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November 3, 2016
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September 17, 2013
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October 19, 1943
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; . ? - ? ? - e _ . . 1 ; t.'zt-t? .?t ?"?,!.?!.e. t1:1. ? e ? " s ? . ? , ? ... . ? .1 1 ' 1 ? ???1'. ? -; . ? ? ? rrt.TF . _ -'17?3?14.' ? . ' S.? !??? ? ? - ___ ? -0; ?-?".t;:.? , ? . :-L1 ? . ? 4, ?? ? . JP, - . ? a - . 71??? ? .? . ? .; ? ? .,- c4.?L'-'74-3n? 'Pc ''`i ? ,P7c'..ft!",' ? ? ?;,.1?A; ????? i ? ? ? --1????-', IL"; 1? ' .4. -1-1 ' (???? ? 1 ? ? ? .. 1- -A -? - - ? "I? i;????? ,?'1!Es?- t? ??a.' ! ,? ? . . ? ?1. .1?;: t: ? ? thsc '1 _ ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 2 ? 4 . ? ? . - I I ; ! - - ` 4:0 ?-1 ? ????-- ? P. - ? : ? - 41t." r.tre".? ,ryt ? r..t ??? ? :? -.4 ? , 3.? ? ML -Z* -3Lirtlf- - F7":;?: ? .1 s'ir??tir. . ? :?ift ? LA. R.1 A,P"---.-7-41 '? ? ??11',',21.. ; , ? .. ?????4.1: 7-- ?:= - ? 2^. - --;?;=i1 . ??-? 1: ?et- '?? ? ?.?1 sie ? t ? . t, ?r- ' ' ?"a. ,A ? rt'?? ? ? ; ;.; . I ? 1 N. zs'N ? ? - ? ? ? *4!"; ? ' 1-11r,f -Lir"14:;? A to ? ' ? 1 '?ef?,:???t ? ? ? 1rrIZI?F Lg;tsit_?4"... .? -4' ,X6f;%'.+qt, "t. V*, : -?'11 ? 4 . ? . ? a ' 1 ? ???? t ,C ? L ? " 1 ?4z? ? ? , ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ' . `r. ? 1.11- 1 ? r? ? ? ? _ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Ihitney Sbmpardson Ulius L. AMOSS The following reports were written at the request of General Donovan and copies are enclosed for you: A779.1210.1 A i4uick10. *my of the facts briefly reported are docutented in ay earlier essays and cables. '? BP-grstmftatiral A few high sot o of the present Greek political situation. I am much worried over the fact that the White House and the State Department are in apparent ignoranee of $ome of the present (Greek) facts of life. flew% cap. C-Tbg Auth9r 9 ,a A hitherto *reported tap auat on of ow Professor Saushofor it the MOsuppecttng parent of the late Greek In.* wr Projects statement of our lack of awareness ioslaw developments. * I* OA! It ? Domovanss expressed opinion that Usigned to Operations this memoram Ww. But / still believe you can use hi* '4e s?s. t and, under Macfarland, guide him to the poirst *bier* he can make a major contribution. id? w4441 - kA44. IA 11, -,t:.2. es of v binge tiat happened Greek Irregular Ons as to the future. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xnnnni Pnnni nr-monn Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 -2- 2, Recommendation is here made to you that the Special Intelligenee Project continues, reporting directly to you. Mecfarland should head the enterprise with Edwards acting as his administrative assistant and Caskey as the Izmir secret deputy. Maddox should be the representative in ionlicn. Captain Melas would be invaluable if he reported only to Macfarland and Edwards. His men are still on the job en Greece; can communicate, 3. The existence of this enterprise should be hidden from all except the officers assigned to it. It should not be mixed with any other 0.S.S. activity In the Middle East. Fruits of its activity should be reported through existing S.I. channels, but no other S.L. officers in the M.E. should be informed of the project. It desired, I will attempt to turn over what can be turned over to 'Macfarland. ' e ? ?_. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Greece is in ferment. But as Greece always is in turmoil it is only necessary to pick up the strands of old prejudices and No one political nor one military figure appears or even threatens to be dominant. Greece is a land of antis; when a leader dares appear, unity is achieved when all opposition joins to tear him down. Greece is united today against the occupying enemy--and against the King. Foreign attempts to line up all factions under George II merely solidify the opposition, rouse resentment against friendly foreigners and diminish operative action against the enemy. PlayIng on this known Greek characteristic is the German an the one hand and the communist organizer on the other. Greeks are being told by the German propaganda machines that their King had made a deal with England for the cession of Greek territory And for the monopolistic control of air routes and communications. The Communist agents are saying that Britain proposes to re-enthrone George and perpetuate 'the racist regime of Netaxas.n Until recently the valiant but quarrelsome resistance leaders were saying, 'But America is in this war; the United States is disinterested in our local politics; Roosevelt will let us decide ogr own political fate and will see that me are permitted to choose our own leaders.' A combination of circumstances has changed such Wife into ems of cynicism; Greeks have been told that the United ***tem bas 4oined England in a plot to force George on then. They to4d that their choice lies between German dominion, andAnglo- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000loomonlf1-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 American plan to reestablish national Fascism and a Communist- Democratic state nprotedtedu by Russia. The Greek distrusts all three and Greece is in a ferment. Following the shock of German occupation, the Greeks remained completely inactive for about six months. The GrIteks divide and sub-divide under the following leader- 1. Middle class 2. Workers 3. Democratic Party 4, Anti-democrats 5. Remnants cf old parties 1. 114141g.91An4 The Middle Class remained generally inactive for more than mix months. Many in this class, for a short period, attempted to collaborate with the Germans. Senior Army officers, statically disposed toward the Tsolakoglou puppet government are in- cluded in this class. They, consciously or unconsciously, were of service to the forces of occupation. Later, many who had col- laborated commercially with the forces of occupation and who had profitted thereby, attempted to join one or another of the rational resistance groups. The Chief Officers, belonging to this group, who did not cot- Itsborste with the enemy are those who had been retired by Metaxas ator the 19,5 insurrection, the failure of whilh had brought dietstershi to Greco*, 2.4. UAW Th* first organised and effective reaction against Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001Ronn1nnnqnni 7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 enemy occupation sprang from this class. It was from this class that the &AA. (National Liberation Party) was built. The Communist Party was not slow to seize this organization. As early as mid-1942, four Russian agents arrived in Saloniki to organize the E.A.N. after the pattern of the Yugoslav Partisans. (This was reported by the Greek Irregular Project at that time.) The Russian organizers completely copied their successful program IA Yugoslavia. Non-Communists were encouraged tA:, join this "the only effective resistance group", Democratic, Liberal and Popular Front ideologies were preached; Communist propaganda was held to a minimum, At first, the E.A.M. took the lead in every Anti- German activity and it was the first to create operative guerrilla centers. Finally, the strength of the E.A.M. grew to such an extent and the noes-Communist members were so many that it divorced itself (for 04 long period) from the Communist Party. At this point, leaders of the Middle Cass and of the other political parties started negotiations with the B.A.M. Workers and peasants of the E.A.M. were joined by Middle Class and wealthy patriots and continuous, though unplanned, sabotage was enthusiastically committed in factories, ships and on railroads and bridges. Parallel to the E.A.M., a number of democratic sub-parties Joined forces in another resistance organ- isation. Those sub-parties cooperate with the E.A.M., but wish to remain independent, as B.A.L0 after vainly appealing to Britislt amd American sources for help, turned again to foreign COmmgoist leadership. Datil Nay 1942, Occupied Creece remained isolated from the GovernmPwlf-im-Exile and intense hatred of the Weldiros Government grew. At this time British agents spirited trA ? ? ? ,"g? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X0onni Pnnn nr1(r-It-1-1,3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 c 36:1 Kanellopoulos from Greece to Cairo and Tsouderos was induced to make him Vice-Premier. Thus, Occupied Greece tacitly recognized ithe Government-in-EIlle and accepted its leadership--but with reservations that have grown in volume. 3. krasszattsjtaaya. Under the several political sub- divisions of the Democratic Party, resistance groups operate in Epirus, on the slopes of Mount Olympus, in Western Thrace and on the Island of Crete. There is no coordination between these groups and there is intense political rivalry. At this moment the great military leaders of the Democratic Parties are asking for *antral guidance from Venizelos. These groups will be directed by Veniselos after the arrival of Bodosakis in Cairo. This man is the power behind the Venizelos throne; his money finances Venizelos. 4.Aps*Pvats, The Anti-Demccrats nave concentrated an the creation of organizations whose aim is the preservation of their coalgtrties and the seizure of Army-Naval cantrol after the mar, MOSe men fear a national general court tar tial in the event an Allied victory, and voty few have participated in action against the -enemy. (A, notable exception id Theotokis, son of the 1st* Master of War, oho now has joined the democratic resistance ' forces.) Leaders of the rem- Mu of Obis01144cal panies hale participated sporadically in Uttial Stettin the enliply and from time to (AM have cooperated lath $11. Until now, they have remained aloof from OTNan1404 NY1010* OOdoris, leader of a party of considerable 2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 .5. 4616 17461* strength has large potentials in organized resistance, but distrusts the E.A.M. and resents British support of the King whom he blames for tle fascist dictatorship of Metaxas. His Chief lieutenant, Captain Alexander Melas, presently is in ths United States. (Melas was a secret OSS agent in Greece until March of this year.) A090mtollshments of t4e Greeks. Under their own initiative, the Greeks established secret radio sending-receiving stations and a calque ferry service between the mainland and Turkey. Both of these services have been taken over by combined secret services of the British-- much of this against the wishes of the Greeks. in the meantime, groups of patriots forms raid and break up. The most vigorous resistance groups are based on Crete and repeatedly have announced that they await American leadership before they take the field as an army. lat1imass.a.4lls4.22Euls. Greeks are influenced variously by Russia, Britain and the United States. 10 linss/g. A small percutage of Greek resistance 'troops are influenced and elated by Russian victories. The larger per- centage fears Russian successes as bringing communist influence and Russian control into Greece. 2. 2ritiskInf24eEm tmmediately after invasion British Intelligence (S.I.S.) and British Sabotage (S.O.E.) tried to con- tact occupied Greece. In the beginning and middle of 1942 certain iNglish officers commissionee a number of dubious Greeks and i Declassified and Approved For Release 2013109/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 - Levantines whose activities in Greece brought panic :o he resistance groups. Until the middle of 194.k it proper to say that English secret service aetivities in Greece yielaed nehing but disaster. After the middle of 194 he Laglisr. .,ervices worked in closer harmony with the Greek Government-in-Exile and conditions improved, but net to a satisfactory dcgree. iftr March 1943, the British undertook the financial Lupt)ort of l'imt one, then another Greek rusistance group and, througl'. their power to give or withhold funds, have maaaged to coutrol many of the Greek patriotic groups but with rather poor results. Guer- rillas and saboteurs acted without a counting of the cost atc vast reprisals were visited on the people of Greece. .0. the same time, it was announced in Greece that the British would impose the King on the people. A reaction has set in and Greece, ditianal admirer of England, is showing dangerous signs of distrust and even hatred. 3* riajbak164?.14113. From every corner of Greece and from every island, the people clamor for evidence of American parti- cipation in Greec*,Almast every fugitive from Greece has been *barged by those vtgritay behind to try to get the Americans to participate at 'mitt on equal terms with the British. The notable bombing of SalOniki and Athens airbases by the United States Ninth Air Force was greeted the whole population of those cit es raaniug met to it)* streets to cheer othe Americans?' while the &trams 404 Italliam ottmpation troops took shelter. la tremmaiis *eel* inspires fears of internal disturbance and 1a04, of 420110itati9140 Th* Xining American efforts in the V F4 Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X000ni Rnnni nnn,znr11 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 1 ) 1 liberation of Greece -- under American leadership -- will allay Greek fears of our two Allies and diminish the rising opposition to them. ResistucGzDsad Chief Greece presents no great movements such as those t)f Mihailovitch and liTito'. Nor has Greece any single leader whose sway is as great as eiLlher of the two Slav generals. The most noted, Colonel Zervos, is a small-time leader pared to to Tito. The E.A.M. has no outstanding general. A group of more than five hundred Cretans formed by Kapitanios "Y" call themselves NDonovants Bands, and three hundred Andarti in Lpirus call themselves the 'American Legion.' This is both an asset and a disadvantage. But its promise is great. A single American officer, trusted by Kapitanios "Yw? and another endorsed by Captain Melas can raise e levy of thou- sands who will act--in distlpline--under orders from the Middle East General staff. The operation can be repeated in every resistance center of Greece. It can be executed under combined Anglo-American Auxiliary Group Control. It will be dispersed, divided and one group will be set against another under present S.O.E. command. Cooperation and planning with the British Advanced 'A' Force is indicated Under the leadership ,d authority of the Director of OSS, the American ?beater Comnomnd and the British Middle East Commanding Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 41, 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 GREECE,: P010;TICA4 14.69,36fie eectipo le The Tsouderos cabinet is now unanimous in opposition to immediate return of Xing George on invasin. Tsouderos deserted the Xing and signed the secret manifesto demanding plebiscite before restoration. The Xing had a apolitical illnessa tnat keeps him oat of Egypt and prevents him from countersigning the Cabinet manifesto. British political interests ase conbidering abandonment of George. A. deal has been proposed to Venizelos who has not accepted it. The power behind the political throne of Greece will be Bodo- sakis who, through the ministers, controls the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force. Venizelos? Admiral Voulgaris and Karapaniotis take his orders. If Bedosakis is assasinated, a munity will break out. Com- 1st agitators are assisting. It would appear that the White House is nat fully advised, else the President's telegram to Ambassador Kirk re the King's attitude toward the guerrilla chiefs might have been held back for further study* (It may be that the State Department is receiving edited intelligence from tie Middle East.) MOM Caution: A deal say have been made -- despite full Intel- ligemse4--but steps should be taken to see that the State Department and late souse Sig have complete information, unedited. ??-?:-.-.4,FP? ? A ' -1 0 .74.M7" oatt???-? j=7 ? y? Declassified A4.10 3 41' kr! and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030n1f1-7 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 German Staff and Nazi Party drew their blue-prin for World conquest after the plans of Professor Carl Hauofer. His Geo-Politik profoundly affected every civilized man, woman and child in the World. Professor Haushofer placed Greece highest among Balkan States; Greeks throughout the World as important to German plans. These things he told me In 1922. These things I had in mind when the Director of Strategic Services (Then Coordinator of Infor- mation) took me into his service 16th December 1941. It may be Interesting to note how this present ruler of German policy has Influenced 0.6.5. activity; how his somewhat indiscrete talks with me gave us an insight into future German activity and enabled us to use his ideas and *forestall his plans. In September, 1922, Greece had sustained an humiliating defeat; a million and a half Ionian Greeks had been forcibly ejected from Asia Minor, the land they had occupied since pre- history. The Turks were threatening the Greek mainland. The Prime Minister, Gounaris, and the Minister of War, Thew.okis, afraid of mutiny had dischasged the entire army, and the Turks were massing for an invasion. Revolt came anyway. Colonel Plastiris, who had fought his way through Turkish line's, refused to be demobilized. The Prime Minister, the Ministers of War, Interior and Foreign Affairs and the Generalissimo were caught and executed. Greece, badly wounded, was in the toila of bloody internecine warfare. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 It was against this background that the even then famed Professor Raushofer asked me to name Yugoslavia Rumania Turkey Bulgaria Greece Albania Greece Yugoslavia Turkey 3ulgaria Rumania Albania used to disaster and will turn this one into a blessing. The Asia Minor Greeks will bring new strength to the mainland; will intro- duce new skills and trades. Competing with them, the "Old Greeks" will have to step-up in enterprise. A wave of patriotism will sweep every Greek community In the World." nature abhors a vacuum," Professor Raushofer continued, ii Miley frog Greeks and friends of the Greeks will pour in from the corners of the Earth, Many Greeks from many lands will return to their ancient homeland. They will bring new points of view and jill strengtten the ties between the Motherland and her sons formerly "Greece is important to the future plans of Germany," the Professor said, *I'll tell you why and something of how we will Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 From the Professor I learned -that he and the policy shape's of Germany considered Gtteece to be the Key to Eastern Europe. At every crossroads of the World; in jungle, at the ports and in the teeming cities of every continent, Greece plays a role in commerce, in foreign trade; Greeks play a part in politics and in espionage. Greece is the most important nation in the Balkans. The countr7 of Greece provides the land bridge between Orient and Occident; its peninsula projects into the Mediterranean and like a policeman, rules traffic fast and West. Greeks had lived for generations everywhere. They were Tiobserverel par excellence. Their history, tradition and aptitudes made them ideal secret agents. Professor Baushofer proPOsed to traduce certain leading Greeks in Greece and, through them, appoint agents throughout the World. Greece itself, in th.9 coming war, would be forced in on Germany's side. One day there would be another revolution in German Greece: this time it v04:24 be iaspired and directed by 7itr secret agents. The Professor felt that in the last World War, Achilles heel had been Greece. In the new war, Germany would not ?avast tor INUtake. The sub3ect Interested me; 1 talked with Witish atents, wittefixericr 4tPahmats and with French officials. The Prof* ors idillas were laughed off. But 1 also talked with BaroirSOienck, who in the First World War had directed Psychological . / '' ' 4 a Wart I fidi 11.1.3 lath iliaiasilicifinext; German spy-master in Greece and with Dr. rabri'Aus who later became the Nazi Minister to Rumania and under tbose trieW leadarship Rummia deserted her old Allies. 3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 I also talked with Madame Hadilazarou, the former Countesr, von Stein, second cousin of the Kaiser. I talked with Dr. Streit,,the Bavarian-Greex who was King Constantine's advisor; with Queen Sophia and with many others. The Germans and the Germanophiles did not discount a new war, though they were vague as to the prospective line-up. When Colonel Donovan called me, the old conversations came back to haunt me. Had what Professor Haushofer told me nineteen years before taken place? I considered it my first duty to in- vestigate Greek officials and their history during that period. I discovered that a number of the Metaxas officials were still in places of power; that the dread, Himmler-appointed Chief of Secret Poll' 1 Maniadakis was in Buenos Aires, on the .'7reek Government's pay roll- openly consorting with German agents, conspiring with pro-German Argentinians. The Black list I compiled is a matter of record and has influenced the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation. But other Greeks were questionable. King George had been faithful to his battle pledge to the British. But the Liberals blamed him for the pro-German Metaxas dictatorship, a dictatorship established forty-eight hours after he had promised the Liberal Chiefs that he would not do so. With his father, be had been expelled as pro-German during the FLrst World War. His mother, Queen Sophia, was the Kaiser's sister and she hated the Greeks, admired the Germans. George himself despized his own subjects. And, even in exile, he had Xept in office a number of Germanophiles. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xoonni Rnnni nr1rr-v1.1, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 7.tv- Admiral Canaris, chief of the German Intelligence Fervice was a Greek. His third cousin was in the United States as a Greek official. Tsouderos, the Prime Minister; had had a peculiar po- litical history. We had to discover where the German line into Greece led; to whom it was linked. And this we did; dozens of documented reports are on file over C.O.I. or O.S.E. signature in many Government departments. We discovered that beautiful, red-headed Irene was not the wife of Prince Peter of Greece as the Prince pretended sbm was; that she was a 'White Russian adventuress who lured AmeTican and British officers into indiscretions, who had communicetions with Nazi ftletter-drops.'" When we had separated the evil tools of Canaris and Rimier, we were able to recruit Greeks safely. We reached behind German lines and appointed courageous patriots as our agent-correspondents. Ve used Raushoferls plan and appointed Greeks in several parts of the World without revealing to them that they were O.S.S. agents, and reports flowud in; reports that affected not only the Balkans, but also other parts of Europe. We watched the suspects in many countries for German pro- paganda and we were able to counter much of it. But we had to do in haste and in war and in enemy countries what Raushoferls pupils bad had long years to do in peace and in quiet. The task is not yet fiaisbed, but it is under way. IA the 'midst of these activities, another influence shoved itself. Early in 1942 we reported the arrival of Communist agents is Sao 4, , they attempted to form a Greek Partisan Army, Declassified and Approved Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001000300 Declassified and Ap 4 a carbon copy of the then not so important Yugoslav Partisans. The E.A.M. resulted and I am able to report that we have penetrated this organization and know its plans. The Greek Brigades in Syria, visited by Communist agitators uniformed as British and American soldiers and purporting to represent Soldiers' Soviets in the British Ninth Army and the U. S. Forces in North Africa spurred the two brigades to revolt against the Government. How the O.S.F. played a leading role in putting down the rebellion is a matter of history; and how O.S.. thus stopped the disastrous propa- ganda line into Greece, where the starved patriots were being told that British troops were murdering Greek L,o1J'iel:: J.: also a matter of happy record. How the Greek Cabinet furnished us-exclusively-with minutes of its secret meetings; how Greek officials in all parts of the World sent their reports to us is also in the book. Our painstaking investigative work was responsible for the tribute David Bruce, then Chief of S. I., payed the Southeastern European Section of Q.S.S. when he said that our intelligence exceeded in volume and value all the production of all other sections Other Balkan countries were not neglected. We agreed with Professor Baushofer in that Yugoslavia was next in importance tp Greece But our large production of Yugoslav intelligence; our Influence on Yugoslav secret activities is another story. Professor Haushofer was right. By the careful selection of Greeks, a world-wide ospionate network can be built quicKly, irely, The Professor was right; Greece was the Achilles heel - .e ? , ? - .H 1;4 ' I 1.11 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : Declassified and A. proved For Release 2013/09/1 7: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 of Germany and the Professor's disciples' were lesc; than able-- for Greece is still the chink in the Nazi armor and 0.F.F. hac the right to claim much credit for the frustration of the Pro- fessor's plans. this is written, the Greek Government has re:-,igned. Germany has not yielded the Greek arena. German influence ag:lin is playing Britain against America and Rusia again:t the The Greek cannot be abandoned for his name legion; he everywhere and in every land he wields sone thfluence. For the official of psychological warfare the Greek is an asset; he can be a threat. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 /laming Slav passions make the itgoslav mess almost insoldble? General *Tito* and General gihailovitch are irreconcilable. The Serb considers the Croat and Slovene past traitors and future dangers to a South Slav State. The Croat and the Slovene, coatents for a thousand years, bitter critics of their Government fmg the last twenty, are no nearer reconciliation now. 'Into the dispute is introdwed the Communist agitator who terms the Serb a rescist; who claims that gibailovitch plots a toelOpAttarian state of old Serbia and Bulgaria with himself Mrs% as authoritartan president of council; later as Xing* The Government-in-Exiles target of Communist and of Croat, i.,!loomposed of modiocracies; is ruled by Dowager Queen Marie (ilimantan Marie's daughter by a 'Rumanian cavalry captain)? Mbytes stoutish, plain and ordinarily affable is still run by theatatejevitch 'brothers, the opportunist young men who, at one Ube* tptroduced the boy king to rather unattractive clatter prettitutes and to dope, O1 oll silitary sat hive been scuttled by the ambitious T ? e 20044Mitat clan, IsavingliebNI uaisportant officers and bewildered loniperrissai agad * #Oattering of others such as Lieutenant-Colonel 1001141Gbieh, SW aide to tholcing and Colonel Savitch who, the 404.4 mots is sloyal, butlimegy; victim of numerous crack- sir sad Oaths ground and of numerous bumps on the 3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 '31 lbtitch, Ambassador to the United States, is the cleverest of all Yugoslav statesmen, but his character is under gravebt assault and his blood relationship to YUgoslav quislings adds fuel to the flames of criticism. The most brilliant; perhaps the most serious of Serbs in exile is Colonel Popovitch, the trusted confidant of General Bonner Fellers; a man I have found honest, able and informed.. perhaps the best of all intelligence operators in Eastern Europe. But, the ftejevitch brothers consider him a personal danger and Lord Menconner lost no opportunity to isolate him. *Ore serious - from one point of view - than the above is the attitude and activity of British S.O.E. toward the Yugoslav mess. It is the opinion of many skilled observers that S.O.E. meddling and their misinforming of other British departments is Largely responsible for the present chaotic condition of affairs in Yugoslavia. Up to my departure from the %addle East it is highly doubtful if 8.0.30ts Colonel Bailey bad seen or contacted ilhailovitch for more than half a year; it is suspected that 111hailovitch1s radio messages were forgeries. Adding suspicion to doubt was the severe attempt on the part of S.O.I. to prevent O.S.S. direct and independent in- telligence contact with Mihailovitch; their determination to block any American direct reporting of conditions in the 1111011oviUh 'area.* lbile I was on duty in the Middle East o I attempted to send two reporters ldtobelleved they could use their own means Inh making contact with the MihallovitCh Headquarters. One an Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X000niRnnninnn,w14,, ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Is presumed lost; the other, after a rugged and diangerons trip from 1%MmIgr, through Thrace and Macedonia, was turn et back at tholontenegran frostier and eventually made bin way through Greece proper across tho Aegean to Turkey, finally etriviug in Cairo* This agent aet Whallovitchts nen who reported thut their forces were an the rump seeking shelter; never able to stay long enough at one spot to establish headcuarters. They claimed that Partisan sympathizers were reporting their N.Wilt? moats to occupation troups? Anked if any British officers zero attached to Mihallovitchls staff, they said there tore none. lbs agent said the trip was denmous; he would not repeat it because of his fears of being turned in by Partisan sympathizers Cl even by Chetnikris It is doubted If we beve the present means of giving criginai? factual and correct intelligence concerning conditions inside of ihnosIavia even Mouth we now have men there. neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 1. The subject has the respect of the Cretan Guerrillas. He was the companion, guide and mentor of itKapitanios '7111, during tYat daring leader's visit to the Middle East. 2, it is recommended that Underwuod's presenc *Greek Irregular Project* assignment be torminated and that he be designated to plan for and operate in Crete under 0. G. direction., 3. It is recommended that Underwood Lave a thirty-minute appointment with the Director. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Jfi Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ,? Some of ou of w rience ort the most excing stories of the war may be ti vTitten about the expes r mon vhommanned the calques. For example -- a load of grenades, boMbs and a..>ed side arms vas taXen directly to the Port of Pireaus, overloaded vith Mattetll produce. The Italian authorities toolt the cheese, olives and unload the other food and helped our men ips were made, always Winitt,Ans -- ill broad daylight. Several tr with. the same resat. veneraIre Breton gives me the ecret time and if you wish.will try to write n lectu to a series of s human tmterest stories that may serve you whering Wroups. 2, Upitanioe wry the great Cretan guerrilla chief, has erj g taltelk Sad% cloth bac3t. to Crete where he expects to have made a tilos feniform for his 40,errillas Whom he calls nonovanis NOV., tas WA* )30 ISwen used . ou e was a party trageously by fiaot who de- feated on eti4014gieriflo to 0%11 and to which h? ,? for fartble inforoatfola :see Valor Beir, Captain Maas and con- Sat litteforlitnat all to assi of whOmCwere brought in by me st in tbe orpnizatiOn. of wtoto intelligence today, the group. Buot mai ntains ttWillf be aarlocal importance whereas he is, ?.., egittialibe fiTure on Crete. (See reports an loPts OttVitiOs tl VOSItelost hiO4elf a Cretan, and by ?Li Vinister me So d Oretan,#) Feeling between an british (FS* is laet-SOOde, It is een him and good bet' the hdvanced *0 fore*, 3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 3.The Epirote guerrillas are controlled by ournO Alex Melas; will tate orders through him from you; sUbject themselves to S.O.N.. command. Eubean guerrillas are controllel by our or Elias, iced in Cairo, awaiting our orders. They will not oU accept 6.0.E. command. They would act under aoint American- Advanced nAlg Force COMMaild. Elias is a political lieutenant of Alex Melas. Elias is willing to act, temporarily, on an intellS,gence mission. (Ile is an old agent of the late Greek Irregular Pro3ect.) Elias,W an telairtrust Macfarland; like Edwards. They will not aOcept leadership of any other officer presently in OSA' 1104145 Bast, unless:that officer works under the di- ? rection of myself or Macfarland. Elias dominates the island of %boa poliftiOalTf# Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Contention is made.that Balkan intelligence presently flaws frau cortrolled sources; that original intelligenge is scaflt of bal it is further contended that no independent source Information exists. (Exception: lacfarland, througll of the old Greek Irregular Project plus several new sources, does receive some valuable intelligence which he channels through Cairo.) It is submitted that a comp"?etely secret system under the direct orders of the Director of his Deputy is required for these purposes; 1. Check am amtbentipity of intelligence presently received Friendly foreign sources. 2. Veintatm an independent reporting.systea. 54, Save a bigay 24011e organization ready at once to secure ;ntelligence which, in emergency, may be required by the Presidsittt-IX0*. Chiefs Of Staff, or by ankiflg cabinet orfieers. each a aystea exists. It has performed and has been proven. Apart of the system has been liblownn. A major part is completely .L14001000 either to our allies or even to OSS officers except the td4riy and his itonediate lie+utenants. 14040a provided 086 with its first original inteiligence 0'40 ti**10 wooly lines atigir at a time viteti absence of a directive ely:Wfrose operatiOns. This system had contacts in Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Greece, Germany, lastria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Swizerland, Spain and Portugal. All these points report from 4%ime to tine and these reports were disseminated through regular C):: sairces without disclosure of their irregular source. Types of Intelligence reported were: Aerial target information; Morale of civilians and troops in Central urope and in occupied countries; Political moves in Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This system suffered the first OSS casualties when four of its agents were elmeated in Athens. Though it is unknown to our British allies, it was activities of agents of this system that the British caique- ferry service between Greece and Turkey was established, manned and operated -- and, until March 1943, controlled. (Captain Zangss, R.S.N. and his staff.) This caique service, operated at virtually DO cArt to the United States was thea ten over by combined British agencies. Russian intelligence was reported by this system through regular OSS channels. Through this systrl the Chief of the German intelligence system was contacted and (inadvertently) the British P.W.L. enabled to frame him before Hitler. Through this system Greek morale has been held high despite fallni and vestilente by the uninterrupted preachings of its agmato that the might of America was gafhering and soon would b* felt. TuFaugh this systeo, the Commanding General of U. S. Army ;.; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 a _ and Approved For Release 2013/09217: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 _3_ Forces in the Middle East received information tha' led him to bomb airfields in Saloniki and Athens for the dual purpose of inflicting military damage and raising Greek morale. Through this system the Greek Brigades were penetraed at the request of the American Commanding General who received resulting intelligence as an emergency service of OSS. (These reports were also filed with OBS, Washington.) Through agents of this system, OSS was able to stop a revolution, prevent further bloodshed between our allies (Greek and British) and to stop the damaging German propaganda line in Greece. Through this system, the United States Anti-Submarine command received valuable intelligence. The volume of intelligence was great. Dissemination was through regular 08$ sources -- t /lout p.scp.pLIt sto It is submitted that this system should be preserved; its confidences protected; itirsoperations executed in super-secrecy. This system taps--and can control--five separate and com- pletely indepemdent chainsofIligents. This system has its own g trained agents in the Balkan States waiting instructions. There is only one WS official presently in the Middle East even remotely capable of directing these activities and only one equilloped by experience to assist him, And the writer is the only persmable to turn over thite activities. AecOmseufttion is Made that the writer turn over tc Mr. *Worland as much of.-these OPerations as can be given him itth the content of the key -aides. '""""-",..sgoko41,4g-r44,' - ? - 17"77.*'" T1P. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : e- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 October 21 191.,: ? 1. Attention is called to the changed tone of .%mitt-JsiAL,r rirk's cabtes, 2. His original position was that George 41 Juld be returned to Greece by the British v.ith Ame,:ic,An :zup,or- and there was nothing any Greek could do bout 3. 4y tti,:ny reports carried the oppOsi:e _ad warned tha.: British 6.0.i., policies in Greqce cre...e disastrous situa'Aon. 4. Attention is c4il1ed'to the fact that my aciv1zie4; - under criacisa to you by Major /Mot hz,d maintainel relative calm In Greek Govermeat circles -7, and in Greece un&I Crete. Cessation of these activities have allowed the cuerri_la id Government-in..Exile 0444tioua to get out of h:and e,'; I fore. 048t to you on the eve ai your departure for tk,e diddle Last. 5= It is submitted that during my tour of duty in the giddte Eavt, my activities were retorted to Waf-hington in detail and a directive was asked ror; not received. 6 Winether Tot *et morfielal influence is decJired seep:a figfitleiCally rigIttInf it is here maintained thc.t arglOor r Uires, potitive informon ezpertJ.y given. - 4 441 ? 4414 " ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 7. It is submittedithat present sources or Greek f - intelligence are inexpert, inadequate, sometimes fallacious and, therefore, dangerous. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Amaimminumunn ?*6 General W. J. Donovan Ulius L. Amoss Greek Politics 0C+.oher 21 1?44J I. AtteLtion is called to the changed tone of Ambassador Kirk's cables. 2. His original position was that George II ,ould be returned to Greece by the British with American sup.or and there was nothing any Greek could do about I.**. 3. my many reports carried the opposite intelligt-nce and warned that British E.O.E. policies in Greece vould create a disastrous situation. 4. Attention is called to the fact that my activities - under criticism to you by Major Huot . had maintained relatiiJe calm in Greek Government circles - and in Greece a.m. Crete. Cessation of these activities have allozed the k.uerrilla und Government-in-Exile situations to get out of a!; I fore- cast to you on the eve of your departure for the Middle 5. It is submitted that during my tour of auty in r.he Middle Masts my activities were reported to Wasilingtan in detail and a directive was asked for; not received, 6. Whether or not unofficial influsnce is iieLired to keep a figrting ally fighting it Is here maintained that he Dimmor requires positive information eipertly ;i'en. _ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/1 7: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 7. It is submitted that present sources of Greek intelligmce are inexpert, inhdequiAte, - .44-4!?1' ? ?????,Er+s, 1 .44 ? ? 4 '? , ; 3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Fe; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ab ?4 wr A 4,11+11. SECRET OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES INTEROFFICE MEMO DATE: 9/14/43 Today 14 September 1943, I had lunch with General BRERETON and his aide Colonel Hobbs. General BRERETON and the entire general staff of the Ninth Air Force are en route to England where they will activate the new invasion air force, the tables of organisation of which were drawn under the direction of General aANDEE and shown me there during sprItayvisit to London. General CANDEE will be under General Brerstonla command. For the consideration of yourself and General DONOVAN / suggest the possibility that I might be of some service to the director of our European Theater Office if I were to be given a short tour of duty with General BRERETON in England. 9/1 / 9-3 ,14"' lA.c044.1 ? ? ? ? 1. ? , 4 "_4?,:.4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 -A?LtLc.,? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7r / 7 I I ,L.1 eci ( 4 4-- tlf* General W. J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services, Administration Building, 26th and E Streets, Washington, D. C. Dear General Donovan: Greek Maritime Minister Thoofanides, under date of 18 October, 1943, 1. "General Donovan arrived in Cairo the latter part of September while wrote as follows: I was in Alexandria. I did not know of his intended arrival nor that he was in Egypt until after his departure. "On my- veturn, Colonel Vest called on MB, and gave me a verbal message 2. to the effect that the Greek Irregular Project was to be dissolved, but would be revived under another cover; that the General would detain you in Washington; that he expected to be in Cairo later when.he would sta longer. "I asked Colonel Test to convey to the General my thanks for his message; y 3. to tell him I regretted not seeing him, and that I look forward to his forthcoming visit to Cairo. I ask you, Ulius, to convey to the General how irnxch I really regret having missed him. 4. "General Donovan was the foremost American who with such deep conviction preached in the United States that moral forces would defeat the material, and pointed out Greece as an example. In the most critical neriod of aur Albanian campaign, he held out hope for and confidence in Greece, when almost DO one else in the war had but prophecies of doom. "I have always felt that the ease with which the General can penetrate the psychologies of whole peoples and nations should give everyone the deepest confidence in the prudence of his judgment on great and vital issues. With each a: complexity of conflicting interests and ideas with which the rtreat as w611 as the small nations are beset, it gives persons like myself, ministers of the governments of allied nations, confidence that Americats waitht will b.S. felt at the conference tables - and that weight for the good ar all mankind; a greater hope that our abused world at last may expect a durable neace. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ' Vrof ? nhen the time, comes, Gieece again expects to hear the voice of General Donovan- and we, the people who did not fail his predict!_ons And his trust, will be glad. Tce remembered that -even during the evacuation, the General foretold the behind-the-lines role which Greece would play despite starvation and ruination; that that moral force in which the General placed such confidence eventually would turn' the tide. ?I am inexpressibly glad and proud to have made his acquaintance, and am happy that, with you, I have never lost confidence in the greater roles the General would play, particularly in the Balkans, where his knowledge of us and our faith in him rides so high. 9. 41 do hope to see the General soon in Cairo; it was almost a heartbreak t6 - me that I' missed_ him on his last trip. 10. wAfteyOur :departure I saw almost nothing of Paul West. And the discontinuance of the Greek Irregular Project has saddened me, for you and I know the' contribution it has made, and could have continued to make in ever:.;,,expanding scope. - I hope that some other "cover" soon will be gi'Z.STI:J--io-.;tbat- its impartial and valuable services may continue to the benefit of all the, United Nations. - But there is no one here who can place you and your knowledge and understanding- of us. , presence-s,here,Creekted-.that,,confidence to 'necessary to full -collaboration'on the, part- Of a 'po6P1e. who,- by historical compulsion, , have such deep-rooted and general distrust of .everybody and every plan. , 4 , , Your long Service in and, many kindnesses for Greece make it impossible _f,Or:there:td-be any _other substitute for you. And so, for this reason, _and' because I w your- faithful friend of so many years standing, I can wish: nothing-,better f,Jr-- us - than seeing you among us soon at this period, --' ? -- -- i'-:-..,,,- ,,,, h-e, .eve-Or somany:imPortant events for Greece. 12, *Meese extend my kindest regards to General Donovan, and tell him for ? me that we need him to visit us ..atain. Also, please give my best wishes to Colonel Buxton, whose sober and penetrating judgment is another and - : .-;;-, ', Wortant reason why I have such faith in 0.S.S. And, also, please s- remeetere td Colonel Bruce, who, as I understand, is again in Washington. A:: g bless ybou, your great leader and all your associates. F you have recognized, Mr. Theofanides is an important person for 0.8.6. ,It, is suggested that You acknowledge his sentiments. 1,1Theoanidee, Captain Alex Maas is important to us. As the tide rsikk politics flows, Melas assumes more and more national importance. -,. , . , Th Eptrrte1-eitierilles still are rsubject to his control. He still exercises , erable_ inflqpnee,on- the Island of Eubia and some influence in Attica. ,A. , , c n 744 Declassified and Approved For Release 201 3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Ulius L. Amoss Melas has not been well used by us. After hevine served O.L. behind enemy lines; after having been wounded in American sereice, both the Assistant Military Attache, Lt. Col. 1Rasbas, end eur Lt. Col. Paul West fell into the political trap set by Melasf enemies, and associated themselves with the Royalist camoaign to discredit him. I respectfully point out possible unfnrtlinate cnnseegences of our disloyalty to a soldier so loyal to us. His resentnent aeelnst es and things American would be a natural consequence nf a continled ant4-"felles attitude in O.S.S. in the Middle East. Melas certainly will be a member of the Liberation Parliament. He may be a member of the Libel-, tion Cabinet. But, besides the future, it is important to have the benefit of Melast continued cooperation now, since he controls an important intereieence net-work originally put together for the discontinued Greek "Irregular" Project. I have recommended to Ar. Sheperdsnn that Melas repo-t tn Yr. Macfarland, since Macfarland hes the confidence of Meles - and that the salvaged parts of the Greek "Irregular" Project be handled by Macfarland. In the interests of success for an independent O.S.S. operation, I respectfUlly, but etrong)yl urge favorable consideration of this proposal. 15. James Underwood, by his own motion, secured dismissal of the case nendinr against him, James Curley, Donald Wakefield Smith and three other former directors of the Engineers Group, Inc. He is, therefore, free to return to our service. I rate Underwood at the top of all 0.5.5. operatives I know in personal courage coupled with physical ingenuity. He is a nio- and a great expert in firearms. He is the one man I would choose tc be with me behind the lines, for his physical proficiency is superb, and his loyalty to yourself is unshakable. He can submit to torture without revealing:anything. (Proved by his record in China.) He wants to be sent behind the lines in Crete or preferably-Yugoslavia. It is recommended that he be notified now that his services are required. If you, at any time, need a personal party, Underwood would be a story-bnok aide. 16. On this, the eve of my departure for my new assignment with General Brereton, I wish to thank you for the opportunity I have had of serving you, and to state that, so far as will be consistent with my new duties, I stand ready to be of any assistance possible to you or your deputies. ? . . A 4.; L - ' ? - ?;^-7/.1"0:1` ? ? 41W- ? Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ? Ai Declassified and _Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 mummemmi Re: Caloti2in Alexpnder Yelas Please attach the enclosed letter from Col.Amoss re the above dated Aug.27 with the report which you are going to submit to General Donovan. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 immiswin 1'8 ? - a .P OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES tOINIMINEMOlmnar? INTEROFFICE MEMO TO: Colonel Edward G. Buxton FROM Ulius L. Amos SUBJECT Captain Alexander Melas DATE: 27 August 1943 1. The following cable was received. "We recommend that Captain Ilexander Melas be retained in the United State e and not returned to OSS in Cairo. We make this recommendation because of his generally poor standing with the Greeks here. Lieutenant-Colonel Richards will offer more detailed information on the subject." 2. Captain Melas was the first agent repkined by the Greek Irregular Project back of enemy lines. He directed our operations there. Ho was wounded in our service. He escaped from Greece and reached Cairo early in March. He was employed by the Greek Irregular Project as our Liaison with the "Revo. lutionaries" and our "bird dog" briaging escapees for us for interviews. He later was appointed as Liaison Officer for the Greek Armed Forces with OSS in particular and the T.!. S. Army Forces in the :Middle East in general. 3. Melas is a bitter enemy of the King and !rine Minister Tsouderos. We have other Greeks in our employ who are friends of the King and of the Prime Minister. It is not possible to get any one Greek to represent both sides. It is necessary to draw from beth comps. The King himself fully understands this and told me he had no objections to our employ:Lent of Melts who rendered the King yeoman service in aiding me to stop the March Revolution against the King and his Governmert. 4. For 17 years Moles has been a member of Greek Parlia- ments. Ho is the confidant of Banister for Navy, Venizelos and Minister for Air, Admiral Voulgaris. 5. One of the chief reasons for bringing Melas here was the urgent request of the Prime Minister who has followed his usual pattern in attempting to cut the ground from under the feet of people" that he dispatched abroad. 6. Melas a national hero and an OSS hero has won the right to expect support. and applause from the Organisation he has ...u..04.0.........???????????mc.e.......e? ?????? F 7 II " "s* Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001 0o0nnlf1-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 served BO well. I will take the same stand toward representatives of the ring who have served us if and when they are attacked by the Veneziliets. 7. Colonel West he no personal experience in Greece. Greece is not a field for amateurs. I am able to command the respect and adherence to my requests by all sides in the Greek political arena because I have never run out on the support of my friends an any side and because I ha7e fought with one group to save the lives of their condemned advTsrsaries and have fought with these adversaries when they were in power to save the lives of the late governors. If we want to lose all hope of holding the most astonishing con- fidences of ali Greek political leaders then we must run out on those who have served us loyally. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 `v. ,r? 14.* ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ite 4 41, MY' 150(110ORGAIMATION 0? ITHE rREKK rfOE ?RAT To expel the enemy it is necessary to organize the "erek 'rt as a secret army. To succeed it is necessar., to euvOyze tee folleneez factors: task, enemy, battlefield, and means. Task: The task is the continuation of the struge:le of the creek te battle by the side of his Allies. The task reluires the orf-Anizat'en of an .SZTlys but, since it is impossible to eobilize end eusiele er orthodox military force, it is therefore neeeseary to use tee peo:Ao of lreece to destroy communicatiors, t'ace, air-eields, duepr, and factories. Sech ees- truction must be underteken only after coordination with t'le :lens sf the Allied 21anners. Such ectivity is an instrument ef war and the operaeiens must be viewed as a part of the rand stretelef of dla oar. The eellowing actions can be organized and cen spread throu]hout Greece and an operate according to a plan. The forces of the Greek peoi,le have the eollowing capabilities: A. To strike hard; to steike with all the elements cf surprise; quick with- drawal. There forces must be highly mob3le. .1?.. The volunteer Irregular Forces of the Greek 2eople must he provid3d with special armament allowing them to move freely but powerfully enough to in!eict heavy loss. C. Thome forces oust be enabled to act simultaneovsly in various parts of the country. D. Supplies must include specially prepared explosives to be utilized for mines and demolition charges effective in a wide variety of sehotage. E. All forces must have constant contact with each other. F. They must have the means of supply without drainin7 the communities from whieh they stem. Jo Materiel of war must be supplied continuously and regularly. H. General direction of the campaign must come under the control of the 'eneral Headquarters of the Allied 9'orcee in the Hddle Fast. The enemy is the orgarized force of the Axis. It is equipped with the most modern equipment; It has at its disposal all the resources of the eountry. The destruction of soh forces is possible only by the opposition of an equal and similarly equipped force, but it is always possible to maintain harassing operations. Such action will contain many units of the Fcr. jr. SECRET g Tor 141k1Arri27.77- ;AL ? 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13xonnnl Pnnnl nrmonn ?4 , t 4, ?34' J V.. .e 1 4 ? : T ??????? ' I 1. ? ??? :4-40 ete 144, t.4 41A 19Z ? .......,...kracrJee ? Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 - 2 - SECREt Organization of the Greek Home Front (continue) enemy; well require their dispesition of rerious forces to restrain the activities of the Irregelars. An example is the occupation (se tea-es Italian divisions which were reeuired to deal with three euereilla eetenh- meats whose total strength was not more than 100 men and who opereted in the following mountains: Parnassos, Chiona, and Oete. Such operetions not only obstruct commaflications and render supe' dieficelt but combined with a withdrawal of:the enemy such guerrilla activity will inflict serious losses en him. The Battlefield: The battlefield for the people of Greece is the whole of Greece. The terrain is distinguished by its broker eround, high mountain and forests and rivers and streams. Communications are precarious and there is an abundance of highland villages inhabited by Greek patriots; its fishing tawns and its innumerable coast and island groups. It is on this erouna that the Irregular %roes of the people of Greece will be celled to operates Greece from a general strategic aspect is a point of land projecting at considerable length into the Mediterranean. It is the second communicaticn land route from Europe to Africa, the first being Italy. For an enemy operating from north to south, I.e., from Europe to Afr4ee, who has not mastered the Mediterranean and who has not adequate naval means, tais peninsular communication toward Africa diminishes the sea distance end enables him to effect surprise. being near Africa, enemy air forces are strengthened by these near air bases. The groups of islands and the multi- shaped coasts provide cover and concealment for naval transport. Besides all this, Greece is the main arch of the great artery which flaws from the Mediterranean to Central Europe through the Vardar valley to the Danube and to the doors of other secondary roads which leave through the Struma Valley and the Maritia to the Sofia area and therefrom to Central Europe. On the other hand, the Greek peninsula, bordering on Turkey, may serve as a basis for operations from west to east against Turkey. The enemy in operating against Africa makes use of Greek soil, of Greek communications, harbors and coasts for the transport of troops to Africa. The enemy, in the event of action directed at him from the south, will secure the doors leading to his interior. If ope-nting against Turkey he will make full use of Greece as e starting poiut. For the enemy Greek territory is enemy territory. For this reason he has to maintain serious forces for his security. It is necessary to study this territory first from the point of view or communications and, second, es a center of supply bases. From the first point of view Greece has not a thick web of communications. It has one main artery and several secondary arteries: *-.111- ? "-N.... SECRET - I ? , Declassified and A 1 ? ,t proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xnnnni Pnr-mi rr - ? `4?? ? ? . ? ?.?43- ; " th : ? - -4?;;;? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 From north to south: (1) The main railway line from north, i.e., from Central Suroi,e throv-,1. the Vardar ITallez* leading to Salonika, Larissa, Laria, Athens and therefrom another one to Pelopponese, Calamas. This is the main rail line used by the emery. (2) The road from Salonika to Kozani, Florina, Monastiri, re- Salonika, Edessa, Florina, to the Vardar Valley, Scoria, Danube or Korani, Larissa, Athens. (3) The rail line through Maritza Valley and nearby the road from Dedatz (Alexandroupolis), Dhidhimolikhon, Mustapha Pacha, Phi lippopolis (Plordir) to Sofia. This line ir bound to play a considerable role in case of operations against Turkey. (4) The road line through the Struma Valley from Serres, Koula to Sofia. (5) The road line from Komotini, Koussouk, Kayak to Philippopolin. From east to west: (6) The rail line from east to west, which from Salonika leads to Alexandroupolis. This is the main line which the enemy, in case of op.irations directed eastwards to Thrace, is bound to employ on the Greek soil. (7) The road line from Salonika to Serres, Drama, Konotini, klexandeoupolis near the railway line. (8) The road line Volos, Larissa, Trikkala, Kalambaka, Metsovo, Yanina to Prevega, Aeta or Valons. This road is used by the Italians transporting their forces from Italy through Adriatica. The most important of these communications is that which runs through Yugoslavia and the Vardar Valley to Salonika, Larissa and Athens; the unique artery from Central Europe to continental Creece and the Pelopponese. These communications are vulnerable and a proper subject for destruction. They extend over high moantains, on broken country, passing across rivers and stliams, over and through I,ridges and tunnels and other features easily destroyed. Under the menace of destruction, the enemy will he compelled to guard these works with considerable force. These guards are those which the Irregulars will have to strike by surprise. The enemy uses Greek ports as his bases; his administration, stores, dumps and factories are to be found in Piraeus and Salonika. Volos, Patros, Prevega an Larissa are of secondary importance. In the two large cities, Athens and Salonika, he has naval bases and headquarters, and his stores and factories as well. ..///aPraffShItilifiediteliS72.4.1?14.051.4WPW.tr...,,, !, el%i',1/11r ? ? If LI' ? , ? ? ? " - 4 ? ? ,s , 4 ? ? _ ? ; .;,14. ? ;: ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 e r. - :11 . - I r 1.: 14 ? ? -. I 1- - ,. -? 4 '4:22 eee.44.- ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ?4 MEI Organisation of the Greek Home Front (centinued) SECRET These must be destroyed. While disruption of commueications in the open country has to be carried on by Irregulars, demolition in the eities 7-10: be performed by saboteurs. Examininp: the terrain from one point of view, we se-- that, as it is covered win forests and broken ground, it favors concealment of eovement and action by surprise. The inhabitants and 'reek patriots will hely and contribute with their knowledge of the terrair, its iaths and hidine pieces. The highland villages can always be centers of supyl: and signal. Eteamining the ground from the point of view of the distribution of *asks, it can be see-e that it provides the poss;Iiility of dispersing tasks over large areas so that in every area the eontrol of detachments could he exer- cised easily, as well as liaison between the detachment?. The areas could be divided as follows: - 4 Cr, r. w. 71- , ? ; (1) The area surrounded by the mountains of Orthrys, Jet?, liona, Parnasses, El ikon, %;hlomos. (2) The area surrounded by the mountains of Olympus, Pieria, KaTVOUTIlls east slopes of Pindos, Chasia, Orthrys. f;?.. (3) The area including Epirus and the Aeta and Carpenisei area. (4) The area including Western kacedonia. (5) The area including Centre.' Eacedonia. ?' (6) The area nclueing Eastern Yacedonia and Thrace, with Pag;aion and the south slopes of hhodopi as a basis. ???? (7) The Pelopponese area. The guerrillas operating in each of these comlbartments should be under the same command and these commands should be directest from -Lie center in Athens. The territorial independence of these areas will easily allow the command the supplying of its detachments. The restrictive measures taken by the enemy for the use of communicstioes, and the scarcity of the.means of communications themselves, present e great difficulty In supplying the detachments with wer materiel from the center. Only the dispatch of money and other similar material eoald be -arried out from the center to these areas. In this case, the means of supplying the detachments through another method should be considered. This method should be either from the air or from the sea. Suplay from tile air should be carried out aircraft dropping war materiel on spots previously appointed by commanders of the guerrillas the center to ol Wormed. 3esides this ;lectern Macedonian area, all the other areas are surrounded by the sea and therefore provided with coasts and shores, so that it is always poskible to establish secret beach operations for various craft or submarines coming directly from Egypt or Syria threrezh Tnrkeys carrying necessary equipment and war materiel, to unload it on these beeches end therefrom, through covered approaches, transport it to the interior. The Western Macedonian area supply should only be maintained by air, but the possibility of supplying this area through the Olympus and Central Masedorian areas by sea should also be considered. SECRET -*----..r.,,r.r7rerryonntne-nr7ernahrnernerron AngrolC.IPaLitilinracrinM?ranint.nc....- no-rnn-errnSi....59 ? r 4 e.lbr"r? ? 14:4 X 41-A ? a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 1 Is . ? ? -::1 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 For action we need maapower and more materiel. the neans available in Greece is both physical and spiritual; of these two the letter IR most important. The Greek people are faithful to their history. They lave fouott through the ages to maintain their freedom. Enslaved more than once, they have a tradition of breaking their bonds. Veither persecution, imprison- ment nor execution - not eeen torture - has ever stopped the Creek striggle for liberty. This powerful impulse, bred in the very fibre of the Greek., offers assurance that there is no Greek who is not ready to offer himself as a sacrifice for his country* Besides the will and the courage to fight, the Greek has manpower. The extraordinary task ahead requires men highly endowed with special military, physical, and mental and :-oral ebility sn that (a) No one will nesitate to face any danger but will look forward with eagerness to hezerdous saei:nrents; "h) Everyone must have such initiative and intelligence so that each will to able to operate alone, making the best decision under every eireumeteace; (c) Physical toughness rill allow them to stand the hardshirs they must face. They must be able to march through mountain passes, ravines, forests; to leee sleep and be without food for days. The officers end men who will form these Irregular Nuclei will be se- lected beforehand. Native Greek ine;enuity and intelligence are round in both city and country. The rtral Greek is tough and frugal and is able to cover great distances on foot with poor rations. He has been inured from boyhood to hardship and privation. The high and tough qua2ities re- quired for these dangerous operations are common in Greece. Mobilization of this manpower should be carried out in the areas of operation so that participants are familiar with the terrain in which they will function, but tnough the highly fitted manpower is available in quantify, war materiel is scarce. Armament: Following the destruction and surrender of Greek arms by certain Tnrings and the enemy's energetic search for hidden weapons, there is a dearth of :suitable arme. Many rifles have been hidden by patriots but the concentration of these arms is difficult. The actual zun s availahle lack ammunition. The rifles vary in type and pattern and render ammunition supply o difficult problem. There are a very few automatic weapons such as Hotchkiss light machine guns but, again, very little ammunition. A few pistols of various makes and calibre are found but are also without ammunitten. There are no grenades. Amdunition which has beea dropped lately from the air was not deposited in the areas agreed on due to inefficiency cf liaison and sig- Clothins Clethes and shoes ere scarce. The price for such materiels as can be oun is exorbitant. The present Irregular organizations heee no funds. Small and sporadic purchases of shoes and trousers have not been serious enough to be of any use. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000lnn1gnn ' ? ; ? / . - -r??4 rz? 44, =p, ?.? ? ?r ? .A.0 : ? . ;.- 44. ? ?? ? ???? ? ,;AtTo, (????'???? ? Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 -4--7 Crganizatian or the Greek Home Front (continued) SECRET Food: Food is supplied locally. The people of the count:7 nave fed and WTTrfeed the Irregulars, but the lamentable condition of r'ireeee :re. vents really adequate food supply since vast areps face stervation con- ditions. While the peasant supplies what food he has, it is a hc,rdsh3p and Irregulars have no funds for the varchase of fond. coald lead to eventual problems and some dissatisfaction on the part of the si.pplyng peasants. Liaison and Signals: The present liaison between the field IrregiAlao detachments is inadequate - so sketchy that it eannot be taken into aeoount seriously. The same deficiency applies to signale. CONCLUSIONS ifter the above examination the following conclusions are drawn: I. Organization. The fighting forces to be employed to continue the battle of the Greek people against its enemy, thereby contributing to the united effort of free nations, should be divided into two forms: A. Organized forces for operation in open country to engage and strike the enemy and to effect destruction or the enemy's communications and supply columns. Organized forces of sabotage for operation in the cities for the purpose of destroying headluerters, harbor installations, stores, dumps, factories, etc. To distinguish between these two forces we refer to them ap "Trregolers" and "Sabotage Parties'. 2. Irreulars. War establishment, organization and control. As has been pointed out, Irregulars should operate all over Greece in liaison and collaboration with each other under the direction of a central general staff. The general staff' must have at its disposal all of the necessary means of communication and signals. It should be situated in Athens or wherever conditions indicate, and should direct and control the entire Home Front, maintaining closest possible touch with Allied GHQ in the Middle East. The Greek general staff will receive all its orders and directions from ',Hied In each area Irregular chiefs will order the operations of their men and Will provlde for liaison with the general staff and for supply. in each area there should be more than one detachment according to exlst- ing possibilities. The strength of each detachment should not exceed 30 or 40 men. When larger forces are needed the area chief should have the pOS3i- ilit7 of concentrating as many detachments as 'are necessary. SECRET 111461141441,14.12=4.44130oetkioArArSi.,A/44 ?4.p. Declassified and Ap dig - ? roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001Ronninnnqnni 7 ??? (4, ' ,;?? .7.: .711 ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Armanent. The Irrezulars must have adequate firepower so ee to be eeie to inflia as much loss on the enemy as possible and so es to have the eeans of defense. At all times they must be light and mobile. They sneele be equipped with small and shoulder errs Rnd with grenades erd explosives. There should be a number of automatic slell arms including sub-meres!nes-ens and light maceine guns. Each detachment of from 30 to 40 men saould borie three subemachine or light machine :ems. All other men must be supplied nit?, rifles, all of the same calibre, and a pistol and erenades. 'or lossible major operations undertaken by the area chief, there must be at nis iiseesal a number of medium machine guns, light artillery end mortere. .Clothing. Only as a last expedient should Greece be depended epo-i for the supply of clothing and shoes. Retions. As as been pointed out, fooi condit The enew seizes all food supplies it can. There r villagers can hide. Supplying. the Irregulars with Each detachment snould be supplied with some money but they should also be furnished with tinned food* ions ie :reface are lamentable. emains only the lit"e the food is not an easy task. for the iurchase of food, Liaison and Signals. Closest liaison between the Irreeulars and eFZ Uiddle East must lpe maintained at all times. It is not necessary to bo greatly concerned with morale, since morale is high and loyalty toward Great Iritein and the jutted States is unshseeeable. Owing to certain conditions in ereece, communications must be carried out by radio and couriers. Between ereek he-e- luartere and GHQ Middle East, messages will be sent by radio (lee couriers, ane also between Greek headquarters and area chiefs. Two radio installations of large power are required; one for immediate use and the other to be held in reserve. A number of smaller sets are required for liaison between Greek headquarters and area chiefs and between the chiefs themselves. For proper efficiencse each detachment should have e smell wireless set. Supply Bases. In each area there aeould be several sea bases at which material can be unloaded and dispatched through covered approaehes to the interior. There must be also several pre-selected places in each srea where euppltes can be droppsd from the air. Sabota e Parties* Sabotege Parties should be formed by 'reek petriots rest ng intectes and the parties will vary in number acnordinr to the task assigned to each. Those in Athens and Piraeus should be leder the control of the center in Athens but those in Salonika should be directed by a represen- tative of the center. Representatives of the center therefore should be supplied not only with the necessary material but also with necessary wireless comrunications. The Parties must be well trained in the 4136 of explosives are sabelace materiel, and each member should De armed witn sidearms. NOT1 BY ME AUTHOR. (The writer of the asove is the Operetions Officer of a 0.1431=i743747171.1tee in Athens.) 1 have only one wish - that the 'reek -ere ?rent should be organized immediately. Organization end supply will take time. lreek patriots are impatient to operate against their hated onemy. Trusting their Allies with complete enfidenee, they still crave assurance that the fieht goat on so Awe they can offer themselves for their country and the common ideal Of liberty. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C. Dear Ellerp Herewith are six photographs of the Headquarters Staff of the Cretan Irregulars, all but two here in Cairo, all re-equipped by OSS. The blurred photograph is a picture of "Kapitanios" Y, the C. in C. of Cretan resistance. The photographs are sent through you to General Donovan with the respectful com- pliment of Kapitanios Y. I would be pleased if you showed the photos to Dave Halliwell, Watts Hill, Lane Rehm, Wes How- land and to the members of my old section staff. (Due to the orders of Mr. Shepardson I cannot write of Irregular Activity except through you without having the possibility of many eyes -. seeing very dangerous material. I am sure that you will agree that true security is had when only those concerned know secret matters - with no exceptions made.) You will be interested to know that we have re-equipped these men and that by the time you receive this letter they will be back in their caves in Crete - where I expect to join them for a brief morale visit at a little later date. Without exception, every man pictured has lost even female young and aged relative by execution or torture. They are tough. My most difficult job is to prevent their ordering an immediate massacre. They say that life is not worth living and that they won't wait Ch. before "killing the bastards." Sincerely (sgd) Ulius ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ? sr ? ' ? 2 t LJ - ? ? t ? - ? _J 4,1 -I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 SECRET OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 22 April, 1943 Colonel Ellery C. Huntington Office of Strategic Services Washington, D.C. Dear Ellery: The following are activities we have under way. INTELLIGENCE Reports from three of our agents now in Greece. Reports from Acting Chief of Caique Operations, Izmir. OPERATIONS. Organizing of maintenance gang and crews for calque operation from Izmir to Eubia, later operation to mainland to Greece. Dispatch of agent to Yugoslavia. Organizing of P.T. service from Cyrenaica to Crete. Arraagements with Ninth Air Force for dropping bodies into Yugoslavia. COMMUNICATIONS. rxangernens A.T.C. signal system to receive and send mes- sages for occupied territories and for any other points. (Mac farland and Edwards). This arrangement is sensationally important, secure. PSYCHOLOGICAL Visseminatien of rumors to Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Asmara, Crete and Athens. Broadcasts by our officers in cooperation with Leete performed before leaving, Mocarski is performing and other officers not with OSS are speaking. arations are made for dropping of ten thousand T.N.T. charges in the vicinity of Athens. Otherwise no immediate plans are made pending authorization of JCS, but surveys are being undertaken so that the S.O. program can proceed without delay. --,,gwesokommisiess4?????.....44-..4 ~4.'4,44 S-444104441 W444% 4:.'11 rals ?t. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 I. ??? -tt .e V r y 4 414 ? - ? . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7.":: MILITARY OPERATIONAL GROUPS. We have discussed plans with the "Xapitanio" or Chief of Cretan Guerrillas and his headquarters staff. We have equipped these seventeen men for their return to Crete and we have trained and are sending back with them a competent radio opera Lor. This group has sixteen thousand skilled fighters partially armed with German guns captured from the enemy. Larger numbers can be mobilized if equipment is provided. If and when coordinated with theatre stra- tegy. an airfield can be seized and the greater part of the occupy- ing troops can be massacred. (I write the above in chunks, de- tailed plans are in hand.). We have traded out an arrangement with the former Chief Operations Officer of the E.A.M. now Chief Operations Officer of the new E.D.E.M. which has split off from the Communists. The E.D.E.M. is composed of the Sociali-I Party, the Plastiris Party and three small parties. (It is believed that the strong Cafandaris Party will join). The officer is ready to return to Athens and to comm- unicate with us. We will send with him our trusted major E. Who has just recently escaped for the purpose of coordinating his plan with us. I enclose a free and hastily made report made by this Major which at least gives the-apirit of the wishes of him- self and his organization. We are making arrangements for the Major to return to Athens. ARMY COOPERATION ISTEWsupport of the Army continues. Hank Wild, Adjutant General of USAFIME and I are almost inseparable friends and on more than one occasion he has told officers - "It's the General's wishes, whateve" OSS wants they're to have without argument." Day before yesterday I had a little lunch mi for King George at my flat with General Strahm, Gus Guenther and Pack Macfarland attend- ing. Strahm is still glowing - especially since the King signed his Short Snorter note. I'm continuing these little luncheons - Prime Ministers, Ministers of War, etc, and good will is a'building. But we would like to see you again - and scon. With the regards and affections of all. Sincerely, (sgd) Ulius Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 . Dear lIrs. Sieber: This is beinc; dashed oef in a very reat hurry ss t pouch Oc3es and the L:ommandine General wants to see me (lucky fellow) tot'-. qt Lhe same time. znclosed you will find a paraphrase of a telegram which I wish you would s'r.ow in secret to Duke Shepardson - and, if thcr:ght desirable, to Colonel Donovan. I send lt as R first hand exhibition of what we are doing in the Irregular Project with the help of the Greek Navy, (un- officially) and Generel Brereton. :his business probably will be handled by Theofanides and we will not appear in At. Here, on; Generals Strahm and 3rereton knai what's going on, and Colonel uuenther, of course. This means that we will have a full blown calque service between Turkey and Greece just is the Rritish do - end we will take over the former 3reek service and direct it completely. This does not preclude Aegular activity. It does not come under the 1-ritish - since it works out from furkey ard it is not an S.C. activity. It is not even O.S.S. - it is Greek ,Jovern- went - which explains why I have worked so hard to keep the Greek revolu- tionists and the Government together and to have Theofanides ke2t in office Its a request - or rather a demand by both sides. It looks now as if I have succeeded. The in will probably accept some modified ter-is of the revolutionists and the new government will be made up 1)0:!, of close friends of oars from both sides. This should all be communicated to those in hashington and New York who are interested. But ceation every one that the Irregular Project HAS to stay incognito or it will run into trouble instead of success as it is now having. With regards to ail. Sincerely, (Si&aed) U. L. A. - c.. , 4c -T11,4L- ?-,v2-4,t.. \ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ?arapl-rase (From: Zangas, For: Boyotas) This must not be repeated to any Greek or other officer as it is personal and secret. All our files, especially those of personal letters and information, orders to the centers and bulletins of information, must be discreetly removed to the American Consulate from the orfice in the British Consulate at MERL. Until my return Blase, PAITNAACTC" "Ind all my ?etty Officers must remain at their posts. Even though 3ritish have proposed dissolvement of our service, retention of contact with occupied Greece is my general purpose. Even if DIAMANTOPOULOS is not at 73ESME, arrange posibili*.y to pass to all personnel secret orders. contact with KAM and all our personnel must urgently be insured by DIAMAIWOPCULOS througl, FAPASTEFANOU and MINIOTIS Brothers. Must be advised of all departures and arrival of KAIKS at once. Agents money IS tomh:cming. Also in order that we may communicate by phone, liaison with IIESME should be arranged. Above message will please be urgently commurv,ca- ted through IZMIR Naval Undercover Observer, Williams. (SlOsti) Brereton ssa,wilowleididarr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xonnni Pnnnintinorw, n Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ?,? paOMNOofeei*ffie Cairo March 16, 1943 We now have more agents in Greece amd one each touring Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Greek political pot boils so furiously that I haven't time to set down events is they happen. At the momeat of this writing it looks as if things might be patched up. I am in touch with leaders of both sides and have spent many hours with them and if this thing blows over, tie O.S.S. will have Leen responsible in that its local half colonel has I. Tamed the King. 2. 4uieted the Prime Minister 3. Had the Liberal Leaders pull in their horns temporarily 4. Induced military commanders to return to their posts. 5. Kept the Greek S.I. operatives at their jobs and kept that service from slitting into groups working against each other. On the Irregular side, I will have a report to make as soon as a few more pieces are fitted together. I have tho full support of British P.W.E. and of all its branch end depart- ment heads. I hive not been in recent touch with S.O.E. Glenconner is al- wayf ill or out of the country and It seems to me that he is purposely delaying coming to grips with our matters. I have been warned by ranking British officers that all British sections comOain that Glenconner refuses to be pinned down and that by these tectice he finally manages to write his own ticket - meetings being called finally when other interested parties are uiavailable. He has a very bad name for this sort of thing in S.L.S# and P.M& and requests have been forwarded to London asking that he be recalled. But we'll see - at least on the surface our relationships are extremely friendly - but I judge relationships by results - and there have been no results. We need a strong counter-intelligence section here - and quickly. Our enemies are extremely active and in most subtle ways. Their present method is framing and black mail and undermining of confidence. Unfortunate- ly, they work through officers and secretaries 'who are either all . or in part gullible or traitoriaus. lighispers are started and stories circu- lated involving the character and deportment of important officers. They have been so successful that one or two very important links from here to the Balkans are under serious question by their chiefs. Fortunately their is net enough impetus to do more than annoyance - because when the charges were investigated, no subatantiation was found . but It has had the effect of arousing resentment in the part of really heroic agents that they should hove been doubted for a moment. One Chief British agent went so fox es to return his decorations and refuse to accept them even though an apology was forthcoming; in most abject terms. *. Declassed and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RD1p13Xnnnn1Drinni rw,? v. ? Declassified and Ape.......rove_d For Release 2013/09/1 . 2 . This thing will catch up with us sooner or later depending on haw good are our results and I want to prevent it long before it happens and, selfishly, I dont want it to happen to me. I am extremely asreful. I go nowhere at night unless in cowany with another officer. But here is one weak spot that I would play on if I were working on am. As I have written. I have been at least partially successful in having matey of the Greek Liberals call off their dogs from attacking the King. They understand my motives and agree - BUT . what a perfect set-up for a rumor to circulate that I am supporting the Jiing and am trying to help him retain his throne. I am watching for this type of attack - and have warned my Liberal friereis of the possibility. But while I have anticipated (adequately, I hope,) this attack . there must be many other innocent and useful activities - (and there will be more) that could be twisted. I am particularZy careful in my relationships with the British. When I hear criticisms about them, 1 present the British side of the picture and at all odds refuse to allow myself to be jockeyed into a position where I could be quoted . though just a listener. Aad I am very careful when I talk to the British because I have reason not to trust their security. (As a matter of feet every one out here is too casual about his gossip and far too much is bandied about . and the enemy has no trouble in hearing of the most secret discussions. So I insist that we need a strong C.I. section FAST. Then . I have a very strong suspicion that we are not in touch with the real British secret intelligence. I doubt if it works through S.I.S. I an almost morally certain that they have their awn irregular activity; that S.I.S. is merely out in front and can afford to be generous with information. The other evening I was invited by a lady with high connections in Greece to meet the "President" of the International Red Cross. The Swiss Colonel was conveniently lute and three British officers, also guests corn- ered me and in a delightfully clever way tried to get me talking about many things. I have tried to investigate, quietly, the role played by these officers in the British scheme of things. One is nominally attached to the Aga Khan - but no one has an assignment at which he works - so there must be assignments that do not appear at which they work. They do not play in British Security or C.I. precincts . and I n guessing that they are a secret C.I. crowd. love noticed other things that don't quite fit together - and I believe we should know what wa are facing - and if it is harmless, okay - but let/3 know. We need FAST - an AIRGRAFE RECORDER - MODEL C with reproducer and all equipment. It is manufactured by KODAK and is used for V Mail. We need it for repor- duotion of documents I sm "borrowing" and which have to be returned to files and for a flood of reports now starting to coma in from our own channels. It Is probably expensive tut it is very necessary if we are to function properly. s'17 f,b1116.?3?41,... S. ? ? 17'774 ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDPtl)(nnnn Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 This is inside dope on the personal set up here. I think you should make this available to Jr. Shepardson, and Mr. Halliwell - and let Jimmie Murphy know that it is available in case Colonel Donovan ix interested: G2 USAFIME is staffed largely with man from SOS sne partly by Ninth Air Force. The pcitvre resembles this . The arrows stem from the organization to which an Officer belongs and point to smother post he also holds. It will be seen from the chart that the SeadquarteTs of all Our Forces is intermingled with the headquarters or the sdbdrdinate bodies. The Air Foca C. G. is Main HQCQ. he Air Force C or S iS Main HQ C of S. The S.O.S. G5 is main Hq G 3. Through this curious bastmrdy partyl controls the Air and the Air partly con- trols S.O.S. and main U.Q. controls Amobo4y. Many S.O.S. Chiefs are sklbordinste (prestoltly) in rank to their Air opposites whom they control Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 ?4?0 ; r?- , ? ?7. S - ? :'4,1 ?430O. -o Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 - 4 - as chiefs of main H.q. sections. it does not take a further diagram to indict-o tno oosz.ble jealoosies, some of which Ofect us beuause we deal with all the I's ana mile, else. Lome of the serious (for us) jealousies are SOS 02 M A A2TH(.G2 Macclanahan vs. Moore and Cram Macclanihan, so far as I can make out has no personal ambitione. he wants to work with us and we have to work with him. But he is on Loore's blacklist and Crom rather favors Moore. We have and want to play with Moore - who is also a very good egg and is (Der friend. ee must nlay with Cram. No one of them cares for us to see the other too much. Sibley is 04 of S.O.S. and of main H.. Jr nates him. osr of S.O.S. dislike him, We nee l hin. The er.Ciooer.= esch other - so do the Signals. Much of this stems - not only from the 'Inwise set-up - l'it Flso - from the debris left by General Matwell. He left not of his own volit,on and his "boys" are not popular. Poor old Colonel Chickering should be a B.G. He is on the level. He is sound and competent. But he is to be relieved as S.,O.S. C of S because Maxwell liked him - even if he didn't care for _ex- well. And so on. Naw - the British have their varrels too. Thoy have personal feuds and are divided into personal camps. But most serious with t-em are tl'eir inter-departmental fights. SIS doesn't like SOE. S.O.E. sneers at S.I.S. ?.W.E. distrusts SOE profoundly end openly charge Glenconner with being a personal ornortunist who cannot see the war for his own ambitions. Now - I do not put Corth the above example as an unusual phenominum of war - it is usual as we know from the organization history of other wars. But is may help clarify the thinking of you fellows back home if mad *len we run tnto difficulties. It is but a repetition of the Yugoslav and Greek fights except that we fight within our ranks and do not start revolutions when we're licked. ***************** I hope to have an interesting translation for you before the po.uch closes . the proclamation of Admiral Sakellarf.cu of which I will have ad- vised by ce)le. Also I am now getting direct reports from Greece. Our translating department does not exist and :or a time I'll be plow getting this hot stuff to you - but I'm giving it at once to G2 and the M.A. I au enclosing the small and unimportant report of the Egyptian police an Xeaos. They do not like Xenos here at all - none of the Greeks and not any ef this Egyptians who know about him. He would be up against amazing '?;;r1. tairikdO61.4O110.111,Sitreswoo..... sr. .4.1M0114M geaViCANPWAino 11.1Ao.? ,V. ?.? - .4 - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001oon'Ann1?1-7 ? , ? 4 , X. -4 " CO. Vt. 4 - ? ?-?,--1`,, F.V4-' ? ? ?). V- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 opposition he-e . and I ma not sure ' it would be wise for him to come here - but I'll still keep on the tr.._ of the proposition here. (It's damned hard to write here - our few offices are pilbd up with people - two- three- four in each one and one office half the size of Mrs. Sieber's has seven - two pretty girls - one American civilian code clerk, one C/reek civilian bird dog and three sergeants - with four other sergeants who drop in for instructions.) Every minute or so same one sticks his or her head in the door aid shouts "Hey Colonel," So, forgive the disconnected stuff. ********************* I am also enclosing a copy of the vicious proclamation of Ldniral Sakellariou. I was able to hand it to the British P.W.E. - They haven't received it yet and are very pleased with us for being on the job. The Greek Prime Minister has called and I am having lunch with him privately today - British Fa and I have struck the only formula that can save the Xing his throne even temporarily and I ma charged by the British to dis- cuss it with the PM and the King - privately and p rsonally as the only old Anglo-Saxon friend they trust with some confidence as to the wisdom of recommendation regarding their awn internal affairs. Ole are not con- cerned about the regime in Greece now or later - except as we stop short any disturbance that hurts the war effort. Ls you know the Germans are making very effective propaganda here - and some communist propaganda The pouch is closine . and I must call a halt. As soon as it does I has appeared) go over to General Brereton for a general discussion of our program. All the best to all of you. Ulius F. S. Please oto attached slip from Edwards. Please try to get this for Us in a burry. U. L. A. Declassified and Approved For Release 201 3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 GREEK PEOPIllt OF EGYPT A great, a terrible, an indescribable calamity has struck our be- loved Yatberland. A band of anarchist leaders or our Army, seeing their approaching end, owing to the firm decision of His Majesty the King to replace some of them as being responsible for the wretched state of the army and for the new national split created out of noth:ng, has REVOLTFD against our HEROIC KING,the Tsouderos Government and the law-abiding officers. The two Brigades which our new officers, the law-abiding and indus- trious, created with so much sweat, have been completely DISSOLVED. The heroic Greek Army of Alamein NO LONGER EXISTS. The anarchist Colonel ladjistavris who was, awing to the many scenes he created against law- abiding officers, ordered to hand over his Battalion to Major Athanassiou REFUSES TO DO SO. At his instigation the hapless Major is MURDERED. The Divisional Commander, General Zigouris, who tried to go to the mutinous camp, is arrested by the anarchists and THROW OUT. Our much atvertised Vice- President, Canellopalos, who summoned-W3istavris to Beirut, instead of having him shot on the spot began to implore him on his knees to stop the revolt. Blithe, on being allowed to go free and to return to his camp, officially proclaimed a revolt and is followed by the Commanding Officers of the other Battalions,?KiTTIoris, Stavroulakis and Konstas. The unfortunate law-abiding officers, who composed almost the tot- ality of officers, faced with this lamentable situation are handing in their resignations en =zee. hieantime and in a similar manner, the I Brigade also revolts. The Brigadiers who are apparently indifferent FORMENT THE REVOIXTION0 The anarchist revolutionaries demand: That the Government should be reconstituted and comprise Boudares, Ketsotas, Bakirdjis, Sophoukis and the dishonourable Alexandrian, G. Roussos, who is the instigator of all this revolt. Meantime BRITISH soldiers who have been sent for service reasons to the mukinous camp are killed. Thus the Commanding Officer of the IX Army, in view of the inability of Canellopoulos to impose order, assumes command and orders: "The mutinous must lay down their arms before the morning of the 7th of March, 1943, otherwise the Brigade will be bombarded by the R.A.F," And now Greek people, 1001- with admiration on your lace-President and the leaders of the Army who are so skillfully chosen by him in order to start against a r/volt and not VAR. Look with admiration at your un- fortunate children oarded by t&-.71.A.F. like common criminals. Look with aair 3onaE your heroic Greek Army, the creator of the Albanian miracle, admire it now as the author of the disgraceful deed, of a new ASIA MINOR DISGRACE. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xnnnni Pnnni nr-monn A n Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Greek people, you are GUILTY. You are the murderers of your child- ren because although you knew that events were coming to this pass, you did not seek to prevent the dishonoyrable creators of this material calamity. AND NOW TAKE HEED: Put to death the dishonorouable Roussos who, although he is half in the grave, does not forget to soak Hellenism in blood oven as he did in the past. MAY GOD DAMN THIS DISHONOURABLE MAN and demand an immediate reconstitution of the Government and the removal of those repponsible for the disaster. THE GREEK ARMY MUST BP REWADE AM) MUST FIGHT AGAIN JUST AS OUR NAVY IS FIGHTIW UNDER GLORIOUS ADMIRAL SAKELLARIOU. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 311 1111.1111111reclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 SECRET p OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES U. S. ARMY FORCES III THE MIDDLE EAST Colonel Willim J. Donovan, Directors Office of Strategic Services, Ni! Building, Washington, DC. Dear Colonel Donovan: 10 March, 1943. Cged iot Kaa7;04,,,, I suppose you have been getting my reports, especially those regarding alleged Russian activity in Southeastern Europe. I mu wire that the line taken in these reports is consistent with what Nati propagandists wish to sow. But 1 believe they are worth further examination. I summarize the intelligence as re- Torted together with questions and comments and :secret reference to tatborities quoted. 1. Bu1geia Propos t o s If and when Russian troops reach the Rumanian fron- tiers the Bulgarian Agrartan and Communist Parties will expel Ring Boris and declare Bulgaria a republic within the framework of the U.S.S.R. ? Author ities2 Greek Irregular Agents "D" and. "S". Colonel Popovitdhs reporting intolligence sent to him from Serbia. Britidh PONE. Major. Dr, Dimitroff, Agrarian leader - but with the exception that this will happen only if the United Nations refuse to guarantee Bulgaria's present frontiers including Greek Thrace and Mecedonia. S., Greek WR.,ot$ in S? ia, Prop on: seream r o s were fomented by Communist agents. Authoritlet Greek Irregular Agent "m". Greek Agent "P". QUestlou: -IS the "communist" charge an attempt of the present Greek Governisant to disorsdit the moveusnt? ttloameents A revolt in an army at war is a mutiny. The intelligence rititeivad plus rumor pluA deduction drawn from facts known make the *barges. Seim jtwitifieds, Parrtiaans E: Irrairialists have token oveT, or will take over, in it responsible ha* exploiting the personal ambitions ir *loaders* JUI order to. discredit the existing 04444 rills 041 OO etfectives, the balance having ? 4 4 r?i5' ???,, '1.7.?j? ? P".17777'9,-7& fr .41111MC?s6 ? ? ? ? - fi-ru- - ' "?-? 011.0?3111;6....?.? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-R0I013X00001R000100030013-7 ? SECRET To Col. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943. gone over to the Partisans; (C) No British agent is In touch with Mihailovioh. Authorities: (A) Reports I filed earlier in Washington. 0.8.5. Weekly Survey, February 4-11: 1943. (B) Greek Secret Service report shown me, but not filed with the British. (C) Colonel Pcpoviteh. Greek Irregular Agents "M" and "S". ? . ? ? ) ? 01 cr1?10 A1,???' ?.)" ? Question: Are these reports inspired by Nazi propaganda? Or by Greek and/or Serb jealousy? Comment: I have sant a Greek Irregular Agent into Serbia to bring back evidence or refutation; unless caught he should be back ir Cairo by the end of March. 4. British S.O.E. Proposition=l1f S.O.E. in the Middle East is badly managed and 1,1303 questionable agents. (2) One agent, a British officer, in Greece recently gave away the entire show, turning in 21 chief agents to the occupation Hathorities in exchange for his own life. (They were shot.) The Greek head, Captain Alexander Meisel managed to escape and has roadbed Cairo. (Melas is in my employ, ;ithout salary, as an Irregular Agent and is a cousin of L.C.M. whom you know as one of our men in Nom York.) (3) Lord Glenconner, perrona117 acibitious, will attempt to dominate 0.8.8. in the Middle East and also gain control of I.S.L.D. (S.I.S.) and P.W.E.; he is some improvement over Mr. Maxwell - but not much. (4) Because of *11 of the above, Commaast group leaders are telling resistance groups that they can have no confidence in British subversive leadership; that the British support and handsomely pay former Fascists and that they csn have no hope of assistance. Many Liberal groups in Greece have joined the Communists, as they have in Serbia. Authorities: (1) Colonel Xenon. A Britl.sh Major, former S.O.E. in Greece, now a member of the W.O. Armistice Committee. Prime Minister Tsouderos. Colonel Putnik, C-in-C of Free Yugoslavian Forces, Captain Melas, Major Saunders, PAX. Colonel Quilliam, former Da#1, of G.Z.Q., now P.W.E. Greek Irregu- lar Agent "S". (2) Captain Melas. (Z0) Colonel Quilliam. Major Saunders, (4) Captain Xelas. Greek Irregular Agent S. British PALE. Major "X". eatiou: Should we accept Glenconneres proposition that all our tprisee should be joint operations, our operational groups xed and 01.4con3or and his Chief Operations Officer, Colonel 4 trieotars of our operations? ? ? _ t? ? -1 ? ? - _ Declassified and Ap roved For Release 7: CIA-R np 4*. .; 74-2:2r- ugg:"I and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7 SECRET To Co].. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943. Comment: To confound German propaganda, and to withstand Communist sniping and to win the war - and the peace - wa must maintain a united front. But it will be better for the British as well as for ourselves if the embittered enslaved peoples see a show of American interest at least parallel t,), though coordinated with, the British. Mote: We get along excellently with Glenconner - but no matter what the discussion, his minutes always reflect his own wishes.) 5. Admiral Canaris. ProparETEEr Admiral Canaria, expatriate Greeks supreme head of German Secret intelligence, now convinced that German) has lost the war and that he is in personal jeopardy at the hands of Himmler, has joined the Vaterland Movement, has move el hts H.Q. to Berne and is willing to make a "deal" with 0.5.3.; invites us to beet him in Turkey; invites me to meet him in Dresden or Switzerland (under pledge of secrecy and safe conduct) to meet with other Vaterland leaders. Authorities: Duke of Wurtemburg (Father Odo). Greek Irregular Agents in the U.S. and in the Middle East. (Colonel Duke in Washington, and Major Pearce in New 'York, are follow- inis this.) A Near Eastern Secret Police Chief. Question: is this an attempt similar to that of Hess to split the Allies from Russia? Could it be an attempt to burrow in the 0.S.S.? Is it possible that they would try this expedient in order to lay bands on an 0.5.5. officer? Is this a chance to aid a secret uprising in Germany? What guarantees would be required if, as suggested, Canaris would order his men to massacre a large number of Nazi party leaders and hand over the Military Government to General Beck? Comets We can only discover these answers by having the first meeting in neutral territory. ns. Doss Russian insistence an placing the Second Front in the West mean that oho intends to reserve Eastern Europe to herself? (See my old memory:tett= reporting my aonversations with Major General Chu and with officers of the Soviet Naval Mission which stated that the secret Soviet view at that time was: 1. After the war three great world powers would be left: the V.S4p Russia and China. 2 Within the next five decades China waild fight Russia wit 4 the U.S. helping China. SECRET - -5 - 151.-