Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 29, 2013
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 5, 1961
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP67-00318R000100790100-1.pdf65.48 KB
Ire Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/29 : CIA-RDP67-00318R000100790100-1 Ivor, ? ? ? 6=4 .44 Ja?-"J pel3 rc7-s yap. CY0'..*.ING STATE TRIBUNE E. 10,122 s. 10,069 ,I,AY 5 ilik? *ofummary of Criticisnis ? .The 49414wA story, Cu- barintsco continues to u Me American gove3nent, faced with a whole clusters'of hair trigger ch the wrong There marizin to get on $t of them. value in ?sum- criticisms. "fr?is:' 1. We Miscalmilated. the possible - weight of ,Fidel Castro's armor and the prospect of a popular Cuban uprising against him. J. A strong and perhaps con- trolling voice in the choice of land- ing spots arid. distribution of rebel forces Was exercised by state de- partment officials backed up' by President. Kepnedy'S- White House foreign policy .advisers. To an outsider, this sounds, like contending that men who might ne- ver have seen a Cuban beach were telling military and intelligence of.: ficers where to land, and with what. 3. Cuban forces trained only for ettrilla warfare and intending to practice it in this instance were sent ashore in a coordinated_ army assault-type landing without the air and naval cover such an attack demands, onto beaches unsuited for any fighting at all. Military critics say guerrilla's should, hit the beach in darkness aird.vanish into ground cover`within 15 minutes. TheSe rebels wallowed in swampland' six to eight hours, ? under Castro's murderous fire, try- ing unsuccessfully to secure their hold. 4. They got their guerrilla train- inenot fro s.. e arin.""Irtnen the 5: ican underground was ? never informed' (r5IITTIcK because rnistrAPsiliggi4L, nor were all , the key rebels, nor was much of the '1 populace whose rising was neces- sary to final success. And top revo- lutionaries were held incommun- icado while U. S. officials issued statenients in their. name.. 1sTo serious consideratioh was given as to how to. meet the conse- quences of failure..' Obviously the Kennedy adminis- tration sought to have its take and eat it, too. It wanted to assist the ; af.,?sault, but_manage it in a manner to play down its intervention. Now it, and all of us as well, , ought to know better. 1c never ? e o r ad -,teen charged with such an assigeiment, having focussed on "small jobs With small groups" bent' on sabo- tage, infiltration, more modest guer- Lrilla effort. ? npriacsified and Approved For Release 2013/05/29: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100790100-1