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Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
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December 3, 2002
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October 1, 1962
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PDF icon CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9.pdf298.66 KB
Approved For Release 2003/.0 x/24 :~00313A000600100~1 IDEA 0904 Copy fof~ 3 October 1962 10EMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director, OSA IDEALIST Concept of Operations 1. Due to recent events which have overtaken the REALIST program it is necessary to reevaluate that program's concepts of operation as it appears presently and during the near future. The principal events. their effects and a recommended coarse of action, will be discussed In this paper. Three main points arise as a result of this unfortunate 25X1A a. Our already low Inventory of operational U-2C aircraft becomes critical. b. This incident, along with the recent revelation of the presence of SAM sites and MIG 21 aircraft in Cuba. dictates a more cautious approach in the employment of U-2 aircraft. The net effect is that it will probably require more operational sorties to achieve less coverage. 25X1 C North Viet Nam reconnaissance cover&& 25X1 A The above mentioned considerations are discussed in some detail in following paragraphs. Approved For Release 2003/01/2 Pc?AbPJE3T3AOOO6OOl 00105-9 "4-1 () f Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9 OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORY ,ea U4ZC aircraft. This figure allows for two aircraft at a. The IDEALIST concept of operations requires a tout of H, two aircraft on TDY or other permanent overs ircraft in ZI at Detachment C and Out rotating proven that as the average more than one vehicle is not available due to the demands for test beds, modifications IRAN, updating, etc. In fact, during the taut 12 months an average of over two operational aircraft have been unavail&ble due to the above activities. These shortages have resulted in a serious loss of -rough periodic IRAN aadlor other maintenance. Experience has t proficiency training, excessive overtime in performing tactical doctrine testing and evaluation. *Operational aircraft availability through April 19b2: CT NOV DEC JAN FEB )AA R A 14R 358 356 34Z(-) 355 3 355 355 355 Z9th) 359 359 359 359 359 358(10th) 342(21st) 342 342 343(-) 352(?) 352 352 343 367(ttth) 343 OCT NOV O DEC JAN FEB routine maintenance and in some cases. our inability to support secondary mission requirements and accomplish fly needed 352 358 352(?) 359(-) 367 367 367 367 3671-) 34Z(Z9th) 342 344 (342 (21st) 358 358(-) 343(-) 358 355 Center, 4 Oct 6Z. Attended jointly by LAC, Project Hqs. Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9 TOP SLUE[ 4. RECO)4MENDATIONS: a. U.ZA, 367, should be obtained from SAC and programmed into conversion at LAC at the earliest possible date. This action will Increase our inventory to the n*ilrnum required to support the operational concept and offers some badly needed pad against either further operational losses and/or unforeseen special testing which all probability. occur. b. That further negotiations be conducted regarding the use 25X1 A 01 1 for future OXCART testing with the objective of obtaining article 352 for operational and IDEALIST project test uses that require a 3>75 engine configuration. It can be anticipated that at least one U-ZC will be required for special testing of new defensive equipments, further NORAD test, 25X1 A engine research, etc. These project support require- ments have not been considered in the current aircraft inventory and flow schedules. An alternative which is acceptable and in some ways preferable to Operations is to use the SAC J-51 engine (350) aircraft for INS testing. This offers the advantage of having a test bed for other camera, film. special equipment, etc.. test' ing which seems to be a perpetual requirement without the 25X1A (expense, NCREASEl3 DEFENSIVE POSITION OF SOVIET BLOC 25X1A Due to the relative invulnerability of the U-ZC to know defensive capabilities of Communist countries over which we have been operating y, it has been possible to program photographic coverage of Cuba, plus some evidence of an increase defensive capability of the ChiComs, tong sorties over some denied areas can no longer be considered acceptable. scant discovery of SAIV sites and high performance aircraft, In many miles of denied territory and/or many specific target areas. For practical purposes, fuel and/or film, supplies were the only limiting factors when favorable weather conditions existed. Now, in the light assuming that photographic reconnaissance will continue to be required and that the U-2 will for some ti:_ er the best vehicle from which to collect this intelligence it is mandatory that every reasonable effort be taken to reduce the risk attendant to any overflight. Improved and additional defensive equipment for the U-2 is presently being obtained on a rush basis. Approved For jDP630031 3A0006001 00105-9 S ti Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP63- 313A000600100105-9 Since an operations paper has been presented reflecting our recommendations (IDEA 0903) regarding TACKLE only North Viet Nam operations are discussed here. It is my opinion that Southeast Asia reconnaissance 25X1 A coverage as wee presently know thorn cannot be satisfactorily accomplished on a TDY rotation basis from Detachment G. However, if the requirements can be satisfied by partial coverage once every 4 to 6 months a modified operational concept similar to[ etc.. could be worked out. The two largest problems, I. a.. suitable weather conditions only 2-4 days per month or less and the ferrying of aircraft across the Pacific, precludes any practical plans for monthly coverage without either using TACKLE facilities as before. 25X1 A or establishing a somewhat permanent detachment at I 25X1A (1) using TACKLE 25X1 A Facilities with for LOW NOTE sorties. This is concept recommended by Operations. Several modiftea- 25X1 D 25X1A minimize some of the principal objections. For example, our tions of previous procedures could be made which should (Z) Another plan would stage the aircraft and a - good weather period. Admittedly this concept would require some personnel augmentations at Detachment H, but would undoubtedly be a more economical operation than any other concept excluding (1) above. I during an anticipated staging team from F (3) A third concept, the feasibility of which is 25X1A dependent on the extent of Cuba requirements in the future, would deploy a staging team from Detachment G to I 25X1A and use TACKLE aircraft on "loan" from Top SECRET Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9 Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9 TOP SECRET The inherent disadvantages of this plan are; (1) the long lead time (minimum a-Z days) would preclude keying the operation to forecast weather conditions, (Z) frequent airlift halfway around the world and return (3) and, of course, the loses of manpower and equipment while traveling and waiting for operational 25X,1 n 25X-1A conditions. I aad I Iwould be operationally crippled during the period of this operation. 25X1A Chief, Operations Division, OSA cc: ADIOSA 25X1A OSA/OD Distribution: #1-Addee #2 - AD/OSA #3 -OSA/OD #5 - OSA/RB (3 Oct 62) Approved For Release 2003/01124 : I NA" T-00313A000600100105-9