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January 14, 1980
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Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 doer nokaccurately reflect the state of relative affection for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Plenty of people, including most East- ern Europeans, would riot against the Soviets if they dared; Rus- sia enjoys immunities purchased by its goonily abstracted dis- regard for the opinions of others. Geography also plays a part. The U.S. is thought to be so far away that the danger of retali- ation seems similarly remote. In any case, the world's expec- tations of Russians are so much lower than of Americans that public opinion is less outraged by Soviet behavior. Russia op- erates in the world not with a morality but with an ideology, which it pursues with grim and slogging coherence. It is a mistake to exaggerate foreign antipathy toward the U.S. America is a natural target for all kinds of random dis- contents ricocheting around on other continents; it is a handy distraction for incompetent leaders when things are not going well. Third World leaders who studied in the U.S., says Taiwan Foreign Affairs Analyst Chang King Yuh, "have found it easy to use the U.S. as scapegoat whenever they have encountered do- mestic difficulties, since the ammunition to use against the.U.S. is so readily available." Authoritarian regimes will always be threatened by the very existence of the U.S. example. The re- lationship between the U.S. and many Third World countries is elaborate and even Oedipal but, along with envy and frustra- tion, the U.S. also stirs, still, a good deal of neurotic admiration. In a way, today's anti-Americanism is founded on a misper- ception. The U.S. is not so weak as many in the world-or in America-take it to be. The nation remains militarily. econom- ically and morally powerful-in the aggregate, far more power- ful than Russia. The problem is not lack of strength but a bewil- derment of will. The U.S. must decide how its strength should be applied, and if it is willing to pay the inevitably high price for ap- plying strength. French Author Louise Weiss believes that the, present American predicament began in "a search for a false popularity," a product of the chagrin over the Viet Nam years. The quest should be abandoned. Americans should recognize and accept the fact that much of world opinion runs against the U.S. now. Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested five years ago that the U.S. should assume a role of minority opposition. Ultimately, the U.S. must appeal, as it has often done successfully, to other people's self-interests. At any rate it must put together a tight, co- herent and absolutely consistent body of principles that it rep- resents and is willing to act upon. It may be that only by accept- ing their unpopularity will Americans have some hope of regaining the world's good opinion and respect. - Lance Morrow Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASHINGTON POST PARADE MAGAZINE 6 January 1980 by, both former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, hate each other so. much that neither will appear in the same room with the other? What is the source of their enmity?-/.L; Arlington, Va.. A. Colby does not hate. Helms, but _ Helms was... .found guilty of perjured testimony before a Senate committee and reportedly holds Colby responsible for releasing the-family jewels"-those. CIA in- house secrets that subsequently brought. him down. As director of-theCIA. Helms believed hewaswork- ing for the President oft the':V.S:: Colby believed he was working for the people. Thedifference in phi-. losophies is responsible for the enmity-more pro- nounced on Helms's side than Colby's... Q. Is it a fact that Richard. Helms and. William Col- Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 AFF UJ)A WORLD MARXIST REVIEW -C:I PAIGE DECEMBER 1979 The Sinister Doings of the CIA "Dossier" Carlucci/CIA. Lisbon, Editorial "Avante!" Publishers, 1978. 167pp. These documents and comments on US imperialist interference in Portugal's internal affairs, notably after the April 25, 1974 revolution, five an insight into the activities of the CIA and US officials in that country from 1973 to December 1977. The opening chapters recount the practices of CIA agents in Portugal prior to the revolution and the-initial response of the US State Department and Congress to the revolution. The Pike report, produced by the special commission set up by Congress, witheringly criticised CIA activities in Portugal, charging that.its.agents were in hibernation. Indeed, the CIA was certain that the fascist regime was strongly entrenched in Portugal. William Colby, CIA. Director at that time, considered posting to Portugal a "prize" for his agents. Nevertheless, members- of Congress were apparently hasty in imputing all the "blame" to the CIA, which was caught by surprise at the scale of the events -of April 25, 1974 and their subsequent development. The example of Portugal and other countries, Tran, for instance, shows that where objective conditions were ripe and the people united, organised and ready to battle, the CIA will never succeed in preventing the success of a revolution however hard it tries. Thanks to the strength of the mass movement and the patriotism of the heroic military and-those who participated in the April 25 events, thanks to the alliance that took shape immediately after these events between the Armed Forces Movement and masses, the revolution followed a road the CIA could not have foreseen: Portuguese democracy gradually took an anti-monopoly and anti-landowner orientation. It was not easy for spokesmen of the US administration to understand what was happening. This is-what led to Stuart N. Scott's recall as Ambassador to Portugal and his replacement byFrank-C...Carl ucci-a trusted and tough man in. contrast to Scott who, in Kissinger's opinion, underestimated the "communist danger" in Portugal (p4O). The new US Ambassador, Frank Carlucci, arrived in Lisbon January 17, 1975. -But some facts of his biography, especially his "services.' were well known long before he came to Portugal. The Lisbon weekly Sempre Fixe wrote that he had been expelled from Zanzibar after that country's security forces learned that this "diplomat" had telephoned for more weapons. Subsequently, Carlucci explained in English the word "ammunition" was innocuous and all he meant was "ammunition for arguments". At Lisbon's Portela Airport the new US Ambassador was more categorical saying there were no grounds for the "rumours" of CIA infiltration in--Portugal (p44). Three years later, however, this man would be appointed Deputy Director of the CIA. In Lisbon Carlucci lost no time: He presented his credentials to President Costa Gomes just a_week after his arrival and met with Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves February 8. On February 21 he went to Oporto. Everywhere his schedule was heavy. He paid his respects to the Commander of the Northern Military District, met with the civilian governor, the Bishop of Oporto, and the chairman of the Municipal Council. Besides, pages 48 and 49 give the names of the ambassador's aides who likewise were up to their neck in the embassy's day-to-day "routine". - Aided by imperialism and European Social-Democratic parties, the local CONTINUED Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 reactionaries started a savage assault in February 1975 to destroy the revolution. That was when NATO began war games on the Portuguese coast. On February 4, 1975, the Portuguese Communist Party issued a statement, declaring: "In the present political situation the NATO exercises in Portugal are totally inopportune ... Objectively they may be regarded as an attempt to influence the political situation in Portugal". Replying to this statement in an interview for the weekly Expresso on February 15, Carlucci made a thinly veiled threat. "Most important." he said, "is for a NATO member to fulfil its responsibilities. There will be no problems as long as Portugal is true to its commitments". On February 20 the Portuguese Communist Party again noted that the situation was dangerous and that anti-communism had been visibly intensified. On March'3 the Lisbon evening newspaper A Capital carried an article headed "CIA Plans Coup in Portugal Before the End of March". Carlucci called these reports "fantastic and blatant lies". But on March 11 Spinola led a counter-revolutionary rising which was crushed by the Armed Forces Movement aided by the people. It is interesting to trace the link between ensuing events and Carlucci's comings and goings. On June 29, 1975, 89 FIDE' agents "`escaped", while the day before, June 28, Carlucci suddenly fell ill and left for Madrid where he entered the military hospital run by the US base at Torrejon de Ardoz. On July 10 he returned to Lisbon. But during his stay in Spain, he met with Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA. Throughout this period acts of terrorism were committed in Portugal; there were 105 assassination attempts, 34 bombings, 20 cases of arson, three armed attacks, and five cases of manhandling. The Portuguese CP alone was attacked 77 times. Suppression of Spinola's counter-revolutionary rising and the defeat of the rightist forces on March 11 compelled Henry Kissinger to urge a strong and reliable rightist, or, if necessary, a pro-fascist regime as an alternative to the success of the Left forces. In giving these facts the book refers the reader to a curious article printed in Harper's Magazine in 1977, saying that Kissinger was disappointed in "his man" sent to replace the unpugnacious Scott (p6s). "The point apparently is that Frank Carlucci was a more flexible and resourceful spokesmen of imperialist interest than his own bosses ... There were two things the ambassador learned quickly: the first was that any efforts to reinstall the most reactionary rightist forces . would. inevitably unite. Portugal's democratic forces, and, second, that broader opportunities could emerge for action in a more favourable situation if the `moderates' were"used and the stake was made on politicians advocating a `European choice', and, if an alliance were formed with Europe's Social-Democrats . . . This would help erect a barrier to socialism and freedom in Portugal" (p68). Carlucci won this round, as is evident from a speech by Kissinger in Alabama in August 1975, which The New York Times called a victory for his envoy. The book deals extensively with the attention Carlucci and his aides gave to the events in Angola while the United States and its imperialist and racist allies were straining to prevent Angola's independence and the victory of the MPLA. That was exactly when former CIA agent Philip Agee supplied the British paper Workers Press with the names of 16 CIA agents operating in Lisbon. The book also details the changes in CIA agents in Portugal, Carlucci's actions in relation to the Azores and Lages where the Social-Democratic Party and Social-Democratic Centre were in the majority and where the Left parties, particularly the Communist Party, were persecuted and not permitted to function over the greater part of this territory. In February 1977 Carlucci went to Washington, where he urged granting CONTINUED Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 loans to Portugal and testified before the House sub-commissions on Europe and the Middle East and the Commission on Foreign Affairs. The debate was over the allocation of 30 million dollars for a NATO brigade stationed in Portugal. Transcripts of this debate, which lasted until March 1, 1977 (pp99- 116) show clearly the extent of US interference in the affairs of Portugal, which imperialism looks upon as its own private domain. . Relative to the planned reorganisation of the armed forces, which two years earlier Carlucci had called a gang, he called the NATO brigade "the beacon illuminating their further development ... giving them moral strength and sustaining their professional spirit" (p116). The closing chapters deal with US handouts and the Socialist Party's credits policy which made Portugal more dependent than ever on the capitalist powers. Some sidelights on Carlucci's active "social life" reveal circumstances of no little importance. For instance his tennis partners included leaders of the Socialist Party Maldonado Gonelha, Jaime Garna, and Manuel Alegre, President of the Social-Democratic Centre Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral, and SDC Vice President Adelino Amaro da Costa, and SDC Secretary-General Basilio Horta, Chairman of the SDP Sa Carneiro and one of its leaders Pedro Roseta. . In the meantime James E. Carter replaced Gerald R. Ford in the White House. Learning that Carlucci stood high in Mario Soares' favour Carter left him in Lisbon until December 23, 1977, when finally the sensational news was released that Carlucci had been named Deputy Director of the CIA. That's the way it is, esteemed reader. On December 22, 1977 the newspaper 0 Diario wrote editorially: "This was an appropriate appointment by Carter; he officially formalised the position of a CIA veteran. Frank Carlucci, the insider, 1 is now where he belongs. However, it will be some time before our people learn of the price the nation had to pay for what the present Deputy Director of the CIA was engaged in in Portugal". And the weekly Opcao will ask: "What can we say about a country that sends future heads of its secret services to countries experiencing critical situations?" The answer to this question is self-evident and the question itself remains topical today, because in many parts of the world imperialism's "insiders" of the Carlucci type are implementing a policy of unparalleled diktat and interference in the affairs of sovereign states. Domingos Lopes 'Salazar's secret police. After the April revolution its most brutal agents were tried and convicted. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ARTICLE .APFr:L D ON PCS. . THE.WASHINGTON POST TO January, 1980 e CIA Deputy llrPCtor' ranki Car luccrwilt'tall% about gdv the 1980s at the Jan :i8 1Un heon sponsored; by th'.Socsety fo:Public :I: A_dinlnistration. Its 1o!al chapter will meet at .George. Washington-. Um oven ity's Marvin Center. Make.reser-' vationr by calling` Dona; It at 357-11M, Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ? AFGHAHISTAN . Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ,t" ct,L AW A 'b? HUMAN EVENTS ON PAGE _ 6 5 January 1980 Ulilll~if :::}~ Afghanistan Coup While the United States has been focusing its attention on Iran, the Soviet Union, according to U.S. intelligence sources, helped foster the Afghanistan. coup last week which saw the even more pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal seize power from President Hafizuliah Amin and than have Amin executed. According to State Department. officials, the Soviets, just prior to the-coup, had quadrupled- from about 1,500 to 6,000--the number of com- bat troops and military. advisers inside Afghanis- tan, using a massive airlift from bases in Russia. As many as 20,000 Soviet military, of all kinds may be in the country, department sources say, and as many as 50,000 soldiers are said to be massed at the Soviet-Afghanistan border. The assessment of U.S.-intelligence officials is that Babrak-is "an.. explosive character, as close as you could, ever get to the classic Moscow-lining Communist" Not since Czechoslovakia have the Soviets been willing to use their troops to impose their will on a sovereign nation, and military analysts note that the swift airborne movement into Afghanistan underscores the Soviet capacity to move signifi- cant number of troops in a relatively short time. The big question now seems to be whether the new regime, with massive numbers of Soviet com. .bat.troops,will be able to eliminate the insurgent. Moslem groups that threatened Amin's rule, and. then use Afghanistan as.a launching pad to ex-, pand the Soviet power base in this area of the world. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 A^TICLE THE WASHINGTON POST 10 January 1980 moves have a disturbing explanation for redly across '. the ? Red Sea from the last days of the shah. Carter ordered a the invasion of Afghanistan,. but their Saudi oil kingdom...The Cubans, 20,000 carrier task: force into the Persian Gulf superior aren't likely to submit the strong: were trained; armed and subsi- but then canceled the order. The task White House. The reason. Nobody-wants clued by the Soviet Union. Soviet advis- force; headed by the U SS Constellation, to hand.. President Carter-- an analysis ers,. meanwhile, replaced-American-ad- dropped anchor in Singapore. - that blames him for; precipitating the ulcers in Addis Ababa. The analysts note In contrast,.the Soviets didn't hesitate Soviet intervention: that Egypt's President ."Anwar- Sadat to airlift troops into Afghanistan to exe- ..Yet the secret, analysis demands- the .- tried in vain to arouse Carter to action cute a recalcitrant leader and to install a urgent and objective attenton of A he Encouraged by Carter's restraint, the more pliant president in his place. Yet 'White House. Otherwise? the experts Kremlin sent 5W Cuban shock troops to . Afghanistan isn't nearly the prize that .,warnthat the Russians can be expected consolidate: its hold on South Yemen in Iran is, with its fabulous oil fields and drive "deeper: into the vital Persian the 'toe of the Arabian peninsula..The access to the Persian Gulf. Gulf oil.region. 1-. have' offered, there- Cubans, acting oa Soviet signals, spear- . The Kremlin leaders, for all their fore, to publish their unwelcome.conclu headed an attack upon; North. Yemen.:: canny caution, are simply more willing sions.. hoping someone--will. be brave This set off alarms in neighboring Saudi ._ -than Carter to use military power to ad.' enough to show them to the president Arabia, whose ruling sheiks appealed to vance:Soviet interests. These conclusions are not- the, wild :Carter for military support.: He ,rushed Footnote: In fairness, Soviet eepan guesses of eggheads who suck them out .::.over a .dozen unarmed F15 fighter sion into ~restern inheres of influence of their thumbs. They have access to Planes..: :-,... began before Carter became president. elaborate intelligence- detailing : what The Saudis, as much in exasperation ..The men of Muscovy correctly- calcu- goes on inside the Kremlin. The conver- ? desperation; madev approaches to. lated that the:US. defeat-:in Vietnam cations of Kremlin leaders have been in- Moscow, through Syria.and Iraq. The - . had sapped the American will to defend tercepted.? and their personalities have Russians. couldn't resist the. chance to faraway lands:. been closely analyzed.."I know -Leonid exacerbate Saudi-American -'relations. '_..: The R.ussians moved quickly into the Brezhnev better than I know my.. own _ .: They took, credit with ? the Saudis for Vietnam vacuum; shouldering aside the father," one analyst told expert me _ - calling off the fighting in Yemen:: Chinese who struggled briefly for' posi- According to opinion; the Belatedly, Carter sent military aid to ion. Today the Soviet presence in Viet Xremliir czars are- crafty but cautious .. -..:North Yemen, but it was-too;little. and :name exceeds, in. both influence and di- .old men-who have a wary respect for too late. North Yemen preferred to take mension the. American Contingent-be- American military, industrial: and eco- out insurance In Moscow by signing an fore the Gulf of Tonkin incident. nomic power.-They-will, push, however, arms pact with the Soviet,Union. There Before Carter's time, the Kremlin also I into any world power vacuum, where = are _intelligence: reports , ; meanwhile, dispatched Cuban shock troops.intothe 'they -find the resistance- weak ' Carter that the Russians have set up an under- 'former Portuguese colony of Angola to has left them with several vacuums: ground _ movement -: operating out of pluck off a prize African plum. This was The United States ? dominated the oil - . South Yemen' to. overthrow- the. Saudi - naked aggression, not part of the black heartland when.Carter took charge of : monarchy: , - : revolution in Africa. In fact, the Cubans American foreign policy in 1977.. The But it was Carters mishandling of. the put down a -revolt by. black leaders in world's two -largest oil exporters,' Saudi Iranian crisis, say the analysts, that per- : 1977 and installed a . Marxist regime I Arabia and Iran, were solid American, suaded the Soviets it would be. safe to headed :by whites.and mulattts.. Today, ! allies: Then-the. Soviets: began testing -take over Afghanistan. He.failed-to?bol- Angola- is..- patrolled by. 25,Mx)-Cuban Carter's mettle.- ster the shah - or establish a substitute troops who We their orders from in.-1978, .the ' Soviets dispatched a ~.:government, acceptable to the-United Moscow ;: - ...- = _,... . Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 NEW YORK TIMES. 9 JANUARY 1980 Economic Scene Afghanistan, Oil, Arms and Inflation :... - HE Soviet. Intervention in Afghanistan.. in bringing back the cold war with a vengeance, has powerful im- pli rations for the. United; States and the world. econ .omy. The threat to the Industrialized world's access to Mid- -die Eastern oil supplies has been intensified. President Car- ter has declared that a Soviet-occupied Afghanistan "Is a stepping stone to possible control, over much of the world's Was the Soviet move into Afghanistan, for which Moscow .will obviously have to pay an Immediate economic price in terms of forgone Imports of grain and technology from the.'.:: West, motivated chiefly, by the need to safeguard its own ac- . cess to Persian Gulf oil supplies and the desire for the ability,.: to deny OHIO Western Europe, the United States or Japan? . The Central Intelligence Agency, In Et I report that has had' Leonard Silk Fean allies will be importing 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels . to pay for their imports. One unforeseen consequence of re- of petroleum a day. That would be equal to more than half duced, United States and West European exports to: the the total United. States imports in 1978: s ? o But, in a study for the Council on Foreign Relations, Prof. Marshall I. Goldman, associatedirector of Harvard's Rus- The return of the cold war. threatens to have other Infla- tionaryeffects. The stepupin' United States military ex- penditures announced by President Carter before the At. sian Research Center, concludes that the C.I.A. report was ghan action was scheduled to average 4.5 percent. per -unduly pessimistic. He argues that the Soviet Union depends annum in real terms (adjusted for inflation). This .could so heavily on petroleum exports, which account for more prove to be on the low side, especially since the Soviet move than half Its hard-currency earnings. that it Is more likely to. in Afghanistan has effectively killed the strategic armslimi= substitute other fuels and conserve energy In order to have tation treaty. oil available forexport. Pressures on the United States balance of payments re-' With huge reserves of coal and natural gas as well as oil, suiting from the climbing price of oil and the cutoff of wheat Russia has considerable flexibility in choosing which fuels to consume or export. The Soviet Union is the world's big-.. Best oil producer, bigger even than Saudi Arabia. In 19778, Soviet production exceeded 11 million barrels; Saudi production has recently been running at 9.5 million barrels a day, although the "permanent" target Is 8.5 million:. With the slash In Iranian oil output and.exports.after the .1979 revolution, the Soviet Union has become the world's second, But Moscow has had complicated' relations with the Or- tration had opposed military equipment built only to be sold ganization of Petrol eum,. Exporting Countries. In the late abroad. 1950.'s, the Soviet push for export markets drove down prices Heavier defense expenditures are regarded by, most and upset Middle Eastern and Latin American oil produce economists as particularly inflationary. Rudolph W. Hardy, ers. As Professor Goldman notes, "Ina very real sense, Soviet action provoked the formation of OPEC" in 1960. During the Arab-Israeli war and oil embargo of 1973 and 1974. Moscow provided important military and economic States. For those who seek short-term Investments in the support for the Arabs, enthusiastically endorsing the oil em- United States with Government-guaranteed profits, se- bargo and huge price increases. Soviet oil prices climbed roughly in step with.OPEC prices. The Soviet Union's enor- mous windfall gains permitted It to reduce the physical vol- ume of its oil shipments, while earning more money. sales to the Soviet Union have given a military thrust. to American export. Policy. President Carter has agreed to back efforts to builda new jet fighter plane; now called.the I FX, strictly for the export market... The Administration's Arms . Control and Disarmament Agency and some. officials In the State Department opposed Mr. Carter's decision as a major change in the policy of re. vestors, states: "Trade in arms is likely to grow. because it Is a readily available offset to Imports of oil,, especially to Middle'Eastern countries. The economic consequences are, nevertheless, Inflationary for the recipient countries and tend to ricochet via higher oil prices back to the United lected 'armament manufacturing can only be recommend- themselves Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ARTICLE 1'P .R D U.S., NEWS- & WORLD- REPORT eN PAGE__1_(Q14. Jangary 1980 shin. The Soviet Union,. which had sent- !, 50,000 troops into Afghani tan, by early January, was reporie4, b_y West- ern. intelligence officials ready to commit as many as 200,000. in, com- ing months to guarantee its;control.of the country. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 I'RTICLE iPP_..R D ON FAGS 12-2-y U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 14 January 1980 It has been a painful learning experience for Jimmy Carter-discovering that the Russian threat is as serious as ever. The lesson is forcing the President into a far-reaching reassessment of his foreign policy. Russia's invasion of Afghanistan confronts Jimmy Carter with the most clear-cut challenge of his Presidency. The Soviet drive to conquer its small and primitive neighbor is widely viewed as an act of Communist aggres- "27Ze =action of the sion unparalleled since North Korea's invasion of South Ko r .. r.~.:rrra a dramatic c l ri i t a an n e me upby Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.): "Detente is dead peace." He asked the Senate to delay consideration of the and the Soviets killed it." SALT II treaty, generally regarded as the cornerstone of In a televised address to the nation on January 4, the Soviet-American detente. However, the State Department President announced a radical shift in the administration's announced that the U.S. will observe the terms of the.pact foreign policy, which for the past three years has given high as long as Russia does the same. priority to cooperation with Moscow and ratification of a Also, Carter threw American support behind'a drive for strategic-arms-limitation treaty. United Nations condemnation of -Russian aggression and a His words: "Neither the United States nor any other na- call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. tion which is committed to world peace and stability can To meet the danger that Soviet aggression would go be- continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union." yond Afghanistan, Carter announced a multinational plan Carter spelled out key features of a strategy aimed at to provide military equipment, food and other aid for Paki- making Russia pay a price for its aggression in Afghanistan. stan. This will require congressional action to rescind a ban 1. Food. A limited embargo was imposed on grain ship- ments to the Russians. Only 8 million tons of grain that the on all American aid to that country because of its efforts to produce nuclear weapons. White House aides- suggested that the administration is U.S. is committed to sell this crop year under a five-year ready to send arms and, other assistance. even to Iran to agreement will be delivered. The delivery of an additional counter the Soviet threat if and. when that nation is ruled 17 million tons that Russia was authorized to buy this year . by a government friendlyto.the U.S. to cope with a crop disaster will be barred. To cushion the. Diplomatic observers in Washington said that, therepr- impact on American, farmers, the embargoed wheat and sals so far ordered by Carter against Moscow are unlikely to corn will be bought by the U.S. government-or its price induce the Russians to, abandon their invasion of Afghani- supported-at an estimated cost of 2 io 3 Billion dollars. Stan-although the squeeze on 'grain deliveries' will :prove The food weapon, which Carter in the past ruled out, will hurtful and doubtless came as something of a surprise 'to be used in other for,.'Soviet fishing privileges in Ameri- can waters will be severely curtailed. And licenses for the. sale of farm machinery and. equipment to manufacture. phosphate fertilizer will be reviewed. 2. Technology. All sales of high technology and other, strategic items to Russia will be barred until further. notice. The entire licensing procedure for, these exports is to be re- Carter had under consideration other options that, if im- plemented, would have a harshen effect on '.the Russians than.anything yet announced.These would-- . ^ Revive Central Inte'lligence' Agency covert operations to help t e Mos em rebels' resisting. the ' Soviet conquest of Afghanistan. Pentagon officials stressed that the' effective- ness; of the', insurgents' stand would depend on. availability 3. Cultural and economic exchanges. Most of the plans, of weapons, particularly hand-held antiaircraft missiles that for exchanges in these fields will be deferred, and for the time being no new American or-Soviet consular. facilities will be opened. Carter raised the possibility. that American athletes might not compete in the Moscow Olympics; Besides these measures, .the President moved on other fronts in retaliation against theSoviet.invasion of Afghani- crease Communist casualties by a factor of three." Stan, which he called "an extremely serious threat. to ? Cooperate actively on defense with China, Russia's can ' destroy Soviet. gunships. These officials advocated guerrillas" in Angola and Ethiopia w o arA Fighting' N. S. ! cow's Cuban prow forces. Said a high-level American strat- . roT3TV Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 archenemy. The early-January visit to Peking by Defense international class struggle and to support "national-lihera- Secretary Harold Brown gave special urgency to this pro- tion'struggles" so long as they avoided a nuclear confronta- posal. Some ranking officials pressed for a change in the ad- tion with the United States. Repeatedly 'since 1972, they ministration policy that barred the sale of American arms to have used that principle-and on an escalating scale. China but that did not oppose weapons sales by European In the 1973 Mideast war, they were aware of an immi- allies- With most European countries reluctant to risk Mos- nent Arab attack and failed to honor a pledge to consult the cog's displeasure, these officials argued that the. U.S. at U.S. to avert a potentially dangerous crisis. In Angola and least should provide China with technology to modernize Ethiopia, Russian military intervention, with the help of an its own defense industry. army of Cuban proxies, had a decisive impact on the course .n Expand the American military presence in the Middle of a local conflict. In South Yemen, they supported an abor- East and Indian Ocean region quickly to counter Soviet am- tive invasion of North Yemen, again smith .the backing of bitions in this strategically vital region- Somalia, Kenya and Cuban proxies. And in Indo-China they gave active encour- Oman already have offered the U.S. access to naval and air agement plus large-scale material support. to Communist facilities. Some U.S. officials urged the administration to ac- Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia. cept a new offer by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to, use Administration officials assert that the. invasion of Af- base: in the Sinai: ghanistan by the Red Army rather than by p.=oxy forces Whatever the long-term impact of Carter's strategy, one represents "a quantum jump in the- nature of Soviet behav- thing was clear: Moscow's massive invasion of Afghanistan for-" Ins fact, strategic analysts-including former Secretary struck at the very heart of Carter's foreign policy. and of State Henry Kissinger as well as experts in the Penta- shocked the President. gon-for the past year have warned that :Moscow was set Early in his administration Carter emphasized that his ting the stage for just such direct military intervention. in foreign policy would give reduced priority to the Soviet local conflicts in the 19S0s. threat, which he tended to discount. In a speech at Notre They pointed to two ominous developments. First, under . Dame University on May 22, 1977, he set the theme of his the umbrella of nuclear parity with the U.S., Soviet policy- approach toward Russia: We are now free of... inordinate. makers were revising their estimate of how far they, could fear of Communism." go without ,risking ,a superpower conflict. Second, the im- A change of heart. Now the President apparently has a pressive buildup of the Soviet Navy and airlift %%-as provid- far different perception of the Soviet threat, as:evidenced ing the Kremlin with the capability to intervene militarily, by this confession in a December 31 ABC-TV- interview: in distant regions. Considering these circumstances, strate "The action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic gic analysts. say, the Russians' decision to cross. a historic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals threshold by sending their own military forces into Afghan- are than anything theyve done in the previous time that istan was not surprising. The invasion, they maintain, has I've been in office." profound strategic implications far beyond the borders of Soviet-affairs experts say that Carter's shock reflected a Afghanistan-even.thoughthe primary Soviet objective ap- lack of .understanding of the fundamental difference be- patently was to prevent. a Communist government from riveen the American and Russian definition of detente: being overthrown by anti-Communist Moslem insurgents. From the outset, Washington has viewed detente not only Two-sided, squeeze: The military occupation of that as a way of reducing the risk of nuclear war but also as a de country by.the Red Army, the analysts maintain, is part of a vice for restraining Russian behavior around the world. For double squeeze aimed at confronting China on one side example, as recently as October 16, the State Department's and the oil wealth-of the Persian Gulf region on the other. special adviser on Soviet affairs, Marshall Shulman, said the In this the Russians are posing the most serious threat to U.S. has failed to establish "a broad understanding on American interests in a quarter of a century-namely, oil ground rules for our continuing political competition, espe-? supplies vital to the U.S., and even more so to its European cially in the Third ' World: and' Japanese allies. To quote Egypt's President Anwar Sa- The Russians, by contrast, have insisted all along that de- dat: The battle around the oil stores has already begin." hos- tente permitted them to continue and even intensify the Crowing turbulence in Iran-where 50 American h tages were still in captivity. in Te e- ~:,; ran-was seen as an invitation for a fur- "battle" for Persian Gulf oil. Besides its traditional interest in expanding its southern ? borders and pushing toward warm-water ports, Moscow now has a powerful new incentive;, to ex its influence' in this area. Th I nr .- diets that the Soviet Union will require substantial oil imports in the 1980s. It was against. this somber back- ground ? that President Carter was forced, to reassess his foreign policy in the wake of the Soviet power. play' in Afghanistan. .Kremlin's Willingness. to use, the Af- ghanistan operation as a model for fu- ture takeovers would depend in large, part on the price they are forced to pay Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 I THE BALTIMORE SUN 8 January 1980 By CHARLES W. CORDDRY Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington-Tbe Soviet Union, contin- uing to tighten its grip on Afghanistan, has dispatched a deputy defense minister to command operations from Kabul and is rapidly building up army and air forces for a long occupation, authoritative gov ernment sources reported yesterday`. There is not the slightest evidence that Carter administration warnings' and ac- tions have in any way slowed the deter- mined buildup; these sources said, as the-1 Russians continue to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan's main towns, roads and airfields. .Over ..the weekend;:: the government sources reported, Sergey. L Sokolov, Mar-' shal of the Soviet Union; one of Moscow's` three first deputy defense ministers, ar- rived in Kabul : to take: charge of opera- tions and, in effect, of the country which is theoretically: under the rule of . Afghan Communist Babrak Karmal. The sources also disclosed that a fresh- Soviet division has begun to move toward. Afghanistan from its base north of the Ira- nian border near Kizyl-Arvat, just east'of. the Caspian Sea. At the State Department yesterday, spokesman Hodding Carter III. estimated that Soviet troops in Afghanistan or on its borders number 80,000.. Specifically, he, said 50,000 to 60,000 now are in the coun try and another 20,000 to. 25,000. are on-the borders and possibly beginning to move in:: Counting all. these forces; including those moving from the Iranian border, the. Soviet Union now is believed to have five mechanized- infantry - divisions and , the equivalent of 'a paratroop division corn.. mitted to the invasion. Three squadrons of jet fighters'and'ground attack' planes have been established on. air bases- north of= Kabul and' in- the west near. the-: main' north-south road. With the consolidation of their grip on' population centers, highways:. and'- air fields, Russian specialists here said, the Soviet forces under Marshal Sokolov are likely to make the sealing of the Afghan border with Pakistan their No.1 task. With helicopter.. gunships and, . winter' weather 'as. their maiti.allies, the forces .will seek, by this judgment, to end Afghan rebels' use of Pakistan sanctuaries for, . cross-border forays., The risks here are -i self-evident, for they could lead to Soviet I but pursuit of rebels across the border.,.:. ;-The United States has warned that a Russian invasion of Pakistan could trigger..- the, 1959 U.S. treaty with that country. The Russian: specialists consulted yesterday . predicted the potential for hot pursuit.: operations could bring sterner U.S. warn- commenting on the Soviet buildup,'',.~ the. State: Department's Mr CarLer Galled It no'n ere expeditionary operation but the,. core:Ali.a_permanent?forc& andiald the; Soviet role "is likely to continue growing, replacing the Afghan army units until a more loyal force can be raised." There. have been.widespread Afghan Army de-'. He was asked the obvious question, about the Soviet buildup continuing in the ; face-'6f administration. actions against. Moscow,` and replied this way: The inva-, sion "amounts to contemptuous rejection byword and deed of the protests raised by scores of nations around the globe." As for'further.U.S. responses; Mr. Car.I ter said be would not go beyond those al.: ready ;announced-the chief ono being 2,1 grain : embargo -and . certainly was not :going to Answer "Anything to do with" the question of American arms supplies for rebel forces fighting the Soviet units.._ y_tntellizence assessmentshere, there has been far less fIgh counts from South Asian points have indi . cat There have been skirmishes as the Soviet forces 'swiftly' moved into kev areas, it was -reported,' but no battles of enough Importance for the Russian coin. mandersto call ln.reinforcements. The Soviet forces-other than .'those flown In-entered Afghanistan' on two main arteries One rap south from'Terme; oA Afghanistan's nortbernbordeir,?where:. yMarshal' Sokolov laltlaily` had kenddqquar-'! tees, and wound into Kabul: The: division that took that, route Is 'now deployed ,round Kabul. with control of all access routes, the government sources said. The, second avenue was from Kuska at Afghanistan's northwest border. Over this route, ;a rifle division made its way to Herat, took the airfield at Shindand, and sent advance elements to Kandahar In the southeast of the country.: Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 A^-:TIC'.,i APP"': i'D THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) ON FG 8 January 1980 U.S. Esil aces :Sovle NPR Have.: ,Tr opsinAfghanistan .0 New' orkT{mesNewiService " C re of a. lar er permanent The United States, says the Soviet force to be deployed in the future.." Union; in "contemptuous: rejection The Soviet military role and of President Carter and other world objectives in Afghanistan, therefore, leaders, has continued to reinforce are likely to continue growing, prob- its military presence in Afghanistan, ably replacing the remaining loyal ,raising the total over the weekend to...,, Afghan army units until anew, more `as many as 85;000 troops. - reliable and effective Afghan army U.S. officials said the, number was, 'can be formed," he said. likely to rise more than 100, When President Carter spoke out Expressing the administration's intelligence. sources estimated there anger at the accelerating-interven-"...were 50,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops in tion, the. State Department accused Afghanistan, the spokesman said. Moscow of building up-..a large,. Over--the weekend, he added, the ,permanent military presence in Af number may have risen by an addi- ghanistan. tonal 20,000 to 25,000 men The Soviet Union has said it was The. spokesman said-there were sending only'a limited contingent signs that two to three Soviet army and would withdraw it when its mis- ~ divisions may be mobilizing north of sion was over. The State Department the Afghan border, and other offi- said the facts challenged that state., cials said they expected them to ment. ?: cross into Afghanistan shortly In releasing the-latest intelligence The.spokesman said that "so far, .estimates, the department s o es- the major Soviet military objective j mg-R,713ifaing Carter 111, sat- the.- ? has been to secure the key cities and Russians were probably creating' lines of communication.". Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 A,~TICLZ=''?'_ THE WASHINGTON STAR ON PAGE 6 January 1980 Rearming By Michael Ledeen Michael Leeden, is editor of Washing ton Quarterly, published by George- town's- Center for Strategic and In Studies The Soviet Union has been the- midwife at.Jimmy Carter's latest re- birth. The invasion of Afghanistan. has compelled the president to alter. his view of the Russians. But the presi- dent - and the country - must not simply look for a "punishment" or a. face-saving device (although .we must certainly attempt to restore our credibility). We must forthwith unburden. ourselves of the danger- ous mythology of the recent past and get down to some hard thinking-and acting. This means that we must-de- fine our own strategic interests and find ways of advancing them. The first.step must take place in Washington. If, as he now: says,. the president has been systematically misled about the nature of the Soviet Union for more than three years he must insure that he is' vised in the future. Those advisers who failed to understand the Krem- lin should step aside and be replaced by those who accurately. warned about the consequences of Andrew Youngism and other forms of post- Vietnam folly. The president needs a'. crash course in strategy. Then he needs to ask for strategic tools to do the job.. This brings us to the second step: rearming the United States.. We owe the Kremlin a great debt-of gratitude for reminding us about the utility of military power, and we should emu- late, theircareful preparations for strategic contingencies. Their action in Afghanistan is a great triumph for them (at least for the moment).. But they could not have done. it without years of military spending, research and planning.. We must fol- low.suit. Instead of laboring under the illusion that Leonid. Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter share common vi- sions (as the secretary of state put it just before the Vienna Summit), we must set about defending. ourselves from our enemies. . If the American people are to-sup- port a serious rearmament program.. they will have to be told why this ef- fort is necessary. The Russians have made this task quite simple. All we have to do is explain the Soviet mo- tives for the invasion of Afghanis- tan. The Russians are. now. closing in on the vital Strait-of Hormuz from two directions: from the North, .across Afghanistan and Iran, and .from the South, via South Yemen .and the Horn of Africa on the oppo- site side of the Red Sea. If the Soviets control that part of the world, they will control the. economies- and hence- the civilizations of the western world. . If it comes to that, we must pre pare to fight, and win, a war for the Persian. Gulf. The Russians are pre- pared to fight -= they are stockpiling.' their best tanks and fighter planes Those who study military rob- lems have not been encoura ins of late. Even before the Russian move into Afghanistan,- the consensus o7 ! eon; CIA and private analysts was that we would be ver^Fart pressed indeed to match Soviet nniii tars powerin that part , the world. This should not surprise anyone, since. the Russians have been out spending (and out-investing), us for .years in the military sector. The situation is. urgent, then, and: we -must act accordingly. EXCERPTED Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ==r~"x''D TIME o:i PAjl~__Lp~ 14 January 1980 It was as though a time warp had plunged the world back into an earlier and more dan- gerous era. Soviet divisions had swarmed across the border of a neigh- boring country and turned it into a new satellite. Moscow and Washington were exchanging .very angry words. Jimmy Carter accused Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev of lying, and the Soviets' TASS press agency shot back that Carter's statements were "bellicose and wicked." For Carter, the rapid series of events in Afghanistan seemed to provide a remarkable kind of revelation. Said he, sounding strikingly naive in an ABC tele- vision interview: "My opinion of the Rus- sians has changed most drasticall y in the last week (morel than even in the pre- vious 2Y2 years before that." He added that it was "imperative" that "the leaders of the world make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot have taken this action .to vi- olate world peace ... without paying se- vere political consequences." What those consequences might be was the subject of week-long strategy ses- sions and then on Friday night Carter.set , forth his response to the bold Soviet chat- lenge. Appearing for 13 minutes on na- tionwide television, he delivered the toughest speech of. his presidency. Warned Carter. "Aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease." He de- nounced the Soviet invasion-of Afghani , stan as "a deliberate effort by a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an in- dependent Islamic people" and said that a "Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping- stone to their possible control over much of theworld's oil supplies." Carter then announced that he was sharply cutting the sale to the Soviets of two kinds of goods they desperately need: grain and advanced technology. Con- tracts for 17 million tons of grain, worth . $2 billion, are being canceled. Soviet fish- ing privileges in American waters are also being severely curtailed, as are new cul- tural exchange programs; Carter further hinted that the U.S. might boycott this summer's Moscow Olympics. To shore up Afghanistan's neighbors, Carter said that the U.S. "along with other countries will provide military equipment, food and oth- er assistance" to help Pakistan defend its independence. These actions were only the latest in an escalating series of retaliatory moves. Carter officially requested the Senate to I postpone any further consideration of the . U.S.-Soviet treaty to limit strategic arms, once the chief symbol of superpower , detente. The U.S. and nearly 50 other countries then called for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council to condemn the latest Soviet aggression. That meeting convened on Saturday. And the U.S. summoned Ambassador Thomas J. Watson Jr. home from Moscow for con- sultations. (Not even during the crisis trig- gered by the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the American ambassador recalled from Moscow.) ad a new cold war erupted be- tween the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Not quite. At least not yet. But it seemed certain that the pot- icy known as detente, which stressed co- operation between the two competing nu- clear giants, had not survived the 1970s.. The events of last week stood also as a grim reminder that it is not the Amer- ican hostages in Iran'that are the central object of U.S. foreign policy, but rather the potentially life-and-death relationship with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan was an odd and remote focal point for such a U.S.-Soviet crisis. The snow-swept, mountainous land has few natural resources, and its. Muslim tribesmen are more than 90% illiterate. Yet it was here that the Soviets chose to do something they had not done since World War II: in a blitzkrieg involving an estimated 50,000 soldiers, supported by tanks and helicopter gunships, the Soviet army crashed across the Afghan border to take control of a country that had not been a member of the Soviet bloc. By forcefully expanding its international sphere of direct control, the Kremlin in ef- fect had violated a.fundamental ground rule of East-West relations. In a meeting . with his top aides, Carter said sternly that the Soviet invasion is "a quantum jump in the nature of. Soviet behavior. And if they get through this with'relative polit- ical and economic impunity, it will have serious consequences on the world in years to come." In an attempt to mobilize a broad in- ternational condemnation of the Soviet action, the President telephoned half a i dozen. foreign leaders and cabled about 25 others, stressing to them how gravely the U.S. viewed the matter. The U.S. made a special effort to ral- ly the NATO allies. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher flew to Lon- don to meet with high-ranking British, West German, French, Italian. and. Ca- nadian diplomats, then on to a New Year's Day emergency meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The NATO al- lies agreed to review thoroughly. their re- lations with the Soviet Union and to..find ways to back countries near Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan, which is not only frightened by the increased proximity of Soviet army, units but is also deeply trou- bled by the mounting chaos in neighbor- ing Iran. They also decided to solicit sup- port from Third World states for a U.N. declaration against Moscow. The U.S. re- ceived.the strongest support from the Brit- ish; Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has been taking a tough anti-Soviet stand since coming to office last year. Though the French were less firm, a.French dip- lomat later said, "Like the U.S., we feel' strongly that Soviet intervention in Af- ghanistan is wrong." One of the fundamental questions. was why the Soviets had suddenly torn the fabric of U.S.-Soviet relations and in- ternational order by such an undisguised invasion.. Moscow had its own rationale. According to the Soviet-government dai- ly Izvestia, the U.S.S.R.'s troops had saved Afghanistan from being subverted by the. CIA and turned into an American base. Other Soviet versions said the U.S. had teamed up with Pakistan, China and Egypt . to carry out "primarily anti-so- viet designs." They described leftist Pres- ' ident Hafizullah Amin, who was exe- cuted four days after the Soviet invasion : Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 began, as a tyrant working for the CIA. When Carter used his hot line to send Brezhnev a tough protest about the in- vasion on Dec. 28,'the Communist leader claimed that the Soviets had been invited by President Amin to protect the nation . from an unnamed outside threat. It was this-lame explanation that an- infuriated Carter later denounced as "completely in- adequate and completely misleading." In- deed, the Administration was acquiring evidence that the Soviets had master- minded the entire coup that had led to the crisis (see following story). he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was condemned not only by West- ern leaders but by numbers of Third World countries, including Egypt, Tunisia and the Sudan. The Saudi 1 Arabia-based Islamic World League de- clared that "the Communist aggression aims at eliminating the Muslim presence in Afghanistan. In Turkey, which has been. plagued by mounting economic. problems and . political instability (see WORLD), military leaders alluded to the' Afghanistan crisis when they warned ri- val civilian politicians to start working to- gether or face overthrow. Even Iran's fanatical leaders de- nounced the Soviet invasion. DuririnnanI audience with the Ayatullah Ruhollah omeini oviet Ambassador to Iran _ - Vladimir Vinogradov tried to ex lain that his country ha moved in Afghanistan I against CIS and orust agents-two spec- ters that Khomeini himself routinely in- vokes to justify his own actions. But-.the Soviet apparently got nowhere. A mem- ber of Iran's clerical establishment later said that the Ayatullah sharply told ?ttie envoy that "Brezhnev was stepping into the Shah's shoes and was heading.for the same catastrophe that befell the ex-dic- tator. He said that the Soviets would come to grief if they remained in Afghanistan." If anyone in the Administration could have smiled during last week's crisis. it was National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has long been trying to get Carter to take a tougher stance to- ward the Soviets, and who has long been paying particular attention to Afghani- stan. Since July, he has regarded the left- ist Afghanistan regime as vulnerable 'to the Muslim insurgents, and he has even enjoyed hinting, without saying so, that the U.S. might covertly aid those insur- gents. To reporters and other visitors, he would recite statistics from secret cables that littered his desk. He could tick off the casualties the Soviets were suffering and would detail the number of coffins flown in to remove the dead. Nor was Brzezinski alone., U.S. into!- licence knew that Moscow had sent huge shipments of ranks artillery and other I weapons to the Kabul regime but that this l failed to stop the rebellion, and that by I midsummer the Afghan army had be- gun to crumble. Desertions cut it from a high of about 150,000 men to about 50,000. U.S. intelligence' knew that Mos- I cow s. o -eve mi t a egauon to Kabul i n , ustLheaded by Ge,n ta) _ Ivan. Pavlovskv, chief of Soviet ground forces. U.S. intelligence knew that Pav_ lovsky reported after a two-month study that Afghanistan was falling apart and that the Soviet army could restore order ,XCL-aTED Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ARTICLE ON PAGE Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 .LF I. TIME 14 January 1980 how tht Sovet ATE urush- -ed Afthian mtan But rebels may find ways to fight back When-you are wounded and left on A ghanistan 's plains, And the women come out to cutup what remains, Just roll to your rifle and blow out your brains And go to your God like a soldier. That was Rudyard Kipling's tribute to Afghanistan, a barren moonscape of a land at the "crossroads of the world." and to its proud and savage people. Conquered by Alexander the Great in the 4th cen- tury B.C. and by Genghis Khan in the 13th century A.D., Afghanistan in the Victorian era served as a buffer between Imperial Russia and the British raj. The . Afghans accepted it all, but they, exacted: a bloody price. For generations, the Hin- dus-of India prayed for deliverance from "the venom of the cobra, the teeth of the tiger and the vengeance of the Afghan." Today the target of the Afghans' an- ger is the Soviet force. of 50,000 troops who have invaded and seized control of their land. "Shoravi Padar Lanath!"cried beggars and shopkeepers alike in the, streets of Kabul, Afghanistan's shabby, snow-covered capital. The curse ("God- damn the Russians") replaced morning pleasantries in the city's ancient bazaar. in central Kabul to the Darulaman Pal- ace, seven miles away, taking his elite guard and eight tanks along with him. It was too late, and the defense was too weak. That same night, the Soviets be- - gan their airlift of troops into Kabul. Between Dec. 24 and 27, at least 350 Soviet aircraft landed at Kabul Interna- tional Airport and at Bagram airbase, 25 miles north of the capital. The planes had been mustered from bases throughout the Soviet Union; they carried an airborne di- vision from near Moscow and support troops from Turkestan. On Dec. 27, Rus- sian airborne troops stormed the Daru- laman Palace. Amin was captured and shot, along with some of his relatives. The only other serious clash - was -a skirmish outside Radio Afghanistan, just across from the U.S. embassy. In both fights, Af- ghan. troops loyal to Amin resisted as best they could and, inflicted about 250 casu- alties, but they were no match for the So- viets. By the next day, Dec. 28, the cap- ital was. entirely in Soviet hands. Amin, whom the Soviet press had treated with respect until only a few days earlier:. was now being described as ''a man who was the service of the CIA" and a "usurp- er" who condemned former President a- raki to death. "Afghanistan is no more," lamented a ~' - bootblack in the shopping district of Share : Nau. "We have lost everything." - And so it seemed. A week earlier, in a lightning invasion, four Soviet divisions moved into Afghanistan, the iron fist be- hind a coup that ended the three-month-, old regime of PresidentHafizullah Amin.' The unfortunate Amin, 50, who had turned out to be a more independent- minded nationalist than Moscow wanted, thus became the third leader of Afghan- istan to be overthrown and killed within the past 20 months. In his place the So- viets installed Babrak Katmai, 50, a for- mer Deputy Prime Minister who had long been considered a Russian protege. The Soviet seizure had apparently been taking shape for several. months. Moscow had disliked the truculent Amin ever since he had replaced a Soviet fa- vorite, Noor Mohammed Taraki, in the coup of Sept. 15. As the Muslim insur- gency kept gaining strength in the coun- tryside, Moscow proposed to Amin that Soviet combat forces be brought in to put down the rebellion. Amin refused. On Dec. 24, the Soviets made a last at- tempt to persuade Amin to cooperate, but again. he said no. Apparently seeking to protect himself, or perhaps on Soviet or- ders, he..moved from the People's House , EXCERPTED Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ON 11"A GE_ THE NEW YORK TIMES 6 January 1980 opine' to Limit ,Soviet in Afghan Area By DREW MIDDLETON i Only a minority of United States,offs-j gals consulted in government depart-; !nents believe that the Soviet Union can! be deterred from completing the occupa- ,lion of Afghanistan and eliminating all but scattered and ineffective resistance. is Accounts of-fierce battles Military guerrillas and Soviet forces emanating! Analysis ? from Islamabad, Pakistan , and from New Delhi. are not Need for U.S. Ground Fortis. Some officials contend that the pres ence of naval and air forces alone will not deter the Russians. They are convincedi that the deployment of American ground) forces is necessary. But they wonder, whether Saudi Arabia, ? for example,'. would accept the_ stationing of, say, an; American brigade, about 4,800 men, in its territory in view of the current contra; :versy over the Saudis' Westernization' program. The potential danger to Pakistan aris- ing from a Soviet presence in Alghani- stan appears to many. officials to be more' worry some than .the prospect of anti. Western rebellion in SaudiArabia.' They favor an early transfer of arms to Paki- stan despite the likelihood that this would drive India closer to the Soviet Union. Differences also exist among officials over the usefulness of 'sending arms to thei ..Afghan rebels through Pakistan or a cov j ert American operation.: - Some officers say the weapons- would not be used effectively as long as the Af ghan, guerrillas. remain. disunited andi i hostile tointernai. discipline or outside] control. Others argue that the guerrillas,;. as the only forces engaged against Soviet ! troops; should be helped. One policy that looks attractive tol many officers is. the start of-arms trans- fers to China, which are now prohibited. Senior officials said that Secretary of De-; fense Harold Brown,' now in Peking, is likely to discuss Chinese arms needs. An increase in Chinese strength, !Lis said, would divert the Soviet Union from further moves in Southwest Asia. Critics; of such a view say that any program that! would 'affect significantly China's mili-i tary potential: vis4a vis the Soviet Union! would have to be so large that it would be! beyond the capacity of the United Staten and its West European allies. z i based (!on, American intelligence aides said. The Unit States is therefore search- ing, for measures that will shore up the West's position in the critical area that stretches from Turkey to India.. Such measures would be designed to stabilize{ the area and make the Soviet leadershi think twice before resuming its thrust. Most officials said they considered that the Soviet Union's? strategy was to con- solidate its position in Afghanistan and then exert pressure on Pakistan, Iran and! ,the Arabian Peninsula.. . Officials .differ on, the gravity and likely duration of the crisis. Oneofficiali regards it as the gravest ,international situation facing the United States since! World War II. He is one of those who ex1 pect the Russians to use Afghanistan as al base for further pressure. Move Called Predictable This view is. rejected by State. Depart ment aides who view the intervention as a, predictable reaction to the Soviet Union's fears that it was losing control of Af-i ghanistan and that military'and political chaos there might peril its security. These officials believe that the Rus- sians acted on the basis of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which calls for inter- vention to preserve Communist govern- ments within the Soviet orbit. The doc- trine was invoked in 1968, when the Soviet! .Union led an invasion of Czechoslovakia . out of fear that a liberalized form of Com- munism there was endangering its con- trol.. Despite these differences there is gen- eral agreement that the situation re- quires a credible American response. Discussions of the military options open to Washington give priority to the establishment of bases in the region. Three. candidates are Masira Island off Oman, Berbera in Somalia, and. Mom- basa in Kenya. Any agreements with the governments concerned. are are regarded only as a first step toward establishing operational bases. The length of runways, the depth of channels and harbors, the condition of existing storage and maintenance facili- ties must be determined before final deci- sions are taken. The earliest date for the Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ARTICLE ppv.! ~- YD NEWSWEEK ON 14 January 1980 PERISCOPE JIMMY'S TALE OF RUSSIAN DECEIT Jimmy Carter's hot-line exchange with Leonid Brezhnev over Afghanistan was not his first personal encounter with Soviet duplicity. In the summer of 1978, Carter told White House visitors about an experience with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who had come to the Oval Office to discuss the ; pending SALT II negotiations. Sitting on Carter's desk at that moment was an intelligence report so detailed-and accurate= that it not only supplied chapter and verse on Soviet involvement in Ethiopia's war against the Somalis, but named a Russian general who had been taken ill in Africa and rushed back to .Moscow. Carter repeated the incriminating data to Gromyko, who listened stoically and replied in effect: "Mr. President, what general? What troops? We have no troops in Ethiopia." Telling the story to his guests, Carter ended by saying: "And that man sat there and lied to me. He lied to my face. I just can't imagine an American diplomat doing that sort of thing." Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 STAT Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 FAVORABLE EDITORIALS (CAN'T BELIEVE -- NOW A SEPARATE CATEGORY FOR FAVORABLE EDITORIALS) Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 7 JANIUARY 1980 Cord Meyer A recu m. to covert actin One inevitable result of the events in Afghanistan and the frustrating stale- mate in Iran will be-a move by a majority in Congress to lift the restrictions that now prevent the U.S. from taking any. effective covert action abroad. In the debate over what .kind. of covert action is necessary and how it should be authorized, the Carter ad- ministration will have to fight on, two fronts in Con- gress.Then the president will be obliged to resolve basic differences between. Secretary of State Vance and national security adviser Zbigniew. Brzezinski. In this complex dispute, there. is near unanimity on one point. The Hughes-Ryan amendment, passed in 1974 in reaction to Nixon's unilateral intervention in Chile, needs to be changed. Under this legislation, eight committees of Congress, about 200 elected represen- tatives and staffers, must be informed of any proposed secret intervention abroad. There is broad agreement that the secrecy essential to the success. of covert action cannot be preserved under these circumstances. The liberal majority on the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee has conceded this point, and in a new legal charter for the CIA worked- out between the committee and the administration there is a provision that in .the future only the Senate and House Intelligence Com- mittees need be informed of covert operations. These two committees have a de- served, reputation for tight security. But other liberal senators are pressing for legislation that would require the presi- dent to report in detail and in advance to the two com- mittees on any proposed covert intervention. The ad- ministration is resisting this prior reporting requirement as an invasion of the presi- dent's constitutional author- ity. While this unresolved dispute is holding up com- mittee agreement on the new CIA charter, the Carter administration faces an en- tirely different situation in the House Committee 'on Intelligence and in the Con- gress, as a whole. Among a majority coalition of moder- ate Democrats and Republi- cans, enthusiasm' for a new restrictive CIA charter is notably absent. These moderates. see no chance in this election year of passing. any charter and, they want to mediately to vote for a change in Hughes-Ryan to restore to the -CIA its lost covert action capability. The Carter-Mondale strategy. is to reach early agreement with the Senate liberals on a charter that is much less restrictive than the original Senate version.: Repeal of Hughes-Ryan will be included as a "sweet- .ever" to attract conserva- tive votes. The more realistic White House advisers acknowl- edge that even a long-leash CIA charter has no chance of passage in the present atmosphere. They plan to ad- vise the president to settle for what he can get in the form of a separate vote on Hughes-Ryan. But this loosening of con- gressional restrictions on covert action will only bring to the surface funda- mental differences between Vance andBrzezinski as to the role and purpose of cov- ert intervention. During his Senate confir- i mation hearing, Vance said that covert action should be used "only in the most ex- traordinary circumstances" when it is "vital to the na- tional security." Under this doctrine, covert interven- tion is seen as morally repugnant and only justified as a last resort. White House national se- curity staffers criticize this doctrine as "the extreme unction" version of covert action,:the kind of desperate intervention which is least likely to be effective. Pragmatic White House aides have no illusions that covert action is an Aladdin's i lamp for the harsh dilem- mas of our times. They real- ize that it takes time to build confidential relationships and far-sighted judgment to decide what political groups merit support. Carter himself will have ! to decide between these two quite different attitudes to- ward covert action. Having preached with moralistic fervor the virtue of non- intervention, the president will not find it an easy choice to make. But the Rus- sian invasion of Afghanis- tan has changed perceptions across the board. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05TOO644ROO0501340001-1 PALMER TEXAS RUSTLER 29 November 1979 CIA Officers Must "Live and e" in Anonymity AT A. STOPLIGHT ON ROUTE 123 in Northern Virginia- across the Potomac River and eight miles from downtown Washington, D.C." is a road leading to the western entrance to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters. At first glance it appears to be a tree-shaded country lane slop- ing back into a thick forest. But then you spot the poles for the high intensity lighting system that marches along the road and the chain link fence set back from the roadway and, at the end, a modernistic guar- dhouse with a red light, a stop. sign and the ever-present guards. The layout of the place,. by design, creates the atmosphere of a college campus. The 219 acre facility is dominated by the 1 million square foot main building. On the south wall of the cen- tral lobby in that building are jarved the words from the Book pf John, Chapter Eight, Verse 32: And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free. On the north wall of the lobby are 35 stars. -Each of those stars' is a memorial, honoring a CIA employee whose life was lost in service of country. The Bentsen bill will provide needed assistance, to those widows and children whose husbands and fathers,are killed overseas as a result of hostile or terrorist acts, or in-'connection with intelligence activites that carry a substantial-degree of risk. Benefits such as this are already available to employees of the. U.S. State Department killed under similar cir- cumstances: And the federal government also provides death benefits, to the survivors of public safety officers killed in the line of duty. in this country. We are familiar with the name of one of those in- dividuals: Richard Welch, CIA Station Chief in Athens, Greece. He was shot down by three gunmen at about 10 p.m. on the night of December 23, 1975 as he drove up to his house in an Athens suburb from a Christmas party. THE NAMES OF THE OTHERS are generally unknown. The names of many of these dedicated Americans can never be revealed. It is the-nature of .th6r,'workt, that CIA officers must live, and. die, in anonymity. But it is not. necessary that their passing go completely un- noted by a grateful nation. I have introduced legislation to provide a year's salary to the widows and children of CIA employees killed in line of duty. We live in a time of'global in. stability and danger.' We face ~ aggressive, provocative and dangerous behavior by adver- saries who are bent' on the destruction of freedoms we Americans have come to take for granted. I WOULD HOPE THAT BENEFITS never have to be paid out under the bill I-have in- troduced. Nevertheless, the dangers of the world-An which we live are. very real-and make necessary its passage:% It is fair legislationr:It is just. It is a clear statement in sup- -port of intelligence officers who serve their country at great per- sonal risk and I am hopeful it will be given swift approval by Congress. There are eight...medals awarded by the CIA for heroism or meritorious service.- The highest medal they can bestow is the Distinguished In- telligence Cross, awarded for: "...a voluntary act or acts of ex- ceptional heroism involving the acceptance of existing,: dangers with conspicuous fortitude and exemplary courage." -: There is also an Exceptional Service Medal, for those who are injured or killed in line of duty. hete_js, of course, a caveat that accompanies medals given ?d&it''by ill C'IA. Recipients, or their 'su ,i rs, are cautioned not to tell anyone about them. If in the future, God forbid, a 1 survivor is ever notified that the I Exceptional Service Medal has been awarded, I would like to see it accompanied by a full year's pay. It's little enough. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05TOO644ROO0501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 THE PITTSBURGH PRESS 16 December 1979 Among other things, the Iran crisis is forcinc critics of the Central Intelligence Agency to rethink their gung-ho desire to gut the CIA. The mindless rush of recent years to hold the CIA up as a bunch of stumble- bum spooks spreading havoc around the globe has severely damaged the U. S. in. telligence-gathering and covert-action. apparatus. It has not only undermined morale at the CIA but it has resulted in restrictions so severe that the agency can hardly make a move without telling so many people about it that it may as well post a public list of what it's doing every day. No fewer than 150 congressional-com- mittee members and aides are privy to any "covert" action that the CIA might . want to undertake. That's because a law passed in 1974 requires that the CIA promptly notify seven separate Senate and House committees. A covert action is one aimed at influ- encing the course of events in a foreign country to our country's advantage. It might range from spreading propaganda to supporting a coup. When the anti-CIA crowd was in full' - cry, there was serious debate about pro- hibiting the agency from carrying out any covert actions. Congress eventually rejected that. But it put into effect such strict reporting requirements that it's al- most impossible for the CIA to under- take any covert action. It is simply ridiculous to have 150 members. of Congress and staff aides looking over the CIA's shoulder. It gives any one of them an instant veto over any CIA covert activity - by simply "leak- ing" word to some reporter. Nobody can justify everything the CIA has done in the past. And certainly the CIA should not be given leave to go around plotting the assassination of for- eign leaders or arranging the overthrow of governments. But there's a big difference between reining in the CIA and destroying its ability to function effectively in a mean and devious world. As one intelligence officer recently observed: "We need something between sending' in the Marines and doing nothing." Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05TOO644ROO0501340001-1 NEW HAVEN REGISTER 20, December 1979 Aleed For Strengthening Intelligence Forces Who but glossy-eyed visionaries and other assorted wooly-minded thinkers could feel content over the dismantling of America's intelligence services over the past decade? We doubt that, even today, such individuals and others of the so-called liberal intelligentsia would concede the damage done to this country . by the attacks! of the, 1970s on the CIA and. FBI. .The ordinary citizen, with a practical, down-to-. earth perception of what is happening in `world affairs,. can: readily grasp what a disadvantage we've dealt ourselves by the probes, condemnations; and. constraints which have: been the.. plight of ,our intelligence-gathering services. during these years. It is a perception that garners no solace in the harsh conclusions. drawn by a foreign affairs special- ist, British writer David Rees, that "the. American security system has. been seriously weakened .as . a result of this country's self-flagellation. Rees, writing on "The Crisis in United States Intelligence" for the institute for the. Study of Con flict, ..a private- research group, found that "the glaring congressional and media investigations of the intelligence services in the mid-1970s. resulted in loss of morale and secrecy, compounded by political I interference and bureaucracy, with consequent loss of efficiency." ' _ . Rees 'blamed a certain elite - members of the academic world, the media, think tanks and the bureaucracy - for the crippling of America's capa- bilities around the world; on the twisted premise that America's. strength: was immoral and dangerous, while on. the other hand, the world presumably had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union.. We see : the .results..The Soviets are moving troops en masse into Afghanistan, but the exact number is a matter of speculation. As: is the Russian's. purpose. There is the hostage situation in Iran. Then there Was the.. confrontation over Soviet combat troops in Cuba. And so- on. America is faltering on the foreign policy front; deprived of an essential_guide, the intelligence- that could be obtained from a potent and effective CIA. The: Soviets mean business; they've never stopped meaning-. business. We can't. let the eggheads. who refuse to believe the Russians, aided by their KGB, are still intent to.. dominate us, one way or another, prevail.. Restoring strength and purpose to our intelligence services should be a high. priority item: Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05TOO644ROO0501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 BOSTON HERALD-AMERICAN 25`December 1979 We've out intelligence Someone once said, "We will-- We . cannot, because the FBI's ran. It is also sharply focused in rue the day we pulled the teeth powers of surveillance are se- a comment by writer John from the FBI and :the CIA for verely restricted. Even pro- Chamberlain, who noted: we left like sitting tecting.a President has become "... Former Acting Director, ducks." more difficult in cities where po- of the FBI Patrick Gray and WVell,in these days of'trial by lice files of subversives or poten- some of his subordinates were Iranian fires we canchange tial subversives have,, been de- indicted for the terrible . crime ofi "will rue the day'.' to "are'.rueing strayed. invading the civil liberties of thel the day;" for the folly of defang .Criticisms of the Federal Bu- V eathermen after that under ing our intelligence services is reap of -Investigation= and the ground group had inadvertently{{. painfully apparent. Central Intelligence Agency blown up a house in New. Yorkl No one~wants to be unkind to have not been entirely unwar- City's Greenwich. Village, killing] Iranian students studying in this ranted. Many have been just-- three of their own who lacked fi- country, supported, : by the way,. fled. In, many instances, how= nesse in handling explosives. I. . by money allocated by the :de-, ever, they :have backfired.' The The hue and cry against the'' posed shah, as part. of his pro-. extent of the backfiring is dem- FBI and .its -sister service; the gram to improve. Iranian educa-. onstrated,-by our. inability to CIA, was that their cops were tion...But isn't it fair for this _ find the few Iranians, if. any,, robbing our liberties and turning country to discern. hints.,of sub- who would aid : and abet: those the nation into a"police state." version, however remote? who imprison; Americans in Teh- A "policelegs state" is worse Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 IPAN Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ~ZLL A1?rr..~B';) THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE) ON 9 January 1980 l 11*s By.Henry:S. Bradsher Wasbingwa starStaff.writer: Ruhoilah'Khomeini might decide to order the re- lease of the American: hostages, the administra tion'is now moving toward the view that the mill tents holding: them are out of his control.. President Carter has received new information that makes him think it a serious possibility that the militants'holding the U.S.Embassy in Tehran cannot be controlled by the Khomeini regime. U.S. moves since the embassy was seized' Nov. 4 have been-intended to. pressureaheregime into having the hostages released. This view.- long held by some intelligence s e- cialists,.. tit now more widely acce t here ee ns.o tcta s pessimism about obtaining t o hosts es' re ease any time soon.. e administra- tion has flatly 'relecte the-mi ants' demands for the return ofexiled Shah Mohammed Reza Pah- lavi and his. money as the price for releasing the: estimated 50 American hostages. Instead, it still hopes that a steady tightening of pressure on Iran will bring about a change of, thinking in'Tehran that will lead to their. release. It hopes to isolate the militants from the support they have been receiving. An effort to isolate them began.publicly yester- day when White House Press Secretary Jody Pow- .ell suggested that the militants were pursuing Communist aims that were against the interests of Iran. Powell told reporters that "developments and conversations". had. raised. questions about Khomeini and his Revolutionary Council's being able to control the militants. This-provoked fur- ther questions about the militants' motives, he said. . "There is some reason to question whether they may not see chaos and disintegration in Iran as . .beneficial to their ends; and whether they are con- cerned' about the fate of. their fellow citizens, or more concerned about their own political ends," Powell said. Noting the Soviet Invasion of: Afghanistan and suppression of the Moslem nationalist resistance there. Powell suggested that Iranians. should. be concerned about letting the militants pursue their own goals in a way that could endanger their na- tion's integrity and:independence.. A senior official at the State Department said The. official was commenting on reports. from Tehran-that quoted *diplomats there as warning that.U N. economic sanctions would impede :ef forts to negotiate the hostages' release. He said the United States intended to continue pressing for sanctions.' There is no indication, officials here conclude, that, the negotiating efforts that a number of friendly countries and the United. Nations have made.on behalf of the United States are getting anywhere., The' negotiations are with the Iranian* government that is responsible to Khomeini, not with the militants themselves. "It is:not clear,".the senior official said, "that anyone can give an order (for the hostages' re- lease) that would be promptly obeyed" by the mill 'tarts. This-included Khomeini, although the mill tents identify themselves as "student followers of the imam's policy," referring to, the ayatollah. U.S.'knowledge of the situation inside the Teh- ran embassy remains limited. The militants are clearly divided into factions, with some reports even describing a system of strings within the 27- acre;embassy compound to divide different fat- tions' ter_ itory. But it is uncertain what views and goals the different groups hold. An unsatisfactorily limited amount of intelli- gence on the identity of the militants has been col- lected. isnows some to. a genuine students w, o have quit going to school to devote full time,to po- litical activities: Others seem to be older, more i. professional political activists. The official said there is no definite informa- tion on reports that some Palestinian terrorists are in the embassy. .The divisions among the militants apparently make it difficult for them to reach any conclu- sions,-and, statements from the embassy are some- times contradictory. Even if some factions were-to decide to-end the hijacking, a small-hard-line minority might be able to keep the Americans cap- tive.: But the administration still hopes that eventu- ally its pressure on Iran will have results. The sen- for official explained that, unlike most terrorist situations in which hijackers find themselves iso- lated, the militants are presently "swimming in a sea of popular support." "It would be useful to separate them from that sea," he said. So the United States. is bringing pres- sure on Iran in hope of convincing the people and Khomeini's,'regime that supliorting the militants costs too high a price. that the administration "is having considerable difficulty these days with the proposition that any- one.has. effective control" over the militants and could get,them to'back down on their demands. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 .. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Li', S P . , AI i C Ol PAGEt, " !U.S. N04Y IM~ICATIPIG TllATCRIS1S IN. IRAN COULD LAST MONTH1.00 AN EFFORT TOPREPARE PUBLIC Carter and Vance Say at.Briefings They See No Imminent Break-, in the Hostage Situation NEW YORK TIMES 10 JANUARY 1980 A senior State Department official;said This analysis Is not necessarily shared tonight that if the Russians block passage many 9i, the, a intelligence communi*.? tomeuu of a .sanctions resolution, the United who believe that Ayatllan .n States- expected.,to. act along with Its __M__ s major allies tosuspend all exports to Iran r. arterat at as a result of the radicals' control of the embassy situa- except food and medicine, thus carrying tion, "there is no legitimate political bar. theprovisions of theeresolution anyway. gaining leverage that can be exerted on A month ago, high Administration off I . them and there is no entity there with cials were saying that if the hostages whom one can negotiate." . were not released, anAmerican blockade Efforts Are Undercut seemed. inevitable. Time was running Mr. Vance said at the breakfast, brief. Iout, officials said in mid-December, and ing that every time he had believed some no effort was made to-discourage specu- lation on-- possible, American military Military Move Held Remote. _ Several participants in this morning's negotiating approach was-possible; some faction had undercut the effort. The :President said last night that the presence of "a very strong military force in the Arabian Sea has deterred them so meeting said, however, they had the im- I been even more abhorrent to-the rest. of on behalf of the hostages was. more re- mote than ever,, though Mr. Carter as=l sured them that the.United States was i taking steps to. augment its military forces lathe region. When asked about this, an official who last month predicted a blockade by mid ?, "It is an ever-present consideration of mine and: yours," he said, "and I am determined that this country will not for-: get "for a moment those hostages and. the last hostage there is justas important to . me as the first one." Ruling out the possibilit y of a military rescue .of the hostages; Mr. Carter said: By BERNARD GW ERTZMAN" ... Special to.The Net, YoAc Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 - The Carter Administration, frustrated by its inabil- ity to negotiate the release of.the Amen can hostages in Iran, has begun in the last 124 hours to prepare the American public fora crisis that might last for weeks or months more. With the hostages now in their 67th day of captivity, President Carter and Secre- taryof State Cyrus'R. Vance told 80 mem- bers of Congress last night and a group of (distinguished Americans this morning that no break was imminent. or seemed likely in the Iran situation even though every effort was being made, through a variety of channels, to obtain their re- ilease. , A White House aide reported that Mr. Carter said at the breakfast meeting at- many former Government offi- cials that "he does notsee developments that would lead to an early and-successful conclusion at this point." Change Not Held Likely: This gloomy assessment will ' persist; one State. Department official said, re- gardles&of whether the United Nations Security Council approves the-American request for economic sanctions against Iran. Signs were strong today, that the Soviet Union, which had gone along with previ- ous Council resolutions against Iran, would veto such a move now,. to gain in- fluence in Iran and- to offset its loss of prestige elsewhere in the Moslem world following. its military intervention in Af ghanistan4 January in the absence of a_solution, said 11"I think most people who have studied that signals had changed, in part because, the situation and who had looked at the of the Soviet moves in Afghanistan.. i map, who have seen where the embassy': President Carter, who last night said Is located within Teheran, can see that a the Soviet actions in: Afghanistan were strike force or military action that might the greatest threat to peace since the be oriented toward the release of the hos- Second World War,has sought to cults- tages would almost certainly end in fail- Soviet are and almost certainly end in the death vate Islamic support against the of the hostages. intervention in a hfostem:state. "We pray that something will happen] The. Administration now judges. that; and that eventually Iran will recognize any American military . actions against; that the threat to them. is not from the Iran - would- turn Moslems against the!, United States but even more vividly from United States and dissipate anti-Soviet the Soviet Union who have, on Christmas sentiment. Eve, invaded Afghanistan." fl Another factor was the analysis of Sec-' retary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations and others that the miit- ants holding the United States Embassy were not subject to the control of either Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council. Last night Mr. Carter said: "The most powerful single political entity in. Iran - consists of the international terrorists or the kidnappers.who are holding our hos- tages. Whenever there has been a show down concerning the hostages between pomeini. or the Revolutionary Council ;versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed." Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE 29 December 1979 f rnM. ' . the kx''anian cr5s s L6$sons from Iran can already be drawn, says fo - threats anywhere in the world. President Carter's It recognizes i defense proposals reflect that view y Ba 1 I . n a wa ., Met Undersecretary :of~..State-George. i , hi,conclusios seem premature: The hostage crisis the fallacy of expecting a surrogate, like Iran un- pg4i'sts, and not even an . ayatollah can predict der the shah, to uphold. American security inter- what other' crises Iran's erratic-leaders might pro- ests.. It assumes that a more visible U.S. military voke: But. lack of imminent solutions is no rea- presence would give friendly nations confidence in i son'.to avoid examining the causes. of the predica- U.S. protection and would deter others from,attack-i ment and its likely, consequences. ing them. The' main question about that "lesson" is whether many. situations are likely to arise in One cons uence'was evident early Balldescribes which U.S. forces could appropriately be used.. e q it as American,: reaffirmation of: a fundamental principle "concern'for the individual as against the ' Bali's fourt1 point concerns the limits on American compulsions of world .politics." He is reassured by ability to influence internal affairs in other. coun- the; overwhelming: opposition to using the shah as a tries., Appropriately;. he cites CIA operations'. in pawn or to retaliating militarily. "There is nothing C,t}t'Ie-as an example of misguided meddling In the more Invigorating to..a nation than. to be true to it_. 'past. But. avoiding, such practices should not mean self, Ball writes in Life magazine. ignoring whatgoes on abroad. "We dare not be the only major nation without an effective intelligence The events in Iran, he says, should help the country service," he argues. learn'the righttlessons. Two are familiar. The:Unit- i ed -States should act to. reduce energy dependence instead. of merely. talking about it. And Americans should be :less. sensitive.. to diplomatic slights,. espe- ciaily from European allies who remain "regional. -,even parochial = in their outlook." A third lesson .is more controversial. Bali urges an improvement in U.S. conventional military forces,, which.he says should be able to...respond quickly to gence capabilities:, have been ' crippled to If intell the. extent Ball charges, that lesson may be: the most important. Now, he says, the United States has I the' worst of bOth 'worlds: The "vituperative post t mortem" to'past abuses "has reinforced the fantasy i prevailing. throughout the Third World that the-EIA.j Is cunning, pervasive and capable of unimaginable" feats of Interference, while almost totally destroy- ~ . ing our intelligence instrument." Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 it GY ?nG$ Rowland Evans And Robert Novak Bete Friends Of the Shah The unearthing of a diplomatic cable to IYashington from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran describing Sen. Edward Ken- nedy's visit in May 1975 casts a shadow on the senator's description of the shah's regime as "one of the most'vio- lent in the history of the world." The routine cable, addressed to then secretary of state Henry Kissinger but which he probably never saw, provides a cloudy backdrop to Teddy Kennedy's latter-day verbal assault on the toppled shah. Kennedy not only. accepted. gratis, an Iran Air Boeing 727 "for travel within Iran; but he was also "provided rooms at the best hotels in Tehran and Isfahan, lavish hospitality for all 12 members of [his] party" and police escorts "usually offered only to visiting heads of government." Paragraph. four of the diplomatic cable barely touched on the issue that, 4Y years later, Kennedy singled out In his Dec. 2 verbal assault on the shah-, the matter of human rights. It said that during the senator's 80-minute private session with the shah and talks- with other . top officials, Kennedy "also touched lightly on human rights is- sues." His "basic themes" were the dan- gers of a Mideast arms race and the need for greater "international cooper- ation to redress economic inequities." :,,The contrast. between Kennedy's ac ceptance of the shah's 'lavish hospital- ity" CImperial court treated senator as ... front-runner for presidency") and his sudden recollection last month of the shah's "most violent" regime has not been unique among politicians. Others, possibly trying to milk votes out of the Iranian tragedy, have done the same. . After. years of relative silence, for ea ample, Sen. Howard Baker, the Senate Republican leader and a presidential contender, has criticized U.S. policy toward Iran, saying on Jan. 7-two weeks before the Iowa caucuses-that he would "stay away from the business of shoring up a dictator." THE WASHINGTON POST 9 January 1980 More pointed has been the about-face in Moscow. On Dec. 5, two days after Kennedy's attack on the shah, Tass called the shah a "criminal." Referring to U.S. assistance that helped restore , the shah to his throne in 1953, Tars asked: "For was not international law also flouted by the actions of the U.S. special services [meaning the Central "Reversals of field following political : upheavals have less to do with facts than.with` the hope of reward." Intelligence Agency], which organized the overthrow of the legitimate govern. ment in Iran and foisted the shah's law- lessness on the Iranian people [for]' a quarter of a century?" For 15 years before that knock at the shah, Moscow nurtured him with a be-. nign public. attitude and a plethora.of economic-goodies. On Nov 18, 1963, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech .during a.state visit by the "criminal" and his wife that "I would like to stress that the distinguished and respected visitors will be received in our country with joy and hospitality."_ In words that gushed with affection, the late Soviet leader Nicolai Podgorny on Nov. 18, 1974, at the end of another state visit from the shah, praised "the strengthening of trust" with the "crimi- nal" of five years later. Such reversals of field following po- litical upheavals in foreign countries have less to do with facts than with the hope of reward. In Kennedy's case, he was judged guilty of overkill immedi- ately after his Dec. 2 outburst and was widely criticized. The uncovering of the June 3, 1975, diplomatic cable seems to confirm that criticism. It was signed by then ambassador Richard Helms. Helms had arrived in Tehran from Washington during Ken- nedy's last day there and, other than having Kennedy to dinner that eve. ring, took no part in the visit and did not write the routine cable describing the senator's visit Messages from a U.S. i embassy are invariably signed with the ambassador's name. The special treatment accorded Ken- nedy by the shah, with no indication of on-the-scene remorse by-Kennedy, la-; eluded his 80-minute audience with the shah; two sessions with "representa. tive" groups of students at the Univer-: sity of Tehran; a dinner at the house of Ardeshir Zahedi, then Iran's ambassa- dor to the United States, "hosted by his daughter, Princess Mahnaz [the shah's .granddaughter] to which the cream of Iranian establishment was invited." Kennedy's Boeing 727, courtesy of Iran Air, took him on a two-day, all points sightseeing tour around the country, including over-flights of the y ersian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz --that critically important passage for the West's and Japan's oil supplies that' the shah protected with U.S. help for a quarter of a century. The last paragraph of the cable from Tehran noted the dsit had been Keno- dy's first It gave him- an "excellent op- portunity to evaluate the situation as it really is and to balance some of the nega tive Impressions about Iran" that Kenne- dy appeared to bring to Iran with him. Until Dec. 2, 1979, that summing up Seemed. to hit the nail on the head. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 STAT Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ON THE NATION 5-12 January 1980 SUB.-Tall, ERA.. he crowds outside. the American Embassy have p:" 1 dwindled, their passions cooled for the moment by the onset of Teheran's snowy winter season and no doubt simple. boredom at the interminable length of the show. But the crisis drags on and, as frustrations mount here at home, Americans must continue to remind themselves of the historical roots of.the fanaticism, fear and seemingly absurd paranoia displayed by Iranian leaders. Take Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the opportunistic- Foreign Minister who recently announced that he may be a candidate for the Presidency. Ghotbzadeh, like many of the other members of the powerful Revolutionary Council, had ac- tively campaigned to overthrow the Shah during nearly two decades of exile in the United States, Europe and the Middle East. Not surprisingly, he became a target of' Savak the Pahlevi regime's American-trained secret -police. Savak, the Shah himself-admitted, was allowed to operate frel4Y izthm - United States. Mike Wallace reported on a Ma-eh 16, X77, (As Received) 60 Minuses broadcast on CBS- that Savak had hired one Jules Compera, an exiled Frenchman, to assassinate Ghotb- zadeh and an associate, Nasser Afshar, the publisher of Iran Free- Press,- a dissident newspaper based in Washington, D.C. The Frenchman decided'not to carry out his .iavak assignment .and instead tinned off Ghotbzadeh. . What is disturbing about this little story is Wallace's report that our own intelligence agencies were aware of Savak's death squads. Wallace interviewed Prof. Richard Cottam, a former diplomat who-once- served in Teheran, who said, "I ..was told by someone in Government, a friend of mine whom I trust- very much - that this was true, that .assassination squads had been dispatched to the United States and Europe by Savak. This individual wanted me to inform some. of the possible victims." Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency regularly exchanged information with Savak, and actually passed on information about Afshar to Savak-. Ghotbzadeh no doubt is quite certain. that the American Government cooperated in Savak's efforts to assassinate him. The story of the American Government's complicity with Savak operations of this sort will remain incomplete,. however, without a full accounting by the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. Their files on the subject should become a part of the public record through an independent investigation of the Shah's "crimes" and the entire Pahlevi-American coopers- I tion-an investigation that would be desirable and necessary even if it were not an adjunct to the resolution of the Iranian-U.S. impasse. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 8 January 1980 ehran s latest bests Secret US documents sold openly on streets By Ned Temko Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Tehran. Iran Revolutionary Tehran's latest paperback smash is reviving a question that has nagged diplomats since. Muslim militants, captured the US Embassy over two months ago: Did the Americans do enough to prevent the hos stage crisis? The consensus answer is both.yesand no. Few, analysts, Western or. Iranian, think Washington could have foreseen an officially sanctioned attack on the embassy. It is true the mission had been attacked by a mob in February, 1979. "But as for an occu- pation with the full and open support of the Iranian regime ... that was something none of us foresaw," one Western ambassador commented. Yet most diplomats are shocked at: the range of embassy documents and equipment the attackers seem to have. seized intact. "Western embassies," one diplomat said, "went through a severe trimming down pro- cess after the revolution, so that all sensitive papers and equipment could be quickly de- stroyed. if necessary." If embassy documents released by the stu- dent captors prove to be genuine - and most Western diplomats here seem to think they are, despite United States denials - then they would point to what one diplomat terms "sur- prisingly lax operations." A photograph released by the students along with photocopies of some of the docu- ments - now bound in' a minor. best seller hawked -along with food and a melange of "anti-imperialist" souvenirs. in front of the embassy also indicates th ,t some equip- ment was captured intact. The photo shows a telex and communications system. Diplomats say-it is impossible, to determine how sensi- tive.'the machinery is, but that coding equip- ment may have been compromised.. The purported documents, under normal international legal practice, are probably more embarrassing than incriminating. If genuine, they would indicate that some American spying and immigration violations were going on. But none of the papers so far released specifically documents "anything more serious than use of a false passport," one diplomat points out.. "Still. at the very least, it seems incredible that' documents linking embassy officials, even indirectly, with illegal activities of any -kind should have been allowed to survive," a Western political officer maintained. There was a period of several hours between the; militants' Nov. 4 attack on the embassy and its final capture. The Iranian, a centerist Tehran political journal, goes further: "The United States," it says, "should have been aware that any docu- ments, innocent or not, which could fall into the wrong hands would be interpreted at the expense of guiltless citizens of both nations. "One thing is certain, that had the em- bassy been as. clean as a' pin as a matter of routine, lives would have been considerably less at the mercy of irresponsible students and a public ... hungering for `evidence', against the US." Another thing now is certain: The alleged US papers, many of them marked "secret." are hardly secret any more. Some are out in a paperback entitled "Exposing Imperialism." Its cover caricatures a man with the letters CIA in place of a head, in a uniform adorned wi erican insi a and the Israeli Star of David. At a mere 15 cents, per copy, the book is selling almost as fast as the kebab and soup; now warming the ragtag winter crowds in front of the embassy. Remaining documents,. photocopied and already issued singly, are to be collected in a second volume. The documents are old news by now. Butl as a body they are viewed by many diplomats here as a stunning indictment of Americani nonchalance. One, dated 1977, appears on stationary marked as "Optional Form 152a(H) (For-, merly FS-413(H)a), January, 1975, Dept. ofj State." esl Ostensibly setting out US policy prioriti in Iran, it argues that Washington should) "maintain US intelligence gathering privi leges'in Iran, and continue to provide quid pro' quo liaison support in response to these; privileges." Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 CINCfl NATI MQUIRER ART A E APP-2 M. 30 DECEMBER 1979 Oh PAGE C0 RANK-AND-FILE Americans. will .prob-` ably never know the extent to which the the great Iranian, debacle of 19?9 was at- tributable to the failure of the United-. States' intelligence apparatus- the in- ability to, foresee and influence events. Yet it is likely to. be increasingly clear, as the= history of thiayear is fully assem- :bled, that; from that me Shah Moham- -,,med.Reza Pahle-vt abandoned the: Iranian throne,, tkrcugh. the establish merit of- Ayatolla Augzo!lah Khoernini as Iran's de facto dictator to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the con- finement,of its staff ashostgaes, the United States has been operating in the dark --, operating, moreover, like a help less giantancapable of protecting its own legitimate interests, including the lives of its citizens_ . The disappearance of Iran as a pro- Western outpost in the most explosive corner of the world rank's (if we can be lieve former Secretary of State Henry A. -'Kissinger) as -one. of the two. or three '.most consequential reversals of. the post- ~'war period. Yet it is a reversal the United -States-was powerless to-resist` because .the United States had unilaterally dis .,'armed itself in- the ongoing intelligence war between East and West,: The -Iranian: crisis,".-wrote Ray S.' Cline, former deputy director. for- intelli- gence of the: Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA),. in the New. York Times the other ,,,day, "illuminatestragicallythe low.state "to which the U.S. central=intelligence-system has been reduced. In the last five -.years,-savage news-media and congres- ?.sional criticism as well as Carter-Mon- -dale punitive restrictions on, the. CIA have disastrously, weakened our capabil- ity .for conducting clandestine intelli- gence operations, abroad: , Approved For "While violence;. anarchy,. war and i anti-Americanism have been spreading, the government has retired or dismissed nearly all of the experienced intelligence officers tempered in the--conflicts of the.i 1950s and, '60s. It has dampened CIA mo- rale,. chilled" energetic efforts to collect hard-to-get; iriformation,, and cu-t Americans off from many valuable for- eign intelligence sources." . Ironically, the United States has been getting the worst of both worlds from the.Iranian experience: Iranian "stu- dents" have issued daily denunciations of the CIA and accused its operatives of attempting to manipulate Iranian af- fairs, while the CIA, crippled and ex- posed by its domestic enemies, has been powerless to do any of the things- of which it stands accused. Anyone,: accordingly, who imagined that. the emasculation of the CIA would bring the:plaudits of the world reckoned without-an appreciation of the utter ruthlessness of the forces arrayed. against us: The Iranian .impasse underscores '1 anew the usefulness indeed, the indis- pensability - of an aggressive clandes- tine intelligence service. For such. a serv ice's primary contribution to a- great power is providing a range of options for its leaders. This is something President Carter manifestly has not had in the Ira- nian crisis: On the one hand, he could. have undertakenmilitary action against Iran in the face of what amounted to an Iranian. act` of war, or, on the other, he could have capitulated to the kidnappers-_ .and returned the former shah to Iran. Mr. Carter-has had no other choices; hence, the continuing stalemate with its attendant damage to the prestige and credibility. of .the United States and the. continued exposure of U.S. nationals to. QOATx MMD Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Clearly, President Carter, once the Iranian crisis is resolved, will have no-l more urgent task than the swift rebuild- 1 ing of a sound and effective intelligence I apparatus. Washington outsider that he was, Mr. Carter, as a presidential candidate, said some singularly silly, things about the. CIA, and its mission in the shaping of=.. U.S.- policy Surely, he has had amplerea- son to repent of his misjudgments. Sure- ly, he sees by now that the United States- cannot-act intelligently without -the most, complete information gleaned from.all conceivable sources., Surely, 'he- recognizes by now that a President needs choices-, other thane capitulation, or all- .out war choices that only a clandes tine intelligence service can make possi America.:has paid dearly for the education--ofi-Jimmy Carter.: America must look to the day - and soon - when he and his successors can forestall a repetition of the events of 1979. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 `J to note a similarity in the cur l of democ- d ea i i f racy could pre- rent environment of both the - ~.. l it n challenge to those officias ..... mu . unity are professionals of ibilit om y. m c possess the respons Protectina our national securi= '.'dedicated. to secrecy but we ~ ~... I our '^ ~' din fe d ~ g n e constantly ty. How do you should; are. , ~' M you protect secrets in an open selves against` being pushed ;< .. And society. ..into excessive. openness. y. Stanfield Tarnef sov Admiral Stanfield' Turner,-'. are dedicated proles- ur~in- uestion director'..of Central'. Intellf-. ` sionals who are. facing - be- P ? 4 gence, bas been addressing cause of Supreme Court deci- in Iran have demon- that puzzling question In' se- sions.- great pressure to dis- strated, that our national secu- veral.recent speeches, Admiral pense with your secre ts. rity'requires impeccable iatel- Turner has been articulating director of.Central Intelli- ` licence in order to relate where an unprecendented sensitivity gence..Admiral Turner has and when it would be In the1 to the public's demandfor?a. also quickly acknowledged long-term interests of our na-i greater accountability: of, our publically that the abuses of tion to intervene. intelligence agencies; - - -civil libPrties;'eposetl;during The U.S. Senate Intelligence "The most : significant ,the' T. ixon Watergate debacle, Committee, chaired by Sen. i change in American- intelli- must never be repeated. But 'Birch Bayh, D-Ind., is oumnt- gence is the introduction of ef- Turner. has also been vigilant ly preparing a new. charter for fective external oversight in his pursuit of the CIA's spe-' the intelligence agencies.. This mechanisms from both the ex- vial integrity. to fulfill its miss` charter will provide guidelines' ecutive and ..sion in accordance with - the . specific dos and don'ts-for branches of the federal govern- National Security-Act of 1947: ` the first time to. be applied to ment~ Twiner observed dun .,"By reducing the excessive .4'Ahe intelligence agencies.Sen. "ing a recent speech. The CIA amount of information that is Daniel P. Moynihan; D-N.Y., is ,and other.intelligenceagezzcies kept 'secret, : we engender re-:' a :member of the- Senate sub- 4 are' evaluated by an Intelli spect for that which remains commitee that is drafting the gence Oversight . Board, ap= classified, ' Turner explained. document that will eventually! pointed by the president, that'. "But, it takes more than mere' be considered by the full Sen-' is comprised of three members openness to preserve genuine ate. Sources on'the Senate In- from outside government. Any- secrets," Turner remarked, telligence Committee staff told one is free to. report activities. "there must be some renewed - the Courier Express, however, that'they suspect.may. be ille*... ' acknowledgement iii the media ?- that the events in Iran have gal or improper to this and' in the public. that secrecy. postponed the completion of i ALSO,. THERE ARE con- `., is legitimate." ~' ?' - the draft charter document gressional oversight commit-.. - , TURNER. IS RIGHT. It has and that it probably won't be' tees in' both the House and the become increasingly clear that ready. for consideration until -Senate. The House committee the ,United States cannot take 'February 1950. has a staff of approximately 30 - 'sides in all.uiternational.con-' and the Senate panel'-has a - ?flicts. And it is also vital, as Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 CIA STUDIES Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 SCIENCE MAGAZINE 21 December 1979 Much Ado About Soviet Trucks A festering quarrel within the Department of Commerce Although the decision to export U.S. technology to the over an old and seemingly innocuous decision to export Kama River plant was made 8 years ago,. the department's truck technology io the Soviet Union is exciting renewed imbroglio did not arise until April. when the Central ter-r debate about the adequacy of safeguards against Russian teltigence Agency presented evidence-that civilian trucks: military gain from civilian trade with the United States. constructed at the plant were being used by military force's The dispute, which pits an export control official against his in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The evidence left department, threatens to disrupt implementation of recent changes in the export control law. Because resolution does not seem near. American firms seeking federal ap- proval for high-technology export: to the Communist bloc may he faced with unuscal delays in the months ahead. while Congress and Commerce officials sift through the varying claims of culpability. The center of the dispute is the Kama River truck factory in Siberia, built with the assistance of American companies. .For now, the Commerce Department is holding up only an application for export of spare parts to the Factory. But an official of the department notes that "with all the tension and discord, everything is not running as smoothly its we would hope, particularly with new licens- ing procedures to be implemented." And the department is clearly under pressure to scrutinize licenses more care- fully in light of the controversy. Lawrence Brady, the dissident bureaucrat causing head- aches for top Commerce officials, says in raising the Kama River case that the entire export control system "has peen gradually dismantled to the point where the Soviet Union and other controlled countries are cap:iblc of acquiring some of the most sophi.'ticated Western technology and di- verting it to military. forces." Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-N.1-1.), who acted as Brady's sponsor during recent hearings of the Senate subcommittee on international fi- nance, says "1 am concerned that the Commerce Depart- ment has succumbed to too much business pressure to is- sue licenses for technologies that have potential military utility." Department spokesmen told the committee this is hogwash, and that Brady has been disseminating "false and misleading information" both about Kama River and about the department's vigilance in preventing diversion of civilian-trade. department higher-ups unconcerned. but it clearly upset Brady. then the acting administrator of the export control administration. He insists that this newly discovered use has strategic implications. "What the Soviets need and want most is economy of scale. and we handed it to them: their capability would have been delayed for years if the United States had not participated." he says. Disclosure of the CIA evidence was made in May before a forum eager for That sort of information. the Senile Armed Services Committee. The senators promptly inter- rogated Stanley J. Marcuss. then it deputy assistant secre- tary for trade regulations: Marcuss. a Carter political ap- pointee, is Brady's boss. Marcuss told the senators that. alarming as this truck threat was, no one seemed to he at fault. The export decision had been made knowingly- he f said, and no actual violation of the export regulations oc- curred because the Soviets had never committed them- selves as to what use the trucks would ultimately he put. It was at this point that Brady jumped ship and accused the departni-Int of covering tip an apparent rules violation. of '*,in unwillingness to face tip to the Soviets' violation." Neither the. rules nor the Soviets' promises were in the slightest hit vague, he says: they signed a promise that the exported equipment would produce either "trucks" or "ci- vilian trucks." and never said anything about "military tricks.'' Brady says that such it pledge is binding, and that the department ought now to punish the Soviets by denying them any additional truck factory exports. Exactly where this narrow dispute will settle in the broader issue of" high-technology civilian trade with the So- viets is uncertain. But it is clear that those who have op- posed such trade in the past are delighted to have a new hook on which to hang their claims, even as tiny a hook as the Kama River truck plant.-R. Ji iT?tit;v Swan Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 SCIENCE MAGAZINE 21 December 1979 Gain in Soviet Oil Reserves Doubted In the battl among the estimators, the CIA's pessimists are winning ground I?'tinlating Soviet oil reserves and pro- duction rates-once it specialized task ;u tong So'. cto!ogis(s-has been a polxl- I:I snect;ttor spoil since April 1977, when the. Central Intelligence Agency ((1A I put out it report predicting trouble in the Russian oil industry within a few Vi cars. The CIA was accused of spread- ing pessimistic propaganda. Other ex- perts pill out reports refilling the CIA's work. and then there were refutations of the refutations. Since then. the debate has runthled along. occasionally break- ing to the surface in it new hatch of aca- demic papers. A fresh harvest of fore- cast-, appeared this fail. The presailing view among American experts is that although the CIA may he wrong on some of its numbers, it is cor- re.l in its pessimism about the Soviets' at-ilit\ to increase oil production before i9M5. If correct. this conclusion means that the Soviets. trendy sinking into an cconomic slump. will encounter more se- vere productivity problems in the next few years. And for oil consumers gener- a!Ic . it means that the Persian Gulf oil fields will acquire greater strategic im- portance. According to the CIA see- nario. a decline in production will compel the Soviets to import oil in order to sup- ply clients in Eastern Europe. In cont- petiug with the West as buyers. the So- %iets will accelerate price inflation in the world market through the I980's. The CIA view gained credibility in late November when Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet chief of state, gave a gloomy re- port on the nation's economic perform- ance this year. Oil production failed to meet the planned goal for the third time in 3 years. and the increase in production in 1979 was the smallest in two decades. Next year's goal has been reduced from a level of 12.8 million barrels a day to 12.1 million. (The current level is 11.7 million.) Brezhnev reportedly spoke of the need for "shock work" to improve economic growth and conserve energy in 1980. Recent papers on this question differ most glaringly. on two points: on the cor- rect way to describe the Soviet oil re- serves and on the likelihood that these reserves will he developed gmickly :u;d es ported. 'I he extreme optimists' view is pill forward in it report by a group known as I'ett'ostudhes. Nosed in M:+ltnu. Sage del). lit all updated vetsiuli of:t rupa4l i., sued a year ago. I'elrostudics cRairrred this fall that Soviet reserves ;are at I50 billion barrels. justa little less than Saudi Arabia's. phis is by for the highest Mauve used anywhere: it contrasts starkly with the CIA's estimate that proved reserves amount to around one-foil tIi of that ti+g- ure. of about 30 billion to 35 billion bar- rels. i'he CIA also says that Soviet produc- tion will drop front the present level to around 10 million barrels if day or less in 1985, at which time the Soviets will he importing more than 2 million barrels it day. Petrostudies suggests olherw ise: "'I here is no danger at all that the USSR will become a net importer of oil in the next 10 years at least, and compete with other nations for purchase ofOPEC oil... Oil analysts in commerce and academe fall between these two extremes in their forecasts, agreeing with the CIA on pro- Oil production failed to meet the goal for the third time in 3 years ... duction estimates. but challenging the notion that the Soviet Union will be forced to import oil. Two of those who spoke with Science. Marshall Goldman of the Russian Research Center at Har- vard University and Leslie Dienes of the University of Kansas, have given de- tailed justifications for their views in it report published in October by the cotr- gressional Joint Economic Committee. Forecasting of this kind has attracted attention recently for several reasons. 'l he Carter Administration made it itn- portant by releasing the CIA's paper on Soviet oil and giving it wide circulation. The President leaned on it himself ?r;: ye;us ago when he introduced his first energy prognun. citing it to holder his ;urmttent that the oil shortage is a world- wide pheuontctton demanding quick and r:nlic;rl action h~; the t mired States. 'I he decision to publish a paper by Anteri,a's spy service was controversial in itselt'.I Stir it put a new political hnrlen on slip- pu>:cdly nenital estimators. Changes outside the United States al- so conu'ihtited to the interest in oil guess- work. In the late 1970's go vern rile fits have found it important to know precisely where future petroleum supplies will; conic from. and in what quantities. Yet at the same time, the Soviet Union. which has always treated reserve data its! a state secret, has begun to cut hack on, the quality and quantity of information it is willing to release. 'this happened just as the Soviet Union became the world's! large, it oil producer and second largest; exporter. When official data are lacking; guesses beconic more interesting. Figally, the forecasters do have some thing tangible and troublesome to work) with. there are signs that the Soviets argil experiencing a real oil crisis of sonic! kind. In 1976. the Soviet govcrnmenti clamped down on the publication of cer-! Lain kinds of data-for example. making secret the previously available figures furl oil trade and regional oil production.) This is taken to be is sign that the govern- ment is embarrassed by poor perform-i ance in some areas. It is also agreed that in 1977 the Soviets began a crash devel- opment program in the Siberian oil fields because the older oil areas west of the; Ural Mountains-near the big cities-are being depleted at an alarmingly rapid' pace. Since the Soviets have been silent on this matter. Sovietologists have been Goldman, a moderate among the fore- casters, argues that both the CIA and Petrostudies reports are wrong. Al-! though he has not yet read the updated! Petrostudies paper, he is scornful of its' conclusions. "Nobody scans to know who these people are," he said, and he suggested, as others have, that this fore- cast had been published as an ' ;answer"I to the CIA, either for its propaganda val- CONTINU.-^ Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 tie or siinply to sell optintism at s73S per The Soviet Union is 28 years behind t opt t to woirketl, nil-short httr'npeaii the United States in technology. accord- eot ernnienis. 1 he first Pru'usntJies re ing to Meyerhoff: " T o drill a 10,000-foot port reads like "tlisiniinnlation. GoIJ well. it takes 34 days in the United States ratan .aid. and 14 months in the S ivirt Union." -lhe ('IA is right to say that the So-And he says that pipes made in the So-; rids h;tve has of problems in their oil vict Union are so brittle that, on the Iie1Js,'' GOklman explained, .uul the; coldest days in Siberia, they shatter; Swedes :ore right to say the Soviets have) when kicked. :Yleyerholl thinks it will! ;1 huge potential tthich is not bcing uti-i take the Soviets 15 years to develop an, lized.?? But it is wrong to expect any dra indigenous oil industry capable of ex- matic change in the world oil market be- ploiting the difficult fields-precisely the' cause of what is happening in Russia., ones that must he relied on to fill. the' Goldman expects that the Soviets will) looming gap in production. Continue to have Irtllhle producing Oil. Robert Campbell of Indiana Universi-' and he even agrees with the ('IA that ty at Bloomington. another Sovietolo- production rates rtay level oll'in the next gist, was skeptical of the Swedish paper:, few %cars. Mutterer. Goldman thinks ,'Some say the f etrostudics people are, the Soviets will deal with shortfalls by connected with the Russians. Their ex- imposing conservation measures and! trenc evaluation makes you wondel' substituting other limns of energy--no-1 about it.'' He added that ''it is irrelevant tahly gas, which the Soviet Union has in to talk about oil reserves tin Russia) in abundance. Dienes thinks the CIA report con- any case. I'm prepared to believe that rained only minor errors and seems "al- there's a lot of oil in the ,tuvid Uniun~ most exactly on the nose" now in itsI and on its continental shelf." But he said) most forecast of Soviet oil pradudirn rates, it is pointless to stress numbers because) the real questions are when and how the, Ile believes the peak may have occurred' already, or will occur in I980. HOwevrr,I Soviets will be able to produce the oil.1 he does not expect as rapid a Jerline as! Campbell expects production to dreline.~ Jars the CIA. He believes the CIA has! He agrees with the CIA*s engineering; understated Soviet reserves, but not sig-i analysis, which described numerous uderstt . problems with the pumps and wells in1 Despite their vast reserves and ern- Soviet oil fields, but he does not endorse) the CIA's figures for production rates ors tt:+liied authority . the Soviets will not be able to respont) reserves. quickly to the crisis. Campbell. like Dienes and other oil! Dienes argues. because there are few up- pornnities time conservation or fuel sub- specialists, awaits the publication of the stitution. New oil fields are remote from next':S-year plan for the Soviet oil fields. due to come out next year. Meanwhile. the centers of population and will require officials in the Soviet oil ministn are re mastve investments uh equipment and labor before they will yield any Fuel. 1-he porteDly as hewi(JCrrd as the CIA by Soviets lack the machinery and the I he Petrostutlies' claims that huge reserves ex- pertise these sites demand. and Dienes are waiting to he tapped. Pressed ahrads argues that the Soviet government is too to explain the disappointing record of the cautious to make the decisions that must Iasi few years, these otlicials find that he made quickly to avert it production Petrostudirs is mtiking their task even slump. When asked about Petrostudies' tlillicult. optimism. he :tsrvered. "It's totally The truth of the matter is that even the idiotic; they c;tr,'t even read. Russian cor- Soviets have an imprecise inventory of' redly." their petroleum resources. The full ex- Arthur Meyerhofl', a petroleum gt:olo- tent of these will not he known until pro- gist who serves as a consultant with the spective fields in Siberia and on the con- Soviet oil ministry. says that the CIA's tinental shelf have been thoroughly ex- predictions are working out "per- plore._-Ft icti \AksnAt.t. frilly ... they've been remarkably ae- cur:ue.'' Meyerholl' himself has had "a running gun battle" with the authors of the Pet rost tidies report. for he thinks they have overstated Soviet proved re-I serves by it factor of 5. The Soviets haven))) vast resources, he says. but they will not he able to tap them rapidly because they lack the drills and pipes necessary for working in deep reservoirs and cold cli- mates. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ON :ACS (-S~ 6 January 1980 ARTICL A`P ?..R D Hopes to Boost Livestock Jolted by.US. Crackdown By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer- Putting more meat into Soviet diets has been the center iece o the rem in leadership s program--to. convince its Leo le t at life is get. ting_better, the C noted in a study In coming months life will get'a lot better in terms of eating meat. Soviet meat markets;; noted for-their long lines of people grumbling over the scarcity of meat and the poor quality available to consumers who lack Communist Party or. military connections,- will'have larger sup plies than usual T But the reason will be the distress slaughtering of 'livestock herds that Soviet authorities had been trying to build up in a long-term, program to increase meat supplies. The short- term benefit of more meat in the Soviet Union followed by poorer future diets and;: possibly, ular unrest o . p p The slaughtering appears to Uh.S:.. specialists to be an inevitable result of President. Carter's decision. to block the sale of 17 million metric cause of its invasion of Afghanistan. 25 million tons that they want in the sales year that began Oct.1. "This grain,"' Carter, explained, .'was-not intended for human con-., sumption but. was to be used. for building upSoviet livestock herds." Despite a shortfall of 48 million tons from the 1979 grain production plan of 226.8 million, the Soviet- peo-ple are expected to have enough of. their- usual starchy; diet of bread, potatoes and cabbage. The approxi mately 34 million -tons of grain`tha the Kremlin had planned to import from the United States, Canada; Argentina,- Western Europe and other sources. in., this 12-month period .-were either, animal feed grains. or-good quality wheat for-:, humans that would release poorer. Soviet wheat for animals. - . The first major program launched publicly by Leonid I. Brezhnev after he succeeded Nikita S. `Khrushchev, as head of the Soviet Communist i Party in October 1964 was for the long-term improvement of agricul- ture=In March 1965 he promised massive investments in overcoming chronic farm shortages. These have continued despitei competing demands on scarce re' ,sources, especially the- major pro- gram that was launched secretly to build up the Soviet armed forces. But agricultural investments- have failed to yield the expected results despite a farm subsidy. now esti- mated at well over S22 billion a year. rob- i n p Part of the continuing gra lem is climatic. Little of the. Soviet grain belt lies as far south and has as good soil as the American Middle West. Most is like-' the Canadian wheat belt or worse. Part is Communistic. Soviet agri culture, and Soviet industry too,.has suffered from an unwillingness of the present geriatric-leadership to reform the political and economic. controls laid down by' Joseph V Stalin in, the 1930s,.even. though the.; controls have crippled- output with bureaucracy that stiffles incentives and initiatives. Averaging out annual fluctua- tions,- grain output. has increased steadily during the past 15 years. In 1978 it reached a record 237.2 million. metric tons but last year it slumped. to 179 million. A constant. increase is needed to 1 feed larger herds. Soviet authorities have reacted to bad crop years by spending some of their scarce for- eign'exchange for enough feed grains to keep the livestock program. goin a A result, per capita meat con- sumption for the 265 million Soviet citizens rose from 90 pounds a year in, 1970 to-110 pounds last year. The average American eats about 240 pounds of meat a year as part of a much more varied diet.: ACIA'tudv n the long-term out- look for Soviet grain imports called the meat program "the centerpiece of Soviet consumer welfare. policy." It takes precedent over an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in grain out- put, the study said, but is threatened by the possible. decline of Soviet oil exports that earn money. for yi g The study said the, planned growth of meat supplies at 1.5.per- cent a year for the next five years will require massive grain imports. Without them, specialists ,now- say, the whole program is endans?t ed. The CIA study commented that "consumer unrest will rise "should the USSR drastically cut back the . growth of per capita meat supplies." ' Other specialists noted that the only significant rioting reported in the. Soviet Union in recent decades was over food shortages, especially of meat.. . ; . Normally the first to be slaugh tered in a bad crop-year are hogs and chickens. Swine and poultry herds can be- rebuilt quickly because of large litters and egg production. Cat- tle are kept as long as possible be- cause cows only have single births, making the recovery from cutbacks very slow. The amount of feedgrains avail- able to.the Soviet Union from its ' own production, the. eight -million-. tons of U.S. grains that Carter is per-1 milting, and- other imports should` allow the preservation of dairy herds. It might even be possible for the Soviets to offset'some of the U.S. cutback. Agriculture Secretary Bob Berg-1 land- said yesterday that. Moscow might be able: to find up to seven million' metric tons of grain in the world to make up the 17 million U.S. denial. But Bergland's own depart- ment has. been. publishing' statistics making the 7 million figure doubt- ful. Other countries in the Soviet bloc had a-bad crop year in 1979 as well..; Poland and Czechoslovakib are im 1, porting as much grain as their facili- ties will permit, with the United States providing about half of each country's imports. grain. r~ ,~...~ :......,.. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 GALE CONTEMPORARY REFERENCE BOOKS November 1979 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONS 1979 This Gale reprint of the CIA's January, 19791 edition of the National Basic Intelligence Fact-il book will make available to a broader spectrum: of students and researchers a variety of infor- mation on. 187 political units. Emphasizing' up-to-date economic and governmental data.,. Handbook of the Nations also provides details- on each political unit's land, people, com-: munications, and defense forces. Additional' features include maps of each entity, eight; reference maps, and tables detailing the' structure of the United Nations. 232 pp. (ISBN 1028-7) 1979. $20.00. (just Published) Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 _ STAT 'A Sr'd Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 _d- Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 oil THE NEW YORK TIMES 7 January 1980 PF-r, i al by A (ree 'I Philip Agee, the onetime C.I.A. agent whose pass-! nort was revoked last week, has earned the hatred of States" but it has yet to accuse him of violating any law. The Supreme Court made clear two decades ago in the Rockwell Kent case that citizens who haven't broken the law can't be denied passports under the statutes on the books. Even if Congress clearly con- ferred such power on the State Department, the Court,: his former employers and the suspicion of many others by systematically identifying United States agents around the world. His writings have made intelligence many (he has been kicked out of three other countries) - said, ' there-would be serious constitutional objections he is bad-mouthing American intelligence agam because the~ right. to travel: has become a.. recognized Gut feelings aside, though, the United States must part of personal liberty. We await with interest the obey its own laws in dealing with him and it's doubtful 'Government's legal .:justification as it resists Mr. that those laws permit lifting his passport. That action. Agee's suit to regain his passport. seems to have been provoked by his public suggestion We have our own quarrel with Mr. Agee. Aside that the C.I.A.'s Iran files be exchanged for the hos--- '_:'from- endangering the- lives of certain countrymen taaes in. Teheran. The idea was offensive, but not a., abroad, he has brought discredit on those who want to crime. The State Department's fear that the former expose C .LA. misdeeds, but for the worthy purpose of agent will go, to Iran to participate in a trial of the hos- bringing intelligence agencies within the rule of law. tages seems based on a misreading of an unconfirmed... Like the Nazis of Skokie who gave freedom of assembly news report. He says he hasn't been invited and would a baname two years ago, Mr. Agee tests not.only our n't accept such an invitation. laws but also our commitment to law. We're tempted to The. Government considers Mr.. Agee a threat. to join Jules ;; eiffer's recent call for "a better class of ,ric- "national security or the foreign policy, of the United tim." But time and circumstance will not let us wait. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS 3 January 1980 'Philip Agee:. Surprise,. Surprise The most- astonished.' man The question likely- raised in the world is possibly Philip in some minds is what Agee ;Agee, former CIA agent, au- was doing with a passport in ..thor of a hate-filled book "ex- the first_ place, given his -posing" his former employers record. The answer is obvi .. - "and disclosing the names, so ous: . For its enemies and "Agee claimed, of numerous maligners, such as renegade -CIA undercover operatives. CIA agents, contemporary America has forgiveness, and The other day, .Agee, who tolerance. Toward its sustain- .,:lives abroad, had. his passport ers such as FBI agents lifted 'by the State- Depart- caught reading. the mail of meat. Not. for stabbing his terrorists - America, alarm- country in the back, nor for ingly often, shows the face of endangering the lives, and righteous intolerance. compromising the'. effective- What a shock; then, for ness, of CIA employees; Agee. Burned by his own gov- rather, for offering .to the Ay- ernment. We're not con- atollah Khomeini documents vinced he won't get his .concerning CIA activities in passport back eventually, but .Iran in exchange for the hos we'll take our. cheer where we stages. can get it. 0 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Inc wr>ninaivr4 rvai ON PAGE--' '- 7 January 1980 ean A an S1 'Un'believable' Exploits in tie rrnns 'r~d By Blaine-Harden Washinaton.PostStaff writer Frank. Terpil of. McLean is an in- ternational,: arms-" dealer. plagued with what his .friends and law en- forcement, authorities say is a haz-, ardous habit. He likes to boast Before he was arrested two-weeks} ago for trying to sell 10,000 machine guns to undercover. detectives in New. York City, Terpil allegedly told.. one of them he had personally ob- served and participated in. torture and murder' in Idi ' Amin's? bloody._ U ganda. The statements Terpil allegedlyt. made ,may appear so fantastic .as: to be unbelievable," says :-Iatthew' Crosson, an assistant -Manhattan dis- trict attorney in charge of the Terpil case there. "But, on the other hand,. Terpil did a .lot of unbelievable- things that were real:' Known. to his.AlcLean. neighboirs as a friendly . but quiet importer- exporter who. was frequently away from home, Terpil's business activ- ities gave him a -vastly'. different reputation among authorities. According. to New York prosecu; tors and sources-close to a two-year ' federal grand' jury investigation of Terpil in -Washington, Terpil has been one of 'the world's major met- -chants-of lethal- weapons;, torture .1 devices and explosives to repressive' governments"since-at. least 1975.'; Sources say?_Terpil, 40, , provided: the handgun in 'a? failed plot by-l Libyan- leader Col... Muammar Qad= dafi to assassinate one of -his politi cal'enemies in 1976. Terpil, accord=. ing to sources familiar with the fed- eral . investigation,. also maintained' an office in the Libyan Embassy in- London where he entertained Qad- dafi. Prosecutor. Crosson in New York said Terpil contracted 'in 1976 with Qaddafi to provide bombs in the form of ashtrays, lamps and explod- ing desks, along with timing devices and former American special .forces personnel to help train Libyan ter rorists.. Documents show that in 1977 In Uganda, Terpil, working through, a Paris-based company, sold $3.2 mil- lion worth of weapons, surveillance equipment and explosives to the government of Idi Amin. Documents also show he helped train Amin's l dreaded State Research .Bureau.{ murder squads in the "art of ?intelli-gence sabotage." Sources say .that . at' other times Terpil sold Amin torture I equipment, including. "electrical col- lars." At a hearing on Friday in New York }State Supreme Court, Crosson said ratlerpil brag ed'o undercover de- tc Lives that in i-anda he put a .liq- uid explosive in the car of an uniden tied foreign. diplomat, then.blew the car to pieces with: a radio-controlled' detonator. -Until Amin was chased from Ugan da last .spring;- TerpiL?flew: to' Kam- pala as-. often as--twice. month- where' he'-'stayed as a personal guest oil his `'very good friend Amin," ac- cording to Eldad Wapenyi, the cur- refit Ugandan ambassador . to the United 'Nations. Terpil oldonearly n 5&00;000 in military supp1 last year.-Wapenyi says. He adds that the present Ugandan government is,, still trying to . figure. out if Terpil has bE+,en paid for the equipment. erpil. who sources say' made 'up toy 1,500 . percent profits on his arms aijd equipment sales.: also bought pqrsonal items. for Amin, including pipking up a -laseratti , sports car engine in Italy -and delivering it- to' Kylmpala, sources say. 7n- -New- York, where - Terpil and another arms dealer; George 'Gre- gary Korkala. were arrested on Dec. 22, on weapons charges, Terpil's law- yer, James, LaRossa, acknowledges that .his : client deals in international arms; but claims all the dealingsi are legak:' X rkala's lawyer, Gustave Newman. ccincedes that his client tried. to, sell 1(1.000, machine. guns to undercover detectives posing as South American reverutionariea, -.but.:-also 'claims . no crime was committed: vit::maY. be unfortunate.. it -may%be immoral, but it is perfectly legal," Newman said in a.-recent New York cqurt'hearing. On Friday, lawyers for botirTerpil and . Korkala argued that their clients had done extensive legiti- mate work for federal agencies ? such asp the FBI, the Secret Service and the Federal Aviation Administration. Sources in Washiuggton say Terpil has done no work for federal agencies in the last five years. _ Lk New York Supreme Court justice or} Friday set boad. for Terpil and Korlala at S100,000 mach, despite pros- ecution argumeuls that they may flee the country. The two; who pleaded in- nocent to nine counts of conspiracy and other weapons violations, had not made bond by.-yesterday afternoon. In New York. Terpil and Korkala face: maximum.: possible prison . sen-.~ te'ices of 25 years if convicted. State Department.:.officiala- say. any unli-- caused shipment of arms out of the United States is a violation of. federal laiv. - Sources close to. the grand jury! investigation of Terpil in Washington say the panel is looking into possible violations of the' Foreign:.Agent Reg- I istration. Act(10 years- maxifnum' pri- 1 soi'l' term) and, the, Munitions Control Act (eight ,years,. maximum:' prisdnil' term). Before- his arrest; authorities say ?Terpil lived a good part of his life aboard , airplanes, : shuttling' to his "safe". .house min"irrewe, . England (Where his- confederates in the arms -trade allegedly stayed) to Paris. to .Geneva (where- he allegedly : keeps large amount of money in Swiss.: 'ba'nks) and to the. palaces of arms.; customers in Africa and the Middle East, including. Syria and Lebanon; Sources say Terpil is a "super sales- man" with a knack for. charming. in- fluential people and maintaining) close contacts with sources of busil ness associates.. His weaknesses so}irces say, are that he kept shoddy business records and had a tendenc for brag about business successes tol other arms dealers. . _ .. . . _ ..:: -1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 nomT1QT~r T] Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Terpil. `40, a stocky, brown-haired man with a thick mustache. lived until. his arrest with his wife and two teen-age sons in a S260,000. -Japanese contemporary home on Chain Bridge Road in 'McLean. Since' his arrest, the house, which he pur- chased in 1978, has. been out up ford sale. - . Frank Edward Terpil was born in Brooklyn and. enlisted in the Army when he was 18. He spent an unevent- ful six years in the military, serving his second tour of duty in Arlington with the Army's security branch. His job was to. repair cryptographic (code-breaking)' . equipment and his electronics . training was extensive, according. to Army records. en,_he left the. Army, in: 1965,. l a it joined the- CIA as acommun- ications soeci ist. Although t e has refused to comment, sources close to the grand jury investigation -in Was g ?n say, eTerpu ryas ire f, a agency in 1.9-71. riecau3 IT boastful and. unpolished manner,;.did. not fit 1s superiors exp ria, . While in 'the CIA- Terpil snent . time is .the Middle East and., East Pakistan. sources close to the investi- gation saE?_- Terpil next came to the-attention-of federal authorities- in 19?5:: whets: he% began selling the. silencedd-Mae40 and_ -llac-11 Ingram machine- guns.. mane= factured by Mitchell,; WeerBelr III of Powder- Springs;,Ga -sources say.. The Mac-li machine-..g=,':weighs less than four: pounds; fires 850 rounds .a min- ute and makes a soft: phyvto-sound- when. fired. It ; has been featured in such- movies- as "Three Days of the Condor? and - - WerBell, an;- internationally- known arms-. dealer, said -. yesterday- "that' from tune; to-time Frank has worked for us" selling the- machine. guns, But WerBell said that. any_deali ngs he bad: with Terpil were approved . by the State Department`offi'ce: 9 f -munitions control.: According to ; federal sources the. machine guns were--sold to a--number: of Third World -countries In l976, .Tr'ipit .began supplying- arms and other military equipment - to Libya's.: Qaddafl:. Sources say Terpil, working partner with for- ative. Edwin P. Wilson.- , who owns- a' large firm in Loudoun County and was also linke to the aborted assassination attempt of -one of Qaddafi's political.. opponents in - 1976. . -Ye-roil and Wilson,. working througk relatives. of Qaddafi, became friends with the Libyan leader and began sup= plying him with a total of'$2.5-millio worth of military supplies. The hard- ware ranged;-.from small arms to at 'least one ? American-made ground-to- -air' Red. Eye- missile, according to sources close to the, grand jury inves- tieation Sources say 'that Terpil and Wilson-I manufacturedff L'timing devices for ex-.1 plosives at a production cost of S4 to $6 each and sold them to Libya for, about $630 each during 1976 and 1977. ` The Central Intelligence Agency, ' angered and embarrassed by Terpit's dealings with regimes that the agency was trying to monitor, assisted the. Justice Department and Treasury o fa- ci als in pthering information on Ter- pil, according to sources close to the grand jury investigation. Terpil and Wilson, sources say, re- cruited teams of American-trained guerrilla fighters and electronics .ex- perts to teach Qaddafi's troops how to fight and make bombs. Later, Terpil and Wilson apparently: had a disagree-_ ment and stopped working together. . Terpil-using. connections he had - made in Libya-began selling arms to -Amin in Uganda, sources say. . -According. to a contract, stamped "secret" found in'the State Research' Bureau files in-Uganda after Amin's fall, Terpil's company sold$3.2 mil- lion worth of equipment in Augusta 1977:'..This.:Iincluded. disguised anten- `?nas;.attache cases fitted with tape re- cordere,- explosives,'remote. radio deto- nators, a- 56-track telephone. monitor- ing system_ and all kinds of interroga tion devices: In 197 - and early '79, Ambassador ~Vapenyi said; Terpil had-an office in:1 the Ugandan Mission on. 45th Street- in New York.. Terpil helped with the installation of an elaborate surveil lance system: that placed listening- de- vices in various rooms in- the mission,.. enabling the monitoring of , 'A' min's. diplomats; Wapenyi said; The ambas-' sador said. that Terpil had :the equip- . ment, valued at $1 million; removed- when-. Arvin's government . was` over thrown. ' During. the years. when Terpil was selling arms to Libya and Uganda,. he frequently stayed in Geneva;-..where.; sources, say he . keeps-- an.. undisclosed.. amount-- of ? money. Sources believe that :Terpil-.often, rexurned to,. the:- Washington.. area with :large amounts of money; which-her_nsed' 1A-pay'-his' mortgage-and other bills: Terpil's family refused to comment. on the arms dealer's activities. New York .police said they became. aware of Terpil while investigating an_ unrelated case. Undercover detectives =-were?sent to 'meet-Terpil? in: England' where they were shown a large quan- tity.of -machine-guns, prosecutor, Cros- son said-,- Terpil: and Korkalawere arrested at the New. York Hilton hotel- after un- dercover, agents allegedly paid them a $56,000 deposit on .10,000 , machine l guns, wortb.$2 million, Crosson said. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 'ARTICLE :k FZA L D WASHINGTON STAR (GREET LINE) Qf PAGE .7 JANUARY 1980 By Allan Frank Washington StarStal Writer Frank Edward Terpil, an interna=- .tional arms dealer who government prosecutors say bragged.about help- ing former Ugandan. President Idi. Amin poison people, prefers. to keep a low profile at home in McLean, Va. Terpil; 40, lives quietly yet.ostenta-. tiously with his wife, Marilyn, and their three children at 1102 Old Chain Bridge Rd., just three houses away. and across the.street from. Hickory Hill, home of the family of the late. Robert F. Kennedy. For a'man who claimed on recent, arrest forms on. file in New York Su- preme Court that he makes only S28,- 500 annually;. Terpil livesextemely well. Fairfax County real estate. asses- sors "value the Terpil home at slightly less than $300,000, although Terpil and his associates have given the impression to neighbors and writers for newspaper real estate sections that the one-story Japanese style home cost between $5 million and $6 million. Like other Terpil ventures, the home is not listed in his own name. It is-owned by Capital Investment of Virginia Inc.. Edgar J. Woodman, an officer of Capital Investment, de- clined to disclose Terpil's involve- ment in ownership of the home. Woodman, an accountant, also is treasurer of Oceanic International at. 2020 Connecticut Avenue NW, a Ter- pil firm that sold the Amin regime S3 million ingoods. As much as-he may make of his prestigious.' address, Terpil reaps .more attention by emphasizing.his links to another: neighbor less than a mile away the CIA-: ' Assistant Manhattan District Attorney Matthew T. Crosson told. a New York Supreme Court hearing last Friday he has confirmed offi- cially that Terpil was "unfavorably terminated" from his job as a com- munications and electronics techni- cian at the CIA in 1971 after six years'service. Crosson said Terpil, a Brooklyn native, who was in the army from 1960-65, still. leads people to believe that he works for the CIA and claims the. agency once provided him with a State Department cover.. Only in the last several months has.Terpil's public facade of mysteri- ous'anonymity begun to crack. His name surfaced briefly in April 1979, when the Amin government fell and documents seized at the State Research Bureau.- Amin's se- cret police organization showed that F. Terpil of Intercontinental Technology had sold the Ugandan government, in, August 1977, $3.2 mil- lionin surveillance equipment and "special secret weapons." Later last, year a federal.grand . jury here'began investigating inter- national arms sales fora variety of offenses. In mid-November, under- cover officers from the 'Manhattan District Attorney's Office got in touch with Terpil and George Gre- gary Korkala, 38, of Nutley, N.J., about purchasing large amounts of weapons: Posing as Latin American revolu- tionaries, the undercover agents were shown samples of, or bro- chures about, silencer-equipped pis- tols and rifles, exploding briefcases, letter':bombs and cigarette lighters 1 and ball point pens that converted to guns. That equipment, as well as bomb detection and surveillance devices, were to be supplied by a Korkala company, Amstech International of Nutley,.and by Terpil firms in Lon- don and Paris. Crosson said Terpil told the undercover agents, who were taken to England to inspect machine guns, that he still worked for the CIA. Crosson added that Terpil told the undercover agents dozens of stories about his derring-do before he and Korkala were arrested Dec. 22 in the New. York Hilton in connection with a plot to sell 10,000 machine guns and 10 million rounds of ammuni- tion.for $2 million. , The prosecutor. said Terpil claimed that he: u Was still close to Idi Amin in exile. ? That he trained the international terrorist; Carlos Ramirez. ? That he could obtain phony pass- ports from Lebanon and elsewhere that he would sell for S2,500. Terpil also is believed to have sold guns to various groups and govern- ments in Latin America; Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Among his clients have been Libya, Leba- non and the Soviet Union,. Crosson said. While law enforcement officials. have.been unable to verify all of Ter- pil's claims, Crosson made' it clear at the arraignment for the two defend- ants Friday that the prosecutors are certain that the two indeed do have access to high-level foreign contacts and. vast amounts of money Terpil's attorney, James M. La- Rossa, admits that his client is a- major international arms dealer, but. said that he is fully licensed. LaRossa said Terpil represents InterArmco of London, a major international' dealer; although he said that Oceanic in Washington sells mostly "nautical supplies." Woodman said Oceanic sold no weap- ons to Amin, just T-shirts bearing "His Excellency.For Life's" picture and equipment for marching bands. Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 STAT Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 ,'ARTICLE Inc. WAL 1111UKt JUN ON PAGE-C-2, 8 January 1980 1.16st, of, s-*,U,-Io,.,I-b"j%",S.,Py-'-S':-W I do w- I hr-9 Un- Oul By SHERIDAN LYONS A federal judge yesterday threw out most of a civil suit by the widow of an American spy who was found electro- cuted in a Fort Meade motel room in April, 1976. Use Sigler, of El Paso, Texas. .claimed in the lawsuit that Army and Central Intelligence Agency officials ei- ther killed her. husband, Chief Warrant Officer Ralph J. Sigler, or drove him to suicide because he was assembling memoirs of his career as a counterintel- ligence agent since his enlistment in the Army in 1947. His duties. Mrs. Sigler said, included selling false information about Amer- ican radar and missile systems to intelli- gence agents of various foreign powers. thereby identifying foreign spies. On April 4. 1976, he arrived at Fort Meade after being summoned by gov- ernment officials. There, according to .his wife, he was subjected to severe In terrogation. On April 13, he was found dead. with electrical wiring wrapped around his arms that had been cut from. a lamp in the room and stripped of its in- sulation. She cited a letter, dated three days before Mr. Sigler's death. in which he told her: "Should anything happen to me, suicide, death or accident, sue the US Army ... ; . and naming specific persons to be sued. Mrs. Sigler did so, seeking damages totaling more than $100 million on vari- ous claims for violations of her hus? band's rights, for return of his papers and for injuries to her and her daughter She said. that officials feared her hus- band might write from memory after they illegally seized his papers. Chief Judge Edward S. Northrop, however, granted government motions to dismiss the claims on behalf of Mr. Si- gler, citing the broad doctrine of govern- ment immunity for injuries to members of the military. lie cited cases dealing with secret use of LSO, allegations of brutality, a forced march into a nuclear explosion and others to demonstrate the scope of that military immunity. While the courts have recognized the "unconscionable results" that the doc- trine may cause, the judge said, the facts of a case do not affect it. The doctrine, however, does not apply to the claims of violations of the constitutional rights of Mrs. Sigler and her daughter, he said, and gave the de. 1 fendants another 30 days to file other de- fenses to those claims. The judge also rejected the demand for the return of Mr. Sigier's papers, after reviewing a classified affidavit ti support the government's claim of a state-secrets privilege. Clifford Alexander, secretary of the Army, said in an affidavit filed with the-- motion to dismiss that the papers "ex- plain in great detail, day-by-day, many of the intelligence activities that Mr. Si- gler undertook on behalf of the Army .. . nearly everything he knew or could glean about the -foreign .intelligence. services." The lawsuit originally was filed in El Paso, but was transferred to Maryland when the Texas judge said the case must be tried where the death occurred. . Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 AR TICL?' AF'r 1D O:I FAG 2 __._ THE WASHINGTON POST 8 January 1980 . F & e4 i Deg. . By Chris Schauble $oecial to The washir.3ton Post BALTIMORE; Jan. 7-A federal judge here today rebuffed an El Paso, Tex., widow seeking to.sue the Army, the CIA and FBI for allegedly con spiring to kill her husband, an Army. intelligence double agent who was electrocuted in a motel room near Fort George G. Meade in April 1976. U.S. District Judge Edward S. Nor- throp invoked a legal principle known as the Feres Doctrine to rule that, ther- military and civilian superiors of Ralph J. Sigler, the agent, cannot be sued for damages because Sigler's.."al- leged injuries were incurred incident to service." In a two-year legal battle, Sigler's widow, Use Sigler, and her daughter, Karin :Mears, sought S100,000 in dam- a,,es as a result of Sigler's mysterious death on April 13, 1976, a month he- lore his 48th birthday and three months before his planned retirement. Sigler, whose joie was to sell mis- leading information to Soviets, was found dead at a motel in Jessup, Md. Electrical wiring, stripped of its insu- lation, was wrapped around his upper arms and plugged into a wall socket. Maryland police and Army authori- ties concluded that Sigler committed suicide. For. lo-=years he had dealt with the -Russians, identifying their agents in this- country and abroad by selling them military secrets, often fabri ' Bated, about American radar and mis- sile systems. Then during a debriefing he flunked a lie detector test about his activities with the-Russians. He was sent to Fort Meade, where he was in- terrogated for nine days. according to Mrs.,Sigler. - Then, he was found dead. Army psy- chiatrists concluded in an official re- j port that he "was not mentally re- at. the time of the act which sponsible caused his death." . . But Mrs. Sigler believed that Army I intelligence had done "something wrong,'' that her husband knew too much about it and that Army person- Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1 nel murdered him for this reason She' said she - hoped her suit would shed light-on the matter. According to James Kenkel,.Mrs. Si- gler's attorney, the doctrine invoked by the judge applies solely because Si- gler "was- duty in the mili- tary on military orders and ordered to Fort Meade." Henkel said he plana ar. appeal and called the Feres Doctrine., "a .throw- the.days when.the king could wrong. I think that's too harsh- in this day and age. "Look at all. the recent abuses." Kenkel continued. "We -have big Watergates and little Watergates and we've learned that national. security is a shield for a whole host of wrongdo- ings. A complete shield is wonderful. You can do anything." Richard R. Beauchemin, one of the defense attorneys, said, "Our hearts and sympathies go out to the individ- ual and But sometimes you just have to stand back and say wait a minute, the whole community could go down the drain. "My God, we'd never be able tai function without it [the Feres Doc+ trine]." said Beauchemin. "My com- ments, I guess, would be called wavw_l ing'the flag. But these are necessary requirements for- our country' being able to operate; in an- international sphere. The judge also-denied a request by Mrs. Sigler that the Army- return ma- terials it confiscated from her house in what.she called "an illegal search and- seizure. He said the materials, which he inspected 'in his chambers, could jeopardize national security. But Northrup did not dismiss. the entire case. He said Mrs. Sigler and her daughter could still sue for dam- ages possibly suffered as a result of the search and seizure if the govern-! ment would not be jeopardizing na- tional security by naming the agents who took the materials. But Kenkel claimed that the heart of the suit "has been gutted with the ruling on Feres .. . We can't even