ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00654A000200130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 151
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CHAPTER I
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MCANIZATTONAL HISTORY OF
C 14'7RA UiTI LLIO CP Ar T; C!,
1l138'~
hapter:
Pages:
I.
Background, 19146-1950
53
II.
Major Organizational Revision
93
III.
Inter-Agency Coordination Problems
48
IV,
The Conduct of Overt Collection
306
V.
Development of a Reference Center
84
VI.
Problezs of Scientific and Tech-.cal Intelligence
80
VII.
Economic., Geographic, and Basic Intelligence
83
VIII.
Current Intelligence and hostility Indications
59
IT.
Production and Coordination of Intelligence Estimates
182
7.
The Conduct of Agency RasinssS
169
A. President Truman's Letter, January 22, 19156
B. Selected Organization Charts of GIG and CIA, ]9) 6-53
C. Directives of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA's)
D. CIA Legislation of 1917, 1919, and 1951
E. NSC Intelligence Directives and DCI Directives, 19157-53
F. List of OIC Projects, 1951-53
0. Missions and Functions of CIA Offices, 1950-53
H. List of . Reports, 1952-53
K. Descriptive List of 01Z Estimates Projects, 1950-53
L. List of OSI Projects, 1949-53
M. List of IAC Projects, 1950-53
A. Index
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'"IA RATIO AL LSTOz y of TRAL INT .LLMENC l95O-19'3
Cdr I: ROUND, w>-x.9547
T:;morissr Relatin ; to CIG
Page
1
Sowers' Ideas of Organizatit , 3,946
14
Modification Required by NIA.-2
8
The Personnel problem, 1916
9
Vandenberss Decisions and Actions, 39h6-19147
11
Coordination of Activities Under Va g, 1946.19147
1?
Expz n:ion of au, 19146-19147
19
Organisational, Changes in CIa, 19146.-19147
23
C bar a of Cow end the Natioraal. Security Act, 19147
25
NSC Interpretation of the Laws 1947.1948
27
Effects of the Interpretation, 3,9148
31
Development of the NiUenkoettW Organization, 19147-19l 9
314
Coordination Prrobles, 19147-19c0
35
The CIRS Problem, 19148-1919
39
The IhUlee Co 3ittes Reconmsndattons and Their Reception
by the Agency, 19149-1950
The 19!49 Agency "Reorganization"
44
The 19501953 Reorganization in Relation to the 19146-1950
Background
149
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C apter I
cKn min. 191,6-195()
The purpose of this stisiy I
I
the organizational developr*'
tions,
of the ::.'antral Intelligence s
within certain lirtit..a-
central Intelligence
as a chronological guide
the period covered by the administration of General ;alter 'edell
.smith (October 7,i950-Februa - 16, 1953). In order to make clear
what Oenerel, ith eras able to accoeh, it is desirable to trace
very briefly the %ain events in to dee,sloptnent of Centr*1 intelli-
gence over the four years that preceded his term in office.
Theories Relating to CIG
is ney 3. ' ouers, first firector of "entral Intelliainnce
(Jan?arv 22, I9b6 - June 10, 191,6) had an afty
was ;shared
by nef Lher of the two on who iwmediately sex:eeeded hi ience, there took place all through 1946 and
1 Ale first issue of the L.*i 5uaa'Y was
ly published is'eb. 15, 1946.
peer VII, below.
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into 1947 a ueter wined but not very successful effort on the part
of the ieports :.ta f to acquire the people it neadeed.1
In his final report on June 10, 19!46, on his c.eparture from
1I e! dmi ral 5ouers singled out _ the personnel problem as a vital
one ca lling for solution. He pointed out in general, however, that
during the four months just passed a good deal of progress had been
do toward laying the groundwork for Cientral Intelligence.2
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, his successor,
an organization consisting principally of the two Staffs Just
described, plus the nucleus of organisations concerned with the
dissemination function accorded to CIG,, its security, and such
internal administrative problems as might arise. The letter,
however, under the ':coup concept in force, would be largely
matter of inter-agency liaison, 3
5cuere left it, GIG was still a body wit yin the
intelligence structure. It could easily become an entity apart
from the -:coup if the ituthority were to decide that the problem
atwar in tel l.it'ence could beet be solved by that means, or
It could develop as a coordinating mechanism for the total struc-
ture of which it was a part.
1 See it", interview with L. L. Montague, )pril 1, 1952, in 3/DdI/,'S files.
2 erlgeet of t:~ t E'rogress 44port, June 7, 1946, in k /~ / fS files.
3 because CI;; must look to the LAB agencies for funds? personnel, and
services.
25X1
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Vandenberg's eciaions & ,ad actions
rr r, r r.......r~
Luring the eleven months (dune 1o, 1946 - may 1, 1947) when
he held office as U rector of trai intelligence, General Ioyt S.
Vandenberg made decisions 'nd obtained agraements that had the
effect of radically altering both the theory and the structure of
Central intelligence, The most in0orUnt of these decisions were
made and carried through daring Vande erg's first three monthe in
office.
The principal and basic decision concerned the resporsibility
Of the Director with respect to the "strategic and national policy
Intelligence" estimates that wsauld be the product of "correlation
and evaluation# of intelligence, relating to the national security.
Although these estimates would constitute but one function Of the
ventral Intelligence :romp, they were the function that, in a sense,
comprehended the rest.
Inaax ch as the estimates were to be produced by the iroups
they would be the product of Group effort and thus of the community
of intelligence agencies under the NIA. As such, they could be
rendered in the nesae of the roup, the Oroup as a whole being
answerable for them. Or they could be rendered in the name of the
1.:'irector of .:.;antral intelligence who alone would be answers ;le for
then. 'rom the point of view of an official using the esti tee,
the difference 4ipht not be great. 'rcaa the point of view of the
producer, the difference sight be considerable because sole
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responsibility for the thing :produced i*plied sole authorit;;~ over
the means of production.
According to `eneral Vsnadenberg, "Pational 1nt }lli. ,s~=nce
s wic tea had to be the opinion of the R:ires:ctor. td a conceded
the ri-:ht of his colleagues on the Intelligence Advisory #.{oard ` to
enter contrary opinions if they chose, which he would feel duty
bound to forward along with the of riciaal esstiaaates. But the esti-
mate itself would be his, and he would atsan d responsible for it.
The reason given by Vandenberg was that his appointment as ?i.rector
of -entral intelligence constituted an order from the President of
the United Litsates, which order entailed all the responsibility of
ooraceand. 2
Fundamentally, it was Vandenberg's attitude toward the
lrector's rcaponsaibility that dictated the three demands that
successfully placed before the National Intelligence Authority
between June 28 and >epteaber 5, 1946; for the right to collect
foreign intelligence apart from the departmental collection services,
for the right to conduct intelligence research, and for the financial
independence necessary to maintain control over the persons engaged,
1 ?redecesavr of the Intelligence Advisory 'oaaittee. Authorised
by 'Bra. 7 of ?restdant Truman's letter of Jan. 22, 1946 (see Annex At
below) to consist of the ". . . heads . . . of the principal agencies
of the government having functions related to the national security
as determined by the National Intelligence Authority."
2 laragraph based on Vandenberg's own statesaents. See Historical
Staff interview with Vandenberg, 'Harsh 17, 1952, in Off ;I f HS files.
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in those and other activities, though all of the rc i apcrtant,
It
oral; the 1a f, iris: a ll b considers hsr**
nci ie of :wing research ccnciioted by i.; was approved
L7 the if th reutive of the fational nte11ig e t uthority, an
duly it 19L6.2 The relevant ;Aaragra h stet d thats
in performing tae functions spceif"ie=d in 'ara arh
3-a of the 'r'residentfs letter, the lrector of central
intelligence is hereby authorised to undertake such reset;rch
and analysis as may be necessary to deter-mine what functions
in the fields of national security izuteelligence are not
being presently performed or are not Lein adequately per-
formed. Based upon these determinations, the 'ixectccr of
;`.entral intelligence may centralize such research and
analysis activities as nay, in his opinion and tictt of the
appropriate member or members of the sntelli ,ence advisory
Board, be l'lore O ficiently or effectively a :omplished
centrally." 3
Literally read, this paragraph is little more than a state-
ment of the obvious; perhaps even a redundant statement in vitw of
1 Sea footnote, page 1, above.
See annex C', below. The officers approving FHA-5 were;
cheson, ;patina; secretary of Statai -bert f:. Patterson, Secretary
of war; John L. Sullivan, Acting secretary of the Navy; and gilliam
1. Leahy, Special .epresontative of the President.
3 :See Annex ~', below, paragraph 2.
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the already-eiaateu unetiun of entry tiL it calsz.~ to "coordinate
inteelli Mce activities," end to r)erforra "services of cocoon concern."
'ztrifeesst" y, ar curve of research activities would be "cuoramation,"
wni e cetit 'a: i.zatioA of goo* of then i
Of Co'OV101a CQa:V r }.
t' . o,i iolA en :cy nerai vaudenbsrg in "uy otnse to the
iiirectivta, awc:-v ey , TL
proceeded at ornce, j
L to aaatabii
and its lituraai terns? for he
l -scale research activity wit4in C!,; by
expansion of the 4ntraai. eports :taf . This action was in line
with--if not necessary to-- -nersl, 'a n enberg t s concept of the
4rector's reoponaibility. The flaw in the arrangement was its
incompleteness. In the nature of things, it would be a long time
before the means either of collection or of interpretation could
reach sufficient maturity to constitute a firaa basis for the exercise
of individual responsibility by the Director of ventral Intelligence.
In the particular nature of the particular case, no central system
of intelligence collection or interpretation would be likely to
become self-su"icient short of a centralization that would have
1 :3istoricaal examination of pertinent docu=nants has disclosed
no evidence to :t Y3eneraal Vandenberg complied with the literal
terms of NIA-5 in this regard.
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the effect of abolia:ith or incorpcrating All cthez
agencies, in the absence of such aA ufl cly and ra, ical develop.
:went, the central research crgsJ,satlcn could only emerge on a
par with ` ency research organise tons e;
their activities.
'Vandenberg 's interpretl ;on of UTA-5 wee also certain to have
an effect on "coordinaation" of eat ttee,~ In Venden"Cerlieating "the intelligence activities and research of the
various epartraents and, A'~ea a:iea." (By 191x8, however, the -.1rector's
office of rase.}rch was so obviously duplicating !nuoh of the work
done in other a _;encies that It i i ht easily have been disestablished
in accordance with a literal interpretation of this part of the
:irective. The Director did nothing, however, to inhibit its growth
and it continued to develop aloe; the lines that had been laid out for
1 The other was first issued -Dec. 12, 19147.
had to do with collection and is therefore not ger*ane to this study.
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3. The =D'irector's right' of dissemination of national intel?
ligenos was curtailed to the gwt that the z ; -'rust -i.rst offi-
cially concur in it or offer an-+lagreeed
substantial
dissent."
t. It was emphasized that there should be a free inter-
change of information as between the Agmey and the intelligence
organizations controlled by the IAC, No means of assuring this
interchan ;e, however, were provided.
The iirectorrs right to hire his own people in addition
to those supplied him by the IAC asuber agencies was confirmed.
was specified, how^ver, that etnplayaes furnished by the Agencies
should rain under their effective control.
b. Terms were, defined and fields of special interest
delineated. "The whole field of intelligence production" was
divided into five parts, ranging from "basic intelligence, " to
"national intelligence", and was allocated as follows:
"Basic intelligence" was assigned to Central
Intelligence as general coordinator, editor, and
fisher; the work of producing basic intelligences, how-
ever, being done by the other agencies.
b. "Current Intelligence" was not specifically
assigned, it being directed that Central Intelligence
and "each other agency" should produce its own. It was
not specified that current intelligence produced by CIA
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should be '?naet,i_onel" or of any other special tt pe; hence,
current intelligence co-ald be ses dereed exera,~)t
being submitted for concurr .nae baftre disseminution,
co "Staff" .and "departseental" inta4"~I'tj
defined as to be, to all intents aancs ,arpoa s, the samf e
things namely what was required by an indl is as l rdinating intelligence activities
should be discharged by the TIrector, aided b,,; his own staff, work-
ing with the Intel l.igence Advisory Committee. National intelligence
estimates should be directly coordinated by the IAC Itself. Better
preparation of these documents would require revision of the Office
of Reports and 'stimaates, l to the extent of having it form one small
group to be solely concerned with the preparation of national esti-
mates on a strictly cooperative basis; and anoth*ir with research "of
common concern" which would supplement, but in no case duplicate, the
work of the established agencies.2 Finally, a series of administra-
tive changes would be inaugurated, designed for greater efficiency in
the Agency's discharge of its statutory responsibilities.
These proposals, although they were not greeted with univer-
sal disapproval, did not find an entirely cordial reception within
the "entrsl Intelligence Agency of 1949. If nothing else, they
e holies Report, p. 81.
2 This proposal was actually, of course, more in accordance with
the agreement that originally established ORF (NIA-5; see Annex C.
below) than what had developed as a result of the Vandenberg
admi.nistratin 's interpretation of the agreement. Fee discussion
Pp. 1t-15, above.
I h.2
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seemed premature, for when ulles Report was submitted to the
-66
National ecurity Council, Central Intelligence was almost exactly
three years old. As an Agency, it Was seventeen months old. In
the course of three years, in spit, of changes and controversies,
a great deal had been accomplished, a fact which the ''omniittee did
not necessarily deny, holding rather that the new system was being
mismana'ed. The defenders of. the system,towever, could point to
progresa In promoting the objectives of unified intelligence effort
and production of sound national intelligence. :simultaneously, they
could emphasize the point that the systse had had a very short time
to develop and that to make radical ogea in the midst of this
formative period would be to risk hard-won gains.l
In simplified essence, however, the disagreement of the 19149-50
administration with what the Dulles Committee proposed, was centered
in the concept of divided responsibility. Although, as has been
noted, Admiral t ilienicoetter had never echoed General Vandenberg's
demand for authority commensurate with the Director's mandate from
the President, he had also never declared unoauivooally for group
(IAC) responsibility and authority. .sing Uillenkoetter's two
years in office, however, the Agency had inclined toward the theory
that it must be independent in order that it could present the NSC
with estimates uncolored by ?)epartmental prejudice. In theory, at
tee P'~'is Comrents on '?idles .eport, dated Feb. 2% 1919, in
O/DCI/Hh,- files.
43
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.oast, the sort -f srO' '-;r'8*e responsibility favoree h- ' e 'ull.ee
~or~rritteer ' k3 Inir!i:?al to this point of view.
"'eff"deg?s Of a'he 19;9 'tatus rluss $ `ertral In elliCence found
coer:frrt In the two c ept?~Ta~ taken to the "uPee "e
!gig exnresrod in the sport known n s ?p, .^_~~") a 1 one thxt th?
Di.ract or s' _.ouir riot he ` ound by the concept c,f collective r espon-
sibilit,1; the ether, the;, rcorg^rat.7ation undtertr:ken in .c.ordince
with the Dulles "z?-ort need not iieces;sertly follow the exact mans
,,roposed br the , nr:.e iIttee.
T! ,,e Inni'ied r ijor.tion of collective rr:s oasibility by the
'fiAtlon'l ``.-,curity Council, Li particular, seu. rsd to giva substance
to L ,e reaction that hvd i
ca:?e greeted the '-'u11e Report
within the '^ritral lntailih--ene3 Agency. This reaction was pri-
nAri1y that of the persona viio hind dealt at first hand oer e period
Of ro1t 3 or years ; 1 th the practical pr .leis ent^iled in getting
up and operating the i ency. Whereas the rull.es Committee thought
of 'entrai I '-el igence primarily as a mans through which all
governmental intelligence could be brought to bear, in a coord
neted form, on notional problems, many key CIA officials of the time
thought of the ",entral tn:elUgenca Agency a the principal instru-
nt, under the National Security Council, for the production of
1 :ometi s known as the "t4cNarney deport" adopted by the Nm
on July 7, 1949, accepting the )idles Report with few reservations.
1 44
FRET
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t113 recsor.,
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notional intelligence. `'hey believed that the other r enciess owed
CIA all necessary "cooper Ycn" toward this
rteiI Lgence
rued
rctivcs of the' hat Tonal uecurity ouncil
had been framed with this end i,n view, but that too many loopholes
left J-1i the t i.recti' ,, and that the Agencies had
r epponsibiiiti.s under themo
l'
etel - 4 1'vaco
Aecepting the pr lees on which this typ* of reason ing was
Lased, howevc , the word -cooperation" sight hr,ve been considered
ill choson. f;nother word would have been "compliance." In order'
for Central intelligence to aea-ot compliance, it would have to be
given sriuch Yreatcr powers than it possessed. A move in the direction
1 Thus, in a memorandum to the 4rector of ventral intelligence
on the subject of "I*C }:ooperation with CIA", dated ept. 30, 19L9,
the Assist:;nt :irector for ~'eports are,. rIstix tees wrote:
""'Ile :,Host spectacular evidence of the lack of depart
mental cooperation with C11 is represented by ' SCII='rs.
?yes are cited as such evidence on the ;;rounds that:
no as a result of the coordination of these direc-
tives with the 1AG agencies prior to C action they
represent only those concessions to CIA that the VC
aencies were willing to cake, and consequently, do not
provide the ..rector of a antral Intelligence with the
authority required by him to discharge the reaponssi-
tiliti,es imposed upon Us.
b. by I:?.C insistence they contain all canner of
escape Clausen which vitiate_epart:nental responsi-
bilities to CIA, and thereby hasher the objectives of
the National Security Act of 19117 toward a fully coor-
dinated US intellt_?ence effort."
see tab 1* to ;'e*o .3) in 0/ICI / files.
I lt5,.
RET
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of obtaining such powers in 1949 would have been a bold one. It
would have amounted to a flat rejection of the banes 'r`eport and
a direct challenge to all critics of Central Intelligence.
Yet some move on this order had become almost the only logical
conclusion from the position being taken by the Agency in 19139 and
1950. `1 he : irector favored a "strong central agency,", ilia
Assistant Lirector for 11eports and gstimates was against any system
which presupposed collective responsibility, The Lrector's feral
Counsel interpreted the intent of Congress as favoring a fully respon-
sible frectorate. The Chief of the Interdepartmental Coordinating
and Planning Staff (or Coordinating, Operating, and Planning Staff)
inclined toward the same general positions
let no direct representations to this effect were made to the
National Security Council by the Hille akoetter administration. For
most of a year, from the fall of 1949 to the fall of 1950, the
questions raised by the bullet deport were debated, primarily
between the .i.rector and a group within the ~tate Lepartment which
had proposed its own plan for 4ntral Intelligence under collective
responsibility. The Agency's proposed reply to this proposal was
in the nature of a counterplan which went some distance in the
direction of centralized responsibility. Neither proposal, however,
reached the point of gaining official approval.2
1 For correspondence underlying these statements, see folder
"NSClia-1" in files of CIA General Counsel.
2 Ibid. Cet also Chapter II9 below.
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The 1949 tgsM " arganisatio
Meanwhile, Admiral fil,lenkoettor reported to the Security
Council on October 7, 191&9, that (in accordance with the Co unc it e s
partial endorsement of the Dulles Report) certain reorganisations
were taking pl