ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953 CHAPTER IX: PRODUCTION AND COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 143
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CHrIPTER IX
ARMY, DOS, JCS and USAF review(s)
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CROANIZATIGNAL
Chapter X:
T
0 IC CLM
Cr7TRAL fl MCE r1CY, 19501953
C.
Contents
ESTIMATIIS
Page
Status of CIA's Estimating Program and ?rocedure in 1950 1
Departmental Participation is of 125e 4
Production Record by 1950 8
Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity and Change, 1950 10
Tq.eactivation of Intelligence Advisory Committee, Oct. 1950 24
ratablishment of New Office of National rstinates Nov. 1950 27
Organizing and Staffing of New Estimates Office, 1950-1953 32
Initial Organization of CNE 36
Board of National Estimates, ONE 38
Estimates Staff, ONE 4it
Support Staff, ONE 49
25X1A I I ONE 51
Training Programs Affecting Estimating 56
Clientele and Scope of "National* Estimates, 1950-1953 59
3roadening Definition of National Estimates 59
ProFramming and Scheduling of Estimates 67
Format Decisions and Challms 70
Clientele for Estimates 73
Geographic and Topical Coverage of Estimates 75
Summary of Progress, 1950-1953 81
Changing Needs for Supporting Documentation, 1950-1953 86
Departmental and Agency-Research Participation in Production
Contributions by Departmental Intelligence Agencies
Contributions by CIA Research Offices
Inter-Agency Coordination of Draft Estimates
94
96
102
111
Pstimating in Relation to Operational Planning, 1950-1953 161
?NE's Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1951-1952 164
Experimentation with "Net' Estimates, 1951-1952 175
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Chapter II
DUCTION AN (....kitOINATIA OF INTELLIGENCE LiT.DIATE.6
Jt.atue of CIA's EstimatinkProgram and i7rocedure in 19p
By August 1950, when ;general omith waa appointed as Director,
CIA had had some 14 years of experience, under three successive
rlrectors, with the Govermient's experiment of producing intelli-
gence estimates on a cooperative, interdepartAental basis. His-
torically there as probably nothing older or mcre basic in
intelligence ork than the ultimate task of estimating a foreign
oower's caJatAlities, weaknesses, and intentions. Only in recent
years, however, had the Jovernment attempted a contizinp, organized
effort at con-)rehonsive ruti'lLtin:, in which the Nation's total
resources and talents, traditionally decentralized among
several depart itnts and agencies, mi'ht so:7khow be relularl: brought
to bear, in a single integrated and objective evaluation, on a -iven
foreign policy issue or international situation. Such a concerted
approach had been informally attempted durin: L'orld .ar I by the
Joint Intelli,,ence Committee (JIC), which had been continued after
the war, Llren though responsibility for coordinated, interdepartmental
estimaldnr sasfficially assi:ned to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence.
The years l6-50 were eleprintal ..1tY respect to this
problem and marked by a measurE of accompliah.rent with, perhaps, a
larger measure of -r blems and difficulties. Responsibility to
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igence /satinet". on foreign problems of mqatienal"
signtticanes, in coordination, with all the deppr1rtnt,. and incise
concerned dth national seturity, was vested in the eucceadvely
by Presidential orier, Congressional etatute Ind Natl.onal ,nottrity
Council directive.1 War these directives the established intelli-
gence branches of the operating and planning departments and agencies
were expectei to contribute to C/A-produced estimates, ta.i to nor
Acipate in the deliberations leading to the final ostieative con-
clusions. At the same time, however, the existing prerogatives of
those egencies to produce independent "tepartmental" estimates were .
left undi turbed; and in practice their cooperation and attention
to the centrally sponsored program of coordinated estimating was
not un d. ?requentiy their cooperation was only peesive.
Within CLI end CrA, the new estimates program was manaced?
PrOM 19116 to 1950, bv a centre' production staff which was known
succesnively as the Central Reports 3taff ('7!1's), February July
1946, the C?fics! of ',Assearch and Pvaluations (ORE), July 1946 -
January 10; and the Office of Reports and attsetss, February
1 bee
pecially ( ?residert trunanto letter of Jan. 22, 1946
(unclaseified), ordering the establishment of the :iational Iatel.-
ligence Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Croup (Cl();
(2) NIA lArective No. 1? ?eb. 19h6; (3) the 4tiona1 becurity Act
of July 26, 194?, effective in 3ept. 1947, which (among other things)
renamed CM the lentral intelligence Agency (A) end gave stetttory
recognition to the A:Iie responsibility "to correlate and evaluate
tntelligenee reletinp, to the tational security"; and (h) National
oecurity Council Intellilence Directive (hAAD) Uo. 3? e- 047,
which implerented thet etatute in relation to eatiftwAng
responsibilitien. (Copies in IcT(1/Mt; files.)
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1947 - November 1950. Pven 4it
to estimates eao divided, because 0
other types of production such an pe
Staff, however, attention
had responsibilities for
summaries, regional sur-
veys, for:aP1 memoranda, and oral brief
In the 174.1 of 1949, ge,0111 changes hed been made in the
organisation of the Office of ,7eports and intimates. The ost
important of then involved the creation Of an "stimates Production
Board" consisting of the chief' of all producing divisions and of
the two principal staff -under the chairmenship of the Asmistant
Director. Subordinate to this ohmage was the formation of an
-...AItimates Branch" within each at the producing divisions. The
intention of the reorganisation was to make the estimates branches
responsible for adequacy and accuracy of estimative material pre-
pared by their divisions, while the ,.., timates production board was
to act as a reviewing authority for all 046 estimative material.
In point of fact, however, this systen was never fully utilized
during the Year when it was technioally in operation,
In July 1950, shortly after the beginning of hostilities in
Korea, the Assistant Uri:rotor appointed a "Special Staff" to assist
him in the review of current intelligenee and estimative material
concerning the Korean eituation.1 This move wee undoubtedly prompted
by the urgency of demands for intelligence on Korea after June 25
1
ORE Operating Procedure Order Mo. 15, July 3, 1950 (Se ret),
in U/ZCl/HS files. See also two further orders: Instruction Nos 27,
July 12$ and Order No. 18, Aug. 3, 1950. (Ibid.)
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when delays in prodtctiou that had formerly been oononp1ac. had
begun to seem inadmissible. The Assistant Arectoris thought seems
to have ben that if he himself, assisted by a staff o intelligence
estimators, avc authoritative consideration to all materiel on Korea,
time otherwise spent in unresolved disagreement sight be saved.
The Spacirnj Aaff" wes not, however, the equivalent of the
toenail estimating group" reoommended so frequently is 15449-.1950.
T'or one thing, this Staff did not supersede the "Kstimates -reduction
Yoard", nor did it in are' wey disturb the general organisation of
as determined in 1949. It was emphasised, on the other hand
that the peas]. Staff was a temporary device, concerned only with
material arising out of the Korean war.
Inasmuch as virtually all material being prepared by vhE in
the steamer of 1950 was related directly to the war in Korea, however,
the 6pecial Staff's responsibilities, as long as it was in existence,
were relatively comprehensive. It was evident that the staff could
easily be transformed into a permanent estimating group such as OV,
was to become. On October 26, however, the 6pecial Staff was abolished
on grounds that the Noreen emergesay no longer required it .1
Airallel with the problem of internal organisation was the
pro 1 of departmental participation in the CIA-sponsored estimating
program. Ay 1950 had experimented with a variety of procedures
and practices, including committee systems, formal correspondence,
and direct contact and liaison, to the end of promoting and improving
1 0i-tic; Operating ?rooedwe 'order Mo. 21, Oct. 26, 1950.
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departmental cooperation in tle national eatimating process, and
obtaining a workable consensus on contemeersial issues.
Wring the period 1516-1950, CIA had been heavily dependent
on other intelligence organisations* for i11 types of- material to be
used in estimates, because its Own ?enaction SOVV1Q rt had
tiAlt to develop. ?hie material beceveY, came to in irt,
through regol4r channels primarily designed to serve ClAts currant-
intelligence needs. idcause CIE had developed since 1947 as a re-
search orAnisation, it was able to arrive rot eome e(,rclAsions
$rimsrily on the basis of this material as stored in its own files,
supplemented through direct consultation with analysts in othdr
a4enoiea. 7oma1 Aieney contributions to estimates also fiKured in
the process when they were provided. Ch;Ats practice of depending
on its own ri:ilearch, however, iec to critioia71 (including that to
be found in the Lulls* Report) to the offset that CIA i;:nored other
azencies -r the preparation of estimates rather than ltadin4.f. them
in a cooperative effort.
On the other hand, however, there could be little question
that sttepte to take oil relevant agencies into socrount in
framing final drafts of estimates. After experimenting for two
years with written circulation of drafts "for concurrence, dissent,
or comment", by 1950 adopted the method of discusting all pre-
pared drafts with ad hoc committees made up of representatives
assigned from all participating agenoies, under the chairmanship
of a 1interest i representative who had ha no ;A]rt in
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preparing the eetimete under discussiOn. These committees?mede
U p eesentially of experts?continued to meat on the estikpte at
irsue until substantial rteont 1- been reached by those par-
ticidating. j,fter the final _euet1ng a new draft was prepared by
based on the consensus reached, circulated for final comment,
and then sent officially to the I4C members themselves for concurrence
or dissent. This was made particulasly necessary by virtue of the
fact that Aembers of the ad hoc committees frequently were not per
mitted to speak officially for their agencies. For this reason,
there was, of couree, no guarantee that agreements reached at
inter-agency meetings would be final. Frequently, in fact, depart-
mental intelligence chiefs, or studying drafts agreeable to their
subordinates, raised unforeseen objections. The *wading effort to
reach agreement, however (which was frequently of lone duration),
did not normally take place at the level of the departmental chiefs
but rather Was handled indirectly through subordinates in the form
of correspondence, telephone calls, or further meetinge of the ad
hoc committees. ht the conclusion of these negotiations a satin-
factor Oran would be produced or a dissent would bcoa unsvold le.
CIA/OE- was nomally in a difficult position in these negotiations
because it could never be sure that concessions it made to dissenting
opinion on the part of one department might not render a previously
agreed draft unacceptable to one of the others. In no case observed
in the course of this study did the IAC itself meet to settle any
of these disputes. This was, ef course, a cardinal difference
between coorelnation
Aires b.fore and after ',_ctober 1.950.
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For reasons as indicated above, it can be seen that no single,
unvarying method could be eade to se)ply to the ;.rt4parction and coor-
dination of all estimates during the 1946-1950 period. In very
general terms, however, the procedure in use by October 1950 was
as follows.
A 4ven estimate project was scheduled in on the basil'
of it request from the SSC or one of the operating departments, or
on the initiative of CIA. Next, an outline of the "terms of reference',
was prepared by ORS, circulated to the departmental member agencies
of the PCs along with a request for contributions to the forthcoming
estimate. On occasion, ad hoe committees discussed terms of reference
and the allocation of contributions before they were circulated.
Tech department was expected to prepare a contribution according to
its special field of interest. The principal contributions came
from the Z;tate, Army, Navy, and Air Force Impartmentej rarely from
the other intefligence agencies in the Joint Staff, the AtOMIO
Energy .;ommission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These
contributions were used by On in the formation of a draft estimate.
This draft was then circulated to the departmental intelligence
agencies by QR. OhE then called informal meetings with JAC; 'working-
level representatives" at which conflicting views were aired, further
research invited if appropriate, and a consensus sought. After
whatever revision wits indicated at this meeting, a final draft was
formally sent to each departmental intelligence chief, for the
written concurrence of that agency-, or its comment or dissent.
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Finally, the finished estimatimus printed and disseminated.
By August 1950, a hundred semi estimate!' hod bean qroduoed,
under CIV01,!.aponsorship, aocording Veriations of this general
formula that had been followed sine. 196. More recently, during.
the eight months elms January 1950, some 21 such estimates had
been completed.2 lost of thawdealt with Soviee Union or 1;oviet
controlled areas, or trouble spots on the Soviet periphery/
/included, for map
erjea of est mates early
In June 1950 warning of the coming war in Aerie'. Other estimates
disseminated in 1950 dealt with, areas of the Free World,
In addition the following est ng projects were under
way in higust 1950, at various sta,:es of completions
nProspects for the Jeferise of Indochina against a
eJhineae ',3ommunist invasion" (ola 5050), and *Prospects
for Chinese ,;ommunist Action in Indochina during 1950P
(0.,t; 50-50 Supplement); requested by tate Lipertment,
!ugust 1950; completed and disseminated on September 7,
1950.
Prirobable fovelopeents in astern Germany by t
end of 1951" (ORI 34-50)i initiated by CIA/OR, May
completed and disseminated September 29, 1950.
50;
1
The gystem described here was highly variable. in any cases,
the "torms of reference* and *contribution* steps were omittad,
.?ach individual estimate usually brought its own problems which
required sdaAations of the system.
2
,opies of these estimates, togetherWith working papers an
correspondence, are in oirzAis files.
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?-oatwquences to the U. S. of Communist Domination
or ?le:inland :outheast Asia" (ORE 29-50); requested by
tate 2.epartment, :pril 1950; completed an0 disseminated
October 13, 1550, with dissents by State, Army, and 'it
rune.
euth ;,rricsnolities and U. S. ,ecu ' (:,r? -50
begun April 1550, requester unknown; completed onti dissemi-
mteti November 17, 1950.
"Ueutrality and Third-Force Tendencies in Western
'4Jrope" (oF 36-50; initiated by CiA/ Ilex 1950;
comAeted and disseminated Deoember 19, 1550.
Ikepercussions on the Retherlends of Indonesian
Independence (OAL 6-50); initiated by .CIA/O:, December
1249; completed and disseminated December 19, 1950.
"Soviet Joarses of Action with kespect to Korea" .
(oT.T:: 45-50); requested by NSC, July 1950; draft tient to
in September 1950; and subsequently cancelled as e
formal estimate.
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1?01111b1e ..ttitudes of Non-Soviet Countrie toward a
U. L. Decision to Initiate War against the usse (cnR 511..50);
initiated by CIA/01F1 about July 1950; draft completed.
about September 20, 1950; and subsequently cancelled as s
formal estimate.
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?ending Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity ' Change
deep :Agneral :,mith became Direetor, this CIA experiment in
cooperative* interdepartmental estimating had been the subject of
criticism ono controversy for almost four years.
oposals for
edministretive changes had come both from within and outside the
agency, P.11
icularly in 1949 and 1950. Ey the sumer of 1950, some
changes h d been made, while others had been shelved or were pending.
In Feptember 190, the outgoing Director, on the occasion of (;L,41
annual request for fends to the President and the Bureau of the
Ludget, bed singled out the manaeement of notional estimating and
the need for "improving" the eetimatimg process as the number-one
management problem of the 4:elley.2
Three major types of c?ntinuing adeinistrative problems
appear to have been involved. First, now could the estimates be
made more responsive to the needs of the Oita House, the National
-;ecurity Council, the Joint Chiefs of staff, and the several operating
departments and agencies conoerned with the national security? Next,
how could departmental intellionoe resources and talents be better
marshalled for national estimating? Finally, how could CU's own
staff for estimating be bettor organised and sUffed to servo the
complicated puroses for which it was intended?
1
8inroduotjon" to CIA Budget Eating'
dated ept. 1* 1950* Lecret, p. 10; copy
"Ustoricel Notes . . ."? 1945-52,
0/DWI3 files.
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Three sets of recommend* ens calling for e
national intelligence spites, Oenfraatiod,
Urectors in September 1950* 'LI thr
the
outgoing and lanoline
brAving beeneMbeitted
by outside parties, on the basis e ryya and inveetleations of
,
CIA and departmental intelligendi agencies made in 194b, 1949,
and 1950. The first was a,repert of the Hoover OommiEsionts sub"'
committee or task force on natiositl...ogoltraded by Ford:UMW
Eberstadt, prepared late in 194e and submitted to Congress by the
Hoover 3ommission in February 1949. The second was a report of
the Lulls. Larry 3roup to the National security Council, submitted
in January 1949 and endorsed in principle by the AOC in July 1949.2
The third was a plan for a *national intelligence sroup', contained
in. staff study prepared in May 1950, ehiefly by Oeneral John
Magruder of the Defense Ospartmcat and W. Perk Armstremg of the
State Department. This last plan was submitted to CIA in July 1950,
The Fberstadt Tisk Toros en about Nee. 15, 1948, submitted a
report to the Hoover Commiasion entitled "The Central
Intelligence Ageney, National and Sergio. Intelligence", which emir-
prised Chapter II (pp. 2540) of a longer report (some 250 pp.) on
the "National Security Organisatiote as a whole. (A copy of Chap-
ter II, undated, in en filo in 0/DCl/AR.) This report, whioh in
turn was transmitted to Congress by Hr. Hoover on Jan. 13* 1949,
remained unpublished, and should not be confused with a briefer,
unclassified repart, also entitled "National Security Organisation"
(121 pp., 1949), Published by the Hoover Commission as "Appendix JA
of its reports, nor with the Hewer Commission's own report to Com-
grass, also entitled lofhe National Security Organisation? (30 pp.).
Copies of these two published reports are in the CIA Library.
2
Dulles. Survey Iroup, Report..., on'. 1, 1949,
in 0/LCl/NS files.
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and Olibittquentl,y revised in collaboration with Cit. officials, in
lugust Hld September 1950.1
while the three survey groups were far from unanimous in many
of their recommendations, they expressed a common concern for improving
the inter-departmental estimating prisons rather than scrapping it and
reverting to a decentralised system of departmental estimates. The
Eberstadt committee* for example, had found the traditional system
of dolArimental estimating to be defloient. it had criticised the
military intelligence services for the wide divergence in their
individual departmental estimates of potential enemy strength, and
attributud this divergence partly to their "natural service interests"
and partly to the inter-service budgetary competition" among thom.2
The 7berstadt committee had foemd? furthermore, that such inter-service
estimates as were being coordimated within the Defense Department
by the Joint Intelligence Committee "contained so many inconsistencies
within a single paper that it was considered valueless for planning
.3
purposes. The Dalles ()noun had questioned the objectivity of esti-
mates made by the Joint Intelligence Committee and by the individual
1 The plan, dated May 1# 1950, was sent to the DCI on July 7, 1950,
by UnderSeerotary of state Webb) oevy in OrcOs files. Later versions
were revisions made in collaboration with CIA officials in Aug.-Sept.
1950. Copies of these later drafts, mostly undated, together with
related correspondence, are in 0/TJCl/ER.
2 Eberstadt Task Force report
',dowdy cited.
3lbid., p. 40.
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military services, and had asserted t thin the tate6 ;epartment,
"the policy make
1
advinora."
re, for OS mast part, their own intelligence
Far from abandoning the expel. C?-s ervised esti-
mating, the F,berstadt committee had emphatimilly urged that CIA
"must . ? . fulfill its respousibility-ter central evaluation of
intelligence free from departmental prejudice, control, or bias,
whether reel or imaginet."2 In the same vain, the Dulles Iroup
had urged that the national intelligenes estimate become "an authori-
tative interpretation an' appraisal that will serve as a firm guide
to policy-makers and planners.103 ClS had the "mandate" in existing
legislative and executive directives, the Dulles Group concluded
to insure that the U. S. Oovernment did have "adequate central
machinery" for "the examination and interpretation of intelligence
so that netional security will not be jeopardized by failure to
coordinate the best intelligemee opinion in the country, based en
all available information."
The Magruder-Armstrong plan of July 1950, had on. farther
than either the am atadt or Bailee plans in proposing that the
scope of "national" estimates be enlarged to include "strictly
1 Dulles Survey Group report, previ
2 1Zerstadt Tas rem* report
previously cited.
3 Dulles Survey aroup report
14 Ds 654
?
cited, p. 69.
P. W. 25
previously cited, pp. 6E-69.
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political" and "strictly eilitare estimetes? whenever such subjects
were of national policy interest. In spite of existing directives
specifying that these were within the "exclusive covetence" of the
State and Lofenea
1
13partmente, the Magruder-Armstrong plan pro-
posed that they be proc084.4 as "national" estimates.
With respect to the pre*lem of IA's "customer relations
with the policy echelon to which national estimates were addressed
the ilberstadt and Ijullea plans both had criticisms to offer and
some inprovements to suggest. The Sbeestadt committee had ooncluded
that CIA. 848 not enjaying rathelall eonfidenoe" of the National
Security Council, and had snot as yet, with ~WA encouraging
exceptions, played an4mportant tele Jape determinations".2
4ors specifically, the +committee oritiolaed the CIA estimating staff
in ORE for not having developed close eeomgh working relations,
either with the C Staff, whose meetings ORE attended only "when
invited", or with the Joint clogs of Staff, with which CIA had only
a tenuous contact.)
The committee also criticised the policy and operating agencies
for withholding background information on the 3evernment's own opera-
tional activities and deeisione. The Eberstadt eommittee concluded
1 Draft of ra tional intelligenoe group" plan, previously cited.
2 Sberstedt Task Force report previously
cited, pp. 37-38.
'Ibid., p. 33
11 Ibid., PP. 33, 37-38, 52.
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that ". . effective intelligence is possible onLyhen it is closely
linked with planning and polio, aiJcis.1 Furthermore, "if" au vas
to perform its job adequately, it *must be aware of, and participate
1
In the thinking at all those 5oLioy and plena levels."
The Dulles report, similarly, had found a lack of confidence
in -.;IA's estimates, but attributed it primarily to CIA's tendeney
to take thu 3n1tiative in launching estimates independently of the
departmental intelligence agencies, and to "select pig own subjects
and establish Zrtg own priorities'. Like the iberstadt committee
the Dulles -iroup criticised policy staffs for withholding background
operational information from CIA, and warned against the dangerous
tendency of the policy staffs to ignore estimates.3
Thu Oulles )roup had little to recommend, however, an how to
meet the needs of the policy staffs, except that CIA should rely
more heavily on greater participation by the departaental intelli
wince agencies, including their participation in the planning of
eettuting projects and the settin; of priorities.4
The 4agroder-Armstrong plan for a "national intelligence
group" had rOatively little to say an this subject, except to pro-
mo that the advice of the intelligence kdvisory onisitte* be
is .Survey ',Inrup report, previously cit
'Ibid., W. 79, 80.
4 Ibid. p. 73.
p. 691 70, 12, 74.
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brongbt into the lanning of ?sttiatjngprejoete, and into the
reviewing of any projects that mightily "initiated" by At ?1
Greater participation ty the departmental 1ntelli4ence
agencies at ell stages of the estimating ;)rocess was, meanwhile,
the major theme in ell three sets of proposels. The iberstadt
committee had recommended that the oontacts between the CIA esti-
matinc staff and the IAC agencies be strengthened, and that the
Intelligence Avisory Committee itself be convened more frequently
by Vie on substantive issueo in specifio estimatee.2 s to
departmental research contributions to entimates, the gberstadt
committee observed that both the departments and CIA ORZ. frequently
'examined the same basic material", but concluded that to "some
degree" such duplication was 'inevitable and even desirable".3
i4ther than curtail CII research, the Fberstadt committee suggested
that CI;'In analysts be placed "in the message centers and secre-
tariats of the departaents and flip-Aare services, to sift out
4
really important material for routing to CIA".On the controversial
issue of "political,' intelligence work, shared by .:11 and the state
Lepartment, the 'eberstadt committee recom;Nended that "a large part"
A.an for naticnal intelligence group", including 'both ori
version of 411y 1950 and revised version of Au.-apt. 1950, pre-
viously cited above.
2 Tberstadt Task -Pewee report
cited), p. 53.
t ?
3 'bid* 49-50.
a.
Ix 16
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of State's intelligence research branch, which during the war had
bea a prrt & f be transferred to CIA.1
Thr.__ Dulles troup had come to somewhat different cceelusiene
on how to iiproe departmental cooperation in CIA's estiTaatinc pro-
gram. Not only should the dep,:ztraerits 'trolly participate" at all
staeeo of the program, but all of them should assume collective
responsielliV for the fininhed estimates.2 OT;ls practice of
relytng heavily on its own research was categorically condemned,
i its procedure of circulatilg drafts of eettmates and inviting
"a formal notation of dissent Jr concurrence" did "not substantially
mitigate" CIA's "failure" to achieve lull cooperation.3 RE's
"initiative" in selectinE stilates projects and setting priorities
on them without departmental ceneultation was deplored. Vihile the
Dulles Croup did not translate these indictments into a full posi-
tive stetor. of revised procedures, it did, in general, erge
fuller participation by the IAC and its departmental memtrs At all
stazes in the estim,. ing process.
Sonowhat in the same direction, but with proposals in fuller
detail) Was. the Magruder-Armstrong plan, which called for greater
participation by the departments, individually and through the IA,
1
Ibid., e, ?
2Dulles 2urvey Group report (previously cited), pp. 5, 77, 62, el.
3 ail. 72, 71J,75
'Ibld., 70, 72, 74.
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in CIAls estimatin4 proram. thus, the IAC was oz.:;sc.tdto "svise"
the T on estimathg zirojects being initiated 45 well as
on '-;overnen
ist 'Jane "which should be based . on estimates". 1
The setusl irtn of estimates woule continue to be hendled within
CIA, but ehohld IA, based as fully as possible on "departmental con-
tributions, oral '740 written, and Zak..7 oe,artmeatal views . . con-
production 2. On the other hind, "depa t-
hould7 be subjected to adequate safegunrds
existing intcllionce resources should
3
"continue to Le employed. The indiviouai departments ut have
sidered t sll stages of
mental . . . resources
srpinst bias", and :.!IA's
an op,)ortunity to review an estimate in dr&ft stage, while the IA::
would subject the final drart to "'formal review". in aduition? the
should review research an collection inadequacies revealed in
a FAven estimatin )roject, and "advise" the !VI on collaLoration
with foreign intt1li;trnce agencies for the production of qcombined'
estimstes.4
Finally, as to internal oraniution for estimating,
?
all three survey groups had recommendations to offer. The [A}erstadt
committee., unlike the others, did not criticise Oilais basic organi-
sation, with its several re4onsl branches, its several branches
1 -
raft of plan for "national intelligence group", '43.y and
-tAj..-ept. 1950 versions, previously (UMW.
2 Ibid.
3 aid.
14 :bid.
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specializing in particular tepiaal fields, and its plannines
1
reviewing, and edAcrial staff'. At the same tIee, eowever, it
proposed that (.:V estatlish en "inteiligence evaluation toe-rd" at
"s hich levcr, presumAhly in .)ei if not in the Arector's immediate
office', where "a email group of highly capable imeple, freed from
adelnistrative ljetairs would be assigned to tconcer.trate upon
intelligence evaluation" and. be "set to thinking about intelligence
on
2
The :Allies lronp, on tte other hand, regarded U as the
the noire of the :;overnmentIE entire estimating system, which should
be thorounI reoreanised. It charged 017 generally with
"failure" in estimating, with one or two- exceptions, whose occur
rence wee largely fortuitous", and accused ORF? of having been
diverted" from national estimates to "the erodnction of miscellaneous
reports and summaries which by .no stretch of the imagination could
be considered national estimates".3 The solution, according to the
lullee Iroue, wee to divorce estimating completely from other types
of intelligence production, and re-establish it in a new, separate
'etimates A?vlsion. That Axesion would consist of "a smell group
of htehlY selected individuals" who would "review" the products of
the depertmentel intelligonce agencies, draft the estimates from
eeerstact Task Force
P. 30.
2 ?
i0* p. 49.
3
version, previous iteu),
uli..,urvey roue report (dreviously cit
IX 19
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them, end At variArls utae s subject the drafts to review by the
departments rnd the
till m,ther n.proacb to reorganization was c;ffered
'..agrur!cr 1,'! .T-.:.3stron, in their plan for a new "national intelli-
?,Ireviou mentioned. Like th._ others, this plan
but
oiled for the end of WI.: and for a separate etimatin,,,: st.aff/it
also called for a companion staff to be concerned with current
intelligence. In this plan, both the "national estimates staff"
Nnd the "current intelligence staff" would work in close coopera-
tion as two complementary parts Of a larger "national intelligence
;1*coup", both staffs would be concerned with evaluating foreign
capabilities and intentions, and each staff in turn would work in
close collaLoration with the departmental intelligence agencies:
one staff (*nal the immediate viewpoint of current indications; and
the other from the more detached "long-range" viewpoint of "well-
confirmed? estiwItes.-
- Thus .1eneral Smith was confronted, between August and October ?
190, with three sets of similar but somewhat divereent proposals
mffecting the future course of CIA's estimating program ond Proce-
dure. T4ken tocethor, these proposals comprised a considerable
body of informed opinion on the problem as a whole, and each report
carried a particular weight of authority with it.
Ibid., pp. 6-7, 77, el, 0.
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The '.7berstadt report, for exsaiple, ld cnt to Congress the
year before, with the endorsement of the totaver 2ommis8ion, and with
it, the implication, at least, that ,;1:, would eventually be account-
able to -)ongreSs on the recomAendations that the :1,00ver Comuission
had made.
The Allies report had been endorsed by the National ,Security
iounoil, at least in principle, in July 1949; and now (in ,,ugust-
uctober 1950) the report had taken on a special persuasiveness, in
the sense that two of the three prim/pal signers of the report
(:11en 4. ;Sullen and William N6 Jackson) were in the process of being
;Wanted by the President at Deputy Lirectors on ,:;eneral 4mith's
staff. Jackson, in particular, is known to have urged the Julies
report on 5-tith, end recalled later that he had accepted the position
of .cputy (to which he was appointed by the 2resident in fuguat 1950)
only on the condition that Tcnaral Smith "read and approv& the Dulles
2
repo
The 'M'aruder-rmstrong plan had at first been rejected by
airsi:iillenkoetter (July 1950), but it had been subeequently
1 on 112,i. 22, 1950, while Ceneral bmith's nomination es 1I was
before the -mate, the lashington Post asserted categorically that
Jackson had Ulm a.,:pointec as .4parrirector of fbout the
same ti!se? Trihur Krock reported, in the New York Times, that
vereU'iarriman (a member of -resident Truman's daTracuae staff),
"had a nand" in Jackson's appointment. (see scrapbook of press
clipoinzs entitled "t3JA in the News", 1950 volume, in the CO
Library.)
2 Aatorica ;taff interview with William L Jackson, Feb. 16,
1955, in 6/,"1 IS files.
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revised by the ncrol .*.ounsel and other CI officials in collabora-
tion wA.t!, ,:tat e And Lefense officials, And by mio- eptember .150
dillenkoetter was ready to accept it. On :etoter 3,
4. !. Jackson read and cum-landed the plan as a "sound" one, end
had endorsed it for ceneral consideration.1
Your days later, Jackson had asked for its views, par-
ticular)} on a eeparate setimeting staff in CIA, and on oeteber 10,
had received from a "rough plan" fur a separate "Office of
,stimatee, over the signature of its chief, Theodore Yabbitt,
and his two senior assistants for estimating, Ludwell L. .4ontague
25X1A and 2 Like the Pulles report of 19149 and the
25X1A
"national intellieence group" ?len of 1950 (which were cited), OR's
plan called for establiehing the eetimates function an a separate
-bmpcnent in CIA. the matter of inter-agency participation in
estimates the S C was to provide final review, while the detailed,
continuing, day-to-day job of inter-sgency liaison and consultation
WIZ tu be Achieved, not by formal committees, but through a )ordina-
tion and Liaison 'Aaff in the new 14timates Uffice. Thin coordination
staff would be composed or full-time representatives from the other
?!:emorandum by Jackson to -;mith, Oct. 3, 1950, I in
filed under "NS;ib-1950P. Jackson and 6mith had been OA
duty in CIA since Oct. 1, but were not sworn in until Oct. 7, 1950.
2 ;lemorandum by ilibbitt, lontague, and to ..eputy
Urector Wiliam 4. Jackson), Oct. 10, 1950,1 !entitled
"Plan for a Tit Office of 'atisates"; copy in
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intolligence-producin4 aenciee, end of esti, es representativen
who would be stationed at the eajor intelligence-usingatlencien,
notably at the :vational eecurity Couneil etaff, tne joint Intent-
eence :roue (of the Joint Chiefs of Starr), and the :,?Pice of the
ieecretary of ;efense. O's plan also included a current intelli-
gence division, accountable teland a responsible component ofothe
new ,Ctimates Office. Apart from organisational particulars,
specified three conditions which had to be met to insure greater
success in cooperative estimating; (1) the recruitment of additional,
qualified senior personnel for estimates work, but not from among
personnel "now in CIA"; (2) more adequate research contributions
from the ::tate and eefense Departments, 4a condition Ziaticki7 cannot
be net at present;4 and (3) "a cooperative attitude" among those
departments an the other intelligence agencies, especially with
respect to the process of coorelination of the drafts of eatimates.
,!ow imeortantly each of the four sets of proposals just
outlined fieured in Aneral emith's plannini during his first weeks
in office, is not entirely clear from the records seen in this study;
eed whether he was influenced by still other sources of opinion is
not known. The Julies report was apparently foremost in his Ind*
and central in Jackson's thinxing as well. Thus, on October 12,
nith expressee his seherence to that report, at lis first appearance
at tee eeetines of the hational 6ecurity .;ouncil; and a;ain on
October 20 he declared (this teem at a meeting of the intelligence
Ibid.
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Advisory '.:4/1121it,t, tint the WiGls previous L:iciGrocileA of the
report, in 34.494 onetituted the governing directive on tiAt ,A the
sa:ul tic4o, announcud t&t1 ili2A "terminated" further co::84,0criAt')roa
of t.he zitate-efense Ann for a "national intelligence grou,F*, with
t4c a,:reent of those depertments. 1
T:ile louver Commission recommendations were not cited at all
at the meeting of .47.tober 20,2 nor WitIVOAOS reorganisation plan
of ctober 10. It appears nevertheless, from .1mith's decisions in
-ctuber End November, and in later modifications in :0'51 and 1952,
that elements in (.:Ift's new organisation were derived from all roar
?dans.
In any case, two major steps were taken immediately that
stcalned d1rect15, froN the ?ulles report. One Was to reactivate the
Ihtellijence virory ommittee (beginning on ')ctober 12, 1950) loe
the focal point or departmental participation in estiAating,
1inutes of 1'C meeting, :Act. 20, 150, in two versione ("rough
notes" and final copy as circulated), both in 0/LCIAS. At this
neetirw *neral ,nith summarised what he hwu said at the meeting
on .,ctober 12.
2
ibid. Although the minutes of October 20 indicate that ;eneral
oclith na60 no reference At that meeting to the oover
survey of in 194t (the .berstadt Task Force), he nevertheless
knew of the clayey arm; had read the report. Thus, two months before,
at the :'esiate LallrinK on his lomination in Ilgust, he had singled
out the toover ,oNmissionla mport as the one item of "homework"
he hao read so far, along wita the directive* and statutes covering
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especially for ntrdopf-:rttl.:1 ov1iborat1on on tilt'
of the esti4zte. T c to establish & 0.*
:(stimatea (on NoveAter 13, 1.0) as thf!'fodhl :uint within for
s:he drafting of eatimatec and tee plennin and ouporvision or the
estimates ?)rdra-,4 (;imerally.
The ntn1iitnoe dvisocy .:ommittee, radc up GI' the, depart-
m6nta1 intelligence chiefs 7:reeided over by the 07,:, was not,
of course, t new inter-agency comAittme In the 2,overnNent's
orgP.nisation, but its participation in the esti- tin process
was a new departure in octobor 1950. initially leneral ith first
convoned the for coordination of estimates, on october 12, 1950,
in perticulAr, to clisouss and approve the final drafts of several
the
estim;Aee onrar astern situation, which had been prepared by
(under its caLabliehod procedures) for us by the l'resi?lent at his
forthcomirm 4iike It5land conference with .;encral 71ackr:h 1ur. Thus
was inauurated under the Ifi, a method for harmonizing and radon-
cunflictin v ewe, for increasinz the zroa of agrwoment? and
for t5tflY the sense of de?artmental participation and inter-
dopartaental cooperation.
1
3mith convened the ',PC, for the first that, in his adminia-
tration, 17or the "precise" ,Iurpolie of working out ray ?a:A estimates
for :re8i6ent Truman to take along to 4ake island, ond this meeting
led to the "firat real coordination of national estimates in the
history a intelligence", it was said later. (See memorandum
by L. irkpPtrick, . . . in . . -,;oordination",
undated, at-out ov. 1951, p. 4; copy in
filed under 1 See also 0/XI/;ES study concerning
esti:la-tea of ,,Thinese ,.eomnuniat Intervention in the 6orvan war dated
195).
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tflc nt meeting, on October 20, Jeeezon ereeented a
restatement of thtory of. national estimatine, eee -zT4r411 eeileet
followed with en outline or Jr-waders gelling eenceforth for ferekel
7 ection at additional stees itothe eutimating process. eence-
leirte te would be Invitee to participate in the elannine of
eeteentine ,eeijectz? to the extent of reviewing and eeopting
ra-
jeet list ncseteene priorities in it, i4ech department was asked
te submit project proposele leeethe next meeting, to to adde0 to the
liet teet wao meanwhile to b.. reeered by O. Likewise, on the
elenniee of terms of. reference for individual projects, eeneral emith
announced that the 1ee henceforth would discuss and pare on the "frame
of reference and . . . assumptions on which the estimate is based.
(Thl rte2 wna revised in suLeegtent weeks, however, to provide,
Instead, th..t.t eiele estimating staff would first discuss each set
of Ur?is of reference informally with the working-vol representa-
tive of the eeparteents, and refer to the IAC only those drafts of
ter me of reference on which a'resent could not be reached.)2
fl 1
1 linutes of meeting, act.
2
20, le50,
in eieefiee.
25
en ect. 26, the .fe. consicered and Reproved
for
terms
of reference
estimates on :i.ndo---!hina enc. :_ermany, and went on to si?Tee on
the
3:e.neral ,Jrinciiole that terms of reference should not, however,
be inflexible,
tiwt "the experts should be allowed some latitude in
*working
eqt neceesary changes." (Minutes of IAC meeting, in lIC
secretariat files, in 1Js..) any in december, elki proposed to Or::
that draft teee of reference heed not be cleared in the Ike
unless issues erise at the working level", and this ermedure (en-
dorsed
Cy OI, on :ec, 6) was eeeroved
by the
ife on Dec. 7. (ece
eemerandum by to eeel? Dec. 6,
totn. in
and Jle minutes, ,mt. 7
25
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In other ascte, the:procedure outltrc,i Gn ctber 20 was
not unlike existini'; praotieeu CIA :would vign contributions
to the UC member departments, unit.: deadlines in "consultatiele
with them. Upon the comdletien of the first draft Of the estimate,
would send it to the departments for review, comment, and
"further discusnic11, if requited." The "second, or later drafts
if required," would te odbmitted to the 71.j.; itscilf for "final
discussion, resolution of differences, and approval," in accordance
wjt t!le -)reoedent stA on (;etober 12.1
sny remaining difforeneee emeld not be resolved there, the
estinvat would be issued with 'notation of suistantiel dissent and
reasons therefore." For "crash' estimates, such as the Far estern
reports co-lr)leted on October 12 for the ''resident? a special meeting
of the 14 would be convened to the PCI, whereupon alency represen-
tatives (that is, from OIA and the departments) would be naseigned
at once" to )2.o4uce s draft, and the I would receive it for
iscussion,
revision,and approval."2
The establishment of a separate estimating staff within OIals
organisatlon war :eneral heith's second major decision, announced
first on .fotober 20, 1950, at the PC meeting with the departmental
inte11i4ence chiefs, and again on Uovember 13, to the staff of C;IA,
,hethor this rcoryanisaticm was to consist aim,Jly of a re-naming of
the 6oecial ,,teff, which had been establishmo within in Ju1y 1950
1
-tnuten of i meetinz, 9c1... 20, 1950,
2
In' files. 25
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to supervise the estimating program, or whethr there tics to be a
liqUidation of L nd a conolete d$Olerce of estimating from Os
other production functions, wan not immediately clear, however,
from two versions of the minetes of the *sooting of ?..ctober wnich
nave eurvived.
ecording to one which 4$8 roparted by one a the i.rmy
observers present 1 17oneral Sm-Ith called 0167 "the heart an soul
of ac and of the national intelligence machinery, which he pro-
posed simply to divide into two divisions--a Erivision of .stimatee,
which woulo ndie the estimate', program, and a -ivision of Besic
intelligence
which would noonfine".ita activities to producing
reports on "subjects assigned specifically by law to ciApn "eithin
the new .['Stimetes ivision of JA10? aeneral 4)mith went on, edcording
to this version, there would be established Ilsk panel of five or six
individuals constituting the top braine of the new estimates organi-
zation. ::-mith had been "lo king hard for a retired General or
idmiral" to head the division, so the i'l!myls minutes reported, and
he had attempted to recruit t.dniral Leslie Stevens, recent Naval
Attache at closcow. ehile Plith was continuing his efforts to "per-
suaee" Asvens to cume to Cit, he was also "anxious to ,:et .1eneral
1 ,141eL,..h draft" or minutes ef 11-J meeting, Let. 20, 1950, niened
by -;-2; in 0/;;GI/H5 files.
2
dhether the
in its technical
(se=e ,Ilk,ter Vi.
resonrch
phrase "Leesic intelligence ivision" was used advisedly
sense, to cover only the National Intelligence :)urveys
, st,ove), or whether it simply denoted a :Leneral
in is not clear from the linuten cited above.
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ft.7 be a meMber of the panel, and ..os bly
1
?i :head the divi5ion.0
in a later editod version of ilihutos of the meetine on
Octobr 2, cs circulated about November 1,2 the new estimates
staff was labelieu es an entirely separate office--the "ffice of
National :stL:aetes,', rather then a new division of ..;ia; arid the
research ecmpenents of which Jeneral irflith had proposed to
call the 'Wale Intelligence avision
f ';#1.4-1 were now also called
a saparate office?the Office or aesearch and eports.
?resumably
neral J.:111th was lore certain hy November I that U4F, shou-lo be
lividated arid replaced by two now offices. No mention 1#41b made
in the revised minutes, icwever, of any board or panel of esti-
mators within
new estia=-Ing organisation. Nor wae the
3
search for 4/1 ststant .irector of ,3/i:? ment.onwel preeurdably
because, by Novelber 1 fleral Selith nee settled on the apdoint-
ment o/ 411/a:4 ,angor.
iieither veraienf these decisions of October 20 indicated
whether enoral ,nith expected to keep 5 current intelligence staff
1 "-,ou;,.!h drsft" of r4eutes cf meeting, Oct. 20, 1950,
previously cited.
2
qeviscd .reft of minutes,
'fills typescript, with longhand
ictober 2,a ,,arently was the
cute and 4iileo,ra,hed copies pr
cm-Y. 1. ' copy of the ,rinted
3 Ibid.
labelled "IPC-'4-1", in 0/CI files,
changes and carrying the original date
final draft fro: 4 which A "stencil was
:xted for circulation, probably about
ainutes is in PC Lecretariat files in
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in CIA, end ee ee eew it was to be relatud to the eatimeteee Tunction,
e few days leteem however, on sovember 7 anC. E, "eurrent division"
appeared 11F. coeeonent of the hew :Office eeLlenel estimates, on
a
two drefts ?/prpGied ti%;Anization chArt t:f TIA's pro-
duction uffleesi and a few weeks later, shortly after CA. was
ofl'icinflestetlished, such a Durant staff wee actually ii tailed.
in elee 14 the transfer of Sawa 30 former 7.abcrs of current
intellieence ereee. Thus the iesue of current intellieence appeared
to be settled, t least for the tile being, much along the lines of
Oe's rememendetione of ectober 10, rather than according to the
eulles reeort (which had questioned CIA's need for that activity)
or the etete-eefenes elan of September 1950 (which had osiiled for
A current 1nt6Jlionce staff ia CIA but ono tbet would be co-equal
with the estleetine staff).
One other item in the plenning being done in the fall of 1950
mieht bear mention with reference to the later development of ee/I.
I deeliminary version of the Agency's new organisation chart, which
hed appeAred on November 7 and 8, 1950, showed a ueeputy Arector for
National estieates", as superintending not only 0Ne but the other
production offices as well, toeether with the Office of eperationa
1
eee proposed charts for (1) CIA as a whole, Nov. 7, 1950, and
(2) GIA's lytellieence offices, grouped under a proposed "eeputy
eirector for National stimates". Copies of these charts are in
r4i; A" file, and in .7nnex 13, below.
2,
eee below, p. 35.
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and time Office of s.olleetion and Dieleminetion. this chart
was newer adopted, it probab34 rein-meted **sthtn the Inportance
attached by the Urector to -his estimeWitrevoneibilAz.,
those critioal weeks. I-urtheracre, with the establsh-nont of A
e)uty'drcAor of intelligence sons fourteen months later (in Ovnu-
ftry 2452), aomet rQvemblime the 195o :-rce)osal was actually
:Aeeanwhile, the Leputy Arector? ifl1.sa . jfiakeon, proba-
bly ,;eve .;urte than a proportionate she's of hiu attention from Octo-
ber 1550 to August 1951 to the affairs ef.the new ATice of National
stimatoe, thus achieving somewhat the 'lame purpose.
In spite of the establishment of new estimating Ce'fice, there
Was e substantial thread of continuity with the past experience of
t 'iEnhy with this 'oroblem. While Oh-k yea forally liquidated,
with the announcement of Novemeer 13, 1,50, ita Job and resourcee
were not abandoned. Its experimsed estimators were to Locos* the
nucleus of the now UNA oollio or its ?rocefiures and methods for eliciting
interdepartmental cooperation were continued end others revised. ' few,
at least, of its pending estimates were continued by Qte. and were come
dieted in the weeks end months ahead, end disseminateu under the new
format of "national intelligence estimates." it was also apearent
that mak; of the substantive and administrative probltma confronting
in the next two years were not unlike those that hied faced 0..%
before it.
1 dmiosed oranisatton charts dated ov. 7 and el 19!:,
cited above.
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2FittRAF:ALLTA:4,i1L.....aff the New stiwrAter -lace
Heading the Office of National Xstimate saiatzult araster,
beginni4:? on November 13, 1950,1 was Mr. William LAO ;,an:;er? who same
to CrCA iarvard Universit:, and who brought with him both a die-
tinipliahed scadeic record in history and internatlonal relation*,
and the intellii:ence experience of having headed the wartime Research
snd finelysis 1A.sneh of %VS and (for nome months after the war) the
otetv e...rtniontle Intelligence research branch, few daya lter2
he was Joined iqy Mr. aerman Kant, professor of hlstory on levoie
from Yale Universty, former instructor et the National der ,ollege?
and like Lare;er, a key officer of the wartime intelligence production
group in :uring his first weeks in t, Kent wee designated as
a "consultant" in :,Nr,33 about ..ecember 1950 he was named its fiputy
Assistant Arector; and some thirteen months later (in January 1952)
he was appointed ;ssistant :irector, upon Lengeris return to ,:ervard.4
11 table of organisation was evolved during the first weeks
of the reorganization, in hovember and ;:-Jecember 1950. it was described
1 Langer's appointment was ahnounced in .',eneral tinier 4o., 37,
13, 14,50, in CIA ecords ,:;enter.
2 :ent came to -.Jr in Nov. 1950, according to a New York Timms
article z,Lout him published Jon. 22, 1952. (!,ee press-clidping serer,.
book, "f.,1 in the N'ews"? in Th Library.)
3 Kent's title "consultant" was used in wrioue l4 memoranda 6uring
his first weeks on duty, for example, on leo. 15, 1950. (lee
"c'Irono file, in
te4311.'3 a-pointment as Pssistant 'irector was announced by the
,hite .qn1s4- on Jim. 21, lid52. (New York Times, 4An. 22, 1952, in
scrnbook cited al:eve.) The yj forlal (otice to
the P stff '7.as not been found.
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by Langer as an "incredibly sinple" internal organization; in
-"one of tile smallest gomponectS7 in CIA," and "chicken f4,0-u by usual
1
jovcrnment standards."
0.11i1e the size of O34Is staff lie larger than the preceding
estiwating -!,roup in (the ":44ocia1staff"), it w considerably
smaller than am of the other production offices in the :,,:ency in
3Enera1 time.
zaton for tA7.? in Jant
1
-xtemporaneous remarks
onference? 13* 11.,
2
"Table of Qrganization
Jan. 17,
et .-)TRos Agency jrientation
on disc recording, in OTA files.
for the.'?,?iffice of 4Ational ifAtimates
in ONE nchrone
3 lcornw by idministrativa officer, N, to Hr.
"Table of isgenization Office of National -stimates", 51#
1.1.PP?m in 0147 "chrono file.
"terronnel !eport, Office of National '';stimates, PS of 17 Feb.
1952," h op., in c:A77. ",7!hront file".
5 femorandum by .eputy .nsistant Firector of ONE for Administration
L534 i n Ol& "chrono file."
Ito &pecial Assistant for ;:dministration, ffice of
Jam. 29,
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Se1ecte bars of the _ismer
tine staff um certain
other intelligence officers of the now-1iqu1dited constituted
the nucleus of the sta.; f that was initiial4 recruited for ??,
between Novenber 1950 and January 1
u ' 11:', for din. 1951 cited above. In. 1950, the tr.?
had asked the -ecratery of ;Jefae for I lofficers"
for estimates work. Oite letter fro l DC! to ;iscretary? of Aefense,
c. 26, 1950, I in Otk.ah.ii, filed under
" epart:lent of ernee, ,1:over uort.")
tvtles of orniz&tion,Meroh 1951 and jam 1953 cited above.
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reh 1951,
,erisonnel on full-time duty in
ome from this
original 0i,- .rou4 urd among then was represented, as 4ent put it
1Pter? a "-consicerable experience in writing estimates."4 Luring
the next two years., &Lost half of these (i'kL,...trained nen, together
...viradormarrournboo.
i -
The .a;its decision to place the current intelligence function
in N was not ninounced in his leneral uroer or Nov. 13, but it was
probatly a1rea4y nettled by tivt date. Thus, two days later,
asked the (I.A Ixecutive to transfer I O 4,spa-
cifical4 to head that function, and on Lox. 22 it submitted a list
offliformer employees I Isto
constitute u .-Orrent intelligence aff" In ,114 (:t. menoranda by
isaistnt rector of to Clf :secutivo, Nev., 15 and Nov. 22,
in .CN, "Carom files; see also ,:liapter VII; above.)
4 Hr. nt 1Pter recalled td the till', in 404. 1V52, that the "entire
stuff" of N-, wiicx it wuu first organized, was rocr4ited from within
r;IA, vius carr,yin forward "consioaratas evyarience in writig estimates".
(ue his AC10 TA) 1,14. is 1952s in "ehrono
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with a good number of clerieal and administrative no:waned who had
also been obtained from late in 1950, remaioad with the new
rAstimetes Office. The others were meennimile released for o
raffle"
ty, for duty with other headquarters officers, or for What Kent
called reasons of "incompatibility,"
The other full.time personnel, who made op the 3t&ff of la
in 1951 and 1d52, were for the nest part new to CI A.2 In addition
to Langer and Kant, those appointed to senior positions during the
first year were
on laier;
from Duke univorsity0
Ii
varsity of Talifornia;
The internal organise on of ORE, as it developed in
and 1952, seenel to follow partli the
9
Fiance of partly the
2 fhese men were brought into CIA "systematically," iartly
"new blood" and partly because of the difficulty or getting "
for existing CIA personnel from other offices, and the net re
1013 "an optimum balance between told hands' an 'new blood'," BO
'ant observed in Atm. 1952. (Ibid.)
3
thereafte
illness.
4
Assistant
came in pec. 1950 and served until about 01
was shifted to a pert-time consultant basis
5
rt-timet
1951, and
cause of
came in Jan. 1951 and a year Later became the )souty
Arector, when rent moved up to become Assistant firoctor.
rwed from about ',Arch to June 1951, and then became a
conaultant.
6 These men came later in 1951.
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Dulles and 'terstr!dt recommendation of 4949, and ,?)artly the ideas
of Langer nnd %is irIllediete adViters. The general outline of oNiOS
orgenization lit13 apparent sol-tly after its establishment in
ovember 1950, And provided for four principal components concerned
with the ostivIting program, -together with a fifth covonent, the
current inte1li7cnce staff, which remained attached to until
erI January 1951. A.? the four components for estimatang, three
were fixed in 3t411: table of organization on January 17, 1951, as
follows: the Soard of hational Estimates; the .Lstimotes Av_ff
(divided into a c.4neral ':;roup, a Specialist ,5roup? and a Alitary
roup); and P alpport Aaff (with three branches for editorial and
reproduction services, reading room nervices, and information
control). 1
The fourth component, consisting of a denel of part-time
consultants
did not apar in the table of organization, but
it had been announced by 'lenerel 6 2mith on IScember le, 1950, and
1 "Table of Cruanization for the ATice of National 'atimates",
Jan. 17, 1951, in OfL; "Ohrono file."
? 2 jeneral i1th announced ta the Assistant iArectore on :.to. If),
1950, the formation of what he called a "consulting board", to meet
periodically on estimating problems, and that
1 hand others"
had been or were being appointed to that hoard. (Anutes of TA;Tin
staff conference 8-M-1, Farly in 1951,
I ;11 Cy2X;Ii. ) . ,
withdrew from the' I (See memorandum by ON to R
tro11er parch 7, 1951, and memorandum to Lag', Nov. 29, 1950, both
n ON "chrono file%)
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and kr May 1951 it s in operation as a recognized element
in OR?ta, rganization rid procedure.
11th minor change this was
in onsral the outline of ONEls organisation during its first
two and one half years, to Irebruary 1953.
Of the four coilponents of ONL the new Board of National
sti-
*tea became, In effect, the senior staff in ONF, with the final
rtsponsibility for reviewing, revising and approving all drafts of
ostimate5' written in CIA before they WITI, submitted for formal
inter-departmental review and approval in the IC and released by
the Arector for dissemin i General Smith apparently had had
such a senior staff in mind wi-on he spoke of the need for what he
called "a panel of five or six individuals constituting the top
brains" in the estiaatin program, in his reorganization plane out-
lined to the TA ,1 on October 20, 19-0.2
2 See minutes of Ife meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, in 0/OCl/H5.
this concept of an internal beard or panel was not specifically men-
tioned in the 1:ulles report in 1949, it was singled out for spacial
recommendation in the Aoerstadt oommitteels recommendations, previously
cited above. ;lowever, in the preliminary organisation chart for OW:,
early in Nov. 1950 arid a week before the new office was launched, no
ouch top panel or board was mentioned, although the chart did show a
"senior staff". (See proposed CIA organisation chart, Nov. 8, 1950,
in Annex below.) by rec. le, 1950, the idea was revived, when
eneral 6mith announced to his immediate staff that a "high level
board" was being established within ON. (see minutes cf DOIls staff
conference, - in 0/ICIA.)
Ix 38
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In its prcceures 4:vrin new Board of Nationnl .1,7.2vItor operated
largely by collective deliberation in such of Its work in the next
two eceer. In membership end crganie,9%!enel status becnuse It was
not A tyeicAl board in the usual eevernmental ,4esning of the word;
that is, .t was not ;I
nommitteF whose members were representatives
? Of different aeencies or repretentetive of various fstlished points
of view. . or was it comperable- tu eells eerlicr experiment of an
estimates
production board, whfoh had been race up principally of
chiefs ef CI 'a research divisons and branches who had tended to
.reererent the particular regional or topical fields of research
speeielIzetien for welch the had individual responsibility. Instead,
the new Tewre? presided over b the lesistant Arector himself, WAS
Aade up entirely of senior staff members of most of them serving
under full-tine 7TA eepointments, who were expected to have a "eeneral"
and "mature" point of view toward the international problem at hind.
Langer described them as intelligence officers with long experience
academie men with extensive knowledge of international relations,
1
and former military officers vAh"global" judgment.
erheps the name "board" was originally attached to this group
in order to eive estimat.'eng procedure An seditionel measure of
prestige,to match the formal committee review by the Interdepartmental
Intelligence ielvisory Committee. Thus, Laneer, at one point early in
jenuary 1951, seemed to regard the internal board and the external
1 -
extemeoraneous remarks by eilliam L. Langer, Nr,i, Feb. 13,
re51, at ._12efe 6gency Crientateon Conference; on disc reeordine,
in Ji iles.
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committee
at "the zOillti
w .t competitive, when he e
ske;.ticism
. . to keep pace wth rch Li h
group" as Ws own "high owere estimates board."'
In any case, he me be.rshid of the rioard? like thtt of tne
other co,)onents of . waz aaue up, frtin the beginning, of "old
hends inc n blood," as int later characteri d AIE's entire staff.2
n Jeneral L;nit n announcement on December l, 1950, he 1 sted
Langer tithe new :ssistant irector), I. 4ent (about to be
,-inted eputy),
as the initial members of the i2oard.3 -leo included,
rirtually from the
the
beginning, are the two senior eU:aatara from
now-1i-I-Idated "- Ludwell L. 'ontegue
who almost imrledietely became the hoard's
, "alumni" served con-
xeoutive ::;te.creta
tinuousiy on the I?,
!,.11 three of these
nz the next two yrs uf the presont study,
as well bs crin the period following. All original members, however,
staff conferences, jan. 1951,
2 ;ee
orpnduiit bi Kent to Aug. 1, 1952,
Ichrono
3 1inutts of staff conference, Dec. 16
sition ;uring S's first weeks was "..decial 1.ssistant"i
begioc. 49, 1950, he was called !,Xceutive .ecretary of the
board of 41tione1 'ationtes. :,lee various !-Iemoranda, Dec. 1550, in
(.24: Ichrono file".) .)11 Jan. 4, 1952, Iw re-eesinated Deputy
I-ssistvnt ircctor mr'nministration. (IX) ice c 52, Jan. 4, 1952,
in ;Ieeords ;:enter.)
in
0,
in ONE
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except Kent, depnrteri eventually in 1951 and 1952, but continued to
serve ONE. subsequently on nn seeisory, part-time basis, tfirtugh,
()NrIs "pnnel of consultants," Jeseribed below.
25X1 A
?
f't first, the Uational 'atimates Beard's single, domirant
function was to review, discuss, and revise drafts of estimates
written by the ,atimates Stnff, and this remained its continuing
responsibility in 1551 end 1952. In this task the !;:oardts procedure
wau somewhat Akin to the academic seminar, in that the one or more
members of the -stimates Ltaff who had worked on the draft were
usually also present, (luring the Deard s deliberations, to defend
their conclusions and their evaluation of the evidence on which the
e3timste wnn bulit?
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The Board Flee ndopted i second type of mooting to which, on
a given draft etAil-titd, it invited "working-level" representativi.,s
of the eentritetine groups in the YAC agenclee am the Ce rcseRrci:
offices, in this second phase of deliberation, the ecerd carefully
adhere to the theory (in its iroereas reports and formal correa-
)ondence) that it wee pimply 13etting 000nsideration" of the estimate
by the departmental representativiro, and not asking them for their
"aeerov 1". Yet this a'Aitional step of in_ormal consultation was
a vital step in the preliminere coordination of e given estimate,
and was reeerded ae a ppycholoeically important factor in promotine
a spirit of inter-agency- cooperation.
The T:orrd also soon entered the review phase of other ateeea
in tile e:;timitin process, especially at the significant first step
of estimate nnking, when the tA?ras of reference were being formulated.
This function of formulating the proper frame cf reference and
essumptiona in an estimate--"erkine the right questions--wan at
first, in (;ttober 1950, yioidec by eenerel smith almoat completely
to the as a. step to Le teem in fernsi committee; but on NOV03-
btr 2, he re-assigned the job, dividine it between CIA, which would
-'s (progress reor s) 0' oee correspondence with IR;
agencies, In ? files.
2.e eoerd of eational .Feetlmatea alto oceesionalle invited to its
neetinge ,:overnlent officials from outside the intelligence organ -
zation, 0.g., eereign eerviee officers from the State eeeartmentti
in ept. end ect. 1952. (sco :NZ "chrono file.")
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henceforth draft the terms of reference, and which we
them.
review
tath the estnb11shent of O later in November 19O, this
proeedure ws further re-defined, se tbat the job wns left lmost
entirely to CIVONE, except that the IAC mould review any essential
differences of opinion between OIA and the depertm ntal repre n-
tatives. .4.fter mid-Lecember 1.950, the function of reviewing terms
of reference belonged to the aserd of National TAitimates? and the
drafting of terms to the 4timatie 8taff. Aare again, as with the
drafts of the estimates themselves, the Board normally invited in
to the discuseion the representatives
f the IC departments to
whom contributions were to be assignad,3 and only rarel>, in li51
and 1952, were the terms of reference appealed to the Inc.
Le d eventually served as an advisory staff to the
Assistant ireotor on other aspects of OWs work. Individually,
the board members were given xpecial tasks on occasion, such as the
assignments to
at different
times in 1951 and 1952,on the oontinu ng problem of liaison with
tho operational planning groups in the efenas i.#epertment, discussed
more fully later in this chapter. ,ollectively, the hoard deliberated
1
tthutes of JA,; meetings, ;)ot. 20, Oct. 26, and Nov. 2, 1950,
in Ii5-C 6ecretarist files, in OkE.?
Anutes of .1:; meeting, Am. 7, 1950, IAC-4-10,
/MIR:4
3 See uN oorres onnenoe with NZ a4 nciee
"ehrono
4 4e Ifi,; minutes, 1 1- 2, passim, in Ale
II 43
51-52, pan
in
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on the lists of eondine estimates projecte, including the annual
programs of estimates begin ng early in 1952. They also received
new requests for estimates; though these required final 1.K approval.
The Roard also served as a foram for staff discussions with
the Estimates staff and the Assistant Director on a wide range of
other problems that were incidental to the estimating job, such as
the quality of research contributions, collection overtones and
deficiencies, disserination policy, ONE's relations with the con-
tributing and operating agencies
The Board was also responsible for reviewing and approeing
for release, types of intelligence evaluations other than formal
estimates, which were produced from tire to time by the Estimates
Staff, such as the many intelligence memoranda written for the
Director'a use independently of formal inter-departmental coordina-
tion, and the various types of prepared comments on NSC planning
1
papers that were referred to the DCI for intelligence appraisal.
The Estimates Staff became the second echelon in ONE. It
was in this Staff that the estimates were actually drafted; con-
tributions from the departments and CIA's research offices assigned
received, and studied; and the day-to-day consultation with the
contributors carried on. The Estimates Staff was headed by Ray S.
Cline from about December 1950 to about May 1951,
1
See files of intelligence memoranda (other than estimates),
prepared by Estimates Staff for the Board of National Estimates,
in ONE files.
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by dins"
Caine was iicce.dd first by tbot . smith, then
and again, by
The L!timetes staff Wes organized et first, late in .2.90,
simply as a nrnsll group of senior estimates writers, leaving to a
str:Jte roup of analysts ir ONIsisupport Brencil the jot, of un6or-
taking whatever neoessary supolewlentertresearch and analysis was
required in the course of comstructingAin estimate. :n January 1911
however). the 'atimstes Aaff was reorganised into three gr- ups:
7,enera1 ,I.roup, consisting of the "generalists", who remained respon-
sible for drafting the conclusions and the discussion section of the
estlilate; a oecialist Group, consisting essentially of research men
(formerly in the Support Staff) expert in particular areas or topics;
and a Ailital7 r;roup, which was to ccmprise the working level repre,-
sontstives from the !rmy, Navy, and fir Force who (it was originally
planned) would be pertnnent4 stationed in Oh.1
A? the three groups in the letimstes Staff, the iilitery eup
had the shortest ii story.
been ,lanned trlat
to Ar,,2 in order to "give co.msel on military, naval, and air
Originally (in iAacember 1950), it had
officers would be esci4ned full-time
1 "Telle of '4.ganivmtion for the Office of National .ati tee,
Jan. 17, 1951, ONF ochrono file".
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matters tnd critically review 0* contributions of the Lefense
sencies" submitted to OMRi in practice, however, did not use
t:*m 4.5s. or as regularly as planned, "because of
decnclunC(7. rorvica7 representatives sent by t!lc aenciss
to our frovrki7 lectina to present the viewpoint of their resdective
,2
e.,:cmeric3,L ,,..czr,n4y, the officers involved wre. nv,vigned
to reGuicr filtn;T. ,Jositione in tlie ,pecialist Group of tho stimrtes
A;aff, wac'To ,,rf'ormed a variety of useful tasks, but tasks
that were not one of "representine their home depertments.3 leide
from the :-)ersowl capaLilities ,lunlifications of the individual
officers thus sssined full Le to there wa c growing feeling
of dissatisfaction with their position in ONE* In Cctober 1551,
(eneral ,nith questioned whether Ori: was using them "to the full
extent or their copabilities,4 And he asked Langer and 1Nent to
exsmine the present method of using ;iervice personnel iA staff
smomndum by
30
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. For example, who was assigned to
)!FffroN1 the A.r. 7orce, was assisting on Far.:estern estimates in
f,pril 1551* .i1-411arly, from the Navy, was
assigned in July 1951 to tne len of attempting to improve ONT's con-
tact and liaison with the intelligence and planning echelons of the
Joint c;hiefs of staff (de more fully later, in this chapter);
and the next Ytonth was detached from 0.N. st the end of
his tour of duore: this particular problem* (See
memorandum by to ,.;hief of :Iilitary orsonnel, fiTt* 11,
1951, anc o er correspondence in (11 "ohrono file",
July, -vg. 191.
Ito Itief, '4ilitary Personnel
in ONF "chrono file".
Ix 46
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assignments." In subsequent months, ONE reiterated its need for
kiiitary';Jositions on trs table of ergenization
2
but apparently did not find it necessary to
change its prectice of assigning them to the 6pecialist roup. In
any case, did not restore a separate "Military Group".
Ath the abandonment of a separate lilitary Group, the sti-
mates staff developedl early In 1951, in two parts, a ,General Group
and a apecialist ,roup, end fills arrangement persisted unchanged
from about?'arch 1951 until after February 1953. This internal
organization was largely one of administrative convenience, however,
which in practice way frequently ignored. As a practical matter,
these two iroeps, rather than being separated, were brought together
intimately in the course of a given estimates project.
Ictualpreparation of estimates was by small special committees
(called "Task Teams") made up of one of the "general" group as chair-
man, with esistance from several "specialists" assigned for the par-
ticular project involved. The chairman was given general responsibility
for seeing that, first "terms of reference" and then a draft estimate
would be brought before the Board And afterwards before the qoardls
meeting with the departmental representatives. This task, in point
of fact (once departmental arsignments had been agreed upon and
tea o CI'a staff ccnference, ,?et. ?2, 1951, 61;-1-29
in U/JI/it.
2
lemorandum by (.7JW: to Chief, Military ersonnel avision, lay 24,
1952. in :i!;? "oerono file".
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departmental co r1bu.Lon1 had been received by AT:), was largely
onef synthesizing four separate studios into a single brief
eent of the ease at hands representing an estimate that right be
egreeable to the ard, the departmental representatives and finally,
the ref.% This synthesis was usually undertaken by the aak Team"
chairean who could not hope to produce a fully valid state-
rnent without reference to his "teammates" who specialized in area
and functional knowl.edge and the immediate sources thereof.
After the first emeriti months of ONE's experience, there
seemed to be no longer any debate on the old question whether CIA's
eattmat&nr staff needed a complete research organisat4on. rhe
ulluinroup had severely criticised 07E for having "cenfused" eti-
mating with research, although the ORE proposals of October 10, 1950,
had stressed he need for "research support." General emith and
Mr. Jackson, In their plan of Octeber 20, had gone bark to the eales
report in calltn for 4 clear-cut divorce of estimating from research.
Alone the same lines, Langer* in his first weeks in ONE, announced
that IC intended to do no "substantive research" on "regional or
"topical"netters and he expressed impatience, at one pant early
in 19512 with the need of supervising any addi tional staff in NE.
1. xtemp0reneoua remark, by William L. banger, Feb.
OTR's k.noy rientatton Conference; on disc recording
In files.
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The
tne xte1 first of Drovidthg an
6up7ort taff aud t;hon, about ni:-.January 1951, re-It/minw these c;NE
analysts a Snecialist reue and shifAng them to the Fstimates
Staff. thus had ? small group of specialists immedistely at
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0 plan was eubaeqently mecitfie, however, to,
is Group" in new
hand, for the purpose of analyzing departmental research on which
ONE primarily depended. As Lndicatid later in this chapter, ONE
relied ever mora heavily, in 1951 and 1952 n both the research
offices in OtA, especially WI, ORR end OCI for sonlemintarY
research bearing on particular questions arising in pending estimates.
The third and last full-ties component in t;NE's table of
organization In 1951 and 1952 was the Support 6taff. In AfEls
original table of organisation, three branches were to make up the
Support t*tfx an Analysis Branch, consisting of research assistants
for the Estimates ;Aaff, mentioned above; t PUblications ,ranch?
which was made responsible for arranging for the reproduction of
finished estimates by the Agency's printing plant; and an Informa
tion Control nrench, which WAS to log in and out of Ah all
1. Memorandum
subject "Table
Pile."
2 0
illian L. Langer
anisation for 0
WA. Jan. 17, 1951,
in ',V "chrono 25
Table of..,irganization of nee. 21, 1950, mentioned in ibid.
If 49
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departmentel c.t.i...bations to estimates. and to maintrt;l. r vclOrence
file of selected intelliivanoo asterials for consuiLatiot!'
timates :::taff and the
in aubsequent revisionz. of 'AYIn table of genicztion, the
uport::taff am'erwent some changes. in .711uary 191 the ,fA.ysis
T.ranch, as indicated
malit shifted to the -3ti4gtes -1;fr,.
where it boame a ;:pecialist x.ovip of research assietant The
Information k;ontrol branch wae divided, also in j,,,,,nuary li51, to
include a eading ooli Branch oontaining intelligence reference
materials borrowed from the 4encyls central library and elsewhere,
for Vit2 convenience of the members of the ''ratimatea taaff and the
Doard. ina11y, some changes Were made in the ?ublications 17:ranch,
which P rrerv7ed for the reproduction of the finished estimate by ,the
.T.gericy le priAing Aent and provided the necessary typing, proof-
readin4? ami editorial services incidental to Publicition.3
Durirw it first year, the P'ublications Drench ?ias staffed
both with clerical ;;ersonnel 114 intelligence officers, su4gesting
that may have planned on a kind of editorial work on est1m-te.4
that would be cioro than stylistic, and s0Ale het comparable to CF/e
1 ,
,aaorandum by Langer to ?11, Jan. 17, 1951, ibid.
25
2 Lbi.
,ce also report of iN. Ad Hoe ,.;Ommittee on .eadirk.7
i'CL? 2/c 1553, az.tached to t.aff feaorandum No. 333,
,inrch 11, 193, in riles.
3 ,amordum L5 i.unger to Jan. 17, 1=)51, in 25
"chrono file".
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practice -..A.evious .00552 the personnel of that 'Jranell had
beemaccnverted entirely- to a clerical basil. resurx1A;i th
ublications :ranch was not ex
-:,rocess until the estrlate was r
to.pseticipate tne eutimg.ting
for the printer.
These teryf: service branches of although formlly and
ocilectivelyor..-1,1e the Supper$ Staffs. were never hee,deo by a separate
-hief serving full-tiee. 111840ads they Ware at first supervised by
t 71elbee- o'' the ;etimates :ita:f as part of his ether duties, and
later, 1d early 1953, seem to hf;ve beep re,ardeci i6formal1y as a
.e,leiniatrative services attached to the ..imediste office
2
of the Snistent irector.
Tes fourth cemponent of.OPOs organisation fer estimating was
its :veel of '.;lonsultants, first antouneed ty 7Cneml Llith on Deposer-
ter ic, 1550.3 The idea or heving attached to ..3C an advisory panel
of art-time consultants, made up of distinguished ard kAd-erieneed
men fre1.1 ctse(41, the lovernmentos intelli?:ence enterprise, was, of
all the devCloplents in organisation, the one entirely new
dedarture in C;? 's estimating aroi.ram. ..c) such panel had been part
of .;.1/es normal Erittipg procedure daring the years 1546-1550, nor
1 tables of organisation and personnel rosters, Jan. 1951,
'Jaren 1551, 'eb. 1952, 'arch 1/52, previously cited.
25X1A 2 4/5Morandum by LAD/NVtdmin, to .:4peoial .%ssistant
for :,dministratdon, GVei, Jan. 29, 1953, in %'14::, "chrono file".
Anutes df ,ZI's staff conference, Ale. lb, 1550,
ih ,/ ,?
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25
ILLEGIB
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had one been rec,,nmended in anyc the sayeral f,ts ,:;f^ reorganise tion
proposals confronting 7enera1 ;:s*ith in Oetdber 10.1
The first ao)cint7lonta to the on El or %;onsultante included
nd
nu expert on the :41riet nion
2
in lii, nie, other appointments were made, early in 161,
??????????????11.......??????????
1
? bl.les report, the Lerstadt report, the Adate-Lefense
plan for a inteliii;,nce group," End OICts plan for the
new 7atimetes C'ffice subittec on Oct. 10, 1950; previously die-
cussed, above,
2
linutes of stafr cenference? rec. 1, 1950?
in 7,%71.,/,-).
3 ibid. had been recomliended to , by the k;onsultants
-enel itsel .ii, first "organisational mettine late in Novsm-
ber lY50. k_anyer reared his appointoent as an "extremely impor-
tnnt" one, in the interest of Lvroving -,;IAla relations with those
a6encies concerned with scientific intelligence; and urged 72enera1
3Nith to conircy t40 invitation to ersonelly. (Aer4orandum by
Len4er to ,,,,I., iosv. 25,, P,-,50, n CIV. "chrano file".)
4.
? told trj.rofler, on !larch 7# 1951 (by memorendoeh
25X1A ibid.), that Id declined to serve
but thatIle w . ibly consult, gratis, with ,.:;:, ,,!..;.? and
othr %:ency colponents? "in other waya".
IX 52
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nel of Consultant aflxat convened In 1951,
to T215xcuss the pending revision of the eneral sitiet,i f the
cswbiUties f:rt :.ntentiona ef the 0g. -2!.;
they net on the average of once month. They Insur1.4 Fcet t
by themselves, but with one or more OM', roard xuid stimates oteff
members.
he agenda of 0,onsultants usually consisted of the
drafts of one or more pending estimates nearing completion, an
which the :anells function was to provide additional indepandent
critical review. The Penel on deliberations did not, however, .con-
stitute a fc,rmal etc p in 71:1's review rocedure. Only- rarely were
its Aeetings noted tz CV :Is pIriodic progress reports circulated to
the "i,C members; 2 and apparently the Panel was never expected to
share Is responsibility for the finished estimates.
The lembership of 1, Ooneeltants anel expanded solewhat
in 1552, and b early 1953 it totalled twelve men.' Among the new
The ='anells first meetim; to consider a apteifie estimate was
in Jay 1951, but it had nad one preliminary meeting, late in Novemr
bar 1950. tee correspondence, previously cited, above.)
2 See 1 ,- _Is (rokyeas reports), 1951-52, passim, in ON.- files.
3 -ee lists of consultants dated lay 21, 1551, Ltac. 5, 1952,
and 1.eb. 2, 1553, in ,)-% "chrono file".
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sOpeintments in 152 were//
The 7,roctice
of adding such distinguished maAdimiaiams end in of rut?lic affeIrs
to :WON roster of part-time consultant* was regarded not only as
a prpetic;:l %,,,ay to solicit their advice when it was ertuelly needed,
but also a oeviee, so N: later theorised, for recruiting and treining
hew
len for 2ossible full-time work on the board of fttonel .stimates.
for example, did "graduate" later (in 1953) from
:41nol to tht Loard.
In the other nold, still other new part-time appointments to
were CI4 "alumni", Who ha retired from full?-time
the
25X1A t:"
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
work with the estimates program atd who took on what ml4ht be called
p "resorvel status. Along the appointees in 1952 were Anima i,.
ntor, the retiring ;ssiethnt Arector of 0)14 former AJqbassador
till other new :ann.:. aebera in 1952 were
who all had previously served
? capacities closely related
on full-time basis in other int,
to eetimatin7,,
part..time consultants were
also retained by i,NE from tie to time for a variety of special
Ix 54
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purposes.
and
eyample these of its Board member
were placed on ,0 pert-time basis in 161 and
ct-rtain speeialists were tomporari)4, attsched
1952.1
On occasion,
to the Board fornsultation on a specific estimate. z,uch was the
case on ;in ;stimeto of ::-ovist air defense oap6bi1ities (Nir-60, pt.
for which CV retained three sciontiata/
Ito help resolve a con-
filet of opirlon ,:i-twertn the ir !-nrce, on thc ono hand, ant u:ot
an6 the ,;avy, on the other na::(z. 2
another occasion in 1952, CW retained
P former :oLre member, as a %.onsultant in connection
of estimative 1angua4e used in NIls".3 Other special consultants
were two Ysle University nerl?
who late in 1952 were appointee to supervise (:Pla external reserf7h
project for an estimative study, to be based entirely on unclessifis
materials, of the U's intentions toward the iinited.7t.ates.14
1.
eniono files", Jessim.
2
-cRorancitvm by '114f:: to uct. 28, 1952
in ?chrono file"; and (?4,. production record,
below.
3 lemorande by ;L.i.INE to KZ., March 21,
in ON1' "chroho file*.
4 :Ate memorcncLe br 'INF'. to I, Nov. 24. I:
1950-53,
oh 27, 1952,
in "chrono file"), ccommending
"intermittent consultants". jn June 1951 a reiated external-research
project had been assigned to for analysing unclassi-
fied ;res ?Pnc; .overnment pullications on gibe Kremlin's -'etimate
of the .priiities bnd Inten-,ions of the (6% (..ce correspondence,
June 1951, in 'chrono
? 1
in ilinex
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From the above outline'tf C-Nis staffing problems during its
first two years, it appears that CN 6 relied heavily at first, in 1950
and 1951, on men with extensive prime -technicei experience in pro-
ducing intellicnce evaluations, en4Llater on men from outside the
.lovernment's intelligence organisation who nevertheless had extensive
acedelic knowledge or broad practical ex;Aarience, or both, in inter-
national affairs which could te applied to the daily ;:roblem of
evoluating intelligence evidence and *peculating on the meanina
of the evidence in the contiming international conflict.
ON did not depend to any great extent on formal
training prorame for either its original staff or its later recruits.
The "recruiting of trained personnel" rather than the "training of
recruited personnel" seemed to be basic staffing policy in
in 1951 and 1952. 4hile its new personnel were normally enrolled
in CdAls general, introductory training courses, as required, there
was no special fprmal course for estimators as such, nor did tN-L
favor the establishment of a "super-intelligence school . . . at the
National Intelligence level" at which the processes of estimating
might be formally taught. Thus, for example,
who served 25X1
in CN.. both as board secretary and AZ Deputy ,edistant iirector for
Administration commented at some length in August 1951 on the plans
for a CIt Career orps. He questioned the need for "training schools
1
7-lemorandum ty on behalf of the !?r/JE, to the
iirector of Training, :lig. 31, 311, commenting on. ".A Pro-
;
posalfor the 74tablishment of a Career corps in CIA", in OK
"chrono file".
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in the upper breckets, criticised training ;,ro;:-,relt; which placed
"too luch cAphasis on over-ellborate testing techniques, ;;choolso.
etc.", ane concluded tlAt, in experience, "a :ear or cu-he-
job training weld be much morn valueble than a ;,-er s',,ent in a
nuer-tntqii?:ence school."3'
tr!Anine wns ptovided ti the stimates
especially to t!? new intelli:ence officers recrlited later from
the univernitiee nn{: 'roe other coeponents of Timilerly, the
''nnel of Jonsultants provided, to a :lore linitlA extent, an on-the-
job perlod of orientation for outside ex Herts from non-overnmentel
institutionr who miOit later be considered for appointment to the
Yoard of Nationel 'stimates. In aJditicn, (;t1'7 also conducted a few
activities which were entireV in the nae of training. -or example,
guest lecturers were invited -AD epeax frorl time to tiNe to the locrd
and the ..atite ttaff, aed were pnie from a special fund allotted
to :.ncluCed amonc these lecturers were "certain professors
of leadin. universities who are particularly 7uelified in fields
of concern to . . this ftice, PS well as other experts presently
2
in uon-governnental capacitier." On the governmental side, too,
1. also took aciVantage of the courses at the National 'Aar :o1le6e,
where Cit wee ,Tiven a nmall qcota of students in 1951, as well as
briefireTs at other Covernment agencies.3
1.. ?
Itdc.
2.. ,
J-)ew Lni:: correspondence with project ,--eview Committee, 1551
pe.sim, in "cnrono file".
eor exaxillet Langer, i%cnt, :.tended the course
at anita in. Avv.-Lec. 19.51. (eye aNi; "chrono
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1,Lke othor components.lit the Agesex, -1-- also took Pdventage
of tha trainin4; vaiutt of 11,tiving a few of its Aen assizned on teori n..
duty at other offices tif !..gency ttne rt overst;s 5tation-4T,
onc!er rotction .).L..ogram or under other rran ;ements. In aodition,
OVeravis traVel the swAmer and
cf 711, under ?tihicii .6electe4 Board arn,i ritibers were n&nt
ntrold fur cevieral weeks of "ro-familiarizat . ovel-geas
arees.''1 7y this racans, the eetioatorL :ICA to timer-
tbko snecific collection assiaments, int to ?' unofficizi
obser ation "r(,sh sense or tle intan4iLic ele4entn In ;116 mituatiOu
abroad, wnich in . . . essential . S S in the process of intelligence
,2
In ly,52 this plan was expanned to ermit personnel,
wien on soc',-1 a trevel status, to visit with selected KC.)? pOliOy
CffiCibl3 in c.i'tisire A. alissiona abroad wnt:, hie.nt exi)reas "informal
CWIIAWat wurtn mar4 tiA03 tn4?t which le
for.3011,i transit,ted In writin."3
1 'elorandum by to sept. 19, 1951 in
CfN7 "chronc :ice plea Atmorand a tG i\jersonncl, ept. lt,
. 26 1'.61 and to Oct. 15, ()et. 1, 1951
in I n_ra. I spoken or the need for aucn overseas
g for -'oard personnel, At the 311ls starf conference on
July 5, 1:61, z:n0 th i agreed tnat hoard members Thhould 6ct to
Lhe field 'crt.. often. ('Inutes, July 9, 191;1,
2
eV ?le:lorandu4 of :,4!3t. 12, 1951, cited above.
3 star: si,udy, 41,.v. 25, 1952 on "proL,ram for re-
familinrization of ;11,:. rlersonnel with overseas areas; in
"chrono :Ile
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aientele 110 54000 of "ttoos1 ntiaRt.s
In contrast to the enaen ive Internal organiuttonml changes
la estimating procedures, desert
above, t..iere were no -
revisions, between Oetober 19;0 and Febrasry 1953, in the formal
definitions which outlined the eubjeatematter scope of national"
intelligence estiates and which specified the "national seourity
aencies of the Aerernment sad the kinds of needs which were to be
served by auch estimates. in particular, the CIA organic act of
July 1Y47 and the 4SC directive of Jameary 1948, in which, these matters
were outlined, were left unchanged daring the period of f;enerel Smith's
directorship. In practice, however, the relationship of national
estimates to foreign and 6efense pol dy formulation was clarified
further, less by statements or estimating doctrine expreesed from
tile to time, than by the fore of precedent in the ,Anding program
of estimates that were actually requested and produeed for various.-
echelons of the .7overnmentts national security organisation.
The directives in force in Oetober 1950 had defined estimates
only in barest outline. The uct of 1947 for example, had simPXY
aoeerted that the Arector of Central intelligence shell evaluate
intelligence 'relating to the national security", and in subsequent
directives or the 4ational security Council such intelligence was
called nattonal intelligence". The clirect yes had not r,
tonal 4curity Act of July 26, 1947.
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eiffrtrentie eo national IntelI
and hed lef
Intellience? too was not, after all, obvioesly-addrensed to problems
of "national ecurity". A further N&J directive in January:194es
had eempted to clarify this relationship hy statin;, that oeationel
de rimontal
oubt the further queen's* whether ?,1 tmental
intel
lee is inteerated deoartmental intellieence th, t
broad aspect
of national polio 4nd national securl%,
the
morn
t iore than one departmont or ag nay, or ansnuv t.tx ineive
tory
.stetlishment". Ueither of tees* directives ayecified who or whot
*nejes in the, evernment were to use iPa estimates, which of them
eiOt demand estimates, what types of subjects were to be emphasised or
excluded, and whether CIA could initiate estimates independently or
only on the basis of a specific request. The tapitction, however,
wee that the Netional ecurity rnci1 would be the rinctpa1 customer
for "national timetes.
The :Ulles Lurvey roup, in its oriationa for c nthe eat g
e prom in January 1949, in affeot had endorsed this
d concept of national estimates as aprecisions on
icy problems, and had not attempted a more precise definition
competence of a sinele dopertlent or agency or the
etiol
"broad"
of their scope, nor had outlined more exactly whet using agencies
(roe the hize
down; were to be exclusively served or
:nttdiience pot te ho. 3, Jan. 132
60
te.
gr3. P
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or *pacifically excluded. ?henational estimate:, the -11rvey I)roup
rniteratsd, should deal with "brood OSPOets of national policy and
national securit,y", it should "transelend in breadth and soepe the
interest and competence of Inv Single intollience .dencx", and it
should be "en plt!vritative interpretation fru, a;eleni thfit will
servo as tirn laid, to policy-mekers and pIannere.1
The Awernment's critical need of ouch "troad". astileotes had,
indeed, been "the lovin factor" in the very establishment of the
4entral Lntelligence Agency, the 5urvey ,'Afetip asserted. As If to
emphasise its ooncern for estimates of "broad" scope, the'?Alrvey
lroup had, conversely, criticized 4;1441* Office of iAtports and Lstinates
for htlrin become "diverted" to the production or what it called
"miscellaneous reports and summaries", including "summaries -of current
developftente, political reports, backomand studies on countries end
areas, economic reports, etc.", which "by no stretch of the imagination
could be considered national estimetes".3
.Up to ..)ctober 1950 these jurisdictional questions uf definition*
end customer relaAons had been mot pragistidally by Cisl and its
!sfice of eiorts and 4timates, four years of experience had
Lungs t5urvoy oup, sport . . Jen. 1, 1$I49
pp. 5, 6B-69.
2 Ibid., P. 5.
3 ibid., pp. 6, 70.
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revealed both variety in subject flexibility in serving
any egos all echelons of the aWrernmentis national security ?rootlet-140n
that expressed legitimate na441!. lug*
te for ef'ti!' 4e Iction
accepted not only from the fiatienet Security i=ouncil and its ,malediets
teff, but also ircm the department;1 members on that aoeneil.
:iequeste creme not only from the fordliey plasm
of the departments bet also from the intelligence
rational echelons
iss represented
on the Intelligence Advisory 'xnessittee. A load number ef Lis
estime
finsaly, were int toted by C without saitin for a
request from en &Aside, agency. n tiny cane whatever the origin
of a particular estimate, the finished remorts were all customarily
distributed, broadly and in quantity, to the entire group of
departments and a -enoies represented on the NT:3": and on the and
occasionally to non-IAC seencies ne well.
eetween october and ecember 1950, during the first week.: of
Jeneral ,Aithis administration when the estimstin,: work of the Office
of reports and etimates was piing reorganised into the new Office of
ationalstimstes, a number of fUrther interpretive statements of
administrative policy were attempted, in the direction of clarifying
the subject-matter scope of "national" estimates and the end-purpose
of euch eatimates in relation to the using agencies. The short-lived
MagTuder-?rmetroni; plan for a "national intelligence group" (on which
CIA and departmental officials had agreed in Jeptember 1950 and which
the new ,keuey irector, ailliam H. Jackson, had endorsed on October 3)
reiterated the IS-approved concepts of janu
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to add that "ntrietlr -Iolitical or strictly mil!tar-: Intolltgence
estimates" (that ttlo7 normal]; SA the jurifOlctton of the :2.-tate
and -iAreingle epartment intellieence'teencies, reseetively)? "should
also be reorded as nationel intelligence when used in forluleting
policy ret the national level"J .11though this definition failed
of forlal. 'Ii.option, when the llan as a whole was shelved by ,,leneral
?th latdr it month, the e)neept neverthele s represented at least
A deers. of Informal inter-aency sgTeement for an expendin concept
of "national" estimates that Ans to be followed, in effect, during
the next two years. Frequently, in fact, the title of Pn eNeeponsored
eatilate was essentielly military, political, Or otherwise lilated
to particular "topical" or "Functional" subject of interest to a
particular depert,fient, but ra,ely was there any evidence of a
centroversy as to whether &ICA an estimate was truly "national" in
scope, and one for CIA legitilmately- to handle.
The pralem of reconciling topical estimates of intra-departmental
concern and thos,a of broader Fignificance at the "national level" also
was implicit in a tetement Jackson, made in October 1950,2 which
1 Undated draft of "NS:7 Directive" for a "National :Intelligence
'iroup", 11 pp., undated (about 3ept. 1950), together with
coverin3 Ikeecrendum by A,. d. 4aokson to 'en. 'fv. b. '47mith, Oct. 3,
1950, both In 0/Twa/eR, filed under "N3CID-19500.
2 Alper by Jackson entitleL "A. Asoussion of the Nnctione end
:tesponsibilities of the rTentrel Intelligence Agency", op. 10-13,
undated, lin 0/LeOtS files. This ?Apex. was apparently
'
prepared about October 1950, originally for press-relations purposes
apparently for :alter Lippman in particular (see LJA file, "0 & M 5");
and the substance of it was also delivered by Jackson at the meeting
of Oct. 20, 1550 (see Alnutee, in Jt.ci/a6 files).
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departed somewht from the earlierviews of the Wiles ::Jroup report
of which he WIS 41 co-author. The scope wr a national estimate was
limited only, he *cid, in the senaw that lt wouid Leal. with foreign
situations not domestic or internal eacurit 4utter. eyond
that limitAtion, however, the *etiolate "should deal with topics of
a wide scope relevant to the 4eterminstion of basic policy, each as
the assessment
country's war potential, d. n 6$ for
war, its stratejc capabilities end intentions, its vulnerability
to various forms of direct attack or indirect pressure".
re eget
while se.e or the topics he cItied night plausibly have been interpreted
as exclusively departmental intelligence problems they were all to
become acceptable subjects of national estimates, in the actual
production program of ONE during the folio win two years.
In still another analysis of the concept of national estimats
presented by the Office of eports and Hatimateel soon after aeneral
imith and Nr. Jackson took office, Oh. reminded Jackson that while
some estimates would, indeed, deal with a single country, others
would cut across particular areas and regions of the world. Furthermore,
some estimates miht be heavily scientific, economic, or geographic
in content, but normally they would cut across such "functional" factors
and represent a balanced "appreciation of the effect of ell factors
in combination". Finally, Or0 expected that an estimate would not
be confined to lcngi.term" trends alone, but deal also with 'current
?Aan for a e of 4timates", by ',esere. Babbitt, Amtegue?
0?iA, Oct. 10, 1950, in 0/. L/ files.
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developments", Lnd nonce it had urged that ',;1.40 currentte11iPeJ2ce
work be tv,arvised by the niAli catj Cffiee.
rimae t;uVria Vit43 s:_milarofIn some catails and divergent in
others, w?re eretliseo further b oneral cmith, at his first
several meetT.n,;$ the 1AZ boatman Jetelber and ,ccaLcr
outlincd no theoretical, 7ritterminad anbject-metter boundaries
thin vic.iintional estimates must be Confined, but Stress instead
the pracAcal Importance of seeking teceeke intelligence apraisals
on the ds.--to-day foreign protases, wfiatever they might be, that were
fe b ,he :)oliey-planning officials of the lovernment. !Atlanta
estimates, ho said, "should endeavor to answer specific .uestions
related to ?olioy determination rather than be 3enarraliss country
studiee 2 . recognised, boomer, that sole of these problems night,
3
indeed, be "specific or colloral? regional or functional, and that
4
in 4iny CPS6 the estimates at be "timely'. The policy officers, he
ad(Jed, ":-)ust hrv6 the intelligent)* they need when tr:e:i are faced with
their decisiohe rather th:n after the decisidm are taker'.
he emphasized that the ohd.-product of the estimating process should
imitate of ,AC meetings, )ot. 20* 26, Nov. 30, ,ec. kl, 1950,
4. Y." !..1.0 2, nnd 11, in 0ttA4/7., and HS files.
2
A.nutes for soy. 30, 1950, cited above.
3 Ibid.
4 'Iinutes for
conference, _vo.
5 Anutos for Nov. 30, 1950, cited above.
loc. 21, 1950. ci
1E, 1950,
4, above; and Iinutea of ;Y:::Tfa staff
in otizIAR.
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be a brief, undom4ient,,td dvi_atin, confined to the cur in fald
to "a summ- thk, 6;.:Cact.iona drnwn fro tie dtri the
:1
ti*
hie pralmatio view a. nntioriA. estimates, AnersI
early ale? su?4est ;hat qAts circle of customer aenoies,
wuch unfer 1-15 -redeceroor had custo:.iarlly included both -the
/10 tat dartmental policy offices, would not be narrowtd W tn;i one
tchelon of ie vernment. Por example, the very first estimAte that
was launched z.fter nia41vAls early in october 10 waz for the
_residentls personal use at tA forthoe*iru ke A51Ind conference
with ,ers1 ac:rthur, ;-.nd dealt with the crean :vat tte prospects
.;A?nese munist intervention. 2Several other estimtes were
scheduled, sIx,ost immediately, at the requ t of the teff, on.
3 -
problems rtl.ting to --ran, Treece, and Turkey. 7o11owin4,; them,
emral -t4ith next solloiteci clitimatin4 problems from the departmEntal
polioy offices, ttLrout:h the cv.partmental intelliF,:encs chiefs sitting
on the 11,; t)wir needs, which included both ndw itee an well
others already under way for son* ti m* in seem to have actually
outnumber:d LTione requaated by the U:)C, in Git'a initial survey of
1 - ?
2
,ec .istorioal Staff atuoy, "Study of CiA aeportind on -,hinsaa
,;-ommuniat :ntervention in the Korean War", 6eptember?December 1950",
Oct.
3 linutea of IA(' meeting, cet. 26, 1950, Ii.s.2,
0/7Va
in 25
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quirements for estimn es colpleted on Gctober 26, 1950.
One 1.Rjor -)rocedural departure by eneral in the
continuip task of plg,nnin ectim tee rnd ,:retoTnining priorities on
them, was to Rive n '7.renter vele* to the InteM,Jenct. ;,dvisory
Comaittee over the ralthorizetion of new c,rjectv undertaken byJ.
Initially, on ':'.ctobr,,r 26, entrvl iiiilivited the t(7; members to
solicit the needu or their respective Ltedartitts c rett,Intes end
he indicated thn tnrt if there wns * prlorit, conflict betw en the
departments end the he 41msel4' would bc the final erbiter.2
:11 e subsequont meetin, 14oWaver, he began the practce of subjecting
the entire it of projects tc 1C review ,nne approve', end thereafter
he re:u1r1,y tobnitted ail new proposals to 17,0 mathorizntion, item
by ite71. In :rretice? durirw the next to :ears, very few of the many
requests for evtites were rejected either b the I or the ITice
of hatiorl. 'ArtINates lint in no case recorded in the Ainutes did the
actually ov4i,!ru1e e prior TiC decision or reeollendation to accept,
reject, or t.e.for 8 ;1ven requested project.3 .1.1 the cher hGnd, in a
few caves tlfw -!Y7, did change relative prioritie84, tne there may. have
1 'lib
2 Ibid.
3 :)eii inuteas Nov. 1950 - Jan. 1953, Palleims in 0/1k:Il?
In or cnnes u;lield by the I's f1N7 rejected n request frwl the Joint
intellience 'ortreittee for an estimate on the effects of a possible
"Poly .4'1." in the -idle ist, an being "lnrgely kpotheticaln. (:;:3
minutes, ftu,:. 23, 1951, in OPCItUt.)
14
6eo "Istoricel .Aecord of National Latinate'.?rojeete Undertaken...,
Annex 7.c belaWe
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been other cases, not
0200170001-2
wiled in t es, where tie mere prospect
of I C review and consensus elht ave s4 an indirect Influence an
#4t acneduling of a given request.
The initial schedule of estimates assembled uner these new
policies wa rdled by the Oiti iecia1 tart and approved by the
on October 26, 1950,
some two weeks before the Office of 3stione
7etiNates wear established. It listed *levee ropoeed estimetes,
divided abcAt evenly between USQ requests, artments1 requests
and,:df-sinitisted projects. Om November 1 and 15, the liat was expanded
twice, first by UF. and then by OC, respectively, to a total of some
twenty projects.2 &soh of thee* early priority lists was essentially
generalized
a/Country-by-country breakdown of critical areas in iurope, the Addle
esti and sia, headed by two continuing priority projects on the
soviet Union, including one on its ,strengths and weaknesses" and the
other on its "intentions to resort to general war". in future revisions,
however, beFinning in January 1951 erx occurring annually thereafter,
projects on more specific problems were added. :/iome of thee were
comprohenai e multi-national appraisals actually broader than so-celled
;:eneral country studies on a particular notion, while others were
addreesed to particular politLcal? military, economic, or scientific
factors in s given foreign situation.
1 Listed i minute* for Oct. 26, 1950, cited above.
2 -
IAC-1-1, Nov* 1, 1950,
Nov. 15, 1950, in
files.
in Ota/gR files; and
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It was quickly evident, late in 1950? that no list of
Pretorrdned projects could antiaipste all policy problerm on
which intelligence appraisals sight be useful. During ?NE's first
six week (that is, by the end of Deceeber 1950) no less than eight
additional studies were requested of CIL, chiefly by the WC and the
tate Department, on subjects as diverse as the followings On the
Korean Wars a third review of the probabilities of Chinese Communist
intorveftion was requested (NIS 2/1), together with one on the conse-
quences cf Chinese nationalist participation (NIE-12), one on soviet
participation in the air defense of Manchuria (NIB 2/2), and (after
Chinese intervention had actually occurred), one on the international
implications of maintaining a beachhead in South Korea NIE-16).
Others dealt with the 3oviet Union, and all were on specific
gees rather than on her intentions to launch general wars" One
dealt with her intentions to 'exploit the current situation (NlEe15);
another with her reactions if remilitariaation of West Germany were
undertaken (NV-17); and still another with her plans to use bacterio-
logical and chemical warfare ,a1 the U. S. if attacked (NIEe18).
From the beginning OKA as faced with the need of accommodating
both a continuing, scheduled program of estimates and a program of
ad hoc requests, some of them with comfortable deadlines hut others
needed on a crash priority basis, By 1951 ONE was dividing its
1 In March 1951, ONE established five relative degrees of priority
for handling estimates: crash, urgent, high, routine, and deferred.
See IAC progress report, March 21, 1951, IAC-PR-9, in ONE files.
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mnnpower resourcet ebout equally between toeee perellel pproachee,
end this ratio cont!nued into 1953,1
emergence of tees? parallel programs of estimates ale?
was reflected somewhat in the changing format of ,IiFte end product--the
rInished estimete itself. Initially, on November 1, 1e0, some two
weeke Wort) 0e7 formally replaced the Office of eports and 'stimates
vs the eney's estimating group, n single series of "National
Intellie,enoe -Atimates" (NIFfs) had been launched, in which (it was
planned) ell of C/A's estimates would be numbered serially in one
sequence end disseminated broadly; and with this new aeries, the
several labels previously used by CO-Ve,, includin-, the numerical "Oe%Is"
ond the "3eectia1 74timates" series, were disountinutd. In January 1951,
after about two montha of experimentation with the i format, a
second series, celled qatimatee" (ele)pwas establiahed by
nNF, patterned soeewhat after the old SF series of 0;i. The new e'n:
format, elthimv,h its purpose was not offioially desoribed?2 was
evidently expected to accommolate those eetimates which were outside
the rapier echeduled program of eatimatea, especially those that
might be disseminated to a limited clientele or deal with subjects
or restricted than those in the general estimates. ',uring the
next two ew,rs about 35 such'Igoe were produced and disseminated,
1
Ike minutes, Jan. 15, 1953, IAC-Me944
2_,
The new series was first mentioned,
in the IA6 minutea for Jen. la, 1951; see I
IX 70
L'cx/e.
but without explanation,
Ae-e..15, in 0/OCl/Zi.
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as compared to ibout 70 1I '3in ti resin series.
theme two principal products, a third, called "Special In
(SIE' s)
4timateen/was otarted later in 1951, as a Me8213 of ieseaLnating
estimetes that were based coa specially snsitive atvris1s list
regoired special handling. 1* 53]., about 135 estimates were issued
n to
in the three series, during the entire period November l950 .F
bruary 1953.
fr.= these formal estimates, each one normally prepared
with artmental cooperation and coordinated in the LAO before
dissemination, nurous informal uncoordinated estimates were also
prepared and released to customer agencies by the Office of Notional
timatas rrom time to time during this period. For example advance
drafte of fornal estimates were ciroulated informally by ATE, in
advance of formal IAC coordination, frequently to the HSC tar, and
occasionally to the State, Defense, and other policy orAc * as well,
1 ,
"Ristorical cord of National Fstimates Project, Undertaken...,
tober 1950-February 19," Annex K below.
2
The leries was first mentioned on March 21, 1551; see TT
progress report IAC-?R-e, in ONE files.
3 Mpartnentel participation is discussed below, in section on
107mpartmental end CIA Contributors...,m Pp. 94-118.
4 imilarly, .3i1S had on occasion sent advance, uncoordinated draft*
of Z3 imates to the NSC Staff (for example, one on the'ittliPPines
in June 1950) and to the State Dept. (one on Indo-China, in August 1950).
e 0% case file* on projects QPF 56-50 and ''7F, 50-50, in VTritis
custody.
5
Included, for example, was an aivance draft of g sent to
the National urity eaorces *6-card in Am. 1950 see progress
report IAG.PR in AV,files.
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in order to meet a part tcularly urgent demand on which an intelligens'
opinion WA/ oeeded.
In addition, informal memoranda were prepared
as intelligence comments on specific MC planning documents referred
to the )Lector by the NY: or the ga: 'ULM. Finally,intelli;ence
appraisals were written in the norm of Yemorande for the 71rector,
some by roar d of National 1utesand others by its '7!stirlates
taff. eeently those Intelligence memoranda were prepared in
advance of any frm1.reeaest for an opinion, and they were intended
to serve ear! y or purposes, such as oral briefings rade by the
7irector t. ts MSC, informal disseeinatiomsby him to artic.i1ar policy
agencies of the %TIM nts or alerts circulated as preliminary
CIA did not co esti thee. informal dtsa.minattons from the IAC
members, regularly noting them in the IAC meetings, and carefully
stating in each case that ths draft was only a preliminary,
uncoordinated draft by CIA, and. .4, so represented to the ..enior
1431 !7Aaff zwp-r other custoesr agency involved]." (1:40, for example,
menorandur by 0144 to IAC working-level :representatives, Jan. 11,
1951, in 'At files.) Mot until June 1.952 were any ittpart-
mental objections to this informal practice raised in the IAC
meetings. On June 5, 1952, the Stale member ()r. Arestrong) warned
that advance drafts sent to policy officers might so "impress" them
that the "final approved version might not be read, and earlier
impressions changed," and he cited the berlin estimate (E..10) as
a ease till point. This practice, furthermore, might also "freeze"
the views of the Adi:card,ne cautioned. (.neral 6mith defended
the practite by emplaining that he had been "listurbed" that the
142C'enter Avail', lacking a finished estimate, "had on occasion
written its own intelligence into policy olpers." The I4C agreed
that estimates, in order to be *more meta," muat he "available
earlier in the pre-mlration of s policy paper." (IAC minutes,
Jun* 5$ 1952, in ut.ti/ER.)
2n August 1951 the DCI ordered that copies of 111.0NE "Intelli-
gence memoranda," after approval by himself, be sant in the future
to General 4senhower in JOPE; awd in January 1952,. to the Navel.
Aicia to rosident Truman. e41 ON memorandum to A. 7 1951,
1 ohrono files; and 0D/1 memorandum tic
1 Jan. 30 1952, in 0/7CibA, filed ander "ONL."
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ilyeotheses and speculations to the several departmental intelligence
agencies on problms that aiA.ht regmare furthers eoecerted aealyste.
These several ty2es of tnformal memorenda actually outnumbered the
formal estimetts, during the two years ending January 1953,
althou4h in total .,)acet length, and in t.h manpower resources involved
In them, they were outwei;ted hy the lenteier, formal estimates
that were produced by ,A .
The AltiQnel -ecurity knincille Staff, or the eenior etaff
as it was leter celled, remained the principal customer from which
request's for estimates were reeeived, in 1951 and 1952. 'en the
other hand, requests from the several departmental polio), offices,
ween ce.ibinee, actually exceeded e::;.; requests, and a subetential
number of etjjntai (stout 1/3 of the total) remained to be initiated
by C, A? a salvia 100 estimates whose origins can be verified
from the records,2 the largest number (2e) stemmed from requests
from the teff. The :Itat e be'partment accounted for come 19 other
evtimateo, while the :Msfense ,epartment called for 18, with the
latterts requests divided aim; the trmy (6), the Navy (2), the tir
'circe (3), the Joint ::hiefs of staff (4), the Office of ekoretary
1 ,
opies of these memoranda, variously entitled DCI Aemoranda,
Aaff eemoranda, and Doare of iational Estimates lemoranda, are in
)N 'a files.
2 :,eis "lstorical Acord of National stimates =2.ojects Undertaken
? ? ? " cited above. About no of the 135 estimates are Identified
by requester.
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13803S
of f,na. (2), nnd the luaajdons Board (1). No raquets at a21
were recorded for the other two ?
resented on the IA
(the rtder 1 bureau of Irnrestigatieet'and the !tomic nsrgy Compassion),
but there were requests from two agencies outside the IAG complex,
one from the Natlanal ilcurity Resources Board and the other from
the Joint
gressional commktiim on Atomic 7n0rgy. The rest of
the estimmtes? 34 in all (or abdut
of the total of 100) wore
initiated V.), ':114; 4 at the reluest of the irector; 3 at the request
of the claneestine operations group; and the remaining 27 on the
initiative of the Office of Rational Obtimatee. In any case, the
1 The request from this Congressional Convaittee, in January 1951
(see NI E--30, ibid.), was for Weetinate on certain Soviet defenses
against atomfratack, and was ultimately cancelled, not because of
or CIA objections but betas's, it was to be based partly on
certain U. ? operational planning information which the Secretary
of Defense declihsd to reveal to the Congress. The Congress figured
in lit least one other estimats. during this periods NI7-7, on Yugoslavia
(ibid.). In this case the State Dept. had "urgently' requested the
ea:nate, in ';:ovember 1950, for use "in connection with its request
before '_2.4crigress for Yugoslavia aid. The IAC concluded th4 it was
"a proper intelligence function", in this case, to tell the rsvernmentis
policy officers that "the current situation may provide opportunities
for creating a eituation more favorably disposed toward the *extern
'friwers and leading to a weakening of Tite-sq (See LAC minutes, Nov. 11,
16, 1950, IAC.01-5,-6, In o/pciPa.)
Ltustoricai ecord of National itinates vojects Undertaken
. . . 1" cited earlier.
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tints' d estimates were r.dar1y 1.1tr * d to sone 20 policy
offices and ?Motels, as well as to the participating lotelligence
agenciee.1
The e coverage of the 135 or more formal estimates
produced by truary 1953 proved to.b? as diverse as JUts Initial
program in 91, fall of 1950.8 Pirst of all the oviet Union
contjnue r 1?Alioste DE's work, to the extent of SOMO 5 e$tieat4e.
A few of ,Jhom were addreseed to t,Joviet caimbilities and tht4tntions,
generally in relation to a "generel war," While mot of them
d?alt ett its cont, 1 over .ommunist countries elsewhere, ond with
ita specific V'weats, rammer., and motives ward the Ineogimitted
countries toward the lest generally. stimstes were also made,
however, on Tany of the countries outside the ov1,.et Bloc, including
'os tern
natioes.
an, Middle Xaw.ern African, .Asian, ndtin American
sin, the astleatts dealt variously 4th capabilities,
The dissemination schedule for Nt's Pellowed byOCT)as of April
1951 included, besides the LC agencies, the rollowing policy en! opera-
tional officials end ageneieso President Truman; his security-affairs
assietant, larrinan; the feecutive Secretary of the IPT, the
Coordinator of the L te?, and the NBC Staff itself; the Aperetery
of rLate and 1-As Policy PIenaing :taff; the recretary of 'etense and
UtIO three departeental tervice secretaries; he Chairman an the ecre-
tar*" 0: thp Joint itefs of 3taff, together with their JEAnt ftrategic
Aims croup an,!. their Joint .;absidiary Plans Avision; the hunitions
3?5rra; the encarch und :;evelopment Eoard; the National Aur ,olluge; the
Armed 4orces :teff follege; he Netionel fterity ittsources Board; the
Atonic "Eof.rey "-)eeteston; end the c,ffice rf ',efense mobilization. (See
OC memorandur to B. Urkpatrick, CtCI? April 17, 1951,
in ,I7f:ItF', filed under "Ala;.") Senior iplometic officers and military
commanders in the Far T;est and Europe, as well as General isennower in
were also ounerarily sent eetiwstcs,through th
headrters n ton.
2 Ibid.
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weaknesses, and reactions toward intersal and external pressures,
inc].udtn oviet pressures sod proposed ebonies in U. C. policy.
25X1C
The United St.t.i itself also figured directly or indirectly
la each estimates at least to the extent that every estimate, since
it ms ultimately addressed (directly or indirectly) to an intelligence
appreciation or an existing or changing U. S. policy, required the
estimators to hove at hand (or to guess at) pertain assumptions
regarding U. . capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions in a
given developing foreign situation. Only rarely, however, was AE
able to attempt an estimate that, frankly went beyond a rine estimate
of * forei7n country in the direction of a "net" estimate of its
capabilities specifically in relation to U. S. ceunter-cepabilities.
2 This problem ii discussed later in this chapter,
ing in teletion to Operational Planning";
see pp. 161.182 below.
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J t)
ahEtever t'e :Ireee severe all of the eatl-,:t6s were, of ookroo,
intended to be e:74Kntially SiireeulaLive or:preel ctivt tl-out the fitUrs,
rather than desor1)2tive or hiatorisal *et the present 4-41d past, and
therefore all of tram contained sowiemeesnre of :aroma:Una on s
pt.rtLoutar development or carried a warnim!, express or implied about
the futAre. tn13- rarely, in sontraet, was a coapleted estim4.!te
tnentitily P doscriAive survey, as in the case of 0 Venezuelan
cstilate OPY;..67) in 1952.1 :onv of tam estimates, neverthelees, were
not cid:, -xedictive tut alsc listerieeli in the pense tat they
incvitatl, LIKWASC*C past trends an one bei5 for perceivin,; trends
into the future. The drojected time span, tu,rthernore, aried from
one estimate to another, row tooka wry lonrmage View into the
future, SUCh PS the 106-year foreesst of ;?-oviet intentions (NIZ-78).
1 ,
..11U told the i, en July 23, 1952 (memorandum in "chrono
files") that the Venesuelan estimate, rottaosted by State, contained
more "descriptive (as distinguished from estimative) matter than is
usual or generally desirable in WIC'V The "estimate turned out
to be nettive--no radical change in the situation is expected?leaving
the paper little function save to describe the situation" (ibid.).
arlier, in ?ecembor 1950, clIE bad rejected a draft of an =estimate
on the ler '!ast CMF 10-50), seying that while it wee "en excellent
and comprehensive survey of developments in the Tar :ast," it "does
not meet the requirements of as N.F as presently defined." (0,0,
memorandum to G :ec. 6, 1950,1 lin cur "chrono files".)
A.miLirly-, in rooei)ting the task of revising the estimate on .Soviet
intentions, previerasly handled by the J, WF's head had commented
thct the ub eetimate "is more related to Notional IntelltiTnce
,I=urvey mktorial" ond that suck "survey" aspects Should be handled
elsewhere than in LV: (IAC minutes, den. 18, 1951, ;AC-K-160
in )/ files). While there was no obvious "competition" between
N74-es nnd tli5.1s, there was some priority conflict between them, in
some of the depertlents, which suggests that some of the some research
analysts worked on both types of reports. (es IAC minmtes, Aug. 16,
1951, in ViCl/TR.)
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any others w,r( of n intermediate range, each k tat?imete
or the Sovitt war ,otentiol r .he swat four yeere
!
or
P prtlettlar foreign situatioe zonerallover the next ?'e r two
-lh, an others). :,till others dealt with tretis. end
crimes likely aise ri the immediate wecAcs and month', ahecO,
:ndeed, ths vt,ry t;t1ts of some estimat sooll es '%-:oviet intentions
the 71,Irreot f'ituvt';.ue" (N7--11) end ilurrent ::evclopmeots in irce
y;:r. . sisested T.,t it was not ,,7.-1ways practIcable to tehere to 8
pre-detri-lined, theol-etical beundary between speculative estimates
alG7A fttore arc zurrent-iintelliience evaluations f he
leneditt, eitoati_on. ..leme of 0117.'5 intorno1 estimates, lo particular,
;neolvo jurisdictional issues and problems of coordinetion with
the ::ffice of -urrent Tnte11ienoe.1-
anw of the 135 estimates produced dealt compnAlensively
Witt] the whole rrn., of political, militar,y, evono4;c? scientific,
psycholol.cal, -tt: other factors in a given pow 2er siteetion. Yet
the very editorial arrngelent of many net estimates, subelvided
er they wert into t6pica1 dararapha comsonding to such fa4;tore,
suggeotee certain practical departure fro the theory of so-called
-"interoted" estimetes, and a ciegree of sereation of those rectors
1 .
-hapter VIII woove, on Office of curreut
especially 1)2. 37-43. T.eceber 1952, foC1.0UF, relations were
calliW "an 9r-larl truce", 4, lanning Book.
,ee - istorical 'ecoro of national -stimetes rojects
token . . . ," ;rnex K.
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for which the seyrr
amtroggieg departments aidageriea each bad
primary jurisdiction. Other eetimates, furthermore, were individually
confined to particular functional or topical factors In many cases.'
Among such examples were SovIet military and civil-defense capabilities
against atomic attack (NI -30, HM40, the peycholo('ical impact of
an air offerLve Against the USSR (NIE-39, SE-45), the importance of
Middle East oil IP
-14) the threat of Soviet economic imperialism
(NIE-40, NIF-56)?2 the possibilities of economic warfare (NIE-22),
the East-ideet trade problem (MIE-59), specific political maneuvers
by the Soviet Union, the parlianentary elections in Italy
?.oviet ological and chemical warfare
plans (IE-18), Soviet clandestine-warfare capabilities (HIE-31), and
Soviet electro-magnetic warfare capabilities. While coordinated
'Ibid. Initially, ONE had avoided what it regarded as strictly
political estimates which, it Pelt, the Stat?e Department would wish
to reserve for itself. This, for example* the new AD of ONE, Mr. Langer,
in cancelling one of CRE's pending ORE projects (one on, Argentina,
CRE 30-50), on Dec. 12, 1950, commented that, while the draft was
"entirely satisfactory," he wanted to avoid challenging the State
Department. He wrote: "In view of the present policy of leaving the
field of political reporting to the State Department, and in view of
the close working relations that have been developed with the Depart-
ment, it would seem that any gain from the publication of the attached
study would outweigh the disadvantages of creating an issue of prin-
ciple at this time." His views were concurred in by the MCI, Mr.
Jackson, on Dec. 15. (Correspondence in ORE ease folder on CRE 30-501
in 0/DCl/HS files.) It is notable, as an indication of a changing
climte among the intelligence agencies, that acme 15 months later the
State Department itself requested an eatinate on Argentina, on subject
matter that was heavily political. (See IAC progress report IAC-FR-23,
April 21, 1952, in ONE files.)
28oth of these projects were eventually ca
favor of the Pconoale Intelligence Committee.
IX 79
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eeonosio and scientific intelligence animates wet* repared
greater numbers t;i .);U( and OSI, thrinigit
interdepartmental.Teenomic
and Scientific Intelligens* Censitteders ISectivell? a substantial
num of topical estimates in this. fields were issued ss Niels
and ao
Ath respect to most of these sad *thr spec fically topical
estimates, each of them was theoretisally within the primary cognisance
of one or the contributing agencies (outside CIA or in Oi, and OSI),
but there sems to have beam a notable absence of Jurisdictional
controversy on the part of ths departmental intelligence agencies
affected, 4kr411.7, in fact, were any of these specific non-integrated
projects challenged as inappropriate for a G1A-sponsored estimate,
at least as far as the deliberations in the IAC meetings mere coneerned.2
Mille there was sans doctrinal contention on the length of estimates,
on their timeliness, and on the jurisdiction between an intelligence
estimate and an operational plan (described later, below), there was
1 These RJC and sic projects were actually list (in the IAC
progress reports) as "estimates" rather than as reports. (See
july 15, 1952, anc later issues in ONE: files.)
in one case, involving an estimate on India (4IR-23), General
Smith questioned whether it was proper to include a warning of poseible
-"losses in terms of strategic raw materials" but the IAC expressed
"general azreement" thet to make such economic predictions "was a
proper mission of intelligence (IAC minutes, Aug-. 30, 1951,
in 0/PWF) In another case, CIA rejected a
request from the JGS for a "psychological warfare intelligence estimate,"
and referred the requester to the State 'irAtpt. (Letter by H.
Jackson to Secretary, Joint Intelligence lroup, Jan. 29 1951, in
0/1Cl/F!R, filed under "Stets Dept.")
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no persistent debate on the proprietylofClAbsponsoring an essentially
military, political, economic, or Oeielatific awreinal when one mks
requested by one of the policy amnion.
In summary, the estimates ree'ested of IA by the poli
a7,encies between October 1950 and February 19 revealed a diversity
of subject matter, a widening circle of cu tomer. and a flexibility
of product handled by t's several series of formal coordinated
estimates and informal intelligence memoranda. All of these factor,
help to explain the development of 0/Als ability to meet the changing
needs of the 11&; and the departmental:policy **Alone.
The progress during this period was summarised by eneral Smith
on two ?cogitates, one near the beAnning end the other near the end
of his administration. In lAwillisber 1950 he told a staff conference
that
" olicy aakszs in the other departments are turning
more and more to CIA for advice and assistance, and
. . the Agency is receiving greater responsibility
all the time. The Agency has not really missed any
timely estimates, with one possible exception . . . ."
In a similar vein, two years later, General 'Smith praised CIA's
progress in meeting the policy needs especially of the NOC. de
regretted that "the demand for estimate' exceeds our ability
lt
Ainutes of Xi's staff
in OPArft.
et ? 181 1950, 'C..4...12
2
Aemarks at the ten )rientation
reproduced in OV Training Bulletin No
in Z/ ecords Center.
IX el
ference? Nov. 2
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to supply thea ,tbut he expressed the SOurance that estimates "haYs
beoome, or at they should become, wh A in mtlitary parlanos
ie callf,d the 2 rnnes On which operetienal plans are haset'a
tilorm and more," he added, they are *being usee in that w." The
coltinuing ,)robles.the found, was that
are 1c,i,ing a little difriculty getting estimates in
in a timely way so that the staff *Metre who do the
work for the 6ecurity ;ouncil will have them well in
edvsnce of their own Job, which is the preparation of
draft policy papers. 2n some cases, we have been a
little behind the policy papers, but more and more
we are keeping up to date and t little bit ahead of
the parede."1
Throughout this period it is evident that TA 'a position as
the 3overnmentts central estimating authority was certainly
strengthened, and that the prestige of its estimates was enhanced
by closer contact with the policy users and by improved inter-
departmental exchange and consultative arrangements with the
intalligence contributors. Om the other hand, CIA did not achieve
exclusive jurisdiction over the:prodaction of ell estimates needed
by the policy officials. The departmental intelligence agencies,
including State's Office of Atteiligence Research and the Arey, Navy,
and lir Force intelligence agencies in the Defense Lepartment, each
continued to produce estimates far intro-departmental consumption,
including reports intended for their departmental members on the tiSi;
and the VS-:; Senior Staff. Se also did the Joint Intelligence Committee,
Ibid.
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under the Jo
except thl.;
periodiL; teU QViGt on)*
in .4L;er /iiu4y, 4hen
fa of ,iteff,. cor4tinue
produce eppreieele,
-;i.i.elded to GlA the jurisdiotl
at
not by the 1AL; but by the Interdepartmental int ioace
Conference ki?I and the Interdepartmental 1:ommittec ternal
.ecurity .) hes,
1410 SLISLO,
nd intentions, to4inning
tic socurit; policies were
jurisdiction oloL4* inteliigence estimates was noreally taken
-- the Federal bureau of .nvestIldtion.
combined ennrto o 11 those intolligence
zroups represented a comprehensive, significant, and ,;rowing body
of intellience opinion and advice, available continuously and on
demand to the policy echelons of the iAreernasent. 4bile thQre was
;:eneral iweement that the eetimates were useful and germane to
policy formulation, it is not as clear, from the historical records
available, whether (end haw) the estimates were actually us
bY
the policy efficers. One critic, who had access to the views and
records of the policy itchelona themselves during this period,
questioned wnatner intelligence estimates were a major inaredient
in policy formulation.2 je segdasted that the policy officers were
.Aos pro?ress report, iov. 2, 1950, IuRl,
?1,42. files.
2 4oger 611sman, Strati c Intelligence and Ustional i.moisions
(Free 'ress, l956)1 based in pert on interviewis apparently daring
the period 1950-52, with various U. S. intellilence and policy
officials.
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Qharacteristicelly thfiuUr1Cid, instead, by a aaeophorvi of wAtJeting
1:-.1.418 on forei4n developments supplied by * varict,i
iLteLL cnce sources, US ,Orienil friends,-,obt,ixt.4. rerty
boasts, warc heelers, aenotorb? congressmen, cabinet :4(;ritars, UniOn
loaders, new,pecrmen, and even pollsters and social psycholojets.J
No such 161014i) 4 i,;eneralizatien san be sup: orted b ttt vidence
used 1.1 t,he present stucry, ,xcept for isolated cthes tly the
public cf.;ntroveray in 19!;1 which revealed mixed reactions by various
policy oVficials to the int.el:igence estimates on Uhinese ,;ommunist
intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950,2 no conclusive evidence
has been found of Any general indifference to intelligence estimates
on the pert of the policy echelons of the .io'versimont. 6eneral Smith,
for his part, seemed convinced, both at the becimning and the end of
his administration, that CU.-produced estimates were, in fact becoming
increasingly influential, is own membership in the ti6C,3 toether
with the assignment of key 01 officers to work directl.y with the
1 Ibid., p. 146.
For varying, publicly expressed reactions to intelligence
eetimates by the resident, cabinet members, and the Far -iast co:-
sander (General MacArthur), see Historical Staff study, "Study of
CIA fieporting on ;Alinese C;ommuniat intervention in the Korean War,
Sectember-Tccemtmr 1950", Oct. 1955s
especially exhibit S.
3 Ural briefings were made by the Iiirector at NSC meetings early
in his administration, and the practioe continued during his next
two years. (See 140 unnumbered minutes, Dec. 11, 1950, and later,
in GijOI/7, files.)
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cellar - tar, 1 probably t;eve CIA a tiex, direct 'mice
in tile policy c. 1 f the ',,:overnmaail, to i t objaatively
i.irodueed intzd r istaa vere-ierter ir clos rezsed
to the :;eeLa of t.ose who were resonsi
rptIonis foreip policies and operttional
for the conduct of the
2
drama.
1 -
,rt Tether 1950, the ax.)aated to personallyep Jj
informed, primariL- through hie attendanoe at tiSC meetings, of
"action taxon cr contemplated by the tr.IC". (See minutes of .iY;.1
staff conference, :00. 18, 195o, in obt1/4?..) Later,
in April 1.1, he directed the i; of Oti:; (1r. Langer) to attend
regular Li-weekly meetings of the CCfotaff. Ar. Langer apparently
objected to attending pareonPily, with "ny time veri Daly taken
up" (see his !Reno to the X1, pril 11/29, 1951, Obit;IP,:;:); and
later VII! liaison task was assigned to specific staff members.
In 1952, this task was re-aselimed to staff assistants of the
2 Ail, V... participated increasingly in 13SC St.aff committee
meetina, only rarely did the policy of r'icers (converse:1,y) par-
ticipate in (lard meetings, when the crucial matter of "terms
of reference" was decided on a given request. There were exceptions,
coursoi in 'pe-1. 1951, for examples the Board at for that
purpose with re,,resentatives of ::tatets 'tolicy lenning iir.t.tff.
(3es 1, pro,7ress re;.:?ort pen 10, 1561,
0:4 files.)
IX 85
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Changing goods for upporttM
umentation
ONE continued the practice, followed by ORE in previous
or providing the user of the finished estimate not only with
the actual *sttmaAve conclusions themselves, in e peee or two of
text at the front of the report but also with an accompanying
"diecussion* section, and sor,etimes with an INIVendi2 in addi-
tion, in which the evidence bearing on the conclusions was summarised
and evalueted, briefly or in more extended detail.
Although Otitis prectiee seemed to represent no essential
change from preceding years, it was subjected to critical review
from time to tine. Various issues were raised on occasion: hew
detailed an estimate should be; whether supporting documentation of
any kind was needed at all by the polity officials to when the
estimative conclusions were addressed; and whether it was appropriate
to revvel, outside the intelligence organisation, the nature, extent,
and reliability- of the factual evidence on which the sneculative
conclusions were built.
In November 1950 nesters' Smith had aired the case for a bare
minimum of factual detail, at ems of his first meetings with the /AC,
apparently on behalf of Or. Langer. In order for national estimates
to meet the requirements of the policy makers," neneral Smith pro-
posed that the finished report "would have to be brief, that the
gusset attached thereto should be a summary of the deductions
1 Hinutes o
,I.kt,CIt
mosetinT, Nov. 0, 1950, IAC-4-R
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drawn from the data suppo
renders would
ing the ?
ads fi r144 thz,t all
to understand that for an examination the
to te, made to tho e
voluminous detail, reference would ha
a statemcnt of administrative principles these views prevailed,
with the unanillous agreement of the departmental inte1lience chiefs
1
22semb1ed at that meeting.'
in actual practice, in 1951 and 1952, however, it was apparently
impossible to exclude supporting documentation completely from the
finished report. it is donbtrUl, on the other hand, whether in
practice the policy readers availed themselves with any regularity
of the opportunity for n first-hand Nomination of that voluminous
detail" from which the estimates were, written, in cases where they
eight wish to challenge the conclusions submitted to them or pursue
the underlying ramification* in detail. In any case, not A single
transmAttal of any such mlterial to any of them has been found in
leny outolng letters r this period.
The "discusaion" section of the F thiahed estimate, in 1951-52
AS before, typically included not only several pages of what 1eneral
th had called the argumentation, but also some summarisation, at
least, describing and evaluating the intelligences documentation from
which the opinions were drawn. In addition, a substantial number
of estimates contained appendixes as well, in which further factual
Ibid.
87
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detail was presented. Muni-
oecember 1950, appendixes appeardld in
they wer included in eleven cf them.
0200170001-2
eeks, in November-
amtinate 1s, and in 1951
The need for supPortirk documentation wee questioned and
defended a number of times in 1951 and 1952, both within and outside
iA.';ccasionally a final draft of an estimate was criticised by
an IA ateaber sency as being simply "overly lengthy".3 In iarch
1952, for example, the Army intelligence chief urged that
estimates in .eneral should be shorter.4 General Smith apparently
continued to take a skeptical attitude toward supporting detail of
any kind. On several occasions Smith was quoted as sayin4 that the
opening conclusions" in an estimate were, after all* "the only part
that the top policy maker, especially the resident, is likely to
5
fridently his sputy, William H. Jackson shared these views,
at least in 'As first months in CIA, which seemed to conform to his
own theories about national estimating, as expressed in the Lulics
read.
1 WI-3 and 1117-7.
2
below,
-18, N1::-21, N1L-27, 14E-19 NIF-411
and ,S-20. 'Jee ?or production record, 1950-53, in Annex K
3 ,,;() ent by-.;neral olfln, G-24 .?arch 27, 1952. See minutes
of Ito meeting, larch 27, 1952, AC;.4.66 in 0/ --
4
bid..
5 Quoted by L:berman PPE, in his memorandum to the VP
April 10, 15,52, commentizr on Lhe problem "Puthentication of Fad
in ONE "chrono file".
nt RR
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Group report rnri 1 later steeements, in which he had dietthguiehed
sharply between estimates, as statements of 9opinion",, And other
intellieenc roducts as "factual" reports. 4 19e1, eowever,
Jackson wes tesisting with respect to some of the estiletes which
came to him for review, that they be more etronely supported "by
facts ant: reasonine from facts .!12 As successor, Loftus e. ;'ocker,
expressed the sense criticism after January 1952.3
In eril 1952, (-IC formally sought out the views of the
National eecurity eouncil ::-enior Staff members, on their preferences
for supportine detail. Pt a meeting with them on !-pril 10, which
!Amman Kent regarded as "certainly the best consumer guidance we
have received," he found tat that group of readers "would on
occasion like more detail than is now supplied
imilArl), on
subsequent occasions in. 1952 and 1953, the WIC representatives asked
aeain for ";:i fuller array of facts upon which the conclusions were
ase .t The etete eepartment an the eeycholoeical etreteey leperd
1
'or era le, at
mode the distinction
(LS'iinutes, in U/ .
2
eomeent be -r.
e41, Jan. 1952, in
3 Ibid.
4
esmorandue by
of Facts",
the meeting on October 20, 1950, Tfe. Jeckson
between "estimates and simple reports of fact"
,cJiiis files).
Jackson, recalled by et. Kent, in memorandum to
eN.S. "chrano file".
ee to ilie, April 10, 1952, "luthentication
in ONE "chrono file".
5
eemorandum by to DC', Sept. 23 1953,
filed under "ee".
u 39
in eibeIte,
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agreed. It seemed evident thet a discriminating and critical reader
of an intelligence appraisal mold have the keenest interest in
going behind the tightly seasured words of page or two of conclu-
sions, not only to check for himself the logic that led to those
conc1uions, but also to satisfy himeelf about the extent, authenticity,
and reliabilityof the evidence on which the conclusions were based.
In April 1952, apparently at the request of the new DIO
ONE explored comprehensively the problea of impreving the supporting
documentation, not only in the finished estimate bet also in the
departmental and intra-CIA contributions on which it was expected
to be based. In a staff study on *authentication of facts,"
Sherman Kent discussed the relative merits of several alternatives
that might be employed) He mentioned, first, the time-honored
academic practice, common to all fields of critical scholarship
and not uncommon to current intelligence reporting and to aome other
types of intelligence production, of footnoting the "dismission*
section of an estimate with acequately evaluated references to the
specific documentary evidence involved. He dismissed footnotes
summarily, however, as being *presumably anathema* to the reader.
Similarly he discarded the comparable practice of systematically
swmiarizing the documentary references in the text by means of such
typical documentary phrases as 'on the basis of P/W reports and
"on the basis of agent reports. He questioned whether such docu-
mentation "would add to the lodgment of a consumer not trained in
IMemorandum by AD/it to D1)/I, April 10, 1952,
in ONE "chrono file.*
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intelligence," and he wondered
also present problems of "bule end
Other alternatives Kent const
a practice would not
nally, of security.
more favorably, in eases
where there as a demonstrated need for more documentation. The
practice of oral "briefingscould be extended, he thought, except
that more briefings mi ht take undue time for ONE staff members.
A f!reater use of "tabs" or appendixes would also appeal to the
consumers, be said. Next, he suggested a greater use of "graphic
metods of nresentation."2 While all these alternatives were pri-
marily methods of presenting facts and figures, rather than devices
for revealing the reliability of the evidence presented, they were
all used increasingly by ONE for extending and ieproving the supporting
detail in the finished report.
Appendixes, in particular, h sOMO
regularity, but not without a formalre-examination of the problem
by the IAC in Septetbar 1952. All the recipients of ONE material
in 1952 had responded favorably to appendixes, so ONE reported,
but 804fle of the producing agencies, especielly the military Intel-
licence services, had raised Objections to supporting detail in
general, and to certain kinds of appendixes in particular. While
the military agencies no longer objected, so ONE had found to such
appendixes as "mope, . . . tables of estimated military strengths,
. . tables of military end items, or . . . rough inventories of
'Ibid.
2Ibid.
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the etrategie resources of another state," belich were R11 primarily
within the rields of their special eolpetenoes those agencies had
been "as n rule, . . . either lukewarm or definitely o:pefe:e to
Tubs which were of gsnoral )olitiosl? nocial? or econ.
On ,;ept Aber 14, 1952, 1410 PC took a fermal eosition 8?:81113t
eependixes kal integral, coordinated :art of the finished estilutt,
are left the problem to CIA as to whether a riven xi)i,endix rnight
be issue alone with an est!mete merely as "background information."2
In the future so the ruled, if an appendix would be proposed,
the :JP woiald determine, after consult-tion with the departmental
intellieence eencies, whether it should' be issued as "beckground
information."
forawily rt-vi
rurthermore, however, while the In would hot
w the substance of an appendix, the appendixes "should
be 'screened, by the tnt.eiiience7 seencies env env serious
disez eement taken Into accourt," before it was circuletee with
the estiw?te as unofficial background informetion.3
=letween ,e2tember 1952 end rebrugry 1953 the number of
s'32endixes declined. Ally three thirster re,peared with them during
thot ,:erioc.4 Those that survived did, however, carry the forma
1 *moranda by ,July-eg. 155
2 -inutes of IPC meeting, :ept. 4, 1952,
3 Ibid.
4 N1;-6L. (Part 1), and It-21/1;N
below, ielnex K.
in GI4F "chrono file".
IX 92
in
see AT production record
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concurrence of the pc, in spite of
iegorical position it had
taken in September 1952. The issuewas raised again the text year,
when the 7rinO,ple )1! fnU.y eoerdinated appendixes was ace gain
restored.1
Zn summary, the presence of adlennete supporting documentation,
in mfFtctent r-levant detail and in readable and understandable
form, seemed to be one of the factors contributing to increasing
"customer acrentanee" end "consumer confidence in CIA's e3timates
in 1951 se6 195% Among the intelligenee producers, documentation
10815 variously regarded either as a strictly editorial proAsm of
form end preeentation or at a sabstantive problem affecting the
very integrity of the final vveluation. in any case, supporting
documentation Nees a production problem *hies, aside from formal
administrative rulings, had to be re-appraised from time to time,
and seemed to be inherent in the veil nature of orderly end respon-
sible estimating.
'Memorandum by An/NE to DCI. Sept. 23 19, on "IAC ?nlicY
on Approval of Appendixes be NTE's,"I lapproved by
Ct,'ot. 1, 193; in 0/,"011 filed under "ONE."
XX 93
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Je.ert-et
?d A .7eaearci: ' rtietnen
Estimates. Prodution
i'erallel with the probleme of customer reletione, ?Aeezribed
above, eeve ia-oblems of maintaining working .relationships
with tic oeveral intelli4ence research an6 production agencies and
offices, both aeon the departments ani within whieh had
varying ;Titellieence resourcss. ead points of view te) eontribute in
the conatrectloe of tile finiatied eutieate. The need for better
departmental contributions and for fuller perticipation by the IV
member cie ifl the estimaAng procesc had been commerily urged
by of the several survey, that had Investigated CIA's estimates
programa before (et-Ober 1950, even though tety had not agreed in
all detaila. ee to what changes might bring about the uestfrod reSult.
Furthermore, wit the internmi roorgsnisation of cu. and the emer-
gence of Nur separate production offices by January 1951, tbere
WS3 alsb e corresponding need, unforeseen by the several surveys
of the old Wfice of eports and sitimatea? for redefining the
relationship between the new Office of National Estimates and the
research and analysis divisions in the Office of ;:.,Ientifie Intel-
ligence, the Office of Researth and Reports, and the Office of
current inteltieencei
7eteren Jetober 1950 and January 1951, after a period of
experimentation first by. the Jffice of eports and 7.stimztes and
then (after MoIeMber 13) by the new 0 ice of Hational 7,atimates,
IX 94
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the procedure,: for intereageney perticipatien were revised, in the
eireetion of eivine the partici,* ing agencies *ed. effices mere
ArPc a71 tineine voice rt various steles of *Ae eetleAting
eroces And At the ss?e time eking their peeticipe? more
reeulorized an- responsible one. There was no broad reorganise?
Mon of tee intellieence p eletion orgenleektion ontside7.T./1: Which
remained eecentrmlieed easentielly in the -eite ane efense part
ments. 4or w th-e env chimes in ehe esAential sten m of the
eatieet reee,wich ineluded (as before) the foreelation of
the terms of reference, the assignment and oroduetion of reeearch
contrieltions, the drafting of the estimate and the review,
revision, end final approval of the finished estimate. In all of
these essential !stops, however, new procedures were attempted
toward the atm of fuller and better participation by the depaete
mantel ce agencies, and a widening circle of participattn
to be
afeoct and office /consulted during the research and deliberative
stages.
Ve nrocedir*i chances, il, not iranatic or revoletionary,
were both definite and flexible. Thus, the terms of reference for
peremptorily
a eieen animate, ineteee of letting sent/to the contrlbetne aeencies
were cAmou7;sed In advance with the r representetives thus
proviiin7
unity for a consenT,la ii *itch the rese rch and
evs1etivs cvaesttoos involved could be more olearly defined or
understood end in which the assignment of research contributions
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would be nore acceptbie.
The pattern of contributing smoneies
remained basically the sane as before 1950, but there wasa degree
of flexibility with an occasional smeller circle of contributors
(tr the subject matter was limited) or one that was wider (if more
ramifying subject matter was involved).
The drafting itself was asualAy reserved as a function for
the Y.stimates taff itself, but again the procedure VAS flexible
swims:7h to yield this task one or another departmental agency
(particularly When the subject was in a department's primary juris-
diction) or to an ad hoc committee of CIA and departmental repro-
snntatives (on subjects that were more speculative than factual).
Finally,the rview of the draft was divided into two step,: in
the first instance, within Ct3, by ONFle Board and Festinates staff;
and second,b
rTA and the departments jointly, in the subsequent
discussions. ht.la this second step corresponded to 19.7-,1s forrer
practice of discussing a draft with IAC representatives, an addi-
tional, third step was added, calling for a farther review and a
final concurrence by the ,Jepartmentel intwIligence chiefs themselves,
ansenbled in the full rAc committee. In not a single case, arong
the 135-sone estimates punished between October 1950 and February
1953, was en estimate fermaltY disseminated until the IAC had had
an oortunity to consider and concur in the final draft.
The inter-departmental character that permeated much of the
work of estimating followed e pattern of flexibility and refularity
during V-is Mod October 195,) February 1953. Al seven departmental
96
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intelligence agencies were regularly relaresen 1.1ongwith
in the Ii taut ;dylsory Committee, When nview of
an istipv,te ls 5ain7 undertaken, bet only the four principal
productinn anci a (those in the 7.tat., Army, Navy, Arvi Air rorco,
renecttvel' nrc.tpated with any re,7011arity in the earlier
reerch end eellberative stages of the estimative process. In
thou eUer, sometimes time-consuming stages, the other three
agencies (the 'trornic rnryCoiseion, the 'doral 'iureau of
Investivtion nnd the Joint Intelligence Coemittee) participated
only to a limited extent, chiefly in relation to specific problems.
The Ai,:jC, for example, itself preoccupied with a separate series of
sic-energy estimates (outside the OL program but nevertheless
ultimately cleared through the :CAC), served chiefly (almv with
he (ffice of ;: lentifie tntelligence) in advising
on atomic-
energy factors tint figured in a larger national. estimate.
Similarly, the 'II, which also had its own estimating progrs in
the field of domestic-security intelligence, participated In ONF's
most part
program for the/only when domestic mutters were involved.' Finally
the JIL 1.0hich as an agency under the Joint Chiefs of ZUff was
1 The -113I objected to OWe standard credit line (In the NTE
that "all" 110: members 'concurred in this estimate," comrAinting that
it regarded itl responsibility to "coordinating foreign and domestic
intelAgence an related matters." (Memorandum by
to Trqr, JIly 29, 1952, in nNE mchrono files.")
97
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itself an inter-departmental issilmatine group (tr military inteI1i-
genes in particular), rarely submitted adlitaulf contributions to CIA's
estimates program, and only rarely undertook to coordinate Army, Navy,
and Air rce military information needed by -,7,1a, leaving that task
either V) one of the three Service departments, or to NI itself.
inetwpsd, JTI: 9 9 ,,.hief ftur tion in the CIA/Mit. ..tilatea program was
to serve as an intermediary between the intelligence estimators in
TA end the operational plasters in the JCS, in relation to problem
f *net Wastes, discussed further later.
The remaining four d
.104rtmental intelligence agoncies mean-
while participated not only In the final Vt meetings but also in
series of regular meetings of department-appeinted working-level
representatives (called IAG representatives). These meetings,
typically,were scheduled by the ONE "Board of National ,istimatio,
first to consider the terms of referenss and next to consider .he
successive Irons of the estimate itself. The OM Board meetings
with tho In representatives consisted usually of a single meeting
on a given sot of terms of reference, but the meetings on the
drafts averaged between two and three meetings per 'gamete, and
occasionally the record indicated that several lone and protracted
meetings" were involved on a draft that was particularly contro-
versial or in which the speculative features outweighed the factual
evidence that was available.2
See below, op. VII ff.
2 ;:ifitt distorical *OTd
annex K, below, vaults),
st
rates I
IX 98
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ta Under
n? ?
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c
In addition, the departmental repreeentatives and their home
agencies performed other functions, en occasion, which departed some-
what from the typical procedure worked out in the fall of 1950. The
State Department's intelligence agency, for example., occasiomeily mins
asked to draft the terns efrelkcenee, as in the ease of Burma (NIE-36))
in April 1251. Similarly, the State Department also occasionally did
the initial drafting of an estinate, as in the cane of the Soviet
Union's current intentions, in Deventer 1950 (N1E-11), Soviet tactics
In a proposed Council of Foreign Ministers, in January 1951 (MIE-28),
Soviet vulnerability to economic warfare, in January 1951 (NTS-22),
the San Francisco treaty conference, in August 1951 (SE-11), and the
political situation in Panama in January 1952 (SE.41). Furthermore
beginning early in 1951, OWE made special requester on the State
Departnent for special background studies on porticular political
problems, such as Mainland Chinese attitudes toward Chiang Kai-ehek
(March 1951), French politics (March 1951), Indonesian
and Thailand politics (June-September 1951), and farther political
1
studies on France and China (in February and Jane 1952).
The three military departments, einilarly, occazionallypro-
vided special services to the CIA eatimates program which went
beyond their normal research contributions and their normal parti-
cipation in ONE meetings to deliberate on the terms of reference
and on the drafts. While most of the military contributions were
llbid.
u 99
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aeparately submitted to ,-41F- by the tdivt1l
occasionally subjected to in'er IgOwice coo
partaculur department ',hat bad the dominating
prtnenta, they were
tion, :anal Lbe
tary subject ma'Arr of the estimate project. rhe ',rmy? for example
was respons151e or Acoorj4 contributions on jootheast Asia
(!4r.20, January 1951), Xorea (111L-32, February 1951), eW the
tkropeal atellitee (NIL-33, April 1951). The Navy, similarly,
ass,-r-blod a single 7cfcnee Nepar1Wmat'contribution on Llhe hincse
Rationalists (HTE-27? March 1951). fo also did the Air rce, on
a psr:hological warrare **time 3E-15, 41117 1951). 4ke the
te 'epartvleet, th irtrj wasealonally was asked to do the drafting
of he eettmete itself, in lieu of ONE as in the case of a
Yugoslavian estimate in April 1951 (NIS-29//), but there Ls no
record that wavy and Air Yore. participated in the initial-drafting
stasle, except in a few cases where they arid other LAC representatives
were temporarily constitutad as an ad hoc drafting coemittee. filch
drefting rormittees were usec ia the case of the estimate on ::eviet
biolceica1 end chemical warrar. (NIE.18, December 1950), one on
Soviet defense .!einet st.omic attack (1111;-)40, Yebruary 1951), aid
the first of the special.latelligenas estimates (M.1, March 1951).1
ftire were still other departures from Cho typical patters of
1AG partteton. In Nay 1951, for example, an estimate on the
probabilities of a sew Nevis*, blockade of Berlin was ',bleated by
1 it?afting mmittese were also used
capabilities estimates; see pp. 161 ff.
of the suet" tiF.Sit-U-
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the TAO to thr 5,i4?vera1 1. tntellilence representatives in
rn another case_ the following year a project on indo-
Chlw 1073 t uest to tho ',*7,1Iss at Saigon
Arid :aris,f..0.,rin;7! them to prepare a consolidateJ coordinetd
contribution o to, views, "Inc1udin7 minority views," of nit the
U. L. inteleneo efi;enciel in those two sreas.2
Ta addition to the i:our principal 1AG members, a number of
nou-Ve egencies also p.Ltrticiated in the research and deliberative
stazu of est,intin7 fron time to time. In one of fl1T.'s very first
estimates projects, ,1 riling with the Middle Eaat petroleum situa-
tLln (77P -1h), the resenrcb and drafting 4.as done by an ad hoc
committee- tbrt included re)re3enttIvea of the 'Treasury aryl ono=erce
-tao7.rt,ments, the .00nomic Cooperation Administration, an the
trci',7)7.fAttea of the Munitions l'ioard.3 rn another chse, in
July 1951, A draft estimate o Coviet clanestine-wcrfare capa-
bilities Nfl'-.731) was revised on the basis of discussions with a
varity of a7encies having particular technical
inc1udin7 (bel.jdes the 721 nni the A'L;C), the F,Ticulture 1.)epart-
menifs tlreaus of Animal Industry and of ",:ntorol,gy, the Treasury
Departmentlfl Customs urcaaid ,:oast Thenil the Army's Chemical
2orps, the 't,derat
an the Yuolic
A.yrats, -'ey 3, 1951, LAc-c-29, ir 25
2
:A(' 'Anutes, Jan. 2h, 1952, TAC.-.-570 in ibid. 25
3
LAC :'rooress report, iov. 15, 1950,
fi1eS?
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Health Service. Indirectly, too, ad mere typically, these and
other Federal agencies also partieipated in the estimates program
through their assistance to the departmental intelligence agencies
in connection with the normal research and collection programs of
the latter agencies.
The contributions of CIA's own remearch offices meanwhile
became an increasingly regular feature in a substantial number of
estimates projects, beginning early in 1951 Although CIA had been
criticised, before 1950, for conducting research on estimative
problem independently of Ike member agencies, the practice was
resumed in modified form, early in 1951 pertly (it appears) in
order to retain an independent review of the reliability of
evidence supplied in the departmental contributions, and partly to
take advantage of special research and collection resources being
October
strengthened in CIA after/1950.
Among the participating of cos of CIA, the Office of
Scientific Intelligence contimned (as before October 1950) to
prepare contributions when a particular estimate dealt with
scientific subjects or the economic aspects of new weapons.
In addition, beginning early in 1951, COI was occasionally
given the further responsibility of drafting a major section
of the estimate. Two such cases were the estimates on Western
Furopean Defense Tri-13) in Janaary 1951, and Civil Defense
in the USSR (PIF-60, part II) in February 1952. With the
lIAC Progress report, Aug. 1, 1951, IAC-PR.16,
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reoreanization 01717:u und ah establuhNont 01 eec
rrcientific ::etimetes :'omeittee laeer in1952, both e,I's reeearch
contributi el en,i draftu of sectioes of the estimate were
inereasinrl7 subjected to advance, inter-eeperteental coordinotIon,
al' ere :cordinely submitted to C?!fr in tne ("er 'T? tent,!fic
st.es Cemeittee" contribet1ons.1
iellerly, the new Office of Research and l'port s soon
beer.-- a -e;er contributor to those entimetes projects that were
hchvil eco-omic in subject natter. tni.l.tery (late in 195', end
eerli in 1951) econoric-intelligence contribetions had been
,lied by ,ee the '"tate "eoartment, but beginning in February 19512'
this eor- wne eradualLy taken over b OR". 7)...e first case was a
ecneeat tetiee%c on soviet cae,bilities are! intentions
in Ae econoric sections were divided three :ay s beteeen the
tuee 'eearement, Dr, and Tel, as follows: (1) :tate, the T.R's
fttotal ev,-Neoete eotential relative to the riniteei 'Metes and
?ester,e dr( /e"; (2) 0Th the 11;]Se's industrial conve-sien to war
eruee Lien, tt ceeabilities to meet ease/I.-lei. civilian nnd mili-
tary neeee, eee toekpiline; and (3) OI, the USSR's prodlction
capecite te lee riairi3 of the newer "weaeoes of mass deetrectien".
1 For example, a "f7j'::.C? coneribution wee prepered, in Jal.-eet).
1?53, for 'IT -65, on !faviet eir Potential, TA1-1953 to !,1.d-1957.
(:'ee oroerees %eeort, N!.rch 13, 1953, Tr,--3-31, I in
45 eerie as Aeril 1?51, there had been occesionae inter-
aeence cocr-qnptinn of ecientlfic cont.ributions by %T., ae in the
e- e oef on eeeteelleence Imelieatione of a censue ale
verification of ?,rmed 7orces and .rmaments,i/
2 zeno be O''ordf?eeeetary, to T-r reerceceta-
eivee, Feb. 10, .15.1 (Tee :"r7 lce)ne riles.'
IX 103
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/n aubsecneet estimates, however, the economic contributions were
more definitele eeetrnlized in ORk (except that fcontinued to
handle the eeeleeie aspects of new olotpons). Purthereore
itself becaee a coordinating, agency on economic intelligence, con-
fir with the establishMent of the inter-departmental Pconomic
Intellnce Comeittee in June 1951 the oconeeic contribetiens to
-sponsored estimates became, (like Ceell-e. scientific core:ribu-
tions, menti ened earlier), A fore of "pre-coordinated erterial
? 1
;leen its delivery to Oile.
The Orrice of Current Intelligence was still another source
of reseerch nne evelustion for On. By June 1951 OeI wee making
oeensional "informal" contribetions, es in the case of an estimate
on Fpain (117'-14), and in October 1951 017. we eskine Ofj to par-
ticipate in ehn teems-of-reference meet-inv on an e3timate on ino-
Sovi, t reletione (11-e-58). IA a number of cases n:ps wore: on
indicaelons ervi. warnings, conducted in collaboratioe with the Ti!,C
eetce eereittee, also flowed in the estimetes, ae in the ceee of
an estimete on ,:oemunise intentions in Japan, in Aueust 1951 L7-11),
ane one oe eoelet air-defense capabilities, in November 1951
In 1952 C)NF exnerimented with the practice or regularly
1 'e.eone the 5eALmates containing WiTelaIC contributions were
x7-56, Nr y-53, r :r-65 N:F-65. (feee "eistorical r- con of
stimates 7'reject rrldertaken . . ." Annex K , below.) In addition,
Tee eneF lso ereduce sepeee- series of reports, entirely
economic le 7iceee. whle - en t TV nrcee.e7 reports were
ideetieriee ne "ustimeee'.
e Lseoriee ecord o Fstimeees ?rojects Underteken .
Pnnex K, bel014. 'er ot'eer elpects of relrAeele, see
eeanter Ur, above.
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subjecting departmental contributions to "factual revinw by OCI
regional specialists, in the interest of overcoming "shortcomings
or passible errors" and improving the departmental contributions.
But found that because of "the pressure of other cosmitments
in on," this review. "alment never results in major aonvilent,"
except for Far astern livision, end except for OCI s
Support :-,tsff, which "has also contributed substantial4 to the
factual side of sone estimates of :ovie.t intentions.4
.-.'epro.rh-1 e s operational groups also were used on
occasif)r, in the estimates program. While their normal relation-
ship to 14415 that of a customer, they also served occasionally
as an intelAgence contributor. The several established series
of secretly collected report,' of OSO, for example, were of course
regtlarly available (in sanitised fora) to OW as they were to
all of the production ?faces In and out of In .-iddltIon,
moreover, HMI occasionally sought the specific rind direct col-
lecU.on.:iistance ofc,:v on special problems's\
1 Memorandum by :hareem Kanto "kuthontication of r'acts."
top secret Tr -75300), p. 16; in ON- "chrono files."
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1
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torattc&tt4esis the
to a
approach was to iniriUr 05:.; (as
on particillar ortsos,ae wait
and .:,astern %rug coin
requested 04' tho OpirlitiOnak
ling ton. Another
-) to brier the TV 3rd
rhino
8 were f.-=evattionz7,1y
or
rootly on the (,Iffiee of Operatto
to 3upplommen
art
also dr*
I *ti4tos
do or the
C.6
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25
STATSPE
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tate; partasent.1
00200170001-2
The pattern of contributing aneis and ot'ftces outlined
above ra he 3tandardized formula of four "EL' member
agencies, on which '11F .piencied in the great rajority of projects,
STATSPEC
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to a hiEhly flt?cible procedure that pirmitted ONE independently
to draw on the additional assistanes of a variety of specialised
off-Leos (within CIA and axon c the non-IAC agencies), in order to
meet research needs in specific estimative problense Normally the
contributions were in written form, bat usually not aupported by
1
documentation. In other cases furthermore, contributions were
received orally by ONE. Oral briefings by the IAC representatives
figured in two projects, condeeted experimentally in November and
December 1952s one on Albania (SE-34) and the other on "Free
World Attitudes . . ." (N1845) 2. The results were regarded by
ONE as "sufficiently successful to warrent repetition in similar
cases" in the future.3
Whether departmental contributions ware long or short, they
were generally not footnoted or otherwise referenced to specific
documentary evidence, Sherman Kent (AD/NE) said in a survey in
April, 1952. While contributions "generally give the subsidiary
facts or line of reasoning in support of statements," they "do
not under present practice go into questions of intelligence
methodology," he said, because the contributors might object to
the additional workload and would regard a request for document&
tion "as a serious reflection on their coepetenee." To require
documentation "might easily impair good relations." he concluded.
(See Kent's study, "Authentication of Facts," April 10, 1952,
pp. 13, 16, 31,1 In ONE "chrono flies.")
For customer (as against contributor) interest in supporting
documentation, see above, pp. 86-93.
2Memorandum
by AD/WF to DCI, Dec. 17, l92, II IAC
progress report, Dec. 12, 1952, IAC-PR-29. pylh in ONE
files.
3Memorandum by AD/NE to 7 1952,
11 108
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tit the other procedural extreme, O37 also had occasion to
draft ettev %e without am feral departmenta contributions
whatsoever. t 1R5t three estimates projects, all of them in
1952, were handled In this way. Among them was an estimate on
Guntemala
er
2) one on i4erlin (52-30), end one on Italy (4IF.71).
The frafts written by ONE ware subjected, of course, to lormal
review wi. revision by the. Ik; representatives meeting with the 114F.
rloard, but they were based entirely on initial research and evalu-
ation conducted with or was ONE' a work on the many other,
more normal inter-agency projects confined to that of a middleman
for contributions. From the beginning ONE had had a !':)upport Ftelf
for rd1iw fa,. hoc research problems that figured in estimating
projects.' Furthermore, both the supporting analysta and the esti-
m tors themselves general/7 had direct access to a variety of 4rem
intelligence" report* and other materials, including certain
special series of departmental cable and radio messages from which
to draw evidence at first hand.2 The key personnel in
had a itional clearances for , ne directly certain categories
of neterial, specially those in the oustody of OSI and OC1, which
had a. research value for estimates.)
1
Foe above, p
2 emorandum by William i. Langer, AD C, to ONE taff,
Dec. 9, 1950,1 lin ONE Chrono files"; and memorandum by ON
to DCD/it' 4 dune 18, /951, (regarding ,C)1 "Pokily uable
f...ummary"i, in ibid.
3 toriac--ertera " clearances and special-intelligence clearances
were promptLf reqieated and oo'..ained between lov. 1950 and
i,are-) 1951; see re, oranda in Ne "chrono files."
109
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Awnsaloss o an
characterlet.ally
? or a mini
an 'infusion of
information" in th initial drafting of sm e
1
tent Director (41erean )sot) said in 1952.
Whatever the Altgree o: departmental and coney p cipa
tion in research contributions, the evaluative probl,monfrontng
to core to intelligeace conclusions and make thea oth
intelligent and intelligible. This teak was sometimes called,
fignretively, the job of piecing t..ogether a jig saw posslo" of
the enemy's intentions, or o: managing an 'assembly line to which
the separate producers of components made eontributions. Both of
these figures of speech, opt as they were, implied erroneously
that the bounlariee of Each of the several elements of an intelli.
genco istimete and each of the contributions could be exactly
drawn end that fethriested reports an each element, once they
were prepared needed only to be joined tog her editorially. Nor
via the drsftin, task in 0NE a function of re editorial
AD/NE
April 10? 1952, p. 17, previously sited.
2 The assenbly-Iins and jig-aaw pus
used (among others) by 41/Lelm 11. 44101mose the D)
also appeared in the 'XI.* progress report to the
Oise recordings, f Jackson's remarks a
conferences, Apri in OTN files; his lot
Omar Bradley, JCS, 3.n. 10,1,52, unclaasified, in "CIAR? filed
under 'Ws," &nd WI progress report, April 23, 1952,1
lin OPCIAR.) Jackson also regarded the entire U.
intelligence organisation as, figuratively, a 'Sears, 'rioebuck
Enterprise,"
quently
951, and
1952.
entation
to Goners].
rx 13.0
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secretariat," Kent said. Rather it was a critical analysis and
synthesis of roiled contributions and of supplementary material.
In this process, ONE "does not lightly depart from the contribu-
tion'," but it "does deliberately amplify, modify, and on occasion
contradict contributions, on the theory that sueb departures
should be ironed out, in the main, in the coordination process.
This inter.ageney coordination process handled by person-to
person discussion in the Oa asard's many meetings with the in
representatives, was probably more akin, figuratively, to an sca 'c
seminar, than to an assembly-.].ire or a jig-saw puzzle, insofar as
the meetings were concerned with such -natters as establishing the
reliability of evidence, reconciling conflicting evidence, and
arriving objectively at generalizations and conclusions. The
Assistant irector of OW described these neetinga, in 1952, as a
period of "constant scrutiny" and "croas-examinationr which usually
result In "a very searching ap.-maisal of the essential factual points."
dn the other hand, such cross-axaminations were sometimes "a die
cow-aging business," he said, especially When they involve military
representatives who are "not the working-level people and are not
accompanied by these people," who have "some tends ..to take a
fixed view and to decline to argue it, on the ground that it is
solely ii thin heir particular agency's competence."' In any cane
deport by Sharman Kant,
viously cited.
2 ,
vieport hy f:'herman Kent,
pp. 1940, previously cited.
3 Ibid., P. 19.
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y rero
vory Upset we make SO owl
(or CW: staff member) fairly inctortabIs,*
nt @aid, and he concluded that by L52 the ettngs had bovome
"far franker .than in the early months of (Ni 's existence.
.is hope was that, with the plasm
Board's pre.
ceedings would develop to the potat where group spirit, plus a
little genial criticism, will permit factual and intelligence
weaknesses to be diooussed with complete framknese.02 A year later
he was able to report further progress toward improving the factual
content of estleative contrioutions. Both military.strnngth and
soientifie-napabilities studies on the Soviet 'Union, which ?two or
three years ago . . . may haws been is large part uncritical
'boilerplate)' are emphatically not* in that category today,
3
wrote in 1953. The committee deliberations were goin meet
lengths to squeeze out all inflation possibilities? in such con-
tribution, he 3aid.4
The inter-ageney coordination meet
Board, together with the final meetings of the lAG, eie.ld not
only differences over the evaluation of fee tail aildence, bit 1
differences or opinion and jedgment an he conclusions and
the
d.. p. 20
2 Ibid., p. 20
3 "Draft" notoranthes
topics for oi megaton id
under "Means for '.1."
A
A
4
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Sept. 2, 195) 0
d J'es in 0
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speculations reriered. There were relatively
dissents, end ca.es
of formal
An estimate was cancelled for lack of
conclusions o g the 135-enme estimates produced between 'cto-
bar 1950 Rld ebruary 1153. The records suggest, however, that
controvre7 1.ros elaracteristic of many of the deliberntive sessions
in the Ildwi.rd and IAC meetings.
In one early case, the A membor of the uci objected
vigorously to a draft estimate on o A:nist China (Na-10) in
January 1951, because:
The effect of the . ? ? paper would be to point
oat to the policy makers advantages of taking positive
stens with respect to 0?ina, and he stated frankly
his own inclinations were in the opposite direction.
In another estimate on Corunist intentions in Japan (-,=7-11), in
August 1951, the Natri and the ON'7 9oard were in a minority on
certain of the conclusions, rhile the majority views (held by the
Aate rml Air Force -:)epartments arv the Joint Intelliftence
committee) were in the end upheld by the PCI.2 In still another
ce5e, in JanuAry 1952, the t;tate 1)epartment and OW had divergent
views on the likelihoo of authoritarian rule in Iran
No one department or agency vas consistently in a minority posi-
tion. In June 1952, the Office of Scient,tftr IntelliTence and the
-------
1 TAc Minutes, Jan. 15, 1951, rAc-m-15, in
2 IA Anutes, Aug. 13, 1951, in 0/DCl/F.
3 :ete "7iistorical Record of Fetimatee Projects
Annex K,below,
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Air Force contended o .-oviet capabilities ;Ism ,Jestern communi-
cetlons
-30); inOctober it was and t avy, versus
the Air Force with respect to certain aspects of Soviet air
defenseT, (1E-5)12 end in December 1952, it was !tate and Army
dissenting on how the UR waa appraising U. E. reactions to
;:oviet measures against derlin (in TE-64, part U.)3
Itrely was an initial draft of an estime e not revised, ftrst
b the r in deliberation with he stijnatea A.aff members
involved,next in Board meetings with In working level representa-
tives,and finally in th II ttseU. The 135-some estimates
projects avorage between too and three f?eard meetings on a project,
preceded by at least one mooting on the terms of reternce, and
ocresionally thire were "several long and protracted mestines1 on
a draft) Almost no revisee drafts were elven final concurrence
in the TAC without at least minor modifications, so the TV
minutes reveal.5 Jihile a ease analysis of the actual deliberations
in these estimates projects is outside the scope of this study, an
examination of the records available (such as TAC minutes and
finute3 of ,
in
ez'ence, June 2, 1952, 5C-P-37,
2 Memoranum by :'/NL to DClo Oct, 28, 1952,
In nchrono files."
3 tl.nutes of IV- ne ting, Dec. 1, 1952, TAG-M-89,
4 "':Astorical ecorn of atbiates rojects Undertaken . .2"
Annex lc, below, passim.,
c
TAC minutes., ct. 1950-Feb. 1953, passim
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ioter-agency correspondence of ONE) suggests that feronces
of opinion were occasionally intra-MA and more often Iner-agency
in scope, en0 t'Lat they steamed fraa a weriety_of factors, such as
a lack of conclusive intelligence evidence, a collection or research
deficiencyi or a departmental or policy bias among the participants
in the deliberetions.
The degree of controversy seemed to be ,Irester 44", the
Quantity er reliable intelligence evidence was lower. For examples
the estimate on 4.no-Zeviet reLatioe0 (NIL-58), late in 'ieptomber
1952, was described as follows by ONEll
There is not much to be said for N11.58 except tat
it does establish a. small area of agreement...con.
earning 4 subject on which there is little knowleve and
such feeling. ...Large sreas of the sub1jeo4 are
inadequately treated. ftt we do now have...a few
significant generalizations, and we may hope to extend
this agreement in subsequent estimates.
tile unanimit, vas achieved in most of the fini:eled est/-
mates, there were dissents in some cases, and in a few, the ,iver-
goece of opinion was so lueroconcilable that it is foun to be
preferable to eubmit the divergent conclusions to the 4:,C and
other policy agencies rather than to give them a misleading
impression of apparent lyemdeity. In one early estimate on ,oviet
intentions, in November 1950 (!I.41), the LAC accepted an
1 Mentorsindula by A4kii to c,17:1, opt. 3# 1952, in OW, .-'chrono files."
.be Lee approved the estimate, with a "reseration" by th tate
fepart!mInt, on the conclusions that related to "the vulnerability of
Une-oviet soli arity to western pressures." (TAC anutos, -opt, 4,
1952, 11-81, in )rGlAii.)
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additional paragraph explaining to the NSC and the President that
"there is a serious difference of viem. . of the firmness of
the Soviet position, mei that it is thought desirable to mem
these views available to the policy nakern."1 There is nn one
"correct" position, the IAC agreed, "on the baSit, of evailable
Ilieenee.4 In another estimate, a year laLer (JE-9 on Korea),
the e_neensus in the ritc was. similarly, "no to reconcile" the
remainin differences of opinion but "simply truncate the several
points of view where they are at variance."3 This practice became
lesa rr ueet in s second year, but reflected a continuing
roblem.
bruary 1953, for example, when al unreconeilable
aspect of an _stimete on a teWest trade (!fl-59) confronted the
estimate the OWE Panel of Consultants
luggested, again, that the estimate aim.
y summeriee
arguments of both sides," and let the NSC "choose the horn of the
dilemma whteh it prefers."k Among the objections to this practice
was one by Allier L. Langer (fervor Assistant Director of OF and
now,anel member), who said that "the NSC cannot make a decision
if the professionals cannot Igreil."5
1950,
Nov. 30?/IAC-M.8,
1 IA': minutes,
2 Ibid.
3 TAC minutes,
Aug. 2, 1951, IAC-1-38,
in
in ibid.
hEernorandur on ,N.E meeting with its Panel of Consultants ("the
peb. 6, 1953, Madill ONE; developmental file
on project WCF-h5 (sic).
5 Ibid.
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?ore characteristic
believer, the overube Ittm, rinjority
of the finished estimates sere preeented as a unanimous report.
This achievement was do btleas a credit to the increasing Wen
tiv nese of the deliberative machinery or the ONE Board aid the
in-nvrrowine down the areas of disagreement on fectual and
apecuirtive lolnL . The many committee deliberations and p onal
ed in a project frequently resulted in some
degree o conpo1se, reflected in the Carefully measured language
in which Lhe? agreed conclusions were couched. "Always," in fact,
"the final estimates reflect a certain amount of compromise,"
concluded near the end of its first year of experience. Com-
menting on certein critical views received after the dissemination
of st.i eetievl.to on Chinese Communist vu1norabilities (SY-5), ONE
acknowlede1 7,ht these views "were, in general, shared by the
conferences. in'
Bonrd
.onel YmtimatalW an went on to explain that*
A number of other intelligence agencies were unwilling
to go along with flat ArAtements on thie subject, and that
since the final estimetes always reflect a certain amount
of enmeromise, the Plias!? Nationalists' capabilities
were perans lemewhat generously defined.2
The da ars and heserds of seekii unanimity at. any cost
remained a problem of continuing concern In 1951 an.:, 1952. The
7;NE J'anel, for example, expressed "some concern in Jarlutry 1952,
"over what they thought a tendency to blur it ane the
1,
*eleoraniii, by
comments received
inti' i._rt An, -41 sont- lh_ 1951. commenting o
in cc nenreno
d.
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probable consecuenc e of censuses of action in order tosewlre
unanimity.
The new Absietant Director, Sherman Kent, likewise
warnnl repeetdly that while an e8timat.:3 mu w,b "the product of
deliberation ,:,.nf.71 argument and deduction and expert guessing," the
finished 2740A?ct must not be Pe waterec-down common denominator."2
rr ncewar,
stied, one or more dissents were preferable so
that the olio/ makers, who after all are not so we1l. informed in
record to eteU, should have every aspect of the complex issue
before the r."3
1 ?
MemoranOun r rt of
to Ixr, Jrn. 22, 1952,
Panel meeting by j-
in 0/DCI4a filed uncer )cir.n
views with Klmt, ?arch 25, Oet, 7, 052,
2 ,istorical .,,taff in
oiDet,4!:., files.
3 ibid.
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Intelligence eetimating in Naation to erational Planning, 1950443
Oaraliel with the prOblea of improving the intelligens*
content of estimates was the ealatinaing problem confronting..,erri
Smith and GNP. as it had their predecessors, of insuring thrt the
intellieence on a given foreign power situation was rezlisticallY
examined Jrd stated in relation to the U. Government's own
operational capabilities, counter-measures, and plane. Up to
October 1950, such planning data had usually been withheld, both
from I and from the departmental intelligence neenciee, by the
planning croups in the Joint ,:hiefs of Staff, the State gpartment,
and the agencies in charge of the Government's foreign end domestic
security programs. The problem was also partly one of reconciling
juriedictional difrerences between the intelligence and policy
elements of the national security organization--between those who
were expected to estimate a foreign situation from the intelligence
point of view and those who were evaluating it from the U. e.
operetioaal point of view.
Both the Julies Survey 3roup and the :7,berstadt Task erce
had criticized IA 'a estimating, in 1949, for being inadequately
based on current U. S. operational information, and both had
deplored the departmental practice of withholding relevant operational
information from ',JA.1 The tberstadt committee, in addition, had
1 Dulles Survey s..roup report, Jan, 1949
and berstadt Task T;orce report, Lee. 1946
p. 52, previeue1y cited.
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concludd tAtt esti-ting ws 11:13ssibleu without th;: l_c'hf-fit of
such information, and urged that r'A 444:only be 4ven prope
!!cceei to the planning Am_ polioy-meking levels of the mAional
Eiccrit;, organisation, but be respemeible for participatin6,
well, '?:iw the L'iinking at all those levele.n1
i.ralzTa of what was commOnly called "withheld operational
inforwcn oized ir the tilefings 4iven to -cmral
it wa6 rind by his belAaT, illi f. Jackson,
at their first Tencral meetint: it the TAe.4 on CotoLer 20.3 in
thc F,snersl :ro*ectus of esti7olting presented IA that meeting by
Jackson, Is thr 3t:-tcAent tk,Ai eetimates "should be irepered
t!.1 furl knowledze of our own plans and ln the light of our
own ;)olicy rulreerts."4
lt sorio polic:)' levels a;parcrtly enjoyed a Ilea!3ure of
succenz fro t :tet, while at others therc were serious diffi-
culties rrcl the beeinnin. Ath tho? Notionzl ::ccurity 2ouncil
enior :Aaff, for example, ,STF established direct contact early in
its new program, And from it regularly received a measure of opera-
tional guidance, especially on those estimates specifically re-
quested by the NS. Similarly, ONC; kept in regular and informal
1 :berstaot 'frisk ?Circe report, cited above, p. 52.
2
!listorical ,Lerr interview with L. iiouston, Cieneral Lounsol,
in V A31/-i files.
3 Anutes of meeting, t. 20, 1950,
4
Foikl. Jackson re-iterated these views in
with thc efense eut. (see below), as well vs
ences. (;ee, for exavle, his extelporeneous
.41entation (.4-Aference, June 13, 1951; on disc
oTP files.)
in 0/::ta
later negotiations
at CIA Psterf confer-
remnrics nt OT's igeney
recording, in
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contact with the clandestine operations group in G74., (CO, end
the rea Divisions under the i)/i), receiving neulnionsl briefings
'on anects or this work bearing on eetiutes."
.fs to the State J:epartmenti?ONE at first was especially-
interested in certain special cateoories of policy messazes of the
Aate ;.opartnent, which LT. :Anger souqht to have routed regularly
to 0%1 as a device for keeping abreast of the current viewoints
of the policy officials in tkn-t epartm 2ent. ?in addition, staff
members rer,71.11ar1y sought background policy information from the `Apte
epartment on specific estimate' under way, either through tateie
intelligence office or by direct contact with ate policy officers
who would tzltiately use the finished estimate. As of Jpril 152
the I regarded CIA Is liaison arrangements with State policy
officers as "reasonably satisfactory, although there is room for
betterment." ONF reported later in. 1952, however, that it was
1
This arrangement was confirmed by Charles V. quilick?
in e memorandum to Feb. 6, 1952, concurring in a memorandum
by N,7sh. 1 (both17-Pi of:ci/ia, filed under "OW). On
various occasions, ick agreed, it has boon important for O'tr
to know to What extent operations within GU control affected
developments and trends which Ne had to identify and whose signi-
ficance ON had to kevreise." (ibid.) As a campromise arror4;ement
in the interest of oerational security, On will "continue the
practice of furnishing draft,terma of reference and estimates for
review" (b5;- the ;:q: .rrea Uvisions), so that ONE "may be advised
of information which ffhog poesess which by the content of the
prper it is clear is not In the ooslession of (:)." (ibid.)
2 inutes of staff conferences, nec. 1950, Jan. 1951,
:
17-73---1 in / ci"
,GI progrees report to ?, h;.311.1 23 952 1
izs
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not eleeye efeeelve to seek out police information en an "ad hoc"
basis* and recoeeeneee to the OD that "a do1le:1
ee,e1 weer-
stending between the DCI Aw! the Secretary of :tate ." Le
developed, followed by the necessary directives froil the eecre-
t 1ery to nla
:JA had less success with the Joint Chiefs or
rl
in ecember 1950, Dr. Langer urged the teputy Arector to Seek a
eireet information channel, far ONE, from key policy officee in
the eefense eceartment, including the Secretary of eefense and
e2ossibly" the three Service Lecretarits as well, in order to
enable ONE to "receive cables . . . which are not normally regerded
ae intelligence materials." In eartieelar? he epecified such items
es eeneral eecee.thur's rcports from the ON command headquarters
in Tao, dmiral :Amble's reports from the Lie e. seventh Fleet
and "similer high-level traffic moving to and from the Joint
ehiefs of etaff."2
?sidentey AL had no immediate success in getting access to'
Jee operational messages, since three weeks later eenerel emith wrote
formelly to eecretere of eefense earshall, urring on him need
to 3bc kept fully informed of operational decisions and plana" of
the deed It was not until April 1951 that eereral eershall
1
lemoranduri by t!-/tv: to e7I, July lb, leee,
"chrono filc."
2
eemorandem by T,./Ne to MCI, rec. 7, 1950,
in C,11 25
in / 25
3
Letter b;,i to ;en. ecre earshall, eccreelry of .efense,
rec. 26, 1950, in s)/ ?, filed unCor
'iertAent of e.rense".
Ix 164
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acknowledged "77.;'s request.
1lie aencurrec irrinciple? he
sLnply referr Ii to a standing policy statement issued by
in te4ber 1950, shish
ribed the opartment's various
restrictions e vernlng the dissemination of operational plinning
information.2
'leanwhile, since late '!to
1950,
had also tin
attempting to solve the .VIS omati guidance problem on the
bifida of specific project nesds. Thus, in the currant estirtte
of iicviet moves with respect talciermany (Mit4), launched by:
in 1:)ctober and completed by ,1i2; in January 1951, the J.C.6 repreeen-
tative on the 1',brig. Gen. Vernon 4 Megee !greed to supply
the necessary A. . operational planning information, in the form
of a contribution to the estimate. Shit work on the contribution
for LA was at first delayed and then stopped, and the estimate
was ultimately issued without an operational evaluation.3
Amilarlyi late in December 1950, with respect to a pending
estimate on the Korean Mar (-1) CIA had sought to cheek the
validity of certain operational eisumptions on U.3. capabilities
And plans. This time ON apparently had a meaeure of success in
obtaining the Derti ent inforsation, not now free the J ut
1
ply
1 tarahall to DCi, April 13, 151, in ibid.
2 General 4srshall cited (ibid.) the Ja, paper JIC-M-1205,
5ept. 1950, for restriction* on aissemination or JCS operational
4anning data. The text of tate paper has not been located.
'ce3 . ?
ouction record, 950,53, Annex K below.
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directly from two oT the Service departments (:rly rne hr i'oreo
through the 0)od officies of ono of ONA's new -Gan; et era, -
After the tIC representatives bsc
concurree, In -0Nios final draft, however, the JaS repreeertative
enteredP -
Eztrann objection" during an 11,, mectir to estimAte
a w!lole, because it contained *olosents . . . wic,1 transcend
intelligence, eneroachilv upon tm, fields of Ann7-zin: n. - 2olicy
making .? :le Announced, furthemore, that his E,gency "will .;-nt to
file s.iilar ajoctions in tnt- future. "1
The Mile issue arose Inter in January 1951, in t,Iii, instr-nce
with a onding estimate on the ",rosuects for tho ,reation of an
,dequate iestern ,aropean efense" (i41-13), whico had been
requested by the Asti, !apartment, apparently on behalf of the
resident. In this case, after the intelligence contributions were
under way, sent out a supplementary questionnaire to the several
ervice intellionce acencies, asking for operational inforNatian
on ".vA,. ca:)abilities in estern f-urope." ain there were objections
in the .afense ,e,artnent because U. S. operational glans and Aanning
information were involved.2
-instead of insisting on this supplementary operational con-
tribution, '4;norcl It proposed at the next 11 meeting (January 22)
1- ve
-
cf. production record,
19501-53, ibid.; JT minutes,
Jan. L4
1951,
It
-1-14,
(progress report), Jan.
2, 1951,
an(j. 4tinutees of
in
staff conference, Feb. 28,
1951, C:-.M-10?
2
'reduction r
1,60-53, Annex K below.
IX 166
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Lhat the eatimete bs"eppreashed jointly by th4 intelligence nod
the pletuting offliArre of the Omileernrent." The 14G mmberea
dently including the Je;i represcuse.c.ive present, agreeci tvo this
new approamt. .4ortly titerearter. Cianaral Oiac based his
proposal wit toe ciairmus ot Me Joint hivf taf1, mar
neported o the the. hadred1eYis aimeurence
of ceepur4tion, not, only for the conpletiod of the . 41-0:pball cfa3e
estimate but also fur working out. a standard opera;ing ;)rocedwra
for coordination with t>ha 4c4Z, piasters in rutting Gases."
General ith, he departmental intelligens* daisies WU/
nOW the chairman of the J thee ell appeared to concur LeStthe
!method of. joint intalligenoe-operstional evaluation wee a
workable coomprotaile order 40 everetme the objections or the
!military planners anti at the sane time suesesefully root the moon
of the ;'reaident end title policy officers in the other agencies.
Acknowleovinq 4-hat he willed the "marginal ere* between policy end
int411.1genctsg" ',aural.'omit!! explained 4tat the questions sated
O the erecident and ottleril do not always fall clearly on one side
or the otters" and F)eted "tat .litere are many teo,wore ifrrolved in
assessing the ader:.,acy of Luropean Uefenes wnicn are b.- M intol-
ie concluded, with the Cebberreeee of the LAG, t.hat in
such cases there was a clear need for "st combined intelligence
03erations estimate." 2
Knutes rf LAC mestinca, Jen 22, Jan. 25, 2951, IA0-11.17, 48
.1.
I Ibid.
IX 16
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The ct,o.tion or the planners having been ;,uthorized hi
the Chairman e the #,:a repreeentetilm on the 1;1':: (leneral
-eee) undertook lete in Jaimyto solicit en "informal" operational
eveluetion free the ?planners, for the use of leanwhile
.Jrocece colplete its draft of the estimate,inti1ic aimly s nh
rr,..* that, is, without the benefit of tacround
operaLowli with the tlnerstnding th,7t tie dreft
would bv "chec4,z-, . against the Join 1tff centritutim
wtlen It ;16 boen received. 1 ." by tne end of January, draft
was coieted, but the 4C3 paper was still not forteeomine, .1o'
'encral ,ce now reported that he had bc;en "uneLle to convince
the plannin officials in ,Nj that they should participate on an
inforAel basis."2 iies added, however, that they mou1z2 de so if
instructed az a result of a farsel request to the Secretary of
:efenze Jr the .:hairman of the INS. 3. instead of waiting for the
information, however, the T.:1 announced on 'rebrnary F, 15i51, that
he intended to sJtit the intelligence draft "formally" to Ji.;?
and to the Ptomic 'aergy ammission as well, for their comments.
.??????
1 Jen. 31, 1951,
Fat. to 1951$ I,:-'4-19101
in C4Ci: files; and J minutes,
0/4;i/.
2 linutes of meeting, rftb. 6, 1951, Dtc-4-19,
3 Ibid.
4
IX 168
in 25
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OK's draft of the '.-"suropean lAsfettet,estimpte never reached
It was first Ful..711.tted'te informal discussion with the
re!es::.nentatives on 7'; ebr 18, *d toth,:- ormal review of the IA
on Fetrunr:i 23.1 The IiiC would not accept it, however. Its objections
were those o!' representative if not Ella() c!' .:1,i-rvice Intel-
1-ice o.hiefs, t.I'v,t "the estteate goes beyond the ;,revince of Intel-
?ince
dertakin: to asseen the edsquecy or ,!.?, iroved Y. plans.2'
t fl wee referred back to for the deletion of the "objs-c
ttonable ,ertions". attempted to revise it, and ascusced the
revision .1 r turn with the ..f./C representatively early inr'.nrch. Xaen-
welle, hows.-.Ter, it e ';earf.e..1 that JCS cooperation, still hoped .for,
would net forthcomine,. The nrojeot wee reduced to "deferred
priority,3 are' late in April 097: reported that "no further efforts
would be Tiede to secure operat.onal informaticro for . . . this paper."'
hortly thereafter, the State .epartment, which had originally requested
the estimate, witArew its request.
tpr13. 1951 OV had suffered set-backs on several additional
estiwetes, for 1aek 7f adequate background operational infornetion,
1 letter of transmittal (for 14th draft of lei-13) to ir,2
representatives, Feb. 114, 1951, Oa fahrone file"; and 25
minutes of 7.10 eeeting, Feb. 234 in t7.1:Afe. 25
2 linutes, Yet.? 23, 1951, ibid.
3 LAC---10, 10, 1951,
4lI tinutes, ri1 23, 1951, in 25
Ix 169
in files.
25
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but had had so74,2 ,,ct;ns in at least one case. This 14:45 A pro4eSt
for evalustin-, Ar4auni$thii 1z relstien to Taiwan,lin which
Nationslist counter-ca?atilities were obviously de2.6nnt
on thc disilittc1;1 cf. V. C). forces in the area. In 1,h1s case, .
4as .stal,o;nwIts of U. So operational sa,liu7itions
",73,)trotLr-_ re0. facts" (s0 Or phrased it laturil not by
circct c roGlor, irol the .1T6 but through considcratle nootlation
with the ,ervice iJt1iienca ehiefa.2 in the same month, however,
anothor entimate was cancelled for lack of operational t;uidance from
In thic ncw case, which involved a itiaser of :;oviet defense
ai;ainst atonic-warfare attacks ti.:.:-.31), and in which the
i;ressional :::mittce on ;Ltomic ze WM4 the requester, Ohr had
bcen IeW to believe, in L. course ne,;otlations wth the :efense
..epartnent extenk, over two mor!ths, tht,t oidance on T. . opera-
tional fnctors would be forthcoming. The t1.7,: ultimately declined
to cooperate, however, with the further objection, cited in its final
decision ,Ind concurred in by the Secretary of efonse, tht the .V6
would not rdecse oata on war 715125 for an c 'imate that waz to e,u
to a .or.lre,:isional connittee.3
1 The estimate in question was
below, !nnex K.
7; see 01,i prodUction record,
2
?imorendum by Alliam :Aindy, (AC ,:stimstes ,Starf, subject,
qThe 'Net 'ntimates, roblem", prepared Jw, 25, 19514, for use of
-].ark 7:onaittt--e; cudy in Virvas files.
3 ,
rleet 'Ingo ru
by n. ;sor,ye. :?
1.'51
Arch 21, 1951, in 011k: filets; minutes of T.V.:
in IXI/i:R; and letter
arshall. ..scretery of :wrongs, to 179
lin OM '/Chavelopmental file" on g11.-30.
IX 170
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Late in 4pril 1951, the issue of operrtioriti _Tforation was
re-studied for upte4y areotor? now by OL; reter tn by ONE,
as P r,roblel uf necessary collaboration between the etimators and
the operational mnd :eeple. OIC observed to vehture
cn intellience c:,precietion if enemy capabilities "witeut takin
into account the capabilities and intentions of the o22osin4; friendly
forces (including U. )" was a "vacuous" exercise, but for UNE and
the .11.; contributors to get into "the business of 'war-gaming" would
be ed by the JCL; and would, in fact, not be proper and useful."
-;hat was needed was "some midway point between these two extremes,"
; concluded., and it pointed hopefully to
con-
tinuing neotiations with the JCS representative on the (Aneral
Megee), with the aim of fixing responsibility on the Joint 6taff
for nguiding the: intelligence estimators in such a may as to provide
the operational and planning information essential to laking their
1
estimates useful."
it4ough oiC suggested Ln its study of ioril 1951 that the
necessary arrrne.aents for Joint Staff assistance to (1441 were already
1 lemorhndul by ti.'" to DiC1, Anril 25, 1951, in )/
filed unocr Various JL4 officials undertook to ne;;otiate
the ,TGblem. r. Jackson, the DWI, for example, talkeu with the
Mairwm of the J7-, :en. C'mar N. Bradley, sometime in pug. 1,51,
ami found himUjfljH to "attempt to work out some sort of liaison
arrangements between the entral intelligence Agency, specifically
its :lffice of National stimates? and the Joint aliens of !taff.11
ecalling this conversation to Bradley later (in Jan. 1952), Jackson
said: "fs 1 told you ffn iug. 19527, 1 personally woulo not under
stv circumstances acceut .lenoral Smith's statutory reei.,onsibilities
without a?cess to such rerational p1anni%7 ioroation." (Letter
ba Jackson to Irdley, Jrn. 10, 1952, unclassified; Copy in
filen under "JL".)
ilArn
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)(1 "eetablishe0" thro.
1
1
effort, ecnrse of still
another *Animating. project daring the *ant month indicated that the
problem remained unr olued. ?r' hod enbaraed on a project on the
.1-cic,li1ities of a soviet invasion of Japan (07F-37), riw ,reosed,
throu.,n an outline of terms of reference submitted tc.. re,re-
senti.tives on ley 22, to inciAe in it the pertinent ,. opera-
ttenrl-su,yert factors affectin, Japanese resistance, in or6er to
lake the estImat( more realistic one. In 0 counter-pro=osal by
the ir ?roe, concurred in b5 the other Service intelligence agencies,
J. .. o?erational factors were excluded, however; ane on -iny 2 the
two alternative approaches wore discussed by the cI oard with the
working-evel re-.)resentstivea from the IA''J ty,encies. J-lthoug): the
militar) a ;encies had 'ready concurred in tnc lore limited a:croach,
their .4orkinzi-1eve1 representatives at the OKII meeting of )- 25
apparently joined the other tic representetives in expressing "con-
sioerable sypipathy" with ins broader approach proposed by In
feet, the JCS representative agreed to "attempt* to ,zet the opera-
tional questions answered.1
Age.n, however, operatIonal guidance was not forthcodng from
the jb, and eventually the Japanese estimate also was cancelled.
CaDtein ;. coo]., the 4JC6 representative, reported to on
??????????????????11MONIVIMONM
1
The ;,)rogress and difficulties with N1F-37 are described at 8040
length in a memorandum by =r. Langer, At/Ni', to the DCI, June 18 1951,
I.:, oN' uchrono file". 3es also I;U progress
reports, 1.:-;-:-1;.-13 (lay 22, 1Y51) and IAC-:It-lh (June 12, 1'.,51),
in files.
IX 172
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tiay 29, that he was "unable" to gat the necessary oereLional informa-
tion, but went on to suggest, on behalf of tne oervice Intellience
aiencies, that the problem be referred by the 11_ to the
thereupon undertook to prepare a statement for the fer tJw, next
IA,3 meeting, urzing the views of the ON iloard that it kr..!F "futile"
to evaluate Soviet intentions "without determining what op2csition
the -,oviets would expect to meet." To limit thg estimate, as the
military departments had proposed, by "carefully deleting anything
thet cculd be reilotely described as operational," would be to "reduce"
the evaluation of the Soviet Lnion "pretty much to a statement of
5ti7 raw caosbilities?"2 the DE Board contended. The expected
discussion in the AJC did not take place, however, for reasons not
explained In the records, and the project was ultimately cancelled,
hy early 1952 there appeared some prospect that cooperation
from the JO.: planners might be forthcoming. On Aarch tne new
ieduty Arector for Intelligence, 3r. beaker, conferred with the
recently appointed senior officers in the Joint Staff,
,labell and zaj. ic Achard t's ?artridge, and found that (while
they reserved "war aming" for their operational planners) they
lemorandua Lan&,er, June 1, 1951, cited above,
2 Ibid.
3 1inutes of 1?..: meeting, .;uly 19, 1954 1AC.4.35, in 25X
ixak1t.
4 (:abell, new Arector of the Joint Staff, had previously been
the 17 eter for the tr Force, and Partridge -before July 1951
had been in ';-2 and a frequent partici?ant in I eetince.
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conceded the need for o)crational 'relativity" in 'IlAt;:-; estimates.'
Throw days later .:Ientiral had mother ipersonel diecussion with
3eneral eradley (chairman of the J1) on thc eet.ntiAnt of
ta.ffeetive liaison" between cJNE and the elenners. nraeley, in turn,
"directed" the new heed of his Joint Aaff, renerel to.
'establish such liaise:1:e, and CW11 denien4Aee his recently-appointed
eputy Artctor for intelligenoe (ieneral 'artridje) es "the point
of contact" to receive C11 roeuirements for planning inforuation cin6:
oeerationel eeidance.3
erompt , submitted erafts.O1 to estimates on Aelmunist
to tee ,,J? in larch 1952, along with questions bearing on
aenumptione as to U. operational pinns rad capabilities In the
-ar'amt. The J. planners replied on the sene day, in one case,
and in little rnor c than a week, in the other. 3herman ;nt, the new
head of OAF., coltmended the for its cooperation, fieding its
re-lies "direct, to the point, and extra, ely helpful, in short, .
all we hope6 they would be.44 It appeared as if the ;)reeence of new
leadership in the joint :Aaff may have been a major factor in improving
1
25X1A Memorandum by 0/LLI, listing pending
projects of conmern-co--ee-iir-7,1rwr 1952, in "CeTC AAnnine
In 0/i/tC files.
2 The recent -3)e.theiiradloy conversations were recalled on A.arch 7,
1952, by 'ej. ;on. ;. . ;sbell, then Arector of the joint etaff,
Il in a memcraneue to the DZ; copy of memorandum
in :/:,;/A, filed under "J,13".
3 Ibid.
4
elorancul cemmenting on reAies received from Joint
ff on rc 15 nn,2 :'7,irce 21, 1952; in -7,-;11.:, filed under "J'3S".
Ix 174
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relations. The assistance of t101.405 plPnners was limited,
however, to comments on specific questions raised by CI,A. estimators,
and did not provide for any contAnnine treeemattal of materiAl t-
F,, nor any committee procedure or other system for regular and
direct conseltetion by the estimators with the pineeers.1
There was one project, however* wch had 5icAnwbile teen
under way since June 1951, calling for a formal systee of coopera-
tion between estimators and planners, and carrying the cleasing of
the National eecurity Council. This project was frankly aedressed
to an overall "net" estimate of eoviet capabilities to ttack the
i;.,soecifically in relatior to S. sounter-capabilities and
counter-elans.'eome eighteen months elapsed between June 1951, when
the Ne; '4ecutive .eicretary first wrote the Dal about the need for
such nn estimate, and November 1952, when the final evaluation was
delivered by CIA. ehile the project was marked by delve and diffi-
culties, the end result was an evaluation that was actually produced
and delivered, and one, that represented at least a minimum of pro-
cedural succesa in interdepartmental estimating in collaboration
with the planners. 'erticipeting at various stsees were all the
1
In iri1 1952 3enera1 th went on record, et the ti%;, on CIA's
need for operational euidance and on the close "interrelationship
between intelUeence end operational planning." 4e warned that "if"
ls "product is to be timely," his estimator "must have adequate
advance information at least of the general nature and objectives of
any plane toward which. he can make an intelligence contribution, as
well as of such national or international policies and agreements as.
precede them." ehile contacts: with the Ant* Dept.'s policy officials
were oreasonably satisfactory-, those with the Lorene, .ept. end the
military Cervices were somewhat less than satisfactory."
(eLd progress report to 4Se OA h*,050, ru23, 1952,
ix 175
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major int,elligence agencies and all the principai dlanning agencies,
including not only the Joint ;hiefs of ;:taff but also the Federal
illreau of lnvestigation and the other agencies having operational
responsibilities for the Nation's domestic security programs.
In Os initial reaction to the )450fs project proposal, in
June 19 151, the ICI concurred at once in the need for such a net
estimate, and agreed to accept reeponsibili*y for providing the
leadership to see it through to coepletion. In his conment, however,
the DCI reminded the *Sd that sUch a. net appraisal would be "neces-
sarily much broader in scope than the usual Wational Intelligence
Fatimate,11 end would involve the integration of intelligence on
the U.S with vario.s types of information on the U. S." It was
essential, therefore, the DCI continued, that the NSC 'a directive
to the participating intelligence and planning agencies be.worded
etronir enough to insure that all types of necessary information,
both 'intelligence and operational, wonld be forthcoming. ie
questioned "certain qualifying phrases" about interdepartmental
cooperation in the draft of the directive, and urged that the direc-
tive be worded so that it would not be interpreted in such a way
as to limit the scope or otherwise prevent the accomplishment of
the project." In addition, the DCI proposed that CIA be loaned
the services of the necessary planning and other personnel from the
other agencies, on a full-time or temporary basis, to assist at
various stages of the evaluation process.2
1 ix.eply by ;.;,1 to Icecutive
by ;Iv (Lr. I ner) an0 051
2 ibid.
June 14, 1951, drafted
, In - 'chrono file".
IX 176
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i'ending th arrival of the formal request from the
Jeneral itbaenounced the proposed *net estimate" ,roject to. the
.112, on Ju13, 19, 1951, describing the scope of the project as
joint effort between the intelligence agencies and the -olannere or
ooerators.? He invited the L a4encies to participate initially
to the extent or assietinz feiii in producing first "a pure intentence estimate.' on :ioviet capabilities, as a point of de?arture,
and directed N to launch that phase of the evaluation immediately,
1
withoet waiting for the C directive.
;Ater in July, the request came officially to 11,1? now in
the name of en* resident, anc with it a request from that W.#
draft tne necessary adninistrative directive for the 1i; to issue
to the intelligence and operational deoartmenta, agencies, and
committees involved. That directive was eccordingly drafted, by
OIC rather than 7)V., and Was ....ssued on August 30 to the several
agencies concerned.2
Four oarticipating groups were assigned to prepare the major
contributine, two for intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities,
and two for evaluations of U. S. counter-capabilities to repel a
ov4 t Attack; and the 1;_a was to be responsible for inte;rating
the contribntions into a final "net" evaluation, in collaboration with
1 linutes of 1 C meeting, July 19, 1951, -FC-M-3,
41CII:111.
2
.I0e,progress report on this estimate
I 1, to .1,0 June 23, 1952,
filed unver
:r 177
memorandum by
cc,py in ?/
in
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the chairmen of the oontribut
1
were as follows;
The aesignments, in summary,
1, tn estimate of Jeviet ce2abi1itie5 for military
attack ;tell/lust the e, excluding Soviet clandestine
ceeebilities, to be prepared by ilORE In collaboration
with the 1AC meiber agencies;
2. An estimate of Soviet capaellities for clan-
destine attack and etibversive action against the U. 3.,
to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence
:;onference (II);
3. .An evaluation Of S.'esapabilitiee to repel
attl'de (excluding counter-measures for clan-
destine attece), to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs
of ;;;taff;
4. Jn evaluation of U. S. capabilities to resist
andet clandestine end subversive attack, to be pr-
':red by the Interdeparteental Committee on Internal
security (ISIS); and
"final evaluation of the net capabilities of
the enemy," to be prepared from the foregoing estimates
by tee D-SI with the collaboration of the above four
contributing groups.
GNE's 9;eare intelligence" contribution to the net evaluation
was completed alnost immediately, in collaboration with the 1H::
agencies, and was issued separately in October- 1951 in the form of
a regular estimate (as Y 14).2 Similarly, the companion satirists
on the clandestine aspects of Soviet capabilities, prepared by the
Federal ureau of investigation and the other agencies that made
up the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was also ready
in October, excpt for * eupplementary contribution requested later
1 Ibid.; and minutes of IC meeting, Aug. 2, 1951, IG-r-3',
efeCite.
2 :e .roduction
record, 1950-53, nnex K below.
IX 178
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by from dealing with U:.67/. clandestine capabilities
againet U. . territories outside the continental limits, which was
ready early in January 1952. The two operational .valuation, NOW-
ever, were not completed until mid-1952. The JCS evaluation of
U S. counter-capabilities was ready is June 1952; while the cor-
responding evaluation of U. S. resistance to Soviet clandestine
attack, orepared by the nit' and the other agencies on the Inter-
departmental Committee on Internal .Jecuritir, was ready in 4.ey 1952.1
The final "net" evaluation was drafted in July 1952 by an
of 25X1
interagency "working group" consisting et
ONE, chairman
(also of ONE), a representa-
tive from the lAC (Maj. Gen. 4ohn A. 3anford of the Air Force), and
one from the JCS Oeneral 4alsh)42 Their work wee done principally
in the Anitagon, averently because the JCS declined to release its
own evaluation outside its premisee; and insisted instead on making
its findings available to the drafters on an oral 1rasis.3
On substantive issues, the working group found themselves in
eventual agreement on all but one issues so
reported to the
iCI on Auguat 1, 1952. That issue was on the *US5it atomic bomb
1 :rogress re;:ort to iCIW*-1 ; on "net estimate"
on USS, June 23, 1952, cited aove3 and minutes of VC meeting,
June 26, 1952, V-C-'11-75, in ObCl/2a.
2 Ibid.; and memorandum by C,N; (,:hairmen of the
"ior1n roup" on net estimate), to XI, Aug. 1, 1952,
in ONi. file "Memos for DCI, 1952".
3 , fl. 1 1952, cited a
amorendull by ;!oover to :la, ug
IX 179
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25X1
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k capability,"
ob:ao
1.1 as,otept on of Ur% do iron." rode by
The representatives
and
the
fenled this formals as "safe -11anning,"
ar,2).-74 Ie
plAnaing it IS "%Atte
3 Li-
mai,. than to unfetrest? es" v.14.-.:h wide 'safety tnergina. . . sh.uld
not b ttei in 74r) t;:tvaluete:1: i.nteiliTiTenoe report.
The dr. It o.g.' the "net 3 t, inerwnt f7trther revision,
in the hti-As
?king grow an.,then in the u
valuatn rtttee, on whick to four contr',..7,uting
and --)lannirq,e were rap-esented and over which the 7.I pre
el 4 nrn-: rdftnee wit the N:r dirge vs f the year beforo.
in ctohr t
the rtpart va d1irnred tl the M vrul lets
ersion.
in iovalebe.?r c as followed 3.; a rtmi
The Utional ,,ecitrity Council, whict reviewed g,"t.,11 final
"net" aveluation n 'ovebr 2, 1952? founi the ,nd result so !IV
whet lens t` art latisractory. It noted that the report was Agree-
tort:4c; by a nur,.'.:er csf ILNI a ions and inado-uscioe, including the
fac the
eeloppw-as since the eveluetivn was prepared have ren-
dered it in pert oit of date.v 3 The experiment es, not abandoned,
1 !bid.
I rhe estisete entitled *Sot Capability of the Ur-:;ft to Injure
the .ontanental U. :;.?41 was sent to the;:(. on lJct. 21, 1952 gn-
en emended estimaa oft Nov. 25, 1952. (f441 paamorin4un by J. -,. Lay
Jr., 4.3m.utrivis ._*?..rotary of &--C, La ,,,...i, liov. .:' 1952,
Itn /OCIAR, filed under ?VW)
1ieoranthn by Lay to rf, T, Nov. ,A, 195? d ?
100
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however. The45C, instructed the DCI to prepare a new set of terms
of reference (in collaboratiommithadlicials of the JCS, IIC icrs,
and other Government agencies "as reqeired!), for a "mere adequate"
evaluation of the 0USSR's net capabilities to inflict direct injury
on the U. S.
1
In January 1953, the 45C established another !Special EvaIua
tion Subcommittee," this time giving it the position of a subcom-
mittee of the WC. Representatives of CIA, JCS, I1C, and XIS were
to make up the committee, with a chairman who was to be acceptable
to all of them,
of the CME Board was 25X1
nominated by the DCI as the CIA member; and Lt. Oen Idwal H. Edwards
became chairman of the committee, on the nomination by JCS and with
the concurrence of CIA and the other groupe.2
Thus General Smith's administration came to a close, with
the experiment of joint intelligence-operational evaluation still
continuing, in the direction of preparing what were now being called
commander's estimates." Whether this new type of committee at the
NSC level was to be more successful than the experiment in 1951-52
remained to be seen. In any case, the problem of adequate operational
lIbid.
2Memoranda by OCT to Executive Secretary, NSC
Jan. 22, 1953, bothl in 0/bCl/ER, filed under "NSC.
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guidance to normal inteleigenee e, 1 imeting *seined. ehortly before
his retirement, eeneral Smith semmaristd the situation during his
two years in CIA, and concluded that CIA-produced estimetes had been
"steadily increasing in quality an4.2Talrg . . . now attained a
standard of excellence welch justifies acceptance as the beide for
national planning." On the other hand, he pointed to what ie regarded
as CIP's one major remaining problem, "thn impossibility making
certain estimmtes in the absence of military assumptions." eithout
realistic guidance on e. counter-capabilities, 11 nnd Its 1.11
contributors could Only "prepare a sort of bill of eateriels of eoviet
assets and let it go at that, he stated. e expreesed doubt whether
the problem woeld be resolved "until we set up on the hieheat level
some machinery forceordinated 0-2 and estimates"; but 'whether
thatls possible or not, I don't know,'" he concluded.2
1 Late in 19E2 the scope of two pending estimates on the JSI WAS
revised to avoid operational matters. On Al!e-64 (part I), for example,
eee reported to the eCI that in accordance with instructions from the
Ilk? on Oct. 231 1952, ?we have excluded all war-gaming paragraphs and
limited ourselves to estimates of raw capabilities.!' (Memorandum by
Pe/Ne to eel., Oct. 29, 1952, I in Ohe "chrono
enother estimate (NI-14O) was recommended for cancellation by the )NL
eoard, on Nov. 25, because its scope (to equate the "strategic value"
of eastern europe to the Soviet Union against "US and kTU forces and
plane) "goes beyond Iee reseonsibilitr." .(Memorendum by Uoard of
National estimates to IAC, representatives, Nov. 25, 1952, in Cee
"developmental file" on NI2e40.) Heenwhilo, the (11E Panel of Con-
sultents had an extended discussion, on Oct. 164 "on the risks attend-
ant on attempts to introduce weregamine into intelligence estimates";
and at least one member of the Panel
subsequerit425X1A
objected to tT"- using the term 'communist capabilities", "without refer-
ence to oe)osition on the pert of UM/US forces." (Memorandum by
ect.
AL/, to lei. Can. 3. C. vartridge, then 3-2,
r.
# in O chrono file"; and summary of eonsu).-
tants meetine o arc 19, 1953, in ONF Staff eemorandum No. 140,
in C) taff emeos" file.)
2 _
extemporeneous remarks by eCI at OTRIs Agency Orientation Con-
ference, Nov. 21, 1952, printed in On Training Bulletin No. 1, Feb. 11,
1953, copy in eIt eecorde Center.
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