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January 1, 1953
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Approved Fo*lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP84=00851W020021000-1--3 CHAPTER I Approved For Release 2005/0 T AzigIDP64-00654A000200250001-3 25X Approved Forejease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065W0200250001-3 Orit;A)7IZ ONAL lirSTOIT crirvAL INTRuiroluicz males, 1950-1953 Chapter; Paress I. Background, 1946-1950 53 I/. Major Organisational Revisions 93 III. Inter-Agergy Coordination Problems 48 IV, The Conduct of Overt Collectices 106 V. Development of a Reference Center 84 VT. Problems of Scientific and Technical IntellIgence 80 N'T/. Economic, Geographic, and Boole Inte114,ence 83 VIII. Current Intelligence and Hostility Indications 59 17. Production and Coordination of ratelligence Est 162 T. The Conduct of Agency Business 189 AMMON' A. President Truman's Letter, January 22, 1946 B. Selected Organization Charts of CIG and CIA, 190-53 C. Directives of the National Intelligence Authority MAIO D. CIA Legislation of 1947, 19h9, and 1751 E. NSC Intelligence Directives and MI Directives, 194743 F. List of OIC Projects, 195143 G. Missions and ?unctions of CIA ?Moos, 1950-53 He List of ORR Reports, 195243 K. Descriptive List of ONE Estimates Projects, 195043 L. List of osI Projects, 194943 H. List of TAC Projects, 195043 N. Index Approved For Release 2005/03SEMIL. P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For "rase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654400200250001-3 CRIzATIoAL 111,1.37071. o OIRNIRAL ,E AGACT, 1950-1953 Contilnts Theories Relating to CIG Sonars' Ideas of Organisation, 1946 Pegs 1 4 Modifimition Required by NTA4 8 Tho Personnel Problem, 1946 9 Vandenberg's Decisions and Actions 1946-1947 11 Coordination of Activities Under Vandenberg, 1946-1947 17 Fapansion of ORX, 1946,1947 19 Organisational Changes in CTO, 1946-1914 23 Change of Commend and the National Security Act, 1947 25 NSC Interpretation of the Law, 1947-1948 27 Effects of the Interpretation' 1948 31 Development of the Hillenkoetter Organization, 1947-1949 34 Coordination Problems, 1947-1950 35 The ORF Problem, 1948-1949 39 The Dulles Committee Recommendations and Their Reception by the Agency, 1949-1950 41 The 1949 Ammey "Reorganization* ? 44 The 1950-1953 Reorganization in Relation to the 1946-1950 Background 49 Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065 00200250001-3 9h6-1950 of the Present 3tgdy of this at within cen-oaln limits- tions, anganisational devlopssnt of Central Intellierk:e nd of the entra1 nte1lt:?ence Agency using as a chronological guide the vitriol covered by the a:minial?ration of General 'elter ::mith (October 7, I950-February 26, 1953). In order to Troika clear what loneral Zmith was able to accomplish, it is desirable to trice very briefly the main events in the development of ,3entra1 Intelli- gence over the ibur years that preceded his term in office. ,r,f Theories'el.ting to CIO :ouers, first nireetor of entral telltene (January ?2, 1911.6 - Julio 10, 19.46) had an i1vantar that was shared by neit,h r of the two ;men who immediately qceedad hi, in being thoroughly ,Artilinr with the planning that underlay the establish- ment of 7'.'ontral e. As assistant Arector f Aaval Intelligence during the war, he had been in position to know at first band te inner wor4iws, not only of the Office of Navel 1 This study is not concerned with t.he oompo nts of CIA under ation to the vput' lrector (Plana), except to mention them in the "overt" activities of the Agency. ZI Approved For Release 2005/03/28 C:VERii 4-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 Intelligence, but of the othSai1ttary intelligence services, the ?lice of Strategic Services, and %he Joint Intelligence 7ommittee. Nring 19)45, he had worked closely ukth various groups that were instrumental in bringing a plan for Central /ntelligence into exist- ence. It was Souers, as a ememittee of one who had written the intelligence recommendations for .the committee on the unification of the War and Navy ,,)epartments, headed by Ferdinand Y.berstadt (June 1945).1 With such a background, Sours well understood the nature of the Central Intelligence Or created by the President's memorandum establishing a central intelligenoe system, dated January 22, 19146. Aside from designating the Secretaries of Stet*, War, and Nary, plus the President's personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority, the essential clauses in,bbis nemorandum directed the newly authorised Arector of Central Dtbelligence to do three things: to distribute within the government "strategic end national policy intelligence" resulting from the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security; to plan for the coordination of national intelligence activities; and to perform 1 See H5 interview with S. W. Souers, Jan. 25, 1952; in oitrtilis files. 2 See Annex A, below. 3 For comments on the meaning of this term as understood by those drafting the basic documents for CIO, see memorandum from L. L. Montague OR1;, to Chief ICAPS, Feb. 6, 190; in 0/DCl/HS files. 2 Approved For Release 2005/0SECRELP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foriease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654000200250001-3 services of cosnon concern to intelligsnce where indicated. Souere was fully aware or the limitations implied under these directions. For whatever form "strategic and national policy intelligence was to take, it was certainly going to be dependent on sources of information controlled by the Deportment* of Auto, War, and Navy. These departments collectively were aiso--in the persons of their secretaries (the National Intelligence Authoritly)--the controlling authority for the Central Intelligence Group. The assistants to the Group's Director, who were going to do the actual "correlation and evaluation" of intelligence, were to be representatives of these same departments and further responsible to the departmental !3ecre- taries through their chiefs of intelligence (the Intelligence Advi- sory Board). The concern of these assistants, however, was not to be with the departmental aspects of the material they "correlated" but only with its "national security" aspects Honce, their true function was first to determine what intelligence was significant with respect to national security; then to evaluate it in terms of national strategy and policy. The same applied to the coordinating function and to the establishment of "services of common concern." The overriding No separate collection service for CIO had been planned at this time. The Strategic Services Unit, as a caretaker organisation for the liquidation of OSS, could not be expected to furnish adequate intelligence for CIO Approved For Release 2005/06EWDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 consideration w the "national security"- OS intelligence was related to it. Wartime and postwar experience had indicated that the govern. - mental intelligence structtee1ted not been ideally designed from this point Of view. The object of lioupordination" was to modify the struc- ture, or redesign it if necessary, to the end of making it more ade- quate for the specific requirements of national policy and strategy. If this required a centrally directed collection service, or a pool- ing of foreign language translation resources, or any sort of major or minor adjustment of the complex of the governnentel intelligence as it existed in 1946, then the edjusteent should be made. Hut it would not be made by fiat of the Director or arty other individual (short of the President), but by the NIA. The primary function of the rirector and his associates, doe/grated as the Central tateilt- genc. Iroup, was to recommend to the CA What should be done. &suers, Ideas. of Organization The nirector, in otter words, wee tbe representative of the National IntelAzence Authority in matters of intelligence having to do with the national security. He not only worked for and with the National Intelligence AuthoriVY, but was part of the intelligence structure that the Authority collectively comprehended. His "Group" consisted of "persons and facilities" assigned to his by the National Intelligence Authority from its constituent departments. lie had no 1 Feb. 8, 1946; in Annex C4 below. 1 14 Approved For Release 2005/03aNEPP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654,0200250001-3 approprirtion nor any right to cmoley or dismiss independent of the MIL Under the concept outlined above, eve c did not need those rights. "he :;entral lutelliteastOlamoup was a part of, not apart from, the departmental- intelligence structure thA had emerged from the war. in the opinior of -:euttir hitsself: "ile set out to establish thee ,:roup as a small 1-roy of experts drawn from the severel 1!,part- mEnts, and servinp? them." qow tho consept would work out in ;)rac- ticw rumstned to be seen. In thaory at least, there was no mason why a Jeptral rttelli- nee ,I.roup directed in accordance with Fuch a concept should not eccomplish the objectives for which it wAs designed. V,ouers organised the originel Central Intelligence 'irodp accordingly. As organisation consisted of two unite: a i',er,tral leports ,Aaff, and Central attuning ttarr.2 The first of these vas to discharge the Croup's responsibilit:, with respect to cor- relation and evaluation of national intelligence. The other was to deal with the 4coordinetion of national intelligence activities. ;.ach of these staffs, of course, consisted of person' assigned from and paid by the departments represented in the National 1 italics our. z,eil Historical Staff interview with 4. !;ouers, Jan. 25, 1952, :ei;fe 15; in 0/:WNS files. 2 bee ?'nnex Fis bel. 5 Approved For Release 2005/03/25F2k164-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 Intelligence 'uthority. The h directly to Le Areotor of Coitral inte ff, however, "report once. The :entral planning Aliff (early Februaey - July 20, 1946) had the larger share of the 'mediate work because any important problems concerned with postwar intelligence activities wore pressing for immediate solution. The task fusing the Plans 4itte:f wee, in effect, to make recortiunatione as to how the intelligence structure that had emerged from the war night become better fitted to postwar needs. PAready, in March 1946, little more than a -Ionth after ,entral Intel- ligence ad even been set in otion the Staff was total of some eleven prob1ets, 1e11 of them demand tling with a lutions and 1 These were; a. survey of all existing facilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methodic b. Survey to determine what *overage of the foreign language press in the United States is desirable for intelligence purposes, and how the coverage should be obtained. c. ,I.ervey of the collection of intelligence in L;hina. d. :?_xamination of the problem of the Joint Intelligence Study bitching Board and determination whether there should be any change in its supervision and control. e. ..)tudy of Foreign Broadcast Intelligence 4irvice--where it should be placed, etc. f survey a intelligence available in the United :..tates from colleges, foundations, libraries, individuals, business concerns, and sources other than those of the .Jovernment. g. survey to determine need for index of U. S. residents' foreign intelligence information. h. .Audy ofi leen- nections abroad which might produce foreign intellig nee. 1. Stud of problems of psychological warfare. J. Survey of the adequacy of the intelligence facilities related to the national eeeurity. k. Ce-pilation of all types of faetuel stretegic intelligence on the U.,Se. :.roa records of the CPS in 0/XI/HS files. 6 Approved For Release 2005/03/28SELC 4-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651,0200250001-3 none offering an easy ene, pertAr boosausil each of them required multiple negotiations, and the agreeleet4teach agency concerned. . , re agreement vas not fortheemling, resort would be to the Nationel intelligence Authority itself, tut there could hardly be a die osition to ask the corsisejas of 6tate ,'Arid Navy to deal personally with eeoh problem that mi ht te facing the entral intelligence Croup. This meant thz,t, the activities of the lane taff would be likely to reduce more discussion then solution. In point of fact, the ;lens Staff, instAtd of providing a quick succession of solutions, left of its problems still in sus- pense after five months. The '.;antral Reports taf, on the other hand, had essentially only one problem. This problem--how to develop strategic and national policy intelligence for use by the resident and the National intelligence Authority?was obviously not susceptible of immediate solution, as certain of the planning problems inherently were; but given time, it was theoretically possible for the Staff to construct the necessary apparatus whereby this type of intelli- gence could be produced. The construction of such an apparatus, however, presupposed: (1) a collection system capable of suiport- ing a national intelligence effort; (2) research facilities ade- quate to interpret the material collected; end (3) staff "estimators" of the highest quality obtainable from or to be acquired by the agencies making up the Central Intelligence 7,roup. Logically, it Approved For Release 2005/03/EO4 64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For Illease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 would be unwise for the 5 to begin se serious n tase RS furnish.. ing strategic and national policy inte111gente until at last these requirements been met. lodification inquired by NIA-2 :!fore the.::eports taff had even been formed, however, ,renid4nt e.sirel for a centrully produced daily tigent of all important incoling intelligence had been jven substance in the 2nd Arective or the ettionel intelligence ;uthority (e February 1946)1 4All the task of furnishing this dizent had been ahsigned to C,!t5. The result was to impose upon a Staff established with e view to drawing deliberate conclusions from the evidence provided by intelligence, a Pattern of activity of an essentially different character. The question is not ao rauch whether the functions of current intelligence reporting, and those of drewing final conclueione from intelligence should have been lodged In the same office; but rather whether the immediate and continuous de-iand created by daily reporting at this te in the tarCle develop tent would necessarily convert it into a current intelligence :72.eup regardless of any deeires or plant to the con- trary. Without division and enlargement or the staff, there would be little time for n orderly- development of a program for 1 :(3e Astorical 3taff interview with S. Sonars, Jan. 25, 1952, ?ale 9-10; in 0/LJCl/J files. 2 ove Annex below. 40 Approved For Release 2005/03/28E1464-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 faltellionce estimates while daily curreatAstell g nee had to be deievered. Indeed, the uroiney or the kilesident's request left insuf- ficient time even to make adequate prepara%ione fur the daily bul- letin itself. The :ientral lane 3Wf had one week (6 - :Lebruary) to word out all the details involved in preparation of reliable current intelli 1gende on a national bezia. Thereafter, the demands of the daily summary necessarily continued to take erecedence over all others besetting the rteporta 6te f. von two years later, nen the etaff hod become a large office of revearch, this continued in large eeaaurs to be true .2 The :enamel Problem The other problems were any, bat the one Viet trenscended them ell was personnel. The process of "correlation end evalua- tion" which Lc:lc:kneed peculiarly to the aports btaff, required persons with e type of mind And experience rare in combination. in order to acquire such persons, eccordiros to the ireotives? the .1roup uet look to the cgenoiee under the 4ational intelligence iothority, but thu ,roup had no power to do more than request trans- fer. 4th reset to persona of outstanding competence in intel- ligence, the members of the NIA were not necesserily anxious to grant suc) requests. eence, there took place all through 1946 and 1 The first issue of the iaily Summary was published Yob. 15, 1946. 2 jee Avipter VJI, below. 9 Approved For Release 2005/03/2SEQ064-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 into 1947 a determined but not very aucC.oeful effort on the part of the Reports ,tarf to acquire ,the people it n?eded.1 In lis final report on June 10, 1946, on his ueparture fres ecmiral :3ouers singled out the personnel problem es a vital one calling for solution. ae pointed out in general, however, that during the four no ths just passed a good deal of progrer had been made toward laying the groundwork fOr Central Intelligence.2 Souers left to kneral Wert S. Vandenberg, his =coos r, an organization consisting principally of the two Staffs just described, plus the nucleus of organisations concerned with the dissemination function accorded to CI, its security, and such internal ac!ministrative probaose as mi ht nrise. The latter, however, under the Ironp concept in force, would be largely a. ,3 matter of inter-agency liaisons, As Somme left it, CIO was still a body within the NIA intelligence structure. It could 'sally become an entity apart from the Aroup if the Authority were to decide that the problem of poeticar intellizence could best be solved by that nteane, or it could develop an a coordinating mechanism for the total struc- ture of which it was a part. 1 See it interview with L. L. !ontsgue, April 1, 1952, in 2 Digest of (,:10 ,Togress $eport, June 7, 1946, in files. 3 Because CI, must look to the IAD agencies for funds, personnel, and services. files. 10 Approved For Release 2005/03/SE1REETP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For "lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065111F0200250001-3 wie and (cue= During the eleven montne 1946 - May 1, 1947) when he held office as Director of Centraf.intelligenee, Oeneral Anyt L. Vandenberg made deeisions end obtained agreement' that had the effect of radically altering the theory and the structure of Central Intelligence. The mostiportant of these decisions were made and carried through daring Vandenberg's first three months in office. The principal and basic dee a&o concerned the responsibility of the Director with respect to the " intelligence" estimates that mild be rategic and national policy he product of "correlation and evaluation" of intelligence relating to the national seoarity. Although these estimate" would constitute but one function of the entral intelligence Group, they were the function- that, in $ sense, oomprehended the rest. Inasmuch as the estimates were to be pre cad by the G sup, they would be the product of lrolip effort end thus of the community of intelligence agencies under the NIA. As such, they could be rendered in the name of the Group, the Q'roup as e whole being answerable for them. Or they could be rendered in the name of the Director of 1:entra1 Intelligence who alone would be answerable for than. From the point of view of an official using the estimates, the difference might not be great. rem the point of view of the producer, the difference might be considerable because sole Approved For Release 2005/03/E CIR-ETP64-00654A000200250001-3 g Approved For erase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 r-spanitibilit for tie means of productlon. Aocordin to :lameral ed sole sit - MAW rg, "Yationa estimates . . . hed to be the opinion of the Director." e conceded the riFht of his coil ties on the Intelligence Advivory hoard to enter contrary opinions if the, chose, whicn he .would feel duty Lound to forward along with the official estimate*. but the esti- mate itself would be his, and he would stt,d responsible for it. The reason given by Vandenberg wee that his appointeent an lirector of :1,7entral Intelligence constituted an order from the President of the United tates, which order entailed all the responsibility of command.2 Fundamentally, it was 14112dOnberg's attitude toward the Axector's responsibility that dictated the three demands that he successfully placed before the National Intelligence Authority between June 2e and September 5, 1946; for the right to collect foreign intelligence apart from the departmental collection services, for the right to conduct intelligence research, and for the financial independence necessary to maintain control over the persons engaged, 1 - redeceseor of the Intelligence Advisory k:ommittee. Authorised by are. 7 of resident Truman's letter of Jan. 22, 1946 (see Annex A, below) to consist of the ". . . heads . . of the principal agencies of the tlovernment having functions related to the national security as determined by the National Intelligence Authority." 2 ersgreph based on Vandenberg's own ststelAents. See astorical Staff interview with Vandenberg, March 17, 1952, in 0/DC1/0 files. 12 Approved For Release 2005/03/28S. EgREF14-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651100200250001-3 in those and other set itt e only t;le :it two will be , Alt u;,;4 all of these were important , dered 4ere.1 -402 ,-e --17ineiPlef of having research eonduoted by .;'10 was approved in '-ne %rootive or the intleaaL,Zatelligenoe Authority, on July 1/46.2 rolevaot :eraraph; stat,d Lhats tas fUnetions specified in zmragreph 3-a of the -resioent's letter, the; -arector of ;entral _intelligence is neroby authorised to undertake such reeeereh and anolysie av may be necessary to determine what functions in t'le fields of national security intelligence are not being presently performed or arc not beim.; odoquately per- formed. Based upon theme determinatione, the Director of Central intelligence may centrals, such research and analysis activities as may, in ble opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the IntelliKence Advisory Eoard, be ,wre efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.? Literally reed, this paragraph is little more than e state- ment of the obvious; perhaps even a redundant statement in view of See footnote, page 1, above. 2 See Annex below. Tho officers approving NIA-5 were: Pcheson, ,'ctinz Secretary of State; Aobert P. Patterson, lecretery of tar; John L. Aalivans odting Secretary of the Navy; and Antal% D. Leahy, Special Representative of the President. 3 liee Annex C, below, paragraph 2. 13 Approved For Release 2005/03/SEGREEP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foripease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065*0200250001-3 the elready-statec function ef Gentrai int./ igenc 4coordinate intelligence ketivities,4 and Wperfora eervicee of co on concern." Manifestly, survey of research activities would be "cuoreination," while centralization of some of them in 4 would create a 'service of co len concern." The action taken by oral iandenberg in response to the oirective, weever, tended beyond its literal terms, for he proceedee at once, apparently without serious ooneultati n with the 1 LAP to establish a full-ecale research activity within CI-4 by expansion of the 'entral moporte 6taf:C. This action wts in line with--if not necessary to?amoral vandenbergle concept of the Arectorle reeponsibility. The flaw in the arrangement was its incompleteness. in the nature of thing*, it would be a long time before the means either of collection or of interpretation could reach sufficient maturity to constitute a firm basis for the exercise of individual responsibility by the 4iroctor Or Central 4ntelligence. In the particular nature of the pert/miler case, no central system of intellizence collection or interpretation would be likely to become self-suflicient short of a centralisation that would have iliatorical examination of pertinent docuiants,has disclosed no evidence that leneral Vanlsaber coplisd with the literal term' of niA-5 in this regard. $EgELT Approved For Release 2005/03/2 . 64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Forilease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200250001-3 the effect of *boltehjn or incor' ii other intelligence agencies. In the absence of such an un]ikei.y and radical develop- ment, the central research organisation could only eserge on a per with Agency research organisations and in. direct conflict with their activities. Vandenberg's interpretation of Nit-5 was also certain to have an effect on ocoordination" of estimates. in Vsedenbergls view, as. ha been noted, national eetimatee were to be his alone to which t.e . iP had a ri ht to eater a contrary opinion. In pree- tice, however, this theory would call for unilateral production of estinates by CL1 which would be submitted, ,without the neces- sity of discussion, to those who had the PU:ht of dissent. 'tach a practice would have rIquired GIG to have independent reaources for the production of estimates, which in fnct it did not have. in point of fact, then, consultation would be necensary. The actual degrne to which the WI deuld nake his opinions prevail would depend upon the authority with whieh he could speak, which would be circumscribed in accordance with the limitations of his organisation ond thus of hie independent knowledge. Hence the irector's position would ultimately become one in which he would either have to: (11 accede to any contrary opinions of his contemr- poraries; (2) take the risk of maintaining a position of whi.n he could not be fully sure; or (3) find the means of more complete control over the sources of intelligence estimates. Vandenberg's I 15 Approved For Release 2005/04-:gA1DP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foripease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654000200250001-3 SIMMS in beine made "emecu "Oa U of the ele on bruary 12, 1947, eee a move in the direetien en control, whose efficacy, however, would depend on tne extent his newlyetound power.1 which the ireotor pressed Financial independence?the th1d element of eandenbergis series of demanda noted above-..was a part of the same development. Fetablishment of independent oellectien sad research under the ireetor required that the eireotor be able to control personnel engaged in these activities, which he Gould do only il tney were in his employ. The method of assigMeRat of personnel tram the NIA departments for duty with the ereup would not serve this purpose, for personnel so assigned would always be under the ultimate con- trol of their parent departments. ,oquisition of financial independence rzowaver, ha u another important effect; it tendede-even beers the eational ,.ecurity Act, was passed in 1947--te create a central intelligence "agency" as opposed to a ceordinating "group heroes previously there had been no need of a full-scale administrative structure, 1 Briefly, at the ninth meeting of the eie4 the Authority approved the statement that the DI should "operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, ear, and Havy," so that his decisions, orders, and directives "should have full forte and effect as emanating from the ifearetaries." eith this power, Vandenee was theoretically in position to direct the work of the Ohiefs of Intelligence in the three departments. uuring his three remaining months in office, however, he seems to have taken no advantage of this authority.. Admiral Allenkoettero his successor, voluntarily surrendered it at the tenth meeting of the PIA, June 26, 1947. See minutea of 9th and lOth meetings of the NIA in eitZI/HS files. 1 16 Approved For Release 2005/03SENEI4DP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006541#0200250001-3 there now was a requirement 1.6141 in the long mu, could only be mat by fully staffed dinje'sje officals of diverse types con- trollsd by t.,114 working for ,antral Intaaigenoe as an entity apart from the .roup. ,A)ordinstien of Activi The decisions and antics Of CAneral Vandenberg so far discussed concerned hie functions with raMpoct to "correlation and evaluation" and "services of common conosrn," but not the tIard function of "coordination of intelligence activities." Vendenber4's insietence on beirm made "executive agont" of th0 National Intelligence Authority any indicate that he hoped ultimately to be in position to coordinate these activities by direction, bat st the outset of his administra- tion he dele4ated this function to an interagency committee. Tho OOMMitted WC3 ziimirently hot foread with this exclusive par e in mind, however, for according to Vandenberg's own tettimouy BOAC six yes later, what he intended prinaril;,, was not so much strict coordination, As a eana of transai,ting business with and through the Intelligence Advisory Board) iihatever may have been the arector's intentions in this regard, the fact teczt the new committee superseded the old :Antral Plans Staff eant alAost certainl;f that it would perfOrm the eoord.ating flunctioD by inheritance from iti predecessor if for no better reason. 1 Astorioal f:iteff lnt.rview with A. S. ';eudenterg, in 0/YIPS files. I 17 01-114-11"-r Approved For Release 2005/03/28 kAAJIVE.44-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006544,0200250001-3 The new organisation was called the "Intcrdepartental Coordina ne and Planning Staff* (ICAPS). Like the Central Plans Staff, it was primarily an interdspailerentel colarrittee. It had one member each from the departments of tate, War, and Navy, plias one from the Army Air Force. The State -apartment representative was chairman. members were appointed to the Group from their par- ent departments, but reported directly to the r!irector of Central Intelligencs? There was one marked difference between the old and new staffs, however. The Chief of the Plans Staff had been, in effect, en Assistant to the :tractor et Central Intelligence for the pur- poses of studying problems and proposing recommendations. But ICAPS was placed in the position of attempting simultaneously (a) to represent the interests of several departments as respecting their status under Central Intelligence; (b) to represent the Director of Central Intelligence in his dealings with these acme departments; and (c) to exercise supervisory powers over the Central Intelligence Group conceived as something separate and distinct from the rest. such a complicated function would have been difficult for any group to discharge 'MAPS, in short, became a focal point of controversies; yet in a weak position with respect to resolving them. This continued to be so until neneral Smith, late in 1950, appointed an assistant for coordination who could concentrate his attention entirely on the I 18 SLL;RET Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Fore lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 one aspect of Central Intelligarnehleh had to do with suggesting and attempting to bring about snahaledifications of the intelligence structure as the national security might seem to require.' Expimeion of ORE The same distinction between "Oroup" and "Agencies,' that has been observed in the organization of ICAPS became equally evident as the Office of Reports and attiiaW.2 emerged out of what had been the Central Reports staff. In thiscase, the organisation was entirely within the nroup, but its nature was such that it promised to duulicive (rather than complement) functions already lodged in the "Agencies". Under the second end third 9/rectors little if anything was done to avert the transformation of the Central Reports ttaff into a large, independent office of research. At the time when the Fifth NTA Directive had been approved, the Central Reports Staff had already planned to acquire experts in geographical areas for purposes of interpreting current intel- ligence. The basis for a regional organisation was already present therefore, and could easily be expanded, given a larger group of people and a somewhat more elaborate sub-organisation. Thus, it would become possible not only to have reference to specialists for 1 That is, the Office of Intelligence Coordination. For a fuller discussion of !AP, see Chapter III, below. 2 02ls name in July of 19146 was the Office of Research and Evalu- ations; later, it was changed to Office of Reports and Lstimates. 1 19 (ACRE" Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-rcur64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 purposes of undilretanding Jamming i omaticn on a currentbasis (as had originally been intended) but to build up files A pedal competence for interpreting the whole body of intelliglnce acquired by the Group in relation to national security. As a result, it would become theoretically possible, within the compass of one Office to deal with almost any intelligence that related to the national security. The tendency to centralise within this Office did not, how- ever, end here.1 To the usual area divisions were gradualty added so-called Panotional divisions which included a group alecialising in various types of economic intelligence, and *mother with scien- tific intelligence. Various forms of ors,' and visual intelligence were included within the Office. "Nieto" inteLdeence (to become the National intelligence 5urvey) was centered in the Office of Reports an timates. It seemed logical, furthermore, if the main underlying activity of the Office were to be research, that it should also have facilities for reference. Thus certain of the functions ultimately included lathe Office of Collection and Dissemination, such as the library and the biographical register, were at one time placed under the management of the Office of See Annex 13 for schematic o ion of ORE I 20 Approved For Release 2005/03/28: CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For.ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 Report.s and stimates. Other activittie that needed organiutjonal placement were from time to time oddod to ORE.2 There was not necessarily any flaw in the organizational principle involved. It merely meant, ss the organisation developed, that the Director had delegated a number of diverse functions to one of his assistants. Assuming that these functions had to be discharged by the Director, it was theoretically immaterial whether they fell under one assistant or many. The problem was for the person or persons handling them to make Mire that each function was kept separate in so far as it was important not to confuse it with the others; while making sure that all functions were so performed as to make theta mutually contributory the goal. of providing ade- quate adaccurate Intel /genet relating to the national security. In theory at least, such a task right have been more appropriately handled by a single directing head than by several separate Assistant :1irectors whose efforts would have had somehow to be synchronized.3 hatever Pa/ have been the virtues or defects of tile new research organization as a component within Central Intelligence, it 1 See ORE "Mission" as approved July 23, 19147, Pare. 9; in oiD-Vtis files. or further discussion of the developments of Central Infer- ence, see Chapter V below 2 For example, the "duty officer" 24-hour watch, when the need for it was perceived, bec?=me the responsibility of O. That Office furnished an officer to stand duty in the Director's office overnight and an week-ends until fall-time duty officers were acquired, who also became part of ORE. 3 The same decision was, of cour, made again with the formation of the Office of n if in 1952. 21 Approved For Release 2005/03/28SECR I I ? ? 4-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For.ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006540200250001-3 was viewed with some alarm in the 5tate and tefense intelligence agencies. If Central Inelligenoe.were to have nn omni-competent research staff to engage in all activities normally undertaken in home-office intelligence operations whose limitations were only those covered by such an all-inclusive term as ?national security', the chances for duplication were exeellent.I The State nepartment, for example, considered itself the preperly constituted authority on political intelligence; yet thin could not help being one of the principal fields in which the Office of eports and Fstimates must specialise. Both ftate andAritary agencies were vitally inter- ested in economic intelligence* which the central group also pro- posed to study. The military agencies and the Atomic orgy Com- mission had special claims on scientific intelligence. Fitton the purely military field was not entirely exempt if Central Intelli- gence WAS to receive military field reports, and be manned in part by military officere.2 In short, the question was inescapable-- supposing that the new Office developed as it certainly promised to develop--why the Agencies originally associated as part of the Aontral Intelligence Group should continue to support research operations which would be duplicated in Central Intelligence; or 1 see, for example, memorandum from L. L. Montague to DCI, Jan. 190, in Which he remarks on-justified alarm in IAB agencies. 2nuring its early development, 01 7. had also a special panel to aid in coordination and research on military affairs. 22 Approved For Release 2005/03SEGIOP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foil/lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200250001-3 conversely, wily .entral Intelligence should engage in independent research so long as the Agendas collectively were doing it. In spite of this inherent opposition, the Vandenberg adminis- tration went ahead with its plans for a large central research unit. 3y Vey 1947, when Vandenberg retired, the Office had 2eo members as contrasted with the seventeen who had originally constituted the central leports !ltaff.1 This rapid growth, plus the multiplication of functions accorded the Office was further complicated by the fact that much was naturally expected of an organisation that appeared so universally competent. The Office was thus called upon to comply with a large variety of requests which it attempted to fulfill oven in cases where it obviously lacked the necessary resources.2 This was the beginning of the preoccupation of the Office with what the Du3.1es Report in 19119 criticised as "miscel- laneous research and reporting activities." 3 Organiaationel Changes in CIO Meanwhile, the newly-found responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Flroup called for a more elaborate organisation of the group itself, for under the circumstances, the simple two-part 1 - See OT P 113 Reports, in 0/DCTAIS 2 See, for example, memorandum from E. K. Wright to MVO Jan. 12, 190, in "SR" folder, in 0/OCIAL9 files. 3 See Dulles Report, p. 81, 23 Approved For Release 2005/03/28g-a-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foripease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 scheme adopted by Almirel !iouers wee obsolete. The orgAnisational chart of the 'entrlt Tntelligense Group dated Ju 19L7 19L7 displeyed forty-five "hoe" as contrasted with thirty fcr. November l9V or ten for July 19b6. The July 19/!6 chart had been content with settiih fortn the general functIons of the Arector, the Tnterde- partrental coordinating and Planning Staff, the nffices of Tpeclal Operationsl and of 9esearch and Bvaluation;2 an Office of t.;ollootion and one of 'Asserination; and en "Executive Office", the letter being generally chargee with adMinietrative Vunctions. The oven- bar chart, which Indicated sore sub-organisation of the various offices, now combined collection Red dissemination into one office, had made a place for an WCffice of feeurty", and Indicated, =der the "rxe utive 7,taff," a Personnel and Administrative Iranch, and an "Advi3ory (ouncil". The July 19h7 chart (the last under the Iraup) had made no essential change except to add the office of the Ieneral Counsel and to expand the Ii_xecutive nter to the extent of giving it An "Fxecutive for Inspections and Security" and an "Fxecu- tive for Zolministration and )4anagement". The latter Office was subdivided into a tudget and Finance Th.anch, a Services lranch, a Personnel Firanch, and a Management Branch., 1 Established October 17, 19h6. aee Chapter TV, below. 2 First name of Office of eports and Fstimates; see p. 19, above, footnote No. 2. 3 ecito Annex St below. 214 Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 Change of Command and the National Fecurity Act General Vandenberg's various neuvora during 1946 and 1947 had reflected the assumption that the irector of Central tntelli- gence, as the one responsible meet have authority car ensurate with that responsibility. The latent power contained in beiw. "executive agent" of the RIA?.plusposse n of an independent apparatus for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence, could be made to constitute such authority, but under circumstances that might eventually subordinate all other intelligence to the central agency. A failure to press for full power, on the other hand, might result, in several independent intelligence agencies, none subordinate to any of the others unless, of course, Vandenberg's whole position were abandoned in favor of a fully cooperative central Intelligence group. In ?a:r 1947, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Vandenberg's successor, abandoned one part of General Vandenberg's position when he asked cancellation of the "executive agent order in the interest of harmony with the Intelligence Advisory floard.1 This negative move, however, did little to clarify the policies of the new administration. It was an indication that the new Arector did not intend to proceed by "authoritarian" methods--any more than, in point of fact, his prede- cessor had done. But it could not be interpreted of itself to mean that the new Arector was returning unequivocally to the idea of a 1 FAN. footnote 1, page 16, above. 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/2:FaLL4-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For Oease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 "cooperative interdepartmental :roof of such intent as tie would require either a seitement to that effect, or organisational changes de,LTr0,7c1 for twit purpose. On becoming &tractor, however, .emiral 111enkoetter neither prodneed a formal etatement regarding the arectorts or the )neuple responsibility, nor made any important change in the oranisation he had inherited. 2 It must be recognised, however, teat during the period uneer diacusaion, there were special obstacles to the kind of decisions thet would clarify the situation. illenkcetter became Urector on Yay 1, 1947, at a time when the **timed Security Act was under die- cussion and probable of adoption. ender such circumstances it would have appeared unwise to attempt radical modifications in the structure of f:;entral intelligence, any of which tgbt have to be scrapped when the new law became effective. This was indieubtedly a factor in inhibiting im- portant decisions during aillenkoetteris first three months in office.3 When the National .lacerity Act finally became law on July 26, 1947, it did surprisingly little to change the original i'residential letter under which Central Intelligence had functioned for eighteen months. The transfer of ultimate authority from the iA to the National Security ouncil was little more than a change of nano from the Agencyle 1 See Annex A, pers. 1. 2 See Annex 13, below. 3 6e0, for example, meoranciim from lsy 2, 1947, in "Alblications eview Su 26 to Admire]. Olsen, tee" folder in 0/DCl/HS files. Approved For Release 2005/03/4 : I - P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 point of view. The principal dials .gency were still there* to provide Pdvice concerning the marehalling of intellience resources for national seal to coreelete and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security; and to provide servioes of common concern.1 he ct created a Central Intelligence Agency, but like iTesi- dent Truman's letter2 in no way diminished the authority or activities of any other intelligence agency. It did not give the Agency or its arector special authority aver any of the "several 3overnment depart- ments and /e7arnoies" concerned with intelligence, but only specified the purpose of ,:lantral Intelligence as -coordinating the intelligence activities" of these agencies. The law said that the "Agency" should "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security," but did not say whether this was the duty of the "Agency" alone as a separate entity, or whether the Agency was to act only as coordinator of :7roup opinion. The Act provided that "the departments and other agencies of the lgvernment shall continue to collect, evaluate, cor- relate, and dipeeminate departmental intelligence" but did not spe- cify the extent to which they should participate in this same effort as it relPted to "national eeowritintelligence. NC lnter?retJ3tion of the Law The National security Act, then, while it gave Central intelligence a firm foundation in law which it had previously lacked See 'rum below, for Act of 1947. 2 See Annex A 41rezr ph 6, below. I 27 Approved For Release 2005/03/245=464-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For llase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 changed very little *lee. in this case with the 40Pr.fil ;'ending Interpretations all organisation of the gency war ticelly assured the integrity it had interpreted. the National Security ;euncil. t decisions as to the internal naturdip deferre. This fact prac- andenber4 organisation until January 13, 1948? which was which the National Security Cincil tesued Intelligence Directive No. 3, the second of the two "N7XIDIs" that 401104 bow Central Int iligence was to operate under the new law.1 The principal points of interpretation turniehsd by NSCIE, No. 1 ind Nscir No. 3 were the following 1, The Intolligence Advisory Committee wh ch had not been mentioned in the ct itself was established as an essential element in the lixectorts coordination function, 2. The 1rector was directed to produce "intelligence relatinz to the national security" but to refrain, "in so far as practicable," from duplicating "the intelligence activities and research of the various rtienta and tgeLcias." (By 1948, however, the Arectorts office of roseerch was so obviously duplicating much of the work done in other ac:encies that it might easily have be?n disestablished - in accordance with a literal interpretation of this part of the Directive. The Lireotor did nothing, however, to inhibit its growth and it continued to develop alon the lines that had been laid out for it.) 1 The other was had to do with coil D-2, first issued Zee. 12, 19i.7. NSCILTA.2 on and is therefore not germane to this study. I 28 Approved For Release 2005/0SERIEIDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved ForOease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654030200250001-3 3. The Director's right of diesemination of nationa intel- ligence we curtailed to the extent that -VA: iA2 must first offi- cially concur in it or offer elijNegreed statement of substantial dissent." 4. It was emphasised that thereghouid be a free inter. change of information as between the Agency and the intelligence organisation' controlled by the IAC. Uo means of assuring this interchene, however, were provided, 5. The Arector's right to hire his own people in addition to those supplied him by the LAB membersgencies wee confirmed. :It was specified, however, that employees furnished by the Ageneies should remain under their effective control. 6. Terms were defined and fields of special interest delineated. "The whole field of intelligence production" was divided into five parts, ranging from "basic intelligence," to "national intelligence", and wee allocated as follows: a. "Basic intelligence" was assigned to ,4ntral Intelligence as general coordinator, editor, and pub- lisher; the work or producing basic intelligence, how- ever, being done by the other agencies. b. "Current intelligence" wee not specifically assigned, it being directed that '?:entral intelligence and "each other agency" should produce its own. It was not specified that current intelligence produced by CIA I 29 SEWApproved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-R 4-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For *ase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200250001-3 should be "nationals of any other se,cial pe; hence, mold ed exell!ut from current intelliende: boin4 eubmitted for conehirence Wore dissemination. c. "Stiff" and tidepartmental? intelligence were so defined as to bo, to all intents an purposes, the sLie thing: newel), what was required by an individual tepart ment for its own individual uee? It was specifically reco,mized that this type of iitelliuence was to be pre- pared from the correlation aid interpretation of all intelligence materials available " to an Agency; and "that the staff intelliggios of each of the departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of col lection responsibility or reoegnition of dominant inter- eat might indicate." reason, any agency, in producing staff or departmentel intelligence could call upon the other A,;enciso or tail for information, in addition to what it had At its own command. d. The Arector of tr.l Intelligence, neverthe- less, was to "seek the eniatance of the IAC intelligence agencies in minimising the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in the fields outside its dominant interests." e. i-tegarding staff lutalligence it was specified that IP and the IAC Agenoies should exchange information I 30 SECRE Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For erase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651000200250001-3 on production p1ns ap$ that "It 1 be normal practice* to make staff intelligence masa* to all Concerned.' f.-"National Intelligenme was defined as "lute- epartmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of lational policy and national security, is of concern to more than oft Department or Agency-, and transcends the exclusive dempetemee of a single 'Tepart ment or Agency or the Military latablishment." The Director of Central Intelligence was to produce and dis- seminate this type of intelligence in coordination with and with appropriate assistance from his Agency col- leagues. g. Fields of "dominant interest" in intell ence moduction were delineated, !ivin, for example, politi- cal Intent ence to the State lepartment and naval intel- ligence to the Department of the Navy.2 ects of e Interpretation Thus, at the beginning of 1948, with two years of varied experience behind it, what had been the Central Intelligence Group had become a 1 These clauses, however, were not to be fully honored in prac- tice. Sees for example, memorandum from AD/ORE to DCI, Sept. 30, 19h9, "Coordination with /AC Agencies" in 0/DCI,61S files. 2 For fall texts of NSCIDIs I and 3 see Annex E, below. 131 Approved For Release 2005/03/SEGREZP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065,00200250001-3 mognised legal entity with formal1r defined7-..1:-tionehipe respecting - other intO1iL nc ,.:rganisatione, scat of teering committee part, the tomc,. had become a at tnt roep had bun aa Luger body of which it was a element, apart from the others of the orrer p, wix1ei 113G its own stated duties to perforate-as distinct roc tc to be performed b3r the others--;%nd :Lts own bounda- ries beyond wicn t not to trios. th resect to thF five cate4ories of intellience to be pro- duced tral Intel' genes wne concerned with three; bauic, current, and national. i4garding the firet, the responsibilities of entral Intelligence were supervisory; CTi!. wsmid coordinate, edit, and pub- lish, but would not do the research for the national intelligence :sur- veys. LemIrd ing the second, he responsibilities of Central Intent- 4enoe were somewhat indeterminate; the Arectives iced no hindrances on CIA his respect, but gave Cii. no exclusive duties. icnce, CIt was at liberty to continue f)utlishing the current intelligence digests that it had been distributing since l946 and to add other forms of current intelligence if it chose, while the other tencie5 were equally at liberty to continue produing their own current intellience. The definition of "national intelligence could be misleading for the purpose of distinguishing "national intelligenee" in fact. eide fro: tn, elastic quality of the term national security" in the phrase, 4covere the broad aspects of national policy and national srcurity, there wau the added term "covers".? if this word were to be taken in its usual ;ulnae of "to envelop", than I 32 Approved For Release 2005/03SEGRERIP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved orelease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651000200250001-3 everything prodaced um!er the heading of national entellieence e woule hal% to be eamPretenaveiSt 14414r other hand, "cower" were to be taken in the sense of "related to," then almost elle intellieence subject of any importance weeld be -eligible. -s "eational intelligence" was actually developed over tee neat two years, the tendency was toward the letter interpreta. tion. Tnia wee another reaeon for the "miscellaneousness" of to qualify. if, on the which the eulles Committee was later to complain. Lee _erector was to "produce national intelligence, but he W58 enjoined to seek the aid of others in producing it. it could ask the ,eencies to contribute the material for national estimates If he chose, or he could get part or all of the material from his own organizetion. it he decided to produce "national intelligence" without eeekin any material at all from the eee Agencies, there was nothine in the eeCleis to forbid it. The period of uneerteinty was now at an end. Legislation had established the former Croup as an Agency, and placed it under the hational eecurity Council. The law had been officially inter- preted by the eecurity ;ouncil. The Agency coeld hire and pay its own people. it was not made entirely independent of, but at the same time it was not entirely dependent on, the other intelligence agencies unoer the Security ',muscat so far as management and pro- duction of intelligence were concerned. It was possible noble to See Lulles eport, pp. 86-67. I 33 Approved For Release 2005/03/2C:Emfff64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 fit the 400 :_40.1C:i 1.-to whatever orgehizatioaal scheme eppeared most appropriatt: 2Q1- cleat:Aare of its nwi def4ned raupoflai- , bility. But thc.r. wns rell,y nothing in the new law end :Arco- t/yea that :jid not tznd to preserve what h *ca1lj 'u,co'Ae the status ,flo. It would have been quite possible, in to reno- vate the ,choy structure altog ther, tut there was nothina in the new situaLion necessitated any encil,;L3 at all. rev.lopent of the Hillenkoetter Olymi on rtttn'..aet organization chart* usually fall to f.hdicste the true nature of a worin urgeniaatioz, thut o. January 1. 1949, is inter ::51,1k; in shoeinq the Asin outlines of CIA as it had 1 developed crter arovtI u.f the basic directive*. )(cluding the position of the National ourltj ounoil, at the top, the Jhnuary 1941 chnrt was arranged on three level the first th,lt of the :i.rector? u nich adars lath WA only the intel- ligence .4ivisory :;ommitteel the second that cf advisory and adminis- - trative roups, ahd the third that of thu 4producine ?Toups. The advisory ,iroups were the Interdepartmental Coordinating and lennini; 'Otaff, theeneral ?ounsol, end the Avisory .;cruncil. The administrative offices were Asnagement, ,ereonnel, urd Services under the fireotor's "71ecutive"; and Fmployeu Investigation, 1 .;Ere ,,nnox iJ? below. 34 Approved For Release 2005/03/2 ECRECTD64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For *ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065,00200250001-3 JnspOctiOns ,I.n;At, and &434,141ilif Brand 'Aander t;,c, '.14jef for :naps*. ton curitr. T sarytn. on uctusl intellizenoe business were; Colloction , *gemination; .,t2ientific Intelligeneej aeports and ,4timategoi !;pecial -ations,olicj cordination, and ,)-perationa. :110 ;;rominent position accorded-the Interdopartontal ,00rd nating a,1L 1anrtn t,a lo uti chart reflects the rirectorfs decision to retain this organiSatica? even In the face of objections on the part of sale of its 00 goobers.' /8 to the remainder of ibt January 1949 chart, the principal change probbJ was the appearance of Scientif 0 IntoIlionco as a separate orrice. This ?bangs, like tbellnal establishment of reference services in the Qffice of Oellection and jisseminntion, repreeented an alteration for greater efficiency then could be attained when all the/K activities were included under the Office of oportn and -E;timates. Other changes from the 1947 charts (none was published during 194E) are more apparent than real. Coordination Problems 4..)anwhile, the two basic Inter-z.en' problems--ccorinotion of activities and production of netional intellizenco?-resincd to be solved. 'ost of tha actual corAnation problems were handled 1 Oee .!iter III, bclow, for explanation of thie d I 35 SECRET 4,4 n. Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Forflipase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065*0200250001-3 under the new arrangement?no by those seised of the cs1 robleme hvolved. ICP fpiently complained of both bYPeesed in these matters./ The other bogie problem between the agencies--that of ishing the 6ecurity Council with sound intelligence estimates sat- isfactory to all participants--also involved coordination, of cf_mrsel but coordination of estimates was handled without refer- ence to ICvZ. This.may not neve been-too surprising since it Wei generally conceded that the whole estimates problew?inoluding coordinstion-..beloeged to the Office of eports and Fetimates. it the fact that the IntellieenseAdVisory Committee tended also not to be involved in this prooste?as * more serious matter. .iAther the Director (leeerding to the Vandenberg theory) or the Director and his advisory pommittee would have to take responsibility for national estimates rendered to the RSC. Whoever did so would presumably heve also to approve them. Fut as esti- matee began to be produced, the Director neither took an independ- ent position with respect to them nor habitually sailed the Intel- ligence Idvisory Ocennittee into consultation over them. The result was that this important problem of final, responsible review and ? approval Wh5 left very largely in the hands of the Director's sub- ordinates and to the subordinates of his colleagues on the LAC. 1 See Chapter III below. Approved For Release 2005/03/25QU'64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200250001-3 The prIncipvl eubordiastO in the Lirector's case was his Assistant Director for 4epoollo and arkWates. Put evea this offiftel did not necessarily maks thCrables of personally approv- ing estimates one of him chief preoccupations. Oenerelly speaking, he preferred to leave it in the hands of his own subordinates. The IAG intelligence chiefs, on their part, epi:ointed official repro- sentvives to the jffice of *ports and astialates whose principal duty would be to reresent their own departments in the matter of contracting to national estimates. These representatives, how- ever, instead of becoming active in the production of national intelligence, remained in their hose Offices and undertook the review of Cif, estimates!! only at the later stages when the estimate was already in draft form. in practice, therefore, much or the necessary discussion that accompanied the process of actually producing estimrtive con- clusions under the terms of HSCID-3 was carried on by regional analysts in CIA with their counterpart. in other intel1i4ence agencies, subject to review by official, senior to then in all departments. 4hat these officials approved for final review did not always include the views of the members or the LAC, but was sometimes concluded In the name of the departmental representatives just mentioned, and or the Assistant Arector for elports and r!etimates for CTP. Occasionally, during 1948 and even 1949, this was the full extent vf the ccordinetion process before publication. Irafts of I 37 64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For Release 2005/03/ Approved Foripease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651r0200250001-3 the publications had been *Tellable, Of &puree, to the !AC and to the Director of eentral Intelligence, but in many instances their silence was taken as consent, and estimates wPre published, not 50 much with their signed approval as merely without their disapproval. Pt other ti,, the IAC chiefstheneolvee took a personal interest in the cooreination prneedure. euch intereet was BOTA tines occasioned because an unusually strong disagreement had develop, oven though eometimes one of ae oseentially minor nature. ?4or'e imporLently, however, monbera of tee lie-, *Quid step in Whom they reeoenized, in finni drafts aceeptable to ali subordinates whe had worked on them, statements that they themselves did not believe should be presented to the ?resident and the National security , eouncil as halving been endorsed by their departmenes.1 That each occasions should havu arisen Is by no means sur- prising. Indeed, one of the chief premie on which central Intel- ligeece had been foulded had been that there would be disagree- ments over what constituted valid intelligence conclusions apeli- cable to problems of foreign polioy.2 7:;'ut under the system al it eeveloped by trial and error, between 1947 ane 19500 the reault of interferenee by Lee chiefs of intelligence in the coordinaLion process after it had reached its final Aevelopment at the Examination of Oee s "coordination" files (in custody of 0/eel/He) relating to estimates published oetween 1946 and 1950, bears out the above statements, p?, 33.39, 2 See NSCID-1, Para. 5a, for example, in Annex E, below. I 38 Approved For Release 2005/WMRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651.00200250001-3 subdirectoral level was often to intro:.luce net, cnna:t.zein into a situation that wa5 aircady *stabled. The bri?.43 of,this-!irTiceity bee*** one of the main xints of the .13.1los Report--i?he Pailure of tte Intelligenc.:e Advisory t:omi.ttee to involve itself directly in Lho produc:tion of votiwatcost The TE Pr*** The situa Lizn was farther corn;41eLzted by the Intal ikronca had establishe2 whet araounted tr.: an 11.4upero,- rt-arch component existed aide b; IlLie with four 0.0parto (in 'tate, ,rry, vj, Ind Air) .11.1,-h 'acre i3e7a:t- pent.n1 empowered tr wri,e oomprehensIvo t!stirate:i fo- L1,3,-.3.7-1-,cpc,n' al purponf.e. The prIncipit cha-acteristica of the iieof vrts nni 54matesa Ativ.Taguicd-qd fr,,rb the otho-s to rid11 ..11r1 ?acts that Ps11 It ir1:3 eentrolly locc,ted; it h1.4,,i boen accorded for drefting "national" 1nte11icence;2 (c) it wee deprived of operational" and "policil rtzq" ,4.1.Ch 1,15 vortinent Latta 1.1oncei for,!it Wes% vino ,*,.):)en.11.-tLt on the Tyr A.3eneie3 or t 117:t011I- 0,nc,, ixt lti e 't1m3t-.3 beaed. 7hus t)031-t1 WDS a atelits*,!ir r1n44 wth 3:3041 ,o leadership in the production of natioi int.el,inc6, ilut. weak-with respec: 1.0 th eetrt of doing so. ve2,108tport, p. 81. 7:4;11-% 3,4 dated July 1, 19h8, Para. 3 I 39 Approved For Release 2005/0gULP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Fore lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 The Dulles 9.eport suleaarised the point exactly in 1949 when it tI that the Central intalligence Agency "cannot and does not by itself have all. the specialised qualifications needed to produce national inteLligonce2. . ." This feat was a central and stubborn one in the controversy that culminated in the :vorgani- satian of 1950-1951. Since Central Intelligence (or specifically the Office of Reports and Estimates) did not have all the quali- fications, it could not produce fully reliable estimates. Central Intelligence could acquire all the qualifications olly through a go rnmental reorganisation that would affect military and diplo- matic oprations as well as intelligence. Whether or not such B change wnuld be desirable, it would undoubtedly prove i ossible. The only other answer lay in W1 "cooperation". But the very existence of the Office sof Reports and Estimates tended to make cooperation difficult. As a sort of fifth wheal, it had unintentionally fostered the species of rivalry referred to fre- quently in the '3ulles Report, which tended to bring the various 1 The Report of a Survey (}roup consisting of Messrs. Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson (appointed by the NSC, Feb. 13, 1948) published Jan. 1, 1949. Se* Chapter II, below, for further discussion of this Survey nroup. 2 P. 73, 3 In that 0-2, otiI, and the State Department Intel Ii pence System were integral to their parent organisations. For one of manyexamples,_ see "coordination" folder on ORE- Feb. 9, 19118, in custody of C/DCl/BS. Approved For Release 2005/03SEGWP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foripease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006540200250001-3 agencies and central Intealirinno in competition rather than cooperation. A competitor*OmXd net Upset cooperation. There mould herdi be a disposition within the Agencies to aid in the success of venture whose success might be fatal to themselves. Furthermore, as the Office of !sorts end Estimates became canal ed that it could not expect cooperation, it tended to pro- ceed without soliciting it. Sometimes--though by no means always-- it produced its own first drafts with little 'reference to its con-. temporaries, and then circulated them for concurrence or dissent." The result was a complaint (registered'incldentally in the Dulles aeport) that the Agencies were treated as outsiders rathc,r than collaborators in the productien of national intelligence.1 The Dulles Coittelvaaeopmendations and Their ReceptiOn.Wt the Agency The Dulles Report, appearing as it did, midway in the ini- tial period of CIA's develepleatjl9116-1951) clarified issues that had tended to become obscure in the midst of developing contro- versy. It emphasised the point that Central Intelligence had been designed and constructed by law as a means of coordinating intel- ligence. It pointed out that the Agency was actually in position to do no more than this in any case. Hence, Central Intelligence must return to the role of coordinator which, among other things, 1 For example, see Dulles port, p. 72. Approved For Release 2005/0Sfielig6P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511111p0200250001-3 entailed collective responsibility the part of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. In accordance with this conclusion, the Dulles Report ventured positive suggestioilb designed to bring about what its authors considered to be "Central rntelligencen within the meaning of the law and of practical circumstances. The essence of the proposal was in three parts. First, the function of coordinating intelligence activities should be discharged by the Director, aided 1)-: his own staff, work- ing with the Intelligence Advisory Committee. National intelligence estimates should be directly coordinated by the IAC itself. Better preparation of these documents would recinire revision of the Office of Reports and Estimates,1 to the extent of having it form one small group to he solely concerned with the preparation of national esti.. mates on a strictly cooperative basis; and another with research "of common concern" which would supplement, but in no case duplicate, the -work of the established agencies.2 Finally, a series of administra- tive changes would be inaugurated, designed for greater efficiency in the Agency's dischsrge of its statutory responsibilities. These proposals, although they were not greeted with univer- sal disapproval, did not find an entirely cordial reception within the Central Intelligence Agency of 1949. If nothing else, they See Dulles Report, p. 81. 2 This proposal was actually, of course, more in accordance with the agreement that originally established ORE (NIA...5; see Annex c ? below) than what had developed as a rssOlt of the Vandenberg administration's interpretation of the agreement. See discussion pp. lh-15, above. I h2 Approved For Release 2005/0SECREFDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foripease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 seemed premature, for when the 1- snifiepo t Val! 'submitted to the national Security Council, Central Intelligence was almost exactly three years old. As an Agency/ it was seventeen months old. In the course of three years, spite of changes and controversies, a great deal bad been accomplished, a fact which the Committee did not necessarily deny, holding rather that the new system was being missiewed. The defenders of the systemohnwever could point to progress in promoting the objectives of unified intelligence effort and production of sound national intelligence. 'Simultaneously, they could emphasise the point that the state* had had a very short time to develop and that to make radical changes in the midst of this formative period would be to risk hard-won gains. In simplified essence, however, the disagreement of the 1949-50 administration with what the Dullea0lemittee proposed, was centered in the concept of divided responsibility. Although, as has been noted, Admiral iallenkoetter had never echoed General Vandenbergla demand for authority commensurate with the riractores mandate from the President he had also never declared Unequivocally for group (TAc) resxmeibiLity and -authority. During Hillenkoetterts two years in office, however, the Agency had inclined toward the theory that it must be independent in order that it could present the NSC with. estimates uncolored by nepartmentel prejudice. In theory, at 1 See PrI's C 0/DCl/RS files. nts on les Report, dated Feb. r, 1949, in 43 Approved For Release 2005/0S2EarEr64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 least, the sort of corporcM responsibility av orcv y the :lulles ? Ittee was inimical to this point ef view. ror tl-is reason, t1-43 _erelr!ere of the 1949 status goo-in nentral Tntellience found comfcrt in the twn excepticas talien to the rullee leport by the MSC r % 1 - in the `Zeport !mown as wx,r-,00): one ths the :irector not be bound Of the cenoept of collective reapon- ';'s other, tha reernization undertaken in eccordance with the .)1alles ;cport neod aot ase.artly follow the exact means r.opose_! by the Comittes. implied rv.ection of collective reeponsibliity by the tinn1,ocurity Council, In purticular, seeeed to give substance to rcactien that had In any case greeted the pullee Report within tho 7antrel Intelilence Agency. This reaction wa3 pri- msrily that of the persona who had dee,.t at first hand over a period of months or years with the practical problems eutviled in setting up and operating the Agency. Whereas the Dulles Comrrittee thought of 7entral prtmarily as a means throuqh which all governmental Intelligence eould be brought to bear, in s coordi- nated form, on natienal problIsse, many key 7IA officials of the time thought of the central Intelligence Agency aa the principal instru- ment, under the National Security Council., for the production of I .7ometimes known as the "McNitrnoy eport" adopted by the NLC on July 7, 1949, accepting the Niles Report with few reservations. 1411 Approved For Release 2005/08/ttgrrDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 national intelligence. They believed that the other geonciell 0110 Ci all necessary *cooperation" toward this purpose. They welled that the :Lntelligence reirectives of the :ietional 5ecurity ClurncU had been framed with this end in view, but that to 'early loopheleS had bAsn left in the Directives, and thet the ',.:ecics hid deliber- ately evaded their responsibilities under them.1 Accepting the promises on which this tA-4 of based, however, the word "cooperation : h;ive been considered ill choeen. Another word would have been ohdlionee." In order for Central intelligence to moot compliance, it would have to be given much greater powers than it posillosod. r move in the direction 1 Thus, in a memorahdum to the Urector of entral intelligence on the subject of "IAd Cooperation with CIA", dated Sept. 30, 1949, the Assistent Ureator for Reports and'hAtimetee wrote: "The meet spectacular evidence of the lick of depart- mental cooperation with CIA is represented by These are cited as such evidence on the around!, that: a, as a result of the **ordination of these direc- tives with the lAc: agencies prior to NC action they represent only those concessions to CTA that the In agencies were willing to make, and consequently, do not provide the Ureotor of eentral Intelligence with the authority required by hie to discharge the reeponsi- bilitiea imposed upon hin. b. by In insistence they contain all manner of escahe clauses which vitiate Departmental responsi- bilities to CIA", and thereby hamper the objectives of the Uational Security Act of 1947 toward a fully coor- dinated US intellieence effort." See tab to ieno (5) in OACl/MS files. 45 Approved For Release 2005/CSEC:RETRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065440200250001-3 ef obtaining such powers 1r teOUld UV*been a bold one. It woad hove amounted to a flat at the Dallies Report and a direct challenge to all critics Yet sone move on this order Arens almost the O!i.t 1O4O.1 conclusion from the position being taken by the Agency in 1949 and 1950. The Aviator favored a *strong central agency." illS Assistant eater for Heports 41t4 Imam; was aleinst any system which presupposed collective responsibility. The irector's :Ioneral Counsel interpreted the intent of Congress At favoring a fully respon sible Llrectorate. The Chief of the _Lnterdeps %mental 'oordinating and nanning Staff (or Coordinating, Operating, and Planning toff) inclined toward the same general position. Tet no direct representations teTthis effect were aad o to the National Security Council by the Hillenkoetter administration. For most of a year, from the fall of 1949 to the fal of 1950, the questions raised by the Dulles Report were debated, primer ly between the Arootor and a group within the state Department which had proposed its awn plan for ,entral intelligence under collective responsibility. The Agency's proposed reply to this proposal was in the nature of a counterplan which ,went sone dirtance in the direction of centralised responsibility. Neither proposal, however, reached the point of gaining official approVal.2 1 For correspondence underlying these s NSCID0.1* in files. of CIA Oeneral Counsel, 2 Ibid. 5ea also chapter ti, below. 146 omits see folder Approved For Release 20051R ET-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654?0200250001-3 Measehile Admiral Hillenko reported to the 6eau ty ogneass Ootober 7, 1949, that (in accordance with the Council's nisi endorsement of the Dulles 4apart) certain reorganisations were takin in the Agensy, ealarly as affecting ICAS and the Office of ,-eports and get mates. These reorganisations, however, took advante of the NBC's concession that there mi,ht be "other met ode than those cag;ested in the Valles eport of accomplish the same objectives. token than real. The lack of any real response to the in es Report or to N30-50 is exemplified in the schematic representation of CIA organisation published July 1, 1950, which is substantially the SAmitt as that brought out in January 1949. The office of "Lkeou- tive now took a place between the irector and the Agency's organisation, but it is evident that the esutivele duties were mainly concerned with "administration", whose organisation was soNewhat more complex than Ware bat comprieed the same enerel functions. On the advisory side of the chart he medical staff had been a dded, and the name of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning ttarf (ICAPS) had been changed to -Coordination Opera- tions and Policy Staff (COAi,S), The latter represented an attempt at reorganisation as well as a name change, but the principle under which ICA WS had attempted to perform its !Unctions had been ted utp they were more I 47 Approved For Release 2005/0SKREFDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foribease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006510200250001 -3 etained, and the revision of iti chart of negli4ble effect.' The six "inte1lienc&" ?Moen Vegan intact with some interml changes as indicated in the *Art. Aside from the appear- ance of ten divisions under the Office of Scientific Intelligence which had not been indicated before, the principal revisions seemed to be in the Office of eports and 6stimates, which contained seventeen sub-divisions as against ten in the previous chart. This does not, however, reflect an actual wth in the number of divisions but an attempt in the opposite direction. The only significant change, in fact, is represented in the addition of an Estimates Production Board" (vice an "Intelligence 'roduction Board" which had appeared on the January 1949 chart) which represented a partial answer to the Wiles eport's auggeatien for a "small estimating group," in that a board of ivision ..:Idefs was to review all esti- mates produced by the Office. Actually, however, the Doard did not function in this capacity, and the Office continued to produce various forme of written intellisence almost exactly as it had done before.2 In short, the period 19148-1951 in Central Intelligence did not become one of change as might have been indicated, but rather of uncertain retention of the status quo. ,7onsequently? the 1 See Annex B, below, for Chart of July 1, 1950. 2 c, oee folder on ORE "Eatimates Production Board," files. I 48 Approved For Release 2005/fttRIAiRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 25X1A Approved For ReJease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 organisation that General Smith inherited in 1950, though larger and more complex, was little different in general composition and operating principles from that which Adliral lillenhoetter had inherited from ,.leneral Vandenberg in 1947. Of al 1 the developed at the end of Own n the Agency orgenixation as term in office (1953), the most prominent is the grouping of 4gencr activities under three main divisionsi lana, Administration, and Intelligence? The first of these is not of concern to this stud,. 4t might be said, however, that the move toward covartmenting clan- destine from other CIA activities was not a new departure. The Office of Volicy oordination had, fro its beginning In the fall of 1948, been managed separately from the rest of Central Intelli 3 - ono.. A.milarly? the ,Ifiee of Special 4mrations, though soon- ingly daring 1946-50 an activity parallel with the non-clandestine office., was In fact nearky as completely separated from then as was OPG. The conduct of the Office of Operations On the other 1 S? Anntx 3, below. See footnote, p. 1, above. 3 See ;lietery of OPC inoirtx/iii 14See, for examae? Chapter VI, below. I 49 Approved For Release 2005/03gMERFP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654 0200250001-3 hand (with certain exeeptionsarisingout of the nature or-iflie Contact Division) exactly foreshadowed during 19/46-50 its ultimate relationship to the D 1T) The groqping administrative ly;Nrepeect_ 4es-under a single authority (DDA) was likewise not a new departure. Begin- ning with the CIC organisation chart of Jule 19V, where provision had been made for administrative support emder an "executive Office," and ccetinuing through November 1950, where almost all offices con- cerned with adhinistration and support were under an "Executive," there was always a tendency in Agony organisation to provide central management for activities of this type.2 The remaining chapters of the present study aphasia: those corponents which came to be known during the period under consider- ation as the *DD/I complex." This grouping of pavdection and related non-clandestine activities is manifestly the heart of Centel Intelligence when conceived as the moans through which the whole intelligence machinery of the United States Government can be nada to produce 'intelligence related to the national security." istorically speaking, the "DEVI complex" is the method adopted under the Smith administration for doing mbet previous administrations 1 See Chapter IV, below. 2 During a part of the flil]sosttr administration, these activities were also subdivided in accordance with the clandestine and non-clandestine nature of the support. See July 1950 chart, in Annex B, toloww, I50 Approved For Release 2005/03/agq4ETP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For. lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654Aa00200250001-3 had attempted to do through the medium of the office of Reports and Netimates and the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. Although the office of DOA was not established until 3352, it was, in nany respects, a normal development fror4 pone be fore. r;tral Vandenberg'splans of 19/47, as 1-las been seen, involved a large and self-contained "Office of aparts and t:sti- mates" that could do research in all geographical and fields of intelli COMO including economics and science. ;t1ong with that office, he sought to have a means of acquiring all intel- ligene: needed from the moat appropriate government sources, and a means of codifying and storing information so acquired. Ttria office already had, in '19147, an official mandate wader which it produced current intelligence for the President.2 In point of fact, either tentatively or permanently, the Office of Reports and Estimates during 1.9147-148 had within its structure what were to hector the office of Current Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and the Office of Collection and Dia semination, together with Basic Intelligence (the National Intel- ligel 'artery); Map Intelligence; what eight be called "crisis above, pp -2 in Annex C Approved For Release 2005/03/28EC1RE5p64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For "Vase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065460200250001-3 intelliesInee? te. Caitta. SW Se 1 ;ndieetiona); Driefin4e); and elements of a spedial intelligence center. Assistant 171rectur for -ieporte an0 -sltimates, in other words, was to comprehend under his superinLadence ail that was later ender the tputy reOr (Intelligence) except fur coord1a4ion of intellln a ivities, end overt intelligence ?enaction. By 1949 the plan for Oiti had bcca e less elaborate because of the transfer of its referees* feallitiJs to oC0 in Adril 194e, and of aciontific intelligence (to ? separate fide) in ,)cember. in spite of these shifts, however, xis was still a coplicated and comprenenelve office stollen been pointed :Alt above. It. still, for example, produced "national intelligence of all type basic, current and "staff") laroly through its Own research facilities; "coordinated this intelligence where indicated; was s producer of specialized economic intelligence; and performed a great variety of related function's. iiaring 1950-53, the office of Reports a .!4timates was dismembered into three parts (Cerrent Intelligence, National int11igances and search and aseports) while the rATiodes of and oral ieUience (ituation The ",7eneral riViSi011e. See Chapter V1, below, 2 Parts of the Office of Operations were also briefly included under ORZ at one time. 5es Chapter 1V, below. 3 See Chapters V and II, below. 52 Approved For Release 20058aRETRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065 0200250001-3 c!ctficIntcll emce r.nd of cOilccttcn end 1ur'irat1on wore ve revolt/int 0 plus to e and of Ope tiona were trou,ht together umer a single head, yhooe position thus resembled thet of the Aseistent rirector for eporte ene stimetes (es platn,d in 1947) with two additional responsi- bilities probably not contempleted under the 1947 plan. The ensuing chapters of the present study will consider, fireto the various roves that brought aboutthe tri-partite organi- zation of 1553' then the die Mon made of the "coordination of intellivece ctivities" (iCC'S) problem by the 8mith tdministrationj then the Oev lopments that occurred in connection with the three offices whelp' cortinuitY was no% ultimately affeoted by the 1950-53 reorgeniletion (CCD, OC, and OSI); and finally the development of the three new offices (OCT, OR!'.., and On) that more created in 1950-51 outof . These discussions of whet may be ooneietered the "Central - telligenoe fenctiona of CT! will be followed by a chapter concerned with the (nen-clandestine) administrative offices whose :..Ttlery Punction is to serve the 'entral Intelligence Agency. pormitted to rein intact. tnt of :ntelligenoe Atordise ????????11111.1110.111.11160.1.111.11011.01101W 1 It should be noted, however, pee Chapter below) that OIC as organised by 1953, was one sting under e different concept from that of TCA,S, it being understood ttelt moot practical matters of coordination would be t function of the various Atlas the trjoic lendin4 his aid where needed. Also (see Chapter IV, below) the placement of under the 7.D/I was based more on expediency than inescapable se.propriatenees. 53 Approved For Release 2005/0:312r: RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved roliplease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065110200250001-3 ccrTIFT CHAPTER II Approved For Release 2005/S3eMTRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 ornANIZi NAL 1ttSTT OF CrNTRAL 011apter I N II 1950-1953 /0 1950-1953 Contents age Orranisational Change vs, Organisational nobility 1 Sovernment's Organisation far Intelligence in 1950 4 CIA's Responsibilities in the intelligence Organisation, as of 1950 7 Status of Inter-Agency Coordination and Leadership, 1950 11 CIA's Internal Organisation as of October 1950 17 Proposals and Ideas for Reorganisation. October 1950 24 Influince of Dulles Survey Group after Oetober 1950 28 ?Ion for a "National Intelligens* Oroup," October 1950 18 Expansion of the Director's Immediate Orate, 1950.1952 45 P,ovival of the Intelligence Advisory Cow/Atte*, 1950-1953 60 Other Mechanisms for Inter-Agensy Cooperation* 1950-1953 66 Coordination Overseas, 1950-1953 78 Reorganization of "National Intelligence" Production Syete 1950-1951 85 Approved For Release 2005/S/ECRErF'64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Fp. lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 rliapter TT .,53 -1-11rit".07,tetrol1 frie-irt% urAer the Direct-, air; ,,3-ener.4.1 ?11Hitr ?::sti th, was vumaari zed br r8drt rum ar as the fievelcrent f "sr efficient r4 pemm-lint arn the Cicvernmert's ratinnal sev;rity structure.'1 gr,7 ?residert," runr,- -bre . A 1r c-,-manding Ulmer& 'mith f-Ar his part in ,he Arecnclifert, "ever hAd rnch a umi tht vital int-,r,Aktihn Tale availahle tMm in such a tree manner as I iave rt.ceived thrcugh 7c7eral inferral rehrganIzatisne fimIred urcmirently in devolcnner 4 ,Inder General 'faith, in the c,nrse ef which ,,ATIAsh- ingt111 hcaifylerterr changed free pe 17 c'fi nes find staffff, as 'tf 10511? t Pl fetch frelcr omsponent- by lf)S3. In add4t1cro tro were less ccrxrien-hs rganiseticrial ehangem hcth in ?-cadtrarters .acd the f1.1,1? f -ai-r sicrifisonce ir thls chrnecti,r was new leadership, inci;ling (besides the rryw r,ireetlr himself) t;e1 Deputy Dirsetcr, kree rOditicnal ).put Utrewetrls (established ae new crumer tc undeted, wt .d by !.."mith in his farewell letter tn all personrel, e February 1'15) (restricted); in TMunnuhhcred re.uls ticrs'" file, in recc-rde cf Manageftert in ems t-,-,4r -)f CIA itec-7,rde C.enter. 21MA. ,SitraTIT Approved For Release 2005A.,..... -RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foil! please 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 positions Iv 1 :emith)4 and the hesOs of merly of the operating offices in headquarters and the Chiefs of 7:env of the miseions and station in the field. There were also juritOietional roalimments among 7?1::'s operating units, which did not neceseerily chanee their nelos oe ee.2pnizetional poeitione. j111 other changes took the rorm reellecrlons of budgetary assets or of specielizod personnel along oderetine units, Gri revisions in the cleesificetion and descriptlen of some of the secoitlized oate,eories of intelligence personnel thet made ue the Agency's professional corps. There were also nuetroue chenees in oper:iting programs, projects, end priorities which rerlectee: the chaneing international situation, the progress of the eereen .ar, and the development of the "cold war" with oviest power doe. or were organizational chanes a urel internal eattor of oromotine meneeeeent end operating Officienciee within a erowing headquartere and field estelishment. if not most el: the chanees? had external ralificetions as well, sed involved attempts to clarify n!Tti t-rove orgenizationnl position, its functional .uriediction, 4nd its workint; relntienships among the other depart- eents, r-encies, ilmj echelons thet ee0e up the eaverneent's national security stru(7ture. In particuler, there were organizetional adjuet- eents betwc.en anc the intelligence echelons in the '1.42te And Defense Y;eport:Aents whtoh historically had controlled a major pert of the .:Cverneent's foreign intelligence enter2rise. there were clerifientions in ;i1,181 position with respect to the II 2 Approved For Release 2005/Sf1RURDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006541100200250001-3 oolicy rlid operational ,Annnint; echelonn or those Zepartm ts of the :ietical ,e'surit;" .:ourv:11. 1.theru h Anti-rnal reorliniestimms and external cri;rJnizt,tion:.1 ad.;untments ..Mra2terised much of..;1-"s rowtel Letwten 1/>0 klnf t-As was orgahisetionnl stability Lnd in eert4.11n 13ajor rEs)ects. Athin :;IA, for example, wLile Auch of its Ni,1_1rtcr tstablishment was under 7oiny.; reornis-tion, num- of i?k-.jor covonents r,Nvined essentially onAsturbed, gt least o- the etnez,-Is or47nnisation chart. :xternally, too, there were anificent :',Lements or stability z4ld continuivy, espeeizal;y in the treat; or,sniar,tional framework of the overnment's nation:11 securt%. L LL!tur,.f. For exam?10, the name .osident under whom kll of eliler4a predecessors tvld served, romaiNed in office t-xouhout .enerel term 2irector.1 :lthough is 5t.i!' to ? 7.zd 7lore frequent persowl contacts then 1, olith's departure from 117. at the end of ''reSident Truman's term was e:Tarently without ;:olitical ;1nificence. There had iconlics',Leculation? n enriy es 1550, that :,,qith would not stay in indefinitely, Lec;'1use of his health. 12, ';nith exres3eU the hoe to the staff that ". . . wt1 the Director himself at undouLtedly Le a nnn wild the -.:ef 1.xecutive is willing to scce)t, snd to whom he Will jA011 a certain messurc of confidence, it IN unlikely that you will ever hnve u Ldrector whose c,tatus will chiane with changes in the ,citsinistration." 4,mars at 71;la :3,7enoy ,:rientation onference, cv. 21, 1i52 (ecret), re-printed in OMi'AILetin No. 1, Feb. 11, 1953 (cerst); in mIcores of !,r1a4ement ?taff, in custody of 011 .ficords enter. Approved For Release 2005/0SECREPP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved FA. lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 i)roct4-x tne;,rt.tsiden. 2er3ow1 ttntton to called /11e intelli4en e service,2 WAS probsay nut funciwacntzaly diffcsrent under the two Arectors. t;Ice uzis no bastek..7ume? In 7?onaml -L.thts. time, in t$ statutory ralationshl.?) to the National. :tourity Under ith,continuec; to f4roish the IVIs support; the ::11-e..otor cutinued to eit a membcr Qrt and rezkx.2 aii7tanistrativt,14' roNeibi by law, tc tit4t boOy43 Jovernment s :;rganization for Intellige ce In 10 for was thorb any fundasental ehange in the or,enitational frtAcw:.rii, under rch tnti :cJvernesentla foreign intelli,Jfnce :)roiirvAs end vt t a w;ole were conducteO.. reeo intellience functions re.lained ;:ivide6 and ti?cntLalized among sever i,utononous .cur, xccutive Scretnr:,. of the Netlonta :ocurity 4.i'ran3ed "et once" for '7.enera1 CAith, after he became in '-,ctober 19507 to have a weAly ,onferenoc with ;r6-rident TrulinL, thus "deliberateay ?a5sing by the Council and the o the Lepartments to the Adte ouse." !.ce Alterview with :iouers, Aule 30, 19.2, 2. 23, in Piles. 2 :Uif interview with Al:en oetter, t. 24, 15'52, in IID-11:-.; Moss. 31n ad,ition, ,rovideO certain acjministretive services to the 4lona1 rvourit) ;ouncil. For sx71:,1e? the 4trollerfs ffie re:,ularly sallisted tho NSC :Aaff in preparin the N-;le tuci4et End pres,ntln 4410 follom?; 5_ts ,,ourse tl'roujh the ,uci..-et Furce.0 t,ne enate "Inc! ouse Ipproprlatione 4ommitt(es. ee I ecret), t7uly 1, 1950 nnd ,iPnuary editions; :Ind O omptroller'e w1ator4,cal ot . . . in 15;45-1952 (Top i,ecret, T74650), in I /:; files. Approved For Release 2005/0SECREFDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For.ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 Z6ZIRCies P;1[ ,rletice the activitica or VI-lents al,:ncies were coor,j1ntte0, uri riety of inter-aKency committee nd Ileison arrshe1ents2 in w'lich trticipated in !,reltfr or leer de,-;ree, f thcsi- seven t:tyncioe2 frou-ntly wlled lnLzfli ence comaunity" in it pr1ee, four compriscO the ion; ostablished oomponemta of the :rmy,-:,0avy2 knd :tete :,(vartments (now joined the Air Force). Tn addition thre wnu the ,:oint Int441 4enco ,:ommittee of the ,!oint Thies of Lterf2 ttether with certain other jointly oersted intelligence facilities in the ;:efense :epartment2 nottbly thermed rorces ecurity 14:ency. th.cre WPS the ttomic'inergy CommisAon whicl-, had had its own thtellience dlilsion, since the end of 'for-1:! War I. The atv,.inth nencY, cf rrse, we2 itself, lees than rive ears olo, with a euLstntiP1 hadr:itrters in 4e0linzteel 44 nhlr.,:ar of overt .f:1?,16 offL:es withih thc ntted!Astet2 and v(4-rious overt covert mIssions Pni stA.ons arod, the letter T.o-stly under .the "cover" of :Ante or :'.efehec2rtIlent installations.. r.ition to tt:one seven princil or1i ich the Gcverwnert/s fchAn intellizencc zIctivitits were delltra1ized2 there were ruln(:roJsortic tn organi7atiohs, on wtdoh the intern- ence n-encios deended for ?arthultifty,-,cs of assi Vince. 1 ight cnies, if the Feder[a LUreem of Investiaation is included. he 7T:17 hPd had certain foreign intelligence re- spcnsiillttes, for ex44A1e in Latin ;,merica durirg ;Ind after or1dkl.r 112 tut as of 1.50 its intelligence resiArmiLilities were esNrhtpily limited to domestic matters. Axce IA9 the rlreetor of ti F1 had ben a member of the inttali;ence d'irisory L:omlittee. II $ Approved For Release 2005/0S0 DIP64-00654A00020025000U3 Approved Fore lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 (..)71e of theme were part of the '7olirromenYe 6C'=*t 7truttares auCh as the 7.deral. Turtu ofitivitatigation, wY,Ach ilod a dirQct reltionshi to the seven foreigkintellience enciee throuh its meraberehi on the 7ntelligence rdvisory pertici2ating were certain other itenclk-3s wffich, hid doneutic accur,ty rt7rponsibilities; anid ntaltrous "non-dcfense" =:pch as, for exampleuthe Interior and 41!ricu1tura'Japert- lents, whtch were contributing parttoulr chaters to the National l'Urvey; and the Library or 7on7reas nnd the ith- acnian Trititution? which served: as c?;annela for collectir nnd flciexin.7. certain types of fore1:I1 7ublications of inteillicnce interest. Thre were lenny lovern1Pnt agencies which hed particular types cf resenroh, administrative, or'technicel skills end resources to ccntribute to ?articular intellijence ':)rojects. !y)le 15 ron-intfali7ence agencies were eorkir7 on economic intelli- gence, as of 1950-51; end sOla 25 OgenaeS, in sci*mtific and tech- 2 , nolcd.cvl other participating grous were located administrvoly outside the lovernnlent. 7.0r there werc the wr-rious ?Jrivatt research o7ronizetions with which 1 '1A/n7i survey of the Iovernment's ecenomic intcllience .rograme and activitiea, about May 1951; issued As ?)-1)..22 co filed filed in 0/D:I/, under headin: ":;1C-D". 2:re')hic organisational chart and proceurn1 flow chart, no date, entitled "5cientific and Technicn1 :nformation and 7ntelli7ence" (ecret)0 in 0/N;I/a, filed under ii 6 WOOApproved For Release 2005/ RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved FAD lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 the intelligstaca agencies had "external research" or other con- tractual projects, and the numerous panels of technical consultants retained for dvice partictlar sulajoets. virseRs, there were certain espionage networks in foreign c untries which were control ed or monitorel by ?merican intelligence; the in4 l'igence orgeni;ations of friendly or neutral governments with whicl- the United 't,rotes had a variety of liaison arrangements end work in: and the several interallied organisations, notably the North Atlantic reaty Organization (NATO), in turope, and the United Nations om- in Korea, with which the United 1;,tates was collaborating. .-jAve rt eaponethi1itjes in the Intelligence Organization as4r,f'9 0 IA's functional responsibilities in this decentralized intel- ligence enterprise, as it was organised in 1950, were to be found outlined in the organic act of July 1947, which made CIA a stPtutory agency under the 3ationa1. :;ecurity Council, and in a series of directives issued by the N C between rtcember 190 and 1July 1950. The effect of the National Security Act and the NSC directives, as has been pointed out, was to establish a new intelligence agency withont essentiall7 ,listurbing any of those already in existence.' Thirst each a -ency had its own collectinn, interrogation, and informati therinT ap nratus; and each had its own research and productio oprana for preparing any finished intelligence thgt was nf:eded support its own pie:lithe and operational echelons. II 7 Approved For Release 2005/0S&CREIDP64-00654A000200250001-3 1 , bee Chapter r, thove. Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 By implicetelon, too, although the direotiees were rot teelieit ie detail, each agerloy nad its sms fecilities and s,yatcms for Incx1niS, analyeine? !tfl C nte11jenc. information. el= had its own arraneeeents for oeteinine extern-el reseurce erd ()tiler c=side assistance rron the non-intelli,ence eeeecles. ach aehey, feem14, had. it own administrative and tech!Ava services, such as buth?elz!ry resources and contrail, ? menpower procurement and intereel security controls, and other "housekeeeine" ;,ne 7,nternal-eansgeeent services for focilitating ent aueeertine its "mestertive" intelligence programs. Lest the result of this manifest duplication be an unduly coepartmented systeN such as had hed a pert in bringing etout the :earl Harbor disaster tr 1941, all a:encies were exhorted to exchsnee infer:lotion, finiehed Intelligence, acid collection and eroduetion plans. Lest there be unessential intellieence collection end pro- duction in particular fields, some attempt was made UJ clarify the part to be elayed in those activities by each eeency. ? m.ramoorm........rome.00.0.10 1. Gne exception was thi4t, under We.rle No. E, :lay 19146, a overnment-wide service for biograehic indexing, in he one field of foreign scientists had been essiened to ? eithin -,e this responsibility wets beine handled, in 1950, by one branch of ioereiphie Aeeister Division, workin in cooperation with the Office of F:cientific Intellieence. The services of :e.els other registers and of its central library were also in extensively used by the other intellieence aeencies in 1950; but ':;It had no specifically aesiened re- sponsibility from the NSC for promotine ieeroved erocederes for indexing and oreanteing intellieence information nor for these reference activities. 1.1 8 Approved For Release 2005/03AIMP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006544100200250001-3 :- Thus, collection 4civIties ilkre dividt,o thc seven )rt17 or a subj?eot twus - ouurce basin. , Overt collection abroad remained dohinentl in the and; ef ;he tate Lkpartmcnt's Foraign Service ate r:nd in thmtMfF,nso Depart-' TaLlat's Military, n3VP1 and:eW attaoh4 and other fld tnteUi genceu. State was ocp,,,cted'te toilect cultural, .,t4:A sociolos;,icl" inforrwtion, ne fqnse wa C collect r-1.11a "Iilitary, nnval, and -Air" informrktion, the eireotives Qid not 6efine these Subject*, ' conclAic, cir,jnj,Lthd tochno-. loqical" Lnformation, on the other hane? wns to 1,A9 ,athereS by "each cency . . . according to its needs"; but r,.,,4_trd1eus of44Ljeet, there WE to be * "free and unrestricted interdepnrtriental exchange of intellienoe information to meet reeve-mils sk,condvry muds of eedh Ccpartment and nency." No a?jincy wns ere,Tir.1: restricted, in the dire,Aives, from irociirin,,!, uncleraifid foreign dLZIlicntions ancl othcr so-caled "opon literature" for its own o;:t-, :atnou,:h the Ltzte did maintLin a ,roup of s'ublication rocurement Jfficers :3's), at soma of its overseas posts, as P common sorvice to the .,k)vcrnment generally. *Aher t:;;:es of deflection activities vire orgenizQn on n :source basis rather ti-lan by subect. Certain types of overt sourcos? for exale ht.en excluaively aE',signef, to IA, AF "dervice of ,-Janmon condom", Including the ;'ol1owin7, as or ';Ltober 1950: foreirn ,ndo fltj news broadcasts) 9 Approved For Release 2005/SECRETRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065W0200250001-3 Another c.;.t; of overt sources,' especially .LL;nificn-r, ,7,inde the outbreak vf the Koreast'sonflit in June1?)."3, wee the "cW,uree 6ourcee" field. Mese seurces, includin ;:,risoners of iAured.weapons Ln6 supplies, ,,nd c'atured documentr, were COntral 'cy the efense ;.opartment, but were nut c;:ecifically doverd ih the ?-C oirectivoi. '..;overt collection, on the other hnd, wee on exclusive re- tionsilAlity of CIA, with exceptions. Certain counter-intellience activities o the Army, the 4avy, and the ;ir ,Force, toether with other se-celled "a7ecid activities" (not listed in the dircctiver), wch werzi 14 the military di::KIrtlents as necesvary for thGir opernional security, remained uniturtve in the A3fense I)epartaent. The collocLion of special intcllit;ence, finally, was ori,ed rr!cordin4 to still nnother -patern, al h service of coAmon concern, in c.Cfect, that wns manno,ed not by but by the 1:tfense 1.:,.oartment; it WA3 controlled ty a acparato board ropre- tintiri allP t:; concerned incluJin C::A, 8.nd respnsible to the Netional ;ecurity surisCiction over the production of -,ntellience had ten divieed acr thc several intelligence agencies. Thus, 10 Approved For Release 2005/038EWP64-00654A000200250001-3 25X1 C Approved For lipase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 the State r.apartment 'rv,O rtAfpons?Ulity Dro7 An* in %Allit cal,? Cultural, and socio1o:i.f!al"Antellience4 .sne, t-fie :kfednse Alpert- ment far. "s:ailitry, naval, :,nd air" intellince. The fields of *con, scientific, eln?technolli(n1" Intelligenca produldn, however., ht nr.:;, dnding. on rql ances ? inJividual needs. 11 tne topical fields remained tc bz defined aild divided further, after 1950. C1A4 an has been said, had exclusive ms;onsibility for lupervisln, the cooperative production of two kinds or "nitional" or supra-departmental intelIigence--natiowl inttlligence estim:,tes which dealt comprehensively with the capatilities an intentiontvof foreign powers and power blocs; nnd nAtional intelligence surveys (W00), which contained ency- olodic area information on indiviJuai 'orein countries. A third Icind of nation!J intelli.;ence--national "in6ications" of threatened hostilities?was not, however, aptcirically to 7,1A, nor had it Jet bo n listed er defintd, in the rl.rectives which were in effect In October 160. :,tatus of oorintjonftfld Lcader'ahj*1950 In 0.-dition to its specific production and collection responsibilities, ;It had broad statutory responnitilit;), which re- mained unchnned ,rom 1>50 to 1953, for "coordinating the intelli- gence activities of the several Oovernment doartments and a ,encies," by means of advice and recommend tions to the Naticnal Security Approved For Release 2005/0gCRELP64.-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Forerase 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651,0200250001-3 ..oundil, plus the rivbt to make "vurveys end inspectional of the intelligence fieneLcs. In actual practice in 1950, however, CIA/e inter-agency c,:or,Ination realpemeibilities wt:rc b,in conducted, not unilaterally, but as an interdepartmental affair; and in some fields th(:., job of coordination was in the hands of other a,Tncise entirely. The rteverel "4.5=1" and ,s:JCIIm requlatory documf:nts, for example, had all been developed jointly by aA and the other ancies involved, chiefly through the mark of its Interdepartmental Coor- dinating and >lanning Staff, a "'cup made up essentially of men an te e mdorary duty from the sveral tie;.;artmental /1 intellience ,7enclem.1 ;s to surveya and inspecLions of outside L11110,014 it is doubtful whether had conducted any of them before or Ourinl 3..5'04, None, et least, were mentioned in records scan ir the course of this stud:y. For the work of actually promotini; inter-a,tency cdordination ?/(J cooperation, was utilisik; a number of iter-aency cum- mittaes, usually under the Chairmanship of CI, officials, together with a variety of "workin= level" liaison relationships ,:mfong the ai2;enciea. The ,)rincipal inter-agency committee under a!' 1,4idership in 1950 was the Intelligence tdvisory Amemittes (1[C), made up of 16ee MA;Aer 11I, below. II 12 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006541110200250001-3 the departmental inti * Obiefn the 4nd preaidsd over the :arector of Central Intelligenoe. The howeveri, *lot only four times during the last six months rch,,6eptelter }050)2 before General Smith came en duty; and it was commonly criticised, within C1., a being less interested ip advising the rci on inter- agency problems than in acting as a governing board over ? Never- thelenes given a decentralised intelligence organis*tQn of new:re' eesentielly autonomous agencies, such a council of ti. ntelligence chiefs seemed a minimum framework through which the irector could carry out his responsibilities for "coordination-. Under the IA: were. e "Stan& ,Olsmitte0"03 and euboommittees (as of :ctober 1950) in atomic energy Itelligencel scientific intelligence jenerally; and the 4ational There was as yet no committee for enc. Surv 0' 1The officials who were attending the IAC as of november 1y50 were as follows: :ark Armstrong, Jr., 5tate (opeciel Aseistent for Intelligence) 'fisel. Gen. I. :t. nailing, Army (Issistant Chief of Staff, G-2) :Muir iai. Felix L. Johnson, Navy (LA:rector of naval Intelligence) Aaj. 4:ar1es Cstell, Air Force (Director of Intelligence) Brig. len. Vernon Magee, Joint :A:1ff, of JG (Leputy Director for Intelligence) ir.r.alter F. ?..;o1by, AEC (Director of Intelligence) Victor . Kesy, FI (cting Assistant to the Director) Lt. len. w. b. 5mith, DC1, airmen Use secret, Nov. 160 1950. In I inutee, 1950.4953, filed in qixi/Li.) 2 :,:arch 31, June 27, July 21, and tugust 1y50. minut a, 1947-1)50 (:.;ecret and Top Secret), in VZCIP4t/PC files. lapter III, below. List of :4; subcommittees, 1947-1953, in an undated.,mper entitled "The Advisory 6ommittes" (beoret), p. 114-15; prepared by U for the "Clark Committee" about Autiet WA; copy in (;/:-.L files. II 13 Approved For Release 2005/Z.g1DP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 economic intell es althouh blne for one hed b je1 nor were there any Pctive subcommittees for consitLerin; inter- :ency interests ir other topical fiilds such se political and Ailitary intelligence; nor in broed "supriedepartlk;ntel" fields such as national estimates and national intiications; nor for administrative and other support prodema that milit be common te 11 the intelli- nce agencies. practice, did not have exclusive reepor tb, ty, in 195o, ro ordinatin:, all aspects of the Oovernment's intelligence orAnization, nor was the sole adviser to the N3C on intent- ence activities and problem,. In 194V-1949, for example, the d a ,roup of (Asti 4uts ed consultants, from outside the grrm.nts intelli- gence orartzation, to make a comprehensive survey and inspection of the -overnm nt's foreign intellig nee pro :Tame; and by October 1950 the recomnendtions of that survey :roup were still on the agenda of the 'ZC. il intelligemee matters, to cite another exemple, were beth - .:uorLinated by the U. S. Communications intelli?ance roard .2 Mlile was represented on this boar6, 1The conomic Intelligence C;ommittee (.1C;) was established in 'lay 1951, but it had been recommended by IN/5 in Deoelber 1949. t-,ete Chepter III, below, and IAC-D-22, lay 1951 (ecret), on file in O/D Cl/!.;. 2:3ee Mo. 9, .july 1, 194e (bp secret); copy in 0/X14. files. Approved For Release 2005/03SE:CCEIP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 the State De,Artmentle inteiligeome,chicf was its chairman, as of and the t.;efenee :epartment dulinated its operations. !voneStiC nce and rel'Aed mntters of internal scurity, were 'leen- while coundnete6 throu41 the Interdaparthental Tnt1 1 nce !;on- filmes (110 ,7ed the Interdrtmentel Committee on Internal Security - 0.210, both of them headed by the :rector of the I. CL as not reeented on either of them, except on invitational trais for consinering a specific matter. There were till other inter-agency intellience coordination mechnniems 1550, in which MA did not participate or particivted only indirectly. In occupied lemony, for example, the 'tate Depart- ment's qigh Commissioner for 'coupied rIermany (AI:700), throuh the ,!hie of his intellionce division in Frankfurt, rve ca thc rankin4 re:Jreaentative for coordinating ell U. S. intelligence ac- tivities, overt nJ covert, based in that orea.2 In the Tar act Prmstrong, Jr. The fact that he was chairmar of in 1950 is mentioned in IfiCeD11 (Jecret), Dec. 29, 1950 copy in 0/j1/F, filed under "IC. hhute, Oirector of intellivnee, =i17,;G, was ex officio J. S. intelligence coordinator in Germany. while his kluthority was apparently clear enough in HIJOals charter issued tu him, in practice his reeponsibility was evidently divided with the U. S. military commend in occupied 'ormany-- iNiT., so the DCI was told in December 1950. Sea OIC memo to i:,71? bee. C, 1950 (Secret), ettached to rC1 Staff :onference '"mutes, 15'50...53, in 0,Aci Approved For Release 209NRETIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651000200250001-3 it WOO the :iefense :vpartmontle Far eneral '.facArthur, *doh in l0 coord:nation Ruthority.1 In Vip eaet-geme,nd (F:',Z,1, beaded apparently had the corresponding finally, the ,:oint of Staff were ,rovIdin various eatihaniams, in 195i), for coordin sting the Ann -1-eAem of the Army, iry, and .;,ir 'cree which were 41rticipatin in verious aepects of the efense eepartment'e own departmentel" intellience programs. eTlder the JCS, for example, the surveiilrnce of hostility indications was a militaryecontrolled Activity coorcinated throuh the Joint Intelligence indications :.:ommittee (.31; e32 end the inter-Service exploitation of captured weepcns and supplies was coordinated by a staff that later became the ,elint 'Isterials Intelligence Agency (JMIA).3 While such inter- a.enc;; coordination mechanisms were outside CIAts jurisdiction in 1950 rnd :111_.7ht be called "purely internal" matters within the No precise statement of the intellieonce responsibilities of F:C (or FOM), as of 1950, has been seen in the course of this study, but that command's coordination responsibilities were im,lied in an "areement" of April 22, 1950 between FC Ceneral Willoughby, jeneral Mactrthurls intelligence c!,lef) and CI!, (Frank 0. iasner). This agreement was men- tioned later by the DCI, in a letter to the Acting 2hief of taff of F.C, Jan. le, 1951 (Top Secret, TS #43568-W1 filed in 0/!Cl/HS, under "CIA-4'U . .n. 2The JIIC was established by the JCS' Joint Intelligence Com- Aittee (JI), about Aug. 8, 1950. See IAC-1-10 (Top Secret), Dec. 7, 1950; filed in minutes, 1950053, in )fIcI/EA. 3The active concern of the JCS intelligence component for coor- dinatin-7, the exploitation of "captured sources" by the many interested l'rmy? Navy, and i.r? Force aeencies probably dated from some time after the outbreak of the eorean conflict in June 1950, and the JMIA wee apparently formally established early in 1951. (2e chapter 1V, below. II 16 Approved For Release 2005/03aa- P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511y0200250001-3 refense :.:?epr...rtment, some of them were of lovernment-wide interest and were to tic: intc7r?%torlinloners). Sattass time, with the inter. C.! .)C)r d na tiOrlh1rier:-. which CrA was sponsoring Lno developinz. is internal Organization as to 1950 Like 's 1tf,r-agency relationships and external r Esvonsi- bilities? its intermi crganization apt its intra-Agency relation- - sht_s were also itor complicated than they appeared on the singls page of It. ,,;eneral organization chart. The organisational framework of la headquarters, as it wee functioning on General Smith arrival in October 1950, consisted of seventeen major offices and staffs, each headed by an Assistant Director or a Chief) In addition, 1The 17 components of ,31A Is headquarters, together with their heads, were as ''ollowa as of Oct. 1, 1950, listed approximately in the order in which they appeared on the latest organization chart snc3 the latest list of key officials on the ;Arectorts st0T: 25X Approved For Release 2005/03/2gEORN64-00654A000200250001-3 1A Approved For *ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200250001-3 the Oirectorls immediate orrt6 :included. the Denety Director (a poe tion vacant since about 1949)a' the ,eetire7 /:?71J ? "persima assistant" to the Hircetor. A' the seventeen major okerating coeponenta, six were llrectly enaged in n: in and conductive: Lex "substantive" cctivitiee of coordination, prooaction, collections and clendeetine services for which alf- had continuire7 responeitility; while the other eleven, together with some of the subordinate divisions in the nix "substentive" offices were ell performing functions are services in "eupport" of these substantive intelliqeme and operational activities. No sin7le j,hrase can objectively describe the above oreeni- eational pattern of CIA's headquarters, as it stood in October 1950, except, ?erneps, that it wee a "functional" rether than a "regional" pattern. :Itch office conducted a number of specialised Nrctionn, processes, and services that contributed to the complicated enter- prise frequently celled "the intelligence process or "the intent- Immo cycle"; and there were no overlaps or duplirations on them eeAch could not be defended by the office concerned. Yet many functions such as liaison, collection, reuearch, and references were necetscrily divided amore: several offices. 1CIAle office nomenclature, of course, before and after 1950, did not help to clarify the "functional" division of labor among the many specielised offices and staffs. The wore of i:olicy coordination, for example, was manr4ed not by the Office of olicy ',:Oordinations but by ;a",-J/cJi?.rs. Collections in the sense of n field enterprises was managed not by the Office of Collection erei ansemlnetion but by and ono. The Advisory onci1was no more Rn advisory council to the Axector than was any other office or staff. And so on. II 18 Approved For Release 2005/03SEWP64-00654A000200250001-3 25X1 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651110)0200250001-3 To somv extent, oxnitioria1 2,qttorn in 1;60 could be described as h divisim batman thii "substantive" offices, operating ? un6Qr clirectives, and ther-ftOpport" ofriarle which were doing their houtin 4 TrIu substantive offices coneisted of the following: for Inter-oTi:ncy coordination planninA i, for national inU1li;r7c ttScr.i.; marmot I together, or related "17,0S of ixtellience resettrch and production, and for int:,ency coordInt3.on r. hot production fields; 01) arid for overt end covert collection, reseatively; and OPC, for cliindeetire operatiorrl services relatO Lo the ovcrr:lentis cold war programa.1 In Support of those offices were nine fld.inistrutive staiTs which '.Jrcvlded personnel, tad.Tet;1*, i)1:-ocurement, legal, nanment,sec7urit:i? and other r%ollittilm t;rvioes; ,lnd two offices (Of;13 and the Avisory' whieh suported the H:ancy's substantive activities with aectnUnd iltrary, reference., contact, an4 dissemination services. Yet every l'ubstantive office also had soma supporting functions of its own, w61ia th ;opport offices were not altogether devoid of substantive ?.nterest. For oxi4le, 0A3 hed the lg'enc4s contra wv library; 0 was apandin:!; a ,,00d part of its mancower, in 1950, less in E;rouction than ,in indexin(; and collating informational CK was ..Averned by 10/2, issued about ;4aguet 194e. This tj.c of directive is an naction'' or "s51,41ment" doco,,lant scArate froA the N'SaD series. 11 19 Approved For Release 2005/03/ -BO* P64-00654A000200250001-3 1A Approved For ease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200250001-3 Qooperation had an entire ditKiejok ( Di SUM, or P neede not it; ref, ens', and tr informational documents; end of support activitieS, trati,.e tioort staffs. tut in on foiei an-language ducting a rurthiSpore, aaat of the so -celled stantive offices had on administrative 0 conducted for itself, oh tever traini 4 OrOgrans were brIl.n,; gency imv150.2 vIra.1y, then, non-snbatantive offices in the and staffs frequently partioipatod direc ly in tbe Ageney's activities, and rear fesslonnle in whatever OProislisrd derforminK. lin of about June 1950,, Qmly 8% orY- the "preparation of finiebid in tail use for "abatracting, cataloging, 4 reports," and 37% in sveliating 2 .s goin n 22% was ng of intollionc conducting liaison with the collecting alenijos, and working on related non-production problems. bee :';IA "SOmmary of Operations" for Fiscal Tears 1946404 Oct. 1, 1950 (Secret), especially the graphic chart laballod *051 I copy in WOMHS, filod under " :IA . . . ." While no training functions appear.rormally und any of the office dascriAions ID CL 'a ordanisational manual of July 1950 0 I they ars mentioned, at least casually', ia /MVO of the-ofhoe histories (on file in 0/X1/36)? and In the If annual budget estimate dated Sept. 1, 1450. Approved For Release 2005/038EX4P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 To descrihe it in another way, CIA's ozaton in l',50 conformed to s eotra11ad pattern, mak/ offices zinc stPffs rters ard many milStemp and stetions it the field. It 4;,3 ,;:c>7.0171 to the Ht;ncy's or4aniestion chart of 1:0, the %ilrf. enci: of these components "reported LC t1 to tor, tz: L. the management specialist's x,:rssion; End accordir, to t ;.octrIne of good mamagoAent, this may have re?re- ?,cnted Ln "!,panof control". but here, toe, t:rt were exclptix113 to decentralAzntion. Th uLiit,4,snaKcent, ersonnel, 'rucarement :le!uivaAents 2taffs, for example were :athered tcthr under the LrA xcutive, accordin to the ensIrt of October L60; zurid in actual practice, notes of trx other offices and utofs probably so reported to the :xeontive rather than to the Arector? esdecially sinoe tnom had b,..en no laputy Director since '4ay 1i149. tntelligence ;rodut:tion In 1, tc cite another major exception, was virtually f:ralized In a airvle office Orli, except for the s,scialised field of scientific intelligence. P.other spmewhat over-simp4iried classification or ilepciqurtE:rs was that it represented a oivision tetwoon "covert" End -overt" activities. Thus, there were three princi;a1 covcrt offices fs O, u 2, end the ',pecisl .ndz;ort Staff. .11 the otour f'ot;rteen ooP-yonents were lore or lelis overt. many ot the so-called overt components, es-,,coloily the administrative staffs, as well as Ci and :were praably II 21 Approved For Release 2005/03/40 : -rxLm-64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200250001-3 spending at least an each of their ?ffort in servine the covert "operations' fficeu eo thee were iw eleporting the overt "interne Tame" offices. Oe the other 11,7-114 the covert office of OS, for example, controlled certain cowman services for tele entire ;.-eencee such As overt end covert radio and cable communications; and was performine certal other services, in eddition to field. collection, which were easential to the work of the overt offices. one of the cevrt offices, eoreovere were probably as "sensitive", if not :ore sae than some of the covertle controlled activities, in ectuel eractice 1950. Whether the offices eieht be cleusified as overt or covert the gencyls general security directives, as they related. (for exemele) to interoffice "compartmentation" ad to the restriction of eoemuniention between oficee applied equally to ell offices in the t,eeeneye there doubtless were Cases where "secrecy" was being colied iore rieidly in soAe of the overt offices than on "the covert side." tlethor IA's internel organizetion and external relationships in .150 were as sieple ea its 1-page oreonizetion chart, or as colelicette ee the varlet:, of epecielties adspecieeists that were centributine to the interneence process, the new eirector was in anJi Case eonfrented eeth eressine organizationel problees ae soon as he took office. eethin and outside CIA, there were ceepetine needs for the bvernment's not unlieeted resource or intellieencee There werc4 furVierore, conflictin points of view and eriorities ene II 22 CitaApproved For Release 2005/0SE _ DP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511)00200250001-3 overllyping jurisdictions, as well as priscictions thot no one wee taKing. There were :Ilse specie' fectore effecting clIA, 91446 " eeen :re in the internetion:1 eituatiomi:Cieneressionel end e.H;t4, -.1oe9e discustions of the need for mitiliyetio!- or at least "rf.,-mobilisatien"; the possibility or new divelopmente in intellime techniques thr:t ii. ht upset cstAAishod .:Jnietrative puttc:rn6; the zaciaterelk: conflict between "security ant, &..frioiency" in intellience w.rk; nd other fn-torl which afrot,ted the efficient eleTenieeten of intelli- -cnce activity. Along with these was ::IcAs loeewilit unenviable ivottion or bring both the youn4est member anang ion; ,;staL1iehe0 intelligence e,?encies, an the one agency that had tne brceeest 41thority for coordinetire; all of them. In relation to the recent outbreak of the f,oreen way and the developirv cold war with the "lioviet pire," ell of .;V's ergani- zational problems hid a new urgency. They were eummarized as follows on ,ptember 1, 1950, a month before "Mneral Smith came on duty, In annual budget eatimete intended for the resident, the E42renu, and selected members of the Fenate kmd ouseippro- ;)rintions omnittlJosil ensure that its own intelligence production effort and that of the departmental intelligence agenciee ere continuously oriented toward current and lorm-range requirements of the national eeturity interests ahd 1":ntroduc,tory tatementm (Amiret), p.14, of CIA Nadget ,:ntimete for eiscal or 1952, apt. 1, 1950; coPy eppended as Tab of ?dmutrollerls "Aistorical liotes . . . pm 1945-1y52 (Top :ecret, P.; ,i74650), in 0/D4/H3 files. :1 23 Approved For Release 2005/0gq/aP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065,00200250001-3 ?,:::::. . . '-object:Ives; Dhat , intelligence collection !-nd source 'Alitipleittion of al A* S. intelligence 41,:ricieS effectireU ms iii Meets the r(e.nlireie iA figld priorities of t)e intelligence:. 'o roduction effort; '' ', all cete ll esries of inteigence l'uiremente bearire7 011:7 _ ietionel seourity ara ei-ec- -fieally identified and difOledi fthael reeponsibilities for :1011eation an6 .',rut.ft.iction action are epproprietely alloc;,tto Lhroughout the governmental intellieence structure$ and rInHily, that tbe relntionship between the ..,mvernmentel intellince effort asul the policy Plarmir !:71 operational levels L,' 1-.c imvernment Are 'strengthened in orAtr that the I:J.cllienc,, ,)rocesea ia effactlyelY end continuolls1:, Urouht tO .._:.e4r et 6 A:th levelais, -., ?r0003e1 b ad Ideas for eoranizstiont October 1)50 There wee, i:owevers'no lack of orqa ticha dlehnin4 and mene4ment aJvies available t.' the new Arector in October 1950, from the number of eters within which had continuing reepoAsibilities for organise-time,' '8.1f-criticism, review, and im?rovemcnt. o is than six major staffs and one intra-fqency co,littes were involved in smith organizationel plannin#?- 89 follows; (1) The Asnaewent Staff was ected to edvise the Arector on orgenisational strecture and on "*n cent imrew.montso generally, to rationalize conflicts in state!4ents of functions and jurisdictions amon the several offices, to prepare the Pzenc:ps composite oz-anisationel chart end menual. 1The on.einisational planning functions of four of these staffs texcopt the oersonnel :Aaft'and Legal A,effs) Are outliried in n survey of CiA's "management improvement activities," pre- pared erout _eptember 1A9 for the Bureau of the eudett, as part of budeet instigates for the following fiscal year. cubsegeently this survey was issued as pert of General j.?rder qo. 23 (ccret), ::Arpt. 19, 1949, as an organizational planning directive widressed to ell ?resistant Directors' end to heads of the other components. (For copy of this OrUer, see Aanagement staff files, in C1:4. qecorde ':;enter.) yeer later, on ept. 1, 1950, eililer stetement on ';'iels "...4ana?Tment Imerovemont "ctivitiea" was sent to the resident and the PIA et Tiureeup AS part of fiudet timate for Fiscal Year 1952, provlous1;i cited. :1 24 Approved For Release 2005/03/2ESEtfE64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 (2) The Cdordination, ,:peratCans? and i(Ans Aeff ws resonsible for reviewina proOosals for tbe improvement of Uoth fatornal relationships ane its intrganey, coordinatior t3) :11etiOstaind A.aff had an inscction :roup ror condacting "special ',nvLtAlottons of operetinq an aCministr,tive activities" cr,3 for reccrtmendth:. improve:lents to the trector. C. The :;,14d4et tAff knd various lc tri 1nnin. tnd exprntature control LI-lotions which wei2 ntendeo to ;revent "empirr I-Ili-tiding" by any one operetfin! office nn?) to assure, on other thin4s, "flexibility of operations o'hot waste ? ? and withot non-productIve work." (5) The .crechnel Staff, amon it other.activi,ties, euervised :,;ersonnel clmoNifications .rnd salary stuAures? orers or eyenple? to uncover mnd correct onneceteary or undosiroble duplication and competition between speeiol... ised ::csitions On different cozlicnents 07 the (6) The taft, wnich reviewed 2endirg le4s- lation r.ld proposals nor NSC directives, bad prepared various briefs for jhe now Arector on organiertionel problele (7) ;7:11e flter...offiee :rojeot eview .;olatlittee heeded (in October 195o) by the CW 'x(4,cutive, which Pilo- coted funds for new i)rojects not foreneen in the annual budete, wms expectetj .r-xion other thins to scruti.rize new pro:ect-popossls critically from the, viewpoint of ossible inter-office juriselctionml conflicts or external ccor- dination roblems. 2-ee 6teff interview with LAwrince -oustons ::penrral ..ouneel, in 1.92, in 0/LICl/Wi files. of Av. 2, 150? the 't17 consisted of the .Jteeutive (ahelmen), the Azet ricar, tho ,ssistant Director or .:,hief of the prolect-sonscrin7, office or offices, an the chief of the Ideal Aaff (the lattr without vote)."ice ministretive Instruction !(). ()-2/1? ov. 2, 1160 (Secret), mmone records of -lanonent ',,teff, in flecords enter. IT 25 Approved For Release 2005/9E?RETRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For/pease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 In each major opera ng component of the et'elcy? moreover, the Assistant Areetor wag expected to review the internal efficiong, o? Joown effice and correct overlaps and duelicetionr, if with other comeonente and with outside someies. n aeition to havinl acce to.theee internal ources for or/aniaational aevice, the new Director wee confrontd in ()ctober 1950 by a variety of recommendation* end euidence from outside agencies end ,,,roupe. Far froe being r strictly "with the f e ily" eatta of "eurole internal concern" to the Director and his staff, .ee Is oreanizeteon and its organisational problems bed for same tile evoked the liveliest intereet on tee part of other 8ericies of the Icvernment. (:TA had been reviewed, criticelly and sometimes in det il, by various authorities almost continually during the pr ceding two years; and some of their recommendations were till pending. when eeneral Smith came on duty in October 1950. The erincipel investigation of this kind was, or course, thet mede by the "LUlles osmittee" 2nd endorsed by the .eC in 19491. There had also been an indeeendent survey by the "Aoover eeenission," lore specifically by its Eberstadt Cemittee, whose findinea, elteouen less influentiels had for the most part tended to confirm those of the Dulles group. ,Iluotttr i, above. II 26 Approved For Release 2005/0L3C. gaDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065000200250001-3 In 19t4 ",:vt 1950, the:Infense and 3tatc i:operteente had each made further- stiidies 411.0 recommendation* or :nrticular af,yects of 1!1:*. Is or ianizations one (by the 'Joint 0:A.e.fs or t( ) on the ct;ntrol of CI,' ts clPnoestin a'.;:t,i..vities under wE>r .!?)ndltions; Fine the other (by 5tete's inteiliK7ence cl:lef) on ,roduction d inter-e:-;enoy coordination functions.? ti1 nother oroposel wnslnk..t"t .;ointly t:3-;, the two klepr-rtmenta? in e ntudy cult 3 'o in 19)0,- eolith; for the rtokyPnization of two rn.octS of i fa production responsibilities (egti1wt?; nc urrnt ndi- c'tions) into nowly-titltd "national Intelligence roup, dis cussed more fully below. P`inally, the Turau of the-6ueget had been qu ie t 1.y ;:rorioting e continuin program of "TIVinroyerftent improve- Ilent 4ctivities" throughout the(*.averment. flthough CI.1. was c;ar- ticipat'in.7 in this iA?ograta in 1950, it had recently reported to iemo frol. h;:irmen? Joint /liefa of ;teff, to ,ecr,Anr:, of eftmso, '? 11, 1960, nnd memo by I to Brie,. ion. ,,:ohn 'ruder, ?:ffice of ',rstary of 4.efen, (Top :ccret, 43639); cies du, . tate ,epaftmentts staff study was the so-cclled "".!--our aper s" tud;y, duly 1949, sent by State to ,CI, 2, P.V14ti ? coy of tt;,.: ,,turiy, and intro- comments or tt, are in ;A.;.71 This study, entitloci study', iy 1, 1?150 (:Meret), 'wee sent to the by Under'.:.-ecretPry .4ebb of the Stete i)a.rtrItent on Jul:" 7, 1950; copies in t:)/I/I:i!:, files, and in i;)/..;;Ii/:-R. See also "T -ebb" file, in tI 27 Approved For Release 2005/0SEC. BIEIDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654?0200250001-3 ? Budget Rureau that it standards and concepts e its covtrt activities, -nd that ft we to v out offc its inter " itheut t-1-10 nuthority for direct Influence at d negement-oant et.icn L;rogreat or to icult," ddition, nation r --onsibilitiee rvey 7;roup after October 1950 Of all the o isenizetiond recoasndctt?ne that confronted Cieneral Smith in October 1950, those made by the emiles jraup in 1949 were at mem the most detailed with 200esome pages of findine p conclusions, and recommendations); thot cosprehensiv (in that tbny covered entire internal orsnisatton, sne its external reletionshi:4 to the other agonoies is well); and the most objeotivo (in the sense that they represented vieWs of experienced men from outside the es disinterested but Arrernoentle intelligence organi- zation, end men who were not ex officio representing the views of er any interested intellidence agency on the outside). tsides being detailed, oomprehonsive, and objec- tive, the Julies group's proposals were the most authoritative and compellin4 of all the tluidence that confronted General Smith eny interested office in 7..A 1Letter by to Director, Durean of the aud4et, (secret), no date (aeout L4pt. 1949?), forming part Qeneral Order tie. 23, .4,dtember 19, 1949 (Peoret); in records of lemgement aff, in LZ,', _ecords Center. II 26 Approved For Release 2005/6ERETRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00651.00200250001-3 between July leeZi, when he sea bein:: aperoeched te tLze ee!,tc -evese to be the new October 1950, when he aFelmee offiee in T. Is endorsed by the !;ationel ',ocurity,06unci1 H,;_5Qh,l the eeport hed become a blueprlet of' internal chaneli that the was, in efect, ordered to install, s her been notee, no end:Lee:1 eYfort Led been lade, before October 1950, to install them. In snort, the reccomendetions of the eulles ,:enteittee could not be 147ner0 nEnY CASO, but tlj make their ecceeteree cla the more certnin, General 5aith's new 'etputyi eilliem A. ..iheicson author el' the recommendations), see.?eed to loin emitn only on eone itione neone other thini;s1 that emith "would read and aperove the Wilco rt."2 Aeanwhile, one of lenerel Smith's first formal bets on treine orrice was to attend P. eeeting of the tictionel eecurit:i encil (on October 12, 1950)? where he :Armly but cautiously aenounced his intention to carry out the dullee :aeon- mendetlone, with one major exception. Or October 20, he reiterated zee ehepter 1, ebove. The lieCla endorsement, in 611e 1549, took the form of a document entitled eeC-50, and WES en endorsement, technically, not of the text of the eulles :eport but of se4eary that 1ad been ereered, about ,y 1949,ty it. ;en.Joseph leNerney? office of the :elcretary of Jefunse, in consultetion with 4. erk 'rmstrune, ,r., intalieence clef of the tete Doerrteent, and others. eetetorIc 1 etaff interview with edilliam, ? Jackson, Feb. 15, 1565, in 4 KL files. 29 Approved For Release 2005/0SECRELP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654.00200250001-3 his general adherence to the_ with the Intelligance 'dvilahry: The principal changes; deftwing from the Jullee 9eport thnt thus med so certain of incor;oratiOn into th actual fromeworx sir-' summarized below. rive now M4tvietons" were rocon:rlended to replace the 15-some components in headquarter's: Estimates; 'easersil am_ ,eports; Operational !70oord notion; and Pdministration. Zntelligenoe production ftnotions were to be realigled Ps follows. 0 which was tional intelligence esti. ience was to be mates and all other types of replaced by two new division* tee", and "Research and i?.e- ports." The new ;:stimates 4Yi$ton, as a email but esperste cox- ponent of the toner,: was to do the eatiaatrg work that had been divided ong Od.r. *ovens ts. Mess estimates would be drafted, not entirely centrally, tut with renter reliance on departmental contributione, while the work "corrclat ilictin' intent- once opinions and evrluntione among such ocntrthutions should be Themae Ili of the on Oct. 124 1,50, was referred to by smith 1?,er, at the JA:, meeting on Oat. 20. :Joe micAtes, 20, 1950 (,ecret), in Wl/US, filed under ";1.0". ithis,!!one.exception" to the Dulles Aeport was the mer:er of 0:31, 0-C, and DO/Contact Division (he did not mention 0(19 FOreip Broadcast intelligence Division). The "coor- dination of these office* .'w . could be achieved by llore effective coopertion., witbout merger," he said. is later decision was somewhere in between: in January 1951 he ?Touped the* all under the new DD/,lanef and in 1Y5Z (60 iuld C were Actually mered, and ';0 was placed ender the DaIntelligence. 2Bolles Survey aroup eport, January 19149 (previous1;: cited) p F1,72. 14 30 Approved For Release 200SEGRELRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Forlease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200250001-3 shared Jointly Ly the -attest,* Is staff And the lii? genes Advisory C;ommittee 21W1 C wee expected to take a "lore active nolo" in producing; ft shed estimates, not only in or6or tP;:-:.17,e and harmonise interdepartmental diveri.;ences, 1.1.1 '),-;.-,roduet, to Ise the work of estimst!n.: as t Aeons for. tictin 'icficifrlicia and overlaps, as well BS the accoolplish- ments," etia in ervernmentlis intelligence collection , 2 i..%),11ntion worN. ? ? . ? lbe new H-sti%intet Division was not to be??Involvoe, however, n eoordinatin the production of other types of natlonal tntofli- gne. nun, tnteUigeDce wee. to Uo transferred to the new osefIrch and 'Aiporta iviaion while the current intallence put1i- 3 cations 7411.jtt well be iscontinue0.-. The new Le.strch ard ,moi4mts Division was, in effect, to produce wMterver "del?trtmentel" itn IP might itlt need to mtget its ;w1rtieu1ar 8k2port commiteents n obligations to its own oAtrations onJ to Wl-re 4othority; ant *qv types .of research 1-, 444-4 61 72. p. 61. 3The evcluatio f h,t1: ty 7.ndicators ALrot, in the form of "netional indications% was not 'rlentioned t all in the redort, rdthollh the aloeoly relPted oixpt of current intellir;ence did receive discussion, but only then to be luetioncd4 k;/ the :,ullos :.-roup, as A leitimate function or Ibid., pp. 70, 814460 31 EUCT Approved For Release 2005/03/zo-: ALRuP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Forelease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 t;lat rtkht fl the future be authorized a. a "service of common concern". in this .;ro)ost:d i tr, the exietin Q untte for ticIntific, eco- nomic, end Ao 1 creseareli were *11 to Is plecod in the new 1 research division. = ,h-11, the new division waa to take over ceyto:!_i; t_ervioe:i fro ,1 othir offices, ch1;,' t ?1Wexin,,, rence, en6 oc:iat,ion zel.iv?,!, which were 1iv1oe0? at that time, L tween cntrza 1ibiO, epeoilim(1 Lio- hic and tndu re4sters, jS /orc,i0 ,oculonts t-r /3 Aap 3:;)rr;, and c.;; Is ;IctoriCi field collection responsibilttics? ovcrt ttrd .overt, to?ethel' .1.ts separate but rated office for clandestine opera- tional servi, ,:cre all Lo be "closely tn ereteo" into sinje new %.:perationz ivizlon? C,Q400 ari f beint; atollsd vs separate This serder s to involve all Aclents in the two covert of ficci.s I L It would leo place under clandestine control :fOls (includind Field offices in thc )nited 'states) the orI;n rondcast intellience Division (tT'l ')Jo t;3. .zicrtific Eranch cf hnd meanwhile 71770re ela.:uary 1549) been shifted out of ()A:7 and re-er,tabliahed PE a nt,:arz-tr.: ofrice?the Office of bciertific intelll .cnce tt1)4, :41e Cliapter VI, below. 2Lulles .1roup ,eport (previouely cited), p. Ltt 62, t3, 103. :bid., pp. 96-107. II 32 Approved For Release 2005SEDREITRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 ATSPEC Approved Fol. lease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 - 00ta or cOmponent, the 1,01444100WOUmonts (F1A, not - bin g A field collecting unit but a.querteri facilit for viding library, indexing, reference, resezirch, And tronelAtion services on foreign-landiaige deouments, wastcte trnnsforred, non; with errlooue types of serviont in OCD and 0 .J!1?, Lo the now ,Joseeroh :=nd r'sporte Division. inter.sgenoy cord1n tion rcsponsitiltir and fanotions, other than those relating diretot4 to the prod4ctLon wld collection activities described above, were to be reof.ened inti r new oor- dination Oivision.1 The :vile. Group was not enti-el clezr, iiowever, as to how coordination could be contralisee In such s stAff division. :one of the Agwacy S liaison work with tre joint ;hies of :taff tte National. Focurity '-'iouncil's staff, for exnmple, would be Oacentrelised to the opereting branches most concerned. On the important natter of inter-agency 2:roblems outside of piamhington headquarters, however, the Dulles 7iroup tvparently made no recom- mendations, except to note that responsibility for coordinrtion was "divided", rInd that it variec from area to areas in ea-,h 06904 in the hence of whoever was the "Senior 9nitsd As tom '41presentative" in that ares.3 n the other hand, in Washington the new 'bordination ..41111.1111101.0141.1101?10.111111.111114.11110* 1 ibid., 43, 46-48, :)..;# 61-62. t;se r.,:hepter /17, below. 2, Survviq Group aeport (previoulay cited), 47. 3Ibi., pp. 4::.-449, tI 33 Approved For Release 2005/03 . L1P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.0200250001-3 Division was to inhi;r t IA loon DiVlslon, te'teh conducted a clearin,:hous for arran,!in, epeditiSt, ccntrolling Agency cL..ntcts ;.nd liaison with the Axv al.40 nun encA-:'-:s thrOu out the overmlent. !Ince this clurnho? function Wis not, hdWever, n "hi b1re1 patcykikinjactiiity but LU essential liddle-inn process, betwn roses:VI' ?ersonnel an, the dk4wirt- mental 1,12ction-cuatro1 offices, the Dulles -rvu rranki,y predicted Ulat -oordination Division conse,_iwnce of thiS droposed to frustrst4A ,A "the of 4dministrO,IN, involvoC, on,1 tht resaltIng delay in the sTAisfcction of .?7ormationa1 7 requests" invGlved in such lir,lson work FinPliy, with rosect to the 40scyls -aniort stfr's, ;110 ito other related support services and !int-control fettvities t.iwt constituted the reminder of Its headquarters oranizaten, no stnffs were recommsnded atelished b, the 7'Jlle3 rnr wcre any new starts recoamendad, slv,..h As a ncenter, or a searete cornunicxitions office. The exiatin,c7 st41"fe vere to be re-rouped onfir e new P.dminlstrative Division, hut the Wiles lroup urged thA, overt covert administrative services 6o. solshow comm. partmentsd fro ero other. t7omplete "centralization or $11 1,1bie., 119. p Approved For Release 20057840'hA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654000200250001-3 administration in ono office is undesirable., since secret operations require their own eepara to afteastration," the Dulles ercee conolu4ed.1 The tone of the Wiles Report was conservative in, recommending not eepension but restriction of CIA to those functions asigned or rive free directives of the eationel eveurity Council. CIA should "discard," especially, any intelligence production work teat was "sueerfluoue or competitive with the proper activities of depart- eentel intelligence' in the other aeennies, the report said. Uki: was perticularly criticized for having undertaken to produce what the Dulles ;roup atigmatised as "miscellaneous" reports; and for attempting to become "a competitive produoer of intelligence on subjects of its own choosing which can by no stretch of the imseine- tion be called national intelligence.e3 Conversely, however, DIA ees criticised, elsewhere in the report, for not having asserted ene expanded its authority; for not being eon: "aggressive" in premotine inter-agency coordination and cooperation; for not exer- cising better "leadership, imagination, and initiative)" and for not givine "continuous examination" to the other intelligence seencies.4 Three fields of intelligence activity were singled out as being particularly" deficient in coordination: scientific Intelli- gence; communications Intelligence; and domestic intelligence, eF. 2bid., p. 11. 3bid., 11...?ee also liapter 1, Above. LDuiies ervey '.roup report (erevionsly cited), e, :1 35 Approved For Release 2005/03/SEREIT64-00654A000200250001-3 14 55-56,76. Approved orelease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065100200250001-3 inaluding counter-intent re at which domestic ead, gnitateillgence overlapped. admit mere,!lowevero that inter a, noy tion wee dirrioett 86 long as there was a "lack of mutual confidence *song the de:Art:tents and said that all the Intelligence icies must ultimately "share in the general reBdonet in coordination and for or ver failures and defloienciPs ?operation existed. hateve Fine ly, this function of coordination," in (Ation to being stressed by the runes )roup as jet su etaritive responsi- bilityin Is jurisdiction, was reco-rnen? as something to be more widely emphaeisad and siEvertised, in CtAle public relations, so that CIA would become better Womb, publicly, as the Government's "400r6lnating agency for inte14gemoss and thus help to "cover up rather thar to uncover the secret operations entrusted to one of the organizational changes in as they were actually developed and installed after c)ctiberfl, l95D, were, indeed, based on the Dulles ,Committee's oneendations, especially as they pertained to e tine, research, secret operations, and oomart- entalisc' acminiatretion. 'Other rectlioendations however, were not lIbid. 4. 56-57. 2Ibid., pp. 45, 60. pp. 36, 39. morose. 36 Approved For Release 2005/CSECREIRDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 followe by -;lithts administration. zione char-es m:,dc t,1- ti % were derived leen from the :ciles wort than fro l other sourcas, or reflected inter 1.0Plems not anticipateo by the Dulles e:;npr6honsive WAS the :ulies Aport, however, that [44.i' ly a CC,.7,10 te fisde or considered in 1$51 end l'A2, without ddllytil it '6;- t?le edrrespondina ideas t:v! ;7iodin a of the Dunce '.7.031Zittte, ;'4port frequently took on an a _lobt leg- :ulles.hi m ostly acknowleded the 17...ond, but :>lzio ed Tetlintic appraisal of the f41cts, 16 rddref;s before e:1,)10;se5 in February 1953,1 13::ortly after :-Jeneral nithla administration lied ended an0 his own be;un: JI:ckson and I sat down Ard spent a good bit of a year fin 19462, with such experience as we had behind us, in outlinin the kind of organisation that we felt shoald pro- duce intelligence . . . That general blueprint is, I believe, round. :With and till Jkckcons fnd to some extent myself, durim; the paet two years, with the able help of many others, have been trying to put that blue- print into effect. Naturally- we have changed it here and thero, but by and large, we have today, Ibe1ieve:4 a worAnz organisation." CV's natetions, Dulles went on to say, were, by 1953, "reasonably divided, between the covert am: the c :rt: between the production of intellinca, ending up in the finished ?roduct of the ,:)Mtional H5timates, and what is done on the covert side . . In Alawrks by 411en Dulles, DCI-designote, Feb. 13, 1953 (:Aecret), at 9th J".11cy Orientation '2!onferencfl? in Training hulietin'4). 5, ''Arch 31, 1953 (Secret) along records of ::.nnaeigent '.tnrf, in :.ecords lenter. IT 37 Approved For Release 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200250001-3 another comilEnt, :also in February 393,L Iil1es denied, however, that any one ortinintiunna ,attern would, by itself? insure the success of intellince: "There ie no easy formula or nPgis table of orifniztiorl' in intelligence activity, he cutioned the '7T. staff. Ian for a oftt3Anal Intellience :iroue" ine major reortonization plan oonfrontin; 3cnern1 :;mith in October 1Y-A7) cAme neither from the Dulles evitte nor from within . This Arm was contained in a 'teff study" issued cointly by tie nefense atyl tate Departments on -4a: 1950, but not sent to !dirrliiillonkoetter until July 7, shortly before his expc;:tod retirtnt ;,f; ,ir ctor was utliely announced, rive weeks before .1encri1 qlithfq wat; 4'ormall; submitted by resident ;rumen to the nre. The 1,tn we developed rinci:ally by Dri. dn. John a rueer (In ,ertnse) Arlo 4. grk 'rlstron;, jr. (in tate)? nd craled or the co,solidation of national intelli,lence production f'unctions n iw orlponent in I to t-e lntFlled the "national :Tnt(1.11,:enee 'ron;:)." This new ,I.ou,;) was to consist of two cvijor staffs; one for the )roduction of estimates, the "national estimates staff'' (similar to wht the ulles ciport prnionsed); an- the other for the ourveillnnce hostility LnCications, the "current 1Letter of gretins by Dulles to all 7U personnel, Feb. 26, 1953 (estricted), on the occasion of assumin duty as in "unnumbered re ulations" file, amon:.: records of :innnement 5 in dA ecorde Center. Ei 3E Approved For Release 2005/4E?CRETDP64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved For Sease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200250001-3 intelligence staff" (e feature net to b*;found in the 4:u1les Report). it detailed charter for each of these two eters was included In the State-Defense study, and it '8, Crom the ventae point of "histv.rical hindsiht,n much like the charters of bilE and as they were actually metallized earlrin 1951. ao Aention wee made in the plan, however, of the thirc irineies1 type of national IntOligence production?the ActIonal Ltelligence 3urveyf--presumeely because the IS program was not s controversial issue. The AaTuder- Arm8troe7 plan also provided for the then-dormaet Tntellieence Idvisoey .',01mittee to be activated as the inter-ency opordinsting cc,zlittes for estimates. The IAC was to be responsible, the plan said, for reconciling cenflicts in intelligence opinion, on the contributim; departments, in the 6rafts of estimates and in other national intelligence products sesembled and disseminated by CIA. It had been this one organisational detail of inter-agency committee procedures, in the "national Intelligence group" plan of May-duly 1950, on which the Hillenkoetter administration htd seized, late in *July 1950, to reject the plan in its entirety. whatever the merits of the detailed charters of the proposed estimates and indications staffs, or the merits of grouping these two closely related staffs under a single chief of a "national intelligence group" in CV., they were not mentioned or a:focussed at ell in the ;irectoros reply to the State and Defense Departments, dated July 26, 1950. Instead, :Vitt comments, and its objection to the whole plan, were directed entirely at the issue of preservin?; the ii 39 S 13ZT Approved For Release 2005/03/28: A- P64-00654A000200250001-3 Approved Foreease 2005/03/28 : CIA-RDP64-006511100200250001-3 Director's inbividopl prerogatives and his independence of judgment end decisio filitshed national intxilience. With these cw!mnts, was chrIllenging the 1:1_1id thret that te ntelILT.nce Advisory ComAttee? toether 4Ith t17, ,v,Amental 1L once chiefs assembled in thvt, LT