ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953 CHAPTER III: INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00654A000200260001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 144
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

'mmmi?mmmmmmmApproved Foreease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200260001-2
SECRET
CHAPTER III
Approved For Release 2003/02SEGFIEZP64-00654A000200260001-2
Approved For "rase 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-00654100200260001-2
ORCIANIZATI L HITORT OP CEIL ICFNCF ACENCY, 1950.1953
FTOI1iMS
Contents
Page
Nature of the Couro Aon Function 1
Coordination Under CIO, 19464947
.,, Vandenberg's Concept, 1946-19h7 7
Hillenkoetter's Concept, 1947-1950 13
Difficulties and Accomplishments of ICAPS, 1946-1950 19
The Dulles 'Report's Analysis of Coordination, 1949 2h
Establishment of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, 1950: 30
Nature of the New Office, 1950r1953 38
Achievesonts of OTC, 1950-1953 44
Approved For Release 2003/02/ P64-00654A000200260001-2
Approved Fo lease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065100200260001-2
Chapter III
INTFR-ACFMY COORD/MITIC 0
Nature of the Coordination Function
The Office of Intelligemee Coordination, whose formation
waa first mentioned on December 1, 1950,/ stands in a sort of
transitinal position between the pre-1951 method of coordination
by inter-agency committee and tbe method adopted in 1.951 when the
function vas transferred to tbe office of the DCI. 2 In the
intwimbetween them dates, the Office of Intalligence Coordina-
tirm had been at first a quasi.oindependent Agency office devoted
to matters of coordination; then in a staff relation to the Deputy
Director (Intelligence),3 Wherever the coordination office (or
conmittes) was organisationally placed, however, its duties did
1 The first announcement of the new OIC moms to have been on
Decenber 1, 1950, when OIC was listed ti-conspicuously in General
Order No. 38 (Secret), "Designation of CIA Officials.P See also
25X1A1 'Dec. 1, 1950. Presumably, OTC's name, if
not its charter, had been decided on earlier?perhaps some time
late in Nov. 1950.
2 On July 1, 1954, OIC
were transferred to a S
tion in 0/DCI
Feb. 15, 1954. was
same date. Other functions were transfe
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A 1371
3 OIc was one of the offices responsible to Loftus E. Becker
as from. January 1952. Becker regarded OTC as a special staff,
but did not absorb it into the office as he had considered doing.
(See interview with Decker, April 18, 1955, in 0/DCI
Approved For Release 200S6GRETA-RDP64-00654A000200260001-2
Approved For. lease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0061100200260001-2
greatly caul": were in effect pr.scrib.d by one of
t important cleuses in the logLal$t.ton on which Central
In ieseoe was based.
If Seetion 102 of the Na
lowed fron peragraph (e) to pare
tions of the trector, it readee
under the National Securit Counsi
.a . for tile purpose of coordinati
?curity Act of I la is fel-
(d) emitting the Qualifies.
hereby estAblished
1 Intelligence Agency
the intelligence activities
of the several Government departmente and agencies in the interest
of national accurity.M In like banner, President Truman's letter
esteblishing cIG hed directed* *that ell Federal fiersign intel-
ligence activities be planned, developed, and 000rdinated lee as
to assure the moat effective accomplishment of the intelligence
mission related to the national security.* In both, the primary
purpose of Central Intelligence was made clears to harmonise
intelligence activities.2
To do this under the concept of a *Group* pure and staple
was one thing; to do it after a ill-fledged Agency had grown up
wee another. Under. *Group* plan, it would be the duty of the
Director, as an expert in the intelligence field (preeumably
assisted by a staff of other intelligence experts) to discover how
1 President's letter of Jan. 22, 1916. See Chapter II Annex A,
above.
2 Alsong the various definitions of *coordinating* in the Webster
Collegiate Dictionary, the one most applicable to the word used in
this chapter is: *harmonious adjustment or functioning.*
IIx 2
Approved For Release 2003SOREIRDP64-00654A000200260001-2
Approved Foreease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200260001-2
the existine Intelligence system could be improved in the directions
suggested by the law and j: sting directives. Then, when the
flirector had decided what wa:: needWfor improvement, he could trans-
late his decisions into proposals which, when approved by the direct-
ing authority, would he placed in force within nil relevant intelli-
gence organizations. In, this way, without essentially eisturbing
the structure for intelligence already in existence, a pore systematic
use of this structure could be developed, the end product of which
weuld ee the sort of intelligence needed for purposes of "national
security".
mat any such method of "coordination" would depenf! heavily
on staff wnrk would he evident. It would he theoretically possible,
hut manifestly irpractical, for the 1rector to rake proposals with-
out firet eakine sure that they would be workable within the depart-
ments to ee effected; hence, the establishment of a special
commiGtee rade up of the actual chiefs of the intelligence depart-
ments (TAF/IAC) to facilitate the Director's problem of consultation)
rhe developrent of a central IntelLieence Agency implied
something more, the difference being that between what is character-
istic of n planning organization and what in cham:teristic of a
functional organisation. As soon as the Croup became an .Agency and
40.*??????????4
,he
TA 7 los authorized in para. 7 of the eresident's letter
of Jan. 22, cited in hapter 1, Annex above.
Ft
Approved For Release 2003/02SEMP64-00654A000200260001-2
Approved Forapease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200260001-2
ban to perform functions in its own right (thouo'n still in the
conteot of a multilaoral system) coordination would come about
through action as well as tOrough aepervision and planning.1
Central Tntellioence was directed, for instance, to "correlate and
evaluate* national aecurity intelligence. AS 3003 43 this began
to happen, those dniloit ere necessarily "coordinating" intelli-
gence activity almost In their every act. Likewise, as soon as
any activity of f7entral Intelligence had been authorized as a
"service of 00000n concern,"2 those directing the "service" would
be carrying on coordination in their own field. Part of the
coordinattoo problem would then be concerned, not with harmonizing
the activities of three agencies (note, 4ar, and Navy) as 300113
at first to have been contemplated, but five--State, War, navy,
Air, and CTA. hence, coordination would involve a watch-dog
function in which someone in authority would attempt to make sure
that the various aspects of intelligence being actually carried
on in a more or less coordinated fashion by CIA and the others,
would not be in conflict among themselves.
Aa will be shown, the first organizational mithod (The
1"Became an Agency" in the sense outlined in flopter I, above.
The problem here diaeusaed began soon after Vandenberg became
rirector rather than later with the passage of the national ticurity
Act.
2ee "tational Seceritv Act, 5ec. 102, Para. (d) (11),e,
banter T, -nex D, above.
d in
Approved For Release 2003/0geRELP64-00654A000200260001-2
Approved Foripease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200260001-2
entral -'1anninct staff" of dealing with inter-agency coordination
followed the nrou7 idea within a context that had not variee for
frori ",-rnty)" princioles, while the. second (LA.,VGOAT'E) was
essentirily unrealistic as iaiplied to the actual prole' at hand.
The third ( T,.) "Tas formed in recognition of the coordination
problem as i oveloped by 1951, though still P?ovt:rned by thc
sane 7,eneral requirements, in force since 1946.
coordination d r rir
The first rArector or ntral Intelligence responded to the
coordtnatin- requirement by establishing what, he called the entra1
tefr which should formulate the recommendations that
he would mrs'