NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300760001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Intelligence
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Near East and
South Asia Review
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NESA NESAR 86-006
28 Fe',-uarv 1986
cony: 3 2 7
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Despite poor health, Ayatollah Khomeini played a key role in the
past year, balancing radicals and conservatives in the choice of
president, prime minister, and Cabinet. Majles Speaker Rafsanjani
exploited the infighting during this period to strengthen his position
and will consolidate his nower as Khomeini's health deteriorates.
Israel: Leadership t IntensifieI
The Likud Bloc's dominant Herut Party continues to be wracked by
serious infighting over the mantle of leadership once held by Herut
founder Menachem Begin. The intense maneuvering has fed a
growing public sense that Herut's leadership crisis seriously
threatens Likud's ability to govern and could split the party
The proliferation of illegitimate radio and television stations in
Lebanon is intensifying animosities among the country's rival
militias as clandestine media spread rumors and disinformation
designed to undermine the credibility of political opponents and seek
to reinforce internal factional cohesion.
Libya has sporadically provided funding, arms, training, and
safehaven to most of the radical factions of the Palestinian
movement since the mid-1970s, and Tripoli and the Palestinians are
probably assessing each other's capabilities and intentions carefully,
with an eye to determining whether closer ties are warranted. F
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-006
28 February 1986
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King Hassan's expectations.
Morocco and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain close ties based on
mutual interests even though the amount of Saudi aid has decreased
and the disbursement of the funding has been erratic and less than
beyond his support network
factors
Suwar
Suwar El Dahab's display of reluctance in the face of political
opportunity results from a combination of cultural and personal
Purchase of Italian Refinery
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Libya: Lobbying for Arab Largess
authors,
23
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
Secret ii
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Israel: Leadership Struggle
in Herut Intensifies
The Likud Bloc's dominant Herut Party continues to
be wracked by serious infighting over the mantle of
leadership once held by Herut founder Menachem
Begin. Each of the rivals-Yitzhak Shamir, David
Levi, and Ariel Sharon-has sought to manipulate
preparations for the party's national convention in
early March to enhance his hold over the party, but
no one has gained a decisive advantage. The intense
maneuvering has fed a growing public sense that
Herut's leadership crisis seriously threatens Likud's
ability to deal with national political events and, over
the long term, could split the party.F_~
Shamir's Tenuous Leadership
Vice Prime Minister Shamir maintains only a shaky
hold on the leadership of Herut, which he inherited
from Begin more than two years ago. Begin never
formally designated his successor, always insisting
that Herut would choose its next leader
democratically. After he joined the party in 1969,
Shamir was considered to be among the front-runners,
although most Israeli pundits believed he would be
only an interim leader until a younger Herut figure
could take overt
Shamir has made clear, however, that he does not
view himself as an interim chief. He has relied on the
support of the party's old guard-party veterans and
former underground members-to outmaneuver his
rivals. We believe the old guard has rallied to Shamir
not so much out of personal loyalty, but out of a desire
to scuttle the ambitions of Levi and Sharon. The old
guard, which is heavily Ashkenazi or of Central and
East European descent, is loath to hand the party over
to Levi, who is a Sephardi or of Middle Eastern
origin, because of longstanding anti-Sephardi
prejudices. Nor does the old guard wish to see Sharon
take over, given his obstreperousness and role in
planning and implementing the ill-conceived invasion
of Lebanon in 1982, which precipitated Begin's
resignation
Defense Minister Arens, who has no group of
supporters in the party, but who is respected because
of his reputation for honesty and integrity. Arens has
agreed with Shamir on most party matters, and he
probably hopes that their alliance will strengthen his
candidacy if he decides to contest Levi and Sharon for
the party leadership after Shamir retires.
Shamir's political acumen has been tested in recent
months as he has sought to assert control of the
scheduling and other arrangements for Herut's
convention-the party's first national gathering since
1979-now set for 9 March. Controlling the
convention is critical for Shamir because it will elect
the party's Central Committee, which in turn will
make the key party decisions for years to come.
During the preparations for the convention, Shamir
has managed to maneuver between Levi and Sharon,
drawing support alternately from one and then the
other, depending on the issue.
The maneuvering erupted into contention in early
January when Shamir's allies on the party's Central
Elections Committee invalidated the memberships of 25X1
over half the 12,000 new members recruited by
supporters of Levi. Levi had hoped to have the new
members added to the party's rolls in time for the
balloting in local party branches to elect the 1,200
delegates to the convention, which would have boosted
Levi's chances for controlling the conclave
Shamir, hoping to isolate Levi further, then tried to
add 400 extra convention delegates-almost all
Shamir supporters. A close adviser to Shamir
explained to US diplomats in Tel Aviv that, as Herut
leader and the party's candidate for the premiership,
Shamir should control an absolute majority at the
convention. According to the US Embassy, Shamir
even offered Sharon 30 percent of the supplemental
list of delegates in return for his cooperation in
cutting Levi out of the action, but Sharon balked at
being part of such blatant convention packing.
In his battle to stave off the challenges from Levi and
Sharon, Shamir has enlisted the aid of former
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NESA NESAR 86-006
28 February 1986
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Despite Sharon's and Levi's opposition, Shamir's
supporters forced his scheme through the Central
Committee, which approved adding 350 delegates to
the convention to be selected by a committee
dominated by Shamir's and Arens's allies from among
youth groups, party veterans, former underground
members, new immigrant organizations, and other
groups. Levi immediately appealed this decision to the
Herut Party court and won a compromise ruling. The
court ruled that Shamir co Id add only 191 new
delegates to the convention
Shamir and Levi, nonetheless, have managed to agree
on postponing the convention three times from its
originally scheduled date in late December 1985.
Shamir presumably believes that the delays will
strengthen the reluctance of the convention to openly
challenge his authority so as not to give Prime
Minister Peres an excuse not to honor the agreement
to turn the premiership over to Likud in October.
Levi Bides His Time
Levi has cooperated with Shamir on postponing the
convention probably because he wishes to avoid-for
the time being at least-an open challenge to Shamir
that would publicly embarrass Herut and damage his
own political prospects. He probably recognizes that
any attempt to undermine Shamir that might prevent
Likud from returning to power in October would not
be popular among the party's old guard-whose
support Levi needs to win control of Herut. He
probably also believes he is better off deferring the
convention than to insist on an early gathering he
could not control
Levi has never tried to hide his ambition-and
expectation-to be Herut's and Likud's next leader.
He hopes to be the first Sephardi prime minister, but
he does not sense any urgency to oust Shamir. He
recognizes that he has broad support among the
party's predominantly Sephardi rank and file, and he
has little interest in a battle with Shamir, whose
control of the party is likely to be temporary. Levi told
the US Ambassador recently that he was looking to
1988 or whenever the next election is held to mount a
major campaign for Herut's leadership.
Levi's opposition to Shamir's efforts to enhance his
control over the party thus stems only in part from
concern that Shamir is trying to prolong his tenure.
We believe Levi is more worried that Shamir is trying
to exclude him from the top position in Herut and
ease the way for Arens to succeed.
To bolster his position, Levi and his supporters have
sought to exploit his strength in trade unions, the
Sephardi-dominated development towns, and at the
party's local branches by raising the specter of his
bolting the party if he is denied an early shot at the
Herut leadership. We do not believe Levi will be
content to be the party's number-two man beyond the
next Knesset election. As a longtime Herut member,
Levi presumably would prefer to remain in the party
fold where he could use the party's organizational
strength to support a bid for the premiership. But,
faced with the prospect of exclusion from the Herut
leadership, Levi might bolt the party and set up a new
Sephardi grouping-or align with an existing one-
taking away a large share of Herut's Sephardi
constituency
Sharon Looks for an Opening
Since the Cabinet crisis in November-in which Peres
tried to force Sharon's ouster from the government
because of his personal attacks on the Prime
Minister-Sharon has been remarkably discreet in
both national and party affairs. Sharon probably did
not intend to precipitate the breakup of the national
unity government in November because he did not
want to be held responsible for hurting Likud's
chances of returning to power. He probably sought to
weaken the government by forcing Shamir to side
with him, thereby undermining the working
relationship between Peres and Shamir and laying the
groundwork for the coalition's eventual dissolution.
He also hoped to strengthen his own party position by
portraying himself as the staunch defender of Herut's
principles.
Sharon's uncharacteristic reticence in recent months
probably stems from his desire to avoid assuming
responsibility for bringing down the government as
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long as there is a chance it may fall on its own accord
or with Peres's help. By this strategy, Sharon can
capitalize on his image as Herut's ideological
defender and, at the same time, score points among
party veterans as a team player and cut into
Shamir's-and Arens's-support. For the same
reason, he has cooperated with Shamir against Levi
element. Implicit in his approach is the recognition
that Herut is courting disaster if its two main camps
cannot be reconciled.
on most convention arrangements
Because his support in the party-only about 20
percent, in our view-is less than Shamir's and Levi's,
Sharon's reasons for self-control are likely to dissipate
the longer the convention is delayed and as the date
for turning over the premiership draws near. He
cannot allow Shamir and Levi time to consolidate
their positions in the party by deferring the
convention or allow Shamir to assume the prime-
ministership without hurting his own leadership
prospects. Thus, he has opposed Levi and Shamir on
postponing the convention, hoping that an early
conclave would boost his own standing
The Ghost of Begin
Herut's inability to sort out its leadership has led
many to look for a "Begin" to restore order. Begin's
name and image have not lost their luster among the
Herut rank and file. The recent television appearance
of his son, Dr. Binyamin Zeev Begin, caused a stir in
the party, leading some Herut faithful to label him
their future leader. US diplomats commented that Dr.
Begin demonstrated the physical appearance, wit, and
savoir faire of a younger Menachem Begin. He knew
what he wanted to say, and he said it well. His main
message was that the two rival camps led by Shamir
and Levi should unite for the benefit of the party. He
also urged Sharon's isolation within the party.
It is uncertain whether Dr. Begin has pretentions to
the Herut leadership vacated by his father. His
television appearance during the runup to the
convention may be merely another variable in an
already confusing Herut equation, but it fostered the
impression that he is preparing to enter politics. For
the time being, he seems to have decided to evoke his
father's name on behalf of Shamir and Levi against
Sharon by recommending the unification of the two
forces that brought the party electoral success in 1977
and 1981-the old guard and the younger Sephardi
As the heir to his father's legacy, he has an advantage
over the other contenders for party leadership if that
is his goal. Or, if Herut's internal squabbling
continues, the younger Begin may find the party 25X1
appealing to him to impose the authority of his
father's name on Herut's unruly house.
Outlook
Although political logic would seem to dictate that
Shamir and his rivals compromise to avoid an internal
explosion in Herut, tensions remain high. Shamir is
likely to try to postpone the party convention at least
until after Labor's convention in April, which is
expected to demonstrate strong support for Peres. He
probably believes that, as the time approaches for him
to assume the premiership, the party faithful will be
less likely to challenge his authority to avoid
jeopardizing Likud's return to power.
His maneuvering, however, may push Sharon and
Levi into an alliance, threatening Shamir's leadership
and endangering Likud's partnership with Labor in
the government coalition. Peres may be tempted to
cite the blatant leadership problems in Likud as an
excuse for not turning over the premiership to Shamir
in October. Sharon's behavior over the next several
months will be critical in this regard because he has
the most to lose from Shamir's becoming prime
minister. Sharon would be much better served by
having Likud enter the opposition so that he could
assert his own leadership from the position where he
operates best-on the attack from the outside.
Over the longer term, the leadership crisis in Herut-
reminiscent of the crisis Labor experienced while out
of office from 1977 through 1984-could erode the
party's support and hurt its electoral prospects.
Prolonged animosity between the rival leaders,
moreover, could eventually split the party.__~
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Lebanon:
The Propaganda War
The proliferation of illegitimate radio and television
stations in Lebanon is intensifying animosities among
the country's rival militias. In the face of the
government's helplessness, the clandestine media
thrive on spreading rumors and disinformation
designed to undermine the credibility of political
opponents but also seek to reinforce internal factional
cohesion. The confusion in the media is symptomatic
of the disarray that has characterized Lebanon since
the beginning of the civil war in 1975.
and accomplishments of the enemy. Disinformation
campaigns, which are common, are the main source of
rumors among the Lebanese population.
The Lebanese, however, have been hardened by their
civil war experiences and view factional propaganda
with considerable skepticism. Thus, propaganda has
only a limited effect, since it generally reinforces
rather than weakens the bonds between leaders and
followers on both sides of the fence. The result is
increasing polarization.
The broadcasts by the various factions are a mix of
propaganda and reporting in which everyone claims to
speak in the name of freedom, legitimacy, democracy,
justice, peaceful coexistence, and nonsectarianism.
During periods of acute tension, propaganda messages
compound the mistrust and hatred among the various
groups and create a climate of fear, which often
complicates cease-fire negotiations and leads to
renewed fighting.
The factional militias have found it expedient to
switch to psychological warfare to intimidate and
demoralize one another. Broadcasting stations are
favorite targets for terrorism and artillery shelling.
Programing is subject to the patronage of the
dominant local militia. Stories that the shrinking
official media consider too inflammatory or likely to
incite factional fighting are quickly aired by the
illegitimate media in open defiance of government
authority.
The mushrooming of private radio and television
stations has also depressed government revenues, as
some stations have begun introducing commercials
into their programs. According to press reports, the
Lebanese Government is apprehensive about the loss
of advertising revenues and blames the illegal media
for the sharp dip in such revenues in 1984-85.
Propaganda employed by the Lebanese antagonists
often conceal the sources of information, attempt to
exaggerate the military or political prowess of the
original initiator, and attempt to discredit the goals
Secret Wars: Spreading Lies About Your Foes
Propaganda attacks appear to increase with the level
of fighting between the rival militias but remain high
even when there is a lull in the fighting. There is a
continuing propaganda war between the two principal
Christian radio stations-the Voice of Lebanon and
Radio Free Lebanon- and the radio station of the
Druze militia, the Voice of the Mountain. Beirut
Domestic Service, the only remaining government
radio station but currently under Shia Amal control
because of its location in West Beirut, is locked in a
similar war with the Voice of Hope, the radio station
operated by the Army of South Lebanon under Israeli
supervision. Beirut Domestic Service is considered by
most Lebanese as neutral except when it reports on
issues dealing with South Lebanon-an area of major
concern to Amal.
The unofficial Christian media often put out stories
reflecting heightened tensions between the Druze and
the Shias. A recent Radio Free Lebanon broadcast
stated that a high-ranking Shia official was ambushed
by Druze gunmen on the coastal highway while on his
way to the south. The Voice of the Mountain
promptly responded, calling the broadcast the work of
"suspect radios broadcasting tendentious rumors and
seeking to spread confusion and sedition." In another
case, the Voice of Lebanon reported heavy clashes
between Shia Amal militia and combined Hizballah,
Palestinian, and Lebanese Communist Party
Secret
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Voice of Hope. Mouthpiece of Army of South
Lebanon. Closely aligned with Israel and run by the
fundamentalist Christian Broadcasting Network.
Also operates the Middle East television station from
Mari Uyun. Vehemently anti-Syrian and anti-
Iranian. Claims to be nonpolitical. Funded by
Christian groups and individuals.
Voice of Lebanon. Currently under Christian
Phalange control; loyal to President Gemayel. Also
operates Channel 11 television station and the Voice
of Right and Dignity. Notorious for broadcasting
false reports.
Ihdin Free and Unified Lebanon. Former President
Suleiman Frangieh's radio station in the Zgharta
region in northern Lebanon. Sometimes represents
Syrian perspective on Lebanese events.
Islamic Unification Radio. The former radio station
of Shaykh Said Sha'ban in Tripoli. Represents
Iranian views and other radical fundamentalist
ideologies. May now be under Syrian control.
Voice of the Mina. Radio station under one of the
Islamic Unification leaders, Shaykh Hisham
Minqara in Tripoli. Anti-Syrian and pro-Islamic
fundamentalism. May now be under Syrian control.
Lebanon Broadcasting Company. The quasi-
governmental television establishment whose
channels-2, 4, 7, 9, and 11-are often pirated by the
illegal media.
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation. The television
center for the Christian militia of Samir Ja Ja,
located in East Beirut. Also controls Radio Free
Lebanon and has inaugurated a new radio station, the
Voice of the Lebanese Forces.
militiamen. Beirut Domestic Service responded by
reading an official Amal statement denying that these
clashes took place.
Spreading rumors to increase tensions in their
opponent's camp is also practiced by the Voice of the
Mountain, especially against President Gemayel and
the Christian militias. The Druze radio station often
resorts to name calling, referring to Gemayel as the
"Somoza of Ba'bda" and labeling the Christian
militias as separatists, while praising militia forces
opposed to the Christians as nationalists. When the
so-called Flag war flared up last November between
the Druze and the Shia militias loyal to Amal, the
Christian media quickly seized the opportunity to
widen the hostilities betweeen the two former allies
with exaggerated stories of Druze and Shia massacres
and atrocities.
Voice of the Syriacs. A Christian radio station
located in the Christian enclave. Claims to be
nonpolitical and designed to represent the Syriac
culture from which former Christian militia
commander Fadi Fram emerged.
Voice of the Mountain. The Druze radio station in
the Shuf region under the control of Walid Jumblatt.
Anti-Christian militia and often attacks President
Gemayel. Will soon begin television broadcasting.
A Propaganda Case Study: Hubayqa Versus Ja'Ja
The propaganda war is so important to the political
survival of the various factions that it occasionally is
employed to win internal factional power struggles. In
January 1986 Elie Hubayqa, former commander of
the Christian militia, in a bid to consolidate his grip
on the Christian community following his signing of
the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Accord directed all
the media under his control to attack his political
rivals Samir Ja'Ja and President Gemayel. The Voice
of Lebanon, which was under Hubayqa's control,
found itself in direct confrontation with Radio Free
Lebanon, controlled by Ja'Ja.
The newly emerging Christian factions had earlier
wrested control of most media inside the Christian
enclave from the wing of the Phalange Party
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Lebanon's Clandestine Radio and Television Stations (continued)
Beirut Domestic Service. Lebanon's official radio
station now under the control of the Amal militia in
West Beirut. Anti-Voice of Hope and primarily anti-
Israeli. Has provided surprisingly evenhanded
coverage, but continues to exaggerate Lebanese
guerrilla successes against Israel and the Army of
South Lebanon.
Voice of Arab Lebanon. Mouthpiece of the pro-
Nasirite Sunni militia, Al Murabitun. Broadcasts
from a mosque in West Beirut and will soon begin
operating a television station.
Voice of the Homeland. Sunni station of the
moderate philanthropic foundation Al Maqasid in
West Beirut. Its director is Tamam Salam.
Advocates continued amicable relations with
traditional Christians.
Voice of the South. Set up by Israel to overcome the
propaganda fallout from Israel's repression of Shia
guerrilla warfare in the south. Broadcasts counter
Amal, Hizballah, and Syrian messages dealing with
suicide, martyrdom, and heroism.
Voice of the Armenians. Represents the views of the
leftist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA).
Voice of Heaven-The Armenian Radio Station of
Lebanon. Status quo station, anti-ASALA, and
mouthpiece of the Dashnak Party.
Voice of the Islamic Revolution. A Hizballah-run
station in Balabakk, supported by Iran. Calls for
Islamic revolution and broadcasts radical religious
messages and slogans. Anti-US and anti-Israel.
Voice ofArab Revolution-The Voice of National
Resistance. Newly inaugurated station directed
against Israel and Army of South Lebanon. Believed
to be financed by Syria but operated by group of
Lebanese Shias, Communists, and Syrian National
Socialists. a
a Syria is encouraging former Christian militia leader Elie
Hubayqa to set up a radio station beamed at the Christian
community from the Natn region.
traditionally loyal to the Gemayel family. At the
outbreak of hostilities on 13 January, Hubayqa
controlled the Voice of Lebanon, the major Christian
television station, the Lebanese Broadcasting
Corporation, the Al Amal Phalange newspaper, and a
daily newspaper called Al Jumhuriah. Ja'Ja
controlled Radio Free Lebanon and the Al Masira
magazine. Al Amal was forced to suspend
publication, and its offices in East Beirut were soon
occupied and subsequently ransacked by Hubayqa's
supporters. Issues of Al Masira opposed to the
Tripartite Accord were confiscated on Hubayqa's
orders.
As the fighting among the Christians intensified, so
did the propaganda war. Hubayqa took to the air first,
claiming he was forced to move against Ja'Ja and
Gemayel for security reasons. His real motives had
more to do with his belief that Gemayel and Ja'Ja
masterminded a failed assassination attempt against
him on 31 December. The Voice of Lebanon
described Hubayqa's opponents as "highwaymen and
felons." Hubayqa's operation, commented the radio,
was designed to "ensure the safe movement on the
main roads of all citizens ... from agitators, hirelings,
and payday gunmen.... The responsibility for the
situation must be borne by the `Man of the Palace'
(Gemayel).
Outsiders quickly sought to inflame the Christian
quarreling. Beirut Domestic Service, under Amal
influence, broadcast rumors and false reports to
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increase Christian suspicions, such as claims that
Israeli gunboats had attacked Hubayqa's
headquarters in Karantina. Similarly, Baghdad's
Voice of the PLO falsely reported that Hubayqa was
killed in a gun battle on 15 January. The Druze Voice
of the Mountain claimed that Gemayel and Ja'Ja's
forces were taking advantage of the fighting by
executing kidnaped Lebanese that were being held in
the Christian militia's barracks.
Addressing his Christian constituency, Ja'Ja stated
that "remaining silent now means collusion against
you, every child, old person, man and woman, and
even crime against our values, principles, and future."
The Voice of the Mountain attacked Gemayel by
stating that "choosing between the emperor and his
interests and whims or the interests of the homeland,
the nationalist forces have adopted the national option
out of their commitment to the agreement supported
by Damascus. When the Somoza crimes became
intolerable, the nationalist forces attacked his
stronghold in Bikfaya and the eastern areas." Radio
Free Lebanon responded by announcing that "certain
well-known suspect information media have been
spreading fabricated and false reports about alleged
attacks and advances in the direction of the eastern
areas."
A propaganda technique utilized effectively by the
two Christian camps was the jamming of each other's
radio stations. The Voice of Right and Dignity, which
supports President Gemayel, had to change its FM
frequency after being jammed by Hubayqa.
Hubayqa's defeat by Ja'Ja and his departure from
Lebanon continue to generate propaganda in the
Christian camp. After car bombs exploded in East
Beirut in February, Ja'Ja's militiamen began
rounding up former Hubayqa supporters and
announced on their Radio Free Lebanon that "certain
individuals involved with Hubayqa took advantage of
the prevailing freedom to reassemble a number of
sabotage teams and to implement a terrorist plan
supported from abroad." Hubayqa, in exile in
Damascus, replied that Ja'Ja's broadcast about
terrorist cells in East Beirut was designed to justify
Ja'Ja's repression and arrest of innocent civilians.
Seeing an opportunity to sow conflict between Ja'Ja
and Gemayel, the Druze Voice of the Mountain
reported that gunmen belonging to Ja'Ja had
assassinated a Phalange notable, Elie Karameh, a
Gemayel loyalist.
The Christians also seek to divide their enemies. Their
Voice of Lebanon frequently reports that savage
fighting between the Amal Shia militia and the
Palestinians is erupting or about to erupt in the
Palestinian camps. Such announcements are designed
to maintain a high level of distrust between the
Palestinians and the Shias. Pro-Amal Beirut
Domestic Service counterattacks by minimizing
reports of fighting and announces that "suspicious-
minded" media have been spreading false reports
about clashes between people in the Palestinian camps
and outsiders.
Foreign Propaganda
Highly sophisticated propaganda campaigns have
been directed at the Lebanese since 1948 by both
Israel and Syria. Most recently, Damascus radio has
been airing commentaries critical of the United States
for hindering the Syrian peace plan for Lebanon.
Syria is known to have occasionally financed the
Druze Voice of the Mountain to attack President
Gemayel and the Christians as circumstances
warrant.
Israel responds through the Voice of Hope in South
Lebanon run by the Army of South Lebanon. A
unique Israeli attempt to divide the Shia Hizballah
extremists and Syria is the publication and
distribution of anti-Syrian pamphlets in Lebanon that
accuse Syria of torturing Muslims as well as
"impugning" the character of radical Shaykh Subhi
al-Tufayli.
To cement its relationship with its Lebanese
constituency, Jerusalem Domestic Service often
broadcasts Israeli Government statements on South
Lebanon. Thus, it carried an Israeli official's address
to a gathering of Christian supporters on the
anniversary of the death of the founder of the Army
of South Lebanon. The Israeli official said, "When I
come here to represent the Government of Israel, I
have only words of peace, friendship, and love."
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Outlook
The propaganda war is likely to intensify in light of
the failure of the Lebanese to reach a political
compromise. Technical assistance from abroad will
probably enhance the various factions' abilities to
expand programing and to improve communication
effectiveness.
The proliferation of clandestine radio and television
stations is likely to continue fulfilling political rather
than social functions and will increase hostility and
mistrust between the various combatants. The result
is likely to be increased Lebanese reliance on rumors
as a means of reinforcing beliefs they already hold
about perceived enemies. The air is likely to remain
filled with accusations of wrongdoing, plots, and
conspiracies. Such a climate will encourage
intensified fighting, since propaganda of this sort aims
to consolidate power within each group, bolster
morale, maintain allegiance to commanders, and keep
fighters engaged in combat rather than tell the truth.
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Libya's Increasing Ties,
to Radical Palestinians
The attacks on the El Al ticket counters in the Rome
and Vienna airports on 27 December have focused
attention on the degree of Libyan involvement in these
acts of terrorism. Even more significantly, they may
be one more signal of increasing ties between Libya
and radical Palestinian terrorist organizations like the
Abu Nidal Group.
Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi began supporting
more radical Palestinians in the mid-1970s after
deciding that Yasir Arafat and the Palestine
Liberation Organization were becoming too
moderate. Since then, Libya has sporadically provided
funding, arms, training, and safehaven to most of the
radical factions of the Palestinian movement, notably
the Abu Nidal Group, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC), the Fatah dissidents, Sa'iqa, the Popular
Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF).
Libya is again increasing aid to these groups
and provides logistic support to terrorist operations.
Qadhafi probably would see great profit in linking his
regime more directly to these militants and their
activities. They share common enemies-Israel and
its supporters and moderate Arab and Palestinian
leaders-as well as a ruthless approach to pursuing
their struggle. The Palestinian groups are rich in
manpower and have extensive operational networks in
Western Europe. Their successful attacks on two
continents have attracted significant international
attention. By joining forces with them operationally,
Qadhafi could probably trade increased financial and
logistic support for a role in the Palestinians' target
selection and use of their personnel and West
European support apparatus for Libyan operations.
The radical Palestinians would have their own reasons
for more active cooperation with Libya and, in at least
one case, have proposed joint planning for terrorist
operations. Groups such as Abu Nidal and the PFLP
appear to be searching for alternative or
supplementary backing to that provided by Syria,
their longtime patron. They may believe that
Damascus tries to exert undue control over them or
that Syria views the Palestinian cause as less
important than its own goals in Lebanon. They may 25X1
also hope to gain use of Libyan diplomatic facilities to
help stage their attacks0 25X1
Financial Support
Libya is more willing-or perhaps more able-than
Syria to provide funds to radical Palestinian groups.
Qadhafi has not kept all his promises to provide
money. As late as November 1985, the Palestine
National Salvation Front had not received the $2
million Qadhafi had repeatedly pledged to rebuild the
refugee camps destroyed in the camp wars last June in
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Safehaven
The radical Palestinians' search for alternatives to
Syrian hospitality to avoid the strings that Damascus
attaches-such as tight supervision of in-country 25X1
activity-has led several groups to consider other
countries as bases for their operations. At least two of
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these radical groups give signs of moving their
operations to Libya, which may make benefits in
addition to safehaven-such as passports and similar
Military Aid and Training
Libya has given military training to Palestinian
groups for more than 15 years. Current training of
Palestinians occurs both inside and outside Libya. It is
well established that Libya provides weapons to
several Palestinian groups.
among recent instances of Libyan
? Libya provided weapons to radical Palestinians who
fought against the mainline Shia Amal movement in
last summer's camp wars in Lebanon.
As with money, Libya does not follow through on all
of its commitments. Fatah dissidents, for example,
requested arms from Iran, saying that Libya had not
delivered the weapons it promised.0
Intelligence and Terrorist Cooperation
Most alarming is the increasing Libyan-Palestinian
cooperation in intelligence gathering and terrorist
operations. The Palestinian groups that appear to
have such operational ties to Qadhafi are Abu Nidal,
the PFLP-GC, and the Fatah dissidents.
all of these parties favor
cooperation in terrorist activity, and there is some
evidence indicating that such cooperation is
Outlook
Tripoli and the Palestinians are probably assessing
each other's capabilities and intentions carefully, with
an eye to determining whether closer ties are
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warranted. Nonetheless, greater cooperation may
have limits. Each of the Palestinian groups,
particularly Abu Nidal, has its own agenda and
values its autonomy. Consequently, we expect none of
these groups would be willing to become fully
dependent on Libyan support. Moreover, in many
respects, Syria is a natural ally and should continue to
play a key role. Nevertheless, to the extent that links
between Libya and the Palestinian radicals increase-
a process that appears to be under way-the range
and effectiveness of each partner's terrorist operations
will also increase.
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Between Friends
Morocco and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain close
ties based on mutual interests. King Hassan provides
political support for Riyadh's foreign policy goals and
assists Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab
regimes in internal security and military training.
Riyadh provides financial assistance that strengthens
Hassan at home and bolsters stability within Morocco
and the Maghreb generally. Although Riyadh's
decreased oil earnings may reduce the level of Saudi
financial assistance over the next two or three years,
we believe mutual political interests will continue to
foster close Saudi-Moroccan relations
Mutual Interests
Morocco and Saudi Arabia have developed a strong
working relationship. Hassan and Saudi King Fahd
maintain close personal ties based on similar political
interests that include shoring up conservative Sunni
regimes, supporting moderate Islamic organizations
and objectives, encouraging free enterprise, and
advancing moderate Arab goals for a Middle Eastern
peace.
In 1982, Morocco and Saudi Arabia worked closely
together at the Arab League summit meeting in Fez
to obtain endorsement of the "Fez Plan" as the
official Arab League position on a settlement to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1984, Fahd and other
moderate Arab leaders engineered the reintegration
of Egypt into the Islamic Conference. Hassan and
Fahd maintain close personal ties and consult
regularly on a variety of matters including Sudan, the
PLO, and the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis have tried to
reduce the friction between Morocco and its Maghreb
neighbors. While diplomatically and financially
favoring Hassan's position on the Western Sahara,
the Saudis have played an important, if somewhat
unsuccessful, role in encouraging better relations
between Morocco and Algeria. For example, they set
up the first heads-of-state meeting in 1983, and,
following Moroccan reversals on the Western Sahara
issue in the Organization of African Unity and the
United Nations, they were in touch with both leaders
in an attempt to ease tensions. According to the US
Embassy, it was also at Saudi behest that Hassan
began to improve relations with Colonel Qadhafi-a
process that led to the Moroccan-Libyan union in
1984.
Saudi Support
Economic Ties. Financial assistance from Saudi
Arabia has helped stabilize the Hassan regime and
enabled Rabat to sustain the Western Sahara war.
Saudi 25X1
military and economic grants to Morocco probably 25X1
amounted to $3 billion during 1980-85, with an
additional $700 million in loans. As part of an oil
package in 1985, the Saudis delivered to Morocco
without charge some 2 million metric tons of oil,
worth about $375 million and equal to half of Rabat's
annual consumption. This is the first time Saudi
Arabia has provided oil free of charge, and it helped
considerabl to ease Morocco's forefian exchange
problems. I 25X1
Security Assistance. Saudi financial support helps
Morocco provide security assistance to moderate
African and Arab governments. This cooperation
grew out of an understanding reached between the
two conservative monarchies in the mid-1970s as
members of the now defunct Five-Power Intelligence
Committee-Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt,
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and France-that multilateral effort was needed to
thwart radical initiatives, counter Soviet inroads in
Africa, and combat international terrorism. The spirit
of the agreement continues on a bilateral level
between Rabat and Riyadh.
Since the Grand Mosque incident at Mecca in 1979-
when several hundred armed religious fanatics seized
the Grand Mosque and called for the overthrow of the
Al Saud dynasty-Morocco has furnished security
training to Saudi personnel. According to the US
Embassy at Rabat, the Saudi Government is
financing the presence of some 1,500 to 2,000
Moroccan Army, Air Force, and gendarmerie
personnel to train Saudi security and military
personnel as well as to undertake specific internal
security responsibilities in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is no longer an important source of
military funding for Morocco.
Outlook
Morocco will undoubtedly continue to pursue strong
bilateral ties to Saudi Arabia. Although Hassan's
preoccupation with growing domestic concerns may
lead him to retreat somewhat from involvement in
general Middle Eastern issues, economic realities, as
well as his diplomatic isolation in Africa, will require
continuing close attention to relations with potential
Arab donors and oil suppliers.
Saudi aid may decrease
In our view, as Saudi oil revenues drop, a greater
percentage of remaining money will be dedicated to
domestic expenditures and to rewarding or placating
Saudi Arabia's nearest neighbors. Nevertheless,
according to US Embassy officials, Morocco remains
the hinge on which Saudi policy toward the Maghreb
turns. Rabat plays a key role in Saudi efforts to
enhance Arab and Muslim unity and support
moderate Arab positions. Although the amount of
we believe the relationship will continue
as long as the regimes in Rabat and Riyadh retain
their current character and common interests.
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Suwar El Dahab:
Sudan's Reluctant General
Shortly after reluctantly joining the military coup in
April 1985 that deposed Sudan's President Gaafar
Nimeiri, Gen. Suwar El Dahab promised to hold
elections for a civilian government within a year. He
appears eager to effect this transition of power by
April 1986. We believe he is sincere in his promises to
resign following successful elections, but we do not
rule out the possibility that his intentions could
change. Suwar
El Dahab would probably not step down if the election
process threatened Sudan's precarious stability.
Furthermore, if he were offered an administrative
post in the new government, such as head of a
Sovereignty Council, he might accept, emphasizing
that his sense of duty overrides his strong personal
wish to retire
Personal History
Abdel Rahman Suwar El Dahab, 52, is a member of a
large and prominent Khatmiyyah (Sudan's second-
largest Muslim sect) family that has included in its
number many high-ranking military officers and
religious leaders. He graduated from the Sudanese
Military College in 1955 and has attended a six-
month military intelligence course in the United
Kingdom (1961) and the US Army Infantry School at
Fort Benning, Georgia (1967). Public accounts of his
career indicate that Suwar El Dahab was twice
dismissed from the Army. He first ran afoul of his
superiors for refusing to serve alcohol at official
functions while military attache in Uganda in 1969.
He was again separated from the Army in 1971
following a failed Communist coup, in which one of
his cousins played a prominent role. Following his
reinstatement in the Army by President Nimeiri in
1972, he rose steadily to the highest echelons of the
military. In the seven years before the coup that
toppled Nimeiri, Suwar El Dahab served as deputy
chief of staff for operations and training (1978-82),
deputy chief of staff for logistics (1982), deputy
commander in chief of the armed forces (1982-85),
and armed forces commander in chief and Minister of
Defense (March-April 1985). He continues to serve as
armed forces commander in chief and is also
chairman of the Transitional Military Council, which
has governed Sudan since Nimeiri was deposed.F_
characterized Suwar El Dahab 25X1
as intelligent, even tempered, scrupulously moral, and
gentlemanly. Meticulous in his appearance and
abstemious in his personal habits, he is, in our view, 25X1
highly sensitive to public opinion. Publicly, he
minimizes any attachment to his career, professing
greater interest in the unassailable and private realms
of family and religion.
A member of the Khatmiyyah sect of Sufi Islam,
which, has 25X1
traditionally enjoyed strong representation in the
Army and its high command, Suwar El Dahab 25X1
carefully balances his religious convictions with his
civil duties. In recent interviews he stated that he
believes that politics and religion-like politics and
the military-should be kept separate. He added that,
while he opposed the imposition of sharia (Islamic
law) in Sudan, he is deferring such matters to the
future civilian government. On several occasions he
has indicated that he is eager to retire to pursue
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Leadership Style: Paternal and Accommodating
characterized Suwar El 25X1
Dahab's leadership style as paternal-he tends to lead
by example. Stern, but not overbearing, he will avoid
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and ignore people who do not live up to his
expectations. he
reacts to stress with stoic composure and only rarely
shows anger. As a result, subordinates can present
him with bad news without fear of recrimination.
In our judgment, Suwar El Dahab is concerned with
maintaining an image of unity, concern for the
common good, and consistency in the decisionmaking
process. when Suwar El
Dahab is confronted with a problem, he often defers
to his staff, but he reserves final judgment for himself.
He guides the course of discussions and relies on his
colleagues and subordinates for creative, substantive
contributions.
Because of Suwar El Dahab's nonconfrontational
style and his reputation for honesty, he could
conceivably be regarded as a useful resource by a
government faced with prospects for severe ethnic and
regional factionalism. Suwar El Dahab would provide
a facade of legitimacy for a highly ambitious and
energetic political leader who needed time and
maneuvering room to consolidate power. While his
year at the helm of the Transitional Military Council
has been taxing, his survival has probably reinforced
his self-confidence and provided him with an
opportunity to extend his support network, should he
choose to use it. We believe Suwar El Dahab might
accept an administrative post, such as head of the
Sovereignty Council, but that he would do so only
after emphasizing his reluctance. In the event that the
elections result in chaos, and if his colleagues do not
preempt him, he may feel compelled to assume the
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Suwar El Dahab's apparent lack of ambition. We
believe his display of reluctance in the face of political
opportunity results from a combination of cultural
and personal factors. Demonstrations of personal
ambition are unseemly, and even dangerous, in a
culture where one man's gain is usually equated with
another's loss. Furthermore, Suwar El Dahab, in our
judgment unwilling to
venture beyond his support network, especially in the
face of Sudan's overwhelming economic, social, and
military problems.
leadership of another coup.
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Near East and
South Asia Briefs
Libya Lobbying for Arab Largess
Libya has approached Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Arab Gulf states for
financial assistance in the event of severe cash-flow difficulties because of the US
assets freeze. In late January, a Libyan envoy requested Saudi financial aid and
asked other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to remove funds from US
While token aid may be forthcoming, large-scale assistance or movement of assets
from US investments is unlikely. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have refused
Libyan aid requests in the past because of their size or the perceived political
implications of assisting Qadhafi. The diversion of US investments would be
difficult for Gulf states to achieve without reducing the rate of return on their
large holdings. Moreover, Libyan agitation for reductions in Gulf state oil
production to remedy the soft oil market probably rankles GCC members because
of Tripoli's record of price discounts and oil barter deals. Tripoli may threaten
retaliation, but the Saudis at least are not likely to be intimidated.
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Purchase of Italian Refinery) 25X1
Tripoli is consolidating control over its recently purchased TAMOIL refinery in
Milan. The Libyans plan to double refinery out out by late and the
distribution network within Italy, The 25X1
refinery is the most modern in Italy with a distribution system of 850 service
stations. The refinery and distribution network will guarantee Tripoli access to the
Italian market and help stabilize Libya's oil exports and revenues during the
current soft oil market. Tripoli plans to discharge all employees of Jewish descent
and to utilize only Libyan or Cuban crude. Havana produces only a small amount
of crude oil, but its high sulfur content makes the crude a good blending stock for
the refinery, which cannot operate efficiently solely on low sulfur Libyan oil.
Moreover, the deal will help bolster Havana's foreign exchange position and
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