THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 6, 1944
• Content Type: REPORT

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T-462
Earch 6, 1944
THE :ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE,
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I. THE .EASTERN BOUNDARY OF CONGRESS POLAND
From 1815 to 1912 the administrative bOundary which sep-
arated Congress Poland from the rest Of the Russian Empire
followed the eastern boundaries of the gubernike of -Vilna)
Grodno and Volyn. For the most part it was wZIT-defined by
rivers, following the Niemen from the border of East Prussia_
to the city of Grodno, the Bobr (Biebrza) arid the Narev to a
point near Byelostok (Bialystok), then running.soUthwest to
the Bug and following that river upstream to the border, of
Galicia. This boundary roughly separated Polish-populated
territory from areas with Lithuanian; White Russian or
Ukranian majorities'. ,However, because of the. inter-mingling
of ethnic groups in this region, it could not' be termed a
clear-cut line of separation between ethnically Polish and
non-Polish territory. In the north (guberniya of Suvalki) a
,solidly Lithuanian-populated area, and in the south (region
of Kholm) an area ithA a-large Ukrainian population, probably.
a majority, were left within Congress Poland. On the other
hand, a considerable Polish population lived in districts
lying to the east of the boundary in Russia proper, where it
was strong in the cities (especially in Vilna, Grodno and
Bialystok) and in certain of the rural districts.
II. TERRITORIAL CHANGES DURING !THE WORLD WAR
In March 1915 the Russian Government altered the boundary
of Congress Poland by separating from it the district of Kholm,
a step condemned by Polish spokesmen as alienation of territory
which had been an integral part 'of Poland for centuries.. By
the end of that year, however, the disposition of the whole -of
Congress Poland, including Kholm, was in the hands of the Cen-
tral Powers, whose armies had driven out the Russians. The
Imp,vial Russian Government attempted to gain Polish support
in 1916 by announcing plans to create an autonomous Polish.
state "under the sceptre of the Russian sovereigns", which was
to include "all Polish territories11. Almost' simultaneously, in
November 1916; Germany and Austria proclaimed the establishment
of a "hereditary and independent" Polish state. It was an-,'
flounced that "the more precise regulation of the frontiers
remains reserved until.after the war" but it was presumed that
.they would be those, of the Congress Kingdom, inaluding Kholm.
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Thecsecret Austro-German agreement, however, upon which the
proclamation was based, provided for the exclusion of the
guberniya of Suvalki, which had a Lithuanian majority, from
the new Poland.
In February 1918.the Central Powers made a further change
when they ceded to the Ukrainian Republic, by a treaty signed
at Brest-Litovsk, the district of hholm. The Austrian Govern-
ment hoped that this concession to Ukrainian ,nationalism would
increase the chances of getting the food supplies which Austria
so desperately needed. The Regency Council of the Kingdom of
Poland, which the Central Powers had recently established but
had not allowed to be represented at Brest-Litovsk, publicly'
protested against the cession of KholLi to the Ukraine; because
of this alienatiOn of territory which they held to be POlish,
whatever remaining faith Polish leaders had in the Central
Powers evaporated.
In August 1918 the Soviet Government decreed the "irrevo=
cable" annulment of the treaties made by the Russian tmpire
partitioning Poland, "in view of their inconsistency with the
principle of self-determination and with the revolutionary
feeling of justice of the Russian people, which has recognized
the inalienable right of the Polish people to its independence
and unity.
III. THE Q,UESTION OF POLAND'S EASTERN FRONTIER
AT?THE AR S.PEACE CONFERENCE'
I. Polish Claims
The Polish case was presented to the Entente 'powers.dur-
ing 1917 and 1918 by Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish
National Committee, which was recognized by them in 1917 as
"an official Pdlish organization". In January 1919 Dmowski
and PadereWski became Polish delegates to the peace Confer-.
ence. Memoranda presented to Balfour,- -Wilson and others by
DmowSki'propoSed that Poland's eastern frontier should run
roughly as follows: northward from the Dniester River passing
to the east of Kamenets Podolsk, following the floryil and Slucz
Rivers through the region of the Pripet Marshes, passing to
the east of Minsk, Borisov and Polotsk, then turning westwards
to pass to the ,north of Dtinaburg (Dvinsk)., reaching the Baltic
Sea at a point north of Libau. The Poles thus claimed-exten-
sive Russian territories beyond the boundary of Congress Poland
inhabited chiefly by Ukrainians, White Russians and Lithuanians.
All Lithuanian-inhabited territory was included, with the idea
that
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Mime,
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that the historic union of Poland with the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania should be revived in modern form. Except in the
southeast, this proposed line was almost as far east as the
Polish frontier of 1772, before the first partition.
The Poles based their claims chiefly on the historic
association of these borderland regions and peoples with
Polish culture and with the Polish state. Although these
peoples were not Poles, neither were they Russians, the
Polish spokesmen contended, and 'since none of them was capa-
ble of independent political existence, their best guarantee
lay in union or federation with Poland. In a formal state-
ment before the Heads of Delegations at the Peace Conference
in January 1919 Dmouski suggested that the frontier of 1772 be
taken as the legal starting point for discussion of the terri-
torial settlement in the east, but conceded that it might be
modified so that "a large portion" of historically Polish
territory would remain under Russia. He did not lay claim to
Lithuania or to the Ukraine as parts of Poland but held that
they should be united in some way with Poland, especially
since anarchy or despotism was likely to reign in Russia for
some time to come. On Lay 23, 1919 a resolution of the Polish
Diet made the same claims and declared them to be consistent
with the principle of self-determination.
2. The American Position at the Beginning of the Peace
Conference; Recommelons of .151Ie InTr
in-1918 the House "Inquiry" undertook a study of the- --------
eaStern limits of the "indisputably Polish" territory which,
according to President Wilson's thirteenth Point, should be
included within the future independent Polish state. Because
of the unreliablility of the Russian census statistics (census
of 1897), it was decided that only a "minimum" boundary could
be described and that any judgment as to the ethnic composition
of the population in areas lying to the east of such a boundary
would have to be postponed until more evidence should become
available. The memorandum, written by Dr. Robert H. Lord and
others, proposed a minimum boundary whidh ran approximately as
follows: southwards from the boundary of the L:uberniya of
Suvalki along the pastern boundaries of the districts-Tuyezdy)
of Sokolka, Volkovysk 1/ and Bielsk, all in the gubertiya of
Grodno,
1/ In another-recommendation covering only the nbrtheastern
frontier of Poland, Dr. Lord suggested the inclusion of $okolka,
Bialystok and Bielsk within Poland, making no mention of
Volkovysk. Such a frontier would be more reasonable ethno-
logically and geographically than one which jutted eastward to
include Volkovysk in Poland.
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Grodno, then following the line of the Bug River to the bOrder
of Eastern Galicia., The Kholm.area; where the Russian' census
of 1897 showed Ukrainian-speaking majorities in four of the
eight districts, was included within Poland becauSe of its
large Catholic majority (nand here Catholic and Pole seem to
be nearly identical terms"), and becauSe the authors of the
-memorandum were convinced that the census statistics for this
area were clearly false. The same considerations accounted
for the decision to include in Poland the uyezdy of Bielsk,
Sokolka and VolkoVysk, where the census sh-O-Je-a--:Thite Russian-
speaking majorities; many of the ':ihite Russians were Roman
Catholics. Apart from this conSideration it was thought nec-
essary to include this area within 'Polandin order to estab-
lish a "fairly broad territorial connection" between Poland
and Lithuania and to leave open the possibility of an even-
tual federal or tariff union between them.
The "Inquiry" memorandum on Poland's eastern frontier
conceded that a boundary following the suggested "Minimum
linen would be "extremely unsatisfactory to most Poles",
since sonic districts to the east of it, particularly in the
region of Vilna, had a substantial Polish population and
since strong ties existed between Poland and all the debatable
territories in the east. The memorandum suggested that pleb-
iscites, or a careful investigation ?on the spot by an inter-
national commission, might be held in the sEuberniye of Grodna
and Vilna and in the western parts of Minsk and Volyn, thus
holding open the possibility of eastward revision along the
whole length of the suggested line.
The "Interpretation of the Fourteen Points", prepared at
the request of Colonel House by Frank I. Cobb, editor of the
New York World, and -jailer Lippmann, 'Secretary of "The Inquiry",
and submiTTa-to President 'jilson in October 1918, stated
that "on the east, Poland should receive no territory in,
which Lithuanians. or Ukrainians predominate". It emphasized
the President's word "indisputably" in nis reference to Polish
territory, and envisaged the taking of an impartial census
before the drawing of the frontiers.
The Report .(or "Black Book") which the Intelligence
Section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace sub-
mitted to the President and to the American Plenipotenti-
aries on January 21, 1919, contained the final recommenda-
tions of "The Inquiry". It took note of the impossibility
of settling finally the territorial problems involving
Russia's western frontier so long as the Bolshevik govern-
ment remained in puwer. The Report did, however, recommend
an eastern boundary for Poland which ran as follows: from
a point on the southern border of Galicia near the source
of the San River, northwards to the southern
border
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border of the province of Lubiin,-.then-following,that boun-
dary eastwards to the Bug -River ?ahd northwards along"the?Bug
,to 'aodawa; then northeastwards ?to include-Pinsk and a large
part of the Pripet I:arshes region within Poland, northeast-
wards along the Sczara and Nlemen Riverb-, leaving-Grodab
outside Poland, then across the guberniya of Suvalki, leaving
to Poland its two southeastern districts,- to the border ?of
East Prussia. Except' for the salient relDredented by. the.
Ulodawa-Pinsk-Grodno triancle, where it departed sharply from
the ethnic limits of "indisputably Polish" territory, this
line was nearly identical with the line later. adopted by the
Peace Conference as the provisional eastern frohtier of ?
Poland, which has come to'be.known the nurzon'Line". The
boundary recommended by the .0.merican experts left outside
Poland virtually all territory with a Ukrainian majority,
? both in Eastern Galicia and in former Russian territory,:but
the Ukrainian-inhabited area between this line aid the line
? of the Zbrucz and Horyil-Rivers--which-Poland evehtually ac-
quired by the Treaty of Riga--was considered as a "possible
addition to:Poland"-as a self-governing province, but only in
case the Ukraine should not give-'evidences, of vitality' as-an
independent state. It was-recommended that a Ukrainian state
be established "provided Ukrainian nationalism is strong
enough to justify that decisiOn", It was also recommended
that encouragement be given to the reunion of the Ukraine
with a federalized or genuinely democratic Russia,
The zone of mixed and uncertdin ethnic?charabter in which
the White Russians, who were not considered ready for politi-
cal independence, were in the majority, the Repert proposed?
to,divide between Poland and Lithuania. If the latter should
remain independent of ,Russia and should agree to federal union
with Poland, the line'along the Sczara and the-Niemen. was rec-
ommended as the most suitable boundary between the two states;
Lithuania would then be a sizeable state, extending from the
Baltic Sea to the Pripet River and including the cities of
Vilna, Grodno, NowogrOdek, and Minsk. It was pointed out that
if .a federal union between Poland and Lithuania proved impos-
sible, this boundary would certainly be unsatisfactory to the
Poles and should be modified, after a careful census by an
impartial commission, so as to coincide With the fairest eth-
nic dividing line between Polish and Lithuanian populations.
General Principles for the Determination
of Poland's Eastern.Frofirnr
At the Peace Conference the study Of Poland's frontiers
was referred to. the Commission on Polish-Affairs, .en.which'
each
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each of the five principal Allied and Associated Powers was
represented. I/ The Commission felt that it would be diffi-
'cult to come TO any decision in regard to Poland's territorial
claims in the east without hearing all sides of the case, and
at that particular time it was not certain what states would
border Poland on the east. The Commission hesitated to give
hearings to delegations claiming to represent Russia, Latvia,
Lithuania, 4)r the Ukraine, since their governments were not
recognized by the Allied Powers. Since no common policy in
respect to Russia had been arrived at, it was agreed that the
Peace Conference could not assign to Poland any Russian terri-
tory not specifically renounced by a recognized government of
Russia. As the Kerensky government, on March 30, 1917, had
declared its willingness to recognize "an independent Poliph
State composed of all regions inhabited by a population of
Polish majority", it was agreed by the Commission on Polish
Affairs that a line could be drawn marking the eastern limit
Of territory about whose Polish characterthere was no doubt.
On March 29, 1919, the Commission -adopted the following
"Principles for the Determination of the Eastern Frontier of
Poland":
1. The Declaration of the Provisional Government of
Russia which recognized the "creation of an inde-
pendent Polish State, constituted of all regions
inhabited by populations of Polish majority", is
considered as serving as the basis for the actual
determination of the eastern frontier of Poland
across the territories of the former .Russian Empire.
This frontier will be drawn according.to the same
principles on which the western Polish frontiers
were based. (Blimmarily, that primary considera-
tion be given to ethnic factors, and that second-
ary consideration, be given to religious, economic
and
'rules Cambch was Chairman of the Commission. The American
representative was Dr. Isaiah Bowman. On April 10 his
place imas taken by Dr. Lord. Dr. Bowmnn returned as prin-
cipal American representative in November. Thus, through-
out the greater part of the period in which the Commission
had under considPration the eastern frontiers of Poland,
it fell to Dr. Lord to 7.)rsert tbo Americ-m viewpoint;
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and administrative factors; and that account be
taken of the exposed situation of Poland between
? Germany and Russia and of the need for strength-
? ening its defensive frontiers).
3. Regions where there is doubt regarding the ethnic
character and the wishes of the population cannot,
for the moment, be attributed to the Polish State.
As a fourth principl.e the Commission proposed that it
should designate certain territories located east of the
line which would be drawn on the above principles, where an
inquiry should be made as to the ethnic and religious char-
acter and the wishes of the population; that this inquiry
should be made on the spot if possible; and,that a definitive
solution should be given to the question of the eastern fron-
tier of Poland as soon as a Russian government, with whom
the Allies could deal, was established.
Early, in April an Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, on
which Dr. Lord and General F.J. Kernan represented the
United States, returned from Warsaw to Paris. Its report
to the Peace Conference recommended that the eastern fron-
tiers of :Poland be determined when circumstances permit;
"on the basis of ethnographic considerations and of -
wishes of the populations, without such frontiers many
case being more restricted than those of the old Congress
Poland". This last recommendation concerning the boundary
of Congress Poland was not accepted by the Peace Conference,
since it had been decided that the _greater part of the
guberniya of Suvalki should not go to Poland.
A The Tracing of a "Minimum Boundary" for Poland
The task of fixing a line conforming to the agreed prin-
ciples was left to the Sub-Commission specially created to
study'this.problem. Its Chairman was General Le Rand (-Prance),
and its other members were Dr. Lord (United States), Mr. Patdn
(British Empire), and Marquess della Torretta (Italy). The .
Sub-Commission had little difficulty despite the British
delegate's reluctance to concede the southeastern portion of
the district of Suvalki to Poland, in reaching agreement on
the extreme northern part of the line, from the frontiers of
East Prussia to Grodno, where it separated Polish-speaking
from Lithuanian-speaking territory, nor on the dentral,part,
where the Bug River, from Mielnik to Opalin, was considered:
the line of ethnic separation between 'Polish and non-rPolish-
_
pooulations. A11 "out one member favored following the line
of. the
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of the .Bug ? from ?Opalin. 'to the: bo-rder of 'Eatern Galicia, but
since. .the pritish ,delega.te_was? of.!,the :bpinion- that Some dis-
tricts ,west- ,of.-the.Bug e. TomaszOw.and-Hrubie'szciw) were
more Ukrainian than Polish.;:in_??pOpulation; .,con'side:bation of'
this sector of the line was postponed until the status of
Eastern ,Galicia-.,shouldihav.e.-been ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
, _ The mostroyerdial?!parc., of. theuline7 wad7i-the:sec tor
between Mielnik on the Bug and Grodno on the Niemen.. Dr. Lord
favored?aeavIng,..--the districts',OfLSokalka,,?.Bialystok andiBlelsk
to Poland., Her admitted that.:.7,the-IstatiStica showed
Rus sianmaj in_.;SokoIka :and.7:.intheeastrn.. part dc.:.of ii
three ...Aistricts5,,,but? .argued.-.)that White Rassiaris were Catholics,
that- their.:_aiaIect and-.that ? "Pdlonization"
was 'making rapid;iprogrspc;among thera-.7c:;liefelt that Poland,.:'
should :.1:?.e.,Tiven.:::thecibenefitf.,-,of ;_any,ldoubt.':in?,thid,2ar'.ea,.7.aince -
the restoration7,.ofTor.der, --.wp.s not .likelr..to:be-lef,-,.
fected for a long time.,--,;;Generalz..Le:14ond..1:aIbo; favored.,d.r'. _
"generous" solution_ for Poland in this region. Mr. Paton,
however, -..objected to.;:anydepartUrecfrdm?:ethriic criteri'ai and
suggested-,]Wainencutting.-.:thrdugh,;thithree district s
, passing
to the:-,west T.of the.L-citie?s of:Sokbika'..afidt-Btelsk ?and -to the..
The_.:Sub-Commis si'on :finally agreed";-,t on* ividi'ch. 27, :that
Grodno-,shCuld zaeft, outside cPoiand...ibut that _Poland .should
have the7.city_..ofT Bialystok:andi.the 3.7ailWay zline from there to
the ',junction '.five_,-ki,Iometers4dciuthwest of. C-rodho,.., and _that ? the
boundary,.shoUldsr.be: drawn _scimew4ere, between the,..ea'sternboun-'
daries d_istricts.?of. Sokolka; 3.ie1sk :and Bialy'stok :and
a line running parall'er. to the -,.?Bialistok-C-rbdno ,railway:about
five kilometers to the east of it.
The British representative then proposed that, since the
population of this ',w4oie..areaseetrie-d:clea:rly more: White -
Russian:_than...Polishy,:_the iboun6_aryJ,sh615.1d,:run as .clOse to the..
railway as(0ossibie; all-_the rway..'froi-a G-rbd_no tb rthe Bug5.1iver,
leav.ing, the -_cities -of?;Pidlystok and Bielsk to Poland and
leaving theAunction kIeszczeli;:-situated ,south .Bfelsk
on the:.line from Brest7Litovsk .VolkOvysk :Ru'ssia.-.J At.
this point (Dr... Lord proposed that; -the Sub;-Commis-sion? -abandon
too- close adherence to .the: line .'of ethnic' se-Carationt, -7which
was? 'Miles: from Warsaw., 'in ;orders to ::take ;accOUnt of
Poland's ".imperious ?strategic necessitie-s".,_ in faccordance with
the ?principles; upon Po1and. s.,west-ern..frontier.was.-based:.
"Doubtless _these' necessities .-coul&bey-neglec.ted." ,, the .said,
"if' it was a, question -merely-of: tracing' .ayproVisional frontier,
but -since the ...others Delegations tbelieve that the frontier
which
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
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which the. Sub-Commission is studyingwill perhaps be defini-
tive, Poland should not be deprived of-all protection against
Russia by having_ the Russian frontier only 70 miles from
WarSaw".. -Torratta, representing Italy, said that he consid-
ered the boundary under -discussion to be the definitive
? frontier. -Dr, Lord, on being asked whether, in taking the view
that. it was to be only provisional he was speaking in the name
? of the American Government, replied that he was giving only
his personal opinion? The chairman, General Le Rand, then
remarked that, at the moment, it was. impossible to say whether
the line shouldbe a provisional or the definitive frontier)
and that only events could decide that question. The discus-
sion then continued, with much greater attention paid to the
strategioapd economic aspects of the lines under consideration,
Dr.-,Lprd suggebted giving Poland the advantage of the
defensive barrier formed by the Swislocz River and the ?
Bialowieska Forest. 'General Le Rond immediately. supported ?
Lordls suggestioa? as a good solution for military and economic
reasonS,land a natural geographic boundary. He admitted that
the T3ritish proposal, which the Italian member favored because
it was fairer on both ethnic and strategic grounds to "our
ally, Russia," was a much better ethnic line, but argued. that
the population in this region was so mixed and had so little
national consciousness that ethnic considerations should not
be decisive, - Lord and Le Rond, after rejecting Paton's pro-
posal of a compromise line following the Swislocz but in its
southern 'portion leaving theBrest-Litovsk-Volkovysk railway
entirely on the Russian side, finally persuaded their British
and Italian. colleagues to accept the Swislocz-Bialoweska.line,
to avoida-lasting.disagreement, The line adopted, in the
sector between. the Niemen and the Bug-Rivers, ran as. follows:
? From the 'confluenceof the Niemen with the Lososnai
following the Lososna to a point about two and?one-
half kilometers upstream, then-taking-an approxi-
mately south-easterly direction, the Grodno-
Kuznitsa railway at a-point 500 meters northeast of
the junction of KielbasIn,-turning south-south-east
to reach the.LikOwka River, .at a point one kilometer
west of Baranowo; following the Likowka and Laszanka
Elvers to the Swislocz River; following the Swislocz
upstream to a point four kilometers north. of Yalowka;
followin a line to 'betraced on the ground reaching
9
the Jiainowka-Swislocz'. railway at the, point where that
railway is cut by the Narew-NareWka road, running
towards the southwest so as to reach the north-south
forest road which passes about two kilometers west of
?
Skupowo;
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Skupowo; following that forest road southwards, to
the .point where it meets the Lesna-Prawa.RiverL .
turning towards the south-west and following a line
to be determined on the ground cutting the Brest- .
Litovsk-Bielsk railway at the point where the
Visoko-Litovsk-Kleshcheli road crosses that railway
(about 10 kilometers south-south-east of Kleshcheli),
reaching the administrative boundary between, the
districts of Bielsk and Brest-Litovsk at the point
Where it forms an acute angle nine kilometers north--
east of MieInik, leaving to Poland the villages of.
Wolka, Piesczatka4 Stolbce and Wierpole, and follow-
ing that administrative line to the Bug .River.
On April 14 the bub-Commission submitted to:the.CommisL
sion on Polish Affairs its recommendation on the eastern
frontier of Poland from the border Of East Prussia to Opalln,
a town on the Bug River due east Of lholm.. Detel4mination of ?
the frontier south of that point was postponed.becaUse of
the uncertainty over the status of Eastern Galicia. In de-
scribing the application of the chosen principles to special
areas, the Sub-Commission's report explained that between
Grodno and Brest-Litovsk the recommended line ran a certain
distance to the eastof the limit within which the Poles
were known to have a compact ethnic majority, in order to
secure, adequate communication between central Poland and the
Polish part of the Suvalki district, and to give Polanda :
"satisfactory defensive frontier" following a natural geo-
graphic line of division.. The report stated that the line
of the Bug, between Brest-Litovsk and Kholm (Opalin) had
been taken as the frontier because the whole region tb, the.
west of it was historically and economically connected, with.
Poland, and the Ukrainian element in the population was cOM-
paratively small and had little.national consciousness; in
addition,, the Bug was the only natural defense line in this
area. The recommended line left the fortresses of Brest-
Litovsk .and Grodno outside Poland, although' two of the out-
lying forts of the former stronghold.were situated west of
the Bug and therefore fell.to,Poland;.the Crodno fortifica-
tions situated west of the Nieden were left to Russia. In
the case of both cities, the Sub-Commission based its deci-
sion on both economic and strategic considerations, trying
to balance the.need for .unimpeded navigation On the two
rivers and for the free economic development of the two
cities against the strategic value of the two fortresses to
Russia. ? -
The Commission on Polish Affairs accepted without modi-
fication the recommendation of the Sub-Commission and
embndi d
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embodied it and its _owri Report ;lib. 2 to the 8Uprenie COuncil
(April 22, 1919). The recommended frontier diverged from
the boundary of 'Congre SY-Poland, ih the former Russian guber-
niiia'' Of Suvalki', of which-only ;4,2100 ;SqUare -kilometers', with
a populatiOn.. of '213 i'00071(den'Susof, ) On the Polish
'side Of1 the;:reCommended:: line -,nthe' ret 'wasr,'eStPected taThe-
come part of, Lithuania'" Between :` thee Niemen and: the_Bug
Rivers the rebOmmeridedfr-ontier_difClUded in,. P
10,670 sqaare.:kilroniet or'S of dthe )17,11b Crodnb,which
h.ad' been Oa:beide:: the -.Vaufid'a-ry-,Of Congr e's'e Poland. 1 According
to 'the ' c-ensus 1897-3.. th1saeaiTas nhabatedby 138,000 ..
Poles, 179.1900'. White-Russians, `0 per;poo:.krainians'; 26 , 000 .1'
Russians,:. and 199, 00071-JeWi ; only 241,000 Pole?inhabi'ted the
area's -.to the eaL-4t -"Of 'the 'recbiiithende ;
,Th August "1919, ter% th.V.: S'up'r eiii-e?.-0 0 LI noir' s deei s fon'
that' Ea8t'ern. Cia : shOuld."- liaVe rovThioh? ol:(dinSr. undei.
Polish' s s for the Study of the
Eastern 'Frontier took '.up'thc-e-tiuesti-ori...Of the ?Seatbr;;;*15etween'
Kholm end `the, northern borde":FJ O`f - . ? The': Amer ioan-, 7 -
French, and Ita1i.nrher4b_ers, pneufCced-cate.goricallSrf:in; favor
of the line of the Bug 1?.'Wheh had the advantage 'af:--beint a'
clear geographical : frontier. Lord stated thatitwas
impossible to trace anethnic botyridary7ln, this; 'a on-ns
gi on einde' iiOvefferit aino`ng%
the Ukrainians living we of Cf.;th.`e ug n thd-ichoa.m 'drelb:, he ?
saw no reason to -separate from ' Poland 'a.,;:territory*:,intimately
bound4:td it. for 660 years: tiSh menber, C61. Xisch,?I
felt. that there were serious objections to-'this line, ince
thc.:populatiori. in the siSuthea-dterri 'art of the :province off
Lublin ( the ? Kholni-ar ea ) Orth6dok.rand speaking, as as was the majority of the population in the
neighporing regions of Volhynia and , Eastern Ga1icia. Kisch
proposed :a 'line , Which WOUld(lea-Ve.'':the Rug below (HrubieszOw
and: run: 'southeast ? 'tO-telida 1.---phe',1-151-thern' terminus' of' the
line: which :had been- ab'cepted. :as the western boundary- -of
- Eastern_ Galicia, The Inembers';stressirigthe'unreli-
ability of
the pOpuldtioh"7, statistics and: the iknown.:Tdct -
that 'treat nuiribers*o'f larginfahd,:- had. migrated eastward from
the kh.o.lni-a.rea-!'aur'irig the War, to ;retreat from their
position!: 'Kisch reluctantly 'band.-difed h1rsproposal, and the
line of - the -Bug we:S.' unaninidusl?--aocepted- (August 27, 19l9):
It was turn a:Ccepted-loy'?-the, Coffilissidri ori;l5bla-sh Affairs,
which; in it's Reports No. 2'2) and No. 6 (Septem-
ber 1), recommended td. the Supreme Council ''the .entire agreed
line running from the border; of 'East Prussia to' the 'oorder
of Eastern Galicia-, ? .
t,.
5. Character
ILLEGIB
ILLtuits ,
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Charadter of the Proposed Boundary.
.Report NO. 2 stated that the uommission had unanimously
decided 1) "to propose the described line, as. the eastern.
frontier of Poland" from .East Prussia :to KholM, and 2) "to
draw the attention of the Peace,Conference"-to the following
.proposals, made in another part of the Report a) that in
certain territories situated to the east of that frontier,.
to be sAptermined by the Commission, an investigation should
be madeaS to the extreme linguistic and religious character
and the wishes o? the population; b) that this investigation
should .be :made, ifloossible?,-on the ground, c) that a defini-
tive settlement, be made of the?question. of the eaStern frOn-
tier of Poland as soon as Russian government with whom the
Powers,woUld deal on this question should be established."
Report Na. 6 stated that the Commission had unanimOusly de-
cided that it would be -impossible, in the near future, to
.take any Steps'vith regard to the attribution of the terri-
tories of mixed populations situated east of the recommended
line, since they were then occupied by Polish troops engaged
in fighting Bolshevism and since the,S4reme Council had
already laid down the principle that the final frontier Was
:a .Matter to be settled either by direct agreement with a
recoo.0hized Russian Government, set up. by a democratically
.
elected constituent assembly, or through arbitration, by the
-
League. of Nations. The report than proposed that the'rec-
ommended line be 'accepted as the provisional eastern fron-
tier of Poland, with the understanding that to the other
territories, situated east of it, Might *in the futurebe
joined to Poland. It was proposed that full Polish sover-
eignty be recognized over territories= situated west of the
line.
This position was the one which Dr. ? Lord, American
representative on the .Commission ,and on. the Sub-Commission,.
had consistently maintained. He was convinced that there
were solid blocs of=territory with Polish majorities situated
east of the provisional ?frontier, and he felt that the in-
habitants of the districts with Ilhite-Russian majorities. '
should be given an opportunity to choose union with Poland,.
However, during the discussions in the commissions it was
nover.clear to the participants ihether or not the line
they were.drawinEz would become the permanent frontier. The
British and Italian representatives. certainly.did not con-'
sider any territory east of the line as ever likely toy'
become
become part of Poland. They actually favored a final' fron-
tier running vest of the line finally recommended as a
provisional frontier, and only accepted the latter'line in
?
order
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order to avoid a complete deadlock and because of the strong
pleas made in its behalf by the French and American repre-
sentatives on strategic and economic grounds, i.e. on grounds
valid for the location of a definitive, nota provisional,
frontier. When the Sub-Commission departed from the ethnic
line in the Bialystok and Kholm areas in order to give Poland
a better frontier from the standpoint of defense and of com-
munications, its members were thinking in terms not of a
provisional boundary but of a permanent Russo-Tolish_frontier.
The net result was that Poland was given a carefully worked
out strategic frontier, which followed marked geographical
features: the Suvalki Lakes, the Niemen, the Swisleoz and
the Bug. It should be noted, therefore, that while the
Report of Commission specifically proposed the line as a,
provisional frontier,, alq. members of the Commission considered
it to lie somewhat further to the east than the line to which
Poland was entitled on ethnic grounds, on the basis of the
available statistics. It is for this reason that British
.statesmen, in 1919 and in the Polish-Soviet crisis of 1920,
consistently thought of the recommended line as the frontier
of "ethnic Poland" and regarded POlish claims to further
territory as unjustified and based on the desire to dominate
non-Polish .peoples. 1/
6. Position of the Supreme Council on the
.Russian-Polish Frontier
In considering the line recommended by the Commission
on Polish. Affairs as the eastern boundary of territory which
should be immediately included within Poland, the SupreMe
Council had to take into account its general policy towards
Russia. In a note sent to Admiral Kolchak on I,:ay 27, 1919,
the Allied and Associated Powers had stated that the object
of their policy was to restare,peace T.rithin Russia by.en-
abling the Russian people to resume control of their own
affairs, and "to restore peace along its frontiers by,arrang-
ing for the settlement of disputes in regard to the bound-
(aries. of the Russian state and its relations with its
neighbors through :the. oeaceful-arbitration of the League of
Nations." The experience of the last few months had con-
vinced them that it. was not Oossible to attain those ends -by
dealing
1/ A census taken by German_military authorities in 1918'
and the. official Polish census of 1931 tended to confirm
*
the conviction of:Pr...Lord that districts with Polish _
-majorities extended continuously from Bialystok all the
way to Vilna, and that the Commission's recommended line
was therefore not the true frontier of "ethnic Poland".
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.dealing with the Soviet Government. They therefore agreed
to give assistance to Koldhak and his associates, Upon
.certain conditions, one of which was ?that Russia recognize
the. independence of. Poland, and that in the event that the
Russo-Polish frontiers could not be settled be agreement,
the matter be referred to the arbitration of the League of
Nations.
FroM this statement of policy it seems clear that the
Allied and Associate Powers did not intend to Make any
final decision on Poland's ?eastern frontier or to prejudide
Russia's territorial rights in any way until the return of
Russia to the family of nations. The :"minimum frontier"
proposal of the Commission on Polish ?Affairs put that ques-
tion squarely before the Supreme Council.
On September 26, 1919; the Supreme Council accepted
the conclusions of ReportsAqos. 2 and 6 subbitted by the,
Commission. Under-Secretary Polk, the American representa-
tive, stated specifically that he aporoVed the proposals of
the Commission and concurred in the Councilsdcision.
The Council thus decided that it 'alone, withOut the partici-
pation of Russia, had the right to recognize Poland's "-
sovereignty over former Russian territory .lying west of the
recommended line, on:-the grounds that the ? existing situation
of uncertainty had become very difficult both for the .Polish
Government. and for the populations concerned, and that there
was no immediate prospect of the restoration of orderly
democratic government in Russia. As for the territories
situated to the ?east of the line, the Supreme Council agreed
-that the rights of both"Poiand and 'Russia should be con-
sidered reserved.
7. The Declaration of December 8,-1919
At first the Supreme Council' decided to draw up an
instrument to be signed by. the Allied and Associated Powers
and by Poland, to. serve as an'. 'additional protocol to the ?
Treaty of Versailles of June 28; 1919. The protocol was to
establish Polish sovereignty over all territory lying west
or the agreed line. Although it was generally agreed that
this was merely a question of form, since the definite attri-
bution of. the territory to Poland had already been decided,
r. Polk, representing'the United States, announced in the
meeting of November 29, 1919, that, without new instructions
from his government,' he could not sign a treaty which seemed
to close the door to any future negotiations with Russia. ,
Representatives of the other powers argued that it had already
been
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been unanimously decided in .previous -meetings :.of the Supreme
Council that Poland should have, sovereignty over all terri-
tory situated to the west of the line in question. Mr. Polk
said that he accepted that decision but questioned the
desirability of embodying it in a solemn treatyi,since it
was not intended to be the final frontier. Council
thereupon decided to abandon the treaty form and merely to
notify the Polish Government of the decision, by a simple
declaration.
On December 2, with Mr. Polk present, the Supreme Coun-
cil approved the following declaration:, ::The.Principal Allied
and Associated Powers, recognizing that it is 'desirable as
soon .as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of
political uncertainty in which the Polish Nation is. placed,
and without pre-judging the provisions which 'must in the
future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, hereby declare
that they recognize the right of .the Polish Government. to
proceed, according to the.conditions-previously provided by
the- Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919,.to organize a 'regu-
lar administration of the territories of the former Russian
Zmpirs situated to the West of the line described below:
Froth the Point where the old frontier between Russia
and Austria-Hungary meets the Dug River, down the
Bug northwards to the point where it is met by the
administrative boundary between the districts of .
Bielsk and Brest-Litovsk; following that boundary
northwards to the point where it forms an acute
angle about 9 kilometers?north-east?of Mielnik;
north-eastwards along a line to be determined-on the
ground, leaving to Poland the villages of Wierpole,
Stolbce, Piesczatka and Wolka, and cutting the Bielsk-
Brest-Litovsk railway at .the point where it crosses.
the road between Vysoko-Litovsk and Kleszczeli, reach-
ing the Lesna-Prawa River at the point where it is
crossed by the north-south forest road passing.about
2 kilometers to the west of. Skupowo; northwards along
a'line: to be determined on the ground along the above-
mentioned forest road to the point where the Narew- ?
Narewka road cuts the Hain6Wka-Swis1ocz railway; ?
north-eastwards along a line to be determined on the
ground to a point 4 kilometers .north of JalOwka where
the river passing through that city joins the Swislocz
.River.; following the Swislocz downstream, then the
Laszanka and the Lik6wka upstream to a point about
one and one-half kilometers west of. Baranowo; north-
northwestwards to 4 point on the Grodno-Kuznitsa
railway
(
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railway about 500 meters north-West of the junction
of Kielbasin; north-west to a.point on the course
of the Lososna River about two and one-half kilo- .
. meters southLwest of its confluence with the Niemen;
...following the course of the'Lososna downstream, then '
.that of the Niemen downstream, then that of the
Igorka upstream.to its source, passing Warwiszki;
west-south-westwards to a point on the course of the
Chernohanya (Marycha) River near Sztudjanka, along a
line on the left bank to be. determined on the ground;
the course of the Chernohanya upstream to a point
about two and one-half kilometers east of Zelwa;
.northwards along _a line to be determined on the
.ground to a point on the Berzniki-Kopciowa road situ-
ated two kilometers South-east Of Berzniki; north-
westwards along a line to be determined on the ground
generally parallel to the line .of small lakes situ-
ated between Berzniki and Zegary, about 2 kilometers
to the east of these lakes; westwards to a point on
GaIadusya Lake about two kilometers north of Zegary,
crossing that lake to its extreme north-western
point, leaving the city of Punsk to Poland, and
reaching: the northern boundary of the province of
.Suvalki at the southernmost point of the salient
about 7 kilometers north-wet of Punsk; northwards
along the boundary of the province of Suvalki to the
point 'where it meets the old frontier between Russia
and East Prussia.
The rights which Poland may be able to prove over the
territories situated to the east of the said line are
expressly reserved.
This declaration, dated December 8, 1919 and signed by
Clemenceau, was communicated to the Polish Government.
The line of December 8-1-, which later came to be known
as the "Curzon Line", 'extended southward only as far as
the, northern border of Eastern Galicia. In. the same meet-
ing of December 2 in which it. was adopted, the Supreme
Council directed the Drafting Committee to prepare a draft
treaty which would attribute Western Galicia to Poland and
fix its boundaries. The Council had already, on Novem-
ber.21, laid down the line separating Western. from Eastern
Galicia. This line, together with that of December 8,
formed a continuous line from the border of East Prussia
to the border of Czechoslovakia,- The Allied and.Associ-
ated Powers had definitely decided that the territory
sitUated
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situated td.the west of that line :should become part Of' the.
Polish state, although it.. had not yet been assigned to Poland
by_formal treaty. They had.definitely reserved their,deei-
,. sion as to the dispcthition.,of the territories eaut ofthe
line which was claimed by Poland. In,the,case.of the,former-
Russian territory, the decision was to await the restoration
of a representative regime in Russia; in the caselof-the
former Austrian territory ,(Eastern Galicia), where no Russian
rights were recognized; the decision pn the regime to be .
eetablished was wholly in:the hands of the Allied and Associ-
atediPowers, tO whom Austria had ceded' it.
IV. POLISH-RUSSIAN HOSTILITIES.
IN1920 AND THE,BRITISH
AREISTICE PROPOSALS. .
A. Poland's Attempt Lg. Realize
its Territorial Claims Force
Force
. -
The Polish Government did not accept the line fixed' by. -
the Supreme council, even as a "provisional frontier", ?since
it laid claim to a frontier much further to ,the east, and at
the time the Polish armies were in military-occupation of '
areas situated east of the line which the Poles regarded as
parts of Poland held by right, not territories occupied prO-
visionally at the sufferance of the Allied Powers. The - -
Polish leaders had had ample demonstration of the'impotenae' '
of the Peace Conference.to enforce its:decisiohs in Eastern
Europe. Setting forth their claim to the historic boundarie6
of 1772, they determined to obtain a "secure_ frontier in the
east by initiating a military offensive against the Bolshe-
viks. Pilsudski planned to support an "independent"
Ukrainian state (including former. Russian territory but not
Eastern Galicia), which was to be'Xederated'with Poland and
to serve as a buffer against Russia.
When the Poles announced'their.intention of holding
plebiscites in the-oecupied territory east of the line of
December 8, in order.to justify the annexation of that terri-
tory to Poland, the Conference of Ambassadors, in February
1920, notified the Polish Government that this procedure was
."open to grave objectione, since Only, the Allied and Associ-
ated Powers had the right to decide when and how the consul-
tation of' the inhabitants of those areas should take place;
any elections held under Polish occupation would be regarded
as null and void and as having no. influence whatever on the
ultimate territorial settlement. The American observer at
the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors, Mr. Wallace,
stated
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stated that the United. States "had no objection" to the
communication of this statement to Poland. At about the
same time the Allied Powers agreed that .they could not accept
the responsibility of.advising Poland and other border states
"to continue a war* which. may be injurious to their own inter-
ests; still less would they advise thet to adopt a policy of
aggression towards Russia;. if however Soviet Russia attacks
Anbide their legitimate frontiers the Allies-will give them
every possible support." Mr. Lloyd George informed ,the Poles
that Poland could expect no assistance from Great Britain in.
holding territory beyond its'ethnic'limits, and intimated
that he desired the Poles to make peace with the Bolsheviks.
The French, however, who were- persisting 'in their,atteMpts
to form a "defensivell anti-Bolshevik Alliance. including '
Poland, Rumania and the Baltic nationsl-alpparently did not
discourage the Poles from undertaking a military offensive
against Russia.
The Polish compaign in the spring of 1.920 was at first
successful, and the army of Pilsudski reached Kiev
But the Bolsheviks, having disposed of the "white" armies,
of Kolchak and Denikin, were able to turn the tide against
the Poles and to drive them back rapidly toward LwOw and
Warsaw. Poland then made an appeal to the western powers
for assistance.
B. British- Armistice Proposals to'?
Poland and Russia,. July 9-10 1920
The 'British Government .undertook to bring about an
armistice between the Poles'and.the To1sh0Vik; in order to
avert the danger that the7western'powers_would:be?drawn into
,xar?with Russia to save Poland's independence. On July 10,
at the Conference of Spa, Lloyd_tleorge? talked with Grabski,
the Polish Premier, and secured his written 'agreement- to sign
an immediate armistice with Soviet Russia on the following
terms:that. the'Polish.army..retire-to the line fixed by the
Peace Conference on December a, 1919,. while the Soviet armies
would halt at a line 50 kilometers to the east .of that line;
that Vilna be handed over immediately to the LithUanians,and
remain outside the zones- te be occupied by the Poles and by
the Bolsheviks;' that in Eastern Galicia the' Polish and Soviet
armies each 'retire ten kilometers from.the'line which they,.
had reached at the date of the armistice; 'that Poland -send
representatives- to a conference at London, to.be attended by
delegates_ from Soviet Russia; Finland,'-Latvia and Lithuania,
and held under the-auspices of the' Peace Conference, with the
object of negotiating a lasting peace between.Rtissia and its
western
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western neighbors. ..The British Government a.greed-to. make
:these sane proposals to Soviet Russia? ,and, in theevent of
Russian refusal aridof the crossing of the stipulatedline by
the Russian armies,- to render, in conjunction with Britainsi ,*
allies,- "all the assistance, possible, consistent with.
their-own:exhaustion and heavy. liabilities-elsehel:e":-
' The .next day the British Government, proposed the same
terms to the Soviet Government. In .a note radioed to Moscow
the proposed armistice line was.described.as "the line laid
down .last year by the Peace Conference as:the-eastern bound-
ary-within which Poland was entitled, to establish:a PeIish
administration, running approximately as follows: Grodno,
Yalovka, Nemirow, Brest-Litovsk, orogusk, Ufitilug, east of
Grubeshbv? (Hrubiesz6w),..Krilovi ancl thence west .of Rawa Rusha,
east of Przemysl.td,the.Carpathians". .North.of-Grodno the
proposed armistice line departed- from_th.0Jine of December 8,
in order to leave Lithuania_outside.both.Polish and:Bolshevik
zones of occupatiaa; It vas to run north-eastwards to, Vilna
and. Dvinsk.and.to-.bs.held_by,the Lithuanians,' not 4y- the Poles.
The 'British note added that. Great Britain "was -bound, ... to
defend the integrity: and independence..:of Poland within its
.legitimate ethnographic. frontiers; if, therefore, Soviet ?
Russia.... will not be content with the withdrawal of the
Polish armies from Russian soil on the condition of a mutual
armistice, but intends to take action hostile to Poland in
its own territory, the British Government and its Allies would
feel bound to assist the Polish Nation to defend its existence
with all the means at their disposal."
C. Analysis of Great BritairOs
"Curzon-Line"-Proposal ?
While the line laid down by the Peace Conference,' after-
wards ..known as the Curzon line because-the British-note of
July 11 was signed by. the: Foreign Secretary,-LOrd CurZon,
was proposed only as an armistice lineand. not as'a final
frontier, the references to therwithdrawal-Of Polish armies .
"from Russian Soil" (i.e., tthe'line,of.Debember 8)-and to
the defense of Poland "within, its legitimate ethnographic
frontiers" (i.e., extending.nd further east than the line of
December 8) Indicated that the British-Government.regarded
that, line as a proper basis for a final frontier Settlement
between Poland and Russia. Statements made at the time in
Parliament by Lord Curzon and Lloyd George confirm that'
interpretation.
The definition
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-The. definitionof , the , terM' -"Cdizoh Line - is?-cbmplicated
by inconsi stencies ;Jin the: text ..of:?the British, nbteJof July 11.
The line ' deseribed-:-in:thehote ran .from -Grodhb all the way to
the Carpathiahs; ,passing to: the-wet of Ea'stern Galicia, in
which Poland has: beeh authorized5tto ;establish: a"- civil adminis-
tration,. ,It was '6oMbinati?Ori: of thelfri'6% ofl:De6ember 8,
which ran only through farmer Russian territory, and ,of the
_y
western bbrderof EasternYGalicia. adopted by t; thelyea-Ce Con-
ference: ihi. NOVemb en,- 1919 but not _embodied',in any-f ormal tr'eaty
or declaration.- 4/. HOwevefe, '_the., note ano:- 'contained the same
provision regarding-Easternalicia.Which.Grabki hadj-accepted
at Spa.,nathelSr'that ?ther,af.miticelineinthati'proVih6e -should
bethe_lineocOupledThy:thetwo-armiesonuthe%date-ofzthe.opn-
. elusion of the. 'armistice:? , The note as enerefOre.;ambiguoUs,
? and the term:',1 Our c anft -'applied="eithe'r7tbr-the- line
of::December betw'een.Grodno,iand-the-border2bf="tEa'st'drn'
Galicia,o to.-:th4t: western"bathdarY. oi:Eat -ern
extending --(3=Itheil3brder".(1)T:-Cz-eoho'slovakia.',.k/
? The Soviet- Government rej ected the : British- armisticet '
proposal,". stating its.:int6ntion.,Of dealingdirectl with
Poland.. It replT :stated that -Soviet -Ruesi& *as-Willing to
agreezto a-finaL,frontier .more -.favorable: tb _P6126.nd'. than - the
line of _Dec ember-8 -,', particulalyGin. the' re-gione of iBi6av-St6k
? 2.1
The. Declaration of December. 8 ;.; 1919rwas :accodparifed by
an official map on which a continuous line, extending to
the Carpathians was shown.' ,LiThi 'map:may. hayd been 're-
sponsible for the inconsistencies!bf zon s:descrip-
tion of the proposed line.
ihe,,Soviet:overnmen G 1 s :proposal .on January f 11,7.1.9441-
of '_-the Curzon Line _accepted.' in -1919' by,-,the Suprerne - Coun-
cil of ,the 7Allied,Power,g'!, as.r:the , future "froritier tbe twe en
.Poland :and -Russia- was accompanied map arid ta':de.serip-
'-tidn of the :line, in ..which :the, line is described by naming
v.thesame: eitkes-_ as had :the :British note =.o.i:July 1920,
-from :Gr ono to the:.-Carpathins. This, in itHe Sovietcview,
the Curzon. linvwould.)leave:-,to-the 'Soviet :Union not_only
all former:-Ru_ssian- territory Ilying , east ?of'. the-,'
line, of- Decpmber_? 81 ;1919 ,-but ,also;Ithe :whole Eastern'
Galicia ,.:,w4ch,-neyer was a part of _imperial :Russia ::.but :
was 'incorporated into the U. S. S. R. in -1939.7..:The Soviet
? statement that this line was adopted by the Peace Con-
ference as the final frontier and confirmed as such by
the Conference of Spa is erroneous. (See I zvestiya ,
January 13, 1944)
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
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and Kholm. 11 Curzonts .second,note, sent on July. 20, men-
tioned the 'Soviet Government's willingness to concede to
Poland a final frontier not labs favorable than "the ethno-
graphic frontier originally -suggested by the Supreme Council",
and stated. the British Government's desire that the Polish-
Russian frontier correspond, as far as possible,.to the
wishes of the populations concerned. The-note-repeated the
threat. that. the crossing of the proposed armistice line by
the Soviet armies would result, in a decision by Great Britain
and its allies to give to Poland the aid which they had
promised in that event.
D. Poland's Military Victory and the
Establishment of the Riga Line
The Soviet Government ignored the British warnings,
while its armies crossed the Curzon line late in July and
marched on Warsaw. The.proposed conference in London never
took place-, and the Polish-Russian territorial conflict was
settIed not under the auspices of the Allied Powers but "
directly between the two .states imMediately cohcerned.. In
august :the Poles threw back the Russian army before Warsaw
and in a counter-offensive drove them eastward far beyond
the Curzon line.
The Western powers urged moderation on Poland, desiring
the conclusion of peaceas quickly as possible, but they made
no
.1/ The Soviet Government* must have been laboring under some
misunderstanding concerning the line of December 8, since
that line left the former Russian district of BialYstok
and the wholeof the Kholm area to Poland.' There. is some
evidence that the Soviet leaders actually comteMplated a
.final frontier which would leave Bialystok to Russia and
thus. would be less favorable to Poland than the line of
December 8. Whatever generosity they showed -toward
Poland's boundary claims was the result of their convic-;
tion that, simultaneously with the entry ofthe.victori-
dus Soviet army, Poland would experience a proletarian.
revolution, and that the frontier between Soviet Russia
and. a Soviet Poland would have no political%significante.
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no specific statements as to what line they favored as a
final frontier. The British wished to avert another "impe-
rialistid adventure" by PilsUdski: probably they would have
preferred that the frontier approximate the Curzon line, but
they left the matter entirely in the hands of the Poles And
the Bolsheviks. The French, who ali along had been more
favorable to the Polish cause than had the British, had taken
no responsibility for thearmistice proposals, and had not
, desired to invite Soviet Russia's participation in a: gen8ral
peace conference, saw their policy vindicated by the Polish
victory at Warsaw, to which the French General Weygand con-
tributed, and by Poland's successr after the victory, in
securing a peace which satisfied its territorial claims.
-
Receiving no consistent advice from the western powers,
the Poles made peace on their own terms, to which the
Bolsheviks, anxious for peace at-any price, agreed. By the
preliminary treaty of Riga, concluded on October 12, 1920,
Poland secured a frontier over one hundred miles east of the
Curzon line, running through regions which had clear White
Russian and Ukrainian majorities. This frontier was con-
firmed by the final treaty of Riga on liarch 18, 1921,
E. The American Position Dur-
ing the Crisis of 1920
During the Soviet-Polish war the United States took a
somewhat inconsistent position. On the one hand it desired
the conclusion of peace, while on the other it maintained
that no territorial settlement reached by the parties at war
could have any validity, since the Bolsheviks could not speak
for the interests of Russia. At the time-of Pilsudski's
invasion of the Ukraine in the spring of 1920, the United
States Government informed Poland that it did not feel in a
position to give any advice, since it could not 'promise aid
to Poland in case. its independence should be threatened by
Soviet Russia. At the time of the*Soviet advance toward
Warsaw, however, the Department of State felt compiled to
state its position regarding the territorial integrity both
of Poland and of Russia.
On August 2, 1920 the Secretary of State re-stated the
established policy of the United States in favor of the
integrity of Poland, making no reference to its boundaries.
At the same time he said that the United States, while
sympathizing with the attempts to arrange a Polish-Soviet
armistice, could not participate in a general European con-
ference involving the recognition of the Boishevik regime
or the
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N
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. or the "partition" of-hi:storic:Russia without:_the.consent of
a representative Russian.Goverpment.-,Any such territorial
. settlement,:in the,,Depp.rtments-viewfwould,inevitably:fall
when, faoed.by "a%restored_RussIa,resolved_to.vindicate its
territorial-Antegrityand unityft!,.. Jn...a.letter addressed to
the'ItalianAmbassador-in mashingtop2i(August-l0),-:which was
made oublic,,the,qes9retary of;qtate stated Gnat therUni'Ged
Saes GovernmentNould regard wiCn.satisfaction ,_a-declara-
tion by. thb,.Allied,EindAssecied Powers tlaat:-the:territorial
integrity ah&true-boundaries?of,Russiashall-be-respected,
and added:thatr.(these :boundaries 1!sha1lprpperIy:Ino1ude the
whole-_of'the.Rassianj.Empire;" ,with,the.:,exceptions,.1.:alonELthe
westerri:Trontier, .ofFinland_proper,and of. ethnic
All_deciions of vital kapprtance:tor_Russia,..!'esbecially-
thoSe concerning its sovereignty over the territory-of,the
former Russian Empire", should be held in abeyance until a
free and.united Russia should'returntocthe community of fr.
natlnn ILLEGIB
R
ILLEGIB
eolana ,:wasnot qell.necl-in.une'Secretary!s.letter,
but in .a subsequent statement of its.,policy_.(Aup:Ust31);, after
the Battle of Warsaw, the Department held to the oosition
adooted by,,:the,PeaceclConference:in.lthe-previous:'year, 'namely
that Polish claims -to territory'east7.of the'line:.of Decem-
ber 8 should be held in abeYance-.antil RtiSsid also could be
heard; pending the determination of the final frontier, Poland
should establislLno-civil'administration'east'oftthat_line,
and should.accompany-itsL.ffilitary advance:beyonthat by a
declarationiof-its::determfnationto:.evaduatethe:occupied
territory'aslsoon as:possibIe.,,,-.Atyhe%same time-it was hoped
that Poland-_would.take_alI reasonable-meaSureS-to.end tie
conflict,%with.the.Bolsheviks. ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
Whtll uii roisii.Lovrn1ienu-_ala.concluae._peace witn the
Bolsheviks at Riga, establishing a permanent :frontier far
to the east Of tha Curzon linethe:Departmentof,State made
no comment. In the light of its receht,Utteranbes,'it Could
hardly aporove the boundary fixed'at Ric's.; since to do So
would have constituted.recognition,of-te-alienation.of a ?
part of historic Russii:i by the-BolShevikS.: Jiowever",-.perhaps
because the termination of the war' was everywhere i-eceiired
with relief, no statement TTasrissued expressingdisaporoval
or refusing,iecsognition,:of.:the. treaty ,andjdf:the:new -frontier,
which the_Amb,assador7of the KerenskyLregime in;1:TashinEton,
in a note to theSecretary..of Statepondemned as "direct, ,
aggran.dizeMent by annexation to Poland. of Russian territory".
. .
In a-
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? In a reply to a letter from Dr. Robert H. Lord, inquir-
ing as to the Department's position on the eastern frontier
of Poland, the view was-stated that there was "a disinclina-
tion to make any hasty recognition of Polish sPvereignty
east of the so-called Curzon line"; however, the proviso
made by the Supreme Council, that the rights which Poland
may be able to establish over territories situated east of
that line are exppssly reserved, "has not been overlooked
by the Department . Thus the American Government, through-
? out 1920, maintained its position that the determination of
the Polish-fRussian frontier must await the overthrow of the
Bolsheviks; meanwhile neither the Curzon line nor any crtiaerline
could be recognized as the final frontier. The United States
thus held to the "ideal" policy long after Great Britain had
abandoned it.
At no time in 1920 did the American Government make any
pronouncement in favor of a ?articular line as the final
frontier between Poland and Russia. However, .the following
conclusions on American policy on the boundary question seem
justified by the evidence:
1. The Department of State did not recognize,
approve, or acquiesce in-the frontier laid
down by the Treaty of Riga.
2. The Department regarded the Curzon line as
the boundary of "ethnic Poland" but consid-
ered it subject to possible revision in
Poland's favor if Poland's claims to any
territories to the east of it should be
recognized as valid, after an investigation
of ethnic and other factors, by the Allied
Powers, including a restored ,Russia,
V. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGA
LINE BY THE ALLIED POWERS
A. The Deeision of the Conference of
Ambassadors, March 14, 1923
. On March 14, 1923 the Conference of Ambassadors, at
which Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan were repre-
sented, decided to give official recognition to the Polish-
Soviet frontier established by the Treaty of Riga. No men-
tion was made of the integrity of Russian territory, nor to
the principle to national self-determination. As grounds
for the decision it was stated that the line had been
determined
?
d
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determined between Poland ana.Russia, and that Poland al?!
readyha41.given to the Allied Powersguarantees regarding-the
treatment of .minorities within Poland...-
?By 1923 it had. become clear to the British and French
-.overnments that the restoration of Russia to the family.of
nations would take place through the recognition, rather
than through the Overthrow, of.the Bolshevik'regime. There
seemed to be no valid reason why a boundary which had been
-recognized as legal for over two years by the states directly
concerned should not be given sanction by the Allied Powers.
France had no hesitation in doing so, since the Riga frontier
was eminently satisfactory to France l5ally, Poland. Great
Britain, once peace had been restored in eastern Europe, no
longer maintained a direct interest in the boundary issues
and was willing to accept as valid the existing boundary be-
tween Poland and Russia. While there may have been some
tendency in official British circles to regard an ethnic
frontier in the neighborhood of the Curzon line as having a
greater chance of permanence than the Riga line, there was
no practical political alternative to acceptance of the lat-
ter.
B. The Attitude of the United States
The United States did not participate in the decision
of the Conference of Ambassadors, nor aia it give any formal
recognition of the boundary accepted as legal by the Allied
Powers. This position was consistent with that of 1920,
when the United States had refused to regard as final any
settlement reached without the participation of a repre-
sentative Russian government and without reference to the
ethnic character and the wishes of the population6 involved.
In 1923, althouRh the statements of policy made three years
before were not repudiated, the American policy was put on
different grounds, namely that the United States was not
concerned with the merits of 'purely European questions? such
as boundary, issues.
Men certain practical matters, such as the administra-
tion of the immigration laws, called for a definition of
policy, the Secretary of State informed the interested
agencies that the United States "took cognizance of the
decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, which was in har-
mony with the assertions of territorial sovereignty by Poland
and effectively attributed to Poland the regions of Pinsk and
Eastern Galicia". A ciroular instruction to diplomatic offi-
cers said that "it was the general policy of the Department
to avoid
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to.avoid participating.in purely European territorial ad-
justments and to.accept such adjustments, when effected by
the governments concerned, as facts with respect to which
this Government was not called upon to express either ap-
proval or disapproval. Thus the United States recognized
the Riga line as a fact but mould make no further state-
ment on the subject which might seem to involve a judgment
on the merits of the question.
TS:JOCampbell:(Drafting Officer) Reviewed by
TS:NBChipman
HNHoward
PEHosely
EE:EDurbrow
4
'4
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