SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 8, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
SURVEY
OF
COMMUNIST BLOC
BROADCASTS
(25 JULY ? 7 AUGUST 1963)
STATOTHR
Approved For Release #O 4 0 bt:1CIA DB65Bq
 STATOTHR Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
Bitter Moscow-Peking Recrim?inat'ions Focused on Test Ban Treaty , , 1
Moscow Claims Soviet Initiative on Test Ban
CPR Says Agreement to Test Ban "Betrays" Soviet People
USSR Calls Chinese Charge of Betrayal "Impudent"
Moscow Says Nonaggression Pact Next Logical Step
Pyongyang, Hanoi Endorse CPR Stand on Test Ban Treaty , , , , , 0 11
LATIN AMERICA
Castro Renews Call to Revolution in Latin America 13
Havana Poses as Sino-Soviet Neutral
CPR Continues Routine Attacks on Indian "Aggressiveness"
Peking Denies Reports of Troop Concentrations
CPR Foreign Ministry Notes Carry Standard Charges
Peking Remains Cautious on Pakistani-Indian Differences
CPR$ Soviet Reactions to Air Exercises and VOA Agreements
Peking Vents Bitterness Over Soviet Aid to India
(continued)
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
BLOC RELATIONS
Moscow Presses "Trotskiyism" Charge Against Peking . . . . . . . , 22
KOMMUNIST Assails CCP Leaders' "Deviation"
Moscow Defends Record on "National Liberation Movement"
CEMA Meeting: Autonomy Agitates Soviet Bloc Propaganda . . . , . , 25
Conference Communique Skirts Autonomy Issue
Soviet Bloc Responds to CPR's Anti-CEMA Sallies
THE USSR
Supreme Economic Council Meeting Underlines Chemical Priorities , , 28
Additional Investment Resources Sought From Construction
Ustinov Position Remains Ambiguous
COMMUNIST CHINA
PEOPLE'S DAILY Cracks Down on Historian's Views of Confucius . . , , 31
Liberal Line on Study of Confucius Tightens
Historian's Theory on Confucius Linked to Modern Revisionism
THE FAR EAST SATELLITES
DRV Regime Reacts Sharply to Novel's "Sour Criticism" . . . . . , . 34
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 NFCIA--DP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
BITTER MOSCOW PEKING RECRIMINATIONS FOCUSED ON TEST BAN TREATY
The conclusion of the partial test ban treaty evokes an out-
pourifig of acrimonious propaganda, with Moscow citing the
treaty as concrete proof of the correctness of the Soviet policy
of peaceful coexistence and Peking characterizing it as a
nuclear fraud perpetrated with the imperialists to maintain
the nuclear monopoly. The increasingly vitriolic exchange is
climaxed by the 31 July CPR Government statement which charges
the USSR with betrayal of the Soviet and other socialist people,
and the 3 August Soviet response which characterizes the CPR
statement as "impudent" and again accuses the Chinese of trans-
ferring ideological differences to the realm of state relations.
This bitter propaganda exchange is followed by a direct and
violent confrontation at the Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons
conference. The Chinese delegate, according to NCNA, went so
far as to charge that the USSR cannot be trusted to live up to
the 1950 treaty of mutual alliance. This charge is the more
brazen coming after the Soviet Government statement had pointedly
asserted that its nuclear shield insures the security of the
socialist countries "including the CPR."
Moscow points up the "isolation" of the Chinese opponents to
the treaty by stressing the overwhelming worldwide approval
it has received, and Khrushchev at the 5 August signing
ceremonies in Moscow said that many states, "including those
in Asia and Africa," have expressed readiness to sign the ac-
cord. Propagandists claim that in addition to the Chinese,
the treaty is opposed only by some "wild men" in the United
States and by Bonn and Paris. All of the pro-Soviet satellites
promptly expressed their intent to sign the treaty. However,
Hanoi has joined Pyongyang and Tirana in echoing the Chinese
argument that a partial ban is militarily advantageous to the
west.
Mo5cad Claims Soviet Initiative on Test Ban
In line with the attempt to portray the test ban agreement as a result of
Soviet "initiative," Khrushchev in his 26 July PRAVDA-IZVESTIYA interview
speaks of the "many years" the USSR has been striving for a ban. At the
same time, he states that U.S. and British negotiators should be given
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
their "due," a graceful gesture which he repeats at the 5 August signing
ceremony, and leaves it to his propagandists to document in detail that
it has been the Soviet Union which has led the way in test ban proposals,*
Consistent with this claim of "initiative," Moscow, of course, obscures
the similarity of the present treaty with the U,S,-British proposal
of last Augusto And predicatably the account of the President's 26 July
TV speech omits his recollection that Washington and London had proposed
limited test ban treaties in 1959, 1961 and 1962, as well as his ref-
erence to U,S, attempts to control nuclear weapons dating back to the
Baruch plane Peking, of course, highlights the similarity between the
treaty signed in Moscow and proposals advanced by the West to support
its charge of Soviet capitulation, And to further document the Soviet
reversal, Peking media published textually past Soviet statements$ in-
cluding those by Khrushchev himself, criticizing a limited test ban,
In keeping with Moscow's cautious optimism about a further relaxation
of tensions and agreement on at least partial measures, propagandists
indicate that it is only isolated circles in the United States which
oppose a detente, Noting that some "wild men" in the United States are
opposing the test ban treaty, commentators refer to the "Pentagon" and
single out for special criticism Teller, and Senators Goldwater, Jackson,
Dirksen and Thurmond,
In keeping with the circumspect treatment of the President, the sub-
stantial TASS account of his 26 July TV speech omitted passages bearing
directly on the cold war such as his reference to the United States'
having stood on the verge of direct military confrontation with the
Soviet Union in Laos$ Berlin and Cuba, TASS also omitted his statement
that Western policies have sought to persuade the Soviet Union to forego
direct or indirect aggression;** a home service commentator, however,,
did say that his words about improving relations are incompatible with
his "slander and attacks" directed at the Soviet Union, and specifically
his statement that the USSR and other socialist countries should "re-
pudiate their aggressive plans," But commentators for the most part
.; Soviet audiences do not hear detailed accounts of past efforts for
disarmament and a test ban, But a 28 July commentary to Germany says
it was not the "notorious" Baruch plan but the 1956 Soviet proposal
which was the first imitative, And a broadcast to Britain the day be-
fore goes on from the 1956 proposal to list the May 1957 Supreme Soviet
appeal, the 1 March 1958 Soviet unilateral moratorium, and the Soviet
"initiative" on a test ban in November 1961,
The NCNA account of the speech, which was interlarded with editorial
comment calculated to point up Khrushchev's "capitulation," included
this passage,
Approved For Release 2& `1O$ TUA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
played up his expression of hope that the test ban agreement would be
followed by progress on other disputes.
CPR Says USSR Agreement to Test Ban "Betrays" Soviet People
While Moscow stresses Soviet initiative in achieving the test ban agree-
ment and says that-it is proof of the correctness of its coexistence
policy, Peking's attack on the Soviet role in perpetrating the nuclear
fraud becomes steadily more acriminous and voluminous, Thus, the
31 July CPR Government statement--which continued to be rebroadcast
through 6 August--goes beyond past indictments of the USSR to charge
that it has betrayed the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union,
of the peoples of the socialist camp, including China, and of all the
peace-loving people of the world, The statement blatantly goes on to
characterize Soviet policy as one of
allying with the forces of war to oppose the forces of peace,
allying with imperialism to oppose socialism, allying with the
United States to oppose China, and allying with the reaction-
aries of all countries to oppose the people of the world.
Making explicit earlier clear implications that Peking would not be
deterred from developing a nuclear capability, the Chinese statement
says of the treaty that "it is unthinkable for the Chinese Government
to be a party to this dirty fraud;" However, there has been no echo of
Kuo Mo-jo's 26 July statement that "it will not be long" before the
nuclear monopoly is broken,* Consistent with propaganda since the 19 July
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the CPR statement points up the Soviet's
about-face in agreeing to a partial test ban. Thus, it again quotes
Kuznetsov's 29 August 1962 Geneva statement that the U,S,-British partial
test ban proposal would give them a one-sided military advantage, since
it 'legalized" underground tests by which the United States could continue
improving its nuclear weapons, The Chinese statement also recalled Khru-
shchev's similar remarks of 9 September 1961--after the Soviet decision
to resume nuclear testing.
A Prague broadcast in Serbo-Croat sees a discrepancy between this state-
ment and the CPR proposal for destruction of all nuclear weapons, Prague
adds that.I'it is even stranger when we take into account the Sino-Indian
conflict and Chinese maps of Asia with large territories of neighboring
countries indicated as parts of China." Peking has lashed out at Soviet-
oriented parties for their attacks on the CPR, and the press and NCNA
have carried detailed-reports of statements by the French, Italian, Czech,
Bulgarian and GDR parties.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
The charges against the USSR voiced in the CPR statement are echoed
in the 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial--blatantly entitled "This Is
a Betrayal of the Soviet People"--which says that by its 180-degree
turn, Moscow has betrayed not only "their own correct stand and the
interests of the Soviet people, but also all those who had supported
them." The editorial in addition to repeating past public Soviet
statements opposing a partial test ban, claims that this appeared to
be the Soviet position "even up to early June this year," PEOPLE'S
DAILY says that after the agreement to hold the tripartite Moscow
test-ban talks, the Soviet Government had "formally" notified the CPR
that the Western countries'position "could not serve as a basis for
reaching an agreement" on a test band The editorial goes beyond the
CPR statement in its frontal attack on Khrushchev. After saying
that it is obvious that the treaty is aimed at tying China's hands,
PEOPLE'S DAILY says
Recently, while fraternizing with U0S, imperialism on the
most intimate terms, the Soviet leaders and the Soviet press
have gnashed their teeth in their bitter hatred toward
socialist China, They use the same language as U.S, impe-
rialism to abuse China, This is a U.S.-Soviet alliance
against China pure and simple,
Since the beginning of the talks, Peking has made sure that its audi-
ence is informed about the warm friendly atmosphere in Moscow. Thus,
the 17 July NCNA dispatch on the opening of the negotiations quotes
Western press reports at length on Khrushchev's good humor and con-
viviality. The NCNA press review for 29 July pointedly notes that
PEOPLE'S DAILY publishes a picture of Khrushchev embracing Harriman,
NCNA on 6 August cites REUTERS for the report that during the signing
ceremony Khrushchev was "bubbling over with good spirits," and that
he "went into a comic routine, pretending that his view of the signing
was blocked by the six foot aide of Lord Home." And a 7 August NCNA
report that Secretary Rusk had accepted an invitation from Khrushchev
to join him at a Black Sea resort says according to Moscow reports,
Rusk was gratified by the warm reception he received in Moscow. NCNA
concludes with the information that "when Rusk and British Foreign
Secretary Lord Home entered a Kremlin reception with Khrushchev on
5 August, the band broke into 'Love Walked In,' by American composer
George Gershwin,"
CPR Pro uses World Disarmament Conference: Peking's concern over the
world wide approval which woul greet a -test ban and China's isolation
in opposing it is pointed up by the call, in the CPR statement, for a
world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. As specific
documentation of the claim of a consistent struggle for peace and
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
disarmament, the statement says that "as is known to the whole world,"
the CPR long ago proposed the establishment of a nuclear free zone in
the Asian and Pacific regions. NCNA on 1 August carries Senior General
Lo Jui-ching's statement of PLA support for the world conference pro-
posal, and on 4 August Peking releases Chou En-tai's letter to the
heads of all states formally advancing the proposal.
The only major propaganda followup comes in the 2 August editorial
ostensibly directed against the United States for saying that the
Chinese proposal is so "sweeping and unrealistic" that it stood little
change of being considered seriously. PEOPLE'S DAILY says that all
those who are sincere in defending world peace will welcome the proposal,
and "only U.S, imperialism and its collaborators fear it," Earlier,
the editorial says that U.S, dismissal of t e proposal shows U.S. in-
tent to use, export, manufacture, test and stockpile nuclear weapons,
And it adds that "the very words prohibition of nuclear weapons are
not found in the much vaunted treaty." The Soviet Government statement's
dismissal of the proposal as "propaganda" has so far occasioned no
direct reply from Peking,
USSR Calls Chinese Charge of Betrayal "Impudent"
Moscow did not acknowledge the CPR Government statement until it re-
leased its scathing response on 3 August which characterized as "impu-
dent" the charge that Moscow has "betrayed" the interests of the Soviet
people. The statement is published in all Moscow papers and PRAVDA and
IZVESTIYA carry the text of the Chinese statement as well, with the
prefatory note that the "shameful" document is unworthy of space in
the Soviet press but is being carried so that the Soviet people may
see "how far the Chinese leaders have gone."
The Soviet statement says the Chinese have provided one more bit of
evidence that they have transferred ideological differences to state
relations, and that the USSR and "other socialist countries" regard
the CPR attack as an unprecedented? most regrettahla act, As though
to point up the "correct" Soviet behavior, the statement in two separate
passages notes that the Soviet nuclear shield has insured and will
insure the security of the CPR as well as other socialist countries.
The statement reveals some sensitivity, however, to Peking's charges
of the reversal in the Soviet position on a test ban when it says that
the CPR "in artificially selecting quotations,..forgets that science
and technology are developing tempestuously, and what was unacceptable
only yesterday might prove most useful today," Moscow says sarcastically
that the test ban treaty can only be objected to by people who "cover up
with flashy phrases about the most radical disarmament measures their
lack of desire or readiness to achieve disarmament."
Approved For Release 2004/0:39YYF'65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
The Chinese position on the test ban treaty was scored in a Yuriy.
Zhukov article published in PRAVDA.. an__29 July' which expressed "astonish-
ment" at "responsible" Chinese leaders acting in concert with the
French to defend nuclear testing, After the Zhukov article, a steadily
increasing volume of radio and press commentary attacked the Chinese
position,
Moscow Says Nonaggression Pact Next Logical Step
Moscow's elite and routine propaganda continues to give wide play to
the notion that the test ban agreement should be followed by a NATO-
Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement, Thus, Khrushchev in his 26 July
interview places it in "first place" and--putting his own interpreta-
tion on the 25 July communique--says agreement was reached in Moscow
that after both sides had consulted with their allies, discussion should
be continued with a view to reaching an accord,* This interpretation
was repeated in a 28 July home service broadcast, and in the 29 July
PRAVDA editorial, In his remarks, at the signing ceremony on 5 Augusts
Khrushchev describes the nonaggression pact as the "next step," and
the 3 August Soviet Government statement speaks of it as a "primary"
task,
While Khrushchev (and the 3 August statement) expresses concern for
settlement of the German problem, he as well as lesser propagandists
remain vague on the relationship between the nonaggression pact and
this issue "on which the liquidation of international tension most
depends," Reporting President Kennedy's 1 August press conference,
TASS includes his remark that "we must,,,discuss the nonaggression
pact with our allies, review their interests and. our interests, re-
view them from the point of view of one problem--Berlin--and then
set out once more for the Soviet Union and explain what the situation
is," The account omits, however, the President's assertion that one
of his interests in a nonaggression pact would be greater security for
Berlin,
Aside from singling out the nonaggression pact for priority considera-
tion, propagandists generally fail to indicate an order of preference
for the partial measures listed by Khrushchev in his 19 July speech-
for control posts to guard against surprise attack, a reduction or
freezing of military budgets, and reduction of troops and exchange of
military missions in Germany--or the forum in which they should be
The communiques said in fact that the allies would be consulted about
continuing discussions,
Approved For Release 26& b3T1A-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
discussed. Khrushchev in his interview with PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA merely
lists these measures (without specifying that the measures to prevent
surprise attack include the establishment of ground control posts)
and in his 5 August remarks he alludes only to "specific problems"
which he has mentioned recently "more than once." According to the
TASS account of the 30 July plenary session in Geneva* Tsarapkin listed
all of Khrushchev's partial measures with the exception of that for
surprise attack. And the account of the 1 August session notes the
Bulgarian representative's suggestion that the Geneva negotiators dis-
cuss a nonaggression pact, the proposal for the reducing of military
budgets, and the creation of nuclear-free zones--which scattered com-
mentaries continue to press as a desirable measure.
Although proposals for a nonproliferation agreement are not pressed
in current comment, Moscow has acknowledged various suggestions to this
effect. The TASS account of the President's 26 July speech includes his
reference to the desirability of a further. limitation on the dissemina-
tion of nuclear weapons. And TASS on 30 July says that Lord Home
indicated that along with surprise attack measures,"'!the next=.lggicil
step" would be a nondissemination agreement. Moscow also reports a
similar statement by Macmillan.
Although Khrushchev failed to mention underground tests in his 26 July
interview, other propaganda including the 8 August PRAVDA editorial
lists such a ban among problems that remain to be settled. In his
3 August message to the Hiroshima conference Khrushchev perfunctor.i}y
spoke of the need to ban "all" tests. Reportage on the Geneva talks
includes expressions of interest by various delegates in banning under-
ground tests.
Approved For Release 2004/0i`/?qFW- 65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
IIIROSHIMA CONFERENCE SCENE OF VIOLENT SINO-SOVIET DEPATE
The 5 August Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons conference was
witness to the most severe public vituperation of the Soviet
Union by China to date, In unprecedentedly frank and detailed
reports, both Peking and Moscow media have described a climactic
verbal bout between their respective delegates in which the
Chinese representative all but rejected the CPR's alliance with
the Soviet Union and accused the Soviets of helping another
country to attack them,
At the same time, the Hiroshima conference revealed the disintegra-
tion of the "peace movement" in the wake of the heightened
Sino-Soviet dispute, The conference was divided at its in-
ception by a break in the tenuous alliance of the Japanese "left",
as the socialist and Sohyo delegates withdraws in protest of
communist manipulations, to form a separate conference. Like-
wise in. a dilemma over the widening Peking-Moscow rifts the
Chinese-oriented Japanese Communist party showed signs of con-
fusion over its own stand on the test-ban treaty,
In view of the Moscow-Peking propaganda exchange over the test ban treaty,
a debate at the Hiroshima conference was to be expected; however, the
degree of bitterness of the exchange, acknowledged in broadcasts from
both'. sides, is unprecedented, Apparently Soviet delegate Yuri Zhukov
replied to a Chinese attack on the test ban treaty by using the Cuban and
Taiwan crises as examples of how the Soviet Union's nuclear might has
protected the security of the 'bocialist camp"; he claimed that "more than
once" we have "saved":the CPR from "attempts at aggression by Taiwan,"
and he recalled that "we said bluntly that we would use atomic weapons
to defend China,"
In response, Chu Tzu-chi is reported by NCNA to have asserted, in party
the following points:
+ that the Chinese won their revolution "mainly by their own efforts,"
and have "relied on their own strength" to "discourage U,S, imperialism
from attacking their country,"
+ that "Zhukov's claim that the Soviet Union managed to protect China
with its nuclear weapons was an insult to the Chinese people',"
+ that Korea was strictly a Chinese victory and that the Soviets comma
mited both the errors of "adventurism" and "capitulationism" in Cuba,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
4 that the Soviets not only do not help China but that they "and U.S.
imperialism have been helping a third country with arms to attack
socialist China,"
+ that China cannot trust the alleged protection of Soviet nuclear
power because the Soviets have "violated Lenin's teachings and the
interests of the Chinese people, the socialist camp, and the people
of the world," and have "betrayed the interests of the Soviet people,"
+ that, by voting in favor of the dispatch of U.N. troops to the
Congo, the Soviets "helped ...in the murder of Patrice Lumumba."
+ that while the Chinese "can list 100 cases of your capitulation to
imperialism," the Soviets will never be able to give a single case of
Chinese capitulation.
+ and? that the Soviets "show far less; courage, if any, than the
Japanese religious circles."
Moscow Peking Pre-Conference Maneuvers: In the 19 July PEOPLE'S
MILY editorial Peking had revealed its concern that the conclusion
of a partial test-ban treaty could cause the CPR to be estranged from
the peace movement. The editorial noted that "some kind-hearted
people" may view even a partial test ban as a "step forward"; but
that the imperialists must not be allowed to exploit the people's
desire for an end to tests. Peking's resolution to attempt to use
the conference to garner opposition to the treaty was evident from
the fact that Chinese speakers at the 1 August Peking rally supporting
the Hiroshima conference concentrated on attacking the test ban treaty,
The Soviet delegation seemed initially to be willing to try to avoid
a direct battle with Peking, However, after failing in an apparent
attempt, through the efforts of the representatives of the World Peace
Council, to give all overseas delegates the status of observers,
rather then delegates, the Soviet delegation countered the-Chinese
offensive by urging the conference to endorse the test ban treaty,
Each side claims to have succeeded in its aim--Peking media emphasize
the anti-imperialist content of the final conference report (which
makes no mention of the test ban treaty); and Moscow claims$ in a
7 August commentary on the conference, that the majority of the
authentic representatives of the world's people supported the treaty
and that the Chinese delegates "looked particularly out of place."
The Position of the Japanese Communists: The Japanese CP has pro-
fesse to be neutral in the Sino- Quiet conflict but has in fact backed
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CCIIA-RDAPL65B00383R000100280020-1
CON
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
Peking's stand on important issues, On the question of the merits of
the test ban treaty, a particularly sensitive issue in Japan, the JCP
has been inconsistent and seems to be attempting to avoid a direct
rejection of the treaty, Reflecting the dilemma;, a 24 July JCP AKAHATA
editorial implies some credit for the expected test ban agreement is
due the 1962 anti-nuclear weapons conference whose declarations and
recommendations "have made great contributions to the suppression of
imperialism," And a 29 July AKAHATA editorial declares that "the
nuclear test ban agreement will have posit.va significance if it is the
first step toward a world ban on nuclear weapons,"
The 3 August JCP statement on the Hiroshima conference presents a
position differing in emphasis significantly from the previous modicum
of optimism by declaring that the view that "the treaty represents a
'first stee toward a reduction of the threat of nuclear war and to-
war wor peace with a total ban on nuclear weapons'" does not "ac-
cord with world reality in Japan," The JCP acknowledged its political
problem when it proposed in this same statement that the conference
"should not be forced" to pass a resolution supporting or opposing the
treaty, "for the sake of preserving unity," The JCP's basic desire
to maintain the unity of the Japanese groups in the anti-nuclear
weapons movement was also given by the statement as the reason why
the conference should similarly avoid a position on the question of
opposing nuclear tests by "any" country--the issue which split
last year's meeting,
Having been unsuccessful in its attempt to prevent the polemics at
the conference and to avoid the disintegration of the Japanese "peace
movement," the JCP has publicly ignored the conference chaos, Thus,
the JCP statement on the "successful opening" of the conference passes
briefly over the socialist-Sohyo walk-out of the first day, appealing
to both to safeguard unity; and, AKAHATA has made no mention to date of
the bitter Sino-Soviet exchanges,
Peking has reproduced in its press JCP statements, editorials and
leaders' remarks on the conference and the test-ban to give the
impression that the JCP favors the CCP's views, The Chinese and JCP
positions while close, are not identical. Peking obviously would have
prefered the conference to have opposed the treaty--Chu Tzu-chi de-
clared that the treaty was a "crime" and that the conference should
"repudiate and oppose it resolutely," Moreover, Peking did not echo
the JCP concern over the socialist-Sohyo departure from the conference--
CPR media, in fact, welcomed the absence of the "trouble makers,"
Moscow, while at odds with the JCP on most issues, has attempted to ob-
scure the differences, A 1 August PRAVDA article implied that the JCP
Approved For Release 200 /iii!I '--DP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
should agree with the test ban treaty. The article declared:
The position of the Soviet Government on the question
of the banning of nuclear tests is wholly in accordance
with the demands of the previous international forums
of peace partisans, and also the demands put forward by
peace partisans of various countries in the course of pre-
paration for the Ninth World Conference against Atomic
and Hydrogen Weapons.... As confirmation of this we can
cite the program of the Japanese peace partisans expounded
recently in AKAHATA, the organ of the Central Committee
of the Japanese Communist Party.
Generally, Moscow media seem to avoid as much as possible any comment
on the internal difficulties of the Japanese "peace movement" and JCP
policy,
Prague in a rare attack upon a party for allying itself with Peking,
one August lauded the Japanese Council Against Atomic Weapons- which,
it said had been "practically destroyed" by the Chinese and JCP--and
condemned the JCP for trying to "force" its opinions on others "at
all costs." The Czech radio commentary openly declared the JCP to
be "one of the the very few communist parties supporting the views
of the Peking leaders,"
The Czech broadcast is particularly remarkable when compared with a
Prague CTK commentary on the previous day which blamed the conference
difficulties on the "wrecking activities of the rightwing leaders of
the Japanese Socialists Party" and attacked the socialists for at-
tempting "to force their views on the conference." Thus the Czechs ap-
pear to have made a complete reversal in picturing the JCP as the
villain of the Hiroshima conference.
PYONCYANC, HANOI ENDORSE CPR STAND OTT TEST BAN TREATY
Peking's apposition to the test ban treaty is seconded by North Korea and
the DRV, as well as by the Indonesian Communist Party. Characteristically,
Pyongyang provides the most outspoken support, although Hanoi joins it in
echoing Chinese assertions that the separation of the test issue from
nuclear disarmanent strengthens the imperialists while nonproliferation
provisions are aimed at weakening the bloc.
After initial Pyongyang propaganda which characterized the treaty as a
"sinister machination of U.S. imperialists," leading DPRK dailies
published the text of the 31 July CPR statement (Pyongyang has apparently
ignored the 3 August USSR statement).. This was followed on 4 August by
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1.963
a NODONG SINMUN editorial(rebroadcast by Peking in Russian) which charged
that the treaty provides the United States with ":Favorable conditions
for attaining nuclear supremacy," and cites Harriman for the comment that
the treaty could enable the United States and USSR to "work together to
prevent China from getting nuclear capability." Echoing proposals of
the CPR statement, the editorial calls for destruction of all nuclear
weapons and their removal from overseas bases. Indirectly endorsing
Peking's call for a world conference, the editorial asserts that matters
of nuclear disarmament "cannot be discussed and solved only by a few
countries."
Hanoi Reactions After reporting the initailing of the treaty, Hanoi on
31 July broadcast to the home audience a series of news-reports obviously
tailored to underline the advantages of the treaty to the United States,
and to point up U.S. intentions of increasing its nuclear strength. How-
ever, Handi's'first independent comment came in a 6 August NHAN DAN
editorial (carried in the Peking press on 8 August)describing the partial
test ban as enabling imperialists to perfect "such nuclear weapons as
they deemed necessary for their war plans,"
Attacking the nonproliferation provisions, the editorial asserts that in
the absence of disarmament, attention should be paid to strengthening
convential and nuclear defenses of the socialist camp. In its sharpest
slap at Soviet participation in the treatye e itorial declares that
the United States "cannot deceive the whole of the socialist camp and
the whole of the communist and workers movement; it cannot deceive all
the peace-loving people of the world."
The editorial, ostensibly pegged to the anniversary of the Hiroshima
bombing, managed to avoid any specific reference to the treaty itself--
aside from a brief allusion to the Moscow talks. While NHAN DAN echoes
the CPR call for a complete nuclear weapons ban and other of the proposals
advanced in the CPR statement, it does not mention the call for a world
nuclear disarmament conference.
The Hanoi press and home service broadcasts on 7 August carried the text
of the treaty together with excerpts of about equal length from the CPR
and USSR statements, Hanoi's fairly full version of the Chinese statement
is notable for its omission of the most blatant. attacks on the Soviet
Government for making an "about-face" on the test issue, for "selling
out" the interests of Soviet and world peoples, and for allying with the
United States and reactionaries to oppose China and the "people of
the world." Detailed information on Hanoi's version of the Soviet state-
ment is not yet available; however, apparently it does contain the charge
of. CPR aggressiveness,
Approved For Release 2004983/111 FCIA*DP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
LATIN AMERICA
With newly restored confidence in the protective deterrence-cover of
Soviet military prowess following his USSR visit? Castro on 26 July
delivered his most militant call to revolt in Latin America since
January. In two speeches in January he had revived from the Second
Declaration of Havana the maxim that the duty of a revolutionary is not
to sit passively in his doorway and "watch the corpse of imperialism
go by," but to actively make revolution. In his July anniversary
speech, he now enlarges repeatedly on the notion that it is the
"duty" of the revolutionary to act, and he adjures Latin American
revolutionaries "not to wait for a change in the correlation of forces
to produce the miracle of social revolution."
Asserting that "a revolution is inevitable" in Latin America, Castro
ticks off a list of 10 hemisphere nations--"and any other countries
I may have forgotten"--as ripe for revolt, exempting the five that
still recognize his regime. He singles out Venezuela and Guatemala
for special attention, offering a "greeting of solidarity and co-
fraternity to the heroic Venezuelan revolutionaries" as well as to
the "heroic guerillas of Guatemala." He claims that revolutionaries
"do not need anyone to send money from abroad when they are fighting,
nor do they need anyone to send them weapons." And he mocks "impe-
rialist" concern that Cuba "exports its revolution": "We only expose
our ideas," he says; "We share our ideas with revolutionaries from
anywhere in the world."
While Castro lambasts President Kennedy in sharper language than
usual in the course of a diatribe against "U.S. imperialism" (Cuban
commentator Gomez Wanguemert says Castro's "harsh language" in re-
ferring to the President "shocked" U.S. news agencies), he reiterates
Cuba's readiness to hold discussions with the United States provided
the latter puts an end to its "aggressive schemes." He had been more
frank in remarks to the Middle East News Agency (MENA) in an interview
on 25 July. Practically admitting that it was at Soviet insistence
that he had recently adopted a more conciliatory position toward the
United States, Castro recalled "contacts for the improvements of
Washington-Havana relations" before his departure for Moscow and
declared that "this visit was a turning point in those contacts." How-
ever, he said, "miserable America" maintained its hostile attitude and
"thus hindered these contacts." He added: "We are happy about America's
hostile policy, since it has enabled us to proceed on our path and do
whatever we wish."
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
Moscow's Handlin. of Castro Speech: Moscow acknowledged Castro's
26 My speech in a 450-word- A account on 27 July which disposed of
Castro's inflammatory calls to arms in the bland statement that he
"dwelt at length on the significance of the heroic attack on the
Moncada Barracks for the development of the revolutionary struggle of
the peoples of Cuba and all Latin America," TASS noted Castro's com-
ment on Soviet power as a deterrent to the United States, on Soviet
economic aid to Cuba, and on the certainty that "the USSR and the
socialist camp" will support "any people doing what the people of Cuba
have done,"
PRAVDA on the same day published an account of the speech similar to
the TASS release, It received no further publicity for four days, when
PRAVDA's issue of the 31st gave "almost two full pages to Fidel Castro's
speech" in "abridged" form, according to the TASS press review, Co-
incident with the PRAVDA publication, versions of the speech were
broadcast some 50 times in various languages. PRAVDA's abridgment
made no effort to suppress Castro's call to arms in Latin American
giving in full his remarks concerning revolutionary "duties" and the
inevitability of revolution in Latin America, Passages concerning
Cuban grievances against the United States were muted, and PRAVDA
softened the attacks on Venezuela and Guatemala through omission or
condensation of Castro's remarks,
While the text of Castro?s glowing 4 June report on his USSR visit had
been broadcast in Mandarin and Korean, in installmentsq with lengthy
excerpts provided for the Albanians from 17 through 22 June, no such
special treatment is given to the 26 July speech in these three language
services, (The 4 June speech had also been promptly published in full
in PRAVDA and given as prompt broadcast dissemination in summary form,)
Pekin 's Treatment of Castro: Peking, which conveyed its reaction to
as ra s une trip report y ignoring it, recounts this speech
promptly and at length in the domestic service as well as via NCNA,
Peking's account concentrates on Castro's outline of the duty of revolu-
tionaries in a hemisphere ready for revolt, and picks up his comment
on the Moncada Barracks attack as showing how "people" can defeat a
modern army. Singling out his remark that "revolutionaries should not
make the path of Yankee imperialism easier" (omitted in PRAVDA's abridg-
ment), Peking rephrases it with pointed applicability to the Sino-Soviet
dispute in reporting that he said revolutionaries "should not facilitate
the tactics used by U0S0 imperialism,"
But the Chinese have clearly not forgiven Castro for his USSR visit,
He is not once mentioned in remarks by Chen I and Kuo Mo-jo (as re-
ported by NCNA ) at a Cuban embassy reception, or in PEOPLE'S DAILY
and TA KUNG PAO editorials on the 26 July anniversary. (PRAVDA referred
editorially on the occasion to "national hero and leader Fidel Castro,"
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
and published articles by Dorticos, Raul Roas and Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez.) And where the CPR leaders' greetings message on 26 July
1962 had applauded Castro's "correct leader'ship," this year's message
mentioned him only once, noting that "Comrade Fidel Castro" led the
attack on the Moncada Barracks 10 years ago and crediting everything
since then to "the Cuban people." (In direct contrast, where last
year's Khrushchev-Brezhnev message referred only to "Comrade Fidel
Castro" leading the Cubans at Moncada, this year's calls Castro an
"outstanding revolutionary.") The 1962 CPR message (from Liu Shao-
chi and Chou En-lai) extended "warm fraternal greetings" from the
Chinese people, governments "and on our own behalf" to Dorticos and
Castro personally, "the Cuban people, and the Government of the
Republic of Cuba"; the present message (from Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-
chi? Chu Teo and Chou En-tai) sends "warm greetings" on behalf of
the Chinese people, the CCP, and the Chinese Government to the "heroic
Cuban people;s the United Party of the Socialist Revolution of Cuba,
and the Cuban Revolutionary Governments" omitting the personal saluta-
tions.
Havana Poses as Sino-Soviet Neutral
Still striving to maintain a carefully neutral attitude in the Sino-
Soviet disputes Havana media balanced publicity for the activities of
the CPR and Soviet delegations to the anniversary receptions Broad-
casts prior to the anniversary reported that pictures of Khrushchev
were displayed in Cuba alongside those of Castro, Marx and Lenin.
On the other hand, PRENSA LATINA on 1 August distributed a summary of
a speech by Gen, Liu Ya-lous leader of a CPR military delegation, in
which he described as an "immutable truth" the claim that "imperialism
and all reactionaries are paper tigers." And PRENSA LATINA announced
on 4 August that the Cuban ideological magazine CUBA SOCIALISTA in its
August edition carried texts of both the CCP 14 June letter and the
CPSU's 14 July reply, while Che Guevara, addressing U.S. students
visiting Cubas said he found "the attitude of Cuban students correct
when they do not comment on Sino-Soviet ideological differences, which
are also among the most important matters for us as well."
That overtones of the polemic were nevertheless present at the celebra-
tion is indicated in an article by Soviet editors Adzhubey, Pavel
Satyukov, and Dmitri Coryunov of the Soviet delegations who accused their
"Chinese comrades" of "grossly and deliberately distorting the truth"
in regard to the Caribbean crisis. They noted that "when Fidel Castro
said that in their revolutionary struggle the people of Latin America
will find a loyal comrade and friend in the great country of Lenin,"
this promise was roundly applauded by the Havana audience, "but the
Chinese delegates would not even remove their hands from their pockets."
Approved For Release 2004/03/1CIONETR--k3B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
THE FAR EAST
CPR CONTINUES ROUTINE ATTACKS ON INDIAN "AGGRESSIVENESS"
Contemptuous of Indian "stories" of Chinese troop concentra-
tions on the border, the CPR continues to focus on charges
of Indian aggressive intent, Peking's propaganda, routine
in tone and moderate in volume, does not threaten retalia-
tions nor appear to be building a case as a pretext for
counteraction, Last fall, a month before large-scale fight-
ing broke out, Peking was charging India not only with border
intrusions but also with armed clashes, and NCNA gave plain
warning that India's "nibbling" at Chinese territory created
a "dangerous situation in which armed conflict may be touched
off at any time, rr
While Moscow shows concern at the effect on Indian neutrality
of the air defense agreement with the West and. the VOA agree-
ment, Peking sees the former as a "grave step" endangering
peace in Asia, and routinely charges that the agreements
are further evidence of Indian alignment with the West, The
CPR, in increasingly bitter tones, castigates Soviet aid to
India,
Peking Denies Reports of Troop Concentrations
Ridiculing the recent spate of Indian "wild stories" of massive Chinese
troop concentrations on the border, NCNA on 3 August quotes foreign
press reports attributing the rumors to an attempt to distract Indian
public attention from the government's political difficulties and to
obtain more aid from the West and the USSR, On 27 July NCNA specifically
attributes the reports to an attempt to make the "military collusion"
of the U0S,-U,K,-Indian air defense agreement appear necessary.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editari:al.the . f.s9llowing day. 'claims that Ix dian. ground .and
air intrusions have increased simultaneously with India's "rumormonger-
ing" about a CPR buildup, and NCNA on 30 July says that Indian newspapers
have "proved" that it is India which is "intensifying military activities"
on the border, Again, on 6 August, NCNA reports that India is "busy
making war preparations" on the border by preparing for the joint air
exercises, by mountain road-building, by enlarging the army, by reorganiz-
ing border defenses and so forth, However, Peking does not portray
these military preparations as constituting an imminent threat to the
CPR, nor as requiring Chinese defensive countermeasures, but rather as
Approved For Releag@ 69 t1A1L: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
evidence of India's generally "aggressive" nature and "alignment" with
the West,
CPR Foreign Ministry Notes Carry Standard Charges
Of the five notes to India publicized by Peking since 12 July, three
are concerned with border incidents, A 31 July note denies an Indian
charge (in a 5 July note) of a Chinese intrusion in June across Natu La
into Sikkim; Peking's note claims that no CPR forces have ever crossed
into Sikkim, and implies a difference between India's and Sikkim's
foreign relations by saying that "China and Sikkim have always lived
together in peace" and by charging that Indian military structures
around Natu La have interrupted normal traffic between Sikkim and Tibet,
Another CPR note on 31 July, also concerning the Natu La area, reiterates
an earlier charge (denied in a 15 June Indian note) concerning Indian
military structures on, and troop occupation of "Chinese" territory be-
yond the watershed defining the Sino-Sikkim boundary, This note demands
a joint Sino-Indian investigation of the military structures to clarify
their location and to show "who is confusing world public opinion,"
A 30 July CPR note accuses Indian troops of two intrusions in July into
Hsialinkung terrance (in the eastern sector of the border) north of
the 7 November 1959 line of actual control (which India does not
recognize) for reconnaissance of a CPR civilian checkpost and for the
erection of military structures on "Chinese" territory, The note goes
on to accuse India of "deliberately creating tension" by its alleged
repeated intrusions in the western sector of the border and recently
extended intrusions in the eastern sector, in violation of the pledge
not to take any action impeding the unilateral CPR ceasefire and with-
drawal, The note demands an end to the "intrusions" but does not
threaten retaliation--nor do the other protest notes,
Two other CPR notes concern the long-standing allegations of Indian-
Taiwan collusion and India's persecution of its overseas Chinese popula-
tion, A 27 July note protests the reception of a Buddhist delegation
from Taiwan by Nehru and other government officials, and charges
that the Indian government "has completely gone back on its oft-repeated
pledge to the Chinese government that it recognizes only the People's
Republic of China and is opposed to 'two Chinas,"' A 31 July note
announces that Peking will send a ship for the fourth time to repatriate
more interned and otherwise "persecuted" Chinese nationals, despite
India's claim that all who desired repatriation have already left,
Peking Remains Cautious on Pakistani-Indian Differences
CPR propaganda consistently plays up Sino-Pakistani amity and liberally
quotes from Pakistani sources on the alleged threat of Indian aggression,
However, there is no evidence in available Peking propaganda to confirm
Approved For Release 2004/03/a lpt5B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
Indian rumors of a secret Sino-Pakistani defense pact and plot to
divide Kashmir, Indeed, Peking circumspectly avoids the Kashmir
issued And Peking does not directly acknowledge Pakistani Foreign
Minister Bhutto's warning on 17 July in the National Assembly that "any
attack on Pakistan will no longer concern only the security and ter-
ritorial integrity of this country but will involve the largest state
in Asia" (as reported in Karachi radio's domestic service), and that
"China would come to Pakistan9s aid if it were attacked by India"
(as reported by REUTERS' correspondent in Rawalpindi, who added that
Bhutto declined to say whether Pakistan had a secret pact with the
CPR),
In what is apparently a diluted paraphrase of the 17 July Bhutto state-
ment, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 28 July says that Bhutto "pointed
out recently that a heavily armed India would always be a threat, not
only to Pakistan but to the whole continent." According to NCNA on
26 July, Bhutto declared on 24 July that Pakistan had received an
assurance from "our friend" (not identified by NCNA, but identified by
Karachi radio as the Western powers) and from "other countries" that
they would "help Pakistan in the event of aggression," Thus while
Peking is apparently not averse to rumors of a defense agreement with
Pakistan, it is careful to remain noncomittsl.
CPR, Soviet Reactions to Joint Air Exercises and VOA Agreements
The 28 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial assails the air defense agreement
as a "grave step taken,,,to menace the peace of Asia," and claims that
the agreement constitutes a political and military alliance with the.
United States and an attempt to revive tension on the border, It is
thus "new proof," the paper says, of India's "rejection of a peaceful
settlement" and should be brought to the attention of the Colombo con-
ference nations, Should India "take rash actions ? .and create new
conflicts," concludes the editorial, "it must bear responsibility for
all consequences."
The Soviet reaction to the air exercises plan evinces serious concern
about the consequences for Indian neutrality; In a Moscow broadcast
on 24 July, Polyakov calls the agreement "part of a Western plan to
* The Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement, signed 2 March 1963, is care-
fully worded so as not to commit the CPR to an endorsement of Pakistan's
claims: It demarcates the boundary "between China"s Sinkiang and the
contiguous areas, the defense of which is under the actual control of
Pakistan," and specifies that after the settlement of the Kashmir dis-
pute between Pakistan and India, the CPR will reopen boundary negotiations
with the "sovereign authority concerned."
Approved For Release 20O00311 TI ?-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
hinder Soviet-Indian cooperation" because the "imperialists" are
well aware of "how important Soviet-Indian friendship is to consolida-
tion of the independence of young states and the strengthening of peace,"
Western military aid to India, supplied under the "pretense of defend-
ing India from aggression," is designed to force India to relinquish
its sovereignty and is thus "causing anxiety among India's friends,"
TASS on 7 August quotes Nehru as saying that the Voice of America trans-
mitter agreement "runs counter to the policy of nonalignment" and was
signed "without being preliminarily studied by the government," and
that therefore talks are in progress to amend the terms of the agree-
ment, Moscow has strongly attacked the agreement: The Polyakov com-
mentary called it "not only an unprecedented concession to the impe-
rialists but a step toward political and ideological cooperation with
them," It stopped just short of calling it an unfriendly gesture by
India toward the USSR:
The aims pursued by the Voice of America are well known,
Its subversion against the national liberation movement,
peace supporters, and the USSR are well known, Making the
domestic service of the Indian radio available for VOA
broadcasts can be considered an unfriendly gesture toward
the countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East, which are
defending their independence, and of course a blow to Indian
sovereignty, It can in no way be associated with the policy
of nonalignment which Prime Minister Nehru has mentioned so
often and so clearly,
Peking treats the VOA agreement as merely additional evidence of U,S6-
Indian alignment, NCNA on 18 July says sarcastically that the Indian
press is worried that the agreement will explode India's "nonalignment
myth," and quotes one Indian paper as saying that the VOA broadcasts
must be confined to "anti-China propaganda" so that "not even the
slightest mention" will be made of the USSR, A few days later, NCNA,
while citing Indian press attacks on the agreement, also quotes an
INDIAN EXPRESS argument that there should be no Soviet objection to it
since Radio Moscow, the Voice of America, and All-India Radio are all
engaged in attacking Peking.
Peking Vents Bitterness Over Soviet Aid to India
After a long period in which CPR media only implied Peking's displeasure
over Soviet-Indian relations, and in which Moscow propaganda discreetly
played down the Soviet position, both sides in July made their opposing
views more explicit, Thus Moscow put on an unusual display of friendliness
for India, with Khrushchev personally opening the Indian exhibition in
Moscow and with the welcoming of a number of official Indian visitors, in-
cluding a delegation seeking expanded Soviet military aid.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
Peking's more direct attacks on Soviet-Indian relations date from the
polemical 16 July PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer article which proclaimed that
Nehru has "not without success" pursued the strategy of "poisoning Sino-
Soviet relations,"* PEOPLE'S DAILY also quoted Nehru as saying that
"Soviet neutrality in the India-China conflict is of greater help to
India than all the military aid received from the West" at the time of
the fighting, And it warned that while the "nonalignment signboard
can still hoodwink some people," Soviet aid cannot change India's status
as a U.S, "protege"--for-!'can the investment of one dollar outweigh that
of 10 dollars?"
Since the Observer article, Peking has continued its attacks on Soviet-
Indian relations, using the device of quotat dns, from the Indian press:
+ NCNA 31 July: "Had Russia not befriended India and were the combined
might of the communist bloc directed against India, no amount of military
aid from the United States would have been of any avail,"
+ NCNA 4 August: The Indian Government is very grateful for Soviet arms
aid because it came despite Soviet misgivings about the air excercises
and VOA agreements, and despite "open Chinese diatribes against Moscow as
aiding and abetting India in its armed encounter with China," and because
the arms aid list "covers weapons which are conventionally called of'fen-
sive,"
+ NCNA 7 August: Moscow's cooperating with India is "no longer inhibited,"
a fact which "explains the reported large measure of success of the
Boothalingam arms mission to Moscow," However, "more important than these
material gains are recent Khrushchevian gestures in public of continued
affection and sympathy for the Indian Prime Minister,"
NCNA says on 6 August that according to an AFP report, Indian Foreign Sec-
retary R,K, Nehru, asked at a Moscow press conference "whether his govern-
ment was as sure of receiving material aid from the USSR as from the United
States in case of hostilities with China," replied that he was certain the
Soviet Government would help India, Peking has not to date picked up a
report from "reliable sources" in New Delhi, carried by Delhi radio on 6
August, that Moscow assured R,K, Nehru that the USSR and East Europe are
not supplying military equipment to China,
* The Chinese delegate at the Hiroshima conference, in the most vitriolic
anti-Soviet charges on record, accused the USSR, along with "U,S, imperi-
alism,'!' of aiding a "third country" with arms to attack China, For a
discussion of the Sino-Soviet confrontation at Hiroshima, see page
of this SURVEY,
Approved For Release 2004MSlTl=-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
On 3 August NCNA reports a Cambodian paper's commentary on the "shocking"
news of the Soviet Union's "agreement to supply India with guided missiles,
radar installations, and transport planes without restrictions on their
use." It quotes the paper as asking: "Does the Soviet Union intend to
allow India to use the weapons it supplied to invade China, which cherishes
peace and has concluded a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union?"
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVE`.'
8 AUGUST 1963
BLOC RELATIONS
MOSCOW PRESSES "TROTSKIYISM" CHARGE AGAINST PEKING
While Moscow and Peking are currently absorbed in hostile exchanges on
the test-ban treaty, the charge of "Trotskiyism" against Peking is pressed
more and more openly in the CPSU's continuing campaign against the positions
of the "Chinese leaders," The charge, which was first bruited in the pro-
paganda as long ago as 1960, was renewed by Khrushchev last December, with-
out, however, an explicit naming of the Chinese, and again in the 14 July
CPSU open letter which accused the Chinese of consorting with Trotskiyites
in Ceylon. Now the charge is leveled directly at Peking in articles com-
memorating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Bolsheviks under
Lenin (30 July), and is further documented in press accounts of Chinese
collusion with Trotskiyites in various countries.
The charge--among the gravest in the lexicon of communist heresies--is
well suited to the current Soviet strategy against Pekingb The labeling
of the Chinese as Trotskiyites--advocates of world "revolutionary war" in
the official terminology--serves both the prime Soviet effort to portray
the Chinese as the warhawks of world communism, and the attempt to build
the case against them as representatives of a classic communist "deviation"
deserving of exclusion from the ranks of orthodoxy. While the emergence
of the Trotskiyite theme provides but one more sign of the deepening of
the conflict since the break-off of the Sino-Soviet talks last month,
Moscow continues to refrain from the logical next step of demanding formal
expulsion of the Chinese from the communist movement and persists in the
anachronism of referring to the Chinese as "comrades."
"Old Bolsheviks" Letter: Moscow uses the 60th anniversary of the Second
Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which marked
the formation of the Bolsheviks under Lenin, to denounce the Chinese as
Trotskiyites. PRAVDA on 30 July publishes a letter signed by a group
of more than one hundred "Old Bolsheviks" who say they "kneI'Leninm They
declare that it is "sacrilege" to argue that Lenin would have condoned
the Chinese neo-Trotskiyite line on "revolutionary ware" Expressing the
hope that the Chinese will publish their letter, they accuse Peking of
resurrecting old heresies they helped Lenin suppress,-and declare that
many of the "theses" of the 14 June CCP letter to the Soviet party
"simply repeat the A-B-C" of Trotskiyism. According to the "Old Bolsheviks,"
The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party advocate a revolutionary
war, but 45 years ago, during the party's struggle for the Brest
peace, the necessity of such a war was being propagated by Trotskiy,
Approved For Release MCI:CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
Bukharin, and left communists, Why don't you, comrades of the
Chinese Communist Party, say how Lenin branded them and others
as archrevolutionary leftists?
The "Old Bolsheviks"--retired party figures whom the Soviet regime often
calls upon to give the stamp of orthodoxy to its policies--combine appeals
to the "Chinese comrades" to see the error of their ways with merciless
criticisms of the Chinese positions along the lines of the CPSU's 14
July open letter.
Pos lov Article: Along with the Old Bolsheviks' letter, PRAVDA carries
a Bolshevik anniversary article signed by Pospelov reinforcing the
Trotskiyite charge. Pospelov asserts that the Chinese have exposed their
Trotskiyite colors by complaining that the Soviet party "forgets" revolution,
Pospelov, who has previously issued warnings to the Chinese in the form of
historical accounts of how Lenin purged leftist factions from the Bolshevik
fold, warns that the Chinese leaders--"whether they want to or not"--are
colluding with the "ideologists of extreme reaction." Thus he says.,
In the past few months the Chinese comrades have slanderously
accused the CPSU of burying revolution in oblivion. There
is nothing original, however, in this slander: the Trotskiyites,
too, said this and wrote in this fashion. Today they repeat this
slander in anti-Soviet books published in West Germany by fascist
revanchist publishers.
In other propaganda, Moscow provides cases in point to document the Trotskiy-
ite charge. Among the numerous repotts'in the-Soviet media describing CCP
divisive activities in various countries are references to Peking's commerce
with Trotskiyites. Thus Moscow has publicized the Canadian party's com-
plaint about Chinese links with Trotskiyites in Canada, and most recently
a TASS report of the Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons conference pictures the
Chinese delegates along with "Trotskiyites" and "rightwingers" as among
the disrupters of the meeting.
KOMMUNIST Assails CCP Leaders' "Deviation"
The CPSU's principal journal KOMMUNIST (No. 11) develops the theme that the
Chinese party has become a full-fledged "deviationist" faction within the
world communist movement. Thus KOMMUNIST's lead editorial, according to
a 6 August TASS review, assails the "deviation of the CCP leadership" in
seeking to force a "revision" of the entire course of world communism.
While repeating in detail the charges that have now become standard in the
propaganda since the release of the CPSU open letter, the journal conveys
to Soviet readers a notion of the massive effort being undertaken by the
Chinese to produce an all-encompassing ideological and political literature
Approved For Release 2004/03/P ' ~U1A~ ii5B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
designed to counter the standard Soviet texts. According to KOMMUNIST,
the Chinese comrades are completely revising from left opportunist
and nationalistic positions the policy declarations of the world
communist movement on all main questions, namely, the nature of
the present era and its principal contradictions, the role of the
world socialist system, war and peace, the development of the re-
volutionary process and forms of transition to socialism, the
national liberation movement, international experience in socialist
construction, principles governing relations among communist parties,
the struggle against the cult of the personality, and other problems.
To date most of the voluminous Chinese tracts countering Soviet positions
have been withheld from Soviet readers--though Peking has assiduously
reprinted the Soviet materials and has dared Moscow to follow suit. Con-
ceivably, KOMMUNIST may now be preparing Soviet readers for eventual re-
lease of some of the major Chinese documents in the USSR.
The specific charges KOMMUNIST lodges against the Chinese leadership are
blunt and scathing. The "Chinese leaders" are accused of pursuing their
present line to distract the Chinese masses from the "actual causes" of
domestic setbacks which, according to KOMMUNIST, are the direct result
of the implementation of the "erroneous preconceptions" of the CCP0 The
Chinese communists are depicted as having lost confidence in their own
capacities and, in desperation, resorted to stimulation of Chinese nationalism
and racialism, And once more the Chinese are accused of a deliberate in-
ternal campaign to arouse anti-Soviet sentiments and hostility toward other
bloc countries and parties in the capitalist countries,
Moscow Defends Record on "National Liberation Movement"
While Moscow presses its offensive against the Chinese on the war and peace
issue, the current propaganda betrays Soviet defensiveness in the face of
the Chinese charges that the Soviets have forsaken the national liberation
movement, Moscow thus stresses the theme that the USSR has been and re-
mains the "bulwark" of the national liberation movement and argues in the
KOMMUNIST editorial that the CCP's theories stressing the revolutionary
primacy of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are really aimed at reducing
and denigrating the USSR's role in these areas. And a large part of the
7 August PRAVDA, for example, is devoted to a defense of the Soviet record
and an indictment of the "Chinese leaders" for taking a "monstrous" and
"unthinkable" stand on the issue, The paper's editorial and editcrial'
article elaborate the charge that the Chinese are seeking to draw the.
national liberation movement away from the Soviet bloc, and numerous items
are published to demonstrate the extent of the USSR's support--"including
open military support"--for "anticolonial" and "anti-imperialist" movements.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 IDENTI IIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
CEMA MEETING: AUTONO ISSUE GITATES SO '' B On
The top-level CEMA meetings in Moscow (24-26 July) attended by
bloc leaders and convoked in the wake of the break-off of the Sino-
Soviet talks implicitly underscored Communist China's economic,
as well as political, isolation from the Soviet orbit. However,
the communique on the meetings failed to register any impressive
gains for Moscow in its effort to accelerate the integration of the
individual economies of the CEMA countries. In addition, the
Soviet bloc propaganda connected with the occasion conveyed
the impression that the issue of national autonomy within the
CEMA framework--raised most openly by the Rumanians of late--
remains very much alive and that Peking's exploitation of the
issue against Moscow has had effect among some of the satellites.
Conference Communique Skirts Autonomy
The CEMA meetings attended by bloc party and state leaders--announced on
the same day (20 July) as the break=off of the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow--
produced a communique which hailed in general terms CEMA's progress in
coordinating and specializing bloc economies since the organization adopted
resolutions on these matters in June 1962;` However, the specific areas
of progress to which the communique refers are.only in the field of bilat-
eral economic projects, not in multilateral coordination, where most of
CEMA's unfinished business lies. The goal of CEMA's future multilateral
efforts, according to the document, is the coordination of the economic
plans of all member countries in the 1966-1970 period. But along with
the communique's rededication of CEMA to multilateralism, it also places
conspicuous stress on the "bilateral" concept and says that "bilateral
consultations" among member countries "create the best possible basis
for the multilateral coordination of plans." Beyond these statements,
the communique does not broach the question of the extent of economic
and planning autonomy retained by the individual CEMA countries,
While the Soviet bloc propaganda has also generally skirted discussion
of the autonomy issue, the Rumanians, a 23 July Yugoslav dispatch from
Bucharest asserted, approached the conference with the viewpoint that
within CEMA "decisive competence in working out details of plans" should
remain in the "corresponding executive institutions of each of these
countries." Although Bucharest's SCINTEIA editorial of 31 July spoke
of Rumania's "wholehearted approval" of the CEMA meeting's decisions,
On 30 July Tirana lodged the complaint that Albania, "a full member of
both CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, was neither informed nor invited to par-
ticipate in" the Moscow meetings of these bodies. Tirana issued a similar
statement last year regarding its absence from'the June 1962 meetings.
Approved For Release 2004/03tMp &gRMp5B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
the contents of the CEMA meeting communique do not necessarily conflict
with the Yugoslav description of the Rumanian position prior to the
meeting. The communique had spoken only of a generalized agreement on
"terms of coordinaiton of plans" made at the Moscow meeting.
However, the only recent clear reference to Rumania's independent stance
in CEMA from satellite sources appeared in a Bratislava PRAVDA editorial.
article shortly before the Moscow meeting. The article, pegged to the
anniversary of a Czech-Rumanian mutual aid pact, unmistakably aimed a
barb at Rumania when it said that "isolation...autarkic national economies...
and neglect of duties resulting from proletarian internationalism are
equally harmful for Rumania- and Czechoslovakia."
Soviet Bloc Responds to CPR's Anti-CEMA Sallies
Following the conclusion of the CEMA meeting in Moscow, Soviet and satellite
propaganda sought to counter Peking's recent charges that CEMA is a Soviet
scheme for exploiting and dominating its neighbors.
On 31 July both TRUD and PRAVDA responded to the Chinese sallies, TRUD
denied the allegation contained in the CCP's lu June letter that the
USSR uses the "international socialist division of labor"--specialization--
to impose its will on and exploit other socialist countries. PRAVDA in
its turn asserted that the application of the Chinese economic theories
to socialist countries is nothing but "an attempt to undermine the unity
of the socialist comity." Like the TROD article, PRAVDA replied to
Chinese charges in kind, claiming that it is the Chinese who are trying
to force their economic tenets on other countries. Extending its attack
on the Chinese position, PRAVDA added that China's preaching of the
doctrine of self-containment among the newly "liberated" countries only
leads to wasted labor, slowed growth rates, and "splitting the peoples in
the face of the united front of imperialist forces."
Various satellite organs also joined Moscow in striking back at Peking's
criticisms.* The 1 August TRYBUNA LUDU, for example, in an article on
the 60th anniversary of RSDWP congress, denounced the CCP's "hostile and
groundless attacks" on the CPSU and declared that
we cannot agree to the principles of relying mainly on one's
own resources in economic building. This principle is shortsighted,
., Tirana, largely ignored in the polemical exchanges between the CEMA
countries and the CPR, as usual stridently resonates Peking's charges.
Thus on the eve of the CEMA meeting, ZERI I POPULLIT charged that the
USSR under Khrushchev's leadership is "exploiting the international division
of labor...in order to impose his will on the other countries... tie their
hands and feet, violate their sovereignty-and reap the biggest possible
profits."
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
it contradicts the interests of every socialist country and
the entire socialist community; it is autarchic and separatist
in its character.
And on 6 August, Sofia's TRUD carried an article denouncing the Chinese
leaders for their concept of "relying on one's own forces." It added
that prospects for development of the world socialist system "cannot
be found along the road of mechanically piecing together different
national economies."
S i g n s of Concern over Domestic Impact of Peking's Char es: Prior to the
opening of the Moscow cow CEMA meetings, the East Germans and Czechs, in
particular, betrayed their concern over the impact of Peking's charges
on domestic opinion. Thus, shortly after Moscow's release of the CCP's
14 June letter which charged Moscow with economic exploitation through
CEMA, the GDR's JUNGE WELT bristled at a reader who, while saying that
the Chinese leaders "exaggerate" when they say the USSR takes unfair
advantage? asked if tis was not in fact the case in regard to the GDR's
abandonment of the aircraft industry. The editors fired back that the
Chinese charge was a "lie," not an "exaggeration ," and that the CDR alone
and in its own interest gave up aircraft production. And Czech Deputy
Premier. Simunek, in his press conference in Prague on 23 July, denounced
similar allegations, attributed to "Western" sources but implicit in the
Chinese attacks, that "our credit policy" of extending large sums of
credit to other bloc countries "is one of the causes of our present
difficulties."
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
THE USSR
MEETING IN SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL UNDERLINES; CHEMICAL PRIORITIES
The announcement by PRAVDA on 3 August of a two-day con-
ference "In the Supreme National Economic Council of the
USSR, of the USSR Council of Ministers," provides further
evidence of Khrushchev's drive to consolidate revisions
of the seven-year plan aimed at releasing greater investment
funds for the chemical, agricultural, and consumer goods
industries. The 1-2 August meeting, which discussed ques-
tions on drafting the national economic plan and drawing
up capital construction lists for 1964-65, follows a meet-
ing on the same questions which had been reported in PRAVDA
on 4 June, The shift in economic priorities apparently
registered by these meetings was attended by a political
mystery--the present status of D. Ustinov, the titular head
of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, In neither
of these important meetings dealing with subjects which fall
fully within the administrative purview of the supreme
economic organ was there any indication of Ustinov's participa-
tion or attendance.
Additional Investment Resources Soupt Frorn Construction
At the 1-2 August meeting, which included members of the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers, heads of the USSR planning organs, and
other high party-state leaders, Khrushchev spoke on "definite tasks for
the fundamental improvement of the planning of capital construction,"
introducing proposals aimed at speeding activation of production capaci-
ties and a more effective utilization of capital investments, Other
speakers included planning chiefs Lomako, Dymshits, Novikov, and
Rudnev; Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Rudakov, and Shelepin were reported as
participants, The meeting, which published no formal directives or
decrees,, was presumably a followup of the meeting in the Council of
Ministers reported by PRAVDA on 4 June and chaired by Khrushchev.
At the earlier meeting, a number of "guidelines" were issued, based on
Khrushchev's proposals, calling for a preferential development of the
chemical industry and specifying the fertilizer and consumer goods
industries as principal beneficiaries of the shift in emphasis. Pro-
posals were also made to delimit a large proportion of capital
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
investments to the technical reequipping and reconstruction of exist-
ing enterprises, with the aims presumably, of freeing additional in-
vestment funds for the commissioning of what Khrushchev described as
"'progressive'" enterprises,
Gostroy Chairman I. Novikov, in an article which appeared in PRAVDA the
following day, 5 Junes added specifies to Khrushchev's proposals by
stating that 1,000 construction projects had been excluded from the
1963 title lists, and by pointing out that these "freed" investment
funds would be allocated to "key and holdover construction sites,"
Ustinov Position Remains Ambiguous
Curiously, the name of D. Ustinov, the head of the Supreme Economic
Council, is again, as on 4 June, omitted from the list of speakers
or participants at the August meeting--an omission adding to a growing
list of indicators that Ustinov's position has become a political
issue in the Soviet leadership. Elsewhere in the 3 August issue of
PRAVDA$, Ustinov is again--as in a series of PRAVDA references in July--
incorrectly identified as "deputy chairman" rather than "first deputy
chairman" of the Council of Ministers--although in this case his name
is placed first, out of alphabetical order, before deputy chairmen
Lomako and Rudnev.
Indications that Ustinov's position is somehow related to a political
issue in the Soviet leadership were first noted on 30 April, more than
a month after his promotion to first deputy prethier. and chairman of
the Supreme Economic Council and two weeks after the incapacitation
of Kozlov, At that time, PRAVDA incorrectly identified Ustinov as
a deputy chairman in noting attendance at a luncheon for Castro, In
succeding weeks, however, Ustinov was accorded preferential treatment
in the press: he was reported in attendance with top . leaders at a
dinner for the Uruguayan CP delegation on 11: May, and he was reported
as accompanying Khrushchev on a tour of Moscow building sites on
14 May--events which gave rise to speculation that Ustinov would be
promoted to the Presidium at the June plenum.
In the weeks following the plenum, however, a series of press indica-
tors suggested that Ustinov's position had again become a focal point
of contention, Thus, on 20, 21, and 23 July, PRAVDA "erred" in
identifying Ustinov in protocol listings as a "deputy chairman" of the
Council of Ministers, On 23 July, SOVIET RUSSIA, in reporting the
arrival of the Mongolian CEMA delegation, incorrectly identified USSR
Sovnarkhoz chairman Dymshits as chairman of Ustinov's Supreme Economic
Councils although PRAVDA, on the same days carried the correct identi-
fication, On 24 and 27 July, PRAVDA again accorded Ustinov his
Approved For Release 2004/00 ' 65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65BOO383ROO0100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
correct title of "first deputy chairman," On 29 July, Ustinov ap-
peared without title at the end of a listing of Presidium and Sec-
retariat members, But on 3 and 5 August Ustinov was again incorrectly
identified by PRAVDA as a mere "deputy chairman,"
One possible explanation for the Ustinov mystery might be found in the
changes which have taken place in Soviet policy since his agency, the
Supreme Economic Council, was established in March of this year. The
indications were strong at that time that the new agency was being
established to preside over a "hard" orientation of Soviet economic
policy and that the arrangement was being imposed upon Khrushchev
rather than being engineered by him. That the new agency was invested
with powers which seemed to undercut the rationale of much of the ad-
ministrative reforms carried out since the November plenum, and that
Ustinov himself was, by background and association, a representative
of heavy industry interests, were only two of a number of indicators
that could be cited to support this interpretation, In brief, Ustinov
and his Supreme Economic Council could be regarded as the political
offspring--and instruments--of a particular policy orientation inimical
to Khrushchev's interests,
Against this background, the current tergiversations around the name
of Ustinov could be interpreted as mirroring the fallen fortunes of
the policy that he symbolizes, The only indications that are available
regarding Khrushchev's attitude toward Ustinov are compatible with
this interpretation, In his 24 April speech, Khrushchev referred to
Ustinov in demeaning terms, ridiculing Western rumors that Ustinov's
promotion signified a major reallocation of resources in favor of
defense, Cautioning Ustinov's successor, Smirnov, Khrushchev warned;
"We shall be able to shake him just as hard as we used to shake Comrade
Ustinov when he was responsible for the development of the defense
industry,"
There are some loose ends in this interpretation. One is the fact
that the strongest indications of Ustinov's political favor came in
May when Khrushchev's authority was well on the mend. The other is
that it does not account for the curious announcement which appeared
in the first Sunday edition of IZVESTIYA on 20 April, under the caption
"In the Supreme National Economic Council of the USSR," that an addi-
tional 1 billion rubles had been allocated to consumer goods, But
there are indications that this item was itself a reflection of politi-
cal infighting: it was not carried in the regular second edition of
IZVESTIYA on that day, and although the report ostensibly dealt with a
decision of the Supreme Economic Council, another organization and
another man, the USSR Sovnarkhoz and its head, Dymshits, were much more
prominently displayed in the article.
Approved For Release 20& M N ALRDP65BOO383ROOO1OO28OO2O-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
COMMUNIST CHINA
PEOPLE'S DAILY CRACKS DOWN ON HISTORIAN'S VIEWS OF CONFUCIUS
A long article in PEOPLE'S DAILY of 18 June strikes out at an
obscure history professor's views on Confucius in a manner which
seems to portend the inauguration of a tougher line by the party
toward the seemingly harmless pursuits of its intellectuals, For
quite some time classical scholars--with the party's encouragement--
have "bloomed and contended" over such issues as the "class stand"
of Confucius, the progressive or reactionary character of his
teachings, and so forth. Now, however, PEOPLE'S DAILY clearly
indicates that professor Liu Chieh overstepped the bounds by stub-
bornly denying the relevance of Marx and the concept of class
struggle to the study of China's classical history.
History, the article warns, plays strange tricks on people who
lose themselves in ancient papers; it leads them from one closet
to another. In espousing the "nonclass" character of Confucius,
the historian has put himself in the same closet with all the
modern revisionists who preach class harmony and peaceful co-
existence$ and who betray communism. The paper leaves little
doubt that it regards Liu Chieh as a witting agent of modern
revisionism.
Liberal Line on Study of Confucius Tightens
W WYe+q P
The first hint that the hard line on class struggle--introduced by the
party plenum last September--augured ill for the relatively more liberal
line which had encouraged diverse interpretations on the historical role
of Confucius, appeared in the journal NEW CONSTRUCTION in January., The
journal's editorial department complained that "unhealthy tendencies"
among some scholars caused them to praise Confucius, and worse still,
to give him credit for scientific epistemology, for the unity of theory
and practice, and for dialectical materialism--some 2,300 years before
Marx. The editors warned that this method of interpreting the CPR's
historical legacy would cause people to look backward to "feudal and
bourgeois ideologies," and to revere the ancients blindly. Another un-
healthy tendency, said the editors, was to ascribe a supraclass character
to the teachings of Confucius, making it a philosophy suited to all classes
indiscriminately. While declaring all these tendencies to be wrong, the
journal was quick to add that its criticism was open to discussion and
those with contrary views were entitled to stick by them, The journal
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
said that its views were in no way meant to hinder the "contention of
100 schools of thought"; in academic research, it said, not even scholars
of Marxism can declare their views to be absolutely right and suppress the
views of others.
But the more authoritative and far more caustic personal attack on Liu
Chieh in PEOPLE'S DAILY in June makes no pretense of preserving a facade
of academic freedom, Purporting to review a recent essay by Liu--"How
History Should Be Studied in Order to Make it Serve Current Politics"--
PEOPLE'S DAILY critic Chang Yu-lou actually calls all of Liu's recent
work to account, and sarcastically observes that it "bears distinctive
colors" and "deserves attention from the public,"
What provokes Chang the most is what he describes as the fearless obstinacy
and cunning in Liu's work, The critic notes that Liu exultantly "refutes"
Marxism, that his theory is in "unequivocal opposition" to the use of
class struggle for historical research, and that Liu says that to ascribe
class character to all facets of history is a method which is dogmatic,
mechanical, and "too anemic" for good historiography. Chang also charges
that Liu poses as a self-styled expert who says that Marxism is applicable
to foreign history but not to Chinese history,, to economic history but
not to ideological history, to modern history but not to ancient history,
Chang seeks to refute the thesis that Confucian laws of benevolence and
propriety are humanist, abstract concepts of man's nature common to all
classes at all times, by adducing the standard Marxist refrain that
there is no love, no truth, and no justice that transcends class interest.,
all such concepts are "merely the terse political slogans inscribed on the
banners of every class for use in the class struggle," To the historian's
query--if Confucius was but a tool of the ruling classes, why was he
persecuted by them and why did he counsel them to promote the interests
of the whole people?--Chang retorts that in all societies based on private
ownership there is wrangling among the rulers themselves, and that
Confucius' so-called regard for the people was only the Machiavellian
ruse known to all traditional ruling classes--to feign benevolence in
order to preserve their rule,
Historian's Theory on Confucius Linked to Modern Revisionism
Chang charges that Liu is deliberately vague as to the application of his
theories on classical history to modern politics. According to Chang,
Liu implies that the notion of class struggle is as irrelevant to the
present era as it is to history, If, for example, Liu says a "proper"
study of ancient history can shed a great deal of light on present politics--
and his proper study of the past excludes class struggle--, can we not see,
asks Chang rhetorically, "what sort of current politics Mr, Liu Chieh wants
to serve in his historical research?"
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
In praising Confucius, Liu appears to advocate the universal application
of the Confucian version of the golden rule: "Do not do unto others what
you would not have them do unto you." Such ideas have no application to
the modern period, Chang avers; in dealing with our enemy
we think that we should do to him what we do not wish to be done to
ourselves, that is, we should overthrow him, destroy him, and give
him a dose of his own medicine,
Worse still, according to Chang, Liu has craftily sought to propagate the
modern revisionist line under the pretext of studying the historical legacy
of Confucius. In the broader context of what the consequences will be
for those who abandon the concept of class struggle, Chang makes the un-
usual observation that "if struggle id eliminated and completely suppressed,
then some sort of slave system will be permanently preserved, no advance,
will be made in history, and mankind will never be liberated." Past
Chinese attacks on what they have called the Soviet abandonment of the
principle of class struggle have invoked the specter of "capitalist
restoration," but never permanent slavery--an image which seems wholly
inconsistent with every communist assumption about the dynamics of
history.
The rationale for Peking's tougher line on the intellectuals is not hard
to find. A characterization of Marxist ideology as "foreign" at a time
when Peking is locked in ideological struggle with the Soviet Union could
give rise:to confusion in the academic community. The historian's appeal
to the universal, humanist elements in traditional Confucianism could
encourage sentiments incompatible with the militant mood which the regime
evidently wishes to encourage. Stubborn individualists like Liu Chieh
often carry more influence among the generally cowed intellectuals in Com-
munist China than their positions in the political substratum would seem
to warrant. Regime propaganda often testifies to this phenomenons The
relentless hounding of the venerable rector of Peking University, Ma Yin-
chu, for his forthright opposition to the economic rationale of the leap
forward, was one case in point. The current attack on Liu Chieh is
probably calculated to cast a chill of conformity over all the wayward
Confucians in the academic community.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
THE FAR EAST SATELLITES
RECIPE REACTS SHARPLY TO NOVEL'S "SOUR CRITICISM"
Hanoi has instituted a bitter counterattack against North Vietnamese
writers who have strayed from the party line in literature, pegging the
assault to a recently published novel by Ha Minh Tuan, "Her First Job."
The novel tells the story of Miss Sen. a schoolgirl, who apparently
bolts from a "forced and commercial" wedding and runs away to Hanoi.
There she finds work at a factory construction site in order to live
"a more significant life," and at the novel's end she becomes a good
worker, even a production-line militant. The story line, NHAN DAN
notes, is acceptable: It could "instill in a reader even more con-
fidence in our regime and socialist construction." But what is
objectionable is the satirical, and sometimes bitter, criticism of
life in the DRV, its revolutionary achievements, various government
organs, and the party itself.
According to a letter to the editor of NHAN DAN on 13 July, the novel
is filled with confused., negative, disgraceful, and frightening scenes.
It not only shows a lack of sincerity and respect for the great successes
of the revolution, the letter says, but it fails to eulogize the regime
or contribute to the safeguarding of the regime. Quite the contrary, it
continues: the novel attacks each step of the revolution, distorts the
truth, besmirches the regime, and arouses the remaining backward elements
to resentment against the regime.
The novel apparently advances in a graphic manner "sour criticisms of
the many daily shortages, worries, and grudges" occasioned by life in
Hanoi. The excesses of the sacrosanct revolutionary achievement of land
reform are blasted by the author by means of the character Hieno who
had been a good soldier in the "war of resistance" against the French,
but whose father was unjustly judged in the subsequent land reform and
hanged himself. Hien loses his "revolutionary character" and falls
into "bad thoughts and actions," forever plagued by the memory of seeing
his father "with his tongue hanging out."
Various government organs are also criticized. NHAN DAN on 29 June charges
that the novel gives rise to "a whole heap of antipathy and prejudice"
against leading cadres, a number of important institutions--such as in-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
dustrial branches, the state trade-organ, the press, and propaganda organs--
and important organs of "our people's democratic dictatorship," 'including
the security service.
Even the heinous crime of criticizing party leadership is ascribed to the
novelist. Although his alleged target is "bureaucracy," notes the letter
published in NHAN DAN, the author "attacked the party leadership under
the form of an 'antibureaucratic struggle."' NHAN DAN comments that,
even when convenient opportunity was lacking, the author still voiced
his "deep-rooted antipathy against the leadership,"
Hanoi is clearly apprehensive of the effect that the book may have, and
plainly intends to totally suppress the novel, NHAN DAN asks: !'After
reading 'Her First Job,' what does a reader retain in his mind as the
most striking impression?" And it answers:
Embarking on the road of life consists purely of catastrophes
and sophisticated tragedies in which one's personal happiness
is broken. There is still room for the free development of
dishonesty and debauchery in our society--and in places where
order and security should be insured, particularly in cities
and factories. The living standard of the people. and workers is
still poor and miserable; here and there the masses sporadically
voice grudges and sarcasm. Leadership everywhere is bureaucratic;
the leaders have no concern for the life of the people--all they
know is empty politics, one-way propaganda, and persuasion.
There has not been a literary protest of such magnitude in the DRV since
the "Nhan Van-Ghai Pham" incident in l9580's Although Ha Minh Tuan is the
only writer now being criticized, NHAN DAN indicates that this intellectual
questioning may not constitute an isolated case. Labeling his whole ap-
proach as "bourgeois individualism," the paper says that the author
has expressed this current of thought in his work. This
current, under circumstances easier for it to soar than before,
has become vehement and brazen and has conspicuously appeared in
the resentful and angry view and attitude of the author in his
novel.
Another manifestation of, this "current" may be the fact that the novel was
even allowed to be published. A writer in NHAN DAN asks: "How could such
a bad, hostile, and seriously harmful book slip through the net and reach
the hands of readers?" NHAN DAN asks if the officials of the Van Hoc
Publishing House have "now seen all their responsibilities toward the
Hanoi's suppression. of literary dissenters at that time is discussed
in the.BLOC SURVEYS of 17 July 1958 and 28 January 1960.
Approved For Release 2004/03/t1Nf46LRBf 5B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
CONFIDENTIAL BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963
party, people, and art." Six days later, the journal VAN NGHE publishes
the "self-criticism" of "the former Van Hoc Publishing House editorial
board." Upon rereading the book, the editorial board states, it discovered
serious shortcomings'in the board's past work: "Opinions voiced by readers
and the press have pointed out to us our weakness. This is a precious
experience for us, from which we can learn so as to improve our editorial
work still further,"
The campaign against the book rages in the DRV press only; it has not
been reflected in any VNA transmissions or-radio :broadcasts from Hanoi.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1
C-O-N-F- I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280020-1