CHILE: INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000100340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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t
?
Directorate of
Intelligence
Chile:
Internal Security Forces
A Research Paper
--Suer&
eu e
ALA 87-10050
October 1987
Copy 229
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reverse Blank
Chile:
Internal Security Forces
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions from Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division
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Secret
ALA 87-10050
October 1987
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Contents
-
Page
Scope Note
iii
An Overview of Chile's Security Apparatus
1
Structure and Composition
1
Capabilities and Problems
3
Issues Ahead
4
The Carabineros: Chile's National Police
7
Organization and Functions
7
Recruitment and Training
7
Pay, Funding, and Equipment
9
Tactics and Operational Effectiveness
10
Morale
12
The Carabineros and Pinochet
12
The Investigations Police
15
Organization and Functions
15
Recruitment and Training
15
Pay, Funding, and Corruption
15
Operational Effectiveness
17
Political Attitudes
17
The National Information Center
19
Organization
19
Recruitment and Training
21
Salaries, Funding, and Equipment
21
Professionalism and Operational Effectiveness
23
Political Attitudes and Support for the Regime
25
The Military's Role in Internal Security
27
Intelligence Functions
27
Counterterrorist and Internal Security Roles
27
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South
Pacific
Ocean
0
Peru
Arica
Antofagast
Valparaiso.
SANTIAGO*
Ch i
Concepciini
400 Kilometers
400 Miles
*LA PAZ
Bolivia
Paraguay
BUENOS
AIRES 1.\;uay
Argentina
.0ovr
Cape Hor7I
Beagle
Channel
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
(administered by U.K.,
claimed by Argentina)
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vi
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
711459 (A04638) 10-87
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Chile:
Internal Security Forces
An Overview of Chile's Security Apparatus
Since a military coup brought him to power in 1973,
President Pinochet has used Chile's security ser-
vices?police, intelligence entities, and the armed
forces?as an effective instrument of political control.
US Embassy reporting has shown that he has em-
ployed the efficient, disciplined security apparatus to
intimidate or eliminate serious opposition. During the
last four years, the services have repressed popular
protests and, notwithstanding an increase in high-
profile terrorist incidents, largely contained leftist-
inspired terrorism.
We believe the security forces will face new chal-
lenges as political opposition to the regime continues
to grow. The regime has been unable to totally stop
the anti-Pinochet activities of the moderate opposi-
tion, and polls show that support for a rapid transition
to civilian rule?which most likely will be expressed
through protest rallies and demonstrations?is mount-
ing. The security forces have also neither stemmed the
growth of the Communist party nor lessened its
determination to upgrade, both in scale and sophisti-
cation, its terrorist capabilities and eventually launch
an anti-Pinochet insurgency.
Structure and Composition
Chile's security forces cover a broad range of respon-
sibilities and include a number of distinct units:
? The 28,000-member Carabineros are a national
paramilitary constabulary subordinate to the De-
fense Ministry. They perform regular law enforce-
ment duties as well as a wide range of nonpolice
functions.
? The Investigations Police, also under the Ministry
of Defense, is a national plainclothes force of some
3,500 officers that investigates common crimes,
pursues terrorists, monitors Pinochet's political op-
ponents, and serves as the national immigration
police.
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Figure 1. President and Capt. Gen. Augusto
Pinochet
? The National Information Center (CNI), subordi-
nate to the Ministry of the Interior, is the regime's
central intelligence agency. The 2,000- to 2,500-
member service gathers foreign and domestic intelli-
gence, monitors the opposition, and carries out anti-
terrorist operations.
? The armed forces and their intelligence entities
help the other security services maintain public
order and control the opposition, while the 60,000-
man Army helps the National Police patrol the
border and protect vital industrial and transporta-
tion infrastructure. The rise in protest activity in the
last four years has led Pinochet to turn more
frequently to the military?especially the Army?to
counter opposition to his continued rule.
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Human Rights and the Security Structure
Since seizing power in a coup in 1973, the Pinochet
regime has had a reputation for consistent human
rights violations. The security forces have routinely
intimidated, tortured, and, at times, murdered mem-
bers of the political opposition, according to the US
Embassy. While the regime has reined in the security
services somewhat in recent months, human rights
violations remain commonplace.
The US Embassy indicates that most human rights
violations are committed by the CNI, the Investiga-
tions Police, and several Army units. The Carabine-
ros?in closer contact with the general population
and concerned about their reputation as police offi-
cers?have largely avoided participation in the most
brutal repression. According to the US Embassy, the
CNI and the Investigations Police have made system-
atic use of torture; the CNI was responsible for 80
percent of the documented torture cases in 1986, the
Investigations Police 10 percent, and the Carabineros
only 5 percent. In our judgment, the CNI, and to a
lesser degree the Investigations Police, are primarily
responsible for the petty harassment, intimidation,
and beatings of political opposition figures-114
cases in the first quarter of 1987 alone?which the
regime blames on unidentified assailants.
US officials report that the increased use of Army
troops in crowd control also has led to serious human
rights abuses. During the July 1986 general strike,
for example, the Army may have been responsible for
as many as 200 gunshot victims in Santiago's slums.
Furthermore, an Army unit?probably at the instiga-
tion of intelligence officers?torched the US resident
Chilean, Rodrigo Rojas, and his companion Carmen
Quintana, during the strike, according to the Embas-
sy.
the regime continues to
rely on death squads to repress the political opposi-
tion. The assassination of former Foreign Minister
Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976 by agents of
the CNI's predecessor, the National Directorate of
Intelligence (DINA), illustrates the lengths to which
the regime has been willing to go to neutralize its
opponents. We believe that high-level security offi-
cials, acting on Pinochet 's orders, direct death squad
activities carried out by the CNI, Investigations
officers, specially selected ad hoc Army units, or
shadowy civilian groups linked to the security ser-
vices.
While the international furor resulting from the
Letelier murder appears to have caused the security
services to veer away from similar overseas actions,
they have continued the selective assassination of
opponents at home. CNI officers apparently killed
labor leader Tucapel Jimenez in 1982,
and assisted a special Army
unit in the murder of three Communists in March
1985. In September 1986 a group called the 11
September Command?the date of Pinochet's 1973
coup?murdered four leftists, apparently to retaliate
for the recent attempt on President Pinochet 's life.
In an effort to improve his image as the 1989
presidential plebiscite draws near, President Pinochet
has taken some steps to improve the human rights
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situation. He lifted the state of siege early this year
and has allowed about 1,000 exiles to return to Chile.
Responding to both domestic and international pres-
sure, the government now requires the CNI to hand
over most of the individuals it detains to the Carabi-
neros or Investigations Police. Finally, the Carabine-
ros, Investigations, and the CNI updated this spring
agreements with the International Committee for the
Red Cross allowing the ICRC more prompt access to
detainees.
According to the US Embassy, the recent improve-
ment on the human rights front is cosmetic, designed
to reduce foreign pressure on the regime and bolster
Pinochet 's reelection prospects. We believe that the
regime will continue, if only on a selective basis, to
use harsh tactics against the opposition. Even though
the CNI cannot legally detain individuals, the Em-
bassy reports that arbitrary arrest and detention still
occur: according to the US Embassy, the CNI may be
? using cells in the Investigations Police headquarters
to secretly detain and torture suspects; and the
special prosecutor assigned to investigate the assassi-
nation attempt and the Cuban-supplied arms caches
is not bound by the restrictions on the CNI. More-
over, the CNI staged
several shootouts in June?killing 12 alleged FPMR
terrorists?to circumvent the restrictions on deten-
tion and avenge an increase in attacks on the security
forces. Finally, we believe that the regime will not
hesitate to use extreme repression if some dramatic
event, such as another assassination attempt or a
series of high-profile terrorist attacks, appears to
jeopardize Pinochet 's rule.
Legally, the individual services that comprise the
internal security apparatus report to the President
through their respective ministries. The US Embassy
reports that in practice, however, President Pinochet
dominates the decisionmaking machinery through
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personal contact with the services' leadership. Accord-
ing to the coordinates 25X1
internal security activities in weekly meetings with an
informal council composed of the Minister of the
Interior, the chief of the Defense Ministry's intelli-
gence staff, and senior officials from the various
intelligence and police entities. 25X1
Capabilities and Problems
US Embassy, press, and government reports all un-
derscore the fact that the Chilean internal security
apparatus is well trained and highly disciplined.
Training for all the services at the beginning and
intermediate levels is rigorous, although advanced
instruction appears to have declined in recent years.
The Carabineros in particular are noted for their
professionalism and enjoy the respect of the citizenry.
With the exception of the Investigations Police?
which is riddled with corruption, according to US
officials?the Chilean security forces have a reputa-
tion for honesty.
Working separately or together the security forces
have demonstrated their capacities in a number of
critical areas:
? They have performed basic law and order functions
well. Stationed in almost every village, town, and
hamlet in Chile, the Carabineros and the Investiga-
tions Police?the two principal law enforcement
bodies?operate effectively in investigating and con-
trolling criminal activity. Despite a recent upswing
in criminality?primarily in Santiago?Chile re-
mains one of the best policed societies in the region,
according to US officials and press reports.
? The internal security forces have the capability to
counter violence by the far left. Even though the
CNI and the Investigations Police have suffered
from intelligence gaps on the subversives' plans?
illustrated by the assassination attempt on Pinochet
in September 1986 and the only accidental discov-
ery of huge Cuban-supplied arms caches in August
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respond to terrorist actions. They have penetrated
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the major subversive groups and apprehended a
significant number of terrorists over the past year.
Through stepped-up patrolling and installation se-
curity, the Army and the Carabineros have en-
hanced their capability to protect vital economic
and industrial facilities, according to US officials.
? The security apparatus can effectively suppress
most antiregime strikes and demonstrations. Well-
developed informant networks within the unions,
political parties, and the violence-prone lower-class
neighborhoods allow the security services to keep
abreast of planned protests and stifle them by
preemptive action. The regime's periodic security
sweeps in the poorer sections also intimidate the
inhabitants and disrupt the opposition's efforts to
organize protests. In our view, only a protracted
period of massive demonstrations would overburden
the security forces' capacities.
This is not to say that problems do not exist. The
security structure suffers from troublesome jealousies
and interservice rivalries.
the rise in protests and
terrorism since 1983 has accentuated these tensions,
with the Carabinero hierarchy clashing bitterly with ?
CNI, Investigations, and Army officials over the
latter services' heavyhanded crowd control tactics and
disdainful treatment of the National Police during
demonstrations. In late 1986, for example, the Interi-
or Minister complained that infighting and lack of
coordination among the Carabineros, the Investiga-
tions Police, and the CNI were threatening the regi-
me's internal security capabilities.
In our view, Pinochet has deliberately exacerbated
interservice rivalries in order to strengthen his person-
al control over the security apparatus and prevent any
one individual or force from challenging his authority.
For example, US officials report that he has often
encouraged a service to assume responsibilities regu-
larly carried out by another, thereby heightening the
normal friction resulting from overlapping duties.
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Figure 2. Carabineros chasing antigovernment
demonstrators during the visit of Pope John
Paul II in April 1987
Manchete C
Moreover, growing political pressure on the regime
and the nearly successful attempt in September 1986
on Pinochet's life have made the President even more
distrustful. This has been reflected in his increasing
tendency to set up ad hoc intelligence groups?usually
drawn from the Army?to carry out special missions,
a practice US officials believe has almost certainly
aggravated conflicts within the security apparatus.
Issues Ahead
Notwithstanding the rivalries, we believe the security
services can forestall any attempt by the opposition to
use confrontational or violent tactics to topple Pino-
chet. Looking down the road, however, a number of
key issues remain that will influence the vitality of the
security structure.
US officials report that budgetary stringencies im-
posed on the Carabineros have almost certainly re-
duced their ability to manage a rise in protests and
violence. Determined to prevent the Carabineros from
ever challenging the Army, Pinochet has consistently
slighted them in budgetary appropriations. The US
Embassy and the that
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Figure 3. Army troops cordoning off slum during
security sweep
Pinochet's parsimony has caused severe equipment
and personnel shortages, and, in concert with low pay,
increasing casualties from combating terrorism, and
Pinochet's favoritism toward the other security ser-
vices, has led to a serious drop in Carabinero morale.
In our view, interservice rivalries will grow, reducing
the security services' capabilities and causing political
problems for the regime. Aggravated by Pinochet's
"divide and rule" tactics, increased infighting will
complicate efforts at coordinated action. Pinochet's
doubts about the Carabineros' reliability will lead him
to rely more heavily on the Investigations Police, the
CNI, and the Army to counter the opposition. This
will probably lead to more human rights abuses,
which will worsen the regime's already poor domestic
and international image.
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Finally, in our judgment, Pinochet will find it increas-
ingly difficult to count on the unstinting support of
the security services to perpetuate his regime into the
1990s. As his options narrow because of rapidly
diminishing popular support and the loss of even
rightwing civilian political allies, Pinochet will be
forced to rely almost exclusively on the security
services to maintain power?thereby making himself
increasingly vulnerable to their pressures and de-
mands. Pinochet can probably depend on the loyal,
but politically and militarily less significant, CNI and
Investigations Police. On the other hand, we believe
the Carabineros and the military services, even
though they will be able to repress the opposition, will
become increasingly restive and dissatisfied, and may
lose the political resolve to persist in the demoralizing
task of protecting a highly unpopular regime. In our
view, relations between Pinochet and the Carabineros
in particular are likely to become especially poor and
the National Police could begin to oppose the Presi-
dent's plans to perpetuate himself in power, perhaps
even engaging in some nonviolent protest if he tries
some gambit such as rigging the voting to ensure his
victory in the presidential plebiscite scheduled for
1989
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The Carabineros: Chile's National
Police
The 28,000-member Carabineros are the cornerstone
of Chile's internal security apparatus. Formed in 1927
as a counterweight to the Army, the Carabineros soon
developed into a competent and honest police service.
Professionalism and integrity have won the service the
respect of a majority of the public, despite its associa-
tion with the Pinochet government?the Carabineros'
director sits on the four-man junta that serves as the
military regime's legislative body. According to a
recent survey conducted by a Chilean socialist think
tank, 63 percent of the residents of four lower-class
housing projects in Santiago stated that they trusted
the Carabineros more than any other sociopolitical
actor, including the Roman Catholic Church. The US
Embassy reports that, during the papal visit in April,
the Carabineros earned public praise for their highly
professional crowd control?most notably their re-
straint in the face of violent radical leftist
provocation.
Organization and Functions
The uniformed Carabineros, along with the plain-
clothes Investigations Police, constitute Chile's forces
of public order and security, according to the 1980
Constitution. Pinochet shifted the service, originally
subordinate to the Interior Ministry, to the Ministry
of Defense shortly after the 1973 coup.
the Carabineros are divided into
five directorates?Order and Public Security, Person-
nel, Logistics, Training, and Welfare; the last admin-
isters the service's benefits and social assistance pro-
grams. The Directorate of Order and Public Security
dwarfs the other divisions and performs the Carabin-
eros' primary police duties: crime prevention, traffic
control, and patrolling Chile's 2,500-mile border. For
policing purposes, the service divides Chile into eight
geographical zones that are broken down into 39
prefectures, 161 commissariats (equivalent to a pre-
cinct), 206 lieutenancies, and 491 posts?the
smallest Carabinero unit that often consists of fewer
than 10 men. This organization gives the force a
presence in virtually every town, village, and hamlet
of Chile, and contributes to its generally good rela-
tions with the population and wide range of sources
and informants in both rural and urban areas.
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The Carabineros perform a much broader range of
duties than do most US and European police services.
While most officers are involved in standard police
functions, a substantial number carry out tasks unre-
lated to internal security. For example, Carabineros
manage an orphanage for abandoned children, rescue
trapped mountaineers, and serve as forest rangers.
Even though specialization is encouraged, a typical
Carabinero will serve in a number of capacities in his
career.
The Subdirectorate of Special Police Activities, which
is subordinate to the Directorate of Order and Public
Security, oversees most of the components carrying
out nonpolice functions as well as the major special-
ized units?air wing, narcotics, and the special forces:
? Air Wing. This component employs five light air-
planes and an equal number of helicopters in a
variety of duties including search and rescue, crime
prevention, and border and shore patrol. Stationed
in Santiago, it is also used by the narcotics, special
forces, and forestry units.
? Narcotics Unit. Headquartered in Santiago, the
large and active narcotics section is also represented
in regional police districts and precincts. According
to US officials, its officers are energetic, resource-
ful, and honest, although they often lack sophisticat-
ed training and sufficient operational funds.
?
Special Forces. Even though all Carabineros receive
riot training, the organization has specialized tacti-
cal emergency response units. Stationed in major
trouble centers?Santiago, Concepcion, and Valpa-
raiso?they are deployed only on the orders of the
director or deputy director.
the detachment in Santiago has a
standard complement of 1,200 men, while the Val-
paraiso and Concepcion units have 250 men each.
Recruitment and Training
The Carabineros recruit openly through advertise-
ments in the media. Official application is made at
local police stations, but recruits may be assigned
countrywide.
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Figure 4
Organization of Carabineros
Directorate
General
Subdirectorate
General
Directorate of
Directorate of
Directorate of
Directorate of
Directorate of
Order and Public ! I Personnel
Logistics
Training
Welfare
Security
Subdirectorate of
Geographical
Special Police
Police Zones
Services
Air
Wing
I Special
Forces
Canine
I Corps
Naroctics
Unit
Forest
Services
the service recruits enlisted men and officers separate-
ly and has established distinct career tracks for them.
arabinero enlist-
ed men have urban and rural lower-class back-
grounds, while officers generally come from the lower
middle class. Enlisted men must have two years of
high school, officer candidates four; all recruits must
be single when they join the force, have completed
military service, and be at least 5 feet 5 inches tall.
US officials report that potential recruits undergo a
series of physical, educational, and psychological tests
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0-42-5 314258 9-87
prior to acceptance, and, since 1984, a background
check conducted by the CNI.
the institution places considerable
emphasis on the psychological examination in order to
weed out individuals with overly aggressive tenden-
cies. The service's few hundred women serve mostly in
subordinate roles as traffic police and juvenile
officers.
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Figure 5. Carabineros on border patrol
that training for
Carabinero enlisted men, NCOs, and junior officers is
first rate. The institution operates four schools in the
Santiago area: the academy, the noncommissioned
officers' school, the officers' school, and the Institute
of Superior Studies for senior-level officers. Carabine-
ro en listed recruits receive a good grounding in Chil-
ean criminal, military, and constitutional law; investi-
gative techniques; installation security; and sociology;
as well as the standard self-defense and arms training.
NCOs and officer recruits also take courses in com-
mand, administration, and advanced criminal investi-
gations. Basic schooling for the enlisted ranks lasts
nine months, while NCOs study for two years and
officers train for three, receiving instruction compara-
ble in length and quality to their counterparts in the
Army.
Advanced training for senior officers?majors and
above?has apparently deteriorated in recent decades.
are often not kept abreast of procedural and technical
advances in other parts of the world, especially in the
United States and Europe.
the Allende administration's decision
to stop sending officers to the International Police
Academy in Washington, D.C.?probably to limit.
exposure of its officers to a country with which it was
9
Figure 6. Children and police officers at
Carabinero-administered orphanage
frequently in conflict?is in part responsible for the
decline. Pinochet seconded the decision, probably in
part as a result of his conflictive relations with the
United States, but also because, as US officials have
reported, he has doubts about the loyalty of the
Carabineros.
budgetary constraints have also played an impor-
tant role in restricting advanced training.
Pay, Funding, and Equipment
pay is low for
officers and enlisted men. The Director makes about
US $1,700 monthly, generals $1,300, and a colonel
$1,000. Junior officers?majors, captains, and lieu-
tenants?earn $250, $180, and $150, respectively.
Enlisted men are paid about $90 monthly; US offi-
cials report that this salary, although twice the mini-
mum wage, is small even by Chilean standards.
Although both enlisted men and officers are entitled
to longevity increases every three to five years, the
service has granted no such increases since 1984. US
officials report dissat-
isfaction in officer and enlisted ranks over the issue of
pay.
Low remuneration, however, is offset, to some degree
by a good benefits plan. US officials report a Carabi-
nero and his family are entitled to 80-percent cover-
age for medicines and specialized health care and 100
percent for professional medical attention at the large
modern hospital run by the service in Santiago.
Moreover, the institution runs a large discount super-
market-department store in Santiago for all Carabi- 25X1
neros and dependents. US officials add that the
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institution provides low-interest housing loans to its
members and has an attractive pension plan that
enables retirees to live comfortably, especially outside
Santiago.
President
-
Pinochet has consistently restricted funding for the
Carabineros to prevent them from developing a para-
military capability that would enable them to chal-
lenge the Army. This policy has resulted in shortages
and inadequacies in equipment, personnel, and train-
ing
there is often a dearth of uniforms; office supplies are
scarce; and the automotive shop often lacks the
necessary parts to repair patrol cars and antiriot
vehicles. Furthermore, a US security official reports
that marksmanship has suffered because of insuffi-
cient ammunition for practice. Budgetary stringencies
have also resulted in a serious shortage of facilities in
which to detain people arrested during public protests.
the Defense
Minister complained in early 1986 to President Pino-
chet that the 28,000-man force was stretched too thin
and needed to be strengthened to compensate for the
increase in Chile's population, rising terrorism, and
the expanding road and highway system.
Tactics and Operational Effectiveness
The US Embassy and the press report that the
Carabineros perform well in enforcing law and order
despite the budgetary constraints.
the service patrols efficient-
ly and responds rapidly to criminality in key urban
areas?downtown areas and upper-class neighbor-
hoods. The US Embassy and the press, however,
report that the police often react less rapidly to crime
in lower-class neighborhoods. The Carabineros' pres-
ence in almost every village in the countryside gives
them good access to the population and enables them
to function as an effective deterrent to crime in the
rural areas.
US Embassy and press reports indicate that the
Carabineros have dealt effectively with the waves of
anti-Pinochet protests and the upsurge of terrorism
that have buffeted Chile over the last four years. They
have, with some exceptions, controlled large demon-
strations and have participated in the security forces'
campaign against the terrorist threat.
Secret
Figure 7. Carabinero and attack dog subduing
protester
Stern C
The Carabineros employ highly effective, if some-
times brutal, crowd control tactics.
hat officers exercise strict control
during demonstrations and resort to force in a calcu-
lated, rather than spontaneous or reactive, manner.
While the Carabineros use shotguns to pepper demon-
strators with buckshot, and often administer beatings
to agitators, they do not resort to the indiscriminate
use of lethal force. Mounted and foot police use
charges to disperse demonstrators, but are careful to
leave protesters an avenue of escape to prevent a large
crowd from becoming cornered and turning on them.
They also disperse crowds by driving through them
with small heavily armored trucks, and by using
special water cannon from Austria that spew a nox-
ious mixture of tear gas and water.
According to US officials
however, large-scale protests over a period of
days would overtax the Carabineros' capabilities. The
Carabineros special forces?the primary crowd con-
trol units?would be unable to handle massive, pro-
longed demonstrations in the Santiago area,
and the service
would have to commit students from the NCO school
to control the protests. the
Carabinero high command believes that the service's
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Crime in Chile
Historically, Chile has been a well-policed country
that enjoyed one of the lowest crime rates in South
America. Highly concerned with order and security,
the Pinochet regime has sought to buttress tha
tradition by using its extraordinary police pOwers to
combat crime as well as repress the political opposi-
tion. Nevertheless, a marked
increase in crime in the last four years: the incidence
of armed robberies, burglaries, and thefts has risen
dramatically, primarily in urban slums. An Investi-
gations Police report observed in September 1986
that, while Chile's overall population was growing at
2.2 percent annually, its prison population was rising
at a rate of 6.7 percent.
We attribute much of the surge in criminal activity to
poor living standards in the urban shantytowns. The
press and the US Embassy report that, despite the
last two years of strong economic growth, rampant
unemployment and substandard housing and health
care remain the norm in those areas. Indeed, the US
Embassy reports that unemployment is highest
among young males between 18 and 25?the age
group that is usually responsible for most violent
crime. They add, however, that inadequate policing
also has contributed to the crime wave. While the
Carabineros and Investigations Police patrol heavily
in upper- and middle-class neighborhoods, they have
reduced their presence in?or even withdrawn from?
many slums because of manpower shortages and
heightened terrorism. US officials have noted an
increase in vigilantism and report that slumdwellers
frequently complain to government officials about the
lack of adequate police protection.
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In our view, the periodic security sweeps conducted
by the Army, Carabineros, and Investigations Police 25X1
have had a mixed impact on crime in the poor
neighborhoods. While the sweeps are aimed primarily
re rooting out political opponents of President Pino-
chet, the government has touted them as crime
fighting measures, since authorities use the identity
checks to nab criminals. Nevertheless, even though
the sweeps have frequently broken up organizations 25X1
responsible for mounting antiregime protests, they
have simultaneously undermined community struc-
tures, such as neighborhood watch groups, that play
an important role in countering criminality, accord-
ing to the Institute of Police Studies, an association
of former police officers. 25X1
Despite the increase, crime has not become a major
social or political issue in Chile. In our view, howev-
er, the government's continued inability or unwilling-
ness to ensure the safety of the lower-class neighbor-
hoods will help fuel the socioeconomic unrest that
has made those areas tinderboxes of antiregime
activity. Moreover, spread of crime into middle- and
upper-class areas contributes to the erosion of confi-
dence in the regime among its chief supporters.
antiriot capabilities are good at the small unit level,
but begin to break down when the need arises to mass
large numbers of police to deal with a severe situation.
According to US officials a shortage
of officers and NCOs would result in confusion, a
deterioration in discipline, and an increase in human
rights abuses.
The National Information Center (CNI)?rather than
the Carabineros?is Chile's principal antiterrorist
force, although the National Police have been in-
volved in bolstering security at vital industrial, trans-
portation, and communications installations. More-
over, the
Carabinero director established within the special
11
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forces a small elite antiterrorist unit?the Special
Police Operations Group (GOPE). The main force of
the unit (some 60 men) is stationed in Santiago,
although smaller detachments serve in Valparaiso and 25X1
Concepcion. Initially the unit received rigorous
training in advanced combat and hostage rescue
techniques at the Army Special Forces school, but in 25X1
recent years instruction has declined because of fund-
ing problems. Despite the existence of this special
unit, its members have participated in few, if any,
antiterrorist operations, and have been used mostly in
normal riot control. 25X1
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Figure 8. Carabineros arresting demonstrator in
the main plaza Santiago
Stern 0
While not strictly an antiterrorist force, the Carabine-
ros have paid a high price in the counterterrorist war.
Stepped-up patrols and infrastructure security have
heightened their profile and made them easy targets.
Indeed, the Carabineros have borne the brunt of the
casualties in the struggle against the radical left?
according to the US Embassy, from 1979 to 1984, 22
Carabineros perished at the hands of terrorists, and in
1986 alone six died.
Morale
Despite the high degree of professionalism there are
signs that the institution has suffered from sagging
morale over the last four years according to US
officials. In our view, the lack of funding, which has
hampered their abilities to perform their duties, the
increasing risk of terrorist attacks, and low pay are
the major factors contributing to a significant decline
in morale.
criticism from family and friends that the service is
propping up the Pinochet government may also be
affecting the morale of rank-and-file Carabineros,
who mostly reside in lower-class areas where socioeco-
nomic discontent and antiregime feeling are high.
According to US officials
Secret
Figure 9. Carabinero attending comrade mortal-
ly wounded by terrorists
morale problems have not translated into
significant corruption in the force. The US Embassy
reports that Carabinero patrolmen and officers rarely
take bribes and have generally resisted the numerous
opportunities for self-enrichment inherent in antinar-
cotics activities.
The Carabineros and Pinochet
The US Embassy and that
the Carabineros are probably the security service
most opposed to Pinochet's remaining in power after
1989. Notwithstanding their dutiful performance in
quelling antigovernment demonstrations, a majority
of Carabineros appear to favor a speedy return to
civilian rule.
most officers back the efforts by Director Stange?
one of Pinochet's most outspoken critics on the jun-
ta?to oppose the President's plans to gain the plebi-
scite nomination. We believe that a.growing number
of enlisted men and NCOs may also privately share
many of the social and economic frustrations of the
working-class milieu in which they operate.
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Rodo(fa Stange Oecklers
Director General, Carabineros;
member, junta (since August
1985)
Gen. RodoIfo Stange is highly regarded within the
Carabineros. After serving as deputy director for
three years, he assumed the top post amidst accusa-
tions that police officers had kidnaped and murdered
three Communists. To improve the force's public
image and upgrade morale, he quickly disbanded a
unit that had been accused of involvement in the
incident. Stange is often credited with the restraint
shown by police in handling opposition demonstra-
tions.
Stange has indicated that the mili-
tary should gradually withdraw from politics and
that Carabineros should not participate in the elec-
toral process, even by voting.
Stange 'S relationship with Pinochet has deteriorated
markedly during the past two years, largely because
the Carabinero chief has surprised the President by
pressing more and more openly for an accelerated
transition to civilian rule, according to the US Em-
bassy. For example, in June he joined two of his
fellow junta members in calling for a civilian candi-
date acceptable to a broad cross section of voters in
the scheduled presidential plebiscite. Pinochet treats
Stange in an openly condescending manner and on
several occasions threatened to fire him. Tensions
between the two men are exacerbated by interservice
rivalry, especially over the Army's increased role in
maintaining public order,
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Stange has told US officials that he believes Chile
will be thrown into turmoil if Pinochet insists on
trying to remain in power beyond 1989. He is worried
that the police would have to handle most of the
violence resulting from opposition to Pinochet's con-
tinued rule and fears that the force lacks sufficient
manpower to confront widespread public protest and
expanded terrorist actions.L 25X1
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Stange was born on 30 September 1925. He is formal
but friendly in his dealings with US officials. He has
strong family ties to Germany and visits there
regularly. 9X1
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We believe, however, that the major source of Carabi-
nero disenchantment with the regime is Pinochet's
determined effort to subordinate the service to the
military and to himself personally.
that most Carabineros would prefer to
return the institution to the authority of the Ministry
of the Interior. The Carabinero officer corps was
infuriated when in 1985 Pinochet attempted to re-
place the service's Director?who had resigned fol-
lowing the revelation of Carabinero involvement in
the murder of three Communists?with an Army
officer. The Carabinero officers resisted the Presi-
dent's ploy, finally persuading him to promote the
13
deputy director, Rodolfo Stange, to the number-one
spot. US officials indicate that many Carabinero
chiefs are also worried by Pinochet's maneuvering to
build a base of support in the Carabinero leadership.
General Stange has become increasingly irritated at
Pinochet's efforts to undercut his authority by culti-
vating his subordinates.
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in addition, and Embassy reports
indicate that the Carabinero hierarchy resents PinO-
chet's increasing use of Army units to stifle protests
and demonstrations. High-level Carabinero officials
complained bitterly to Army generals when on several
occasions the government used Army troops to quell
riots and disperse protesters.
Stange has stated privately that he
believes the subordination of the Carabineros to the
Defense Ministry, limitations on the service's budget
and personnel, and tentative plans to create municipal
police forces add up to a concerted campaign by the
regime to reduce the Carabineros' status and
effectiveness.
Pinochet's handling of the investigation into the 1985
murder of three Communist militants engendered a
particularly sharp reaction from the Carabineros.
.hen Director
Mendoza was shocked that Pinochet allowed the CNI
to issue a public report that cast all the blame on their
institution when in reality the crime was committed
by rogue Carabinero officers?operating outside the
formal hierarchy and possibly without the knowledge
of Mendoza?in conjunction with a joint CNI-Army
unit. According to press reports, some Carabinero
officers reacted to the report by meeting clandestinely
to plot undefined actions against the government.
While these rumors are unconfirmed, there is no
doubt that the incident badly soured relations among
the Carabineros, the CNI, and Pinochet.
Di-
rector Stange is pressing to have the case reopened in
order to clear his institution's name.
Secret
In our view, relations between Pinochet and the
Carabineros are likely to worsen over the next two
years. Declining morale, Pinochet's growing use of the
Army in internal security matters, and Pinochet's
persistent favoritism toward the CNI and Investiga-
tions Police will translate into increased resentment
toward the President. We believe that under these
circumstances the Carabineros may begin to resist
Pinochet's efforts to perpetuate himself in office.
Recently, Stange publicly agreed with calls by the Air
Force and Navy chiefs for a civilian candidate in the
presidential plebiscite. In our view, officers and enlist-
ed men are likely to become increasingly disaffected
from the regime, and perhaps more vocal in their
support for a transition to civilian rule.
We believe that a gambit by Pinochet to ensure his
victory in the plebiscite?such as using the CNI or
the Investigations Police to intimidate antiregime
voters?could spark a reaction from the Carabineros.
General Stange has publicly affirmed that the Cara-
bineros should guarantee the security and integrity of
the electoral process. In our view, the Carabineros
might be galvanized into some form of nonviolent
protest, such as remaining in their barracks or refus-
ing to vote, if they believed the regime was trying to
rig the plebiscite.
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The Investigations Police
The 3,500 man Investigations Police (also frequently
called the Investigative Police or the Civil Police) is
Chile's plainclothes civilian investigative agency.
Originally a branch of the Carabineros, it became an
independent police agency in 1938, falling under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Shortly
after the 1973 coup, Pinochet?using the same tactic
he employed with the Carabineros?subordinated the
force to the Ministry of Defense.
Organization and Functions
he Investigations
Police is organized geographically and functionally.
The Director General and his staff supervise the two
large subdirectorates?Police Operations and Admin-
istration?that perform the majority of the law en-
forcement and administrative functions. The Subdir-
ectorate of Police Operations (SOP) administers the
five geographical zones?north, central, south, austral
(far south), and Santiago metropolitan. At the zone
level, the organization is further subdivided into dis-
tricts and precincts that usually have specialized units
to deal with homicide, robbery, and other crimes. The
Police Services Support Command?that includes the
narcotics, technical, and statistics departments, the
crime lab, and the Special Operations Prefecture?
that supervises the Intelligence Brigade and the files
department?is also subordinate to the SOP. Finally,
four smaller commands?Inspector General, General
Counsel, Interpol, and the International Immigration
Police?re ort directly to the director and his staff.
Since 1973, however, the agency's functions have
narrowed considerably, according to US officials.
Prior to the coup, the Investigations Police had prima-
ry responsibility for intelligence and internal security,
including counterterrorism and foreign counterintelli-
gence?President Salvador Allende, for example,
relied on it heavily as a secret police force. The agency
now shares these functions with the National Infor-
mation Center (CNI), which, in our view, is increas-
ingly overshadowing Investigations Police in the cru-
cial counterterrorism field. Its main duties include
investigating major crimes such as narcotics traffick-
ing, murder, customs and maritime violations, and
serving as Chile's immigration police.
15
Recruitment and Training
The Investigations Police recruit openly in the media,
according to US officials. US officials report that
candidates must have a high school education and are
generally from the lower middle class. The press has
reported, however, that Pinochet in recent years has
detailed a substantial number of CNI and Army
intelligence officers to serve in the Investigations
Police. We believe this reflects the President's interest
in staffing the security services with politically reli-
able officers rather than any recruitment shortfalls in
the agency.
The Investigations Police operates a large academy on
the outskirts of Santiago that all recruits attend for a
year. US police officials familiar with the organiza-
tion say recruits leave the academy well schooled in
Chilean military, constitutional, and criminal law;
investigative techniques; and police administration.
The agency augments this training by sending select-
ed graduates and experienced officers to the CNI's
intelligence school. Because of the rise in terrorism
over the past four years, a substantial number of
Investigations officers now attend the Army's Special
Forces School for advanced combat and counterter-
rorist training, according to US officials.
Pay, Funding, and Corruption
Although data are sparse, US officials believe the pay
of the Investigations Police on average is probably
somewhat better than the Carabineros; indeed, we
have no indications of serious dissatisfaction in the
ranks as a result of low pay. As with the uniformed
police, the benefits structure compensates to some
degree for the low remuneration. Investigations offi-
cers and their families receive 80-percent health care
coverage for medicines, eye care, and dentistry, and
full coverage for professional attention at the Carabi-
nero hospital. They also are entitled to low-cost
housing loans. After 20 years of service they can retire
with a monthly pension of 70 percent of base pay.
Finally, we suspect that many Investigations agents
make ends meet by supplementing their income illicit-
ly. In sharp contrast to the Carabineros, US officials
report, the service suffers from serious corruption and
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Figure 10
Organization of the Investigations Police
Director
General
j Police
I Services
Subdirectorate
Special
Operations
Prefecture
j Inspector
, General
Intelligence
Brigade
International-
Immigration
' Police
Geographical
Police
Zones
Archives
Department
General
Counsel
Police Services
Support
Command
Interpol
_11
Narcotics Technical
Department Support
Department
Statistics
Department
Crime
Lab
Administrative
Subdirectorate
lacks popular respect and trust.
Narcotics-related corruption appears to be a major
problem in the highest levels of the organization. At
present, Chile is not afflicted with a high incidence of
narcotics abuse or illicit drug production, although it
serves as a transit route for traffickers transporting
cocaine from Bolivia to Argentina and Europe. US
Secret
0-42-4 314258 9-87
officials report, however, that senior officials in the
Investigations Police have either turned a blind eye to
the transit activities or actually shielded them. In
1985, Washington made a demarche to the regime,
charging that numerous top officers of the Investiga-
tions Police, including the deputy of operations, were
receiving payoffs from drug traffickers. The force
removed two of the officials named, but
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Figure 11. Investigations Police station in
Valdivia, Chile
narcotics-related corrup-
tion remains rampant and continues to be tolerated by
the director.
We believe that lack of discontent over money matters
also reflects the service's generally adequate funding
levels. The Investigations Police have a far higher per
capita annual expenditure than the Carabineros?
$6,000 and $4,000, respectively. We believe this
difference is probably explained by the close personal
and political ties between Pinochet and the agency's
Director, Gen. Fernando Paredes, as opposed to the
increasingly antagonistic relationship between the
President and Carabinero chief Stange.
Operational Effectiveness
FBI agents?who have official liaison contacts with
Investigations officers?report that they are generally
competent. They appear adept at investigating, fol-
lowing up leads, and setting up informant networks.
US officials assert that the service's crime laboratory
is the best in Chile and perhaps the region, excelling
particularly in arson investigations.
the force often resorts to
violent, if effective, techniques to track down crimi-
nals and terrorists. They frequently use intimidation
and blackmail in order to obtain and manage infor-
mants, and utilize physical and psychological torture
much more commonly than the Carabineros.
17
Figure 12. Investigations Police at the scene of
murder of an officer by terrorists
In practice, the Investigations Police have taken a
backseat to the CNI in the antiterrorist struggle over
the last decade, even though they are empowered to
investigate terrorist acts. In 1986, however, they
achieved a notable success by nabbing five of the
individuals involved in the September 1986 attempt
on President Pinochet's life. According to US offi-
cials, Investigative Police technicians lifted a finger-
print from a beer can at the site of the assassination
attempt, and, by a painstaking manual search of their
files, identified the suspect and arrested him. Subse-
quent interrogation led to the arrest of four others.
Political Attitudes
US officials report that, unlike the Carabineros, the
Investigations Police appear to solidly support the
Pinochet regime. Director Paredes is a longtime crony
of Pinochet and is beholden to the President for his
status and wealth. Paredes, a hardline supporter of
Pinochet's continued rule, has surrounded himself
with a like-minded staff that has no qualms about
using the service to harass regime opponents and help
Pinochet remain in power after 1989. According to
the US Embassy, the Investigations Police actively
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Gen. (ret.) Fernando
Paredes Pizarro
Director General, Investiga-
tions Police (since August 1980)
Former Army Gen. Fernando Paredes, who is report-
edly close to President Augusto Pinochet, shares
Pinochet 's hardline views on many issues, including
political dissent and international Communism. For
example, in the past
Paredes has favored punishing military officers who
openly disagreed with official policies, expelling for-
eign priests involved in antigovernment activities, and
banishing students and professors who took part in
antiregime protests. He has repeatedly in public
accused the Soviet Union of sponsoring protests and
has charged Cuban President Fidel Castro with
promoting Chilean terrorism, including the Septem-
ber 1986 attack on Pinochet.
Paredes has a mixed record as head of the Investiga-
tions Police. Named by Pinochet to head the service
at a time when its detectives had been implicated in a
wave of kidnapings of suspected leftists, he marginal-
ly improved the service's image by signing an agree-
ment allowing officials of the International Red
Cross access to detainees. Furthermore, he has im-
proved the service's crime-fighting capability by up-
grading training and introducing modern technology.
However, US diplomats distrust and avoid dealing
with Paredes, who they say has ignored corruption
and refused to dismiss some high-level police officials
who have been protecting drug traffickers.
propagandize for the regime. For example, the organi-
zation recently released its own polls that purport to
prove that Pinochet's popular backing has reached 44
percent of the population. To offset the boost in
prestige that the Church?frequently critical of Pino-
chet?received from the highly successful papal visit
in April 1987, the Investigations Police released cal-
culations on the size of the popular turnout, claiming
Secret
it was much lower than the numbers given by reli-
gious officials. Finally, US officials report that the
service is intimidating government workers suspected
of disloyalty to Pinochet and forcing all employees to
sign documents in support of the President's reelection
bid.
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The National Information Center
The National Information Center (CNI) replaced the
National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA) in 1977
as Chile's principal intelligence agency. The govern-
ment abolished DINA following revelations about its
involvement in the murder of former Foreign Minister
Orlando Letelier in Washington the previous year.
Because of the domestic and international political
fallout from DINA's notorious activities, the junta
restricted the arrest and detention powers of its
successor, but still gave the CNI overall responsibility
for national security and VIP protection.
Organization
Legally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior,
the 2,000- to 2,500-man CNI has two principal
officers, the director and assistant director. The Chief
of Staff for Intelligence supervises the director's
personal staff, the elite antiterrorist unit, and the
center's analytical section. The highly secretive anti-
terrorist unit has a complement of about 100 men,
stationed in Santiago, divided into 10 patrols each
headed by a lieutenant. The analysts?military and
civilian experts divided into internal, foreign, political,
and economic intelligence units?prepare daily and
long-term studies for President Pinochet.
the assistant director
directly supervises the head of the Internal Security
Brigade who supervises the operations department,
the national intelligence school, and the Joint Infor-
mation Center?the clearinghouse for all communica-
tions from regional units and other armed forces
institutions. The CNI is divided into six geographical
and functional divisions which carry out the basic
intelligence collection and security activities:
? Metropolitan Division. Responsible for the greater
Santiago area, this division has an assigned strength
of about 200 to 250 men and is divided into six
subunits. The largest?the antisubversive section
commanded by an Army captain?has about 150
officers who track the far left, focusing primarily on
the Moscow-line Communist party and Chile's two
19
terrorist groups, the Movement of the Revolution-
ary Left (MIR) and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriot-
ic Front (FPMR). Highly trained volunteers from
each section form a special team?equivalent to a
US police force special weapons and tactics team
(SWAT)?used in dangerous arrest situations. The
five other units?each with about 15 members?
monitor the activities of nonviolent groups, includ-
ing the Catholic Church and its human rights
affiliate the Vicariate of Solidarity, moderate polit-
ical parties, labor unions, and student
organizations.
? Regional Division. This division?with about 800
members assigned to 15 geographical sections?
performs similar duties outside the Santiago metro-
politan area.
? Foreign Intelligence Division. Located in Santiago,
this division manages about 80 officers involved in
foreign intelligence collection. US officials report
that the CNI stations about 12 to 14 officers
overseas, primarily in neighboring countries.
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? Psycho-Political Division. Headquartered in Santi-
ago, this unit is responsible for propaganda activi-
ties. The command monitors the opposition press,
plants progovernment stories in the news media, and 25X1
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opposition. 25X1
? Technical Support Division. The telephone inter-
cept and telecommunications sections target the
communications of domestic opponents and foreign
embassies and monitor foreign antiregime broad-
casts into Chile. The television and photography
section provides a wide range of photographic and
television support functions to other operational
components, including photographic support for the
President's security detail. The explosives operation
section has about 25 personnel divided into two
detachments: a conventional bomb disposal squad
and a subunit that determines the type, origin, and
manufacture of bombs.
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Figure 13
Organization of the National
Information Center
Director
'
Comptroller
Chief of Staff
for Intelligence
Finance ; Assistant Analytical Antiterrorist
Department Director ' Section i Unit
! I
Personnel
Department
Internal
! Security
' Brigade
Logistics
Department
Operations National Joint
Department Intelligence Information
School Center
Regional Metropolitan
Division Division
Foreign Technical Psycho-Political
Intelligence Support Division
Division Division
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Figure 14. Presidential security team
Que Pam @
? Files and Information Division. This division main-
tains both computerized and manual records on over
1 million individuals?nearly a tenth of Chile's
population?considered to pose a threat or potential
danger to national security. The CNI quickly re-
ceives or sends information to and from regional
offices via a secure microwave telephone system.
Recruitment and Training
that the CNI's staff is
drawn almost exclusively from active duty Army
personnel, although the Center's directors claim the
agency has a large civilian component. According to
the US Embassy, the Air Force pulled its officers out
of the CNI eight years ago and the Carabineros
recently followed suit; the Navy intelligence apparent-
ly still retains a small representation in the agency.
The CNI places great emphasis on the training of its
officers, according to US officials. Although not a line
command, the directorship of the Center's National
Intelligence School is considered one of the most
responsible senior CNI positions. The school's perma-
nent staff of about 30, along with a cadre of contract
specialists, teaches both CNI agents and students
from other security services. US officials report that
the school's standards are fairly rigorous. In addition
to a short intelligence orientation course, officers
attend a five- to six-month basic operations course in
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which they receive technical instruction, classroom
and on-the-street training in trade-craft techniques, as
well as weapons and self-defense courses. Senior
officers usually return for an advanced operations
course and special classes that focus on management
and administration of intelligence operations.
Foreign intelligence organizations and private firms
have played a significant role in the development of
Chilean intelligence officers since the establishment
of DINA in 1974.
Brazilian, French, and Israeli intelligence specialists
have taught at the intelligence school.
Training for the CNI's antiterrorist unit is extensive
and excellent, according to US officials. Regular
training consists of daily calisthenics, sports, karate,
and hand-to-hand combat with the "corvo," a native
fighting knife. Members also undergo day and night
marches, survival training, infiltration into and exfil-
tration from enemy territory, resistance to interroga-
tion, and weekly parachute jumps. The unit holds
monthly simulated field exercises in hostage rescue
techniques.
Salaries, Funding, and Equipment
Pinochet has been generous to the CNI, which he
rightly considers one of the bulwarks of his regime.
US officials report that regular middle-grade Army
officers are unhappy about low pay?a captain makes
roughly $400 dollars a month?and often moonlight
to supplement their salaries. Officers detailed to the
CNI, however, are much better off financially: they
receive a 50-percent increase to their base pay, prefer-
ential housing, and an operational expense account.
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Terrorist Organizations in Chile
In the decade following the 1973 coup, the Castroite
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was the
only significant terrorist group in Chile. A few hun-
dred MIR members, supplied and trained by Cuba,
kept alive the minimal armed resistance to Pinochet
in the late 1970s, carrying out isolated bombings,
bank robberies, and attacks on policemen. In the
early 1980s, however, the MIR upped the ante in the
struggle against the Pinochet regime by assassinating
the mayor of Santiago and a high-level Army intelli-
gence officer and seriously wounding a Supreme
Court justice. In the last five years, however, infight-
ing and successful penetrations by the security ser-
vices have seriously debilitated the MIR, leading its
leaders to almost cease activities.
In September 1980, the Communist Party of Chile
(PCCh), the largest and best organized far-left group
in the country, announced a strategy of "armed
struggle" against the Pinochet regime. Over the past
four years the PCCh has carried out recruitment
drives, enlarged its clandestine wing, built up its
military apparatus, expanded indoctrination of the
rank and file, and systematically tried to broaden the
party's appeal, especially in the slum areas ringing
Santiago and other cities. In 1983 the PCCh support-
ed the creation of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front (FPMR), which has committed the lion's share
of subversive acts in the past four years, including the
assassination attempt on Pinochet.
the MIR 's militant cadre at about 200 to
300 in country and a few hundred more overseas.
he FPMR,
has grown from only a few dozen
militants at its inception to 1,500 to 2,000 at present.
Originally the FPMR drew a significant percentage of
its membership from non-Communist radical leftist
groups, including renegade MIR members. In the last
two years, however, members of the PCCh 's militant
wing have displaced many of these leftists as the
party has attempted to bring the FPMR fully under
its control.
We believe that the Communists and the FPMR are
committed to a long-term strategy of promoting an
insurgency in Chile, aimed at overthrowing the Pino-
chet regime and establishing a Sandinista-type gov-
ernment under their control.
9r/or to mid-I986
the PCCh was content to wait until at least
I989?when Pinochet 's term ends?to begin insurrec-
tion. We believe the party calculated that by then
Pinochet 's insistence on retaining power would have
so antagonized popular opinion and discredited the
moderate opposition that other political groups
would recognize the Communists' advocacy of armed
struggle as the only viable option against Pinochet.
The arms caches and the assassination attempt,
however, suggest that at least some elements in the
PCCh and the FPMR wanted to speed up the timeta-
ble for launching an insurrection.
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We believe, however, that the Communists and the
FPMR lack the capability to mount an insurrection
in the next two years. The discovery of the arms
caches and the failed assassination attempt, in our
judgment, have put the Communists on the defensive.
Press reports indicate that the public opposes terror-
ism and Communist-led protests. Moreover, moder-
ate opposition parties want to avoid even the appear-
ance of cooperating with the far left, and, in our view,
improving economic conditions have dampened pros-
pects for Communist agitators to capitalize on social
discontent to foment unrest. In our view, even Com-
munist leaders probably believe that their prospects
for mounting an insurrection before the early 1990s
are poor. Communist leaders are emphasizing the
PCC/I's so-called political line and are trying to
cultivate the moderate opposition, while playing
down the military option even to the party rank and
file.
In our view, however, the far left is planning to
increase significantly the level of violence in the near
future. We believe that the PCCh?which has a
demonstrated ability to learn from its mistakes,
improve security, and rebound?can withstand the
security services' intensive antiterrorist operations.
Last summer the FPMR stepped up bank robberies,
bombings, and assaults on police officers despite the
casualties they suffered from the security services.
the FPMR and the
PCCh are pressing forward with recruitment despite
recent losses. Even though the FPMR and the Com-
munist party probably cannot mount an insurgency
any time soon, we believe they will keep pressing the
increasing& burdened security structure and continue
to pose a threat to any transition formula worked out
by the moderates and the military. A rapid escalation
of violent activity?in particular a series of coordi-
nated assaults on senior officials?could overtax the
security services and provoke them into a harsh
crackdown that could undermine chances for a peace-
ful transition.
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These benefits?along with the high degree of integri-
ty prevalent in the Chilean Army?have precluded
the development within the CNI of the systematic and
widespread corruption that characterizes the Investi-
gations Police.'
Pinochet's largess is also reflected in the CNI's
funding and equipment,
US officials report
that the CNI's technical and communications equip-
ment is first rate and that the agency has systemati-
cally upgraded the nationwide secure microwave tele-
communications network installed by DINA in 1976.
Professionalism and Operational Effectiveness
The CNI performs effectively, monitoring?and at
times intimidating?both the moderate opposition and
radical leftist groups. We believe that the agency's
counterterrorist record, to date somewhat mixed, is
improving.
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The CNI is well informed on the activities of the
major moderate opposition groups. According to US
officials, it regularly uses telephone taps, surveillance, 25X1
and a well-developed informant network to keep tabs
on the moderate parties, the church, and the unions.
The only serious financial scandal that has touched the CNI was
the involvement of two officers in a bank robbery and murder in
1981 in northern Chile. Following an internal investigation, mili-
tary courts convicted?and later executed?a regional director and
another officer for the crime. The CNI intensified background
checks on all its personnel following the incident; these checks have
helped prevent similar occurrences.
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Figure 15. Terrorists of the Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front
The agency has detailed knowledge on the inner
workings and deliberations of the moderate opposition
parties. This information has enabled the regime to
tailor propaganda to exploit internal dissension in the
parties, formulate strategy to counter the moderates'
political tactics, and often harass and arrest demo-
cratic opposition figures.
The CNI has also played a significant role in stifling
labor unrest and popular protests. Its extensive net-
work in the labor sector has allowed the regime to
keep a tight rein on union activity. US officials report
that the CNI frequently counters antigovernment
demonstrations by planting agents in their midst to
disrupt the activities. Moreover, US officials report
that CNI thugs, posing as progovernment counter-
demonstrators, frequently attack and beat protesters.
Finally, the CNI uses threats and physical intimida-
tion to secure informants in the lower-class neighbor-
hoods where the most violent protests generally occur.
While it has done well in controlling the moderate
opposition and helped stifle public protests, the
CNI?Chile's principal counterterrorist agency?has
performed in only a mixed fashion against the violent
left. The Center, according to US officials, has been
plagued by large gaps in knowledge of the plans and
operational procedures of the Communist party and
its terrorist affiliate, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front (FPMR). For example, the CNI reportedly was
Secret
surprised and embarrassed by the discovery in August
1986 of the huge Cuban-supplied arms caches.
The CNI?by statute responsible for VIP security?
also has a spotty record in protecting high-level
officials from terrorist assaults; it has failed to obtain
reliable information on terrorist targeting of senior
officials and has been remiss in security procedures.
In late 1981, terrorists seriously wounded the chief
justice of the Supreme Court and in late 1983 mur-
dered the mayor of Santiago, a high-ranking military
officer. Even the officers detailed to presidential
security have been guilty of poor security practices.
only an alert driver
and armor plating on the presidential vehicles saved
Pinochet's life in the 1986 assassination attempt.
Finally, the CNI?we believe acting on Pinochet's
orders?has not hesitated to engage in death squad
activity.
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Figure 16. Presidential escort car destroyed in
assassination attempt 7 September 1986
Secret
Brig. Gen. Hugo Salas Wenzel
Director, National Information Center (CNI) (since December
1986)
Gen. Hugo Salas Wenzel owes his current position to
his predecessor, current Army junta member Gen.
Humberto Gordon, under whom he served as CNI
deputy director during 1984-86. He apparently still
defers to Gordon, who,I
still controls the CNL
s a hardline sup-
porter of President Augusto Pinochet and a staunch
anti-Communist. They say he is very well disposed
toward the United States.
Political Attitudes and Sunnort for the Regime
Disquiet is growing in both the middle and
senior ranks of the Army about Pinochet's plans to
remain in office after 1989. Since CNI assignments
are directed, we suspect that some of the Center's
officers may reflect that disquiet as well. We believe,
however, that, given the pay differential CNI officers
receive and the political vetting to which they are
doubtless subjected, loyalty to the regime is probably
more militant than within the Army as a whole.
By all accounts Pinochet closely controls CNI opera-
tions and has effectively turned the Center into a
personal police force that hounds his political enemies.
The US Embassy reports that the Vicariate of Soli-
darity, the Catholic Church's human rights group for
which Pinochet has a particular aversion, is constantly
under surveillance and has had its offices burglarized,
probably by the CNI. Last year ruffians, probably
CNI officers, beat up employees and ransacked the
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as deputy director of the CNI, Salas met with
officials of the Communist and Christian Democratic
Parties to discuss the political situation; he almost
certainly informed Pinochet of those talks.
Salas Wenzel was born on 3 October 1935. He
graduated from the Military Academy as an infantry
officer in 1952. He has been commander of the
Rancagua regiment in Arica (northern Chile); in the
Army Intelligence Directorate (1973); guest instructor
at the US Army School of the Americas, Canal Zone
(1973-74); commander, Army Intelligence Corps
(1975-76); vice director of the Enlisted Officers
School; director of the Military Academy (1979-81 ;
and military attache to Argentina (1982-83).
offices of the Intergovernmental Committee for Mi-
gration, an international organization that assists
exiles and has been criticized openly by the regime.
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More recently, the agency has been supporting Pino-
chet's efforts to bolster his chances for winning the
presidential plebiscite and remaining in power after
1989. The regime is using the CNI to funnel money to
the hitherto minuscule ultrarightist party National
Advance (AN), which has now become the primary
political vehicle for Pinochet's plebiscite campaign.
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The Military's Role in Internal Security
During most of the Pinochet regime's tenure the
military has played a backup role to the Carabineros,
the Investigations Police, and the CNI in maintaining
internal security. The military intelligence agencies?
chiefly the Army service?have to some degree moni-
tored the opposition, but have focused most of their
attention on intraservice security and overseas intelli-
gence operations. Military units have also traditional-
ly assisted the Carabineros in patrolling the border
and the shoreline. The serious rise in antiregime
activity in the last four years, however, has led
Pinochet to turn more frequently to the military,
especially the Army, to counter opposition to his
continued rule.
Intelligence Functions
The three military branches have intelligence services
that operate domestically and abroad, independent of
the CNI. they are
smaller, less well equipped, and, in most respects, less
effective than the principal security services:
? Army Intelligence. The Army has reduced the size
of its Directorate of Intelligence from 500 to 127
staffers over the past two years, probably to
strengthen the CNI. While the Directorate's small
operations section seeks to obtain military intelli-
gence on potential foreign enemies, such as Peru
and Argentina, it focuses primarily on countering
leftist attempts to infiltrate the Army and on moni-
toring the political leanings of both officers and
troops.
? Air Force Intelligence. The Air Force Directorate
of Intelligence has a complement of about 100
officers and enlisted men who mainly carry out
intelligence collection and operations against Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, and Peru.
? Naval Intelligence Service. The smallest of the
military intelligence services, it focuses almost en-
tirely on naval developments in Peru and Argentina,
and on movements of Soviet Bloc and Cuban naval
and commercial fishing fleets in the area
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Figure 17. Army troops patrolling slums during
July 1986 protests
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Counterterrorist and Internal Security Roles
Since antiregime protest and violence erupted four
years ago, Pinochet has often deployed military units 25X1
to quell riots and combat terrorism. In the spring and
summer of 1983, he called out Army and Air Force
units to suppress?often with considerable blood-
shed?the monthly demonstrations and strikes mount-
ed by labor and the political parties. During 1985 the 25X1
regime deployed troops to intimidate protesters and
conduct security sweeps of Santiago's lower-class
neighborhoods. In May 1986, Pinochet shocked the
public, and even many government and police offi-
cials, according to the US Embassy and the press, by
blanketing Santiago with soldiers to prevent demon-
strations during the meeting of the Latin American
parliamentary congress and by supplementing the
police with regular Army units during the general
strike in July of that year. Finally, the regime has also
expanded the Army's role in patrolling the Argentine
border to intercept an alleged influx of leftist subver-
sives and arms, and has detailed more troops to guard
vital bridges, power plants, factories, and other poten-
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Increasingly concerned about the security services'
ability to control dissent, Pinochet, in our view, has
slowly shifted the Army's traditional focus on the
external threat from Argentina and Peru to an em-
phasis on internal security.
last year Pinochet ordered stepped-up
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counterguerrilla, commando, intelligence, and demoli-
tions training for regular Army units. In early 1986,
Vice Commander of the Army Sinclair?closely iden-
tified with the notion that the Army must concentrate
on the enemy within?created so-called Basic Anti-
subversive Units in all major Army commands to
complement the Carabineros' riot control functions.
Pinochet also has formed special units drawn from
regular Army commands to carry out intelligence
functions and, at times, to eliminate political oppo-
nents. A paramilitary Army unit assisted by the CNI,
for example, was responsible for the murder of three
Communists in 1985.
Pinochet, however, has drawn criticism from within
the services for the military's stepped-up internal
security role. senior and
middle-grade Air Force officers, for example, have
strongly opposed the use of their units in security
sweeps and crowd control. In late August 1983,
following the killing of a dozen protesters by poorly
trained Army draftees, senior Army generals com-
plained directly to Pinochet about the use of their
troo for .olice functions.
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