IDEALIST CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: October 1, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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IDEA 0904
Copy fof~
3 October 1962
10EMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director, OSA
IDEALIST Concept of Operations
1. Due to recent events which have overtaken the REALIST
program it is necessary to reevaluate that program's concepts of
operation as it appears presently and during the near future. The
principal events. their effects and a recommended coarse of action,
will be discussed In this paper.
Three main points arise as a result of this unfortunate
25X1A
a. Our already low Inventory of operational U-2C
aircraft becomes critical.
b. This incident, along with the recent revelation of
the presence of SAM sites and MIG 21 aircraft in Cuba.
dictates a more cautious approach in the employment of
U-2 aircraft. The net effect is that it will probably require
more operational sorties to achieve less coverage.
25X1 C
North Viet Nam reconnaissance cover&& 25X1 A
The above mentioned considerations are discussed in some detail
in following paragraphs.
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OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
,ea U4ZC aircraft. This figure allows for two aircraft at
a. The IDEALIST concept of operations requires a tout of
H, two aircraft on TDY or other permanent overs
ircraft in ZI at Detachment C and Out rotating
proven that as the average more than one vehicle is not available
due to the demands for test beds, modifications IRAN, updating,
etc. In fact, during the taut 12 months an average of over two
operational aircraft have been unavail&ble due to the above
activities. These shortages have resulted in a serious loss of
-rough periodic IRAN aadlor other maintenance. Experience has
t proficiency training, excessive overtime in performing
tactical doctrine testing and evaluation.
*Operational aircraft availability through April 19b2:
CT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
)AA R
A 14R
358
356
34Z(-)
355
3
355
355
355
Z9th) 359
359
359
359
359
358(10th)
342(21st) 342
342
343(-)
352(?)
352
352
343
367(ttth)
343
OCT
NOV O
DEC
JAN
FEB
routine maintenance and in some cases. our inability to support
secondary mission requirements and accomplish fly needed
352
358
352(?)
359(-)
367
367
367
367
3671-)
34Z(Z9th)
342
344
(342 (21st)
358
358(-)
343(-)
358
355
Center, 4 Oct 6Z. Attended jointly by LAC, Project Hqs.
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TOP SLUE[
4. RECO)4MENDATIONS:
a. U.ZA, 367, should be obtained from SAC and programmed
into conversion at LAC at the earliest possible date. This action
will Increase our inventory to the n*ilrnum required to support the
operational concept and offers some badly needed pad against either
further operational losses and/or unforeseen special testing which
all probability. occur.
b. That further negotiations be conducted regarding the use
25X1 A 01 1 for future OXCART testing with
the objective of obtaining article 352 for operational and IDEALIST
project test uses that require a 3>75 engine configuration. It
can be anticipated that at least one U-ZC will be required for
special testing of new defensive equipments, further NORAD test,
25X1 A engine research, etc. These project support require-
ments have not been considered in the current aircraft inventory
and flow schedules. An alternative which is acceptable and in
some ways preferable to Operations is to use the SAC J-51 engine
(350) aircraft for INS testing. This offers the advantage of having
a test bed for other camera, film. special equipment, etc.. test'
ing which seems to be a perpetual requirement without the
25X1A (expense,
NCREASEl3 DEFENSIVE POSITION OF SOVIET BLOC
25X1A
Due to the relative invulnerability of the U-ZC to know defensive
capabilities of Communist countries over which we have been operating
y, it has been possible to program photographic coverage of
Cuba, plus some evidence of an increase defensive capability of the
ChiComs, tong sorties over some denied areas can no longer be
considered acceptable.
scant discovery of SAIV sites and high performance aircraft, In
many miles of denied territory and/or many specific target areas. For
practical purposes, fuel and/or film, supplies were the only limiting
factors when favorable weather conditions existed. Now, in the light
assuming that photographic reconnaissance will continue to
be required and that the U-2 will for some ti:_ er the best vehicle
from which to collect this intelligence it is mandatory that every
reasonable effort be taken to reduce the risk attendant to any overflight.
Improved and additional defensive equipment for the U-2 is presently
being obtained on a rush basis.
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Since an operations paper has been presented reflecting
our recommendations (IDEA 0903) regarding TACKLE only North
Viet Nam operations are discussed here.
It is my opinion that Southeast Asia reconnaissance 25X1 A
coverage as wee presently know thorn cannot be satisfactorily
accomplished on a TDY rotation basis from Detachment G. However,
if the requirements can be satisfied by partial coverage once every
4 to 6 months a modified operational concept similar to[
etc.. could be worked out. The two largest problems, I. a.. suitable
weather conditions only 2-4 days per month or less and the ferrying
of aircraft across the Pacific, precludes any practical plans for
monthly coverage without either using TACKLE facilities as before. 25X1 A
or establishing a somewhat permanent detachment at I
25X1A
(1) using TACKLE
25X1 A Facilities with for LOW NOTE sorties. This is
concept recommended by Operations. Several modiftea-
25X1 D
25X1A
minimize some of the principal objections. For example, our
tions of previous procedures could be made which should
(Z) Another plan would stage the aircraft and a
-
good weather period. Admittedly this concept would require
some personnel augmentations at Detachment H, but would
undoubtedly be a more economical operation than any other
concept excluding (1) above.
I during an anticipated
staging team from F
(3) A third concept, the feasibility of which is
25X1A
dependent on the extent of Cuba requirements in the future,
would deploy a staging team from Detachment G to I
25X1A
and use TACKLE aircraft on "loan" from
Top SECRET
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TOP SECRET
The inherent disadvantages of this plan are; (1) the long lead
time (minimum a-Z days) would preclude keying the operation to
forecast weather conditions, (Z) frequent airlift halfway around
the world and return (3) and, of course, the loses of manpower
and equipment while traveling and waiting for operational 25X,1 n
25X-1A conditions. I aad I Iwould be operationally
crippled during the period of this operation.
25X1A
Chief, Operations Division, OSA
cc: ADIOSA
25X1A OSA/OD
Distribution:
#1-Addee
#2 - AD/OSA
#3 -OSA/OD
#5 - OSA/RB
(3 Oct 62)
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