OSS - FIELD REPORTING, 1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 22, 1945
• Content Type: MISC

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, pogo throe eehaofor field report to oh/of
?hi operotion ofitO promir? no z obsiorvid it? losad haft
boon store ouoolresful had' tOere been a oftion iissOro
botweea Washington *ad Zondon on matIsre of palter oisd
leadership' MUth of Ude 90000010 of rwD som so tr000d to tit*
efforts of trOstin? arlir Ap4 oivillan? who probabAr_vosad hate
boon pastod had the, aot nave boom oontributod to aNproas
Roodquartors" I an afraid the MO blush In Undo. would
hare failed in Ito purpose had it not had the Poyeholagiaal
Worfaro Division to loan on"
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page to echAefer field report to chief 1114
wau arranged.
?Aar
10. With my opposite number, a British major, plammied
German oombat and occupational operations insofar as use of
films for propaganda and education were concerned. It was
originally planned that I would join combat team of 12th Army
as Film Officer; later it was decided I should go direct to
Berlin upon fall of the city.
11. When it appeared to ma that Berlin would not be taken
for six or more months, oinked MO in London whether I could take
my leave back in the United States and so visit my wife end child*
This wall arranged.
12. Arrived in Wanhington 27 November 1944 and was, given
choice of returning to the TO, going to the CBI or teaching MO
at WA for Ochoole and Training Branch. I chose the instruction
assignment.
13? Colonel Robinson approved on 4 December to my joining
S&T, which would necessitate my being transfered from MO. The
following day I checked out of Washington.
14, Reported 2 January 1945, at completion of my leave,
to Newport Beaob, California, for transport to WA.
15. GeneTal Observations;
a) Of the British and Americans who passed
through ND, those from MO owe best trollied,
those from OWI worst. The OWI Huntington
School appeared to have been more of a country
club than training center and/or tbs OWI was
sloppy in its recruiting*
b) "S? reports were not available and MO was
unwilling, rightly or wrongly, to send poreonmi
to No. 4 WO OM for screening; consequently, MO
nen were not always considered for ke:/- Jobs by
many PWD section heads.
c) The ion training program wasp general4 lees
offecti44 than the MO beeause the Iriti3h and
Americans could not (Uwe agree on p01147,
majority of instruotors mere uninspired DrittOk
?Moors, the training was too gemeral in matare.
4) More training in white techniques might have
been given MO personnel who, in looadam, tommd
themselves assigned to work in white *Wes wait
six or seven weeks atter D Mny for the bleak
directive to coma through. -mum
1Conclusion to Yield Report( I wish to go 46 r?witico
pleased helve had the opportunity or reprosentift MD in sem
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24 AnserY 1945
OUBIEOTs European Theatre of Operations Field Report
TO1 Colonel Kenneth Mann, Chief Morals Operations
Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Washing-
ton, D. O.
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L. Following recruiting by Lt. (s.j.) :ohm Reinhardt
and signing by Bdward Cushing, on 2 February 1944, reported
to OS Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 10 March 1944. It.
twain dates was confined under physician's oars, coffering
attack of serum poisoning.
2. Attended "S" 14-15 March. Trained for Mew York
17th, Oiled for ZTO 20th, arrived in Scotland 28tk, reperted
to MD Office in London 29th,
3. While awaiting definite assignment developed NW
wrote "black" newspaper aimed at foreign slave workers In
Germany. Also produoed rumors and submitted several postai
and radio project ideas.
4. Attended the two week Mrondesbury Training Sehieeii'
operated by the Psychological Warfare Division of Supremo
Headquartere Allied ExpeditiOnary Pores.
5, Asked for and received aesi4nment to FiliDiSMARF. I
could see that this would be the successful operation in plop,
chological warfare.
6, Slotted by PWD to the Training Section. As senior
training officer I was associated closely with NO. 4 War Of
Selootion Board, which was the PWD equivalynt of "W. At the
area, Where I spent much of my time, I officially represented
WASP and unofficially the United States Army. With the an*
caption of myself the staff of No. 4 WM was British.
7. Additionally served in the administration of *hi
other PWD training oenterst Olevedon, field schwa Um**
near Bristol; Brondesburyp basic lectorce,leafLetaiopiniav
prisoner interrigation schoel near London Ruth-teat walk
located in the Midlands; the Garden, Oman prisoner oVIOW,0001.
near London. ,
S. Following liberation of Praise*, by "bleb tilms.41. 1
deputy ohief of training, it was decided to close the Irsi
Section until such time as policy toward occupied Situniar
-) defined.
' 9. The Yiln Section of PW36SRAW requested I
,that unit in view Of my-notion picture backgromadw
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111TANIMM. 100.414 HO. 114
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVE NMENT
TO
PttOM
SU NMI's
Director
Secretariat
Field Report from Carl Schaefer
DATR: 16 Februdry 1945
I. Attached iH a report from Mr. Carl Schaefer, who
served with MO/ETO and was assigned to the PWD training
Section. Mr. Shaefer makes the following general observa-
tions:
a. PWD training program was less effective than the MO
because of disagreements on policy matters between the
British and Americans and rather uninspired caliber of
the British officers engaged in this training.
b. Because MO was unwilling to allow its personnel to
be screened by PWD and the reports were unavailable,
MO personnel were not always considered for key Jobs by
many PWD section heads.
c. MO operations would have been considerably more
effective had there been a common understanding between
London and Washington on matters of policy and leadership.
Attachment
e0.3
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer
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life at the base was unoomfortable and monotoaous. Many fasilitiee
were looking and the conditions of secrut operation in a neutral
country made even a simple haerioan sort of op impossible. hair
and Cairo undoubtedly failed at times to do all they should have
done for Boston. It is the writer's opinion that the diseostemt wee
due portly to weariness and boredom, partly to /sparest'. and Lew
maturity in eons of the offioore of the beim. (There were se eon.
plaints from the oommander of Key West, who performed single-handed
a more diffioult and trying task than any of the mon at 'oaten.)
When there was a shortage of supplies, the writer tried ooasistontly
to oarry out the polioy of favoring the most forward unit -- miesious
taking precedence over base and base over headquarters -- irreepeetive
of the nationality of personnel, provided only that base and head-
quarters wore not stripped to the point of helplessness. It was
argued by others that this was an Amerioan operation and that, there-
fore, Amerloan personnel should rooeive first onasideration in all
oases. The Chief of OBS Middle Bast supported the latter argumomt.
After the ?losing of the Turkish bases, therefore, the writer, feel-
ing that he was not well qualified to Garry out the polisy laid down
by his oommanding officer, requested transfer to another theater.
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for look of proper training wog the at.. The writer hem
recently seen that great ohnngee have been made in the traimies
programs mine* 10414 and essumes that the defieioneiee are betas
mado up, but cannot emphasise too strongly the seed of eensontra.
tion on this aspect of preparation, tor both spate and 'tett ottleers,
5* ti.a1114"14/"...inti.hillf1ll
Notes Most ef the diffieulties encountered by the writer have
been olassified or set down as examples in the preceding empties, and
need not be repeated.
a. Internal discord .
The writer's chief disappointments, dimpouragamiat sad isOliosa.
tion mole not tram the difficulty of opposing the enemy, bat firm
profitless and wasteful antsgonism end ineffieionsies ammo /Mimi,
between Ameriean agencies, and within Oil itself. Periommotily his
owe periods or depression did not last long,and his efforts eerild e.
uelly be directed toward eliminating rather than prolonging the eft-
Mots.
b. 1111t141!!!!!.!!!!?E2114.2 -
rt may be worth recording (without undue emphasis) that as as.
Nippy atmosphere of discontent showed itself oeeasionally at Porten
during the last few months of work at that Immo. Certain Amorloos
members or the staff sampleined of the conditions of life there, it
being given too little eonsideration from Caire and lair, ail for
favoritism being shown to Greek personnel of the nice Iowa.
gave rise to thoughtless aocusetions and grudges. It is true that
C EC RET
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required. As the nature and soope of the Lair operations biome
evident, however, he did devise ? system of bookkeeping and made
the acloounts as detailed as time and eircumstanees allowed. Repeated
requests were made for instructions in this matter, but none were
received until the end of August 1944 when a representative of the
Special Funds Branch came to Ismir to examine this books and explais
the proper system. (For full statement of the case, see letter of
16 August 1944 from Caskey to Blind). errors and inadoquacies in
the financial records could have boon eliminated bys (1) a clear
statement of financial policy and instructions in the form of bock-
keeping that was wanted; (2) sufficient clerical staff to keep the
records and prepare the reports.
f. 1111T1.91.7
A number of officers and other members of the Ismir staff miry
recruited overseas and, having no formal training. MOTIO obliged to
pick up the necessary knowledge from day-to-day experience. Those
who had gone through WS schools in America or Middle Bast had boss
exposed to a good deal of theory on security and methods of under.
?over work, but knew painfully little about military and other teeh-
nical fields of intolligenoe or about the correct organisation and
form of an intelligenoe report. In practice. ammo's sense and nettle
wit proved far more important than special training in the field of
Security. The same qualities were dram upon (wit)t rather sotamiskims
su0000s in some oases) for the main job of reporting. but a very tarp
amount of valuable information goo ovorlookod or isadoquatoly reported
? togif...
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that were impossible to carry out. As a result, unneeessary
friction developed between Cairo end the advanced bases; Izmir
gained an exaggerated reputation for obstructiveness and amok
time and energy were wasted. Those diffieulties mould have been
largely eliminated byl (1) placing caique operation in the Aegean
unconditionally under the command of Izmir from the start; (2)
restraining the branches in Cairo from making plans for that area
without previously consulting Inair; (3) frequent personal confer-
ences between offioers of the forward and rear headquarters.
d. !ma -
Until mid .summer of 1944 the bases were poorly equipped and
supplied. They often lacked it. of basic necessity for their
operations, to say nothing of those that would contribute to the
comfort and well being of the men. This was owing partly to a
general lack of experience and partly to inefficient ordering in
Izmir; but the major responsibility rests with the ordering and
procurement departments in Itiddlo East and with those who failed
to provide adequate transport and to see that the goods moved forward
promptly.
m. Finance -
011?011??????????????????????????
Inair was generally well supplied with funds, the expenditure
of *loh was properly left to the discretion of the offieer in charge.
Pinches were felt only ocoasionally when funds were not delivered en
schedule. The procedure of accounting, however, was not well worked
out. The writer was told before he left Washington that, for reasons
of security, no records of the expenditure of special funds d
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Jurisdiation eommand
As stated in filiation 2. above, the ehief offieer of 048 in
hair VAS held responsible by the Turks for all 048 aativities in
the area, and it was therefore necessary that he be in abeolute
oceimand of all personnel and operatives there. ?or examplti wire.
lose could not be set up or used without the sanction of the antlysti
oaiques on secret miesion oould not touch at unauthorised ports ex-
oept under the cover of the anniviti supplies could not be move4.
nor could mon lend and travel without passports and visas except as
elements of the Imniyet. (Notes An Italian resident of Ismir was
summarily tried and hanged in 1944 beoause ? small wireless trans-
mitter, belonging to someone else, was found buried on his land;
whereas 08$ wireless, arms, explosives, etc., were handled with sem.
siderablo freedom and hundreds of tons of supplies were moved with-
out the customs control which was normally imposed even on the
British secret servioes.) Under these conditions, the independent
direction of oommunioations men, maritime operations, 80, SI. etc.,
by different branch heads in Cairo was an unthinkable anomaly. And
yet the various branches, being responsible each for its own type
V.:4V2r,
of operation and feeling an understandable jealousy of its owls
activitie9, often initiated actions which could not be reeoncile4
with the realities of the situation. This was particularly true
with various officers of MU, who, apparently with little knowledge
of the ways of oalques and their crews, or of Aegean weather as it
*treats mall craft, or of the immediate requirements governing our
operations from day to day, frequently made plans and gave orders
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and obliged to spend most of their time at (Aortae' jobs Pur whish
they had not been trained. The ?Moe never had a secretary1 though
requeots were repeatedly made for one. from June 1943. This secretary
should have been an intelligent. reliable American (man or woman)
knowing typing, stenography and riling. A full-time ?ode clerk was
needed from the fall of 1943; he arrived at the end of June 1044;
up to that time, the work was shared waong the officers of the staff
or done by ? highly trained wireless technician who was thus kept
from his own tasks. From the beginning of 1944 onward the dutinl
of cashier and bookkeeper became increasingly burdensome and ?ampler;
they were performed first by the writer and later by one of his un-
fortunate assistnnts who could have used her time more profitably
in other work. Security investigations could not be oonduoted as
thoroughly as was desired and r000rds were never adequately main-
tained. Thio was a part-time job, calling for a man of good Gammen
sense rather than speoialised training. A sound knowledge of Creek
would have been espeoially valuable in his case, though not essential.
In tact the writer would gladly have undertaken to train an able
and willing NCO in financial and security duties, continuing thereafter
to supervise and be responsible for the ponduot of both. Finally,
the function of Supply Officer, most important and emoting, was
never quite satisfactorily performed. It was undertaken by various
men, in turn and In eombination. One ?Moor, familiar with orderiago
handling, and shipping supplies, and with keeping inventory. would
have added greatly to the efficiency of the organisation.
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4. Congtions whioh mi ht be isTrowed,
Motel Si,, the operation under disoussion has boom terminated,
no ?hang's in it oan now be "ado. The following remark' eau,
therefore, be of interest ooly as guides in other familiar enterprises,
present or future. The writer would *leo st,Ite that he is fully
*were of the extreme diffioulty of meeting oven the basis requirement'
ln mon and supplies, as well as orgeniastion? of an operation so coo*
pies and dolionto as that oonduoted in Izmir.
a.
Staff . (moral ualifiostions
In an operation dependent, like ours, on the aervioes of Weeks,
it is important that many of the staff should haw, at least a seek-
ing knowledge of the language, and almost indispensable that thine
should home some familiarity with the Greek *harm:liter and mentality.
Working, furthermore, in noutreci Turkey, and being dependent en the
good will of the Turks, it was most desirable that the staff should
know smoothing of that oountry too, and be able to behave with tel-
erano. and taot in order to avoid friotion and to mmiain ineoespisuous.
Moat of the members of the limjt. staff who had not lived in the liemr
last before mode up in good humor for what they leaked in exporiemne.
A few, however, allowed their immature judgment to be warped by ig-
norance and personal projudio,. to the detriment of the operation'
in hand and to the danger of security.
b. Staff s ?iris needs -
The limir base woe undermanned. As a restrlt, *everal offioers
wore drawn from the intelligenoe work for which they wore qualified
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Greek Section (all branches) could be forwarded, maintained,
and kept in contact with Cairo. In addition, ce,-taia separate
operations were sueoessfully carried auto during the eraouation
of Samos (17-20 November 194S) OBS oaiques brought out British
troops, Greek troops and civilians, and several hundro4 Italians
of the hapless Ounce Division (letters of oammendation tram Major
General A. C. Arnold, British )4.A., and General Sir Nary "ilea*);
Lt. Savage of the Izmir staff won the Silver Star and Purple nowt
for his part in the notion in ilmaos, the escape of ? Gorman woman,
who had been secretly working for the American Mmbassy and had
fallen under suspicion of the Germans and was sought by the S.D.,
was successfully engineered by OBS Izmir, somewhat to the surprise
and greatly to the satisfaction of Brigadier General Tindall
American Military Attache in Ankara (see report of ?penal*s gleney-
moon"); numerous smaller day.to.day services, such as transporting
men and equipment, relaying messages over our network, and supplying
information, wore performed for Amerioan, British, Greek. and Turkish
agencies when occasion permitted. The writer was partioularly trat-
Mod that genuine friendly cooperation, based on mutual confidence
and respect, was developed (sometimes in the fact of considerable
opposition and prejudice) with the Stat. Department and O.:, Dritish
military and secret services, and Turkish intelligonoo? At the
closing of the Izmir base in Noveaber 1944, several Amorioan and
British officers of AML and of the Pritish operational command in
the Aegean (Pore. 142) expressed genuine regret that our services and
facilities would no longer be available.
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Most of the missions put into Greece were prepared and
trained in Middle Rest. Ismir was ooeasionally able to help
in the recruiting of ageivts by spotting promising candidates
as they first come out of Greeoe and directing than to WS
Cairo. Several agents, wireless operators, and guides were
recruited looally or brought specially from Greece, and were
trained by the Izmir staff and attached to missions going in.
A few missions notably those to the Samos area and the
Dodekanese, were formed, trained and entirely directed by
(Se. histories of tassione itmerald, Dago and Lucian.)
Refugees, enemy deserters and special agents coming to
Ismir from Greece were interviewed by OBS offioers whenever it
was possible. Most of this work fell to Miss Cox. the Rsports
Offioers who was able from these sources to add an tmportant
body of supplementary intelligence to the regular reports or
our own agents. The writer was prevented by his administrative
duties from engaging personally in much of this work, but enjoyed
a few opportunities of interrogeting mnd of preparing roperts,
The major aohievement of the lair staff was the su000ssful
founding and operating of bases through which the missions of the
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II. Missions
Most of the missions put into Greece were prepared and
trained in Middle Mast. Ismir was oecasionally able to help
in the recruiting of agents by spotting promising candidates
cm they first came out of Grimm) and direating them to OSS
Cairo. Several agents, wireless operators. and guides were
recruited looally or brought specially from Oreeca, and were
trained by the Ismir staff and attached to missions going in.
A few missions. notably the.. to the Samos area and the
Dodokanese. were formed, trained and entirely directed by
Izmir. (See histories of tnissions Imerald. Dago and Lucian.)
g. te!!O&fttion and -
Refugees. enemy deserters. and special agents coming to
Izmir from Greece were interviewed by OSS offiocors whenever it
was possible. Most of this work fell to Miss Cox. the Reports
Officer, who was able from these sources to add an important
body of supplementary intelligino? to the regular reports of
our own agents. The writer was prevented by his administrative
duties from engaging personally in much of this work, but enjoyed
a few opportunities of interrogating and of preparing reports,
espeoially on military subjects.
h. Achievements -
The major achievement of the Ismir staff was the suecossful
founding and operating of base. through which the missions of the
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there ware only 6 to 10 arrivals and sailing* per month at Key
West. In 5aptember 1944. 39 were raoordad at Beaton and 65
at Key ftst.
d. 3uppzing of bases and field -
Ono of the chief responsibilities of the Ismir bass was
supplying food, clothing, and special aquipment to missions in
the Mold. Most of these materials were procured in Middle
Bast and sent by ea* to Key West aid Boston whars they were
trans-shipped into mall caiques for dolivary to the field.
Tha supply rout. from Alexandria and Cyprus was not properly
eotablished, howovar, until the summar of 1944, and before that
the Izmir staff was obliged to buy many items loeally, both for
the equipmant of th:J- bases and for sacrat (and illegal) export
to tho field.
Wireless .
????0111?11....1111111106.111111?14?11.1
Wireless stations were set up in Izmir. Key 14st. and $amos
In Auguat-Saptember 1943 and at Boston in January 1944. Contact
was maintained among the bases and with Oalre. Cyprus and Istanbul.
Latsr, as the nacessary ommunications staff and proper aquipment
was supplied, contacts were *ado and maintained on an increasing
scale with agents in oonupied territory and even with our own
claques at sea. At the and of August 1944 a maall broadcasting
station was sot up at Boston for tha use of 110 in addressing
subversive propaganda to enemy forces in Greece.
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ordors to his reprosontative in 'sla.1r te furnish the neeessary
aosistanoe and oovor for the operatioeo. The Sritish servieoo
holpsd with advlee and pooaoloaally with **sea and supplies, et
first hesitantly and with signs of joalbuoy. but later nith a
spirit of good will end sooperatiem,nhem their raspeet end 000p-
oration had boon woe.
b. Ks Wost Samos Boston -
The firmt OBS base. "ray Wilt" was assignod in Aso 1114S at
a small port fifty miloo south of rear. Owing to look of salvoes
and supplies, howipver. it did not basin to fUnotioa Natal September.
1m that month, immediately after the surrender ef .444. ? subeldimry
balsa was set up in Samos. Atter the 'vacation of that island by
the Allies (17 Novembor 1943), oonaidarations of eeourity sad of...
fimiamoy demanded tho ?polling of an altogother *ow balm. whioh was
dono at "Boston", mono forty Idles north of 'emiin Deeme.ber 1941.
Boston was gradually developed into an motive *altar of operations
and the more taportabt 'eft dispat?hod from their*. though
Key West was always eaintainod as a valuablo seeondary bee* sod pert
of amll.
S . Growth of oal ue fleet -
A float of oaiquos was built up ()lowly *ad pataftilly.
first oraft war* acquired in Soptember 1$43, others were taken et
in Samos in Ootobar and November; but it was net until the smear
of 1944 that adaquato weasels wore provided from Cyprus and theist',
rebuilding and rofitting at Boston. In the fW11 sad Water of' 1,444
de
44. it. 4-4;014,-..c. 41; ? .0:5
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h. Supply;
Proourement and forwarding to the field.
Maintaining r000rds.
I. Finanoio
Paymont of bbaffer,.
Forwarding gold to the field.
Maintaining reoords40.
3. Frogrloss and Aohiovemonts;
a. Foundiv...?3.61.Ladairt, asaistanc? of %irks and British
Nverything aooampliahod by the writor and his staff in !air
constituted programs. sine* no previous work had boon Ilan. there
by OBS, (Wise Dorothy U. Oox, who arrivad in January 1043, mad.
valuable observations and ?outsets during hors first row months in
Lair, but was preventod from jotting on with tho main job by leek
of directions, authorSty, supplios, and means of aemmuniaationj
The writoros assignmeint wan to put agents into soompled Orme*, sad
to get their risports out. %view the amaditions prevailing, %ha
boot mama was a limit or oalquas working from the Turkish *oast.
such as the British Bervioes had alroady boon aperating for ammo
oightoon months. Buoh a oaiquo sorrice Gould not exist without
the approval, assistance, and protaotion of tho TUrkish warmest.
Appreaeh ens therefor. mad* through tha Chief of TBLD Istaahul, to
the Chief or Oeneral Staff Intolligoneo (a sorvioe kayos as the
Maniyst, somprising seourity and moorot pollee tuaetieso) is takara?
This ?Moor gave paranoias and approval or the prajeat sad oast
4
SECR
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Greek Consulat? Goneral Isnir
()rook a ?11 gene* Ssrrloe. amir
Italian Intolliganc., Sorvioe.
Turkish General Staff Intelligone? (Mani t) Ismir
(Chief oontaots und?rlinod)
b.. Maritime operations.
Founding*, direoting* and maintaining calque bases
("Key West", Samos, "Boston").
Acquiring*. equipping and directing* caiqu? float
and personnol*
Maintaining reoords*.
c. Intalligence.
Roceiving and forwarding &vont@ and forwarding
thoir roports (by mail ad wireless)*.
Rooruiting and training agents.
Intorrogation and reporting.
r.
NI Mt
t? ,
-...il ?
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Forwarding &lesions, supplies and roports.
Forwarding missions. supplias and reporte?,, Providing
facilities for secret broadcasting statics.
Labor Doak'
Forwarding mission and roports.
Communications"
Eetablishing wireless stations at 'noir and the
operational bases**
Providing signal plans and ciphors*.
Ciphoring*.
Maintaining reoorde.
1,e7-
- .1:Vr,tztt,
. _
`372.1o?y?motilbomt.3???,"
4$ . ,
?,-
. ? :?/?:: ? r 12..7 .1,4
et
2,
it ?
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444-5.)
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
w
thot pountry and Croat eperetione of penotratime. Me wee origimally
aootgned to the Of tirenoh, mad inteliigenee wee almmye she major
oonoern or the Imoir bone. Out Isar developed ehiefly MI so *perm.
tionel ?enter obteining end operating afleet of magmas, reeeiv.
log
an forwarding men, doomments and ounplies, to and from Greece
and the Middle Meet' serving IX, 010, MO and the Lehor Desk Misston'.
and employing the fooilities of those drannhes se well 411 WV owed
Commuoioottone. Owing to look of staff for these dntiee, and te
our position vie.e.vis Turkish amend nor N1'4.114010. whit*
m0ognis.4 only one ()Moor 40 responsible for 00d eetivity in the
area, the writer was de tnoto salamander of ell brawl**s ond woo
obliged: to mange many or the eetivities himself. (Ne won effietally
appointed reprosentetive of MU in Moly: 10441 A written order emnt1ma.
in hie position as ohior of Win lamtr was not publieked until
September 1044). Duties performed in whole or in port, by the
writer (marked *) and those carried out under his direet supervision
were the following#
Liaison* 'WWII
111 Department of State (10ebessy. Ankara; Consulate Iamir)
US Military Attoohoo, Ankara, an Aosistailirrail6rm"im
itit41010!_k_Inoir -
UWi Owl, 0 Istanbul, and ropreeantativee
Jetanbul
ON PIA, Ankara
Oritish TOLD lair
Oritish ,omir
gritisk rrrrrkFar
lair
giritish Army Omilmo t Immir
Oritish *$ (10 jtlimar
rt-19:1[,
4.41"/'.. 4r4ak44 162 tJ:ch.,,g4iAt'U4
r?e".""rosiereNewesPoiliii
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
L1.4c Q.,
? ''ALVibeZO;
_
?
SIMANPAII0 IOWA NO, 04
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO Chief, SI DATL jamU, 1044
John L. Caskey, Major ADS, Greek Beek, 82 %repeat Sestina
Report on Field Conditions -- 068 Izmir
PROM
SUNRCT;
Notes The following report deals with conditions in the Ir
arek from early in 1943 to the end of Novuobor 1944, the period
during whisk penetration of 000upied Orem,* was serried omt by
086 from and through the Isnir beim. This partionlar operation
was closed with the writer's departure from Turkey. Legal eon.
ditions and specific problems encountered and methods employed
are. therefore, chiefly of historical interest. Certain general
comments and criticisms, however, may have a wider and .or Ls.
mediate importanoe.
1. Itronolosioal outline of the writer's aetiv14e
20 July 1942
16 August 1942
August-September 1942
October-November 1942
Joined 088
Commisiioned Captain ALI
8/ and $O seheele and trciming
Adjutant to Chief 82 2nrepeen Qoettem
Dec. 1942-January 1943

Preparation for field with Offiee of
Land-Lease Administration
February-March 194$ Travel, Washington to Middle Beet
1-15 April 1943 OBS Cairo
24 April 1943 Arrived Amerieen Inbassys Ankara
May 1943-November 1944 Chief, 088, Isnir
20 November -7 Dee. 1944 Aegean Islands and Athens, *losing
Ismir operations
7.19 December 1944 068 Cairo
19.26 December 1944 Travel ?air...Washington
1. puttees
The writer was recruited to be one of the offieers working
on the periphery of oeoupiod ?rime*, to gather inforootios about
SECRET
21:C4-1214gbfalOOttiOlel* M
knq,?*.05
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
I NDU
Not* on the application of this report
1. Chronolul!al outline of tho writer's aotivitz
2. D__uttee
a. Li4iSOU With various Military and Diplosatie
Branches and Departmentn.
b. Moaltime operations.
0. Intelligence
d. SO
I. MO
f. Labor Desk
g. Communications
h. Supply
Pinanco
Pro rens and Aohievemonts
4. oun ng o r ?ages; assistance of Turks
and British.'
b. Key Wont, ONG011e Boston
c. Growth of claque fleet
d. Supplying of banes and fiold
*. Viridian
f. Missions
g. Interrogation and reporting
h. Achievements
Note
a. staff . general qualifications
b. Staff - special moods
ofh Jurisdiction; oomaand
d. Supply
e. Finance
f. Training
Lleoifio iliffioulties in the fiold
Note
a; Internal disoord
b. Disegreement over policy
4
-
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j
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A
gI4A;
AV2A1
ce Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOV E R NMENT
TO i Chief. SI DATR: January 24. 11148
nom 1 D. Dellardeleben
SUBJRCT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by Major John L. Caskey
10 This report covers an operation which. beginning at
scratch and beset by numerous and sundry difficulties. never-
theless a000nplished a job which made 8/ activities in Grow*
possible.
2. In paragraph 4, page 9, Major Caskey discusses oertain
conditions which might be improvod. In enumerating these son-
ditions, Caskey quite properly places the selection and assign
-
merit of personnel first. I consider his observations sound ..
stressing as they do the necessity for the most careful choice
and utilisation of 81 representatives. While Coskey was great)!
in need of qualified people (sub-paragraph b. page 9) in Turkey,
there were 08fi people in Cairo and elsewhere with no profitable
work to do. It is believed that ths establishment of personnel
officers and their staffs in the variouo theater. will do such
to oorreat such situations and to provide suitable people when,
they are needed.
3. Caskey's oomments on oommand, supply, finance and train-
ing (pages 11. 12 and 13) ape pertinent. Difficulties in these
various functions were due for the most part. I believe, to
inexperience and the necessity for improvising and short Gutting
because of our late start. Corrective measures have been taken
as lessons have boon learned.
? 6$401.-UF 1.01,44 ji.t.4LAU..1,0/46AVU..'"11'4I/10"'
; . F
,
4-41/3.
D. De8.
;I 4011 Mg*IgigtciN
gaZElf-121IINEWArgo,
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"NT
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. 3.
? 71 "--p. 41?-?
? 3
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8.) It in oorthinly truth tiyIt Meh WhO Weht to tLe
t.ho oorly doa wore told thnt for security rtneons flu
r.00rda or tii exnenditure or 5oovt,i1 hinie would he F.-
ouirad. ThiaWbt duo to lila lo(L of ooprefliottoo or
oxt.ht to whloh maoh orponOttur a wo,.10 rob(')i hthi. it )?!id,
to be norreoted in n11 oo0.0, Cortoinl ? (hm 000rhtton of
tho It.,111tr Brine required navern1 tiononntiN.. qevtn, h full
ttmm letnonos ?Moor woul(t have bmen desirnble.
f.) 141Jor Cinekeyie commente on troiolnv baPn re-
p, tad.a ntuober of t imee by oti.mrs who in :d1,1 t do wi
31 operntion In the Hiddim Ehtit. l'robhbly ti.m major
failure in .4.fl trnintng wnn the nomplotm lenit or eltpmhiti uhon
roportinv:. Thie greatly handinapped the work until slow
and varern1 nould bm riven to hCeihte Who by thnt
ttino hod b.coma diffinult of nonsee.
?Oonoornine? ;4ajor Onel:eyso nomment0 In Smetion five of
I. memorandum, ht 13 comments on Ar11,ernal dienord repreeent nothing
new in principle, but t1t nonditiole were parnnpm intensified in
Turhtah area. GonuorninL the i'lisacreement between rajor CfAsksy
ood Golvo on whtters 03" polioy, it in my holtiif tInt rnjnr Chey
Iii mista:en in his int.rprottltion of th, ,Atitudo of Colonel 410.rioh.
The lattarlei Aneistanoe Wht-t In MUO1 Alserioan fiersonnel
,leserved first nonsiderotion ben/twit) tney were Amerinans, hti tnnt
vory Amen concern Whioh tho iiL 8ontion oorfonnal it for
Cho wm1r,ire or GP0606 !int! (:raoL9 p oolta.d tno1.1 to lose eirilt of
the tantu ej,r0 of 0$:.; 000rt,iont!. It Oft hi'mn Iikt nni nion, wLivi:
novo oxprooBod to Co1ono1 Aldvton, thot h. Wan otatkon in reit-1rd t,
1300fflin, 100E1 Of bolonoo on tho' port or t!.0 Gree Section )ler-
simnel. In hny hvfmt it wit, unfortunht6 that ?iieunderet,indinr7s
to erWito n oonaiiton of dianomfor on to, 1)nrt of ANN,nnes base
personnol.
SECRET
It 1'O
I, '7 11_ I 0 lid I, iiiikiZar14_4103,?,.atZ4e243-4I-V-ItZisA
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
m?ta,clsou.
it oxintod. Izmir lihne Vq.P ostablisted ro
forwardine noint or t-e Groe4 Section, S.., and toe t;oLit-tnA,-
ing Ofricor usually reported to loun, Chief hf too_ Greek
Section in ,airo. Wl.en ot-or furctionm wore lonti*d on
some quostion arose in Jairo concorniiv tne capnnelin of
such functl'ins. it urls not until the Sumer of 1944 tnnt
Eajor Cew.coy wen m. do Chief of OSS in Imir nri undor-
stood to be in c!.alye ov all o-oratEons, SI, SO, "O nnA
w le- Lore, oueroted from ti.nt base. Prior tJe
h'd tonrform th.1 function o:ti Domaandor without tne r,.ml
qutoority and '.ercin t_o root o! many of r .0 Aifl-toiltif;
that dovol000d botween hranc:.0s. -ed the or;:qc17t,tion
elerifiod et an e:rlier time t!%ore wo-'d !tette 'ire,: little
question As to the nronriety of branch Js in ,f,iro attefInt-
inr to c)ntrol seoarato oeerations.
Tno relntions with !Lr wre par v difficult for re.sonft
which could not be nvcided under tna circumetnnes. SI ,,ct
perforce established Its own caique service for tfo trrtnn-
portation of itR own teams before toe naritime Unit WhA
actually established. Teo SI oPeration wan daveloned :_ten
woo oad no 1low1e1t:.e of boats or shipsin4-: ft.-d it involveA
many practicos that were doubtless improoer. Tl'ese error
were pointod out wilen tne reritime Unit war entablisheA
al.,ont no ,)ersonnel waft proved t) over tee nLinnini-
wort- and 1.1..e sem() Si officers hod to continue t.:eir functions
:t' or ncw ,tennoment w,%ile at t ene-te time the:' were roe-
oonnElle to SI. T.1is develolod A considerable amount of
friction Wflie:1 could only nave beer evolded by tao esteblish-
ment of a rol tnit w-ic- t2es can: :31e of .andlin,-,
all tne onerntions witrou* tne nacessit:' of c!:11inf.:
uoon untrained ST officers to follow procedures witn whicn
they were totally unfmniller.
NaJor (!askoy's comment trA frecuent nersonnel confer-
ences of tho forwnrd -nd rear neadsuortors would wAre been
dosirable Lc exceedinc,ly apt on should nave beri followed.
Howover, the ol-lortec of ,wrsonocl in Izmir nnd tn. difficul-
ties of transportation in ond out of .1;:do suc.!: con-
forcncer difficult althluce MUc'.: more torious effortp shou'd
nvve been mnde Tr) arran,T
1.) 2.o failurs of Ruenly wnn -.Arobpbly au,.. in nf-,rt to 1.10,c1:
)f cooperation in tne GPecl: section in Cairo .n.1 ti' Services
3rancl. there bocnuse En the 1)erinnin of t:.0 Cairo o-eretione
o Croe:: section had t be Its own suoply H,ction. It fetilsd
until recently comulotely to .urraner functi:pn r.tc
dellend u2on t!.f,OSf'4:111) ly Ot'icors. A9 rerult, one or tre
ot_er thoujit thet %. ere 7.4`mir
octnelly too stronl,int, vas dmne br ncit.er.
SECRET
4 1.4.14.40
-C1 *.tAl&l.
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o .' r1 nd AoorovedF Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Ap_oved For Rel_e_27 CIA-RDP'13X000u1 ? _
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC !SERVICE'S
FROM3. 11, Pourotto,
INTKROFFICE MEMO
CIATE February
SIJELIECT Report on f 181 ti nondi t lone trwlowitt,,.,1 by jrolo. crey
1. Oomhiont th 11.1111004.1h6Ar4' 011tt riret throe seetiona of
,'?hltoyle r000rt. 3oS V te I AM iv.44V0 hte otdttosit:anta -rt
correot 'Ind 1 110111t t4191. i%ey will be exn,Indod into .% wore eX-
Lohstvo .11dthry of Lho Nee,
? Wito roolrd to Najor 1 j 000!9enre in
followIA be in (rder!
eeotion four
it. ) Thr ? 1, ftri)' ar uI if I t I to ,vtrt tFoti
mowbota of t:.ei 11.11A) stee Is lt'.tl,ttt,c'tiI ilmot f.thd it Id
without Qom-atoll trut . of orhotioAlly fio*W bhiWhiCtit
? !1:1:1t b t I?.o.1 . Ittim:io I it I I '1 r ted
ofrloerd who woold ho AvotlAbl fov h!,fe ik
otol Alw!Ays haan olNidotIlt4,1? limitdt, ,16h
wIth I 1,011Ifit1ittiOtta WrVA ImMillUttolj emitted Unit!:
rv rtalti Oprritt101ai.
b.) Tno tihkitirMahtlia OC WAO t:rpi(*ftl 1tf ti,er
039 bhaoe WIth vrd t. too lhoh- oi stiorothrldE, tt?lient
be -pointed oitt ft)'Llt edorat!trida srrived
eatrit 4,6 1tt,6 !lb DOiloNt 1.4: ,intl roqw.,ate for !itla1tton41
soorotort?il povuonool t o Oqiro offioe lt6.elts Wnr:? oon-
tInwk11;! 1.11k10 ohtIl tno non,tor of 1944. A nilAtber oe edr-
votArir,s w,vo provided by Coiro Cor ttle ihrt ati Utfor
letonbui. T-avc, wAs oavc soffintout mobor o, wotoeu
on hillta in 2ht1'o to i Ill Lie ndoAa W1 (1 ware ex,oreeseA by
tho edvanoe beeee.
Tho dtilha thh nrrtvel of oodo ,in,1 other
pereonnel wra unfortunate bat eghtn they represent the ax-
oorienoe of othar field bhFae. Thr wort- in it-mtr k,ole un-
doubtedly hnndionpood by to.tt lho of h F1nhnO6 OfftZ'Or tti
h phri-tiwe 3ooarity Orrimor. Tnaea mt4,,ht lt,,vo been obtained
hhd eutfiotout oreeenro bear brou,fht to bear but it ie
orohnhle t,nt tlo er;rio, heeitl its?Air for ;iufrtotent ,Ner-
donool who not todlo eoffioiwitly wAof,rdnt ttt ii ri
o . ) The ootwiiant 6 Of UI' -)it 'lot '1.1*4- r. r3.t. t
oat fnil In nfirt t th'o Into tn, etttl,htt0,11 ,141
SECRET
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2-0131-641-2-.7 CIA-RDP13X00 0'1
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
There
is attached the field report of Major JohP 14,
Oaskoy.
Your attenti is *Used to tho wowing momersaima
by Copt. PeUardelotion, MAW of tho South Sast Swope Sootiest.
4,04?...4y 01..0 44144,4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2 .44"
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
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?r -;,(1.1.f),96-r.,'Poei"1:4 mkt i -anti. 6
i - -- ---::LL Y- = ? ii-7. ... -- ?-,
,. . ?
..,
,-...---,L 11 ,
. t _
.
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a a 41.0 ft t kirteikr.
..c1 be O'retd 1
--- ( Ohi)4k _ Mil
,1
eke)) ill!) ottl d
be- ., l!etown,
oo fie.parolitlil
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.
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,
? ,. -
_e,ech'ci
T3 - 0 In
n ' Q. 11,1 -I1
rk iintiuffia
he Ind ,i.oitt.
lead. ...j.o 14e. gi,.*
'titii_evl '
,..,!,, ..
, A E
-
?
narlaggifiAd 2nd Approved For Release 2013/09/27_: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
irrovamwer mot No. 04
-
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOV
TO
PROM
SUBJECT:
The Director
Secretariat
Field Report by Maj. John L. Caskey
r , . ,r
r
DATE: 17 February 194,5
.L. Attached Attached is a report by Maj. John L. Caskey who was
connected with Greek opervtions as chief of the OSS mission at
Izmir. Many of tne difficulties which this officer reports are,
according to Mr. Penrose, due to the confusion which existed
at all bases in the early days of OSS.
2. Maj. Caskey makes the following comments and criticisms:
a. Personnel should have had a knowledge of the language,
mentality and character of the Greeks, and operating In
such an area as Turkey, should have had some knowledge of
that country.
b. This base suffered a shortage of personnel. Mr.
Penrose notes that while this shortage existed at Izmir
many persons at Cairo were idle. Maj. Caskey's suggestion
that frequent personnel conferences be held between forward
and rear headquarters is endorsed by Mr. Penrose.
c. A clear-cut directive should have been issued to
some one person to act as commander of :,11 branches in that
area. Because no one held such authority for many months,
friction arose between the Izmir base and Cairo, with the
branch chiefs in Cairo trying to direct branch operations
at Izmir without full knowledge of conditions at that out-
post.
d. Izmir was poorly equipped and supplied, particularly
in the early days.
e. Because no clear policy was laid down in financial
matters for this base, accounting procedures were somewhat
haphazard, and unnecessary confusion arose.
Attacl)ment
?r,
Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reperts Officer
.41
t.?
Cnr R Alease-20-1 3;09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
????41
?
-4)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
-0
for Corfu. Asking ? sailor what tine the boat nould depart, r
loarnod that tho motor was undor repairs in another port and that
there was no possibility of leaving. A few days later I west aboard
again and learned that this sohooner, on which there wore ne
quartors for me, was going to spend several days in other /Ultimo
ports, where I should have slept on (look. I askod tho British
to lot as Eo aboard at Brindisi. We ohookod as to the time of
sailing. The boat left throe hours ahead of time and / oamght
it when tho Italian skippor turnod back booause of weather. lho
British did not authorise a visit to Banti Quaranta. although
beoauso of ainefields the boat almost had to enter there in order
to sail to Corfu. When the stons dolayod us. the Italian skipper
elooted to wait for morning before, passing the mlnefields. and I
porsuaded him to drop anchor at Banti Quaramta. Later at Corfu
I notioed that it would have been practically impossible for ma
to get to Santi Quaranta from them.
Declassified and Approved For Release-2013/09/27 :-CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
4CL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
40 id
Orticcc. and 4111 the end of the Oernan Oecupation approaahod. the
Amoriaan Intolligenso ilervics bows* au alborrasement for two
reasonss first, it did not retard the intoreots of the Britvsh
*spire as tho oriterion and hence it would ropresent aortals
things in an unfavorable light. Simon& in many oases the prosenoe
of Amorioans or of supplies from on Amerioan source tended to
enoourago the Greeks to assume an attitude at less dependence upon
the British. A remark/0.10 'ories of aeoidonts befoll the late
oporations which the British 'wood to carry out in support of
our missions. They may all have been real asoidents, but they
roeallod vividly acoounts of British instruction in simvle
sabotage. I' had numerous unhappy experts/se-us with requests for
supplies to teams from Cairo. but Y. will use only the asamplo of
Barios Molossos Mission in Spirus. We had request** ? Lysander
operation tor 7 Septelber. The operation was arrant** for the
7th but was postponed on a purely daily basis for well over ?
month. Then I asked if we could substituto ? boat trip to Stott
quoranta. The British Agri** and tho agents sot out tor Santi
quaranta. On the day appointed by the British, I mysolf west dews
to Brindisi with supplies to tato the daily beat. end after
waiting around, r Lwowd that the boat would mo longer make the
rut. No other boat would go to Oanti quarenta. Finally in
November they atrood to take so to Corfu, when** allotodly I
could make my way to Santi Quaranta. I went aboard a sohoomer
,C45421L4Wite;;IT0414
a41,1
? E.
flc-I2ssified and Aooroved For Release 2013/09/27 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
?
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
17;
-41-
exists so that it beoomes inpossible to fulfill all legitimate
claims, it is natural that in, at least dubious oases British
needs are more often favored over American needs. whish ordiaarily
do not appear to the British as serioum as the British needs.
They have nor* confidenoe in themselves. Mere the British eon-
trol transportation. a priority can be effectively exereised only
when there is oomplete supervision. As the war, moreover, nears
an end, the British inky subordlaste the common interest of de.
hosting the Germans to what they eonsider the laterest of the
post-war British Xiupir,. The British upper class is oonviaeod that
what is to the interest of the British Empire is to the interest
of the world. Bina* the end justifies the means, the British,
while individually honorable, mmy resort, where the aspire is
conserned, to the most dishonest and ruthless behavior on the
highest moral prinoiple. In Grooms the SUS aky b. alsgujded.
but when the British who know better suggest that the SLAB are
working in deliberate conspiracy with the Germans it is an in-
oilman, slander, contemptible in the eyes of an unprejudiced
Amoriesa. During a conversation last July Major Rio., shier ef
SILO, said to me, "/ as a great liberal exoept where the British
Impire is ooncerned. I believe in the neoessity of the British
bapire. To safeguard the British Empire we must eontrol the
Mediterranean, and to control the Mediterranean we must eontrol
(1) Italy. (2) Greeoe." He knew that I would understand and he
thought that I would sympathise. Ike British did try to eontrel
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2 "*-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
,
scandalous amount of time and cerebration was wasted by the
Reports Office in an attempt to improve the translatioma of artieles
from one foreign newspaper, and when the distastefal work sae
done. the result was still awkward and unworthy of the Organise.
ties which produood it.
Gino Diffieulties in the Field.
Members of the Allied Military Missies to Grosse viewed II
agents in their areas with disapproval a: poteatial essmise lobe
might file unfavorable reports about that. PUrthermore, they ego.
sidered the existence of an latelligease System. extemdimg late
their area but independent of their control, aa superfluous and
invidious, because every Liaison Miser liked to think that
despite his lack of training in latelligenos some natural talent
gave him all the equipment neoessary and that what he did met knew
was not worth knowing. They tended to regard may information
gathered in or traversimg their territory as theirs to appropriate
and to pass on as they saw fit.
British Control
Whether or not orders from above lodleate to the British per.
sommol in a British Theatre that they are te give equal attention
or even priority to the seeds of MB. the looal British !Neel that
the Amerieans are there sorely on sufferance and that they (the
British) are bei mg generous is f*Ifillimg obligations undertaking
by their distant superiors. lben an ovate shortage et tramopertatiesi
q.'-4444,1ft!`144 ,,,,v;er;;;:4;.t.-14,0444.-vor3
. '
+413,1-4Netoet,... ca-ew-matr4300, V4,0 lip
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
,
first into Albanian by one man and then from Albanian into a kind
of English by another.
tt. The Personal Ti.
The main task, however, to which all the other work led up or
from which it resulted, was the guidance and support of missions
in the field. In ? previous section I have tried to convey in-
cidentally the atmosphere in which the misdonswere conceived
and grew to a prolific maturity. It remains to emphasise that
between us at the Deck and those agents in the field there existed
? very natural bond, oompounded of trust, sympathy and mutual
respect. It was ? very powerful bond, or in the turmoil other Parses
would have carried us away.
3. Conditions Capable of Laprovement.
a. One Positive 8 gentian
It is obvious from the preceding remarks that I UMA aware of
very great imperfections in services and in training. I might
also criticise the behavior of administrators who avoided decisions.
Yet it mould be idle to denounce the frauds and the deficiencies
of those who fall short of generally recognised ideals, and if I
must become a reformer, / Shall limit myself to the solid ground
of a suggestion for the correction of ? principle in regard to the
translation of material in a foreign language. I depone that formal
translations should always be made into, not out of, the mother
tongue. It takes far less time to make any translation than Is
correct a translation done into poor English. In Bari a
vi I
4.1r
SECIET
I I
;
fl-I.ifir1 nd AoorovedF Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
4
rr.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDp13X00001R0001000600062
- -, - - - -.' ? -
? 88 ?
Greek Desk could not hay. spared tin b.tor., and I have always
r.gr.tt.d the d.partur. of ny genial, witty and effieiat rsrto.r.
Int.11igence R.ports
Th. work that pl.as.d us nost was the preparation of Intel-
ligano. Report.. Th?r? war. occasional opportunities ?ls..r.,
but our m.in traffic can. through the SI ssious. ian G.org.
Xsloud.s r.turnmd in March, thor. wi a rush of business, again
stt.r the collection of ?aoh pouch. Brur. and 'I .dit.d the first
two pouch.. and att.r Rrure'a departure I sian.. edited th. oth.rs.
We .er'vid, ther.tor., as Reports Off Lo.rs. In thi adnirsble R.ports
Ofilo. itself, f ron April on, a very abi. officer Robert Ihaff.r.
Lt., USNR. who handled Gr..k son.what 1... readily than we did.
r.view.d carefully whatever we pr.sont.d. The tu aat.rial. except
from Targakis personally. can. out in Gr..k, ?oatiass typ.writt.n
but fr.qu.ntly in a 1t? Bysantine .uraiv. script. Radio sag.s
in Greek wer, often mutilated by garbles, which could not be
eliainat.d by the sssg. Canter ilk. garbles in Xngiish.
5.. Us. f Fr.. Tin.
B.tw..n pouches there 'was a certain amunt of ft.. tin.. duztJ
which I off.r.d services to relieve crises in the Reports Office
or in th. highly r.sp.ot.d Albanian Desk. For the Isport. Office,
I undertook various tasks. For th. Albanian Desk I used to trw-
late fra a bastard Italian into the nost elegant Inglish at
o'si'td the handwritt.it reports of an iat.11tgant but ..mi.illit.rate
agent, whose productions, otherwise, would in sari be translated
Declassified and Approved F
ri ?
ii
e 2013/09/27: ClA-RDP13Xflflnipni -'
0'
'I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
10,1,1) fib;j HI'S
(31'11.11,:DIFINE,DI cp,PT GF:0HGp
16,3!)6
COQ :UNT Ct.T1ONS
7, ,,k,*4
()1i G;,0,4GEC.
Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
',LI 'I'.
'
I ? Fir!
- -
.A.jt ):, )0' "L.
TA I.,?
,,70
SI)17,!' I AI,
YUGO[Ii11IIA 5
fmgrucAL
IQ-Xi!:
I) R
171'0
iTrli ,
ETO
FE TO
OPAiN
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release.2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
FIELD iiEPORTS
VOL. XT
Theater:
ETO
MEDTO
1TEDTO
ETO
LC.:TBOUROV, F.R.
16,761
634
16,762
425
16,763
SL!ON? ..1AJO't THEODORE
16,773
BREBVER :Ai COL CHARL74:S
16,794
BRAC :AN, 'ALTER
16,808 -
PLOW:VILI CAPT
16,813 -
BALAGdER, 1101E0
16,820
AFRICA
AFRICA
FRANCE
ETO
ETO
fUGOSLAVIA 15
DEURETT. C. .J.
X-2
16,824
FRANCE
LEBANON
? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
FA TSEAS JORX S.
/6,933
IP. I CH 71 P.
16,9371 J.4
EASTZ 1N
16,950 2
C?tOSBY
16, 953' JUtGAR
T
T.AN, Ct. !-T PAUL
GLIDDEN, HAROLD
16,958
KA ADO 01,
16,965
BEAGGINS ,
16,966
CHANDL
16,967 -
LT COL FITZHUGH
ft% CAPT HELBERT I.
PERA TIN?. L
16,)84 T lir LLIATJ
CRO C A P
16,985 --
CADY prr,
16,;46
TA, CAPT elUAT:T D.
161991IVEWSTWI, RI CIL/1RD
FIELD PHOTO
SO
FILD PHO TO
SPEDIAL FUNDS
R&D
S E TARIA T
15th & 20th AP
2LAP DIVISIOD
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release.2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
FIELD iiEPORTS
VOL. XT
Theater:
ETO
MEDTO
1TEDTO
ETO
LC.:TBOUROV, F.R.
16,761
634
16,762
425
16,763
SL!ON? ..1AJO't THEODORE
16,773
BREBVER :Ai COL CHARL74:S
16,794
BRAC :AN, 'ALTER
16,808 -
PLOW:VILI CAPT
16,813 -
BALAGdER, 1101E0
16,820
AFRICA
AFRICA
FRANCE
ETO
ETO
fUGOSLAVIA 15
DEURETT. C. .J.
X-2
16,824
FRANCE
LEBANON
? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
',LI 'I'.
'
I ? Fir!
- -
.A.jt ):, )0' "L.
TA I.,?
,,70
SI)17,!' I AI,
YUGO[Ii11IIA 5
fmgrucAL
IQ-Xi!:
I) R
171'0
iTrli ,
ETO
FE TO
OPAiN
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
10,1,1) fib;j HI'S
(31'11.11,:DIFINE,DI cp,PT GF:0HGp
16,3!)6
COQ :UNT Ct.T1ONS
7, ,,k,*4
()1i G;,0,4GEC.
Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
4
rr.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDp13X00001R0001000600062
- -, - - - -.' ? -
? 88 ?
Greek Desk could not hay. spared tin b.tor., and I have always
r.gr.tt.d the d.partur. of ny genial, witty and effieiat rsrto.r.
Int.11igence R.ports
Th. work that pl.as.d us nost was the preparation of Intel-
ligano. Report.. Th?r? war. occasional opportunities ?ls..r.,
but our m.in traffic can. through the SI ssious. ian G.org.
Xsloud.s r.turnmd in March, thor. wi a rush of business, again
stt.r the collection of ?aoh pouch. Brur. and 'I .dit.d the first
two pouch.. and att.r Rrure'a departure I sian.. edited th. oth.rs.
We .er'vid, ther.tor., as Reports Off Lo.rs. In thi adnirsble R.ports
Ofilo. itself, f ron April on, a very abi. officer Robert Ihaff.r.
Lt., USNR. who handled Gr..k son.what 1... readily than we did.
r.view.d carefully whatever we pr.sont.d. The tu aat.rial. except
from Targakis personally. can. out in Gr..k, ?oatiass typ.writt.n
but fr.qu.ntly in a 1t? Bysantine .uraiv. script. Radio sag.s
in Greek wer, often mutilated by garbles, which could not be
eliainat.d by the sssg. Canter ilk. garbles in Xngiish.
5.. Us. f Fr.. Tin.
B.tw..n pouches there 'was a certain amunt of ft.. tin.. duztJ
which I off.r.d services to relieve crises in the Reports Office
or in th. highly r.sp.ot.d Albanian Desk. For the Isport. Office,
I undertook various tasks. For th. Albanian Desk I used to trw-
late fra a bastard Italian into the nost elegant Inglish at
o'si'td the handwritt.it reports of an iat.11tgant but ..mi.illit.rate
agent, whose productions, otherwise, would in sari be translated
Declassified and Approved F
ri ?
ii
e 2013/09/27: ClA-RDP13Xflflnipni -'
0'
'I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
,
first into Albanian by one man and then from Albanian into a kind
of English by another.
tt. The Personal Ti.
The main task, however, to which all the other work led up or
from which it resulted, was the guidance and support of missions
in the field. In ? previous section I have tried to convey in-
cidentally the atmosphere in which the misdonswere conceived
and grew to a prolific maturity. It remains to emphasise that
between us at the Deck and those agents in the field there existed
? very natural bond, oompounded of trust, sympathy and mutual
respect. It was ? very powerful bond, or in the turmoil other Parses
would have carried us away.
3. Conditions Capable of Laprovement.
a. One Positive 8 gentian
It is obvious from the preceding remarks that I UMA aware of
very great imperfections in services and in training. I might
also criticise the behavior of administrators who avoided decisions.
Yet it mould be idle to denounce the frauds and the deficiencies
of those who fall short of generally recognised ideals, and if I
must become a reformer, / Shall limit myself to the solid ground
of a suggestion for the correction of ? principle in regard to the
translation of material in a foreign language. I depone that formal
translations should always be made into, not out of, the mother
tongue. It takes far less time to make any translation than Is
correct a translation done into poor English. In Bari a
vi I
4.1r
SECIET
I I
;
fl-I.ifir1 nd AoorovedF Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
,
scandalous amount of time and cerebration was wasted by the
Reports Office in an attempt to improve the translatioma of artieles
from one foreign newspaper, and when the distastefal work sae
done. the result was still awkward and unworthy of the Organise.
ties which produood it.
Gino Diffieulties in the Field.
Members of the Allied Military Missies to Grosse viewed II
agents in their areas with disapproval a: poteatial essmise lobe
might file unfavorable reports about that. PUrthermore, they ego.
sidered the existence of an latelligease System. extemdimg late
their area but independent of their control, aa superfluous and
invidious, because every Liaison Miser liked to think that
despite his lack of training in latelligenos some natural talent
gave him all the equipment neoessary and that what he did met knew
was not worth knowing. They tended to regard may information
gathered in or traversimg their territory as theirs to appropriate
and to pass on as they saw fit.
British Control
Whether or not orders from above lodleate to the British per.
sommol in a British Theatre that they are te give equal attention
or even priority to the seeds of MB. the looal British !Neel that
the Amerieans are there sorely on sufferance and that they (the
British) are bei mg generous is f*Ifillimg obligations undertaking
by their distant superiors. lben an ovate shortage et tramopertatiesi
q.'-4444,1ft!`144 ,,,,v;er;;;:4;.t.-14,0444.-vor3
. '
+413,1-4Netoet,... ca-ew-matr4300, V4,0 lip
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
?
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
17;
-41-
exists so that it beoomes inpossible to fulfill all legitimate
claims, it is natural that in, at least dubious oases British
needs are more often favored over American needs. whish ordiaarily
do not appear to the British as serioum as the British needs.
They have nor* confidenoe in themselves. Mere the British eon-
trol transportation. a priority can be effectively exereised only
when there is oomplete supervision. As the war, moreover, nears
an end, the British inky subordlaste the common interest of de.
hosting the Germans to what they eonsider the laterest of the
post-war British Xiupir,. The British upper class is oonviaeod that
what is to the interest of the British Empire is to the interest
of the world. Bina* the end justifies the means, the British,
while individually honorable, mmy resort, where the aspire is
conserned, to the most dishonest and ruthless behavior on the
highest moral prinoiple. In Grooms the SUS aky b. alsgujded.
but when the British who know better suggest that the SLAB are
working in deliberate conspiracy with the Germans it is an in-
oilman, slander, contemptible in the eyes of an unprejudiced
Amoriesa. During a conversation last July Major Rio., shier ef
SILO, said to me, "/ as a great liberal exoept where the British
Impire is ooncerned. I believe in the neoessity of the British
bapire. To safeguard the British Empire we must eontrol the
Mediterranean, and to control the Mediterranean we must eontrol
(1) Italy. (2) Greeoe." He knew that I would understand and he
thought that I would sympathise. Ike British did try to eontrel
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2 "*-
4CL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
40 id
Orticcc. and 4111 the end of the Oernan Oecupation approaahod. the
Amoriaan Intolligenso ilervics bows* au alborrasement for two
reasonss first, it did not retard the intoreots of the Britvsh
*spire as tho oriterion and hence it would ropresent aortals
things in an unfavorable light. Simon& in many oases the prosenoe
of Amorioans or of supplies from on Amerioan source tended to
enoourago the Greeks to assume an attitude at less dependence upon
the British. A remark/0.10 'ories of aeoidonts befoll the late
oporations which the British 'wood to carry out in support of
our missions. They may all have been real asoidents, but they
roeallod vividly acoounts of British instruction in simvle
sabotage. I' had numerous unhappy experts/se-us with requests for
supplies to teams from Cairo. but Y. will use only the asamplo of
Barios Molossos Mission in Spirus. We had request** ? Lysander
operation tor 7 Septelber. The operation was arrant** for the
7th but was postponed on a purely daily basis for well over ?
month. Then I asked if we could substituto ? boat trip to Stott
quoranta. The British Agri** and tho agents sot out tor Santi
quaranta. On the day appointed by the British, I mysolf west dews
to Brindisi with supplies to tato the daily beat. end after
waiting around, r Lwowd that the boat would mo longer make the
rut. No other boat would go to Oanti quarenta. Finally in
November they atrood to take so to Corfu, when** allotodly I
could make my way to Santi Quaranta. I went aboard a sohoomer
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
-0
for Corfu. Asking ? sailor what tine the boat nould depart, r
loarnod that tho motor was undor repairs in another port and that
there was no possibility of leaving. A few days later I west aboard
again and learned that this sohooner, on which there wore ne
quartors for me, was going to spend several days in other /Ultimo
ports, where I should have slept on (look. I askod tho British
to lot as Eo aboard at Brindisi. We ohookod as to the time of
sailing. The boat left throe hours ahead of time and / oamght
it when tho Italian skippor turnod back booause of weather. lho
British did not authorise a visit to Banti Quaranta. although
beoauso of ainefields the boat almost had to enter there in order
to sail to Corfu. When the stons dolayod us. the Italian skipper
elooted to wait for morning before, passing the mlnefields. and I
porsuaded him to drop anchor at Banti Quaramta. Later at Corfu
I notioed that it would have been practically impossible for ma
to get to Santi Quaranta from them.
Declassified and Approved For Release-2013/09/27 :-CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
irrovamwer mot No. 04
-
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOV
TO
PROM
SUBJECT:
The Director
Secretariat
Field Report by Maj. John L. Caskey
r , . ,r
r
DATE: 17 February 194,5
.L. Attached Attached is a report by Maj. John L. Caskey who was
connected with Greek opervtions as chief of the OSS mission at
Izmir. Many of tne difficulties which this officer reports are,
according to Mr. Penrose, due to the confusion which existed
at all bases in the early days of OSS.
2. Maj. Caskey makes the following comments and criticisms:
a. Personnel should have had a knowledge of the language,
mentality and character of the Greeks, and operating In
such an area as Turkey, should have had some knowledge of
that country.
b. This base suffered a shortage of personnel. Mr.
Penrose notes that while this shortage existed at Izmir
many persons at Cairo were idle. Maj. Caskey's suggestion
that frequent personnel conferences be held between forward
and rear headquarters is endorsed by Mr. Penrose.
c. A clear-cut directive should have been issued to
some one person to act as commander of :,11 branches in that
area. Because no one held such authority for many months,
friction arose between the Izmir base and Cairo, with the
branch chiefs in Cairo trying to direct branch operations
at Izmir without full knowledge of conditions at that out-
post.
d. Izmir was poorly equipped and supplied, particularly
in the early days.
e. Because no clear policy was laid down in financial
matters for this base, accounting procedures were somewhat
haphazard, and unnecessary confusion arose.
Attacl)ment
?r,
Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reperts Officer
.41
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
There
is attached the field report of Major JohP 14,
Oaskoy.
Your attenti is *Used to tho wowing momersaima
by Copt. PeUardelotion, MAW of tho South Sast Swope Sootiest.
4,04?...4y 01..0 44144,4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2 .44"
Declassified and Ap_oved For Rel_e_27 CIA-RDP'13X000u1 ? _
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC !SERVICE'S
FROM3. 11, Pourotto,
INTKROFFICE MEMO
CIATE February
SIJELIECT Report on f 181 ti nondi t lone trwlowitt,,.,1 by jrolo. crey
1. Oomhiont th 11.1111004.1h6Ar4' 011tt riret throe seetiona of
,'?hltoyle r000rt. 3oS V te I AM iv.44V0 hte otdttosit:anta -rt
correot 'Ind 1 110111t t4191. i%ey will be exn,Indod into .% wore eX-
Lohstvo .11dthry of Lho Nee,
? Wito roolrd to Najor 1 j 000!9enre in
followIA be in (rder!
eeotion four
it. ) Thr ? 1, ftri)' ar uI if I t I to ,vtrt tFoti
mowbota of t:.ei 11.11A) stee Is lt'.tl,ttt,c'tiI ilmot f.thd it Id
without Qom-atoll trut . of orhotioAlly fio*W bhiWhiCtit
? !1:1:1t b t I?.o.1 . Ittim:io I it I I '1 r ted
ofrloerd who woold ho AvotlAbl fov h!,fe ik
otol Alw!Ays haan olNidotIlt4,1? limitdt, ,16h
wIth I 1,011Ifit1ittiOtta WrVA ImMillUttolj emitted Unit!:
rv rtalti Oprritt101ai.
b.) Tno tihkitirMahtlia OC WAO t:rpi(*ftl 1tf ti,er
039 bhaoe WIth vrd t. too lhoh- oi stiorothrldE, tt?lient
be -pointed oitt ft)'Llt edorat!trida srrived
eatrit 4,6 1tt,6 !lb DOiloNt 1.4: ,intl roqw.,ate for !itla1tton41
soorotort?il povuonool t o Oqiro offioe lt6.elts Wnr:? oon-
tInwk11;! 1.11k10 ohtIl tno non,tor of 1944. A nilAtber oe edr-
votArir,s w,vo provided by Coiro Cor ttle ihrt ati Utfor
letonbui. T-avc, wAs oavc soffintout mobor o, wotoeu
on hillta in 2ht1'o to i Ill Lie ndoAa W1 (1 ware ex,oreeseA by
tho edvanoe beeee.
Tho dtilha thh nrrtvel of oodo ,in,1 other
pereonnel wra unfortunate bat eghtn they represent the ax-
oorienoe of othar field bhFae. Thr wort- in it-mtr k,ole un-
doubtedly hnndionpood by to.tt lho of h F1nhnO6 OfftZ'Or tti
h phri-tiwe 3ooarity Orrimor. Tnaea mt4,,ht lt,,vo been obtained
hhd eutfiotout oreeenro bear brou,fht to bear but it ie
orohnhle t,nt tlo er;rio, heeitl its?Air for ;iufrtotent ,Ner-
donool who not todlo eoffioiwitly wAof,rdnt ttt ii ri
o . ) The ootwiiant 6 Of UI' -)it 'lot '1.1*4- r. r3.t. t
oat fnil In nfirt t th'o Into tn, etttl,htt0,11 ,141
SECRET
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m?ta,clsou.
it oxintod. Izmir lihne Vq.P ostablisted ro
forwardine noint or t-e Groe4 Section, S.., and toe t;oLit-tnA,-
ing Ofricor usually reported to loun, Chief hf too_ Greek
Section in ,airo. Wl.en ot-or furctionm wore lonti*d on
some quostion arose in Jairo concorniiv tne capnnelin of
such functl'ins. it urls not until the Sumer of 1944 tnnt
Eajor Cew.coy wen m. do Chief of OSS in Imir nri undor-
stood to be in c!.alye ov all o-oratEons, SI, SO, "O nnA
w le- Lore, oueroted from ti.nt base. Prior tJe
h'd tonrform th.1 function o:ti Domaandor without tne r,.ml
qutoority and '.ercin t_o root o! many of r .0 Aifl-toiltif;
that dovol000d botween hranc:.0s. -ed the or;:qc17t,tion
elerifiod et an e:rlier time t!%ore wo-'d !tette 'ire,: little
question As to the nronriety of branch Js in ,f,iro attefInt-
inr to c)ntrol seoarato oeerations.
Tno relntions with !Lr wre par v difficult for re.sonft
which could not be nvcided under tna circumetnnes. SI ,,ct
perforce established Its own caique service for tfo trrtnn-
portation of itR own teams before toe naritime Unit WhA
actually established. Teo SI oPeration wan daveloned :_ten
woo oad no 1low1e1t:.e of boats or shipsin4-: ft.-d it involveA
many practicos that were doubtless improoer. Tl'ese error
were pointod out wilen tne reritime Unit war entablisheA
al.,ont no ,)ersonnel waft proved t) over tee nLinnini-
wort- and 1.1..e sem() Si officers hod to continue t.:eir functions
:t' or ncw ,tennoment w,%ile at t ene-te time the:' were roe-
oonnElle to SI. T.1is develolod A considerable amount of
friction Wflie:1 could only nave beer evolded by tao esteblish-
ment of a rol tnit w-ic- t2es can: :31e of .andlin,-,
all tne onerntions witrou* tne nacessit:' of c!:11inf.:
uoon untrained ST officers to follow procedures witn whicn
they were totally unfmniller.
NaJor (!askoy's comment trA frecuent nersonnel confer-
ences of tho forwnrd -nd rear neadsuortors would wAre been
dosirable Lc exceedinc,ly apt on should nave beri followed.
Howover, the ol-lortec of ,wrsonocl in Izmir nnd tn. difficul-
ties of transportation in ond out of .1;:do suc.!: con-
forcncer difficult althluce MUc'.: more torious effortp shou'd
nvve been mnde Tr) arran,T
1.) 2.o failurs of Ruenly wnn -.Arobpbly au,.. in nf-,rt to 1.10,c1:
)f cooperation in tne GPecl: section in Cairo .n.1 ti' Services
3rancl. there bocnuse En the 1)erinnin of t:.0 Cairo o-eretione
o Croe:: section had t be Its own suoply H,ction. It fetilsd
until recently comulotely to .urraner functi:pn r.tc
dellend u2on t!.f,OSf'4:111) ly Ot'icors. A9 rerult, one or tre
ot_er thoujit thet %. ere 7.4`mir
octnelly too stronl,int, vas dmne br ncit.er.
SECRET
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8.) It in oorthinly truth tiyIt Meh WhO Weht to tLe
t.ho oorly doa wore told thnt for security rtneons flu
r.00rda or tii exnenditure or 5oovt,i1 hinie would he F.-
ouirad. ThiaWbt duo to lila lo(L of ooprefliottoo or
oxt.ht to whloh maoh orponOttur a wo,.10 rob(')i hthi. it )?!id,
to be norreoted in n11 oo0.0, Cortoinl ? (hm 000rhtton of
tho It.,111tr Brine required navern1 tiononntiN.. qevtn, h full
ttmm letnonos ?Moor woul(t have bmen desirnble.
f.) 141Jor Cinekeyie commente on troiolnv baPn re-
p, tad.a ntuober of t imee by oti.mrs who in :d1,1 t do wi
31 operntion In the Hiddim Ehtit. l'robhbly ti.m major
failure in .4.fl trnintng wnn the nomplotm lenit or eltpmhiti uhon
roportinv:. Thie greatly handinapped the work until slow
and varern1 nould bm riven to hCeihte Who by thnt
ttino hod b.coma diffinult of nonsee.
?Oonoornine? ;4ajor Onel:eyso nomment0 In Smetion five of
I. memorandum, ht 13 comments on Ar11,ernal dienord repreeent nothing
new in principle, but t1t nonditiole were parnnpm intensified in
Turhtah area. GonuorninL the i'lisacreement between rajor CfAsksy
ood Golvo on whtters 03" polioy, it in my holtiif tInt rnjnr Chey
Iii mista:en in his int.rprottltion of th, ,Atitudo of Colonel 410.rioh.
The lattarlei Aneistanoe Wht-t In MUO1 Alserioan fiersonnel
,leserved first nonsiderotion ben/twit) tney were Amerinans, hti tnnt
vory Amen concern Whioh tho iiL 8ontion oorfonnal it for
Cho wm1r,ire or GP0606 !int! (:raoL9 p oolta.d tno1.1 to lose eirilt of
the tantu ej,r0 of 0$:.; 000rt,iont!. It Oft hi'mn Iikt nni nion, wLivi:
novo oxprooBod to Co1ono1 Aldvton, thot h. Wan otatkon in reit-1rd t,
1300fflin, 100E1 Of bolonoo on tho' port or t!.0 Gree Section )ler-
simnel. In hny hvfmt it wit, unfortunht6 that ?iieunderet,indinr7s
to erWito n oonaiiton of dianomfor on to, 1)nrt of ANN,nnes base
personnol.
SECRET
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A
gI4A;
AV2A1
ce Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOV E R NMENT
TO i Chief. SI DATR: January 24. 11148
nom 1 D. Dellardeleben
SUBJRCT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by Major John L. Caskey
10 This report covers an operation which. beginning at
scratch and beset by numerous and sundry difficulties. never-
theless a000nplished a job which made 8/ activities in Grow*
possible.
2. In paragraph 4, page 9, Major Caskey discusses oertain
conditions which might be improvod. In enumerating these son-
ditions, Caskey quite properly places the selection and assign
-
merit of personnel first. I consider his observations sound ..
stressing as they do the necessity for the most careful choice
and utilisation of 81 representatives. While Coskey was great)!
in need of qualified people (sub-paragraph b. page 9) in Turkey,
there were 08fi people in Cairo and elsewhere with no profitable
work to do. It is believed that ths establishment of personnel
officers and their staffs in the variouo theater. will do such
to oorreat such situations and to provide suitable people when,
they are needed.
3. Caskey's oomments on oommand, supply, finance and train-
ing (pages 11. 12 and 13) ape pertinent. Difficulties in these
various functions were due for the most part. I believe, to
inexperience and the necessity for improvising and short Gutting
because of our late start. Corrective measures have been taken
as lessons have boon learned.
? 6$401.-UF 1.01,44 ji.t.4LAU..1,0/46AVU..'"11'4I/10"'
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R00010006onnR 9 ? LIP
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
I NDU
Not* on the application of this report
1. Chronolul!al outline of tho writer's aotivitz
2. D__uttee
a. Li4iSOU With various Military and Diplosatie
Branches and Departmentn.
b. Moaltime operations.
0. Intelligence
d. SO
I. MO
f. Labor Desk
g. Communications
h. Supply
Pinanco
Pro rens and Aohievemonts
4. oun ng o r ?ages; assistance of Turks
and British.'
b. Key Wont, ONG011e Boston
c. Growth of claque fleet
d. Supplying of banes and fiold
*. Viridian
f. Missions
g. Interrogation and reporting
h. Achievements
Note
a. staff . general qualifications
b. Staff - special moods
ofh Jurisdiction; oomaand
d. Supply
e. Finance
f. Training
Lleoifio iliffioulties in the fiold
Note
a; Internal disoord
b. Disegreement over policy
4
-
vilt6.00MIPPIV
Declassified and Approved For Release 201370-9/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2 ?a-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
L1.4c Q.,
? ''ALVibeZO;
_
?
SIMANPAII0 IOWA NO, 04
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO Chief, SI DATL jamU, 1044
John L. Caskey, Major ADS, Greek Beek, 82 %repeat Sestina
Report on Field Conditions -- 068 Izmir
PROM
SUNRCT;
Notes The following report deals with conditions in the Ir
arek from early in 1943 to the end of Novuobor 1944, the period
during whisk penetration of 000upied Orem,* was serried omt by
086 from and through the Isnir beim. This partionlar operation
was closed with the writer's departure from Turkey. Legal eon.
ditions and specific problems encountered and methods employed
are. therefore, chiefly of historical interest. Certain general
comments and criticisms, however, may have a wider and .or Ls.
mediate importanoe.
1. Itronolosioal outline of the writer's aetiv14e
20 July 1942
16 August 1942
August-September 1942
October-November 1942
Joined 088
Commisiioned Captain ALI
8/ and $O seheele and trciming
Adjutant to Chief 82 2nrepeen Qoettem
Dec. 1942-January 1943

Preparation for field with Offiee of
Land-Lease Administration
February-March 194$ Travel, Washington to Middle Beet
1-15 April 1943 OBS Cairo
24 April 1943 Arrived Amerieen Inbassys Ankara
May 1943-November 1944 Chief, 088, Isnir
20 November -7 Dee. 1944 Aegean Islands and Athens, *losing
Ismir operations
7.19 December 1944 068 Cairo
19.26 December 1944 Travel ?air...Washington
1. puttees
The writer was recruited to be one of the offieers working
on the periphery of oeoupiod ?rime*, to gather inforootios about
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060006-2
w
thot pountry and Croat eperetione of penotratime. Me wee origimally
aootgned to the Of tirenoh, mad inteliigenee wee almmye she major
oonoern or the Imoir bone. Out Isar developed ehiefly MI so *perm.
tionel ?enter obteining end operating afleet of magmas, reeeiv.
log
an forwarding men, doomments and ounplies, to and from Greece
and the Middle Meet' serving IX, 010, MO and the Lehor Desk Misston'.
and employing the fooilities of those drannhes se well 411 WV owed
Commuoioottone. Owing to look of staff for these dntiee, and te
our position vie.e.vis Turkish amend nor N1'4.114010. whit*
m0ognis.4 only one ()Moor 40 responsible for 00d eetivity in the
area, the writer was de tnoto salamander of ell brawl**s ond woo
obliged: to mange many or the eetivities himself. (Ne won effietally
appointed reprosentetive of MU in Moly: 10441 A written order emnt1ma.
in hie position as ohior of Win lamtr was not publieked until
September 1044). Duties performed in whole or in port, by the
writer (marked *) and those carried out under his direet supervision
were the following#
Liaison* 'WWII
111 Department of State (10ebessy. Ankara; Consulate Iamir)
US Military Attoohoo, Ankara, an Aosistailirrail6rm"im
itit41010!_k_Inoir -
UWi Owl, 0 Istanbul, and ropreeantativee
Jetanbul
ON PIA, Ankara
Oritish TOLD lair
Oritish ,omir
gritisk rrrrrkFar
lair
giritish Army Omilmo t Immir
Oritish *$ (10 jtlimar
rt-19:1[,
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Greek Consulat? Goneral Isnir
()rook a ?11 gene* Ssrrloe. amir
Italian Intolliganc., Sorvioe.
Turkish General Staff Intelligone? (Mani t) Ismir
(Chief oontaots und?rlinod)
b.. Maritime operations.
Founding*, direoting* and maintaining calque bases
("Key West", Samos, "Boston").
Acquiring*. equipping and directing* caiqu? float
and personnol*
Maintaining reoords*.
c. Intalligence.
Roceiving and forwarding &vont@ and forwarding
thoir roports (by mail ad wireless)*.
Rooruiting and training agents.
Intorrogation and reporting.
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Forwarding &lesions, supplies and roports.
Forwarding missions. supplias and reporte?,, Providing
facilities for secret broadcasting statics.
Labor Doak'
Forwarding mission and roports.
Communications"
Eetablishing wireless stations at 'noir and the
operational bases**
Providing signal plans and ciphors*.
Ciphoring*.
Maintaining reoorde.
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h. Supply;
Proourement and forwarding to the field.
Maintaining r000rds.
I. Finanoio
Paymont of bbaffer,.
Forwarding gold to the field.
Maintaining reoords40.
3. Frogrloss and Aohiovemonts;
a. Foundiv...?3.61.Ladairt, asaistanc? of %irks and British
Nverything aooampliahod by the writor and his staff in !air
constituted programs. sine* no previous work had boon Ilan. there
by OBS, (Wise Dorothy U. Oox, who arrivad in January 1043, mad.
valuable observations and ?outsets during hors first row months in
Lair, but was preventod from jotting on with tho main job by leek
of directions, authorSty, supplios, and means of aemmuniaationj
The writoros assignmeint wan to put agents into soompled Orme*, sad
to get their risports out. %view the amaditions prevailing, %ha
boot mama was a limit or oalquas working from the Turkish *oast.
such as the British Bervioes had alroady boon aperating for ammo
oightoon months. Buoh a oaiquo sorrice Gould not exist without
the approval, assistance, and protaotion of tho TUrkish warmest.
Appreaeh ens therefor. mad* through tha Chief of TBLD Istaahul, to
the Chief or Oeneral Staff Intolligoneo (a sorvioe kayos as the
Maniyst, somprising seourity and moorot pollee tuaetieso) is takara?
This ?Moor gave paranoias and approval or the prajeat sad oast
4
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4
ordors to his reprosontative in 'sla.1r te furnish the neeessary
aosistanoe and oovor for the operatioeo. The Sritish servieoo
holpsd with advlee and pooaoloaally with **sea and supplies, et
first hesitantly and with signs of joalbuoy. but later nith a
spirit of good will end sooperatiem,nhem their raspeet end 000p-
oration had boon woe.
b. Ks Wost Samos Boston -
The firmt OBS base. "ray Wilt" was assignod in Aso 1114S at
a small port fifty miloo south of rear. Owing to look of salvoes
and supplies, howipver. it did not basin to fUnotioa Natal September.
1m that month, immediately after the surrender ef .444. ? subeldimry
balsa was set up in Samos. Atter the 'vacation of that island by
the Allies (17 Novembor 1943), oonaidarations of eeourity sad of...
fimiamoy demanded tho ?polling of an altogother *ow balm. whioh was
dono at "Boston", mono forty Idles north of 'emiin Deeme.ber 1941.
Boston was gradually developed into an motive *altar of operations
and the more taportabt 'eft dispat?hod from their*. though
Key West was always eaintainod as a valuablo seeondary bee* sod pert
of amll.
S . Growth of oal ue fleet -
A float of oaiquos was built up ()lowly *ad pataftilly.
first oraft war* acquired in Soptember 1$43, others were taken et
in Samos in Ootobar and November; but it was net until the smear
of 1944 that adaquato weasels wore provided from Cyprus and theist',
rebuilding and rofitting at Boston. In the fW11 sad Water of' 1,444
de
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there ware only 6 to 10 arrivals and sailing* per month at Key
West. In 5aptember 1944. 39 were raoordad at Beaton and 65
at Key ftst.
d. 3uppzing of bases and field -
Ono of the chief responsibilities of the Ismir bass was
supplying food, clothing, and special aquipment to missions in
the Mold. Most of these materials were procured in Middle
Bast and sent by ea* to Key West aid Boston whars they were
trans-shipped into mall caiques for dolivary to the field.
Tha supply rout. from Alexandria and Cyprus was not properly
eotablished, howovar, until the summar of 1944, and before that
the Izmir staff was obliged to buy many items loeally, both for
the equipmant of th:J- bases and for sacrat (and illegal) export
to tho field.
Wireless .
????0111?11....1111111106.111111?14?11.1
Wireless stations were set up in Izmir. Key 14st. and $amos
In Auguat-Saptember 1943 and at Boston in January 1944. Contact
was maintained among the bases and with Oalre. Cyprus and Istanbul.
Latsr, as the nacessary ommunications staff and proper aquipment
was supplied, contacts were *ado and maintained on an increasing
scale with agents in oonupied territory and even with our own
claques at sea. At the and of August 1944 a maall broadcasting
station was sot up at Boston for tha use of 110 in addressing
subversive propaganda to enemy forces in Greece.
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r
II. Missions
Most of the missions put into Greece were prepared and
trained in Middle Mast. Ismir was oecasionally able to help
in the recruiting of agents by spotting promising candidates
cm they first came out of Grimm) and direating them to OSS
Cairo. Several agents, wireless operators. and guides were
recruited looally or brought specially from Oreeca, and were
trained by the Ismir staff and attached to missions going in.
A few missions. notably the.. to the Samos area and the
Dodokanese. were formed, trained and entirely directed by
Izmir. (See histories of tnissions Imerald. Dago and Lucian.)
g. te!!O&fttion and -
Refugees. enemy deserters. and special agents coming to
Izmir from Greece were interviewed by OSS offiocors whenever it
was possible. Most of this work fell to Miss Cox. the Reports
Officer, who was able from these sources to add an important
body of supplementary intelligino? to the regular reports of
our own agents. The writer was prevented by his administrative
duties from engaging personally in much of this work, but enjoyed
a few opportunities of interrogating and of preparing reports,
espeoially on military subjects.
h. Achievements -
The major achievement of the Ismir staff was the suecossful
founding and operating of base. through which the missions of the
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Most of the missions put into Greece were prepared and
trained in Middle Rest. Ismir was ooeasionally able to help
in the recruiting of ageivts by spotting promising candidates
as they first come out of Greeoe and directing than to WS
Cairo. Several agents, wireless operators, and guides were
recruited looally or brought specially from Greece, and were
trained by the Izmir staff and attached to missions going in.
A few missions notably those to the Samos area and the
Dodekanese, were formed, trained and entirely directed by
(Se. histories of tassione itmerald, Dago and Lucian.)
Refugees, enemy deserters and special agents coming to
Ismir from Greece were interviewed by OBS offioers whenever it
was possible. Most of this work fell to Miss Cox. the Rsports
Offioers who was able from these sources to add an tmportant
body of supplementary intelligence to the regular reports or
our own agents. The writer was prevented by his administrative
duties from engaging personally in much of this work, but enjoyed
a few opportunities of interrogeting mnd of preparing roperts,
The major aohievement of the lair staff was the su000ssful
founding and operating of bases through which the missions of the
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Greek Section (all branches) could be forwarded, maintained,
and kept in contact with Cairo. In addition, ce,-taia separate
operations were sueoessfully carried auto during the eraouation
of Samos (17-20 November 194S) OBS oaiques brought out British
troops, Greek troops and civilians, and several hundro4 Italians
of the hapless Ounce Division (letters of oammendation tram Major
General A. C. Arnold, British )4.A., and General Sir Nary "ilea*);
Lt. Savage of the Izmir staff won the Silver Star and Purple nowt
for his part in the notion in ilmaos, the escape of ? Gorman woman,
who had been secretly working for the American Mmbassy and had
fallen under suspicion of the Germans and was sought by the S.D.,
was successfully engineered by OBS Izmir, somewhat to the surprise
and greatly to the satisfaction of Brigadier General Tindall
American Military Attache in Ankara (see report of ?penal*s gleney-
moon"); numerous smaller day.to.day services, such as transporting
men and equipment, relaying messages over our network, and supplying
information, wore performed for Amerioan, British, Greek. and Turkish
agencies when occasion permitted. The writer was partioularly trat-
Mod that genuine friendly cooperation, based on mutual confidence
and respect, was developed (sometimes in the fact of considerable
opposition and prejudice) with the Stat. Department and O.:, Dritish
military and secret services, and Turkish intelligonoo? At the
closing of the Izmir base in Noveaber 1944, several Amorioan and
British officers of AML and of the Pritish operational command in
the Aegean (Pore. 142) expressed genuine regret that our services and
facilities would no longer be available.
Ark%
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I
4. Congtions whioh mi ht be isTrowed,
Motel Si,, the operation under disoussion has boom terminated,
no ?hang's in it oan now be "ado. The following remark' eau,
therefore, be of interest ooly as guides in other familiar enterprises,
present or future. The writer would *leo st,Ite that he is fully
*were of the extreme diffioulty of meeting oven the basis requirement'
ln mon and supplies, as well as orgeniastion? of an operation so coo*
pies and dolionto as that oonduoted in Izmir.
a.
Staff . (moral ualifiostions
In an operation dependent, like ours, on the aervioes of Weeks,
it is important that many of the staff should haw, at least a seek-
ing knowledge of the language, and almost indispensable that thine
should home some familiarity with the Greek *harm:liter and mentality.
Working, furthermore, in noutreci Turkey, and being dependent en the
good will of the Turks, it was most desirable that the staff should
know smoothing of that oountry too, and be able to behave with tel-
erano. and taot in order to avoid friotion and to mmiain ineoespisuous.
Moat of the members of the limjt. staff who had not lived in the liemr
last before mode up in good humor for what they leaked in exporiemne.
A few, however, allowed their immature judgment to be warped by ig-
norance and personal projudio,. to the detriment of the operation'
in hand and to the danger of security.
b. Staff s ?iris needs -
The limir base woe undermanned. As a restrlt, *everal offioers
wore drawn from the intelligenoe work for which they wore qualified
_ 114 ,061
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and obliged to spend most of their time at (Aortae' jobs Pur whish
they had not been trained. The ?Moe never had a secretary1 though
requeots were repeatedly made for one. from June 1943. This secretary
should have been an intelligent. reliable American (man or woman)
knowing typing, stenography and riling. A full-time ?ode clerk was
needed from the fall of 1943; he arrived at the end of June 1044;
up to that time, the work was shared waong the officers of the staff
or done by ? highly trained wireless technician who was thus kept
from his own tasks. From the beginning of 1944 onward the dutinl
of cashier and bookkeeper became increasingly burdensome and ?ampler;
they were performed first by the writer and later by one of his un-
fortunate assistnnts who could have used her time more profitably
in other work. Security investigations could not be oonduoted as
thoroughly as was desired and r000rds were never adequately main-
tained. Thio was a part-time job, calling for a man of good Gammen
sense rather than speoialised training. A sound knowledge of Creek
would have been espeoially valuable in his case, though not essential.
In tact the writer would gladly have undertaken to train an able
and willing NCO in financial and security duties, continuing thereafter
to supervise and be responsible for the ponduot of both. Finally,
the function of Supply Officer, most important and emoting, was
never quite satisfactorily performed. It was undertaken by various
men, in turn and In eombination. One ?Moor, familiar with orderiago
handling, and shipping supplies, and with keeping inventory. would
have added greatly to the efficiency of the organisation.
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Jurisdiation eommand
As stated in filiation 2. above, the ehief offieer of 048 in
hair VAS held responsible by the Turks for all 048 aativities in
the area, and it was therefore necessary that he be in abeolute
oceimand of all personnel and operatives there. ?or examplti wire.
lose could not be set up or used without the sanction of the antlysti
oaiques on secret miesion oould not touch at unauthorised ports ex-
oept under the cover of the anniviti supplies could not be move4.
nor could mon lend and travel without passports and visas except as
elements of the Imniyet. (Notes An Italian resident of Ismir was
summarily tried and hanged in 1944 beoause ? small wireless trans-
mitter, belonging to someone else, was found buried on his land;
whereas 08$ wireless, arms, explosives, etc., were handled with sem.
siderablo freedom and hundreds of tons of supplies were moved with-
out the customs control which was normally imposed even on the
British secret servioes.) Under these conditions, the independent
direction of oommunioations men, maritime operations, 80, SI. etc.,
by different branch heads in Cairo was an unthinkable anomaly. And
yet the various branches, being responsible each for its own type
V.:4V2r,
of operation and feeling an understandable jealousy of its owls
activitie9, often initiated actions which could not be reeoncile4
with the realities of the situation. This was particularly true
with various officers of MU, who, apparently with little knowledge
of the ways of oalques and their crews, or of Aegean weather as it
*treats mall craft, or of the immediate requirements governing our
operations from day to day, frequently made plans and gave orders
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that were impossible to carry out. As a result, unneeessary
friction developed between Cairo end the advanced bases; Izmir
gained an exaggerated reputation for obstructiveness and amok
time and energy were wasted. Those diffieulties mould have been
largely eliminated byl (1) placing caique operation in the Aegean
unconditionally under the command of Izmir from the start; (2)
restraining the branches in Cairo from making plans for that area
without previously consulting Inair; (3) frequent personal confer-
ences between offioers of the forward and rear headquarters.
d. !ma -
Until mid .summer of 1944 the bases were poorly equipped and
supplied. They often lacked it. of basic necessity for their
operations, to say nothing of those that would contribute to the
comfort and well being of the men. This was owing partly to a
general lack of experience and partly to inefficient ordering in
Izmir; but the major responsibility rests with the ordering and
procurement departments in Itiddlo East and with those who failed
to provide adequate transport and to see that the goods moved forward
promptly.
m. Finance -
011?011??????????????????????????
Inair was generally well supplied with funds, the expenditure
of *loh was properly left to the discretion of the offieer in charge.
Pinches were felt only ocoasionally when funds were not delivered en
schedule. The procedure of accounting, however, was not well worked
out. The writer was told before he left Washington that, for reasons
of security, no records of the expenditure of special funds d
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II
required. As the nature and soope of the Lair operations biome
evident, however, he did devise ? system of bookkeeping and made
the acloounts as detailed as time and eircumstanees allowed. Repeated
requests were made for instructions in this matter, but none were
received until the end of August 1944 when a representative of the
Special Funds Branch came to Ismir to examine this books and explais
the proper system. (For full statement of the case, see letter of
16 August 1944 from Caskey to Blind). errors and inadoquacies in
the financial records could have boon eliminated bys (1) a clear
statement of financial policy and instructions in the form of bock-
keeping that was wanted; (2) sufficient clerical staff to keep the
records and prepare the reports.
f. 1111T1.91.7
A number of officers and other members of the Ismir staff miry
recruited overseas and, having no formal training. MOTIO obliged to
pick up the necessary knowledge from day-to-day experience. Those
who had gone through WS schools in America or Middle Bast had boss
exposed to a good deal of theory on security and methods of under.
?over work, but knew painfully little about military and other teeh-
nical fields of intolligenoe or about the correct organisation and
form of an intelligenoe report. In practice. ammo's sense and nettle
wit proved far more important than special training in the field of
Security. The same qualities were dram upon (wit)t rather sotamiskims
su0000s in some oases) for the main job of reporting. but a very tarp
amount of valuable information goo ovorlookod or isadoquatoly reported
? togif...
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for look of proper training wog the at.. The writer hem
recently seen that great ohnngee have been made in the traimies
programs mine* 10414 and essumes that the defieioneiee are betas
mado up, but cannot emphasise too strongly the seed of eensontra.
tion on this aspect of preparation, tor both spate and 'tett ottleers,
5* ti.a1114"14/"...inti.hillf1ll
Notes Most ef the diffieulties encountered by the writer have
been olassified or set down as examples in the preceding empties, and
need not be repeated.
a. Internal discord .
The writer's chief disappointments, dimpouragamiat sad isOliosa.
tion mole not tram the difficulty of opposing the enemy, bat firm
profitless and wasteful antsgonism end ineffieionsies ammo /Mimi,
between Ameriean agencies, and within Oil itself. Periommotily his
owe periods or depression did not last long,and his efforts eerild e.
uelly be directed toward eliminating rather than prolonging the eft-
Mots.
b. 1111t141!!!!!.!!!!?E2114.2 -
rt may be worth recording (without undue emphasis) that as as.
Nippy atmosphere of discontent showed itself oeeasionally at Porten
during the last few months of work at that Immo. Certain Amorloos
members or the staff sampleined of the conditions of life there, it
being given too little eonsideration from Caire and lair, ail for
favoritism being shown to Greek personnel of the nice Iowa.
gave rise to thoughtless aocusetions and grudges. It is true that
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life at the base was unoomfortable and monotoaous. Many fasilitiee
were looking and the conditions of secrut operation in a neutral
country made even a simple haerioan sort of op impossible. hair
and Cairo undoubtedly failed at times to do all they should have
done for Boston. It is the writer's opinion that the diseostemt wee
due portly to weariness and boredom, partly to /sparest'. and Lew
maturity in eons of the offioore of the beim. (There were se eon.
plaints from the oommander of Key West, who performed single-handed
a more diffioult and trying task than any of the mon at 'oaten.)
When there was a shortage of supplies, the writer tried ooasistontly
to oarry out the polioy of favoring the most forward unit -- miesious
taking precedence over base and base over headquarters -- irreepeetive
of the nationality of personnel, provided only that base and head-
quarters wore not stripped to the point of helplessness. It was
argued by others that this was an Amerioan operation and that, there-
fore, Amerloan personnel should rooeive first onasideration in all
oases. The Chief of OBS Middle Bast supported the latter argumomt.
After the ?losing of the Turkish bases, therefore, the writer, feel-
ing that he was not well qualified to Garry out the polisy laid down
by his oommanding officer, requested transfer to another theater.
0 I f
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111TANIMM. 100.414 HO. 114
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVE NMENT
TO
PttOM
SU NMI's
Director
Secretariat
Field Report from Carl Schaefer
DATR: 16 Februdry 1945
I. Attached iH a report from Mr. Carl Schaefer, who
served with MO/ETO and was assigned to the PWD training
Section. Mr. Shaefer makes the following general observa-
tions:
a. PWD training program was less effective than the MO
because of disagreements on policy matters between the
British and Americans and rather uninspired caliber of
the British officers engaged in this training.
b. Because MO was unwilling to allow its personnel to
be screened by PWD and the reports were unavailable,
MO personnel were not always considered for key Jobs by
many PWD section heads.
c. MO operations would have been considerably more
effective had there been a common understanding between
London and Washington on matters of policy and leadership.
Attachment
e0.3
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer
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24 AnserY 1945
OUBIEOTs European Theatre of Operations Field Report
TO1 Colonel Kenneth Mann, Chief Morals Operations
Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Washing-
ton, D. O.
?
L. Following recruiting by Lt. (s.j.) :ohm Reinhardt
and signing by Bdward Cushing, on 2 February 1944, reported
to OS Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 10 March 1944. It.
twain dates was confined under physician's oars, coffering
attack of serum poisoning.
2. Attended "S" 14-15 March. Trained for Mew York
17th, Oiled for ZTO 20th, arrived in Scotland 28tk, reperted
to MD Office in London 29th,
3. While awaiting definite assignment developed NW
wrote "black" newspaper aimed at foreign slave workers In
Germany. Also produoed rumors and submitted several postai
and radio project ideas.
4. Attended the two week Mrondesbury Training Sehieeii'
operated by the Psychological Warfare Division of Supremo
Headquartere Allied ExpeditiOnary Pores.
5, Asked for and received aesi4nment to FiliDiSMARF. I
could see that this would be the successful operation in plop,
chological warfare.
6, Slotted by PWD to the Training Section. As senior
training officer I was associated closely with NO. 4 War Of
Selootion Board, which was the PWD equivalynt of "W. At the
area, Where I spent much of my time, I officially represented
WASP and unofficially the United States Army. With the an*
caption of myself the staff of No. 4 WM was British.
7. Additionally served in the administration of *hi
other PWD training oenterst Olevedon, field schwa Um**
near Bristol; Brondesburyp basic lectorce,leafLetaiopiniav
prisoner interrigation schoel near London Ruth-teat walk
located in the Midlands; the Garden, Oman prisoner oVIOW,0001.
near London. ,
S. Following liberation of Praise*, by "bleb tilms.41. 1
deputy ohief of training, it was decided to close the Irsi
Section until such time as policy toward occupied Situniar
-) defined.
' 9. The Yiln Section of PW36SRAW requested I
,that unit in view Of my-notion picture backgromadw
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wau arranged.
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10. With my opposite number, a British major, plammied
German oombat and occupational operations insofar as use of
films for propaganda and education were concerned. It was
originally planned that I would join combat team of 12th Army
as Film Officer; later it was decided I should go direct to
Berlin upon fall of the city.
11. When it appeared to ma that Berlin would not be taken
for six or more months, oinked MO in London whether I could take
my leave back in the United States and so visit my wife end child*
This wall arranged.
12. Arrived in Wanhington 27 November 1944 and was, given
choice of returning to the TO, going to the CBI or teaching MO
at WA for Ochoole and Training Branch. I chose the instruction
assignment.
13? Colonel Robinson approved on 4 December to my joining
S&T, which would necessitate my being transfered from MO. The
following day I checked out of Washington.
14, Reported 2 January 1945, at completion of my leave,
to Newport Beaob, California, for transport to WA.
15. GeneTal Observations;
a) Of the British and Americans who passed
through ND, those from MO owe best trollied,
those from OWI worst. The OWI Huntington
School appeared to have been more of a country
club than training center and/or tbs OWI was
sloppy in its recruiting*
b) "S? reports were not available and MO was
unwilling, rightly or wrongly, to send poreonmi
to No. 4 WO OM for screening; consequently, MO
nen were not always considered for ke:/- Jobs by
many PWD section heads.
c) The ion training program wasp general4 lees
offecti44 than the MO beeause the Iriti3h and
Americans could not (Uwe agree on p01147,
majority of instruotors mere uninspired DrittOk
?Moors, the training was too gemeral in matare.
4) More training in white techniques might have
been given MO personnel who, in looadam, tommd
themselves assigned to work in white *Wes wait
six or seven weeks atter D Mny for the bleak
directive to coma through. -mum
1Conclusion to Yield Report( I wish to go 46 r?witico
pleased helve had the opportunity or reprosentift MD in sem
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, pogo throe eehaofor field report to oh/of
?hi operotion ofitO promir? no z obsiorvid it? losad haft
boon store ouoolresful had' tOere been a oftion iissOro
botweea Washington *ad Zondon on matIsre of palter oisd
leadership' MUth of Ude 90000010 of rwD som so tr000d to tit*
efforts of trOstin? arlir Ap4 oivillan? who probabAr_vosad hate
boon pastod had the, aot nave boom oontributod to aNproas
Roodquartors" I an afraid the MO blush In Undo. would
hare failed in Ito purpose had it not had the Poyeholagiaal
Worfaro Division to loan on"
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