CASE STUDY OPERATION LEMON AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02T06251R000600010001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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~NTEI
CASE STUDY
OPERATION LEMON AID
FBI review completed
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This paper details a variety of counter-
intelligence resources, methodologies,
techniques and/or procedures considered
sufficiently sensitive to warrant "Secret"
classifications; however, the majority
were declassified for evidentiary. purposes
in legal proceedings against the subjects
of this case and therefore are presented
herein as unclassified. Sensitive counter-
intelligence sources and methods not
previously declassified and addressed
herein are classified "Confidential" as is
the overall classification of this paper.
Date of issue: October 25, 1979
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The May 20, 1978, arrest of two employees of
the United Nations Secretariat, both Soviet nationals,
in Woodbridge, New Jersey, and their subsequent conviction
on charges of violating the espionage statutes of the
United States have been the topics of extensive news media
reportings. Even the Soviet press, usually silent when it
comes to any allegations of wrongdoing by its citizens
abroad, was compelled to present its view of this obviously
embarrassing situation to its readers. The November 15,
1978, issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta, in a lengthy article on
"FBI 'Anti-Soviet Provocations' Aimed at Harming Relations,"
asserted that Comrades Enger and Chernyayev were the victims
of an FBI act of provocation, code named "Operation Lemonade
(sic)." Under the by-line of the publication's New York
correspondent, I. Andronov, and subtitled "Crooks Under
the FBI's Coat of Arms," the article declared that the
staging of this case was "an act of flagrant tyranny --
incompatible with universally recognized international
norms and normal relations between states," and built
upon fabricated evidence and perjury from witnesses.
Predictably, the Soviet news article failed to document
its charges. (U)
Background
Operation Lemon Aid, an induced double agent
operation, was conceived, controlled and concluded as
a cooperative counterintelligence effort b the FBI and
the U. S. Naval Investigative Service (NISy). Conceptually,
the operation was designed.to assess the potential agent
"spotting" cabability of crew members serving on Soviet
cruise liners calling at the Port of New York; to determine
whether a potential agent recruit, once spotted, would
be developed and operated by intelligence personnel serving
aboard Soviet ships or by those based in a legal Rezidency;
and, upon resolution of the spotting, developing and
operating issues, to effect optimal countermeasures. (C)
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A consensus was reached amongst operational
planners that a U. S. military "volunteer," sufficiently
backstopped as to motivation and informational access,
would be the most attractive bait to offer in furtherance
of the predetermined objectives. In addition, and because
a Soviet cruise vessel had been selected as the initial
target environment, the operational planners. agreed that
a U. S. Navy officer playing the role of a"volunteer"
could best relate to the ship's crew members in offering
his services to Soviet intelligence. The NIS thereupon
identified a U. S. Navy Lieutenant Commander, who possessed
a "Top Secret" clearance in connection with his military
contract review duties, as a likely. candidate to meet
these operational requirements and his candidacy held
up during subsequent screening processes. Thus, the U. S.
Navy officer, who later became known to his Soviet principals
simply as "Ed" (and for purposes of this paper will be
so identified), was selected and readied for a stint as
an "agent provocateur" in this induced cvunterintel].i. encP
operation. (U)
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Operational Staging
Pursuant to his controllers' instructions, Ed
purchased a cruise ticket on July 7, 1977, from the March
Shipping Passenger Services, Inc., New York, for the
sailing of the Soviet liner, "Kazakhstan," on August 13,
1977, from New York to Bermuda, returning on August 20, 1977.
He was then provided a "cover story" for his family and
co-workers, i.e., during the period August 13-20, 1977,
he would be in Detroit, Michigan, to negotiate a Navy
contract with a private industrial firm; and an emergency
point of contact (an NIS representative) in Bermuda. About
mid-afternoon on August 13th, Ed boarded the "Kazakhstan"
and the operational stage was set. (U)
Kazakhstan (U)
On coming aboard, Ed and the other passengers
were directed to stand under an arch bearing the ship's
name and photographed by the ship's photographer. He was
then assigned to stateroom 2026, where he found a brief
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biographic questionnaire to be completed by him and
returned to the Purser's office. Since the ship's cruise
director immediately began imploring the passengers to
promptly return the completed questionnaires, and such
appeals continued over the loudspeaker right up to departure
time, Ed provided his true name, date and place of birth,
and residence; but falsely noted that he was self-employed.
(U)
Immediately following the ship's departure from
New York, Ed attended a "get acquainted mixer" in the lounge
and was sought out by a couple who appeared to be Americans
and who began asking questions about his background and
employment. Ed was quite evasive in responding to their
queries and, when the male conversationist bluntly asserted
"You look military," tactfully excused himself from their
presence without making a reply. He made a point of
avoiding the couple for the remainder of the cruise, but
'did observe the male individual engaging other passengers
in similar conversations and speaking with ship's officers.
The cruise was otherwise uneventful, since the
Soviet nationals- aboard generally were segregated from
other passengers, and the ship's-officers and crew did
not mix or socialize with foreign passengers. Ed did
not participate in the Soviet-organized tours in Bermuda;
instead, he made some independent sightseeing trips there.
(U)
The "Kazakhstan" arrived in New York from
Bermuda at 8:30 a.m. on August 20, 1977. After clearing
Customs and Immigration, and immediately prior to debarking,
Ed went to the Purser's office where he observed two of
the ship's officers engaged in conversation. He approached
them and handed a note.,.written the previous evening on
the ship's stationery, to the officer who appeared to be
the most senior. Upon taking the note, sealed in an
envelope and addressed to the "Soviet Ambassador" on the
face thereof, the recipient officer asked, "What is this
for?" Ed gave no reply and immediately departed the
ship. The note read as follows:
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"I am a career American Naval Officer,
stationed in the New York City area, and will
retire in six years. I am interested in making
additional money prior to my retirement and can
provide you with information which may be of
interest to you. If you are interested, telephone
me at [phone] at 11:45 a.m., August 30, 1977.
Ask for Ed." (U)
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The Target Nibbles at the Bait
The telephone number indicated in the note
passed to the ship's officer was assigned to a public
telephone booth located in the parking lot o:f the Castle
Diner at the intersection of State Route #33 and West
Jumping Brook Road, near Exit #100 of the Garden State
Parkway (a major North-South highway) in New Jersey.
On August 30, 1977, Ed, in military uniform, stood by
this telephone booth at the designated time and, sure
enough, the phone rang. .(U)
First Contact Site (U)
When Ed picked up the receiver, a heavily accented
male voice said, "Hello Ed, we have received your letter
and were pleased to get it. To make sure we're talking
to the right person, what was your cabin number on the
ship?" Upon Ed's immediate and correct response, the
caller, who identified himself simply as "Jim," stated,
"We'd like to meet with you tomorrow night at Queens
Boulevard and 56th Street in New York City." Ed, expressing
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reluctance to travel that far and to be away from his job
and home for any length of time, requested the contact
occur closer to his place of employment in New Jersey.
The caller then suggested they meet at the New York City
location, but on Saturday --- a nonworkday. Ed again
indicated his unwillingness to meet in New York City, to
which Jim thereupon advised he would check with his
superiors; attempt to arrange a meeting closer to Ed's
place of employment; and call him back on Wednesday,
September 7, 1977, at the same time and telephone number.
Before terminating the conversation, Jim asked for, and
received, a description of Ed's automobile. (U)
*N.B.: Since this first telephone contact was not
monitored and/or recorded, the identity of the
caller remained unknown for the time being.
However, Ed's responses were deemed to be
in keeping with the role he was attempting
to play, i.e., a "volunteer" quite concerned
about his personal security; and sufficiently
enticing for the Soviets to initiate a follow-up
contact. (C)
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The Target's Interests Begin to Surface
At the appointed time and place, on September 7,
1977, Ed received a telephone call from Jim; however, it
was a terse, one-way conversation with the latter instructing
Ed to immediately proceed to another public telephone
booth located in front of a Sears Roebuck Store in Asbury
Park, New Jersey, where he would be called again in exactly
30 minutes. Ed hurriedly complied with the instructions
and, true to Jim's word, received a second, albeit equally
brief telephone call in which Jim told him to retrieve
a magnetic "hide-a-key" container attached to the underside
of the phone booth's shelf; to read the message contained
therein; and to await a return call in 15 minutes. The
message is reproduced. as follows: (U)
Bello,
II. u you ?t derstand we are ready to soeept y-,-
proposal. ZLC t nor t:as first thing for us to do Ia .
to have a rrreoral mating where us candirmes all
oonditiore of our future oooperetion. 1tt here
we have s:.ie difficulties : according to our previor,
conrarsation you can't meet with us in New YorZ. On
the other side we are restricted by the 25
and can't go far than that without notification of
the State Dept. Besides,1aw Jersey and eopcciasiy
the place where you live and work is not the p_sce
for our personal ;noting and further ojerations from
the security point of view. In this situation we
urge you to give a thorough considerationto our pro-
posal to use your vacations for going to ' 'inianu,
Guyana, Colussbia or .mica Where we can discuss
with you all the questions under the utmost see1L;Lr_t
neasures. Of course, all the expences will be paid
(even if you go with your family.). Up to our, ner
contact(conditions below) be very cautious and accu-
sulete information.
#11. We have already used your phone twice and
:4 because of security we can't use it any longer.
That's why for our next contacts use public p ass
at MONIOUTh SEBVIC3 AREA located at the QklrJ', t
STATE PI..f between exits 98 & 100. There are 5 Pub..
lip phones there. We'll use i63 I-9743 1 681-9744.
Wait there for our call every last Saturday of sv.e
month from 2 p.m. tIll 2.15 p.m.. As usual we sulk
for Ed. Alternate times the same day, 8 p.m. - 8.15
p.a..
fill. Rtght now we can't discuss ourmatter to7S?
the phone openly. That's why we prepared a qumations.
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I have a copy of theme questions (below) co wo
don't need to read then over the phone. Just ^lce
your short ana ra ("Tae" or ntam 110~Y'.'.~
number of question. A-3 you understand it's done cor
the sake of time and #eourity.
QUESTIO'_4S
I. Are you an offioar on a+.a.ive duty?
2.Do you serve at a-navy base?
3.Do you work at a receaeh institute?
_i
nte-w
e
5.Do you have clearance?
..6.Do you have access-t0 classified materials?
7. Do you have military information?
8.Do you have scientific information?
I0. Do you have access to any information connect"
with strategic system "TRIDZNT"2
II. Do you have any information about submarine waM-
fare?
I2.Do you have any information coansated with the
construction of surface ships?
13.Do you have information about fire control eyta
U. Do you have contacts with the NAVY INT LLIaCTI.,
I5.Do you have secret information prepared for 9
sing. to us .in the nearest future?
I6.Ia it up-to-date information?
17.Ia it original material?
18.Is it film-a from secret document.?_
19.Do you familiar with photo?
20. Doyou have oara?
2I. Can you take home olsssified stteriale frost yarn
office?
22. Can you film or copy secret doomrnte?
23. Can you ? do it at home?
24.Can you do it at your office?
25. Do you have co ees to AD-.A ...AD-B sderofiehes?
26. Can u acouzalate doow ants(films or copies from
them) for passing to as at a convenient plaoe.
and time?
27.D0 you agree to pass your information to us
through caches (hiding places)?
28.Do you agree to get money for it through caches?
29. Do you want to make all deals with us at perao-
Dal meetipas?
30. Will you have your vacations this year?
31.Can you go to r.urope (Finland or Austria) during
next (this) year vacations? (Ali expenoes will paid by us.)
32. Can you go to Latin Amerioa (Columbia or Jamaica)'
during your vacations?
'Blank Yam.
P. S. Bake necessary notes & destroy the letter.
Best wishes.-
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As indicated, Ed received a third phone call
15 minutes later and during which he provided yes and no
answers to the 32 questions listed in the message. In
addition, Jim asked if any specific country was preferable
and/or unacceptable for personal meetings, to which Ed
replied that he had reservations about Guyana. Jim then
confirmed that the Monmouth Service Area met with Ed's
satisfaction for the next telephonic contact; repeated
his instructions for continuing contacts there on the
last Saturday of each month; and extended "best wishes"
to Ed before hanging up. (U)
*N.B.: This first written message to the asset,
while primarily intended to test and measure
his bona fides and informational access, nevertheless
provided some interesting insights to the target's
interests and intentions. First and foremost,
the security precautions taken by the Soviet
principal(s) portended the difficulties to be
encountered in any attempts to effect his/their
identification(s). Secondly, the specified Latin
American third-country sites for personal. meetings
were indicators of the Soviets' current perception
of the most secure operational environments
in the Western Hemisphere. Lastly, the query
as to the asset's access to AD-A/AD-B microfiches
(question ##25) confirmed the target's familiarity
with the "Technical Abstract Bulletin," a quarterly
publication of the Defense Documentation Center,
U. S. Department of Defense, which lists technical
reports that have been reduced to microfilm. (C) .
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A KGB Principal is Identified
Ed appeared at the bank of public telephone
booths located in the Monmouth Service Area of the Garden
State Parkway on September 24, 1977, and received a call`
from Jim on schedule. The call simply instructed him
to drive south on the Parkway to the Herbertsville Picnic
Area, where he should retrieve a crushed Marlboro cigarette
package placed at the foot of a "Do Not Drive on Shoulder"
road sign; read the message contained therein; and continue
south to the town of Toms River, New Jersey, where he
should await a follow-up call, at 3:00 p.m., at the public
telephone booth located directly in front of a "Two Guys
Store." (U)
Herbertsville Picnic Area at southbound mile marker ##94.6 on the Garden State
Parkway, New Jersey (U)
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September 24, 1977, dead drop site (U) .
As instructed, Ed proceeded to the dead drop
site and retrieved the.apparently discarded cigarette
package. A lengthy message secreted therein addressed
long-range objectives and modus operandi; the expectation
of large cash payments with cautionary advice as to how
such monies should be handled; a "shopping list" of coveted
informational topics; specific instructions for the next
scheduled dead drop activity; and the wherewithal to
maintain "constant conditions of connection" in the
United States and abroad should current contact channels
be interrupted. After reviewing the message, Ed immediately
drove on to Toms River to receive Jim's follow-up call,
the purpose of which turned out to be simple verification
that the drop had been cleared and conditions for the
next scheduled activity were acceptable to Ed. (U)
Ed's personal value to this counterintelligence
operation, already established by his deportment in playing
the "volunteer" role, was further enhanced by his reported
observations as he passed through the Herbertsville Picnic
Area. During an operational debriefing, Ed recalled seeing
a blue Plymouth automobile parked in the rest stop and a
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portion of its New York State license plate number. Based
on this reporting, the vehicle's registration was traced
to Rudolf P. Chernyayev, employed as a Personnel Officer
at the United Nations Secretariat, and known to the FBI
as an officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security
(KGB). (C)
Condit ono o~ ,F irson
pe _ we iAg
in leinki Pinla6d.
I. ta: of meeti ,
c>[~:`1~ti.Snndep o! ,4%atie~ each year.
2.~ Place of ,fie tin :' litranoe of the "Cafe".
ToT ron a u streetox ,qr of.. Tbironkatu & man_
nerheimintil 4tr, ), .] ele nki.. 'Fin nd.
3. ss ords s four contact : "1i zcu60 me o rihera I
can see the 4me' iigari .movie" "Ths Deb
here in ...lalsir ?"
You : "I'm not sera' of "Tie Deep"
but you eon see "Star wars" somewhe-
re downtown."
4. Time of meeting:, 7:30`p.m. (tOoal time)
5~. `You are to have a "Time* muazimo in your ri
6. Alternate meeting: one week later, the same time
and placed
Enclosure to KGB's message of September 24, 1977, establishing
"constant conditions of connection" abroad. The succeeding two pages
depict the text of the message. (U)
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Ia this letter aye would.=like'to draw `your at`tent
.to ooh, ports which are -of- great'}' a pox# ion for
u -ts of money to .your salary as a.:result' of our co.
operation. T3iese amounts might, be as great as ,thou
sands,