are for the most part mutually intelligible, there wi:s
a ready interchange, depending on who was transcribing.
Much of the recording, however, was accomplished in
the Tosk- speaking Albanian enclaves in Italy; nearly all
of the material has subsequently been set down in
modern Albanian Latin orthography, itself based (since
World War II) on the Tosk idiorn.
The strong European nationalist movements of the
19th century, notably the Risorgintento in Italy, stirred a
national awareness among Albanians. With their
homeland still firmly under 'Turkish control, such
awareness was first manifested in the writings of
expatriate Albanians in Italy, and then in neighboring
Serbia. A conclave of Albanian patriots in the Serbian
town of Prizren, who protested the shelving by the
Congress of Berlin (1878) of the Albanian petition for
autonomy, gave a marked impetus to Albanian letters
through the nurturing of two of Albania's greatest
writers: Naim Frasheri (18.6 -1900) and George Fishta
(1871 1940).
Standing above all the writers of this period is Father
George Fishta, whose epic, The Lute of the Mountains,
details the Albanian struggle for national freedom over
the past several cenwries. Largely ignored by the
Communist regime, Fishta used the Geg idiom of the
northern highlanders and the meter from traditional
Albanian heroic poetry in composing the more than
13,000 verses of the The Lute. Frasheri�a romantic poet
influenced by Persian mysticism and Bektashi Muslim
beliefs- -was a staunch proponent of Albanian
nationalism and is often regarded as the national poet of
Albania. Although his collection of short poems, Spring
Flowers, is considered to have more literary merit, the
Communist regime recognizes only his works which stress
great patriotism, as the history of Skanderbeg, an epic
poem which details the battles between Albanians and
Turks during the era of that greatest Albanian national
hero (17th century).
Following Albania's declaration of independence in
1912, a number of Albanian writers were able to return to
their native land to work. Among the writers of this
period must be numbered P. Vincene Prennushi (1885
1954), a lyric poet who remained in Albania after the
Communist takeover; another lyric poet, Lasgusk
Poradeci (1899- who moved from the traditional heroic
subject matter to write of sunsets, birds, and love; Ernest
Kolicli (1900- a poet who attempted to combine
traditional Albanian themes and exposition with the
newer Western trends and later turned to fascism.
Western, and especially Italian influences were great
before Work' War 11, but with the imposition of the
Communist regime Yugoslav, Soviet, and Chinese
influences have, in turn, been paramount.
Before 1945 there were no professional theaters and
only occasional amateur performances in Albania. Two
Albanian playwrights who attained some local
prominence were Sami Frasheri and Kristo Eloqi. The
Communist regime recognized the utility of the theater as
an instrument for indoctrination and under Yugoslav
tutelage established a professional theater group in 1945.
Since then several professional and amateur groups have
been established throughout the country. In 1 .964 some
22 professional drama and variety theaters were
identified. Cinematography likewise was unknown in
Albania (except fora joint Italian Albanian documentary
team in Tirane during World War II) and was developed
only with Soviet aid in 1949-50. A few full length, artistic
films are produced from time to time; the majority of the
films are short usually documentaries of a di actic
nature.
Albania has a rich tradition of heroic and lyric folk
songs. Accompanied by the lute, the bagpipe (roja), or
the tamberine (tupan), these songs have been handed
down from generation to generation. Small field
orchestras (save) often provide music for weddings and
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other special occasions. Western music was first spread
throughout the country in the 1920's by an Albanian
brass band trained in the United States. Kristro Kono, the
only composer of significance in pre Communist
Albania, remains active tinder the Communist regime
and is a friend of Enver Hoxha. State supported musical
academics and iocal musical groups have been started
throughout the country, and the National Opera and
Ballet Theater and the National Song and Dance
Ensemble have been established in Tirane.
Painting and sculpture were poorly developed in pre
Communist Albania. An art school, rudimentary by
contemporary Western standards, opened in Tirane only
in the 1930's, and it was necessary for students to g1 1
abroad for advanced st: dy, usually in Italy. Androni:li
Zengo, an Athens- trained painter, and Odhise Paskal, a
sculptor trained in Florence, achieved fame before the
Communist takeover and continued to be productive
under the new regime.
Artistic and cultural expression under the Communists
has been tightly channeled to promote the goals of the
regime. Few works produced since 1944 in Albania have
any literary value. Rather, the cultural front has been
characterized by attacks on the principle of "art for art's
sake," efforts to mobilize the arts as a didactic tool of the
regime, and appropriation of great Albanian writers of
the past to support current campaigns. All books, music,
plays, paintings, or sculptures are judged for
acceptability according to the precepts of "socialist
realism." to practice, these precepts may range from the
personal predilections of the party leadership to thernes
supporting economic or social goals. The arts are
regarded as a political weapon and envisaged as being on
the front lines of the "class struggle." They constitute
part of the media for education and indoctrination and
must he topical and reflect the themes of current
experience. Consistently stressed themes have been the
heroic struggle for socialist construction, the emancipa-
tion of women, the struggle against old customs, and e
virtue of patriotism.
Cultural policy seeks to awaken an awareness of It
Albanian cultural and military achievements as a method
of inculcating patriotism. Naim Frasheri has been
extolled by the regime as a great national poet,
principally because of his idealization of Skanderbeg. His
near contemporary, George F'ishta, tends to be ignored,
notwithstanding the greater literary merit of his work. In
the eyes of the regime The Lute lacks material that lends
itself to interpretation as "socialist realism." The regime
has selectively extracted from Albanian history persons
and events to support current campaigns. One of the
salient features of the "cultural revolution" begun in
1966 was a depiction of the close parallels between past
heroic deeds and the heroism of socialist construction in
present -day Albania.
Mass organizations, such as the Union of Working
Youth of Albania, the Union of Albanian Women, and
the Albanian- Chinese Friendship Society, envelop
virtually all the population and encourage and organize
amateur cultural activities among different groups. The
32
designation of Palaces of Culture (Figure 23) has
accompanied the effort to "organize" culture. As in all
other Communist states, writers and artists are organized
into a professional control organization. The Union of
Writers and Artists of Albania, formed in 1956 as a
successor to two separate organizations for writers and
artists, has held only two congresses (1957 and 1969) since
its inception, with the last congress attended by some 400
members. The union publishes two cultural journals,
Drita and Nendori, which print literary works and
criticism. All longer written works must be published
through the state publishing house.
Artists and writers are able to produce works only at the
sufferance of the regime. Periodic repressions of writers
and artists are probably more an exercise than a reaction
against genuine protest, which has not been much in
evidence. A particularly scathing and wide- ranging
attack took puce in mi4-1966 in an apparent modified
imitation of the cultural revolution in Communist China.
Singled out for special attention were deviant writers.
Previous criticism was milt( compared with the attack on
the novel The Tunnel published in 1966. Its author,
Dhirniter Xhuvani, revealed the hardships of life in
Albania and the heavy price which the people have been
forced to pay in order to achieve some progress in their
country. Xhuvani was censured for distorting the reality
of life, lowering the morale of the working people, and
slandering their hero image. Xhuvani quickly admitted
his "grave ideological errors" and publicly confessed that
he had fallen prey to foreign bourgeois influences. This
episode was accompanied by a campaign obliging
intellectuals to live and work for a while among the
people. In early 1966 and 1967, brigades of writers and
artists were dispatched to the countryside to work and to
learn from the broad popular masses. By early 1969, with
the convocation of the much postponed Second Congress
of the Union of Writers and Artists of Albania, the
pressure on the cultural intelligentsia seems to have
abated. Criticism of leading personalities of the union did
not end in their removal from leadership positions. A new
law in late 1969 reversed the party position of 1966.
Whereas the campaign of 1966 -67 sought to place artists
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FIGURE 23. Palace of Culture, Berat (U /OU)

among the people and put them in production work, the
1969 law made it possible for writers and artists �with
the approval of the Ministry of Education and Culture
to become professionals. quit production work, and live
entirely on a government subsidy.
J. Public information (C)
All public information media, the press, radio, and
films, are tightly controlled by the state and used
primarily to indoctrinate the population with the
regime's goals, achievements, and outlook. Only
secondarily do they attempt to raise the cultural level of
the people or provide entertainment and relaxation. The
ability of the public media to imbue the population with
official aims is hampered, however, by the newsprint
shortage, poor transportation and distribution, and the
poorly organized and inadequate radiobroadcasting
system.
In spite of these problems, circulation of printed matter
has increased. In 1955 there were nine newspapers with a
total annual circulation of more than 19.5 million copies,
whereas in 1961 there were 13 newspapers with an annual
circulation of almost 33 million copies. By 1967 these
figures had increased markedly, with 19 newspapers
accounting for a circulation of 45.5 million. The number
of periodicals increased from 23 in 1955 to 37 in 1964, but
subsequently decreased to 34 in 1967, with a total
circulation of 1.5 million. Probably the most widely read
newspaper is the party's official organ Zed i Popullit,
which has an estimated daily circulation (1967) of 85,000
copies, and serves as a model for all the other news media.
A recent development in journalism has been the
appearance of Ideal newspapers sponsored by regional
party committees. Since 1967, five regional papers,
reported to he published twice weekly, have appeared:
feta a Re (New Life), published in Shkoder; Perpara
(Forward), published in Koro; Pararoja (Vanguard),
published in Gjirokaster; Adriatic, published in Durres,
and New Kukes, published in Kukes. At enterprises,
schools, and state institutions information sheets are
posted as wall newspapers �or flash bulletins �by local
party agitators or youth organizations. tike all the public
media, these wall newspapers are polemical in style and
generally aim at propagandizing current campaign
slogans. Principal newspapers and periodicals are listed in
Figure 24.
The official Albanian Telegraph Agency (ATA) is the
only press agency in Albania and handles both domestic
and foreign Pews. Its regional representatives are the
channels by which local propaganda media receive
handouts from governmental and party organizations. It
also transmits domestic news abroad, distributes the
releases of other news agencies, and monitors foreign
broadcasts. Since Albania's break with the Soviet Union
in 1961, Communist China's New China News Agency
(NCNA) has replaced the Soviet TASS service as the main
supplier of foreign news to Albania.
Radiobroadeasting serves primarily as an instrument of
the party for furthering its social, economic, and political
policies. Radio Tirane is the heart of the entire system of
radio stations in Albania and originates both the
Albanian International Service and the Albanian Home
Service. The domestic radio stations (located in
Gjirokaster, Korg6, Kukes, Shkoder, the city of Stalin, and
possibly in Durres) have low -power transmitters and
probably serve as relay points from Radio Tirane to a
network of wired loudspeakers and private receivers.
Radio programs from Italy and Greece are reportedly
popular in southern and southeastern Albania. The
government's policy of not jamming foreign broadcasts
on a regular basis to stem from the expense
involved in establishing and maintaining appropriate
installations rather than from a relaxation of ideological
vigilance.
Although the Albanians have had an experimental TV
station operating in Tirane since 1960, there are few if
any relay stations in the mountainous country, and
telecasting still appears to be limited to some 3 hours a
week in the vicinity of the capital city. The regime may
now be moving to expand this coverage. In late 1969 it
reportedly requested French aid for the early installation
of a national TV network. Television sets are estimated to
number 2,100, all located in the capital area. Both
Yugoslav and Italian TV transmissions are received in the
Tirane area, but the regime evinces strong hostility only
to the Yugoslav programs. Private ownership of TV sets
appears to be restricted almost entirely to the ruling elite
and is discouraged by very high import duties. Albanian
TV receivers use the standard European 625 -line
definition.
Both radio receivers and wired loudspeakers are fairly
numerous in Tirane and other large cities. Some rural
areas probably have neither, but the campaign to
electrify every village (a goal whose success was
acclaimed in November 1970) undoubtedly will bring
wired loudspeakers to most parts of the country. Official
Albanian statistics indicate that there were about 150,000
radio receivers in the country in 1968 �a twofold increase
over 1964. Nevertheless, the high cost of radios continues
to place them out of the reach of many rural dwellers.
Reliable statistics are not available, but it was estimated
that there were about 161,000 radio receivers and 30,000
to 35,000 wired loudspeakers in 1970.
Other public information media, such as films, public
libraries, and museums, also are utilized to serve the
interests of the state. Albanian studios produce very few
full length, feature films, restricting most of their
production to short documentary and propaganda films
which are intended to reinforce loyalty to the regime and
its policies. A small number of feature films are imported
from Italy, along with documentaries from friendly
Communist countries. In 1967 Albania had 95
permanent motion- picture houses in operation and an
unknown number of mobile units for the less accessible
areas of the country. In the same year there were 24
museums open to the public, along with 29 libraries,
having a total collection of about 1.4 million volumes.
The two largest libraries �the National Library and the
University Library, both in Tirane �hold over half of the
available volumes.
33
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25X1

Government and Politics
A. Summary and background (C)
Albania emerged as a nation -state in 1912 when a
group of Albanian leaders declared the country's
independence from a hard- pressed Ottoman Empire
during the First Balkan War. Five centuries of Turkish
hegemony could not he replaced overnight, however, and
the country's birth was a protracted event (1912 -21)
presided over by the Great Powers and complicated by
the territorial claims of Albania's neighbors. The Treaty
of London (1913), which provided a general settlement of
the First Balkan War, rejected de facto Serbian
occupation of much of the country and affirmed
Albania's unilaterally declared independence. It was not
until after World War I and the peace settlements of
1919 -20, however, that Albania was able to achieve its
goal of independence.
As elsewhere in the troubled Balkans, self
determination in the area inhabited by ethnic Albanians
was not all- pervasive. The fairly extensive northeast
Kosovo region, originally awarded to Serbia just prior to
the outbreak of World War I, was confirmed under
Yugoslav control. In fact, the boundaries of Albania as
determined in 1913 -14 remained virtually unchanged,
engendering reciprocal Yugoslav and Greek irredentist
claims that have endured to the present. Further claims
on Albanian sovereignty were made at the outset by
Italy, which only after acrimonious debate at Versailles
was pressured into pulling out of Vlore, which Italian
troops had reoccupied following the defeat of the Central
Powers.
Because of the backwardness, bellicose parochialism,
and impoverishment of the people, uncommon even in
the underdeveloped Balkan area, effective central
government eluded the new state for the next few years. A
"period of parliamentarianism" (1921 -24) brought the
trappings of Western political life without the traditions
necessary to make it work. A chamber of deputies and
Albania's first political parties appeared in 1921, but
political life was characterized by personal rivalries,
regional differences, and tribal loyalties which rendered
central government almost superfluous. The main
political combatants of this period were the radical
Orthodox Bishop Fan S. Noli (whose short -lived
government in 1924 recognized the Soviet Union) and
the authoritarian Ahmet Zogu. The latter personality,
with Yugoslav backing in 1924, staged the last of a series
of coups and countercoups, and in early 1925 Zog had
Albania proclaimed a republic with himself as President.
The republic was short lived, being transformed into a
monarchy in 1928 under "Zog I, King of the Albanians,"
who ruled until the Italian invasion in 1939.
Zog's rule, both as President and King, was a curious
mixture of authoritarian control and Western reforms.
Such anarchical traditions as the blood feud were curbed,
some fundamental education and health measures were
implemented, and various new codes (including a penal
code, civil laws, and a commercial code) were drawn up
after Western models. During Zog's reign, the central
government gained power at the expense of the local
leaders. Much as the Ottomars had done, Zog controlled
the country through local begs who had sworn allegiance
to the ruler and manipulated the government by
appointing deputies to parliament. While Tirane
increased its control over national affairs, Albania's
sovereignty was impaired by the King's many concessions
to Italy.
A salient feature of Zog's rule was the gradual growth
of Italian influence through a number of economic,
military, and political agreements, seriously challenged
only once by a short -lived attempt to reassert national
sovereignty in the early 1930's. The period of rising
Italian influence culminated in Fascist Italy's invasion
and occupation of the country in 1939 and subsequent
efforts by Rome to absorb Albania. An objective of
Italian rule was to win over Albanian public opinion by
supporting Albanian irredentists in their demands for
annexing the Kosovo (that part of Yugoslavia populated
largely by ethnic Albanians) and a portion of Greece. The
Italians did not succeed in winning over Albanian public
opinion by these tactics, and opposition io the
occupation continued to grow; in 1941 -42 two major
resistance groups were founded: the National Liberation
Movement (Levizja National (lirimtar), created and
dominated by the Albanian Communist Party, and the
anti Communist Balli Kombetar (The National Front).
Aided by the Yugoslays, the Communists emerged as
the most effective element in the resistance and were able
to lay the groundwork for their eventual takeover of the
country in 1944. This was greatly facilitated by the
promises of economic and political reform made by the
National Liberation Movement during World War 11.
The front's program for political independence from
foreign rule and for improvement of social and economic
conditions had a dynamic appeal. Disillusionment with
the new regime and hostility toward it followed soon after
1944, however, because the Yugoslav- backed Commu-
nists not only failed to fulfill their promises of unfettered
national independence but also imposed a harsher, more
regimented system than that experienced during the
Italian and German occupations.
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Yugoslavia, which had played the major role in
organizing the Communist party in Albania in 1941,
dominated the country from 1944 to 1948. When Tito's
refusal to accept Soviet dictates caused a break with the
Soviet Union in 1948, Albania abandoned Yugoslav
protection in favor of orthodox Soviet -style "Stalini:;m."
Khrushchev's attempts in the immediate post- Stalin years
to improve relations with Tito's Yugoslavia occasioned
the first doubts in Tiran6 of the efficacy of its close
alliance with Moscow. In 1961, after 13 years as a Soviet
satellite, Albania openly repudiated Soviet Premier
Khrushchev's interpretation of Marxism- Leninism and
publicly embraced Mao Tse tung's more dogmatic
version, and it has since continued to echo and often
exceed the anti- Soviet polemics of its current ally,
Communist China.
The fall of Khrushchev in 1964, indicative to
Albanians of continued dissension within the Soviet
hierarchy, strengthened the internal position of the
Albanian leadership and weakened further the
insignificant elements in the country that had opposed its
policies. Albanian official reaction to international
developments has tended to be most predictable and
almost always reflects a further advance in doctrinaire
intransigence. The coincidence of interests which, at the
time of the crisis with Moscow, led to the unique alliance
between Albania and Communist China are still
relevant, and Mao Tse tung's China remains the main
source of international support of the Albanian regime.
Since 1966 and early 1967 the Albanian Communist
party hierarchy has stressed a self reliant nationalism as a
key to gaining popular acquiescence and participation in
the rapid economic development of Albania. Progress in
this area is still heavily dependent on Chinese assistance,
and as the two countries have expanded their
international contacts in 1970 their alliance has shifted to
a more flexible but still firm footing.
The impact of a quarter of a century of Communist
rule on the domestic institutions and traditional way of
life has been sharp and painful to many Albanians.
Communist ideology itself is foreign to the ancient
traditions of Albania and to the Albanian orientation to
family and tribe rather than to central authority. Life in
the small, isolated communities characteristic of Albania
has produced a highly individualistic people who are
hostile to the strict, centrally controlled system imposed
by the Communists. In addition, the popular view of
communism as a foreign influence has further alienated
many people. These negative factors are offset to some
degree by the undeniable economic and social progress
that has been achieved under the Communists. The sheer
length of Communist rule and the dim prospect for its
deposition have probably led to growing popular
acceptance of the regime. Open resistance to the
Communist regime is sporadic, isolated, and generally
without organized leadership. The country remains a
police state in the Stalinist tradition, with security forces
which have proven effective against internal resistance
and foreign subversion.
36
Ruling in the name of the Communist party in
Albania, party First Secretary Enver Hoxha and Premier
Mehmet Shehu head a regime which is still the most
oppressive in Europe, wielding almost absolute power
over the political, economic, and social life of the
country. The regime has attempted to gain popular
support by erecting a facade of democracy and most
recently by stressing Albanian national traditions.
Intensive propaganda campaigns extol the constitutional
guarantees of the rights of the individual. The
constitution, however, is used only to give a semblance of
legality to the regime; in practice the people have few
civil or religious rights. The People's Assembly and the
"elections," routinely rigged in standard Communist
fashion, serve merely to give unanimous approval to
party decisions and to implement policies already made
by the party hierarchy. In theory the party is separate
from the government, but in fact the governmental
apparatus is merely the administrative and executive arm
of the party.
B. Structure and functioning of the govern-
ment (S)
1. Constitution
The Albanian constitution of 1950 defines the political
institutions and ostensibly regulates the government of
the Albanian people. Patterned essentially after the basic
laws of Albania's contemporary Soviet mentors, the
document seeks to give an appearance of legitimacy to
the governmental, economic, and social institutions
created by the Communists. Although it clearly
guarantees essential liberties, assuring each citizen his
basic civil and religious prerogatives and his equality
before the law, the constitution remains essentially a
propaganda instrument, while the most elementary of
human rights are consistently and flagrantly abused.
Most of the Albanian people are apathetic in matters
concerning governmental processes and have demonstrat-
ed little interest in the various constitutions which have
been adopted during Albania's existence as an
independent state. Such apathy stems from their very
limited historic experience under a written basic law that
was actually functional, and, more importantly, from
their recognition that the provisions of the new
Communist constitution, however explicit, in reality offer
no protection to the individual. Furthermore, many
Albanians probably consider the constitution, based as it
is on Soviet models, a foreign import; it reflects standard
Communist ideology, while it disregards Albanian
traditions and customs. In the event unforeseen
exigencies force a reorientation of Albanian tutelage back
to Europe and European models, with some loosening of
Communist dictatorial authority, a means for expression
of the popular will does exist in the de jure political
institutions defined in the national constitution.
The first of Albania's five different constitutions was
drawn up in 1914 by an International Control
Commission established by the Great Powers of Europe
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following the country's declaration of independence in
1912. This constitution, which was almost immediately
shelved because of the outbreak of World War I and
remained in abeyance for the duration of that conflict,
was revised in 1925. While the constitution of 1925
provided for parliamentary government and reflected an
awareness of the concept of "checks and balances," the
excessive authority it granted to the President of the
Republic in fact nullified the latter principle. It, in turn,
was replaced in December 1928 by the constitution
which established a monarchy under King Zog I (Ahmet
Zogu). In practice, basic political guarantees continued
either to be ignored by the willful King or at best
interpreted cavalierly. The monarchy remained in power
until 1939 when the Italians introduced a Fascist
government into Albania, and a new Fascist constitution
on the Italian model was subsequently approved by the
Albanian Constituent Assembly in June 1939.
The first Communist constitution of Albania was
drafted during the anti -Axis resistance early in World
War II, but it was not formally adopted until March
1946. It was almost a direct copy of the Yugoslav
constitution. As Yugoslavia could not be accepted as a
model following Stalin's break with Belgrade in 1948, a
new constitution was adopted in 1950. This last
document was intended not only to establish a closer
conformity with the Soviet constitution but also to reflect
the social, a onomic, and political changes necessitated
by Albania's switch from a Yugoslav- to a Soviet oriented
state.
The 1946 constitution transferred local administrative
functions from agencies of the central government to
people's councils and made provisions for the
introduction of a unified economic plan. Although
retaining, at least theoretically, a blueprint for local
initiative, the 1950 constitution recognized and provided
for the perpetuation of the dominant role of the
munist party (Article 21). The 1950 constitution also
.dished the party's legal status by defining it as "the
organized vanguard of the working class and of all the
laboring masses in their struggle to construct the bases of
socialism." Provisions for the socialization of agriculture,
protection of socialized property, and state control of
domestic trade were incorporated into the constitution for
the first time.
The 1950 constitution consists of 97 articles grouped
into three sections. The first part contains such
fundamental principles as the definition of the "People's
Republic," the nature of its social and economic
structure, and descriptions of the alleged rights and duties
of citizens. The second part outlines the political
structure of the state, the most important bodies of which
are the unicameral People's Assembly and its Presidium,
the Council of Ministers, and the judiciary. It also defines
the role of "people's councils" in local administration
and discusses the military establishment. The third part
describes the seal and flag and names Tirane the capital
city. Changes or additions to the constitution may be
adopted by an absolute majority vote of the People's
Assembly.
The Albanian constitution stresses social and economic
ideology, as do the constitutions of other Communist
countries. The concentration of all means of production
in the hands of the state, undertaken in Albania
immediately after World War II, is legalized in Articles 7
and S. Although Article 11 guarantees the rights of
private property and private enterprise, this provision is
rendered meaningless by the addition of the qualifica-
tions that "no one has the right to use private property
against the public interest" and "private property can be
limited and expropriated if such action is demanded by
the public interest." Article 11 has been used by the state
to confiscate or nationalize virtually all private property
in Albania.
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion,
speech, the press, assembly, and petition, and the right to
form public organizations and hold political meetings
and demonstrations (Articles 18 and 20) are subsequently
so qualified and delimited that in practice these rights
scarcely exist. Any opposition to the regime is considered
treason; freedom is interpreted to mean obedience to the
party, and the citizen has in fact no protection against
the state. The constitutional document itself not only
implicitly tolerates repression in its numerous qualifying
clauses, but in "wrap -up" Article 38 it states explicitly:
Citizens cannot use the rights given them by this con-
stitution to change the constitutional regime of the
People's Republic of Albania for antidemocratic purposes.
Women are guaranteed equal rights with men in
nearly all spheres of private, political, and social life
under Article 17. In practice, however, these
constitutional provisions do not appear to have
materially affected the position of Albanian women who
traditionally have been assigned a subservient role in
society. All citizens who have reached the age of 18 have
the right to vote and to stand for election to all the organs
of state power. The constitution establishes work as the
basis of the Albanian social system, and a duty and an
honor for all able- bodied citizens. As stated in Article 13,
society will be administered according to the principle of
who works not, eats not."
In theory, the inviolability of the person is guaranteed
by Article 22 which states that no one can be detained for
more than 3 days without a decision by a public
prosecutor or a court. Search warrants are required �or
the consent of the owner of the house �and all searches
must be conducted in the presence of two witnesses.
Guarantees of the secrecy of personal correspondence are
excepted only for criminal investigations or during a state
of war. In practice, however, these guarantees have
proven to be largely meaningless. A person considered
dangerous to the state may be held for an indefinite
period; homes may be searched and citizens may be
evicted from their homes without due process of law; and
mail censorship is widespread, although it is somewhat
more relaxed than in the earlier years of the regime.
A number of articles outline some of the state's
responsibilities to the citizenry. Included among these
responsibilities are provisions for a state health service, a
37
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state school system, and state support for science and the
arts. Additionally, the state guarantees citizens the right
to work, to rest (annual paid vacations), and to receive
old -age and disc' ''ty pensions. Article 39 enshrines the
national minoriti rights of cultural development and
the use of their native language.
Duties of the citizens to the state, as set forth in the
constitution, are headed by the obligation to protect
public property, which is called "the sacred and
inviolable basis of people's democracy, the source of
strength of the homeland, and the welfare and cultural
life of the working people" (Article 35). Other duties
include military service, defense of the country, and
payment of taxes.
The constitution establishes separate legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the government.
Article 41 conforms to European constitutional practice
in providing that the legislative branch, the People's
Assembly, is "the highest organ of state power." Article
61 designates the Council of Ministers as "the highest
executive organ." This theoretical division of power, with
explicit legislative supremacy, is noted in. other
Communist constitutions and reflects the West European
constitutior..J experience. III Albania, however �as
elsewhere in the Communist world �the theory is not the
practice. The concept of the unitary state in which all
organs of government function under the direction of the
Communist party in the interests of one class is the fact of
political life. The Marxist- Leninist political formula that
the state represents the interests of the worker class
exclusively has constituted the de facto underpinning for
an Albanian workers' state and has in practice nullified
the theoretical "separation" of powers and the implied
principle of some checks and balances. Aside from the
instruments of central government, the constitution also
provides for a hierarchy of people's councils �local
organs of the central power �at the different territorial
administrative levels in the country.
2. Structure of the Obvernment
Despite the po%fiJ4 11111) iesponsibilities assigned the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches by the
constitution, all important decisions are made by the
party leadership and passed on to the appropriate
government agencies for implementation (Figure 25).
Because the party leaders themselves are the top- ranking
government officials �the orthodox Communist principle
of the interlocking directorate �the government agencies
serve merely as executive and administrative bodies of the
party, and the judiciary acts as an instrument for the
enforcement of party decisions. The government has
three levels of administration below the national level,
but functionally it is essentially unitary. Regional and
local governments as generally understood in most
Western countries are nonexistent, and administration at
lower levels is merely an adjunct of the central regime in
Tiran6. Figure 30 depicts the interlocking directorate, a
concept discussed more fully below under Political
Dynamics.
E-1
The major legal entities of the national government, in
order of importance, are the Council of Ministers (the
cabinet), the Presidium of the People's Assembly, the
People's Assembly, and the judiciary. Even within the
context of party control, the regime does not permit the
legislative supremacy called for in the constitution but
directs the government first through the more
manageable executive branch. The three branches are
closely coordinated by party discipline, however, in
controlling every facet of public life and most facets of
private life as well.
In March 1966 the Presidium of the People's Assembly
approved sweeping measures for reorganizing the
governmental structure and redistributing responsibilities
within the state apparatus, including the diffusion of
some additional administrative powers to lower
governmental levels. The number of ministries was
reduced from 19 to 14 (and later to 13) and the number of
departments within these organs was decreased from 400
to 110. According to a speech by Premier Shehu before.
the People's Assembly in March 1966, district
governments were to be entrusted with additional
unspecified duties which previously had been the
exclusive prerogative of the Council of Ministers.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of lower organs has also
been broadened in the fields of the budget, labor,
finance, and inventories. The purpose of these reforms
appears to have been to satisfy a genuine need to
streamline the bureaucracy and make local government
more responsive to local needs.
a. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Nominally appointed and subject to recall by the
People's Assembly, the Council of Ministers is the most
important executive and administrative agency in the
government. Although it is theoretically accountable to
the People's Assembly or its Presidium when the assembly
is not in session, the Council of Ministers is actually
chosen by the central party apparatus, and its main
function is to insure that all party decisions are carried
out by the central and lower governmental units. Council
decrees, which cover all political, economic, social,
cultural, and military activities in the country, are
binding on all government agencies. Theoretically, the
Council of Ministers acts in accordance with the
provisions of the constitution and expresses the will of the
People's Assembly. In practice, important decrees and
decisions are issued jointly in the name of the party's
Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers presents the country's annual
budget to the People's Assembly, and it issues and
impiements most decrees and regulations in pro
forma compliance with the laws in force. Its other stated
constitutional duties include the direction of the
monetary system and the armed forces and the
enforcement of all necessary measures to guarantee
observance of the constitution. The Council of Tinisters
is also charged with maintaining relations with foreign
countries and with carrying out the provisions of treaties
and intemational obligations.
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NATIONAL
DISTRICT
LOCALITY OR
UNITED VILLAGE
OR CITY
VILLAGE
OR WARD
ALBANIAN WORKERS
PARTY
GOVERNMENT OF ALBANIA
District Committees
District People's Councils*
i
Secretaries
No Executive Committees
People's
Locality Peoples Councils*
Courts*
Executive Committees
Basic Organizations
Village People's Councils*
Secretaries
or Work Centers
KEY
Cordrol
tkaad Party Cor*ais
over dl Apeneses
Nonxrsd Respona'SiMy
Appeal
*Nominally elected by popuksr vote.
Nominal,Appanlmegl
or Ektelion
FIGURE 25. Party control
of governmental structure (U /OU)
39
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In the March 1966 government reorganization that
reduced the number of portfolios to 13, all three First
Deputy Premier posts were abolished; the staff of the
Central State Administration was cut in half; and in
September the Ministry of Justice was eliminated. These
changes were part of a campaign to reduce the
overinflated bureaucracy and were in line with other
intensive efforts to simplify administration in order to
make government more efficient. The only change in the
Council of Ministers since the 1966 reorganization has
been the addition of a secretarial body �the Secretary
General of the Council� presumably to streamline the
inner workings of the council.
The Council of Ministers in December 1970 consisted
of Premier Mehmet Shehu, four Deputy Premiers, and 14
other ministers and officials of ministerial rank, whose
areas of responsibility were as follows:
Agriculture Industry and Mining
Commerce Internal Affairs
Communications People's Defense
Construction Public Health
Education and Culture State Planning Committee
Finance Minister without Portfolio
Foreign Affairs Secretary General of the Council
Nine members of the Council of Ministers were members
or candidate members of the powerful party Politburo,
and all but five were members of the party Central
Committee.
Mehmet Shehu (Figure 26) has been Premier shim
1954 and a member of the Politburo sine 1948. He is
outranked in the regime only by party first Secretary
Enver Hoxha and is considered the ruthless strongman of
the regime. Prior to becoming Premier, as Minister of
Internal Affairs he controlled the state security
organization, the Sigurimi. In this capacity he built the
Sigurimi into an effective secret police organization and
'For a current listing of key govemmcnt officials consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
40
became the most feared and hated man in the country
because of his skill and ruthlessness in eliminating
resistance to the regime. Although much has been written
of possible Shehu Hoxha friction, there is no firm
evidence of basic disagreements between the two.
Because the government is virtually the sole owner of
industry and almost all agriculture is under state or
collective farms, the ministries represent government
monopolies and are responsible for all matters in their
field of competence, including the training of cadres,
planning, technical developments, and investment.
b. PRESIDIUM OF THE PEOPLE ASSEMBLY
The Presidium of the People's Assembly, composed of a
president and 14 members, including three vice
presidents and a secretary, is elected by the assembly to
exercise the assembly's authority between its semiannual
sessions. The assembly may dismiss the Presidium or anv
of its members before the end of their 4 -year terms and
elect new ones.
The President of the Presidium, Haxhi Lleshi (Figure
27), is the Chief of State, but he is only a figurehead and
wields little power or influence. His principal duties are
limited to ceremonial functions such as accepting
credentiai. of foreign representatives and greeting visiting
dignitaries.
Because the full assembly meets only twice a year for a
short period of time, the party uses the Presidium as the
primary instrument for the enactment of legislation.
Among its nominal functions are interpreting and
making decisions concerning the constitutionality of
laws; issuing decrees and promulgating laws passed by
the assembly; ratifying and denouncing international
agreements; upon cabinet recommendation, appointing
ministers (ad interim), heads of commissions, and
representatives abroad; determining the enterprises and
institutions to be operated by the government; and
declaring (ad interim) general mobilization and imposing
martial law. The Presidium also proclaims elections and
convenes the People's Assembly, grants pardons and
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FIGURE 26. Mehmet Shehu, Chair-
man, Council of Ministers (C)
FIGURE 27. Haxhi Lleshi, President
of the Presidium of the National
Assembly (U /OU)

awards, and appoints the commander of the armed
forces. This impressive list o f nominal powers stands in
contrast to its actual complete subse,vience to the party.
C. PEOPLE's ASSEMBLY
The People's Assembly is a unicameral body popularly
elected every 4 years on the basis of one deputy for every
8,000 citizens. All candidates for the assembly are picked
by the party and run on the slate of the Democratic
Front, the party's mass political organization. Elections
in 1970 provided an assembly of 264 members. Although
the constitution stipulates that the assembly is the only
executor of legislative power, it performs little actual
legislative work and usually meets only twice a year for 2-
or 3 -day sessions to approve decrees and laws proposed by
its Presidium or the Council of Ministers. Other pro
forma responsibilities of the assembly include approval of
the state budget, creation or abolition of ministries, and
amendment of the constitution.
Theoretically, elections of assembly delegates are direct
and by secret ballot. In practice, however, voting is for a
party prepared single slate of candidates who are chosen
by the Democratic Front, a mass political organization,
and "unanimously endorsed" by sponsoring social, trade
union, and political organizations. To vote against the
regime, the voter must cross out the name of the official
candidate and write in another. Assembly deputies
theoretically have parliamentary immunity, but legal
action can be taken against individual deputies if the
assembly or its Presidium authorizes such action.
d. JUDICIARY
The main function of the judicial system is the
preservation of the Communist regime. In adjudicating
criminal and civil disputes, mo-ty of the latter involving
pension and social insurance claims, the courts have
proved relatively freewheeling. Constitutional guarantees
are meaningless when they conflict with party policy,
and the court system consistently upholds the state's
rights rather than those of the individual. Interpretation
of the constitutionality of laws is theoretically the
responsibility of the Presidium of the People's Assembly,
not the court system. The Presidium, however, through
the interlocking directorate, directly expresses the wishes
of the partv Politburo. The President of the Supreme
Court, Aranit Cela� writing in mid 1969 revealed the
extent to which the entire court system is inhibited from
interpreting and applying the law freely. Cela enjoined
the courts to judge on what is "right" and not to engage
in "formal applications of the provisions of the law."
Stressing that the courts must be guided by "proletarian
policy," Cela proceeded to decry the "intellectualism,
narrow judicial light, and professionalism" of some legal
workers. Attempts to standardize punishments were
exhibited as manifestations of a "technocratic" attitude.
The court system consists of a Supreme Court, district
courts, and village, city, and city district courts. The
Supreme Court �the highest judicial organ in the
country organizes and controls the Albanian court
system. It consists of a chairman, several deputy
chairmen, and an unspecified number of judges and
assistant judges �all elected by the People's Assembly for
4 -year terms. The Supreme Court meets as one body (a
plenum) or in several different compositions (a penal or a
civil or military collegium) with the chairman of the
Supreme Court or one of his deputies pre ;iding at each
convocation. The number of justices necessary for the
convocation of a collegium seemingly varies, but when
functioning as a court of the second instance (appellate) a
collegium of three judges sits in session.
There are no firm criteria specifying which category or
categories of cases must be adjudicated by the Supreme
Court as a court of the first instance. Any "important"
case can be removed from the district court's jurisdiction
by the chairman of the Supreme Court. The court is a
court of second instance in hearing appeals against the
decisions of district courts. The highest appellate judicial
body is the plenum of the Supreme Court. The plenum,
in addition to establishing norms of legal practice and
studying judicial problems, examines appeals "for legal
protection" arising from penal and civil decisions of the
Supreme Court's collegiums.
District courts �the mainstays of the legal system �arc
courts of the first instance for most penal and civil cases
aired in the country. They also serve as courts of second
instance in appeals against the decisions of lower courts.
The activities of the district courts are closely monitored
by the Supreme Court, which, aside from the control it
exercises as an appellate court, sends inspectors with
undefined powers and responsibilities to sit in on sessions
of the district courts. Additionally, the functions of a
district court can be assumed by a Supreme Court judge
upon the decision of the chnirman of thr Supreme Court.
Judges of the district courts are ?opuiarly elected for a
period of 3 years. Assistant judges, much less experienced
and of lower educational background than judges,
participate in various ways in the work of the district
courts.
The lo-Nest courts �at village, city, and city district
level �judge minor criminal and civil cases. Essentially,
these pseudojudicial organs, often called people's courts,
are controlled by the district courts. They are composed
of an assistant judge from the district court and local
social "activists" popularly elected for 1 -year terms.
Since the judicial reorganization of 1968, military
courts have ceased to exist as a separate court hierarchy.
In their stead are military collegiums of the Supreme
Court and district courts. For the most part, military
judges are selected in the same manner as their civilian
colleagues, except that assistant military judges are
selected by the military instead of the People's Assembly
or the general public.
The implementation of the law is the prerogative of the
Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the People's
Assembly. He in turn appoints the district prosecutor,
whose office is the main investigative office Jor most
court cases in the country. People's prosecutors are
popularly elected at the district and lower administrative
levels and are directly responsible to their respective
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district prosecutors. They, in part, serve to popularize and
implement the law, but have a very limited legal
background. Defense attorneys probably still exist in
Albania, although they are organized and emploved by
the state. A 1967 decree increased the regime's control
over attorneys by abolishing the Lawyers' Collective and
establishing an Office of Legal Assistance under the
Supreme Court.
C. LEGAL CODES AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
Albania's penal code and code of criminal procedure,
adopted in 1952 and 1953, respectively, are patterned
after Soviet law. The main objective of the codes is
"protection of the socialist state and its legal order."
The penal code has two sections. The first contains
general provisions which define crime as any action that
is "socially dangerous." It adds, in Article 3, that an "act
is socially dangerous if it is directed against the people's
authority and state resources." The second section has 12
articles dealing respectively with crimes against or
involving: 1) the state; 2) socialist property; 3) the
socialist system of economy, particularly industry, foreign
and domestic trade, finances, taxes and tariffs, transport,
agriculture, forestry, handicrafts, or fishing; 4)
individuals; 5) marriage and the family; 6) property of
citizens; 7) work and labor discipline; 8) the performance
of official duties; 9) denial of the right to vote; 10) denial
of justice; 11) administrative order; or 12) military
matters and discipline.
The general provisions of the first section of the code
appear to be harsher than their Soviet counterparts, and
in many instances the penalties are much more severe.
The major penalties provided by the code are death,
imprisonment, and internment in "corrective" labor
camps. The death penalty is for crimes against the state,
and there have been instances of capital punishment for
certain economic offenses, "social endangerment," and
murder. Although life imprisonment is not provided for
by law and allegedly does not exist, defectors claim that
there are a number of criminals serving life sentences.
Harsh penalties are also provided for persons who give or
offer shelter to enemies of the state. In contrast,
individuals who break laws in defense of the state and of
"socialist wealth" are exempted by the code from
criminal prosecution.
The code of criminal procedure describes the processes
to be followed from the discovery of a criminal act to the
final disposition of the case. Criminal proceedings are
initiated by the prosecutor and investigative agencies
either on their own initiative or in response to accusations
by citizens, enterprises, social organizations, officials, or
self denunciation by the defendant.
The results of pretrial proceedings are of major
importance because they may be used at the trial if the
defendant's testimony before the court conflicts with that
which he has given to the investigators or if the defendant
refuses to testify before the court. Thus, a "confession"
may be the main evidence of a defendant's guilt.
Albanian criminal procedure in theory adheres to the
principle of presumption of innocence until guilt is
12
proven. However, the procedures provide no legal
guarantees for enforcing this presumption, and in
practice it is ignored.
Constitutionally, all Albanian citizens are guaranteed
the right of defense counsel. The code of criminal
procedure, however, does not provide for participation of
a defense la:vyer in the all- important pretrial
examination or investigation. Moreover, a defendant
under arrest does not have the right to communicate with
a lawyer or with anyone else to request assistance in
gathering evidence pertinent to his plea or in organizing
his defense. The net result of this procedure is that guilt is
usually determined before the trial, and the defense
lawyer merely enters a plea for mercy.
Based on Soviet civil law, the Albanian civil code
consists of provisions on inheritance and a so- called
general section (introduced in 1955), which deals with
property law and nonproperty personal relationships.
The first article of the general section regulates
property relationships among social organizations,
among social organizations and citizens, and among
citizens themselves. The second article clarifies the
character of the country's civil legislation, which aims at
assisting the building of the "new life." Nothing which
interferes with developing and strengthening "socialized
existence" is countenanced. In addition, juridical persons
consist solely of those individuals and state and social
organizations and institutions which are endowed with
socioeconomic functions in the building of socialism. No
partnership or other combination of private persons for
economic purposes is recognized as a juridical person.
f. LOCAL COVERNMENT
Local government is based on a hierarchy of people's
councils which exercise governmental authority over
areas corresponding to administrative territorial divisions.
People's councils exist in districts (rreth), localities
Uokalitei), cities, city wards, united villages, and villages.
Albania is divided into 27 districts, including a district for
the city of Tirane (Population and Administrative
Divisions inset, Summary Map, Figure 79).
Although theoretically autonomous, the people's
councils are essentially local agencies of the central
government under the control of local party organs.
Article 2 of the law on people's councils states that the
party defines the general line of their activity and
controls systeu'latically the execution of that line in
practice. Additionally, the district people's councils have
the right to define the concrete duties of the lower
people's councils in the economic, social, and cultural
fields.
Responsibilities of the people's councils, as set forth in
the law on people's councils of 31 December 1967, are so
diverse and open ended that the councils in theory are
responsible for practically everything that occurs in their
district. Some of their specific responsibilities include
execution of the economic plan; collection of fees and
taxes; guidance of all institutions, enterprises, and
economic organizations in their territory; and the direct
supervision of certain institutions and organizations
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directly attached to the people's councils. Additionally,
the people's councils are responsible for organizing health
services, directing education, maintaining roads and
parks, controlling the collection of agricultural products,
expanding the commercial network, and developing
agriculture and industry in general. The actions of the
people's councils in so many diverse fields are, of course,
subject to the real political power exercised by the local
party organization and the constraints and regulations
laid down by the central government's bureaucracy.
Members of the people's councils at all levels are
elected for 3 years by the citizens from lists of candidates
prepared by the party and issued in the name of the
Democratic Front. In the May 1964 elections 22,780
administrators were elected to people's councils.
Subsequent elections in June 1967 and in September 1970
have not revealed how many elected administrators are
working in the people's councils.
People's councils meet regularly, with the minimum
number of sessions as regulated by law ranging from 4 to
12 times a year, depending on the administrative level.
The lowest level (village) meets most frequently. Each
people's council elects it "presidency," chooses
permanent or temporary commissions, arid elects an
executive committee. The executive committee is the real
repository of administrative and executive authority. The
executive committee prepares the local draft economic
plan and draft budget, executes decisions of the party
and higher government organs, and directs activities of
all institutes and organizations on the territory of the
people's councils. Meeting at least once a month, the
executive committee performs its work on a day -to -day
basis through various sections and offices, whose heads
have considerable authority and need not be members of
the executive committee of the people's council. The
executive committee is composed of a chairman, deputy
chairman, secretary, and a specified number of members
(depending on the administrative level). The presidency
of the people's council consisting of a chairman, several
deputy chairmen, and a secretary� prepares and presides
at meetings of the people's council and oversees the work
of the council's commissions. The presidency is it
relatively powerless position. Commissions of the people's
councils are appointed as necessary by the people's
councils and sometimes serve to involve the citizenry in
special council efforts.
C. Political dynamics (S)
1. Party history
The long isolation of Turkish dominated Albania from
European currents and the very late emergence of the
nation as an independent entity are reflected in the
belated introduction of Marxist socialism. The first feeble
cells� inspired by the Soviet October Revolution (1917)
and the third International (1919) �did riot appear until
the 1920's and were for a long time confined to the cities,
notably Tiran6 and Korg6. The impact of developments
in the Soviet Union was strengthened by the fact that it
was the Bolsheviks who had revealed to the world in
December 1917 the contents of the secret 'Treaty of
London (April 1917) which provided for the partition of
Albania among the Great Powers of Europe.
In the wake of Ilitler's rise to power in Germany and
the resultant Comintern policy of forming anti- Fascist
organizations in Europe, several small Marxist groups
expanded their influence in Albania, and future
Communist leaders, including Enver Hoxha, who had
been active in the Communist movement in Western
Europe, returned to the country. The Italian invasion of
Albania (April 1939) enabled these early Marxists to
identify their anti- Fascist role with national liberation
and thereby greatly to increase their following. After the
German attack on the Soviet Union, all Albanian
Marxists joined with other nationalist groups and, partly
through demonstrated leadership qualities, enhanced
their influence in the coordinated resistance to the Italian
and subsequent German occupations. The consolidation
of Communist control over the resistance movement was
essentially brought about from the outside; Albanian
resistance fighters were systematically aided and directed
by the well- organized Communist partisans in
neighboring Yugoslavia.
The Albanian Communist Party was founded
clandestinely in Tirane on 8 November 1941 by two
emissaries of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Dusan
Mugosa and Miladin Popovic, both of whom directed
the Albanian party until the end of the war. The
Albanian Communist Party was in reality a branch of the
Yugoslav Communist Party until 1948 when Belgrade
was expelled from the Cominform. The Albanian
Communist Party did not become completely independ-
ent until it held its first congress in November 1948 and
changed its name to the Albanian Workers Party.
The Communist- dominated Albanian National
Liberation Movement took control of the country when
the Germans withdrew in 1944, and on 29 November
Premier Enver Hoxha inaugurated the government of the
"Albanian Democratic Republic." Prominent during
World War 11 as a party arid resistance organizer, Hoxha
cr-crged in the postwar period as the undisputed leader
of the government and party. Hoxha had received his
education at the French Lycee in Korg6 and later studied
at Montpellier University in France. After only a year at
the university he went to Paris, where he came under the
influence of radical French Communists. Returning to
Albania in 1936, Hoxha taught at the French Lycee
before joining the resistance against the Italians in 1959.
As Premier from 1944 to 1.954 and First Secretary of the
party since 1941 (the positiop was known as Secretary
General from 1941 to 1954), Hoxha (Figure 28) has
remained top man in the Communist regime.
The Albanian Workers Party (Partia E Punes E
Shgiperise �PPS H) has been subjected to a number of
purges which have affected Politburo members as well as
the lowest party rank and file. Of the 11 leading members
at the time the predecessor Albanian Communist Party
was founded in 1941, only Floxha remains. Although
some purges were carried out between 1944 and 1948, the
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minority submits to the majority. In practice, the higher
party officials select the candidates and the members
approve them automatically. The party is organized in
accordance with the country's territorial subdivisions,
with a central apparatus in Tirane and subordinate
organizations in districts and cities. The lowest level,
usually at the individual rural village, factory, school, or
collective farm, is the basic party organization. Each
level is similar in organization, with a "representative"
body for the entire level which theoretically is the highest
organ and comprises the leadership. The "representative"
bodies are the congress at tha national level, the
conference at the district and city levels, and the general
meeting at the basic party level. Between sessions of these
representative bodies, the everyday work of the party is
carried on by executive bodies, which are the real
leadership organs of the party (Figure 29).
first major purge occurred in the latter year, after Albania
sided with the U.S.S.R. against Yugoslavia. Between 1948
and 1952, out of a total PPSH membership of some
29,000 in November 1948, about 6,000 party members
were purged for alleged pro Yugoslav sympathies. Koci
Xoxe, Politburo member and chief of the security force,
who had become one of the most powerful figures in
Albania because of Yugoslav backing, was stripped of his
position, tried, and executed in 1949. Only in July 1954,
following the post Stalin Soviet lead, did Hoxha
reluctantly apply the "principle of collective leadership"
and relinquish the premiership to Mehmet Shehu. Hoxha
retained the position of party First Secretary, however.
The next period of factionalism and purging began as
soon as 1955, when the U.S.S.R., to the dismay of the
Hoxha regime, sought a rapprochement with Yugoslavia.
Two former Politburo members and government
ministers, Bedri Spahiu and Tuk Jakova, were ousted and
imprisoned for promoting a liberalization in domestic
policies. Further purges erupted in 1956, when Liri Gega,
who had been a top party leader during World War I1,
was executed on charges of being "linked with the
espionage organization of a foreign country" (presuma-
bly Yugoslavia). His dereliction was more likely
continued support for contemporary Soviet liberalization
policies.
The most recent purge of party and government
leaders occurred in 1960, when Liri Belishova and Koco
Tashko were dismissed from high party offices Lecause of
their pro Soviet leanings at a time when thz- regime had
begun to side with Communist Chimi i -a the growing
Sino Soviet rift. Since 1960 the party leadership has
stabilized and has consistently reaffirmed Sino- Albanian
solidarity while stressing the independent character of its
own revolutionary movement.
2. Party organization
Under the principle of "democratic centralism,"
officials of party organs are "elected" and in theory the
44
FIGURE 29. Structure of the Albanian Workers Party,
March 1971 (U /OU)
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FIGURE 28. Enver Hoxha, First
Secretary of the Communist party
(C)
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
(6) Members, 36 Candidates)
PARTY
CONGRESS
Politburo
(10 Members, S Candidates)
Central Control
Secretariat
and Auditing
14 Members)
Commission
(17 Members)
Directorates:
Administrative *Finance and
Organs Trade
Agitation and Industry and
Propaganda Construction
Agriculture Foreign Affairs
Education Mass
and Culture Organizations
I
District or City Committee
District
or City
Bureau
Conference
Secretariat
Sections:
Control and
Agitation and Organization
Auditing
Propaganda and Inspection
Commission
Agriculture Cadres, etc.
Bureau
Basic Party
Organization
General
Meetin
Serxerorfot
ElecSors
Under the principle of "democratic centralism,"
officials of party organs are "elected" and in theory the
44
FIGURE 29. Structure of the Albanian Workers Party,
March 1971 (U /OU)
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FIGURE 28. Enver Hoxha, First
Secretary of the Communist party
(C)

a. NATIONAL LEVEL
According to the party statutes the highest organ of the
party is the congress. Delegates to a congress are
nominally elected by district and city conferences, but
the election, which has always been nearly unanimous, is
only pro forma because the delegates are handpicked in
advance by the central apparatus in cooperation with the
district and city conferences. The party statutes state that
a congress must be called at least once every 4 years, but
in actual practice more time usually elapses between
sessions. Over 5 years elapsed between the Fourth
Congress (February 1961) and the Fifth Congress
(November 1966), and in early 1971 the Sixth Congress
was scheduled for November of that year. Theoretically,
extraordinary congresses may be called by the Central
Committee at its initiative or at the request of no less
than one -third the number of all party members who
were represented at the previous congress. This
prerogative has never been exercised.
The functions of the congress include ratification of
reports submitted by the Central Committee and other
central bodies, review and amendment of party tactics,
and election of members of the Central Committee and
the Central Control and Auditi:ig Commission. Much of
this activity, however, is pro forma; the party congress
usually rubber stamps the policies and decisions of the
leadership.
PARTY
SECRETARIAT POLITBURO
Aaember:
First Secretary I. Enver Homho 11911)
Mehmet Shehu (1918)
Becir Balluku (1918)
Khafer Spahlu
�Adil Carcanl (1961)----
*Maki Toska (1961)
Rita Marko (1956)
Secretary____ Hysni Kapo (1916)
Secretary �Rams: Alia (1960)
Spiro Koleko (1918)
e'Manush Myftiu (1956)
Candidates:
Pilo eeristeri (1952)
Kadd Hosbiu (196 1)
Petrit Dume (1961)
Koco Theodhosi (1956)
Abdyl Kellezi (1
NOTE, Years in parentheses indicale dotes of
appowment to fM Paimboro.
The Central Committee, composed of 61 members and
36 candidate members, is nominally assigned the
functions of representing the party in its relations with
Communist parties and mass organizations in other
countries, directing the activities of party organizations,
electing members of the central party organs and
supervising their activity, authorizing publication of the
party newspaper and journal, and administering party
funds.
The real locus of power is in the Politburo, the policy
formulating body of the Central Committee, composed
in early 1971 of 10 members and five candidate members.
It exercises control over the party and, through the
placement of its members in top governmental and mass
organization positions (the interlocking directorate,
Figure 30), it formulates all policies concerning
economic, defense, internal security, and social and
political affairs of the country.
Although the Politburo is formally elected by the
Central Committee, in reality it determines its own
composition and has been stable since the purges of the
mid- 1950's. With the exception of Liri Belishova, who
was purged in September 1960, and Rrapo Dervishi, who
was not reelected to candidate membership, all the
incumbent members and candidates elected at the Third
Party Congress (1956) were reelected at the Fourth and
Fifth Congresses, in 1961 and 1966, r- gnectively. The
GOVERNMENT
ORGAR
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S
MINISTERS ASSEMBLY
Presidium:
Member
President of
Premier
Democratic Front
Deputy Premier
Chairman of
Minister of People's
Committee of Albanian
Defense
War Veterans
Deputy Premier
_Deputy Premier
Chairman of Central
Deputy Chairman t Council of Trade
Unions
Deputy Premier
Member
Minister of Internal
Affairs
Minister of Industry
and Mining
Chairman
State Planning
Committee
'Candidate members from 1956 to 1961.
�'CmnddmN members from 1952 to 1956.
President of
Albanian- Chinese
Friendship Society
FIGURE 30. Members of the Politburo and Secretariat and their positions in government
and mass organizations (U /OU)
45
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consistent reelection of the top party body lends support
to the regime's assertion that the party is "monolithic."
The party hierarchy, many of whom are related by blood
or marriage, is now a tightly knit group which has given
Albania a degree of stability under First Secretary Hoxha.
Like many Communist dictatorships, however, Albania
does not appear to have any provision for succession
within the leadership, and unforeseen events, such as the
death of Hoxha, could seriously disrupt the equilibrium
of the party elite.
The Secretariat, composed of First Secretary Hoxha
and three secretaries, is the administrative and executive
body of the Central Committee. It manages the various
directorates of the Central Committee and is also
responsible for other select party functions, including
ideology and relations with foreign Communist parties.
The division of responsibility between the three party
secretaries is not clear, but Hysni Kapo appears to be in
charge of organizational matters and party cadres, Xhafer
Spahiu is apparently in charge of industry and other
economic affairs, and Ramiz Alia remains the party
ideologist.
The Central Committee directorates �the core of the
central apparatus �are directly controlled by the
Secretariat. At the behest of the secretaries, the
directorates often collect information and devise options
for policy decisions, and also implement policy guidelines
adopted by the Politburo. The directorates have direct
cownections with all implementing bodies. For instance,
the Dii,: of Agitation and Propaganda (agitprop)
not oni� Issue- directives to the agitation and propaganda
sections of the district party committees but also to all
propaganda outlets in the government, mass organiza-
tions, and the armed and security forces. Directorates
exist for different sectors of the economy as well as for
internal party matters and all governmental functions.
The most important directorates are those of Cadres and
Organizations, responsible for appointments to all major
positions in the country; of Agitation and Propaganda;
and of State Administrative Organs.
The separate Control and Auditing Commissions were
combined into the Central Control and Auditing
Commission at the Fifth Congress in November 1966. Its
duties consist of assuring that party directives reach local
party organs and of checking on the application of party
discipline. It also regulates the treasury and investigates
the fiscal activities of the Central Committee.
The Ministry of People's Defense has its own Political
Directorate which is on the same level as other
directorates or departments within the Central
Committee. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also has
"appropriate" political organs which are responsible for
the political orientation of the ministry's forces. In March
1966 the Politburo decreed that effective immediately
political commissars would be reintroduced in all army
units, a move undoubtedly intended to strengthen party
control over the armed forces.
46
b. LOCAL LEVELS
Below the national level, the pattern of party
organization parallels the governmental structure.
Twenty -seven district party organizations, including one
for the city of Tirane, are responsible to the central
apparatus. Below the district and city levels, the more
than 2,800 basic party organizations form the base of the
party pyramid. The district party organization not only
"guides the activities of all the party organizations
within the district, but also "guides and regulates" the
activities of the local government bodies and mass
organizations, partly through interlocking directorates at
the local level. The basic organizations are established in
factories and plants, agricultural enterprises, machine
tractor stations, villages, basic units of the armed and
security forces, state administration, schools, and other
work centers where there are no less than three party
members. Where there are less than three party members,
"groups" of party candidates or joint groups of party and
"working youth" members are created and directed by a
party member selected usually by the district party
committee. The basic organizations arc assigned a
multitude of duties ranging from checking and
controlling enterprises to admitting and indoctrinating
new party members. The hierarchy of party organizations
in the armed forces extends from the basic organizations
through a series of chiefs of political branches in units
and installations up to the Political Directorate of the
Ministry of People's Defense. The latter is directly
subordinate to the party central organ, Additionally, all
political organs in military units are obliged to maintain
close relations with local (civilian) party organizations.
The annual party conference is the highest organ of
each district and city party organization. Between the
conference meetings the affairs of the organization are
conducted by a committee whose members are elected by
the conference. The election of delegates to the
conferences by party members at the next lower level
gives the appearance of democratic control, but in
practice control is always exercised from above. No party
committee or conference may refuse to obey or even
question orders issued by higher authorities, nor may it
refuse to elect a candidate nominated from above.
C. MEMBERSHIP
Membership in the party is open to any Albanian
citizen IS years old or over who is a "worker," accepts
and upholds the program and statutes of the party,
executes all party decisions, pays his membership dues,
and does not "exploit" the work of others. All prospective
members are carefully screened and the character,
background, and work of applicants are thoroughly
considered. They must undergo a probationary period of
candidate membership, which lasts from 2 to 3 years.
Additionally, all applicants must be sponsored by three
full fledged party members who have known him for at
least 3 years. Children of formerly wealthy farmers, pre
Communist governmental officials, and wealthy
tradesmen may be accepted in the party only under
special circumstances.
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Total part; membership in January 1970 was officially
announced as 75,673. This figure represents about 3.5%
of the country's total population and an increase in
membership of 9,346 since November 1966 when total
party membership was 66,327. Workers accounted for
about 35% of the total party membership, peasants
almost 29 and white collar workers about 36 Since
1966, the percentage of party members classed as workers
has slowly increased. Of the new party members selected
during the period 1966 -69, 35% were workers, 45%
collective farmers, and only 16% white collar employees.
Efforts are continually made to increase the number of
women party members, wko in 1966 amounted to 12.5%
of the WWI membership. The regime is also concerned
about the unequal geographic distribution of the party
membership. Although the rural population is twice as
large as the urban population, 68% of party members live
in urban areas. Despite the great number of peasants
joining the party in 1966 -69, the percentage of peasants
in the total party membership in 1970 was only 0.02%
higher than in 1966, indicating, in part, changes in job
status.
Most party members lack professional qualifications as
administrators or are insufficicatly grounded in the
principles and practices of Marxist Leninist ideology, or
both. The lack of administrative skill is attributable
largely to regime policies of placing first priority upon
faithfulness to the party. The still relatively widespread
illiteracy and functional illiteracy makes it difficult to
indoctrinate ideology, dependent as some of it must be on
minimum reading skills. Some capable men have been
purged because they have shown tendencies to deviate
from the party line in the interest of economic or
bureaucratic efficiency.
3. Mass organizations
The party has created a number of mass organizations
whose chief functions are to further the political,
economic, ideological, and cultural aims of the regime.
Completely under the control of the party, they are used
as propaganda instruments to maintain political control;
all citizens are under political and economic pressure to
join them.
The Democratic Front of Albania, an outgrowth of the
National Liberation Movement, is the most important
mass organization because it has the primary function of
mobilizing the country to execute the program and
policies of the party and of choosing candidates for
national and local elections. The organization is headed
by party chief Enve, Hoxha. Membership in theory is
voluntary and open to all citizens 18 years of age or over,
regardless of national origin, religion, or social class, who
accept the front's statutes and actively promote its
principles. In practice, however, participation is forced
by regime pressure, because it is very difficult to obtain a
job or make purchases in state stores without a
membership card. Only those considered hostile to the
regime are refused admission. Even under these
conditions, only about half the population, or 700,000,
belonged to the organization in 1961. More recent
membership totals are not available.
The Union of Working Youth of Albania is a junior
branch of ',he party and constitutes the core of future
party membership. Youths under 20 years of age are only
eligible for party membership if they belong to the union.
This organization recommends members from its ranks
for party membership, takes an active part in promoting
party directives, and educates members in Marxist
Leninist principles. Membership is open to all between
the ages of 15 and 26 who accept the union's statute. In
1967 the union was officially reported to have 210,000
members �a rather insignificant increase over the 1961
membership of about 135,000, in view of the rapidly
expanding population. Although the provisions of the
statute imply that membership is voluntary, youths who
fail to join run the risk of being barred from higher
education, being denied a desirable job, or being branded
an "enemy of the people." Nevertheless, the union
seemingly has failed to induce a majority of the youth to
join.
In addition to its main task of instructing future
members of the party, the union controls the pioneer
organizations (which group children from 7 to 14
together), makes certain that party directives are
implemented by the youths, and organizes young people
into "voluntary" work brigades. The party periodically
gives the union special missions, most prominently during
Albania's recent cultural revolution. In February 1967
Enver Hoxha tasked the organization with closing down
all religious institutions in the country. The union
purportedly accomplished its mission within a few
unas.
The Central Council of Trade Unions, created in 1945,
implements party policies in the economic and labor
fields; it does not rep worker interests. The
organization enforces work production quotas, helps
administer the regime's program of social insurance, and
is responsible for raising the cultural and ideological level
of itF members. Membership is open to all workers,
members of the professions, and managers. Many workers
join primarily to avoid discrimination in jobs and to gain
privileges and benefits. Their lack of genuine motivation
is reflected in frequent regime complaints against
persistent inefficiency, lack of enthusiasm for work, abuse
of state property, and failure to meet planned goals in
agriculture and industry. The number of members is not
known and may be as low as 150,000 or as high as
400,000.
Other less important mass organizations include the
Union of Albanian Women, which indoctrinates
Albanian women in Communist ideology, controls and
supervises their political and social activities, and strives
to improve their status in the patriarchal society; and the
Society for Aid to the Army and Defense, a military and
civil defense corps whose main task is to provide
premilitary training and to conduct special civil defense
courses for Albania's youth. Another is the Committee of
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Albanian War Veterans, which is largely composed of
survivors of World War 11 partisan detachments.
4. Electoral procedures
Elections in Albania provide the regime with an
opportunity for a vigorous campaign to bolster its
domestic policies by obtaining apparent popular
endorsement and participation. Electoral procedures are
so designed that the voters have no choice of candidates,
and even the right to abstain from voting is in effect
denied by regime intimidation and pressure.
Preparations for electoral campaigns begin months in
advance, and agitation and propaganda teams attempt
to persuade voters "that elections are free and
democratic, that everyone is free to express his views, and
that only those candidates desired by the voters should be
elected." All information and propaganda media extol
the achievements of the regime and make optimistic
promises for the future. Electoral meetings throughout
the country are addressed by high party officials who
urge the voters to cast their ballots for the Democratic
Front candidates.
Since 1956, citizens have voted by dropping into a box
a single ballot which contains only the names of the
regime's candidates. To vote against the regime the voter
must cross out the name of the candidate and write in
another name. Since the booth provided at the voting
place may or may not be used, at the voter's discretion,
anyone who does enter it to cast his ballot is
automatically suspected of doing so to write in another
candidate's name, and thus of being in opposition.
Voting day, always Sunday, is a national holiday and a
festive occasion. Great efforts are made to bring out every
voter; voting places are decorated with flags and flowers,
and the youth organizations are mobilized to keep order.
Theoretically, voting is optional; in practice, however,
local party officials insure that every registered person
votes either at the polls or at home if he is sick or an
invalid. A voter who abstains runs the risk of being
accused of opposing the people's candidates or being an
"enemy of the people."
Voting procedures result in automatic approval of the
regime's candidates by over 99% of the voters. The
regime propaganda media always give much attention to
the elections as signal endorsements of its programs.
During the national election of July 1966, official
announcements assert, only four of the eligible voters
neglected to vote, and, of those who did vote, only three
reportedly failed to cast their ballots for the single list of
Democratic Front candidates. In the September 1970
elections for deputies to the People's Assembly, also
according to official announcements, 100% of the voters
cast 100% of their ballots for the Democratic Front slate.
D. National policies (S)
1. Summary and background
Three major influences underlying Albania's domestic
and foreign policy are its restricted size, its underdevel-
oped economy, and its deep isolation from the outside
48
world. These factors have encouraged a defensive posture
manifested in the rigid totalitarian attitudes of Albania's
rulers and their protective alliance with Communist
China. Until recently, foreign policy under the
Communist regime had been largely confined to
maintaining close relations with the patron power of the
moment successively Yugoslavia (1944 -48), the
U.S.S.R. (1948 -60), and Communist China (since
1961) �and vigorously advancing its causes in
inrrnational forurns. Since 1969, however, Albania has
begun to establish more normal relations with its
immediate neighbors, among other states of the
Mediterranean basin, and with the smaller countries of
Western Europe. Albania's internal policy has stressed
rapid economic development in a context of revolution-
ary fervor, the "class struggle," and the inspiring of a
genuine national motivation to replace tribal and
regional particularism. The Albanian strain of "self
reliant" nationalism has necessitated, inter alia, the
maintenance of relatively large internal security and
defense forces, and has been verbalized in such typically
Marxist mass- oriented slogans as "a pick in o:ne hand, a
rifle in the other." Every important policy decision is
linked ideologically to the need for combating the
internal and external menaces of "revisionism" and
capitaiism, or to the importance of maintaining the
dictatorship of the Communist party. If ideological
Marxist "purity" has long been the rationale for a self
imposed isolation, its expression has, on occasion, meshed
with the needs of a labor- scarce, undercapitalized
economy. The imperative of bypassing the "exploitive
period of capitalist expansion" �of catapulting economic
production into the modern age �has been met by
programs designed to involve the greatest possible
number of people, regardless of status, in the attainment
of national economic goals. Some of the benchmarks of
this process were the equalization of wages (1967),
mobilization of "voluntary" labor, requirements of
"production work" for students and intellectuals, and the
drive to sharply increase participation of women in the
industrial labor force. This welcome confluence of
socioeconomic policy and ideological "rightness" was
especially characteristic of the Albanian "cultural
revolution" when the very "young" population (median
age in 1970 was 19 years of age) was mobilized in
economic and 'social action groups �in structure but not
in purpose vaguely reminiscent of the Red Guards in the
Chinese cultural revolution �so as to exploit youthful
energies as a wedge to move the largely apathetic
population toward a positive commitment vis -a -vis
regime policies.
2. Domestic
Since the mid- 1960's the leadership's domestic
priorities have shifted from consolidation of power to a
concentration of effort to bring Albania into the 20th
century. Basically, however, the regime's domestic
objectives of consolidated central political control, rapid
economic development through a tightly regulated
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economy, and the "modernization" of a backward
society have remained unchanged since the Communists
gained c of the country following World War 11.
The party has consolidated its power by means of purges,
intrigues, and family friendship ties. The ruling elite, at
least outwardly, has been a very stable grouping, and
periods of purging have been closely linked, on the
whole, with changes of foreign sponsorship. In 1960 -61
party leader Hoxha was strong enough to t!:row party
and state support to the Chinese Communists and against
the U.S.S.R. after dismissing only two pro Soviet
members of the leadership. Economic development,
which has proceeded largely with foreign assistance, has
meant in the Albanian context the initiation of such basic
programs as working to achieve agricultural self
sufficiency, bringing electricity to every village, and
developing export markets for raw and semifinished
industrial and agricultural products. The regime has
taken the first steps toward "modernization" of the
society by initiating extensive literacy and education
programs, health and sanitation measures, and strong
attacks on "old customs," the targets of the latter ranging
from the sale of brides to religious beliefs.
In an effort to break down family ties and to substitute
the state for the tribal patriarch, the Albanian leadership
has shown great concern for organizing and controlling
every facet of society, as well as the life of each individual
citizen. Because of this policy, distinguishing between the
public life and the private life of an individual is
meaningless, and there is little that one can do to escape
participation in regime programs. A strict system of
security precautions throughout the general population
further strengthens centralized political control. A police
state atmosphere pervades all aspects of life in Albania.
The large number of paid and unpaid informers among
all strata of society has given rise to the popular belief
that perhaps one -sixth of the population is in the pay of
the security forces. Albanians are forbidden any
unregulated contacts with foreigners. Mail censorship,
while less pervasive than in earlier years, is still a common
practice, and travel restrictions are stringent. Personal
identity cards are required for travel within the country
arid checkpoints are numerous.
Available evidence at the end of 1970 suggests that by
1966 the party leadership may have taken stock and felt
sufficiently confident of its position to initiate a series of
socioeconomic and political changes that were intended
to transform Albania into a modern state. With Chinese
Communist help the regime had survived the break with
the Soviets and isolation from its hostile neighbors, and
had capitalized on the siege mentality developed during
this period to initiate the awakening of a national
consciousness, a phenomenon largely dormant in the
country's modern history.
The decision to break with the past involved a basic
psychological reorientation of Albania's leaders. This
meant a turn from a negatively oriented, defensive
outlook seeking mainly self perpetuation, and the almost
incidental provision for the basic necessities of the people,
to a positive commitment offering viable programs for
building a better life for all, which consequently would
require the active support of the party and government
bureaucracy. Perpetuation of the regime's monopoly of
power is still a sine qua non of its policy aims, but in
contrast to the earlier period the leadership now seeks
popular acquiescence and participation in this goal. One
of the keys to the successful implementation of these
changes is to secure the participation of youth, with its
idealism and vigor. Educated exclusively under the
Communist system, young people could most readily be
harnessed to the new programs which seek to transform
Albanian life under the banner of the so- called cultural
revolution. This symbolic rallying slogan confused
foreign observers, who were inclined to equate Albanian
developments with Chairman Mao's revolution in
Communist China. These observers erroneously
concluded that Albania had been reduced to the status of
a mere puppet in its relationship with China and that the
regime was aping Peking's policies without a discernible
reason.
Unlike events ir. China, the Albanian revolution never
pitted social organizations against each other, and the
dominance of the party was never questioned or
threatened. Events in Albania did include the use of force
to weaken or eliminate old traditions considered
impediments to national growth. Even the beliefs and
practices of the Muslim and Orthodox religions came
under attack, albeit in a more thoroughgoing,
devastating manner. The new religion and the source of
morality is "Albanianism," the turning of necessity into
virtue, with respect to "self- reliance," and of apathy into
fierce national pride, based on the country's heritage and
undeniable accomplishments in the years since World
War 11. Little is known about the changes in popular
outlook accompanying this controlled revolution, but it is
clear that Albania is on the threshold of a new distinctive
phase in its history. The fact that in 1970 the leadership
was grappling with the problem of whether or not it
could afford to decentralize some state functions without
losing its control is indicative of how far the process has
already gone.
In 1966, the first order of business was to replace
terrorism as the major instrument of national policy with
a constructive, popular program of nation building.
Indispensable to such a program was the rapid
development of a streamlined party and government
which would be more efficient and responsive and
eventually gain a larger measure of popular acceptance.
This entailed a risky dismemberment and rebuilding of
the military and the state apparatus, which, knowing no
other tradition, had established an influential "new
class" of privileged bureaucrats with a vested interest in
keeping themselves in power. Therefore, in March 1966
the party leadership published an unprecedented open
letter to the people, admitting the situation as it existed
and attacking the bureaucracy in terms reminiscent of its
savage polemics with the Soviet Union. The leadership
disclaimed responsibility for the "bureaucratic
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distortions" that had occurred and placed the blame on
unnamed party members who had allegedly lost touch
with the people. The immediate purpose of the attack
was to break the bureaucracy's grip on the machinery of
state and to serve notice to local officials not to undercut
or oppose the party's new program. A far reaching
reorganization of the party and state apparatus at the
national and local levels followed the open letter and
allowed for limited decentralization of power, but party
control remained firmlv in the hands of Albania's leaders.
During 1966 -67 large numbers of bureaucrats were
transferred from their central offices to the outlying areas,
especially to regional production centers. Little is known
about the new bureaucracy that has been established in
Tirane, but to be consistent with the program it would
necessarily have to be loyal, nationalistic, relatively
young, deeply committed to modernization of the
country, and probably better educated than its
predecessor group. One of its key assigned missions is to
be the source of ideas and action for "progress," rather
than for perpetuation of the status quo.
Since 1966 the regime has relied heavily on appeals to
Albanian nationalism to inspire the masses and to rally
popular support for projected social and economic:
programs. The violent antireligious campaign begun in
1967 was based on a dictum by party boss Hoxha that
"the only religion for an Albanian is Albanianism." In
literature, the theater, and the folk arts the Albanian
leaders have aggressively promoted the use of such
traditional themes as heroism, self sacrifice, and love of
freedom and independence from foreign domination.
Pry tiinent Albanian national and literary figures of the
pa::, most of them non Communists, have been restored
to places of honor. During the 1968 -70 period, for
example, the regime celebrated with considerable fanfare
the anniversaries of four important (but decidedly non
Comrriunist) events in Albanian national history: the
90th anniversary of the League of Prizren (established in
.1878), which sparked the Albanian national movement;
the 60th anniversary of the Congress of Monastir (1908),
which first attempted to standardize the Albanian
language; the 50th anniversary of the Congress of
Lushnje (1920), the birth of the modern Albanian nation
state; and the 500th anniversary of the death of
Skanderbeg, Albania's greatest national hero. During the
latter festivities the leadership attempted to draw
parallels between the struggle against the Turks in the
15th century and Albania's current struggle for survival
against the "imperialists and revisionists." Given the
lineup of world powers in 1970, this type of phraseology
was directed equally at the West and the U.S.S.R.
The development of the economy has been spotty an I
uneven because of Albania's heavy dependence on
foreign aie from the Communist countries and the
periodic disruptions in the flow of this aid resulting from
the differences which have arisen in Late Communist
world. Prior to 1948 Albania was largely dependent on
Yugoslavia for development aid; from 1948 to 1961, on
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and since the
50
latter date, on Communist China. Nevertheless, over the
years, solid progress has been achieved. The first
economic plan, the One Year Plan of 1948, was scrapped
in mid course because of the Cominform- Yugoslav break.
Subsequently_ Albania promulgated a Two Year Plan
(1949 -50) and a series of 5 -year plans culminating in the
fifth Five Year Plan (1971 -75). Sino Albanian economic
agreements negotiated in late 1968 and again in October
1970 have allotted substantial but unpublicized amounts
of aid for Albania's economic development in 1969 -75.
Judging by numerous reports, a substantial portion of this
aid is allotted for 30 large -scale industrial projects,
ranging from a hydroelectric plant to a metallurgical
combine.
Agriculture is still the predominant sector of the
economy and its development has been slow. The
regime's agricultural policies from the beginning were
aimed at complete collectivization, but a policy of
gradualism was pursued for a number of years, probably
because of the imperative need to sustain food
production. Immediately upon taking power the new
regime expror :ated land from large landowners, giving it
to the peasants. This -,:)n was followed shortly by rigid
controls over production and marketing which forced the
peasants to turn most of their produce over to the
government. First begun in 1946 against strong peasant
resistance, the collectivization drive did not get fully
underway until 1955. With the consolidation of remote
highland farmsteads in 1968, the regime had in large part
achieved its goal of a collectivized agriculture. As
collectivization proceeded, the amount of land and
livestock allowed to the peasant for his private use has
varied. Following the change of national policy in 1966,
however, a determined effort was made to reduce the
peasant's independence and to increase his reliance on
the state for survival; regulations in 1967 reduced the size
of private plots and subsequent steps have strictly limited
privee livestock holdings. Although more than 95
and perhaps as much as 99 �of the arable land has
been socialized, party boss Hoxha assured the peasants in
late 1970 that they would be permitted to retain their
private plots for the foreseeable future. Despite the
appearance that this is a concession to the peasants, it
probably more accurately reflects Hoxha's satisfaction
with the status quo, as well as recognition of the
economic importance of the private plots.
Agricultural output has been totally insufficient for
domestic needs and the country probably will remain a
net importer of foodstuffs. The regime has attempted to
achieve agricultural self- sufficiency by promoting the
expansion of arable land through large -scale programs of
land reclamation, soil improvement, and irrigation.
Much of this land melioration has been accomplished by
mobilizing large numbers of people, both civilian and
military, to work on massive projects. Since 1967, land
reclamation has been intensified in the mountainous
areas, and during the fifth Five Year Plan (1971 -75) these
regions are envisaged as providing still further tracts of
reclaimed land. The construction of two fertilizer plants
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in recent years has helped to increase agricultural yields
somewhat. Despite the continuing shortage of basic
agricultural products for domestic consumption, the
regime has also attempted to expand agricultural exports.
The increased planting and cultivation of grapes, olives,
and other fruit and vegetable crops has been directed
toward the sale of such products on foreign markets.
Industry in Albania is still rudimentary, but it has
developed considerably since World War 11, largely
because of foreign economic and technical assistance.
Despite the limited resources of the country, industrial
projects continue to receive the government's special care
and attention in the hope that they will soon provide a
base for future Albanian heavy industry. Presently,
industry is unable to meet the country's goals for
industrial development and is stilt heavily oriented
toward exports of raw and semifinished goods. Much of
the investment capital channeled into domestic use has
gone for producer goods and infrastructure needs (e.g.,
electrification of the country). The most important
industrial sectors are agricultural processing, manufac-
ture of textiles and clothing, timber, and the extractive
industries.
Highly centralized control of the economy has enabled
the regime to concentrate capital and labor on the very
intensive development of certain economic sectors. The
entire population has been regimented in support of
economic programs. Controls over the workers have been
implemented through the trade unions and other mass
organizations, as well as by regulating production quotas,
absenteeism, and wages. Penal or forced labor is still a
factor in the economy; "volunteer" youth brigades and
military uvits are also used on many projects.
As in oth: r Communist states, the advantages of
centralized control have been offset by the generally
inefficient utilization of economic resources. A large
bureaucracy and the highly centralized decisionmaking
apparatus have stifled local initiative. Since 1966 the
regime's increased willingness to discuss publicly
economic problems has led to such proposals as a partial
decentralization of the industrial structure (but bearing
little resemblance to the Yugoslav experience). For
example, Haki Toska, one of the first appointees to a
deputy chairmanship on the Council of Ministers under
the program of national mobilization inaugurated in
1966, asserted in July 1970 that some centrally directed
enterprises should be placed instead under the guidance
of the district people's councils; he added, however, that
there are "differing ideas concerning the solution of these
problems." Little evidence has become available to
explain the differing positions, although a job swap
between Toska and party secretary Xhafer Spahiu at the
end of 1970 might have been related to the discussions.
The Communist regime during its years of power has
implemented a series of programs unique in Albanian
history �that have directly benefited the general
population. For the first time, extensive social insurance
and health care programs have provided workers and
families with such benefits as retirement pensions, free
health care, disability and maternity payments, and day-
care centers for children. The incidence of disease and
illness has also been greatly reduced. Despite the marked
progress that has been made, much still remains to be
done to educate the population in basic sanitary
measures and to increase the availability of medical
facilities and personnel.
It is probably in the field of education that the
Communists have achieved their most impressive gains
since taking over the government a quarter of a century
ago. The state assumes the responsibility for providing an
education, free to all, from the kindergarten to the
university level, but in practice the schooling of those
considered unreliable or antiregime tends to be limited to
the basic levels. The literacy rate of perhaps 75% (1970)
contrasts sharply with conditions prevailing in pre
Communist Albania, when the literacy rate was only 20%
(1939). The educational system is largely technical
vocational in nature and is hampered by a shortage of
facilities, materials, and trained instructors, but it has
gone far in meeting the country's dire need for a literate,
semiskilled labor force. Indoctrination in Communist
ideology and the inculcation of loyalty to the state and its
policies are pervasive features of the education:. system;
periodic press reports remind educators that scholarly
pursuits must not be emphasized at the expense of
indoctrination and training in Marxist ideology. All
forms of intellectual expression literature, theater,
music, and art �are controlled by the party and are
regarded as a means by which to develop a "socialist"
outlook among the people.
3. Foreign
Because of its bitter past and very brief history as an
independent nation, Albania's prime foreign policy
objectives are the protection of its territorial integrity and
maintenance of its independence. Because it is small,
economically weak, and susceptible to outside pressures,
its need to rely on more powerful foreign sponsors has
made difficult all attempts to establish a purely Albanian
foreign policy, even though Tirane has always been
careful to assert its independence from the donor
countries. Under Yugoslav and during at least the early
years of Soviet tutelage, Albania had virtually no foreign
policy. In the latter years of their alliance with the Soviet
Union, the Albanians were clearly espousing their own
foreign policy, even to the point of publicly contradicting
the Soviet line. Since its alliance with Communist China,
following the break with the Soviet Union in 1961,
Albania has consistently promoted Peking's international
objectives but has had a measurable amount of freedom
to conduct its own foreign policy.
From 1961 to 1966 Albania's foreign policy was almost
indistinguishable from Communist China's, principally
because Tirane needed Chairman Mao's protection
against what it considered to be a continuing threat from
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Also
impeding the development of an independent foreign
policy was the fact of the traumatic split with the
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U.S.S.R. The regime required a period of consolidation
and reorientation because its longtime sponsor and the
font of the ruling Albanian party's ideological beliefs and
ideals was now classified as potentially a dangerous
enemy. The first years after the break with Moscow were
spent in purging or neutralizing those elements in the
party who balked at making the transition from a pro
Soviet to a pro- Chinese policy. Once having embarked on
a course of independence from the U.S.S.R., the regime
had to face up to the precariousness of Albania's position
and its future prospects. From Albania's point of view
perhaps one of the most important factors was
Communist China's great distance from Albania and its
consequent limited ability to be of direct assistance to
Tirane should the Soviets launch a campaign of
subversion or an outright invasion. Despite these
uncertainties, ideological sympathies compelled Hoxha
to look to Communist China for support and guidance.
Available information indicates that the regime has
sought Communist China's views on a number of issues,
apparently in order to determine the degree of freedom
Peking would grant Tirane in the area of foreign
vela: ions. It appears that the Chinese have given the
Albanians a freer hand in these matters than did either
the U.S.S.R. or Yugoslavia during their periods of
tutelage.
Thus, coincident with the domestic campaign to bring
Albanian society into the 20th century, Tirane began to
make a gradual but discernible break with its policy of
isolation from the non Communist world. Since 1966 a
series of events has moved the Albanian regime, slowly at
first but with increased momentum by 1970, to increase
its ties with foreign countries. It seems likely that at first
the Albanians were motivated by worry over whether or
not they would have a viable ally because of the ferocity
of China's internal upheavals in 1966 -67. This worry
began to subside in 1968, but the lesson remained. The
dangers inherent in the regime's policy of isolation were
brought home hard by the Soviet -led Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the subsequent
pact threats to Romania, Yugoslavia, and ultimately
Albania itself. The reemergence of China in international
diplomatic circles after years of self imposed isolation,
apparently reassured Albanian leaders that they were on
the correct path, and subsequent Chinese support in
terms of large -scale economic aid confirmed this. The
creation of an industrialized economy has been a major
pillar of the regime's policies, and perforce such a policy
requires contact with foreigners. Indeed, the desire for
expanded economic ties has been foremost in TirarWs
mind, but in trying to establish these ties the regime has
been hampered by Albania's lack of readily marketable
export items and the dearth generally of even the most
rudimentary contacts with the non Communist world.
The regime still officially reveres Stalin �a concomi-
tant of its domestic and contemporary pro Chinese
policies �:and in many respects still maintains rigid
control over all facets of national life. After World War
II, Albanian Communist leaders willingly sacrificed their
52
national in.egrity on the altar of "proletarian
internationalism.' As events unfolded, this neant in
practice acquiescence to Yugoslav control ove the largely
Albanian population in the Kosovo region and overall
subjugation to Yugoslavia, because Stalin considered Tito
a more important ally than Hoxha. By 1948 the Albanian
party leadership was prepared to deemphasize the
idealism of earlier years and to assert more vigorously
Albania's own national interests. When Tito broke with
Stalin, the Albanians took the opportunity to end their
dependence on Yugoslavia. The new, more intimate
association with the U.S.S.R. paid dividends in economic
terms, and Albania's economy today is based on the
foundation laid by the Soviets. But the Soviets were
interested in Albania primarily as their only base in the
Mediterranean, and they wished it to be secure.
Moscow's assistance was accompanied by a style of
colonialism not unlike that endured by the Albauians
during the period of Turkish domination. Growing
disillusionment with "proletarian internationalism" as
practiced by the Soviets increased the desire for true
independence and an opportunity to regain national
integrity.
The major develr,pme -it in Albania's foreign policy
during the post- Stalin period has been its break with the
U.S.S.R., which was formalized with the suspension of
diplomatic relations in December 1961. This break also
entailed the immediate severance of ties between the two
ruling Communist parties, the withdrawal of Soviet
technicians from Albania, the recall of Albanian military
and civilian students from the U.S.S.R., the withdrawal
of Soviet submarines from the base near the head of Gji i
Vlores, and the suspension of Albanian participation in
the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).
Albania's official withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact did
not occur until September 1968, when Tirane's concern
over the Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslovakia led it to
formally renounce the Warsaw Pact agreements.
The ouster in 1964 of Khrushchev, Hoxha's
archenemy, strengthened the position of the Albanian
regime and increased the domestic prestige of its leaders.
But Khrushchev's successors in the Kremlin have treated
Albania with the same hostility as did Khrushchev, while
the Albanians have reciprocated by accusing the Soviet
leadership of ideological deviation. The two parties have
become implacably hostile, and Albania's leaders have
summarily rejected any proposals to reestablish contacts
with the Soviet leadership. An invitation to the 23d
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
March 1966 was refused by Tirane "with contempt," and
the appended explanation added that Albania could not
have relations of any kind with "traitors to communism
and renegades of Marxism- Leninism." Events in
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 markedly increased
Albanian apprehensions over Soviet policy aims in
Eastern Europe, and, among other things, led Tirane to
become even more abusive in condemning Soviet
policies. The invasion also moved Albania to find
common cause against the Soviets with the other two
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maverick states of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and
Romania. Reports in late 1969 of a Soviet initiative to
improve relations with A_!ba ia a ere answered by a
scathing attack on the Kremlin leadership by Albanian
party boss Hoxha at the celebrations marking the 25th
Anniversary of Albania's liberation. In early 1971, an
improvement in relations between Moscow and Tirane
appeared highly improbable, at !cast during the tenure of
the current leaders.
The break in party ties with Moscow extended to the
other Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, at the time of the suspension of Albanian
Soviet diplomatic relations, none of these countries
completely severed ties with Albania. Indeed, Bucharest
has consistently maintained relations on an ambassadori-
al level with Tirane. The other Communist countries
censured Tirane's intransigence but chose to maintain
diplomatic oantact at the chargd level or lower. Poland
appointed an ambassador in February 1966, but almost
immediately relations reverted to the chared level.
Between July 1968 and October 1970 Albania was
represented in Sofia only by a trade representative, the
Bulgarians having exp(!Icd the Albanian diplomatic
mission for "unseemly" proselytizing. Romania's
relations with Albania have been moderately warm, and
since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which the
Romanians refused to participate, the two countries have
drawn even closer. While. the Stalinist overtones of the
Albanian regime are undoubtedly an embarrassing
reminder to the other countries of their not -too- distant
past, they have avoided an all -out condemnation of
Albania. Instead, they have patiently cultivated
economic ties with Albania in the expectation that
"reason" may ultimately prevail in Tirane. All Eastern
European bloc countries, except Yugoslavia, had long-
term agreements with Albania extending at least into
1970, and throughout the long period of hostility dating
back to 1948 even Yugoslavia has negotiated trade
protocols on a year -to -year basis. In May 1971 the two
countries c their first bilateral 5 -vear trade
agreement (,amounting to a total of US$110 million).
Albanian relations with Peking developed slowly for
the first decade after the Communist takeover of
mainland China in 1949. With the realization of
common ideological interests, however, closer relations
developed quickly after 1959, and since 1962 China has
been the Hoxha regime's main source of economic and
political support. There have been numerous exchanges
of political, military, economic, and cultural delegations.
Some of Albania's propaganda attacks on the Soviet
Union have been coordinated with Communist China
and, in addition, Peking frequently broadcasts
vituperative Albanian commentary about the Soviet
Union.
Albania has relied heavily on Chinese assistance to
compensate for the cancellation of Soviet aid, which left
the country on the verge of economic ruin. China
provided a long -term trade and aid agreement (1961 -65)
and at least US$125 million in credits to finance the third
Five Year Plan, helped finance the fourth Five Year Plan
(1966 -70) with unspecified amounts of credit, and in
1968 concluded an extensive, long -term (1969 -75) trade
and aid agreement. A further agreement negotiated in
the fall of 1970 appears to implement the 1968 protocol.
Albania's shortages of grain have been relieved on a
number of occasions by grain from China, which initially
had been purchased for hard currency from Western
countries. The Chinese have provided economic and
technical assistance in support of Albania's industrializa-
tion program. On various occasions as many as 1,000
Chinese technicians have been reported in Albania at one
time, working in a variety of fields and specialties.
During 1966 -67, when the struggle for power within
China perhaps was at a peak, Tirane grew increasingly
apprehensive that Peking's support �an item of critical
importance to the Albanian leadership �would falter or
possibly end outright. An exchange of high -level
delegations in 1967 helped strengthen the Peking- Tirane
alliance, but a certain aloofness in relations was noticed
by diplomatic observers into early 1968, suggesting that
the Chinese leaders were preoccupied with domestic
problems. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the two
countries closed ranks to contend with the hardening of
Soviet attitudes toward the "socialist community," and
since then there has been no evidence of strains within
the alliance. The rapprochement between the two allies
in this anomalous political partnership has continued
into 1971, although both Peking and Tirane have slowly
begun to reestablish and strengthen their ties with the
international community. Albania helps earn its support
from Peking by waging an intensive propaganda
campaign aimed at placing the sole responsibility for
"splitting" the international Communist movement on
the Soviet Union. Albania also acts as spokesman for
Communist China in the United Nations, affords China
its only foothold in Europe, provides a convenient place
where pro Chinese Communist elements from European
Communist parties can meet, harbors exiled splinter
groups from the Eastern European parties, and operates
one of the most powerful radio propaganda operations in
the world against the U.S.S.R. and its allies.
S::viet policy toward Albania's traditionally hostile
neigabor Yugoslavia was perhaps the major reason
underlying the Hoxha regime's decision to switch
allegiance to :,ommunist China. Hoxha was forced for
lack of an 4ernative to accept Khrushchev's
rapprochement with Tito in 1955, although he viewed it
as contrary to Albania's national interests. Subsequently,
Albania's propaganda against Yugoslavia was frequently
out of line with Soviet policy: China's challenge to the
increasing "revisionism" it saw in the Soviet-led
European Communist movement, as exemplified in the
Soviet -led rapprochement with Tito's "renegade"
national communism, finally provided Hoxha with an
alternative.
Although Hoxha chose to justify his opposition to
Yugoslavia by portraying it as a struggle of orthodoxy
against revisionism in the Communist movement, it is
53
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perhaps more a manifestation of long -held fears of
Yugoslav expansionism and the xenophobia which
characterizes the popular attitudes of Albanians toward
their Slavic neighbors. It is widely believed in Albania
that Yugoslavia was preparing to annex Albania before
the 1948 break. Relations between Albania and
Yugoslavia are also aggravated by the large number of
ethnic Albanians who live in Yugoslavia. About 915,000
ethnic Albanians (equaling roughly 42% of the
population of Albania proper), live in the contiguous
areas of Yugoslavia known as Kosovo province (Figure
31). Their level of living, while lagging behind that of
other areas of Yugoslavia, is higher than in Albania.
Diplomatic protests have frequently been exchanged over
alleged mistreatment of these ethnic Albanians as well as
over border violations and other "provocations." On
occasion both countries have expelled one another's
diplomatic representatives, but neither has taken the
extreme step of breaking relations.
Albania's hostile propaganda campaign against
Yugoslavia continued unabated until the fall of 1968,
when the Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslovakia
thoroughly alarmed both countries, and Tirane
suspended its polemics against Belgrade. Since late 1968
polemics between the two countries have only
x MONTENEGRO L
a Skople
ADRIATIC
MACEDONIA
GREECE
0.
0
Area Inhabited by
Albanians
General limits of
Northern Epirus
Administrative Dound-
arias In Yugoslavia
Q
FIGURE 31. Albania's population and border problems with
Yugoslavia and Greece (C)
54
occasionally been revived, .tnd never on the former scale.
As areas of common conce and cooperation have slowly
expanded, so have the economic ties between the two
countries. Commercial exchanges were expanded in 1970,
and border crossing procedures have been simplified.
Tourism to Albania has once again been opened up, and
during 1970 cooperation between Tirane State University
and the new ethnic Albanian University of Prigtina in
Yugoslavia was formalized in a series of agreements. Of
major importance in the improved relations has been the
public expression of good will toward Yugoslavia by
Albanian party boss Hoxha in'May 1970. At that time
Hoxha turned his back on t1le previous 20 years of
hostility toward Yugoslavia and expressed a desire to
improve Tirane's ties with Belgrade, reserving only the
right publicly to air the "deep ideological differences"
which separate the countries. In February 1971 this sign
of Albanian good will was translated into an elevation of
diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level, a move
reportedly proposed by Belgrade as early as the spring of
1970.
In mid -1971 Albania resumed formal diplomatic
relations with its other neighbor, Greece, thereby ending
some 30 years of non representation between the two
countries. For years, normalization of relations had
foundered on Greek claims that a state of war existed
between the two countries because Albania was an
autonomous entity, rather than a puppet of Italy, when it
attacked Greece in 1939. Another obstacle to the
resumption of normal relations had been the area of
approximately 2,000 square miles called northern Epirus
by Greece. It is still a potential irritant. The Greek
minority of perhaps 40,000 who reside in this area have
Greek language schools but have not been granted
autonomy.
Albanian- Turkish relations have moved forward since
December 1965, when Albania supported Turkey in the
United Nations over the Cyprus issue. Subsequently the
two countries raised their diplomatic missions to the
ambassadorial level and have taken a number of steps to
improve relations in the political, economic, and cultural
fields. The two countries exchanged parliamentary
delegations in 1968 and 1969, and the visit of an
Albanian delegation in 1969� headed by Behar Shtylla,
who previously had been foreign minister �was notable
because it was the first trip of a high -level Albanian
official to any state other than Communist China since
the Soviet- Albanian break in 1961. A Turkish view of
Albanian -Tul kish relations, expressed at the time of
Shtylla's visit, stressed the identity of interests between
the two countries in their efforts to resist Greek
irredentism. Albania's traditional ties to the Ottoman
Empire also provide some common ground for
association between the two populations, but since
Albania is of only limited economic interest to Turkey, it
is doubtful that Ankara will vigorously pursue the
development of bilateral relations.
Until 1970 Albania maintained diplomatic relations
with only three members of NATO Turkey, Italy, and
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France. Albanian approaches in late 1969 to a number of
Western European countries for diplomatic relations
slowly bore fruit throughout 1970. Within 11 months,
Tiran6 received favorable responses for the establishment
of relations from four European states� Denmark,
Sw;'�. Belgium, and the Netherlands. Close ties
with Western countries are complicated, however, by
Tiran6's militant anti- Western propaganda.
Between 1960 and 1967 Albania established relations
with only nine Afro -Asian countries. Since December
1968, Tiran6 additionally has agreed to e.:,tablished
relations with Syria, Kuwait, and Southern Yemen, and
in 1970 reached an accord for the exchange of diplomatic
representatives with two African countries, Libya and the
Central African Republic.
Relations with the United States, broken off in 1939
after the Italian occupation, have not been reestablished.
An informal U.S. mission to Albania was withdrawn in
1946 when the Hoxha regime refused to recognize the
validity of bilateral treaties in effect between Albania
and the United States in 1939 and placed the mission
under increasing harassment. Occasional Albanian hints
of a desire to reestablish diplomatic relations with the
United States have not been pursued by either side. These
isolated, abortive overtures were always followed by a
sharp step -up in vituperative anti -U.S. propaganda, a
tactic that has led some observers to conclude that Tiran6
was not genuinely interested. Albania's attitude toward
both the United States and the United Kingdom has long
been colored by its belief that the governments of both
states were responsible for attempts to subvert or
overthrow the Communist regime on various occasions
since 1945, the latest being in 1952.
After World War II, the British encountered
undisguised hostility from the Hoxha regime and
withdrew their military mission in 1946. Later that year,
in October, prospects for normal relations were further
reduced when two U.K. warships struck mines in the
internationalized Corfu Channel. The International
Court of Arbitration subsequently ordered Albania to
compensate the United Kingdom in the amount of
US$2.3 million, a judgment which Albania has ignored.
London maintains that Albania must pay at least a
portion of this indemnity and guarantee normal
operating conditions for a diplomatic mission before the
United Kingdom wn-ild be willing to resume diplomatic
relations. Albania h-s shown no willingness to comply.
Albania joined the United Nations in 1955 as a part of
the so- called package deal that also brought into the
international organization several of the other Eastern
European Communist countries. Although it is a member
of seven of the United Nations' specialized agencies, it
has not made a major contribution to their work. Albania
annually introduces before the General Assembly the so-
called Albanian resolution which calls for the United
Nations to seat Communist China in place of Nationalist
China.
4. Defense
During the relatively short period of time that Albania
has been independent it has been forced to look to more
powerful states to guarantee its territorial integrity. As a
consequence, when the Communists seized power in
1944, they turned to Yugoslavia as their guarantor;
following Hoxha's break with Tito in 1948, the regime
shifted its allegiance to Moscow. Since Albania's break
with the U.S.S.R. and its de facto withdrawal from the
Warsaw Pact in 1961, Albania's integrity has rested more
on the stabilized situation in the Balkans than on the
political psychological support of Communist China.
Yugoslavia is loathe to begin a Balkan war for fear of
Soviet or Western intervention; Greece and Italy are tied
down in the NATO alliance. Albania's foreign policy
since 1966 suggests that these facts are more appreciated
by the leadership.
Latest available information (1966) credits the
Albanian armed forces with 35,000 men on active duty.
There is ample manpower for military needs, for there
were an estimated 505,000 males listed in the 15 to 49 age
group in 1970. A reserve and mobilization system, which
appears to be countrywide, includes some 160,000
trained ground forces reservists. A majority of the
population will receive some form of basic military
training if a 1970 law providing for compulsory military
training for all students is fully implemented.
A series of measures promulgated since 1966 evidently
have been intended to give the Albanian military
establishment a revolutionary image modeled on the
experience of Communist China. Military rank has been
abolished, and a new uniform styled along the lines of
Chinese military dress has been introduced. Great stress
has also been placed on the economic self reliance of all
military units, which often clear land, grow their own
food, and construct their own housing.
Announced budgetary outlays for military expendi-
tures since 1966 have fluctuated from a high of 9.1% of
total expenditures in 1969 to a 1970 low of 5.9 The
1970 national budget allocated 304 million leks (1
lek= US$0.20) for defense, a decline of 27.6% from the
previous year. The high military expenditures in 1969,
however, may have reflected the anxieties and the
response of the Albanians to the Soviet -led invasion of
Czechoslovakia. Increased outlays, in part, have gone for
modern egt!.ipment and armaments including planes,
patrol boats, and various antiaircraft and coastal defense
weapons �which have been supplied by the Chinese.
Albania has denounced all international discussions of
disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear -free
zones. China's emergence as a nuclear power has served
to reinforce Albania's demands for granting Peking a
voice in world nuclear policy decisions. Tirane
characterizes U.N.- sponsored disarmament efforts and
especially the two -power strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT) begun in 1969 as a "plot between the U.S.S.R.
and the United States to dominate the world."
Albania's civil defense programs are directed by the
Society for Aid to the Army and Defense, established in
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1949. This organization is a military and civil defense
corps charged with training the population in
paramilitary operations and civil defense procedures. Its
known activities range from excursions to historic places
to grueling "partisan marches." It also offers instruction
in "morale building," radio communications, first aid,
and precautionary measures against bombardment and
gas attack. Fragmentary information indicates that a few
underground shelters may have been built in some of the
large cities. There has been very little information on the
society since its first and only congress in November 1963.
At that time it reported a membership of 173,590 in 3,250
local organizations.
E. Propaganda programs (U /OU)
1. Organization, purpose, and control
As do other Communist governments, the Albanian
regime relies heavily on official propaganda for
disseminating its views and implementing its policies.
The propaganda mechanism is therefore highly
developed and pervades every aspect of Albanian life.
While the methods employed and the content
occasionally reflect a sophisticated understanding of the
people and culture, the propaganda dispensed by the
regime tends to be naive and even more heavyhanded
than that of the other Communist countries.
The Albanian Workers Party has a monopoly of control
not only over those agencies concerned solely with
propaganda but also over the activities of all mass and
specialized organizations in the country. This monopoly
is guaranteed in the 1.950 constitution in which the party
is appointed leader, teacher, and guide of "all
organizations" �both public and state (Article 21).
Dissenting views are not permitted a forum, and attempts
to disseminate material critical of the regime are regarded
as a threat to the "people's authority" and are punishable
by from 3 to 10 years' imprisonment.
Control of the dissemination of propaganda themes to
the mass and specialized organizations is directed by the
party Central Committee's Directorate of Agitation and
Propaganda (Agitprop). The gist, or often the precise
content, of propaganda is then communicated to
government ministries such as the M-nistry of Education
and Culture, to editorial boards of newspapers and radio
stations, to film studios, and to groups such as the Central
Council of Trade Unions, the Democratic Front of
Albania, the Union of Working Youth of Albania, and
the Albanian- Chinese Friendship Society.
2. Domestic propaganda
The primary aim of domestic propaganda is to bring
about the suppression of the tenacious customs and
habits which inhibit "socialist growth" and to transform
the Albanian people into a Communist society. Such
propaganda concomitantly aims at preventing the
growth and dissemination of views hostile to the regime
which could lead to active resistance, and therefore it
maintains a persistent campaign against "reestablishers
of capitalism." A secondary purpose of domestic
56
propaganda is to secure popular support for specific
regime programs, through criticism or praise. Words are
considered to be almost as important as wages in boosting
economic output and productivity. The regime develops
extensive publicity campaigns around events such as
factory competitions, voluntary labor projects, and
individual production achievements. Local Agitprop
workers post wall newspapers acclaiming successes and
rebuking laggards, dole out labor awards, and
periodically hold workers' meetings to give peptalks on
the importance of overfulfilling work norms. Albania's
so- called cultural revolution (1966 -69) �which featured,
inter alia, the dragooning of urban workers and
intellectuals to cultivate the new lands, some apparent
decentralization of administration, the use of
"voluntary" labor on numerous local building projects,
and the closing of all churches �was accompanied by a
barrage of words and propaganda actions. All these
campaigns were orchestrated under the general heading
of a "struggle against bureaucracy and the capitalist
mentality, the struggle for the full emancipation of
woman, and the struggle against backward customs and
religious beliefs."
The effectiveness of domestic propaganda has been
limited by the small number of radio receivers and wired
loudspeakers and other technical factors. In addition, the
constant exposure of the populace to the exaggerated
claims and m srepresentations in Albanian propaganda
has probably developed an apathetic attitude on the part
of the average Albanian toward claims and pronounce-
ments of the regime.
The major media for disseminating domestic
propaganda are the press, radio, films, and public
lectures. All have been used since 1960 -61 to condition
the Albanian people to the break with the U.S.S.R. and
the alliance with Communist China. While the
propaganda in the Central Committee's daily paper Zeri i
Popullit� partly designed for foreign consumption �is
couched in terms of universal Marxist ideology, there is
firm evidence pointing to a stress on nationalistic themes
in purely domestic propaganda. The principal medium
for this line is reportedly the party- sponsored lecture in
cities and villages. The tremendous publicity accorded in
early 1968 to the 500th anniversary of the death of
Skanderbeg (Albania's only national hero) attests to the
regime's emphasis on bolstering nationalism.
Motion pictures are one of the more popular means of
disseminating propaganda. The primary task of the film
industry is to bring about a Marxist- Socialist orientation
of the people �to rally them to a struggle for the "new
life," to accept new customs, and to engage in "self
sacrificing labor." Few feature films are produced locally,
and approved imports either have the Albanian language
dubbed in or they use subtitles. Because the government
and the party are the only distributors of films, censorship
poses no problem; films from other countries are shown
only after careful selection. The Albanian film studio
Shqiperia a Re (New Albania) does produce documentary
films which tout the accomplishments under commu-
nism.
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3. Foreign propaganda
The basic purpose of Albania's propaganda directed
abroad is to present the country's foreign policy in a
favorable light. Ancillary aims are to advance the
regime's views on intrabloc problems while demonstrat-
ing its support of Chinese Communist ideological
viewpoints, to portray a peaceful Albania, and to win
support of Albanian emigree communities abroad. The
most important dissemination channels are the press,
Radio Tirane, the Albanian Telegraph Agency (ATA),
diplomatic acid trade missions, foreign pro Albanian
Communist organizations, and books and periodicals.
The other Eust European Communist countries have
tried to stem the dissemination within their borders of
Albanian- originated materials �once permitted under
cuitural exchange agreements. Persistence in this activity,
however, has led to sporadic official diplomatic protests.
Albanian diplomats in key centers in the non Communist
world still distribute a considerable volume of printed
material. Pamphlets containing reprints of press articles
and anti- Soviet speeches of First Secretary Hoxha have
appeared in Italian, French, German, and Spanish in
Europe and even in South America. Albanian diplomats
also actively support pro Chinese party factions which
are active in a number of non Communist countries.
Several changes were made in Albania's international
broadcasting schedule and its methods of transmission as
a result of the break with the U.S.S.R. In 1.961 Radio
Tirane began broadcasting to the U.S.S.R. in Russian for
the first time. At the same time, Tirane began
broadcasting in Bulgarian; a program in Hungarian
commenced in early 1964, and transmissions in Czech
and Polish were initiated in September 1966. The Polish
language programs of Radio Tirane are frequently used
to disseminate messages containing attacks on the Polish
leadership by the so- called Polish Communist Party, a
minuscule pro- Peking splinter group with which Stalinist
escapee Kozimierz Mihal is believed to h^ linked.
Albania embarked in 1966 on a rapid expansion of its
foreign broadcasting facilities. A new radio transmitter,
built with Communist China's assistance, was
inaugurated in November 1966 and reached full
operation during 1967. By the end of 1967, Albania's
foreign broadcasting output had swelled to a record 381
hours per week (from 199 hours a week at the end of
1966). Consequently, Albania that year jumped to fourth
place among Communist countries in international
broadcasting volume arid, by the end of 1969, was tied
with North Korea for third place. Between 1966 and the
end of 1969 Albania added more than 300 hours of
propaganda broadcasts, inaugurating broadcasts in
Indonesian (1967), Portuguese (1969), and Romanian
(1969). Tirane also broadcasts in Arabic, English, French,
German, Greek, Italian, Serbo- Croat, and Spanish.
Figure 32 presents Albania's weekly foreign broadcast
schedule.
4. Propaganda directed from abroad
The medium of radiobroadeasting is one of the few
ways of penetrating Albania's rigid barriers to
Greek
17:30
Hungarian
21:00
Romanian
21:00
Portuguese
21:00
Indonesian
21:00
Serbo- Croatian 24:30
Italian 24:30
French 24:30
Czechoslovakian 24:30
Arabic 24:30
Polish 28:00
German 28:00
Bulgarian 28:00
Spanish 31:30
Albanian 31:50
Russian 49:00
English 59:00
FIGURE 32. Albanian weekly foreign broadcast schedule
(U /OU)
communications. The Albanian leadership is cognizant
of the potential of this channel and has on more than one
occasion warned against this "poisonous" source. The
two chief protagonists of the "modest revisionist" camp
which are very active in the field of Albanian- language
broadcasting are Radio Moscow, which transmits 28
hours weekly, and Radio Pristina in Yugoslavia, which
maintains a full daily program in the Albanian language,
ostensibly only for the large Albanian ethnic group
located in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia but also
clearly directed to Albanian citizens on the other side of
the border.
After the break with the U.S.S.R., Radio Moscow
began broadcasts to Albania which were critical of the
Hoxha regime. When this proved to be fruitless, the tenor
of the broadcasts changed to one of extolling the unity of
other Communist parties with the Soviet party and
reminding Albanian listeners of Soviet aid in former years
which had proved indispensable to the socioeconomic
development of Albania.
The transmissions of four Western broadcasting
services can be received in Albania: Voice of America
(VOA), Radio Vatican, Radio Audizione Italiana-
Televisione, and Trans World Radio (a privately
operated religious station in Monte Carlo). These four
services broadcast a total of 7 hours weekly to Albania in
1970, a marked decline from previous years. As recently
as 1967, when the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) was still transmitting to Albania, major Western
radio stations allotted a total of 25 hours of programing to
57
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Albania each week. By early 1970 Radio Audizione
Italian Televisione broadcast slightly over 2 hours each
week, VOA 3'/z hours, Radio Vatican 1 hour, and Trans
World Radio 15 minutes. In addition, the Yugoslays
transmitted 10 hours of Albanian- language programs
weekly (down from 13' hours in .1967) and the Greek
radio allocated 1 hour weekly to a Greek language
program directed to the ethnic Greek minority in
Albania. Greece had suspended its broadcasts in
Albanian in 1962.
The effectiveness of foreign broadcasting to Albania is
limited by the comparatively small number of radio
receivers in the country. Reception in some valleys also
suffers because of the surrounding high mountains.
Furthermore, most of the existing sets are owned by loyal
party members, which also limits the .effectiveness of
foreign propaganda. Although there is no known law
against listening to Western broadcasts, the regime uses
pressure tactics and intimidation to prevent this activity.
It has not, however, systematically jammed transmissions
from abroad.
F. Subversion (S)
The Communist regime encounters occasional
resistance, both active and passive, on a small scale
within the country, and some subversive activity directed
from abroad. The continuing stability of the regime in
this uncongenial environment depends on a pervasive
and powerful police system which intimidates the
populace, eliminates dissident elements, and prevents
discontent from crystallizing into action.
Subversion directed from abroad poses a more serious
threat to the regime than purely internal dissidence.
Albania's support of the Chinese Communist position in
the Sino- Soviet dispute led to a Soviet effort in 1960 to
unseat the Hoxha regime. The U.S.S.R.'s capabilities for
intervention, however, were sharply curtailed after 1961
when its diplomatic, military, and aid personnel were
withdrawn. Both Greece and Yugoslavia have
traditionally engaged in clandestine activity against
Albania but have been restrained from undertaking
coordinated or extensive overt action by the mutual
suspicions governing much of the intercourse among the
three powers and by international political considera-
tions. Most recently, the desire by all three countries to
improve relations with one another has probably caused a
decline in subversive activity among the three countries.
The Albanian security forces probably have been unable
to prevent some clandestine Yugoslav and Greek groups
from crossing the border for sabotage and intelligence
missions.
1. Internal subversion
Although there does not appear to have been any
organized indigenous resistance in Albania for many
years, unorganized resistance, particularly of a passive
nature, continues among all classes of society. Aside from
an abortive attempt at a coup in the summer of 1960,
which was abetted by the Soviets, the break with the
58
U.S.S.R. has led to only a few i.stances of active
indigenous opposition. Poor living conditions, for
example, exacerbated in the early 1960's by the drying up
of Soviet aid, appear to have helped provoke sporadic
riot:,. One such riot is known to have occurred in the
Shkoder region of northern Albania in March 1963.
Discontent and sharp aversion to regime practices
among wide segments of the Albanian population have
been reported as recently as 1967. The general feeling of
the man in the street, according to a 1967 appraisal by
the Italian ambassador in Tirane, was that "things are
going to get still more difficult." The "cultural
revolution" most certainly exacerbated the hard feelings
of portions of the population; but, at the same time, it
-erved mobilize many segments and provide them with
a cause that allowed little time for grumbling. Because of
the effectiveness of the security apparatus, there is no
apparent leadership behind which any malcontents
might rally, and the great majority of the people have
grudgingly acquiesced in the status quo. The regime's
urprisingiy effective ban on all arms and ammunition
among a heretofore well -armed mountain people
virtually rules out armed resistance on the part of the
populace without the defection of some army troops.
Passive resistance appears to be widespread, and the
government has rot been able to eradicate it. The regime
has probably had the least success in dealing with
resistance among the peasants. A series of harsh
agricultural decrees during the early postwar period and
an intensive period of collectivization in 1956 -60 spurred
peasant discontent. The reaction of the peasants was to
resist as long as possible, even by resorting to acts of
terrorism in some sections of the country. When
coerced �which was not infrequent �they were reluctant
to bring property into the collective and in some instances
sold it or, in the case of animals, slaughtered them. Once
in the collective, the peasants have registered opposition
chiefly through work slowdowns, wastage, negligence,
and attention to their private plots. Collectivization of
the mountainous agricultural areas in 1966 -67 (amid
regime claims of complete agricultural collectivization)
may have been accompanied by sporadic violence and
unrest.
In industry, worker disaffection has often been
expressed through abuse of state property, pilfering, and
deliberate failure to fulfill work quotas. Most of the
industrial worker force is not even one generation
removed from the land, and although lacking
organization and cohesion in their new environment
many workers may still exhibit some of the fierce
independence long associated with the Albanian
mountain peasantry. Such an independent spirit is
apparently being worn down, but it is bound to be
antipathetic to the regimentation of life in the factories
and industrial dwelling areas.
The Albanian press has repeatedly complained about
shortcomings on the part of some Albanian youth; it has
charged them with indifference, carelessness, and with
failure to fIfill tasks assigned to them. Manifestations of
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apathy periodically aired in the press stern more from the
opposition of youth to attempts by the regime to organize
and direct all activity toward regime sponsored goals
than from a general sense of disaffection. Young people
have been accused of clinging to traditional concepts and
habits regarding family life and agricultural methods.
Nevertheless, it is to the youth, educated under the
Communist system and exposed to incessant regime
propaganda, that the Tirane leadership must look for its
basic support.
Dissatisfaction with the regime has periodically
surfaced among hie younger intellectuals. The demands
on spare time imposed by the Communists and the
pragmatism which is supposed to be the motivating
factor in all forms of intellectual activity are particular
irritants. Although members of the inteli!ctual class by
and large reject religion and family unity as discredited
relics of the past, they resent Albania's enforced isolation
from the outside world. The regime's program in 1967 of
sending artists and writers to engage in production work
in the countryside undoubtedly was also a major irritant
to this social stratum.
The nagging disaffection which appears to have
always existed in varying degrees in the armed forces was
exacerbated in 1966 when all rank reportedly was
abolished and political commissars were reintroduced
into all military units. The discontent caused by these
decrees and other regime measures to eliminate
bureaucracy have reportedly led to isolated arrests of a
few high- ranking military officers. There does n -,t
appear, however, to be any organized antiregi rr :e
resistance within the military.
The bulk of the enlisted personnel, conscripted from
the ranks of the peasantry, often bring their resentments
and antagonisms with them into the service. Isolated
groups or individuals within the still extant officer corps,
which is assumed to be loyal to the regime, have on
occasion proven more loyal to communism as practiced
elsewhere. Thus, purges of the military have often
involved those alleged to have pro Yugoslav or pro- Soviet
feelings. It was to the military, and especially the navy,
that the U. S. S. R. turned in 1960 to seek a group willing to
overthrow Hoxha; this led to the arrest of some officers,
particularly among the group that had most recently
studied in the U. S. S. R. The regime places its greatest trust
in the secret police (Sigurimi) as an organ of internal
control, as was evidenced in the 1962 riot in Fier when
ammunition was withheld from the army and turned
over the Sigurimi. Unconfirmed reports in early 1970
asserted that several army officers had been dismissed
and subsequently executed for dissenting activities.
Lower level office workers and civil servants have also
shown signs of disaffection. Although their hostility seems
somewhat muted, at least when compared with that still
evidenced among peasants, they have been subjected to
many of the same restrictions and obligations. The
launching of a Chinese -style campaign in 1966 to transfer
white collar workers to "voluntary" production work,
especially in provincial centers, undoubtedly provided
administrative workers with a new source of dissatisfac-
tion. 'There have been no indications, however, that this
reshuffle, which reportedly involved thousands of
workers, was actively resisted.
2. Subversion from abroad
In the Communist era the threat of foreign subversion
has come mainly from two historic sources, Greece and
Yugoslavia, and, since 1960, from the U.S.S.R.
a. GREECE
The Greek claim to southern Albania, known in Greece
as northern Epirus, is based on occupation of the area by
Greek forces during the Balkan War of 1912 and again for
brief periods during World Wars I and II. Greek claims
also derive from the fact that the population of southern
Albania was under the protection and cultural influence
of the Greek church for centuries; consequently, the
Greeks have always considered this population to be
Greek. Hostility between the two countries has been
intensified by Greek assertions that Albania discriminates
against the Greek minority in Albania.
The Greek Government has refrained from taking
overt, official action to realize its claims to northern
Epirus. Reports of Greek subversive actions against
Albania are now relatively infrequent when compared
with the widespread disorders attributed to Greek
clandestine activities in 1961 -62. In October 1962 the
Greek Foreign Ministry admitted privately that a secret
organization led by Bishop Serafim was engaged in acts
of sabotage along the border between Greece and
Albania. Units of this organization reportedly were
responsible for the destruction of a flour mill, the blowing
up of portions of a highway, distribution of anti -Hoxha
leaflets, and explosions at some ammunition dumps
during 1962. The status of the Greek minority in northern
Epirus is still a political issue of some importance, and
propaganda barrages periodically issue from Athens. An
improvement in official relations beginning in early 1970
reportedly extended to a reciprocal return of escapees,
notwithstanding the possible international reaction to
repatriation tinder these circumstances. Greek territorial
claims to parts of southern Albania remain an emotional
issue capable of resuscitation at any time, even though
the two countries agreed in May 1971 to resume formal
diplomatic ties.
b. YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavia directed subversive activities against the
Albanian leadership for some time a-ter losing control of
the country to the Soviets in 1948. Since the latter 1960's
Belgrade's policy has apparently been one of trying to
overcome the traditional Albanian hatred of Yugoslavia
rather than one of underwriting a maximum effort to
subvert the Hoxha regime. Infiltration of Yugoslav agents
and small -scale acts of sabotage may still continue, but in
all probability at a much reduced level compared with
the 1950's. Broadcasts and other more conventional
methods of psychological w �fare attributing the harsh
life in Albania to the dogmatic, Stalinist policies of the
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Hoxha leadership have largely replaced terrorist and
espionage activity.
Yugoslav subversive efforts were initially directed
through the League of Albanian Political Refugees in
Yugoslavia (Prizren Committee), which was established
in 1951 at Prizren, a city near the Albanian border. The
objective of the league's Yugoslav backers was to give
their country an organized group of Albanian refugees
who could be returned to Albania should the opportunity
to overthrow Hoxha's regime arise. Although the
organization had some success in recruiting and
infiltrating espionage agents into Albania, it failed in its
efforts to gain the support of the Albanian people and to
weaken the Hoxha regime. Because of these failures, it
was disbanded after being active for only 3 or 4 years.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's usually reliable
sources reported that another subversive group had been
organized in Yugoslavia. It was led by Dusan Mugosa,
Yugoslavia's foremost authority on Albanian affairs and
one of the two Yugoslays who helped found the Albanian
Communist Party. Mugosa, who was a Secretary of the
Communist Party in the autonomous region of Kosovo,
where a large Albanian minority resides, was active in
gathering intelligence ormation from Albanian
refugees. The activity of this jroup dwindled sharply in
the aftermath of Mugosa's transfer to a Belgrade post in
Mav 1965.
After Albania survived the break with the U.S.S.F. in
1961, Yugoslavk, officially adopted a policy of
nonintervention in Albanian affairs, not because the
desire to replace Nwzha and Shehu with leaders
amenable to Belgrade heal lessened, but because overt
intervention would have damaged Yugoslavia's
international position of nonalignment and peaceful
coexistence and would risk a great power confrontation in
the Balkans. Yugoslav secret police officers in late 1962
and early 1963 reportedly were in contact with Albanian
refugee groups in Belgium and France. Apparently as
early as 1967 the Yugoslays began to scale down their
subversive and propaganda activities against the
Albanian regime, a process markedly stimulated by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
Frontier incidents have been minimal, and the Yugoslays
have persisted in returning escapees from Albania. The
commonly felt threat of the Soviet Union to both Albania
and Yugoslavia is encouraging further moves toward
detente on the state level. The potential for subversion
still exists, however, and may only await a lessening of
Yugoslav Soviet tensions.
c. U.S. 5. R.
Following the Soviet moves in 1956 toward improved
relations with Yugoslavia, Moscow allegedly exerted
strong pressures on Albanian leaders Hoxha and Shehu to
follow suit. According to a speech by Hoxha in late 1961,
the Soviet leadership had tried in 1956 to persuade the
Albanian Workers Party "to rehabilitate the traitor Koci
Xoxe." Hoxha noted that this attempt had coincided
with the convening of the Tirane municipal party
conference in April 1956, at which time opportunist
60
elements had "endeavored to carry out a plot" with the
direct encouragement of Yugoslav revisionists. The
Albanian leaders, probably correctly, regarded these
.maneuvers as aimed primarily at their own overthrow
and replacement by persons more acceptable to Tito.
The Hungarian revolt in late 1956 and the subsequent
renewed deterioration of Soviet Yugoslav relations
relieved Soviet pressure on Hoxha and Shehu. At the
Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in
Nov. :mber 1960 Hoxha revealed that the U.S.S.R. had
been involved in the internal coup attempt against the
regime which had been uncovered in August 1960.
Hoxha declared that the Soviet ambassador in Tirane
and his staff were engaging in "attacks" on the Albanian
leadership and using "corrupt" elements to sow trouble
within the party. To make it clear that he meant deposed
party members Lin. Belishova and Koco Tashko, Hoxha
stated that Belishova had "capitulated to the dishonest
threats of the Soviet Union."
Having failed to overthrow the Albanian leadership by
an internal coup, the Soviets began applying economic
pressure. This pressure, which later included complete
cessation of Soviet economic aid and withdrawal of all
Soviet technical, military, and economic specialists,
apparently placed the Albanian leaders in a very difficult
economic situation and put the regime's stability to a
severe test. Chinese Communist economic and political
support in 1960 -61, coupled with support Hoxha and
Shehu gained from the countryside by appeals to
nationalist sentiment, however, enabled the two leaders
to maintain control of the party and government.
Since the diplomatic break with the U.S.S.R in 1961,
the Albanian leaders appear to have successfully
thwarted Soviet plans to overthrow the regime. Albania's
geographic isolation from the Soviet bloc which was once
a decided handicap, has now worked to Tiran6's
advantage by discouraging direct intervention. The
professed effort to maintain Albanian independence and
territorial integrity against alleged designs of neighboring
countries is probably one of the most popular features of
the present regime.
G. Police and intelligence services (S)
The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for
maintaining public order and safety and for suppressing
all internal opposition to the Communist regime. It also
assumes ultimate control over Albania's limited foreign
intelligence collection effort. To accomplish these
missions, the ministry has three separate police and
security organizations: the Directorate of Frontier and
Pursuit, the Directorate of People's Police, and the
Directorate of State Security. Kadri Hasbiu has been
head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1954, and is
related to the former Minister of Internal Affairs,
Mehmet Shehu, who became Premier. Prior to his
appointment, Hashiu was head of the Directorate of
State Security (more commonly known as the Sigurimi).
Hasbiu, 51 years old in 1970, has since 1961 been a
candidate member of the Politburo, the policymaking
body of the Communist party.
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The combined personnel of the police and security
forces were estimated in 1967 to number 17,500, which
included 7,500 frontier troops, 5,000 state security forces
(also referred to as interior troops), and 5,000 people's
police. Many Albanians are forced to become informers;
the populace is said to believe that every sixth person in
the country is directly or indirectly employed by the
security apparatus. There is no firm evidence to confirm
or refute so high an estimate.
The decree of May 1966 which abolished traditional
military rank and insignia in the armed forces also applies
to Albania's security forces. This measure was reportedly
intended in part to ease interservice rivalries between the
Ministry of People's Defense and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. There have also been unconfirmed reports
indicati 1 that the Sigurimi was inflating its ranks to
counter the power of the armed forces. Despite such
rumored rivalries and tensions, the Albanian military and
security forces appear to have remained stable and
dependable.
1. Police system
The people's police are responsible primarily for
maintaining public order and safety. In addition to the
normal police and public assistance tasks, they have
unpublicized functions, such as collaborating with the
Sigurimi in the apprehension of anti Communist
elements. They also control the movements of civilians,
issuing identity cards which must be carried by all
citizens 17 years of age or older.
The people's police are org. lived into five branches:
general police, police for guarding economic projects and
installations, firefighting police, communications police,
and police for the protection of isolated areas (i.e., penal
institutions). There are various sections and subsections of
the people's police in districts, localities, and villages.
They are assisted by local civilian "voluntary groups,"
including civilian firefighters and the "guardsmen" of
the executive committees of district and local
governments.
The Directorate of Frontier and Pursuit is responsible
for border controls and the prevention of escapes by
defectors and foreign agents, as well as the elimination of
subversive infiltration. This office came into being in
April 1957, when the Directorate of Border Defense and
the Pursuit Battalions were merged. Prior to this merger,
the highly mobile Pursuit Battalions, semi independent
units subordinate to the Directorate of State Security,
were charged with tracking down and suppressing anti
Communist resistance bands and guerrillas. The
responsibilities of this directorate became more
significant after Tiran6 broke with Moscow in 1961 and
Albania, more clearly on its own, had to provide its own
protection against potentially hostile neighbors.
Decree No. 4650 of 9 March 1970 provides general
regulations on boundary demarcation and control
procedures. This decree supersedes two decrees (1952 and
1961) on border areas and redefines and redesignates
restricted frontier zones. Contiguous to all land
boundaries, according to the new decree, are border zones
and border belts, both areas being designated and
controlled by regulations from the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. Albania's territorial waters as defined by the
decree extend 12 nautical miles west from a series of lines
connecting the mouth of the Buenc river in the north
with the middle of the Corfu Channel narrows in the
south, and determined by Kep i Rodonit, Kep i Palit and
Kep i Durresit, Kep i Lagit, Kep i Seman, and the west
coast of Ishulli i Sazanit (Summary Map, Figure 79).
The frontier units have not vet been able to seal the
border or to prevent completely the flight of dissident
Albanians to Greece and Yugoslavia. However, the
number of escapees, particularly those crossing to Greece,
has been steadily decreasing. The reduced number of
escapees reflects the continuous improvement in the
border control apparatus, which includes the use of
specially trained dogs, a system of fortifications, trenches,
barbed -wire barriers, and a number of mechanical
devices to thwart illegal border crossers. Extra rations as
well as cash awards have served as effective incentives to
improved performance by frontier unit personnel. A
strong deterrent to political defectors may well be an
awareness of the unpredictable nature of their reception
in the prospective host country. Both Yugoslavia and
Greece, in the interest of improving relations with
Albania, have since 1967 selectively returned escapees.
2. Security and foreign intelligence
The Directorate of State Security (Sigurimi) has the
primary responsibility for both internal security and the
collection of foreign intelligence. The Sigurimi delegates
part of its responsibility for maintaining internal security
to the other two directorates, but it retains overall control.
Similarly, while the other two directorates cooperate with
the Sigurimi in carrying out its foreign intelligence
operations, the Sigurimi retains final authority within the
Ministry of Internal Affairs for all foreign intelligence
activities (Figure 33).
The internal missions of the Sigurimi specifically
include detecting and suppressing agitation and
propaganda activities of dissident political elements;
uncovering and eliminating antiregime infiltration into
the country's economic projects and preventing
interference with national production; detecting and
neutralizing the efforts of foreign agents and
"diversionists monitoring the activities of foreigners in
Albania; providing personal protection to government
and party leaders; and preventing infiltration of
dissidents into government agencies, including the armed
forces.
In its foreign intelligence operations the Sigurimi is
primarily concerned with thwarting the activities of anti
Communist Albanian emigrees. These sane refugee
groups, however, have, in the past, provided the Sigurimi
with its primary source of agents for intelligence
operations abroad. The Sigurimi also recruits agents from
the Albanian populace, allowing them to "escape" and
emigrate into selected European countries. The Sigurimi
61
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authority in these fields is secondary to that of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The intelligence section of
the Ministry of People's Defense is called the Directorate
of Military Intelligence, and it constitutes an integral
part of the armed forces general staff. Its activities are
confined to military matters and are probably conducted
only within Albania, the two bordering countries of
Greece and Yugoslavia, and Italy. Information is not
available on its size, organization, specific functions, or
effectiveness.
FIGURE 33. Organization of intelligence and security
services (S)
also directs intelligence operations from Albanian
diplomatic installations abroad, its main responsibility in
this connection being the collection of military,
economic, and political information.
Sigurimi's foreign intelligence operations have been
moderately successful, and in several instances the service
has proved itself to be well organized and surprisingly
efficient. Although Greece and Yugoslavia are probably
the main foreign intelligence collection targets, the Sino-
Soviet dispute has made the Sigurimi increasingly active
in propaganda efforts to influence other Communist
parties, especially in Western Europe. The rift with the
U.S.S.R., however, has impaired relations between the
Sigurimi and the intelligence services of the Eastern
European Communist countries. For example, in the past
the Sigurimi had used Bulgarian diplomatic installations
and trade missions in some non Communist countries to
provide cover for Sigurimi officers, but this arrangement
is no longer permitted. Similar cooperation once extended
by the Yugoslays came to an abrupt halt when Tito broke
with the Cominforrn.
Many Sigurimi officers, about 10% of whom are
stationed at the Tirane headquarters, were trained in
Moscow. Some evidence suggests cooperation more
recently between the Albanian and Chinese intelligence
services, and the Chinese Communists are known to be
training Sigurimi personnel, particularly in the fields of
espionage and counterespionage.
The Ministry of People's Defense also has some
responsibility for intelligence and security matters, but its
62
3. Penal system
The Ministry of Internal Affairs administers the penal
instituti< s. The people's police guard all prisons and
forced labor camps, and the wardens or directors of these
institutions are Sigurimi officers. Most of these prisons
and camps contain both ordinary convicts and political
prisoners. Specific information on the organization of the
penal system, location of prisons and camps, and the
number of prisoners is not available.
With the exception of those found physically unfit,
work is obligatory for all prisoners, whether in prisons or
forced labor camps. An 8 -hour day is the supposed work
norm, but excessive hard work is more likely the reality of
prison life. Those who fail to complete their production
norms are deprived of their daily food ration; heavier
punishment is meted out for repetition of an offense.
Prisoners ordinarily receive 15% of the daily wage of a
free worker. Overcrowding and undernourishment have
resulted in the prevalence of disease, particularly
tuberculosis, and in a very high death rate among
prisoners.
According to the 1959 amendments to the criminal
code and to the code of criminal procedure, a prisoner
may be paroled after having served more than half of his
term. Paroles are granted by the courts on the
recommendations of the Prosecutor General and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
H. Suggestions for further reading (C)
Stavro Skendi's Albania brings together much material
on Albania's historical development. Although Robert
Wolff's authoritative The Balkans in Our Time has no
section devoted solely to A'bania, its lucid history of the
Balkans places Albania's history within the general
context of southern Europe's development. Joseph Swire's
Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom is an excessively detailed
account of the country's first years as a nation- state; the
book contains an excellent chronology and an extensive
bibliography. A volume of special interest is Julian
Amery's Sons of the Eagle, a personal account of the
author's experiences with Albanian resistance groups
during World War II. The one chapter on Albania in
Paul Lendvai's recent volume on nationalism and
communism in the Balkans, Eagles in Cobwebs, is a
boldly sketched interpretative essay which outlines the
country's recent past. Nicholas Pano's The People's
Republic of Albania examines the role of Albania in the
world Communist system; it is also a somewhat useful
introduction to the politics of Communist Albania.
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The Economy
A. Summary and background
1. Introduction (U /OU)
Albania has a traditional peasant economy and a
rapidly growing population. Like other countries in the
same position, even its present low level of living can be
maintained only with outside help. This help has come
from Communist China since Albania's break with the
U.S.S.R. in 1961. With Chinese help averaging about
US$20 per capita a year, the economy has grown since
1961 at a rate of about 7% a year, according to official
claims, which may be exaggerated. In any case, the rate
of economic growth has exceeded the annual growth of
population, estimated at 2.6 The level of output and
per capita consumption, however, remains much lower
than in any other European country.
Albania is a predominantly agricultural country with a
substantial but'dcclining deficit in bread grains (wheat,
rye, and corn), amounting to a known 62,000 metric tons
in 1968. Even though imports of grain declined during
1966 -69 compared with 1961 -65, apparent per capita
consumption of grain rose somewhat. Because of the
small amount of land suited for cultivation, the
backwardness of agricultural practices, and the rapidly
growing population, there is little chance that Albania
will become self sufficient in grain in the near future.
By European standards, agricultural land accounts for
a small share �about 43 of the total area of the
country. Much of the agricultur;J land lies in
mountainous areas and is suitable only for pasture, so
that only about 20% of the total area is arable. Arable
land per capita is thus only 0.27 hectare, the lowest in
any agricultural country in Europe. Forests cover about
43% of the total area and are an important source of fuel
and of wood for construction.
Apart from the land, the natural resources consist
largely of low -grade petroleum and brown coal,
chromium, iron nickel, and copper ores, and construction
materials. The hydroelectric potential is relatively large
but mostly unexploited. Albania is just beginning to
develop metallurgy beyond the stage of simple refining of
its own ores. The recently completed electrolytic and
copper wire plant has enabled the country to begin
producing finished copper products. The fifth Five Year
Plan (1971 -75) calls for the construction of a
metallurgical combine, which will process Albanian iron
nickel ore and will produce semifinished and finished
steel. Most of the output of chrome and nickel is now
exported.
Albanian resources of petroleum, natural gas, salt,
pyrites, chromium, copper, limestone, and phosphorites
could be used to expand greatly the small chemical
industry. The Albanians have just begun to exploit some
of these: resources in the recently completed superphos-
phate, nitrogen fertilizer, and caustic soda plants; and
plans call for further development of the chemical
industry.
In spite of its break with the U.S.S.R. in late 1961,
Albania has retained Stalinist institutions and has
followed Stalinist policies in its efforts to modernize and
industrialize the economy. Industry has received much
greater material support than agriculture. Agricultural
progress has been further impeded by the socia'ization
campaign. The collectivization in 1967 of most farms in
mountainous areas brought more than 99% of the arable
land under the control of cooperative and state farms.
Industrial production has grown much more rapidly
than agricultural production. Even so, the industrializa-
tion of the country is barely underway, and agriculture
still accounts for about three fifths of total estimated
employment, vrith industry accounting for about 18
Most of the growth of industrial production reflects
substantial additions to employment and the commis-
sioning of new plants, some of which represent large
increases 'n industrial capacity.
The level of economic development in Albania is lower
than in the other Balkan countries but is somewhat
higher than that in Turkey and considerably higher than
that in Communist China (Figure 34). In 1969 the gross
national product (GNP) of Albania amounted to an
estimated US$800 million (1968 prices), or about $400
per capita.'
Albania depends on imports for nearly all its supply of
machinery and equipment and finished steel and for an
important part of its supply of foodstuffs (Figure 35).
Moreover, the economy has long been dependent en
foreign help. The country received large amounts of
economic aid from Italy (1925 -45), Yugoslavia (1945 -48),
the U.S.S.R. (1948 -60), and the Eastern European
Communist countricsa (1949 -60). Since 1961, economic
aid has been furnished by Communist China. Chinese
Me GNP of Albania is estimated by means of a comparison with
Turkey and Bulgaria, using selected indicators of production and
consumption, plus demographic data. The method used is that
proposed by Charles K. Wilber for studying less developed areas (Soviet
Studies, April 1966, p. 408ff.). The results indicate that GNP per capita
in Albania is somewhat higher than that of Turkey and only one -third
that of Bulgaria.
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania.
63
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FIGURE 34. COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR ALBANIA AND SELECTED
OTHER COUNTRIES, 1969* (C)
(Production per capita)
credits �which in reality are gifts because of Albania's
inability to repay �f ave been the principal basis for the
country's recent industrial development and have helped
in maintaining the food supply.
2. Growth and structure of the economy (C)
Economic growth has been steady since 1950 in spite
of the great fluctuations in agricultural production
caused by variable weather (Figure 36). The growth of
industrial production, which was rapid during the 1950's,
slowed sharply during 1961 -65, partly as a result of the
cessation of trade with the U.S.S.R. in the latter part of
'in this section, official Albanian data are used for growth of national
income, industrial production, and agricultural production. The latest
available Albanian statistical yearbook is for 1967. In large part, the
yearbook data for 1965 -67 are given in terms of indexes rather than
absolute numbers. Because of this, data used herein for later vears are
mainly bused on percentage increases given in plan fulfillment reports;
some are estimates based on other considerations.
1961. During the period 1961 -65, gross industrial
production grew at an average annual rate of 6.8
compared with a rate of 16.7% during 1956 -60. Largely
because of Chinese Communist assistance in the
completion of a number of industrial projects, gross
industrial production reportedly increased at an
estimated average annual rate of 13% during 1966 -70.
According to official data, gross agricultural production
on the average was 25% greater during 1956 -60 than
during 1951 -55, about 32% greater during 1961 -65 than
during 1956 -60, and about 32% greater daring 1966 -70
than during 1961 -65.
s"I'hese data are believed to overstate economic growth consistently,
though probably not grossly. Aside from the inflation of production
Indexes for industry and possibly for other economic sectors, official
data for national income exaggerate overall economic growth because
they exclude depreciation and "unproductive" services �which
typically grow less rapidly than production of goods �and because
distortions in the price system greatly overstate the share of industry in
the national income.
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COMMUNIST
UNIT ALBANIA TURKEY
CHINA
BULGARIA
YUGOSLAVIA
Primary energy Kg 952 366
294
1,226
1,093
Electric power...... Kw.- hr.......... 443 224
61
2,048
1,125
Crude oil........... Kg 557 :04
17
39
131
Cement............ ....do.......... 154 168
14
423
194
Grain ....do.......... 379 430
237 -243
721
706
Ginned cottont..... ....do.......... 4 12
2
2
Insig
Cotton textiles...... Linear meters.... 21 22
na
40
na
na Data not available.
*Many of the data are estimated or provisional.
**Estimate in terms of standard fuel of 7,000 kilocalories per kilogram, including coal, crude
oil, natural gas,
and hydroelectric power, but excluding fuelwood, peat, and shale.
*Data include potatoes on it grain equivalent basis of 4 metric tons of potatoes to I metric ton of grain.
tData are for 1967.
FIGURE 35. STRATEGIC SUPPLY POSITION,
1967
(U /OU)
(Thousands of metric tons, unless otherwise noted)
PRODUCTION
AS A
APPARENT
PERCENT OF
CONSUMP-
CONSUMP-
PRODUCTION IMPORTS EXPORTS
TION
TION
Electric power (million kw.- hrs.) 590 0
0
590
100
Crude oil 980 0
166
814
120
Brown coal 434 0
0
434
100
Coke 0 26
0
26
0
Tractors (units) 0 388
0
388
0
Planters and cultivators (units) 0 211
0
211
0
Trucks units) 0 627
0
627
0
Rolled steel 0 *77
0
77
0
Cement 22 17
0
238
93
Chemical fertilizers *15 67
0
82
18
Corn 286 na
0
286
100
Wheat 148 *89
0
237
62
Sugar 18 *0
0
18
100
Cotton textiles (million linear meters)..... 37 1
3
35
106
na Data not available.
*Estimated.
credits �which in reality are gifts because of Albania's
inability to repay �f ave been the principal basis for the
country's recent industrial development and have helped
in maintaining the food supply.
2. Growth and structure of the economy (C)
Economic growth has been steady since 1950 in spite
of the great fluctuations in agricultural production
caused by variable weather (Figure 36). The growth of
industrial production, which was rapid during the 1950's,
slowed sharply during 1961 -65, partly as a result of the
cessation of trade with the U.S.S.R. in the latter part of
'in this section, official Albanian data are used for growth of national
income, industrial production, and agricultural production. The latest
available Albanian statistical yearbook is for 1967. In large part, the
yearbook data for 1965 -67 are given in terms of indexes rather than
absolute numbers. Because of this, data used herein for later vears are
mainly bused on percentage increases given in plan fulfillment reports;
some are estimates based on other considerations.
1961. During the period 1961 -65, gross industrial
production grew at an average annual rate of 6.8
compared with a rate of 16.7% during 1956 -60. Largely
because of Chinese Communist assistance in the
completion of a number of industrial projects, gross
industrial production reportedly increased at an
estimated average annual rate of 13% during 1966 -70.
According to official data, gross agricultural production
on the average was 25% greater during 1956 -60 than
during 1951 -55, about 32% greater during 1961 -65 than
during 1956 -60, and about 32% greater daring 1966 -70
than during 1961 -65.
s"I'hese data are believed to overstate economic growth consistently,
though probably not grossly. Aside from the inflation of production
Indexes for industry and possibly for other economic sectors, official
data for national income exaggerate overall economic growth because
they exclude depreciation and "unproductive" services �which
typically grow less rapidly than production of goods �and because
distortions in the price system greatly overstate the share of industry in
the national income.
64
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too)
I950:.52 54 56 .:58 60:.
�Mortionul
The relatively rapid growth of agricultural production
during 1961 -70 and of industrial production during 1966-
70 resulted in an average annual increase in national
income of about 6% during 1961 -65 and about 8%
during 1966 -70. Because of the rapid growth of Albania's
population, national income per capita increased much
less rapidly than total national income during 1961 -70:
an average annual rate of 4% compared with 7 1%,
according to official statistics.
a. INDUSTRY
Albanian industry produces mainly foods, textiles,
timber, minerals and metals, petroleum, and construction
materials. In its successive 5 -year plans, begun in 1951,
the Hoxha regime has stressed the development of mining
and petroleum extraction together with the production of
electric power and construction materials. Since the mid
1960's the regime has also stressed the development of the
chemical and machine building industries.
According to official statistics, gross industrial
production was about 15 times as large in 1970 as in
1950. A large part of this increase came from increased
employment. Estimates indicate that the industrial labor
force increased at an average annual rate of 11 during
1951 -60, 5% during 1961 -65, and 10% during 1966 -69.
Labor productivity rose by an estimated average annual
rate of 8% during 1951 -60, and by 3% during 1961 -69.
However, increases in labor productivity probably are
exaggerated, especially for the 1951 -60 period, because of
exaggerations in the official index of gross industrial
production.
1). AGRICULTURE
Agricultural production has risen significantly despite
the higher priority given to industrial development.
Production of grain, which comprises about four fifths of
the average Albanian diet, increased only 8% on an
annual average output basis during 1956 -60 compared
with 1951 -55 and tflen declined slightly duri j 1961 -65.
Increased acreage and greatly expanded use c,:' chemical
fertilizers enabled the Albanians to increase average
annual output of grain during 1966 -69 an estimated 61
over the 1961 -65 average. Albania still produces less food
than it consumes and will continue to do so for years.
Gains in the value of gross agricultural production
reflect in part increases in the cultivated area and, since
1966, increases in crop yields which, however, remain low
by European standards. These gains also reflect in part a
shift to high valued products such as industrial crops and
fruits. By giving priority to reclamation projects and
promoting the cultivation of marginal land, the regime
doubled the arable area between 1938 and 1969. The
ratio of arable land to population, however, remains
about the same as in 1938. Opportunities for increasing
the cultivated area are diminishing, and more chemical
fertilizer and pesticides, higher quality seed and livestock,
and greatly improved farming practices are required if
agricultural production is to be raised substantially.
The variety of climate permits production not only of
the usual grain and root crops, but also of such products
as tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, grapes, and olives.
Tobacco and tobacco products are among the leading
exports. Because grain production has not kept up with
the growth of the population, imports of wheat have been
essential. In recent years Albania also has imported about
two fifths of its sugar supply. A large share of meat and
the bulk of other livestock products are derived from
sheep and goats. The increase in hog numbers has been
substantial but probably has been held down by the old
Muslim traditions against eating, pork. Much of the
pasture land is not suitable for the grazing of cattle.
Although per capita production of livestock products has
increased since 1955, it remains less than before World
War 1I.
c. FOREIGN TRADE
Albania is dependent on imports for nearly all the
machinery and equipment used in investment and for
certain industrial materials and foodstuffs, especially
wheat. Although the country continues to rely heavily on
credits to finance these imports, it probably has made few
if any repayments. In 1961, Communist China replaced
the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European Communist
countries as Albania's source of economic assistance.
Albania accumulated a trade deficit of about US$340
million nearly all with Communist China� during
1961 -69.
65
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FIG !JRE 36. Economic growth (U /OU)

Following a period of stagnation, trade turnover grew
rapidly during 1956 -60. As a result of worsening relations
and the final break with the U.S.S.R., Albanian trade
declined sharply in 1961 -62. As the Chinese Communists
became more active in the Albanian investment program,
trade began to grow again and by 1969 was an estimated
72% greater than in 1960. Communist China accounts
for about one -half of Albanian trade, compared with less
than one -tenth in 1960. Trade with the U.S.S.R., which
accounted for about one -half of Albanian trade during
1956 -60, ended in 1962. Trade with the Eastern
European Communist countries �which accounts for
about two fifths of Albanian trade �rose in 1961 but fell
somewhat in 1962. This trade increased sharply in 1964
and by 1969 was about 80% over the 1960 level.
Albania's most important imports are machinery and
equipment, wheat, and rolled steel. Chromium and iron
nickel ores, crude oil and refined asphalt, and tobacco
and c ;garettes constitute Albania's major exports.
Albania ceased to be, active in the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) after 1961.
B. Sectors of the economy
1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (U /OU)
a. AcRICULTuu -L PRODUCTION
Albania is a predominantly agricultural country that
cannot adequately feed its rapidly growing population
without food imports. Even in the record year 1969,
production of breadgrains (wheat, rye, and corn), the
principal basis of the diet, provided only about nine
tenths of domestic requirements. Natural conditions are
unfavorable, and agricultural practices are still primitive
by Western standards (Figure 37). In these crucial
respects, Albania is only slightly better off than some of
the less developed countries of Asia.
Of the total land area of 11,100 square miles
(2,875,000 hectares); some 43% is devoted to agriculture
(Figure 38) compared with 57% in Yugoslavia and 697c
in Turkey. Moreover, the largely mountainous terrai:.
and the i.:avalence o: swampy conditions in the lowlands
limit arable land to only 20% of the total area. In 1969
FIGURE 37. Harvesting grain on a cooperative farm (U /OU)
66
FIGURE 38. land use, 1967 (U /OU)
Albania had onl; 0.27 hectare of arable land per capita
as compared with 0.40 hectare per capita in Yugoslavia,
which has many of the same natural disadvantages.
The climate of Albania permits the growing of all
major crops characteristic of U.S. and European
agriculture, but under the usual hazards in the
Mediterranean area (Land utilization inset, Summary
Map, Figure 79). Droughts are frequent in summer, and
heavy seasonal rains in the fall result in serious erosion
and occasional floods. Grains are the dominant crops. In
1967 approximately 65% of the land in field crops was in
grain (primarily corn and wheat), 14% in industrial crops,
8% in potatoes and other vegetables, and 9% in fodder
crops. The main industrial crops are cotton, tobacco,
sugar beets, and oilseeds. Albania also produces fruit,
olives, and nuts. 'Tobacco is one of the country's most
important exports. Figure 39 shows production and yields
of major crops.
During 1951 -65 the output of grain grew considerably
more slowly than the population. Since 1965, sharply
increased yields, together with an increase in acreage,
have resulted in a large increase in grain output. During
1966 -69, the total average yearly output o grain rose
61% over the 1961 -65 average. Estimates �based on
official statements� indicate that production of grain
reached a record high of 555,000 metric tons in 1969.
Because of the sharp increase in grain production the
Albanians have been able to reduce considerably their
dependence on imports. Thus, known imports of grain
(primarily wheat) dropped to about 13% of the total
supply during 1966 -69, compared with 31% during 1961-
65. The Albanian consumer has benefited from the
increased grain production in spite of the cutback in
imports. Apparent per capita availability of grain rose to
an average of about 280 kilograms (kg.) a year during
1966 -69 as compared with about 255 kg. a year during
the previous 5 years. Communist China, by financing
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FIGURE 39. PRODUCTION AND YIELDS OF PRINCIPAL CROPS (U /OU)
1934-38 1956 -60 1961 -65
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE* 1965* 1966* 1967 1968 1969*
Production (thousand metric tons):
Total grains *193.0
Of which:
Corn 133.3
Wheat 39.5
Cotton unginned *0.1
Tobacco. *2.0
Sugar beets 0
Potatoes 3.6
Yields (quintals per hectare):
Total grains 12.8
Of which:
Corn 14.3
Wheat 10.4
Cotton unginned *5.0
Tobacco. *7.5
Sugarbeets 0
Potatoes 90.0
312.0
310.2
342.3
437.4
490.1
515.0
554.6
173,3
160.9
166.0
277.2
286.3
254.7
189.2
95.1
107. 1
119.2
101.1
147.6
196.0
269.7
15.9
21.6
24.6
24.6
21.9
na
na
8.7
11.5
13.3
13.6
13.1
14.9
17.1
90.0
96.3
90.2
132.9
138.5
na
na
22.1
25.6
21.2
108.0
115.9
158.4
121.7
10.3
10.5
11.6
14.1
15.6
15.1
na
11.3
11.8
11.6
14.8
18.0
17.2
17.8
9.8
9.2
11.3
13.0
13.3
14.1
19.1
7.0
9.5
10.8
11.0
10.0
na
na
6.1
5.0
5.9
6.1
6.3
na
na
160.8
168.9
156.2
221.5
230.8
na
na
74.6
70.0
57.4
73.0
60.2
60.7
56.1
na Data not available.
*Estimated.
*1938.
Albanian imports of grain from non Communist
countries, has taken over the U.S.S.R.'s former role as the
major supplier of grain.
In 1966 the Albanians began to expand rapidly the
production of potatoes. The Chinese supplied a large
share of the seed potatoes used. By 1969, the area devoted
to potatoes was seven times that in 1965 and production
was more than five and a half times the 1965 level. Even
so, the Albanians apparently did not achieve their goal
for 1970, which was to increase the area to 12 times and
production to 22 times the 1965 level. Yields so far have
amounted to only about three fifths of those planned.
Production of industrial crops, which in the past had
contributed the most to increases in gross production of
field crops, appears to have stagnated in 1967 -69. The
Albanians themselves have admitted shortfalls in the
output of cotton and have not published production data
on either cotton or sugar beets for these years. Production
of tobacco has grown, however, and in 1966 -69 was 28%
higher on the average than in 1961 -65.
Because of the priority given to raising the level of
technology in food crop production, growth of the
livestock sector lagged during the 1960's. Little or
nothing has been done to expand output of concentrated
or roughage feeds, and recently introduced programs to
upgrade breeding stock have yet to show results.
Consequently, livestock numbers and productivity have
failed to grow faster than the population. The per capita
production of meat in 1967 (the most recent data
available) was less than in 1960, and that of eggs and
milk no better in 1969 than 1960.
The number of cattle, horses, asses, and mules
increased very little between 1950 and 1966 (Figure 40).
The number of goats, which in 1950 was considerably
below the 1938 level, rose 44% between 19�0 and 1966,
but the number of sheep declined slightly. The number of
hogs, with an increase of 204 showed the fastest
growth, followed by an increase of 164% in poultry
numbers. Official Albanian data for the gross value of
livestock production -which accounts for about one
third of total gross agricultural production -show that in
1961 -67 output was substantially higher on the average
than in the previous 10 years. Official statistics also
indicate, however, that during 1960 -67 meat production
FIGURE 40. NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK (U;OU)
(Thousands, end of year)
*Annual average.
*Estimated.
67
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1938
1950
1956 -60*
1961 -65*
1965
1966
Sheep
1,573.9
1,707.0
1,612.9
1,613.2
1,637.0
1,670.0
Goats
932.3
830.2
1,071.6
1,150.3
1,175.0
1,200.0
Cattle and buffalo
412.7
434.3
424.6
425.0
429.0
432.0
flogs
15.3
46.7
106.2
127.0
141.0
142.0
Horses, asses, and mules.........
109.2
117.3
119.0
124.0
124.0
125.0
Poultry
1,037.2
660.1
1,385.7
1,682.5
1,722.0
1,746.0
*Annual average.
*Estimated.
67
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declined and wool output was unchanged. Production of
milk and eggs went up during 1960 -69 by only 26% and
3,4 respectively, or by no more than the increase in
population.
The average daily per capita availability of food �an
estimated 2,500 calories �is among the lowest in Europe.
This compares with average availabilities of roughly
2,900 calories ir., Greece and Yugoslavia. Caloric intake in
Albania is not much higher now than before the war, and
the quality of the diet has shown little improvement.
Most foods are still rationed.
Grain products are the chief food staple, accounting for
an estimated 80% of the caloric intake. The major change
in the diet has been an increase in the consumption of
wheat and potatoes at the expense of corn during the
1960 -69 period. The share of livestock products in the
average diet is no better than the early 1960's, about 5%
of caloric intake. The regime has admitted the need to
import livestock products but lacks the foreign exchange
to do so. Similarly, the increased output of fruit and
vegetables is not reflected in diets; the increase has been
absorbed in exports.
Exports of agricultural and forestry products accounted
for an estimated two- fifths of total exports in 1967.
Tobacco and cigarettes alone accounted for an estimated
30% of total exports. Nearly all exports of tobacco and
cigarettes went to other Communist countries.
b. AGRICULTURAL PROBLENIS AND POLICIES
A low level of technology, insufficient industrial
inputs, and Chinese Communist influence on agricul-
tural policies go far to explain the very low yields of most
crops in Albania. Much of the increase in the gross value
of agricultural production can be attributed to expansion
of the cultivated area, to emphasis on higher valued
industrial crops, and to chemical fertilizer. Average yields
of wheat and corn, however, have recently improved and
in 1966 -69 were 62% and 44 respectively, higher than
in 1961 -65. The main reasons for the improved yields of
these two crops are increased use of fertilizer and
improved varieties of seed. Average yields of most other
crops have not increased over the average for 1951-55,
which in turn was no higher and, in some cases, was lower
than the average for 1934 -38. Cotton and sugar beets are
the main exceptions. Average yearly yields of cotton and
sugar beets rose 96% and 90 respectively, between
1951 -55 and 1961 -67 but appear to have declined in
1968 -69.
The use of chemical fertilizers, improved plant
varieties, and pesticides is still small, but has increased
rapidly since 1966. Supplies of chemical fertilizers to
agriculture by the state fluctuated between 15,151 metric
tons (presumably in gross terms) and 32,404 tons during
1957 -66. Unusually large imports, together with the
beginning of production in Albania's first two chemical
fertilizer plaits, raised the supply to 81,646 tons in 1967
and to about 184,932 tons in 1969. Application of
chemical fertilizers per hectare of agricultural land in
6 i
1969 amounted to 50 kg. (estimated in terms of active
nutrients), compared with the application in the crop
year 1968/69 of 35 kg. per hectare in Greece, 42 kg. in
Yugoslavia, 91 kg. in Hungary, and 57 kg. in Italy.
In October 1966 the superphosphate plant in Lao
started operation on a small scale. The nitrogen fertilizer
plant in Fier reportedly began operation in February
1967. The Albanians are still, however, importing some
nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers and will continue to
rely on imports for potassium fertilizers.
Nearly all arable land is held by collective and state
farms. Collectivization was slow from 1946 through 1955.
Only 13% of the arable land had been collectivized by
the end of 1955, and only 8% was under the state sector.
The pace was greatly accelerated during 1956 -60, and, by
the end of 1964, 73% of the arable land was in collective
farms, 17% was under the state sector, and only 10
largely in the mountains, was held by private farmers.
With the collectivization of most farms in mountainous
areas in early 1967, private farms now account for less
than 1% of the arable land. In 1967 there were 33 state
agricultural establishments, modeled after Soviet state
farms, receiving preferential treatment, and there were
1,208 cooperative farms. Besides state farms, the state
sector of agriculture includes other nationalized areas
managed as experimental stations, agricultural
subsidiaries of other state enterprises, and state grazing
land.
Despite considerable improvement in recent years,
Albanian agriculture is one of the least mechanized in
Europe. By the end of 1969 Albania had in use about
10,500 tractors in terms of 15- horsepower (hp.) units. The
average amount of agricultural land to be handled by
one 15 -hp. tractor unit was about 55 hectares, compared
with 103 hectares in 1960 and 67 hectares in 1965.
However, lack of complementary equipment for tractors
and poor maintenance have limited their effectiveness in
farming operations.
Most of the heavy machinery used in collective farms is
under the control of the machine- tractor stations
(MTS's), which also provide other forms of technical
assistance and are an important instrument of political
control over agriculture. In 1967, there were an estimated
30 of these stations. The MTS's operate at a low level of
efficiency because of the lack of skilled manpower, poor
work discipline, shortages of spare parts and fuel, and
poor planning and organization.
In a series of decisions in 1966 concerning agriculture,
the Albanian Government increased the state's control
over agriculture. Besides collectivizing private farms in
the mountainous areas, the government decided to
reduce by 50% to 66% the size of the private household
plots of collective members and to reduce by about 50%
the number of livestock that can be held by collective
members. By 1967 the average size of household plots
had been reduced 37% below the 1966 level.
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Other measures already taken include the transfer of
party and state officials into the country; the movement
of unemployed workers from towns to the farm and
greater control over the flow from farms to cities and
towns; the establishment of work norms through the
example of superior brigades; and the abolition of
personal plots of state farm workers. Also, party and state
employees, professional people, and members of the
military are expected to work one month a year in
production, primarily on farms. In addition, members of
the army are to continue to grow their own food and to
participate in agricultural projects, such as opening new
land for growing potatoes.
As in earlier periods, the Albanians are trying during
the fifth Five Year Plan (1971 -75) to achieve self
sufficiency in grain. The regime hopes to about double
the output of breadgrains primarily by increasing
yields. The achievement of this goal is highly unlikely,
given the country's past performance and poor potential.
Some increase in production is nevertheless likely if
average weather conditions prevail. The Albanians also
hope to increase considerably the production of industrial
crops and livestock products. The Chinese Communists
are to aid in the expansion of the superphosphate plant in
Laq and in the construction of another nitrogen fertilizer
plant in Fier. Because of the sharp increase planned for
credits to agricultural cooperatives, the Albanians
established an Agricultural Bank in January 1970. It is
not known whether the increase in credits is to supplant
in part or to supplement investments by the state in
agriculture.
c. FORESTRY, TIMBER PROCFSSING, FISHING
Albania's forests are an important natural resource,
providing fuel and construction materials for the
economy and some exports. The forested area amounted
to 1,242,100 hectares in 1967, or 43% of the total land
area. In 1964 the total stock of timber was 80,900,000
cubic meters, of which slightly over one -half was suitable
for commercial timber. Because of the decline in the use
of firewood, log removal dropped from 1,894,000 cubic
meters in 1965 to 1,471,000 cubic meters in 1967, when
two- thirds was used as firewood. Although firewood
accounted for only 14% of total energy consumption in
1969 compared with 25% in 1964, it remains the main
fuel used in the heating of residences.
The timber and timber processing industry accounted
for 8% of gross industrial production in 1967. Products of
the processing industry include plywood, veneer, pit
props, telegraph poles, furniture, and matches. The
Albanians plan to double the output of furniture during
1971 -80. This industry is located primarily in Elbasan,
Durr6s, Puk6s, and Shkoder rreths (districts). During
1961 -69, the Albanians put into operation at least three
small timber processing plants, two of which were built
with Chinese Communist assistance. Some processed
wood products, such as plywood and veneer, and forest
byproducts, are exported. Output of timber products is
shown in the following tabulation, in thousands of cubic
meters:
1950
1955
1960
1965 eat
1966 eat
1967 e8t
1968 eat
SAWN
TIMBER PLYWOOD
51 0
107 3
170 6
148 8
162 9
144 9
120 na
na Data not available.
Fishing is poorly developed, despite the country's long
coastline and numerous lakes. This deficiency is mainly
the result of inadequate equipment, opportunities for
earning higher incomes from farming in the coastal plain,
and poor transportation facilities. Except in the coastal
towns, fish is not an important part of the Albanian diet.
2. Fuels and power (C)
Crude oil is by far the most important source of
primary energy in Albania. In 1969 the estimated
consumption of energy available from primary sources
was as follows, in percent of total:
Crude oil 58
Brown coal and imported coke 14
Hydroelectric power 14
Fuelwood 14
Total 100
According to official claims, the petroleum industry
accounted for 7% of gross industrial production in 1969.
In 1969, crude oil production reached almost 1.2 million
metric tons (Figure 41), nearly nine times the 1950 level
and 61 over that of 1960. Proved oil reserves are
adequate for 12 to 15 years at the current level of
production. The Albanians claim to have discovered
several new deposits in recent years and assert that
reserves are greater than Soviet experts had led them to
believe. Total refining capacity has doubled since 1966
and now amounts to about 1.1 million tons a year. Nearly
all of this increase came from the 500,000 -ton refinery in
Fier, which began operation in the latter part of 1968.
The Chinese Communists provided the equipment for
this plant. Albania exports only small amounts of crude
oil, once an important earner of foreign exchange. These
exports accounted for 45% of industria output and an
estimated 10� %0 of total exports in 1960, but for only 7% of
output and an estimated 4% of exports in 1967. Because
of its, low quality, most Albanian crude oil is not suitable
for production of high -grade light petroleum products.
Small quantities of aviation gasoline and other light
products as well as lubricating oils are imparted. Albania
exports a large p? -.t of its output of refined products,
primarily asphalt, Which, with small exports of natural
asphalt, accounted for an estimated 19% of total exports
in 1967. Most of the exports of asphalt went to
Communist cot with the remainder going
69
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FIGURE 41. PRODUCTION OF FUELS (U /OU)
(Thousands of metric tons, except where noted)
THROUGH-
1950 1955 1960 1965�
1966'
1967'
1968�
1969*
Crude o 132 208 728 820
890
980
1,040
1,170
Diesel fnal 4 6 68 78
96
105
no
Gasolin:+ 5 4 54 45
44
45
788
no
Refined asphalt and other residuals........... 47 68 245 385
450
54'
no
na
Brown coal 41 195 291 331
393
434
500
600
Fuelwood (million cubic meters) 1 1 1 1
I
1
1
1
Electric power (million kilowatt hours) 21 85 194 341
433
590
710
930
na Data not available.
believed possible from Fier to Stalin.
Patos (oilfield) Fier............
6
*Data are, for the most part, estimated or based on percentage increases.
....do......
no
Connects with Devoll L'i to Ftoht6 pipeline
primarily to Italy. A plant for the production of coke
from natural asphalt was completed in Stalin in 1965.
During 1971 -75 the Albanians plan to expand greatly
the output and assortment of petroleum products and to
begin production of petrochemicals. The Chinese have
agreed to assist in the construction of another refinery,
which is to have a capacity of 1 million tons of crude oil a
year, i.e., about as much as the country's present total
refining capacity.
The Albanian pipeline system is used for carrying
crude oil from the Patos and Devoll oilfields to the
refineries at Fier, Stalin, and Cerrik, and to Uj to Ftoht6
south of Vlore. The system consists of an estimated 80
miles of major trunk lines and 30 miles of gathering lines
in the oilfields. A short gas pipeline from the Devoll
oilfield is believed to supply the nearby city of Stalin with
natural gas. Details of selected pipelines are given in
Figure 42.
Albania is self- sufficient in solid fuels except for small
imports of coke. Coal deposits are small, scattered, and
limited to brown coal. As of 1958, total reserves of brown
coal were estimated at 19 million metric tons, but
subsequent prospecting and the discovery of additional
deposits have probably added substantially to the
estimate. Production of brown coal in 1969 was
approximately 600,000 tons, or about 15 times that in
1950 and twice that in 1960.
In 1968 the Albanians, with Chinese Communist
assistance, began the construction of a coal preparation
plant at the Memaliaj coal mine in Tepelene district.
This plant, with a planned processing capacity of 700
tons per day, was scheduled for completion in 1970.
Another preparation plant and a new coal mine at Va:ias,
both located in Tirane district, are also to be constructed
with Chinese Communist assistance. The Valias mine is
to have a yearly production capacity of 210,000 tons. A
small preparation plant at the Mborja coal mine near
Korqe is currently being enlarged.
The electric power industry has made significant
increases in production and installed capacity since 1965.
Production reached an estimated 930 million kilowatt
hours (kw. -hr.) in 1969 with an installed capacity of
240,000 kilowatts (kw.), compared with about 290
million kw. -hr. and 117,000 kw. in 1964. Per capita
production was 443 kw. -hr. in 1969, a considerable
increase over the 228 kw. -hr. in 1966. Although the rate
of growth is high, total capacity and production are
insignificant.
The production of electric power is about equally
divided between thermal and hydroelectric powerplants.
The generating base of 240,000 kw. consists of 140,000
kw. in thermal plants and 100,000 kw. in hydroelectric
plants. The four largest plants contain 73% of the total
generating capacity. These four plants are the 99,000 -kw.
Fier thermal powerplant, the 25,000 -kw. Ulze Karl Marx
hydroelectric powerplant, the 24,000 -kw. Shkopet
hydroelectric powerplant, and the 28,000 -kw. Delvine
FIGURE 42. SELECTED PIPELINES (C)
TERMINALS
THROUGH-
PRODUCT
PUT
From To
LENGTH
DIAMETER
TRANSPORTED
CAPACITY
REMARKS
Miles
Inches
BbOday
Devoll (oilfield)..... Uj t6 Ftohte.....
50
12.75
Crude.......
no
Constructed 1935; completely overhauled
1947 -48. Pumping stations at oilfield,
Fier, and Skrofotin6. Reversible flow
believed possible from Fier to Stalin.
Patos (oilfield) Fier............
6
12
....do......
no
Connects with Devoll L'i to Ftoht6 pipeline
at Fier pumping station. Pumping station
at oilfield.
Stalin. Cerrik..........
22
12
....do......
no
Connected in Stalin with Fier Stalin section
of Devoll �Uj to Ftoht6 pipeline. Pumping
station at Stalin.
no Data not available.
70
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Bistrices I and 11 hydroelectric powerplants. Other
powerplants are less than 8,000 kw. in size, and many are
less than 100 kw.
Consumption of electric energy, mostly in the form of
motive power, is largely in support of industry, which
accounts for about 65% of total usage. Powerplant uses
and transmission and distribution system losses account
for 12% of the consumption. The other principal
consumers are municipal and governmental services,
agriculture, and households. Household consumption,
satisfying minimal lighting requirements, is increasing
rapidly. The Albanians claim to have completed on 25
October 1970 �a year ahead of schedule �an electrifica-
tion program to provide for the extension of electricity to
all villages.
The country has a well developed transmission system
fo: its small power base. Transmission of electric power is
accomplished by a 110 kilovolt (kv.) network which
extends to principal areas of the country. Lower voltage
lines extend to less important areas. In many remote or
isolated areas, where extension of transmission lines is not
feasible, electric power is supplied by small powerplants.
Development of the electric power industry is oriented
toward the hydroelectric potential, which is relatively
large and mostly unexploited. Under construction is the
250,000 -kw. Va i Dejes hydroelectric powerplant on the
Drin river, scheduled for completion in 1972. Also on the
Drin river is the planned 400,000 -kw. Fierze hydroelectric
powerplant. Construction of this project is to begin in the
early 1970's. Other new construction is planned in the
5,000- to 15,000 -kw. range, both in thermal and
hydroelectric installations. Higher voltage lines of 220 kv.
also are planned during the early 1970's. Growth of the
industry will depend on timely imports of generating
equipment, none of which is domestically produced.
3. Minerals and metals (U /OU)
Albania now has no iron and steel industry, except for
a small rolling mill, but it is an important producer of
chromium ore and since 1959 has produced iron- nickel
ore on a relatively large scale. Chromium is one of the
principal exports; together with iron nickel ore, it
represented roughly one -fifth of the total value of
Albanian exports in 1967. Largely because of the
development of the copper industry, output of the
chromium, copper, and iron nickel industries accounted
for an estimated 8% of gross industrial production in 1969
compared with 3% in 1965. Continued stress will be
placed on developing the extractive industries during the
fifth Five Year Plan.
Albania is the world's sixth largest producer of
chromium ore and has reserves between 4 million and 6
million metric tons. Production �which was developed
with Czechoslovak financial and technical aid
increased from 52,191 tons in 1950 to an estimated
420,000 tons in 1969 (Figure 43). The ore is exported
principally tc other Communist countries. In 1967
export of chromium ore accounted for an estimated 15%
FIGURE 43. PRODUCTION OF DtETALS (U /OU)
(Thousands of metric tons)
no Data not available.
*Data are, for the most part, estimated or based on percentage
increases.
of total exports. With an average chromite content of
about 45 the Albanian ore is inferior to the grades that
can be readily obtained in non Communist countries and
from the U.S.S.R. and thus is difficult to sell in non
Communist markets. A plant for upgrading low -grade
chrome ore to over 50% chromium content is now being
constructed with Chinese assistance at Bulgize. The
Albanians plan to export the ore from this plant. During
1971 -75 the Albanians plan to construct facilities for the
production of ferrochrome.
Exploitation of Albania's reserves of iron nickel ore,
which amount to an estimated million� tons, began in
1958 with Czechoslovak aid. Nearly ali of the ore is
exported primarily to the Sered Nickel Plant in
Czechoslovakia, which began operation in August 1963.
Before the opening of this plant, the ore was stockpiled at
Sered. The nickel content of the ore is only I but
Czechoslovakia has developed a process for obtaining
electrolytically refined nickel from the ore. In 1968,
Albanian production of the ore amounted to an
estimated 405,000 tons, 59% over the 1960 level. The
fifth Five Year Plan schedules a considerable expansion in
the exploitation of iron nickel ore reserves.
All pig iron and most rolled steel is imported. In
October 1966 a small rolling mill built with Chinese
Communist assistance was put into operation at Elbasan.
Albania produces no crude steel and thus must rely on
imports of semifinished steel to operate the rolling mill.
The only other iron or steel facility in Albania is the iron
foundry at the Enver Hoxha General Machine Works in
Tirane, which produces about 5,000 tons of iron castings
annually, using domestic scrap and imported pig iron
and coke.
The Albanians have ambitious, and perhaps somewhat
ridiculous, plans for the steel industry. In line with their
policy of becoming economically self sufficient, they
plan to build, with Chinese assistance, their first
integrated steel plant at Elbasan. This plant, which is
planned to incorporate the present rolling mill, is to
process Albanian iron nickel ore for both iron and nickel.
The Albanians plan to replace their exports of iron- nickel
ore with exports of rolled steel products from this plant.
71
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IRON
CHROMIUM
NICKEL
COPPER
BLISTER
YEAR
ORE
ORE
ORE
COPPER
1950
52
0
14
1
1955
122
0
24
1
1960
289
255
81
1
1965
310
395
220
4
1966
302
395
228
5
1967
327
405
267
5
1968
365
405
285
5
1969
420
no
no
6
no Data not available.
*Data are, for the most part, estimated or based on percentage
increases.
of total exports. With an average chromite content of
about 45 the Albanian ore is inferior to the grades that
can be readily obtained in non Communist countries and
from the U.S.S.R. and thus is difficult to sell in non
Communist markets. A plant for upgrading low -grade
chrome ore to over 50% chromium content is now being
constructed with Chinese assistance at Bulgize. The
Albanians plan to export the ore from this plant. During
1971 -75 the Albanians plan to construct facilities for the
production of ferrochrome.
Exploitation of Albania's reserves of iron nickel ore,
which amount to an estimated million� tons, began in
1958 with Czechoslovak aid. Nearly ali of the ore is
exported primarily to the Sered Nickel Plant in
Czechoslovakia, which began operation in August 1963.
Before the opening of this plant, the ore was stockpiled at
Sered. The nickel content of the ore is only I but
Czechoslovakia has developed a process for obtaining
electrolytically refined nickel from the ore. In 1968,
Albanian production of the ore amounted to an
estimated 405,000 tons, 59% over the 1960 level. The
fifth Five Year Plan schedules a considerable expansion in
the exploitation of iron nickel ore reserves.
All pig iron and most rolled steel is imported. In
October 1966 a small rolling mill built with Chinese
Communist assistance was put into operation at Elbasan.
Albania produces no crude steel and thus must rely on
imports of semifinished steel to operate the rolling mill.
The only other iron or steel facility in Albania is the iron
foundry at the Enver Hoxha General Machine Works in
Tirane, which produces about 5,000 tons of iron castings
annually, using domestic scrap and imported pig iron
and coke.
The Albanians have ambitious, and perhaps somewhat
ridiculous, plans for the steel industry. In line with their
policy of becoming economically self sufficient, they
plan to build, with Chinese assistance, their first
integrated steel plant at Elbasan. This plant, which is
planned to incorporate the present rolling mill, is to
process Albanian iron nickel ore for both iron and nickel.
The Albanians plan to replace their exports of iron- nickel
ore with exports of rolled steel products from this plant.
71
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The plant is to produce annually 250,000 tons of rolled
steel, including sheet products, .varermain materials, and
oil and gas pipe. Other products of the plant are to be
ferronickel and cast iron for foundries. In order to meet
the smelting capacity of the combine, the Albanians plan
to put into operation mines with a capacity of 500,000 to
700,000 tons of iron nickel ore a year. They will have to
import much or all of the metallurgical coke required for
the plant. The need to import coke together with the
difficulty of extracting iron from iron- nickel ore as well as
the small consumption of iron and steel domestically
make the construction of an integrated iron and steel
plant in Albania a questionable undertaking. Although
the iron nickel ore has a high iron content, the presence
of chromium, nickel, and other minerals reduces its
suitability for the production of all but "naturally
alloyed" pig iron, which has limited uses. Also, it is likely
that the Albanians will have a much harder time finding
markets for their iron and steel products than for the iron
nickel ore, especially since the latter has an assured
market in Czechoslovakia.
Output of copper ore increased from 14,207 tons in
1950 to 81,477 tons in 1960 and to about 285,000 tons in
1968. Output of blister copper, the unrefined smelter
product, changed little during 1956 -60 but by 1969
reached an estimated 6,400 tons, or 6.1 times the 1960
output. These increases were largely the result of
economic and technical assistance from Communist
China. Four new mines were opened, and concentrating
and smelting facilities were constructed at KuWs, Rubik,
and Req. Other new construction included a small
refinery at Rubik and a copper wire factory in Shkoder.
With the opening of these latter two facilities, exports of
blister copper dropped from about 3,700 tons in 1965 to
about 1,900 tons in 1967, and Albania began to export
refined copper and copper wire. In 1966 the Albanians
began to export cathode copper.
The Chinese Communists will provide assistance in
future plans for the Albanian copper industry. They are
to help in the doubling of the capacity of the
concentrator in Req and in the construction of a new
concentrator at an unspecified location as well as in the
construction of a smelter and refinery at Laq. The latter
will produce sulfuric acid and copper sulfate as well as
refined copper. Also, the Albanians plan to install at the
copper wire plant in Shkoder a nc% line for the
production of plastic insulated cable.
4. Construction materials (U /OrT)
With the aid of the Chinese Communists, Albania L
becoming self sufficient in major construction materials.
Output of this industry accounted for an estimated 7% of
gross industrial production in 1969 as compared with 5%
in 1965. During the 1960's, the expansion of the Lenin
Cement plant in Vlore and the construction of cement
plants in Tirane, Elbasan, and Fushe-Kruje permitted the
Albanians to increase cement output ni,