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December 14, 2016
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January 3, 2003
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January 1, 1953
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'mmmi?mmmmmmmApproved Foreease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200260001-2 SECRET CHAPTER III Approved For Release 2003/02SEGFIEZP64-00654A000200260001-2 Approved For "rase 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-00654100200260001-2 ORCIANIZATI L HITORT OP CEIL ICFNCF ACENCY, 1950.1953 FTOI1iMS Contents Page Nature of the Couro Aon Function 1 Coordination Under CIO, 19464947 .,, Vandenberg's Concept, 1946-19h7 7 Hillenkoetter's Concept, 1947-1950 13 Difficulties and Accomplishments of ICAPS, 1946-1950 19 The Dulles 'Report's Analysis of Coordination, 1949 2h Establishment of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, 1950: 30 Nature of the New Office, 1950r1953 38 Achievesonts of OTC, 1950-1953 44 Approved For Release 2003/02/ P64-00654A000200260001-2 Approved Fo lease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065100200260001-2 Chapter III INTFR-ACFMY COORD/MITIC 0 Nature of the Coordination Function The Office of Intelligemee Coordination, whose formation waa first mentioned on December 1, 1950,/ stands in a sort of transitinal position between the pre-1951 method of coordination by inter-agency committee and tbe method adopted in 1.951 when the function vas transferred to tbe office of the DCI. 2 In the intwimbetween them dates, the Office of Intalligence Coordina- tirm had been at first a quasi.oindependent Agency office devoted to matters of coordination; then in a staff relation to the Deputy Director (Intelligence),3 Wherever the coordination office (or conmittes) was organisationally placed, however, its duties did 1 The first announcement of the new OIC moms to have been on Decenber 1, 1950, when OIC was listed ti-conspicuously in General Order No. 38 (Secret), "Designation of CIA Officials.P See also 25X1A1 'Dec. 1, 1950. Presumably, OTC's name, if not its charter, had been decided on earlier?perhaps some time late in Nov. 1950. 2 On July 1, 1954, OIC were transferred to a S tion in 0/DCI Feb. 15, 1954. was same date. Other functions were transfe 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 1371 3 OIc was one of the offices responsible to Loftus E. Becker as from. January 1952. Becker regarded OTC as a special staff, but did not absorb it into the office as he had considered doing. (See interview with Decker, April 18, 1955, in 0/DCI Approved For Release 200S6GRETA-RDP64-00654A000200260001-2 Approved For. lease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0061100200260001-2 greatly caul": were in effect pr.scrib.d by one of t important cleuses in the logLal$t.ton on which Central In ieseoe was based. If Seetion 102 of the Na lowed fron peragraph (e) to pare tions of the trector, it readee under the National Securit Counsi .a . for tile purpose of coordinati ?curity Act of I la is fel- (d) emitting the Qualifies. hereby estAblished 1 Intelligence Agency the intelligence activities of the several Government departmente and agencies in the interest of national accurity.M In like banner, President Truman's letter esteblishing cIG hed directed* *that ell Federal fiersign intel- ligence activities be planned, developed, and 000rdinated lee as to assure the moat effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security.* In both, the primary purpose of Central Intelligence was made clears to harmonise intelligence activities.2 To do this under the concept of a *Group* pure and staple was one thing; to do it after a ill-fledged Agency had grown up wee another. Under. *Group* plan, it would be the duty of the Director, as an expert in the intelligence field (preeumably assisted by a staff of other intelligence experts) to discover how 1 President's letter of Jan. 22, 1916. See Chapter II Annex A, above. 2 Alsong the various definitions of *coordinating* in the Webster Collegiate Dictionary, the one most applicable to the word used in this chapter is: *harmonious adjustment or functioning.* IIx 2 Approved For Release 2003SOREIRDP64-00654A000200260001-2 Approved Foreease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200260001-2 the existine Intelligence system could be improved in the directions suggested by the law and j: sting directives. Then, when the flirector had decided what wa:: needWfor improvement, he could trans- late his decisions into proposals which, when approved by the direct- ing authority, would he placed in force within nil relevant intelli- gence organizations. In, this way, without essentially eisturbing the structure for intelligence already in existence, a pore systematic use of this structure could be developed, the end product of which weuld ee the sort of intelligence needed for purposes of "national security". mat any such method of "coordination" would depenf! heavily on staff wnrk would he evident. It would he theoretically possible, hut manifestly irpractical, for the 1rector to rake proposals with- out firet eakine sure that they would be workable within the depart- ments to ee effected; hence, the establishment of a special commiGtee rade up of the actual chiefs of the intelligence depart- ments (TAF/IAC) to facilitate the Director's problem of consultation) rhe developrent of a central IntelLieence Agency implied something more, the difference being that between what is character- istic of n planning organization and what in cham:teristic of a functional organisation. As soon as the Croup became an .Agency and 40.*??????????4 ,he TA 7 los authorized in para. 7 of the eresident's letter of Jan. 22, cited in hapter 1, Annex above. Ft Approved For Release 2003/02SEMP64-00654A000200260001-2 Approved Forapease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200260001-2 ban to perform functions in its own right (thouo'n still in the conteot of a multilaoral system) coordination would come about through action as well as tOrough aepervision and planning.1 Central Tntellioence was directed, for instance, to "correlate and evaluate* national aecurity intelligence. AS 3003 43 this began to happen, those dniloit ere necessarily "coordinating" intelli- gence activity almost In their every act. Likewise, as soon as any activity of f7entral Intelligence had been authorized as a "service of 00000n concern,"2 those directing the "service" would be carrying on coordination in their own field. Part of the coordinattoo problem would then be concerned, not with harmonizing the activities of three agencies (note, 4ar, and Navy) as 300113 at first to have been contemplated, but five--State, War, navy, Air, and CTA. hence, coordination would involve a watch-dog function in which someone in authority would attempt to make sure that the various aspects of intelligence being actually carried on in a more or less coordinated fashion by CIA and the others, would not be in conflict among themselves. Aa will be shown, the first organizational mithod (The 1"Became an Agency" in the sense outlined in flopter I, above. The problem here diaeusaed began soon after Vandenberg became rirector rather than later with the passage of the national ticurity Act. 2ee "tational Seceritv Act, 5ec. 102, Para. (d) (11),e, banter T, -nex D, above. d in Approved For Release 2003/0geRELP64-00654A000200260001-2 Approved Foripease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP64-0065.00200260001-2 entral -'1anninct staff" of dealing with inter-agency coordination followed the nrou7 idea within a context that had not variee for frori ",-rnty)" princioles, while the. second (LA.,VGOAT'E) was essentirily unrealistic as iaiplied to the actual prole' at hand. The third ( T,.) "Tas formed in recognition of the coordination problem as i oveloped by 1951, though still P?ovt:rned by thc sane 7,eneral requirements, in force since 1946. coordination d r rir The first rArector or ntral Intelligence responded to the coordtnatin- requirement by establishing what, he called the entra1 tefr which should formulate the recommendations that he would mrs'