NEWSPAPER ARTICLES WITH CIA INTEREST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300010009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 29, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGTON
DAILY NEWS
Approved For Release 2002/01408 A9IMP71B00364R00030,q010009-5
-
By R. H. SHACKFORD
Helms reported source of tbSR-may-la b-ChirEce story
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
For a couple of months Soviet officials have faced with a very serious problem if they
Secretary of State William P. Rogers is been trying to peddle all kinds of scare stories made a strike. . . then they would be involved
trying to dampen down what is reported to be thruout th.world to woo sympathy and sup- in a land war with 800 million Chinese. On the
a CIA-inspired scare story that Soviet Russia port against the Chinese. - other hand, ?the Chinese Communists realize
may he thinking about destroying Communist A,.
StateD
Department spokesman conceded that they are not really able militarily to cope
China's nuclear installations with a surprise with the Soviet Union.'
that there have been "rumors" that the Rus-
air strike.
sians might at some stage "take out" the Nevertheless, for many months the Soviet
Mr. Rogers and his associates fear..that the Chinese nuclear installations. But he added union has been going to extraordinary lengths
widely publicized report ? the source of which that these have been unconfirmed and come, to persuade other countries to join them in
Is understood to be Central Intelligence Agen- at best, from second-hand tources. Moscow's anti-Chinese crusade. On March 29
ey director Richard Helms ? will damage the ANYTHING POSSIBLE ' and June 14, the Soviet government delivered
secretary of state's efforts to establish a policy ' to the State Department written statements
of American neutrality in the Sino-Soviet word Department officials take the position that giving Russia's versions of the difficulties
and border war. anything is possible? in the Russian and along the Chinese border.
heard from on this latest intra-administration
The White House in California has not been C - At his last press conference, Mr. Rogers told
Chinese worlds. But what is probable .is some- :
thing else.
of the abnormal diplomatic activities of the
controversy. Nor is it known whether Mr. Rog-. With that caveat, most of the experts '''' on Soviets this way:
ers feels strongly enough to make an issue of both Soviet and Chinese affairs lean to the '
'
It with President Nixon. , theory that the "rumors" of a possible Soviet "The Soviets have gone to embassies all over
But if it should precipitate a showdown, Mr. strike against China are part of Moscow's war Western Europe and this hemisphere present-
, ng
Helms is unlikely to carry as much weight of nerves against Peking. ?i their case against the Chinese, which is
with Mr. Nixon as Mr. Rogers, who is an old Credibility of the "rumors" of a possible So really quite unusual."k
and close friend of the President. viet strike at China's nuclear installations was Officials explained today that these Russian
OTHER COMPLICATIONS put into perspective this way by one observer: diplomatic overtures in no way suggested So-
let military action. On the contrary, the So-
What is most distrubing to State Department "If the Soviet Union is, in fact, planning a bv ets were arguing that they were threatened
So-
officials is that giving even a little credence to surprise attack on China, it is unreasonable to y the Chinese.
the idea of a Soviet pre-emptive strike against believe that the Kremlin hierarchy would tell ,
China plays into tile hands of the Soviet propa_ low-level officials and authorize them to dis-
Why the rumors?
cuss it with non-Russians."
gandists.
EXPECTS NO STRIKE
The Soviet-Chinese border fights and rumors
In addition, It could complicate the Nixon-
Rogers efforts to work with the Soviets on dis- On his recent return from Asia, and after
of a Soviet plan to bomb China's nuclear arse-
Kremlin, several days of discussion with top U. S. offi- nal may be part of an intricate battle of strate-
armament, the Middle East and Vietnam if the
dais in Hong Kong, Mr. Rogers said: ?'? ftS Moscow hopes will produce a change in
wants a pretext for further delay. The
Chinese are expected to regard the report a "The best judgment is that probably the So- ?
"proof" that the United States is ganging up viets will not use its forces to strike against
D Iwo ogearc,binou will not
Wial.
with Russia against Cbkoptiviodlivilgttinaibaggig
Rogers' neutrality effOrt. ' - ?ESCWOBORS100300010009-5t ` . ? . - 1
continued
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Chinese leadership, according to Dr. Richard
C. Thornton, consultant to the State Depart-
ment on Asian affairs. He offered this analysis
of the situation in an interview with United
Press International:
? The current border clashes are Soviet
"probes" aimed at pressuring China and open-
ing the way for establishment of new, inde-
pendent border republics in China. Dr. Thorn-
ton predicted one to three of these republics,
perhaps in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and
Sinkiang, and all controlled by Soviet Puppets,
will be established within the next six months.
? As a result, the Soviets have to be pre-
pared to race the threat of a retaliatory attack -
from Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles which:
are in the final stages of development. The
threat, therefore, that the Soviets might try to
knock out the Chinese nuclear missile installa-
tions before the Chinese could strike is a real
one.
? ? The Soviets would not want all-out war -
with China and so would hope the puppet bor?
-
der republics and the pre-emptive nuclear at-
tack, if they decided to risk it, would fragment -
Chinese leadership. The result could be a civil
war, or perhaps the emergence of pro-Soviet
forces erased from power during Mao Tim- a
Tung's proletarian cultural revolution.01).
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W AS-111 NC; I UN STASIS
Approved For Release 200i1611MiQbf.4-RDP711300364R000300010009-5
INTERPRETIVE REPORT
ked ovet Story?
,
By HENRY BRADSHER heard "rumors," meaning un- here think would escalate into
Star staff Writer confirmed reports, a spokes a a war with world-wide reper-
A number of similar news man said, but he added diplo- cussions?
stories said yesterday that the matically that perhaps they "We think this kind of war
Russians might have leaked were "r eport s," meaning would be injurious to all pee-
word they were considering somewhat more reliable, pie, and we hope it doesn't
bombing Chinese nuclear in- John A. Scali, who reports occur," Secretary of State Wile
stallations as a psychological from the State Department for ham P. Rogers said Aug. 20.
warfare move against Peking. the American Broadcasting Pravda, the Soviet Commu-
The stories attributed word Co., arranged for a selected nist party newspaper, seemed
of the alleged Soviet thinking group of diplomatic correspen-, to agree., It repeatedles**,
to "intelligence reports" or dents to lunch with cm - ? ? . ? ?
just simply "reports." tor Helms. .
None of the dispatches ex- From that luncheon Wednes-
plained what psychological,' day emerged the stories say- ?
warfare considerations there, ing Moscow was checking
might be in having word of a around on what the reaction-
possible Soviet , pre-emptive would be to a hypothetical
strike at China come from ? strike on Chinese nuclear in,t
Washington. stallations.
The motive remained unex- .?A "Backgrounder"
plained because CIA Director , ?
Richard M. Helms, the source e The luncheon was held on a
of the news dispatches, does "background" basis, meaning
not talk much about why they that reporters present could :
do things at the Central Intelli- not identify the source of their,
gence Agency and, apparently,t ? : information in their stories.
he was not asked. The Star did noE have a report-
er present,. and printed a ver-
Old Rumors sion . of the backgrounder
t
Rumors of a possible Soviet transmitted by United Press
,
attempt to destroy China's nu-
International. The "reports" of what the
clear weapons potential before ,
it got too dangerous had been: Soviets might be thinking, said
circulating for some time. the stories, had come first
The rumors sounded.. from Communist party cen-
strangely like echoes of a U.S. facts of the CIA in Italy and.
discussion two &cads ago. , other West European countries
t
Then some "big bomber men" then from Eastern Europe.?
called publicly for the United They were a little vague, cern-'
States to eliminate Soviet nu-
mg from sources of varying
clear installations before the eredibilitYi according to the
Soviet Union became danger- ? news stories.
ously armed with atomic But the newspaper headlines
bombs. ? ., and the, 30-second broadcast
. Now the Kremlin's version summaries focused attention
on the possibility of a Soviet,
of hawkish generals were ru-'
mored to be advising a quick pre-emptive strike. rather than
blow against the Chinese gas- on the vagueness. There was.
eous diffusion plant at Lan- , plenty of attention here and
chow, another plant at Pa-. . abroad to the stories, with;
otow, the test site at Lop Nor some of the versions going
and other nuclear installa- abroad being second-hand dis-;
patches of foreigners uninvited
The State Department had to meet with Helms.
been hearing such rumors for
a couple of months.
Helms Psychology?
. The dispatches faithfully ye-
Moscow Believed Cautious fleeted the suggestion that the
It did not put too much im- Russians might he engaging in!
portanee an them, preferring psychological warfare. There'
to believe Moscow is too can- was an implication that Mos- ,
tious to do it. Continuing bar- cow wanted to warn Peking toi
der clashes were one thing, quit stirr ing up border
but attackineb vital Chinese trouble-eif, in fact, it is the
.sites would lead to a bigger, Chinese rather than the Ruse
'more disastrous war than the sians who are doing the stir-
'Soviets wanted, 'State Depart- ring, whir', uncertain &tom:
:
ment experts thought. The State Department even' Sthi5o, w trying to
had heard the Russians were warn Moscow uul to strike at ,
checking with allies, and China? Was Helms engaged in
friendly Communist parties on '.a little psychological warfare
what the reaction might be to of his own to try to head off an
pre-emptiv_e.
day earlier Soviet charges that
the Chinese are preparing for .
war, adding:
"No continent would be left'.
out if a war flares up under :
the present conditions, with
the existing present-day tech-
nology, with the availability of.
the lethal weapons and the.
up-to4late means of their de',livery" -1
Iftlitag*CIFDPAtit444c12019234_019tititlatIA-RDP71 B00364R00030001 0009-5
THE WASHINGTON FOST
U Approved For Release 2St02/0_1/lie 64?R00Q01,00,09-5
I. Fears Chance of Sino-Soviet War is sini 71B??
it.
de?^N
' By Chalmers M. Roberts As viewed here there are at I The. Nixon administration
Washington Post Staff Writer least three major possible had proclaimed a public policy
? Reports reaching Washing. Soviet tactics:
ton relating to a possible So- 1. A punitive action such asan extensive border clash, ml-
vitt strike at the Chinese nu- tiated by Moscow as: it is be.
clear complex have increased
Nixon administration alarm'
'about the chances of a war be-
tween the two Communist power.
'giants. , , 2. Attempts to subvert" the
According to these reports,
i minority o
the ltygiirnoeuspe side In
in Sin-
at' :
least two in number, the n ciiI
Central Asia where anti-Pc-
have been making king feeling is thought to run
discreet inquiries of some fel- high.
low Communist leaders, both 3. A preventive' strike, by air
Russia Reported Eying Strikes at China
tte
oaf not ? taking sides in the,
?
Chinese-Soviet dispute but The current issue of Peking
rather of trying to improve re-;
alations with both countriosJ
lieved was the case last month Moscow and Peking, however,1
in Central Asia, in which a appear to remain suspieieusi
large Chinese force would be that the United States ? Will,
destroyed by superior Soviet i join the other against its.
? There has been minimal of-.1
.ficial public comment here on
the possibility of a Chinese-So-
viet War, On Aug. 20, however,
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers told a group of college
students that "our best judg-
'bent is that border clashes
those in power in Eastern Eu-: and incidents will 'continue"
- or on the ground.
This latter, by far the most since "we are convinced that
Tope and some out of?power in, serious and thoUght likely to the hostility between them is
.Western. Europe, oh what lead to major conflict if not deep.". He expressed hope
would be the reaction to such all-out war, includes the'strike such clashes would not turn
a Soviet strike. There are no at ?the Chinese' nuclear corn- ,into a war.
reports on the responses. plex about which the new re- Rogers. went on to say that
It appears that the Inquiries nnrfe a 'nnpni-nn1. it Ic, 1..l,llChina watchers in Hongkong
had told him the Soviets had
the capability to "take over a
good section of the country.
near Peking and ,probably Pe-1
king itself." However, it is
widely felt here that the Sovi-
ets would shrink from such a
major attack lest they become
bogged down in a major land,
war in China much as were
the Japanese in the pre World
War II period.
Recent* polemics front Mos-
-cow and Peking show the in-
tensity_ of feeling..Boviet Corn-,
pendent on the single double- munist Party thief Brezhnev-
track Trans-Siberian railway. in June charged that China:
Were first made at the world lieved that such an attack
Communist gathering in Mos- would be with' conventional
cow last June and later re- bombs.
peated at another place. That Perhaps the single most crit-
could not be ascertained yes- ical target in such a case
terday. ' would be the gaseous diffusion
The reports are considered plant at Lanchow which
authentic but it is conceded makes the fissionable material
that they might somehow have for Chinese nuclear weapons.
been surfaced as part a the However, the advantages
Kremlin's psychological war' that the Soviets enjoy in
fare against the Peking re- terms of logistics in Central
gime of Mao Tse-tung. , Asia are thought to be missing
The rishig tension between in Siberia. There, in the Soviet
China and the Soviet Union, Far East, the Soviets are de-
most marked since the clashes
on the Siberian border in
March, has led American offi-
cials to draw up scenarios of
what Moscow and Peking
might do and what the United
States reaction could be. It is
,understood there has been a
'National Security Council
study.
r The sense of alarm over a
possible war has been steadily
irising in Washington form
onths. The border clash in
Central Asia last month con-
siderably accentuated the
alarm.
One key official who only a
month earlier had rated the
chances of a major Chinese-
Soviet fight at about 10 per
,cent recently said that the
phances now are only slightly
,less than 50-50. This sort of
"."4. "talk Is now also widely hear N1
which runs close ' to the'was preparing to wage "both
Chinese border in many places
and which could be cut by an ordinary and a great nu-?
raiding parties. This would be clear war" and declared that;
especially true in the long the Soviet people "are not in-
winter months when the Amur timidated by shouting." Other:
and Ussuri river borders are
.'Russians have rattled their
. ?
own nuclear weapons.
Anatoly V. Kuznetsov, the
prominent Soviet writer who
recently defected in Britain,
told the. New York Times in
1London that the great fear of
:the ordinary Soviet citizen
i today is China. He said Rus-.
slam fear ..a. Chinese attack
and believe war .cannot be
avoided. Even though Kuznet..
soy broke with his own gov-
ernment he put all the blame,
on the Chinese.
A' Peking broadcast on.Augl
14 charged that the Soviets,
have "built a series of airbases
and guided missile bases along
the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mona_
golian borders!' and have
"plotted to gather some of the
satellite troops, of the Warsaw
It is the virtually unanimous
view of those here who follow
China that the Peking govern-
ment would retaliate if there
were a Soviet strike of any im
p_ortance. But there is a divi
sion of opinion as to whether
Peking would use its nuclear
weapons.
The Chinese lack a missile
capability but do have a few
Soviet-made bombers and
many Soviet fighters that
could be modified to carry
bombs. The Soviets have
mounted massive defense in
Siberia but there can be no
guarantee that a plane or two
among those who follow Siberian cities as
, So- would not get through. Such
VIpt Ct141.1eP.affa4li .;= important
Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk
and Vladivostok are barely on
APplictiagoitoriRektdboatove
Review contains a scathing
denunciation of "the nevi
Czars in Moscow. especial
ly attacked Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko's re4
cent friendly words about
President Nixon's call for an
"era of negotiation" to replace
confrontation. Gromyko was
charged with revering the
Nixon formula and with hav-i
mg "prostrated himself before
it."
Some Soviet watchers have'
concluded that the Kremlin
leaders have decided there is
no merit in waiting for Mao's'
death in hopes he would be
followed by leaders who woulcI
repair the breach with MM.
COW.
it also is theorized here that
Soviet military leaders have
been making the case.that the
Chinese before long will have:
an invulnerable nuclear capa-:
Witty and' thus the time to
strike is now. But earlier
American estimates ofi
Chinese nuclear developmentl
have proved to be 'overopti-1
xniStie, judging ? by. known]
frozen .
Nt9PPikikai';N '
rt,
000300010009-5
go-dal 0? 'n Chia Ond `?e
1
wr"ttIPP',19:011110.6,i,Chi0O, continued
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300010009-5
I r kutsk
AMIIP
River
Khabarovsk
Alma Ata,
Ulan Bator*
BORDER
CLASHES ?Ururnthi
SINKIANG
KASHMIR
MANCHURIA
.0"
N,
Pei Peking KOR
S.
KOREA
NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
Production Plants'6 Test Sites
Miles "1
Assembly Plants rti 300
? Lanchow ?
August 28. 1N9 331 Joseph P. Mastrangelo?The Washington Post
Map of Soviet?Chinese border area shows locations of, known Chinese nuclear plants and test sites. Other such
ill or border clashes this year, as well, as 'soma ? af the sites known to U.S. authorities have not been disclosed.,
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BALTIMORE SUN
Approved For Release 2002/01/08 8d11141490/1600364R000300010009-5
:Russia Said To Ask Raid Reaction'
?Ciene involved in a land war rious to all people, and we hoPo
with 800,000,000 Chinese. it doesn't occur.
Other members of Washing-
ton's international community
privy to the intelligence reports
about Moscow's soundings said
the reports came first from Ita.
ly, then West Germany, and in
rapid order thereafter from East
European conntries.
Three Categories
Speaking of conflicts among
the reports, they divided .themj
Into three categories, the firs('
consisting of reports that Soviet
leaders, as hosts in June to an !,
international conference of Com-
munist parties at Moscow, had
merely lectured their guests
about "the great threat from -1
China." A
The second category com-1
prised reports that the Russians I
had warned the leaders of just.
some countries', Communist par..
ties that Peking might escalate:
the border situation and general
hostility to a point where the
Russians might have to take
military action. '
To the third category, the re-
ports' collators assigned those
they called the "most extreme"'
?meaning, ' they explained, re-
ports that Moscow has been tell-
ing its Warsaw Pact allies that
the Soviet Air Force might have
to "tette out" Communist Chin-
a's nuclear arms installations
'and wants to know what attitude
its allies would take In that ,
event.
The collators professed to
know that some of the Soviet
Union's East European allies are
concerned lest they be called on
to aid it in a Sino-Soviet wad
They also suggested that the!
looser language'. appearing
their recently negotiated mutuall
defense pacts %VOL the SOVie
Union' may 'be, e efleetieki
thikkOd,PLYIlitileabiLirdikiAletvi rtlat '
Reportedly Considers
Attack On Peking's
Atom Facilities
By PAUL W. WARD
(Waehington Bureau of The Sunr
Washington, Aug. 27?Reports
indicating that the Brezhnev-Ko- t
sygin regime at Moscow is con-
sidering trying to bomb Com-
munist China's atomic installa-
tions out of existence are begin-
ning to be taken seriously in the
International community of dip-
lomats here.
Chief among them are intelli-
gence reports that Soviet Com-
munist party leaders have been
taking soundings on the subject
among their oppoSite numbers in
both Eastern and Western Eu-
rope.
I Contributing also to the sober
I turn in the speculation here are
'intelligence reports to the effect
Ithat the Soviet Union has dou-
r", , bled its forces along its China
border; that ?they now total
about 30 divisions (nearly 500,000
men) as against 15 divisions four
years ago, and that they include
mobile missile launchers.
State Depai tment officials, cit-
ing conflicts in the reports about
Soviet soundings of other Com-
munist parties, continue to pro-
fess about them a skepticism
which also colored a statement
William P. Rogers, Secretary of
State, made a week ago.
Addressing a group of students
? winding up their summer em-
ployment as "executive in-
terns," Mr. Rogers was asked:
"What do you people feel the
chances are that the Soviet UnN
'ion will use a nuclear strike
against China." ?
"I think the best judgment is
?that probably it will not do so,"
Mr. Rogers answered.
He added, "The Russians
would be faced with a very seri-
ous problem because, although if
they made a strike against Com-
munist China they could take
over a good segment of that
area up near Peking?they prob-
ably could even take over Pe.,,
gr)ius_ ?then _tbey ,w9411
'? "That would be a very diffi-
cult thing for them to handle,
and I think they are quite aware
of that, even though they have
moved military, equipment up to?
ward the Chinese border."
'Mr. Rogers went on to volun-
eer a commentary on the possi-
bilities of Peking initiating a
Sino-Soviet war. ? ?
"The Chinese Communists,
'think, realize that they are not
really able militarily to cope
with the Soviet Union; so we
rather doubt that they would ini-
tiate a major, attack," Mr. Rog-
ers said: . ?
"Very Permanent"
Then, referring to the more
than 430 Sino-Soviet border
clashes that Peking claims have
occurred this year and blames
on Moscow, including the latest
one on August 13, Mr. Rogers
added:
"Our best judgment is that the
border Clashes and incidents
probably will continue to recur.
We are convinced the hostility
between the two' is very deep
and very permanent. We are
quite conscious, though, of the
fact that these border incidents
always can flare?up into some-
thing neither side really intends,
and I must say our position is a
government is that we hope that
doesn't happen."
"There are some people," he
continued," who argue, 'Well, it
would be a good thing for the
United States to let the Soviet
Union and Communist China en-
gage in a fairly sizable war. We
don't think so. We think warfare
anywhere is harmful to the total
'world community, :and we think
Approved For Release 2602/01/02 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300010009-5
r
( I
Approved For Release 2002/01/02: CIA-RDP71600364R000300010009-5
WA SHIN GT ON POST
DATE
o
' I n
C -1.1'011111111.()il
On Foll
?"(IAC.IKG:1101,IND fir
? the antiballistic missile dr-
. bate in the Senate that liav
I nst. begim is the :record of
?one of the most curious
eel cifyontali atiS in lair'. history
of a bi.irly that lois seen so
touch of lurtnan squalor and
nurna kl(hilly. That re COrti
IIONV It the PniOD.
tWill.f.4 ? sanitized, which
:means often that only the
blanks are left in a puzzle to
.he solved by a few special-
ists with inside kno:Wledge.
Secretary of De:Cense Mel-
? win R. became acittely
. 3e.itisit..iVe, as he earrie":1 the
,Adirkiniatra lion load in the:
..,\EI'WE controversy, at the
SU.iff.Zestipn that liii estl.mate
- of tbe. Soviet missile threat
; differed from. :that of
h-
ard : Ilehns? director o.f- the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Laird told Chairman J. Wil.-
: Ham FtdbrIght of the Senate
Foreign Relations Cornrait,
tee that be would like to ap-
pear with :Helms to show
there vvas no real difference
between them.
. Yu/bright, after consulting
Approved For Release
C7--) Crq PAGE
? - fic
COMM litre tnenthe:rs, pro-
posed that the confrontation
be '1,:n open ratite:I. than.
el OgNi sesirist, ThiS ns, of
COnt'Se, liltiostiiblt, since the
-CIA. director never testi Iles
in Public, ft was ? extraordi?
nary en on that be stiould
lropvar with a nIgh-raniting
Le IA t officer :who had
challenged. the Corattilttee
to prove any disagree:talent
between. them, :For those
WhO I.abored to matte
the C.I.A. a strictly profes-
sional, flan-political organiza,
? don this .seemed above and
beyond the call of duty.
0:4E AION VHS eaiicr ?
.ffeinos had .given the (4.itn-
nt Lace a pixtfemiorial esti,
mate?????-?the agreed estimate
of tbe intelligence corrtumni-
' ty----of what the 1Soviets
were doing to build a defen-
sive wall with antiballistic
missiles. "Helms' careful ap-
RVal.tial, In the top??srciet cat-
egory, WrTIS very much in the ?
ntinds or (..7ommittee mem,
hers Pa the two men faced
Uteri. The extent of the So-
defense relates
to .11...aird.'s main ar-
gt, ro hat.itt--????t the tiitiSitlfltl
are hoilding a first -strike:
would wipe
out Arno eleti.'s lT.Iriu t croon.
:wed Triti.ke a retaliatory .
.1 tr0.4 had testified that
11..4iviet. 1.)4,frined
s defen.se Mos-. :',,.naitting .A.rnerican mei:i rind.
mo tie y to ventures I. h
might mean another Viet-
nam, really mean S, the sup- ?
port fi:;re It was sii:mifieitnt.
The :vote of 70 to 16 s:aid a
lot about attitudes not- only
on Capitol Hill but in the
country. The danger signals
are flying, as ti ley were
!flying for I..,yrid.en
before lie walked off the
scene of battle. Sh.rewd ill
tician as .he was rated, be
failed to read thoqw sletials
until it was too late, And.
that may say something to
the present occupant of the
White House,
19661, thattnd .rea
Sa'iitiz?
A.FTER SIX merit is in R
'post as demanding as any in
/(?;overnroerit: i..aird is the su-
persalesman. Even those
most stro.rtgly opposed to his
views on A illVf and tile test-
ing of the rmiltiplt?warlicad.
IVIIHV, e aehari.,
table view of his role,Thu I.
Is what he has been told oef
to do :in a position he ccr-
tall*I did 7101; 2Cek, If lie
Trusties too .bard at arnes????????-
his mother is reported to
have said, "'Mel, you soural
as though you're trying to
scare people"---it the zeal
of the earnest, sir' 414 owl
advoca.to we down
with a .respqnsibIlity almost,
too much for any solitary
human being.
ills trial by fire comes at
a time when, whether he tio-
derstands It or not, the pot.
itical 'atmosphere is rapidly
changing. A brush with Fut- '
bright at an earlier hearing
was indicative. In a pream,
ble to: a broad policy stole,
rnetat Laird remarked thab.
responsibility for the ."F a-
tion' nicutrity was now MS,
Full:fright T eSpO fit" (.1 Tel !,ii
Ing that it, might he will to
realize that the Con prq
has -some share of aiis re,
sponsibility.
How much the coiriroJt?
non its resolution, calling in
the Executive to consult,
with Congress before com?
mo or with. Cheir
I nown ins tint ;Pentagon code
(.;aii.111. They had
plat:mod to install more than
5.110 lau.nehers.
Part 'then, and this 'was five..
ilisiAmatic thrust or Helms'
tt'st. I tnmy, .'after CO to (i5
latini..hc l.'s 'were put, in place
a. 114411,, was called... The best,
cod tree w.as that doubts
ha 4:1 increased about C;a?
losifs effeeti:venes6 'the de-
velopment was it upped so
that., with further research a
I reakthrough Might res:olt
In a truly defensive weapon.
This
is the ease made by
'tea ay opponents of l:lnti
Nixon AdmirdiitratiOn'S
Sitt.Ceguard Ali,N1, who ?nr!.:',1..se
9.gainst spending. $7 billion
to 411 billion to deploy the
missiles WhCri. 0 rig tte h (1001)
Nan e1tE, ani tu .4ctir espa-.
hillty.
A.5 1:0 'the Tallinn 1,11W ?
around bolts d, I Tel ms'
testimony WaA similar, ?
tho Ugh witi miniher less sup...
porting c?vitlettee, Talton had .
also 'been pl.antied..as it eity?-::
wide defense, using the
same, iii effect, experimen-
tat launchers.
'With the confrontation :.;
continuing In)tir after hour,...:
:tensions built up in the
Coinnalttee room. ilelnimi
.squirmed, as one Senator
put, It "later, but he did, not :
back down, Ills original esti-
ionic of Soviet ABM eapabil.-?.:
'?ity stood for the record. .1A.07
a ,Avil s(1ri/alit wit c) has trierl
2002/01102i
:sCiA4RDP7180931144R0003000100
(tut cti'. rothlic eentinvers:y
was aii e xi rein?e y: ff leo it
position,.
re SyrullOft IA;
9-5
W ,k$111N G. l'UN
Approved For Release 2002/01/424tJA9030P711300364R000300010009-5
'WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP
Is Laird riefin Us Too Much?
By ORR KELLY
Ever since he moved into
;the Pentagon last Janurary,
Defense Secretary Melvin R.
Laird has been pouring out an
almost steady stream of pre-
i viously secret information
' about the Soviet Union.
He has talked about the 559
? missile, tests in the Pacific of
some form of multiple war-
head for the 559, the rate at ,
which the Russians are de-
? playing intercontinental mis-
'
silos and the rate at which
they are building submarines.
In the process, he has been
accused for saying too much,
of saying too little and of dis-
torting the intelligence esti-
mates of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to bolster his
case for a missile defense sys-
tem.
. How much validity is there
to these criticisms?
? Of the three, the least likely
? to be valid is the criticism that?
? Laird's appraisal of Soviet
capabilities in the future dif-
fers from the official National
; Intelligence Estimate, because
the procedure by which the
NIE is arrived at specifically
. provides for dissenting views,
which become part of the esti-
mate.
As part of his job as the
principal foreign intelligence
adviser to the President, Rich-
ard Helms, the director of cen-
tral intelligence, is responsible
;for preparation of the NIE.
The process starts with the
President or a request from
the National Security Council
for an estimate on some prob-
lem of foreign intelligence.
The request goes to the Board
of National Estimates, which
reports directly to Helms as
director of central intelli-
gence.
The members of the 12-man
board or their staff get togeth-
er with representatives of the
Defense and State Depart-
ments and other agencies that
might be involved and divide
up the work. When the drafts
come back from the various
? agencies, a member of the
board's staff puts them to-
gether in preparation for a se-
ries of meetings by the board.
When they have finished
their work, Helms takes the
report to the U.S. Intelligence
Board, of which he is chair-
man. The board includes rep-
resentatives of the CIA, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, Na-
tional Security Agency, the
State Department's Office of
Intelligence Research, t h e
Atomic Energy Commission
and the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.
"One of the beauties of the
system is that there is a com-
plete sharing of all informa-
tion among the agencies, so,
that everybody, is working
from the same set of facts,".
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., for-
mer executive director of the
CIA, wrote in his book on
"The Real CIA."
Planning for military pur-
poses normally goes beyond
the NIE to what is known as
the "greater-than-expected-
threat." In other words,
plans are normally made for
the worst that might happen
rather than for what appears
likely to happen?even if
the Pentagon agrees with the
NIE. Because of the long
time it takes to develop and
produce new weapons, mili-
tary planning also normally
reaches out beyond the time
in which the NIE has any, real
certainty.
The criticism that Laird
is saying both too much and
too little has more basis in
fact.
So far as the intelligence
community is concerned, it
would be happy if no one ever
said anything about what has
been learned about ,he activi-
ties of other countries, friend
or. foe.
Part of the problem is that
any revelation of what we
"`` ? ? ? ? I " ? ?
know?or think we know?lets
a potential enemy know how
much we know and how accu-
rate our information is.
An even more serious part
of the problem is that any rev-
elation could expose the
sources of information. This is
the area in which intelligence
officials are most touchy be- ,
cause it can endanger the I
effectiveness and even the ,
lives of intelligence agents.
On the other hand, Laird
may well be telling us less
than we need to know for a
fully objective look at the'
threat posed by the Soviet Un-
ion.
He has ,said, for example,:
that the Russians are testing a,'
multiple warhead on the SW.
and that the warheads seem to ?
fall in a pattern corresponding
to the way our Minuteman
missiles are deployed. This in-
formation comes from a de-?.;
stroyer waiting out in the Pa- ,
cific near the impact area. .;
But what if he has additional
information?as he aim os t.,
surely does?that comes from.:
sources less obvious than a..
destroyer. Is he free to make .1
that public, too, without seri- 1
ously endangering sources of
? information? Probably not.
This is a problem that has
been with us for a long time
and one that we can never
wholly avoid. "
People in the government at
the policy-making level are
going to try to use as much
information as they can to
prove the wisdom of what they
have decided to do?as the ad-
ministration is now doing in
the case of the Safeguard mis-
silo defense system.
But no one?and especially
none of the critics of what the
administration has set out to
do?can ever be satisfied that
the information being made
public is, if not the whole
truth, at least a close approxi-"
mation of the,truth.,: '
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bH134113.113446-f1/4145'kelease 2002101/ft L.C.igatItia7.4-B6C4364R606-306610009?-5'
Around
nie World
?
.12ri,1L eee omic
aliestRe ..1? est seen
LONDON ? China will
soon test a nuclear missile
with a range of 6000 miles
that could give the country
second-strike nuclear capa-
bility in the 1970s, The Lon-
don Sunday Times said in
an article yesterday.
The article was written by
Francis James, an Austra-
lian journalist who visited
China's Lop Nor nuclear
testing site earlier this year
and took pictures of missile
and nuclear bomb plants.
James, who specializes in
religious journalism, said he
interviewed Wei San-fu, a
top Chinese nuclear scien-
tist, who said China had
?
made seven nuclear tests,
beginning with a bomb
using enriched uranium
built with Russian help in
1904, and ending with an IT-
bomb on Christmas Eve,
1967, entirely Chinese-made
of lithium 6.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300010009-5
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : Wergap71B00364R000300010009-5
1,9 MAY 1069
THE PER?SCOPE
SUPER-YARD FOR SOVIET SUBS
i The Russians have started producing submarines
. at the rate of eight Polaris-type submarines a
year and fourteen atom-powered attack and
Lpther combat subs for an annual production of
-22. By comparison, the U.S. built two submarines '
last year. The Soviets have the world's biggest
?i submarine yard, highly automated and entirely
' lunder cover. This permits all-weather operations,
and shields the yard from photo-satellite surveil-
?1,lanee. However, the U.S. has a wide lead in
Polaris-type missile submarines with 41; so far:
the Soviets have completed seven.,
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300010009-5
.413WSWEEK
Approved For Release 2002/biYaWdei-RDP71B00364R000300010009-5
Agent of Doom
him out of East Berlin and off to the U.S.
Once they began interrogating Sigl?
1? At an age when many men begin to U.S. intelligence officers found him far
crumble under the wear and tear of life, more of a gold mine than they had ..
. Rupert Sigl seems the epitome of psycho- hoped. For one thing, he had violated
, logical good health. A solidly built man a basic canon of intelligence work by i
whose face does not betray his 40 years, maintaining notebooks which included Ti
Sigh is calm, intelligent and quietly self- the names and telephone numbers of
. assured. Which is somewhat remarkable many of his agents. Beyond that, he t
I considering the fact that for twenty years proved to have an almost incredible
; he has been a Soviet spy?and that when faculty for dredging up the particulars
i he defected to the West not long ago a of "cases" with which he had dealt
. jubilant U.S. intelligence officer hailed years before. .
1 the event as "one of our great postwar Detained: Within days of Sigh's defec- .
i coups." tion, suspected Soviet agents throughout
An Austrian who served as a junior of- Europe and in Brazil suddenly be-
Beer in Hitler's Wehrmacht, Sigl was re- gan to vanish from sight. But many of '
' cruited by the foreign intelligence branch them were not quick enough; already,
! of Russia s KGB shortly after World War some fourteen people, including two in
the U.S.. have been detained by West-
ern intelligence agencies on the strength: -
of Sigrs revelations. Among the suspects. -
currently in custody: Darley Opusumah,'
a former employee of the Ghanaian Em-
bassy in Bonn, and Dr. Franz von Wes- -
endonk, a former legal expert for the
Common Market who specialized in in-
dustrial and economic intelligence. .
Presumably, moreover, this is Only the
beginning of the damage that Sigh's
? defection will do to KGB networks
abroad. According to U.S. intelligence of-
ficers, the number of "interesting names"
that Sigh broughe witl . him runs to well '
over a hundred. And in the months
ahead, as CIA interrogators seek to stim-
ulate Sign memory with photos and the .
recollection of. incidents past, still more
names seem sure to emerge. In fact, said
one U.S. official last week, Sigrs knowl- ,
.edge of Soviet espionage operations is so :
vast that "it will take years before we
.can evaluate all this stuff.7..1.2.............:__......
.:. t.?01"J?itittrortairatiear-RIVIC:na
rrelch stela heirs Auslleferungsbagthren
.111:141"reg
.bin der
Vbt,e,
, onunen.
? ech..ene
In Ge-
LInheber
Y.I.T.intl.:::,
\
,WrtiVrlr
Are,t.
tinge',
ein3Cht
t fiber*
ehingen
, .:n und
chi In
talon.
behtnt.
erbell-
filr den
wendet
ett
, Mnit-
rlorm
dehen
g e
titer. r?
r tH
a er
des
? n Ruch
) iron
verhat-
I Anner
erhend
gni:Inge
elgent-
I den
et Oat-
Rupert WO, eine der rwlellebtlgeten Castel.
ten der Nnebkrtegearlt, untrde ,fritt Irt Slid- '
*turflike verbena, Olnrehl er der elnelge let,.
der deg Gebetrunle urn dea Anysterldern rem,
raub von nreehnIta verruten IdInnte, Ise& chut
'iunttarnIntiterlunt *eine Anelleterung nub
? Osterretch nlaht betinIragt
Rupert Sigh One of the boys
II and worked successively in Brazil and
in the huge Karlshorst espionage center
. in East Berlin. As a foreigner, he could'
never aspire to the highest rungs of the.
KGB, but in time his talents won him
such respect that he came to be regarded
. as "one of the boys" and was given a key
assignment as an "agent handler."
For all his ability, however, Rupert
Sigh was not happy in his work, and two.
years ago he made a discreet approach
to West German intelligence. Largely be-
cause they feared he might be a Soviet
.plant, the West Germans refused to have ?
anything to do with him. But a year ago
a determined young CIA officer in Ger-'
many persuaded his superiors to take
Sigh on as a double agent. And in mid-
April, by now thoroughly convinced of
AVAMR/19i4ISACRagg."2191g2Y.bi#19-4 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300010009-5