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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
November 3, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 23, 2013
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Publication Date: 
May 29, 1942
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PDF icon CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0.pdf26.06 MB
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' ; ; ? 1 ? ? ? ? - ? ? 1 1 1 ? ? ? : ' ?-?? ? ? . ? . _ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006'-0 ' ? ? ?????????????????.,,? 4_2(444 0,44. .SOMUMMO.....ROVAMMEI,elw 111.2 07 - ' t14.?- , f .!1 "sc'7'.:;1?71:?7, - ? ..*A" t.; ;0-1.1 ?? ?',4-21`;'="4": 4: Y f , r1 ,...,:t. ? ,....,. g.,.,,,-, ? ., 1..e.- i? ,,r.t.,,--sa: ? 1-,- -,..3?e. ..P.' Z.' L',. ? ?? '- , ????, - , - - ? ' ? . ? ? ??= ?.? ? - ;'',:',11'.,;!7; '?%-? ??;. irf . . ? r, ? - . q'44. 61 I 111 1 I I I I I I El NI I I I III I I I I I I 111 IP"1"5"1 ; I I I I I I I I s s i f i e d and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP-100001R000100170006 ??1' _?[.`"r:71-# r Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 _ --,_-.. : . _ - - _ ---... ? . fr., ??.,= - -? --:.%.?.;., -.F.v...1.L.---.. - ? .-,-1-....;_e... - - ?-1,---=0;-,i`-?- ? ---.,....-1 - : j . ' ::-*:', ! '-' .4 .1 '''.1:: ?-f:i ? -t - i -,.... ? - - . .., - ?,-. t_4,---.:: t : - ?..ttViti .'" 1 ; _ , , '''''.-'3?-i!'..- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 A COMMENTARY ON SONE ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY SITUATION May 29, 1942 came much sooner than previously expected explains in considerable measure the cur- rent surge of optimism in the United States. Close observers of the Gellman scene view such optimism as unsupported by their esti- mates of the Nazi domestic and military Coordinator's office reveal that the British bombing campaign will probably have a minor effect this year on the Nazi war effort against Russia; that the German oil position remained substantially in balance even during the Invasion of Russia; and that Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R00010017nnmn Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 SECRET ? optimietic BrItioh eottmaten of (lemon mon- tattoo on the Ruamlan front are fru too htcho On the homo front the allegell differenoon between the Na At Pup.* nnd Retehowehr are believed no longer to be an inDUO of fundamental importanoo. Germany'o rood pooltlon to probably oared Cot' throurh the year 1942-10486 The Wily are already in potioonoton or a lftrge and airntfieant part or the Rnoolan eounomy. There in nu oonlano. ing ovidenee that (WIWI morale hoe boon aeriouoly impairod? Reoent Oemin ponoe foolovo aro probably a oign of otrongth rather than weak- moos in the "ocoupled conntrioo," ao repro- anted by aftlY, 1rall00, ana NOPINV, 1ie oon- trolling authority (honoo Nazi influofloe) dmi not eoem to be throatonod in Any noriona way. Finally, a judiolouo uoo or prop ganda can undoubtodly bo elootivo In wtdoning tho floouroo in tho Gorman Immo front; onoo r. :yr 'W,I1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 fP11 ?-tt. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 the situation has become sufficiently serious. But for any large scale propaganda assault a strategic moment should he chosen. That moment might arrive after important German defeats in Russia* fr. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - ` , t, ? ? G.???" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 2 t. A COMMENTARY ON SoME ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITAAY SITUATION May 29, 1942 Tho past two weeks have witnessed a surge of war optimism in this country. This Ameriean "victory panic)," as one Swedish cor- respondent dubs it, refleets various develop- ments--reports on the Battle of tho Coral Sea, optimistic American official statements, the Russian "offensive" borer? Khnrkov, and a vague fooling that the Germans aro serious- ly weakening and that the eraek-up may not be far off. This vein of optimiam has de- veloped despite the warninp: of the President that the war will be long and that the pre8s should de its part by redueing individual vieter5.1s to their proper proportions in the larger pattern of the struggle. A high point Wan reaehod When Nemmek carried as the titlILUe of its loaa artiole: "Chance for Victory in 1942 Causes Allied Hopes to Soar." 1.4 - ? . ?.` ? - Pt ' nnmv pc1 For Release 9/2 . RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 .;_,.....:11.:::;:i:ifi; ' 47:14f .:-.1. -......----11.::-,..01'-1'13-..:;172:42:7: - - ? . --- ......1i.-..::-.-2 ........ ......, ,,, .....,..,, .....?......, ' ?'; " .... - _ .1 :?4 ? 1.: - ? __I : ? ???ri :... - ' ?A:-.-S.-ii ? ?.1-4,,,..t..:7: . ,. .," ;'....--..7-1 _,... -.e.?---- ?,?,, , -- - --, '.:.,-? . ir-iszfl . , _ -,? iv,. ?fi,..4 ? ? .11.- ;4 ":???`-1 ? , ? ? ., ? ?-. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Close observers of the 3erman view suoh optimiam as ufl8Upport y heir estimates of the German domestic alid military situation, The following meinoranduti makes no attempt to offer anything like a camprehet- sive picture of the German situation. It has simPlY ohosen certain aspects of the picture to which careful study has recently buen de- voted by the Qoordinatoris office. EFFEtiTS OF TER RRIT18H Af/c OFFEkSIVE The press in general has tended to "p1ay up" the iplportance of British bombing of Ciermaal 444 the occupied terrItories, The PUT4is is spectaoular and "newsworthy." It reppepents the only significant British 4411417 effoPt tle qoment, A survey of PV44.4@f3 by 44 4412 @xporf poncludes, how- @Irt43/ 404 t49 ppopekt tempo; this bombard- 4144tW4Lh4V? hut A 41144QP offect on the German W413 ktf@Pt 4g4iNft 44144 4tWeen noW and the ,O (114T4t4411 4.13@ PlIrt41.[Pd by te Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 a s.r Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ??? - 3 - It is very easy, however, to exag. gerate the amount of damage which would be done even if Anglo-American resources permit a notably heightened tempo of attack. The blitz on Coventry, most successful of all, reduced the town's activity index, based on electric power consumption, to 37 percent of its previous level. But electric power consumption had returned to normal in about five or six weeks. The conclusion i8 simple: the most damaging blitz of the war must be repeated every few weeks if the industrial activity of the target area is to be kept down to a damaging level. Bombing operations of this type are, moreover, relatively inefficient. An estimate of Britiefh bombardment of individual factories as of the end of 1941 indicates that, of 100 planes dispatched on missions, 60 will reach the target area, 12 will actually find the target, and .-Jf the latter 25 percent will deliver bombs on the target. In other words, f'ICQIfI(1ove or lease 2013/09/23? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 SECRET three percent of the bombs dispatched will actually find the target. British experience ind3.eate8 that 75 percent of the aircraft assigned a bomber command will be fit to fly at any one time, that there will be crews trained to man 50 percent of the total assigned, and that weather will permit bombardment opera- tions on an average of six to seven nights a month. Losses from day bombing are too high to make that a regular practice. One British bombardment group showed a loss of 25 percent per month of its operational strength in day- light operations against Germany. THE GERMAN OIL POSITION Commentators and the press generally have indulied in consistently loose talk about the weakness of the German oil position and the "inevitability" of a Nazi military cam- paign to acquire oil resources in the Caucasus or eleeWhere. A current study of the Coordina- tor's office reveals a very different picture. IThca-AncCifiPri And Anoroved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? ;?7; i ? ??? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 5 It conoludes that petroleum production and consumption were In approximate balance even during the German offensive of last fall, when military oil requirements were at their peak. At most the Nazis made only nogligible withdrawals from stooks during that period. From June to December of last year, petroleum consumption of the German ground and air forces on the Eastern Front probably amounted to about 430,000 tons a month?around 300,000 tons of whloh were for the ground forces alone. Combat vehicles accounted for about 70 peroent or this latter figure, supply vehioles for the remainder. Divisions actively engaged in combat were responsible for more than 90 parent of the ground force consump- tion. Of the 130,000 tons oonsumeti by the air force, almost all was for planes rather than for the supply servieo. DurinR this same period, military oonsumption elsewhere than on the Russian I .. I . ? nprIassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001 R000100170006-0 I p. Ii a 171414:;41 ?????,' - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - 6 - SECR";) front amounted to about 225,000 tons a month, with civilian consumption 670,000 tons. The consumption total of 1.3 million tons a month was only slightly larger than the estimated production rate. Thus petroleum production and coneumption were in approximate balance. Although this report has not studied the period from December, 1941, to March, 1942, as camfully as the preceding period, it seems unlikely that military consumption of petroleum during the winter amounted to more than 420,000 tons a month. If civilian consumption continued at the rate of 670,000 tons a month, total consumption was approximately 1.1 million tons. ascompared with a production of 1.3 million tons. The conclusion is inescapable that German petroleum stocks last winter were in- creasing at a rate of approximately 200,000 tons a month. GERMAN CASUALTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT Optimistic estimates of Germaa Permanent, casualties on the Russian front, '410. k 3SUattittmatensaaosium?....?6.4t nprIassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - ?'? .414-cc?.';?! _ 1,F*3?5: ? ,:rricr- V.41 if ? 14 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 from British and other sources, mn as high as 2,300,000. The estimate of the Coordina- tor's office, however, is only about 1,250,000. This figure is unquestionably a conservative one. lhile these higher estimates cannot be summarily a1&MJAW1, it is believed that they are based on total casualty figures which are too high and that to breakdowns or these figures utilize percentages of killed, missing, and totally disabled which ars too high R pro- It should be noted that any estimate of permanent losses does not include the Im- portant factor of men in hospitals. What may be called the "hospital Pool," in a period of large-scale offensive operations such as the campaign of last fall in Russin, probably results in a constant drain of somo 600,000 700,000 men on the strength of the German armed One oommontary introduces another Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 OP. -- ? N.4....14,0111???01.....t?et-?.?? ft41.4.1????.1.4?111400110111. 4... d?fillWatAliai.1240 .....?, SECRET it refers to the calling up for military service of boys 17, 18, and 19. It adds that those groups are being brigaded with the divisions, and introduce a large new ele- ment of relatively untrainod men into the army. No authority can he discovered for this report, and it ie not accepted in certain responsible quarters in M.T.S. which have been queried. It is be3ieved that the statement, in so far as it concerns boys 17 and 180 comes from someone who failrA to distinguish between military service and Arbeitsdienst. German law makes boys begin- ning at 18 subject to military training. Prior to their military training, they are obliged to enroll in the Arbeitsdienst for a variable period. In this connection, a Military Attach report from Berlin, Decem- ber 5, 1941, states that boys 17 to 19 were in fact called up for Arbeitsdienst to work .11 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDF13X00001R000100170006-0 ???????.... ? ? ,? 4.4 ? . ? 15 ,6,47????? : z? ? ' ??G" ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 SECRET with the Organization Todt in an effort to solve transport and supply problems in the East. But there is no evidence that they were brigaded with the divisions to fight at the front. ? PARTY AND ARMY Certain writers have emphasized what they term a "fundamental opposition" between the Party and the Army. But the old independent Wehrmacht no longer exists. Since February 4, 1938 when Blomberg and Fritsch had to go, the German army has been pretty effectively Nazi Lied from the top downward. For some years now the entire young manhood of Germany has passed through the pre-military training en- trusted on January 19, 1939 to the SA. All the younger classes now in the Army are the products of Nazi training and education. Nothing is more certain than that the expan- sion of the 4000 commissioned officers of the old Reichswehr into the hundreds of thousands of officers of the present army has resulted ;???? ? ? 'Y?4 .???????fflaufr111110224, ? 4Ainlo Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 in an immense strengthening of the position of the Nazi Party in the Army. Military Attach' reports agree that all the officers in the grades from major downward aro solidly National Socialist. The higher officers from colonel upward are still in the main the officers of the Reiehswehr. Promotion in tho Gorman army is slow, oven in time of war. Very few Nazis have found their way into tho higher and high- est grades. The officers or these grades aro above all professionals with little or no political tradition behind them. It was only due to the lack of political leadership on the part of Hammerstein, Blomberg and Fritsch that the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air Corps, held aloof from the Nationalist Sooialist movement. But such an aloofness as that of the Reichswehr under the Republic was impossible to maintain in the face of a nationalist rsvaution which in its essence 45: ? t r. 1'47' - I ? , ,s - .1- ? i' ? - Anni-miRri For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 was military. Hitler made an end of that aloofness on February 4, 1938, and he did It without resorting to one of Stalin's purges. The hostile officers were pensioned or gradually eliminated. It 15 safe to ay that few enemies of Hitler remain amoni the This is not to say that there is no longer any irritation between these pro- fessionals and the new and more radical Nazi loaders. A General von Kleist might still resign after a quarrel with Sepp Dietrich, the ranking general of the SS-Combat Divisions. It is also quite possible that the SS-Combat Divisions were a minor issue in Hitler's quarrel with the generals last autumn. Sinoe these SS-Combat Divisions are now being expanded very considerably, however, it is not unreasonable to presume that the high command is reeonoiled to their existence and special position. They have produced some abl.e.pfficerp, amorg them General Rommel. They npClassified and Approved For Release 2013./09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 1:!CRET are now accepted ns eontributors to the more conservative military journals, especielly the oonservative Milititrwoohenblatt, in spite of the persistenee of oortain irritations among the older army officers, the relation- ship between the Party and the Army is te longer an tost4e or fundmental tmportance,in the opinion of the best informed of our former Military Attaehlis. THE GERMAN FOOD POSITION The April ()hang? in German rations gave rise to optimistic oommento in the press, even suggesting that Nazi food shortages might soon be serious. A 'went nnalysis or the German food position by the Economies Divi- sion of the Coordinator's office, however, suggette a different situation. Germany's food posit!gon appears to be cared for through the year l942-48, on the assumption that the same areas now available to her will oontinue to be - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? ? ? '.? rY:4 -13- - It is only after the end of the calendar year 1943 that the situation may become serious, and to a considerable extent this too may be avoided by a further reduction in rations, particularly rat5ons of fats and oils and, In all probability, of meats. Such reductions might still be made without dealing a body blow to the efficiency of the German military and economic machine. THE EXPLOITATION OF RUSSIAN RESOURCES Certain commentators on the Russian front have consistently emphasized the tremen- dous diffioulties the Germans Laos in exploit- ing the Soviet economy. This comment general- ly fails to take into account the fact that the Germans have been in possession of consid- erable parts of that economy for many months. The Germans actually began their spreading oc- cupation of Soviet territory as far back as June, 19410 and had occupied before the end of November, all the Russian lands that they ' t, ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 now control* Thus the Germns have already been in covmand of these (=pored resources for from five=iand-a-half to eleven months, depending upon the date of occupation, region by region. After this occupied zone had been somewhat reduced by the winter advance of the ftasslan army, it still included about 50,000,000 hectares of cultivated land and had had g peacetime productivity very roughly estimated at 18,0000000 metric tons of coal, 16,000,000 metric tons of iron ore, 3,500,000 metric tons of pig iron, 3,400,000 metric tons of steel, ingots, 1,000,000 metric tons of manganose ore, and 32,000 metric tons of kluminum# Tho occupied area also had numer- ous large cleatria power planta, aa well ao the be developed railway net in the soviet The peaaevtime equity of thiogone vats, of ?moo,iiwhreduaed by Russian evaoua. tion of population, animalo, and mohinery, by Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ( I(1) 411 I ) r) i I f * i P4 4 " - it ( ),./. t ' \ ' ''! 'i (,l''' _ 1 ,,,?,, (I? ' 1 ii .;; 7 ? - ?'; i 1 t ? , ? I , .. ?..r. .; I, 1 . 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'sei "/) - f fii 4 ,E,I ?4. sy,141.,::s ' ./ 4* '4* 1:11 ,11-')1( ? i t ) ,II 1 0,*9 C.),,1 P. k) (?;r, 0 4 ,f)e, . j? ?Cc' oc, 49 A Pio0 ..)- is, 0 ? ? ,,,, , , .. ,,. ., --, i ' ..7,-'?' ?,' $.:: t-,- i7 ' - 4 . i V. 1? f e fiiiii eh % ? -^ ..riz, '*' , to -111441 ti?ri ' 041to ."1! " ?143 V 6 ' ke),i6 .2 s ,,,,. ?4-:...6..?' ..-,. ',..",?---, i C;) 0,1 C101,1 1?4,1Vi.e. PI) 41 Ir4 4 4*-44 4,0 s'.,,-', ; , ? ' i Q.4.7(ii P.? 4,40 If Ctilio ;'''' ..!.' le, . "? , _ _ ::- .. '4 eh_ ell 1 %) , ,,, ? . r fir e,ei E' ? . , 1.7it, I e 0 ?? ,....,',1'f ,.. li,k 6 ".' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 deliberate Russian wrecking of equipment and buildings, by damage resulting incidentally from combat activity, and so on. Besides all this, other conditions have operated to pre- vent the Germans from utilizing to the full the productive capacities that still remained When they took over; among these, the most important are perhaps the continued strain of military activity on this front, and the dif- ficulty of either operating or replacing the collective system of agriculture. Yet there is every reason to believe that long before the end of this year the Germans will have realized very considerable economic gains from the lands that they have already occupied with- in the frontiers of the Soviet Union. CONSIDERATIONS OF GERMAN MORALE Intimately allied to such considera- tions as food rationing and bombing is the problem of German morale. The view that serious cracks have already appeared in the - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 442ps49111...- W Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 -16- (;!CRET morale front and that we can win the war by propaganda is one of the favorite Corms of contemporary wishful thinking. It is unquestionably true that the German people, imbued with the notion that they were embarkinp on a short war of brilliant but inexpensive conquest, have been grievous- ly disappointed. The reverses and serious losses suffered by the German Army in Russia must have had deep and disheartening effects on all strata of the German population. The prospect of another winter of war, and per- haps still another, is doubtless a nightmare to the great masses of the German people. On the other hand, there is no con- vincing evidence that German morale has been seriously impaired. A recent survey in the Coordinator's office reveals widespread sup- port of the existing regime in word and deed. There is grumbling and SOMB dissidence among the aged, women, Austrians, South Germans, fterz Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ftrdnnt Luthoranft and Catholion, intolleotnnia, Jews and oortftin ?thorn. But opparontly tiler? in no juntirioallon ror ihoylow that tho organizational ertoioney or tho rorlmo wi.donproftd roma that, in th0 OVOld, or doroat tho Gftrman pnoplo wiii roap npoftoo or von- goanoat hao undoubtedly contributed Lo tho creation of an aititudo or r in dotorminft- tion to uoo the war through at 01 man. GERMAN PEACE PEELERS In oommonting rrom Limo to timo on roourront Gorman poaon footern, oorinin orrAnn of tho prone hay? givon thn impromftion that such ntopn nocesmftrily volloot Gorman wiftk- nonu-mthra tho Nazis aro attompting to omoapn from thn war booauno it has b000mo nnondurablo. Noro it Is important to Ointintvish botwoon two typon a poftoo foolors--tho firmt nrining from oonfidonoo and a dosiro to noo a oonsolida- tion of tho countrylm war ralno; tho c000nd Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001Pnnninni7nrma Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 tee, 3*-F. springing from a convietion of imminent In the last war, the outstanding spontaneous German peace offer, that of Decem- ber, 1916, same when the Central Powers were in a strong position. They had completely crushed the Rumanians. The Brusilov offen- sive on the Eastern Front had failed. And on the Western Front, the Allied advance on the Somme had in the previous month bogged down in rain and mud. Similarly in this war, the only clear-out German offer of peace (lame after the whirlwind triumph in Poland. In the sum- of 1940, after the fall of France, the Nazi radio informally suggested that Britain might as well lay down her arms. Last Decem- ber, after the disaster at Pearl Harbor (and When the German shook in Russia was less serious than many people in this country be- lieved) the Nazis again allowed the impression to get obroad that there was serious dissension Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? SECRET 1 between the Fuehrer and his generals, and that certain elements in the Reich might be ready for a negotiated peace. The second type of peace feeler, the offer of desperation," is exemplified in the initiatives of Emperor Charles or Austria In 1917 (Prince Sixtus affair), or of Luden- dorff in the autumn of 1918. There is, however, little apparent indication in any recent Nazi peace feelers that the Germans find themselves in a situation comparable to that of either the spring or the fall of 1918. A more apt comparison would probably be between the present position of the Germans, and their situation In late 1916 or early 1917. And such peace feelers may be just as much a sign of strength as was their offer of December, 1016. German peace feelers in a period of strength have significant propaganda values. natever happens, they tend to confuse and disorganize the Allied powers. If they are z VittimavaisLiapa-iftio.. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 nonoptad, thOy ()poll thb way NW tho oonnolida. Lion or Oomann ITInti and tho pomaildo phu/1i or tho Amp nndor moro ravorahlo oondltIonn. If thoy aro rornnod, lhoy may at lohla nprwid tho domoraLizInr. nonviutIon that qormany In II notnbly woaltonod oondItIon. I ri THE MaPW1) Viii.alThR1W3 R0000 dInounalonm or alloo:od man woaknonn lay oonoldorabto omphanio on Nazi dirrioult100 ill th0 000110fl(t LorrItorloo* Tho Implication In thnt oortaln or thoao oonntrIon aro alromdy dovolopim within thorn nIrnIrtnant lnatr,Amoato or ravolt and ILO. thoy aro, thororovo, inoreaminrly ripe) rot. Alliod Invanion. Troo clountriom aro oontrid in thin argurnout: ltftly, Vranoo? nnd Nurwny. In nono or thom doon Llit oontvoiling authority (Immo Na1 inrluonoo) naom to bo throat:ono(' tn n.ry porloilo way. Tho throo Cundmontol Coroor. lh Itattan 'two, namoly, tho monarolly (tnoluding ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R00010017onnn n .4000e. .t ? .???? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 the army), the faseist regime, and the Catholic Church, appear to be intact and to be united in an effort to preserve the intop:- pity of the kingdom and the power of the present government ugainst foreign and domestic The foreign anemias include the nations with which Italy is at war and may aiso inolude Italy's ally, Germany, whose Increasing power in the peninsula is a matter of "great (mourn to Italian ruling ciroJes, At the moment, this concern takes the form of limiting German control in Italy rather than of repudiating the German alliance which, from many points of view, has proved helpful to Italy (as, for axle, in the Greek and North African eampaigns). Curious- ly enough, even in non-faseist or mild anti- fmscist circles, Mussolini is looked upon as a bulwark against overhearing Gorman control Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 i? - - ? : ? ? The Savoy Monarchy, with its deep roots in Italian life, still has cons51orablo prestige among the pnople and still comands the unquestioned loyalty of the army. Tho strongest elements In tho army appear to be intact and to be still In Italy. Thn monarchy and the fasolst regime need oach othoP. To be sure, even it the fascist 1'e0m0 shwild fall, the monarchy could hope to wirvIva be- cause it might be able to count on tho mrmy and wide popular support. Thu Catholic Church and Min rnsoint rorime hay() been and arm on frlevOly term. The Church, oven MON) than tho monarchy, can purnun an Independent poliny, oven If raseiBm should fall. It must not be forRotten that the olercy in italy?inoluding the hierarchy -- in predominantly Italisn and feels o Rtirvit sense of patriotism towards Italy. The rear or national humilliWon, of dhaos or revolution (oommunism), Is one o the strong bonds whioh unite the foroos or , .7.0_;r:4??? 61: ? - - ? ' . ? :07."-?f-.., ? . . ? .'? ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 J Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Ia , -23- faseism, the monarchy and the Church at the present time. No organized anti-fascist move- ment, strong enough to seize power, seems to exist in Italy today. There appears to bo no immediate prospect that the Cascint rerimo will be overthrown. All the above is subjeet to qualifies,- tion dictated by a constantly changing world and Italian situation. The most important qualifioation is this: the return of Laval to power has created an "opening" which affords the bent opportunity for a diplomatic: anti-Nazi offensive in Italy sinoe that eountry entered the war. Frame At least three elements in the current French situation tend to discount optimistio views of the early crystallization of French resistance to the Nazis. First, the political or5ontation of Laval remains undefined. Anthony Eden believes that Laval is planning to lie low for a time to quiet apprehensions in America as ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4 well as in France, according to a recent statement. Laval probably hopes to mediate between Washington and Berlin and to acquire enough prestige in the New Order to feather his own nest and that of France. He will do nothing about Vichy warships for a time, Eden indicates, and neither contemplates nor aesires allowing Berlin to have them. This point of view receives confirmation from the current rumors that the Nazis, dissatified with Laval's failure to plot a clearly collaborationist course, may replace him with some outright pro-German such as Doriot or D6at. The second factor, a logical result of the first, is a confusion ir. the minds of the French people themselves. Reports from Vichy suggest that certain French civilian and military authorities, although not in sympathy with Laval himself, are still unwilling to believe that he will play the Germans' game completely. This wishful thinking extends - -4: ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 apparently even to a belief that Laval is clever enough to be able to double-eross the Nazis. Such a conviction, according to General de Gaulle, may for tho present lull the French people Into a falso sense of secur- ity. The third factor is an apparent dl3inelination for organized revolt on the part of the French masses. A report from Vichy suggests thnt the Freneh people will not dare to move until the Americans and nritish have established a seeond front in their country. Such a lack of initiative is not unconnected with the food situation on the continent of Europe, where undernourishment induees acute depression, listlessness, and general lack of interest in life. In the opinion of the food experts or the Coordinator's offices persons suffering from mlnutrition arc not desperate man readily moved to rash activity. Rather they are apathetic and Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? ? 4t Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 3.01.6Li411. o..................................,?.........**wroar-vrJAInun.waftaniwaamettoedisaiva4eartitwaz~tizeavilluktits2sise,ai#4 -2(3- indifferent pooplo who aeeept their lot with- out marked protest. The United Nationa can noaroely rely on such men apontanoously to foment internal rovolt on any significant scale. Nomx It la ?leer that since February thore hAs boon a marked deterioration or the relations botweon the quisling rogime and tle poopio. Quis)inr., who in said to have rained the aup- port of a scant one poreent of the people, has met mounting hostility since the failure or his February trip to Berlin. This has boon sharpened by h3s resent actions agalnat the clergy and toaehers of Norway. Inoroasin Coed restrletions and pormoeution have also inereanea the provocation to revolt, There also exists an intolliRent, diseiplined Underground movement, engaged in disseminating information, planning sabotage, and oolleeting arms for the day of Allied in- vasion. ? CIA-RDP13X00001 R000100170006-0 IF'lmr-Irl A nnr ved For Release ? ? .0+ 7.; ..? -2: 4 . I , ' ? - ? ? . ? ; . : ??????? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 0 -27- .ECRET However, as a recent study of the Coordinator's office shows, all this opposi- tion to Nazi rule and these preparations for armed revolt, do not threaten Germany's present strategy in Scandinavia. It is the Quisling government, not the German occupying forces, which is embarrassed by the uncooperative- ness of the Norwegian civilians. The sabo- tage activities of the Underground are not to be unleashed until Norway is invaded by British or American forces. Norwegians, Who six months ago looked forward to such an in- vasion in the spring of 1942, now hardly dare hope for it this summer. Commando raids, while in theory a reminder to the Norwegians that they are not forgotten, have become in- 'reasingly embarrassing to the Underground, since they offer an excellent excuse to the Germans for widespread arrests in reprisal. In any event: they are only local in character and do not afford an opportunity for the Nor- wegians themselves to hamper Ilitlor's plans. ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 z 4-tf,1a .a./delauoinitil*Kalig.,P4tax.......% ? 0 ---. (SECRET Sinoo February the Germans have Increased their forces In Norwny to eight or nine divisions. They are steadily improving communioations, ?specially with the rnr north. They are obviounly in a position to tighten up their control or the eivilian population at any time, an in seen in reported plant.; for clearing certain coastal nrean. There moreover, oonsiderable danger of any action that would prematurely expone the Underground to the Nazi authorities. In num, it in clear thnt Norwegian renintance in stifrening an the pressure in- ereanes, and it may be thnt the deteriornting position of the Quisling regime will bring some kind of a reshuffling in the government; but there does not appear to be any evidence that (greatly() Na23 eontrol of Norway is ?rack- ing, or will craok unless there is an Allied invasion or a withdrawal of Gorman force's. flliifiri nd Aooroved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 -14 ? -taSAii:' ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ' -20- THE GERML! SITUATION IN 1918 AND 1942 Historians have long appreciated the dangers of comparing seemingly similar events occurring at different periods. To many observers the last war appears "similar" to this one, and the optimism of the present moment even pretends to see in the events of 1942 a situation not too different from that of 1018. As a matter of fact, however, condi- tions on the German home front in 101h were distinctly different from those at present. The Empire lacked the propaganda-police en- vironment of the 14azi state which has made such strenuous efforts to prevent precisely such a weakening in the home front as finally came in the autumn of 1918. At that time the German governmeat failed dismally in the pro- vision of a propaganda of war aims, whereas the Nazis have built up a resplendent picture of the New Order of the future. " Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 no rood nitnntion In Ootimany by tho ona of tho fltint World Weir 1td 11Ioroov6p, bocomo vory ncnto. Normn1 ounnumorn In qopmAny (honnowlvot) and ?Moo workorti it I' oxnmplon) woro obtatnino: nbont . 1600 onlorlom 1101v. thnn 1110 Ilumbov vc(inivod h) taln .11 lo whtm no rola phyoicol About NO0 onior,v:! in n0000nn ry rot 111 1 ?,t1 ohinn nr con- Lhoy Iwo r000iviv toany In Gormhoy. leor thono who do lho Iriti ont typo r worht Lim minimum n[mildnrd im naunlly uot nt 44)00 . 4800 colorlon. thono workorn in Oormnny nro pr4ividrid 4000 onlorIon tIn I iy vorhopn PROPAGANDA AT TNE 1RE:1),;NT MIM;T100.: Tho POM401.0 above, (Jfi qt.WM411 mnrmlo aro not intonaod to augp,00t Clint pruldnif.nna may not pPovo n ointrionnt Intammesnt In in a nnrove or 13/09/23?CIA RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 .t=.1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 *W14nit 444 WWI; hicAr' Mak .9Z-611. hantoning ti o final collnpno or Oormin anoo. Donbliess n rola lironkdown in tho limn home front witi cow thitl 191B, an tho retiult or a militnry do r(+0,0 But the fist:Juror,' in LI o GOMM') homo rrola onn undoubtedly be erfootivoly vildonod hy n Judi- olous propaganda nflsaull. (moo Iht) nitunfl,m has become suffictontty noriAmn. For nny 8nch propaganda annaull, howovor, Wo tdionid choonn Ft highly ntrategio momont. That momont would come after a soriona Gormnn deront, who!) propa- ganda wouJd sorvo to drive home to Min 1:ormanri the ntark reality or widely r000!TI.;od ractfl. That moment might arrtve when a low oampni,,rn In Ruoula had ended in nerinun rtivernor an't when the GOVM4DS wore faced with Ilio Nyroach OC another winter. On the other hand, ir such a large noalo campaign were launohod now, It would probably be at me followod by tial German suooesses in Russia. It would then misoarry and might be difrioult to repeat later, nprlassifiRd and Aooroved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 weiseitelinffladitnitledlINIAMON26.12121110FEWVIINLCOMINVIUSIR!VIV,M1W- CSECREI It is bootless to discuss now the precise character which that campaign should take. It should obviously be designed to take full and precise advantage of the situation then existing. If, for instance, the Russians were at that moment rapidly rolling the Ger- mans back on their eastern frontier, it would be of little avail for the United States and Britain to make promises to the German people unless these were fully concurred in by the Kremlin and adequate guarantees of fulfill- ment were offered. Certain generalizations can be made now. Such a campaign should avoid saying what the everyday experience of the German disproves. It should avoid furthering the cause of those elements Which would like peace by negotiation in order to stabilize Germany's position for fresh conquests in the future. Such a campaign should probably avoid the /11sonian technique Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 and approach which the Germans have been taught profoundly to distrust. $, 414 .1 44iirf ? -1? . att. . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION 270 MADISON AVENUE PEW YORK '1541,144, Colonel William 3. Donovan Coordinator of Information 25th and E Streets, NW Washington, De C. With further reference to my yesterday's memorandum, I should like to develop a little further the thought expressed on page 4, paragraph (c). Thinking about this idea last night, it seemed to me that this particular proposal concerning parachute troops in Gernany has the merit that it requires practically no cooperation from anybody, and in one version of the pro- .ject it requires no action that we could not take ourselves. What I mean is this: 1. Suppose we got the War Department to give out, or permit us to give out, a story that a unit composed of German American volunteers is being trained to be dropped at night by parachute in Germany in order to commit sabotage. 2. A little latert the names of some ot\ those who have volunteered are casually given out and\ references made to the fact that several such units halm already been trained and that this is not the first one. 3, An outraged squawk could be arranged from the War Department on the grounds that this information had leaked out. This would insure its being widely dis- 4* Through British or our Intelligence, we learn that there has been a train wreck or an explosion somewhere in Germany, although this news has been withheld from publication by the German authorities. 5. We immediately announce that a few days ago American parachutists were dropped over a seetion of Germany in which we know that this accident has occurred. 6. A few days later the news of the explosion or accident comes out of Germany. If it does not come out, we can plant the story in one of the neutral countries. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-R 0 01Rnnninn ?-' 17.? ? .1,;?7 ;?;' , ???7: rfr ' rier, ,0471.A. - F: ? '"33C411Pm'll'""q4? Declassified and Ap?roved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 7. Two and two make four, and a lot of Germans will believe that German American saboteurs ars at work in Germany. 0 * 0 ? ? IP ? This same scheme could be worked in Italy, or any of the occupied countries. You remember how effective the stories of a German secret weapon were at the time of the break through in Belgium. There was no secret weapon, but the idea spread terror throughout the world. Thus, in this case there might be no parachutists at all and yet terror - and what in more important, hope - might be spread through- out oeoupied Europe. Sincerely, Warburg Advi Assistant Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 , 4 " : 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4.5cp- SECRET -e COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION 210 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK Colonel William J. Donovan Coordinator of Information ntb and E Streets, NW .%asbington, D. C. Dear Bill: S. 4/12 I.- ( U"' te1144, ? A * 17e* ? 4, eV, 44.4. AA-401,0w" I .-?- 1400( At. 1 February 19, 1942 The more) I think about our conversation yesterday, the more it seems clear that what you have now aceompliohed le a real mileatono and enables us for the firat time to plan upon to basis of reality, This, plus certain organizational changes which I hope the Roper Committee will recommend, ought to mobilize ua in sueb a way that the only excuse for our failure to do a real job will be our own ineptitude. On February 17th I gave the Roper Committee a written otatement of what organizational ehanges I thought were necessary. Tom Early has a copy or this statement in ease p.m ohould want to look at it. The attached memorandum contains an idea - or a group of ideas - which I would like to discuss with you when we meet again next week. It seems to me that we must find A way to overcome the difficulty in which we shell be for at leaat the next six months - namely, the fact that we ohall probably have no ouccesaful major notiona upon which to hang our propa- ganda, and that therefore we are likely to be thrown and kept on the defensive. I do not think we need to accept thio position, but to get away from it requires a somewhat radical approach. With best regards. Sincerely, Warburg Advi y Asaistant ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 0.0481 SECRET MEMORANDUM COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION 270 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK February 19, 3.942 It is unlikely that for the next six months the United Nations will a000mplish any me0or offonsivo nueceoses. So far se can be foreseen, the period immediate.. ly ahead will be a painful one of defending ourselves as best we can until our strength is fully mobilized. During the next oix months in all probability the Germans will reoume the offenoive in RUSSIA or the Middle East, or poosibly Africa, and the JapATIOSS will undoubtedly continue their offensive both toward Australia and India. This will therefore be a period during which it will be difficult to build up resietanee in the ocoupiod and so-called neutral countries. This situation need not be accepted from the Onemais soya Fornew.ms. point of view of olitical It ehould not be aocepted, bOCAUSO another six months of defensive politioal and psychological warfare added to the inevitable six months of military defensive may have disastrous oonsequences. Modern warfare differn from warfare in the past in that wnr is no longer a matter of armies, navies and air foroee, nor is political warfare any longer a matter in Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ueclassified and A Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDID13X00001R000100170006-0 ...."....e.oureMOINVIMMOMA94~4140.017WWWW11100t Nt2fe of negotiations between diplomats with an occasional full dress performance for the benefit of the general public. Military and political warfare are waged today with practically every man, woman and child in the world nitting in the theater As an audience, watching every detail, applauding when pleased, breathless When thrilled, art ready to throw oggs at the Rotors whenever bored or displeased. Hitler understanda this, lie has made the Nazi revolution and the war A oontinuing drama. He has made himoelt the chief actor. Ho has for six or seven yearm managed to keep the entire world talking about what he had done, wan doing, or was going to do. Since the war etarted, the British have only on throe eecasions been able to steal the show: riret, at Dunkirk; second, when they won the Battle or Britain in the air; and third, in their first Libyan campaign. But the British have never understood how to make their cause dramAtio* The Russians have come clogler to stealing the show from Hitler than anyone else. Even when they were being defeated they managed to make their Mae dramatic. It ban become doubly so since they suet:loaded In turning tho tide. Our entrtnce into the war was largely robbed of Ito dramatic flavor by the feet that we were attacked and defeated at ?earl Harbor, and have been waging a de- fensive war over sine*. But MacArthur's defense in the Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-Pnoi ueciassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 !I 4 e 7-, (em defense in the Philippines is dramatio and will oontinue to bo so even though it was foredoomed to failure at tho outset. You said to me: "Our trouble is that we think 4 big nation. Until we are reedy to Rot as a big Fl nation, we ought to think as a little nation and do the thInos thnt a little nation can do." You were entirely right. What I am proposing now lc ;along the line of your own suggestion. Our politioal and psychological warfare, even during tho forthooming defensive period, should aim at dramatizing (1) ourselves, nnd (2) our cause. In order to drawitizo ourselves, we should undertake limited but spoottioular adventures whieh will steal the show and win no sympsthy. Such adventures should he designed to demonstrate tour things: ? (a) That we aro on the offensive, are thtnkIng offensively, and aro preparing major offensive strkAos. (b) That we are not 'Afraid to take risks, nnd that the Germans nnd the Japanese have no monopoly on untcldo vontilrou. (o) Thnt wo nro onpabltl of planning and onrryli)g out por.footly 000rdlnntod nnd timod offensive notions in n11 pnrIA of Lho wor1d. (d) That we have only begun to fight. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : ? ? ? ? ? of action: Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 -t. -:?`" - fore are some random examples or this sort (a) A division of American destroyers suddenly appears at Malta - the hot spot of the Mediter- ranean. It is welcomed enthusiastically by the garrison and the population, who have been under constant attack for two years. Nobody knows why the destroyers went there. Shortly thereafter a squadron of American fighter planes begins to knock down Axis bombers over Malta. It then appears that the destroyers convoyed a ship or ships carrying such fighter planes to Malta tnd that Americans are now taking part in the defense of this fortress. Why? Just because Americans are going to be wherever the going is toughest. Possible loss: Three destroyers and nine plane crews. (b) An American submarine division (three submarines) makes Its way into the North Sea, bombards a Cow coastal cities, and sinks a few ships off the German ?oast. Possibly one of these submarines makes its way into the Baltic and joins the Russian Baltic Fleet. Possible loss: three submarines. (o) A group of German-American volunteers, speoially trained for the purpose, are dropped at night by parachute in Germany to commit acts of sabotage. This one could take either of two forms. It could actually be done, or it could be announced as having been done without snything having taken place. In the latter case, we would t. 4 Declassified and A. roved For Rel 201 CIA-RDP13X000QI Pnnni nn ? Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4Nii& . ). 1.4116111a1MINMONDIMIIi* 11)1.000.14,4)4101) "MIN ? 1 ) see that a story got out as a leak saying that this operation had been undertaken two weeks ago, mentioning a few names of the German Americana and suggesting that since nothing had been heard from them, they had either been caught and killed or were still at large in Germany. The Germans would know that they had not caught any parachutists and therefore would begin to wonder whether they were at large in Germany. Another way to do this would be to wait until through our intelligence we were informed that an explosion had taken place at the X factory in Germany. Immediately upon receipt of this information we would let out our story that a little while ago parachutists had boon dropped near Xiwithoutjmentioning the explosion. When the story of the explosion came out, every one could put two and two together. ? ' (d) A hit an run raid by a fast cruiser and air- craft carrier squadron coming down from the Aleutian Islands upon Japan itself. If only a few bombs were dropped on Japanese cities by carrier-borne aircraft - a few shells pumped into Japanese coastal cities - the effect would be spectacular. Incidentally such a raid might well draw both naval and air forces back to Japan and thus relieve pressure on the East Indies and Australia. I could go on enumerating such examples, but the four above stated will serve to illustrate the point. None of these adventures except the last one would have any real Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23 : I' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ii ? t---.7x*.? .417Mosioies, -8- ` military significance. All or them involve very great risk to limited forces. All of them would acoomplish Lho purpose of dramatizing ourselves. But it 1.8 necessary not only to dramatize ourselves And to steal the show us against Hitler and the Japanese - it ie ale? neoessary to dramatize our cause Am Against the "Now Order" in 14urope, and "Amin for the Asiatics" in Asia. This le a subject about whioh 1 want to do some more thinking before I make any specific, suggestions. What I ave in mind ia that we must make the oause for which we are firhting something more than a more defense of the world as It has boon and likewise eomething more than a more promise or a better world in the future. We must find Q Way LO do what Wiloon did In the last war. We must find a way to demonstrate that the four freedoms are real and that wherever we aro viotorious we titian establish them. To give jubt or examp1o: Suppone Prance definitely goes with Oermany. Suppose we then immediately take Martinique and in consul- tation with the Latin American Ropublies set up Martinique nn a Republio, giving full freedom to the inhabitants and equal suffrage to all, irrespective of color, provided they can pass a literacy tont. Thim woulu he a practical domonntration of t Ilboration. The) great Maus or pooplo throughout the world / * 1. E Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Ar-i.r .44 ? - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Imittnettvoly think or Churohill 118 their Defender, but think or Roosevelt aa their Liberator. This is perhaps our atrongoot weapon, but in order to uno it we muat prnotioal and dramatic) demonstration. Aa I say, more on this Llubjeot in A later memo- , ? 4-togiffii 'og.Z 7:..! ?.&e; qN1:14, - ? , ???':r ? ? - .' 'eta ? f" _ - .?.?. .11 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 in considorinG the vcstion of drivinii 4 tho Nazis and their Japanose allies, Wis att# tliat tho main wol6ht . and perhaps All the weight or ,pimganda must be direntod against Germany since the sonrcIty of short.wave listening nets in Jvan rendflrs 1,r-adonsts to that country largel:i inerCectunl. There ure a numb(_, of !)oirltn w I r II mt6ht be chnd on and oihich mic,ht nnuve dissonqi(m. Stres the point ttA L in the event or an Axis ^ictor:, Japan, with thu territory which sho will (ontrol, and the riches which she will command, will be far better off than qermany, even though the k(Ich mny dominate Europe. With command of mw materials, Japan will bo o'do to live on tho fat of te land, while Germy %illl still by' u prey to the tyvanny of 1ationint5. "Vhil(; Oormany 10 still experiencing the "Uenefits" or orontz materials, Japan will revel In rcch tImpplIno or natural rubber, and tin, nnd will ilor it for chcap manufactured ,:;oodn, Ifowevrr much (ormany emilaves the ooplo or EtiriTe she catmot, (lompoto v?ith the toomIng millions or chnap coolie labour which Japan will command. Howrvor much Germany experiments with sub.! ? LItute oeffoo, nho cannot equal the excellent richnPos of real coffee which will be amenr JapAnts 1,1zes. a) A Military trvdition exists between lermany and Cnina since 1U20. Veal*. German mill'ary figures - Wetzell and Soeckt turnou to China us a field cnr. tholv emnius. They knew that the throat of Japan to China was a throat to all ^ivlilzoLlon. Thn oevmnn Military MInJton under Palitenhauson won willdrawn In 1:)7A3 only on the demand of Japan, 31nco when have Garman soldiers been ordered out r)r Lhulp posittrino by an alien rnce2 ) V1L (ioneral von Palkobhkution what he saw at thm sock or Nanldn6, orld how IL arrocted him? Ask him - why OormO71;0;cloprti, Waro. r arftd. lm -, -. ?. unIforma An - 4J) .V.a , ,., , . ,.. 4a.para. '/A6 ... . , , ' -, .4.6, '04, ? 1 , - AW Alar Plith Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - I ?'%=, P - I - ? +PA ?Z- I -'?=??? ' ? .$ 4: .2 /?. Copy sent to Ed Taylor " " " Dr. Lnnger 111 (OO1il 1 NAT ON OP rN littliMAT 1 ON rilk-71,pro.fr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ANN Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? 11.1 1- 1 J.:L."? 3 4 - I 7., ? - , t - ? - ? r: 4 14) 6 COD100.1 *1'1/ 1) ' 41414)16 lt?,a t'tNe tvatiVus It 103, I, Geivocall li.41.1., IA tkoilt 0, 6. oi,stsvcot 0,,it4107 411 011, toort'o, , s 66/710 peovle. oil tolVe tevto ot 1010,0 101* Vel vs1A. iodo 0001 Oit 001 it : esiblale tc,,,r tWe, INovori?tilie c0.0 ot t of yottaxvi WI txlstinte,641 Ve tOcriP10._:Opiliiie Stlel vii:11 sVeds tilrOx. tsivey %Ole Vot 60, t`O 90910 ot 'OA *016 Itt,11-6,e4,: e. 4,4:001 tAiSo, a GI .r ssNy illtisb, Yis.e I.Voets;t04, ilt,0004111. Int1.61.? Vir ttlte 600,1 ot VIA lilvitite6, Ott.Ors OA i,ts 1.01,:i.S,es .1.tN set coatit'o to %Us 1,4a0 fp_ti,:4400 -4149100 otarig,i.e,tecl, VI ?resik,eut Sposolelt. 0 Vi,010, ;;E. filv;61:11f::0i10,ri:71: ioirooti, V4tX? 1?41'. '8'''1?.311 . t 0. 40;11001). :: le : t016tA:11:0?I Pc ?ow : 11.??t ?? ' to to 4,0 tO 00' vitii, so.to OVID,. geo9les c' jcArl? .,:,:r.14:"-.-:;..4,\::::,:':? 9?71:%"?11? 13r ell- t140.:_ liPtAt lar :::::;:::::,:?'.1 k ! . Te6:::r.:i.L.:::77.,ric.4.0.1 r?.k:';`1 ' ti fr4 IP....,..- -. -, ? VI' ?-,..r ' ; ., Approved For Release 2013/09/23 :' :II 1: 41.41*1).;.7:** .. 10.;:eti, A:::-. . t :_. -t: Declassified and A 1:- *:11:7;00:10014:11.110:.1.370.10.-,.-0E,6-.171.:';'*-''".....:;,,:: Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 and frightfully treated as Lave the irenchi the P4Les, the Greeks, the Dutch, ete?il conquered by littler. just as no Gerian wants to witness ths national oppression of 4ermany, so no French- Mbh, no Norwegian, no Greek, no Pole no Russian Tants to see his countily subjugated# 3) Goebbels lies when he says that the Nazi regime is fighting to prevent a new Versailles If that?. the case, why did Hitler make a sneak attack on the Soviet Union which had nothing to do with Versailles? Why are the NorwegAans and the Dutch, who had not even taken part in the last world war, being so cruelly subjugated? Why doe!!! Hitler collaborate with Mussolini who certainly did everything during the first World War to involve Italy in war with Germany and who regarded the VDrsailles Treaty as inwafficientIr drastic for Germany? Why is Hitler collaborating with the Japane e who were eo-signers or the Versaillos Treaty and who seized the German possessions in the Par Fast during the last war? 4) Hitler has pursued un even more in9anc policy than Kaisor Wilhelms He launched a trencherous and unprovoked attack against the Voviet Union and oubsequentlys and 4f1thout prov- oc;Icion, declared war again bt the United States Thereby he welded the two most powerful nationo Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 of thu twonty ix United Nations. Italy ia juSt am wrotchvd an Ally us Austria-Hungary was. The mime 0004 for Japan. Expose Italy's 4nd 41404n14 woaknossoz, as well as the hatred of the Italian pooplo for Hitler Germany. Hitler Germany is alrvady doomed because tae most powerful countries Of the world have united againe.t the Hitler maw,. Recount eyotnmaticsaly the armament program and armament possibilities* the human reserves* the indu:ttrLal ond food reserves* the high morals which the United Nations 4nd people have for use adhinmt tho Nagi regime. And the entire Worman peopl mhould be constantly informed how Hitler h4p oriven tho Gorman army into 4 horrible dwfent on the YaAitorn Front. All the losses or the Uorman arqly shou1d sy:Itemati('ally bo made public s) Germany has become bigger but the poople arc hoco,lina poorer and poorer. Poverty in becomin8 (Ivor. aro/Ater and the people are boipte. whit0 by the Hitlorite despoilers of tho Gwin nation 014 poovle. Only the big WM- mkorut the :unicorn* and the Nasi offieials pr,ri% frm Hitiorto war. It should be shown how L1, etc., how then Orown rulers* how flo G)urr!nc trAmt aro enriching themoelvv,s in an0 Ivy4 Lhoy aro incororating all the imdorLi,nt Induntrion in the countrieft ocaupiod by thoM ho thvir ,11111 private property. Novor has . :j4:-;;?? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 . ?. ? ? , ;44 Et. ? a R.- ? ? such a small upper-cruat made so much from the as under Hitlor* The (erman plutocrats, the Jtnier, together with the Nazi millionaires uvo robbing the Gorman people in the most horri- 6) Hitler and the Hitler regime have draggod the German name and the great German cultural traditions in the mire by their enslave- ment of and frightful atrocities against the other ,i0oplea. Tho German people therefore, in its own interest, must help the other peoples to cestroy the Hitler regime. Thereby the Gomm people will ?mte aeatn ro6tA1n respect and the other ptoplet?. will know that Hitler has nothing in CO 84X]1 with tho true spirit or the German poj:iiFffectivo portrayal should be made of the mtrovitios ,lerpotratod by the Hitler reisime in the occupied territories atint the civilian populi;tion And the national rights and inde- pendence of the conquered nations. 7) Tell why the Germun-Americans are also for the dontruction of the Hitler regime, Not only becauso they wnnt to defend America's national freodom and democratic liberties, bat fano bocuune they know from their own tixperi- oncomh w much the atr, citiom porpetrated by the rogloo against the other peoples are boAnirchinic the Orman mu, and bocauoe they know that the only salvation ror Uermany Wits in Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09;23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R00010017nnnR n KIMMIMININEMISit .EAMMIESSMI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - B) It ? It is of extreme importance that special appeals should be made to the German working class. Analyze their standards of liVing, their lc Lt of civil liberties und free trade union*. Remind them of the great traditions and asoirations of the Gorman labor movements 9) Mow that peace could come tomorrow, the German poople could nave peace tomorrow the German people cnn determine their own fate in frec.dom tomorrow, tomorrow the freely again, tomorrow justice and eanity can prey 11 in Germany again if the Hitler regime is dostroyed. For tho centrul iue in this war is the unitwl and resolute detruintjon of all frpedom-loving peoples and natton not to becoue the alaveg of the Drown the Prussian generals, the German munition kings The followil.g personalities could be used very effectively for broadeanting to Germany* 1) American labor and trade union leaders various industriev. For example, an American miner could appeal to hi n Gorman colleagues and Gxplain to them why they have a common interest from the standpoint of the interests of the workers of all countries, in the debtruction of the Hitler Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? ? ' $4 t 4 *Mr 44144 eplain that they are not rioting so Wit Go,04117 In ordor to affect Oormatylo nAtionel itidepend6nee but only to prevent the people* of tho world fron boeoming slaves of the Hitler regime. 3) Roprepontativeta of thti Communis Prty V, 0* A., who could explain why they are one hundrod per cent behind our govvrnment in thin just war against Hitler Germany? (It phould be borne In mind that in the last free 41401410119 in GerN4ny over 6, 00,0o0 votes were oast for the Communist Porty of Germany)* 4) German-Amtvicant who would tell that tZ&yexorciao all demooratio liberties in the Unit VtaulrA that they have Garman Language nets-. pupors and maeuzinow publiohed without interference; that they have German language radio programs sal that Choy can bold German langunao mootings and can itseemblo in German /anguade orgt:lasations; that they nri, flr the dooLruction of the Hitlor resin not only betftuao they want to defend ;km democrgttic lihortioY of the Unite Dut also bV6aune they know the mhame thut the Hitler regime has brought down upon the Oornan name and people throurhout the world* 5) Protetant and Cathalo clergymen who could opcak on the quwtion of religious froedom. im.mm mmovimmmmm5 8888 SSS 88 8 8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 15) Artists, movie uctors, journaliete, NvientisUi whoEo mimes to* known in Germany who ypot.k of their respect for the great Oerman culture which ha6 nothing in common with the Nitlur rugimc* 7) Engineore who cou1d epeuk factually bout thp er.ormoua armament industry And the ov wGr production In the United 8) .)roninent Amoric(An women, including or Oe-rmitIn 410Y.cont1 who aro associated with groseivo otkovement who could 1c, Lh illothers or Germany, especially to 01.1 tald working womon. OimIlarly, woud bv .iLa rol.C,vInable to Utilizo 40M0 out.. A.:tvirtrilJrx youth loadvr8, ropro-entatives of vari-uu Utica' tandvnclos nnd fieldo of ie rcligioua, labors frot-mal, culforia rlovc.1(10P. 9) Utmaial cmigrocT whosoUtj notice NAND 14 Utmany; 'o:t' example, porNon likJit tnrjh e It would bo ubeful to eutablialh ry for broadc44tn to Germaqy the Ge1M411 lo1jil3ae0 which wwuld includo a number uuthorittalvto ()ovum anti.fa!sci.vt (,Acrtn, roprcalit4,t1ve of all political nd(hvitqi. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? 1: ? pq... 'gag 10) It sho40 be roto4 lhat ther* aro a whol* number of Gorman amigroot in Mexico have had much valuable experience with NOW- , propaganda to Germany since they spent* years in Republican Spain working on radio compiains aguinst the Hitler regime? Also some have had, considerable experience with the illegal Gump radio etations? k ;Fet-? ' . - ? -; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 41 trO CO 3,0110: (4. ? I': ? PlUdOn ? r? ilrlAr4I * p 6 t1 a ej. rev 'Pr octetr t,11 to Oorno-ny 1?"ft' 110 to 1*(1 r'11/ of the Anwrivt,n 1,rut-100t.s1 ii to colvt,ny ? !tovicvore , 1,' Lint' 1'10 :,1.11y 2-eootim1el)0111y. /11infl,er or poini Priet iternn .J c1 In vv. oi In_1(.1) 01)(113.(1 ccrintlletelpockt jvci intatori 11 1 for brar L. t 11(1 01.11or Apd-.1-vict n proputejlielr eilroctre to to r? ormrin is,ocej gs Iuo:1 Aff.' inr411-:?e100 1710Ver1:11 ni4V11 LIA.1 Il'opontar, t-rellut cortf-in (st, t 1t11,,(1.(1" ?'1 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 r ? ? 044 ITSILUERVIK.L.Aw?Almat Mt. Leigh has been mr agent for lecturing in the past year and his organization has been extraordinarily efficient in arrang- ing travel and other details of a tour. Mr. Leigh tells me that he would ask nothing better than to turn his entire efforts to the service of the nation without cos. pensation. I an convinced that whether for your organization or for the whole Government service in organizing tours they could not be in mare efficient hands than in those of Mr. Leigh. You may feel that this suggestion offers something of in- terest to COI; it not, you may think of another wganization in the Administration to which this might be of interest. FlarlaccifiPri 2nd Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 mrPt9 11.`e?-2. a I. 4013Mt5cam maroh 17, 19424 Propaganda, in the MAO of the ferosful presentation of new ideas, seems to be effeotive only in periods of defeat and discouraimment. I do not know of a case in the past where a people have revolted agaiast their government when the forma of that government are on a viotorious maroh, The Japanese, therefor*, would not seem to be in a mood at present where propaganda could be effeotive. Furthermore, the oharaoteristios of that people are so immutable that it ie diffioult to believe that alien thought and argument can ever maks their appeal, In Germany, on the other hancil the ground would seem to be Ruh more fertile, First, the German people are hig)Ay mystic; they readily wept new ideas. They have no brakes in humor or eommon sense on the reaehos of their ideas, so that their resulting philosophy frequently develops into the grotesque of exaggeration. Thus they fluotuate more widely in the pattern of thnir philosophy than any rao* I know of. Bowl, they have enoountered a severe military ()hook in Rummies Their losses have been heavy and they have given ommiderable ground. Further, Hitler has as. fumed supremo commend at Jut this moment and thus has made himself re. sponeibie for military romults, and responsible Wore a warrior raoe who have held their General Staff almost in reveronoo for hundreds or years. To *nob a now, it suet be staggering to have a lance-corporal move in on the supreme teohnioal command. It would appear, therefore, that it is essential at the moment to expend our greatest effort in propaganda on Germany, and only seoondarily and in antioipation on Japan, npnlassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? --- 6,AP. For such purpose, we must have a thesis, and one whir* has a (sham of being tempting to the German people. We can beat Germany ee of this I am oonvinced but we oast accomplish this in a much shorter time if we have the help of some of the German people. twenty-five years ago, President Wilson developed a Oillesophy whioh was worth several argy corps to us in breaking down German morale. In other words, in giving the German people an alternative to dying, to the last man, for the Kaiser. Up to this moment in the present struggle, we have done nothing nor suggested anything, I feel, whioh has alienated one German in Germany from Hitler, nor have we offered any alternative to the Germans whioh was better than a struggle to the death to preserve his nation. Knowing something of the 3ermans, I feel sure that "amiss to raw materials," fair field in international trade, even domooragy and individual rights, bulk tar less largely in their imagination than the future of the raoe Geramos place in the famlAy of nations; GermaAylis pride and prestige; Geranyls desire to be not only one of the great powers but to be con- sulted and treated cc tuoh. To py mind, nothing offers such brilliant hope for the future as the Anglo-Amerioan ecloperation which the President initiated with Mr. Churchill" It is exaotly the type of thing to oarry into the future. It is without rigid form, henoe pragmatics and able to follow the method of trial and error, so dear to the Anglo.Saxon. While the newspaper headlined have labelled the collaboration as ea Nallianoe," both Mama of State ban ocrupulously refrained from use of the word, and with profound wisdom. An "alliance no matter how powerful invariably sooner or later Galls into being somewhere in ths weal a hostile and counter., balancing tom. A "oollaboration" is under no suoh inexorable oondimi tion. 108:1001 %Mg Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP1 .v" 3X00001R000100170006-0 a' 4.1?F- ; ?? ,,?11 41 ? a . ? 'I _ ? *?-? ? ?t?-," ? JA. ??:? $t V, - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ?? ? wOollaborationr0 intimate as it alw be between two parties, is a fluid thing and has no need to be exclusive. It oan and doubtless will call into oonforence or even to collaboration, states which have a like purposes The only yardstiok for admitting the eollaboration of a state would to its determination to maintain peas and order. Form of govern- wont would not matter oertainly we will have to oollaborate with a vtotortooe Soviet Uuion through reoonstruction days and thereafter: Our only *riterion, it f@OMN to meg will have to be "does this state went to help to keep the peeoelw If it does, we must work with It and admit it to our ocranoils, no matter what its form of government. To do otherwise would be to ensure a ropition of a world struggles If suoh is our philosophy, there would elm to as every reason to say go, and to say so formally and emphatically. Oone genius may find a better approach to Gorman thinking, but my mind oannot oonneive of any- thing so effeotive. Suoh a deolaration would mean to the Normans that omis they had thrown out Hitler and his gang and had oonvinoed the Russians, the Drtttan And oureelvee of peaoeful intent, they 000ld begin to oolbabor- ate with the Great Powers for the maintenanoe of pulse, for great projeots of development or backward areas, *to. Their splaoe in the ese would still be theirs, and they would not neoesearily be condemned to another generation of humiliation through their exolusion from the oounoils of the world. As suffering and fatigue wear them down, so more and more the Germans will be groping or a 'my to end the struggle. If it can be in- dicated that the way is in their own hands, the war may be immeasurably shortened, If it is felt that Germany must be punished, and it may well be advisable, then let her be punished. The punishment may be formidable, but it must not be enduring. The (Wane themselves may, in their Mew , ,e?Nitta,????Witt1. npriassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170066-0 t. ? ? _ - , , ? , to, 2. 4=0' _ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4.4( 0,1 tuating pbilosophy, resognise the necessity of punishment, but they will moguls' it the nors readily if they see light bwyond, it they can be oonvinoed that when they have purged themselves, their plame as a great people is milting them. It would be fasoinating to explore this thought further, as to ito influent's in a postftwar world, bat this organisation is dealing with the present only. Helm I an treating the subjeot from the propa* ganda phase only. I oannot refrain from adding, however, that I have been convinoed for years that there is no enduring pease without Oorman participation, that even au overehelang viotory would demand from the viotors a sustained ruthleesuess of which they are inoapable, if they attempt to set up a pootowar organisation for peace without the ool1ab4. oration of Oermany. Oertainly ouoh a declaration as I suggest would have to be most ?irefully Wailed. It could not be pit as an obvious appeal to Germans to revolt against their lesders. The memory of the fourteen points and their reception at Versailles are still too vivid in the German mind. It would have to be done oauti000ly and by inferenoe and the repetition of the thought would not only make it penetrate, but also sight well, after a poriod of time, cause a belief in its sincerity. / doubt whohor we could oount upon suoh help from the Snglish in thin conneotion, I have only met Mr. Ohurohill, but have read him deoply4 / could imagino his showing great generosity to a conquered foe however, I oould not imagine hie bellicose nature paying great attention to subtle 1106fta of wearing his down. Mr. Eden, on the other hand, / know intimately. I ammo that his is not the type of NW to Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 a ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 dna with matters of /mg range effoot. His mind grasps and *lingo to the problems of today., President Roosevelt, however, night be deeply interestod in such a thought, both from the point of view of stratog, and for the futures If he were interested, he Gould awry out the program oonommmatelr well. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 v , ? COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION 101111.1?1111.101611651111.111101111M INTEROFFICE MEMO FROM: Langer TO: :;401.on 01 1 tin j ? Donov SUBJECT: DATE Vebruary 14, 1042 enti.w. ldr y!loiquidlthi of youtoruay, pciulive to iosonli .a.Liole of ,iovelabcr 16, 1U41 In LI-to ;Autsohc IL;:l!.eoino :AolLunP, I am now ploasod Lo aLtAtoh _ciaorunuum oontuinlw, solao ooluni out on thi's article Ly ,alLer L. 'Arno ehiee of oltr 'CH 1, Pit I 111110 1,c ucc Lion. .L Luctuit ..? AM= Lunror DirccLor Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ,00 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ?-!""c4 ? ... ; - ? 41, ?.? FNfiRMATM SF- ItlfefikinCli INIffiliffiR *WO FRoyl: Walter L. Dor To: Colonel Donovan SupJECT: Joseph Windschnhts taticle o?oVember 10, 1941 in the 4.)9,11$.,che PAUX4440r.04L141ta4, ? ? ? 494,ATilebru4kry],4 }942 Geerdl v4awics. Joseph Windochuh does not always hew closely' to the Nazi party line anymore than AdrIA.rl Tatiens does in his military broadcasts. Both play a intAiatin4 role between the old, German Nationalists or Oan-Germans and the Nazi party. Winascti,ih in particular is maKing strenuous eZforts to reconcile industrialists, who want nothing so Much as free enterprise, with the ctmtrolled economy of trie Nazi regime. This article appeared shortly after a speech by Dr. Funks in Onigsberg on November 7, 1941. Funk's !al)Q0Cit equiValent to a G,irman solution of the East- cr:A problem: Me Ukraine is an area for German exploit- ation, 6. source of raw materials; it is to constitute the busts for a large-..;cale migration of German industry from tue RLine to bilesia and to serve as a hinterlAna for t,le German ad-Ltie ports, Danzig and lOnigsberg. Windscnuh c9uld not have been ignorant of Funk's speech when he wrote this article. The body of the Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? el Sr article may be cons &used under two heads: Gomm policy toward the q.st and the relation of the United States to the New Order. I gpmatLALIALtolitxd tttJjj. Windschuh speaks of a common participation of the countries of Europe in the exploitation and development of the East as a substitute for colonial expansion overseas. There is literally nothing in past Nazi practice that justifies the suggestion that this now is or is likely to be Nazi policy The New Order is merely a propugandu semen designed to conceal the bre:calitios of Nazi military economy. a. They are using their currency control not to stabilize the currencies of the conquered countries but to undermine them. Local currencies are constantly being subjected. to German pressure. b. In the East and South-oust of Europe Germano have largely bought out French, Belgian and Dutch in- terestn. This applies to banking, insurance, and all varieties of induatrial investments. German economy has been emancipated from outside control, while Germans ? and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R0001 0170006-0 ? have filtored into the economies of all other peoples to an unbelievable degree. c. The trade of all countries has boon made to center in the Reich. All imports - textiles, food, raw materials - come from Germany, und all exports go to Germany. Total trade has everywhere declined, while tragic with Germany ham constantly increamed. In all countries Germany in primurily concerned in nupporting thono inOnstrift which nro working for the Gorman wnr mchine. All othor intoronts, including to a largo ex- tent it4liun, have been excluded from the Balkans. Already the aumulltrAilLAt41 iB boing groomed to opovato in the Ukraine, and Windschuh is, to my know- loage, Lilo only Gorman journalist who speaks of "common pirtIcipationni Dr. Funk in no roference tu it. II. Wh4tever Nazi agentn may have; said in the United Otaten before the war, no Amnrican should forgot that in the Nazi systom foreign trade is and in likely Lo roman hiajjatramilLoiLuttaat. Thio is an integral trait of the ystem, not merely u matter of policy. Alrgady Nazis bount of having made within the past roved For Release 2013/09/23. CIA-Pnr14 Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? ? _ 'TM 4 j two years the most comprehensive analysis of the Latin American market yet undertaken. There aro German mil- itary men and economists enough who believe that the final test will bo between German-controllod Europe and the United &Mattis. What in really significant in Windnchuhts article Is the That that now even he sub- scribes to this doctrine. * Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 A. ?-,;. - - - ? a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? Aitootettill ERMOtilai.SfAMMUNICATKINS THE SECRETARY CP 3TA1E ? WAINARAITON. D. C. L C./ 1) ICA DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON February 7. 1942 my dear Colonel Donovan: On the possibility that it may not have coma to your attention I am transmitting herewith a copy of a significant article which appeared in the November 16, 1941 issue of the authoritative Detitsohe AlLeadin Zeta s of Berlin, which article might hove some value from a propaganda viewpoint. It appears to me that as of the time this article was written the Nazis considered the Russian ompaign as virtually completed and were planning for post-war developm mints in which they would treat the conquered territory as a colonial satraphy. In the sets-up envisaged in this article the United States, of oourse, was ,to have been isolated from all participation and Europe under the New Order was to have been a closed compartment to American trade. Colonel William R. Donovan, Coordinator of Information, 144 Apex Building, Washington, D. O. ? assified and Approved For Release ?-?????:. 09/23.CIA- .W* ' 00001R00010017 06-0 FL, This )4E-- Al Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 This picture, of course, is ftolly at variance witk the propaganda disseminated LA this Gauntry by Nee, spats to the effect that the United States would have been tke recipient of a huge amount of trade from Germany had vs remained neutral? Sincerely yours, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA RDP13X000 1 : ' t 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? (COPY:pit:MID) ? sEEM LOLThLAS: SK RAL rtiopi "(l) In au article in the prow! gigskajne :osef Winschuh discuases what the neiglag conquered territories in the last will mean to Europe economically. The destruction of Bolshevism and the progressive conquest of the Soviet sacs and opening up .on Germany's and Europe's door e e ?? or land for e tle eaLcoloni t w 'El I& our i oes n s is d-tr sand ts _sutra US DOD 04 W 11 bj jb]s to n& smalopient. "Winschuh says that a 'little' solution of the Eastern problem is imaginable, working with traditional eonooptions, methods and tempi, and a 'great' solution, radical in its methods, planned on a world-wide scale and passionate in its attitude. There can be no doubt that this ttie "Such a turning to the East implies a lot more than just a geographical extension of Europe, with the contin- ent's centres of gravity and of energy remaining the same. When towards the end of the Middle-Ages the New World was discovered; Europe's face turned towards the West. The colonisation of the East ceased, the forces of the East became hostile to Europe, the West became great. Europe's energies flowed out into the wide world and were lost to Europe o The shifting of Europe's centre of gravity to the East means for a start that Europe must emancipate itself from the world outside. Next, it means that Europe as a whole participates in the construction work in the East and that Germany neither desires nor is in a position to revitalise the East by herself. mrho Eastern territories will see a similar deploy- ment of European energy as the New World did when the white races penetrated North America. The East will become the welting pot of Europe, and a new colonising race will grow up there. "The New Europe was helped into the saddle by three factors: the oommon conduct of the war against Bolshevism, the British blockade which forced the continent to become self-suffioient and the hostile tension between America and Europe. Even when the first named two factors have ceased to exist, t e to s on betwee ca sd aro?? will remain r a n3 may even $ a ? the der to endure asid to e us assume that the war were tdifolii-tiiiiia-rlyend and trade and shipping wire to start once more: in that case 'Cu ..e co wou d ?r.? ? di re to r ? o o ?? ? ? ? ? ga_maglik.i.e ou s ?e wor ? wou ? aga.n OA 00 ?on. Ruzrtioipation in the construction work in the East counterbalances the tension between America and Europe. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ?3T; ??? r ?=?r?? ? ?:j ? ' ? - r ? ?:. :1 ? I ? ? Declassified and Ap ? roved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? * a 4, $ are raw ma er a s an oo surp usess of the Xast as well as in the investments for constructive purposes which the East will require in a large measure. "Naturally the undertakings and poasessions of the Soviet State will, to begin with, be taken over by the State, but there can be no question of Eastern economic forms influencing the Reich, for instance in the Shape of increasing nationalisation of industry, but on the contrary, our energies and our forms must influence the East. Before the World War, Russian shares were greatly valued in Paris and everybody on the Stock Exohange knew the name of Kriwoi Rog. Why should not the same thing happen again gallAllimaijunisal. The periodical, fiar?...f..---aitid-irani,--rifixiiiitl-y-lidoated the intro.s diiiitioricirTastern shares (Ost-Aktion) on the German Stook Exchange, in order to alleviate the shortage of shares on offer (See Digest 666, 17.11., A I -). This seams to dispose of Freneh hopes that French holders of Imperial Russian shares may now get their money back - See Digest 633, 9.10., r III- 15., - Ed.). The reform of the conditions of property and industrial initiative in the East would have important results in many directions, thus one need only mention t it e w, ? t? ? v.t s t ? o ? ? t ? E . mink 41, grirM1114.1.11.1104114t am* amoun ng 0m ax.s o mar * oou mo ized in this manner. "The 'great' solution of the Eastern problem is above all a question of transport. The Wept, the North and the South of Europe are hinterlands to great sea ports relying on the cheap freight rates of sea shipping, but in the East gigantic distances must be overcome by land transport. 1,-? tfe t .1 ??rt.be deo ve as t e OMITI1 Declassified and Ap?roved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA 001 I. 4 ? 17.11;' _ .?? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 .? ?". . v ? ? ? "14 .! ? " ' ' - ? - - - - As a post script to the Horst Wessel Lied idea, an Austrian Jewish friend of Mrs. Morris's Who had been told about this idea, said that she thought that it was psychologically quite wrong, because party members would simply be infuriated at hearing their song used, and nothing could be done anyway in winning party member away (?), and for people who were not a hundred per cent with the party the tune of the Horst Wessel Lied would have too many terribly associations. I think this may be more the exiled and persecuted German's reaction perhaps, than the reacti-m of an ordinary citizen of the Reich. ? . : Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 * , Mrs! Marketa Morris, M. Morris in Czech by birth, and ?am. from Prague. SNP it.:717ii to a Gorman Jewish doctor of mehologyt and is herse1f-a_p0044, analyst of the %Tung school, I think. She left Germany shoit14-)iitte? Hitler came to power in 1933, and than lived in Italy, then rrallati and lived through the fall of Pranee in 1940, and has been ifv:thili." United States now for several months. 3he lives at 605, WeWl13t New 'York City (telephone University 4-503l). She spoakfi GepOiln, French, Ozeoh, but her 2Aglish is not yet very good. She hifi*ade special studios, in the past, on the use of mass suggestion 1he Nazi mopogandists, and of the power of the unconscious in nigois0 an national groups. 3ho carried on over a period of about twolears (1933-1035) a oorreapondance with a woman in Germany, aver she-hers wns living In Italy, in which she pretended to be an unhappy, eiiled Nazi, asking for information from a Nazi friend in Germany as to'how to deal with tho criticisms of the German governmant that she encountered among foreigners. Sometimes shty was answerdd by the Gorman censor as well aa by her friend. She was expelled suddenly, frnvl Italy, but she mild never find out if it had angithing to do wi ANOmit those letters. Later she not the friend with whom she had corroopondod in Prague and learned that her reports of the criticisni of ponplo living in the democratic world had had groat effect not on In this wiman who had received the latters but also on a groutiof people t) whom she had read them. She said)in carrying on thig. nIrrospondaneepshe learned a groat deal about the Nazi 1)01/eft-and psychilogy, and foots that she could put slme of it to use. I thing' she w 4' luld like to work in some sort ' advisory capacity, or on. gehno tdoan, within a propoganda organisation. , anri Anoroved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 1) and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001 011104001 Notes on a conversation with Mrs* Markete.Morria* 1229ific Ideas* To approach the German youth, particularly children, in propoganda broadcasts to try and conkteraot the street of the education they receive in the 'Wools and In the Hitler Youth, Which is concentrated enttrely on the pripparation of ate child to be a Natim--i.o., they are educated to fight from the rt :Loi moment, to believe only in the German race, and to fight for the supremaey of the German race. They are appikaled to,)in the Nazi educational nystem)by way of their emotions, therefore propoganda to be effeetive should ala e approach them through their emotions--same methods but different matter. ROO 1 017 006-0 -1.?NV45717R; t = To have a good song for the German mopoganda broadcasts, which would capture the imdgination of the German peoplii , a song they would find theme selves bumming au they did their work. In a ouggestion made later, she Say S that tre Hort Weaael Lied, which hue a fine, swippg tune, could be used with different wordo, and it would have the advantrage of being a tuna which when hoard hummed or played could not immediately be labelled an a rebel song, in fact it might eauee infinite confusion end embarraesment to the Nazis, because they would never know Whieh words lore being thou t if a person whistled the Horst Wesel Lied, and if they forbade its use it would be a biz blow to the Party. She encloses some words written by her husband for this new version of the Horst Weeeel Lied, and asks oppiaLally that it ahall be noted that where the Naxitiolimpaye, "Die Fihno Hoch" (the fings high) this version says "Die Hetnirlioah", one a mab rial object being lifted as a symbol, an the other a spiritual idea* Yo 11 SOO by her attached letter that thin song has been Bent by her hue and to MUL as an entry In the competition for a German Song of Freedom asked for by WIWI,. a In o more general sonno to carry on a propaganda to Germany that is based cal on embtional appeal, appealing to the sentimental and the mystic side of the) Gorman race. Logic is no good, because they have been utterly confuse4, to long by th,., tortured logic of Mein Kampf. Hitler ha e known how to cohminicate to their unconscioue, he has asked them to "think with their bl.)ed"and It in only through the same sort of approach that new ideas can. be got neross to them. Give them strong, emotionalowaty stuff, and they underntand that sort language; give them recbsonable, friandly, quiet chatty atatement or facts and everything that they have been filled up with about the soft, sloppy democracies Who do nothing but talk will be uppermost In their minds) nnd they won't accept anything they hoar thus presented* GeneraA, Ideas. Generally speaking Mrs. Morris diecuesed at seine length the whole subject of the 1130 of the unconsoLoue on MA3B03. She thought that for someone Who underntoed the American people, au she said she did not as she was a newcomer here and did not speak good iLnglish, that the name sort of thing could be used to bring the war home to them, as could be used immerimit propoganda to Germany, adapted ofeouree to the Amerioan character. She si. felt thot the only thing that a European could do in America itself and(W ftmovittans, is try to impress on them the eerlioulnese of the totalitariah menacee-the aetual truth of the wcrld convent idea, the fact that you ea*, truOt *Hitler as you cm hardly trust anyone else to go through with WKO lue Iliad he intends to do. To make that true to Americans. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: ? 4' .7r - ?P-1 r- 4 -t-?_ ? .1.77.:7-z. ? . ;- _ . . I ' ??-? - ? i - 7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ?4141.44ti 1 - , kdoiiNiAamiclokiologislierletaisoopoi '4,4,4414,4,060,2.04:',74e4. t'? ? Virs? Varketa M. MORRIS atm* 6OFC Veit 113th StrOOt ? APICA3 WOW York City' Pbenis UNivorsity 4.931 chbre Madams, je vous envoi. el-joint uns shanson de MSG marl. 13. l's faits WA on Prams 0 elle/ orbit dO itro utilt- se pour los 4missions in longue allemande do is MIX. Ls dim fait* do l* rm.* smpisba la rielisation de so projot? rods sotto IdOo sat vraiment ostuelle, doss loopinion ousel dos !nations** eormitenteiii Prows: Is fait quo WIWYL, German Bastion, nous envois just dans sea jour*. s call for a Goren song of Freed's. On4immenso dons somprendrs ltimportanis de 14141ment Aggiktsma dahi la propaganda m it mitt.' oulierement dens sone qui solidness* auilknemanda. Nous regrettons sopendint quo so sonsours de wrul fixe tbo deadline pour los sontributions pour 301 lir mat* Nous scams constornds (Luton sroit 'Noir tent Is temps it queen puisse retarder losotion tenement urgents do plus dgTois? ii faudrolt asmildror 311 r4a3isotion do sotto idds qui eat bonne. clutestmes quo vous in MOOS ? Mon men i * snvoyd as chins on WM pour me ooncours C eves 6ndisation de son nom dans uns onvolopps osebet4s)* Et simojoint tins sopie de is aontributios. Yale nous prifdrerions si l'on no voulsit pee tordor trap longtempso lo 16 more 1042. .74 te Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 [, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 This seas shoula beim.. the Neilimit Anthers fair .11 - theissrithe sib either inside Germany or shrost.40..ars: fighting few the destrustion of the Nest -regime and for ths estsioltsismsit It should be breedeast as often as possible m sad partieularav-whenever the programs is irtemdei foram emetioam el appeal and not only for mere informations Sometimes.** broedossts should be devoted espeeielll to orptiosoutotion of this By aboosing the melody of the *Rem Weasel Lie." els Ws medal and rythinie basis, we faellitsto the infiltration of the 1210r# song among the Norman asses. The firet words of the text in referring beek to the ipeniftwerds of this Nall- song show the eontrast between the tetaliterin end the dime** retie way of life* ',Die Pelmet boob', of the Herat Vocal Lied Is a military order and hes itio do with the lifting of em terrial ebjeet m "Diehersenhoebw Is an appeal to our inner WM( and summons us to the exercise eft free eeoPere$14n? we reeommend that the text be spoken first by one person and then bra ohms, seeempenied by soft music, Later ON, the anthem should be sung by s eberuss with f011 sampspimest. neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 A Gerson Sees ef Triladia ? lin doutsebos Preibeitslic4 ? su stunt nosh dor Atledio dos *Mona Wessel Liodass Die Harlan Meld taibt Purobt ashy oder Utters \ter Sobreeltenslierrsobatt. Und "War Tyronnoi e?al unsers Lobanstraudo was vorbittern? Autl Doss dor lionsob um wieder acklicb , I - .S ? 7 Trii , win Manor, MUNI, Kinder doutsobor Sproobo Sind einig goon Meat Hitleroi? Vi r kiloton Air dos owion Deutsoblands Socha* Wir welltn sin Deutschland hilfreiobt Viol" fit. Sohluss mit dew Krieg** Sobluss wit ellen Qualms, Tfl d4non bout Willson untergebn. Die meauldigin Amor sellita is bosoblon. Das deutsche yolk wird **dig auferstebn Und wird slab nit den enders% villkorn atm Xa Kampf Air ireiheit und semis is Roelit? Die welt bat Raus ter elle ?v? sic wird Minos versobtent wider Reams, nosh Gosobleobt? Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RnPi Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 TM GERMAN FOOD SUPPLY OUTLOOK JUNIII 1042 1. In reoent woolint Information trom varioua 601042a nourooa doolota a deterioration in tho l_aropoan Vood and ngrtmatnval poattion: food rationa havo boon roduood; a cold and prolonged wintor ham damagnd oropm; farmora ore r000rted to have had Inaufillelont mood for apring Many ouch neoounte niply that 4,ho Gorman food potlItion i.i nuVVIcinntly unfovernble to be of doolaivo nId to In not yit wnrva0L0d. Vood pueltIon In 4ormany nnd throuzhout tho pnvticulor3y in iirban orenn, luto undoubtedly ioLopt?vfo.ma ln LI to imnt 1'ioneLho1mma, the now ,;rimon rotlowi 1:111 pvovIdo Eal (iorman workera and Noldlewh vitLh dieLn adognoLn tO maintain thoir rroaent hvtIvItIon. Nvon Clopmnny'm no1'mn1 nonnumorfi, who mnkm no tp,ocIrlo oro,itrIhntIon to the wor effort, will be oilownd dietd onfrIcIttnt Le mnIntnin thorn. gormal!onn, In ruot, :31.111 InmIALIAo momo rnrithor ration rootriotionv wILtultt 'LI o notivILImm ur the) Unman population Lho noxt yomr or movo. Anolytilm or the, told-a rood Pneultlementa In n.,incQifipd and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Gortanny at the now ration :Loyola reveals that the present consumption pattern or one not ripprooiably inrerlor to It can, in all probability, be maintained throuph the erop year ending on Augunt 1, 1043, and perhnpo tltromh unlondnr 1043, Por the Old Heich, oudh piAWAM will requIre approxima tely the rollowing domestic ppoduction In the throe basic rood uxoupnt breadgrains,_ 1010000000 motrto tone; mento? 203001000 metric, tone; ol1m, 1,000,000 meLvio tont . it wi 11 also re- (vitro the tmportation or smn11 additteoal aupdliee of L1e:14.3 !nimbi o t , t tm y I V tho (hintonn envionF;e military activity aftep 1d46, ?r;noh pvmhiotton and Import pronpeots still urn Lt boniAnInfthlm. ovnn grant log orodonee to the wivorno (loo) ( ondI ti UI E1I1U tho unavailability 1)1 mood. A o tunny', f.1 lin rill x iitttOn or ollrrent crop roporLm Imilont:on it bho anmnp:0 may well be lona cover* than Litman vopopLa atti:mat. Total output in 101rope need llot; he AppveolaWy bolow that or 1041, it in thun irtt rtnant. Molt production requiromeotm entimatod above are well bti Luw pve-wav nopmni leve10 in the 010 unieh, and mvrlo bo how Lhn milhoormn1 prodnottoo or the crop yearn 1940.41 nod 1041-42. iscifid d Aooroved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 o."L? ?4- ?-? ?:?? ." ? ? s ? .? -1?. ,. 4 ? ? Ant13:01m0 bhorororop hupporta Vic) oonnlualon thmt ttio NmAl WIIVWort will tlot bo appveloiably Jnborformd with by 140k or Nod nominv, yoarp 7:: - ? =3 ? , "-- - '-? - ? ? - , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 o."L? ?4- ?-? ?:?? ." ? ? s ? .? -1?. ,. 4 ? ? Ant13:01m0 bhorororop hupporta Vic) oonnlualon thmt ttio NmAl WIIVWort will tlot bo appveloiably Jnborformd with by 140k or Nod nominv, yoarp 7:: - ? =3 ? , "-- - '-? - ? ? - , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 o."L? ?4- ?-? ?:?? ." ? ? s ? .? -1?. ,. 4 ? ? Ant13:01m0 bhorororop hupporta Vic) oonnlualon thmt ttio NmAl WIIVWort will tlot bo appveloiably Jnborformd with by 140k or Nod nominv, yoarp 7:: - ? =3 ? , "-- - '-? - ? ? - , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 tr. . ? jot * ? .1, ?.* ? . .? I/ to - .0- )Ptal ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ? t .0?? . k4-t? .:44 ? . : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Mr. 'hrun that the dissemintoi, tion of thla memorandum in its editod form is in aouoruanos with General Donovan's instruotiona. 7 , ? . ' ::...t I : i'4.1,:.-?-',1 : , 1---..,...,..i.... .? t., : - ? ? . . ?, r--,,,,,,,....,,ii. . , --.:7,.:-%,,;5-- - ,--4-...S.41ag ,,....::: _ .v.,......,Iats..... 4., ..,,,,.,..4?.r .,...ftiw?. . ._ ; % ,* ??-') .. . 1.--:..r :!...P ; - ,. . -i,.t-,FL?-???.:: :.. . ' - ? -.4.1r--,=-14 i :;.-,..... .?-.7.1.A.A. 40-4.-2g1 WAO N ir4 ????. .f) ? IP' 41111 404.00; "Nor ' Declassified and A. .roved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ., .. Li.. }, ..::..' .7' / .t.? , . I ? ..,,,;:.,4 , ,. 1 ." *- - ; ? F t - ? . i ;E ?--; , )4 i ?,t,?,?," . ...,' r. 3 V ' 1",?: 1 s, l', -; :?;-..:::,T,...?:,(1-,1i; 4 : -?,,,,i .,.-T- -, ? .,,-, ... , ,4 .1.''; , , ,pt ,:r v;?i! ..effrLf . j,.. - - 4.1 1 :!. ,, T 741 4_43 ,.' ?A 4.+,.,..t, --,..4 ... . , t., ,,..,., 7.-,- ,.:.,?;, ? , ?I 1 ,t0 ,.'"..51,,,-- r. 1_ 0 ff 1 ,,t " ? ' g 1.-r ' f 4 , , . ,!4?,, ,.,'..'' 1 -*' '-1' ,:.4 f- 4.. :? . _:r .,.I i .. , i . 71- , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 -.Pa.,. ?-?21.4, , ? . ? ? ? I ' 001.0.0 ' ? .1.; t Z;;IE ? '; ',? oto? ' 'irt.fol'aff? 1,10Yei 1041,4:4 f 4.141. ft 4? ? 6 Tricl . ? 0, Ili 74. 1.: lir ,,,,Alty4t4120 44.41.,1,41? ? tdt, 411,t . ? ..,. '' T ? 44! g ...?'.4---4' -1, ..,,,i, . ? e 0601, 404 iilla 4 . e ? a ai ..,..." , ; ,. /4.4, ' e n mite ri a I) f di 4 84?0?00 04. ? ton t?I ;PI ? nsigetAtatibormammottostonowareporammoomprometamoviiipoisinem.111109.0teitivOliftwbeitiolialt.s1 donne rt t ce-,1 194tommetutromaseminnitoastaroomot.roont acrobat eirsondslar gyttmsatitoom maa?mmess klabiNMINIANNIIIIIIWIttlifi1114.1?1110.0mtdilatall,1111011111101P4011411121.1.1GIMAI iwinsiltiswirompumatiaeaseigmaanwleausat so se IIMMIttInfitIOSIM.D.110.01?4111101....1411.4 ? 4,1r1.01?4111100rs., ;,,7) hAirto 4.06J ea 06,0 ? lef ? Y 'I.' t ...,./ ? ,.. e ,, . Z . , ''..,.,4 " .4.-' -;.,p1 1 t , .I.V? 05 , A..". ...,54: '1 .... .,,i31, r ... r ??? ? ; g..AS . ..il " ' eV E, taJ . 1411116111111111,6411 ? ? ; t ? 4' it ???????illialiNlarrait&P,.?reatgit?ISIMI 11.10?111t011 orua. )441 1 saapaaalaposawassaamaotame-weams.,....lwassaa, 14, , 4'1 04024. Ift?????????1001,0041101014491110iCailt??14044.1.1110111414101410,0464 , etiel .1?T;4?) 44 lifitllinabla49111?110161.1AOR 042154,00.11.3 beiaseme 64 orm ?o-,'; ? i; 14:01(1041 7 4,40 :1! tfr. ? ex -rout i ttg y. lump 1-11' 4 "f:Nt 41 4) p ? ? -? 6 ? i!t4 ?"'Fri IP! ? ' kR S.; "f t. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ft jt(ot:rci.co.r-,.. ,V14,..... - .........'''.., 641 4 (LL C 5-- A !"::1.,( parch l et 1944 A /-1) i.11 4-, ire, (. *g k ' !I 4 4 According to your instructions, upon arrival in Italy on January 20th. I reported to Colonel TrIPMIHAR, Commarolyir Officer of O.S.S. Special Detachment G 2 Vth Army. A4 I arrived they day after the Ansio lmtUng, evoirynne was keenly interested in the development of operations at the beachhead. Captain OOZE had been ordered from the "'Forward Vohelon" to cover these operations and in view writhe work to bo Oonf4 or the 34th, 36th Divisions and contacts to be made with the Fran& Expeditionary Corps (C37) I was ordered to go to the front as ston a*I had familiarised myself with the organisation ce CANTIPPA Loadquarters and with the Intelligence and Operations Sectione in particular. Owing to the friendly assistance of the Ofoicers In charge, of these Sections. I was able in a short time to get a fairly accurate picture of the, situation. The various activities of our oligauleation are eo iateresting that it would be difficult not to be *sold on 0.9.g.0 AfOr one has understood the, workhin iteolf end obtained confirmation that the informitiOn defitrolt4 IA AP* *4004 And r@lied upon by Allied torsos. the 00100,-Wrtnrr0to beenitee we haw, been 4111efl & porbQntt7 to rligtetor the Opre$40tow of pgrtien 1010 0 the 7z- ?:% . , _.1....?. ,.._=,...--,-. ---, --'-r ' ----"`"*""LdatataitkatlkirSittliM %, '1 . ' a ? . I . e.. .......P.....4, ....4.S.41: d. '-'741:1114-`"" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 proved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 beginning might hhve been skerticel about our Ability to ao go. In addition to U.S. YOTIOVIR, other ALUMS in 'mite of tboir ornoroneo in G 2 work, here expresmod their inteeekAttlind takon momouroo on their Part of the front to help 0.9.5. oarry out its Activitioe. This is tho came of the Yrenoh Upeditionary porno whoohas given our Of#looro a permanent pass requesting all Trenoh Commanding Offiooro Thittn to give us every poesible assistance whenever we might neea it. T'4119 ie not on acaount of existing mowl relations between 0.q.9. aria tho ALIASTI MOM but because O.L. rsnreeents sometMng new, nattivtoil to circumstances, the value of which might have boon quontionoa by our assooihtee in the war until they were convinced ftnA booamo our boot supporters. Xxemination of Intelligence collected for instmoce fromilloptembew 35th to ditto is most illustrAttve becnuee ths ouAlity and precision of the information indicatee the groving offici07107 of the work performed, this being equally true l'or torogreilhical And comhnt Intelligence as well as for political And contact intelligence. while 0.5.9. activities are 'happily not limited to Intolligenoe and firs ofton eXteriOrisod by operotione planned AV oarried out by un, their nature obviously cannot be diecuesed here. The attached name ars therefore based on wimple experience which is of course oven to *vitiates* 44,11ropla mr1r1 A nnrnved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 itup, 41,1r. n1/ e ? ? ? Yor the %roes@ of the 'rile to bm unAortnion ono because Colonel thougt tt reettng exnerionce 2 *Past mil 0 ie Beforo going forward. Oo1on4:46T outsider did everything piSsible to Assist me to obttn ii persnective of the Unit under his oommAnd And partinularly of th* Tntelligence And OnerAttons leottons. material in the Intel1igecce &Action to, 000rAtnnt*A by th* Into,. 1tgeno0 Offtomr anA tho promaration of rwmorts for rollowinp Ain A) Oommt ano Tollograltionl Int01110noo Volittoal Lfl4 Oontoot Intellience o tlecatiby s000rding to thnir nntur* gtvon out to ONAtth Army, 00.qedleleres MOM SR and SIMI etc4...4 Those rerorlivintre?Ae-/Fottewirl 212;111120.R7,0111 wheamme0(rworo2otionti of Agents Reports" ass remwritten only if nocomittry)), a) Reports at Agents received through *YorwArd Moholon (AWT)s onlY when ot Interest to ireotal Detaohment a:keit/1h ArMy for redistrift button, because t$trnofioe 71 f 01 tnformatto for And nonem . 4. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 rally utilised by unite in the combat sone. b) In aikAlaglaro information rooetvefi from Long nnntro Yntolliponca (LRI) *pinto, This information tp Roneral Am well mm AetftileA onA while evalustoli am to nouroe AAA reliability, no Atmorimination im made on the nature of tho subjects oonoerneile ! ' alanaLarjr,",:75,211 0,1 0 ore oonAenflois from reports reoeived in many 08604 from n,R.g, Algiormo aloo othor sources. Those extrecto Are vorranfireolateri bpownoit. thoy oinnrinrtts. thr ettuntion over A wirioft of anyo nnA Ow* /%rooloo informntimn in n nut-shell. modo from ohorto ftnA ronorte of eye witnesses emi which nro of gront imnortoncA whmn ofmroo mg information to reliablik mnA lagialMalli which oro writton by :ntollirmnoe Officer whenever a particular requoot hnn boon rsoolvoid on .11 aortrtin subject and whenever he considers that tntelligenco wtr be' of opeci44 intermit to one of the partion to whom Tntellimonoe nommrtft are distributed' Vol. eonmnle itwoecial report will be mado on t.". The PlAttionl situation tn Italy...or the PsoA sitnetion in Aome., Slack mftrket prices in 'N.,. region' services (Wilmati etc..) tntelligence wanted for the Yth Army or giving Utter boWileisettem4um information requested on a ?ormolus motto?, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 z..? .0 s TPA -Paigivii 4 ' ? ? While the Intelligence Sectkon of 00.9# tAkmil no 'treat action on information recAived entl sent, the offiotonoy of this section fills many gaps nni, in nartioular tnforno onorfAionti of real conaitions which permit the,- to but1A militory ormAnInAtion. 44. ;? , ::?*4 ._ :. 1--.' -if_,..,1?::''::::,1Z-'4. ,..,.......#-!.. . .- ... .? r.-.--....e-0 -fi .,.: ...',-2_,7-24,,,:".-4,,1 ? ii- -ill' ::;-1.{ .:?-? :::-(1-17:-.1!-:?'1};7;:?-;:::At:t7I?lit::::;73il! _ -..... ....: 1 ?.., . .,,,- -1. 1- Zi,,":'4,: V. i - -.'-? 1.t7:,,_...7'?:..,:,:ii.s...-?!..12:..,.,P.t77.:Alii - ? ? /- 7... r? ,-41q74???N . ? 1 ..,.. ? ,.., ,::::!.....14:7;11r.1.:"v:7:-...5..t''-' . 1 1. ???,'. '::).:.:: '',.,1. ,.---..:?..i...;.: ?? 5`..:::'.. :.::,;.: ? , - : - .4 _: 14-.f.7? 14 -- 4.-- ' .1'?.;"....."..1:...1-',f01. - ? ?-.?,4 U'141K1 t? .s4,4.1-1.-? 1 ? ? - 1 ,ti..", 1 - ' .- * r..*:?._-;7- 7,,:.?.t?-?.'3; 4. ;,r --A a e. ....004601000000wwisaggirsalaa, RINEWSPOOMBISU " - " ? *IelgagOlaigr-404sisl a o'"? ' A ? 'Apo, 10-4 r 4 If ; ?-? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Ntt,oit No444 NK,A4 14%,..wf ki.t wol4 CNN 431.11z+Mt 1NU 44,0,,V*ItUli Skit it bot testftela Atot 04.4 akbAk it Ant 4.11mkm$1410 vvt 14 ImiffA4%= 4t.-^-',x4-"kriiiict 1,1 t to311 k,fl tolikvh t t t,44 ti titk, (4410444Ni* Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 r qtElan The AteCutive Officer with who* / worked showlo ma how operations pending had boon proparoA anA wore tb bo OarriotA out. It would be imprepor to detail those in this report. Operations anA Long range Intellieonco work not only requires full knowledge of the situation. tound planninr onA executive talent, but also requires **n of ovnerience nnP courage* The dispatching of What may ,.?m tho eimrloot mission, rri- instnnno parachuti:4 or landing of Agents with their radio onerntf,r, n tyom oe work with whioh we are femtlinrp requires berfect conrAinAtion in orAor to reduce as much as rossible unforetoen oircumstanoos* Theroeoro work of thc qApvly Officer of oneratione who hp e to eoe thnt Aponte nr. equipped with Viings varying from civil clothes nnA undorwonr mnyinfac. tured in the country where they will operates.. to hemA mi-onnAea or plastic eta*** or the Inansla Officer who sink*, all arreuromente and ensures the epee landing of the mon1 or the mungla Oeficor who checks that nothing has been omitted and is reenoneMe fOr tho final phase of the onerntion, each in their we are ae tirmortent A fnotor to the $1100048 of the operation as is the will* which .nre0000 the. iplanning. I have 'leen an important oreratton postm,ned because in on kl instance the ammm)riato (Aril clothing boneht at the blnok mnrket was not available in time to take advantage of the last day of 010 moon period ovost though everything was sot and the "recsttion committee" Prw Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 alerted. In another Instance one of the motors of the nlmne thronith ignition trouble. Pernono fnimilier with onerntimno mommtimo* absurd hod tragic) mid* of their work boonii.v. 'fteoutive talent le moot neoPleary in n tyllo where omohwoperation" to be onrriso out in AiffArant bacesunP nirmum. atanetqa Ara oeltlom the 4RMA? 1114r work in K territory where doing on, autonhtlonlly sliminatAo elemento whiob avie not nAwotable to ohaneing 4ltuatIons. The remaining 060innOrmonnel, .4ireoteli by an able ohief At its hoed naturally reenrReente n oiret olege outfit. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ' It'F;fiti ? .4 - As stated-previously most of the Omo waR sneint at thp reb?tiiit= I'Vervard lohelon (I)". Approximately 90% of the activity Atkesle is nocessw*Ily Iftsical because when Agents are not infiltrated ts,ronph enomy line it is necessary to keep close liaison with unqte in tbe combnt gonp and *SRVI must therefore take advantage dO all ft:militias that its amtonomy and independnnce conferstron it. Th. romainine 104 rayr-Psonts coordinating activity, initiative, organisation anP comrPnA. 4, The gpmg, of Short Range Intellipfmce ip to obtntn information of tltari valu to operations. by moans of sn4cial- ly trained Agents, sent 00 or patrolled through enemy lines or dropped in enemy territory. It also obtsine ieo-mation though questioning of civilians and ID.risoners of war. 3, The SWAM= of short Rang* Intolligonco unAor the command of a Command/34'01'110er, assisted by on or two other officers 'teeev. ding to the importance of the govt.:up required, conprisos OW* non. comm off. for clerical work who can also assist in matters f intel. ligenoe, interrogation of Agents upon thoir return, interrogstion of eisilia**, drafting of reports, he also takes carp of sumnliooge civilian clothes etc... One radio operator and ono mechanic for the vohicules and transportation. The organisation also includes one or two forner Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ???? .? 4 Ar ? For eIe-seAtel AKOMOMEIBI:arg v A .. almateartimintl . . /*Ants who are maintained at HOW become of tnot servinoll onA because of their knowledge of thA country and our nnrtiatanr tyrlo OVIT:t - +.7"4-.? , 41."4,Mi The INIMSMSA is required by 0 3 e Army RomAgnartemr* its WO// AN from Division, Rogimentssoright down the ocele 000 ehmrt attached) and therefore ?avers Intelligenoo of pommel cko woll st% detail isTortnnoet whenever lonm rftdOe rfttrole of unite In combat or air obeervation have not been abl* to mother came. grylprieroe he'vever$ has shown thatt1314* work to moot off/4;AI'. ot the onholon Oorilo ov Dtvioton be0ause the information obtained ift menmrnlly mn A onalm in harmony with oporktione they act ion. 'Mt" to obtmln04 wIthIn A rang* generally not exceeding an winos from onoimi ilnoo an4 thmrAenrm tiothe not interfere with the work of Lone Range lnte1Iittenee4 Ttio tribution of intelligence to parties other thin the Above le deoidod Ipon by HQ, Speoial Det4chaent 0 :lath Army it Agrotmont with Intelligence ane Olsrations Officer4 Permanent &WM are emtahlieheA follovm s 2) I4 min Special Detoohment 01 for all vottmro of general interest, somettses with other allied ouftte enoNed it) elmiur work (example I Vorward tohelon of RR) in ortter to mot 'co ftplionte scissions or at other times to prevent Auplicittions# Of 00111640 nolynw*. rAtiOn implying obtaining wag photogrAnho, woo etor,. which we might Amid for a missto*, is bane through 1140V14 c?xi, ?!??? '-t ' ;!?. seris.1, ? ' alateftoowe-alws,4.4k4.4406,411klie,Mt*4 v .4. ? 4 41111100 mei 0. .04.41sm; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 '.74:41TAL 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 .,1,714AIRMA: 4441- 2) with 0 3 Army Headquartere in order to be constenbly Informed on the situation at thm front AS a whole along with OP nnA 03 Division Staffs in actual combat ( exannlos the 340 pnA 36th ) for mere detailed data which may have n bearing on Aeoinionn to be taken in connection with accomplishment of Missions. 3) with Units actually engaged in eorosat ( Battalion of x.... Regiment ) or with Commanding Officers of outnoe+Ft when necessary to patrol Agents outs or making arrangements to ensure safety our own rmtnrn when Ant m infiltrated without aeoletance of unit in combat, arrangements for pnmn words for our Amahtn tf We should be unable to pick them ur upon returns also tomorftry auntoAy nf civilians for interrogation and interrogation of prisoners of war. ;,(17esiwithont s a hre aming;t,ii llieno LTATAnng established by direct contact and t(he del4 di crmen,,and nPin Ansncs of friendly relations between ouretielsree has hmlned to :lake the work much As practically all the work in of a physical. character it goes condition, and if in many cases they were not rielred *or their experience ix combat work, they lose no time in heoeminn noquainteA with it. The results of a mission depends on its proper planning nn ti oxecution '4 I Declassified and Approved For Release 20'13/09/23 : CIP:,-RDP'13X0-0001R000100170006-0 Mt ;,*q3g Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4 iffil I 1 s 4e1 fres ths ssoubtry point of visit. The risks invol7e0 different nature than combat work in ft regular unit beenuno the work must be undetected aryl whilm retoining ths knowlffilgo at 00 same time that chanoes to pun through are meagre if mtronv opposition is mot? ?or this reanon when our offloere trPfPet thovir Infiltrations, they carry no compromtainm Ilagnoret no wIlmnpvqq. pOssible war a privates, uniform ae it is a question of "Ao or &lens 4' A", '1441611Mr- 0-04,4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 "IN ? ? 44.11-fW far ? I. a ? ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 a ?- ea 1si order to obtain the bost restate for Short %ARM* ,:atelligenoe Work, the ideal would bo to home At our Atouilonl 0A7nb10 Agents And be Able to brie then thoroughly botoro , -lher sr* dispAtohode While thin mAttor is in tho sited oo 411 roreons literosted in the works tho following observfttions wore, tonothor Whi/o tAkivOpert reoent4 ea A fow 000rAtions rind aot forth ?or 0104 Vag if Any they MAY Wes %art Range tntelltnenoe (In) conlo, lite words 0PRMOZRION TN OIM2'LTOITY3 but ovon :hio to Wiloult ?or two reneonta I) on :mount of the trqinitig Monts .Pao-ivo rt tho *shoo/ ,ad the fAot tflAt 4104 iR their knowleAgo onunot alwityn ho /led afterwilids! a) the ?lase the Agent!) esolo,yad ifhothn !Roc high Omni civilians or former tow' offioers. t$ le Nest important that the Aponte should I" fully before 'being sent out on a mission anti tilat thas eir Dersonal 4011 so 'their ftsical fitness tor AAetermined mission * be Won into coneidoratiosi Tht,14e morel And 1)hysionl factOri oontribute greatlr to the * find with thtm tn tho ihmoulAing;Offlosr Ototonta000rding to tho ? ? 0010101 41111100"1011 1 OM SA fill ItEr I Mita (11 f IIiII A Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 $., 4-e s,- ; ? r The present situation makes it 'possible to finti Apeota nmong patriots whose sole interest le to work for the liberstion of their country. An Agent who therefore thinv,v AnA eoto ltko o o o a soldier is at the nreeent time creferoble to men wh i nmin. jimmalitte. in 0, very important tootle Whioh require+) lOte of care. The choice of Agents shgt110 be influsnce4 more by the souroe of recommenliatiou than by the apparent eince4ty of the recruit himself. No recruit ehoulti be oontoeteA before the ofoloor charge hes jut1ge0 of hie qumlificotions .. ono ehou10 obtain manifest proof of his goof, will before mentionine the tryle of work with which he might be entrneteti. lt?gerest1 thet privste lives of Agents, anti their inclination oor inetnoretioee or Ank have been careful' v ohocketi,but of?Acer in ohmrpo ahmlA row about the former life of theme men whenever neseible. If sny Aimaretion hue been oommittmil one muet immOintely pet riA of his anti follow ur his former oentraoto. At Asthma Aponte have reoeiveti I2) a basic instruction which is function of their Maslen anti whiob inelnAmeothe know:1,004m of the, enemy, of the country sna of the 'particular region where - 1 ":".,4?""??-a,c, 3'? 4 ? ?->? at? P) ft nrnetinoltn truction which is more or leas comtleite mei tietentie on whether they operate with a specialist or alone. But there rare also other 'otters in which thy shoulA portoct themeolvess in rartionlari C4Sirsorss.410Crite eati ssuA their informmtton oritanise their mission - h .:41101kr. ,Pln SWIM* of their 0.410.011 us Wen as ito esonrity. 101,04140401W 4,0 VO-VA*4"414}Va .a3VPREO Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 115"4,-Z Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 7 21 17?2:47;574.4,..1- 4 tr, 1,.% ? All thillosme sasy and in faot to, but lot us eolimit that nothttai io fo01,anA that Mars aro many .it who have fteudiPsit itt.' ollwolanee 11.61; tn *new ooviintedTIie territory. , pilatotroyfr !IOW to to rather tnovomktion nf Offrigii*-intiliho main took of the Agent to to obtain Astnil infor. 4 Attica on evoirythinft oonoertlinir the army or the onomy, in nArtiorlor what ts beina prorated nnti %Pith what moon. Thin in Ant he munt constantly ohoorve in the sone whiob 11,40 anoteneil tn him. The constant paeoccuration et thm Oommanti helm, the order of battle (02), the Arent mutt nlwnyo try itutl *041,115, to tho three elemontarr questions s who where .mm when. with tbior la mind ho will mothodtoully novel' his (woo hoenninR hy the looblittoo where he is observing all &Owns of the enemy whether in bnrraoko, under testa *tow and nfterwarfis Amino on to tho oevt locality t,0 will get the exact riottro of his area. /Inch otol) wt)1 hp ??.4,?4,? thoroughly Wort' passing on to thn Mohler. firtt rule tilioismihgrowe h MI4M1011 to to Austikyot inImpudie fhoreforo deocribe minutely, giving detnilo v whom rossih14146 lhoul0 novorintortrot in hie own wma" tnem'mAtton csOsoted from a third wily, Use tolain etii yln!tefliii4lit' VANUA WorAtt 6,4 *WV Large Ulthilk4060 small ditaohmentes?s.. Nemo tttle 'tares are above hooded %IA we eminot be Oven with yJreolaion they snot always be monttene4 as #aptroximatelvnOt met not be ovoirse, ) oak or9 10000,044A Aants 4r* 4t*so and reocritttttlteir own 441; ea.,1 .41,1,4????,' ?ye-a?For -Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4t1,91.1P IWO; ^ In the cane of meditocre A 4Amte it would', be useleos to verbally request information on too many subject, but for poet, class mkon the desired Intelligence can be summarist.d for instance which can easily be swallowed if Agent in onupht ) &no auylocations mapped out which will help the Agent as well as engure precision of the information, Many Agents do not apnreciats the imnortance of certain intelligence because it may not have been made clea)- to them. A rme hours of additional practical training is necessary to confirm their knowledge of baste intelligence such * 2,,of unitq by their uniforms and badges, typos of tanks tynos of guns and their calibre, and all vehicules used etc.. tbeir Aireotton of movements, whoth4r loadod or not, pillboxes, fortifications etc, StrillaShUZLIALI q/ias Ments.141.1s AAC448ArF that rrch 4/4"" ? / 7 - of infori?tiqiehatiid U6 made-with 4sr3001.senhils aiA olwArlino. The nature of information required from an At epolends 4 1) the Agent)11 personality ( intelligenem memrry of Observation .. general odueatilon particular knowleepe Aue to hie Profusion 2) ie the particular need of RC/ Commanding at a detarmined moment:.? for example in region, possible indications of an attack or withdrawal of troops. ' ; . r ,?;`0 , , ? ? ? ? ? ?t ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 11-41k 2013/09/23. CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 7 4."TV fRIY v? of ?, , firstas the general questionnaire only constitutes ths frAmo in if 3) et the geographical looation where Agent is infiltratr4d. In an industrial region)researoh will isXisi- include information on war nroduction in nartioular:..., in it uort, movement of troonm 0034 er in area liable to beoome oobt 4t off tv Thersiore in-each/Case a/Yisftble vigione'tn whidh they will onorntm ticular requirements of ReadquArters 77....,geogranhicP1 thurbriffing for- **oh partioular,eass. applying to each particular case can be of use for good clang Agents only. During the instruction of Agentn nnd afterwar4n in nonvernations, .At ohookAihat(they know the basis of it by heart. Of courqe items this questionnaire aro only theoretically clannigiee since order cr importance should be modified whenever necessary. 0661?? made to realise that it will often0iffiou1t to satisfy All the '..qui... remehts of thn command. They will therefore deAl with thm esnentlel which they operate. Directives they will receive ..;;4. unexnecte4 luck and their own judgement,should help them to make the n000esnry selection sod modifications on the order of twmortAnoo of the quomtionnal. aid 4 Smactp4)1*--,lor-ettififfeli.irt letirst. A.MtritiNti-oit of 101,310111--As itestoria,44c,the Aomi4ii*i41attivit-3,0364 - So while rotedniling ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 'Tr - r ft* ? Agents that characteristic of their work Is NPrectelon in Simnlic1ty4 they will appreciate that complete Information on a few es-outiel points is preferable to a quantity of varied information on too many subjects. limio,44watdo questionnaire applylng to the Ants particular casts 4 would include ,In particular, demands of Vivi Comma& ( examille composition of x.... unit not yet well known ...trafto In parti,-ular wt, on a ce Jrtain route etc..).#reelse questions of geoRraphical locafions ;` ( factories, communications, torts etc..) 14Wtel? einT?baviblIvIon-trenla. formed in 49/4?- thot41oskut4.14eat Ion. s quo t 4 on s, InlroArxi-li-:-44? Agent's particalar ability. Special questionr requIreW rules of circulation in x.., town, papnre required, oelimitation of AZ~(? ( theoretical anA to be modIfled for particular case) 'Emplacement of POI s identification ) Composition ti Importance i Armament ) Movement of troupe ( road . rail . sea ) (Identification (irportance (tostination 1 '''1,7174r imm1,77._?.4............,.......... ? , ;-----...,... . . ? ,?,,......,,..,,,, A CP i f T.1 . i .., e ?- . . ,1,...;,. . , 4 ...- , :till:2' .FT.L.;. -'-ai????IC? ? ? , 1 ' n - i; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassifie al A ro e Damps berreoks Defensive works trenches.. itllboes Aria blockhaus. Depots ... stocks (ammunition, gasoline, turn, food) Important rativ-oad stations railways (trpeks) ronA? and their condition if derived conntruoted. Nmplecoment of batteries ... strength .. calibre. Measures taken by civil authorities etc.. bleckoitt.. Wect of bombardments .- where fell If ilmlettbloi. liffects from Judi:Atrial roint of view. ships war & merchant oftracteriotice ? R8M88 siluktion -. armed .. being reraired and tyne convoys -. importance rrotection (armament areas mined .. dates. survey of coasts patrols etc batterime positions roads organisation and OD airfields occupied .. effect of bombardments on airfields conditions of landing fis.lds liatgatriikat A4Wifted, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ????? ??????111... ?01.. 2013/09/23. CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Co3t of Itted.. salaries. Black market eituation. Rationing foods taken by occurrying Health situation. Production essential foods ... stockiv Resistance. Attitude occupying authorities. Public opinion. Manifestattone. .74-7,1;4474-u5r. t ? s' The Agents giarmxiarz shonld be ilgn and based on the latest available informntion. ble directives should be given as to beat cover? on should this cover be left to the Arehtn own initiative? as cases have occur ed where thoftwho had not been briefed before bon,' Alo not return. Agent munt be convinced of Importance of his misston n' that it to.esset shown that bravery consists tn resPecting the rules of security. A may otherwise not orly compromise himself but the men who are with The Agent must always know by 'levet his cover story in crier to prevent coutradictory answers in the couree of hisquestiening aft?41 cross examinatioA? His cover story must be simile Anti based which can be controlled, otherwise It must be entlrely uncentrol#0,1,0 The Agent must never rotraotteven if the reople qmeettontap seem te, - ' .41 ? I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 t 1.,1-A1 ? -4,- ?.? ? _ er.a. a-11.? . ? . _ 10"?V.111,r. Declassified and Approved For Release 30131/t0793,3.: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 _ " . , , * 1 IR have persona information contrary to the cover ntory hp hns just given. He should never give or.dit to ths flo onlloP1 nionod oonfoesionn of third parties 'wan if thow have work0A vitt him nn th.v mnytho false. In the course of his interroemtion thA Agont munt net plv. details which are not asked him and if nosniblo h. will mr.kA nhort and ambiguous answers, not emnloyina words like "yen" gorical way otherwise than to dony nominations or "no" in A colt*. nPoinet him. Re* mot not gorget that the enAmy will use nil m.thodn ! nromin.n, nminbili. ties, m.nneos and brutality. If Agent mces 1.n A Cmil howAro of tilo "sheep" nn o do not communicate anvtbinn evmn to narty about the questioning Ate.... As regords the n-mmandi.vr ofoicAr knnwn Imedtythi or qra, ?le must lbecl, any fneblesneen on the ,art of hl, Arent, nnd nhot thorn thnt h? hoe' puts an A full knowledge of onch operation ho rim)** Oom=ipnAlnp officor must definitely know what is wanted and tIle ingtruotione h. hnn rivon must never be modified if a Aisoutedon onir wt nn Aport. Of course the work tvlat*can b0 eirfse.ot-A of "'PT ? i*t dictated by the nature of tho country nn A tho Aitunt4or or #1,o bnttio front p. it poee without saying thW in a mountp4nous romionll, whore the combat line cannot b* continuous, the 11,4obler of infiltratinp men through onen y linos if considorably simpliftoe. ror inotnnoo, et tho beginning of Febrpary at Cassino it WAR aif14110t to UnAielq41 any , ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 - ???=j work with assurance of success because of the hanA to hanA fightqn, and heavy artillery fire there, and onAthe,..041thestaohand the Arent* infiltrated behind enemy line's a few days before at the same niece were unable to return for the same reason. During the name nobrioA are! ry only some-gifistlew+wasAmat4ms, we were able to infiltrate Aeente on another mission with a minimum of rink, but these coulA nnt have fullfilled the original mission booaune of the bigh mounteinn an the lack of communications between the two noints. Uneler sucll cireamm. stances the inter,gogation of Ps/Weg may brine in more immPaInto While the length o? a mission eepend,*on th Aistanos and difficulty of the terrain, WI micRions ao not 0TcPm4 6 days, as it would otherwise fall under the scone of Lone "Paw^ ligence (LW. No rigid rule can be arnlied however, as thin'riient can work both ways since it may occur that LRI in not alwayq ( for instance impossibility of parachuting men su9-riciens1y 14_,) area etc.. ) The example given at-44.--tsilovtror-vaire ? that typiaftl SRI mission which was recently cnrried nut anA quceeqe.rully I It , 4- I The reading of these no/tes may seem a bit coeulive because they cover vOrted detail/all of whiffiii ao no hangthar0 but it rnuet/ tage- / e remember. Ithat neve7/two oto ationn pre alike down a/1 /genern r4 Oe t?ir Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 OW. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ?? ? The request sij;;In, herebelow ae was maA0 verbally at NIA en the 6th of by tho Ohiogf of 02 of x... who otatod that it woul4 be very important If infnrmation ?clad bo obtaiaed for the 8th of..... We infiltrated onff.of our Agents in the ogily hour n of thA 7th and picked him up on thm 8th with Om information mnele available at the required time and greatly appreciated, We lefleoft tn1A later that our information confirmed information previouely olltained which had been requested in connection with r.Planned advance in thiv sector to enable long range guns to onpilato iiermAn batte,bies at -SAW-MIATO,r818111Wierth PHIN1600i411001-210MA nno elow un to nhmll supply roads leading to MINA. Saftuallonata6.9tit4s41,0441. circulation ( in whet direotton heavier trait ) Imam ilimnWlention of ma very importnat center as roadkrot sumatos TW1pory fire. tf hormital wh4cliy previons17 At tis etc.. whnt Oa lommis my If Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 4. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 ? .7R11,1 L ? ? 17