STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090075-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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February 17, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 2151
to U.S. officials. Upon his release, Professor
Barghoorn made the interesting remark
that "under Soviet law one can be accused
of conducting intelligence activity merely
by walking down the street, especially if one
has hostile intentions against- the Soviet
State-hostile, that is, in the opinion of
the appropriate authorities."
It was only after President Kennedy or-
dered the postponement of a new cultural
exchange agreement and stated publicly that
the incident might affect the sale of wheat
to the Soviet. Union that Soviet authorities
released him. Similarly, in the more recent
Kazan-Komarek case, the Czechs effected the
release of a United States citizen only after
visas were denied Czechs wishing to visit the
United States, and only after it was hinted
that credits for purchases in this country
would not be extended by the Export-Import
Bank.
By the same token, we should not over-
look the complicity of the Soviet Govern-
ment in the Kazan-Komarek case. It was
the Soviet Union which diverted a sched-
uled international aircraft to facilitate the
seizure of an American citizen. Did the
Soviet Union pause to consider that such an
action might damage the case of the consular
convention which it knew would shortly be
before the U.S. Senate? Apparently not.
The point is that this convention is not
going to deter Communist governments from
falsely arresting U.S. citizens on trumped-
up "espionage charges." Professor Barghoorn
was arrested in Moscow, where we have a
fully-staffed embassy capable of dealing with
such incidents. He was released because of
pressure from Washington and a threat to
postpone or cancel certain things which the
Soviets wanted. Likewise, Mr. Kazan-
Komarek was arrested in Prague, where we
also have an embassy, and was released only
because the Czechs feared that we would
actually go ahead with our threat to cancel
commercial credits.
Now, far more attention has been given to
the possibilities that this convention will
enhance Soviet intelligence capabilities in
this country. I do not think there is any
question that Soviet intelligence operations
will benefit if consulates are established,
and I base this conclusion on what is gen-
erally known about the intelligence ap-
paratus of the U.S.S.R. Nor do I have reason
to doubt that the presence of some U.S con-
sular officials in a Soviet city will add to our
own knowledge of current Soviet affairs. But
I suspect that, given the nature of Soviet
society-that is to say, a police state which
has always maintained an extremely strict
internal security apparatus aimed as much
at its own citizens as at foreigners-we will
benefit less from such an arrangement than
will the Soviets. The argument that ours
will be the greater advantage assumes that
American consular agents and other officials
will have approximately the same access to
Soviet citizens and their sources of informa-
tion as Soviet agents presumably will have to
U.S. citizens. That assumption is patently
unrealistic.
However, I do not claim competence to
discuss in great detail the question of in-
ternal security in the United States. The
record of Soviet performance throughout the
world is generally known, and has recently
been described in a book known as The
Penkovskiy Papers.
One Senator has pointed out quite cor-
rectly on the floor of the Senate that real
espionage agents-i.e., deep-cover agents-
do.not operate openly from diplomatic and
consular establishments. But we should not
fail to consider the question of whether the
presence of one or more Soviet consulates
would increase the organizational efficiency
of the Soviet espionage apparatus.
In the end it will be for our own internal
security officials to decide whether the ex-
pansion of Soviet intelligence operations
constitutes a manageable problem. It is my
understanding that this issue is still under
consideration.
Another point of interest relating to the
convention is the provision of Article 2, Para-
graph 2 stipulating that consular officers
shall be entitled to further the development
of commercial, economic, cultural and scien-
tific relations. Would this include the right
for us to establish libraries and dissemina-
tion centers for books, articles, pamphlets
and other printed information pertaining to
life in the United States? Would an in-
terested Soviet citizen be able to read U. S.
newspapers at an American consulate? And
if he were able to do so, would he be dis-
couraged from doing it regularly? What
would be within the rights of Soviet con-
sular officials in the United States in this
respect? What would they be allowed to
distribute?
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, be-
fore concluding my statement, I would like
to return to the broader considerations gov-
erning my views of the instrument now be-
fore this Committee
There is a widespread opinion that the
Soviet Union is now embroiled in overwhelm-
ing domestic and foreign problems, and that
these problems have gradually forced the
Soviet leaders to steer a "more realistic and
pragmatic" path in dealings with their own
people and with the world. Many hold that
the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was
the great watershed of American-Soviet
relations.
It is argued that the dispute between the
Soviet Union and Communist China, coupled
with the "polycentric" process in Eastern
Europe has caused the Soviet leaders to make
new assumptions about the West in general,
and about the United States in particular.
Some, observing certain readjustments and
reorganizations in the Soviet and East Euro-
pean Communist states, go so far as to argue
that these countries are "becoming capi-
talistic." There are even some who go be-
yond these positions to argue that the United
States and the Soviet Union are on a "con-
vergence footing," and that it is only a mat-
ter of time before the two nations will per-
ceive that commonly held interests will
"force" them to act together to preserve
world peace.
It is certainly true that the form of the
Soviet threat to the United States and, for
that matter, to Western Europe, has changed.
But it is, in my judgment, an error to say
that its nature has changed. It is also true
that there have been changes within the
Soviet Union, and that on first glance they
appear to constitute "liberalization." In
fact, there have not yet been introduced in
the Soviet Union (or in the "polycentric"
East European States) institutional guar-
antees for a real liberalization. Any student
of democracy would agree that such guar-
antees must be made permanent before one
can speak of true liberalism.
While we in the West speak of concilia-
tion with, and change within, the Soviet
Union, the Soviet leadership constantly re-
affirms that the goals of the two "opposed
systems" are absolutely irreconcilable. Typi-
cal of this constant reaffirmation is the state-
ment made by Leonid Brezhnev just two
weeks ago on the "Current Tasks of the
Young Communist League." He said:
"We must not overlook the fact that we
are living at a time of bitter class struggle
of two worlds-the world of socialism and
the world of capitalism. In the field of
ideology, as in other fields of our relations
with the world of capitalism, socialism is
in a state of historic offensive, capitalism
[is] on the defensive. The ideological in-
fluence of socialism, the impact of our Marx-
ist-Leninist ideoloy, of our successes in the
upbuilding of a new society upon the minds
of the masses in the capitalist countries is
tremendous. This influence is mounting day
after day, eroding the pillars of capitalism
from within."
He also said: "We regard ourselves part
and parcel of the world system of socialism,
a detachment of the world army of fighters
for freedom . [and] for the victory of
socialism and communism all over the
world."
As one who observes the activities of the
international Communist movement, I find
this statement in accord with the traditional
foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and in
accord with its historical and oft-repeated
goals. It is a matter of record that the
Soviet Union has shifted, but intensified, its
strategic operations directed against the
United States, which is regarded as the prin-
cipal "enemy." It is also a matter of record
that the Communist movement itself has
expanded rather than contracted. There are
some 90 Communist Parties in the world to-
day, with a membership of approximately 50
million. Fourteen Communist states exer-
cise governmental power, forty operate clan-
destiny, and thirty-six function "legally."
The overwhelming majority of these Com-
munist Parties, it should be noted, support
the Soviet Union and its policies.
In the past ten years, and despite the
differences between the Soviets and the Chi-
nese, the Communist movement has under-
gone a degree of consolidation, and the stra-
tegic emphasis has shifted to the underde-
veloped world. Most striking evidence for
this statement is the so-called Tricontinental
Movement established in Havana in January
1966. It has been a source of astonishment
to me that virtually no official attention has
been given to the Tricontinental Move-
ment. These developments are of direct
concern to this Committee and to both
branches of Congress. They relate to the
consideration of our over-all foreign policy,
as well as to the consideration of pacts such
as the consular convention.
The available evidence shows that the So-
viet Union is making a substantial commit-
ment in Latin America through this Havana-
based organization. That commitment is to
a broad-based revolutionary struggle, includ-
ing armed struggle. As the Pravda editorial
of December 7, 1966 put it:
"It has been shown that the securing of a
peaceful international atmosphere increases
the opportunity for the victorious develop-
ment of the class struggle by the proletariat
and the struggle by the oppressed peoples for
their social and national liberation in any
form, including through national liberation
wars."
If we ignore the standard Communist
cliches in this statement, we will see that
the Soviet Union clearly sides with the
program for subversion and armed insur-
rection which comes under the heading of
"national liberation warfare," and which is
the essence of the "Tricontinental Move-
ment."
It was in this spirit that the Vietcong rep-
resentative in Havana, Nguyen Due Van, said
in an interview on January 5 of this year:
"Within a short time there will be not
just one Vietnam, but many Vietnams, and
the Yankees will not be able to handle so
many attacks at the same time."
Thus, when we, speak of the "dialogue"
with the Communist world, we should keep
in mind that the Communists, including
the Soviet Union, have one language for the
industrialized West and another for the rest
of the world. Which of these diametrically
opposed approaches should we take as genu-
ine and sincere?
The assumptions underlying the process
of bridge-building to the East are, in my
view, not in accord with present realities.
The record shows that the Soviet Union and
its allies do not enter into agreements, such
as the one before this Committee, on the
basis of good faith. Instead of genuine
bridges with a two-way traffic, the Soviet
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S2152U CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February 17, .1967
Union seeks a temporary escape hatch which
will provide a measure of security and stabil-
ity while it achieves certain other goals-
most notably an expansion of its power and
influence, hopefully with 'Western assistance.
The consular convention, as a part of the
"package" of agreements which form the
basis for "building bridges" is, under present
conditions, clearly premature.
BISHOP PIKE'S DISSERVICE TO
CHRISTIAN RELIGION
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, ac-
cording to an Associated Press article
published in the Washington Evening
Star of February 8, 1967, Bishop James
A. Pike has urged the Young men of this
country to disobey the legally consti-
tuted authority invested in the President
and refuse to enter the Armed Forces. I
should like to point out several aspects
of this extraordinary suggestion by the
Bishop:
First, Bishop Pike is urging our youth
to act on a mass basis, instead of on the
basis of individual decision.
Second, his statement that "Johnson is
not willing to negotiate" is in direct con-
tradiction of every pronouncement the
President and his top officials have made
on the subject, and is an imputation of
dishonesty.
Third, he characterizes the moral duty
of men to obey their lawful superiors un-
der lawful rules of war as "murder," a
tendentious term to say the least.
All of this I find deeply disturbing in
a man who sets himself up as an arbiter
of ethics. Moral science requires the ut-
most detachment and objectivity. Moral
problems cannot be solved in the midst of
emotion-laden controversy. Bishop
Pike does himself a disservice, and a dis-
service to the Christian :religion which he
claims to represent.
Moreover, the position which he urges
is highly undemocratic, in contradiction
of what one would suppose to be the prin-
ciples of the organization for which he
works, the Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions. The procedures
which Bishop ]Pike urges are not the
principles of democracy as it is under-
stood in our American Republic.
Mr. President, Bishop Pike turns the
basic right of dissent into pure anarchy.
When he proposes dissent on a mass
basis he is urging mob a-,tion, and the
overturning of the fundamental assump-
tions of free government. He sets up
his own whims as the rule of popular
action. He deliberately seeks to short-
circuit the democratic process.
1, myself, have often. dissented from
actions and policies pursued by the
President. It is entirely possible that I
may dissent from them in the future.
But for dissent to be democratic, it must
remain within the rules of government.
The genius of the American system is
that it provides procedures for a wide
variety of free expression, and offers or-
derly methods for minority opinions to
leaven the quality of government. Nei-
ther the tyranny of the minority nor
the tyranny of the majority holds sway
in the United States. Both minority and
majority have opportunity not only to be
heard, but to affect directly the course of
legislation and executive action. The
rights of both are protected by order.
But free government assumes that all,
citizens must abide by the decisions of
the democratic process. For that proc-
ess, as I have just pointed out, is not,
simply majority rule, but a rule in which
all can affect government to some ex-
tent. When Bishop Pike calls for mass
dissent from the democratic process, he
is placing an intolerable burden upon the
organs of the state. It is a burden which
will lead to the collapse of order, and to
the collapse of freedom. For this rea-
son, Bishop Pike's proposal is subversive
of this Nation's self-interest and survi-
val. And when American youth are dy-
ing to assure that survival, Bishop Pike's
proposal is tantamount to treason.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the Rscoso an
article entitled "Pike Suggests Youth.
Refuse To Go to War," published in the
Washington Evening Star of February
8, 1967.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PIKE SUGGESTS YOUTHS REFUSE To Go TO WAR
GETTYSBURG, PA.-Bishop James A. Pike
says that If President Johnson refuses to
negotiate for peace in Vietnam, the young
men in this country, "as a last resort," should.
refuse to go into the armed forces.
"Peace in Vietnam depends on Johnson's
willingness to negotiate," the former Epis..
copal bishop of California said yesterday at
a news conference on the Gettysburg College
campus. "'What's holding us up is that,
Johnson is not willing to negotiate.
"As a last resort, we would give serious
consideration to conscientious objection on.
a mass basis. The boys should stick together
In refusing to go in.
"The alternative of being put into a, peni-
tentiary is better than having to murder
people."
Bishop Pike said that although ;ae faked
an eye test to join the Navy in World War II
he could not in good conscience go to Viet-
nam.
"I do not believe it is just wars' he said.
He added however, that he Is opposed to
the United States pulling out of Vietnam be-
cause it would leave that country "in a
chaotic state." He said we should stay there
and negotiate, but that the bombing should
be stopped.
Bishop Pike, who resigned as bishop of
California last year to join the Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions at
Santa Barbara, came to Gettysburg Monday
to deliver a two-day series of lectures.
LADIES GARMENT WORKERS
PRAISE RAISE IN MINI-WAGE
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
I commend to the attention of Senators,
a resolution of the International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union commending
President Johnson and Congress for
their unstinting efforts in the last Con-
gress to amend the minimum wage Act.
The 1966 Fair Labor Standards Act
amendments, beginning February 1, will
provide millions of American citizens in-
creased wages and the dignity that comes
with a fair wage.
I consider it highly significant that
the ILGWU, which was born in strife
and has fought long and hard to see
that every working man and woman is
able to earn a living wage, considersthis
legislation a "pillar of progress."
While citing the rapid advances in so-
cial legislation in recent years, the union
properly reminds us of the "still un-
finished business before the Nation, in-
cluding expansion of social security and
unemployment insurance programs." In
urging swift passage of this important
legislation by the Congress, the ladies
garment workers' union call upon their
own 442,318 members, all labor and the
community to work toward that accom-
plishment.
The text; of the resolution addressed to
President Johnson reads:
In America's continuing war against
poverty, the minimum wage of $1.40 an hour
that goes into effectFebruary 1, 1967 repre-
sents a major advance. It lifts earnings
for :millions of low income families, spurs
economic growth, provides greater employ-
mena opportunity and raises the standard
of living for the entire Nation.
This giant step forward is a dramatic re-
minder of the rapid and real advance we
have made toward the goals of the Great So-
ciety. In two years, the Johnson-Humphrey
administration has brought greater Civil
Rights to minorities, better education to
the poor, more medical care for the aged
and the needy, job training for the unem-
ployed-rope to those once without hope.
This adnini.strs,tion has demonstrated
that there is still unfinished business be-
fore the nation with the President's pro-
posal further extending of Great Society
goals including expansion of social security
and unemployment insurance programs.
We urge ,he Congress of the United States
to act speedily on these proposals. We call
upon our members to join with other forces
in the labor movement and the community
to urge speedy passage upon their Congres-
sional representatives.
We cal:: upon our affiliates to keep members
informed on vital legislation before Congress,
on voting records of Congressmen and on the
need to give active grass roots support to the
Administraaion in its battle to realize the
Great Society. This campaign in which we
seek to join with all labor and liberal ele-
men is is not merely to realize present legis-
lation but also to prepare for the crucial
Presidential and Congressional elections of
1968.
In. thanking you for your foresight and de-
termination in this battle, we wish to enroll
in your army for the continuing crusade to
win the objectives of the Great Society. You
have not failed the people of this Nation, we
will not fail you.
Louis STULBERT,
President, International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers' Union.
STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND TBE SOVIET UNION
M:r. THHURMOND. Mr. President, one
of the most critical issues facing our Na-
tion today is the strategic - balance of
power between the United States and
the Soviet Union. In this regard., the
controversy over the production and de-
ployment of an anti-ballistic-missile
system is of prime importance. In my
judgment, Congress should take action
similar to that which it took last year
in providing funds for preproduction
engineering and development for our
own antiba.llist;ic system.
The February issue of Triumph maga-
zine, which is a Catholic journal of news
and opinion, contains an article entitled
"Soviet Missile Power: 'A Credible
Threat' Now." The article was written
by an individual who is identified only
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February 17, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
as Xenophon and is an illuminating dis-
cussion of recent Soviet developments in
the field of ballistic missile defensives.
The individual who wrote the article is
obviously quite knowledgeable in this
field and makes an irrefutable argument
in favor of the U.S. production and de-
ployment of an anti-ballistic-missile
system.
The article has been reprinted in the
current issue of U.S. News & World Re-
port. The facts contained in the article
bear heavily on the decision which will
be facing Congress on this question.
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that
the article be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SOVIET MISSILE POWER: "A CREDIBLE THREAT"
Now
(By Xenophon)
The United States is again at a crossroads
in its efforts to deter a major nuclear war.
The present crisis is traceable primarily to
our lag in the development and deployment
of an anti-ballistic missile system capable of
effective defense against an attack by the So-
viet Union. Secretary of Defense McNamara
recently acknowledged our inadequacy when
he admitted that the Soviet Union is already
engaged in the deployment of an advanced
ABM system.
The crisis is heightened by apparent ad-
vances in the Soviets' offensive capability, no-
tably in the area of multiple warhead tech-
nology. The urgency of the situation is evi-
dent not only to U.S. military experts and
intelligence officials, but also to our Western
European allies, who look to us for the tech-
nology and weapons needed for their own
protection.
So far the Johnson Administration has re-
acted to the Soviet challenge by again post-
poning the deployment of an ABM system,
hoping that diplomacy, possibly resulting in
a new nuclear treaty, will persuade the
U.S.S.R. not to exploit its present lead.
THE BACKGROUND
The dilemma confronting and threatening
us has a history starting in the late 1940's.
It may be better understood by tracing the
major developments affecting U.S. missile
strategy since then.
President Truman's 1949 decision to de-
velop the super bomb established the basis
of U.S. strategic policy for the next fifteen
years. In view of the almost simultaneous
development of a thermonuclear weapon by
the U.S.S.R., his decision came none too soon.
The hydrogen bomb not only multiplied the
potential striking power of U.S. manned stra-
tegic bombers, but by reducing warhead
weight paved the way for favorable recon-
sideration of a previous decision to refuse
approval for the development of ballistic
missiles.
U.S. strategic policy soon adapted to the
technical advances of the missile age. The
concept of balanced offensive and defensive
forces that had prevailed when our principal
strategic weapon was manned aircraft faded
into obscurity. It was replaced 'by the strat-
egy of deterrence based on retaliation with
massive strikes by nulcear weapons. With
the perfection of solid propellants for bal-
listic missiles, which made possible the de-
velopment of the Polaris missile, for under-
water launch, and of ICBM's, which could
be launched from underground silos, U.S.
policy shifted farther still from defensive
concepts. More recently, there has been a
concentration on those offensive forces capa-
ble of a "second strike"-forces, that is, that
can survive a nuclear first strike by an
enemy and retaliate with a counterstrike.
The threat of wholesale nuclear destruction,
therefore, came to be regarded as an adequate
deterrent to a nuclear first strike against
the nation, which it has so far proved to be.
Early proposals to work out a plan of de-
fense against ballistic missiles met with
widespread skepticism in political, military
and scientific circles. A group of military
personnel and scientists in the Army, how-
ever, believed that an effective defense sys-
tem utilizing missiles to intercept missiles
could be constructed. It was not until 1958
that the Army was authorized to go ahead
with research on such a system. Initially,
the project was thought of as a highly re-
fined follow-up to the Army's Nike series of
anti-aircraft systems, and was called the
Nike-Zeus, "Zeus" being the name of the
proposed interceptor missile.
Nike-Zeus used two radar systems sepa-
rately operated: one for acquisition of the
incoming, or target, missile; the other for
tracking the target missile and guiding the
intercepting missile. By the early 1960's the
Army had proved through tests that ballistic
missiles could be intercepted with missiles
for a radiation "kill" on the incoming war-
head within the necessary radius.
These tests failed to satisfy skeptics who
pointed out that in the Army's intercep-
tion tests the operators had prior knowledge
of the approximate time of launch and the
trajectory of the target missile. In addition,
experiments with missile-borne "decoys" had
already provided, proof of their feasibility.
Radar at that stage had little discrimination
capability to distinguish between actual war-
heads and decoys other than the operator's
limited capacity to differentiate "blips" on
his screen.
Despite these objections, the Army team
working on the project was sufficiently en-
couraged by the success of the initial ex-
periments to seek funds for "pre-production
engineering" for the system. Since the ex-
perimenters had adopted a "point" defense
system, its deployment required the mass
production of radar equipment and missiles
for each designated point to be defended (key
cities presumably). Production of the com-
ponents of the system was expected to take
some years. This "lead time" could be re-
duced by pre-production engineering-that
is, by designing the machinery to produce the
system's basic components concurrently with
the development of the more refined compo-
nents of the system.
The Army's request for pre-production
engineering funds was first rejected in the
last year of the Eisenhower Administration.
The request has been made repeatedly since
then, but despite continued improvements in
the Nike-Zeus system, the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations have consistently
turned it down.
By 1963 the total investment in research
and development of the Nike-Zeus system
had passed $1.5 billion. It had demon-
strated by performance that it was equal
to the Soviet system (according to Intelli-
gence information on the latter) in its .abil-
ity to defend selected points against nuclear
missile forces. Improvements in radar,
moreover, had made it possible to distin-
guish warheads from decoys with fair relia-
bility.
FIRST SOVIET DEPLOYMENT
The Army's request in 1963 for pre-pro-
duction engineering funds-to be included
in the fiscal year 1964 appropriation-gained
impetus from the by then certain knowledge
that the Soviet Union was hard at work on
an anti-ballistic missile and had, in fact,
deployed ABM equipment in the vicinity of
Leningrad.
The Army estimated that the total cost of
protecting some twenty-five U.S. cities would
run to $15 billion; the Department of De-
fense predicted it would come to more than
$20 billion. Both estimates included the
$1.5 billion already spent on research and
development. They covered a deployment
and operation period of ten years, with max-
imum expenditure in a given year of approxi-
S 2153
mately $3 billion. The immediate need for
pre-production engineering funds, however,
amounted to only $200 million. But to have
granted that request would, as before, have
amounted to a commitment to deploy an
ABM system.
The Administration, through Secretary of
Defense McNamara, countered with a pro-
posal to undertake development of another,
more sophisticated, system, the Nike-X.
This proposal called for the use of a new
missile, the Sprint, and an advanced radar
system, which would incorporate and inte-
grate the radar functions of acquisition,
evaluation and tracking of the target war-
heads. The Sprint missile, it was claimed,
would utilize far higher acceleration capa-
bilities and intercept targets at lower alti-
tudes than the Zeus missile, although the
latter would still be employed to make initial
interceptions at greater distances. Sprint's
capabilities were designed to improve radar's
ability to distinguish between actual war-
heads and decoys by allowing more time for
evaluation of the incoming targets in a dense
atmospheric environment.
By now close observers began to notice
inconsistencies in the Administration's op-
position to ABM deployment. At the same
time the Administration was urging the
Congress to appropriate some $600 million
for research and development of the ad-
vanced Nike-X system, President Kennedy
advised a news conference that he doubted
that any workable ballistic missile system
was technically feasible. Indeed, Mr. Ken-
nedy's scientific adviser at the time, Dr.
Jerome Weisner, asserted in a paper read
later at the 1964 Pugwash Conference that
such a system could not be perfected, and
if it could, should not be deployed by any
nation.
Nevertheless, grave concern over the con-
tinued delays in an administrative decision
for deployment was expressed by the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee's approval of
appropriation of funds for pre-production
engineering of Nike-Zeus over the adamant
objection of the Secretary of Defense. How-
ever, the Senate overruled the committee's
action and merely approved funds for the
development of the Nike-X project.
Even before acting on appropriations for
the fiscal year 1964 the Senate had been con-
fronted with a new factor in the ABM con-
troversy. This factor emerged when the
Senate's consent was asked during the sum-
mer of 1963 to the partial nuclear Test Ban
Treaty.
By the time the treaty was negotiated
and signed by the U.S., the Army had com-
pleted its design for ABM missiles and satis-
factorily tested and proved the warheads to
be used. The Administration stressed this
point as part of its argument that no fur-
ther testing was needed. However, oppo-
nents of the treaty maintained that it would
inhibit the ABM project and place the U.S.
at a relative disadvantage to the U.S.S.R.
in this field. They based their position on
reports of U.S. Intelligence that the Soviet
Union had tested an ABM system in a
nuclear environment, whereas we had not.
As a result of these tests the Soviet Union
could be assumed to know whether, and to
what extent, its ABM radar would operate
in the presence of nuclear radiation. The
treaty, opponents argued, would preclude
U.S. testing of an ABM system in a nuclear
environment and thus prevent us from as-
certaining its reliability with any degree of
certainty.
The issue of whether a nuclear test ban
might cripple the U.S. in the ABM field was
never really joined during the Senate hear-
ings, True, there was some testimony sug-
gesting the possibility of adducing whether
an ABM system would function in a nuclear
environment from data extrapolated from the
underground nuclear tests that the treaty
did permit. But the idea was never seriously
urged as an adequate answer to the problem.
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One reason is that underground tests could
hardly determine whether radar can "see
through" the radiation caused by the detona-
tion of the warhead of an interceptor missile,
so as to be able to acquire, evaluate an
track a "follow-on" target missile.
Curiously, in this connection-or it may
not be so curious-the official and semi-offi-
cial arguments advanced over the past three
years to justify the continuing opposition of
the Kennedy and Johnsen administrations to
the deployment of an ABM system have never
included as a reason for inaction, have not
even hinted at, this obviously critical diffi-
culty: that the U.S. does not know whether
the best A.BM system it is now able to build
will operate reliably in a nuclear environ-
ment. This explanation would probably
strike many as more convincing than the
anti-deployment arguments that have ac-
tually been offered, for instance, that the sys-
tem costs too much; yet it would amount to
a stunning admission of potential weakness,
and inevitably raise the question of whether
those primarily responsible for the country's
security have prudently discharged their
duties in permitting this apparent disparity
with Soviet technology to arise.
Despite the denial of funds for pre-produc-
tion engineering, the Nike-X system has en-
joyed a relatively high level of expenditure
for research and development since 1963, and
has progressed beyond the hopes of its most
ardent supporters. Not only has the high
acceleration Sprint missile been developed
successfully; but the Zeus missile itself has
been improved, particularly through in-
creased range. Moreover, radical improve-
clients in ABM radar have made feasible the
utilization of the Zeus at increased ranges.
Multifunction array radar, which can perform
the functions of the several types previously
used with enormously increased effectiveness,
has proved. the ABM concept highly reliable
in this particular, and at the same time re-
vealed the possibility of deploying the system
on a broader scale and at lower costs than
previously deemed possible.
Indeed, had the present capability of the
Nike-X system existed in 1963, the oppo-
nents of ABM deployment would have had
far greater difficulty in. preventing appro-
priations for pre-production engineering.
Since that time, however, new factors have
entered the equation that both increase the
urgency of the problem and further compli-
cate it.
In 1965 (when requesting funds for fiscal
1966) the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously
recommended an appropriation for ABM pre-
production engineering and a commitment
for deployment of the system. In 1966 the
Joint Chiefs were again unanimous in this
recommendation; and for fiscal 1967 the
Congress for the first time authorized and
appropriated funds for pre-production engi-
neering on the Nike-X system, despite the
Administration's opposition. Yet to date,
with more than half of fiscal 1967 passed,
the Administration has not released the ap-
propriated funds for expenditure.
The previously unobtainable unanimity
of the military and Congress' reversal of its
own position were not without cause. Dur-
ing the period of the formulation of the mili-
tary budget for fiscal 1966 the Joint Chiefs
became aware from U.S. Intelligence that
the Soviets had begun serious deployment
of an advanced ABM system. In 1966, more
than a year later, this information was com-
municated to the Congress.
THE TIME EQUATION
The U.S.S.R., at this point, had progressed
well beyond the deployment of ABM's around
a major city or several cities; it-had-developed
it comprehensive, advanced and expensive
system. Even more important, the Soviet
system is evidently not a "point" defense
system, but an "area" defense system. It is
geared, that Is to say, not only to defend
cities and concentrations of weaponry, but
to protect military installations that have
already been widely dispersed as a means of
blunting the effectiveness of an enemy at-
tack. Although U.S. Intelligence is aware
of the deployment of the Soviet system, it
is not able to assess confidently the system's
operational capability. The measure of
Soviet confidence in its system is indicated,
however, by the large commitment of re-
sources to its installations--substantial al-
lotments of money and materials, as well as
scientific and technical talent.
Time factors are particularly crucial in the
deployment of a major weapons system of
this kind. The deployment of an American
ABM system is estimated to require five
years at a minimum, starting with the mo-
ment of the decision to deploy. The Soviets,
having productive facilities substantially in-
ferior to ours, will in all probabil:.ty require
an even longer period for complete deploy-
ment. The extent of the U.S.S.R.'s present
lead depends on when the decision for de-
ployment of its advanced system was made
and production begun.
THE SHIFTING BALANCE
The effect of Soviet ABM deployment on
America's capacity to deter nuclear war-in
the absence of any such defensive system
in this country-is dramatic and profound.
Such a development raises doubts, at the
very least, as to whether U.S. retaliatory
strikes car. destroy the Soviet Union, assure-
ing the Soviets strike first. Therefore, if the
Soviets have confidence in the capability of
their ABM system, the completed deploy-
ment of the system could be the factor that
tips the balance in favor of a Soviet decision
to risk a nuclear strike. (The odds favoring
such a decision would be affected, of course,
by the nature of the man or group that holds
power in Moscow at the moment: while any
Soviet leadership must be assumed to be
willing to make the strike if the odds are
right, the enemy estimate as to whether the
odds are right will necessarily reflect human
and political factors not strictly connected
with the military equation.)
A further consideration must be kept ':n
mind. Even should the U.S.S.R.'s confidence
in the capacity of its ABM system prove un-
founded-:..e., should the Soviets attack, and
then discover that their A13M system has
failed-it remains that the U.S. objective
of deterrence would also have failed. The
effectiveness of a deterrent depends not on
whether retaliation will inflict unsupportable
damage on a potential attacker, but on
whether the attacker thinks he will incur
such damage.
This is an important part of the reason
why proponents of immediate deployment
of the Nike-X system are approaching the
problem with such urgency. They believe
that nothing less than actual deployment
by the U.S. will offset the all-too-subjective
factors in the equation of deterrence.
But the issue no longer remains this
clear-cut. New developments outside the
ABM field have further complicated the
issue for U.S. policymakers.
In the past, objections of various ad-
ministrations to deployment of the best
available ABM system-notably as expressed
by Secretary McNamara, who has borne the
burden of the case against deployment--
have been based primarily on doubts as to
the effectiveness of such systems, doubts
framed in terms of their "cost-effectiveness"
as compared with the cost-effectiveness of
improved offensive forces. Mr. McNamara
has also insisted that deployment of an
ABM system cannot be justified, unless ac-
companied by an extensive shelter program.
Moreover, he has questioned whether an
ABM system can be effective against a mas-
sive attack of sophisticated. missiles. It
should be noted in this latter regard, how-
ever, that until very recently McNamara has
attributed to the Soviet Union an offensive
missile capability considerably smaller than
that required for a very large sophisticated
attack.
All of these considerations have been af-
fected by recent breakthroughs in weapons-
but not only in the ABM field. Compara-
ble advances have been made in offensive
systems. The potential significance of these
latter developments, together with Soviet
ABM deployment, would seem to require a
complete reassessment of U.S. deterrent cap-
abilities and deterrence policies.
Recently, the U.S. has cautiously dis-
closed that the employment of multiple
warheads on a, single missile is not only
theoretically feasible, but within the com-
petence of the existing art of weaponry.
Now, there would be little advantage to land-
Ing several small warheads, instead of one
large one on a single target. Therefore the
significance of the multiple warhead devel-
opmnen t obviously lies in the capacity of
such weaponry to direct the several war-
heads carried by one missile to individual
ta:rgets separated by substantial distances.
The Soviets naay be less advanced in this
area, but they are certainly close abreast of
U.S. multiple warhead technology.
The :full irr.portance of this comparatively
new development becomes apparent only
when contemporary multiple warhead tech-
nology is viewed to the light of the Soviets'
long-held advantage in the thrust capacity
of ballistic missiles. The U.S., as the testi-
mony on the :nuclear Test Ban Treaty clearly
revealed, has considered infeasible the de-
velopment of large-yield warheads, or of
missiles with the thrust necessary to lift
such warheads. The Soviets, by contrast,
have emphasized larger warheads, as well as
the missile delivery capability to lift them to
target.
Several factors account for these different
trends in missile development. On the one
hand, the superior U.S. productive capacity
lends itself to the acquisition of a large
number of missiles. On the other, U.S. in-
dustry and population are significantly more
concentrated than the industry and popula-
tion of the U.S.S.R. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the U.S. has emphasized a
larger number of missiles, with smaller war-
heads, designed to cover a greater number of
targets; while the Soviets have emphasized
fewer missiles, with larger warheads, designed
to cover the comparatively fewer American
targets.
The reasons for this disparity in weapons
system strategy help explain why the devel-
opment of a multiple warhead capability-
assuming the level of development on each
side is the same---gives a heavy relative ad-
vantage to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets can off-
set their inferior capacity to produce missiles
in large numbers by equipping their fewer
large-thrust missiles with the multiple war-
heads oracle available by the new technology.
By comparison with this gain on the Soviet
side, the addition of multiple warheads to
our weaponry adds relatively little to the
U.S. offensive capability.
The importance of this relative advantage
may be grasped by considering a single aspect
of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance. Ad-
vances in multiple warhead technology now
raise the possibility that the Soviet Union,
having substantially fewer missiles than the
U.S., but missiles equipped with multiple
warheads, can consider feasible an effective
first strike, not only against U.S. cities, but
against U.S. retaliatory forces.
The far-reaching effect of this development
can be seen by calculating its potential im-
pact on the existing U.S. numerical superi-
ority in strategic missiles. According to re-
leased Defense Department figures, the U.S.
has abort 1,054 ICBM's and some 651) Polaris
missiles, a total of approximately 1,700. U.S.
Intelligence has assessed the strength of
Soviet ICBM's at less than 400, giving the
U.S. a numerical superiority in strategic mis-
sile delivery vehicles of between 4 and 5 to
1. (Such a wide disparity has been con-
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sidered an essential element of U.S. deterrent
strategy because of the initial advantage that
automatically accrues to the side that strikes
the first blow.)
Yet this further factor must be taken into
account. The average lift capability of U.S.
strategic missiles is a weight equivalent to
one megaton. Few of the Soviet ICBM's have
a lift capability of less than 7 megatons, and
most are 10 megatons or more.
It follows that if both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. converted the lift capability of their
strategic missiles to multiple warheads of
approximately one-third megaton size, the
U.S. would multiply the number of its de-
liverable warheads by a factor of three,
while the Soviets would multiply the number
of their deliverable warsheads by a factor of
21 to 30.
Worse still: if the Soviets do indeed man-
age to deploy (as they may be on the brink
of doing) an ICBM capable of lifting the
weight of their 100 megaton warhead, the
U.S.S.R.-with as few as twenty such mis-
siles equipped with multiple warheads of one
megaton each-could acquire the capability
of striking 2,000 targets, more than the en-
tire existing U.S. strategic missile arsenal
can now cover.
This potential diminution of the U.S. de-
terrent capability resulting from probable
Soviet gains in offensive weaponry makes
clear why the issue of ABM deployment is so
critical. If the Soviet offensive capability is
relatively increased; if the U.S.S.R. is able
to defend itself against such missiles in the
U.S. retaliatory force as might survive a Soviet
first strike (our Polaris missiles, for in-
stance); and if the U.S. continues to post-
pone the deployment of any ABM system-
then the danger is very grave indeed.
It is also clear that the ABM issue is no
longer simply "to deploy or not to deploy."
In the light of our Intelligence estimates of
advances in Soviet defensive capability, the
U.S. must decide if the Nike-X system, even
if deployed, would be adequate. For Nike-X,
even with its extended range and improved
capability, remains essentially a "point" de-
fense system-feasible for defense of a city,
but hardly practical, particularly from a cost
standpoint, for defending the deliberately
wide geographical disbursement of the U.S.
ICBM force. Therefore, the U.S. must con-
sider whether to initiate development of an
area-type ABM system. A possible alterna-
tive is to concentrate our ICBM's and deploy
the Nike-X system to defend offensive missile
concentrations as well as cities.
It goes without saying that whatever de-
cision the United States makes regarding
ABM deployment must take into account the
emergence of Red China as a nuclear power
and its prospective entry into the ranks of
nations possessing delivery vehicles of inter-
continental range-possibly within the period
required for complete deployment of an
American ABM system.
POLITICAL MISJUDGMENTS
ABM deployment by the U.S. would also
have a major impact on NATO and Western
Europe, particularly Germany. Inhibiting
the spread of nuclear weapons has been a
prime objective of U.S. policy. A pressing
concern of the Soviets, on the other hand, is
the possibility that West Germany may ac-
quire nuclear weapons. A tacit bargain in
these matters is the principal U.S. hope for
obtaining a treaty banning the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. To this end, the
U.S. has denied to West Germany even a
substantial voice in the control of NATO's
nuclear weapons, a policy that has been
responsible in no small part for the deterio-
ration of NATO as an effective defensive
force.
Yet West Germany, and indeed all of West-
ern Europe, are targeted by hundreds of So-
viet short- and medium-range nuclear mis-
siles, a matter of greater concern by far to
Western Europeans that the threat of Rus-
sian and satellite armies. Therefore, should
the U.S. deploy an ABM system for its own
protection, we must anticipate serious de-
mands by our Western European allies to
build a similar system-possibly as an al-
ternative to maintaining large numbers of
U.S. troops in Europe. Moreover, a denial
of such purely defensive nuclear weapons for
our NATO allies would prove hard to justify.
And therein the dilemma: the deployment
of an ABM system by West Germany, al-
though it would substantially neutralize the
Communist military threat to Western
Europe, would almost surely end whatever
Soviet interests now exist in a non-pro-
liferation agreement.
In fine, the gravity of the decision now
facing U.S. policymakers is the result of a
series of political misjudgments-above all,
misjudgments of the intentions of the Soviet
Union. The partial Test Ban Treaty, signed
in 1963, was publicly interpreted by the
Administration, and by much of the com-
munications media, as a signal that the
Soviet Union had learned a lesson and had
abandoned efforts to achieve nuclear su-
periority. U.S. Intelligence has accumu-
lated voluminous evidence indicating a quite
different disposition on the part of the So-
viets, but the public impression of a genuine
nuclear detente between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. has been permitted to persist.
Even as the Test Ban Treaty was con-
summated, the Soviets were launching a
broadscale research and development pro-
gram for qualitative breakthroughs in
strategic weaponry. The Soviet attempt to
develop new ICBM's was pressed on an un-
precedented scale, and has even been pub-
licized to a degree by displays in military
parades. Of still greater significance, the
U.S. has been aware of the U.S.S.R.'s effort
to increase its capacity to produce weapons-
grade nuclear material.
By contrast, the American effort in the
field of strategic weaponry has steadily
diminished since the signing of the Test Ban
Treaty. In fiscal 1962 U.S. expenditures for
strategic forces totaled more than $11 bil-
lion. Since then U.S. expenditures for
strategic forces have declined each year; in
fiscal 1967 they reached a low of $6.5 billiofi.
To the charge of procrastination and fail-
ure to meet the challenge of Soviet strategic
weaponry developments, Secretary McNamara
has consistently replied that the U.S.,
through continuing research, was "keeping
the options open," on various strategic sys-
tems. But it is now clear that the option
time is running out. Unless decisions are
made soon, the danger of nuclear war could
vastly increase to say nothing of the danger
of successful nuclear blackmail.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. is there
further morning business? If not,
morning business is concluded.
THE CALENDAR
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
the Senate proceed to the consideration
of items on the calendar in sequence, be-
ginning with Calendar No. 15, Senate
Resolution 21.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THE COM-
MITTEE ON FINANCE
The Senate proceeded to consider the
resolution (S. Res. 21) to provide addi-
tional funds for the Committee on Fi-
nance.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
the order for the quorum call be re-
scinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
members of the staff of the pertinent
committees be given the privilege of the
floor today during the consideration of
the money resolutions on the calendar.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so order.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
the order for the quorum call be re-
scinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR FOR
SENATE RESOLUTION 16
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, due to a clerical error, the
name of the distinguished junior Sena-
tor from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] was not
included in the list of cosponsors of a
resolution introduced by my distin-
guished colleague, the senior Senator
from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH],
Senate Resolution 16, to create a stand-
ing Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
while it was being held at the desk.
Therefore, at Senator RANDOLPH's re-
quest, I ask unanimous consent that the
name of the Senator from Kansas [Mr.
PEARSON] be added at the next printing
of Senate Resolution 16.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, because of a clerical error, the
name of the Senator from West Vir-
ginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] was omitted from
the list of cosponsors of S. 917, the Safe
Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967.
I ask unanimous consent that Senator
RANDOLPH's name be added to this bill at
its next printing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February 17, 19'67
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent th at the order for the
c;uorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSALS IN THE PRESIDENT'S
CONSUMER MESSAGE POINT THE
WAY
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, Presi-
dent Johnson, in his consumer message,
sounded a new note in our national life.
The President has served notice that the
American people can and we must be pro-
tected in our homes, our daily lives, our
economic decisions, and in this compli-
cated and interdependent world in which
we live.
Life, in the age of the caveman, had its
dangers. Man. developed means to cope
with them. Life today also has its dan-
gers, its risks, its hazards, its uncertain-
ties. We cannot eliminate these elements
of life. We can take steps to help a pru-
dent man to face these factors and learn
how to live with them. The reasonable
and farsighted proposals set out in Pres-
ident Johnson's consumer message point
the way.
The proposals extend virtually to every
facet of modern living. They each de-
serve our most serious consideration but
at this time I would like to discuss three
of them.
The National Commission on Product
Safety is important to every home in
America. Who among us is not aware of
the hazards which lurk in the technol-
ogy-crammed houses of the country to-
day? The National Commission on Prod-
uct Safety should provide the users of
products with some assurance of safety.
The Commission should provide manu-
facturers of products with assurance that
their mass-production techniques for
giant markets will not be thrown into
chaos because of differing and conflict-
ing State and local laws aimed at as-
suring product safety. A joint resolu-
tion to establish such a Commission has
been introduced in the Senate by Sen-
ators MAGNUSON and COTTON, and in the
House by Congressman. Moss.
Amending the Flammable Fabrics Act
of 1953 should go far toward reducing
the 3,000 deaths per year caused by burns
from clothing fires. The act will also be
broadened to include interior furnishings,
such as upholstery, foam padding, drap-
eries, and rugs.
Any nation which suffers more than
12,000 deaths each year and more than
$13/4 billion in property losses due to fires,
clearly needs a national fire safety pro-
gram. There is no simpler argument for
it. I cannot imagine any rational argu-
nlent against it. But we are not creating
a new bureaucracy here. The rationale
behind the proposal envisions support
and expansion of existing programs,
wherever possible.
It may be argued that no message is
perfect, and no draft Legislation is ideal.
One thing, however, is clear. This mes-
sage from President Johnson, and the
legislative proposals contained in it can-
not be ignored. The needs of people,
babies, growing children, housewives,
working men and women, businessmen,
are displayed before us here and now.
The rest, of course, is up to the legis-
lative process. It is my fervent hope that
the President's proposal will be given
speedy consideration, rapid direction,
and ultimate success by Members of the
Senate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
URBAN REHABILITATION
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, in
the February 1967 issue of the Practical
Builder magazine a very fine and
thought-provoking article is published,
entitled "A Realistic Look at Rehabilita-
tion."
I ask unanimous consent to have this
article printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed :in the RECORD,
as follows :
A REALISTIC LooK AT REHABILITATION
Rehabilitation offers the biggest single area
of expansion for the building business today.
To the ill-prepared, it also offers plenty
of pitfalls that have left many builders with
a very bad after-taste and vows of "never
again."
However, the growing number of success
stories and the slump in housing starts are
making rehabilitation attractive to many
builders.
Few bu.lders can Ignore the increasing
number of programs directed towards pump-
ing vast sums of money into our cities' worst
slums.
Despite the actual dollars or units in-
volved, "rehabilitation is a job of massive
financial and human lnvest:men that can
best be accomplished by the private sector,"
according to David Rockefeller, president of
the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City.
What, exactly, is rehabilitation?
If you ask one hundred experts you get
one hundred different answers.
The Department of Housing and Urban
Development has never clear'y defined
rehabilitation.
"Rehabilitation is not a program of tinker-
ing-with a ranch house in the suburbs, nor
is It splashing a little paint over the cracked
plaster of a rundown tenement,' says HUD
Secretary :Robert C. Weaver. "To no a re-
habilitation job across the nation of enough
size and quickly enough to avoid creating
less housing than becomes obsolete, rehabili-
tation must become a major new industry."
James Henderson, rehabilitation director
of the Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Au-
thority, says, "remodelers who have been
doing rehab say that home builders are the
ones who :should be."
Rehabilitation is not remodeling warmed
over and called by a new name. I; is a whole
new industry.
"The great step forward is urbane rehabili-
tation," says builder Phillip :Lindy of Phila-
delphia. "It's a different world, but the po-
tential is great. It starts people moving in
rather than out."
Rehabilitation involves the conversion, de-
conversion and reconversion of dwelling units
and non-residential buildings. It starts with
buildings that have become uninhatbitable
by acceptable standards of decent, safe and
sanitary housing.
The normal goal of rehabilita,lAcn is to
bring these buildings up to mininram stand-
ards prescribed in the building code. But
most often, when rehab work gets started,
the end result is a quality standard much
higher than the minimum. While the exact
size of the rehab market may never be
known, many experts, including HUD Secre-
tary Robert C. Weaver, estimate it at between
eight and nine million dwelling units. This
does not include the non-residential rehab
market, which is estimated to exceed $10
billion.
According to Larry Blackmon, past presi-
dent of NAHB, our national housing goals
should include an annual volume of 500,000
rel-.abilitated dwelling units.
At this rate, it, would take at least eight
ye:=.rs to rehabili:ate the homes and apart-
ments of four million urban families now
living in substandard housing, providing no
additional units sank below the line.
According to recent figures from the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, there are $12 million in rehab proj-
ects in progress and another $30 million re-
served under vanous FHA programs in New
Ycrk, Chicago and Pittsburgh.
In addition, there are $9 million in rehab
projects under way in New York and Chicago
under various public housing programs, with
another 56.5 million reserved for future
projects.
In Phil idelphia, a joint public 'housing-
private enterprise experimental program to
rehabilitate about 1500 vacant, single-family
rowhouses nears completion.
However, the rehab market is not limited
to the major cities. For example, a recently-
annourced urban renewal project in Evans-
dale, Iowa, cans for the rehabilitation of 750
homes and apartments.
A similar project in Georgetown, Tex., will
require the rehabilitation of over 200 dwell-
Ing units.
In Lorain, Otio, over 500 buildings, most-
ly :residential, bu: with some light commer-
cial, wi''l be rehabilitated under a new urban
renewal. program.
HO W TO TAP THE MARKET
There are several ways a builder can get
into the rehab market. He can bid for or
negotiate contracts with any of the numer-
ou, public? quasi-public and private bodies
which are sponsoring rehab projects.
Some cities, such as New Haven, Conn.,
maintain lists of approved rehab contractors,
which are distributed to residents of fed-
erally-designated urban renewal or code en-
forcement areas.
In many instances, the builder buys, re-
habilitates and resells homes and apartment
buildings. He may do this on his own or as
part of a sponsoring group, to take advan-
tage of federal programs for rehab.
Briefly, these programs include:
Section 220--Loans for rehabilitation of
homes and apartment structures is fed-
erally-designated urban renewal and code
enforcement areas, insured by FHA at a 6%
interest, rate.
Section 221:(d) (3)-Loans to non-profit
and limited dividend sponsors for rehabili-
tation in cities with federally-certified work-
able programs for community improvement.
Loans are insured by FHA at both 3% and
market interest rates.
Section 221(d ) (l) -Loans to sponsors, with
no limitations on profit, anywhere in the
nation, insured by FHA at market rate.
bection 213--Loans for rehabilitation and
conversion of rental apartments to cooper-
ative units anywhere in the nation, insured
by FHP., at market rate.
Section 231--Loans for rehabilitation of
housing for the elderly, insured by FHA at
market rate. Both 90% and 100% loans are
ava:ilab:.e, depending on the type of spon-
sor.
Section 115--Direct loans up to $10,000
and direct grants up to $1500 to property
owners in designated renewal and code en-
forcement areas for rehabilitation. These
loans and grants are made directly to prop-
erty owners, not to builders.
The details. of these programs are not
nearly as important as understanding re-
habilitation financing.
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090075-4