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January 1, 1953
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Approved For"pease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 3rd carbon SECRET CHrIPTER IX ARMY, DOS, JCS and USAF review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2004/SECREALDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065*00200170001-2 CROANIZATIGNAL Chapter X: T 0 IC CLM Cr7TRAL fl MCE r1CY, 19501953 C. Contents ESTIMATIIS Page Status of CIA's Estimating Program and ?rocedure in 1950 1 Departmental Participation is of 125e 4 Production Record by 1950 8 Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity and Change, 1950 10 Tq.eactivation of Intelligence Advisory Committee, Oct. 1950 24 ratablishment of New Office of National rstinates Nov. 1950 27 Organizing and Staffing of New Estimates Office, 1950-1953 32 Initial Organization of CNE 36 Board of National Estimates, ONE 38 Estimates Staff, ONE 4it Support Staff, ONE 49 25X1A I I ONE 51 Training Programs Affecting Estimating 56 Clientele and Scope of "National* Estimates, 1950-1953 59 3roadening Definition of National Estimates 59 ProFramming and Scheduling of Estimates 67 Format Decisions and Challms 70 Clientele for Estimates 73 Geographic and Topical Coverage of Estimates 75 Summary of Progress, 1950-1953 81 Changing Needs for Supporting Documentation, 1950-1953 86 Departmental and Agency-Research Participation in Production Contributions by Departmental Intelligence Agencies Contributions by CIA Research Offices Inter-Agency Coordination of Draft Estimates 94 96 102 111 Pstimating in Relation to Operational Planning, 1950-1953 161 ?NE's Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1951-1952 164 Experimentation with "Net' Estimates, 1951-1952 175 ARMY, DOS, JCS and USAF review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2060EitRETIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X Approved Forapease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065600200170001-2 Chapter II DUCTION AN (....kitOINATIA OF INTELLIGENCE LiT.DIATE.6 Jt.atue of CIA's EstimatinkProgram and i7rocedure in 19p By August 1950, when ;general omith waa appointed as Director, CIA had had some 14 years of experience, under three successive rlrectors, with the Govermient's experiment of producing intelli- gence estimates on a cooperative, interdepartAental basis. His- torically there as probably nothing older or mcre basic in intelligence ork than the ultimate task of estimating a foreign oower's caJatAlities, weaknesses, and intentions. Only in recent years, however, had the Jovernment attempted a contizinp, organized effort at con-)rehonsive ruti'lLtin:, in which the Nation's total resources and talents, traditionally decentralized among several depart itnts and agencies, mi'ht so:7khow be relularl: brought to bear, in a single integrated and objective evaluation, on a -iven foreign policy issue or international situation. Such a concerted approach had been informally attempted durin: L'orld .ar I by the Joint Intelli,,ence Committee (JIC), which had been continued after the war, Llren though responsibility for coordinated, interdepartmental estimaldnr sasfficially assi:ned to the Director of Central Intel- ligence. The years l6-50 were eleprintal ..1tY respect to this problem and marked by a measurE of with, perhaps, a larger measure of -r blems and difficulties. Responsibility to Approved For Release 20041E1GREZRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065410200170001-2 igence /satinet". on foreign problems of mqatienal" signtticanes, in coordination, with all the deppr1rtnt,. and incise concerned dth national seturity, was vested in the eucceadvely by Presidential orier, Congressional etatute Ind Natl.onal ,nottrity Council directive.1 War these directives the established intelli- gence branches of the operating and planning departments and agencies were expectei to contribute to C/A-produced estimates, ta.i to nor Acipate in the deliberations leading to the final ostieative con- clusions. At the same time, however, the existing prerogatives of those egencies to produce independent "tepartmental" estimates were . left undi turbed; and in practice their cooperation and attention to the centrally sponsored program of coordinated estimating was not un d. ?requentiy their cooperation was only peesive. Within CLI end CrA, the new estimates program was manaced? PrOM 19116 to 1950, bv a centre' production staff which was known succesnively as the Central Reports 3taff ('7!1's), February July 1946, the C?fics! of ',Assearch and Pvaluations (ORE), July 1946 - January 10; and the Office of Reports and attsetss, February 1 bee pecially ( ?residert trunanto letter of Jan. 22, 1946 (unclaseified), ordering the establishment of the :iational Iatel.- ligence Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Croup (Cl(); (2) NIA lArective No. 1? ?eb. 19h6; (3) the 4tiona1 becurity Act of July 26, 194?, effective in 3ept. 1947, which (among other things) renamed CM the lentral intelligence Agency (A) end gave stetttory recognition to the A:Iie responsibility "to correlate and evaluate tntelligenee reletinp, to the tational security"; and (h) National oecurity Council Intellilence Directive (hAAD) Uo. 3? e- 047, which implerented thet etatute in relation to eatiftwAng responsibilitien. (Copies in IcT(1/Mt; files.) Ix 2 Approved For Release 200SIEORECTA:RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 1947 - November 1950. Pven 4it to estimates eao divided, because 0 other types of production such an pe Staff, however, attention had responsibilities for summaries, regional sur- veys, for:aP1 memoranda, and oral brief In the 174.1 of 1949, ge,0111 changes hed been made in the organisation of the Office of ,7eports and intimates. The ost important of then involved the creation Of an "stimates Production Board" consisting of the chief' of all producing divisions and of the two principal staff -under the chairmenship of the Asmistant Director. Subordinate to this ohmage was the formation of an -...AItimates Branch" within each at the producing divisions. The intention of the reorganisation was to make the estimates branches responsible for adequacy and accuracy of estimative material pre- pared by their divisions, while the ,.., timates production board was to act as a reviewing authority for all 046 estimative material. In point of fact, however, this systen was never fully utilized during the Year when it was technioally in operation, In July 1950, shortly after the beginning of hostilities in Korea, the Assistant Uri:rotor appointed a "Special Staff" to assist him in the review of current intelligenee and estimative material concerning the Korean eituation.1 This move wee undoubtedly prompted by the urgency of demands for intelligence on Korea after June 25 1 ORE Operating Procedure Order Mo. 15, July 3, 1950 (Se ret), in U/ZCl/HS files. See also two further orders: Instruction Nos 27, July 12$ and Order No. 18, Aug. 3, 1950. (Ibid.) IX 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For 4,ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 when delays in prodtctiou that had formerly been oononp1ac. had begun to seem inadmissible. The Assistant Arectoris thought seems to have ben that if he himself, assisted by a staff o intelligence estimators, avc authoritative consideration to all materiel on Korea, time otherwise spent in unresolved disagreement sight be saved. The Spacirnj Aaff" wes not, however, the equivalent of the toenail estimating group" reoommended so frequently is 15449-.1950. T'or one thing, this Staff did not supersede the "Kstimates -reduction Yoard", nor did it in are' wey disturb the general organisation of as determined in 1949. It was emphasised, on the other hand that the peas]. Staff was a temporary device, concerned only with material arising out of the Korean war. Inasmuch as virtually all material being prepared by vhE in the steamer of 1950 was related directly to the war in Korea, however, the 6pecial Staff's responsibilities, as long as it was in existence, were relatively comprehensive. It was evident that the staff could easily be transformed into a permanent estimating group such as OV, was to become. On October 26, however, the 6pecial Staff was abolished on grounds that the Noreen emergesay no longer required it .1 Airallel with the problem of internal organisation was the pro 1 of departmental participation in the CIA-sponsored estimating program. Ay 1950 had experimented with a variety of procedures and practices, including committee systems, formal correspondence, and direct contact and liaison, to the end of promoting and improving 1 0i-tic; Operating ?rooedwe 'order Mo. 21, Oct. 26, 1950. IX 4 Approved For Release 2004/04/cM1DP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065460200170001-2 departmental cooperation in tle national eatimating process, and obtaining a workable consensus on contemeersial issues. Wring the period 1516-1950, CIA had been heavily dependent on other intelligence organisations* for i11 types of- material to be used in estimates, because its Own ?enaction SOVV1Q rt had tiAlt to develop. ?hie material beceveY, came to in irt, through regol4r channels primarily designed to serve ClAts currant- intelligence needs. idcause CIE had developed since 1947 as a re- search orAnisation, it was able to arrive rot eome e(,rclAsions $rimsrily on the basis of this material as stored in its own files, supplemented through direct consultation with analysts in othdr a4enoiea. 7oma1 Aieney contributions to estimates also fiKured in the process when they were provided. Ch;Ats practice of depending on its own ri:ilearch, however, iec to critioia71 (including that to be found in the Lulls* Report) to the offset that CIA i;:nored other azencies -r the preparation of estimates rather than ltadin4.f. them in a cooperative effort. On the other hand, however, there could be little question that sttepte to take oil relevant agencies into socrount in framing final drafts of estimates. After experimenting for two years with written circulation of drafts "for concurrence, dissent, or comment", by 1950 adopted the method of discusting all pre- pared drafts with ad hoc committees made up of representatives assigned from all participating agenoies, under the chairmanship of a 1interest i representative who had ha no ;A]rt in T.:x 5 Approved For Release 200agR.FCI-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For *ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 preparing the eetimete under discussiOn. These committees?mede U p eesentially of experts?continued to meat on the estikpte at irsue until substantial rteont 1- been reached by those par- ticidating. j,fter the final _euet1ng a new draft was prepared by based on the consensus reached, circulated for final comment, and then sent officially to the I4C members themselves for concurrence or dissent. This was made particulasly necessary by virtue of the fact that Aembers of the ad hoc committees frequently were not per mitted to speak officially for their agencies. For this reason, there was, of couree, no guarantee that agreements reached at inter-agency meetings would be final. Frequently, in fact, depart- mental intelligence chiefs, or studying drafts agreeable to their subordinates, raised unforeseen objections. The *wading effort to reach agreement, however (which was frequently of lone duration), did not normally take place at the level of the departmental chiefs but rather Was handled indirectly through subordinates in the form of correspondence, telephone calls, or further meetinge of the ad hoc committees. ht the conclusion of these negotiations a satin- factor Oran would be produced or a dissent would bcoa unsvold le. CIA/OE- was nomally in a difficult position in these negotiations because it could never be sure that concessions it made to dissenting opinion on the part of one department might not render a previously agreed draft unacceptable to one of the others. In no case observed in the course of this study did the IAC itself meet to settle any of these disputes. This was, ef course, a cardinal difference between coorelnation Aires b.fore and after ',_ctober 1.950. :X 6 Approved For Release 200SKEtprr-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 For reasons as indicated above, it can be seen that no single, unvarying method could be eade to se)ply to the ;.rt4parction and coor- dination of all estimates during the 1946-1950 period. In very general terms, however, the procedure in use by October 1950 was as follows. A 4ven estimate project was scheduled in on the basil' of it request from the SSC or one of the operating departments, or on the initiative of CIA. Next, an outline of the "terms of reference', was prepared by ORS, circulated to the departmental member agencies of the PCs along with a request for contributions to the forthcoming estimate. On occasion, ad hoe committees discussed terms of reference and the allocation of contributions before they were circulated. Tech department was expected to prepare a contribution according to its special field of interest. The principal contributions came from the Z;tate, Army, Navy, and Air Force Impartmentej rarely from the other intefligence agencies in the Joint Staff, the AtOMIO Energy .;ommission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These contributions were used by On in the formation of a draft estimate. This draft was then circulated to the departmental intelligence agencies by QR. OhE then called informal meetings with JAC; 'working- level representatives" at which conflicting views were aired, further research invited if appropriate, and a consensus sought. After whatever revision wits indicated at this meeting, a final draft was formally sent to each departmental intelligence chief, for the written concurrence of that agency-, or its comment or dissent. Ix 7 Approved For Release 2004/0SECRE-rP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1C Approved For lipase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 Finally, the finished estimatimus printed and disseminated. By August 1950, a hundred semi estimate!' hod bean qroduoed, under CIV01,!.aponsorship, aocording Veriations of this general formula that had been followed sine. 196. More recently, during. the eight months elms January 1950, some 21 such estimates had been completed.2 lost of thawdealt with Soviee Union or 1;oviet controlled areas, or trouble spots on the Soviet periphery/ /included, for map erjea of est mates early In June 1950 warning of the coming war in Aerie'. Other estimates disseminated in 1950 dealt with, areas of the Free World, In addition the following est ng projects were under way in higust 1950, at various sta,:es of completions nProspects for the Jeferise of Indochina against a eJhineae ',3ommunist invasion" (ola 5050), and *Prospects for Chinese ,;ommunist Action in Indochina during 1950P (0.,t; 50-50 Supplement); requested by tate Lipertment, !ugust 1950; completed and disseminated on September 7, 1950. Prirobable fovelopeents in astern Germany by t end of 1951" (ORI 34-50)i initiated by CIA/OR, May completed and disseminated September 29, 1950. 50; 1 The gystem described here was highly variable. in any cases, the "torms of reference* and *contribution* steps were omittad, .?ach individual estimate usually brought its own problems which required sdaAations of the system. 2 ,opies of these estimates, togetherWith working papers an correspondence, are in oirzAis files. :x 6 Approved For Release 2004/SEEEHIRD P64-00654A000200170001-2 k Approved For ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 ?-oatwquences to the U. S. of Communist Domination or ?le:inland :outheast Asia" (ORE 29-50); requested by tate 2.epartment, :pril 1950; completed an0 disseminated October 13, 1550, with dissents by State, Army, and 'it rune. euth ;,rricsnolities and U. S. ,ecu ' (:,r? -50 begun April 1550, requester unknown; completed onti dissemi- mteti November 17, 1950. "Ueutrality and Third-Force Tendencies in Western '4Jrope" (oF 36-50; initiated by CiA/ Ilex 1950; comAeted and disseminated Deoember 19, 1550. Ikepercussions on the Retherlends of Indonesian Independence (OAL 6-50); initiated by .CIA/O:, December 1249; completed and disseminated December 19, 1950. "Soviet Joarses of Action with kespect to Korea" . (oT.T:: 45-50); requested by NSC, July 1950; draft tient to in September 1950; and subsequently cancelled as e formal estimate. 25X1 25X1 C 25X1 C 1?01111b1e ..ttitudes of Non-Soviet Countrie toward a U. L. Decision to Initiate War against the usse (cnR 511..50); initiated by CIA/01F1 about July 1950; draft completed. about September 20, 1950; and subsequently cancelled as s formal estimate. Ix SECRET Approved For Release 2004/ _ RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ,ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065440200170001-2 ?ending Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity ' Change deep :Agneral :,mith became Direetor, this CIA experiment in cooperative* interdepartmental estimating had been the subject of criticism ono controversy for almost four years. oposals for edministretive changes had come both from within and outside the agency, P.11 icularly in 1949 and 1950. Ey the sumer of 1950, some changes h d been made, while others had been shelved or were pending. In Feptember 190, the outgoing Director, on the occasion of (;L,41 annual request for fends to the President and the Bureau of the Ludget, bed singled out the manaeement of notional estimating and the need for "improving" the eetimatimg process as the number-one management problem of the 4:elley.2 Three major types of c?ntinuing adeinistrative problems appear to have been involved. First, now could the estimates be made more responsive to the needs of the Oita House, the National -;ecurity Council, the Joint Chiefs of staff, and the several operating departments and agencies conoerned with the national security? Next, how could departmental intellionoe resources and talents be better marshalled for national estimating? Finally, how could CU's own staff for estimating be bettor organised and sUffed to servo the complicated puroses for which it was intended? 1 8inroduotjon" to CIA Budget Eating' dated ept. 1* 1950* Lecret, p. 10; copy "Ustoricel Notes . . ."? 1945-52, 0/DWI3 files. IX 10 for Fiscal Year 1952, tached to CP ;'-cmptrollerts lin cIgRgi Approved For Release 2004/d 1 : -RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 Approved For *ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065#00200170001-2 Three sets of recommend* ens calling for e national intelligence spites, Oenfraatiod, Urectors in September 1950* 'LI thr the outgoing and lanoline brAving beeneMbeitted by outside parties, on the basis e ryya and inveetleations of , CIA and departmental intelligendi agencies made in 194b, 1949, and 1950. The first was a,repert of the Hoover OommiEsionts sub"' committee or task force on natiositl...ogoltraded by Ford:UMW Eberstadt, prepared late in 194e and submitted to Congress by the Hoover 3ommission in February 1949. The second was a report of the Lulls. Larry 3roup to the National security Council, submitted in January 1949 and endorsed in principle by the AOC in July 1949.2 The third was a plan for a *national intelligence sroup', contained in. staff study prepared in May 1950, ehiefly by Oeneral John Magruder of the Defense Ospartmcat and W. Perk Armstremg of the State Department. This last plan was submitted to CIA in July 1950, The Fberstadt Tisk Toros en about Nee. 15, 1948, submitted a report to the Hoover Commiasion entitled "The Central Intelligence Ageney, National and Sergio. Intelligence", which emir- prised Chapter II (pp. 2540) of a longer report (some 250 pp.) on the "National Security Organisatiote as a whole. (A copy of Chap- ter II, undated, in en filo in 0/DCl/AR.) This report, whioh in turn was transmitted to Congress by Hr. Hoover on Jan. 13* 1949, remained unpublished, and should not be confused with a briefer, unclassified repart, also entitled "National Security Organisation" (121 pp., 1949), Published by the Hoover Commission as "Appendix JA of its reports, nor with the Hewer Commission's own report to Com- grass, also entitled lofhe National Security Organisation? (30 pp.). Copies of these two published reports are in the CIA Library. 2 Dulles. Survey Iroup, Report..., on'. 1, 1949, in 0/LCl/NS files. IX 11 copy Approved For Release 2004/09/1-S: uIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For Iease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065410200170001-2 and Olibittquentl,y revised in collaboration with Cit. officials, in lugust Hld September 1950.1 while the three survey groups were far from unanimous in many of their recommendations, they expressed a common concern for improving the inter-departmental estimating prisons rather than scrapping it and reverting to a decentralised system of departmental estimates. The Eberstadt committee* for example, had found the traditional system of dolArimental estimating to be defloient. it had criticised the military intelligence services for the wide divergence in their individual departmental estimates of potential enemy strength, and attributud this divergence partly to their "natural service interests" and partly to the inter-service budgetary competition" among thom.2 The 7berstadt committee had foemd? furthermore, that such inter-service estimates as were being coordimated within the Defense Department by the Joint Intelligence Committee "contained so many inconsistencies within a single paper that it was considered valueless for planning .3 purposes. The Dalles ()noun had questioned the objectivity of esti- mates made by the Joint Intelligence Committee and by the individual 1 The plan, dated May 1# 1950, was sent to the DCI on July 7, 1950, by UnderSeerotary of state Webb) oevy in OrcOs files. Later versions were revisions made in collaboration with CIA officials in Aug.-Sept. 1950. Copies of these later drafts, mostly undated, together with related correspondence, are in 0/TJCl/ER. 2 Eberstadt Task Force report ',dowdy cited. 3lbid., p. 40. 1/ 12 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : L,IA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 Approved For "vase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065460200170001-2 military services, and had asserted t thin the tate6 ;epartment, "the policy make 1 advinora." re, for OS mast part, their own intelligence Far from abandoning the expel. C?-s ervised esti- mating, the F,berstadt committee had emphatimilly urged that CIA "must . ? . fulfill its respousibility-ter central evaluation of intelligence free from departmental prejudice, control, or bias, whether reel or imaginet."2 In the same vain, the Dulles Iroup had urged that the national intelligenes estimate become "an authori- tative interpretation an' appraisal that will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners.103 ClS had the "mandate" in existing legislative and executive directives, the Dulles Group concluded to insure that the U. S. Oovernment did have "adequate central machinery" for "the examination and interpretation of intelligence so that netional security will not be jeopardized by failure to coordinate the best intelligemee opinion in the country, based en all available information." The Magruder-Armstrong plan of July 1950, had on. farther than either the am atadt or Bailee plans in proposing that the scope of "national" estimates be enlarged to include "strictly 1 Dulles Survey Group report, previ 2 1Zerstadt Tas rem* report previously cited. 3 Dulles Survey aroup report 14 Ds 654 ? cited, p. 69. P. W. 25 previously cited, pp. 6E-69. IX 13 Approved For Release 2004/0SELRIELDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For "Vase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.10200170001-2 political" and "strictly eilitare estimetes? whenever such subjects were of national policy interest. In spite of existing directives specifying that these were within the "exclusive covetence" of the State and Lofenea 1 13partmente, the Magruder-Armstrong plan pro- posed that they be proc084.4 as "national" estimates. With respect to the pre*lem of IA's "customer relations with the policy echelon to which national estimates were addressed the ilberstadt and Ijullea plans both had criticisms to offer and some inprovements to suggest. The Sbeestadt committee had ooncluded that CIA. 848 not enjaying rathelall eonfidenoe" of the National Security Council, and had snot as yet, with ~WA encouraging exceptions, played an4mportant tele Jape determinations".2 4ors specifically, the +committee oritiolaed the CIA estimating staff in ORE for not having developed close eeomgh working relations, either with the C Staff, whose meetings ORE attended only "when invited", or with the Joint clogs of Staff, with which CIA had only a tenuous contact.) The committee also criticised the policy and operating agencies for withholding background information on the 3evernment's own opera- tional activities and deeisione. The Eberstadt eommittee concluded 1 Draft of ra tional intelligenoe group" plan, previously cited. 2 Sberstedt Task Force report previously cited, pp. 37-38. 'Ibid., p. 33 11 Ibid., PP. 33, 37-38, 52. Ix 24 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For.ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 that ". . effective intelligence is possible onLyhen it is closely linked with planning and polio, aiJcis.1 Furthermore, "if" au vas to perform its job adequately, it *must be aware of, and participate 1 In the thinking at all those 5oLioy and plena levels." The Dulles report, similarly, had found a lack of confidence in -.;IA's estimates, but attributed it primarily to CIA's tendeney to take thu 3n1tiative in launching estimates independently of the departmental intelligence agencies, and to "select pig own subjects and establish Zrtg own priorities'. Like the iberstadt committee the Dulles -iroup criticised policy staffs for withholding background operational information from CIA, and warned against the dangerous tendency of the policy staffs to ignore estimates.3 Thu Oulles )roup had little to recommend, however, an how to meet the needs of the policy staffs, except that CIA should rely more heavily on greater participation by the departaental intelli wince agencies, including their participation in the planning of eettuting projects and the settin; of priorities.4 The 4agroder-Armstrong plan for a "national intelligence group" had rOatively little to say an this subject, except to pro- mo that the advice of the intelligence kdvisory onisitte* be is .Survey ',Inrup report, previously cit 'Ibid., W. 79, 80. 4 Ibid. p. 73. p. 691 70, 12, 74. Approved For Release 2004/09$1C&EITDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 brongbt into the lanning of ?sttiatjngprejoete, and into the reviewing of any projects that mightily "initiated" by At ?1 Greater participation ty the departmental 1ntelli4ence agencies at ell stages of the estimating ;)rocess was, meanwhile, the major theme in ell three sets of proposels. The iberstadt committee had recommended that the oontacts between the CIA esti- matinc staff and the IAC agencies be strengthened, and that the Intelligence Avisory Committee itself be convened more frequently by Vie on substantive issueo in specifio estimatee.2 s to departmental research contributions to entimates, the gberstadt committee observed that both the departments and CIA ORZ. frequently 'examined the same basic material", but concluded that to "some degree" such duplication was 'inevitable and even desirable".3 i4ther than curtail CII research, the Fberstadt committee suggested that CI;'In analysts be placed "in the message centers and secre- tariats of the departaents and flip-Aare services, to sift out 4 really important material for routing to CIA".On the controversial issue of "political,' intelligence work, shared by .:11 and the state Lepartment, the 'eberstadt committee recom;Nended that "a large part" for naticnal intelligence group", including 'both ori version of 411y 1950 and revised version of Au.-apt. 1950, pre- viously cited above. 2 Tberstadt Task -Pewee report cited), p. 53. t ? 3 'bid* 49-50. a. Ix 16 previously Approved For Release 2004/09/OrarAMP64-00654A000200170001-2 Ir.t.)1?r Approved Fore lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200170001-2 of State's intelligence research branch, which during the war had bea a prrt & f be transferred to CIA.1 Thr.__ Dulles troup had come to somewhat different cceelusiene on how to iiproe departmental cooperation in CIA's estiTaatinc pro- gram. Not only should the dep,:ztraerits 'trolly participate" at all staeeo of the program, but all of them should assume collective responsielliV for the fininhed estimates.2 OT;ls practice of relytng heavily on its own research was categorically condemned, i its procedure of circulatilg drafts of eettmates and inviting "a formal notation of dissent Jr concurrence" did "not substantially mitigate" CIA's "failure" to achieve lull cooperation.3 RE's "initiative" in selectinE stilates projects and setting priorities on them without departmental ceneultation was deplored. Vihile the Dulles Croup did not translate these indictments into a full posi- tive stetor. of revised procedures, it did, in general, erge fuller participation by the IAC and its departmental memtrs At all stazes in the estim,. ing process. Sonowhat in the same direction, but with proposals in fuller detail) Was. the Magruder-Armstrong plan, which called for greater participation by the departments, individually and through the IA, 1 Ibid., e, ? 2Dulles 2urvey Group report (previously cited), pp. 5, 77, 62, el. 3 ail. 72, 71J,75 'Ibld., 70, 72, 74. Approved For Release 2004/06fiCaUDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved ForOlease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 in CIAls estimatin4 proram. thus, the IAC was oz.:;sc.tdto "svise" the T on estimathg zirojects being initiated 45 well as on '-;overnen ist 'Jane "which should be based . on estimates". 1 The setusl irtn of estimates woule continue to be hendled within CIA, but ehohld IA, based as fully as possible on "departmental con- tributions, oral '740 written, and Zak..7 oe,artmeatal views . . con- production 2. On the other hind, "depa t- hould7 be subjected to adequate safegunrds existing intcllionce resources should 3 "continue to Le employed. The indiviouai departments ut have sidered t sll stages of mental . . . resources srpinst bias", and :.!IA's an op,)ortunity to review an estimate in dr&ft stage, while the IA:: would subject the final drart to "'formal review". in aduition? the should review research an collection inadequacies revealed in a FAven estimatin )roject, and "advise" the !VI on collaLoration with foreign intt1li;trnce agencies for the production of qcombined' estimstes.4 Finally, as to internal oraniution for estimating, ? all three survey groups had recommendations to offer. The [A}erstadt committee., unlike the others, did not criticise Oilais basic organi- sation, with its several re4onsl branches, its several branches 1 - raft of plan for "national intelligence group", '43.y and -tAj..-ept. 1950 versions, previously (UMW. 2 Ibid. 3 aid. 14 :bid. Ik 18 Approved For Release 2004/0iE3GRIETDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 specializing in particular tepiaal fields, and its plannines 1 reviewing, and edAcrial staff'. At the same tIee, eowever, it proposed that (.:V estatlish en "inteiligence evaluation toe-rd" at "s hich levcr, presumAhly in .)ei if not in the Arector's immediate office', where "a email group of highly capable imeple, freed from adelnistrative ljetairs would be assigned to tconcer.trate upon intelligence evaluation" and. be "set to thinking about intelligence on 2 The :Allies lronp, on tte other hand, regarded U as the the noire of the :;overnmentIE entire estimating system, which should be thorounI reoreanised. It charged 017 generally with "failure" in estimating, with one or two- exceptions, whose occur rence wee largely fortuitous", and accused ORF? of having been diverted" from national estimates to "the erodnction of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by .no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates".3 The solution, according to the lullee Iroue, wee to divorce estimating completely from other types of intelligence production, and re-establish it in a new, separate 'etimates A?vlsion. That Axesion would consist of "a smell group of htehlY selected individuals" who would "review" the products of the depertmentel intelligonce agencies, draft the estimates from eeerstact Task Force P. 30. 2 ? i0* p. 49. 3 version, previous iteu), uli..,urvey roue report (dreviously cit IX 19 Approved For Release 2004/09SEWRIP64-00654A000200170001-2 70, 77. Approved ForOease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 them, end At variArls utae s subject the drafts to review by the departments rnd the till m,ther n.proacb to reorganization was c;ffered '..agrur!cr 1,'! .T-.:.3stron, in their plan for a new "national intelli- ?,Ireviou mentioned. Like th._ others, this plan but oiled for the end of WI.: and for a separate etimatin,,,: st.aff/it also called for a companion staff to be concerned with current intelligence. In this plan, both the "national estimates staff" Nnd the "current intelligence staff" would work in close coopera- tion as two complementary parts Of a larger "national intelligence ;1*coup", both staffs would be concerned with evaluating foreign capabilities and intentions, and each staff in turn would work in close collaLoration with the departmental intelligence agencies: one staff (*nal the immediate viewpoint of current indications; and the other from the more detached "long-range" viewpoint of "well- confirmed? estiwItes.- - Thus .1eneral Smith was confronted, between August and October ? 190, with three sets of similar but somewhat divereent proposals mffecting the future course of CIA's estimating program ond Proce- dure. T4ken tocethor, these proposals comprised a considerable body of informed opinion on the problem as a whole, and each report carried a particular weight of authority with it. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 77, el, 0. IX 20 sreETT Approved For Release 2004/09/P3 :iciA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 The '.7berstadt report, for exsaiple, ld cnt to Congress the year before, with the endorsement of the totaver 2ommis8ion, and with it, the implication, at least, that ,;1:, would eventually be account- able to -)ongreSs on the recomAendations that the :1,00ver Comuission had made. The Allies report had been endorsed by the National ,Security iounoil, at least in principle, in July 1949; and now (in ,,ugust- uctober 1950) the report had taken on a special persuasiveness, in the sense that two of the three prim/pal signers of the report (:11en 4. ;Sullen and William N6 Jackson) were in the process of being ;Wanted by the President at Deputy Lirectors on ,:;eneral 4mith's staff. Jackson, in particular, is known to have urged the Julies report on 5-tith, end recalled later that he had accepted the position of .cputy (to which he was appointed by the 2resident in fuguat 1950) only on the condition that Tcnaral Smith "read and approv& the Dulles 2 repo The 'M'aruder-rmstrong plan had at first been rejected by airsi:iillenkoetter (July 1950), but it had been subeequently 1 on 112,i. 22, 1950, while Ceneral bmith's nomination es 1I was before the -mate, the lashington Post asserted categorically that Jackson had Ulm a.,:pointec as .4parrirector of fbout the same ti!se? Trihur Krock reported, in the New York Times, that vereU'iarriman (a member of -resident Truman's daTracuae staff), "had a nand" in Jackson's appointment. (see scrapbook of press clipoinzs entitled "t3JA in the News", 1950 volume, in the CO Library.) 2 Aatorica ;taff interview with William L Jackson, Feb. 16, 1955, in 6/,"1 IS files. IX 21 Approved For Release 2004/0gUELP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Forilease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 revised by the ncrol .*.ounsel and other CI officials in collabora- tion wA.t!, ,:tat e And Lefense officials, And by mio- eptember .150 dillenkoetter was ready to accept it. On :etoter 3, 4. !. Jackson read and cum-landed the plan as a "sound" one, end had endorsed it for ceneral consideration.1 Your days later, Jackson had asked for its views, par- ticular)} on a eeparate setimeting staff in CIA, and on oeteber 10, had received from a "rough plan" fur a separate "Office of ,stimatee, over the signature of its chief, Theodore Yabbitt, and his two senior assistants for estimating, Ludwell L. .4ontague 25X1A and 2 Like the Pulles report of 19149 and the 25X1A "national intellieence group" ?len of 1950 (which were cited), OR's plan called for establiehing the eetimates function an a separate -bmpcnent in CIA. the matter of inter-agency participation in estimates the S C was to provide final review, while the detailed, continuing, day-to-day job of inter-sgency liaison and consultation WIZ tu be Achieved, not by formal committees, but through a )ordina- tion and Liaison 'Aaff in the new 14timates Uffice. Thin coordination staff would be composed or full-time representatives from the other ?!:emorandum by Jackson to -;mith, Oct. 3, 1950, I in filed under "NS;ib-1950P. Jackson and 6mith had been OA duty in CIA since Oct. 1, but were not sworn in until Oct. 7, 1950. 2 ;lemorandum by ilibbitt, lontague, and to ..eputy Urector Wiliam 4. Jackson), Oct. 10, 1950,1 !entitled "Plan for a Tit Office of 'atisates"; copy in TX 22 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 ? Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 intolligence-producin4 aenciee, end of esti, es representativen who would be stationed at the eajor intelligence-usingatlencien, notably at the :vational eecurity Couneil etaff, tne joint Intent- eence :roue (of the Joint Chiefs of Starr), and the :,?Pice of the ieecretary of ;efense. O's plan also included a current intelli- gence division, accountable teland a responsible component ofothe new ,Ctimates Office. Apart from organisational particulars, specified three conditions which had to be met to insure greater success in cooperative estimating; (1) the recruitment of additional, qualified senior personnel for estimates work, but not from among personnel "now in CIA"; (2) more adequate research contributions from the ::tate and eefense Departments, 4a condition Ziaticki7 cannot be net at present;4 and (3) "a cooperative attitude" among those departments an the other intelligence agencies, especially with respect to the process of coorelination of the drafts of eatimates. ,!ow imeortantly each of the four sets of proposals just outlined fieured in Aneral emith's plannini during his first weeks in office, is not entirely clear from the records seen in this study; eed whether he was influenced by still other sources of opinion is not known. The Julies report was apparently foremost in his Ind* and central in Jackson's thinxing as well. Thus, on October 12, nith expressee his seherence to that report, at lis first appearance at tee eeetines of the hational 6ecurity .;ouncil; and a;ain on October 20 he declared (this teem at a meeting of the intelligence Ibid. IX 23 Approved For Release 2004/SECRURDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fortipease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 Advisory '.:4/1121it,t, tint the WiGls previous L:iciGrocileA of the report, in 34.494 onetituted the governing directive on tiAt ,A the sa:ul tic4o, announcud t&t1 ili2A "terminated" further co::84,0criAt')roa of t.he zitate-efense Ann for a "national intelligence grou,F*, with t4c a,:reent of those depertments. 1 T:ile louver Commission recommendations were not cited at all at the meeting of .47.tober 20,2 nor WitIVOAOS reorganisation plan of ctober 10. It appears nevertheless, from .1mith's decisions in -ctuber End November, and in later modifications in :0'51 and 1952, that elements in (.:Ift's new organisation were derived from all roar ?dans. In any case, two major steps were taken immediately that stcalned d1rect15, froN the ?ulles report. One Was to reactivate the Ihtellijence virory ommittee (beginning on ')ctober 12, 1950) loe the focal point or departmental participation in estiAating, 1inutes of 1'C meeting, :Act. 20, 150, in two versione ("rough notes" and final copy as circulated), both in 0/LCIAS. At this neetirw *neral ,nith summarised what he hwu said at the meeting on .,ctober 12. 2 ibid. Although the minutes of October 20 indicate that ;eneral oclith na60 no reference At that meeting to the oover survey of in 194t (the .berstadt Task Force), he nevertheless knew of the clayey arm; had read the report. Thus, two months before, at the :'esiate LallrinK on his lomination in Ilgust, he had singled out the toover ,oNmissionla mport as the one item of "homework" he hao read so far, along wita the directive* and statutes covering IX 24 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For IIlease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00651000200170001-2 especially for ntrdopf-:rttl.:1 ov1iborat1on on tilt' of the esti4zte. T c to establish & 0.* :(stimatea (on NoveAter 13, 1.0) as thf!'fodhl :uint within for s:he drafting of eatimatec and tee plennin and ouporvision or the estimates ?)rdra-,4 (;imerally. The ntn1iitnoe dvisocy .:ommittee, radc up GI' the, depart- m6nta1 intelligence chiefs 7:reeided over by the 07,:, was not, of course, t new inter-agency comAittme In the 2,overnNent's orgP.nisation, but its participation in the esti- tin process was a new departure in octobor 1950. initially leneral ith first convoned the for coordination of estimates, on october 12, 1950, in perticulAr, to clisouss and approve the final drafts of several the estim;Aee onrar astern situation, which had been prepared by (under its caLabliehod procedures) for us by the l'resi?lent at his forthcomirm 4iike It5land conference with .;encral 71ackr:h 1ur. Thus was inauurated under the Ifi, a method for harmonizing and radon- cunflictin v ewe, for increasinz the zroa of agrwoment? and for t5tflY the sense of de?artmental participation and inter- dopartaental cooperation. 1 3mith convened the ',PC, for the first that, in his adminia- tration, 17or the "precise" ,Iurpolie of working out ray ?a:A estimates for :re8i6ent Truman to take along to 4ake island, ond this meeting led to the "firat real coordination of national estimates in the history a intelligence", it was said later. (See memorandum by L. irkpPtrick, . . . in . . -,;oordination", undated, at-out ov. 1951, p. 4; copy in filed under 1 See also 0/XI/;ES study concerning esti:la-tea of ,,Thinese ,.eomnuniat Intervention in the 6orvan war dated 195). IX 25. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : Clm-r?DP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065460200170001-2 tflc nt meeting, on October 20, Jeeezon ereeented a restatement of thtory of. national estimatine, eee -zT4r411 eeileet followed with en outline or Jr-waders gelling eenceforth for ferekel 7 ection at additional stees itothe eutimating process. eence- leirte te would be Invitee to participate in the elannine of eeteentine ,eeijectz? to the extent of reviewing and eeopting ra- jeet list ncseteene priorities in it, i4ech department was asked te submit project proposele leeethe next meeting, to to adde0 to the liet teet wao meanwhile to b.. reeered by O. Likewise, on the elenniee of terms of. reference for individual projects, eeneral emith announced that the 1ee henceforth would discuss and pare on the "frame of reference and . . . assumptions on which the estimate is based. (Thl rte2 wna revised in suLeegtent weeks, however, to provide, Instead, th..t.t eiele estimating staff would first discuss each set of Ur?is of reference informally with the working-vol representa- tive of the eeparteents, and refer to the IAC only those drafts of ter me of reference on which a'resent could not be reached.)2 fl 1 1 linutes of meeting, act. 2 20, le50, in eieefiee. 25 en ect. 26, the .fe. consicered and Reproved for terms of reference estimates on :i.ndo---!hina enc. :_ermany, and went on to si?Tee on the 3:e.neral ,Jrinciiole that terms of reference should not, however, be inflexible, tiwt "the experts should be allowed some latitude in *working eqt neceesary changes." (Minutes of IAC meeting, in lIC secretariat files, in 1Js..) any in december, elki proposed to Or:: that draft teee of reference heed not be cleared in the Ike unless issues erise at the working level", and this ermedure (en- dorsed Cy OI, on :ec, 6) was eeeroved by the ife on Dec. 7. (ece eemerandum by to eeel? Dec. 6, totn. in and Jle minutes, ,mt. 7 25 26 SEct1ST Approved For Release 2004/09/1 : A-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654400200170001-2 In other ascte, the:procedure outltrc,i Gn ctber 20 was not unlike existini'; praotieeu CIA :would vign contributions to the UC member departments, unit.: deadlines in "consultatiele with them. Upon the comdletien of the first draft Of the estimate, would send it to the departments for review, comment, and "further discusnic11, if requited." The "second, or later drafts if required," would te odbmitted to the 71.j.; itscilf for "final discussion, resolution of differences, and approval," in accordance wjt t!le -)reoedent stA on (;etober 12.1 sny remaining difforeneee emeld not be resolved there, the estinvat would be issued with 'notation of suistantiel dissent and reasons therefore." For "crash' estimates, such as the Far estern reports co-lr)leted on October 12 for the ''resident? a special meeting of the 14 would be convened to the PCI, whereupon alency represen- tatives (that is, from OIA and the departments) would be naseigned at once" to )2.o4uce s draft, and the I would receive it for iscussion, revision,and approval."2 The establishment of a separate estimating staff within OIals organisatlon war :eneral heith's second major decision, announced first on .fotober 20, 1950, at the PC meeting with the departmental inte11i4ence chiefs, and again on Uovember 13, to the staff of C;IA, ,hethor this rcoryanisaticm was to consist aim,Jly of a re-naming of the 6oecial ,,teff, which had been establishmo within in Ju1y 1950 1 -tnuten of i meetinz, 9c1... 20, 1950, 2 In' files. 25 EX 27 Approved For Release 2004/6/ECRPDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved ForOease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200170001-2 to supervise the estimating program, or whethr there tics to be a liqUidation of L nd a conolete d$Olerce of estimating from Os other production functions, wan not immediately clear, however, from two versions of the minetes of the *sooting of ?..ctober wnich nave eurvived. ecording to one which 4$8 roparted by one a the i.rmy observers present 1 17oneral Sm-Ith called 0167 "the heart an soul of ac and of the national intelligence machinery, which he pro- posed simply to divide into two divisions--a Erivision of .stimatee, which woulo ndie the estimate', program, and a -ivision of Besic intelligence which would noonfine".ita activities to producing reports on "subjects assigned specifically by law to ciApn "eithin the new .['Stimetes ivision of JA10? aeneral 4)mith went on, edcording to this version, there would be established Ilsk panel of five or six individuals constituting the top braine of the new estimates organi- zation. ::-mith had been "lo king hard for a retired General or idmiral" to head the division, so the i'l!myls minutes reported, and he had attempted to recruit t.dniral Leslie Stevens, recent Naval Attache at closcow. ehile Plith was continuing his efforts to "per- suaee" Asvens to cume to Cit, he was also "anxious to ,:et .1eneral 1 ,141eL,..h draft" or minutes ef 11-J meeting, Let. 20, 1950, niened by -;-2; in 0/;;GI/H5 files. 2 dhether the in its technical (se=e ,Ilk,ter Vi. resonrch phrase "Leesic intelligence ivision" was used advisedly sense, to cover only the National Intelligence :)urveys , st,ove), or whether it simply denoted a :Leneral in is not clear from the linuten cited above. Ix 28 Approved For Release 2004HOW-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 ft.7 be a meMber of the panel, and ..os bly 1 ?i :head the divi5ion.0 in a later editod version of ilihutos of the meetine on Octobr 2, cs circulated about November 1,2 the new estimates staff was labelieu es an entirely separate office--the "ffice of National :stL:aetes,', rather then a new division of ..;ia; arid the research ecmpenents of which Jeneral irflith had proposed to call the 'Wale Intelligence avision f ';#1.4-1 were now also called a saparate office?the Office or aesearch and eports. ?resumably neral J.:111th was lore certain hy November I that U4F, shou-lo be lividated arid replaced by two now offices. No mention 1#41b made in the revised minutes, icwever, of any board or panel of esti- mators within new estia=-Ing organisation. Nor wae the 3 search for 4/1 ststant .irector of ,3/i:? ment.onwel preeurdably because, by Novelber 1 fleral Selith nee settled on the apdoint- ment o/ 411/a:4 ,angor. iieither veraienf these decisions of October 20 indicated whether enoral ,nith expected to keep 5 current intelligence staff 1 "-,ou;,.!h drsft" of r4eutes cf meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, previously cited. 2 qeviscd .reft of minutes, 'fills typescript, with longhand ictober 2,a ,,arently was the cute and 4iileo,ra,hed copies pr cm-Y. 1. ' copy of the ,rinted 3 Ibid. labelled "IPC-'4-1", in 0/CI files, changes and carrying the original date final draft fro: 4 which A "stencil was :xted for circulation, probably about ainutes is in PC Lecretariat files in :X 29 Approved For Releasei 2004/0c'. ik LDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 Approved Foripease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065V0200170001-2 in CIA, end ee ee eew it was to be relatud to the eatimeteee Tunction, e few days leteem however, on sovember 7 anC. E, "eurrent division" appeared 11F. coeeonent of the hew :Office eeLlenel estimates, on a two drefts ?/prpGied ti%;Anization chArt t:f TIA's pro- duction uffleesi and a few weeks later, shortly after CA. was ofl'icinflestetlished, such a Durant staff wee actually ii tailed. in elee 14 the transfer of Sawa 30 former 7.abcrs of current intellieence ereee. Thus the iesue of current intellieence appeared to be settled, t least for the tile being, much along the lines of Oe's rememendetione of ectober 10, rather than according to the eulles reeort (which had questioned CIA's need for that activity) or the etete-eefenes elan of September 1950 (which had osiiled for A current 1nt6Jlionce staff ia CIA but ono tbet would be co-equal with the estleetine staff). One other item in the plenning being done in the fall of 1950 mieht bear mention with reference to the later development of ee/I. I deeliminary version of the Agency's new organisation chart, which hed appeAred on November 7 and 8, 1950, showed a ueeputy Arector for National estieates", as superintending not only 0Ne but the other production offices as well, toeether with the Office of eperationa 1 eee proposed charts for (1) CIA as a whole, Nov. 7, 1950, and (2) GIA's lytellieence offices, grouped under a proposed "eeputy eirector for National stimates". Copies of these charts are in r4i; A" file, and in .7nnex 13, below. 2, eee below, p. 35. IX 30 c3T131(71r Approved For Release 2004/09M-:'CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Forilease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00651100200170001-2 and time Office of s.olleetion and Dieleminetion. this chart was newer adopted, it probab34 rein-meted **sthtn the Inportance attached by the Urector to -his estimeWitrevoneibilAz., those critioal weeks. I-urtheracre, with the establsh-nont of A e)uty'drcAor of intelligence sons fourteen months later (in Ovnu- ftry 2452), aomet rQvemblime the 195o :-rce)osal was actually :Aeeanwhile, the Leputy Arector? . jfiakeon, proba- bly ,;eve .;urte than a proportionate she's of hiu attention from Octo- ber 1550 to August 1951 to the affairs ef.the new ATice of National stimatoe, thus achieving somewhat the 'lame purpose. In spite of the establishment of new estimating Ce'fice, there Was e substantial thread of continuity with the past experience of t 'iEnhy with this 'oroblem. While Oh-k yea forally liquidated, with the announcement of Novemeer 13, 1,50, ita Job and resourcee were not abandoned. Its experimsed estimators were to Locos* the nucleus of the now UNA oollio or its ?rocefiures and methods for eliciting interdepartmental cooperation were continued end others revised. ' few, at least, of its pending estimates were continued by Qte. and were come dieted in the weeks end months ahead, end disseminateu under the new format of "national intelligence estimates." it was also apearent that mak; of the substantive and administrative probltma confronting in the next two years were not unlike those that hied faced 0..% before it. 1 dmiosed oranisatton charts dated ov. 7 and el 19!:, cited above. Approved For Release 2004/0SE3CRIUDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 2FittRAF:ALLTA:4,i1L.....aff the New stiwrAter -lace Heading the Office of National Xstimate saiatzult araster, beginni4:? on November 13, 1950,1 was Mr. William LAO ;,an:;er? who same to CrCA iarvard Universit:, and who brought with him both a die- tinipliahed scadeic record in history and internatlonal relation*, and the intellii:ence experience of having headed the wartime Research snd finelysis 1A.sneh of %VS and (for nome months after the war) the otetv e...rtniontle Intelligence research branch, few daya lter2 he was Joined iqy Mr. aerman Kant, professor of hlstory on levoie from Yale Universty, former instructor et the National der ,ollege? and like Lare;er, a key officer of the wartime intelligence production group in :uring his first weeks in t, Kent wee designated as a "consultant" in :,Nr,33 about ..ecember 1950 he was named its fiputy Assistant Arector; and some thirteen months later (in January 1952) he was appointed ;ssistant :irector, upon Lengeris return to ,:ervard.4 11 table of organisation was evolved during the first weeks of the reorganization, in hovember and ;:-Jecember 1950. it was described 1 Langer's appointment was ahnounced in .',eneral tinier 4o., 37, 13, 14,50, in CIA ecords ,:;enter. 2 :ent came to -.Jr in Nov. 1950, according to a New York Timms article z,Lout him published Jon. 22, 1952. (!,ee press-clidping serer,. book, "f.,1 in the N'ews"? in Th Library.) 3 Kent's title "consultant" was used in wrioue l4 memoranda 6uring his first weeks on duty, for example, on leo. 15, 1950. (lee "c'Irono file, in te4311.'3 a-pointment as Pssistant 'irector was announced by the ,hite .qn1s4- on Jim. 21, lid52. (New York Times, 4An. 22, 1952, in scrnbook cited al:eve.) The yj forlal (otice to the P stff ' not been found. IX 32 Approved For Release 2004/S/WRIPDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X9 25X1A 1 Approved Forillease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 by Langer as an "incredibly sinple" internal organization; in -"one of tile smallest gomponectS7 in CIA," and "chicken f4,0-u by usual 1 jovcrnment standards." 0.11i1e the size of O34Is staff lie larger than the preceding estiwating -!,roup in (the ":44ocia1staff"), it w considerably smaller than am of the other production offices in the :,,:ency in 3Enera1 time. zaton for tA7.? in Jant 1 -xtemporaneous remarks onference? 13* 11., 2 "Table of Qrganization Jan. 17, et .-)TRos Agency jrientation on disc recording, in OTA files. for the.'?,?iffice of 4Ational ifAtimates in ONE nchrone 3 lcornw by idministrativa officer, N, to Hr. "Table of isgenization Office of National -stimates", 51# 1.1.PP?m in 0147 "chrono file. "terronnel !eport, Office of National '';stimates, PS of 17 Feb. 1952," h op., in c:A77. ",7!hront file". 5 femorandum by .eputy .nsistant Firector of ONE for Administration L534 i n Ol& "chrono file." Ito &pecial Assistant for ;:dministration, ffice of Jam. 29, 1X 33 Approved For Release 2004/09c 1?ALDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065 00200170001-2 Se1ecte bars of the _ismer tine staff um certain other intelligence officers of the now-1iqu1dited constituted the nucleus of the sta.; f that was initiial4 recruited for ??, between Novenber 1950 and January 1 u ' 11:', for din. 1951 cited above. In. 1950, the tr.? had asked the -ecratery of ;Jefae for I lofficers" for estimates work. Oite letter fro l DC! to ;iscretary? of Aefense, c. 26, 1950, I in Otk.ah.ii, filed under " epart:lent of ernee, ,1:over uort.") tvtles of orniz&tion,Meroh 1951 and jam 1953 cited above. tX 314 Approved For Release 2004/09faRIP64-00654A000200170001-2 ' 1.` Approved For.ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00651y0200170001-2 reh 1951, ,erisonnel on full-time duty in ome from this original 0i,- .rou4 urd among then was represented, as 4ent put it 1Pter? a "-consicerable experience in writing estimates."4 Luring the next two years., &Lost half of these (i'kL,...trained nen, together ...viradormarrournboo. i - The .a;its decision to place the current intelligence function in N was not ninounced in his leneral uroer or Nov. 13, but it was probatly a1rea4y nettled by tivt date. Thus, two days later, asked the (I.A Ixecutive to transfer I O 4,spa- cifical4 to head that function, and on Lox. 22 it submitted a list offliformer employees I Isto constitute u .-Orrent intelligence aff" In ,114 (:t. menoranda by isaistnt rector of to Clf :secutivo, Nev., 15 and Nov. 22, in .CN, "Carom files; see also ,:liapter VII; above.) 4 Hr. nt 1Pter recalled td the till', in 404. 1V52, that the "entire stuff" of N-, wiicx it wuu first organized, was rocr4ited from within r;IA, vius carr,yin forward "consioaratas evyarience in writig estimates". (ue his AC10 TA) 1,14. is 1952s in "ehrono a 35 Approved For Release 2004/4b? ATRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 1 1 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 with a good number of clerieal and administrative no:waned who had also been obtained from late in 1950, remaioad with the new rAstimetes Office. The others were meennimile released for o raffle" ty, for duty with other headquarters officers, or for What Kent called reasons of "incompatibility," The other full.time personnel, who made op the 3t&ff of la in 1951 and 1d52, were for the nest part new to CI A.2 In addition to Langer and Kant, those appointed to senior positions during the first year were on laier; from Duke univorsity0 Ii varsity of Talifornia; The internal organise on of ORE, as it developed in and 1952, seenel to follow partli the 9 Fiance of partly the 2 fhese men were brought into CIA "systematically," iartly "new blood" and partly because of the difficulty or getting " for existing CIA personnel from other offices, and the net re 1013 "an optimum balance between told hands' an 'new blood'," BO 'ant observed in Atm. 1952. (Ibid.) 3 thereafte illness. 4 Assistant came in pec. 1950 and served until about 01 was shifted to a pert-time consultant basis 5 rt-timet 1951, and cause of came in Jan. 1951 and a year Later became the )souty Arector, when rent moved up to become Assistant firoctor. rwed from about ',Arch to June 1951, and then became a conaultant. 6 These men came later in 1951. 1I 36 Approved For Release 2004/096/1-M764-00654A000200170001-2 ;')E. 25X1A 25WA1A 1 25X1A 1 Approved For eease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006544100200170001-2 Dulles and 'terstr!dt recommendation of 4949, and ,?)artly the ideas of Langer nnd %is irIllediete adViters. The general outline of oNiOS orgenization lit13 apparent sol-tly after its establishment in ovember 1950, And provided for four principal components concerned with the ostivIting program, -together with a fifth covonent, the current inte1li7cnce staff, which remained attached to until erI January 1951. A.? the four components for estimatang, three were fixed in 3t411: table of organization on January 17, 1951, as follows: the Soard of hational Estimates; the .Lstimotes Av_ff (divided into a c.4neral ':;roup, a Specialist ,5roup? and a Alitary roup); and P alpport Aaff (with three branches for editorial and reproduction services, reading room nervices, and information control). 1 The fourth component, consisting of a denel of part-time consultants did not apar in the table of organization, but it had been announced by 'lenerel 6 2mith on IScember le, 1950, and 1 "Table of Cruanization for the ATice of National 'atimates", Jan. 17, 1951, in OfL; "Ohrono file." ? 2 jeneral i1th announced ta the Assistant iArectore on If), 1950, the formation of what he called a "consulting board", to meet periodically on estimating problems, and that 1 hand others" had been or were being appointed to that hoard. (Anutes of TA;Tin staff conference 8-M-1, Farly in 1951, I ;11 Cy2X;Ii. ) . , withdrew from the' I (See memorandum by ON to R tro11er parch 7, 1951, and memorandum to Lag', Nov. 29, 1950, both n ON "chrono file%) IX 37 Approved For Release 2004/0 DP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 and kr May 1951 it s in operation as a recognized element in OR?ta, rganization rid procedure. 11th minor change this was in onsral the outline of ONEls organisation during its first two and one half years, to Irebruary 1953. Of the four coilponents of ONL the new Board of National sti- *tea became, In effect, the senior staff in ONF, with the final rtsponsibility for reviewing, revising and approving all drafts of ostimate5' written in CIA before they WITI, submitted for formal inter-departmental review and approval in the IC and released by the Arector for dissemin i General Smith apparently had had such a senior staff in mind wi-on he spoke of the need for what he called "a panel of five or six individuals constituting the top brains" in the estiaatin program, in his reorganization plane out- lined to the TA ,1 on October 20, 19-0.2 2 See minutes of Ife meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, in 0/OCl/H5. this concept of an internal beard or panel was not specifically men- tioned in the 1:ulles report in 1949, it was singled out for spacial recommendation in the Aoerstadt oommitteels recommendations, previously cited above. ;lowever, in the preliminary organisation chart for OW:, early in Nov. 1950 arid a week before the new office was launched, no ouch top panel or board was mentioned, although the chart did show a "senior staff". (See proposed CIA organisation chart, Nov. 8, 1950, in Annex below.) by rec. le, 1950, the idea was revived, when eneral 6mith announced to his immediate staff that a "high level board" was being established within ON. (see minutes cf DOIls staff conference, - in 0/ICIA.) Ix 38 CaqApproved For Release 2004/09g: - P64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 In its prcceures 4:vrin new Board of Nationnl .1,7.2vItor operated largely by collective deliberation in such of Its work in the next two eceer. In membership end crganie,9%!enel status becnuse It was not A tyeicAl board in the usual eevernmental ,4esning of the word; that is, .t was not ;I nommitteF whose members were representatives ? Of different aeencies or repretentetive of various fstlished points of view. . or was it comperable- tu eells eerlicr experiment of an estimates production board, whfoh had been race up principally of chiefs ef CI 'a research divisons and branches who had tended to .reererent the particular regional or topical fields of research speeielIzetien for welch the had individual responsibility. Instead, the new Tewre? presided over b the lesistant Arector himself, WAS Aade up entirely of senior staff members of most of them serving under full-tine 7TA eepointments, who were expected to have a "eeneral" and "mature" point of view toward the international problem at hind. Langer described them as intelligence officers with long experience academie men with extensive knowledge of international relations, 1 and former military officers vAh"global" judgment. erheps the name "board" was originally attached to this group in order to eive estimat.'eng procedure An seditionel measure of prestige,to match the formal committee review by the Interdepartmental Intelligence ielvisory Committee. Thus, Laneer, at one point early in jenuary 1951, seemed to regard the internal board and the external 1 - extemeoraneous remarks by eilliam L. Langer, Nr,i, Feb. 13, re51, at ._12efe 6gency Crientateon Conference; on disc reeordine, in Ji iles. IX 39 Approved For Release 2004/SERETRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 committee at "the zOillti w .t competitive, when he e ske;.ticism . . to keep pace wth rch Li h group" as Ws own "high owere estimates board."' In any case, he me be.rshid of the rioard? like thtt of tne other co,)onents of . waz aaue up, frtin the beginning, of "old hends inc n blood," as int later characteri d AIE's entire staff.2 n Jeneral L;nit n announcement on December l, 1950, he 1 sted Langer tithe new :ssistant irector), I. 4ent (about to be ,-inted eputy), as the initial members of the i2oard.3 -leo included, rirtually from the the beginning, are the two senior eU:aatara from now-1i-I-Idated "- Ludwell L. 'ontegue who almost imrledietely became the hoard's , "alumni" served con- xeoutive ::;te.creta tinuousiy on the I?, !,.11 three of these nz the next two yrs uf the presont study, as well bs crin the period following. All original members, however, staff conferences, jan. 1951, 2 ;ee orpnduiit bi Kent to Aug. 1, 1952, Ichrono 3 1inutts of staff conference, Dec. 16 sition ;uring S's first weeks was "..decial 1.ssistant"i begioc. 49, 1950, he was called !,Xceutive .ecretary of the board of 41tione1 'ationtes. :,lee various !-Iemoranda, Dec. 1550, in (.24: Ichrono file".) .)11 Jan. 4, 1952, Iw re-eesinated Deputy I-ssistvnt ircctor mr'nministration. (IX) ice c 52, Jan. 4, 1952, in ;Ieeords ;:enter.) in 0, in ONE 25X1 25X1 ? 25 Approved For Release 20045gPURDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 25X1 Approved Foripease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 except Kent, depnrteri eventually in 1951 and 1952, but continued to serve ONE. subsequently on nn seeisory, part-time basis, tfirtugh, ()NrIs "pnnel of consultants," Jeseribed below. 25X1 A ? f't first, the Uational 'atimates Beard's single, domirant function was to review, discuss, and revise drafts of estimates written by the ,atimates Stnff, and this remained its continuing responsibility in 1551 end 1952. In this task the !;:oardts procedure wau somewhat Akin to the academic seminar, in that the one or more members of the -stimates Ltaff who had worked on the draft were usually also present, (luring the Deard s deliberations, to defend their conclusions and their evaluation of the evidence on which the e3timste wnn bulit? ix a Approved For Release 2004/SUREIDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065100200170001-2 The Board Flee ndopted i second type of mooting to which, on a given draft etAil-titd, it invited "working-level" representativi.,s of the eentritetine groups in the YAC agenclee am the Ce rcseRrci: offices, in this second phase of deliberation, the ecerd carefully adhere to the theory (in its iroereas reports and formal correa- )ondence) that it wee pimply 13etting 000nsideration" of the estimate by the departmental representativiro, and not asking them for their "aeerov 1". Yet this a'Aitional step of in_ormal consultation was a vital step in the preliminere coordination of e given estimate, and was reeerded ae a ppycholoeically important factor in promotine a spirit of inter-agency- cooperation. The T:orrd also soon entered the review phase of other ateeea in tile e:;timitin process, especially at the significant first step of estimate nnking, when the tA?ras of reference were being formulated. This function of formulating the proper frame cf reference and essumptiona in an estimate--"erkine the right questions--wan at first, in (;ttober 1950, yioidec by eenerel smith almoat completely to the as a. step to Le teem in fernsi committee; but on NOV03- btr 2, he re-assigned the job, dividine it between CIA, which would -'s (progress reor s) 0' oee correspondence with IR; agencies, In ? files. 2.e eoerd of eational .Feetlmatea alto oceesionalle invited to its neetinge ,:overnlent officials from outside the intelligence organ - zation, 0.g., eereign eerviee officers from the State eeeartmentti in ept. end ect. 1952. (sco :NZ "chrono file.") :X 42 &EPP' Approved For Release 2004/09/ 3 : fr.-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 henceforth draft the terms of reference, and which we them. review tath the estnb11shent of O later in November 19O, this proeedure ws further re-defined, se tbat the job wns left lmost entirely to CIVONE, except that the IAC mould review any essential differences of opinion between OIA and the depertm ntal repre n- tatives. .4.fter mid-Lecember 1.950, the function of reviewing terms of reference belonged to the aserd of National TAitimates? and the drafting of terms to the 4timatie 8taff. Aare again, as with the drafts of the estimates themselves, the Board normally invited in to the discuseion the representatives f the IC departments to whom contributions were to be assignad,3 and only rarel>, in li51 and 1952, were the terms of reference appealed to the Inc. Le d eventually served as an advisory staff to the Assistant ireotor on other aspects of OWs work. Individually, the board members were given xpecial tasks on occasion, such as the assignments to at different times in 1951 and 1952,on the oontinu ng problem of liaison with tho operational planning groups in the efenas i.#epertment, discussed more fully later in this chapter. ,ollectively, the hoard deliberated 1 tthutes of JA,; meetings, ;)ot. 20, Oct. 26, and Nov. 2, 1950, in Ii5-C 6ecretarist files, in OkE.? Anutes of .1:; meeting, Am. 7, 1950, IAC-4-10, /MIR:4 3 See uN oorres onnenoe with NZ a4 nciee "ehrono 4 4e Ifi,; minutes, 1 1- 2, passim, in Ale II 43 51-52, pan in r nri. Approved For Release 2004/4M131E-IRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 1 1 Approved Foribease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006544,0200170001-2 on the lists of eondine estimates projecte, including the annual programs of estimates begin ng early in 1952. They also received new requests for estimates; though these required final 1.K approval. The Roard also served as a foram for staff discussions with the Estimates staff and the Assistant Director on a wide range of other problems that were incidental to the estimating job, such as the quality of research contributions, collection overtones and deficiencies, disserination policy, ONE's relations with the con- tributing and operating agencies The Board was also responsible for reviewing and approeing for release, types of intelligence evaluations other than formal estimates, which were produced from tire to time by the Estimates Staff, such as the many intelligence memoranda written for the Director'a use independently of formal inter-departmental coordina- tion, and the various types of prepared comments on NSC planning 1 papers that were referred to the DCI for intelligence appraisal. The Estimates Staff became the second echelon in ONE. It was in this Staff that the estimates were actually drafted; con- tributions from the departments and CIA's research offices assigned received, and studied; and the day-to-day consultation with the contributors carried on. The Estimates Staff was headed by Ray S. Cline from about December 1950 to about May 1951, 1 See files of intelligence memoranda (other than estimates), prepared by Estimates Staff for the Board of National Estimates, in ONE files. Approved For Release 2004/ DP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 25 25X1 25X1C Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 by dins" Caine was iicce.dd first by tbot . smith, then and again, by The L!timetes staff Wes organized et first, late in .2.90, simply as a nrnsll group of senior estimates writers, leaving to a str:Jte roup of analysts ir ONIsisupport Brencil the jot, of un6or- taking whatever neoessary supolewlentertresearch and analysis was required in the course of comstructingAin estimate. :n January 1911 however). the 'atimstes Aaff was reorganised into three gr- ups: 7,enera1 ,I.roup, consisting of the "generalists", who remained respon- sible for drafting the conclusions and the discussion section of the estlilate; a oecialist Group, consisting essentially of research men (formerly in the Support Staff) expert in particular areas or topics; and a Ailital7 r;roup, which was to ccmprise the working level repre,- sontstives from the !rmy, Navy, and fir Force who (it was originally planned) would be pertnnent4 stationed in Oh.1 A? the three groups in the letimstes Staff, the iilitery eup had the shortest ii story. been ,lanned trlat to Ar,,2 in order to "give co.msel on military, naval, and air Originally (in iAacember 1950), it had officers would be esci4ned full-time 1 "Telle of '4.ganivmtion for the Office of National .ati tee, Jan. 17, 1951, ONF ochrono file". TX 145 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved ForOease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 matters tnd critically review 0* contributions of the Lefense sencies" submitted to OMRi in practice, however, did not use t:*m 4.5s. or as regularly as planned, "because of decnclunC(7. rorvica7 representatives sent by t!lc aenciss to our frovrki7 lectina to present the viewpoint of their resdective ,2 e.,:cmeric3,L ,,..czr,n4y, the officers involved wre. nv,vigned to reGuicr filtn;T. ,Jositione in tlie ,pecialist Group of tho stimrtes A;aff, wac'To ,,rf'ormed a variety of useful tasks, but tasks that were not one of "representine their home depertments.3 leide from the :-)ersowl capaLilities ,lunlifications of the individual officers thus sssined full Le to there wa c growing feeling of dissatisfaction with their position in ONE* In Cctober 1551, (eneral ,nith questioned whether Ori: was using them "to the full extent or their copabilities,4 And he asked Langer and 1Nent to exsmine the present method of using ;iervice personnel iA staff smomndum by 30 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. For example, who was assigned to )!FffroN1 the A.r. 7orce, was assisting on Far.:estern estimates in f,pril 1551* .i1-411arly, from the Navy, was assigned in July 1951 to tne len of attempting to improve ONT's con- tact and liaison with the intelligence and planning echelons of the Joint c;hiefs of staff (de more fully later, in this chapter); and the next Ytonth was detached from 0.N. st the end of his tour of duore: this particular problem* (See memorandum by to ,.;hief of :Iilitary orsonnel, fiTt* 11, 1951, anc o er correspondence in (11 "ohrono file", July, -vg. 191. Ito Itief, '4ilitary Personnel in ONF "chrono file". Ix 46 Approved For Release 2004SGR E 61-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Forelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 assignments." In subsequent months, ONE reiterated its need for kiiitary';Jositions on trs table of ergenization 2 but apparently did not find it necessary to change its prectice of assigning them to the 6pecialist roup. In any case, did not restore a separate "Military Group". Ath the abandonment of a separate lilitary Group, the sti- mates staff developedl early In 1951, in two parts, a ,General Group and a apecialist ,roup, end fills arrangement persisted unchanged from about?'arch 1951 until after February 1953. This internal organization was largely one of administrative convenience, however, which in practice way frequently ignored. As a practical matter, these two iroeps, rather than being separated, were brought together intimately in the course of a given estimates project. Ictualpreparation of estimates was by small special committees (called "Task Teams") made up of one of the "general" group as chair- man, with esistance from several "specialists" assigned for the par- ticular project involved. The chairman was given general responsibility for seeing that, first "terms of reference" and then a draft estimate would be brought before the Board And afterwards before the qoardls meeting with the departmental representatives. This task, in point of fact (once departmental arsignments had been agreed upon and tea o CI'a staff ccnference, ,?et. ?2, 1951, 61;-1-29 in U/JI/it. 2 lemorandum by (.7JW: to Chief, Military ersonnel avision, lay 24, 1952. in :i!;? "oerono file". IX 47 Approved For Release 2004/44.fiELDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foripease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065 0200170001-2 departmental co r1bu.Lon1 had been received by AT:), was largely onef synthesizing four separate studios into a single brief eent of the ease at hands representing an estimate that right be egreeable to the ard, the departmental representatives and finally, the ref.% This synthesis was usually undertaken by the aak Team" chairean who could not hope to produce a fully valid state- rnent without reference to his "teammates" who specialized in area and functional knowl.edge and the immediate sources thereof. After the first emeriti months of ONE's experience, there seemed to be no longer any debate on the old question whether CIA's eattmat&nr staff needed a complete research organisat4on. rhe ulluinroup had severely criticised 07E for having "cenfused" eti- mating with research, although the ORE proposals of October 10, 1950, had stressed he need for "research support." General emith and Mr. Jackson, In their plan of Octeber 20, had gone bark to the eales report in calltn for 4 clear-cut divorce of estimating from research. Alone the same lines, Langer* in his first weeks in ONE, announced that IC intended to do no "substantive research" on "regional or "topical"netters and he expressed impatience, at one pant early in 19512 with the need of supervising any addi tional staff in NE. 1. xtemp0reneoua remark, by William L. banger, Feb. OTR's k.noy rientatton Conference; on disc recording In files. U he Approved For Release 2004/09/1$aW64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fo The tne xte1 first of Drovidthg an 6up7ort taff aud t;hon, about ni:-.January 1951, re-It/minw these c;NE analysts a Snecialist reue and shifAng them to the Fstimates Staff. thus had ? small group of specialists immedistely at lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006 00200170001-2 0 plan was eubaeqently mecitfie, however, to, is Group" in new hand, for the purpose of analyzing departmental research on which ONE primarily depended. As Lndicatid later in this chapter, ONE relied ever mora heavily, in 1951 and 1952 n both the research offices in OtA, especially WI, ORR end OCI for sonlemintarY research bearing on particular questions arising in pending estimates. The third and last full-ties component in t;NE's table of organization In 1951 and 1952 was the Support 6taff. In AfEls original table of organisation, three branches were to make up the Support t*tfx an Analysis Branch, consisting of research assistants for the Estimates ;Aaff, mentioned above; t PUblications ,ranch? which was made responsible for arranging for the reproduction of finished estimates by the Agency's printing plant; and an Informa tion Control nrench, which WAS to log in and out of Ah all 1. Memorandum subject "Table Pile." 2 0 illian L. Langer anisation for 0 WA. Jan. 17, 1951, in ',V "chrono 25 Table of..,irganization of nee. 21, 1950, mentioned in ibid. If 49 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved ForOease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 departmentel c.t.i...bations to estimates. and to maintrt;l. r vclOrence file of selected intelliivanoo asterials for consuiLatiot!' timates :::taff and the in aubsequent revisionz. of 'AYIn table of genicztion, the uport::taff am'erwent some changes. in .711uary 191 the ,fA.ysis T.ranch, as indicated malit shifted to the -3ti4gtes -1;fr,. where it boame a ;:pecialist x.ovip of research assietant The Information k;ontrol branch wae divided, also in j,,,,,nuary li51, to include a eading ooli Branch oontaining intelligence reference materials borrowed from the 4encyls central library and elsewhere, for Vit2 convenience of the members of the ''ratimatea taaff and the Doard. ina11y, some changes Were made in the ?ublications 17:ranch, which P rrerv7ed for the reproduction of the finished estimate by ,the .T.gericy le priAing Aent and provided the necessary typing, proof- readin4? ami editorial services incidental to Publicition.3 Durirw it first year, the P'ublications Drench ?ias staffed both with clerical ;;ersonnel 114 intelligence officers, su4gesting that may have planned on a kind of editorial work on est1m-te.4 that would be cioro than stylistic, and s0Ale het comparable to CF/e 1 , ,aaorandum by Langer to ?11, Jan. 17, 1951, ibid. 25 2 Lbi. ,ce also report of iN. Ad Hoe ,.;Ommittee on .eadirk.7 i'CL? 2/c 1553, az.tached to t.aff feaorandum No. 333, ,inrch 11, 193, in riles. 3 ,amordum L5 i.unger to Jan. 17, 1=)51, in 25 "chrono file". IX 50 Approved For Release 2004/4ECRETOP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For *ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065e00200170001-2 practice -..A.evious .00552 the personnel of that 'Jranell had beemaccnverted entirely- to a clerical basil. resurx1A;i th ublications :ranch was not ex -:,rocess until the estrlate was r to.pseticipate tne eutimg.ting for the printer. These teryf: service branches of although formlly and ocilectivelyor..-1,1e the Supper$ Staffs. were never hee,deo by a separate -hief serving full-tiee. 111840ads they Ware at first supervised by t 71elbee- o'' the ;etimates :ita:f as part of his ether duties, and later, 1d early 1953, seem to hf;ve beep re,ardeci i6formal1y as a .e,leiniatrative services attached to the ..imediste office 2 of the Snistent irector. Tes fourth cemponent of.OPOs organisation fer estimating was its :veel of '.;lonsultants, first antouneed ty 7Cneml Llith on Deposer- ter ic, 1550.3 The idea or heving attached to ..3C an advisory panel of art-time consultants, made up of distinguished ard kAd-erieneed men fre1.1 ctse(41, the lovernmentos intelli?:ence enterprise, was, of all the devCloplents in organisation, the one entirely new dedarture in C;? 's estimating aroi.ram. ..c) such panel had been part of .;.1/es normal Erittipg procedure daring the years 1546-1550, nor 1 tables of organisation and personnel rosters, Jan. 1951, 'Jaren 1551, 'eb. 1952, 'arch 1/52, previously cited. 25X1A 2 4/5Morandum by LAD/NVtdmin, to .:4peoial .%ssistant for :,dministratdon, GVei, Jan. 29, 1953, in %'14::, "chrono file". Anutes df ,ZI's staff conference, Ale. lb, 1550, ih ,/ ,? II 51 Approved For Release 2004/6EC:11*TRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 25 ILLEGIB 25X1A X1 25X1A Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 had one been rec,,nmended in anyc the sayeral f,ts ,:;f^ reorganise tion proposals confronting 7enera1 ;:s*ith in Oetdber 10.1 The first ao)cint7lonta to the on El or %;onsultante included nd nu expert on the :41riet nion 2 in lii, nie, other appointments were made, early in 161, ??????????????11.......?????????? 1 ? bl.les report, the Lerstadt report, the Adate-Lefense plan for a inteliii;,nce group," End OICts plan for the new 7atimetes C'ffice subittec on Oct. 10, 1950; previously die- cussed, above, 2 linutes of stafr cenference? rec. 1, 1950? in 7,%71.,/,-). 3 ibid. had been recomliended to , by the k;onsultants -enel itsel .ii, first "organisational mettine late in Novsm- ber lY50. k_anyer reared his appointoent as an "extremely impor- tnnt" one, in the interest of Lvroving -,;IAla relations with those a6encies concerned with scientific intelligence; and urged 72enera1 3Nith to conircy t40 invitation to ersonelly. (Aer4orandum by Len4er to ,,,,I., iosv. 25,, P,-,50, n CIV. "chrano file".) 4. ? told trj.rofler, on !larch 7# 1951 (by memorendoeh 25X1A ibid.), that Id declined to serve but thatIle w . ibly consult, gratis, with ,.:;:, ,,!..;.? and othr %:ency colponents? "in other waya". IX 52 Iur Approved For Release 2004/1W:UAIRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A 25X1 25X1 25 25X1A Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 nel of Consultant aflxat convened In 1951, to T215xcuss the pending revision of the eneral sitiet,i f the cswbiUties f:rt :.ntentiona ef the 0g. -2!.; they net on the average of once month. They Insur1.4 Fcet t by themselves, but with one or more OM', roard xuid stimates oteff members. he agenda of 0,onsultants usually consisted of the drafts of one or more pending estimates nearing completion, an which the :anells function was to provide additional indepandent critical review. The Penel on deliberations did not, however, .con- stitute a fc,rmal etc p in 71:1's review rocedure. Only- rarely were its Aeetings noted tz CV :Is pIriodic progress reports circulated to the "i,C members; 2 and apparently the Panel was never expected to share Is responsibility for the finished estimates. The lembership of 1, Ooneeltants anel expanded solewhat in 1552, and b early 1953 it totalled twelve men.' Among the new The ='anells first meetim; to consider a apteifie estimate was in Jay 1951, but it had nad one preliminary meeting, late in Novemr bar 1950. tee correspondence, previously cited, above.) 2 See 1 ,- _Is (rokyeas reports), 1951-52, passim, in ON.- files. 3 -ee lists of consultants dated lay 21, 1551, Ltac. 5, 1952, and 1.eb. 2, 1553, in ,)-% "chrono file". Ix 53 Approved For Release 2004/0SECIRtrP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 sOpeintments in 152 were// The 7,roctice of adding such distinguished maAdimiaiams end in of rut?lic affeIrs to :WON roster of part-time consultant* was regarded not only as a prpetic;:l %,,,ay to solicit their advice when it was ertuelly needed, but also a oeviee, so N: later theorised, for recruiting and treining hew len for 2ossible full-time work on the board of fttonel .stimates. for example, did "graduate" later (in 1953) from :41nol to tht Loard. In the other nold, still other new part-time appointments to were CI4 "alumni", Who ha retired from full?-time the 25X1A t:" 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A work with the estimates program atd who took on what ml4ht be called p "resorvel status. Along the appointees in 1952 were Anima i,. ntor, the retiring ;ssiethnt Arector of 0)14 former AJqbassador till other new :ann.:. aebera in 1952 were who all had previously served ? capacities closely related on full-time basis in other int, to eetimatin7,, part..time consultants were also retained by i,NE from tie to time for a variety of special Ix 54 SCREI Approved For Release 2004/09/T3 : tAm-1xDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved Fort/pease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 purposes. and eyample these of its Board member were placed on ,0 pert-time basis in 161 and ct-rtain speeialists were tomporari)4, attsched 1952.1 On occasion, to the Board fornsultation on a specific estimate. z,uch was the case on ;in ;stimeto of ::-ovist air defense oap6bi1ities (Nir-60, pt. for which CV retained three sciontiata/ Ito help resolve a con- filet of opirlon ,:i-twertn the ir !-nrce, on thc ono hand, ant u:ot an6 the ,;avy, on the other na::(z. 2 another occasion in 1952, CW retained P former :oLre member, as a %.onsultant in connection of estimative 1angua4e used in NIls".3 Other special consultants were two Ysle University nerl? who late in 1952 were appointee to supervise (:Pla external reserf7h project for an estimative study, to be based entirely on unclessifis materials, of the U's intentions toward the iinited.7t.ates.14 1. eniono files", Jessim. 2 -cRorancitvm by '114f:: to uct. 28, 1952 in ?chrono file"; and (?4,. production record, below. 3 lemorande by ;L.i.INE to KZ., March 21, in ON1' "chroho file*. 4 :Ate memorcncLe br 'INF'. to I, Nov. 24. I: 1950-53, oh 27, 1952, in "chrono file"), ccommending "intermittent consultants". jn June 1951 a reiated external-research project had been assigned to for analysing unclassi- fied ;res ?Pnc; .overnment pullications on gibe Kremlin's -'etimate of the .priiities bnd Inten-,ions of the (6% (..ce correspondence, June 1951, in 'chrono ? 1 in ilinex IX 55 Approved For Release 2004/06EREIDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25 25 25 25X1 25X1 Approved Fore lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 From the above outline'tf C-Nis staffing problems during its first two years, it appears that CN 6 relied heavily at first, in 1950 and 1951, on men with extensive prime -technicei experience in pro- ducing intellicnce evaluations, en4Llater on men from outside the .lovernment's intelligence organisation who nevertheless had extensive acedelic knowledge or broad practical ex;Aarience, or both, in inter- national affairs which could te applied to the daily ;:roblem of evoluating intelligence evidence and *peculating on the meanina of the evidence in the contiming international conflict. ON did not depend to any great extent on formal training prorame for either its original staff or its later recruits. The "recruiting of trained personnel" rather than the "training of recruited personnel" seemed to be basic staffing policy in in 1951 and 1952. 4hile its new personnel were normally enrolled in CdAls general, introductory training courses, as required, there was no special fprmal course for estimators as such, nor did tN-L favor the establishment of a "super-intelligence school . . . at the National Intelligence level" at which the processes of estimating might be formally taught. Thus, for example, who served 25X1 in CN.. both as board secretary and AZ Deputy ,edistant iirector for Administration commented at some length in August 1951 on the plans for a CIt Career orps. He questioned the need for "training schools 1 7-lemorandum ty on behalf of the !?r/JE, to the iirector of Training, :lig. 31, 311, commenting on. ".A Pro- ; posalfor the 74tablishment of a Career corps in CIA", in OK "chrono file". II 56 Approved For Release 2004/0gt:&-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 Approved Fore lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00611000200170001-2 in the upper breckets, criticised training ;,ro;:-,relt; which placed "too luch cAphasis on over-ellborate testing techniques, ;;choolso. etc.", ane concluded tlAt, in experience, "a :ear or cu-he- job training weld be much morn valueble than a ;,-er s',,ent in a nuer-tntqii?:ence school."3' tr!Anine wns ptovided ti the stimates especially to t!? new intelli:ence officers recrlited later from the univernitiee nn{: 'roe other coeponents of Timilerly, the ''nnel of Jonsultants provided, to a :lore linitlA extent, an on-the- job perlod of orientation for outside ex Herts from non-overnmentel institutionr who miOit later be considered for appointment to the Yoard of Nationel 'stimates. In aJditicn, (;t1'7 also conducted a few activities which were entireV in the nae of training. -or example, guest lecturers were invited -AD epeax frorl time to tiNe to the locrd and the ..atite ttaff, aed were pnie from a special fund allotted to :.ncluCed amonc these lecturers were "certain professors of leadin. universities who are particularly 7uelified in fields of concern to . . this ftice, PS well as other experts presently 2 in uon-governnental capacitier." On the governmental side, too, 1. also took aciVantage of the courses at the National 'Aar :o1le6e, where Cit wee ,Tiven a nmall qcota of students in 1951, as well as briefireTs at other Covernment agencies.3 1.. ? Itdc. 2.. , J-)ew Lni:: correspondence with project ,--eview Committee, 1551 pe.sim, in "cnrono file". eor exaxillet Langer, i%cnt, :.tended the course at anita in. Avv.-Lec. 19.51. (eye aNi; "chrono IX 57 Approved For Release 2004/09SEGRERIP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For.ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 1,Lke othor components.lit the Agesex, -1-- also took Pdventage of tha trainin4; vaiutt of 11,tiving a few of its Aen assizned on teori n.. duty at other offices tif !..gency ttne rt overst;s 5tation-4T, onc!er rotction .).L..ogram or under other rran ;ements. In aodition, OVeravis traVel the swAmer and cf 711, under ?tihicii .6electe4 Board arn,i ritibers were n&nt ntrold fur cevieral weeks of "ro-familiarizat . ovel-geas arees.''1 7y this racans, the eetioatorL :ICA to timer- tbko snecific collection assiaments, int to ?' unofficizi obser ation "r(,sh sense or tle intan4iLic ele4entn In ;116 mituatiOu abroad, wnich in . . . essential . S S in the process of intelligence ,2 In ly,52 this plan was expanned to ermit personnel, wien on soc',-1 a trevel status, to visit with selected KC.)? pOliOy CffiCibl3 in c.i'tisire A. alissiona abroad wnt:, hie.nt exi)reas "informal CWIIAWat wurtn mar4 tiA03 tn4?t which le for.3011,i transit,ted In writin."3 1 'elorandum by to sept. 19, 1951 in CfN7 "chronc :ice plea Atmorand a tG i\jersonncl, ept. lt, . 26 1'.61 and to Oct. 15, ()et. 1, 1951 in I n_ra. I spoken or the need for aucn overseas g for -'oard personnel, At the 311ls starf conference on July 5, 1:61, z:n0 th i agreed tnat hoard members Thhould 6ct to Lhe field 'crt.. often. ('Inutes, July 9, 191;1, 2 eV ?le:lorandu4 of :,4!3t. 12, 1951, cited above. 3 star: si,udy, 41,.v. 25, 1952 on "proL,ram for re- familinrization of ;11,:. rlersonnel with overseas areas; in "chrono :Ile u 58 Approved For Release 2004/(SECREIRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foriplease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 aientele 110 54000 of "ttoos1 ntiaRt.s In contrast to the enaen ive Internal organiuttonml changes la estimating procedures, desert above, t..iere were no - revisions, between Oetober 19;0 and Febrasry 1953, in the formal definitions which outlined the eubjeatematter scope of national" intelligence estiates and which specified the "national seourity aencies of the Aerernment sad the kinds of needs which were to be served by auch estimates. in particular, the CIA organic act of July 1Y47 and the 4SC directive of Jameary 1948, in which, these matters were outlined, were left unchanged daring the period of f;enerel Smith's directorship. In practice, however, the relationship of national estimates to foreign and 6efense pol dy formulation was clarified further, less by statements or estimating doctrine expreesed from tile to time, than by the fore of precedent in the ,Anding program of estimates that were actually requested and produeed for various.- echelons of the .7overnmentts national security organisation. The directives in force in Oetober 1950 had defined estimates only in barest outline. The uct of 1947 for example, had simPXY aoeerted that the Arector of Central intelligence shell evaluate intelligence 'relating to the national security", and in subsequent directives or the 4ational security Council such intelligence was called nattonal intelligence". The clirect yes had not r, tonal 4curity Act of July 26, 1947. 1-.X 59 Approved For Release 2004/SEEKATRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 eiffrtrentie eo national IntelI and hed lef Intellience? too was not, after all, obvioesly-addrensed to problems of "national ecurity". A further N&J directive in January:194es had eempted to clarify this relationship hy statin;, that oeationel de rimontal oubt the further queen's* whether ?,1 tmental intel lee is inteerated deoartmental intellieence th, t broad aspect of national polio 4nd national securl%, the morn t iore than one departmont or ag nay, or ansnuv t.tx ineive tory .stetlishment". Ueither of tees* directives ayecified who or whot *nejes in the, evernment were to use iPa estimates, which of them eiOt demand estimates, what types of subjects were to be emphasised or excluded, and whether CIA could initiate estimates independently or only on the basis of a specific request. The tapitction, however, wee that the Netional ecurity rnci1 would be the rinctpa1 customer for "national timetes. The :Ulles Lurvey roup, in its oriationa for c nthe eat g e prom in January 1949, in affeot had endorsed this d concept of national estimates as aprecisions on icy problems, and had not attempted a more precise definition competence of a sinele dopertlent or agency or the etiol "broad" of their scope, nor had outlined more exactly whet using agencies (roe the hize down; were to be exclusively served or :nttdiience pot te ho. 3, Jan. 132 60 te. gr3. P Approved For Release 2004 '.. dA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 or *pacifically excluded. ?henational estimate:, the -11rvey I)roup rniteratsd, should deal with "brood OSPOets of national policy and national securit,y", it should "transelend in breadth and soepe the interest and competence of Inv Single intollience .dencx", and it should be "en plt!vritative interpretation fru, a;eleni thfit will servo as tirn laid, to policy-mekers and pIannere.1 The Awernment's critical need of ouch "troad". astileotes had, indeed, been "the lovin factor" in the very establishment of the 4entral Lntelligence Agency, the 5urvey ,'Afetip asserted. As If to emphasise its ooncern for estimates of "broad" scope, the'?Alrvey lroup had, conversely, criticized 4;1441* Office of iAtports and Lstinates for htlrin become "diverted" to the production or what it called "miscellaneous reports and summaries", including "summaries -of current developftente, political reports, backomand studies on countries end areas, economic reports, etc.", which "by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimetes".3 .Up to ..)ctober 1950 these jurisdictional questions uf definition* end customer relaAons had been mot pragistidally by Cisl and its !sfice of eiorts and 4timates, four years of experience had Lungs t5urvoy oup, sport . . Jen. 1, 1$I49 pp. 5, 6B-69. 2 Ibid., P. 5. 3 ibid., pp. 6, 70. IX 61 Approved For Release 2004/09f. O I P64-00654A000200170001-2 NE1 Approved Forelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 revealed both variety in subject flexibility in serving any egos all echelons of the aWrernmentis national security ?rootlet-140n that expressed legitimate na441!. lug* te for ef'ti!' 4e Iction accepted not only from the fiatienet Security i=ouncil and its ,malediets teff, but also ircm the department;1 members on that aoeneil. :iequeste creme not only from the fordliey plasm of the departments bet also from the intelligence rational echelons iss represented on the Intelligence Advisory 'xnessittee. A load number ef Lis estime finsaly, were int toted by C without saitin for a request from en &Aside, agency. n tiny cane whatever the origin of a particular estimate, the finished remorts were all customarily distributed, broadly and in quantity, to the entire group of departments and a -enoies represented on the NT:3": and on the and occasionally to non-IAC seencies ne well. eetween october and ecember 1950, during the first week.: of Jeneral ,Aithis administration when the estimstin,: work of the Office of reports and etimates was piing reorganised into the new Office of ationalstimstes, a number of fUrther interpretive statements of administrative policy were attempted, in the direction of clarifying the subject-matter scope of "national" estimates and the end-purpose of euch eatimates in relation to the using agencies. The short-lived MagTuder-?rmetroni; plan for a "national intelligence group" (on which CIA and departmental officials had agreed in Jeptember 1950 and which the new ,keuey irector, ailliam H. Jackson, had endorsed on October 3) reiterated the IS-approved concepts of janu IX 62 Y 194e, but went on Approved For Release 2004/0g0RfLP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 to add that "ntrietlr -Iolitical or strictly mil!tar-: Intolltgence estimates" (that ttlo7 normal]; SA the jurifOlctton of the :2.-tate and -iAreingle epartment intellieence'teencies, reseetively)? "should also be reorded as nationel intelligence when used in forluleting policy ret the national level"J .11though this definition failed of forlal. 'Ii.option, when the llan as a whole was shelved by ,,leneral ?th latdr it month, the e)neept neverthele s represented at least A deers. of Informal inter-aency sgTeement for an expendin concept of "national" estimates that Ans to be followed, in effect, during the next two years. Frequently, in fact, the title of Pn eNeeponsored eatilate was essentielly military, political, Or otherwise lilated to particular "topical" or "Functional" subject of interest to a particular depert,fient, but ra,ely was there any evidence of a centroversy as to whether &ICA an estimate was truly "national" in scope, and one for CIA legitilmately- to handle. The pralem of reconciling topical estimates of intra-departmental concern and thos,a of broader Fignificance at the "national level" also was implicit in a tetement Jackson, made in October 1950,2 which 1 Undated draft of "NS:7 Directive" for a "National :Intelligence 'iroup", 11 pp., undated (about 3ept. 1950), together with coverin3 Ikeecrendum by A,. d. 4aokson to 'en. 'fv. b. '47mith, Oct. 3, 1950, both In 0/Twa/eR, filed under "N3CID-19500. 2 Alper by Jackson entitleL "A. Asoussion of the Nnctione end :tesponsibilities of the rTentrel Intelligence Agency", op. 10-13, undated, lin 0/LeOtS files. This ?Apex. was apparently ' prepared about October 1950, originally for press-relations purposes apparently for :alter Lippman in particular (see LJA file, "0 & M 5"); and the substance of it was also delivered by Jackson at the meeting of Oct. 20, 1550 (see Alnutee, in files). IX 63 Approved For Release 2004/0SE. P64-00654A000200170001-2 MERTD 25X1A Approved For/lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 departed somewht from the earlierviews of the Wiles ::Jroup report of which he WIS 41 co-author. The scope wr a national estimate was limited only, he *cid, in the senaw that lt wouid Leal. with foreign situations not domestic or internal eacurit 4utter. eyond that limitAtion, however, the *etiolate "should deal with topics of a wide scope relevant to the 4eterminstion of basic policy, each as the assessment country's war potential, d. n 6$ for war, its stratejc capabilities end intentions, its vulnerability to various forms of direct attack or indirect pressure". re eget while se.e or the topics he cItied night plausibly have been interpreted as exclusively departmental intelligence problems they were all to become acceptable subjects of national estimates, in the actual production program of ONE during the folio win two years. In still another analysis of the concept of national estimats presented by the Office of eports and Hatimateel soon after aeneral imith and Nr. Jackson took office, Oh. reminded Jackson that while some estimates would, indeed, deal with a single country, others would cut across particular areas and regions of the world. Furthermore, some estimates miht be heavily scientific, economic, or geographic in content, but normally they would cut across such "functional" factors and represent a balanced "appreciation of the effect of ell factors in combination". Finally, Or0 expected that an estimate would not be confined to lcngi.term" trends alone, but deal also with 'current ?Aan for a e of 4timates", by ',esere. Babbitt, Amtegue? 0?iA, Oct. 10, 1950, in 0/. L/ files. IX 64 Approved For Release 2004/09SECARP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 developments", Lnd nonce it had urged that ',;1.40 currentte11iPeJ2ce work be tv,arvised by the niAli catj Cffiee. rimae t;uVria Vit43 s:_milarofIn some catails and divergent in others, w?re eretliseo further b oneral cmith, at his first several meetT.n,;$ the 1AZ boatman Jetelber and ,ccaLcr outlincd no theoretical, 7ritterminad anbject-metter boundaries thin vic.iintional estimates must be Confined, but Stress instead the pracAcal Importance of seeking teceeke intelligence apraisals on the ds.--to-day foreign protases, wfiatever they might be, that were fe b ,he :)oliey-planning officials of the lovernment. !Atlanta estimates, ho said, "should endeavor to answer specific .uestions related to ?olioy determination rather than be 3enarraliss country studiee 2 . recognised, boomer, that sole of these problems night, 3 indeed, be "specific or colloral? regional or functional, and that 4 in 4iny CPS6 the estimates at be "timely'. The policy officers, he ad(Jed, ":-)ust hrv6 the intelligent)* they need when tr:e:i are faced with their decisiohe rather th:n after the decisidm are taker'. he emphasized that the ohd.-product of the estimating process should imitate of ,AC meetings, )ot. 20* 26, Nov. 30, ,ec. kl, 1950, 4. Y." !..1.0 2, nnd 11, in 0ttA4/7., and HS files. 2 A.nutes for soy. 30, 1950, cited above. 3 Ibid. 4 'Iinutes for conference, _vo. 5 Anutos for Nov. 30, 1950, cited above. loc. 21, 1950. ci 1E, 1950, 4, above; and Iinutea of ;Y:::Tfa staff in otizIAR. IX 65 Approved For Release 2004/0SE3CRIRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foil pease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006510200170001-2 be a brief, undom4ient,,td dvi_atin, confined to the cur in fald to "a summ- thk, 6;.:Cact.iona drnwn fro tie dtri the :1 ti* hie pralmatio view a. nntioriA. estimates, AnersI early ale? su?4est ;hat qAts circle of customer aenoies, wuch unfer 1-15 -redeceroor had custo:.iarlly included both -the /10 tat dartmental policy offices, would not be narrowtd W tn;i one tchelon of ie vernment. Por example, the very first estimAte that was launched z.fter nia41vAls early in october 10 waz for the _residentls personal use at tA forthoe*iru ke A51Ind conference with ,ers1 ac:rthur, ;-.nd dealt with the crean :vat tte prospects .;A?nese munist intervention. 2Several other estimtes were scheduled, sIx,ost immediately, at the requ t of the teff, on. 3 - problems rtl.ting to --ran, Treece, and Turkey. 7o11owin4,; them, emral -t4ith next solloiteci clitimatin4 problems from the departmEntal polioy offices, ttLrout:h the cv.partmental intelliF,:encs chiefs sitting on the 11,; t)wir needs, which included both ndw itee an well others already under way for son* ti m* in seem to have actually outnumber:d LTione requaated by the U:)C, in Git'a initial survey of 1 - ? 2 ,ec .istorioal Staff atuoy, "Study of CiA aeportind on -,hinsaa ,;-ommuniat :ntervention in the Korean War", 6eptember?December 1950", Oct. 3 linutea of IA(' meeting, cet. 26, 1950, Ii.s.2, 0/7Va in 25 Approved For Release 2004/09/1iQ.f64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foe lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 quirements for estimn es colpleted on Gctober 26, 1950. One 1.Rjor -)rocedural departure by eneral in the continuip task of plg,nnin ectim tee rnd ,:retoTnining priorities on them, was to Rive n '7.renter vele* to the InteM,Jenct. ;,dvisory Comaittee over the ralthorizetion of new c,rjectv undertaken byJ. Initially, on ':'.ctobr,,r 26, entrvl iiiilivited the t(7; members to solicit the needu or their respective Ltedartitts c rett,Intes end he indicated thn tnrt if there wns * prlorit, conflict betw en the departments end the he 41msel4' would bc the final erbiter.2 :11 e subsequont meetin, 14oWaver, he began the practce of subjecting the entire it of projects tc 1C review ,nne approve', end thereafter he re:u1r1,y tobnitted ail new proposals to 17,0 mathorizntion, item by ite71. In :rretice? durirw the next to :ears, very few of the many requests for evtites were rejected either b the I or the ITice of hatiorl. 'ArtINates lint in no case recorded in the Ainutes did the actually ov4i,!ru1e e prior TiC decision or reeollendation to accept, reject, or t.e.for 8 ;1ven requested project.3 .1.1 the cher hGnd, in a few caves tlfw -!Y7, did change relative prioritie84, tne there may. have 1 'lib 2 Ibid. 3 :)eii inuteas Nov. 1950 - Jan. 1953, Palleims in 0/1k:Il? In or cnnes u;lield by the I's f1N7 rejected n request frwl the Joint intellience 'ortreittee for an estimate on the effects of a possible "Poly .4'1." in the -idle ist, an being "lnrgely kpotheticaln. (:;:3 minutes, ftu,:. 23, 1951, in OPCItUt.) 14 6eo "Istoricel .Aecord of National Latinate'.?rojeete Undertaken..., Annex 7.c belaWe Ix 67 $ET Approved For Release 2004/09/ :) -rwP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065 been other cases, not 0200170001-2 wiled in t es, where tie mere prospect of I C review and consensus elht ave s4 an indirect Influence an #4t acneduling of a given request. The initial schedule of estimates assembled uner these new policies wa rdled by the Oiti iecia1 tart and approved by the on October 26, 1950, some two weeks before the Office of 3stione 7etiNates wear established. It listed *levee ropoeed estimetes, divided abcAt evenly between USQ requests, artments1 requests and,:df-sinitisted projects. Om November 1 and 15, the liat was expanded twice, first by UF. and then by OC, respectively, to a total of some twenty projects.2 &soh of thee* early priority lists was essentially generalized a/Country-by-country breakdown of critical areas in iurope, the Addle esti and sia, headed by two continuing priority projects on the soviet Union, including one on its ,strengths and weaknesses" and the other on its "intentions to resort to general war". in future revisions, however, beFinning in January 1951 erx occurring annually thereafter, projects on more specific problems were added. :/iome of thee were comprohenai e multi-national appraisals actually broader than so-celled ;:eneral country studies on a particular notion, while others were addreesed to particular politLcal? military, economic, or scientific factors in s given foreign situation. 1 Listed i minute* for Oct. 26, 1950, cited above. 2 - IAC-1-1, Nov* 1, 1950, Nov. 15, 1950, in files. in Ota/gR files; and I 68 Approved For Release 2004/09/1S /kt - 64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Forelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 It was quickly evident, late in 1950? that no list of Pretorrdned projects could antiaipste all policy problerm on which intelligence appraisals sight be useful. During ?NE's first six week (that is, by the end of Deceeber 1950) no less than eight additional studies were requested of CIL, chiefly by the WC and the tate Department, on subjects as diverse as the followings On the Korean Wars a third review of the probabilities of Chinese Communist intorveftion was requested (NIS 2/1), together with one on the conse- quences cf Chinese nationalist participation (NIE-12), one on soviet participation in the air defense of Manchuria (NIB 2/2), and (after Chinese intervention had actually occurred), one on the international implications of maintaining a beachhead in South Korea NIE-16). Others dealt with the 3oviet Union, and all were on specific gees rather than on her intentions to launch general wars" One dealt with her intentions to 'exploit the current situation (NlEe15); another with her reactions if remilitariaation of West Germany were undertaken (NV-17); and still another with her plans to use bacterio- logical and chemical warfare ,a1 the U. S. if attacked (NIEe18). From the beginning OKA as faced with the need of accommodating both a continuing, scheduled program of estimates and a program of ad hoc requests, some of them with comfortable deadlines hut others needed on a crash priority basis, By 1951 ONE was dividing its 1 In March 1951, ONE established five relative degrees of priority for handling estimates: crash, urgent, high, routine, and deferred. See IAC progress report, March 21, 1951, IAC-PR-9, in ONE files. 11 69 Approved For Release 2004/09/1EQW64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foil please 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 mnnpower resourcet ebout equally between toeee perellel pproachee, end this ratio cont!nued into 1953,1 emergence of tees? parallel programs of estimates ale? was reflected somewhat in the changing format of ,IiFte end product--the rInished estimete itself. Initially, on November 1, 1e0, some two weeke Wort) 0e7 formally replaced the Office of eports and 'stimates vs the eney's estimating group, n single series of "National Intellie,enoe -Atimates" (NIFfs) had been launched, in which (it was planned) ell of C/A's estimates would be numbered serially in one sequence end disseminated broadly; and with this new aeries, the several labels previously used by CO-Ve,, includin-, the numerical "Oe%Is" ond the "3eectia1 74timates" series, were disountinutd. In January 1951, after about two montha of experimentation with the i format, a second series, celled qatimatee" (ele)pwas establiahed by nNF, patterned soeewhat after the old SF series of 0;i. The new e'n: format, elthimv,h its purpose was not offioially desoribed?2 was evidently expected to accommolate those eetimates which were outside the rapier echeduled program of eatimatea, especially those that might be disseminated to a limited clientele or deal with subjects or restricted than those in the general estimates. ',uring the next two ew,rs about 35 such'Igoe were produced and disseminated, 1 Ike minutes, Jan. 15, 1953, IAC-Me944 2_, The new series was first mentioned, in the IA6 minutea for Jen. la, 1951; see I IX 70 L'cx/e. but without explanation, Ae-e..15, in 0/OCl/Zi. E.-(7rr! Approved For Release 2004/09/ ti . CI :R-P64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Follease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006511000200170001-2 as compared to ibout 70 1I '3in ti resin series. theme two principal products, a third, called "Special In (SIE' s) 4timateen/was otarted later in 1951, as a Me8213 of ieseaLnating estimetes that were based coa specially snsitive atvris1s list regoired special handling. 1* 53]., about 135 estimates were issued n to in the three series, during the entire period November l950 .F bruary 1953. fr.= these formal estimates, each one normally prepared with artmental cooperation and coordinated in the LAO before dissemination, nurous informal uncoordinated estimates were also prepared and released to customer agencies by the Office of Notional timatas rrom time to time during this period. For example advance drafte of fornal estimates were ciroulated informally by ATE, in advance of formal IAC coordination, frequently to the HSC tar, and occasionally to the State, Defense, and other policy orAc * as well, 1 , "Ristorical cord of National Fstimates Project, Undertaken..., tober 1950-February 19," Annex K below. 2 The leries was first mentioned on March 21, 1551; see TT progress report IAC-?R-e, in ONE files. 3 Mpartnentel participation is discussed below, in section on 107mpartmental end CIA Contributors...,m Pp. 94-118. 4 imilarly, .3i1S had on occasion sent advance, uncoordinated draft* of Z3 imates to the NSC Staff (for example, one on the'ittliPPines in June 1950) and to the State Dept. (one on Indo-China, in August 1950). e 0% case file* on projects QPF 56-50 and ''7F, 50-50, in VTritis custody. 5 Included, for example, was an aivance draft of g sent to the National urity eaorces *6-card in Am. 1950 see progress report IAG.PR in AV,files. IX 71 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : Cl W.00654A000200170001-2 1 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065 0200170001-2 in order to meet a part tcularly urgent demand on which an intelligens' opinion WA/ oeeded. In addition, informal memoranda were prepared as intelligence comments on specific MC planning documents referred to the )Lector by the NY: or the ga: 'ULM. Finally,intelli;ence appraisals were written in the norm of Yemorande for the 71rector, some by roar d of National 1utesand others by its '7!stirlates taff. eeently those Intelligence memoranda were prepared in advance of any frm1.reeaest for an opinion, and they were intended to serve ear! y or purposes, such as oral briefings rade by the 7irector t. ts MSC, informal disseeinatiomsby him to artic.i1ar policy agencies of the %TIM nts or alerts circulated as preliminary CIA did not co esti thee. informal dtsa.minattons from the IAC members, regularly noting them in the IAC meetings, and carefully stating in each case that ths draft was only a preliminary, uncoordinated draft by CIA, and. .4, so represented to the ..enior 1431 !7Aaff zwp-r other custoesr agency involved]." (1:40, for example, menorandur by 0144 to IAC working-level :representatives, Jan. 11, 1951, in 'At files.) Mot until June 1.952 were any ittpart- mental objections to this informal practice raised in the IAC meetings. On June 5, 1952, the Stale member ()r. Arestrong) warned that advance drafts sent to policy officers might so "impress" them that the "final approved version might not be read, and earlier impressions changed," and he cited the berlin estimate (E..10) as a ease till point. This practice, furthermore, might also "freeze" the views of the Adi:card,ne cautioned. (.neral 6mith defended the practite by emplaining that he had been "listurbed" that the 142C'enter Avail', lacking a finished estimate, "had on occasion written its own intelligence into policy olpers." The I4C agreed that estimates, in order to be *more meta," muat he "available earlier in the pre-mlration of s policy paper." (IAC minutes, Jun* 5$ 1952, in ut.ti/ER.) 2n August 1951 the DCI ordered that copies of 111.0NE "Intelli- gence memoranda," after approval by himself, be sant in the future to General 4senhower in JOPE; awd in January 1952,. to the Navel. Aicia to rosident Truman. e41 ON memorandum to A. 7 1951, 1 ohrono files; and 0D/1 memorandum tic 1 Jan. 30 1952, in 0/7CibA, filed ander "ONL." Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIAWL11 :4A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 ilyeotheses and speculations to the several departmental intelligence agencies on problms that regmare furthers eoecerted aealyste. These several ty2es of tnformal memorenda actually outnumbered the formal estimetts, during the two years ending January 1953, althou4h in total .,)acet length, and in t.h manpower resources involved In them, they were outwei;ted hy the lenteier, formal estimates that were produced by ,A . The AltiQnel -ecurity knincille Staff, or the eenior etaff as it was leter celled, remained the principal customer from which request's for estimates were reeeived, in 1951 and 1952. 'en the other hand, requests from the several departmental polio), offices, ween ce.ibinee, actually exceeded e::;.; requests, and a subetential number of etjjntai (stout 1/3 of the total) remained to be initiated by C, A? a salvia 100 estimates whose origins can be verified from the records,2 the largest number (2e) stemmed from requests from the teff. The :Itat e be'partment accounted for come 19 other evtimateo, while the :Msfense ,epartment called for 18, with the latterts requests divided aim; the trmy (6), the Navy (2), the tir 'circe (3), the Joint ::hiefs of staff (4), the Office of ekoretary 1 , opies of these memoranda, variously entitled DCI Aemoranda, Aaff eemoranda, and Doare of iational Estimates lemoranda, are in )N 'a files. 2 :,eis "lstorical Acord of National stimates =2.ojects Undertaken ? ? ? " cited above. About no of the 135 estimates are Identified by requester. LX 73 Approved For Release 2004/09SE P64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 13803S of f,na. (2), nnd the luaajdons Board (1). No raquets at a21 were recorded for the other two ? resented on the IA (the rtder 1 bureau of Irnrestigatieet'and the !tomic nsrgy Compassion), but there were requests from two agencies outside the IAG complex, one from the Natlanal ilcurity Resources Board and the other from the Joint gressional commktiim on Atomic 7n0rgy. The rest of the estimmtes? 34 in all (or abdut of the total of 100) wore initiated V.), ':114; 4 at the reluest of the irector; 3 at the request of the claneestine operations group; and the remaining 27 on the initiative of the Office of Rational Obtimatee. In any case, the 1 The request from this Congressional Convaittee, in January 1951 (see NI E--30, ibid.), was for Weetinate on certain Soviet defenses against atomfratack, and was ultimately cancelled, not because of or CIA objections but betas's, it was to be based partly on certain U. ? operational planning information which the Secretary of Defense declihsd to reveal to the Congress. The Congress figured in lit least one other estimats. during this periods NI7-7, on Yugoslavia (ibid.). In this case the State Dept. had "urgently' requested the ea:nate, in ';:ovember 1950, for use "in connection with its request before '_2.4crigress for Yugoslavia aid. The IAC concluded th4 it was "a proper intelligence function", in this case, to tell the rsvernmentis policy officers that "the current situation may provide opportunities for creating a eituation more favorably disposed toward the *extern 'friwers and leading to a weakening of Tite-sq (See LAC minutes, Nov. 11, 16, 1950, IAC.01-5,-6, In o/pciPa.) Ltustoricai ecord of National itinates vojects Undertaken . . . 1" cited earlier. -X 74 Approved Faelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006.000200170001-2 25X1 C Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 tints' d estimates were r.dar1y 1.1tr * d to sone 20 policy offices and ?Motels, as well as to the participating lotelligence agenciee.1 The e coverage of the 135 or more formal estimates produced by truary 1953 proved to.b? as diverse as JUts Initial program in 91, fall of 1950.8 Pirst of all the oviet Union contjnue r 1?Alioste DE's work, to the extent of SOMO 5 e$tieat4e. A few of ,Jhom were addreseed to t,Joviet caimbilities and tht4tntions, generally in relation to a "generel war," While mot of them d?alt ett its cont, 1 over .ommunist countries elsewhere, ond with ita specific V'weats, rammer., and motives ward the Ineogimitted countries toward the lest generally. stimstes were also made, however, on Tany of the countries outside the ov1,.et Bloc, including 'os tern natioes. an, Middle Xaw.ern African, .Asian, ndtin American sin, the astleatts dealt variously 4th capabilities, The dissemination schedule for Nt's Pellowed byOCT)as of April 1951 included, besides the LC agencies, the rollowing policy en! opera- tional officials end ageneieso President Truman; his security-affairs assietant, larrinan; the feecutive Secretary of the IPT, the Coordinator of the L te?, and the NBC Staff itself; the Aperetery of rLate and 1-As Policy PIenaing :taff; the recretary of 'etense and UtIO three departeental tervice secretaries; he Chairman an the ecre- tar*" 0: thp Joint itefs of 3taff, together with their JEAnt ftrategic Aims croup an,!. their Joint .;absidiary Plans Avision; the hunitions 3?5rra; the encarch und :;evelopment Eoard; the National Aur ,olluge; the Armed 4orces :teff follege; he Netionel fterity ittsources Board; the Atonic "Eof.rey "-)eeteston; end the c,ffice rf ',efense mobilization. (See OC memorandur to B. Urkpatrick, CtCI? April 17, 1951, in ,I7f:ItF', filed under "Ala;.") Senior iplometic officers and military commanders in the Far T;est and Europe, as well as General isennower in were also ounerarily sent eetiwstcs,through th headrters n ton. 2 Ibid. Ix 0 cp_r_= Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : ClI1)11.1119640.01D654A000200170001-2 25X 25X1 25X1C Approved Fo lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065 00200170001-2 weaknesses, and reactions toward intersal and external pressures, inc].udtn oviet pressures sod proposed ebonies in U. C. policy. 25X1C The United St.t.i itself also figured directly or indirectly la each estimates at least to the extent that every estimate, since it ms ultimately addressed (directly or indirectly) to an intelligence appreciation or an existing or changing U. S. policy, required the estimators to hove at hand (or to guess at) pertain assumptions regarding U. . capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions in a given developing foreign situation. Only rarely, however, was AE able to attempt an estimate that, frankly went beyond a rine estimate of * forei7n country in the direction of a "net" estimate of its capabilities specifically in relation to U. S. ceunter-cepabilities. 2 This problem ii discussed later in this chapter, ing in teletion to Operational Planning"; see pp. 161.182 below. IX 76 Approved For Release 2004/09/1S:FSARRDT64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1 25X1 25X1C .X1 Approved For Release 2004/0-9031:"RIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 J t) ahEtever t'e :Ireee severe all of the eatl-,:t6s were, of ookroo, intended to be e:74Kntially SiireeulaLive or:preel ctivt tl-out the fitUrs, rather than desor1)2tive or hiatorisal *et the present 4-41d past, and therefore all of tram contained sowiemeesnre of :aroma:Una on s pt.rtLoutar development or carried a warnim!, express or implied about the futAre. tn13- rarely, in sontraet, was a coapleted estim4.!te tnentitily P doscriAive survey, as in the case of 0 Venezuelan cstilate OPY;..67) in 1952.1 :onv of tam estimates, neverthelees, were not cid:, -xedictive tut alsc listerieeli in the pense tat they incvitatl, LIKWASC*C past trends an one bei5 for perceivin,; trends into the future. The drojected time span, tu,rthernore, aried from one estimate to another, row tooka wry lonrmage View into the future, SUCh PS the 106-year foreesst of ;?-oviet intentions (NIZ-78). 1 , ..11U told the i, en July 23, 1952 (memorandum in "chrono files") that the Venesuelan estimate, rottaosted by State, contained more "descriptive (as distinguished from estimative) matter than is usual or generally desirable in WIC'V The "estimate turned out to be nettive--no radical change in the situation is expected?leaving the paper little function save to describe the situation" (ibid.). arlier, in ?ecembor 1950, clIE bad rejected a draft of an =estimate on the ler '!ast CMF 10-50), seying that while it wee "en excellent and comprehensive survey of developments in the Tar :ast," it "does not meet the requirements of as N.F as presently defined." (0,0, memorandum to G :ec. 6, 1950,1 lin cur "chrono files".) A.miLirly-, in rooei)ting the task of revising the estimate on .Soviet intentions, previerasly handled by the J, WF's head had commented thct the ub eetimate "is more related to Notional IntelltiTnce ,I=urvey mktorial" ond that suck "survey" aspects Should be handled elsewhere than in LV: (IAC minutes, den. 18, 1951, ;AC-K-160 in )/ files). While there was no obvious "competition" between N74-es nnd tli5.1s, there was some priority conflict between them, in some of the depertlents, which suggests that some of the some research analysts worked on both types of reports. (es IAC minmtes, Aug. 16, 1951, in ViCl/TR.) .j 77 Approved FloPRelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006111000200170001-2 25 25 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006W00200170001-2 any others w,r( of n intermediate range, each k tat?imete or the Sovitt war ,otentiol r .he swat four yeere ! or P prtlettlar foreign situatioe zonerallover the next ?'e r two -lh, an others). :,till others dealt with tretis. end crimes likely aise ri the immediate wecAcs and month', ahecO, :ndeed, ths vt,ry t;t1ts of some estimat sooll es '%-:oviet intentions the 71,Irreot f'ituvt';.ue" (N7--11) end ilurrent ::evclopmeots in irce y;:r. . sisested T.,t it was not ,,7.-1ways practIcable to tehere to 8 pre-detri-lined, theol-etical beundary between speculative estimates alG7A fttore arc zurrent-iintelliience evaluations f he leneditt, eitoati_on. ..leme of 0117.'5 intorno1 estimates, lo particular, ;neolvo jurisdictional issues and problems of coordinetion with the ::ffice of -urrent Tnte11ienoe.1- anw of the 135 estimates produced dealt compnAlensively Witt] the whole rrn., of political, militar,y, evono4;c? scientific,, -tt: other factors in a given pow 2er siteetion. Yet the very editorial arrngelent of many net estimates, subelvided er they wert into t6pica1 dararapha comsonding to such fa4;tore, suggeotee certain practical departure fro the theory of so-called -"interoted" estimetes, and a ciegree of sereation of those rectors 1 . -hapter VIII woove, on Office of curreut especially 1)2. 37-43. T.eceber 1952, foC1.0UF, relations were calliW "an 9r-larl truce", 4, lanning Book. ,ee - istorical 'ecoro of national -stimetes rojects token . . . ," ;rnex K. Approved For Release 2004/094GRUP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X6 Approved Forfease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006541"200170001-2 for which the seyrr amtroggieg departments aidageriea each bad primary jurisdiction. Other eetimates, furthermore, were individually confined to particular functional or topical factors In many cases.' Among such examples were SovIet military and civil-defense capabilities against atomic attack (NI -30, HM40, the peycholo('ical impact of an air offerLve Against the USSR (NIE-39, SE-45), the importance of Middle East oil IP -14) the threat of Soviet economic imperialism (NIE-40, NIF-56)?2 the possibilities of economic warfare (NIE-22), the East-ideet trade problem (MIE-59), specific political maneuvers by the Soviet Union, the parlianentary elections in Italy ?.oviet ological and chemical warfare plans (IE-18), Soviet clandestine-warfare capabilities (HIE-31), and Soviet electro-magnetic warfare capabilities. While coordinated 'Ibid. Initially, ONE had avoided what it regarded as strictly political estimates which, it Pelt, the Stat?e Department would wish to reserve for itself. This, for example* the new AD of ONE, Mr. Langer, in cancelling one of CRE's pending ORE projects (one on, Argentina, CRE 30-50), on Dec. 12, 1950, commented that, while the draft was "entirely satisfactory," he wanted to avoid challenging the State Department. He wrote: "In view of the present policy of leaving the field of political reporting to the State Department, and in view of the close working relations that have been developed with the Depart- ment, it would seem that any gain from the publication of the attached study would outweigh the disadvantages of creating an issue of prin- ciple at this time." His views were concurred in by the MCI, Mr. Jackson, on Dec. 15. (Correspondence in ORE ease folder on CRE 30-501 in 0/DCl/HS files.) It is notable, as an indication of a changing climte among the intelligence agencies, that acme 15 months later the State Department itself requested an eatinate on Argentina, on subject matter that was heavily political. (See IAC progress report IAC-FR-23, April 21, 1952, in ONE files.) 28oth of these projects were eventually ca favor of the Pconoale Intelligence Committee. IX 79 presumably in Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 25X6 Approved For *ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 eeonosio and scientific intelligence animates wet* repared greater numbers t;i .);U( and OSI, thrinigit interdepartmental.Teenomic and Scientific Intelligens* Censitteders ISectivell? a substantial num of topical estimates in this. fields were issued ss Niels and ao Ath respect to most of these sad *thr spec fically topical estimates, each of them was theoretisally within the primary cognisance of one or the contributing agencies (outside CIA or in Oi, and OSI), but there sems to have beam a notable absence of Jurisdictional controversy on the part of ths departmental intelligence agencies affected, 4kr411.7, in fact, were any of these specific non-integrated projects challenged as inappropriate for a G1A-sponsored estimate, at least as far as the deliberations in the IAC meetings mere coneerned.2 Mille there was sans doctrinal contention on the length of estimates, on their timeliness, and on the jurisdiction between an intelligence estimate and an operational plan (described later, below), there was 1 These RJC and sic projects were actually list (in the IAC progress reports) as "estimates" rather than as reports. (See july 15, 1952, anc later issues in ONE: files.) in one case, involving an estimate on India (4IR-23), General Smith questioned whether it was proper to include a warning of poseible -"losses in terms of strategic raw materials" but the IAC expressed "general azreement" thet to make such economic predictions "was a proper mission of intelligence (IAC minutes, Aug-. 30, 1951, in 0/PWF) In another case, CIA rejected a request from the JGS for a "psychological warfare intelligence estimate," and referred the requester to the State 'irAtpt. (Letter by H. Jackson to Secretary, Joint Intelligence lroup, Jan. 29 1951, in 0/1Cl/F!R, filed under "Stets Dept.") 1.1 80 QL.rr r11:7 ../1? Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 no persistent debate on the proprietylofClAbsponsoring an essentially military, political, economic, or Oeielatific awreinal when one mks requested by one of the policy amnion. In summary, the estimates ree'ested of IA by the poli a7,encies between October 1950 and February 19 revealed a diversity of subject matter, a widening circle of cu tomer. and a flexibility of product handled by t's several series of formal coordinated estimates and informal intelligence memoranda. All of these factor, help to explain the development of 0/Als ability to meet the changing needs of the 11&; and the departmental:policy **Alone. The progress during this period was summarised by eneral Smith on two ?cogitates, one near the beAnning end the other near the end of his administration. In lAwillisber 1950 he told a staff conference that " olicy aakszs in the other departments are turning more and more to CIA for advice and assistance, and . . the Agency is receiving greater responsibility all the time. The Agency has not really missed any timely estimates, with one possible exception . . . ." In a similar vein, two years later, General 'Smith praised CIA's progress in meeting the policy needs especially of the NOC. de regretted that "the demand for estimate' exceeds our ability lt Ainutes of Xi's staff in OPArft. et ? 181 1950, 'C..4...12 2 Aemarks at the ten )rientation reproduced in OV Training Bulletin No in Z/ ecords Center. IX el ference? Nov. 2 Feb. 11, 1953, Approved For Release 2004/09/SEGRUP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For arse 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654e0200170001-2 to supply thea ,tbut he expressed the SOurance that estimates "haYs beoome, or at they should become, wh A in mtlitary parlanos ie callf,d the 2 rnnes On which operetienal plans are haset'a tilorm and more," he added, they are *being usee in that w." The coltinuing ,)robles.the found, was that are 1c,i,ing a little difriculty getting estimates in in a timely way so that the staff *Metre who do the work for the 6ecurity ;ouncil will have them well in edvsnce of their own Job, which is the preparation of draft policy papers. 2n some cases, we have been a little behind the policy papers, but more and more we are keeping up to date and t little bit ahead of the parede."1 Throughout this period it is evident that TA 'a position as the 3overnmentts central estimating authority was certainly strengthened, and that the prestige of its estimates was enhanced by closer contact with the policy users and by improved inter- departmental exchange and consultative arrangements with the intalligence contributors. Om the other hand, CIA did not achieve exclusive jurisdiction over the:prodaction of ell estimates needed by the policy officials. The departmental intelligence agencies, including State's Office of Atteiligence Research and the Arey, Navy, and lir Force intelligence agencies in the Defense Lepartment, each continued to produce estimates far intro-departmental consumption, including reports intended for their departmental members on the tiSi; and the VS-:; Senior Staff. Se also did the Joint Intelligence Committee, Ibid. ii 82 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 under the Jo except thl.; periodiL; teU QViGt on)* in .4L;er /iiu4y, 4hen fa of ,iteff,. cor4tinue produce eppreieele, -;i.i.elded to GlA the jurisdiotl at not by the 1AL; but by the Interdepartmental int ioace Conference ki?I and the Interdepartmental 1:ommittec ternal .ecurity .) hes, 1410 SLISLO, nd intentions, to4inning tic socurit; policies were jurisdiction oloL4* inteliigence estimates was noreally taken -- the Federal bureau of .nvestIldtion. combined ennrto o 11 those intolligence zroups represented a comprehensive, significant, and ,;rowing body of intellience opinion and advice, available continuously and on demand to the policy echelons of the iAreernasent. 4bile thQre was ;:eneral iweement that the eetimates were useful and germane to policy formulation, it is not as clear, from the historical records available, whether (end haw) the estimates were actually us bY the policy efficers. One critic, who had access to the views and records of the policy itchelona themselves during this period, questioned wnatner intelligence estimates were a major inaredient in policy formulation.2 je segdasted that the policy officers were .Aos pro?ress report, iov. 2, 1950, IuRl, ?1,42. files. 2 4oger 611sman, Strati c Intelligence and Ustional i.moisions (Free 'ress, l956)1 based in pert on interviewis apparently daring the period 1950-52, with various U. S. intellilence and policy officials. 83 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654100200170001-2 Qharacteristicelly thfiuUr1Cid, instead, by a aaeophorvi of wAtJeting 1:-.1.418 on forei4n developments supplied by * varict,i iLteLL cnce sources, US ,Orienil friends,-,obt,ixt.4. rerty boasts, warc heelers, aenotorb? congressmen, cabinet :4(;ritars, UniOn loaders, new,pecrmen, and even pollsters and social psycholojets.J No such 161014i) 4 i,;eneralizatien san be sup: orted b ttt vidence used 1.1 t,he present stucry, ,xcept for isolated cthes tly the public cf.;ntroveray in 19!;1 which revealed mixed reactions by various policy oVficials to the int.el:igence estimates on Uhinese ,;ommunist intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950,2 no conclusive evidence has been found of Any general indifference to intelligence estimates on the pert of the policy echelons of the .io'versimont. 6eneral Smith, for his part, seemed convinced, both at the becimning and the end of his administration, that CU.-produced estimates were, in fact becoming increasingly influential, is own membership in the ti6C,3 toether with the assignment of key 01 officers to work directl.y with the 1 Ibid., p. 146. For varying, publicly expressed reactions to intelligence eetimates by the resident, cabinet members, and the Far -iast co:- sander (General MacArthur), see Historical Staff study, "Study of CIA fieporting on ;Alinese C;ommuniat intervention in the Korean War, Sectember-Tccemtmr 1950", Oct. 1955s especially exhibit S. 3 Ural briefings were made by the Iiirector at NSC meetings early in his administration, and the practioe continued during his next two years. (See 140 unnumbered minutes, Dec. 11, 1950, and later, in GijOI/7, files.) SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDF'64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For erase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 cellar - tar, 1 probably t;eve CIA a tiex, direct 'mice in tile policy c. 1 f the ',,:overnmaail, to i t objaatively i.irodueed intzd r istaa vere-ierter ir clos rezsed to the :;eeLa of t.ose who were resonsi rptIonis foreip policies and operttional for the conduct of the 2 drama. 1 - ,rt Tether 1950, the ax.)aated to personallyep Jj informed, primariL- through hie attendanoe at tiSC meetings, of "action taxon cr contemplated by the tr.IC". (See minutes of .iY;.1 staff conference, :00. 18, 195o, in obt1/4?..) Later, in April 1.1, he directed the i; of Oti:; (1r. Langer) to attend regular Li-weekly meetings of the CCfotaff. Ar. Langer apparently objected to attending pareonPily, with "ny time veri Daly taken up" (see his !Reno to the X1, pril 11/29, 1951, Obit;IP,:;:); and later VII! liaison task was assigned to specific staff members. In 1952, this task was re-aselimed to staff assistants of the 2 Ail, V... participated increasingly in 13SC St.aff committee meetina, only rarely did the policy of r'icers (converse:1,y) par- ticipate in (lard meetings, when the crucial matter of "terms of reference" was decided on a given request. There were exceptions, coursoi in 'pe-1. 1951, for examples the Board at for that purpose with re,,resentatives of ::tatets 'tolicy lenning iir.t.tff. (3es 1, pro,7ress re;.:?ort pen 10, 1561, 0:4 files.) IX 85 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For 'Vase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.010200170001-2 Changing goods for upporttM umentation ONE continued the practice, followed by ORE in previous or providing the user of the finished estimate not only with the actual *sttmaAve conclusions themselves, in e peee or two of text at the front of the report but also with an accompanying "diecussion* section, and sor,etimes with an INIVendi2 in addi- tion, in which the evidence bearing on the conclusions was summarised and evalueted, briefly or in more extended detail. Although Otitis prectiee seemed to represent no essential change from preceding years, it was subjected to critical review from time to tine. Various issues were raised on occasion: hew detailed an estimate should be; whether supporting documentation of any kind was needed at all by the polity officials to when the estimative conclusions were addressed; and whether it was appropriate to revvel, outside the intelligence organisation, the nature, extent, and reliability- of the factual evidence on which the sneculative conclusions were built. In November 1950 nesters' Smith had aired the case for a bare minimum of factual detail, at ems of his first meetings with the /AC, apparently on behalf of Or. Langer. In order for national estimates to meet the requirements of the policy makers," neneral Smith pro- posed that the finished report "would have to be brief, that the gusset attached thereto should be a summary of the deductions 1 Hinutes o ,I.kt,CIt mosetinT, Nov. 0, 1950, IAC-4-R 86 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIS-L ir EL44000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 drawn from the data suppo renders would ing the ? ads fi r144 thz,t all to understand that for an examination the to te, made to tho e voluminous detail, reference would ha a statemcnt of administrative principles these views prevailed, with the unanillous agreement of the departmental inte1lience chiefs 1 22semb1ed at that meeting.' in actual practice, in 1951 and 1952, however, it was apparently impossible to exclude supporting documentation completely from the finished report. it is donbtrUl, on the other hand, whether in practice the policy readers availed themselves with any regularity of the opportunity for n first-hand Nomination of that voluminous detail" from which the estimates were, written, in cases where they eight wish to challenge the conclusions submitted to them or pursue the underlying ramification* in detail. In any case, not A single transmAttal of any such mlterial to any of them has been found in leny outolng letters r this period. The "discusaion" section of the F thiahed estimate, in 1951-52 AS before, typically included not only several pages of what 1eneral th had called the argumentation, but also some summarisation, at least, describing and evaluating the intelligences documentation from which the opinions were drawn. In addition, a substantial number of estimates contained appendixes as well, in which further factual Ibid. 87 Approved For Release 2004/09/1SECCA464-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654 detail was presented. Muni- oecember 1950, appendixes appeardld in they wer included in eleven cf them. 0200170001-2 eeks, in November- amtinate 1s, and in 1951 The need for supPortirk documentation wee questioned and defended a number of times in 1951 and 1952, both within and outside iA.';ccasionally a final draft of an estimate was criticised by an IA ateaber sency as being simply "overly lengthy".3 In iarch 1952, for example, the Army intelligence chief urged that estimates in .eneral should be shorter.4 General Smith apparently continued to take a skeptical attitude toward supporting detail of any kind. On several occasions Smith was quoted as sayin4 that the opening conclusions" in an estimate were, after all* "the only part that the top policy maker, especially the resident, is likely to 5 fridently his sputy, William H. Jackson shared these views, at least in 'As first months in CIA, which seemed to conform to his own theories about national estimating, as expressed in the Lulics read. 1 WI-3 and 1117-7. 2 below, -18, N1::-21, N1L-27, 14E-19 NIF-411 and ,S-20. 'Jee ?or production record, 1950-53, in Annex K 3 ,,;() ent by-.;neral olfln, G-24 .?arch 27, 1952. See minutes of Ito meeting, larch 27, 1952, AC;.4.66 in 0/ -- 4 bid.. 5 Quoted by L:berman PPE, in his memorandum to the VP April 10, 15,52, commentizr on Lhe problem "Puthentication of Fad in ONE "chrono file". nt RR Approved For Release 2004/09/1UREL4-00654A000200170001-2 aft Approved For Oease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 Group report rnri 1 later steeements, in which he had dietthguiehed sharply between estimates, as statements of 9opinion",, And other intellieenc roducts as "factual" reports. 4 19e1, eowever, Jackson wes tesisting with respect to some of the estiletes which came to him for review, that they be more etronely supported "by facts ant: reasonine from facts .!12 As successor, Loftus e. ;'ocker, expressed the sense criticism after January 1952.3 In eril 1952, (-IC formally sought out the views of the National eecurity eouncil ::-enior Staff members, on their preferences for supportine detail. Pt a meeting with them on !-pril 10, which !Amman Kent regarded as "certainly the best consumer guidance we have received," he found tat that group of readers "would on occasion like more detail than is now supplied imilArl), on subsequent occasions in. 1952 and 1953, the WIC representatives asked aeain for ";:i fuller array of facts upon which the conclusions were ase .t The etete eepartment an the eeycholoeical etreteey leperd 1 'or era le, at mode the distinction (LS'iinutes, in U/ . 2 eomeent be -r. e41, Jan. 1952, in 3 Ibid. 4 esmorandue by of Facts", the meeting on October 20, 1950, Tfe. Jeckson between "estimates and simple reports of fact" ,cJiiis files). Jackson, recalled by et. Kent, in memorandum to eN.S. "chrano file". ee to ilie, April 10, 1952, "luthentication in ONE "chrono file". 5 eemorandum by to DC', Sept. 23 1953, filed under "ee". u 39 in eibeIte, Approved For Release 2004/09/13 tiT4-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 agreed. It seemed evident thet a discriminating and critical reader of an intelligence appraisal mold have the keenest interest in going behind the tightly seasured words of page or two of conclu- sions, not only to check for himself the logic that led to those conc1uions, but also to satisfy himeelf about the extent, authenticity, and reliabilityof the evidence on which the conclusions were based. In April 1952, apparently at the request of the new DIO ONE explored comprehensively the problea of impreving the supporting documentation, not only in the finished estimate bet also in the departmental and intra-CIA contributions on which it was expected to be based. In a staff study on *authentication of facts," Sherman Kent discussed the relative merits of several alternatives that might be employed) He mentioned, first, the time-honored academic practice, common to all fields of critical scholarship and not uncommon to current intelligence reporting and to aome other types of intelligence production, of footnoting the "dismission* section of an estimate with acequately evaluated references to the specific documentary evidence involved. He dismissed footnotes summarily, however, as being *presumably anathema* to the reader. Similarly he discarded the comparable practice of systematically swmiarizing the documentary references in the text by means of such typical documentary phrases as 'on the basis of P/W reports and "on the basis of agent reports. He questioned whether such docu- mentation "would add to the lodgment of a consumer not trained in IMemorandum by AD/it to D1)/I, April 10, 1952, in ONE "chrono file.* IX 90 CErkror7.7 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-R0R64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 intelligence," and he wondered also present problems of "bule end Other alternatives Kent const a practice would not nally, of security. more favorably, in eases where there as a demonstrated need for more documentation. The practice of oral "briefingscould be extended, he thought, except that more briefings mi ht take undue time for ONE staff members. A f!reater use of "tabs" or appendixes would also appeal to the consumers, be said. Next, he suggested a greater use of "graphic metods of nresentation."2 While all these alternatives were pri- marily methods of presenting facts and figures, rather than devices for revealing the reliability of the evidence presented, they were all used increasingly by ONE for extending and ieproving the supporting detail in the finished report. Appendixes, in particular, h sOMO regularity, but not without a formalre-examination of the problem by the IAC in Septetbar 1952. All the recipients of ONE material in 1952 had responded favorably to appendixes, so ONE reported, but 804fle of the producing agencies, especielly the military Intel- licence services, had raised Objections to supporting detail in general, and to certain kinds of appendixes in particular. While the military agencies no longer objected, so ONE had found to such appendixes as "mope, . . . tables of estimated military strengths, . . tables of military end items, or . . . rough inventories of 'Ibid. 2Ibid. cc-EF- Approved For Release 2004/2004/09/fl:cTit-RP6"5 A000200170001-2 Approved Folease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 the etrategie resources of another state," belich were R11 primarily within the rields of their special eolpetenoes those agencies had been "as n rule, . . . either lukewarm or definitely o:pefe:e to Tubs which were of gsnoral )olitiosl? nocial? or econ. On ,;ept Aber 14, 1952, 1410 PC took a fermal eosition 8?:81113t eependixes kal integral, coordinated :art of the finished estilutt, are left the problem to CIA as to whether a riven xi)i,endix rnight be issue alone with an est!mete merely as "background information."2 In the future so the ruled, if an appendix would be proposed, the :JP woiald determine, after consult-tion with the departmental intellieence eencies, whether it should' be issued as "beckground information." forawily rt-vi rurthermore, however, while the In would hot w the substance of an appendix, the appendixes "should be 'screened, by the tnt.eiiience7 seencies env env serious disez eement taken Into accourt," before it was circuletee with the estiw?te as unofficial background informetion.3 =letween ,e2tember 1952 end rebrugry 1953 the number of s'32endixes declined. Ally three thirster re,peared with them during thot ,:erioc.4 Those that survived did, however, carry the forma 1 *moranda by ,July-eg. 155 2 -inutes of IPC meeting, :ept. 4, 1952, 3 Ibid. 4 N1;-6L. (Part 1), and It-21/1;N below, ielnex K. in GI4F "chrono file". IX 92 in see AT production record Approved For Release 2004/09/SEGRUP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fol. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 concurrence of the pc, in spite of iegorical position it had taken in September 1952. The issuewas raised again the text year, when the 7rinO,ple )1! fnU.y eoerdinated appendixes was ace gain restored.1 Zn summary, the presence of adlennete supporting documentation, in mfFtctent r-levant detail and in readable and understandable form, seemed to be one of the factors contributing to increasing "customer acrentanee" end "consumer confidence in CIA's e3timates in 1951 se6 195% Among the intelligenee producers, documentation 10815 variously regarded either as a strictly editorial proAsm of form end preeentation or at a sabstantive problem affecting the very integrity of the final vveluation. in any case, supporting documentation Nees a production problem *hies, aside from formal administrative rulings, had to be re-appraised from time to time, and seemed to be inherent in the veil nature of orderly end respon- sible estimating. 'Memorandum by An/NE to DCI. Sept. 23 19, on "IAC ?nlicY on Approval of Appendixes be NTE's,"I lapproved by Ct,'ot. 1, 193; in 0/,"011 filed under "ONE." XX 93 Approved For Release 2004/098EMP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foie lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 Je.ert-et ?d A .7eaearci: ' rtietnen Estimates. Prodution i'erallel with the probleme of customer reletione, ?Aeezribed above, eeve ia-oblems of maintaining working .relationships with tic oeveral intelli4ence research an6 production agencies and offices, both aeon the departments ani within whieh had varying ;Titellieence resourcss. ead points of view te) eontribute in the conatrectloe of tile finiatied eutieate. The need for better departmental contributions and for fuller perticipation by the IV member cie ifl the estimaAng procesc had been commerily urged by of the several survey, that had Investigated CIA's estimates programa before (et-Ober 1950, even though tety had not agreed in all detaila. ee to what changes might bring about the uestfrod reSult. Furthermore, wit the internmi roorgsnisation of cu. and the emer- gence of Nur separate production offices by January 1951, tbere WS3 alsb e corresponding need, unforeseen by the several surveys of the old Wfice of eports and sitimatea? for redefining the relationship between the new Office of National Estimates and the research and analysis divisions in the Office of ;:.,Ientifie Intel- ligence, the Office of Researth and Reports, and the Office of current inteltieencei 7eteren Jetober 1950 and January 1951, after a period of experimentation first by. the Jffice of eports and 7.stimztes and then (after MoIeMber 13) by the new 0 ice of Hational 7,atimates, IX 94 Approved For Release 2004/09SECRJELP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 the procedure,: for intereageney perticipatien were revised, in the eireetion of eivine the partici,* ing agencies *ed. effices mere ArPc a71 tineine voice rt various steles of *Ae eetleAting eroces And At the ss?e time eking their peeticipe? more reeulorized an- responsible one. There was no broad reorganise? Mon of tee intellieence p eletion orgenleektion ontside7.T./1: Which remained eecentrmlieed easentielly in the -eite ane efense part ments. 4or w th-e env chimes in ehe esAential sten m of the eatieet reee,wich ineluded (as before) the foreelation of the terms of reference, the assignment and oroduetion of reeearch contrieltions, the drafting of the estimate and the review, revision, end final approval of the finished estimate. In all of these essential !stops, however, new procedures were attempted toward the atm of fuller and better participation by the depaete mantel ce agencies, and a widening circle of participattn to be afeoct and office /consulted during the research and deliberative stages. Ve nrocedir*i chances, il, not iranatic or revoletionary, were both definite and flexible. Thus, the terms of reference for peremptorily a eieen animate, ineteee of letting sent/to the contrlbetne aeencies were cAmou7;sed In advance with the r representetives thus proviiin7 unity for a consenT,la ii *itch the rese rch and evs1etivs cvaesttoos involved could be more olearly defined or understood end in which the assignment of research contributions Approved For Release 2004/09EMIP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fol. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 would be nore acceptbie. The pattern of contributing smoneies remained basically the sane as before 1950, but there wasa degree of flexibility with an occasional smeller circle of contributors (tr the subject matter was limited) or one that was wider (if more ramifying subject matter was involved). The drafting itself was asualAy reserved as a function for the Y.stimates taff itself, but again the procedure VAS flexible swims:7h to yield this task one or another departmental agency (particularly When the subject was in a department's primary juris- diction) or to an ad hoc committee of CIA and departmental repro- snntatives (on subjects that were more speculative than factual). Finally,the rview of the draft was divided into two step,: in the first instance, within Ct3, by ONFle Board and Festinates staff; and second,b rTA and the departments jointly, in the subsequent discussions. this second step corresponded to 19.7-,1s forrer practice of discussing a draft with IAC representatives, an addi- tional, third step was added, calling for a farther review and a final concurrence by the ,Jepartmentel intwIligence chiefs themselves, ansenbled in the full rAc committee. In not a single case, arong the 135-sone estimates punished between October 1950 and February 1953, was en estimate fermaltY disseminated until the IAC had had an oortunity to consider and concur in the final draft. The inter-departmental character that permeated much of the work of estimating followed e pattern of flexibility and refularity during V-is Mod October 195,) February 1953. Al seven departmental 96 acauApproved For Release 2004/09 . P64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foe lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 intelligence agencies were regularly relaresen 1.1ongwith in the Ii taut ;dylsory Committee, When nview of an istipv,te ls 5ain7 undertaken, bet only the four principal productinn anci a (those in the 7.tat., Army, Navy, Arvi Air rorco, renecttvel' nrc.tpated with any re,7011arity in the earlier reerch end eellberative stages of the estimative process. In thou eUer, sometimes time-consuming stages, the other three agencies (the 'trornic rnryCoiseion, the 'doral 'iureau of Investivtion nnd the Joint Intelligence Coemittee) participated only to a limited extent, chiefly in relation to specific problems. The Ai,:jC, for example, itself preoccupied with a separate series of sic-energy estimates (outside the OL program but nevertheless ultimately cleared through the :CAC), served chiefly (almv with he (ffice of ;: lentifie tntelligence) in advising on atomic- energy factors tint figured in a larger national. estimate. Similarly, the 'II, which also had its own estimating progrs in the field of domestic-security intelligence, participated In ONF's most part program for the/only when domestic mutters were involved.' Finally the JIL 1.0hich as an agency under the Joint Chiefs of ZUff was 1 The -113I objected to OWe standard credit line (In the NTE that "all" 110: members 'concurred in this estimate," comrAinting that it regarded itl responsibility to "coordinating foreign and domestic intelAgence an related matters." (Memorandum by to Trqr, JIly 29, 1952, in nNE mchrono files.") 97 Approved For Release 2004/09ggELP64-00654A000200170001-2 ApprovedForelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006.00200170001-2 itself an inter-departmental issilmatine group (tr military inteI1i- genes in particular), rarely submitted adlitaulf contributions to CIA's estimates program, and only rarely undertook to coordinate Army, Navy, and Air rce military information needed by -,7,1a, leaving that task either V) one of the three Service departments, or to NI itself. inetwpsd, JTI: 9 9 ,,.hief ftur tion in the CIA/Mit. ..tilatea program was to serve as an intermediary between the intelligence estimators in TA end the operational plasters in the JCS, in relation to problem f *net Wastes, discussed further later. The remaining four d .104rtmental intelligence agoncies mean- while participated not only In the final Vt meetings but also in series of regular meetings of department-appeinted working-level representatives (called IAG representatives). These meetings, typically,were scheduled by the ONE "Board of National ,istimatio, first to consider the terms of referenss and next to consider .he successive Irons of the estimate itself. The OM Board meetings with tho In representatives consisted usually of a single meeting on a given sot of terms of reference, but the meetings on the drafts averaged between two and three meetings per 'gamete, and occasionally the record indicated that several lone and protracted meetings" were involved on a draft that was particularly contro- versial or in which the speculative features outweighed the factual evidence that was available.2 See below, op. VII ff. 2 ;:ifitt distorical *OTd annex K, below, vaults), st rates I IX 98 Approved For Release 2004/09/1SE4F64-00654A000200170001-2 ta Under n? ? 25X1 C Approved For !Mese 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654#0200170001-2 c In addition, the departmental repreeentatives and their home agencies performed other functions, en occasion, which departed some- what from the typical procedure worked out in the fall of 1950. The State Department's intelligence agency, for example., occasiomeily mins asked to draft the terns efrelkcenee, as in the ease of Burma (NIE-36)) in April 1251. Similarly, the State Department also occasionally did the initial drafting of an estinate, as in the cane of the Soviet Union's current intentions, in Deventer 1950 (N1E-11), Soviet tactics In a proposed Council of Foreign Ministers, in January 1951 (MIE-28), Soviet vulnerability to economic warfare, in January 1951 (NTS-22), the San Francisco treaty conference, in August 1951 (SE-11), and the political situation in Panama in January 1952 (SE.41). Furthermore beginning early in 1951, OWE made special requester on the State Departnent for special background studies on porticular political problems, such as Mainland Chinese attitudes toward Chiang Kai-ehek (March 1951), French politics (March 1951), Indonesian and Thailand politics (June-September 1951), and farther political 1 studies on France and China (in February and Jane 1952). The three military departments, einilarly, occazionallypro- vided special services to the CIA eatimates program which went beyond their normal research contributions and their normal parti- cipation in ONE meetings to deliberate on the terms of reference and on the drafts. While most of the military contributions were llbid. u 99 5170 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : LAA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200170001-2 aeparately submitted to ,-41F- by the tdivt1l occasionally subjected to in'er IgOwice coo partaculur department ',hat bad the dominating prtnenta, they were tion, :anal Lbe tary subject ma'Arr of the estimate project. rhe ',rmy? for example was respons151e or Acoorj4 contributions on jootheast Asia (!4r.20, January 1951), Xorea (111L-32, February 1951), eW the tkropeal atellitee (NIL-33, April 1951). The Navy, similarly, ass,-r-blod a single 7cfcnee Nepar1Wmat'contribution on Llhe hincse Rationalists (HTE-27? March 1951). fo also did the Air rce, on a psr:hological warrare **time 3E-15, 41117 1951). 4ke the te 'epartvleet, th irtrj wasealonally was asked to do the drafting of he eettmete itself, in lieu of ONE as in the case of a Yugoslavian estimate in April 1951 (NIS-29//), but there Ls no record that wavy and Air Yore. participated in the initial-drafting stasle, except in a few cases where they arid other LAC representatives were temporarily constitutad as an ad hoc drafting coemittee. filch drefting rormittees were usec ia the case of the estimate on ::eviet biolceica1 end chemical warrar. (NIE.18, December 1950), one on Soviet defense .!einet st.omic attack (1111;-)40, Yebruary 1951), aid the first of the special.latelligenas estimates (M.1, March 1951).1 ftire were still other departures from Cho typical patters of 1AG partteton. In Nay 1951, for example, an estimate on the probabilities of a sew Nevis*, blockade of Berlin was ',bleated by 1 it?afting mmittese were also used capabilities estimates; see pp. 161 ff. of the suet" tiF.Sit-U- Approved For Release 2oo4m9krttakirevip64-oo654A0002ooi 70001-2 oLtjEly. Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 the TAO to thr 5,i4?vera1 1. tntellilence representatives in rn another case_ the following year a project on indo- Chlw 1073 t uest to tho ',*7,1Iss at Saigon Arid :aris,f..0.,rin;7! them to prepare a consolidateJ coordinetd contribution o to, views, "Inc1udin7 minority views," of nit the U. L. inteleneo efi;enciel in those two sreas.2 Ta addition to the i:our principal 1AG members, a number of nou-Ve egencies also p.Ltrticiated in the research and deliberative stazu of est,intin7 fron time to time. In one of fl1T.'s very first estimates projects, ,1 riling with the Middle Eaat petroleum situa- tLln (77P -1h), the resenrcb and drafting done by an ad hoc committee- tbrt included re)re3enttIvea of the 'Treasury aryl ono=erce -tao7.rt,ments, the .00nomic Cooperation Administration, an the trci',7)7.fAttea of the Munitions l'ioard.3 rn another chse, in July 1951, A draft estimate o Coviet clanestine-wcrfare capa- bilities Nfl'-.731) was revised on the basis of discussions with a varity of a7encies having particular technical inc1udin7 (bel.jdes the 721 nni the A'L;C), the F,Ticulture 1.)epart- menifs tlreaus of Animal Industry and of ",:ntorol,gy, the Treasury Departmentlfl Customs urcaaid ,:oast Thenil the Army's Chemical 2orps, the 't,derat an the Yuolic A.yrats, -'ey 3, 1951, LAc-c-29, ir 25 2 :A(' 'Anutes, Jan. 2h, 1952, TAC.-.-570 in ibid. 25 3 LAC :'rooress report, iov. 15, 1950, fi1eS? Approved For Release 2004/09SEGRaP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200170001-2 Health Service. Indirectly, too, ad mere typically, these and other Federal agencies also partieipated in the estimates program through their assistance to the departmental intelligence agencies in connection with the normal research and collection programs of the latter agencies. The contributions of CIA's own remearch offices meanwhile became an increasingly regular feature in a substantial number of estimates projects, beginning early in 1951 Although CIA had been criticised, before 1950, for conducting research on estimative problem independently of Ike member agencies, the practice was resumed in modified form, early in 1951 pertly (it appears) in order to retain an independent review of the reliability of evidence supplied in the departmental contributions, and partly to take advantage of special research and collection resources being October strengthened in CIA after/1950. Among the participating of cos of CIA, the Office of Scientific Intelligence contimned (as before October 1950) to prepare contributions when a particular estimate dealt with scientific subjects or the economic aspects of new weapons. In addition, beginning early in 1951, COI was occasionally given the further responsibility of drafting a major section of the estimate. Two such cases were the estimates on Western Furopean Defense Tri-13) in Janaary 1951, and Civil Defense in the USSR (PIF-60, part II) in February 1952. With the lIAC Progress report, Aug. 1, 1951, IAC-PR.16, Approved For Release 2004/09g :18fA in ibid. 25X qi4154A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 reoreanization 01717:u und ah establuhNont 01 eec rrcientific ::etimetes :'omeittee laeer in1952, both e,I's reeearch contributi el en,i draftu of sectioes of the estimate were inereasinrl7 subjected to advance, inter-eeperteental coordinotIon, al' ere :cordinely submitted to C?!fr in tne ("er 'T? tent,!fic Cemeittee" contribet1ons.1 iellerly, the new Office of Research and l'port s soon beer.-- a -e;er contributor to those entimetes projects that were hchvil eco-omic in subject natter. tni.l.tery (late in 195', end eerli in 1951) econoric-intelligence contribetions had been ,lied by ,ee the '"tate "eoartment, but beginning in February 19512' this eor- wne eradualLy taken over b OR". 7)...e first case was a ecneeat tetiee%c on soviet cae,bilities are! intentions in Ae econoric sections were divided three :ay s beteeen the tuee 'eearement, Dr, and Tel, as follows: (1) :tate, the T.R's fttotal ev,-Neoete eotential relative to the riniteei 'Metes and ?ester,e dr( /e"; (2) 0Th the 11;]Se's industrial conve-sien to war eruee Lien, tt ceeabilities to meet ease/I.-lei. civilian nnd mili- tary neeee, eee toekpiline; and (3) OI, the USSR's prodlction capecite te lee riairi3 of the newer "weaeoes of mass deetrectien". 1 For example, a "f7j'::.C? coneribution wee prepered, in Jal.-eet). 1?53, for 'IT -65, on !faviet eir Potential, TA1-1953 to !,1.d-1957. (:'ee oroerees %eeort, N!.rch 13, 1953, Tr,--3-31, I in 45 eerie as Aeril 1?51, there had been occesionae inter- aeence cocr-qnptinn of ecientlfic cont.ributions by %T., ae in the e- e oef on eeeteelleence Imelieatione of a censue ale verification of ?,rmed 7orces and .rmaments,i/ 2 zeno be O''ordf?eeeetary, to T-r reerceceta- eivee, Feb. 10, .15.1 (Tee :"r7 lce)ne riles.' IX 103 SECRFI Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : tApk- P64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fori'lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 /n aubsecneet estimates, however, the economic contributions were more definitele eeetrnlized in ORk (except that fcontinued to handle the eeeleeie aspects of new olotpons). Purthereore itself becaee a coordinating, agency on economic intelligence, con- fir with the establishMent of the inter-departmental Pconomic Intellnce Comeittee in June 1951 the oconeeic contribetiens to -sponsored estimates became, (like Ceell-e. scientific core:ribu- tions, menti ened earlier), A fore of "pre-coordinated erterial ? 1 ;leen its delivery to Oile. The Orrice of Current Intelligence was still another source of reseerch nne evelustion for On. By June 1951 OeI wee making oeensional "informal" contribetions, es in the case of an estimate on Fpain (117'-14), and in October 1951 017. we eskine Ofj to par- ticipate in ehn teems-of-reference meet-inv on an e3timate on ino- Sovi, t reletione (11-e-58). IA a number of cases n:ps wore: on indicaelons ervi. warnings, conducted in collaboratioe with the Ti!,C eetce eereittee, also flowed in the estimetes, ae in the ceee of an estimete on ,:oemunise intentions in Japan, in Aueust 1951 L7-11), ane one oe eoelet air-defense capabilities, in November 1951 In 1952 C)NF exnerimented with the practice or regularly 1 'e.eone the 5eALmates containing WiTelaIC contributions were x7-56, Nr y-53, r :r-65 N:F-65. (feee "eistorical r- con of stimates 7'reject rrldertaken . . ." Annex K , below.) In addition, Tee eneF lso ereduce sepeee- series of reports, entirely economic le 7iceee. whle - en t TV nrcee.e7 reports were ideetieriee ne "ustimeee'. e Lseoriee ecord o Fstimeees ?rojects Underteken . Pnnex K, bel014. 'er ot'eer elpects of relrAeele, see eeanter Ur, above. Approved For Release 2004/09/NeggP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foie lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 subjecting departmental contributions to "factual revinw by OCI regional specialists, in the interest of overcoming "shortcomings or passible errors" and improving the departmental contributions. But found that because of "the pressure of other cosmitments in on," this review. "alment never results in major aonvilent," except for Far astern livision, end except for OCI s Support :-,tsff, which "has also contributed substantial4 to the factual side of sone estimates of :ovie.t intentions.4 .-.'epro.rh-1 e s operational groups also were used on occasif)r, in the estimates program. While their normal relation- ship to 14415 that of a customer, they also served occasionally as an intelAgence contributor. The several established series of secretly collected report,' of OSO, for example, were of course regtlarly available (in sanitised fora) to OW as they were to all of the production ?faces In and out of In .-iddltIon, moreover, HMI occasionally sought the specific rind direct col- lecU.on.:iistance ofc,:v on special problems's\ 1 Memorandum by :hareem Kanto "kuthontication of r'acts." top secret Tr -75300), p. 16; in ON- "chrono files." Approved For Release 2004/09/KCIR-HP64-00654A000200170001-2 TSPEC 1 25X1A Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 torattc&tt4esis the to a approach was to iniriUr 05:.; (as on particillar ortsos,ae wait and .:,astern %rug coin requested 04' tho OpirlitiOnak ling ton. Another -) to brier the TV 3rd rhino 8 were f.-=evattionz7,1y or rootly on the (,Iffiee of Operatto to 3upplommen art also dr* I *ti4tos do or the C.6 Approved For Release 2004/09/1SEag64-00654A000200170001-2 25 STATSPE 25X STATSPEC Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065 tate; partasent.1 00200170001-2 The pattern of contributing aneis and ot'ftces outlined above ra he 3tandardized formula of four "EL' member agencies, on which '11F .piencied in the great rajority of projects, STATSPEC 25X1A STATSPEC U 107 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Forilease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00651.00200170001-2 to a hiEhly flt?cible procedure that pirmitted ONE independently to draw on the additional assistanes of a variety of specialised off-Leos (within CIA and axon c the non-IAC agencies), in order to meet research needs in specific estimative problense Normally the contributions were in written form, bat usually not aupported by 1 documentation. In other cases furthermore, contributions were received orally by ONE. Oral briefings by the IAC representatives figured in two projects, condeeted experimentally in November and December 1952s one on Albania (SE-34) and the other on "Free World Attitudes . . ." (N1845) 2. The results were regarded by ONE as "sufficiently successful to warrent repetition in similar cases" in the future.3 Whether departmental contributions ware long or short, they were generally not footnoted or otherwise referenced to specific documentary evidence, Sherman Kent (AD/NE) said in a survey in April, 1952. While contributions "generally give the subsidiary facts or line of reasoning in support of statements," they "do not under present practice go into questions of intelligence methodology," he said, because the contributors might object to the additional workload and would regard a request for document& tion "as a serious reflection on their coepetenee." To require documentation "might easily impair good relations." he concluded. (See Kent's study, "Authentication of Facts," April 10, 1952, pp. 13, 16, 31,1 In ONE "chrono flies.") For customer (as against contributor) interest in supporting documentation, see above, pp. 86-93. 2Memorandum by AD/WF to DCI, Dec. 17, l92, II IAC progress report, Dec. 12, 1952, IAC-PR-29. pylh in ONE files. 3Memorandum by AD/NE to 7 1952, 11 108 Approved For Release 2004/09/1SEW064-00654A000200170001-2 Approved 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065030200170001-2 tit the other procedural extreme, O37 also had occasion to draft ettev %e without am feral departmenta contributions whatsoever. t 1R5t three estimates projects, all of them in 1952, were handled In this way. Among them was an estimate on Guntemala er 2) one on i4erlin (52-30), end one on Italy (4IF.71). The frafts written by ONE ware subjected, of course, to lormal review wi. revision by the. Ik; representatives meeting with the 114F. rloard, but they were based entirely on initial research and evalu- ation conducted with or was ONE' a work on the many other, more normal inter-agency projects confined to that of a middleman for contributions. From the beginning ONE had had a !':)upport Ftelf for rd1iw fa,. hoc research problems that figured in estimating projects.' Furthermore, both the supporting analysta and the esti- m tors themselves general/7 had direct access to a variety of 4rem intelligence" report* and other materials, including certain special series of departmental cable and radio messages from which to draw evidence at first hand.2 The key personnel in had a itional clearances for , ne directly certain categories of neterial, specially those in the oustody of OSI and OC1, which had a. research value for estimates.) 1 Foe above, p 2 emorandum by William i. Langer, AD C, to ONE taff, Dec. 9, 1950,1 lin ONE Chrono files"; and memorandum by ON to DCD/it' 4 dune 18, /951, (regarding ,C)1 "Pokily uable f...ummary"i, in ibid. 3 toriac--ertera " clearances and special-intelligence clearances were promptLf reqieated and oo'..ained between lov. 1950 and i,are-) 1951; see re, oranda in Ne "chrono files." 109 SgclET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : P64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Folease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200170001-2 Awnsaloss o an ? or a mini an 'infusion of information" in th initial drafting of sm e 1 tent Director (41erean )sot) said in 1952. Whatever the Altgree o: departmental and coney p cipa tion in research contributions, the evaluative probl,monfrontng to core to intelligeace conclusions and make thea oth intelligent and intelligible. This teak was sometimes called, fignretively, the job of piecing t..ogether a jig saw posslo" of the enemy's intentions, or o: managing an 'assembly line to which the separate producers of components made eontributions. Both of these figures of speech, opt as they were, implied erroneously that the bounlariee of Each of the several elements of an intelli. genco istimete and each of the contributions could be exactly drawn end that fethriested reports an each element, once they were prepared needed only to be joined tog her editorially. Nor via the drsftin, task in 0NE a function of re editorial AD/NE April 10? 1952, p. 17, previously sited. 2 The assenbly-Iins and jig-aaw pus used (among others) by 41/Lelm 11. 44101mose the D) also appeared in the 'XI.* progress report to the Oise recordings, f Jackson's remarks a conferences, Apri in OTN files; his lot Omar Bradley, JCS, 3.n. 10,1,52, unclaasified, in "CIAR? filed under 'Ws," &nd WI progress report, April 23, 1952,1 lin OPCIAR.) Jackson also regarded the entire U. intelligence organisation as, figuratively, a 'Sears, 'rioebuck Enterprise," quently 951, and 1952. entation to Goners]. rx 13.0 Approved For Release 2004/09/1 70001-2 OLUMA Approved Fore lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006510200170001-2 secretariat," Kent said. Rather it was a critical analysis and synthesis of roiled contributions and of supplementary material. In this process, ONE "does not lightly depart from the contribu- tion'," but it "does deliberately amplify, modify, and on occasion contradict contributions, on the theory that sueb departures should be ironed out, in the main, in the coordination process. This inter.ageney coordination process handled by person-to person discussion in the Oa asard's many meetings with the in representatives, was probably more akin, figuratively, to an sca 'c seminar, than to an assembly-.].ire or a jig-saw puzzle, insofar as the meetings were concerned with such -natters as establishing the reliability of evidence, reconciling conflicting evidence, and arriving objectively at generalizations and conclusions. The Assistant irector of OW described these neetinga, in 1952, as a period of "constant scrutiny" and "croas-examinationr which usually result In "a very searching ap.-maisal of the essential factual points." dn the other hand, such cross-axaminations were sometimes "a die cow-aging business," he said, especially When they involve military representatives who are "not the working-level people and are not accompanied by these people," who have "some tends take a fixed view and to decline to argue it, on the ground that it is solely ii thin heir particular agency's competence."' In any cane deport by Sharman Kant, viously cited. 2 , vieport hy f:'herman Kent, pp. 1940, previously cited. 3 Ibid., P. 19. Approved For Release 2004/09/1 thentieation of Feats," p. 17, pre. entication of cts,' April 10, 1952, 7.64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006510200170001-2 y rero vory Upset we make SO owl (or CW: staff member) fairly inctortabIs,* nt @aid, and he concluded that by L52 the ettngs had bovome "far franker .than in the early months of (Ni 's existence. .is hope was that, with the plasm Board's pre. ceedings would develop to the potat where group spirit, plus a little genial criticism, will permit factual and intelligence weaknesses to be diooussed with complete framknese.02 A year later he was able to report further progress toward improving the factual content of estleative contrioutions. Both military.strnngth and soientifie-napabilities studies on the Soviet 'Union, which ?two or three years ago . . . may haws been is large part uncritical 'boilerplate)' are emphatically not* in that category today, 3 wrote in 1953. The committee deliberations were goin meet lengths to squeeze out all inflation possibilities? in such con- tribution, he 3aid.4 The inter-ageney coordination meet Board, together with the final meetings of the lAG, eie.ld not only differences over the evaluation of fee tail aildence, bit 1 differences or opinion and jedgment an he conclusions and the d.. p. 20 2 Ibid., p. 20 3 "Draft" notoranthes topics for oi megaton id under "Means for '.1." A A 4 IT Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : Cl4fkJ I654A000200170001-2 Sept. 2, 195) 0 d J'es in 0 possible It, filed Approved For *ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 speculations reriered. There were relatively dissents, end of formal An estimate was cancelled for lack of conclusions o g the 135-enme estimates produced between 'cto- bar 1950 Rld ebruary 1153. The records suggest, however, that controvre7 1.ros elaracteristic of many of the deliberntive sessions in the Ildwi.rd and IAC meetings. In one early case, the A membor of the uci objected vigorously to a draft estimate on o A:nist China (Na-10) in January 1951, because: The effect of the . ? ? paper would be to point oat to the policy makers advantages of taking positive stens with respect to 0?ina, and he stated frankly his own inclinations were in the opposite direction. In another estimate on Corunist intentions in Japan (-,=7-11), in August 1951, the Natri and the ON'7 9oard were in a minority on certain of the conclusions, rhile the majority views (held by the Aate rml Air Force -:)epartments arv the Joint Intelliftence committee) were in the end upheld by the PCI.2 In still another ce5e, in JanuAry 1952, the t;tate 1)epartment and OW had divergent views on the likelihoo of authoritarian rule in Iran No one department or agency vas consistently in a minority posi- tion. In June 1952, the Office of Scient,tftr IntelliTence and the ------- 1 TAc Minutes, Jan. 15, 1951, rAc-m-15, in 2 IA Anutes, Aug. 13, 1951, in 0/DCl/F. 3 :ete "7iistorical Record of Fetimatee Projects Annex K,below, TX 113 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CRFOReFf0654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.30200170001-2 Air Force contended o .-oviet capabilities ;Ism ,Jestern communi- cetlons -30); inOctober it was and t avy, versus the Air Force with respect to certain aspects of Soviet air defenseT, (1E-5)12 end in December 1952, it was !tate and Army dissenting on how the UR waa appraising U. E. reactions to ;:oviet measures against derlin (in TE-64, part U.)3 Itrely was an initial draft of an estime e not revised, ftrst b the r in deliberation with he stijnatea A.aff members involved,next in Board meetings with In working level representa- tives,and finally in th II ttseU. The 135-some estimates projects avorage between too and three f?eard meetings on a project, preceded by at least one mooting on the terms of reternce, and ocresionally thire were "several long and protracted mestines1 on a draft) Almost no revisee drafts were elven final concurrence in the TAC without at least minor modifications, so the TV minutes reveal.5 Jihile a ease analysis of the actual deliberations in these estimates projects is outside the scope of this study, an examination of the records available (such as TAC minutes and finute3 of , in ez'ence, June 2, 1952, 5C-P-37, 2 Memoranum by :'/NL to DClo Oct, 28, 1952, In nchrono files." 3 tl.nutes of IV- ne ting, Dec. 1, 1952, TAG-M-89, 4 "':Astorical ecorn of atbiates rojects Undertaken . .2" Annex lc, below, passim., c TAC minutes., ct. 1950-Feb. 1953, passim TX 11h Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIttlei8t.Op654A000200170001-2 I Approved Forlipease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 ioter-agency correspondence of ONE) suggests that feronces of opinion were occasionally intra-MA and more often Iner-agency in scope, en0 t'Lat they steamed fraa a weriety_of factors, such as a lack of conclusive intelligence evidence, a collection or research deficiencyi or a departmental or policy bias among the participants in the deliberetions. The degree of controversy seemed to be ,Irester 44", the Quantity er reliable intelligence evidence was lower. For examples the estimate on reLatioe0 (NIL-58), late in 'ieptomber 1952, was described as follows by ONEll There is not much to be said for N11.58 except tat it does establish a. small area of agreement...con. earning 4 subject on which there is little knowleve and such feeling. ...Large sreas of the sub1jeo4 are inadequately treated. ftt we do now have...a few significant generalizations, and we may hope to extend this agreement in subsequent estimates. tile unanimit, vas achieved in most of the fini:eled est/- mates, there were dissents in some cases, and in a few, the ,iver- goece of opinion was so lueroconcilable that it is foun to be preferable to eubmit the divergent conclusions to the 4:,C and other policy agencies rather than to give them a misleading impression of apparent lyemdeity. In one early estimate on ,oviet intentions, in November 1950 (!I.41), the LAC accepted an 1 Mentorsindula by A4kii to c,17:1, opt. 3# 1952, in OW, .-'chrono files." .be Lee approved the estimate, with a "reseration" by th tate fepart!mInt, on the conclusions that related to "the vulnerability of Une-oviet soli arity to western pressures." (TAC anutos, -opt, 4, 1952, 11-81, in )rGlAii.) 115 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CISEGKop654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 additional paragraph explaining to the NSC and the President that "there is a serious difference of viem. . of the firmness of the Soviet position, mei that it is thought desirable to mem these views available to the policy nakern."1 There is nn one "correct" position, the IAC agreed, "on the baSit, of evailable Ilieenee.4 In another estimate, a year laLer (JE-9 on Korea), the e_neensus in the ritc was. similarly, "no to reconcile" the remainin differences of opinion but "simply truncate the several points of view where they are at variance."3 This practice became lesa rr ueet in s second year, but reflected a continuing roblem. bruary 1953, for example, when al unreconeilable aspect of an _stimete on a teWest trade (!fl-59) confronted the estimate the OWE Panel of Consultants luggested, again, that the estimate aim. y summeriee arguments of both sides," and let the NSC "choose the horn of the dilemma whteh it prefers."k Among the objections to this practice was one by Allier L. Langer (fervor Assistant Director of OF and now,anel member), who said that "the NSC cannot make a decision if the professionals cannot Igreil."5 1950, Nov. 30?/IAC-M.8, 1 IA': minutes, 2 Ibid. 3 TAC minutes, Aug. 2, 1951, IAC-1-38, in in ibid. hEernorandur on ,N.E meeting with its Panel of Consultants ("the peb. 6, 1953, Madill ONE; developmental file on project WCF-h5 (sic). 5 Ibid. 116 ckV4Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : - 100654A000200170001-2 Approved orelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 ?ore characteristic believer, the overube Ittm, rinjority of the finished estimates sere preeented as a unanimous report. This achievement was do btleas a credit to the increasing Wen tiv nese of the deliberative machinery or the ONE Board aid the in-nvrrowine down the areas of disagreement on fectual and apecuirtive lolnL . The many committee deliberations and p onal ed in a project frequently resulted in some degree o conpo1se, reflected in the Carefully measured language in which Lhe? agreed conclusions were couched. "Always," in fact, "the final estimates reflect a certain amount of compromise," concluded near the end of its first year of experience. Com- menting on certein critical views received after the dissemination of st.i on Chinese Communist vu1norabilities (SY-5), ONE acknowlede1 7,ht these views "were, in general, shared by the conferences. in' Bonrd .onel YmtimatalW an went on to explain that* A number of other intelligence agencies were unwilling to go along with flat ArAtements on thie subject, and that since the final estimetes always reflect a certain amount of enmeromise, the Plias!? Nationalists' capabilities were perans lemewhat generously defined.2 The da ars and heserds of seekii unanimity at. any cost remained a problem of continuing concern In 1951 an.:, 1952. The 7;NE J'anel, for example, expressed "some concern in Jarlutry 1952, "over what they thought a tendency to blur it ane the 1, *eleoraniii, by comments received inti' i._rt An, -41 sont- lh_ 1951. commenting o in cc nenreno d. Approved Approved ForRelease 2004/09/1SW1064 400354A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 probable consecuenc e of censuses of action in order tosewlre unanimity. The new Absietant Director, Sherman Kent, likewise warnnl repeetdly that while an e8timat.:3 mu w,b "the product of deliberation ,:,.nf.71 argument and deduction and expert guessing," the finished 2740A?ct must not be Pe waterec-down common denominator."2 rr ncewar, stied, one or more dissents were preferable so that the olio/ makers, who after all are not so we1l. informed in record to eteU, should have every aspect of the complex issue before the r."3 1 ? MemoranOun r rt of to Ixr, Jrn. 22, 1952, Panel meeting by j- in 0/DCI4a filed uncer )cir.n views with Klmt, ?arch 25, Oet, 7, 052, 2 ,istorical .,,taff in oiDet,4!:., files. 3 ibid. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Next 42 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For/pease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065100200170001-2 Intelligence eetimating in Naation to erational Planning, 1950443 Oaraliel with the prOblea of improving the intelligens* content of estimates was the ealatinaing problem confronting..,erri Smith and GNP. as it had their predecessors, of insuring thrt the intellieence on a given foreign power situation was rezlisticallY examined Jrd stated in relation to the U. Government's own operational capabilities, counter-measures, and plane. Up to October 1950, such planning data had usually been withheld, both from I and from the departmental intelligence neenciee, by the planning croups in the Joint ,:hiefs of Staff, the State gpartment, and the agencies in charge of the Government's foreign end domestic security programs. The problem was also partly one of reconciling juriedictional difrerences between the intelligence and policy elements of the national security organization--between those who were expected to estimate a foreign situation from the intelligence point of view and those who were evaluating it from the U. e. operetioaal point of view. Both the Julies Survey 3roup and the :7,berstadt Task erce had criticized IA 'a estimating, in 1949, for being inadequately based on current U. S. operational information, and both had deplored the departmental practice of withholding relevant operational information from ',JA.1 The tberstadt committee, in addition, had 1 Dulles Survey s..roup report, Jan, 1949 and berstadt Task T;orce report, Lee. 1946 p. 52, previeue1y cited. II 161 Approved For Release 2004/09/1 T64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065111100200170001-2 concludd tAtt esti-ting ws 11:13ssibleu without th;: l_c'hf-fit of such information, and urged that r'A 444:only be 4ven prope !!cceei to the planning Am_ polioy-meking levels of the mAional Eiccrit;, organisation, but be respemeible for participatin6, well, '?:iw the L'iinking at all those levele.n1 i.ralzTa of what was commOnly called "withheld operational inforwcn oized ir the tilefings 4iven to -cmral it wa6 rind by his belAaT, illi f. Jackson, at their first Tencral meetint: it the TAe.4 on CotoLer 20.3 in thc F,snersl :ro*ectus of esti7olting presented IA that meeting by Jackson, Is thr 3t:-tcAent tk,Ai eetimates "should be irepered t!.1 furl knowledze of our own plans and ln the light of our own ;)olicy rulreerts."4 lt sorio polic:)' levels a;parcrtly enjoyed a Ilea!3ure of succenz fro t :tet, while at others therc were serious diffi- culties rrcl the beeinnin. Ath tho? Notionzl ::ccurity 2ouncil enior :Aaff, for example, ,STF established direct contact early in its new program, And from it regularly received a measure of opera- tional guidance, especially on those estimates specifically re- quested by the NS. Similarly, ONC; kept in regular and informal 1 :berstaot 'frisk ?Circe report, cited above, p. 52. 2 !listorical ,Lerr interview with L. iiouston, Cieneral Lounsol, in V A31/-i files. 3 Anutes of meeting, t. 20, 1950, 4 Foikl. Jackson re-iterated these views in with thc efense eut. (see below), as well vs ences. (;ee, for exavle, his extelporeneous .41entation (.4-Aference, June 13, 1951; on disc oTP files.) in 0/::ta later negotiations at CIA Psterf confer- remnrics nt OT's igeney recording, in II 162 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : Cltrarr654A000200170001-2 Approved Forelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 contact with the clandestine operations group in G74., (CO, end the rea Divisions under the i)/i), receiving neulnionsl briefings 'on anects or this work bearing on eetiutes." .fs to the State J:epartmenti?ONE at first was especially- interested in certain special cateoories of policy messazes of the Aate ;.opartnent, which LT. :Anger souqht to have routed regularly to 0%1 as a device for keeping abreast of the current viewoints of the policy officials in tkn-t epartm 2ent. ?in addition, staff members rer,71.11ar1y sought background policy information from the `Apte epartment on specific estimate' under way, either through tateie intelligence office or by direct contact with ate policy officers who would tzltiately use the finished estimate. As of Jpril 152 the I regarded CIA Is liaison arrangements with State policy officers as "reasonably satisfactory, although there is room for betterment." ONF reported later in. 1952, however, that it was 1 This arrangement was confirmed by Charles V. quilick? in e memorandum to Feb. 6, 1952, concurring in a memorandum by N,7sh. 1 (both17-Pi of:ci/ia, filed under "OW). On various occasions, ick agreed, it has boon important for O'tr to know to What extent operations within GU control affected developments and trends which Ne had to identify and whose signi- ficance ON had to kevreise." (ibid.) As a campromise arror4;ement in the interest of oerational security, On will "continue the practice of furnishing draft,terma of reference and estimates for review" (b5;- the ;:q: .rrea Uvisions), so that ONE "may be advised of information which ffhog poesess which by the content of the prper it is clear is not In the ooslession of (:)." (ibid.) 2 inutes of staff conferences, nec. 1950, Jan. 1951, : 17-73---1 in / ci" ,GI progrees report to ?, h;.311.1 23 952 1 izs IX 163 Approved For Release 2004/09/15EC2EC164-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 not eleeye efeeelve to seek out police information en an "ad hoc" basis* and recoeeeneee to the OD that "a do1le:1 ee,e1 weer- stending between the DCI Aw! the Secretary of :tate ." Le developed, followed by the necessary directives froil the eecre- t 1ery to nla :JA had less success with the Joint Chiefs or rl in ecember 1950, Dr. Langer urged the teputy Arector to Seek a eireet information channel, far ONE, from key policy officee in the eefense eceartment, including the Secretary of eefense and e2ossibly" the three Service Lecretarits as well, in order to enable ONE to "receive cables . . . which are not normally regerded ae intelligence materials." In eartieelar? he epecified such items es eeneral eecee.thur's rcports from the ON command headquarters in Tao, dmiral :Amble's reports from the Lie e. seventh Fleet and "similer high-level traffic moving to and from the Joint ehiefs of etaff."2 ?sidentey AL had no immediate success in getting access to' Jee operational messages, since three weeks later eenerel emith wrote formelly to eecretere of eefense earshall, urring on him need to 3bc kept fully informed of operational decisions and plana" of the deed It was not until April 1951 that eereral eershall 1 lemoranduri by t!-/tv: to e7I, July lb, leee, "chrono filc." 2 eemorandem by T,./Ne to MCI, rec. 7, 1950, in C,11 25 in / 25 3 Letter b;,i to ;en. ecre earshall, eccreelry of .efense, rec. 26, 1950, in s)/ ?, filed unCor 'iertAent of e.rense". Ix 164 Approved For Release 2004/09/18EARZET64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For Illease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00651000200170001-2 acknowledged "77.;'s request. 1lie aencurrec irrinciple? he sLnply referr Ii to a standing policy statement issued by in te4ber 1950, shish ribed the opartment's various restrictions e vernlng the dissemination of operational plinning information.2 'leanwhile, since late '!to 1950, had also tin attempting to solve the .VIS omati guidance problem on the bifida of specific project nesds. Thus, in the currant estirtte of iicviet moves with respect talciermany (Mit4), launched by: in 1:)ctober and completed by ,1i2; in January 1951, the J.C.6 repreeen- tative on the 1',brig. Gen. Vernon 4 Megee !greed to supply the necessary A. . operational planning information, in the form of a contribution to the estimate. Shit work on the contribution for LA was at first delayed and then stopped, and the estimate was ultimately issued without an operational evaluation.3 Amilarlyi late in December 1950, with respect to a pending estimate on the Korean Mar (-1) CIA had sought to cheek the validity of certain operational eisumptions on U.3. capabilities And plans. This time ON apparently had a meaeure of success in obtaining the Derti ent inforsation, not now free the J ut 1 ply 1 tarahall to DCi, April 13, 151, in ibid. 2 General 4srshall cited (ibid.) the Ja, paper JIC-M-1205, 5ept. 1950, for restriction* on aissemination or JCS operational 4anning data. The text of tate paper has not been located. 'ce3 . ? ouction record, 950,53, Annex K below. II 165 Approved For Release 2004/09?fCCUT RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1 Approved Forelease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 directly from two oT the Service departments (:rly rne hr i'oreo through the 0)od officies of ono of ONA's new -Gan; et era, - After the tIC representatives bsc concurree, In -0Nios final draft, however, the JaS repreeertative enteredP - Eztrann objection" during an 11,, mectir to estimAte a w!lole, because it contained *olosents . . . wic,1 transcend intelligence, eneroachilv upon tm, fields of Ann7-zin: n. - 2olicy making .? :le Announced, furthemore, that his E,gency "will .;-nt to file s.iilar ajoctions in tnt- future. "1 The Mile issue arose Inter in January 1951, in t,Iii, instr-nce with a onding estimate on the ",rosuects for tho ,reation of an ,dequate iestern ,aropean efense" (i41-13), whico had been requested by the Asti, !apartment, apparently on behalf of the resident. In this case, after the intelligence contributions were under way, sent out a supplementary questionnaire to the several ervice intellionce acencies, asking for operational inforNatian on ".vA,. ca:)abilities in estern f-urope." ain there were objections in the .afense ,e,artnent because U. S. operational glans and Aanning information were involved.2 -instead of insisting on this supplementary operational con- tribution, '4;norcl It proposed at the next 11 meeting (January 22) 1- ve - cf. production record, 19501-53, ibid.; JT minutes, Jan. L4 1951, It -1-14, (progress report), Jan. 2, 1951, an(j. 4tinutees of in staff conference, Feb. 28, 1951, C:-.M-10? 2 'reduction r 1,60-53, Annex K below. IX 166 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654100200170001-2 Lhat the eatimete bs"eppreashed jointly by th4 intelligence nod the pletuting offliArre of the Omileernrent." The 14G mmberea dently including the Je;i represcuse.c.ive present, agreeci tvo this new approamt. .4ortly titerearter. Cianaral Oiac based his proposal wit toe ciairmus ot Me Joint hivf taf1, mar neported o the the. hadred1eYis aimeurence of ceepur4tion, not, only for the conpletiod of the . 41-0:pball cfa3e estimate but also fur working out. a standard opera;ing ;)rocedwra for coordination with t>ha 4c4Z, piasters in rutting Gases." General ith, he departmental intelligens* daisies WU/ nOW the chairman of the J thee ell appeared to concur LeStthe !method of. joint intalligenoe-operstional evaluation wee a workable coomprotaile order 40 everetme the objections or the !military planners anti at the sane time suesesefully root the moon of the ;'reaident end title policy officers in the other agencies. Acknowleovinq 4-hat he willed the "marginal ere* between policy end int411.1genctsg" ',aural.'omit!! explained 4tat the questions sated O the erecident and ottleril do not always fall clearly on one side or the otters" and F)eted "tat .litere are many teo,wore ifrrolved in assessing the ader:.,acy of Luropean Uefenes wnicn are b.- M intol- ie concluded, with the Cebberreeee of the LAG, t.hat in such cases there was a clear need for "st combined intelligence 03erations estimate." 2 Knutes rf LAC mestinca, Jen 22, Jan. 25, 2951, IA0-11.17, 48 .1. I Ibid. IX 16 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA- eRE5TA000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00651.00200170001-2 The ct,o.tion or the planners having been ;,uthorized hi the Chairman e the #,:a repreeentetilm on the 1;1':: (leneral -eee) undertook lete in Jaimyto solicit en "informal" operational eveluetion free the ?planners, for the use of leanwhile .Jrocece colplete its draft of the estimate,inti1ic aimly s nh rr,..* that, is, without the benefit of tacround operaLowli with the tlnerstnding th,7t tie dreft would bv "chec4,z-, . against the Join 1tff centritutim wtlen It ;16 boen received. 1 ." by tne end of January, draft was coieted, but the 4C3 paper was still not forteeomine, .1o' 'encral ,ce now reported that he had bc;en "uneLle to convince the plannin officials in ,Nj that they should participate on an inforAel basis."2 iies added, however, that they mou1z2 de so if instructed az a result of a farsel request to the Secretary of :efenze Jr the .:hairman of the INS. 3. instead of waiting for the information, however, the T.:1 announced on 'rebrnary F, 15i51, that he intended to sJtit the intelligence draft "formally" to Ji.;? and to the Ptomic 'aergy ammission as well, for their comments. .?????? 1 Jen. 31, 1951, Fat. to 1951$ I,:-'4-19101 in C4Ci: files; and J minutes, 0/4;i/. 2 linutes of meeting, rftb. 6, 1951, Dtc-4-19, 3 Ibid. 4 IX 168 in 25 Approved For Release 2004/09/ A- Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200170001-2 OK's draft of the '.-"suropean lAsfettet,estimpte never reached It was first Ful..711.tted'te informal discussion with the re!es::.nentatives on 7'; ebr 18, *d toth,:- ormal review of the IA on Fetrunr:i 23.1 The IiiC would not accept it, however. Its objections were those o!' representative if not Ella() c!' .:1,i-rvice Intel- 1-ice o.hiefs, t.I'v,t "the estteate goes beyond the ;,revince of Intel- ?ince dertakin: to asseen the edsquecy or ,!.?, iroved Y. plans.2' t fl wee referred back to for the deletion of the "objs-c ttonable ,ertions". attempted to revise it, and ascusced the revision .1 r turn with the ..f./C representatively early inr'.nrch. Xaen- welle, hows.-.Ter, it e ';earf.e..1 that JCS cooperation, still hoped .for, would net forthcomine,. The nrojeot wee reduced to "deferred priority,3 are' late in April 097: reported that "no further efforts would be Tiede to secure operat.onal informaticro for . . . this paper."' hortly thereafter, the State .epartment, which had originally requested the estimate, witArew its request. tpr13. 1951 OV had suffered set-backs on several additional estiwetes, for 1aek 7f adequate background operational infornetion, 1 letter of transmittal (for 14th draft of lei-13) to ir,2 representatives, Feb. 114, 1951, Oa fahrone file"; and 25 minutes of 7.10 eeeting, Feb. 234 in t7.1:Afe. 25 2 linutes, Yet.? 23, 1951, ibid. 3 LAC---10, 10, 1951, 4lI tinutes, ri1 23, 1951, in 25 Ix 169 in files. 25 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fore lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 but had had so74,2 ,,ct;ns in at least one case. This 14:45 A pro4eSt for evalustin-, Ar4auni$thii 1z relstien to Taiwan,lin which Nationslist counter-ca?atilities were obviously de2.6nnt on thc disilittc1;1 cf. V. C). forces in the area. In 1,h1s case, . 4as .stal,o;nwIts of U. So operational sa,liu7itions ",73,)trotLr-_ re0. facts" (s0 Or phrased it laturil not by circct c roGlor, irol the .1T6 but through considcratle nootlation with the ,ervice iJt1iienca ehiefa.2 in the same month, however, anothor entimate was cancelled for lack of operational t;uidance from In thic ncw case, which involved a itiaser of :;oviet defense ai;ainst atonic-warfare attacks ti.:.:-.31), and in which the i;ressional :::mittce on ;Ltomic ze WM4 the requester, Ohr had bcen IeW to believe, in L. course ne,;otlations wth the :efense ..epartnent extenk, over two mor!ths, tht,t oidance on T. . opera- tional fnctors would be forthcoming. The t1.7,: ultimately declined to cooperate, however, with the further objection, cited in its final decision ,Ind concurred in by the Secretary of efonse, tht the .V6 would not rdecse oata on war 715125 for an c 'imate that waz to e,u to a .or.lre,:isional connittee.3 1 The estimate in question was below, !nnex K. 7; see 01,i prodUction record, 2 ?imorendum by Alliam :Aindy, (AC ,:stimstes ,Starf, subject, qThe 'Net 'ntimates, roblem", prepared Jw, 25, 19514, for use of -].ark 7:onaittt--e; cudy in Virvas files. 3 , rleet 'Ingo ru by n. ;sor,ye. :? 1.'51 Arch 21, 1951, in 011k: filets; minutes of T.V.: in IXI/i:R; and letter arshall. ..scretery of :wrongs, to 179 lin OM '/Chavelopmental file" on g11.-30. IX 170 Approved For Release 2004/0931ECKIDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Fore lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-006511000200170001-2 Late in 4pril 1951, the issue of operrtioriti _Tforation was re-studied for upte4y areotor? now by OL; reter tn by ONE, as P r,roblel uf necessary collaboration between the etimators and the operational mnd :eeple. OIC observed to vehture cn intellience c:,precietion if enemy capabilities "witeut takin into account the capabilities and intentions of the o22osin4; friendly forces (including U. )" was a "vacuous" exercise, but for UNE and the .11.; contributors to get into "the business of 'war-gaming" would be ed by the JCL; and would, in fact, not be proper and useful." -;hat was needed was "some midway point between these two extremes," ; concluded., and it pointed hopefully to con- tinuing neotiations with the JCS representative on the (Aneral Megee), with the aim of fixing responsibility on the Joint 6taff for nguiding the: intelligence estimators in such a may as to provide the operational and planning information essential to laking their 1 estimates useful." it4ough oiC suggested Ln its study of ioril 1951 that the necessary arrrne.aents for Joint Staff assistance to (1441 were already 1 lemorhndul by ti.'" to DiC1, Anril 25, 1951, in )/ filed unocr Various JL4 officials undertook to ne;;otiate the ,TGblem. r. Jackson, the DWI, for example, talkeu with the Mairwm of the J7-, :en. C'mar N. Bradley, sometime in pug. 1,51, ami found himUjfljH to "attempt to work out some sort of liaison arrangements between the entral intelligence Agency, specifically its :lffice of National stimates? and the Joint aliens of !taff.11 ecalling this conversation to Bradley later (in Jan. 1952), Jackson said: "fs 1 told you ffn iug. 19527, 1 personally woulo not under stv circumstances acceut .lenoral Smith's statutory reei.,onsibilities without a?cess to such rerational p1anni%7 ioroation." (Letter ba Jackson to Irdley, Jrn. 10, 1952, unclassified; Copy in filen under "JL".) ilArn Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : AtaiE10654A000200170001-2 Approved For *lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 )(1 "eetablishe0" thro. 1 1 effort, ecnrse of still another *Animating. project daring the *ant month indicated that the problem remained unr olued. ?r' hod enbaraed on a project on the .1-cic,li1ities of a soviet invasion of Japan (07F-37), riw ,reosed, throu.,n an outline of terms of reference submitted tc.. re,re- senti.tives on ley 22, to inciAe in it the pertinent ,. opera- ttenrl-su,yert factors affectin, Japanese resistance, in or6er to lake the estImat( more realistic one. In 0 counter-pro=osal by the ir ?roe, concurred in b5 the other Service intelligence agencies, J. .. o?erational factors were excluded, however; ane on -iny 2 the two alternative approaches wore discussed by the cI oard with the working-evel re-.)resentstivea from the IA''J ty,encies. J-lthoug): the militar) a ;encies had 'ready concurred in tnc lore limited a:croach, their .4orkinzi-1eve1 representatives at the OKII meeting of )- 25 apparently joined the other tic representetives in expressing "con- sioerable sypipathy" with ins broader approach proposed by In feet, the JCS representative agreed to "attempt* to ,zet the opera- tional questions answered.1 Age.n, however, operatIonal guidance was not forthcodng from the jb, and eventually the Japanese estimate also was cancelled. CaDtein ;. coo]., the 4JC6 representative, reported to on ??????????????????11MONIVIMONM 1 The ;,)rogress and difficulties with N1F-37 are described at 8040 length in a memorandum by =r. Langer, At/Ni', to the DCI, June 18 1951, I.:, oN' uchrono file". 3es also I;U progress reports, 1.:-;-:-1;.-13 (lay 22, 1Y51) and IAC-:It-lh (June 12, 1'.,51), in files. IX 172 SECRE Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Forklease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 tiay 29, that he was "unable" to gat the necessary oereLional informa- tion, but went on to suggest, on behalf of tne oervice Intellience aiencies, that the problem be referred by the 11_ to the thereupon undertook to prepare a statement for the fer tJw, next IA,3 meeting, urzing the views of the ON iloard that it kr..!F "futile" to evaluate Soviet intentions "without determining what op2csition the -,oviets would expect to meet." To limit thg estimate, as the military departments had proposed, by "carefully deleting anything thet cculd be reilotely described as operational," would be to "reduce" the evaluation of the Soviet Lnion "pretty much to a statement of 5ti7 raw caosbilities?"2 the DE Board contended. The expected discussion in the AJC did not take place, however, for reasons not explained In the records, and the project was ultimately cancelled, hy early 1952 there appeared some prospect that cooperation from the JO.: planners might be forthcoming. On Aarch tne new ieduty Arector for Intelligence, 3r. beaker, conferred with the recently appointed senior officers in the Joint Staff, ,labell and zaj. ic Achard t's ?artridge, and found that (while they reserved "war aming" for their operational planners) they lemorandua Lan&,er, June 1, 1951, cited above, 2 Ibid. 3 1inutes of 1?..: meeting, .;uly 19, 1954 1AC.4.35, in 25X ixak1t. 4 (:abell, new Arector of the Joint Staff, had previously been the 17 eter for the tr Force, and Partridge -before July 1951 had been in ';-2 and a frequent partici?ant in I eetince. Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIECA m 4200654A000200170001-2 Approved Foglklease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 conceded the need for o)crational 'relativity" in 'IlAt;:-; estimates.' Throw days later .:Ientiral had mother ipersonel diecussion with 3eneral eradley (chairman of the J1) on thc eet.ntiAnt of ta.ffeetive liaison" between cJNE and the elenners. nraeley, in turn, "directed" the new heed of his Joint Aaff, renerel to. 'establish such liaise:1:e, and CW11 denien4Aee his recently-appointed eputy Artctor for intelligenoe (ieneral 'artridje) es "the point of contact" to receive C11 roeuirements for planning inforuation cin6: oeerationel eeidance.3 erompt , submitted erafts.O1 to estimates on Aelmunist to tee ,,J? in larch 1952, along with questions bearing on aenumptione as to U. operational pinns rad capabilities In the -ar'amt. The J. planners replied on the sene day, in one case, and in little rnor c than a week, in the other. 3herman ;nt, the new head of OAF., coltmended the for its cooperation, fieding its re-lies "direct, to the point, and extra, ely helpful, in short, . all we hope6 they would be.44 It appeared as if the ;)reeence of new leadership in the joint :Aaff may have been a major factor in improving 1 25X1A Memorandum by 0/LLI, listing pending projects of conmern-co--ee-iir-7,1rwr 1952, in "CeTC AAnnine In 0/i/tC files. 2 The recent -3)e.theiiradloy conversations were recalled on A.arch 7, 1952, by 'ej. ;on. ;. . ;sbell, then Arector of the joint etaff, Il in a memcraneue to the DZ; copy of memorandum in :/:,;/A, filed under "J,13". 3 Ibid. 4 elorancul cemmenting on reAies received from Joint ff on rc 15 nn,2 :'7,irce 21, 1952; in -7,-;11.:, filed under "J'3S". Ix 174 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : sE6 ? T-00654A000200170001-2 ILLEGIB 25X 1 Approved ForOease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 relations. The assistance of t101.405 plPnners was limited, however, to comments on specific questions raised by CI,A. estimators, and did not provide for any contAnnine treeemattal of materiAl t- F,, nor any committee procedure or other system for regular and direct conseltetion by the estimators with the pineeers.1 There was one project, however* wch had 5icAnwbile teen under way since June 1951, calling for a formal systee of coopera- tion between estimators and planners, and carrying the cleasing of the National eecurity Council. This project was frankly aedressed to an overall "net" estimate of eoviet capabilities to ttack the i;.,soecifically in relatior to S. sounter-capabilities and counter-elans.'eome eighteen months elapsed between June 1951, when the Ne; '4ecutive .eicretary first wrote the Dal about the need for such nn estimate, and November 1952, when the final evaluation was delivered by CIA. ehile the project was marked by delve and diffi- culties, the end result was an evaluation that was actually produced and delivered, and one, that represented at least a minimum of pro- cedural succesa in interdepartmental estimating in collaboration with the planners. 'erticipeting at various stsees were all the 1 In iri1 1952 3enera1 th went on record, et the ti%;, on CIA's need for operational euidance and on the close "interrelationship between intelUeence end operational planning." 4e warned that "if" ls "product is to be timely," his estimator "must have adequate advance information at least of the general nature and objectives of any plane toward which. he can make an intelligence contribution, as well as of such national or international policies and agreements as. precede them." ehile contacts: with the Ant* Dept.'s policy officials were oreasonably satisfactory-, those with the Lorene, .ept. end the military Cervices were somewhat less than satisfactory." (eLd progress report to 4Se OA h*,050, ru23, 1952, ix 175 Approved For Release 2004/09/13SEIC-R 4-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 major int,elligence agencies and all the principai dlanning agencies, including not only the Joint ;hiefs of ;:taff but also the Federal illreau of lnvestigation and the other agencies having operational responsibilities for the Nation's domestic security programs. In Os initial reaction to the )450fs project proposal, in June 19 151, the ICI concurred at once in the need for such a net estimate, and agreed to accept reeponsibili*y for providing the leadership to see it through to coepletion. In his conment, however, the DCI reminded the *Sd that sUch a. net appraisal would be "neces- sarily much broader in scope than the usual Wational Intelligence Fatimate,11 end would involve the integration of intelligence on the U.S with vario.s types of information on the U. S." It was essential, therefore, the DCI continued, that the NSC 'a directive to the participating intelligence and planning agencies be.worded etronir enough to insure that all types of necessary information, both 'intelligence and operational, wonld be forthcoming. ie questioned "certain qualifying phrases" about interdepartmental cooperation in the draft of the directive, and urged that the direc- tive be worded so that it would not be interpreted in such a way as to limit the scope or otherwise prevent the accomplishment of the project." In addition, the DCI proposed that CIA be loaned the services of the necessary planning and other personnel from the other agencies, on a full-time or temporary basis, to assist at various stages of the evaluation process.2 1 ix.eply by ;.;,1 to Icecutive by ;Iv (Lr. I ner) an0 051 2 ibid. June 14, 1951, drafted , In - 'chrono file". IX 176 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 :SEW1-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved Folease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 i'ending th arrival of the formal request from the Jeneral itbaenounced the proposed *net estimate" ,roject to. the .112, on Ju13, 19, 1951, describing the scope of the project as joint effort between the intelligence agencies and the -olannere or ooerators.? He invited the L a4encies to participate initially to the extent or assietinz feiii in producing first "a pure intentence estimate.' on :ioviet capabilities, as a point of de?arture, and directed N to launch that phase of the evaluation immediately, 1 withoet waiting for the C directive. ;Ater in July, the request came officially to 11,1? now in the name of en* resident, anc with it a request from that W.# draft tne necessary adninistrative directive for the 1i; to issue to the intelligence and operational deoartmenta, agencies, and committees involved. That directive was eccordingly drafted, by OIC rather than 7)V., and Was ....ssued on August 30 to the several agencies concerned.2 Four oarticipating groups were assigned to prepare the major contributine, two for intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities, and two for evaluations of U. S. counter-capabilities to repel a ov4 t Attack; and the 1;_a was to be responsible for inte;rating the contribntions into a final "net" evaluation, in collaboration with 1 linutes of 1 C meeting, July 19, 1951, -FC-M-3, 41CII:111. 2 .I0e,progress report on this estimate I 1, to .1,0 June 23, 1952, filed unver :r 177 memorandum by cc,py in ?/ in Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : Claa4(1654A000200170001-2 Approved For. lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200170001-2 the chairmen of the oontribut 1 were as follows; The aesignments, in summary, 1, tn estimate of Jeviet ce2abi1itie5 for military attack ;tell/lust the e, excluding Soviet clandestine ceeebilities, to be prepared by ilORE In collaboration with the 1AC meiber agencies; 2. An estimate of Soviet capaellities for clan- destine attack and etibversive action against the U. 3., to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence :;onference (II); 3. .An evaluation Of S.'esapabilitiee to repel attl'de (excluding counter-measures for clan- destine attece), to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of ;;;taff; 4. Jn evaluation of U. S. capabilities to resist andet clandestine end subversive attack, to be pr- ':red by the Interdeparteental Committee on Internal security (ISIS); and "final evaluation of the net capabilities of the enemy," to be prepared from the foregoing estimates by tee D-SI with the collaboration of the above four contributing groups. GNE's 9;eare intelligence" contribution to the net evaluation was completed alnost immediately, in collaboration with the 1H:: agencies, and was issued separately in October- 1951 in the form of a regular estimate (as Y 14).2 Similarly, the companion satirists on the clandestine aspects of Soviet capabilities, prepared by the Federal ureau of investigation and the other agencies that made up the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was also ready in October, excpt for * eupplementary contribution requested later 1 Ibid.; and minutes of IC meeting, Aug. 2, 1951, IG-r-3', efeCite. 2 :e .roduction record, 1950-53, nnex K below. IX 178 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : ara1E4100654A000200170001-2 25X1A Approved For*lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 by from dealing with U:.67/. clandestine capabilities againet U. . territories outside the continental limits, which was ready early in January 1952. The two operational .valuation, NOW- ever, were not completed until mid-1952. The JCS evaluation of U S. counter-capabilities was ready is June 1952; while the cor- responding evaluation of U. S. resistance to Soviet clandestine attack, orepared by the nit' and the other agencies on the Inter- departmental Committee on Internal .Jecuritir, was ready in 4.ey 1952.1 The final "net" evaluation was drafted in July 1952 by an of 25X1 interagency "working group" consisting et ONE, chairman (also of ONE), a representa- tive from the lAC (Maj. Gen. 4ohn A. 3anford of the Air Force), and one from the JCS Oeneral 4alsh)42 Their work wee done principally in the Anitagon, averently because the JCS declined to release its own evaluation outside its premisee; and insisted instead on making its findings available to the drafters on an oral 1rasis.3 On substantive issues, the working group found themselves in eventual agreement on all but one issues so reported to the iCI on Auguat 1, 1952. That issue was on the *US5it atomic bomb 1 :rogress re;:ort to iCIW*-1 ; on "net estimate" on USS, June 23, 1952, cited aove3 and minutes of VC meeting, June 26, 1952, V-C-'11-75, in ObCl/2a. 2 Ibid.; and memorandum by C,N; (,:hairmen of the "ior1n roup" on net estimate), to XI, Aug. 1, 1952, in ONi. file "Memos for DCI, 1952". 3 , fl. 1 1952, cited a amorendull by ;!oover to :la, ug IX 179 ? Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIAUM44454A000200170001-2 25X1A 25X1 25X1 25X 25X1A Approved Foe lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200170001-2 k capability," ob:ao 1.1 as,otept on of Ur% do iron." rode by The representatives and the fenled this formals as "safe -11anning," ar,2).-74 Ie plAnaing it IS "%Atte 3 Li- mai,. than to unfetrest? es" v.14.-.:h wide 'safety tnergina. . . sh.uld not b ttei in 74r) t;:tvaluete:1: i.nteiliTiTenoe report. The dr. It o.g.' the "net 3 t, inerwnt f7trther revision, in the hti-As ?king grow an.,then in the u valuatn rtttee, on whick to four contr',..7,uting and --)lannirq,e were rap-esented and over which the 7.I pre el 4 nrn-: rdftnee wit the N:r dirge vs f the year beforo. in ctohr t the rtpart va d1irnred tl the M vrul lets ersion. in iovalebe.?r c as followed 3.; a rtmi The Utional ,,ecitrity Council, whict reviewed g,"t.,11 final "net" aveluation n 'ovebr 2, 1952? founi the ,nd result so !IV whet lens t` art latisractory. It noted that the report was Agree- tort:4c; by a nur,.'.:er csf ILNI a ions and inado-uscioe, including the fac the eeloppw-as since the eveluetivn was prepared have ren- dered it in pert oit of date.v 3 The experiment es, not abandoned, 1 !bid. I rhe estisete entitled *Sot Capability of the Ur-:;ft to Injure the .ontanental U. :;.?41 was sent to the;:(. on lJct. 21, 1952 gn- en emended estimaa oft Nov. 25, 1952. (f441 paamorin4un by J. -,. Lay Jr., 4.3m.utrivis ._*?..rotary of &--C, La ,,,...i, liov. .:' 1952, Itn /OCIAR, filed under ?VW) 1ieoranthn by Lay to rf, T, Nov. ,A, 195? d ? 100 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : ClAga154A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 however. The45C, instructed the DCI to prepare a new set of terms of reference (in collaboratiommithadlicials of the JCS, IIC icrs, and other Government agencies "as reqeired!), for a "mere adequate" evaluation of the 0USSR's net capabilities to inflict direct injury on the U. S. 1 In January 1953, the 45C established another !Special EvaIua tion Subcommittee," this time giving it the position of a subcom- mittee of the WC. Representatives of CIA, JCS, I1C, and XIS were to make up the committee, with a chairman who was to be acceptable to all of them, of the CME Board was 25X1 nominated by the DCI as the CIA member; and Lt. Oen Idwal H. Edwards became chairman of the committee, on the nomination by JCS and with the concurrence of CIA and the other groupe.2 Thus General Smith's administration came to a close, with the experiment of joint intelligence-operational evaluation still continuing, in the direction of preparing what were now being called commander's estimates." Whether this new type of committee at the NSC level was to be more successful than the experiment in 1951-52 remained to be seen. In any case, the problem of adequate operational lIbid. 2Memoranda by OCT to Executive Secretary, NSC Jan. 22, 1953, bothl in 0/bCl/ER, filed under "NSC. ]jm1n4 IT 181 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1A 1 X1 Approved Foil/lease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200170001-2 guidance to normal inteleigenee e, 1 imeting *seined. ehortly before his retirement, eeneral Smith semmaristd the situation during his two years in CIA, and concluded that CIA-produced estimetes had been "steadily increasing in quality an4.2Talrg . . . now attained a standard of excellence welch justifies acceptance as the beide for national planning." On the other hand, he pointed to what ie regarded as CIP's one major remaining problem, "thn impossibility making certain estimmtes in the absence of military assumptions." eithout realistic guidance on e. counter-capabilities, 11 nnd Its 1.11 contributors could Only "prepare a sort of bill of eateriels of eoviet assets and let it go at that, he stated. e expreesed doubt whether the problem woeld be resolved "until we set up on the hieheat level some machinery forceordinated 0-2 and estimates"; but 'whether thatls possible or not, I don't know,'" he concluded.2 1 Late in 19E2 the scope of two pending estimates on the JSI WAS revised to avoid operational matters. On Al!e-64 (part I), for example, eee reported to the eCI that in accordance with instructions from the Ilk? on Oct. 231 1952, ?we have excluded all war-gaming paragraphs and limited ourselves to estimates of raw capabilities.!' (Memorandum by Pe/Ne to eel., Oct. 29, 1952, I in Ohe "chrono enother estimate (NI-14O) was recommended for cancellation by the )NL eoard, on Nov. 25, because its scope (to equate the "strategic value" of eastern europe to the Soviet Union against "US and kTU forces and plane) "goes beyond Iee reseonsibilitr." .(Memorendum by Uoard of National estimates to IAC, representatives, Nov. 25, 1952, in Cee "developmental file" on NI2e40.) Heenwhilo, the (11E Panel of Con- sultents had an extended discussion, on Oct. 164 "on the risks attend- ant on attempts to introduce weregamine into intelligence estimates"; and at least one member of the Panel subsequerit425X1A objected to tT"- using the term 'communist capabilities", "without refer- ence to oe)osition on the pert of UM/US forces." (Memorandum by ect. AL/, to lei. Can. 3. C. vartridge, then 3-2, r. # in O chrono file"; and summary of eonsu).- tants meetine o arc 19, 1953, in ONF Staff eemorandum No. 140, in C) taff emeos" file.) 2 _ extemporeneous remarks by eCI at OTRIs Agency Orientation Con- ference, Nov. 21, 1952, printed in On Training Bulletin No. 1, Feb. 11, 1953, copy in eIt eecorde Center. IX 182 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 25X1