LETTER TO MR. LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON FROM MATTHEW BAIRD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00631R000300070021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 25, 1958
• Content Type: LETTER

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igE8
Mr. Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel
Dear Larry:
You may have heard that we are trying a new experiment this
year in the Junior Officer Training Program. Instead of having
JOTts enter the Agency throughout the year we are attempting to
enter a 1960 Class of JOTts this September who will receive all
their formal basic training as a group and then be turned over
to the various component offices for the on-the-job training
phase of the program. This plan will help us solve the problem
of what to do with JDTts between courses, enable us to gear the
training content to a relatively homogeneous group, and avoid
the inconvenience to the operating offices of having to release
JOTts for subsequent training courses at a time when they are
deeply enmeshed in activities of their offices.
Language and area training will be given the JOT when the
DD/I offices indicate a need for it. In the case of Ants
assigned to the Clandestine Services for on-the-job training,
language and area training will be given when an overseas
assignment has been agreed to and as Close to the date of
departure as feasible.
The Formal Training Program is composed roughly of six
blocks of instruction as per the attached schedule (Attachment 1).
I'd greatly appreciate your participation in the first block of
the course, intelligence Introduction, with a talk on "The
History of American Intelligence" along the lines previously
discussed with you byl I A copy of the intelligence 25X1 A
schedule is attached Attachment 3) indicating speakers who
will precede and follow you.
The general Objectives of the Formal Training Program (see
Attachment 2), particularly II, 1. and 2. are important consid-
erations during the initial experience the JOTts will have with
the Agency. For the first nine months of duty with CIA, the JOT
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will perforce form his opinion about our business from the people
he meets and listens to. This is why I so much want you to
participate in the program. I don't think one can wave the flag
too vociferously before these kids, and I certRinly don't expect
you to whoop it up for Old Nassau. But it will help the as yet
unconvinced neophyte in making his career decision to hear why
have Chosen to devote a good size chunk of your life to
this business.
If you would like to discuss this further, please give me
a call.
Sincerely,
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Attachments
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25X1A
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Lawrence It ston
General Counsel
?Larry:
Toumey have heard that me are trying a new experiment this
year in the Junior Officer Training Progree6 Instead of having
40Tts enter the Agency throughout the year we are attempting to
enter a 1960 Class of JOT'. this Septeaber who will receive all
their formal basic training as a group and than be turned over
to the various oomponent office* for the on.the-jdb training
phase of the program. This plan mill help us solve the problem
of what to do with JOTts batmen courses, enable us to gear the
training content to a relatively homogeneous group, and avoid
the. Inconvenience to the operating offices of having to release
JOTte for subsequent training courses at a time when they are
deeply enmeshed in activities of their offiosei
language and area training will be given the JOT when the
0 offices indicate a need for it. /n the case of JOTfs
assigned to the Clandestine Services for oni.thegijOb training,
language and area training will be given when an overzcas
assignment has been agreed to and as Close to the date of
departure as feasible.
The Formal Training Program is composed roughly of ex
blocks of instruction as per the attached schedule (Attachment 2)
It'd greatly appreciate your participation in the first block of
the course, intelligence introduction, with a talk on nThe
Bietory of American Int con along the lines previously
discussed with you by j A oopy of the Intelligence
schedule is attached 3) indicating speakers who
mill precede and follow you.
The general objectives of the Prommel Training Program (see
Attachment 2), particularly II, 1. and 2. are important consid.
orations during the initial experience the JOTts will have with
the Agency. For the first nine months of duty 'with CIA, the JOT
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will perforce form his opinion about our business from the people
he meets and listens to. This is why 1 so much wont you to
participate in the progrem. I don't think one can wove the flag
too vociferously before these kids, and I certainly duet expect
you to whoop it up for Old Nassau. But it will help the as yet
?Unconvinoed neophyte in making his career decision to hear why
have chosen to devote a good sise -.hunk of your lite to
business.
If you would like to discuss this further, please give mo
a call-
Sincercay
SIGNED
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Attachments
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. The American Intelligence system had its beginning in the midst
of the Revolutionary War.
A. In the early days of the War, the Continental Army depended
on prisoners, deserters and refugees.kv
B. The need for better information led Washington to operate
personal secret service.
C. From the early days of the Republic, the gathering of inf'rn--
mation by unpublicized means was regarded as a legitimate function 7cpr
which public funds could be spent.
1. The army and navy obtained intelligence information_
incidental to their other duties.
2. The diplomatic service utilized unvouchered finds.
II. Intelligence activities during the Civil War were more advenceb
than during the Revolution, but it was still not an organized servie.
A. President Lincoln, himself, hired a man to gather information
while in the South. (Totten Case)
B. Intelligence was practical in nature.
1. Brig. Gen. Dodge was charged with directing a secret Aeruice
in the West.
2. Denied funds by Quartermaster he confiscated and sold c.)-t,W
crops to pay for his agents.
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III. Following World War I, intelligence information was obtained IA
diplomats and attaches.
IV. Immediately after World War II broke out in Europe, the governm
undertook preparations for a national emergency.
A. The Office ot imergency Management was established in May 1q4C:
to advise and assist the President.
B. In order to F4iin information on enemies and allies William J.
Donovan was appointed to position of Coordinator of Information in
July 1941.
1. Authority to "collect and analyze all information and data
and to make such information and data available to the Pri pf Al(3
to such departments and a3 tae Preside', niaa
carry out, when requesten nv the President, snch =0.innlemen1-arv
activitien as mav facilitate the seenrincY of infonlAtirin
for hationaJ security not now available to the governmnt.
lie was to have acceaa to information and data in o,her
aP'encie , but he was not to interfere or impair tne .-a
or the President' regular military advisers.
was the forerunner or a centralized Unil,ed ;.tate,;
-Intelligence service.
C. OSS was estaplisned on 1--t June 1942 and the Office of coor
or information was abolished.
mis.ion was simple: "a. Collect and analyze sl'eh
:trategic information as may be, rennired by the 1Tn1te,3 i-t
Chiei's of Staff: and b. Plan and cerate snob snecip1 re P c,
MMV 1)e nlrecteu mr, tne t,vited -itt,tteS Joint Chief's of Staff.
i)1PC or
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2. William J. Donovan was appointed as Director.
3. OSS was allowed certain privileges in conductinr it opt-rations.
a. It could enter into contracts "without provisions
of law."
?
n. Latitude was granted in expenditure of public urd..
V. Studies were undertaken to develop the concept of a permanent.
centralized intelligence serviee.
A. On 10 October, Gen. Donovan presented a document to President
Roosevelt entitled "The Basis for a Permanent United Jates Foreign
Intelligence Service."
1. It contained much of the basic scheme of the present Central
Intelligence Agency.
2. According to Gen. Donovan, an organization was needed ,vtLich
will procure intelligence by overt and covert methods and will
the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine natonal
intelligence objectives and. correlate the intelligence material
collected by all government agencies."
3. General Donovan suggested that the establishment 01- a
United States intelligence agency be governed by ten prnef..bles;
"1. That it should be a central overall Foreign Irtelli e
Service which (except for specialized intelligence pe' 17-;erit tc
the operations of the Armed Services and certain other Goverrnwnt
agencies) could serve objectively and impartially the reeds of
the diplomatic, military, economic and propaganda serve ci tt7!
Government.
"2. That such a Service should not operate clandetine]:,,
within the United States.
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"'R. That it should have no policy function and should rot
be identified with any law enforcing agency either at home cr
abroad.
"4. That the operations of such a Service should be pri.marili
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on
the pielicy or strategy level.
"5. That such a Service should be under a highly oualillec
director appointed by the President and be administered. under
Presidential direction.
"6. That, subject to the approval of the PresidenT, thu
policy of such a Service should be determined by the Df ector
with the advice and assistance of a board on which the Department
of State and the Armed Services should be represented.
"7. That such a Service charged with collecting iptellierne
affecting national interests and defense should nave its own
means of communication and should be responiple for a.J_ secret
activities such as:
(a)
(h)
Secret intelligence.
Counterespionage.
(c) Crypto-analysis.
(d) Clandestine subversive operations.
That such a Service be operated on both
vouchered and
unvouchered funds.
"9. That such. a Service hallea staff of spPrAqiiP.tf.
trained in analysis of intelligence and possessing a. high de-re
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of linguistic, regional or functional competence to e,ialua-,c
incoming intelligence, to make special reports, and to pro,-
guidance for the collecting branches of the Government.
"10. It is not necessary to create a new agency. The
nucleus of such an organization already exists in the Offite (A:
Strategic Services."
B. President Roosevelt continued to be actively intereste in the
establishment of a centralized intelligence service until his deatt..
C. Gen. Donovan emphasized that intelligence control "be returned
to the supervision of the President" and that the "establishment of a
central authority reporting directly to he President7 471.th resnon,idq. Jty
to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the
intelligence material required by the executive branch in planning tnd
carrying out national policy and strategy."
1. Several new proposals were added to the ten princinlcs
including (a) overall coordination of intelligence functions in
government; and (b) procurement and training of intellience ne-ornL
2. Secrecy was recognized as essential to the st cess., u3
operation of the agency in management and organization.
D. The Joint Chiefs accepted Donovan's plan in princip)e but
criticized it because they feared overcentra.lizaton.
1. The Joint Chiefs recommended that existing intellig,nee
agencies continue to operate but make their products available tb a
central Intelligence service for synthesis.
2. Secretary of Navy Forrestal considered their Naner ;oundl
conceived and suggested that the plan for a federal intelli ence
service pe pushed "vigorousy et the *lite Rouse."
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E. The Lovett Committee in the War Department con3iderec Fle
views of many people experienced in wartime intelligence and sub-
mitted a report to the Secretary of War which was approved h5 the
SecretarifAf Wp,r, NSN'y and ii-J'ttP and wnich was setit to tne WYAt
House on 7 Januar 1946.
1. This report contained many of Gen. Donovan's oriE:inal
ideas.
2. President Truman was sympathetic to the plan.
VI. President Truman by a Presidential Directive of 22 Jaruar. 1,94
established a federal intelligence system? d.
A. The basic responsibility for intelligence was put in ;he NIA.
B. Coordinating, evaluation and dissemination of ihtellience ee
given to a Director of Central Intelligence-G-Pet*p.
C. The White House concept of intelligence at that time wa.:; that
CIG would be an interdepartmental group and would not be an opeatbn 1
entity.
1. Prior to the 22 January order OSS was abolished and Resea-cl-
and Analysis Section was transferred to State and the remit -de War.
2.
2. SSU was set up in War essentially consistiur of Seccet
Intelligence, Counterespionage and Communications.
3. SSU began to turn to direct support of the DCI.
4. CIG absorbed SSU.
D. Enabling legislation was requested for CIC in July
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1. Expenditure of CIG funds accomplished by practical arrage
ments with Treasury, Comptroller General and other agencies.
2. The agency lacked operating authorities.
VII. The National Defense Act of, 1947 included the establishment of tie
Central Intelligence Agency.
A. Congressional interest in an intelligence agency was spurre(
by the results of the investigation into the Pearl Harbor disaster.
B. Unification legislation set up the NSC and under it Cit.
C. Intelligence agency section of the unification act was consered
as one of its most important points.
D. Cnngress had difficulty in the deterrninvvif CIA's otaLi
Position in the government structure.
1. General Vandenberg said he and the President were oppose..
to any more agencies freewheeling.
2. Senator Tydings wanted close relationship between CIA aro
Defense.
a. Pearl Harbor revisited.
b. Should not happen again.
3. Mr. Boggs suggested Director be a member of N3(7.
4. Mr. Forrestal disagreed because he did not want NSC exne,de'
but he said that Director would have great influence on KFX.
VIII. CIA enabling legislation was passed in 1949 after failure
A. Mr. Marcantonio provided opposition in House.
1. He charged that there was too much secree; , daner
liberties and the alien and confidential funds provisions wr 1-
desirable.
2. The vote wis
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1. He offered two amendments in debate, one to prevent CIA
employees on home leave from infiltrating labor unions arl u ine,ss
enterprises.
2. Passed by voice vote.
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The American intelli ence system had its beqinnin in the midst ot
the Revolutionary War. As the war progressed General Washington had a
growing,need for certain and continuing information on the British forces
and their intentions. In the early days of the War, the Continental Army
depended on prisoners, deserters and refugees. The need for better
information led Washington to devise his own secret service, which operate4
mostly under Is personal guidance. No formal organization emerged, out
an awareness developed of the need for information about the enemy whic2
could only be obtained through clandestine means.
From the early days of the republic, the gathering of information
unpublicized means by the War and Navy Departments was regarded aE a
legitimate function for which public funds could be spent. The intellienee
function, hQwever, was considered only as incidential to other duties. Even
in the Civil War, intelligence was more of a personal mission with the
Commanders then an organized service. President Lincoln himself directfiv
hired a man to gather information while in the South - a man b,v the name
of Loyd, whose administrator, after the war, tried to collect the ;alar
for which Loyd had contracted. The case eventually went up to the SdpreTe
Court which held that the Government was not obligated to pay because L,
was employed in a secret service and a contract for such employment cou13
not be divulged even in court because of the danger of embarrassment and
compromise.
Intelligence activities during the Civil War were more advanced thyd
they were during Washington's time but intelligence was still unorganized
In the sense of being directed by policy emanating
intelligence during the Civil War was practical in
the needs of an al*. The exploits of Bri . Gen.
from headquarters. itit.er,
nature and directed 4,
G.M. Dod,7e
rfeCrg --n-
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Dodge was charged with the duty of recruiting, organizing and. directin St
secret service in the West. Denied the necessary funds by the Quartermast-r
for paying agents, Dodge resorted to confiscating and sellin cotton crops
using the proceeds to pay his agents.
Intellisence activities were supported in the main by tne armed s.vies
during World War I and durins, the period between the two World War,. Between
the Wars, most of the information received on the status of foreie governments,
their armies, politics and economics was from attaches.' sce 64/41~4
Immediately after World War II started in Europe in Septemner 14s4, s eps
were undertaken to prepare the United States for a national emergencs ani
by May 1940 an Office of Emergency Management was established to avsse
and assist the President. It was evident at that time that the United ; a,es
had little knowledge of 2s potential enemies or allies. In order to gais
\c:144203%'
information necessa4Wthe coun ry with war approaching, Colonel WS
Donovan was appointed by President Roosevelt to the position of Coordin tos
of Information in July 1941. He had authority from President Roosevelt to
"Collect and analyze all information and data, and to make such inrormation
and data available to the President and to such departments and agencies
as the President may determine, and to carry out, when requested b? the
President, such.supplementars activities as may facilitate the secnring of
information important for national security not now available to tne
-Government." The Coordinator of Information was to have access to informanion
and data within the various departments and agencies but he was not to
interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities or e Presidert's
regular military and naval advisers. To assist him, the Coordinator could
appoint committees of representatives of the various departments and at,ensfes.
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Under his broad mandate, the Coordinator of Informationtegan to put.
together an organization capable of producing intelligence necessary for tie
successful carrying out of the war effort. This was the forerunner of a
centralized United States intelligence service.
Several months after we entered the war, on 13 June 1942, by e miltartJ
order, the President abolished the Office of Coordinator of Information anC
established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which operationally came
under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. OSS's mission was -jifte
simple. It was to:
"a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be
required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
"b. Plan and operate such special service as may be directed
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."
William J. Donovan was appointed by the President as Director of StrateTic
Services. OSS was allowed certain privileges in conducting its operations
such as entering into contracts "without regard to the provisions of law
relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts..'
Also it was imperative in performing certain of the wartime functions of ();-:
that
latitude be granted in the
In early 1944, over a year
taken within OSS concerning the
expenditure of public funds.
before the war's end, studies were
under-
concept of a permanent, centralized intelli,Fence
service for the United States Government. After several months of stud
General Donovan drafted a document entitled "The Basis for a Permanent
United States Foreign Intelligence Service," which he presented to Preslien'
Roosevelt around 10 October 1944. The President asked that General Donovan
continue his work on a post-war Intelligence organization. Mr. Rocevel
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interest continued and several days before his death he requested r;enerJA1
Donovan to call a meeting of interested agencies for their suggestions
"to the proposed centralized intelligence service."
The 10 October document contained much of the basic scheme whica
eventually was accepted for the Central Intelligence Agency. According to
General Donovan, an organization was needed "which will procure intelligenoe
both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide inte-tligerce
guidance, determine national intelligence objectives and correlate tae
intelligence material collected by all Government agencies."
General Donovanedvised that the establishment of a United States
intelligence agency be governed by ten principles:
"1. That it should be a central overall Foreign Intelligence
Service which (except for specialized intelligence pertinent to
the operations of the Armed Services and certain other Government
agencies) could serve objectively and impartially the needs ot
the diplomatic, military, economic and propaganda service of the
Government.
"2. That such a Service should not operate clandestinely with
the United States.
3. That it should have no policy function and should no be
identified with any law enforcing agency either at 'home or abl-( d.
"4. That the operations of such a Service should be wimexily
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence or the
policy or strategy level.
"5. That such a service should be under a highly qualified
director appointed by the President and be administered uner
Presidential direction.
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"6. That, subject to the approval of the President, the boli;
of such a Service should be determined by the Director with the ad/ice
and assistance of a board on which the Department of State ani the
Armed Services should be represented.
"7. That such a Service charged with collectinF intelligence
affecting national interests and defense should have its own mearri
of communication and should be responsible for all secret activities
such as:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
"8.
Secret intelligence.
Counterespionage.
Crypto-anal s1.
Clandestine subversive operations.
That such a Service be operated on both vouchered and
vouche red funds.
"9. That such a Service haea staff of specialists nr-pfess
trained in analysis of intelligence and possessing a high de
AC%
linguistic, regional or functional competence to evaluate ncorn
intelligence, to make special reports, and to provide guidance eor
the collecting branches of the Government.
"10. It is not necessary to create a new agency. The nucleus of
such an organization already exists in the Office of Strategie i,erveices."
On 18 November 1944, General Donovan submitted a memorandum t(- the
President which emphasized that "intelligence control be returned to ti?
supervision of the President," and that the "establishment of a certral
authority reporting directly to you /he President7 with responsibieLit:,
to frame intelligence onieetives and to collect and coordinate the
intelligence material re)- et by the lexee tive Branch in D1snn.7.
carreing ont nationa
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A draft directive was also forwarded to the President Vk-?ch detailed
the principles pet out in the 10 October document and added several new
proposals as functions and duties of the proposed agency including: "Coordi-
nation of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government . ?
collection, either directly or through existim2; Government Departments
and agencies, of pertinent information . . .; procurement, training and
supervision of its intelligence personnel; subversive operations abroad;
and determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential
to the collection of information." The Donovan plan also recognized the
element of secrecy necessary to the successful operation of an intelligence
organization in that the Director was to have authority itto employ necessarJ
personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, and
services" and he "may provide for the internal organization and management
. . . in such manner as he may determine."
While accepting the Donovan Plan in principle the Joint Chiefs of .Staff
criticized it because the organization General Donovan proposed would
"overcentralize the national intelligence service" without compensating
advantages and "place it at such a high level that it would controa the
operation of departmental intelligence agencies, without responsibility,
either individually or collectively, to the heads of departments concerred"
The Joint Chiefs recommendation included an organization which wou1n. not
result in a "too radical reorganization with the attendant disturbance (--
the present intelligence set-up." The Joint Chiefs wanted the exiting in-
telligence agencies to continue functioning. Their products, however, we
to be freely available to the Central Intelligence Agency for syntheBis, and
the operations of the departmental intelligence agencies were to be cylben tA,
inspection by the intelligence a?4ency in support of its planning ttnetiun.
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Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal considered the Joint Chiefs of
Staff paper "soundly conceived" and in a memorandum to the Secretary of
War on 13 October 1945 suggested that the proposal for a federal intelleeece
agency should be pushed "vigorously at the White House." Shortly there-
after Assistant Secretary Lovett was placed in charge of a committee in thf
War Department to study the matter. After considering the views and options
of a great many persons experienced in wartime intelligence, the Lovett
Committee submitted a report to the Secretary of War which presented the
case for a centralized national intelligence organization. The Lovett
Committee report served as a basis for the recommendation to the Pre id('Tlt
by the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for the establishment of a national
intelligence organization which was submitted on 7 January 1946.
The difference between General Donovan's view that the Director of
Central Intelligence should report to the President directly and the vier;
of the military services and the Department of State that he should report
to a board or through a department head we ee3olved by Preeie3ert Tru-o'
by the creation of the National Intelligence Authority or. 22 January
consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the President'
personal representative. The idea of a centralized coordinating functe?,e
was pretty well accepted and the main debate was on the position ce''
function in Government structure and its reeponsiveness to departmental eo
President Truman put the basic responsibility in the National
Intelligence Authority and, subject to law and their direction and cone-31,
gave the coordinating, evaluating, and dissemination functions to the Diracter
of Central Intelligence. The concept of the White House at that time 9-13 et
the Central Intelligence Group would be an interdepartmental group corm 3e
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of a staff furnished by the National Intelligence Authority departments
and would provide for the coordination but would not itself be an operatiolaJ.
entity. Prior to the Truman Order, however, the position of the Director
of Strategic Services had been abolished, the Research and Analysis See,Liol
of the Office of Strategic Services had been transferred to the Department
of State, and the remainder of the Office of Strategic Services had peen
put under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of War, with the directive Gila,
it be liquidated as rapidly as possiele except for such activities and
assets as might be required for the peacetime intelligence function. These
remnants were set up on 1 October 1945 as the Strategic Services Unit of tte
War Department, an almost autonomous unit reporting to the Under Secretary of
the Army. The paramilitary aspects were rapidly liquidated, leaving
essentially the Secret Intelligence, Counterespionage, and Communications
Offices with the attendant administrative support staffs.
Upon the creation of the Central Intelligence Group, the Strategic
Services Unit's contribution began to turn to the direct support of tae
Director of Central Intelligenc; and by the spring of 1946 they were wol?in7
almost as an integrated operation. This presented formidable legal and
administrative problems, which led to the conclusion that the Central
Intelligence Group should absorb the assets of the Strategic Services Unit
and operate them directly. This was done in the fall of 1946, the funds any
assets being taken over directly, the personnel being taken 1) transfer
(allowing selective appointment from the Strategic Services Unit's rosters),
and the documents being placed in the custody of the Central Intelligence
Group, although for some purposes they were considered Joint Chiefs or
War Department papers. Also during 1946, General Vandenberg aad requested
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drafts of functional and enabling legislation, which were prepared in
the form of a single bill establishing the Agency, settirg forth its
functions, and providing for all the authorities deemed necessary for it
to operate. (Meanwhile, practical arrangements had been made with the
Treasury, the Comptroller General, and other agencies to allow the Central
Intelligence Group to expend its own funds and otherwise act as a 3eparate
agency.) This draft legislation was brought up for top-leval study in the
Executive Branch of the Government
of the military services was being
Act took form, that portion of the
and setting forth its function was
at about the same time the unification
considered. As the National Secant;'
draft legislation establishing
he An(v
incorporated into the proposed National
Security Act inasmuch as it was deemed desirable to have the Director anl
the Agency directly responsible to the National Security Council, of whch
the President was to be ex-officio Chairman. However, many of the operating
authorities which CIG needed were not considered on the ground that the:
were too controversial.
While there were many at various levels who objected strenously
still to the central intelligence idea and to a separate, independent
agency to perform the function, every review at top levels confirmed the
earlier conclusions in the Executive Branch that the Director of Centra
Intelligence should not be subordinate to any agency or board lower than
the Secretaries. Aside from the debate on legislation, a separate 3tr1;z1-
was in process in the field of intelligence proper based on the question o:
whether the Director had any supervision or authority over tile metiers uf'
the Advisory Board and the atencies they represented, or whether he ral
one among equals who would proceed b:j Board decision.
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There is little doubt that the Congress intended toitake the Director
of Central Intelligence solely responsible in the field of foreign intigence relating to the national seCurity. The Director, however, eennot
exercise any command authority over the departmental intelligence .,:orapTents,
yet as head of the Agency he has a statutory duty to advise the Naj;iona;
Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of
the Government departments and agencies as related to the national secua
and to make recommendations to the National Security Council for ale
coordination of such Intelligence activities.. The Director must, the eort,
of necessity consider the scope, effectiveness, completeness, or dupli vtien
,
of the departmental contributions to the over-all intelligence repting.
1
to the national security.
Congressional interest in legislation to establish a Central
Intelligence Agency was spurred by the results of the post
ihvestigatioIs
by Committees of Congress into the Pearl Harbor disaster .particulaal the
House Committee on Military Affairs report On intelligenee which recomm nded
Congressional authorization of the National Intelligence Authority: 'rept
Congressional appropriations for CIG.
In the Senate and House hearings on the -Petional SeCurity Act, bill the
need for an effective intelligence. agency was, stressed over and over aga n,
The intelligence agency sectio4 of the unification bill ,,Tas consi(iered as
one of the most important parts ofyt e bill and a czy, to one of the
members of the House Committee ne centre .spction wae, given
more study by the 54b7committee and by the full committee. than any other
section. He also admitted it was the most difficult section to write. )rie
of the greatest difficulties encountered was placing the agency into the
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government structure. General Vandenberg stated that both the Preiident
and he, as Director of CIG, were opposed to any more agencies "free-
wheeling" in the government and wanted the place of CIA specifically
determined. In explaining the intelligence sections of the legislation
before the Senate Armed Services Committee Admiral Sherman, a memDer crf
the President's drafting committee, pointed out that the primary control
of the Central Intelligence Agency was "through the National Security Council,
which, of course, is responsible to the President." Senator Tydin-
questioning Admiral Sherman on this occasion wanted it made very clear
that there as a close relationship between the Central Intelligence Agenc;
on one hand and the three Defense Agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff'
the other. He believed that without a close tie-in "we may have another
Pearl Harbor controversy with the question arising, 'Who got the inforraction?'
and the reply, 'It was not transmitted.' That is one thing that siould ncr,
happen again."
The vagueness Of CIA's actual place as set out in the bill was recogn;; zed
by some members of Congress. Congressman Boggs discussed this problem rit
Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal at hearings of the House Committe-:. or
Expenditures in the Executive Department. Er. Boggs suggested that. the
Director of Central Intelligence should be a member of the National Sectir-i-,:,
Council because the knowledge and information which he had would eontritutf
most if he were placed on an equal basis with other members of the Council.
Secretary Forrestal's reply indicated that be fully supported the ntel,ligt-nce
function particularly as to its importance to the MSC. Possibly for
political reasons he did not want -to see the NSC expanded, but he said ILa-
"the practical workings of he MSC/ would require ft.he Directors7 nenz
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most of the time." A few minutes later he said: "This thing will work,
and I have said from the beginning it would only work, if the components
in it want it to work."
President Truman signed the National Security Act on 26 July 1047
and the Central Intelligence Agency was then a fact. The machinery to
operate the new agency was still in the offing, however. Early in 1948 a
move was begun to enact further CIA legislation; bills based on drafts
submitted by CIA were introduced in the House and Senate. Committee
hearings were held avd-eerteei-n-chattges-weve-ineele. The bill Passed the
House but was not acted upon by the Senate.
A new draft substantially the same as the one submitted previously was
sent to Congress on 11 February 1949. Mr. Marcantonio provided the major
opposition to the bill in debate basing his argument on such issues a
the secrecy surrounding the bill which deprived Congressmen of a full
explanation of the bill, the danger to civil liberties, the inappronriatnes4
of confidenttal funds and the undesirability of the alien provisiots. The
bill passed 348-4.
Senator Langer opposed the CIA bill in debate in the Senate denoun inq
the secrecy surrounding the Act and the alien provisions in it. Ha
proposed two amendments which were accepted - one specifying that CI,
employees would not be available
to the U.S. on home leave. This
for employment except by CIA ,TIleh
gas designed, he said, to prevent
by CIA employees into labor unions and-othex enterprises. Senator
returnin,
infiltrition
Johnaon
was concerned that CIA would have "sweeping powers which are being vestedi
in the military thrOugh this piece of legislation." The bill passed. by. Ar ce
vote and after adoption by both Houses of a conference report the ,:'entral
Intelligence Act was signed by President Truman on 20 June 1949. 7oL.
first time in_its history the United States had a recognized inder,rvierr;
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centralized intelligence agerc:v.
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4. It vas the
the repponeibilities ie zthoritiee ot the
tiara in the lottine of contracts, and although it was well recogeized
that the DMA representatives acted au the basis of stotutory autherUY,
nevertheless the seseral sentiment of the aloes was thmt oontraeting
with Ubesinseaes tad pitfall* both far the Government and for tbe
contractor** It wee also interesting to note the emphasis placed in
the course upon the analpsis of financial informmtion (belseme *beets,
etc.) to identify potential problem areas in the negotiation or adminis-
tration of a coatract
5. The instructors, who re sepleyees of Marbridge House, wtru
experience' and competent la their field mai they 14411ELlated the clime
to spirited discussion of the problems. In addition to the moos in
teethe*, there vas me lecture daily by a representative frua OMM on STATINTL
street of contract administration. Usually the lecturers them-
information to impart but their abVt4ty MA
An exception vas'
Procurement Division, Cala
Procurement Division, amt.
6. In summary, the t weeks coarse was of considerable walla': to
me amd I feel sure that ether demegy perseenel vho lave an opportunity
to attend this coarse vill find that their knowledge at procareemez
activities is increased and their horizons extended to a signifieart
degree.
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2
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