NEED FACTS, NOT SOFT SOAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780045-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: May 2, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

EAST
cbeclassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780045-4
EXPRESS
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EVENING 47,776
0--, MAY:2 1961
Our Views On The News
Need Facts, Not Soft Soap
Last week a._top adviser to Presi-
dent Kennedy, in an off-the-record
nreeting with newspapermen, en-
gaged in a remarkably far-fetched
rationalization of the U. S.-sup-
ported invasion debacle in Cuba.
One might have gotten the impres-
sion, in hearing him explain
blandly that the action had "crys-
tallized" Latin-American senti-
' ment behind the U. S., that we had
been involved in 44gufat victory
instead of a 12.uwalgoimg xr eat.
. A few days at , eeting
Adolph Berle, special .c etOtant to
tfirreVernty of Sti?te- and :head
of the special KenriedY task force
on. Latin America, took the same
tack in a,talk to the Woman's Na-
tional Democratic Club. Mr. Berle
compared the Cuban action by the
KeiffirdraniiniStration-U Pre-
dent Truman's ..interychtioan
against cOmmunifsgi4Areece and
Turkey. in -104 ?
One might expeet a leading of-
ficial of an administration. con-
cerned with the problems facing
President Kennedy and the nation
today to be somewhat more. atten-
tive to the truths of history. Presi-
dent Truman made his decision to
send American aid to the legally
constituted governments of Greece
and Turkey when it became clear
that they -were the targets of a
Soviet-backed insurrection. In Cu-
ba the roles were reversed. The
Communists were supporting a le-
g9Lgovernment ? no matter how
repugnant that government might
be to the United States which
faced an external threat.
The results of the invasion clem-
onstrated clearly. that the Castro
government in Cnba enloys a stip-
stantial,..ine.asure .of popUlar pup-
port. At least in the face of re-
ewressive measures the majority
I as passive. It failed to rise to
the counterrebellion'S standards,
Ides ite .f ? attributed to the
Cen ra lliagnisk Ageiacy ?
that the Cuban people were ready
to flock to the aid of a deliverer.
,.
1 The Communists of course do not
has evoked such profound shock?
among American allies as well as
neutrals, as evidenced by the Brit-
ish commentary in today's Round-
table column ? is that the United
States, with its professed belief in
the processes of world law, hemi-
spheric cooperation and the United
Nations charter, would become in-
volved in such an action. Even if
the U. S.-supported "invasion" had
succeeded this kind of reaction
would have been -inevitable.
But far from "crystallizing"
Latin-American opinion in favor of
the United States, the Cuban in-
vasion folly appears to have added
new incentiVe to "Yankee imperi-
alism" charge, a in South American
and Caribbean countries. A few
governments openly hAve endorsed
the U. S. action. The majority, at-
tuned to the voices of peasant
workers who identify themselves
with the currents of social revo-
lution, have remained noncommit-
tally politic in their expressions.
Despite Mr. Berle's Alice-in-Won-
derland evaluation of the inva-
sion's results it is obvious that
under any circumstance they be-
long on the debit side of the U. S.
leadership prestige ledger.
Furthermore, although manfully
accepting the full responsibility
himself for this costly failure, the
President, in later attempting to
thrust a share of the blame upon
the press, did not inspire neW con-
fidence in his shaken administra-
tion. He contributed to the aura
of confusion and insecurity, giving.
rise to fear that rash ,new action
would be undertaken as a means
of redressing U. S. losses.
Fortunately our policymakers
now seem to have regained some
degree of equilibrium. Recogni-
tion appears to be increasing that
Cuba, as Laos, is a subsidiary as-
pect to the cold war struggle, and
should be treated as such. Emo-
tional judgments cannot be per-
mitted to compel Us into errors in
circumstances which are 'not cru-
cial to the total free world secur-
ity; into wasting our resources
where they cannot be telling over
Scruple -4- "^
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780045-4