A SUMMARY OF CRITICISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100790100-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 100
• Publication Date: May 5, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/29 : CIA-RDP67-00318R000100790100-1
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TRIBUNE
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,I,AY 5 ilik?
*ofummary of Criticisnis
? .The 49414wA story, Cu-
barintsco continues to u
Me American gove3nent,
faced with a whole clusters'of hair
trigger ch
the wrong
There
marizin
to get on
$t of them.
value in ?sum-
criticisms. "fr?is:'
1. We Miscalmilated. the possible
-
weight of ,Fidel Castro's armor and
the prospect of a popular Cuban
uprising against him.
J. A strong and perhaps con-
trolling voice in the choice of land-
ing spots arid. distribution of rebel
forces Was exercised by state de-
partment officials backed up' by
President. Kepnedy'S- White House
foreign policy .advisers.
To an outsider, this sounds, like
contending that men who might ne-
ver have seen a Cuban beach were
telling military and intelligence of.:
ficers where to land, and with what.
3. Cuban forces trained only for
ettrilla warfare and intending
to practice it in this instance were
sent ashore in a coordinated_ army
assault-type landing without the
air and naval cover such an attack
demands, onto beaches unsuited for
any fighting at all.
Military critics say guerrilla's
should, hit the beach in darkness
aird.vanish into ground cover`within
15 minutes. TheSe rebels wallowed
in swampland' six to eight hours, ?
under Castro's murderous fire, try-
ing unsuccessfully to secure their
hold.
4. They got their guerrilla train-
inenot fro s.. e arin.""Irtnen
the
5: ican underground was
? never informed' (r5IITTIcK because
rnistrAPsiliggi4L, nor were all
, the key rebels, nor was much of the
'1 populace whose rising was neces-
sary to final success. And top revo-
lutionaries were held incommun-
icado while U. S. officials issued
statenients in their. name..
1sTo serious consideratioh was
given as to how to. meet the conse-
quences of failure..'
Obviously the Kennedy adminis-
tration sought to have its take and
eat it, too. It wanted to assist the ;
af.,?sault, but_manage it in a manner
to play down its intervention.
Now it, and all of us as well,
, ought to know better.
1c never ? e o r ad -,teen
charged with such an assigeiment,
having focussed on "small jobs
With small groups" bent' on sabo-
tage, infiltration, more modest guer-
Lrilla effort. ?
npriacsified and Approved For Release 2013/05/29: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100790100-1