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Approved For Release. 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 ET GERMAN NATIONALIST AND NEO-NAZI ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA DOCUMIENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS, 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANCED TO. TS S 0 NEXT REVIEW UATEf AUTHt HR 102 0AT8f.------REVIEW ERt_ O GJ636 ~' 2 DEC 1980 25X1A8a State Dept. declassification instructions on file SECRET NOT TO LE I L 3 F" " -2 2 IL-0 -. 11,., 25X1A9a Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865 0300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 CER3 4N N&TION&LIST AND NEO-N&ZI ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA. 25X1A8a Prepared by Prepared for o WH Division Case number i L-10046 Date completed: 8 July 1953 25X1A9a SECURITY I ON Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 GERMAN NATION LIST AND NEO--N IZI ACTIVITIES IN ARGE! 1'IN& STiRY Evidence of intention to carry on Nazi activities, and of belief in eventual resurgence of Nazism., has been apparent among Germans in Argentina since 1946. Shadow organizations left behind by officials of the Nazi Party and Third Reich upon the break in diplomatic relations between Argentina and Germany., in 1914, have continued to function. Communications have not been interrupted between nuclei of hard-core Nazis in Argentina., Europe, and the Middle East. Since 1945, selected immigration has been fostered by German organizations with the help of the Argentine Goverment. The Government itself and the Armed Forces have employed Nazi economists and military experts as technical advisers. German scientists are retained for research in nuclear physics, jet propulsion and guided missiles. In order to improve and regulate communications between the homeland and Germans abroad, nationalist and neo-Nazi leaders in Germany have discussed the possibility of establishing a new entity like the Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party., Aus ndsorg_anisation (AO), NSD P, Through that agency the rulers of the Third Reich regimented Germanic populations in foreign countries., accom- plished Nazi political and economic aims abroad., collected intelligence and carried out covert operations; the success of this instrumentality was out- standing in Argentina. The proposed new "AO" would serve a similar fourfold purposes to act as spokesman for Germans abroad, to represent their interests in German politics and the home government, to facilitate emigration, and to obtain intelligence through Germans living or traveling outside the borders of Germany. It was the large Ge ,tdeutscher Bak, rightist refugee party of Germany, better known as BHE#, which sponsored this proposal. Refugee problems and irre- dentist sentiment in Germany will continue to provide substance for agitation and organizational efforts by extremists. The rightist and nationalist groups can be expected to keep alive, in some form, the idea of a reconstituted Foreign Organization. The situation in Argentina, is peculiarly favorable for such a revival. A well entrenched stay-behind organization was established before the recall or expulsion of German officials and known Nazi agents. President PERON is politi- cally obligated to leaders of the German colony and in a recent speech publicly reaffirmed his friendship for his "old comrades of the Wecht" and "the eternal and glorious Germany of all times." __2/ There is little ideological difference between Peronism and Nazi-Fascism. It would be entirely possible., in favorable circumstances, for the Peronist government party to turn to open collaboration with neo-Nazi-Fascism. A minority of the German colony in Argentina today is involved in neo-Nazi activity. However, "in the event of a strong resurgence of Nazi Fascism as a power factor in Europe, the local pro-Fascist groups could quickly achieve an importance out of proportion to their present small, number." Both the neo-Nazi movement in Argentina and the radical nationalist organi- zations in Germany lack unity and dominant leadership. They are generally guided, however, by a single basic aim., which is to destroy or invalidate democratic Originally called Bloc de He t e; triebenen Entree hten (Bloc of the Homeless and Disenfranchised ;the name was changed to Gesamtdeu Cher Block (Pan German Bloc) but the initials BHE continue in use. Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 SECURITY INF TION capitalism and establish planned economy on a global scale., through the agency of strong, totalitarian governments. The scattered neo-Nazis also have in common a certain optimism as to the future, and appear to have ample financial backing. They receive support from such 'industrialists and financiers as Ludwig P'RETA)E, and possibly, Fritz !INDL in Argentina and Johannes BERNHARDT in Spain. Nazi war veterans like Otto SI RZENY and, air ace Col. Hans-Ulrich RUDE serve or are used by unknown leaders to stimulate interest in and coordinate organizational efforts. During the past five years Skorzeny and Rudel have traveled in an orbit touching Buenos Aires, Madrid, Cairo. Munich, Vienna, Dublin, and Paris. Since the end of World War II, about 7000 Germans have entered Argentina. This immigration was facilitated by the Argentine Government, which permitted its consular offices abroad to',supply documentation and created posts for Nazi officials and Argentine neo-Nazis in which they could screen immigrants according to the political history and ideological leanings of the applicants. There is substantial evidence of communications and coordinated planning since that time which link neo-Nazi groups in Argentina with: (1) various nuclei of radical nationalist activity in Germany, particularly the Brudersohaft and Freikorns Deutschland; and (2)1the leaders of the international neo-Fascist "Association of European Nationalist Movements.." through its permanent office in Spain. Argentine nationalists aria neo-Nazis generally are hostile to the US and to the USSR. Some neo-Nazi leaders in both Argentina and Germany, however, advocate collaboration with the Communists. They have been in communication with former Wehrmacht and Waffgn SS officers in the Soviet Zone of Germarfy and with members of the so-called Naumann Circle, recently arrested by the British Zone authorities for conspiracy to overthrow the West German Republic. Members of the Naumann Circle, with wham neo-Nazis from Argentina had contact, were negotiating with Soviet representatives. The Government of the USSR has shown marked interest in Peronist Argentina in recent months. The new Argentine ambassador was received with flattering attention. A Soviet trade mission headed by a high official has been sent to Argentina. The Soviet Union indirectly supports and apparently plans to capital- ize on Peron's anti-US propagaida and intrigues. Soviet diplomacy in the future may pay attention to courting the Peronists and conceivably may follow the line laid down by German policy twenty years ago; namely, to encourage Argentina's long-standing ambition to dominate a bloc of South American nations. This would satisfy both Communist and neo-Nazi-Fascist desires, if it tended to separate the area from US influence and obstructed US efforts to preserve hemispheric unity and alliances witb;h the Organization of American States. Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 SECURITY I TION GERMAN N&TION.LIST AND NEO-NAZI ACTIVITIES IN.ARGENTIN& THE PROBLEM To prepare a review of background information bearing on possible revival in Argentina of the former Nazi Foreign Organization (uslandBorganisation, NSl P) together with a brief summary of the basic structure and tenets of the A. o at 25X6F The review includes a discussion of: 1. The organizational, financial and personnel resources for possible Nazi resurgence in Argentina, left behind by the Auslandsorganisation on withdrawal of Germanys Third Reich agencies; 2. The pattern of Nazi "survival" operations in the early post-war period, during which escape routes were established from Germany through Madrid and Rome to Argentina and the Middle East; Recent indications of Nazi resurgence in Argentina; 4. Links connecting the Argentine neo-Nazi movement with Nazi resurgence in Germany; 5. Liaison between the neo-Nazi movement in Argentina and the international neo-Fascist movemeent- and 6. Attitudes of Argentine neo?Nazi leaders toward the USSR and indications of Soviet intention to capitalize on the anti-US, anticapitalist designs of Argentine nationalists and neo-Nazis. Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 GERM N NATIONALIST AND NEO-NAZI ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA TABLE OF CONTENTS S~aarv I. Introduction II. Pattern of Post-war Nazi "Survival" Operations III. The Nazi Stay-behind Organization in Argentina IV* Recent Indications of Neo-Nazism in Argentina, V. Relationship of Argentine and German Nationalists and Neo-Nazis VI. Argentine Links with International Neo-Fascism VII. Attitude of Argentine Neo-Nazis toward the USSR VIII. Classified References IX. Bibliography of Unclassified Material X. Annexes A. The Foreign Organization of the German National Socialist Party (Ausland.sorganisation NSfl P) B. 0. Group Lists 25X 1X6 25X6F 1. German Club of Buenos Aires (1951) _2. Nazi Firms in Argentina (1943) 3. German "Officers' Junta" in Argentina (1952) 4. Former Wehrmacht Officers in Argentina (1952) 5. Former Gestapo Officers in Argentina (1949) 6. German Scientists and. Technical Advisers in Argentina (1950-1953) 7. German Propagandists associated with "Officers' Junta" (1952) 8. Germans Employed by Argentine Goverment (1952) 9. "Wiedemann" Intelligence Network (1953) 10. "Von Luxberg" Intelligence Network (1945) 1.1. Association of European Nationalist Organizations. National Representatives (1953) 12. References Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 SECURITY I194enleiter) was a Dr. RESENBERG, and his deputy wasi,a Herr KRUGER. On 22 December 1937, Bohle re- ceived the rank of Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, and it was announced that orders over his signature would have-the force of instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was understood that this enhanced authority would enable him to compel members of the regular Foreign Service to promote the work of the Foreign Organization. The 'use of diplomatic communication facilities also was made available to the Wat this time. The independence of this new office and its influence on German foreign policy became evident, even before its incorporation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, on 17 July 1936. Concrete German support for General FRANCOIwas delivered within two weeks after the Nation- alist uprising as the result of direct appeal to Hitler and Goering by the Orts- gruppenleiter in Spai_n? Adolf LANGENHEIM, and Johannes BERNHARDT, a German busi- nessman in Morocco. J Without reference to the German Minister to Spain, or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, these two Nazi agents flew to Berlin on 22 July, carrying a letter of appeal for aid from Franco to Hitler. Through the agency of the Auslandsorganisation they were given immediate access to .Gauleiter Bohle and Rudolf Hess. The latter directed that the letter be delivered to Hitler immediately, and the two men from Spain were flown that afternoon to Bayreuth for an interview with Hitler, which took place later the same evening. Hitler summoned Goering and arrangements were made forthwith to supply planes and other war material to Franco.', By 2 August, acting through a commercial organization set up by Bernhardt,'the Germans began transporting Franco's troops by air from Morocco to Spain.* Regimentation of Germans and German Institutions Abroad As defined by Bohle and his 'personal adviser, Dr. Emil EHRICH, the Foreign Organization had the task of winning to the National Socialist world outlook all German citizens living abroad or engaged in navigation; and of "keeping alive in every German abroad the principle of the racial community which tran- scends all classes and religious cenominations% / The purpose was to propagate Nazi doctrine among Germans abroad, and to control their economic, political, and cultural activities. The Auslandsoreanisation estimated that there were about a hundred million Germans in the world, of whom ten to twelve million were in the United States and 800,000 in South and Central America. * HISMA, Lta. (-.'(a His ano-MarroquI de Transportes). With Goering's assistance ROWAK (Rohstoffe-and-Waren Einkau'sgeselleschaft was organized to handle economic assistance at the German end. Bernhardt later unified his expanding commercial interests in SOFINDUS (Sociedad F nanciera Industrial Lta.)- Bernhardt still heads a considerable %financial empire" in Spain. -52-, SECURITY ITION Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 RET SECURITY ITWWATION Bohle set an especially high value on utilization of firmly established Ger- man societies within their respective countries. The fiction was repeatedly emphasized, that Germans living abroad would never be given any command which could not be reconciled with the laws of the country in which they resided. Bohle stated publicly that the Reich's interest in Germans of foreign citizenship was not political but cultural; yet in the same speech he declared that since the Nazi Party possessed "the exclusive right to determine the philosophical and polit- ical views of the entire people, the Foreign Organization has logically been estab- lished for the leadership of.all German citizens abroad". V Farther on he added, "When we speak in general of foreign Germandom we understand thereby not only Ger- man nationals abroad but also persons of German origin", A/ ?` """ n ,.,,,In the AO's definition of principles it was made clear that, under-the Nazi concept, organization of Germans abroad meant conversion of the individual to National Socialist doctrine, followed by his enlistment and employ- ment for the German community over and above everything else. "No power in the world can withdraw from a German abroad the obligation which he bears to his people and his Reich. The legality of the Auslandsorgmisation is based on the innermost law of the National Socialist philosophy, which exists only for the German people," "The German everywhere is a German", said Bohle. ". . . every German national abroad is a wholly equal and fully obligated servant of his nation and his Fuehrer." Once the regimentation of Germans abroad had been accomplished, service for the Nazi goal of political domination was taken for granted. Subsidiary organi- zations under the Auslandsoraanisation were fully integrated into the program for boring from within; for undermining established governmental authority; weakening public morale; forwarding vital information to the German-military authorities, and, in general, preparing the way for German military conquest and Gestapo control. "Nazi fifth columnism is a three-ring circus, built one ring inside the next," it was said of the Au slandsorganisation. "The innermost ring is repre- sented by the normal espionage and intelligence service of the military estab- lishment common to all governments. The middle ring is the Nazi Party organi- zation with its affiliated agencies operating on foreign soil. And the outer- most ring is the socio-economic situation of the workers and businessmen in the country where the Nazi spies and fifth columnists are at work." In Latin America' the Auslandsorganisation operated through propaganda developed to a level of intensity hitherto unknown. It utilized the labor groups, employing anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist slogans and system- atically whipping up strikes. In Buenos Aires, the General Federation cf Labor was overthrown in certain trades through the action of agitators, among whom were members of the German Labor Front. Still more effective, because of their greater political influence, were the Nazi efforts to infiltrate, organize, or sponsor native political parties of totalitarian or extreme nationalist inclination. Among these were the Conservative Party of Colombia, the Intearalistas of Brazil, the sinar uistas in Mexico, and various nationalist factions in Argentina. The Levi n C vita Ar egntiuas the A6ociaci6n Argentina de Grgmios, Alianza de la Juventud Nacionalista, and the Argentine Social (not Socialist) Party were used to develop propaganda and agitation against the democracies and in favor of totalitarianism. Nazi strategy called for creation of a group of totalitarian states, includ- ing Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, all to be controlled under German guidance, from Uruguay. Indigenous nationalistic movements were to be used in furtherance of this aim and to serve as the local fifth column when the Nazi; would take over the hemisphere. They were to become bulwarks for the political protection of German interests. -53- SECURITY INFZ$ON Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Buenos Aires was selected as Nazi headquarters for South America. Groups of German colonists were either attracted by propaganda, or forced by Gestapo methods into the Nazi organization. Immigrants from the Ukraine were also brought in as "belonging to the. German race", The Argentine Republic was organized into a Special Group District; Buenos Aires was divided into five subsidiary districts. In 19419 there were 30,000 members of the German National Socialist Party in Buenos Aires. Organization Like the Nazi Party, the Foreign Organization was arranged in interdependent units, country grows (Landesgruppen), regional sections (Landeskreise), local groups (Qrtsgruppen), and branches~Stuetzpunkte). This hierarchic arrangement was built up in accordance with the Fuehrer principle, which conferred supreme authority upon the Party leader in each country. Party leaders abroad were called "Bearers of Sovereignty" (Hoheitstraeger). The world was divided into eight geographic divisions (Laenderaemte with a regional department for each, as follows: Regional Department Is n " II, III, Northeastern Europe Western Europe Southeastern Europe, Austria and Near East Italy, Switzerland and Hungary Africa North America Latin America Far East, Australia, Great Britain, Ireland The designation country group" (LandesgrupRe) was applied only to countries of special significance for Germandom abroad. The designation "regional section" (Landeskreis) was applied to all 'other countries. The "Bearers of Sovereignty" of the Auslandsorganisation were: 1) the Director, with rank of Gauleiter; 2) Deputy Director, with rank of deputy Gauleiter; 3) the country group leader, with rank of Gau office chief; 4) regional section leaders; $) section leaders; 6) local group leaders; 7) branch leaders. The affiliated organizations covered every phase of German life. Among the more important were: 1. The German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront or DAF), one of the most useful and widespread Nazi organizations. Membership was usually obligatory and a prerequisite for obtaining employment in a German firm. The DAF endeavored to'place workers in all vital and strategic enterprises and public utilities.) 2. Youth, woments, welfare, charitable, and relief soci0?ie8,. (By threat of withholding relief funds from relatives in.Germany, welfare activities were in a position to exercise great influence over the German colony, besides serv- ing as cover for Nazi intelligence activities.) 3. Associations of German schools, school teachers, German students, lawyers, and professors abroad. 4. Social, dultural, and sports clubs. 5, Associations of German war veterans, "54o-, MEET SECURITY IN ION Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 6. German churches, especially the Evangelical Church.. (While not Nazi organizations as such, nor entirely under Party domination, the churches were used extensively as fronts.) 7. Cultural societies composed of Latin-Americans and Germans. 8. German chambers of commerce and business firms. Functional offices in the Auslandsorganisatioa were: 1) Office for Foreign Trade; 2) Department for Culture; 3) Legal Department; 4) Press Officer servic- ing the Reich press and the German press abroad; 5) Speakers' Department, which supervised the organization of festivals, handled film and radio work; 6) Depart- ment for Returning Germans, which arranged for employment of Germans returning to live in the Reich, and also prevented the reintegration into German society of those who, from the National Socialist point of view, would be undesirable citizens. The Nazi high command for South and Central America was established in Buenos Aires under Parteileiter Gottfried BRANDT. All district leaders (Landeskreis- leiter) and directorates for the republics of Latin America were under his per- sonal control, as well as special representatives of the SA, SS, Labor Front, Propaganda, Gestapo, and auxiliary organizations. There were six Territorial Directorates controlling the various zones of Nazi organization in South America, with headquarters at Buenos Aires, Santiago, Lima, Bogota, Rio de Janeiro, and Havana. District Sections for each country were under the directorate composed of the following parts: 1) The Directorate, which was composed of a) Secretary-General; b) repre- sentative of the German Labor Front; c) secretary for propaganda; d) secretary for the SA and SS, and e) a member of the local Gestapo; 2) Geographical sections under zone chiefs, block chiefs, and cell chiefs; 3) The diplomatic organization, which received instructions from Berlin but worked under the vigilance of Gestapo agents; 4) Secretariat for Internal Affairs, charged with national problems; 5) Secretariat for Military Affairs, governing SS and SA operations and military and depot administration; 6) Secretariat for Special Police Matters (Gestapo); 7) Secretariat for Judicial Matters; 8) Secretariat of the Treasury, which directed the Party's economic cam- paigns, supervised the commercial organization attached to the diplomatic ser- vice, saw to it that German chambers of commerce complied with the special laws governing their activities, levied and collected the taxes which Germany imposed on all Germans regardless of where they lived; 9) Secretariat for Propaganda; 10) Secretariat for Culture. -55- Approved For Release 2000/04/11 CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 The following schematic listing shows the chain of command and principal members of the Foreign Organization in Argentina, as of 1941: MartinBORMANN (in BERLIN) Deputy to the Fuehrer Ernst Wilhelm BOHLE' (in BERLIN) Gauleiter of Auslandsorganisation Dr. Gottfried BRANDT (in BUEN(S AIRES) Gauleiter for South America Prinz Stephan von and zu SCHAUMBURG-LIPPE Hugo Wend von RADOWITZ Vice-Gauleiter Secretary General of Political, Military and Police Chief Diplomatic and Propaganda Affairs Heinrich VOLBERG, Buenos Aires Landesleite .for Argentina I - Directorate for Argentina Alfred MUELLER, Secretary General Alfred BECHLER, Delegate National Labor Front Bann SANDKUHL, Director of Propaganda, Heinz FROELICH, Chief, Storm Troops and Elite Guard Wilhelm WEILAN D and Hans FORSTERx representing the Gestapo George C. SCHMIDT/$ Secretariat of Internal Affairs Erwin WALD, Administration Walter S. STOCKER, Commerce and Industry Martin WEINSCHENCK and Leo MULLER, Export and Import Operations The Auslandsgrganisation brought together individuals and groups of German origin or extraction wherever found abroad, and kept track of them through its network of social,: cultural, and Party organizations. At that point the Gestapo moved in and applied its measures'for bending all Germans'to'the Nazi will and. control. Simultaneously, the-SD, (Sicherheitsdienst) or security service*, operated within the same ax?ea to gain influence over the indigenous government} This was. accomplished by infiltration and by !"capttiring"and developing potential leaders who, at a given time, would assume control cf the police and military forces and the public administration, and guide national policy in ways favorable to Nazi designs. The third arm of the Nazi organization for foreign conquest was the vast propaganda network which served to indoctrinate Germans and to blanket the target countries with barrages of words against democracy, in favor of nation- alist.extremism and totalitarianism. Arprincipal objective was to undermine *The SD was a political intelligence organization within the Schutz Staffel (SS), the elite guard of the Nazi Party. When the Party had penetrated the apparatus of the German State, the SD was decreed to be the intelligence organization of the State as well as of the Party, with the official task of supporting the criminal police (Kripo) and secret police (Sipo), of which the Secret State Police, the. Gestap?, was part. The Abwehr, Intelligence Service of the German High Command, usually confined itself to normal military intelligence operations. It gradually lost prestige and at ',last became subordinate to the SD. Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 public confidence in established leaders and popular institutions, and build up sentiment sympathetic to Nazi ideology, and thus to prepare the way for imposition of new leaders who would be friendly or submissive to Nazi Germany and unfriendly to the UK, France and the O.S. The schematic listing of Auslandsorganisation officials in Argentina, given in the preceding section, shows how each major'component of the Nazi plan for domination was represented in the Central Directorate. The program was compre hensive and grandly conceived. Its implementation required money and entrench- ment under cover.: which would be more secure than that provided by the German diplomatic servize or the cultural societies. Clandestine operations would also be less subject to the scrutiny of indigenous government agencies or parliaments. Both money and cover were forthcoming from the great German commercial firms through- out the world. These firms had already established multiple, deep-rooted liaisons with government and commercial circles, with indigenous families, and with social and political leaders. Yet, within the vast framework of the cartel system, they remained closely linked to the Fatherland. -57 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Annex (A) Sources: A. U. S. Department of State, National Socialism (Basic Principles., their Appli- cation by the Nazi Party's Foreign Organization, and the Use of Germans abroad for Nazi Aims), US G rernment Printing Office, Washington, 1943 New York The Nazi Undergroufld in South'America 1943 Hu Fernandez Art cio o B , , g , , . 25X1A2g D. U. S. Department of State, Memorandum, Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine SituationsFebruary1946 References; Department of State, Publication No. 383$, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, (From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry )p Series D, Vol. III, pp. 1-2. Department of State, National Socialism, U. S. Gcw ernment Printing Offices Washington, 1943, p. 96. Ibid, p. 105 "'. P. 107 " po 292 P. 355 p. 139 SECj1RITY INFMWACION S Approved For Release 200.0/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4 25X6A Next 28 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/04/11: CIA-RDP62-00865R000300030004-4