MCNAMARA'S WAR IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200140056-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: April 9, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 7197
the course of this statement, Wilson law be authorized in some other county of of proceeding, whether by jury trial or
made a very cogent comment concerning the same State, as near as may be to the seat summary proceeding, as discussed in
the advantages of trial by jury: of the offence. United States v. Hudson v. Goodwin (7
In cases of crimes committed not within Cranch. 32 (1812)), and Anderson v.
I think I am not now to learn the advan- any county, the trial may by law be In such
tages of a trial by jury. It has excellences county as the laws shall have prescribed. Dunn (6 Wheat. 204 (1821)), is not in-
that entitle it to a superiority over any other In suits at common law, between man and volved.
mode, in cases to which it is applicable. man, the trial by jury, as one of the best se- The question of the power of State
Where jurors can be acquainted with the curities to the rights of the people, ought to courts to punish contempt summarily
characters of the parties and the witnesses- remain inviolate. 1 Annals 435. without violating the 14th amendment
where the whole cause can be brought within as pin Fisher v. Pace (336 U.S.
their knowledge and their view-I know no After some debate, the House referred Dmode of investigation equal to that by a Madison's proposed amendments to the 155 presented ent4 )P), , and d County Eilenbecker (134 U.S. v v. . District
st 31
jury; they hear everything that is alleged; Committee of the Whole. Subsequent Court of
they not only hear the words, but they see action by the House and Senate can be (1890) ), is not involved.
and mark the features of the countenance; traced in the journals of the two bodies: The question of the power of a Federal
they can judge of weight due to such testi- Volume 1, Annals pages 660, 665, 672, court to punish summarily for a con-
mony; and moreover, it is a cheap and ex- 755-60, 779, 71, 74, 77, 903, 905, 913, 88. tempt committed in open court and in
peditious manner of distributing justice. the presence of the judge, as in Ex parte
There
There is another advantage annexed to the The final text of the amendment pro- Terry (128 U.S. 289 (1888) ), is not in-
trial by jury; the jurors may indeed return posed to the States, and which became volved.
a mistaken or ill-founded verdict, but their the sixth amendment, was as follows:
errors cannot be systematical. Id. at 516. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused The question of the right of appeal in
Whatever may be said against juries, shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public the Federal judiciary from a contempt
James Wilson says, "Their errors can- trial, by an impartial jury of the State and conviction, as presented in Bessette v.
not be systematical." Whenever the district wherein the crime shall have been W. B. Conkey Co. (194 U.S. 324 (1904) ),
committed, which district shall have been is not involved.
general government can be a party previously ascertained by law, and to be in- The question of the inherent power of
against a citizen, there is the need for formed of the nature and cause of the ac- a court established by the Constitution
the intervention of some agency whose cusation; to be confronted with the wit- to punish for contempt is not involved.
"errors cannot be systematical." nesses against him; to have compulsory by many
Edmund Randolph spoke on the sub- process for obtaining witnesses of his favor, This the was the State court question n presented onby many
ject in the following manner to the rati- and to have the assistance of counsel for his of , sometimes
fying convention in Virginia: defense. cited as supporting legislation of the
type embodied in the bill, H.R. 7152.
The trial by jury in criminal cases is se- The debates on these amendments Watson v. Williams (36 Miss. 331
cured-in civil cases it is not so expressly proposed to the States in 1789 do not (1858)) ; Carter's case (96 Va. 791, 32 S.E.
secured, as I could wish it; but it does not contain so much as a word suggesting 780 (1899)) ; Bradley v. State (111 Ga.
follow, that Congress has the power of taking that contempts not committed in the 168, 36 S.E. 630 (1900) ) ; Ex parte Mc-
away this privilege which is secured by the presence of a Federal court could be
constitution of each State, and not given Cown (139 95, 51 S.E. (1905)).
away by this Constitution-I have no fear prosecuted other than by a jury trial. The Supreme eme Court in Ex Forte Robin-
on this subject-Congress must regulate it couaT DECISIONS son (19 Wall. 505 (1873)), recognized
so as to suit every State. I will risk my Although the Supreme Court of the the power of Congress to regulate the
property on the certainty, that they will in- United States has often spoken in dicta exercise of contempt powers by the Fed-
stitute the trial by jury in such manner as about the defendant having no right to eral courts, with the possible exception
shall accommodate the conveniences of the
inhabitants in every State; the difficulty of trial by jury in contempt proceedings, it of the Supreme Court, including con-
ascertaining this accommodation, was the appears that the Court has never ac- tempts in causes or hearings before the
principal cause of its not being provided for. tually sanctioned a denial of trial by jury courts. The Court said:
Volume 3, Farrand page 309. to a defendant subject to criminal sane- The power to punish for contempts is in-
THE FIRST CONGRESS tions in a proceeding brought by the herent in all courts; its existence is essential
One of the most authoritative sources United States as an interested party, rep- to the preservation of order in judicial pro-
of information on the meaning of the resenting the public-until the decision ceedings, and to the enforcement of the
of last week in the case from Mississippi, judgments, orders, and writs of the courts,
Constitution is to be found in the pro- involving, among others, Governor Bar- and consequently to the due administra-
ceedings of the First Congress, which tion of justice.
met in 1789, since so many of the Mem- nett, who had demanded a jury trial but The moment the courts of the United
bers of this body had also served as del- had been denied that right. States were called into existence and in-
egates to the Constitutional Convention A strong minority on the Court would vested with jurisdiction over any subject,
of 1787. grant the defendant a right to trial by they became possessed of this power. But
This First Congress proposed to the jury in all proceedings for criminal con- the power has been limited and defined by
States the amendments which have tempt. the act of Congress of March 2, 1831. The
come to be known as the Bill of Rights. The word "contempt" covers a multi- act, in terms applies to all courts; whether
On June 8, 1789, Mr. Madison, of Vir- tude of ideas. Many of the decisions it can be held to limit the authority of the
Supreme Court, which derives its existence
ginia, laid before the House of Repre- dealing with the subject involve points and powers from the Constitution, may per-
sentatives his proposals for amendments not presented by the pending bill, H.R. haps be a matter of doubt. But that it
to the Constitution. Among these was 7152. The question is not whether a vio- applies to the circuit and district courts
the following: lation of an injunction obtained by the there can be no question. These courts
Seventhly. That in article 3d, section 2, Attorney General should be called civil were created by act of Congress.
the third clause be struck out, and in its or criminal contempt, direct, or indirect Their powers and duties depend upon the
place be inserted the clauses following, to or constructive contempt, or by any act calling them Into existence, or subse-
with: other particular labet The narrow and quent acts extending or limiting their juris-
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of explicit question is whether Congress has diction. The act of 1831 is, therefore, to
impeachements, and cases arising in the land the power under the Constitution to them the law specifying the cases in which
or naval forces, or the militia when on actual summary punishment for contempts may
service, in time of war or public danger) authorize the Attorney General to bring be inflicted. It limits the power of these
shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders proceedings in the Federal courts in the courts in this respect to three classes of
of the vicinage, with the requisites of unani- name of the United States, in which pro- cases: First, where there has been misbe-
mity for conviction, of the right of chal- ceedings the defendants may be fined havior of a person in the presence of the
lenge, and other accustomed requisites; and and imprisoned, without according to courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the
in all crimes punishable with loss of life or the defendants a right to trial by jury, administration of justice; second, where
member, presentment, or indictment by a for acts committed outside the actual or there has been misbehavior of any officers
grand jury shall be an essential preliminary, constructive presence of the Federal of the courts in his official transactions;
provided that in cases of crimes committed and, third, where there has been disobe-
within any county which may be in posses- courts. dience or resistance by any officer, party,
sion of an enemy, or in which a general in- The question of the inherent power of juror, witness, or other person, to any law-
surrection may prevail, the trial may by a court to punish contempt by some type ful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or com-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE April 9
mand of the courts, As thus seen the power
of these courts in the punishment of con-
tempts can only be exercised to insure order
and decorum in their presence, to secure
faithfulness on the part of their officers
in their official transactions, and to enforce
obedience to their lawful orders, judgments,
and processes.
The law happily prescribes the punish-
ment which the court can impose for con-
tempts. The 17th section of the Judiciary
Act of 1787 declares that the court shall
have power to punish contempts of their
authority in any cause or hearing before
them, by fine or imprisonment, at their dis-
cretion. The enactment is a limitation upon
the manner In which the power shall be
exercised, and must be held to be a nega-
tion of all other modes of punishment. The
judgment of the court disbarring the pe-
titioner, treated as a punishment for a
contempt, was, therefore, unauthorized and
void. (Id. at 510-12.)
The fact that the United States, as a
disinterested party, may constitutionally
exercise particular powers In order to
secure justice in litigation between pri-
vate parties, does not provide a prece-
dent for granting the United States, as
an interested party, precisely t e same
powers.
McNAMARA'S WAR IN VIETNAM
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Virginia yield, with the
understanding that in doing so he will
not lose his right to the floor, with the
further understanding that this Inter-
ruption will not count as a second speech
when he resumes?
Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to yield to the
Senator from Oregon, under those con-
ditions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
NELSON in the chair). Is there objec-
tion? The Chair hears none, and it is so
ordered.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, last night
on a national television network, Mr.
Walter Lippmann explored some of the
changes that have overtaken the world
and America's position in It since the
end of World War II.
With respect to our present involve-
ment in South Vietnam, Mr. Lippmann
pointed out that it has long been a prin-
ciple of American policy not to become
involved in a land war on the continent
of Asia.
I agree with Mr. Lippmann that this is
a sound guide for us to follow; but I
would also say it is a guide we should
be following now with respect to South
Vietnam.
To say that because this sound prin-
ciple has been ignored to the extent that
we have put 15,000 troops in South Viet-
nam does not mean we should maintain
our position there no matter what the
cost. Mr. Lippmann declares that for
us to change our policy now in South
Vietnam would mean a great loss of pres-
tige for this country. But, the longer we
must fight, and the more troops we must
put in just to stay in the same place, the
more prestige we are bound to lose.
France's prestige was never lower than
while she was fighting to maintain her-
self in Indochina and Algeria. Since she
has extricated herself from those impos-
sible endeavors, her prestige has gone
steadily upward.
More important, as the costly status
quo continues in South Vietnam, the
American people will lose confidence in
their Government. I am far more con-
cerned about the prestige of the U.S.
Government with Its own people than I
am about its standing in Asia.
Whatever prestige the United States
stands to lose abroad by terminating its
unilateral intervention in South Viet-
nam, the American people are not going
to support an indefinite and expanding
intervention there.
I invite the attention of the Senate
to the statement reported in today's New
York Times that the Secretary General
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion denies there is any military aggres-
sion In South Vietnam. I have been
pointing that out for weeks In speeches
on the floor of the Senate in opposition
to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I have
stated over and over again that this is
a civil war. I have pointed out the un-
deniable fact to the Secretary of State
and to the Secretary of Defense that not
one single witness for the administra-
tion on the record, and not one single
spokesman for the administration oil'
the record, ever denied that this is a
South Vietnamese conflict with South
Vietnamese supporting the government
and with South Vietnamese supporting
what has become known as the Vietcong.
There has never been any evidence sub-
mitted that there are any foreign
soldiers in South Vietnam engaged in
this civil war, except U.S. soldiers-no
North Vietnamese soldiers, no Red Chi-
nese soldiers, and no Russian soldiers.
This is a South Vietnamese operation.
All that the administration witnesses
have been able to disclose is that equip-
ment used by the Vietcongs is, for the
most part-except for American equip-
ment which they have captured from
South Vietnam-either Red Chinese
equipment or equipment that is manu-
factured in North Vietnam, or Russian
equipment. We have furnished vast
quantities of equipment to South Viet-
nam. The situation in that re*ard is
almost as bad as when Chiang Kai-shek
was in China and the Communists cap-
tured American equipment from him or,
in a very interesting oriental operation,
in some way, or some how, got It into
their possession before it was even un-
crated.
Whose equipment are the South Viet-
namese using? It is 100-percent Ameri-
can equipment. We had better not start
throwing stones on that issue. One of
the replies that the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense make in
justifying McNamara's war In South
Vietnam is to tell us that the South Viet-
nam Government invited us In. Sena-
tors know what we think about the ex-
cuse of Russia, when it tries to ration-
alize its presence in East Germany. It
is that the East Germans invited the
Russians in there.
Puppets have a way of doing that.
Thatis one of the purposes of creating
a puppet government. South Vietnam
is a puppet government of the United
States. The United States Is more re-
sponsible for the creation of the so-called
South Vietnam Government than any
other factor.
I continue to ask the question: What
are we doing there? Why are we there?
By what international law or right are
we there? I am still waiting for the
State Department to tell me, or for the
Defense Department to tell me. In my
judgment, the Defense Department has
taken over State Department policy in
South Vietnam. I do not believe the
Defense Department should determine
American policy in Asia. I think it is
wrong. It ought to be changed.
It is very interesting that we now hear
the Secretary General of SEATO deny
that there is any military action in South
Vietnam. The SEATO Secretary Gen-
eral is reported to have said In Manila,
on Monday, that the struggle in South
Vietnam is only an internal quarrel be-
tween two factions. Those who have
been criticizing American foreign policy
in South Vietnam have said-just that.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I did not under-
stand who made that statement.
Mr. MORSE. The Secretary General
of SEATO. The Secretary General of
SEATO is from Thailand. Thailand bor-
ders on South Vietnam. It is a next-door
neighbor. There is not one Thai soldier
in South Vietnam. There is not one Thai
dollar in there, either. One would think
that if the civil war in South Vietnam
were of such importance, as U.S. officials
try to make out-and they are fooling
the American people about it-Thailand
would be concerned.
One would think that Australia would
be concerned, as would New Zealand,
Pakistan, and the Philippines. They are
all in that area. They are doing nothing
about it. For them the policy is hands-
off. Let me repeat-and it is necessary
to repeat this over and over again, until
finally the American people will begin to
understand the facts-that we are In
there because of the SEATO treaty.
That is the reed on which we are lean-
ing. What part of the SEATO treaty
are we leaning on? It is on the protocol
agreement, attached to the SEATO
treaty. The signatories to SEATO-
New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, Thai-
land, the Philippines, Great Britain,
France, and the United States-state in
the protocol agreement that this is an
area of mutual concern. South Viet-
nam, however, is not a signatory to
SEATO. It is not a member of SEATO.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Is any member of
SEATO participating in this conflict in
any way whatever, financially or mili-
tarily?
Mr. MORSE. None but the United
States. This is a U.S. unilateral inter-
vention In a civil war in southeast Asia.
Our administration Is trying to convince
the American people that if we do not
stay in there, and kill more American
boys, communism will take over. That
is so much "hogwash."
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 1964
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield further?
Mr. MORSE. I Yield.
Mr. MCCLELLAN Is not the,Senator
from Oregon somewhat encouraged by
the recent reports of the Secretary of
Defense on the progress we are making
and what we hope to do in the future?
Mr. M_ ORSE. I was never so - de-
pressed. I was'never so depressed as I
was the other day, when I listened to the
Secretary of Defense. I appreciate his
inviting `me to the National Security
Council meeting. I do not know why I
was invited. I listened to the report by
the Secretary of Defense. As I listened
I kept saying to myself, "If all these
things are true, 'what in the world are we
doing in there?"
He made the greatest, statement in
support of our getting out of 'South Viet-
nam, and ended by urging that we go
into a greater extent. That is the kind
of mental gymnastics that I do not un-
derstand. Dut that is our position.
Senators , have heard , me say before
that I do not criticize a .policy unless I
am willing to offer what I believe to be
a substitute. Ihave offered the substi-
tute over and over again. r cannot find
any takers for it in the administration,
but I cannot get any answers,' either. 'I
offer it again this evening on the floor of
the Senate. The SEATO Minister`s are
meeting in Manila. I am waiting, won-
dering whether they will pass a resolu-
tion saying, "We are coming. We are
coming in with you. We will put in our
battalions."
I do not believe that the battalion ap-
preach is the way to settle thecontro-
ve y. But if, we are to take the military
approach-and I do not believe we
should-why do not our allies offer to
do some of, the dying?
. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN A battalion from
any one of those countries would be a to-
ken contribution, would it not?
Mr. MORSE. Even one soldier would
be a token contribution. I shall come in
a moment to a discussion of whether the
military approach is the approach to
make. However, I point out that if we
are to make the military approach-and
that is the approach we are making-the
SEATO nations in southeast Asia are
not sufficiently interested in dying. If
they are not interested 'in doing any of
the dying, the situation is not of the se-
rious import on the basis of which the
Secretary of Defense is trying, to sell it to
the American people, as his rationaliza-
tion of McNamara's war.
But my alternative is that the SEATO
countries, the signatories to the SEATO
treaty who entered into the protocol
agreement at Manila-now assembled
there-offer to have the SEATQorgani-
zation take over the trouble'
rouble spot in
South Vietnam. That would give De
Gaulle an opportunity, to put up or shut
_up. T
Do not forget the play that De Gaulle
made a few short weeks ago. Weydid not
have any blueprint : But with one dip-
lomatic brush stroke, he put the United
States in a very'diflicult spot. Senators
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
will remember that he announced that
he thought South Vietnam ought 'to be
neutralized. I do not know what he
means. Who does? I want to find out.
I should like to know what be Gaulle's
program is in South Vietnam. France's
signattnre is on that treaty. That is why
I' offer this as the first alternative: "All
right, SEATO. Come on in. Say that
SEATO is going to carry out whatever
obligations it has under the protocol
agreement and offer to take over the ad-
ministration and handling of the opera-
tion in South Vietnam."
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. There is no con-
tention on the part of any of the SEATO
countries that South Vietnam is an ag-
gressor, is there?
Mr. MORSE. Oh, no. There is no ag-
gression in Vietnam. It is only a family
fight-fathers on one side, sons on an-
other; brothers on one side, brothers on
another; uncles on one side, nephews on
another.
. Mr. McCLELLAN. There is no claim
that there is any danger to the area by
reason 'of the nature of the activities or
plans of aggression in South Vietnam?
Mr. MORSE. I could not say that
there is ,no claim.
That is a part of this fabulous-
Mr. McCLELLAN. I am talking about
a-claim by the SEATO countries.
Mr. MORSE. Their silence is golden.
They are waiting for our gold, however.
They are not engaged in any discussion.
They do not want to talk about this af-
fair. But they want more aid.
Mr. McCLELLAN. SEATO countries?
Mr. MORSE. SEATO countries-Pak-
istan, Thailand, the Philippines. They
want our money. They want our gold.
But they are maintaining a golden si-
lence with respect to this affair. The
talk by the Secretary General is the first
mention of it in some time except De
Gaulle's talk a few weeks ago when he
talked about neutralization. I want to
know what he means by "neutraliza-
tion."
The Senator from Arkansas knows
that one cannot understand my position
about foreign policy unless he under-
stands my deep conviction that in a
situation such as this we ought to try
to exhaust all the possibilities of reach-
ing accord and a settlement without kill-
ing, through the application of what we
claim too be our basic foreign policy in
the trouble spots of the world; namely,
the substitution of the rule of law for
the jungle law of force.
That is what I am pleading for. Of
course, I was trained in that concept by
a great Republican-I think one of the
greatest we have had in my 20 years in
the Senate. He was my leader on for-
eign policy. Ile became one of the great
internationalists in the Senate, after be-
ing one of the leading isolationists for
many years. I speak of the late Arthur
Vandenberg, of Michigan.
The other day I told the story about
his changing from isolationism to inter-
nationalism when he became convinced
that the atomic bomb would become a
reality. He used to tell us that he real-
7199
ized there was no longer any place for
an isolationist in the Senate. He left us
this unanswerable ideal criticism. It is
an ideal criticism because it is not sup-
posed to be practical. And'because it is
an ideal, it is a great practicality. It
cannot be a practicality except in terms
of an ideal put to work.
I want to apply it to South Vietnam.
What a great opportunity we have to
keep faith with all our prating. We
ought to try, at least, to settle interna-
tional disputes.
Senator Vandenberg used to say there
would be no hope for permanent peace
in the world until all the nations of the
world were willing to establish a system
of international justice through law, to
the procedures of which they were will-
ing to submit each and every issue that
threatened the peace of the world for
final and binding decision to be enforced
by some international organization such
as the United Nations.
I do not believe we can leave a heritage
of freedom to our grandchildren unless
we do a better job of trying to implement
that great ideal. There is no better time
to start than now. I receive much abuse
and castigation because I favor making
greater use of the international law pro-
cedures of the United Nations than the
United States has been willing to advo-
cate. I do not know whether those pro-
cedures will work or not; but we shall
never know until we try. Trying does
not mean that we will weaken our se-
curity.
I have voted in the Senate, and shall
continue to vote in the Senate, for huge
appropriations to keep my country
strong, so that Russia and Red China
will understand that they have every-
thing to lose and nothing to gain by
resorting to aggression against the
United States. But I also know that if
that should become our foreign policy,
we should be sunk. If that should be-
come the basic foreign policy of the
United States, we should not have a
chance of survial, in terms of trying, in
the years not too far distant. If that
should become our foreign policy, we
should be headed straight to war. We
would not survive a nuclear war; nor
would our potential enemies. But that
is not much consolation to the advocates
of freedom.
So I favor remaining strong, so that no
nation will dare to attack us. But I am
against aggression on the part of the
United States, too. I am against killing
on the part of the United States in South
Vietnam or anywhere else in the world.
Our country must be able to demonstrate
for the record of history that we can al-
ways be counted upon to resort to the
peaceful procedures of international law
for the settlement of international dis-
putes.
So I continue to repeat what I have
said many times. How many times? I
do not know-a dozen or more times in
the Senate in. recent weeks. , shall re-
peat again that we ought to say to the
SEATO nations: "Come in, sit down in
conference, and try to arrive at a pro-
gram for the handling of the trouble spot
in the world known as South Vietnam."
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If they do not want to cooperate; if De
Gaulle, for example, does not want to
put up or shut up; if Thailand, as I judge
from the statement of the Secretary Gen-
eral of SEATO, which I have quoted, is
not interested; if Pakistan is interested
only in getting more military aid and
economic aid to the tune of hundreds of
millions more dollars; and if the Philip-
pines want to take the same position; let
us wash our hands of South Vietnam.
Let us move out, and save the lives of
American boys.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Oregon yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. What does the
Senator from Oregon think would be the
consequences If we withdrew our troops
from South Vietnam?
Mr. MORSE. The Vietnamese would
settle their differences. Those peopleare
not militant. They do not want to fight.
The people of southeast Asia are the
most peaceable, lovable, happy-go-lucky,
cheerful, live-by-the-day people in the
world. But, of course, when we are giv-
ing them material benefits they never
before dreamed of, what do we expect?
Mr. President, consider the amounts of
money we have been pouring into South
Vietnam, and also the amounts we have
provided for the pay their soldiers have
been receiving. It is sad to have any of
them die; but is it not remarkable how
long the fighting there has continued,
with a relatively small number of casual-
ties?
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Oregon yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Do I correctly un-
derstand the Senators' statement to
mean that the presence of our person-
nel over there is sustaining and prolong-
ing the conflict?
Mr, MORSE. I so charge; and history
will so record-to the shocking disgrace
of the United States of America.
Mr, President, do Senators think I
like to say that about a program of my
country? Certainly I do not like to say
it. But I have a responsibility as a
Member of the U.S. Senate, and includ-
ing my responsibility as a member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, to express my honest views on the
basis of the facts, as I see them; and
I believe that our country could not sus-
tain its record in South Vietnam before
any impartial, internatl"Qnal jury estab-
lished to evaluate if. Furthermore,
there will be such an impartial, interna-
tional jury after all of us have left the
scene. That jury will be composed of
the historians who will write the record
of the United States In South Vietnam;
and it will be a record against the United
States, not for our country.
Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. President, will
the Senator from Oregon yield further?
Mr. MO E. I yield.
Mr. Mc LAN. I wish the Senator
from Oregon to understand that I am
not asking these questions for the pur-
pose of being frivolous or in any sense
to challenge the position of the Senator
from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. I understand.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Heretofore, I have
heard him speak on the floor of the Sen-
ate on this subject. He serves on the
Foreign Relations Committee; and
therefore there is available to him, I am
sure, Information not available to me.
So I am very much interested in his
point of'view and his opinions and rec-
ommendations.
In my opinion, all of us believe some
change is needed in the situation in
South Vietnam-whether to remove our
personnel from South Vietnam or to
really wage a war there and get it over
with, I do not know. But so far as I
can determine, the situation there does
not give much satisfaction either to
those who want our personnel to leave
South Vietnam or to those who want
our country to wage and win a war there.
Instead, we are merely doing enough to
keep the situation in the stage of con-
flict. but we are not willing to devote
enough to it to be able to win it; neither
do we seem to be willing to leave it. I
am not criticizing the administration,
but I should like to have a better under-
standing of that situation.
Mr; MORSE. I am trying to ascer-
tain any reason the administration could
give which would rebut the information
I am placing in the Recoao.
We called representatives of the ad-
ministration before our committee.
Those gentlemen did not have any in-
formation which would answer the
points which I and the Senator from
Alaska [Mr. GauZNINGI and other Sena-
tors have been making on the floor of
the Senate.
Before I conclude, I shall read some
letters from American military person-
nel In South Vietnam. I wish to read
them for the benefit of the Secretary of
Defense, Mr. McNamara; I want him to
have availableall the information I can
make available to him in regard to this
situation.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Oregon yield for an-
other question?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. A few days ago, I
heard the Senator from Oregon-or per-
haps it was the Senator from Alaska-
state on the floor the amount of money
the presence of our personnel In South
Vietnam is costing, daily. What is the
daily cost?
Mr. MORSE. The daily cost is $1,500,-
000; and if McNamara is allowed to pay
for the additional draft costs, that will
Increase the daily cost.
When ? we consider the amount of
money we made available to France-
$1.500' million to France, at the time
when she was losing the Indochina war;
nevertheless, we provided all that money,
to help France-we find that we have
spent in this part of Asia, during the
French debacle and since then, $5,500
million. But France was thrown out;
and a little prince in Cambodia kicked
out the U.S. personnel.
In my judgment, we can never win in
South Vietnam. In the situation which
exists there, we cannot win. The in-
ternal situation there must be settled by
the South Vietnamese, among them-
selves.
The question asked by the Senator
from Arkansas prompts me to make an
additional comment about a point which
I think we must keep in mind; namely,
the nature of the operations in South
Vietnam.
At our committee meeting, one of the
witnesses was Mr. Gaud. The other day,
when I went to the Foreign Relations
Committee hearing, I had no intention of
voting against approval of the nomina-
tion of Mr. Gaud, the Assistant Admin-
istrator of the Agency for International
Development-at least, not until I heard
him. Mr. Gaud had been Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, in the State Department.
The Senator from Vermont [Mr.
AIKEN] asked him a few questions. As I
listened to the mental gymnastic, tra-
peze performance by Mr. Gaud, I asid to
myself, "Why are we considering this
nomination?"
So I asked Mr. Gaud a few questions,
one of which was:
What are we doing in South Vietnam?
He replied:
We were invited in.
When I raised the question of the
puppet relationship, it became perfectly
obvious to me that I was dealing with a
witness who was not coming clean.
Whenever I find a witness is not coming
clean, I will vote against approval of his
nomination. So in the committee, I
voted against approval of his nomina-
tion.
He said we were invited in by the Re-
public of South Vietnam. Mr. Presi-
dent, I know something of the seman-
tics used by the State Department; so I
asked him whether he would discuss with
the committee what he meant by his
use of the word "Republic." I asked:
Do you mean that we are dealing with a
country that is democratic or is based on
freedom?
Of course he knew he could not say
that.
That causes me to state that in South
Vietnam we are dealing with a tyran-
nical military dictator; in South Viet-
nam we are trying to strengthen a tyr-
anny. Do Senators think there are any
human rights under the control there by
that general-dictator?
The other day that dictator called me
a traitor. Imagine that. Mr. Presi-
dent-that little tinhorn tyrant-mili-
tary dictator in South Vietnam is sup-
ported by the Government of the United
States. How come? He proceeded to call
an elected Member of the United States
Senate, one of the representatives of a
free people, a traitor. I wonder whether
he thought I was going to send him a
bunch of roses.
I hear the whip say, "Portland roses."
I say to the Senator from Arkansas
that one would think that if we were
going to get ourselves into a controversy
abroad, we would be supporting freedom
and human rights and democratic proc-
esses. Has the Senator from Arkansas
been surprised, when he has picked up
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G1 SSIONAL RECORD SENATE
the daily newspapers' during the past are through; but if we escalate the war
several years to discover that that little to North Vietnam, we shall not do it
tinhorn tyrant in South Vietnam has alone with conventional American
had to do some recouping and some ma- ground forces. We must do it with nu-
neuvering- and juggling because he has clear weapons. I believe that after the
some trouble with his Cabinet? first nuclear bomb that we drop in con-
I wonder if our Ambassador is helping nection with the South Vietnam Mc-
him. The Ambassador should be called Namara war, we shall have few, if any,
home to make a report. I do not believe friends left among the free nations of
he is doing a good job. I think it is a the world. If we cannot even interest
lousy job. The situation is growing SEATO in coming in and trying to reach
worse under him. an accommodation in keeping with the
Mr. McCLELLAN. Is' the Senator processes of law for the settlement of
from Oregon talking about the candidate that international dispute, where do we
for President? think we shall have any friends in
Mr. MORSE. 'The Senator means the Europe?
c andiate of the - other party ~ The second phase of my program for
- Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes. settling the South Vietnam situation in
Mr. MORSE. I do not know who their keeping with our professed dedication,
candidates for President are. It makes at least, to the peaceful procedures for
no difference who they are. They do not the settlement of disputes which threat-
have a prayer, and they know it. en the peace of the world is to take it
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will to the United Nations. What in the
the Senator yield? world is wrong with that procedure?
Mr. MORSE. I yield. Sometimes in the Senate I gain the im-
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator has pression that if we have a simple pro-
suggested that the Ambassador be called gram that is right, it is unacceptable be-
home. cause it is not complicated enough to
Mr. MORSE. He ought to be called confuse.
home for. a report. He should never Sometimes it seems that the only for-
have been sent over there. eign policy the United States can have
Mr. HUMPHREY. Other distin- is a complicated gobbledegook program
guished public officials also feel that the for which we need a half dozen interpret-
Airibassador should be called home. ers to try to figure out its semantic
Mr. MORSE. I understand. Some of meaning. It is designed to conceal simple
our good friends running for the Re- principles that usually describe what
publican nomination also believe he is right.
should come home and report. What is wrong with taking the South
I shall get on with my alternative. Vietnam controversy to the United Na-
111r, McCiLELLAN. Mr. President, will tions? Will Senators tell me? We
the Senator yield for another question? might be surprised. We might be able
Mr. MORSE. I yield. to reach an agreement in the United Na-
'Mr., McCLELLAN. l asked the Sen- tions by which a United Nations trustee-
ator about the cost of the operation or ship could be set up for 10 or 30 years,
war in South Vietnam. The Senator re- until we could train a civil service, until
plied. I recall that a few days ago the we could do the educational training
Senator. made some reference to the that would be necessary to develop an
number of ,casualties in South Vietnam.. ability on the part of people to govern
He said that at that time he had not themselves. We could strengthen the
been able to procure information as to seedbeds of economic freedom in South
the number of casualties that we have Vietnam so that the flower of political
suffered in that operation. Has the freedom could blossom. There cannot
Senator ,been able to obtain such infor- be political freedom in South Vietnam, in
matlon? Latin America, or in any other under-
Mr. MORSE, Not yet. We have developed area of the world until the
asked for it. We know that more than People first enjoy economic freedom of
200 American boys have been killed in choice for the individual. It is a truism.
South Vietnam-in my judgment, need- I have made that statement almost ad
lessly and unjustifiably. In my judg- infinitum on the floor of the Senate, but
ment, not it one of them who gave his Senators will hear it again and again
life i0-South Vietnam gave it for a good and again, for there is no answer to it.
.cause. `American foreign policy, so far as aid
The Senator ought to read the edito to underdeveloped areas of the world is
rials that have come into-my office and concerned, must be based upon economic
read the editorials by which editorial freedom, and helping those areas de-
writers, by "sticking their pens in my velop their economic freedom. We can-
blood," thought they were going to bleed not develop economic freedom with bul-
mne, lets. We cannot develop economic free-
,
I have paid, and repeat again to- dom with Sherman tanks. We cannot
night-and I have been saying it on the develop economic freedom with fire
Platforms of America away from the bombs.
floor of the Senate-that South Viet- A little of the news got in the ws-
naiv is not worth the life, of a single papers, but a remarkable coverup job-- has
American boy. I repeat that statement. been done in America in recent days.
More than 200 of them have been killed. We were caught flatfooted We were
If we escalate the war, there will be more caught with an American light plane
casualties.., inside of Cambodia, with American mill-
I say, "Watch out. Watch out." tart' personnel as well as South Viet-
The trial balloon is up. We may escalate nam personnel, dropping a fire bomb
the war Into North Vietnam before we which destroyed a village and killed 16
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7201
people. We rushed for cover with apol-
ogies. We said, "It will not happen
again."
Do Senators think that the apologies
would have been forthcoming if we had
not been caught? The Cambodians
were able to shoot down our plane.
That is how we were caught. But sup-
pose that had been a successful flight,
engineered with so-called American mil-
itary advisers, who are really combat
soldiers. I do not think we have any
right to put our boys in that position.
Suppose we had not been caught. Those
same 16 Cambodians would have died.
The same Cambodian village would have
burned from that fire bomb. We were
caught. Our Government was quick to
announce, "No more fire bombs."
Mr. President, we shall witness one in-
cident after another in South Vietnam
until we get out.
I am greatly disturbed about the dan-
ger that we may escalate the war. I am
greatly disturbed lest this country will
continue to follow a unilateral course of
action in South Vietnam that will lead
to worsened conditions, and that finally
some shocking catastrophe may happen
and many American boys may be killed.
Then the superpatriots will demand some
kind of first-scale operation, and the
holocaust will be on.
Hypothetical? Perhaps. But I think
it is a very real possibility.
Now is the time to think about it. Now
is the time to try to do something about
it. Now is the time for those of us who
feel as deeply as the senior Senator from
Oregon feels about it to dare to stand
up on the floor of the Senate and say so.
Popularity contests are not won that
way, in or out of the Senate, but one
goes to bed at night satisfied that he
did what he thought was his duty. I
sleep much more comfortably knowing
that I have raised my voice again in a
plea for taking the problem to the United
Nations. That is where we should take
it. I do not know what we are waiting
for.
If we are waiting for the trouble in
South Vietnam to vanish, we shall wait
a long time, so long as we stay in South
Vietnam and continue to stir it up with
mercenary pay and military pay. I would
like to get the military aid out of there.
For want of a better descriptive term, I
would like to get some form of inter-
national trusteeship established. I would
like to see my country stop supporting
military tyrants. 3nder a military
Fascist rule, there is no more freedom
for the individual South Vietnamese
than there is under Communist rule.
They are equally bad and intolerable.
Yesterday's and today's newspapers in-
dicate that the military tyrant in South
Vietnam is having more trouble. This is
an old pattern. Stop and reflect on the
number of times there has been a jug-
gling of military and government ' per-
Sonfiel in South Vietnam. The juggling
continues. A group here and there will
Start organizing, conspiring, and con-
triving. We pick up a paper some morn-
ing and read either of a successful or
unsucdeSsful coup.
Mr. President, they live on that.
There is much dissent in many of the
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7202 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
hamlets in the so-called delta area. We
ought to go down to some of those ham-
lets and take their arms away, although
they got their arms in the first place be-
cause it was thought they would be loyal
to the South Vietnamese Government
and the U.S. Government.
We discovered, of course, that they
were working in concert with the Viet-
cong. Among the Vietcong were some of
their relatives, in some instances mem-
bers of their families.
We cannot proceed under those con-
ditions. There will continue to be a
juggling and shuffling for new positions.
We are supporting this sort of thing on
a unilateral basis, making more and more
enemies for ourselves around the world,
losing more and more face.
I am somewhat amused by the sug-
gestion which has been made that if the
suggestion of the Senator from Alaska
and the Senator from Oregon is followed,
American prestige will suffer. We are
losing more support and more face by
supporting the little tyrant by McNa-
mara's war in South Vietnam than we
will ever lose by being honest with our-
selves, by saying we are ready to resort
to the peaceful procedures provided for
in the charter to which our Govern-
ment's signature is attached.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
Will the able Senator from Oregon yield
tome?
Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator
knows the great respect I have for him,
so I ask the Senator why he calls it
"McNamara's war." It seems to me in
peacetime and in normal times the
Secretary of State handles foreign pol-
icy, with the advice and approval of the
National Security Council. As the Sen-
ator knows, I have great respect for him,
but I also have respect for the Secretary
of Defense. I wonder sometimes, having
read it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
why the Senator from Oregon constantly
calls it "McNamara's war." Knowing of
the justice and fairness of the Senator
from Oregon, which I also observed when
I testified before him when I was in the
executive branch, I trust he understands
the spirit in which I ask the question.
Mr. MORSE. I call It McNamara's
war because, before the Senator from
Missouri came to the Chamber, in the
early part of my speech I said that in my
opinion McNamara is the Secretary of
State in southeast Asia. I believe Rusk
has abdicated. Rusk merely follows
McNamara. It is McNamara who is call-
ing the shots in South Vietnam. It is
McNamara's policies that are being fol-
lowed. The four objectives that have
been outlined as U.S. policy in South
Vietnam did not come from Rusk. They
came from McNamara.
I always believe both in giving a man
credit and placing on his shoulders the
responsibility when he is to blame.
The South Vietnamese program is
McNamara's program. I am not inter-
ested in Rusk's "me-too-isms" in regard
to it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield further?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
April 9
Mr. SYMINGTON. I have respect Mr. SYMINGTON, The Senator
both for the Secretary of State and for,,,, knows I would never try to close my
the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I mind to anything he had to say.
based on my knowledge of the executive
branch, no Secretary of Defense could
operate without full consent of the Sec-
retary of State and the National Secu-
rity Council. I disagree with my friend,
I believe McNamara is not the architect,
although, because he is the operator, he
has to be the builder.
Mr. MORSE. The Senator heard
him. He heard the testimony. The
Senator heard him outline the program.
The Senator heard the Secretary of
State in effect say "Me, too." or, if the
Senator likes a more polite phrase, "I
second the motion."
That is exactly what has happened in
regard to the South Vietnamese pro-
gram. The South Vietnamese program
is being called by the Pentagon and the
rest of the administration is following It.
I am trying to change that course of
action, so I am pressing my honest con-
victions as to who is responsible to see
if I cannot secure a change. I never
give up hope.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator
from Oregon yield further?
Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield,
Mr. SYMINGTON. No Member of
this body has more consistently fought
for civilian control over the military
than has the Senator from Oregon. I
therefore suggest to the Senator that
there may be some dichotomy of thought
on his part, because of all the Secretaries
of Defense who have worked for civilian-
control. I am confident he will agree
with me that none has tried harder than
the current Secretary of Defense.
Mr. MORSE. I did not mean to inti-
mate that the Secretary of Defense is
not in the saddle. There Is no general
in the saddle in the Pentagon. What I
am saying is that the Secretary of De-
fense Is surely in the saddle. He Is gal-
loping ahead with saber drawn, leading
McNamara's war in South Vietnam.
That is my position.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
ator for yielding to me. I trust he will
give consideration to my observations,
because he is a fair man.
Mn. MORSE. I always give consid-
eration to the observations of the Sena-
tor from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my good
friend, the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. I am always hopeful
that sooner or later I may persuade the
good Senator from Missouri to my view.
I am always hopeful. I never give up
hope,
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator of-
ten does persuade me; but in this par-
ticular case I would hope to persuade
him.
Mr. MORSE. Please do not bar the
doors ? of the wonderful intellect of the
Senator from Missouri. Please keep
them ajar until I can get through to him.
I am perfectly willing to wait for that
final discussion. Please do not bar those
doors to me yet. Give me an oppor-
tunity.
'Mr. MORSE. I point out that I have
outlined my program for a peaceful ap-
proach, and not a bullet approach, to
South Vietnam, for an international law
approach rather than a law of the jun-
gle approach to South Vietnam, seeking
to make it through SEATO, and if that
fails, through the United Nations.
To continue with my argument on this
problem, I have pointed out that the
Secretary General under the SEATO
treaty-who is a Thai-states that there
is only an internal quarrel between two
factions In South Vietnam,
His reported statement is indicative
of the reluctance of the Asiatic nations
to involve themselves in someone else's
behalf in warfare, which might involve
Red China.
According to reports of foreign aid
spending for fiscal year 1963, the United
States has spent $280.8 million on re-
gional aid in this part of the world.
That was for military aid only. Ap-
proximately $4 million or more was spent
for economic aid. The footnote on the
aid summary shows that the $280.8 mil-
lion figure included aid to Australia and
New Zealand, furnished on a regional
basis. The grand total of our military
aid in that area, on a regional basis,
since 1946, comes to $1,510 million. Do
not forget, that is grant money. That
is giveaway money.
As I stated in my reply to the Ambas-
sador to India, my good friend Chester
Bowles, when he made his speech before
the Press Club the other day, when he
said that in connection with the AID
program we had better stop playing God,
I also suggested that he remember that
we should stop playing Santa Claus as
well. This is Santa Claus aid which the
United States has been pouring into
that part of the world. The only re-
gional organization in that part of the
world Is the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-
ganization, known as SEATO. Besides
the regional aid we have furnished, we
are also furnishing hundreds of millions
of dollars each year in military aid to
certain Individual members-namely,
Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan.
That is separate and distinct in what
they receive.
Of course, we know what Pakistan will
do with her aid. She is building up a
vast military force for a potential war
with India over-Kashmir. If anyone be-
lieves she is building it up for a war
against Red China, he could not be more
wrong. Pakistan is opening her doors
to Red China, entering into trade agree-
ments and entering into airport landing
agreements.
Although India is not a member of
SEATO, we are pouring millions of dol-
lars of military aid Into India. What
will it be used for? It will be used to
fight Pakistan over Kashmir, if it is
deemed necessary.
What a paradox-what irony. The
United States is supplying 100 percent
of the military equipment for Pakistan
and India-building It up.
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The only possible use to which the aid
will be put will be in fighting each other.
Perhaps some Senator can justify that
procedure on moral grounds. I cannot
do so. I have been heard to say before
that if we cannot justify a policy on
moral grounds, we cannot justify it at all.
If we cannot justify a policy on the basis
of its morality, we had better dump it.
We cannot justify a policy of building lip
the military strength of Pakistan and
India and placing them in a position in
which they can kill large segments of
their population over Kashmir, when the
issue of Kashmir should be taken to the
United Nations.
Here is another dispute that threatens
the peace of, the world, which should be
subjected to the procedures of determi-
nation by international law.
What is wrong with that? I ask that
question again.
It makes so much commonsense. It is
morally unanswerable that we should be
supporting it, not undercutting it.
In my judgment, the military aid we
are giving to India and Pakistan is mor-
ally unjustifiable.
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Oregon yield?
Mr. MORSE. Why did I lead the fight,
along with two or three other Senators in
the previous session, against the foreign
aid bill? Not because I was against for-
eign aid, but because I am against that
kind of foreign aid.
I am glad to yield to the Senator from
Alabama.
Mr. HILL. How much aid are we giv-
ing to India and Kashmir at the present
time?
. Mr. MORSE. I have not that informa-
tion before me, but I will get it and place
it in the RECORD. I believe we have given
each country billions of dollars in aid
since 1946. We have poured out more
than $100 billion of the taxpayers' money
since 1946 in foreign aid, military and
economic-but mostly military. -Military
aid is almost always an overwhelming
percentage of grant money.
Does anyone believe that has stabilized
the world? Does anyone believe that has
tilled the seedbeds of economic freedom?
I am the chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Latin America. Does anyone be-
lieve that we have tilled the seedbeds of
economic freedom in Latin America?
We flirted with one coup after another.
We let a military junta overthrow a con-
stitutional government in the Dominican
Republic and after a certain period of
time, when most people had forgotten
about the Dominican Republic and it
went off the headlines, we recognized it.
We let a military coup overturn the
constitutional Government of Honduras
a few days before an election was to be
held, because the leading candidate on
'a democratic ticket-with a small "d"-
believed in the American principle that
the military should be brought under
constitutional control with the President
of the country as its Commander in
Chief. That is a pretty good American
doctrine, is it not? The Honduran mili-
tary did not think so. Knowing that if
he won the sound principle of constitu-
tionalism would be established in Hon-
duras, they overthrew the Government. aid from us under SEATO, SEATO would
However, a little while later we recog- be finished overnight. It is one of
nized them. Dulles' gimmicks for extracting a great
At that time we had an Assistant Sec- deal of money from the United States
retary of State by the name of Martin. _ for the benefit of those countries.
He tried to distinguish between dictators SEATO was a great mistake when Dulles
as "good guys" and "bad guys." I never
saw a good military dictator in my life,
and no one else has, either. A military
dictatorship means the end of civil lib-
erties. It means the end of self-govern-
ment. It means the end of economic and
political freedom. It means that the
citizens have become but pawns of the
state.
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? -
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. HILL. There is no separation of
powers, no check and balance, is there?
Mr. MORSE. There is only one. power.
Mr. HILL. No separation; only one
power.
Mr. MORSE. Yes;
dictatorship.
Mr. HILL. That is the dictatorship.
Mr. MORSE.- Yes.
Of course, Senators know what would
happen to the Senator from Oregon if
he were in Vietnam now. He would be
liquidated. I said at the White House:
Do you know what would happen to the
senior Senator from Oregon if- he were in
South Vietnam? - He would be liquidated.
That would happen, because they do
not tolerate any criticism of the Gov-
ernment over there.
Let me say to the Senator from Mis-
souri, before he leaves the Chamber, that
McNamara, in conducting McNamara's
war, is perfectly willing to support that
kind of 'dictatorship. He is supporting
that kind of dictatorship and he is now
advocating that we pick up the check
and pay for the military draft that is
supposed to be put in effect over there.
Does the fact that Rusk supports it too
make the Senator from Missouri feel any
better?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I should like to
discuss the matter further with the Sen-
ator from Oregon. Unfortunately, I
must leave the Chamber. It is always a
privilege to discuss a subject with the
Senator from Oregon. At another time,
I look forward to discussing the problem
with the Senator from Oregon, and per-
haps our discussion will lead into an
argument. I would look forward to it.
Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
ator very much.
Mr. MORSE. The only regional or-
ganization in that part of the world is
the Southeast Asia Treat Organization.
Besides this regional aid we have fur-
nished under it, we are also furnishing
hundreds of millions of dollars each year -
in military aid to certain of its individual
members; namely, Thailand, the Philip-
pines, and Pakistan.
This is why I said here some days ago
that SEATO is little more than a mech-
anism for extracting aid from the United
States. -
Mr. President, if they could not get
proposed it. His "domino" theory was
also a fallacy. There was never any-
thing to it. Little Cambodia proved it.
Even before Cambodia, it was proved by
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and
North Vietnam. They all proved it.
It is interesting to listen to the State
Department officials talking about the
Geneva accord of 1954. All the Geneva
accord did was to quarter Indochina, to
create South Vietnam, North Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia.
Then there was the great Dulles brain-
storm of the "domino theory." It was
said we must go in there, we must pour
the largess of the American taxpayers,
because those countries are like a row
of dominoes. The theory is that if one
of these countries falls, they all go down.
Bunkum. Pure bunkum. Events have
proved how much bunkum it was.
Connected with the Dulles "domino
theory" was Thailand, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. They have not gone over to
communism. I do not say that they
have gone over to democracy, either.
They have not. Does anyone believe
there is any democracy in Thailand? It
is another monarchy, whose king sits on
the throne at the sufferance of the mili-
tary. We support the military.
Do American taxpayers know that we
support the military in Thailand 100
percent? We pay the full cost of the
Thia military organization. As I said
the other day, I observed a great Thai
military maneuver. It was held to show
the result of our military aid to Thai-
land.- I do not exaggerate very much
when I say that I could have taken 10
American Boy Scout troops over there
and whipped the whole Thai Army. If a
film of that maneuver were shown in an
American theater, it would be the sub-
ject of high comedy. Does anyone think
they would be of help to American forces
if our forces were engaged with them in
in fight against an enemy? The great
problem would be for the American
soldiers to get out of the way of the
Thai troops before they were trampled
to death as the Thai retreated.
We pour money into all--those coun-
tries. We are not pouring it into armies
that are willing to die for a cause.
It is a shocking waste. It ought to
be stopped.
I want to help the Thai. I want to
help the Pakistanis. I want to help
India. However, I want to help them
sow the seedbeds of economic freedom.
I want to bring the economic freedom
of choice to the masses of people, be-
cause I know that, according to history,
will be the result. Every society in the
history of mankind which has developed
economic freedom of choice for the in-
dividual has become a free society.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I commend the
Senator for the views he is expressing.
I have shared those views for a long
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time. As evidence of it, In the past 9 its construction would be nil. We build only an internal struggle between two
years I voted against all foreign aid. I roads which go nowhere. This is not factions. I do not disagree with him.
voted against it not because I was against the senior Senator from Oregon speak- I believe he is quite correct. But I also
all foreign aid, but because of the kind ing. This is the Comptroller General of agree with General Khanh, the military
of aid the Senator refers to. the United States. tyrant of South Vietnam, when he calls
.I ask the Senator if he agrees with me Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will SEATO a "paper tiger." He does not
that when we give aid some condition the Senator yield? like it. He is not a booster for SEATO.
ought to be laid down that these coun- Mr. MORSE. I yield. He knows very well that if SEATO came
tries must live up to; otherwise it Is a Mr. McCLE LLAN. We must do much in, he would go out.
complete giveaway, irrevocably and irre- more than merely ask for a project. We He knows very well that an interna-
trievably. must justify it by the best available ex- tional jury, which the foreign ministers
Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Ar- pert testimony and show that it is eco- of the SEATO countries ought to be, be-
kansas has been 100 percent right. I nomically justifiable. cause the signatures of their countries
greatly appreciate the great support he Mr. MORSE. Of course. are attached to that treaty, could not
gave me In the previous session of Con- Mr. McCLELLAN. In the countries very well support that tyrant's policies.
gress as we tried to modify the foreign where we are spending the money, no Probably In this instance both the Sec-
aid bill. The administration has now such requirement is made. I recall that retary General of SEATO and the miii-
made a good start. It is not enough. some 7 or 8 years ago, the Committee tary tyrant of South Vietnam are cor-
We hope it will go further in this session, on Government Operations and the Per- rect: SEATO has become a paper tiger.
The Senator is correct. I offered an manent Investigations Subcommittee in- I wish It were not, if it could do any
amendment to end all foreign aid--stop vestigated a project in Bolivia. An Irri- good. I should like to give SEATO a
It-wipe the slate clean-at the end of gation project was constructed where chance to prove whether it Is a paper
fiscal year 1965; and then start all over there was no water, tiger. That is why I am urging my Gov-
again on two major premises: First, that Mr. MORSE. There was no water at ernment to try to make a resort to the
those who want foreign aid will come all. SEATO organization In an attempt, at
and apply for it. We have rammed down Mr. MCCLELLAN. That is correct. least, to end the killing in South Viet-
the economic gullets and the military Mr. MORSE. Do not be surprised at nam and restore some kind of order
gullets of some foreign countries, since that. The Comptroller General is our through a SEATO command, a SEATO
1946, foreign aid that they did not want, watchdog. He is our agent. He is an trusteeship, or whatever can be agreed to
that they did not ask for, because of the officer of Congress. He has been trying by way of a SEATO pact for South Viet-
human frailty that characterizes the hu- to warn us for years as to what is going nam. We have no business getting into
man animal, and they could not turn it on in foreign aid. He has given us a the middle of a civil war in South Viet-
down. My amendment provided that we pile of reports. And he does not mark nam. We have no business being a "sug-
end it and start all over with two princi- them top secret. But they are marked as daddy" to a group of nations in
ples or guideposts. We would require "Top secret." southeast Asia that are strong for Amer-
that first they must apply for it on Does the Senator remember when I Scan Intervention In Vietnam, but who
terms and conditions which we proscribe used the reports in a debate during the want no part of the activity for them-
in order to qualify them as applicants; previous session? There was an 18- selves,
and, second, that we limit the aid to not inch-high pile of reports showing the Unless the meeting of SEATO in Ma-
more than 50 countries. Does the Sena- shocking waste in foreign aid, the fail- nila embarks on a joint SEATO policy
for know how many countries we are ure to carry out the professed objectives toward South Vietnam and begins to
aiding now? One hundred and seven. of a given program, and also the exist- deal with this threat to the peace in the
Mr. McCLELLAN. How many more ence of great corruption among govern- one and only area It was created to deal
are soon to be born that we will assist? ments in underdeveloped areas of the with, the United States should get out of
Mr. MORSE. That we do not know. world. I announced in the Senate SEATO. At the very least, we should
We shall be economic midwives to them, Chamber that the reports were available cancel our military and economic aid
if we do not watch out. There are only for Senators to read. to it.
eight countries outside the Iron Curtain, In my judgment, one of the main rea- The only thing about SEATO that
down whose gullets we have not rammed sons there are the votes which occur on seems to work is its mimeograph ma-
foreign aid. some amendments Is that Senators ac- chines. I receive an ample supply of
Mr. McCLELLAN. Only eight? cepted my Invitation and read some of publicity releases about its joint exer-
Mr. MORSE. Only eight. If some of those reports. Senators came to me and cises with all-American equipment. Ap-
us had not made the fight-including the said, "WAYNE, I had no idea this was go- parently that is all that the military
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLEL- ing on. I have listened to you. I know establishments of these countries will
LAN]-which we have been making, the your position. But I had no Idea this ever do under SEATO-that is, to exer-
State Department would have seen to it was your backstop evidence." cise their American equipment.
that those countries would be getting Iremember that I once said-because If there is a threat to peace in South
the taxpayers' dollars. of what the Senator from Arkansas has Vietnam, SEATO should be dealing
I would drastically cut military aid, said, perhaps I ought to say it again- with It. That is its only reason for exist-
and I would reorient foreign aid so as that one of the reports from the Comp- ence. The United States should not be
to follow the program which I suggested, troller General showed that more than dealing with it on a unilateral basis. If
and require a demonstration of economic 200 hay balers were shipped into a desert there is not a threat, but only an inter-
feasibility on a project-to-project basis. country, where it would not be possible nal struggle between two factions, the
I would have most of it based on loan to grow a ton of hay in a hundred United States has no business in South
money, not grant money. square miles. Yet there they were, rust- Vietnam, and should get out. Our pres-
What does the Senator from Arkansas ing away, some of them not even un- ent policy is only bleeding the United
have to do and what do I have to do crated, and absolutely no good to any- States financially and militarily.
when we want to get a reclamation proj- body. Somebody lined some pockets. I Some days ago, on the floor of the
ect, or when we want to get a dam, or do not charge that American officials Senate, I discussed a statement made In
when we want to get a public works did, because I will say to the everlasting Manila by the President of the Philip-
project? credit of American officials that I know pines. He said that, by all means, the
He and I must present evidence that of no evidence of any corruption on their United States should stay in South Viet-
shows a cost-benefit ratio favorable to part- There was bad judgment. But nam. There was no question about it. I
the project. I do not quarrel with that. much corruption is created in other was a little disturbed because that state-
We ought to be required to do it. Does countries because of the exercise of bad ment by the President of the Philippines
the Senator think we do that in our for- judgment on the part of U.S. AID did not continue and say that because
eign aid program? We build dams when officials. the Philippines Government signed the
any careful study of the project would It Is Important that we now hear that SEATO Treaty, the Philippines would
show that the prospect of ever getting the Secretary General of SEATO, a That, come in and help. He did not add that.
enough water behind the dam to warrant finds that the war in South Vietnam is So I respectfully-if none too politely-
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suggested, on the floor of the Senate,
that I was not very much moved by that
statement by the President of the Phil-
ippines; and I said I thought it would be
more -fitting if Filipino forces were in
South Vietnam, doing a little of the
dying and a little of the supporting. The
President of the Philippines did not like
that statement; and he had a few un-
kind words to say about the senior Sen-
ator from Oregon-which convinced me
that I was right.
I received a letter from Jose F. Impe-
rial, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Em-
bassy of the Philippines. The letter
reads as follows:
EMDASSY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Washington, D.C., March 31, 1964.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate of the United States,
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I read with much
interest your remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, Senate, of March 26, 1964, titled
"Answer to the Secretary of Defense."
On page 6258 of the RECORD is the follow-
ing statement: "Your country's signature is
on the SEATO Treaty. You have walked
out, Mr. President of the Philippines; you
have not lived up to your signature."
I am not aware, Mr. Senator, that the Pres-
ident of the Philippines has either "walked
out" or that he has "not lived up" to the
signature on the SEATO Treaty. South
Vietnam is one of the protocol states. I am
certain, Mr. Senator, you are also familiar
with the fact that without the specific re-
quest of a protocol state, SEATO is power-
less to intervene in the internal affairs of
that country. Since SEATO is not involved
in South Vietnam, and American assistance
there is a unilateral action on the part of the
United States, your strong remarks against
the President of the Philippines is both un-
fair and unjustified.
Without counting the cost, Filipino boys
fought side by side and died- side by side
with American boys in two World Wars and
in Korea for the cause of freedom and hu-
man dignity. In the event that SEATO
action should become. necessary in South
Vietnam please rest assured, Mr. Senator,
that the Philippines will be there to the full
limit of her treaty obligations.
Sincerely yours,
JOSE F. IMPERIAL,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, at
this point will the Senator from Oregon
yield?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore (Mr. METCALF). Does the Senator
from Oregon yield to the Senator from
Arkansas?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. McCLELLAN. If there is no such
obligation on the part of the SEATO
countries-apparently that is what he
was trying to state in his letter-and
nothing which has developed in South
Vietnam calls for the SEATO members
to act to fulfill their signatures to the
SEATO agreement, why is the United
States called on to intervene unilaterally
in South Vietnam?
Mr. MORSE. I point out that there is
a "gimmick" in that gentleman's letter-
namely, his statement that the Govern-
ment of the Philippines never was asked,
to go into South Vietnam, whereas the
United. States was asked to go in.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Who asked - the
United States to go in? As I understand
the statement the Senator from Oregon
is making, only the South Vietnamese
Government asked the United States to
go in there.
Mr. MORSE. We were asked to do
that by a tryant we put into power there
in 1954-a man by the name of Diem.
Let us remember that after France set up
a puppet, there, and after France was
kicked out, we set up a puppet there-the
late dictator Diem. And of course it was
not difficult for us to get him to ask us
to go in there-just as it was not difficult
for the East Germans to ask the Rus-
sians to go into East Germany.
However, let me say, as a former pro-
fessor of logic, that the Charge d'Affaires
ad interim of the Embassy of the Philip-
pines who wrote the letter to me would
have flunked my course, if he wrote
an examination paper which was as full
of false assumptions, non sequiturs, and
misstatements as the large number we
find in the letter he sent to me. It will
be noted that in his letter he admitted
that South Vietnam is one of the proto-
col states; but he failed to state tha
SEATO had much to do in connection
with that protocol state arrangement,
because every nation which was signa-
tory to the SEATO Treaty joined in the
statement in the treaty that the signa-
tories thereto recognized South Vietnam
as an area of mutual concern and in-
terest. Of course they pledged them-
selves, at that very time, to take an in-
terest in South Vietnam-along with the
United States. We have kept our
pledge-although I think we have car-
ried it out very poorly and unfortunately.
But the point is that the Philippine Gov-
ernment and every other government
which signed the SEATO Treaty should
have been in South Vietnam with us,
trying to work out there, with us, under
the protocol agreement they joined in
placing in the SEATO Treaty, an agree-
ment involving South Vietnam-a peace-
ful handling of the controversy which
has arisen, in South Vietnam.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Then, if I correctly
understand, whatever obligation the
United States may have had to be in
South Vietnam stemmed from the fact
that the United States was a party to
the SEATO Treaty; is that correct?
Mr. MORSE. Yes, that is the only in-
ternational-law reed we have to lean on;
and the same obligation exists with
respect to every other nation signatory
to that treaty.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Is it true that
there is no other obligation, in that con-
nection, that has been incurred by the
United States, other than through our
signature of the SEATO Treaty?
Mr. MORSE. That is correct.
Mr. McCLELLAN. If I correctly un-
derstand, every signatory to that treaty
is under as much obligation to be in
South Vietnam tonight as the American
troops are. Is that correct?
Mr. MORSE. That is my position;
and the escape hatch that McNamara
and the State Department are trying to
use-mainly, that Diem asked us to come
in-is, in my judgment, an arrangement
of convenience. ,
Mr. McCLELLAN. Were we under any
obligation to go in there?
Mr. MORSE. Only as a member of
SEATO.
Mr. McCLELLAN. If we had an obli-
gation to respond to that invitation, it
seems to me that all the other signa-
tories to the SEATO Treaty had the same
obligation.
Mr. MORSE. Certainly they did. Not
only that, but when we did respond to
that invitation, every other signatory
to the SEATO Treaty should have asked
us, "What are you up to? What do you
propose to do? What are you doing in
there?"
In this matter we bound ourselves in
regard to mutual concern. In that case,
what'happened to Australia, New Zea-
land, Great Britain, France, and the
other countries? I do not know; I never
have been able to find out. But I be-
lieve we can take judicial notice of the
fact that they merely took the position
that if Uncle Sam was willing to spend
his money and blood there, let him do it.
Of course that happens all around
the world; as long as the United States
is willing to "pick up the checks" and
the responsibilities, the other countries
will let us do it.
Mr. McCLELLAN. They will say, "Let
you and him fight."
Mr. MORSE. Of course, as the Sena-
tor from Arkansas has said, they will
reply, "Let you and him fight."
We poured out over $100 million.
In response. to the letter I received
from that Filipino diplomat, I dis-
patched the following letter:
APRIL 6, 1964.
Hon. Jose F. IMPERIAL,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Philip-
pines, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: Thank you for your letter of
March 31.
I completely disagree with the rationaliza-
tions set forth in the letter. The fact re-
mains that the Government of the Philip-
pines signed the SEATO Treaty. It, like the
other signatories of the treaty, has exercised
noileadership in trying to resolve the civil
war in South Vietnam short of military
action. Until your President exercises such
leadership, I shall continue to point out that
he, along with the other signatories of the
treaty, have walked out on their clear re-
sponsibilities to seek a peaceful solution to
issues that threaten the peace in South
Vietnam.
I recognize and have paid tribute to the
fact that Filipino boys have fought along
beside American boys in past wars, but
there are no Filipino boys in Filipino uni-
forms dying in South Vietnam these days.
I am enclosing tear sheets from the CoN-
GRESSIONAL RECORD, containing the refer-
ences I have made to the President of your
country and to the policies of your country.
I assure you that I stand on every word I
have spoken in criticism of your President
and your country.
Yours respectfully,
WAYNE MORSE.
Mr. President, I now repeat, all the
criticism that I have heretofore made of
the failure of the Philippine Govern-
ment to live up to 'what I consider to be
their clear obligations under the SEATO
Treaty, and I now incorporate in that
criticism, Australia, New Zealand, Paki-
stan, Thailand, Great Britain, and
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France. The only one, I believe, who has
made a gesture on the question is De
Gaulle. The trouble is that we do not
know what he means, and I wish to give
him an opportunity to clarify his posi-
tion. I wish to give him an opportunity
to expound, amplify, and define. I do
not believe we can do so except through
SEATO.
There was a little criticism of my posi-
tion on South Vietnam from an Ameri-
can Legion Post, Southeast Post No. -146,
American Legion, Department of Ore-
gon, signed by Don E. Johnson, Ameri-
canism Chairman, District 8, Post No.
146, American Legion, Field Box 7013,
Portland, Oreg., 97219.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the entire letter, including the
listing of the officers of the post, be
printed In the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SOUTHEAST POST NO. 148,
AMERICAN LEGION,
DEPARTMENT OF OREGON,
Portland, Oreg., March 30,1964.
Subject: Your picture-Peoples' World,
Senator WAYNE MORSE.
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
HONORABLE SENATOR MoRsE: Do you think
that the patriotic, well-informed citizens of
the State of Oregon appreciate your smiling
picture on the front page of the Peoples'
World, dated Saturday, March 28, 1984?
Yours very truly,
DON E. JOHNSON,
Americanism Chairman, District 8, and
Post 146, American Legion, Portland,
Oreg.
OFFICERS 1963-64
Dan E. Mosee, commander.
Alfred G. Rouse, first vice commander.
Roy L. Axt, second vice commander.
Hohn E. Shapland, adjutant.
Don E. Johnson, assistant adjutant.
Willard G. Hoard, finance officer.
Clarence D. Griffiths, junior past com-
mander.
George F. Payne, chaplain.
Earl F. Olson, historian.
William J. Kirkland, service officer.
Charles R. Crisp, sergeant at arms.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
A. A, Esau, Ervin R. Johnson, Herb Smith,
Norman LePoideuin, Bernard Anderson, Har-
old Widman, Jr., and Jack Stewart.
PAST COMMANDERS
Herbert A. Peterson, 1946-47.
Gordon O. Auborn, 1947-48.
Ronald E. Callbeck, 1948-49.
Albert H. Boss, 1949-50.
Donald M. Lehman, 1950-51.
Ralph W. Kaufman, 1951-52.
Willard G. Hoard, 1952-53.
George O. Nelson, 1953-54.
Irvin R. Johnson, 1954-55.
Orville W. Reynolds, 1955-56.
William J. Kirkland, 1958-57.
Robert C. Jones, 1957-58.
Clinton H. Fromm, 1958-69.
William F. Bower, 19590.
Peter B. Lang, 1960-61.
Irvin R. Johnson. 1961-82.
Clarence D. Griffiths, 1902-83.
Dan E. Mosee, 1963-84.
Mr. MORSE. I wish to complete my
discussion of the letter I received from
the chairman of the Committee on Amer-
icanism of Southeast Post No. 146 of
the American Legion in Portland, Oreg.
The letter reads:
Subject: Your picture-People's World
HON. SENATOR MORSE: DO you think that
the patriotic, well-informed citizens of the
State of Oregon appreciate your smiling pic-
ture on the front page of the Peoples' World,
dated Saturday. March 28. 1964?
Yours very truly,
DoN E. JoRNSON.
I responded to the chairman of the
Americanism Committee of the South-
east Post No. 146 of the American Legion
of Portland, Oreg., as follows:
DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I have received your
letter of March 30.
I would be interested In knowing what in
the world you think I had to do with my
picture being on the front page of the
Peoples' World. Do you mean to tell me
that you have duped yourself with the guilt
by association philosophy? What nonsense,
Yours truly.
One cannot take my position on South
Vietnam and not receive mail of that
type, because the people who write such
mail are not interested in the facts.
Seldom do they give evidence that they
resort to thinking of great abstract prin-
ciples of government that keep us free.
When a Senator fights In the Senate to
have his Government keep faith with
the great ideal that this country should
resort to the rule of law-which we say
we do-Instead of the jungle law of force
for the settlement of disputes, and then
says it should be applied to South Viet-
nam, and says, quite frankly and un-
deniably, that this country is not doing
It there, one expects people to write let-
ters such as this. But It is a part of
the liabilities that go with the position
one holds in this body, and I do not In-
tend to be deterred by mail of that type.
I Intend to continue to press my ad-
ministration for some answers to the
questions I have been raising.
I have another letter I wish to read.
It is similar to the 200 or more letters I
placed In the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a
few days ago, from every State in the
Union, and from officers, privates, and
sergeants of our Military Establish-
ment in South Vietnam, In support of
the position I am taking on South Viet-
nam. I said before that those letters
would have to be published without dis-
closing their signatures. I said the let-
ters were available for Senators to read,
and I said the letters were available to
the White House to read, if the White
House wanted to read them. But, know-
ing the military as I do, I know what
would probably happen to any officer in
South Vietnam who wrote a letter of en-
couragement and support to the senior
Senator from Oregon in regard to his
position toward American foreign pol-
icy in South Vietnam. So the Official
Reporter will please eliminate the name
or any identification mark, and return
the letter to my office uncut.
The letter reads as follows:
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I thought you
might note the enclosed article clipped from
today's Saigon Post. Also enclosed is the
Vietnamese press version of Ambassador
Lodge's and Mr. McNamara's statements. It
seems that policies as usual are still un-
decided.
The small article on the L-19 crash, of
which the lieutenant has died, shows what
some of our military aid in southeast Asia
has done for us. As you will note he was
shot down by Cambodian T-28 fighters.
This is a case of some of our foreign aid com-
ing back to us in the form of death to our
own troops. This is just one of many
instances.
I trust you will find these articles of
interest.
Yours truly,
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the articles that the member
of our Military Establishment in Saigon
sent to me also be incorporated at this
point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
IFrom the Saigon Post, Mar. 28, 19841
U.S. AIR FORCE L-19 MISSING WITH Two
ABOARD-KHMER-Dow$EG U.S. PILOT DIES
A U.S. Air Force L-19 observation plane has
been reported missing in Quang Tri Province
since Wednesday with two American pilots
aboard according to American military
sources.
The plane took off from She Sanh at 2:15
p.m. for a 3-hour reconnaissance flight. It
carried enough gas for approximately 3 hours
and 40 minutes of flight.
When the aircraft did not return to Khe
Santa as scheduled, a ground communications
check failed to reveal any Information on its
status. Darkness and bad weather in the
area prevented any immediate airborne
search.
No emergency messages or position reports
were received from the aircraft after it took
off. The general area of the L-19's proposed
flight plan was searched Thursday by 18
fixed-wing aircraft.
Due to bad weather in the area, the search
Could not be started until 11:10 a.m.
Two H-34 helicopters are on standby for
medical evacuation purposes and 12 other
H-34's are on alert to fly troops in to secure
the area when the missing plane Is located.
The pilot is assigned to the U.S. Air Force
and the observer is a U.B. Army officer.
The sources also reported that the U.S.
Air Force first lieutenant who piloted the
Vietnam Air Force 1-19 observation plane
shot down by Cambodian fighter planes
March 19 died Wednesday at the Clark Air
Base hospital in the Philippines.
The pilot was evacuated to Clark on Tues-
day; at that time he was still in critical
condition with multiple injuries.
The L-19 crashed in Kien Tuong Province
about 2.5 miles this aide of the Cambodian
border after being fired on by two Cambodian
T-28 fighters painted gray with red tails.
[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 28, 19841
U.S. PULLOUT DISASTROUS; VICTORY SURE,
LODGE SAYS-.Loss OF VIETNAM WOULD EN-
DANGER FREEDOM OF 240 MILLION PEOPLE
U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said
Thursday that withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Vietnam would be disastrous and that neu-
tralization of the country at this time would
be "the complete equivalent of Communist
victory."
The Ambassador also said, in prepared an-
swers to questions put by Associated Press
that persistent execution of existing civil-
political and military plans under Gen. Ngu-
yen Khanh will bring victory-provided the
hostile influences stay within bounds.
The loss of South Vietnam to the Commu-
nists would be a clear success for Communist
China, which wants to turn Vietnam into a
satellite, and would endanger a vast area of
Asia in which 240 million people live, he said.
This is the reason why the freedom of
South Vietnam is so important to the United
States, the Ambassador pointed out.
"South Vietnam Is the hub of an area
which Is bounded on the northeast and east
by Formosa and the Philippines, on the south
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by Indonesia and on the west by Borneo.
Communist seizure of South Vietnam would
put the Communist squarely into the middle
of southeast Asia, whence they could radiate
all over," he said.
The loss of South Vietnam would have an
incalculable effect on Cambodia and Laos,
with strong. repercussions further west in
Thailand and Burma, he added. It would
shake Malaysia to the south, it would surely
threaten Indonesia. If Indonesia were un-
able or unwilling to resist, the Chinese Com-
munists would be on the front doorstep of
Australia.
Eastward, the repercussions for the Phil-
ippines and for Formosa would be severe, he
said. Therefore, when we speak of south-
east Asia, we are not talking of some small
neck of the woods, but of an area about 2,300
miles long from north to south and 3,000
miles wide from east to west with about 240
million people.
"If the Communist Chinese, using North
Vietnam as a catspaw, were able to take over
South Vietnam, it would be interpreted as a
vindication of the fanatic Chinese methods
over that of the Soviets. It would also be
regarded in the free world as reflecting a
general lack of ability, a lack of willpower by
the United States to prevent Communist ag-
gression," he said.
The Ambassador dismissed current criti-
cism about the war being in a stalemate with
little gain by either side. He said that under
General Khanh a new and much stronger
situation is being created which means that
in the Army bravery is being rewarded. "I
believe that persistent execution of the exist-
ing civil-political and military plans will
bring victory-provided the hostile external
influences stay within bounds," he added.
Commenting on suggestions that the U.S.
troops withdraw immediately, the Ambas-
sador said that .some U.S. troops which are
performing specific missions can be with-
drawn as soon as their missions are com-
pleted. "But a general withdrawal of the
United States at this time would be dis-
astrous," he reasoned. "We and the Viet-
namese have built a strong position here."
He said that the cost to the United States
in dollars per year is less than it cost to build
one airplane carrier. "For us to throw away
this joint investment, for which brave men
have laid down their lives, would be im-
prudent," he emphasized.
The Ambassador scored the idea of neutral-
ism as proposed by France, as the complete
equivalent to Communist victory under
present. circumstances.
"In fact," he said, "the Communists in
describing their idea of victory always use
the word `neutralism'. But they apply it ex-
clusively to South Vietnam and not to the
North."
He said that before discussing any kind of
new relationship between North and South
Vietnam, the North should stop aggression
against the South?
No conversations with North Vietnam are
even conceivable while this interference in
South Vietnam's internal affairs is going on
"They must withdraw immediately," he
pointed out.
The minute they do so, there will be peace
he concluded.
[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 28, 1964]
MORE MEN, GUNS, PLANES FOR VIETNAM-
MCNAMARA: HIT-HANOI PLAN NOT SHELVED
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara
Thursday night said that the United States
will help the Republic of Vietnam expand its
land and air forces to press its war against
the Communist Vietcong. At the same
time, he did not specifically rule out the
possibility of direct South Vietnamese mili-
tary action against North Vietnam.
Speaking at the annual James Forrestal
memorial dinner in Washington, named in
honor of America's World War II Secretary
of War, McNamara said that President John-
son approved 12 recommendations which he
and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman, following their
S-day visit here early this month.
The Secretary did not spell out in com-
plete detail what the 12 recommenda-
tions were, but mentioned the following:
He again reaffirmed U.S. support for the
Government of South Vietnam in carrying
out its anti-insurgency plan. Under the plan,
he said, Prime Minister Gen. Nguyen Khanh
intends to supplement a national mobiliza-
tion plan program to mobilize all national
resources in the struggle.
The Secretary said that the quality of the
"new life'P hamlets will be improved, and will
be built systematically outward from secure
areas and over-extension will be corrected.
The security forces will be increased by at
least 50,000 men. The present strength of
all regular and paramilitary forces is now
about 400,000. The armed forces will be
consolidated and their effectiveness and con-
ditions of service will be improved, he an-
nounced. "We will provide required addi-
tional material," he said. "This will include
strengthening the Vietnamese Air Force with
better aircraft and improving the mobility
of the ground forces."
McNamara made the rural problem the
focal point of his speech. He said that a
broad national program is to be carried out,
giving priority to rural needs. He announced
the imminent establishment of an adminis-
trative corps which will include teachers,
health technicians, agriculture workers and
other technicians. The initial goal during
the year 1964 will be at least 7,500 additional
persons, he disclosed, with the ultimate goal
being at least 40,000 technicians for the more
than 8,000 hamlets in 2,500 villages and 43
provinces.
The Secretary touched on the topic of
carrying the war to North Vietnam. He
said it was one of the options before Presi-
dent Johnson in the counterinsurgency
program in South Vietnam. -
He said: "This course of action-its impli-
cations and ways of carrying it out-has been
carefully studied. Whatever ultimate course
of action may be forced upon -Lis by the other
side, it is clear that actions uunder this op-
tion would be only a supplement to, not a
substitute for, progress within South Viet-
nam's own borders." -
McNamara ruled out two other options for
dealing with the Vietnamese problem, He
totally rejected the notion that the United
States withdraw its help, and he said the
proposal for the neutralization of Vietnam
would, in reality, be an interim device to
permit Communist consolidation and even-
tual takeover.
McNamara noted that both North Vietnam
and Communist China regard their battle
for South Vietnam as a test case for the
new Communist strategy. But he noted that
they have different objectives. Hanoi's ob-
jective is limited to a mere conquest of the
south, he said, while Peiping would regard
Hanoi's victory as a first step toward even-
tual hegemony over the two, Vietnam and
southeast Asia.
America's goal, McNamara said, is peace
and stability, both in Vietnam and south-
east Asia. "When the day comes when we can
safely withdraw, we can expect to leave an
independent and stable Vietnam, rich with
resources and bright with prospects for con-
tributing to the peace and prosperity of
southeast Asia and the world," he concluded
ONE-STAR RANK CREATED IN VIETNAM ARMY
A new rank, a one-star general has been
created within the Vietnamese Army, it was
authoritatively reported yesterday.
The source said the officers getting this
new rank will be between a full colonel and
the present brigadier general. Just why the
move has been made is not known.
In Vietnamese, according to the source,
the rank is "chuan tuong."
English translation of the rank is a prob-
lem since the Vietnamese brigadier general
or "thieu ttong" has two stars, the major
general, three, and the lieutenant general,
four. So what can this new rank be called
in English?
What about "junior general" for Vietnam's
future one-star officers?
[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 30, 1964]
No BIG POWER BACKDROP FOR KHMER TALKS-
P.M.-U.S. SENATOR INVITED FOR LOOK-SEE
Prime Minister Gen. Nguyen Khanh on
Saturday apparently tried to dissuade Cam-
bodia from demanding a Geneva conference
to guarantee its neutrality as a prerequisite
for resumption of the Vietnamese-Cambo-
dian border talks postponed early last week.
The Prime Minister said Cambodia and
Vietnam are independent countries having
complete sovereignty and when it comes
to matters only concerning our two coun-
tries, we should settle them between our-
selves without having recourse to the
patronage of any outside country or seek any
guarantee - other than the sincerity and
friendship of two fraternal people.
After pledging "strict respect for all agree-
ments" the two governments may sign "in
full freedom of action," he said the Viet-
namese people "are ready to welcome" a
Cambodian' delegation which Prince Sihan-
ouk recently said he might send to Saigon.
General Khanh said he and his govern-
ment understood Cambodian indignation
over the Chantrea bombing, and we have
shown to the world that we know how to
accept our responsibilities.
"If Vietnam and Cambodia now self-re-
liantly solve the common problems between
the two nations, they will directly and ef-
fectively contribute to the maintenance of
peace in southeast Asia and at the same time
win the esteem of the whole world for the
Cambodian and Vietnamese people," he
added.
General Khanh made this statement at a
45-minute planeside press conference after
presiding over the end of a course for ob-
servation pilots at Nha Trang Air Base.
Before inviting newsmen to ask questions,
General Khanh made known the press con-
ference had to be held in Nha Trang be-
cause he had to fly to Central Vietnam on an
inspection trip immediately after..
Asked to comment on Prince Sihanouk's
most recent attitude in the light of his
"guarantee Cambodian neutrality first" state-
ment, the Prime Minister said:
"On the basis of that statement, I asked
myself why our two nations can't get to-
gether directly to settle their common prob-
lems without always relying on some great
powers standing beside them? On my honor
I can guarantee that Vietnam will respect
all the agreements it may sign with Cam-
bodia.
"At this point I also want to answer a
rumor in the press that in the Cambodian
incident, the Vietnamese Government acted
on the recommendation of'the United States.
I want to make clear that the Government
and myself made the decision ourselves
without any advice from outside.
"On the other hand, one paper said to make
concessions to Cambodia was a shame to our
nation, They said that because they didn't
understand the matter. Actually as far as
force goes we are stronger than Cambodia
and precisely because of this strength we
must show modesty and peaceful intentions.
On the contrary, we cannot have the same
attitude towards a country stronger than us,
as France for example.
For these reasons I want to repeat that the
Vietnamese Government is striving to re-
establish normal relations with Cambodia on
an equal basis.
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In reply to another question, he said he
knew nothing of Cambodia's intention to ex-
hibit the Chantrea victims' bodies but ad-
mitted that damage done to the Cambodian
border village was heavy.
"Just Imagine that a 1-ton bomb makes
a crater 35 feet wide and you'd realize," he
drifted off in a visibly moved mood.
Asked to comment on a recent statement
by U.8. Defense Secretary McNamara that ex-
tension of the war to North Vietnam Is not
entirely ruled out, the Prime Minister said
that was "a question of grand strategy, and
the enemy always would like to know what's
in our minds."
"All I can say as a general Is that to be on
the defensive is to lose and to be on the of-
fensive is to win.
"However, military actions above the 17th
parallel have Important International impli-
cations and I can't answer you in detail. I
can only let you know that we can repay
Communist aggression, and there are many
ways we can do that, not only with flags
flying and drums beating."
KNOW BETTER
In answer to a newsman's question about
his reaction to a recent statement by a U.8.
Senator (WAYNE MORSE of Oregon) to the
effect that all South Vietnam "isn't worth
the blood of one American soldier," General
Khanh said:
"If I were an American citizen, I would
never vote for such a Congressman. Be-
cause the Americans in Vietnam are fighting
for a just cause-freedom-to oppose the in-
ternational Communists' Invasion of a small
nation.
"I am ready to invite that Congressman
to come and live here with the Americans in
the field. Then he will know better,"
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, how right
he is about some of that military aid
coming back to us. I referred previously
to the Incident when a small military
plane was caught dropping a fire bomb
inside Cambodia, which course of con-
duct could not possibly be justified on
humane grounds.
Mr. President, I have another letter.
Tomorrow, or next day, or the day
after, or in the near future, I shall have
another collection of letters to put in
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, many of
them from South Vietnam. News has
reached there that some of us in the
Senate dare to speak out in opposi-
tion to this policy. So I am hearing from
them.
The next letter, Mr. President, is dated
April 1, and reads as follows:
DEAR SIR: Today I read an article about
you in the Pacific Stars and Stripes. I'd
like to congratulate you and say I'm behind
you 100 percent. Many others here share
your viewpoints.
You "hit the nail on the head" about the
statement aimed at the Philippine President.
We are the only ones here sitting as targets
for the Communists. Believe me, the Reds
are hitting those targets too. And then
they say we're not actually "in" the cold(?)
war.
I also believe in the fact that the Com-
mander In Chief should speak up. He's
evaded the situation long enough. I believe
this whole thing is a political scandal which
is a 100-percent flop. It's all a political
battle in the U.S. offices.
As for the flag flying at half mast; it'd
be at half mast for many, many days.
I also believe McNamara should've spent
some of his time here talking to the Ameri-
can GI's while he toured the field. No, he
spent It all with the Vietnamese and the big
U.S. officials who probably "snowed" him.
If he actually knew the situation, maybe
he'd change his viewpoints.
The administration should stop and think
of all of our supplies that are being shot
right back at us.
Sir, I appreciated your article very much.
It helped many of us that read it. We're
glad to know someone sees things right,
Nine out of ten of the W's go along with my
feelings.
Again I say "Thank you" for the support.
Keep up the fight. The righteous wins.
P.S. I'd appreciate acknowledgement if
possible.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an article entitled, "Saigon
Criticizes Position of SEATO," written
by Jacques Nevard, and published in the
New York Times for April 9, 1964.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the REcoRn,
as follows:
SAIGON CRITICIZEs POSITION or SEATO--SATs
BAN ON MEETING CovEar AGGRESSION HAM-
rEas IT
(By Jacques Nevard)
SAIGON, SouTB VIETNAM, April 8.-8outh
Vietnam said today that the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization was running the risk
of becoming a "paper tiger," because It con-
sidered its role limited to prevention of open
aggression by Communists.
A statement issued by the government of
Premier Nguyen Khanh said that the sub-
versive struggle being waged by the Chinese
Communists "does not require frontal at-
tack, uniformed soldiers, or even a battle-
front,"
The criticism of SEATO was a result of re-
ports here that Konthi Suphamongkbon,
Secretary General of the eight-nation pact,
said Monday In Manila that there was no
military aggression in South Vietnam and
that the struggle there was only an internal
quarrel between two factions.
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET
The Secretary General, a That citizen, was
interviewed on his arrival in the Philippines
for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of
the SEATO nations-Australia, Britain,
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Thailand, and the United States.
A protocol to the 1984 treaty that estab-
lished the alliance provided an umbrella of
protection for South Vietnam, Leos, and
Cambodia. although they are not members.
In a statement issued by the Foreign Min-
istry. South Vietnam said that never in the
nearly 10 years since the beginning of the
alliance had the Chinese Communists com-
mitted open aggression, "except perhaps in
the cam of the Indian frontier."
The statement said that "Instead of armed
struggle." the Communists "preferred by far
far an Intensive propaganda campaign in ex-
tremist groups in newly Independent coun-
tries, thus creating unyielding infiltrators
more dangerous In the long run for seizing
power than a battalion of soldiers."
CLASSIC IDEAS OBSOLETE
The Foreign Ministry said: "In another
order of ideas, the classic concept of aggres-
sive war, or rather traditional terminology in
military matters, risks being obsolete. In-
ternational law, which governs our treaties,
conceives of aggressive war in the form of
a frontal attack launched by a uniformed
army. But the subversive struggle invented
by the Communists, designed for wars of
liberation, does not require a frontal at-
tack, uniformed soldiers, or even a battle-
front. How, in such cases, can one talk
about war and aggression, much less about
Intervention and armistice?"
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President. I have
other material here, but the Senator
from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE] has arrived in
the Chamber. I understand that we
April 9
are to take up another subject matter
tonight-I am not too sure whether
there has been a change in the.plan,but
this is my speech on McNamara's war
in South Vietnam for today. There will
probably be another one tomorrow and
the day after, so long as the adminis-
tration continues to follow a course of
actioh which I believe is as unsound as
America's unilateral action In South
Vietnam.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
had Intended to discuss the pending bill
some time today, but circumstances have
intervened. Other Senators have been
recognized by the Chair and have oc-
cupied the time until this late hour. I
understand, too, that some agreement or
arrangement was made whereby it was
understood that there would not be an-
other quorum call tonight. I believe
that arrangement was made to accom-
modate a number of Senators who are
now absent and who desire to be ab-
sent.
Under the conditions which prevail, it
would hardly be expected that I would
make a lengthy address this evening on
this important proposed legislation with
the Chamber completely empty except
for two Senators of the majority party
who are now present, besides the occu-
pant of the chair, and with the member-
ship of the minority party, except one,
absent attending some repast, some en-
joyable dinner. I hope that when I speak
on the measure I shall have the presence
of some of our distinguished friends
across the aisle as well as some of my
own colleagues.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.
Mr. BENNE'rr, I wish to make the
observation that even Republicans must
eat, though the fare is sometimes a little
bit scanty.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I am In favor of
that, and I think we ought to recess im-
mediately so that we can all eat. I do
not believe it is fair to permit only the
Republicans to eat with the understand-
ing that there will be no quorum call.
While they dine, some of us must carry
on. As soon as the distinguished Sena-
tor from Oregon returns and finishes
his remarks, it would be very fitting and
very becoming to the dignity of this body
for the Senate then to recess under the
previous order until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning-so I look forward to that mo-
ment that I think would be appropriate
under the conditions that now prevail.
Nil'. President, I spoke on the motion
to consider the bill on the 12th day of
March, One day from now that will be
a calendar month ago. I have been
prepared to speak on the bill each day
subsequent to that day. The reason I
have not is that I have had very little
opportunity to do so. I have been
crowded off the stage. The supporters
of the measure have taken up a great
deal of the available time-and rightly
so. But to date I have been almost a
little peeved at times because I could not
get to speak routinely as the day arrived
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