OSS - FIELD REPORTING, 1945

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
100
Document Creation Date: 
November 3, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2013
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 21, 1945
Content Type: 
MISC
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PDF icon CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5.pdf12.61 MB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 $POIRET LO Ildteft * UNITED STATES GOVERNIVEN/ B. L . Penrose : Charlez: S. Cheston Field Report - 194 Lois Lozibard kill you and Co/one/ Pfaff get together and dIscuss tills report, and let Jae have your coraments. the indlvidlaal referred to by the writer in the /ast paragraph of the report one that we shoala question? Also *hat about the pollcy of continuIng to use native personnel in that office? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RD013X00001R000100060003-5 rod to correspond vit ',skeet undDer ea hnbmberch comment. slof be/ uoirl Ars o column. alai lobe,* mark insufficient) before further routing. hat indicated In Coftmests column. ,wvgarned to Recistry. 4404,444srate sheet. and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 A .? (Vice Memorandum ? UNITED STATES cGOVERN4"igehl4Y9(/4" :1714; DATE: '';..114elr'19411.v5 C72- Direotor, OSS Chief, Sr Field Report - Lois Lombard tho field report on the activities dated 26 March 1045. SECRET pe7,51ity.w4,0?,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 *. 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-R6P13X00001R0 00100060003-5 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHSHOTON WC O. O. Lois Lombord Fiold Import Oubjoot, opproximatnly rorty yoors old, unmarried, wos rooruitod to h000mo Taosso moorotary when ho Wko osslood to LI Nb as dopoty to ArKos fur rortoilal. Moue, sohjnot's voliflootions prn P thorooGh kouwiodcn of Prnooh pod ltotian o$ w? 11 as oskblo Uponish, isort000so and Unrman. IH 0000notion with her reforeoos to Mr. Vood I wish to may that Mr. iivod in sorvio6 to Lim ookt ompaolty of hood or tho UJ brmnoh om wmli 040 tho Floomoiol Affooho, its wfiloh latter position he has oonsidoroblo dottss to perrorm oh behalf or tho Trolisury imopowtmont whloh, rkthnr thoo Ontrootio6 from his utility to or, strongthoos his stotos, portioolmrly lo mattors partaloior, to Ws haven oporntions. Roports that wo bow, r000iyod lo tho pnot tHdlopfn thot Mr. Voodss work hos b000 r000gnitod kod bi6hly oommeoded by rumor Ambasmkdorm, Hish and Norweb, am w011 MN by thn !Mktg importment and Troopory. Uobinot hos rosiGood from bhn orgPolsation ma or April 12 t4 retool to hor rumor work of privkfe loormomo insfrootor in how home oummuoity of Riverside, thm000tioot. ' ^ - cnt- Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X0000 R000 *. 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-R6P13X00001R0 00100060003-5 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHSHOTON WC O. O. Lois Lombord Fiold Import Oubjoot, opproximatnly rorty yoors old, unmarried, wos rooruitod to h000mo Taosso moorotary when ho Wko osslood to LI Nb as dopoty to ArKos fur rortoilal. Moue, sohjnot's voliflootions prn P thorooGh kouwiodcn of Prnooh pod ltotian o$ w? 11 as oskblo Uponish, isort000so and Unrman. IH 0000notion with her reforeoos to Mr. Vood I wish to may that Mr. iivod in sorvio6 to Lim ookt ompaolty of hood or tho UJ brmnoh om wmli 040 tho Floomoiol Affooho, its wfiloh latter position he has oonsidoroblo dottss to perrorm oh behalf or tho Trolisury imopowtmont whloh, rkthnr thoo Ontrootio6 from his utility to or, strongthoos his stotos, portioolmrly lo mattors partaloior, to Ws haven oporntions. Roports that wo bow, r000iyod lo tho pnot tHdlopfn thot Mr. Voodss work hos b000 r000gnitod kod bi6hly oommeoded by rumor Ambasmkdorm, Hish and Norweb, am w011 MN by thn !Mktg importment and Troopory. Uobinot hos rosiGood from bhn orgPolsation ma or April 12 t4 retool to hor rumor work of privkfe loormomo insfrootor in how home oummuoity of Riverside, thm000tioot. ' ^ - cnt- Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X0000 R000 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 013/09/27 CIA-RDI-?13X00001R000100060003-5 hialORANDillt A.,??????^?00?11yrAcio??????,?, I1Sr34 ? VII I14. ? tl?tt, Q,sq - OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WAISHINOTON b, 0, TO. Chief, MI via) Saeoutive ()Moor, CI now Lois Lombard UUBJECTI Field Report ? ? Maroh 20, 194G 4 t 1?14,5i 1. ,Utiotual Ueoretery and general eosin-tent, Stenograp14-, ond oode with 81 in Lisbon, Portugal from June 1, 1W44 to Deoember 2, 1W44. Then wes sent to X..2 division to work on otArdinG 4nd Uerman papers (mostly from German Propaganda ortioe, Lisbon) until my deporture on the %owns!'" February 1G, 11)46. Z. UI hod numerous reports on eneow eotivities in general) purchase of war mi,teriels ond food in Portugkl) in- veotAents) bombing objectives In the Reioh) Politiokl sitnetiono (mostly in enemy oodupled territory). The number end length of these rcports beget' to dwindle sometime in November 1144 and at Llaot time the "bore, lieven" projeot took their piton,. 3. UI hid, until reoently, more 'eortugneee then American (Alio, employees. They did not have acceso to the ?ode nor to the safe in whioh code Mee ond funds were kept, but they we telephone operators, trensleLoro end ettended to the outgolnc, pouch. There were two among them) reoeplion olerk named Westwood) end telephone operttor Reoul Rodrigues - whom Miriom Forbes, Betty Robertson and myself ounpected of disloyolty. Ne hod no proof but Rodrigues lintened in on telephonl ounversattonn And he end Westwood hobnobbed and hod nothinG in oommon es e heels for friendship. I believe both these mon are still in our employ thongh Rodrigues hes been given a three insteed of on eightmhour telephone shift. The trenslator0 knowledge of Lnglish was so poor thRt Romn of their translations (whioh i. ourreoted) aoluelly sold the oppo- site of the originel. This situttiun hAs been somewhet oltered reoently. Villiem 41, aheeler, Ubourity officer, made objeobions aid now the pouoh is handled exoluaively by Americans. I feel thief; Portuguese should never heve been employed in our offine but I oleo feel it is bed polloy to get rid of them kt thie time. ? _ c: ? ? r4 r-trtrrIVACI For Release 3/09/27. SECRET ? 3X00001R000100060003-5 ,t ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Thor, is sae Si ?Moor in Lisbon for whom worked eke I found impossible to get along with - Janos Its Abed? head of the $I Lisbon branoh. He had nuns or the simaliflootions that I have always 40011 manifest ia an oamentive *Meer La any office. Ale *am un000perative fad WI bad offset on the maralo.of the whole offioe staff 4Neerleaa sad Pertuguese alike)* HO displayed more interest La reports to the Treasury Department thab in reports to NW. Deria4 iv stay in Lisbon / sever met anyone who liked kr. good. I thiak it important that we maintain a post-war 088 ervaisatios at stratogio points all over the world. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ti.vesk Its 1,6041 *MN Ws !maw* ,* 1414 &pert !Sift% APPINNestAr risre did,'II umarvi?d? 11!,41046B4 to Osseo" %owe *kw he asid dimigadd A.0 .41.11* 14 ' _ Mesa subjest's 4... , filL.:,...,,,, ., imilittria= aild Italia' 11.71: ull. allift10,100111 14* lbw sOodidreas to in Weed X wield *1*,t0,44,. lisioill on$04 tut the Awl *pow* dr hoed 1 4,10 1041 ill *hi PladadOil,,. Attasks. Is sitisb Aso "didisiderule oft** ti i?,_ flora sid Walt IWO*. 'rather Mod dosstaistisig trod hia Oats% portioslarit is , boo verstione. :v. that we halo dieleived, Ls We paiitHistdisst- .1080,1 -? L.,.fs smirk las Willi rt.sig.- 4.41 God 14414 4' il*sor doefoubdard /IA sild ,INIPtrib. lie sell as kr CU ' asismilival imsdlessaft. ' . Illsk)setIns re fres Slido erewrimaktea ad at Aritt 11 wMum O. hop diet si prive,e, largasse adinsieser is hvid bow oftweiiiiiv at itIversids? Osombeirtiost? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 CI ? Cbc Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? I. . Sooretasy sad gemeral assistomti Ptottn"r?a tilled rad sod* with a la klohoe. Oka 1, 1044 to Sosember 11, 1N1Thes *Ss piii-471.11 divisism to sorb ea eordimi sod Soma papers 111000610 bee derma lespasee_de Otis., Lisboa) NOLA iv departure am the %maim" Pshomam, liii 10416 S. SS hod memorems roperts ea easy aotivities La immoraiil iteerohme et ear materiale amd food la Partegal$ law vAsemmets sombima shjoetivei La tie liotoei Polittoal sitmatiems (me* im sm. 0004044 11_AierrSilor)? the amsher amd loasth Ot Sham ?sports boom to mosmdlo O1Mt1140 la M000hhor 11104 deilmihs6 time the Niste MAW props, took their plaeo. So 81 hod? mottl riftohtArr more Perttimese them dmerica Wise hap did Olt hot' 140000 to tho eed0)mor to the "Moth oede files sod teats were kepti lib lamormars telephoto operators, tramslaters sad steamed jots**. there weft be a1M4 them reeaptiom 0104 mommods OM telaphom epeeists, kaial Medrigses ? eiweltrimm loft's, doe* IOWAN* mad myseltssupeeted of ly. lb had so pros/bit leapioes lAstesed im oci 400111011410sa sad be and WOOUsad astislobitsd SW had Is imam se a basis ter frismdohip? X believe both Urea 411111400 sin 60 04P 44,0ib1104110 ??,41$004 1140 b004 a iss**610.6?41 of as edwommor lampiruano Watts V. ak w_y_ 11,4meemedle offload' silo ee that some er maaldera OW* I the! _ _rooted lip said the opps- o000 ot the fbie oivmaim ha boom oresoisoret sitsrsd ,yeeratipe Mil eirilmwo male ebjeetioas ad a.. ?M i ,W, AMorisoma. 2 feel ., ,1110.4ricisiese Amid weer hove beck- leo* Is our Otte, ow 1 also 001 141 1.1114 .to gist d et thee 14 this tileo i t ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 rare *IAA 411111014414. *11011 i10 wairseeigeed Wisklose* Stel ealim=is irleitoeiii, est Ilirses? . her reterese* W itro Wised I wish 1100,40$ Ii tho dhol sapid* et heel li itke Atliaolioa is *Ash 4101??. t* porters es WOW petite, the* tetreeibiss &es lois Mots.. pertioularipLi -Met* eparatisse? 11,11 p4osivet in 4101,000(Aileisie. hi. lois riesiptilodM4Mt* easselled 1.1 0114 111040111. se 1P0ii 00 V/ 11110 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 4660441,010,* 4114 Wm With 0: Li 1,440a, lidd DeeemborA, We* this is. J1?11 dirisiies to work sr ssaliss tad Germs paws *mos Preposisda ottiloo. Wows) lista of 0,01,00 fibt igeeesei Rebroary leo 1041* $0 41 hhi eismorons report,' on am" astivities is dmoirelt Ishrihosi sem, anotorinlo Sod toed is Pertnols is- 11,000hennhos 1411111614 lejleiktfee is t W he oks Pelitisal f situations emet4 sew sooppied territory)* the softer and longth of %No reperto boons to dbrisAftv sosouse in ilevember 1044 Mid et that tdme the list" Moen' potion took their plasm* 44 II had. 0611 ropoontAy, mere Pertupose than Aelerteee set* emOomrses. thny did not have *Hose to the sedo star site in whioh *ode tilos asid tondo semi WO, bo6 tbor got, tslopbsso'vorstiors. tresslsOre asid attended both" ists4a lonosh* There wore two see% this reeeptiem 440111 wbeteeedi hot telephone operator haeol hodrisues Adimssidirina Forbes, Sooty *aborts* and veldt msweeted et tsI1itr. ft had me proof but asodripos listened in is oemiorineitso sat he and Wieh000d hobnobbed aid had lio66604 14 OWNS sam basis for trismiekip. I UtAieve both *ea mos am obill la au* 1::o throe imatosd et an ' telephone -shirt. the viss ripe" has boon Mil it %Mob oso op poor that Hoe or thoir trim MO (atelli I oerrooted) aotoo14 "Aid the sop.- 0000 it the or As this stioottas los boom somewhat Altered reomblIp? Mt . , Sigiespilr *motto nide objeetioas sibil,,._ _ WO 'lilt 1104 tioly Asstriesse. I fowl IWO 141,141.110 Oleg* moor bsoi simp wit is sour *Mee tine* alashell 66.44Upsd 'Why 61 set rid et this at this Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 44?, VI.V T2 18 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 r ..4 i Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Supply Miser at NS bases ea Ismir and the Island of Stem loptelber 1943 ts 'Orson 194,9 Lt. Savage gives au , seem, et the supply oetegap sod states that adequate impales mod the mown ot equipment vhile available at Cairo headquarters ware est semi ea to the atomised bases where they were seeded. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 "." "kL,s /(e (eL- INIMINIS ORM Ink Pirootor, 038 Chlmor, 31 Viola Report IA* John 11. gevNle DATIII name Cito-tA in tosrentnr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approve-d For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 4 Imeeutive ?Moor* 111 DAM SI Maroh 1940 Mie D. DeSardeleben SUSJSCTI Report on Meld Conditions Submitted by Lt. Sevage There hey* been several report. or uneatiefeobory eupply to the Turkish buss. Moot probably there wore many end perhaps aomolex reasons for this deficionoy, At the risk of over simplitioation I eumeet that failure properly to eupply thee, bevels was largely due to lack of,direotly interested and responmible eupply pereonnol.in Wm). SI oould requisition ropeetodly end insistently without evell ir the 'supply offioer was indifferent or willing to lot proouremosit take ite tor. Vous unipAginatiV* witer40. On page 4, peragraph do there is reference to divided euthor- ity end the difficultiee resulting' therefrom. There ehould oortainly be no divided outhority in the field. The 00 or civilian head Is reeponsible for Operrtions under his oolitrol end hetwe the authority should he hi.. The verioue branches (referred to es departments in this report) must 000porate d1reoted by the 00, This principle eppeerm to be basic*. In paragraphs bo page 0, end so pen Op it is 0044 thet the authority of tro commanding Orricer over ell personnel in his command or In his area either temporarily or permanently was not generally reoogniked. Obviously euoh t situetion would be intolerable for the responsible person. Declassified and Approved F rR I 2 . IA-R 000niRnnnin a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 WONT ON PIED CONDITIONS by 1st L. John Wo Savage 4. Istablishing "Poston" Base Os Aehlevements of 04S, Ismir S. Diffgoulties in the Pield S. Divided Authority b. temponsibility without Control o. Confused Polley in Cairo 4. Supplies do notS. pass Headquarters Unsuitable Personnel M11,4 ta.rnex..... t ?.1 r*I'1754.,tilktiNb.411,7i Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 19 September 1943: Plowed on detached servioe with Office of Strategic Services, USAFINE, Cairo, Egypt. 19 September 1943: Departed from Cairo for Itmir, Turkey, via Cyprus ? 3 October 1943: Arrived Izmir and was assigned clerk, supply officer, and supervisor of bases. 17 November 1943: Returned to Turkey. 23 Nay 19441 Placed in charge of "Boston" SO September 19441 Wade reconnaissance trip to Tinos. 31 January 1945, Dmpartki for Washington. 11 ftbruary 1946, Arrived in ftshington. When the staff in Izmir consisted of only three Americans, it was necessary for each of as to do cryptography secretarial work and to act in one another's absence, )r particular duties rs to serve as supply officer and supervisor of the bases. Supplies of food and equipment for the bases were purchased locally or obtained by requisition from Cairo. Local purchases Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 -.MAitiZtVir-av,70.),711,,,,flt...., , q?t ' *ors diffieult booauee of the soaroity of goods in Torkey and iwkinaio of the inflation. On the other hand, many tiems were not obtainsble in Cairo or wore of the wrong type, aod bill long 40100 in transportation (mulled grvat inconvenienoes An order Cop light salI oloth vont to Cairo in Ootobor 1043 wag Atit tiliOd Until August 1044. The supplies to be prooured were the gear tor oaiques, material for ?alto* repair, rood for bes6 perponnel, eamouflage dirgeful, and oquipmeot Por miomionos Th. distribution of lie bases around Ismir made it noose- entry tor Ati American officer to spend a groot deal of time going from one to the other to 000rdinate their aotilvitiom aad to aot as liaison between the ?reek mmployees end the Turkish offiolole. The trAp by auto to "Koy West" was two and a halt hours south, and to "noston" was two hours north. Those or a oombination S. The island of Samos When Samos wee liberated in Septomber 14a, tt woo djd?d to 64400114h a Woo to supplement "Key West". A base on Allied territory avoided the troubleeome cuetome and movement restrio. %lona of the Turks and alio provided better howling and anohorage faeilitlea. / was sent to Samos to owt up tho boo, for our operations. We were just getting building' and anohoragoo and establishing relations with the britleh and Orook authoritleo when the (Norman attaok nos made and the /eland evaouftted. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 During the battle of ',soros, our oalques helped embark rein- forcements; and, when the order came to evaouate Samos, our were abi, to oarry British and Greek military personnel as well as hundreds of oompromised Greek oivilians to Turkey. 4. tatablishi 'Boston" Ballo rh? evaouation of Samos compromised "Key West" and made it neoessary to obtain another base on the Turkimh coast. The port of Reshadiye, two hours by oar north of Izmir, was chosen and a large warehouse was hired for storage and living epaos. Through tho Smniyet (Turkish Military Security) wo wore intro- duced to the local civil and military authorities. "Boston" was the main base of operation(' of the Izmir area and ta1ne4 the mission calques and stored the supplier brought from Personnel quartered at Bonton a.mounted to t. 4%flioroan. and fifty Greeks. Most of the missions sent into maintained at "Boston" and doparted from there. Tho ba10 sufforsa from ?ramped quarters, leek of supplaauj ies, trained personnel. Nhaign Spence of the Maritime Unit arrived at the end of Aucust 1944 and closed the bare about of November. About 75 men imr? 'feint into oocupici Grooms. these were selected and trained in Ismir, by Caj, These mon were maintained and partially equipped in Izmir and arrangements made for their reoeption in Greeoe. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? 17. f**A ? 1;4 1111ML Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 t74.,%1 AZ. After the *lesions were inside, they were supplied and their iatelligence eolleoted. In order to oarry out these assign- moots we obtained and supported a fleet or small claques. For each vc;tage a calque had to have talse navigation papers and a camouflage cargo. Those caiques wore almo used In the evacua- tion of Samos. At the request ot the American Military Attache', a membor of the Oerman Nmbamsy staff was pent to Oyprus to ',soaps the Gestapo which was pure in her. We also inftltrated an MO mission, maintained it, and evaouated it after its work was done. The MO also established 04 voicto hroadoamtlng station at "Dostoni 6. Diffiouktier in the Field 46+00461.a. 4MS Abo asatamoieasoaaraisrows SO 1g4""lAitttLott iwo The jurisdictional disputes and the confusion situated by several separate departments operating In the same arca causod diffloulties in the field. The Maritime Unit was given the authority to organise and maintain the oaique service and to establish bases in Turkeys nowt/over, they did not hove the personnel to operate the service, or an understanding of it purpose. As a result, the supply OiliqU04, operating from Ngypt, were improved and thn mis- oalquee, whioh did the dangerous runs, were neglected. It was bad for the morale of all pqrsounel when a 0-knot one.loylindor calque had to mak+. a 300,0mile run through enemy meters and a powerful silent motor wan installed In _ IMACAI141414.4t,0-.4n)01. " - 1,41mowv.1111W:4-3Vg&IN x3414?.40g,o4 r 014;414ER St, iAt 0.04""'"""'"" " Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release-2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ,t1 6 I ), ,S1L t Vain -ail , ? 100414r4saintp.m---431mcgetlii' 6 se tt N \\ \, _ cou,trl not be given duties outside ive most essential item such as pistols 'and Mills bombs. ,W4, never did receive any of the special gadgets. In Cairo, itagrever,overal of the enlisted men kaa,one.shot pistols \\ that worQ smic?ter than a fountailent?' Unsuitable Perscnwa \\\ 11 \\. The communiimitiot:CW6d maritime periOnnol'it\nt to us were not intoreettyti in 8INeotivities.1 They oonsidc ed 61. L) ,4 themse17zii rovonsible only to their ohiefs in Cairo 'a d ks, * ? 1.7 - ste Q N :971? r ltteir own field. ,ere wore only two SI officers:In the\ it was im- . sible for either to go to Caiio heia4luitkers. 'Etixtepn, too ,long for an offiOer to remain etv.illt Iron' his tJ W ? john L liavage 'A.mtAAboutionant, Ordnance,' CLL C.r. rEetarr tkotc:i - \\ ? ./ la%? . ? '" 3t. ? t?tr. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Thiore iv attaohed the field report of Cuptain M. M. Pittard, im him Ran Innen t with Drittlohmont lot ? . tonroae Aotim Chinf Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ' Captain M. M. Pittard %port on Field Operations arrived in India in Number 1943) and reported to Lt. Ool. Hammon After eight deys in Mew Delhi t was *feigned to temporary duty with Dot. 101. The first few daye were spent in obeerving end eeeieting with al work at Pet. Neadquartern. The majority of the work was ?oncoming operations in aurae, and I brought Oaptein Chartrandos residence and merlon?, in Hume to the ettemtiom or the Chief 81 Officer. Then X eychenged plots*. with Captain Ohertrend and was treneforred to Ochool and Training Headquartere where I 'tidied the *Duress and observed the teaching or these course by the inetructore. After learning the location of the *ammo I was given from 18 to 36 bourn per week of instruesion work in addition to other duties such as supervision of reeds and oemp maintenanoe, and the construction of new comps. X also spent *onaidsrohlog time,' in the schools end training office sestet- ing with record., censoring letters end other administrative duties. Even though the greeter port of my work wito with schools end training we ware well informed as to the progress of SI and operetionel activity. The morale of the *Moors and men at Dot. 101 was very high. They lived up to their motto "rho difficult can be done immediately. The impoosible takes a little longer." We were doing a job and it was a pleasure to work with than. In April 1944, I was recalled for duty with Det. 404, end arrived at Plort. Needvartere on eth Soy 1944. 1 was sent to Olodegh to assist with ito preporatiem 44 4 ?amp, and I served as oonducting ?Pricer for Thai vocruits? Poring the *oath of June, I served as conducting officer for aMelhy pomp of recruits at Camp I. Attar the arrival of Captain Heltoe, I returned te Oamp 01t0 to eontinue with It. preparation as a wimp and serve as a conduct. lag officer for Indo-Ntsian, Thai mid Towel recruit'''. In August 1944, Dr. Lyon arrived and it was decided to use amp "K" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 se aa aseesemen ?amp. '4t then beoame Commanding Officer, at the requemt of*. Ilgme and *erred umtil the arrivel of 8chool And Training pernonnel la Norember 1944.. Until this time most or our personnel were on loan from other brsaahos inniuding spoilt* lS levember I asked for a transfer with A view to more aotive servi..24, oithor with $I or 306 In Depoember / reoeived orders to return to Washington ? ,h and arrived in slushington 2nd Yebruery 1945. hattaigagaguiLiDAILSMI.d, Valuable information is being reoeived from all areas in which we ore interootod. SI and SO work in generel le making good progreom from All reporto. Schools and training have reoeived pereonnel who hove hid epeoial trein- ing snd the pommel from other brennhem are being replaced. Dr. Lymhn has done an exoollent job In the amseeemeut field, All diffioultieo and handioapn being oonsidered. Conditionsit the field which migh be t improved, - speoiflo difficultien and suggestions, The limited 4umber of recruits who can qualify as native Agents hem handloapped the progress of Dot. 404. Individual rtoruiting is preferable to givap reorutting whenever possible and when more recruiting con be done from within oocupled coantriem OUP reoulta should be proportionately better. In my opinion the preliminary pheoe of ansensment, oonnioting or inter. views and tests, *covering m period of from 4 to 7 ftymi, mhould be placed near the recruiting oentor in order to ellmlnete the obvioun rejectn before they reseh the treining fines. Thie is espeoially important in group reorultIng. The majority of recruits sent to Ceylon for aooeonment were recruited In India end elsewhere, and it wee neoegostry to reject A Dirge number And return them to olvilien lite from ) to 10 woke after being recruited. Speolel efforts should he conetently exercined to coordinate the work et all brenehes, oepacially recrultIng, armeonment, trelning end eeourity. It wonlid be of adventege to sll brenohem for Sohools *lid Trelning to have designated, personnel to revise oourses, id arrenge the subjeote pro- greeelvely where students receive treining in more than one cemp, And make avsilable solootsd information to instruotorm with i view to keeping the students interestisd end informed am to their respective oountrieo during their Period et training. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 - I ? A^ a "PAVZ; flu ; ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 iiiminownw ? "v. tgv, , A ?J: ? ", atie. ea? ieljj "tit4s1, ? P.: ,? The constructive side of en agent's work nhould be emphenized AA well sia the eubirorelvs. Por exemple, A course on nircrAft, pilot mono work, And Milled plane and part molvoge (such ma bomb sightn, etc.) could be omphanized alonir with the eseential courses of SI, much no reaonnninvonce snd reporting# obeervetion and description, relent:ion of target pip] viti pouting 10cati0nn, nap reeding and 004p#1114, SO courses much es svlention oil lending ntripe, signaling, iiirplane sabotage, etc. In conneetion with the ron,un of pllotn 4 liberal rowsr0 might by offered for each pilot renoned from onomy territory. Such a course would verve tIn an excellent reviow for recruits nenring the completion of their treining, And the pilot rescue work would give to tho reorult A constructive approach which might help to discover the possibility tad extent ofsupport that on be expeeted from Oovernmont offico:1n i nnd others in occupied areas, who might not be readily inolined Co porticipnto In rubvernive activity. The acoomplishmente or Dot. 101 in the field ha n oonvinced me of the possibility and Importance of a courae of training that will omphnniao the rescue of pflotn Ane'f other aircraft personnel. Wharf, our react's, work from within the ocovied area can 1>e coordinated with the work of (1-;" Ana A-2 who all, workt,g from omaide the occupied organ, it Appeern thnt we art, in a ponition Jo Ponder even greater serving thnn we hove in the peat, It woe obrioun befoft I lett the flold from moent ohrIngen in personnel and policy that other specific difficulties which might be mentioned here have elreedy received' attention end something In being done about thorn. _ etaitteg 01. (1.*4 .-""ft".. ?,atttr?V?ft?-????.?.? -r Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 - L A Aft ? . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Id ?et. ? 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 .tifttftiolt* rum 011 . ? , e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GO ENT to Acting Director ommm Reports Office, Secretariat r- r 1 Pield Report of Clip (P) Nelson Conroid NoNdward F6/\',1 mural A ( C (r( ilv"1 k c c ) ItAnti 16 April i943, 1. Cep (P) NoNdward participated in photographic misslons in the British Isles durihg 194:2 and 1943 and 1.4 Rapt during the winter and spring of 1944. Prom April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in italy. 2. Re found the food generally poor and auggesta that ft regular OX mess be set up with Army cooks. J1. Nr. Noldward has praise for cooperation of the British in his work In Brigland and of OSS personnel in lgypt, but not in Caserta. 4. Ke notes that OBS naval mon, even chiefs, are requirod to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship at Maples. Attaebiscrat >r,3146?ZtZede, W. B. Kantack Capt., A.C. Reports Officer Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Il ?S? 7 411 -rj.? 1, :???A ? `? F 47. 0-4o ? S. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 0". s , I 4Al?teitti..sAt.,-...f,... t. ? .4.016 114 ? Office andum ? uNinD STATES G:1)1 NT Tit kiting Director 0110.416 Apr il 190 &sports Office, Secretariat Maa Field Ihiport of Cap (P) Nelson Conrad Madward r yce. e k- ,;.,4 (-? C f A' /AV AtCcnj 1. Cap (P) Noldward participated in photographic, misslons In the British Isles during 194:4 and 1943 and in Rapt during t winter and spring of 1944. From April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in rtnly. 2. Re found the food generally poor and suggests that n regular 0/ moss be set up wIth Army cooks. ie Mr. NeNdward has praise for cooperation of the British in his work in *island and of os personnel in Ngypt, but net in Caserta. 4, Me notes that OSS naval men, even chiefs, are required to perterm fatigue duties at the receiving ship at Maples. vi Attaehment )r13441t4i4, W. B. rantack Capt., A.C. Reports Officer ,AJAA.K.:411311Pillk,0?AgAtaAA,A.???-= 1-4 Tr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 7,16 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 MeinerandUM ? UNITED STATES GC! ENT Se k Aettog Director 16 April 190 Reports Office, Secretariat / 6 r ; f Field Report of Cap (P) Nelson Conrad Madward ("? ,17/5 1. Cep (P) Madward participated in photographic missions In the British Isles during 194;2 and 1943 and in Rapt during the winter and spring of 1944. From April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in Italy. 2. Re found the food generally poor and suggests that t regular 0/ mess be set up with Army cooks, 3. KIN Madward has praise for cooperation of the British in his work in ngland and of WS personnel in ID'Pt, but not in Cagepta, 4. Re notes that OBS naval men, even ch1er, era required to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship at Maplos. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 tk49 I SECREF , e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Director, 088, Administration Building 'las Sooret.ariat, Administration Building MON Chief, Field Photographic Branoh DATA! 28 Maroh 1945 MOM Report. from Personnel Returning from Yield Yorworded for your information and fil*. 1 Bool.4oport of C8p (P) MoMmard SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 -a I k, ' .? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ik 714ss 4...1/4 ki t'ir ? f: "'???? 4 ? i fr 4. 1114.011100?..." Imoompsessisp SECRET OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 101 Kreuter, 088, Administration Building 28 March 1945 YXAs Secratariat, Adninistration Building Chief, Field PhatograPhic Branch FROM: cap (P) Nelson Conrad Moldward, U8MR SOBJECTs Reports from Personnel Returning from Field Arrived in Ragland 1 September 1942. Went to Roseneath, Scotland on first amalgams!. Photographed U. S. Army and Marines during training. This asaignmemt lasted approximately six weeks and consisted of motion picture work. Returned to Lamdon 11 November 1942 and assembled gear and equipment for mew assignments On 12 January 1943 reported to Lt.Col. Jeffery Courtney, la Glasse of Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, located at Westward No, North DOV03, England. This assignment consisted of photo- graphing all 'caret operations held in this area, with still photographs lmeluded. Photography was made of all tank wade operations, waterproofimg of vehiclec, landing waft operations, mine laying devices, mortar firing, track devices, stretcher devices, cable living devices at Mimehead, firicg of bangalores, eggs, blowing up of underwater piping - them photographing results at low tide. The foregoing operations were photographed 'eider fire. At Portland photographed operations of Vehiole Landing Ramps tied on Port and Starboard deck, wired with Hexite, and shim fired Landing Ramps mere blown off, tied to Bow of LST, then all vehicles were driven to Shore; total time of operation 16 Minutes. Major Pillar was in charge of operations. All still work at Westward Ho was dome by Field Photographic Branch. All supplies and equipment used at Sootuord No Imo furnished' by Field Photographic Branch. Upon completion of this assignment, entire darkroom supplies were retained at Westward Ho, with the exeeption of motion picture cameras and still equipment, in so- serdmaee with instructions from Lt. M. Z. Arvistead of the London Branch. Dosing this ascigmmest 137,000 feet of raw negative was exposed; 3,000, 4 z 5 stills ware made, from which 30,000 prints were made, not inoluding enlargements. All British Army personnel on this assignment were very co- operative. Transportation difficulties were encountered due to the fact that faellitlec were limited. The food problem was our worst difficulty dos to the fast that no OI Mess was available in this area. These oper- ations were eoadmeted in preparation for D-Der Invasion. Assignment was emmpleted 28 Imember 1943. Retuned to London 2$ November 1943 to assemble gear and equipment for new assigmmemt. On 12 Amory 1944 was assigned to USAFIKE in Cairo, Egypt. F Vr. tt. A 1 424k SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2613/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003- . - 640 ?41411$*.}714im-ek; maw. 7 r ?yr. ? SECRET ttrintor, oss.a 28 Marc& 1945 Photographed Beirut Agent School near Cairo for Major Yassos of 008. Mx- *ellen! oeoperation was reeeived by OBS men there, a11 officers being very. *cooperative. Atter completion of foregoing assignment, PW E School near the Pyramids wato photographed for Nritish Arvay. Om 2$ April 1944 left Cairo br plane for Bari) ttaly, arriving in Bari on 26 April 1944. A complete darkroon was established there for us to devel- op sod print any operations taken oss offioers who photographed opera- tions La Yugoslavia and Albania. Our principal job there was to go in the field to photograph these operations, come beak to Bari and print and de- velop these photagraphe to be turned in to Major Ross, Mead of Operations. Due to the loss of Chief O. P. Yowler, taken prisoner In Tugoolavia, we were mot permitted to leave, but Bpi/0 J. B. 111in left for two missions in Yugoslavia for Marshal Tito and to photograph general Mihailovitoh. While assigned hors I oompleted darkroom work, mapping, and reproduction work for the Operations Offioe. All OSS men stationed here were very oo- operative and excellent results were obtained. I feel sure that these 058 nom did their job in an excellent manner and it was a pleasure to work for them. food ?auditions in Mari were mediocre, but the food in Caserta is terrible due to the fact that no 01 Mese is ettablishod and all food is cooky* Italians,. Not much 000peration was given us ay 080 men stationed in Caeerta, living oonditiont were diffioult, and there 'ma such resentment by offieers stationed there. Dispensaries in Marl and Caserta are stranded for Implies such as bottles and various articles. All pharmaoisto matee there are exoellent workers and very cooperative. Left Caserta for Napier 6 November 1944, arriving at Reoelving Ship in Naples store all OSS mon leaving for the United States scrub floors, paint walls, sad nave furniture, Chiefs are expected to do likewise. The food was excel- lent om the Reoeiving Ship. Left Casablanca 11 November 1944, arriving in Now York 1 December 1944. Ii sonalusina, will state that all COS men in the field do their work very roll and the omly complaint I nave to make is that the food is poor and the emly solution I see would be to have a regular established OI Ness, with Army crooks. ? v:/(14,e.A Grf/ re6 MUM CONRAD MolDWARD 08 (P), tIOUR SECRET .4-A?t?- -' rnr Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00 01RO n61. ? A 1 0060003-5 ? A ? . ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 i .........04,54.*IterdiieDL-Ter-1.111Y4 i ; I 1I. i i 1 r r ? - I I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 , Acting Director i Reports Office) Secretariat mom Field Report of Capt. Arthur S. Bates /6, 4 (( \//c /(/ S 'GOVERNMEg: d t1i 16 4) ' April 190 (1.1CM\ (h If I 44 it \i/ 6 (Communications/)TO.) Attached 1s a report from Capt. Arthur 8. sates who was in ch4ge of the London Message Center, Capt. Dates says that, the principal difficulty he encountered was that not enough time was allowed to train and brief agents in ciphsrs, which resulted in decipherment diffi- culties once the agent was in the field. He suggests that any branc contemplating the Use of agents make every effort to inform the Cipher Section of Communica- tions as soon as possible am to how many require cipher training. For security reasons this information must be definitive. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RbP13X00001R000100060003-5 CONFIDIATIAL Ce Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT The Direeter, OM, through (1) Chief, Oommunie OATH! 29 )arch, 1945. oationernranch, (2) Secretariat PION t Capt. Arthur S. Bates SUNlitil Report on Field Condition.. 1. begriglign,gljaim. Offieer in Charge of London Massage Center, 6 April, 1943 to 31 January, 1945, duties involving the supervision of aryptographing and decryptographing of claseified mongsages, assurinp, the proper handling of OSS cryptographic systems, the acoounting for cryptographic material received from Waehington and other USS offices, the isauing or such met4ria1 to field detachrents and to agents, the oryptographio training of agents, and the training of Measage Center personnel recruited in the ET?. 2. PlajaatligjliDijilialastnaligli. The only diffioulty vorthy of particular montion has to do with the question of agent training in ciphers. On a number of occasions the Communications Branch in the ETO VOA not allowed adequate time to train and brim" agents in thin subjeot, with the result that decipherment difficulties arose ono(' the agent was oppmating in the field. This difficulty has been remov1.4 to a oertain degree by re-vampting the agent training program, but agents are still being brought to the Communications Branch for cipher training as late as a week or ten days before their departure for the field. I would reoommend that branches contemplating the use of agents be urged to make every effort to inform the cipher section of the Communioations Branch as soon as possible at to how many require cipher training.and au to the type of work the agents will be expected to do. It is also important that the cipher training section know as soon as possible whioh men are 4glaillx going on missions becaune of the insecurity attaohod to teaching spocifio top secret detail to men who may mot be required to use them. - .101040Now"?L" (?gff4. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 CONFIDENTIAL e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO PROM SUIVICTI ir Wiser la Cherie et Imedos asses. ?eater, 6 60,11. , 940. duties imvolviag the supervieloa of orpptesrephleg sad destyplosraphi et sleesitied assesses, assurimi the proper heedlia, et as ern systems the asiesstios ter eryptesraphis usterildirsosiwed fres asehlastsa and other OSS Wiese, the iesaiag of gush materIi te :told driaehments and to asents, the sryptosraphis Mutates of wisp sad the tabu of alesease Water pommel 'intuited is the Wfts The oldr diffioulty art* et questioa of asset train*/ la elphers. ember et essaeleas Osmossioatiese Irameh in the Reuss sok aliened time to trate sad bried assets is this eubjest, with the result that ditflosities arose ease the asest was opematies is the field. this dittisalt, how hese removed to ? sertaia degree tir ro-vampOmih. most hut &seats are still helms brought to the Oemmasioatioes lima Iv= treislasos late as amok sr ten days before their depertere ter the field. ruseid reismsemd that *when eeetemplatime the use et iasnte be urged to rho ever, otter% to Wens the elpher sostioa of theOIaiO.tLQaI Ireseh 0 sees es possible as to hen seamy require sipher train*/ and as to the typo emelt the assets will be espeeted to de. It Le else *sportiest that the sipher *aisles ',sties lamas soot as Ildleh sem are seta, es missies, bosoms. a the atteshed to Ofitteliesitle top omit detail' to mem who may mei roliired to we them. ? .? CONFIDLIT,?!41, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Aeting DirocteP Reports Office, Seoretariat mmact Pield Report of John Waldron (X-2/IT0) 1. Attached Is ? report from Mr, *niched to the X-2 Wmr Room in Paris to participate in disousaion relative tbe now German War Room in Lond 2. This report tokplaini in some detmil the funotiohm ;And adminlotration of the War Room, the differonce lh the duties, of and relations between the British mnd Amerlomn mtmffs, mnd eohelon !Andoni the relation between thy forward unit ln Paris And the resr in 3, Mi. Waldron points out that Nano, the British unit WMN AttiO1244 1411 SHAW while the American SCI units were attsched to Communications Zone, there WAS a oertsin divergenoe in the funetions of the two units. Moreover there was M dUpilvMt1011 Of work and personnel as a result of the division of the FrOh011 Desk between London and Paris. Mr. Waldron Aim o es that American ICI units ere forced to do more C.I.C. work than mhould be expected of ea fully trained OCX officers. 4. In lomolus on Mr. Waldron points out that many of the between Mlilild MU. ?title**. leveled gainst the Prow War Room, were due to Nfeudien , . John Waldron, who And returned to Washington to the emtobliehment of 13-Z ,? - .? ? .7g14:01'414,f, . ' -? '5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ' - 'imt? - ? ? 4km Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ' ' ? ... ? a.. - .; Gonerft1 Ni DohOym Attlintlont Captatn W. P. Lt. Col. Rorr A. torkpr, *toting Chief, X-2 branch Attmohed im ft romport pr,pawmd by W. ?covering the purled 17 Marah 1044 to 1 dftnumry ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 nAtml 11 January. 1045 Retaraiail: I lett Leaden se 1 Ammo 1045 sad the v. ?e 4 ES on 5 Late is Oetaber X visited the Paris striae tor a week, pours* Atter a tow weeks et 1440410144U* and o;:4 with the 10-5 - 141 0 Sifters, whisk is venal with newly arrived personnel la Londe' i was detailed to IRS ter trawl la the Medlin at Special *pat eases. th: intsetioe wee thin ! sheild eke eare of the Landau sod at all gush oases as we eight rim either tree tho V. R. er la Pram or the Loelaeds. to this end I shared the ernes it the Ohio, et the seethe et MRS that samood wok 041106 Ilesever1 ehmores is the Loads% agar 1~ ocasequant am Mks. liturpbea dasisiste to establish a terverd detaehmset Is Paris stter the liberatise et Met litre led te ir bails asked to Wild the Amortise side of the Just Orittsbqamer._ieem Shr Sees? lost relistaet4, I screed to take over aid rem the !hi selAy with mr Dritleh opposite amber netil I retuned to Washlaltsa ter seepage. I. je ilIMMIUMMIMULammiaa1 I els ashed to seas toSesbdarszttnpor ea the preliminary dis- sessimat at the am lo_aeda agereee Shr mommeseeme - liseussions 'blob ! 'Oared with the MRS armors hes the begiloplret their plasm* for the eseiblisheret et mesh as focsaleetiaa. Mr. mad Mho. Pearsall telt, too, theS asoll4 be et gee have la the Im4appeetettem et Lambe marts sm the aide with reepeek te the mew eiratienanto alLammikatime NI 01900446 ?ht.:lir& :II. I sa !rte. the into I lig the bittioss Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release'2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ' 4fik, ? Up bVALML`63 .!**** re. "e tvisetrad Poiar brow:, ese As sheet. the Probeh Beek geared to hemdle the multitudinous asise:ted elth our esplettatiss et the IstellAgemoo opportunities Miramar behind the 4,0160 and to serve, through our de the?111.4 various latellAgesee argosies la 'Silo, the jab well death nor et Wm ear MIN Ile to assist the alto is the field kr V . ? . . 4 11. ?4 'd I - 711 qr-rjr- rrnir virrn.iirwriv ? ac. 'r. r ? are. oaf tisk asd Ameriees, that west to the field? fhe intersetios thus sallied vas drams fres all tha sources e_ivallehe to Ifte aad IOC War seour* ramose, the intermaties thustfrevided was to be made available to other emotes le the old threigh dieeraet dietribution trebled 24 /14 Misers, fr soap Utilities?. organisations, tssisieg oehestsi Isom er suspect siesta aod the like, ill a pertehle tent* the use of Set sem with task forams Field result' and the reports et field ?Moore Wiest* that these lists eere,et the greatest value. ir O. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 9-?00090001-00n11-0000X?1-dCl-V10 L/60/ eSeeiei -10d panaiddv pue Pe!PsseloeCI t1.1,ekt -1144%1 f / 1P110o jo 441044 gra /Oft ? ..1.1.140401 oft arAll or: 4411: 141" ..0144.. ws;tiejse queut eft "moo eq. "%torten," ask: tessii 10, .01"7;11744"1,11. grirST?tir ipeata..?.118.$31* Wif" Pireikt 1134 .:411:vt..._aftft4 0$ s?qr peames'Aft ja."7?41* 4011$1 age etea isto "ftftkit %ow eft asj gro ocult e?rulics-r:41. 414,1111.141.44004104. aerilitriterykstr ortio:111"--posAl? ?ram: ;et, 4,00 or 0 'efts; ; a ega 4eurs am** so ifty tdewr PooseratZ "I" drati 40413ere:rftplit alr4 411. left 414104, 14 eltiqa? d'vortpt 4411-wwetter 404: ir?"4:;1:11:11 46114 1164 Oi se l tr *we pfterroa vlbrovosdo Ato pirdx? sew, poliv 40; - Ons 14?4?41eir twfig Jo jsrlop qpr:11.411 !ft4,411it .400:454 r , itti; 'r3e.r.r4;P: 441?1111":447.14 pose _w Zap v %P.m "44r ale "ft -Ps .4autaa 840 4441 /1/t/ /41 Alo ell$ --- *.14;;40"; lanta.41114.41? $11:444.4"; it*Z .11,73;11DPs eva Irt 44.14 ito .4141/11).?484 *RI 4%;41 es elPra.it uliontreer nv . "*** Paso 04 wag AI et, viiasi4 zap blip 404 *like $haqua Oft*, .2_,M1,100 41to "11110 /41074:01,11hras.?.411444/. 10100 0114 11eadt,.. --mm41117 qo sX411110 Mali aft 1114 ;4061,00 441; Margie._ OR ern AZ? Ifte2 tiepeo "1111410.Thip -fflrv von- bousarr irer7t. py.ft 4404001: ,u a#10,0 r4044T uit 0664,44. fipiir 4444 3t4tr eqs Ilsoottoot Pi* wm._ 410 ""V 0Pft 114 q * ?pp ' 444 441.11,:. 14414 11,414.2 try 40 j. (.81, .7Pelv ".41.4 /De 44; gr/or" 4R1 1.4 trIAN411 41q; ay. ftriglipels.tir 11114 ,4108 46") 4411C Pee eioZa. flooki-474141; or Ziall Voter! OW jhrws:11,16?? dr.4404074 alllisrefto 4"1") ,...._"q1704. y."4 Pie 401; r3.20.4. .7 lab *p.m "raft plwassfl, el at, If ;Pr -vw IPT 1.00Saao Waqi IOU Arr ea?fts ? Rev lepomeoz J,3 33g ? kg' (I) (4) (1) ' 9-?00090001-00n11-0000X?1-dCl-V10 L/60/?LO eSeeiei -10d panaiddv pue Pe!PsseloeCI p. ? ? 1 - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-R6P13X00001R000100060003-5 Oho SECKE1 41, ? The MU* side of the Varlet* has boom sommod by am average of sees doses sees Wise's, snob of shem WOs sorviess et e soerwkagy, the Sumplemm side, by moo tam Wiser., sees of oboe bad a oeoretegy. The Ameriesm shaft hes bed mo Ameriamm seeretarial assistemts. Two of our yowls memo typists wars assigned to the Mese, het thy were very telly oesepied Wattle espying mei distribution (to ihritisk sod &martian offieers in the Room) AmerisemaM Sritieb eibles, reports, eta., sad in the loggias sod false at digimastee It le see dear to the aseruitimg Mice in Washimgton %bet *tot ;mowed ta the field are inbalirmetysimg Poem who sem amd are 'Wing to 4o typing sod other oesses4Artal walk. 14,k Iwo 0 Os lwritish oposu9 la the Mhr licoo is * trio of brillisetly gee. NOV iotollipistfr soli traiaad, 400rizres4 orrAters? 74r tho row*. WO/ ottieors sod iphoir sooretscies have, T41 the rhols, all000d to @thy lime 44:1U0 0 their speol,41 tarks to dovolv iuL* ottlAtitm* #1mlistaats is the work. The Amerioem poop, os Ow other haa4? was rathom e,410 at the time of the establishment ?t the Fart. *trio., With he oxsoprioa tor eme. Dolowits, all offisers and soorokariss who had to4s traleimg and :111for tho Job tho6 las to bo does le Leedom Iwo tam for the use 11 et es to inhledimg the too *plat assisteets . bad to loam as we did ea* Oyes work, !shish by this time (our drives earess !ranee was is Ml swims) lest with a dimerimg reek es6 always mew prehlsese Oir Ihrittsh sellegies ompremely taproot cod helpful durimg thou, early weeks. For the most pent oirleopito respeaded gemorovely amd latterly we have boom holding mp our end vow doissoW sal* Soso thins that we saw seeded doimg bed), ? thst vested to de for the teller .port of the Paris and tho field effigies hod to go enema. Newever, we made me major mistakes . wham we eight tm the ems. ot amy emir of them, days have made mew amd we earned tho lospeet amd the so/id friendship of orer eelleageos by the work we, so meetly nerieos, sommged to get dome. Smog the Amerieems is Moller Room to* should be mentiomod for Notably SW won are, . 1. Was Oraeo Dolomites by tar the most everionood end well 'raised ettilber as the Preeoh Desk. She had sated as eseratert to NO. Robert has ter more than *your Ker gemeMMObad brilliantly latelligont otudY of not omir the treash but the general looters luroposs 0. X. situation made her ma imvalumblo officer in the War Room. Nor work, WA bed ohiefly to do with the letsrprotatioa of vest sosrot mime, weed her the highest reeReot free the NIS people. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003 5 ? ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 44 ft? 3 P17-1 ' ?.? SECRET -4. tk. sods ?ewe yew soeestly arrived hies lashiaston .3. lifter as am them the naval train* there, he gave his SIM rote intalliirome nith Illienotie eakeraeity to the beskteee et lea** his Job sad tatting it dose. ile hue . not bad 0, eneept ter a ter thadeys im aw Wider' in tour asnilhe mid mely leaves the Otte. until, late at nights 110 ill ON flay likedbat eitaired by our een people aW by tbi *Utah sinews who him muted with hia? a selfless. La _owasi pal vell trained. mobile and linguieto he se the woe,*** woo, z woe. ma is the smelts as lo as II tke Irtvatt tor 1/2,Azirti big sort as 101 unit with , ile aillW. kV* he vtil bo. ttavalueble at esir Brain *antra et ow vol,?,k6 fYx.t6 11).1tiallilifee peeplA would, it seem to , is U. orioti bwictirona tet.trit, a% es will. 1,r". 4:ip.rp win efei,-,41 ter ? poet in the eirviee ? , 11# LC Mtn &runt 0630Neitt an4 thi ntor.itlit 1urke have devslopod %to vary. call'oase ottioere, *doable ot doing a large wolves at watt, Nies Allem Demo with her lone lbshingtor *North Atria' owporiesoe as preparation has boom most bagel show imikiiewleal Is London. Sheiwill, hewer, preboblr novo or to Ports later. idlikemildmilliLiCtilli ;:arlflag thelreneh. _Iller leen ate a Joist Almeria,* Lettish siDeekilithe iitth tOist ad* shish the Latish 'nom worked. shies the amine* we. rade its eantribution vas not quite The Drit_ish ettisere in Paris nere_undsas the diroition or their WAS daisy the assriesa loftiest"' there sanded te milk as as iadepoident , soy Mat repefted... _ Ito alliblitti. to Lesion. nob, ow. as Louisa bee done, AMA dims. to ussaingtes. Oopplote iidopsediON moo ot (soiree, set possible lad Pude 104 eseeteatly to have raterame to London tor helps et ono Mad or safter? this pliyaisal supaistisa of the tee parts of the Peak* Desk 46 .,.1. .;?:A.f.-, t..4U.;p::7;-_1_ tar t,het sae the etoattial Stet et the eitartios i? Galled for not eak4 a .. , psi,g _ it, bit a duplication of seek else. Iambi to, Inatome, los MO lip to St. Its oun sot it mires. Doubtless this situation has been dimmed by Ihr? IWO, an his mem, visit to Peri. end Dome > 'et the two Wises. seeermintlesa AU by nes hive been nelde as to the relations and reeponsibilities . the Ileitis* ettiaere Is Paris sure. to ropesto oder the dirsetien It Iseedie?_ they vase, also. . to mote *ether Mat or diverge'''. Iron the Aserlies.arempaeint, ettoshoWl to Napo simmer ear people were attaahed to lone. teathdelts: in atteastrajenr!kbp understood as MIA IMO. jolt esek et the SOX *its wee to have boas advisory. to pose on .0, I. egoaeloe +Ike interaation ado dkvailable br the rosouroes aine ? ,,Vp?fi'' t SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 fi? ? ? 4 Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/27 1 CIA-RDP13X00 SECRET 01R000100Uouuu,,, et Mk rt, MIS, sad to advise sad direst such owcioo ta the use of thAt Interafttien, The Oritish An hese* end the Lowlands kept, ktipeciallty *maser tt the role of adviser, to such American, Ingiioh, Preach aid ether Cy Z. ageinciec vat 'Tlidalt they bad tUaliagse They did tic wider dive01,,* toga MOON rwt left thin, illi Itarlop In the happy posit1=Nn of Weteng, oo the atm af aetual opolice* opartton4i tc gather the at. or Aseriese activity as it dev4p4d g'et.0 4Ar Sutotqesgelt4tm *i4a; timOirttod hi our er.tnies. Ilioaticheent of our SO/ tblitio to Oomamnioations 140* for44d U6 ti 10 rather sere 210.140.* work than our oarefullly trained 80X offimllow ohould, periao?, Wee bees askei to do. Homfte, had to do it for the reason that the immiums 0.1116 vas it su loll ohossen, or twitted, or experionoed for its $4b, se wey, the *MA P.O.?. were for theirs. Ile had, therefore, to help not say* previdlas the kind of intensities available to us sad with advice ad dinettes, but had to jump in sad do no mall asouat of 110.4.0.11 work as sell. The disadvestages of this Vidition were olear4 reoognised by the heads et ear Dreash, but the disadvasiages of act doing what we did were equally sad of eossidereble weight. Oa* large result of our generosity was t our *Moors ens eepywhire the respest and good will of the Arey people . sm asset that will stead good stead for Witt the low ram. It meet be said th.t the Iritish 801 its is the 21 A. 0. area bed to do mere field and ordiaary woe work than they "WOW to do. It is, hesewer, s fixed priasiple if pair, with this to avoid suoh operations and they aro pleasing, oder direetioas from Loodon, to turn over most of this to the Prima, Wiles, sad Dutch peewit, services in the near future. Their atm is to get fres thee* servioss full, reports for their files an all such eases is ',tura fer'sseh Asformatisa and *doles as they pass as. They feel that thsg should sew be giving their thought and energy to realising their Dog range plass emd are doing so. They have concentrated their 801 Omits in Smells. ese or thee* As a fay large mit of **radially doses youeg corniers she were 04104 et in the.haadlAwg of Special Agent oases. Us mats Job et the small loiat ?mob kr item in London would sees as to bey* bees demos At sea sad probably will *outlaw for a bit to serve the Josiah British, Amerioan, and PrenobsLewlands operations in the field, but the several Weeks within it will doUbtless some more and more to serve the le operations of the erreeal, or the interested governments. ass important value of the War Soots has beat its use as a laboratory ter thaw plasm'', the Oerwea lir hoist the weaknesses in the present eet-up sad its imadelsasies for getting a f- satisfeetory job done Mee booms very. ilearly *epeeist as the weeks by. The remedies for these that we bad to imprevise mad revise as we went along son now be inoorporeted in fairly ? SECHE Dnipase 2013/09/27 1 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 AR ""A Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 1/413001frO". Pat w thIllik stfective work to get itself MN Ms thealrg:=6. Ifs vats failure of the Or NW 4m, 60000,1*$ to reports of tritish Wises's, lbs it seted is was %regime% it OS gisSms,mid 11112?Mag to offiooro is the fist& It bissobeweverelbees meted abaci-hi-that Leads* *as the Volta Office tel ttairtileratiess esd their Lomas people kept a fit* bead os their visite IS es OM, people, es tbe other hood, were inolised to get thiags dose eat to toll is about VIOS atiffara - oallimg is the seastiee for every possible is C* !WI* errespobrak was based os two importent considerations I sirwiee Wad give os IW the tss% that Weiss lad is WWI sad III regietries sad in the files of west Wiest swarees,? sass of detailed intonigoomo that *oat not be avoilable te ettieers is the fie* sad tie the feat that it tad oleo e pool - is MIS \ isils espesiellyMISS - et istelligesee Wise's oho hod loos sad fell exptriesce it 1010111110101110111 is the fleld. Os the 'hole the Americo* ?Moors etc had lad smikieufersem... -that with the visits ester L-por ...seri, themselves in pude est tath the armies. the relattvelr great American case officer's in LemAssisere see likely to have midi of value to Wigf to the people in the field sodium, set likaly tabs tistesai to whoa they did. Our Loudon pelople did, Mesmer, liars the )ch of processing the saterial available in 'Audi,* sad of esereletimg it with messages sod reports fro* the Croat and did a potato Sob Of prewillmg istormatiss that peeved valuably as a ti Ibis servioe vas often of t spertamoo. asailll' ag that tweed out to be most useful. 0I% is Mews is Ils=tes, ef oourse, that the oriticises of the * Or Triad' Ines wet is so part, the resat of the log 'tome between Ilio Trawl' tor Swaim*ossomisod woldwe the symptom, of NIG - Wash U is shag* et assert* outside the U. I. owl to custodian of Circle informatioa. OS saint. Os the etherbode the SO aegistry le the rioheet sad most useftl in loglaid ea vour.10/ et Vrio iss ?Mews here bsiro boss trsis?ii by 1110* It to true that Mai of the WOW/ motoriol toot to the field Ime be prepared by 11111, es sio ell ONION Worts. VIS is, %Wrote's, swims to team a greeter share . ts the Weir sperstiess, Nemo, they hellfire thet 0.00 they balm boos oaa- traveling so heavily is Ohet las tees dams, tbor (mto have a proper share it tea sad of wastrel is the lowlier Roes. Visa diswassiess of these setts& aro sow going forisrd is London sod repasts as Magee WO sad desisioss soopoottos the Dermas Illar loos will 00014 eselidae WO. Wog as our Imputes to MU aro, us gill do4btless tied ea alljoir to tiost so volottoto betimes omothing 1110 a joist SO - 1nS -- is Or Wigs INoi Soo* - sot ors17 poostiao tut savostroovo. Ito SO Or r000rd boo *Pm Ito013141041. & Watt Use sober ot Z.11 Winer. bairo bad traipsing Meer 0. 04? Ws UM/ oar vativiri is We a htet adietriktios set asy tel their Milt as isibuLltissee ? tut SO SOS or trot lenerellitel ea taros* Jioholeks?omihket+., ? ? 01" , --Aer -7. SECK *xe.,-,-eA;r-ek.r.gtwEtta? okdow4T-4w:4.*-474-tit,Vit "- "rre'04 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? ? ? .1???? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? NAMOUTIVI4 N. Hettheim 11, fe? N*fhosio js Mortimer: AS ja tOZ Tit e it # Ildwor fel WI 141,11 _ ji0hf, Os W1141074- -- , ? v. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON. 0. C. Acting Chief, SI Field Report by Jameo M. Henry with Ooomento by Major DIoncen 0. tee Attached Is Field Report of JameN M. Ownry, June 300 1944 - January 22, 1945, with oommonto thereon by MAjor DtrnQI a, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 S , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 , , OFFICE OF STRATUM SERVICES WASHINGTON D. Cts 18 April 194, TOs Ohi.f, 81 PiIOIs ?Mr bet Divieion, 81 SWIM' tiladlik11921.,Ligt.whismILAIRCI 1. Dr. Henry's field report dated 16 April is forworded herewith. It im believed that you will find this rmport unuouslly latereetinei Beetione 511 6, 8 and 9 will be of intorest to mll eranehos and to mil OPS personnel preoesding to Chine. Smetion 8 will be of partieuler intermmt to MO, 2. There are attached herewith for your signmture note. of transmittal savoring oopiem of thim report to be sent to the Direetor end to the Chief of MO, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 k ?FMCS OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. Report of Teohnioal Representative Jaws M. Henry June 343, 1944 - January 22, 1945 Resume of work. Central Government and General Political Situation. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ,47 -2 Aloft, 1. Itugo. Left Miami June 30, 19441 and arrived in Kunming July 17th, was finally assigned to AGFRTS and August 22nd went to Kweilin. From there I was aseigned to Detachment 6 in Kwangtung. Reach KuKong Septouber 1st. Helped organise and run radio school for selected men from 7th and 9th War Zones. From end of October until I left January 22nd, 1945, was in charge of the liaison with the 7th War Zone Headquarters. And also one (AI) operating in Hongkong and reporting to Capt. Lynn at Detaohment 6 HQ in Hing Ming. 2. ThiadainkfistrimmtlasUngitil Political Situation. From talks with some of the political loaders, including Sun Fo, Wu Te-chen, Madame Sun Tat Son, Kan Naikwong, former Kwang-et war-lord Li Chai-Sam, bankers, merchants, professors, the whole civil and military group in Zwang-tung, I received the distinct impression that the popularity and prestige of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in 1945 was less than in 1944, and that vis-a-vis his own political entourage he was weaker. Sun Fo seems to be generally regarded as an ardent advocate for drastic reforms within the Kuomintang. In conversation with me he was emphatic as to the necessity of coming to terms with the Communists. He seemed worried over the results in case nothing was done. He believes Russia will enter the war. There is continual political maneuvering between the Central Government and the various provinces. A definite struggle is now on in Yunnan. Former Minister of War Ho Ying-yin now holds an important Central Government post in that province and is definitely trying to undermine the power of Governor Lung. Generally, the Chinese regard the present Chungking trend as fascist. Freedom of movement, and of speech, is certainly in many quarters being interfered with. Practically every intelligent Chinese with whom I talked, outside of purely government or military ciroles, was pessimistic as to post war China, envisaging a prolonged period of internal strug- gle. 1 3. &month !far Zpiag. This takeji in the Kwangtung Province. The Commander-in-Chiefa, Yu Han Mao L 3 star general of whom there are eighteen in Chink,/ is the man primarily responsible for swinging the Kwang-tung Provinoe into line with the Central Government in 1936. General Yu and his group are very friendly with General Hsiao-Yu, Commander-in-Chief of the Ninth War Zone, which takes in Hunan and the Southwest Section of Kiang-si. The troops in this war sone are to a large extent Cantons's*, Gen. Asia? being ? native .of the Kwang-tung Province. k Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Both the 7th and 9th War Zones are very bitter over the Changsha and Hengyang defeats which they attribute to the mishandling of the defense by Chungking. Some go so far as to claim that this was deliberate and that the loss of Cantonese troops, estimated at 100,000 was part of a settled policy to weaken the war strength of those two peripheral sones. The comparative lack of resistance to the recent enemy drive in lamas and Kwangtung, is in part at least due to the present weakness of these two war sones. It may also be in part due to the desire to husband their strength for the final struggle with the japans's. The Seventh War Zone appears to have some excellent men on its general staff. The second in command, General Chiang Kwong Nail was formerly number two in the famous 19th Route Army, and is also a three star general the dosen or so two star generals, one comes from the Virginia 1..,..LItary Institute, one from Stanford, and one was trained in Prance. One is the highest ranking Chinese General to have studied in Bawer, India. The Colonel of a special training regiment is himself English trained, ? graduate of Woolwich. To a man they are all pro-American and can be relied upon for active co-operation and valuable assistance, should opportunity or occasion arise. 4. This haA been headed since 1939 by a General Left Han-wen Two star general/ who had a considerable military reputation some years ago. This man while pro-American is surrounded by a number of poor assistants, of whom some are considered as very corrupt. A goodcmany financial scandals are attributed to his regime. He is very ambitious and his underlings and the 7th War Zone underlings have created a very unco-operative situation as between the civil and military authorities. Governor Lee's strength derives from his friendship with the Chen brothers in Chungking. Many unsuc- oesisful efforts have been made to unseat him. The writes has had many conferences with him and credits hist with being sinoorely anxious and really prepared to co-operate with American toms if and as an oppertunity arises. Should there be a landing in the Kwangtung area by American troops, there will be 100% cordial co-operation upon the part of the Civil Government as well as of the Military Government. 5. jimmals. Thepe are innumerable and everywhere. Presumably the various Chinese secret services know many of them, but the greater number are not known. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Our airfields are policed by Chinese soldiers. The Hostels are staffed by Chinese. Undoubtedly a percentage, particularly of the soldiers, are saw agents. Tha writer would seriously urge that even greater measures of eeeurity be taken is respect to both these classes than seem to be takes. Boot-blacks, newsboys, professional people, attractive young moues, have all figured in "spy arrests' from time to time. In each large city there is a big list of suspects, many of whom, of course, are innocent. There can be little doubt, however, that every section of 4,00140ty in "free China" is eaturated with enemy agents. . Poverty is perhaps the greatest cause for these. Resentment over previous unfair treatment is another cause. Thimeroenary motive is another and impoOtant factor. In the writer's opinioa there are no pro-Japanese Chinese. The mem agents probably hate the Japanese worse than anyone else, and moue of these are pro-Japanese, unless it be that group concern- ing whose existenoe the Chinese are most insistent, a group of real Chinese adopted in their childhood by japanese and educated for this purpose. 6. Anulgia niers Mho Have to WI. Qxt in Occqpied_Territory. I have had some experienoe receiving these men from the guerrillas the brought them in and have talked with others. I have discussed this with 058 authorities in Kunming and with the appropriate or- ganisation for dealing with this question. I feel I should stress the importance of making sure that the guerrillas or farmers, or troops, eho resew our Mem should never be in the least out of pocket. When rewards as high as $1,000,300.00 Chinese currency are offered by the Japanese, it seems to no it should be our duty to make sure that all OM men at leamt, should be instructed that there should be no withholding or hesitanoy upon their part if any ocoasion should arise when some payment or reimbursement in this connection should seem either necessary or desirable. I do not know how to emphasise this as much es it should be emphasised. I have heard the statement mode that 95% of our men who have had to bail out behind the lines have been rescued. I have also heard the statement that ? large percentage of these rescued have beim in AGMS areas and have in this last analysis passed through A07128 beads. If so, then it should be all the more important that oar people should have specific instructions in this matter. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 7. 16.24.6*. P*om conversation with people who have come out of attempted South China, workmen, business men and guerrillas, it is evident that in this section of China at least the Japanese soldier la ? tired and pessimistio person. In spite of widespread reports of better treatment of the people, one gets the same story. Billeted Nadler* prefer to burn furniture to firewood and consistently defile the houses whoa they are billeted ia preference to going outside to the toilet. They are consistent in "paying" for what they use, on the basis of 5 or 10 oents - to the dollar. They reproach the people for feeding the* fUlse news, indloating that they have a very fair idea as ,to what is happening and after leaving a plea., walls and blackboards when they happen to remain, are covered with pessimistic writing* indicating that for the soldiers the future holds nothing but death and umhappinens. The situation would seen to be ready for a big increase of MO work. 8. ussugAiazi plia. The greatest care should be exorcised in the oholoe of personnel for the China Theater. Certainly no one with race prejudice, and no one conscious3y oototemptuous of the Chinese, should be sent out. In view of the evident inorease in MO and Commando work, it would be of great value if a few more mature men of the right attitude and qualificatione, who know China particularly who might happen to 'peek Chinese, were added to the 04S groups in China. Such men, if nothing else, could serve as advisors, ae liaison men between our Commando SO, and MO groups. The better the co-ordination and mutual understanding the more successful will be the resultant work. 9. . . A war is being fought. Men are in a foreign country, often poorly fed, uncomfortably quartered, deprived of companionship of their kind, and out off from normal diversion, often storm; for reedine matter. Drink and women are the common and perhaps natural reoouree under such oircumstances. Moderation in the one and discretion and commen-seuse in the other, will win commendation from the looal people. Intemperance will only win thorough contempt, While flouting 311160the conventions has brought on definite dislike and indignation in many 11. OBS being what it is, and particularly OSA in China being in a manner tied up with the Tel Lee organisation - a 'caret service organisatiem with an incredibly large force and the ability and deter- mtmation to kw, everything about OSS and its members - should litres' with all its members the importance of each memberoa behavior and comportment in China. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Chairman or the Moportimg Board, SI, and Mr. D. DeSardeleben, Chief, Southeast Swope Section, SI. ?t IS 3.3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 :Sseeutive Offioor, Sr DATE: April 18, 1945 D. DeDardeleben Concerning the subjects discussed in the several paragraphs of Kr. Nu1ley's report on the activities of the Yugoslav desk, I offer the' following comments, Paragraph Is Reports previously received from informed observers Indio& Chat the supply of 8/ personnel in Yugoslavia has been, on the whole, unsatisfactory. I am not prepared to state the reasons for this state of affairs, but I do feel that it is most unfortunate because supply is a most essential requirement of our activities there. I do not know what section in Caserta or Bari was directly oharged with the supply of activities in Yugoslavia. I do know that Colnnel Glavin arranged his staff a000rding to the usual four-section design with section four charged generally with supply. It is reason- able to presume that the supply section was responsible for over all supply in Yugoslavia. However, it seems illogical to me to hold the Yugoslav Desk, SI. entirely unaccountable for the supply and equipment of personnel working under its diroction in Yugoslavia. It just does not seen posnible to me that a desk head, aware of conditions described in such general terms as those used by Mr. Hulley would be unable to do something about a situation so injurious to our operations. If the Yugoslav Desk was dissatisfied with the state of supply, and upon investigation had specific oritioimms and protests to make, cer- tainly sosewhere alonr the line between that desk and the Strategic Services Officer sr410.,i,-, wuld e lone to remedy the situation. However, if it covld vat two ,.9?noollinhed In field, then it seems to me that the Ittigue 'ii. thc protwrlbed ohennels, Chief SI, Stretegie 8erwric.,,3 E-Tflter, wtmld te %;(? present the facts to the Chief :opHngton, aud tho DL' c? for apprnpriate corrective action. Or Oltole, t oma to onitroly ilicAppropri$Ite that an individual ag.*-iled to f56 flas1(, oharreAt wit,!t II adminintegtion in a certain area, should oriti4ii,a4 an avtivity so vital aa oupply and disclaim all disoredit for tiLm unmatisfaotory and inexcusable conditions reported upon. Paragra h 2$ When an independent United States intelligence system was established in Yugoslavia, it was well known by those concerned that the activities or this system would frequently duplicate the efforts of our British anies. However, this duplication was considered of no great importance compared to the profit to be derived from receipt of information provided by our awn people over our awn oommunioations and to our own interested agencies. It is true 'hat because of certain ? ?-??,110*.44ilk-railLA.41Mi4-1?104.irolgUM)azriatgl rifthuovI2 S. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? ? 44, ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5 ? ? 2