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October 29, 1969
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Octotarit 196pproved Ftftvtgfil9N9N3REEMID_EMB9004R000300040001-0 H10271 the dirt farmer and the tenement dweller looked to the New Deal and, its successors for economic salvation. The basis for the new coalition must be not only the common good but also conscience, including not only the poor but also those too recently poor to have forgotten and those too secure to feel threat- ened?not only realistic black and Spanish- speaking Americans but also idealistic white Americans?not only the old-time New Dealers, interested in public power and So- cial Security, but also their children and grandchildren, interested in black power, Vietnam and urban blight. Those in the so- called white upper middle class including suburbanites arid the well-educated and their voting-age children?once largely writ- ten off as traditional Republicans?now hold the balance of political power in the big states. Largely unorganized and uncommit- ted, unwilling to vote by party label only, un- interested in the old-time economic issues and party history, these voters will more easily find comfort and safety in generally following the lead of their Republican fa- thers, employers and neighbors unless Demo- cratic candidates can appeal to their con- sciences as well as their pocketbooks. A new coalition of conscience can bring the old Democrats and new Democrats to- gether, combining the manpower of youth- ful activists and part-time housewives with that of regular precinct workers, who know what it takes to keep the party functioning. It can use the energies and skills of count- less numbers of young lawyers and business- men who have expressed to me their desire to take part in elevating American politics and who have the time, money and talent to help bring that about. Nothing would be more self-defeating than to discourage their participation by surrounding the new coali- tion with an ideological wall so high that only the inflexible purists of the so-called New Left would be eligible for entry, Humor- less militants and narrow-minded nihilist, who want freedom for the indulgence of their own moral tastes but not for the ma- jority of Americans (whom they denounce), do not represent the coming wave of New Politics. On the contrary, the most important of all Democratic party traditions?the one historic trait distinguishing It through his- tory from other partes?is its role as a broad- based, multi-interest, internally divided po- litical party, too diverse to be doctrinaire, too big to be unanimous. The key word in the lexicon of the New Politics is "participation." Real political power in both parties has too often rested disproportionately in the hands of a few party officials and contributors, nearly all of them white, male, affluent. Establishment- oriented and over 50, many of them more concerned about keeping their places on the political ladder than solving the national and urban crises surrounding them. Until we change that picture, we can hardly preach to other peoples about self- determination. Having been in power nationally for nearly all of the last 36 years, Democrats have be- come too accustomed to accepting leadership from the top down and changing it too in- frequently. Southern dissent inside the party was expected, but liberal dissent was considered heresy. One of the brighter spots of the dreary 1968 convention in bloody Chicago was the willingness of 40 percent of the delegates to oppose the party Establish- ment in voting for the minority "peace" plank. That same convention terminated most concessions to the Old South, encour- aged as never before the participation of black, young and grass-roots Democrats, ended the unit-rule device byv,>hich minor- ity voices were stilled, established one com- mission to modernize convention rules and established still another to insist hereafter on the democratic selection of all delegates. These developments must continue. The frustrating sense of powerlessness that many Americans feel toward remote, impersonal in- stitutions applies to political parties as well. I am constantly asked by dissatisfied Demo- crats: "What can I do?" If our party is to be responsive to its members?and we can- not otherwise succeed?it is not enough that they be "involved" stuffing envelopes or ring- ing doorbells, important as such activities may he. We must formulate procedures to redis- tribute political power to achieve the broad- est possible participation in the exercising of that power. Precinct meetings open to all must have an effective voice in the for- mulation of policy and in the selection of both party leaders and candidates. The no- tion that a few men should successfully choose the party nominee for any important office regardless of whether he reflects the will of the voters is shocking. Through direct primaries, periodic surveys and more frequent state and national plat- form conventions, through more open chan- nels of communication between party mem- bers, leaders and public officials, through in- creased party informational and educational activities, and through a far broader finan- cial base of small contributions, rank-and- file Democrats can obtain new confidence in party decisions, and that kind of direct par- ticipation can produce the enthusiasm and momentum that lead to victory. A national presidential primary would be chaotic and exorbitantly expensive without assuring as representative a choice as an overhauled convention system. It would make even more difficult the prospects of an in- surgent candidate. But every presidential and every senatorial or gubernatorial nom- inee of our party will have greater voter confidence (and surely more workers) if his policies and appeal have first been fairly tested in a contested open primary. All this will be to no avail, however, with- out high-caliber candidates at every level. We need men and women we are able to appeal to all elements in the Democratic party and to independents as well, willing to campaign hard at the grass-roots level, and more inclined to explain on TV the new and current issues than to engage in blindly partisan exaggeration. Young people and intellectuals must be involved in those campaigns, their imaginative contributions welcomed regardless of their refusal to sup- port every Democrat or every plank in their own candidate's platform. Storefront head- quarters will be more important than smoke- filled hotel rooms. A candidate's convictions, commitment and ability to inspire a ma- jority of the voters will be more important than his acceptability to a few party lead- ers and donors. Increased citizen participation does not deny the need for strong leadership. On the contrary, the very turbulence and di- versity that have consistently characterized the history of the Democratic party have also made it responsive to those strong per- sonalities who survived spirited intraparty debates and led all factions to victory. But above all, the Democratic party must not stand still. It must not be the party of the status quo. Its leadership must not be confined to the old and the established. As Edmund Burke cried out long ago: "Ap- plauds us when we run, console us when we fall, cheer us when we recover, but let us [press] on?for God's sake, let us [press] on.,, THE ARMS TRADE?PART VIII (Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, last Saturday the President announced that the long-awaited strategic arms limita- tion talks?SALT?between the United States and the Soviet Union would com- mence in Helsinki on November 17, 1969. The time was never more opportune to urge the Soviet Union to join us in dis- cussing limitation on the international trade in conventional weapons of war. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union's aggressive arms sales policy has been primarily 'responsible for the cur- rent political, military, social, and eco- nomic instability in the Middle East. The size, scope, and objectives of the Soviet arms sales effort in the area, however, are seldom appreciated fully in the West. Therefore, I thought my colleagues might be interested in certain back- ground information, charts and statistics which I have compiled that illustrate what I believe to be the true nature of the Soviet military involvement with the Arab States. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has shipped an estimated $7 billion worth of military equipment to non-Iron Curtain countries. This averages approximately $500 million in arms sales yearly. Of that $7 billion in sales, $5 billion has gone to 10 Arab States. Egypt alone has re- ceived nearly $2 billion in Soviet arms, and the remaining $3 billion has gone, in varying amounts, to Afghanistan, Al- geria, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Pak- istan, Syria, and the Yemeni Repub- licans. There are many reasons why the So- viets are selling arms so vigorously in the Middle East, but all are predicated?as elsewhere in the world?on the desire to destroy Western influence and to replace it with their own. In pursuit of this over- all objective, the Soviets will, for in- stance, support "wars of liberation" such as those in Algeria and the Yemen. Moscow will also sell arms to dilute or destroy the effectiveness of a Western military alliance?such as CENTO. Arms also are sold to protect Soviet frontiers, trade routes, and 'forward facilities" in foreign countries. Sometimes, In. its war for ideological supremacy, the Soviet Union sells arms to undercut Red China; on other occasions, it sells arms because it wants"the money. With few exceptions, the Soviets have never given away anything of significant value. Usually, they sell arms at low? by Western commercial standards?in- terest rates, from 2 to 2.5 percent payable over a 10- to 12-year period. Occasion- ally, they will barter arms in exchange for commodities. One result has been that Egypt, .for instance, has been forced to hock many of its cotton crops to pay for the fancy Soviet hardware. Selling arms, the Soviets realize, satis- fies the touchy pride of a poor nation; limited foreign exchange reserves are also tied up in the Soviet Union, thus restrict- ing a poor country's trade relations with the West. From what sources are available, it ap- pears that all arms sales decisions come from the Politburo, and that the opera- tive control of the Soviet arms aid pro- gram rests with the KGB, the Soviet's foreign intelligence apparatus. In order to hide their activities, the Soviets will sometimes use their satellites Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 H10272 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE October 2, 1969 US Intermediaries. Thus, many arms sales of Soviet origin often encrdp in the record books as Czech, Polish, gest German or Bulgarian sales since it *as these coun- tries that actually hand,W the transac- tion. We in the West shote not be fooled: all arms sales, no matte; which country initiated the transactions are first cleared in Moscow. Red Chinese arms aid to the Middle East, as in other parts Of the world, is currently small in volume; it is designed primarily to undercut the West and the Soviet Union and to ordinate worldwide revolution. While smallnhe future po- tential for a large-scaleinfnsion of Red Chinese arms into the area is always present, and may beconit a reality once the Peking regime shiftsits primary con- cern from domestic to feign affairs. The Soviet infusion of weaponry into Egypt and the other Arab States repre- sents the classic exam??in terms of World peace and stability ?of the con- ventional arms trade at its worst. Emboldened by the huge arms sup- plies, Nasser provoked the 1956 war that gave the first frightening glimpse of what a major power codrontation could portend. Eleven years later, Nasser dared again to plunge the Middle East into war. Nasser's Egypt?overacted and under- developed?used the S*Iet weapons to invoke war as an instrument of national policy. Moscow found it e0uld not control Cairo once it had oterarmed Egypt Which, in reality, faced no military threat other than that iiiscd by its own reckless policies directed at Israel and the West. The Israelis were coinkelled to engage in a terrifying game of Military catchup on which their very exl4tence depended. vote an exces- a tonal prodUct Even now Israel must sive portion of its grass to defense. It is obvious that of the Arab States intend to use ieir Soviet and Chinese arms to d jeostraotIsrael. There is at no question, for , that Nasser has twice gone to war with Israel be- cause, with all that SoVlet weaponry, he saw no need to settle: his differences peaceably. Each time -the Communist nations have pumped_ an additional quantity of arms into an Arab country, the Israelis, in self dense, rhave been forced to increase bothiteizs e of their military and the quartz of their weap- ons. This process hasi- continued un- checked for over 14 yes- rs and has so swollen military estOlishments, so weakened economies, and so destabilized political and military flActors, that the threat of widespread vie ence of a very high order is quite possible at any moment. It is clear at the Soviet Union, far more than ariy other nation, provoked this situation,to oustAariansb it, with its massive armsaiddill States. In order to give my colleagues some idea of the volume of Cianmunist weap- ons currently deployed in the Middle East, I submit the following chart show- ing a breakdown ofa rms delivered by country. Also included e footnotes and short comments on eachy 'ill coun- try which, hopefull Will both clarify and put into proper perspective certain aspects of the Soviet and Chinese arms aid programs not evident in the chart. I hope that ths chart will also encour- age the President of the United States to take whatever steps are necessary to initiate multilateral discussions among the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and other arms-producing coun- tries on control of the arms trade in gen- eral and in the Middle East in particular; to take whatever other 'steps are neces- sary to begin a general debate on the subject in the United Nations; and in particular to seek to include the inter- national trade in conventinnal weapons of war on the agenda for the strategic arms limitation talks. The material follows: MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM COUNTRIES DEPLOYED IN THE AS OF 1968-591 AFGHANISTAN' Army Six divisions, equipped mostly with Soviet arms. At least 100 Soviet T-54 and PT-76 tanks.' Soviet artillery. COMMUNIST MIDDLE EAST Air Force 4-5 squadrons Soviet MIG-17's. 1-2 squadrons Soviet 11-28 bombers. Some Soviet helicopters. Navy Afghanistan has no Navy. ALGERIA Army 200 Soviet T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks." Soviet 140mm and 240mm rocket launch- ers. Soviet 85mm, 122mm and 152nam howitz- ers.' 50 Soviet SU-100 self-propelled guns. Some Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. Air Force 110 Soviet MiG-15's, -17's and -21's. 30 Soviet 11-28 bombers. 8 Soviet AN-12 transports. 4 Soviet 11-18 transports. 50 Soviet Mi-4 helicopters. Navy 6 Soviet subchasers. 2 coastal minesweepers." 9 Komar- and Osa-elass missile patrol boats. 8 Soviet motor torpedo boats. CYPRUS Army 30 Soviet T-34 tanks.= Some Soviet trucks.' Some SA-2 surface-to-air missiles., Soviet anti-aircraft guns.' Soviet and Czech small arms." Navy 6 Komar-class motor torpedo boats." /RAN Army Some Soviet trucks. Soviet 57ram and 85mm anti-aircraft guns. IRAQ Army 300 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks. 100 Soviet T-34 tanks. Some Soviet S17-100 self-propelled guns.' Some Soviet armored personnel carriers" 5 batteries Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air rals- siles.1? Mr force 60 Soviet MiG-21's. 45 Soviet MiG-17's and -19's. 20 Soviet SU-7 fighter-bombers. Footnotes at end of article. 8 Soviet TU-16 jet bombers. 10 Soviet IL-28 jet bombers. About 20 Soviet transport planes. Navy ' Some Soviet river gunboats.' Some Soviet Komar-class motor boats.' torpedo MOROCCO Army 35 Soviet T-54 tanks." Some Soviet SU-100 tank destroyers. Air Force 16 Soviet MiG-17's (in storage). Some Soviet Yak-9 trainers." Some Soviet helicopters.* PAKISTAN Army 80 Red Chinese T-59 tanks." Air Force 40 Red Chinese MIG-19's. 28 Red Chinese 1L-28 jet bombers.' SYRIA Army 150 Soviet T-34 tanks. 250 Soviet T-54, T-55 tanks. 60 Soviet SU-100 tank destroyers. 500 Soviet BTR-152 armored personnel carriers. Soviet artilfery up to 155mm. Some SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. Air Force (10 Soviet MiG-21's. 70 Soviet MiG-15's and -17's. 20 Soviet SU-7 lighter-bombers. 8 Soviet IL-14 transports. 14 Soviet helicopters. Navy 2 Soviet minesweepers. 6 Soviet motor torpedo boats missiles. 17 Soviet motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons) . with Styx UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC Army 500 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks. 100 Soviet T-34 tanks. 50 Soviet PT-76 tanks. 20 Soviet JS 3 tanks. 150-250 Soviet SU-100, JSU-152 and ZSU- 157 self-propelled guns:" 600 Soviet heavy caliber field guns and truck-mounted rocket launchers. 800 Soviet armored personnel carriers. 100 Czech amphibious armored personnel carriers." 15 Soviet Frog-3 surface-to-air missiles 20 Soviet Samlet surface-to-air missiles. 180 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (30 batter- ies). Air Force 110 Soviet MiG-21's. 80 Soviet MiG-19's. 10 Soviet TU-16 jet bombers. 40 Soviet 11-28 jet bombers. 90 Soviet Su-7 fighter-bombers." 120 Soviet M1G-15's and -17's. 40 Soviet 11-14 transports. 20 Soviet An-12 transports. 50 Soviet Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters. 150 Soviet and Czech trainers. Navy 4 Soviet destroyers. 8 Soviet minesweepers. 18 Soviet missile patrol boats. 40 Soviet and Yugoslav motor torpedo boats. 18 Soviet submarines. 1 Soviet tank landing ship. Some small Soviet craft. yrsecErr CREPUBLICANSPA' Army 30 Soviet T-34 tanks. 50 Soviet 81.7-100 assault guns. 70 Soviet armored personnel carriers. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Octerr.429, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 10273 50 Soviet light guns. 100 Soviet anti-aircraft guns. Air Force 30 Soviet Yak fighters (flown by foreign mercenaries). 24 Soviet MiG-19's.17 Some Soviet II-10 bombers., FOOTNOTES 1 Figures taken from "The Military Balance 1968-1969" (Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969), unless otherwise noted. , "The Middle East and The Arab World, The Military Context," by David Wood, Adelphi Paper No. 20, Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1965, except as noted. s "Arms to Developing Countries 1945- 1965", by John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp. Adelphi Paper No. 28, October 1966. P. 26. Ibid., p. 23. New York Times, February 10, 1967 reports 600 tanks. May be Red Chinese in origin. 6 Probably Soviet. New York Times March 30, 1965. 8 Ibid., December 22, 1966. "The Soviet Military Aid Program As A Reflection of Soviet Objectives", Georgetown Research Project, Atlantic Research Corpo- ration, June 24, 1965. Table I, pp. 83-4. Mimeograph document issued by the In- stitute for Strategic Studies at the outbreak of the Six Day War of 1967 listing equipment of countries involved in the war. 11 Sutton and Kemp, op. cit. ' 1, "The Armed Forces of African States," by David Wood, Adelphi Paper No. 27, April 1966, p.6. 18 "The Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Mis- siles and Their Supporting Technologies," by John H. Hoagland, Jr., and Erastus Corning 1.11, et al. Browne & Shaw Research Corpora.. tion, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1966. P. A-14. 14 (London) Sunday Times, August 31, 1969. 18 New York Times, May 8, 1969. 11 "The Middle East and the Arab World, The Military Context", op. cit. Most of the equipment came via Egypt. 17New York Times, December 15, 1967. COMMENTS ON RECIPIENT COUNTRIES , AFGHANISTAN The Soviet Union is the major arms sup- plier. Afghanistan first received Soviet arms in 1956; much of the equipment delivered since has been routed through Czechoslo- vakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary. A permanent Soviet military mission is stationed in the country, but its members are not allowed to accompany Afghan troops on maneuvers. Soviet aid has been given to ensure that Afghanistan maintains its historical role as buffer state between the Soviet Union and Western interests to the south and west. ALGERIA The Soviet Union is the major arms sup- plier. Small quantities of arms were received from Czechoslovakia, Red China and Egypt during its war for independence. Some post- independence arms came from Cuba. Algeria was used by the Soviet Union as an arms aid transit point during the Congo violence of 1960-65. Many Algerian army and air force officers are trained in the Soviet Union. At least ten communist countries offer political and mili- tary training courses to Algerian students. Communist' arms have been supplied to Algeria primarily to displace French influence In the area, and to acquire refueling and re- pair bases for Soviet planes and ships in the Mediterranean area. CYPRUS Great Britain and Greece are the major arms suppliers. Most of the small arms and crew-served weapons are of Swiss, Swedish and Belgian origin. Some arms were acquired from Egypt, Yugoslavia and private dealers during the troubles. The 1964 militarY aid agreement with the Soviet Union reportedly states that no bloc personnel will be stationed in Cyprus. The Soviet military aid program to Cyprus, while relatively small, is designed primarily to displace British influence, to antagonize two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) and to enhance the Soviet political and military position in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas. IRAN The United States has been Iran's major arms supplier since the end of World War II. The value of U.S. military aid to Iran since 1950 exceeds half a billion dollars. In January, 1967, the Soviet Union agreed to sell Iran $110 million worth of arms. Iran was the first Western ally to buy weapons from the Soviets. This move was made by the Shah reportedly to erase the "U.S. client only" tag, and to encourage Washington to supply Iran with the latest military equip- ment (which subsequently has, been done.) On at least one occasion Iran has acted as a secret arms purchasing agent for Pakistan, who was suffering under an arms embargo Imposed in 1965. IRAQ The Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal arms supplier since 1956. Iraqi officers and technicians have attended training courses In the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In 1963, approximately 500 Soviet technicians were stationed in Iraq. In 1966, it was reported that 58 Soviet 11-28 bombers had been transferred from Egypt to Iraq. Soviet reasons for selling arms to Iraq are essentially the same as those for Syria and Egypt. MOROCCO The United States and France have been Morocco's major arms suppliers. Morocco first received Soviet aid in 1961 when a quantity of Mig fighter planes and other advanced equipment were delivered. The only other instance of Soviet aid oc- curred in 1967 when spares and replacements for the above eguipment were delivered. Soviet military aid is designed to help Morocco in its border disptues with Mauri- tania and Algeria, and to increase the pres- sure on the Rabat government to end the U.S. presence in the country. PAKISTAN The United States is Pakistan's major arms supplier. Since 1947, the U.S. has either given or sold to Pakistan military equipment valued at an estimated $750 million. Following the 1965 war with Indian, Pakis- tan began to buy its arms from other sources than the United States, since a general American embargo was in force. (On at least two occasions Washington has covertly broken its own embargo by allowing several NATO allies to supply U.S. arms to Pakistan.) Red China has supplied CENTO-ally Pakis- tan with a small amount of combat weapons. The aid was designed both to diminish Western influence in the country and to counter Soviet aid to India. Pakistan recently offered to send troops to its Moslem allies in their fight against SYRIA The Soviet Union has been Syria's major arms supplier since 1956; however, Moscow's interest in the country seems to have waned temporarily. As far back as 1957 there were as many as 300 Soviet military and technical advisors in the country, although there are probably less today. Despite all the Soviet aid, the Syrian mili- tary is considered ineffectual. Much of its better equipment was diverted to Egypt dur- ing the Egyptian-Syrian union. Soviet aid to Syria was designed to destroy French, British and American influence in the country. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC The Soviet Union has been the major arms supplier to the U.A.R., or Egypt, since 1955 when $200-225 million worth of weapons were delivered via Czechoslovakia. The presence of these arms alone were sufficient to provoke war the following year. Between 1955 and 1967 the Soviet Union delivered an estimated $1 billion worth of arms to Egypt. To pay for each new succeeding generation of Soviet arms, Egypt has become an exporter of its second-hand arms. During the Six Day War of 1967, Egypt lost approximately one-half of its Soviet equip- ment. Within a year, Moscow had completely re-quipped Egypt with even more advanced weaponry, valued at an additional $1 billion. It is estimated that there are currently 3,000 Soviet military advisors in Egypt. Soviet military aid to Egypt is designed to undercut Western influence in the Middle East, to protect Soviet trade routes to the Far East, to provide refueling and repair bases for Soviet planes and ships, and to provide a strategic transit point for Soviet economic, military and political aid going to other nations in the area. YEMEN (REPUBLICANS) The Soviet Union, using Egypt as its inter- mediary, has been the major arms supplier to the Republicans since 1965, possibly ear- lier. Soviet arms have been supplied to the Yemen as far back as 1928, although post-war interest dates from 1956 when a small quan- tity of arms was delivered. Soviet and Syrian mercenaries reportedly have been flying combat missions for the Re- publicans. Czech guerrilla instructors are ac- tive in the army. Poison and blister gases of Egyptian origin are reported to have been used against the Royalists. Egypt denies using such weapons although the evidence is strong that the Egyptians used some type of toxic gas bomb. Soviet interest in the Yemen complements its reasons for' providing arms to Egypt. TYPICAL COMMUNIST TERROR TAC- TICS CONTINUE IN KOREA AS WELL AS IN VIETNAM AND CZECH- OSLOVAKIA (Mr. TALCOTT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.) Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, the offi- cial attitude of Communist governments toward neighbors whose lands they covet was clearly brought home to us when the North Koreans ambused and mur- dered a patrol of U.S. servicemen south of the demilitarized zone. One of the soldiers, Bill Grimes, was a native and resident of Salinas, Calif.?a young friend of mine. Contemporary conduct as well as his- tory continues to remind us that neither - agreements nor human life are respected by the Communists. The geographical and political divi- sions of Germany, Berlin, Korea, and Vietnam were designed to purchase peace for the citizens of those places who wished to determine their own livelihoods and destinies. The Communists, however, will not relent in their aggression or ter- ror until they dominate all of these places. I suppose I should be tolerant and meekly excuse this preplanned terrorist murder in South Korea as just another natural nationalistic exuberance. No of- fense intended. Planned Communist ter- ror and aggression is somehow, and for Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300040001-0 1110274 41/4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30_: CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- HOUSE October 24) 1969 some unknown reason, supposed to be played pianissimo. I believe the Congre4, particularly some Members of the o r body, and most citizens of this counlry would look upon preplanned terror a,Ad murder dif- ferently if one of the victene. was one of their young friends. We need to remember these victims and these incidents when we negotiate the Communist control of South Viet- nam. DELAY ON THE PAIV OF CON- GRESS WILL HAMP THE CAM- PAIGN TO MAKE 0E0 A BETTER AGENCY (Mr. STEIGER of Wiscops' n asked and was given permission to addre?the- House for 1 minute and -to ree and - extend his remarks.) Mr. STEIGER of Wg?sin. Mr. Speaker, one of the mosf serious criti- cisms which has been lev cl. at the Office of Economic Opportuni in the past is the lack of State involv 'inent in its pro- grams. In his February 19 m ssage on the Eco- nomic Opportunity A Peesident Nixon recognized the proble over the rela- tionship of State, cou ty, and local gov- ernments to the pro anis edministered by 0E0. Again, in the heari gs before the Ed- ucation and Labor omMittee it was pointed out that the s rtnership between the State and Feder 1 Govt.] nments in the poverty program as a nominal one at best. I - Now, however, this p lic7 has changed. The concept of a new idefalism has be- come a part of the OE and efforts are being made to involve tbe States in a meaningful relationship With this pro- gram. A number of major s s have been taken to heighten State ivo1vement in antipoverty efforts. A n division of State and local governennit has been created to promote effettive relation- ships between State goverei ents and field operations. An incnease 30 percent in the basic furling the State Economic Officee has b chided in the fiscal year 1970 b A complete revision in tree' 0E0 tive on the role of the State Econo Opportunity Offices is being circulate for review and comment by Governors. It will dramatically increase the role of the State in the planning -and coordina- tion of programs under the Economic Opportunity Act. I believe that this example of 0E0's willingness to deal effectively with a seri- ous problem within its piogram shows that the Nixon administration have made a serious commitment to;the improve- ment of the poverty program. Delay on the part of Congress will only hamper the campaign to make 0E0 a better agency. for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MeCULLOCH. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced an administration bill which would correct two basic flaws in section 3731, title 18, United States Code, which delineates the Government's right to appeal in criminal cases. Section 3731 divides appeals by the United States into two categories?those which may be taken only directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and those which may be taken directly to the court of appeals. The problem is this: too many cases of less than landmark significance are appealable only to the Supreme Court. A typical case might be one where the defendant moves to dis- miss the indictment because he has not 'been accorded his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The resolution of that claim may very well involve nothing more than a question ef fact. That is hardly a matter for an expedited review by the Supreme Court. Thus the Su- preme Court will dismiss such an appeal because it presents no substantial Fed- eral or constitutional question. The result is that the Government has neither a trial nor an appeal. In view of the mounting crime problem, such a result is not in the best interests of an effective administration of justice. In addition to granting the often illu- sory right of appeal directly to the Su- preme Court, section 3731 in some cases fails to authorize any appeal at all. The statute does not presently authorize any appeal to the court of appeals in all cases where the double jeopafdy clause would permit it and where there is no direct appeal to the SuPreme Court. It should. It would if jffie proposed legis- lation were adopt d'. However, if an in- dictment is dis ssed for technical rea- sons after the ury is sworn, hut before the verdict, he courts have held that no appeal s authorized. It is i ? ?rtant to note that those court decisio are not based on constitutional groune. but on statutory grounds only. Thus this flaw can be, must be, and sho d be corrected by the Congress. I nd no inconsistency between grant- ins the United States the right to one t 1 on the merits and the double jeop- dy clause. The leniency of trial judges in per- mitting the defendant to raise an objec- tion to an indictment at any time should not deprive the Government of its appel- late rights. Such a result completely sub- verts traditional notions of fair play and established rights. It, frankly, encou- rages defense counsel to delay in making motions which could have been made before trial. The continued practice of such dilatory tactics could only lead to restrictive measures for defense counsel, such as automatic waiver of rights not pressed before trial. The proposed legislation is therefore both constitutional and wise. I urge its prompt consideration and adoption. LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TO DELINEATE THE GOVERNMENT'S 'RIGHT TO APPEAL rikt CRIMINAL CASES (Mr. MeCULLOCH asked and was given permission to address the House The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) is recognized for 30 min- utes. [Mr. GROSS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Ex- tensions of Remarks.] THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF UNCONDITIONAL IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House. the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. WYATT) is recognized for 15 minutes. Mr. WYATT. Mr. Speaker, for more than 4 years now the Gallup poll has shown the issue of Vietnam to be the most urgent question of public policy, foreign or domestic, in the minds of the American people. During these 4 years there has been a dramatic shift in public opinion about the wisdom of the policy begun in 1965 of committing large American forces to combat in Vietnam. According to the Gallup poll of August 1965, 61 percent of the people approved of sending American troops to fight in Vietnam, whereas 24 percent opposed this step. The most re- cent Gallup poll on this subject indi- cates that only 32 percent now approve of the action while 58 precent call it a mistake. During the Korean war, public opinion shifted in the same way from approval in tl initial stages of the war to disap- prove n the later stages. The 65 per- cent o the public who approved the commit4ent of American fighting forces to Korerj in August 1950 dwindled to 37 percent y October 1952. In th,?egotiations that brought the Korean1 war to an end, President Eisen- hower 'faced a problem not unlike that which' confronts the Nixon administra- tion today?an impatient public opinion demanding swift termination of the war. Eisenhower did succeed in achieving an honorable settlement in Korea ending the war 6 months after taking office. In reaching this settlement, he was aided by the fact that the public, however dis- illusioned about the Nation's military involvement in Korea, appeared to place its trust in the President as he strove to restore the peace. Had there been widespread public demonstrations of dissatisfaction with the course the President was purstling to achieve peace in 1953, the end of the Korean war might not have come so speedily. So, to millions of Americans who to- day are impatient for an end to the war in Vietnam, I would raise the ques- tion of whether the methods of protest currently practiced advance or retard the coming of the peace which the over- whelming majority of our countrymen ardently desire. Sincere and concerned Americans should ponder the words of the respected British journalist, Victor Zorza: The main obstacle to a peaceful settle- ment now is the belief ... that the pressure of American public opinion will in the end give the Communists all they want. No one wants peace more earnestly than President Nixon, and he has em- barked on a course of policy that leads to peace. What the Nation needs now is a clear understanding of the President's policy Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 19p roved Fort 1110263 II10263 October 29, the "achievement of representative gov- ernment." If we do not manifest in decisive policy statements our intention to encourage freedom and representative government in Greece we will not only betray those who signed this moving letter, but the very basic traditions and ideals of the United State. AN APPEAL FOR A MUTUAL MORA- TORIUM ON ARMS TESTING (Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given per- mission to address the House for 1 min- ute and to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, we are ap- proaching a date that could be a historic turning point for a world living under the threat of nuclear warfare. On Nov. 17, the United States and the Soviet Union begin preliminary nuclear arms limitation talks at Helsinki. While I have constantly urged that such talks get un- derway, I have no illusions about any shortcuts for ending the arms race. But I do believe that as a first order of business at Helsinki we must strive for a mutual moratorium on all arms testing pending the formulation of com- prehensive agreements with extensive safeguards that can come only from pro- longed negotiations. I think this Con- gress and the President should express a sense of willingness to accomplish this objective. We have pondered too long while the world has been living under what the late John Fitzgerald Kennedy described as "a nuclear sword of Damocles." More than a year ago, our Nation and the So- viet Union pledged in the nuclear non- proliferation treaty to begin arms con- trol talks promptly. Now, at last, we are on our way to the conference table. But the luxury of time has been lost. Therefore, America and the Soviet Union must display a more urgent de- termination to reverse the arms race than either has exhibited thus far. Both sides are continuing the develop- ment of multiple independently target- able reentry vehicles--MIRV's. This new type of multiple warhead will greatly expand the striking power of strategic missiles and further endanger all mankind. It has been evident for too long that weapons systems have become more sophisticated and more destructive? and America and the Soviet Union are still locked in the arms race. We have reached the point where it is not enough to limit the buildup of strategic arms. We must instead reverse it. I have often thought about the bil- lions spent by the two superpowers for weapons from which there can be no survival. When I reflect upon this and then consider that we are spending bil- lions more to sustain the arms race, I find myself deeply distressed and wonder whether the, powers of the world have lost their senses. Yes, I agreq,a2at we must be able to defend our:NW' on from attack. I am sure that this is the principal reason why we are moving ahead with the anti- ballistic-missile?ABM?system. But when I think of our already over- burdened taxpayers and America's grave urban problems?the ghettos and the crime and the underprivileged?I pray for an end to the arms race. Just think what we could do here in America to achieve tax relief, model cities, and equal opportunity for all if the Federal Govern- ment did not have to expend time, effort, and a fantastic amount of money to engage in an arms race with the Soviet Union. So much could be done for so many if we were able to divert some of the resources that are now required to sustain the arms race. Take, for example, just one item: The cost of the anti-ballistic-missile system. Consider what America could do with that money alone at home if we did not have to spend it in the arms race. I ask, therefore, that Congress help build the foundation for meaningful and effective talks at Helsinki. As a first and very important step, I urge expressions of support for a mutual moratorium on arms testing pending the outcome of an agreement with proper safeguards be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union. Such action would be an invitation to the Soviet Union to joinus immediately in moving away from the shadows of war for the benefit of all mankind. It would also be a vivid demonstration of our good faith at the conference table on Novem- ber 17. REPRESENTATIVE WAGGONNER'S EFFORTS TO SAVE OUR FRATER- NITIES AND SORORITIES (Mr. LONG of Louisiana asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and ex- tend his remarks, and to include extrane- ous material.) Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, an article appears in a fraternity mag- azine, the Shield, of Phi Kappa Psi? volume 89, No. 4, summer 1969, pages 253-262?which goes into considerable detail about the efforts of my colleague, Representative JOE D. WAGGONNER, to protect the Nation's fraternities and sororities from the meddling of HEW into their membership practices. This discus- sion of what has transpired in recent months is well worth the time and at- tention of any reader who feels as I do, that it is high time to put whatever brakes are necessary on the extralegal, sociological meddling of this Department. With unanimous consent, I insert this article in today's RECORD, as follows: CONGRESS, FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION, AND FRATERNITY DISCRIMINATION (By Tom Charles Huston, assistant attorney general, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity) (Norm?This is an analysis of the legisla- tive history of the Waggoner Amendment and an assessment of the protection it provides for the fraternity system and for universities, through the 1965 Higher Education Act.) On June 28, 1958, President John E. Homer of Hanover College wrote to the executive secretaries of national fraternities which had chapters on his campus that he had been re- quested by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights "to file with the agency an extensive questionnaire relating to policies in the civil rights area." According to Dr. Homer, "the questionnaire makes specific reference to the policies of fraternities relating to the admis- sion to the fraternities of Negro, Jewish, and non-Caucasian students in principle? How many actually have Negro, Jewish, an non- Caucasian students as members? President Homer requested the national fraternities to provide him with the infor- mation necessary to answer these questions. In addition "to a complete statement" from them on these matters, he asked that they send him a copy of their constitution for use in the event that he received similar in- quiries in the future. The announcement that the Civil Rights Commission had begun -an investigation into the affairs of college fraternities and sorori- ties created a stir among fraternity leaders. On July 12, Louis F. Fetterly, a California attorney and leader in national interfrater- nity circles, wrote to the Commission about Its activities. He asked for a copy of the ques- tionnaire and an explanation of the use to which the information elicited would be put. A week Later he received a reply from Cor- nelius P. Cotter, Assistant Staff Director for Programs, who declared that "The Commis- sion is not at this time conducting a study related to fraternities or their admission policies." If such a questionnaire is being distributed among fraternities, he asserted, "it comes from a source other than this Com- mission." However, he added, "If you have reason to believe that a questionnaire is being distributed and represented as coming from this Commission, we should appreciate your help in securing additional information concerning it." On August 12, Mr. Fetterly wrote Dr. Cot- ter advising him that the letterheads, return envelopes, and title on the questionnaire all indicated they came from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington 25, D.C. Mr. Fetterly reported that the question- naire was being represented as part of a nationwide survey, and the covering letter and questionnaire were apparently sent by Mr. Will Erwin, Co-Chairman of the Sub- committee on Education for the Indiana Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. On the basis of this new information, the Commission ascertained that indeed there was a questionnaire. It had been developed by the Indiana Advisory Committee in co- operation with the Civil Rights Commission of the State of Indiana and, "due to a mis- understanding," had been mailed without prior clearance by the Washington staff of the Commission. Mr. Peter M. Sussman, As- sistant Staff Director for State Advisory Com- mittees, to whom the ball had been bounced by Dr. Cotter, explained that since this ac- tion was "contrary to established Commis- sion procedures," he had requested the In- diana Advisory Committee to suspend any further use of the questionnaire. He went on to point out that the reference in the letter accompanying the questionnaire to a "na- tionwide survey" was in error: "Neither the United States Commission on Civil Rights itself nor any of its Advisory Committees outside the State of Indiana is conducting such a survey." Less than two months later, however, fra- ternity chapter presidents at campuses throughout the State of Utah received a letter from Adam M. Duncan, Chairman of the Utah Advisory Committee of the Civil Rights Commission. Mr. Duncan explained that his committee had been "commissioned by Congress to make factual findings and recommendations" on problems of racial dis- crimination. The "function" of his commit- tee, he went on, was to serve as a "sounding board" and "clearing house" for civil rights problems. Mr. Duncan enclosed a questionnaire which he requested be promptly returned "in the enclosed, self-addressed and franked enve- lope." The questionnaire concerned the Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 1110264 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE October 29, 1969 membership practices and internal opera- tions of the fraternity., It requested infor- mation on whether members of minority groups were accepted as merabens by the local chapter and, if not, whether this was due to a prohibition in either the local or national governing document, It also re- quested that copies of these documents be attached, or if this was not possible, that a place be indicated where the Committee could examine them. This intrusion into the affairs of a private organization by a government agency, coming as it did upon the heels of the Indiana case, aroused protests not only front fraternity leaders, but also from members of Congress. During debate on the proposed Civil Rights Act In the House of Representatives on Feb- ruary 6, 1964, Congressman Edward E. Willis of Louisiana, citing these inaidents, moved to amend the bill by denying to the Com- mission the power to "authorise any investi- gation or study of the membership practices of any bona fide fraternal, religious or civic organization which selects its taembership.", Congressman Emanuel Cellar, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager for the bill, accepted the amend- ment., He told the House that on behalf of the Judiciary Committee he had complained to the Commission that it had gone too far and exceeded its authority. Ca January 29, he had received a letter from Howard W. Rogerson, Acting Chairman of the Commis- sion, explaining that the action of the Utah Advisory Committee "was a very Minted in- quiry . . . into the racial practices of fra- ternities and sororities located at the State University." 5 "The Utah committee," Mr. Rogerson reported, "was not interested in the practices of fraternities of sororities at private colleges. NOT was the committee in- terested in the practices of adult fraternal organizations,' such as the Masons, which are unconnected with public inatitutions of higher education." The Commission was not, however, planning to putsue "even the limited Utah inquiry into the racial practices and sororities at the State university." 6 Mr. Rogerson enclosed with his letter a memorandum outlining the legal basis for the inquiry which the Utah cotrimittee made. The final paragraph of this memorandum stated: "We do not recommend that the Commis- sion add a survey of practicee at the State universities to its present program, but all of the factors discussed above idleate not only that there was a legal base for the Utah ques- tionnaire, but that the OcanIttiasion would have ample authority to inquire further into this matter if it chose to do at)." Congressman Geller was not satisfied by Mr. Rogerson's letter and, arently, not impressed by the reasoning of e legal mem- orandums He contacted Mr. Rogerson and re- quested a specific answer to the question of whether the Commission intended to pursue this sort of inquiry further. Mr. 1?.ogerson re- plied in a letter dated January 30, that the Commission did not have any plans to do so. He indicated that the Utah connnittee had no authority to take any action if the question- naires were not answered, and it did not plan to seek further information from fraternities and sororities. He concluded with the assur- ance that no other questionnaires were being sent by any of the Commission's advisory committees to fraternities or acwial organi- zations., Aware that similar assurance had been fol- lowed by more questionnaires, Congressman Cellar advised the House of Representatives that it was essential to get "embedded-in the statute, not correspondence or promises but some definite prohibitions against some of these activities which have been complained of with reference to the Civil Rights Com- mission?, He felt the Willis Amendment ac- Footnotes at end of article. complished this purpose and he Was happy to accept it. Congressman Meader of Michigan, however, had doubts that the Willis proposal Was ex- plboit enough. He offered a substitute amend- ment whbola read that "nothing in this or any other Act shall be construed as authoriz- ing the Commission, its Advisory Committees, or any person under its stiafervisien or con- trol to inquire into or investigate any mem- bership practices or internal operations of any 'fraternal organization, any college or uni- versity fraternity or sorority, any private club, any religious organization, or any other private organization." 11 Congressman Meader argued that the Commission believed, as expressed in the legal memorandum sent to Congressman Celler, that it had every right to conduct inquiries into discriminatory membership practices by private associations, and to pre- clude such activity it was necessary to spell out in the most precise terms the limitations which Congress wished to place upon the Commission in this area?, Congressman Roosevelt of California raised a question re- garding the definition of' "private organize- Mons." 13 This phrase had not been included in the original Willis proposal, and Roosevelt feared that it would be construed so broadly as to limit the power of the Commission to investigate discrimination in labor unions, corporations, and other organizations not generally included in the concept of volun- tary associations." On the basis of' this objec- tion, Congressman Meader agreed to the deletion of the phrase.15 Congressman Meader had also added an- other dimension to the Willis proposal by including the phrase "internal operations" in his amendment. Not only would the Com- mission be prohibited from investigating into membership practices of private groups, but also would be prescribed from conducting an inquiry into their "internal operations." Congressman Celler was worried that this inclusion would unduly limit the authority of the Commission." It was one thing, he argued, to investigate membership practices, but quite another to look into internal oper- ations. The latter, he reasoned, might be of legitimate Interest to the Commission where they involved the denial of rights granted to members of minority groups by other pro- visions of the Civil Rights Act. Congressman Meader was asked what he had in mind when he referred to "internal operations." "I will tell you what 'internal operations' was in- tended to get at," he answered. "The Masonic Order, Knights of Columbus, and many fra- ternal organizations like the Eagles, Elks, or secret clubs. It is not only their membership practices which should be protected but all of their internal operations?, "Would you," asked Meader of Congress- man Celler, "permit a Civil Rights Commis- sion to demand a document of the ritual of a secret society or fraternity or sorority or Masonic order?" 18 "No," the Judiciary Com- mittee Chairman replieda, Congressman Roman Pucinski of Illinois introduced a subject Into the debate which would be hotly debated in the Senate a year later." He objected to the amendment on the grounds that fraternities and sororities, as an integral part of a State university which received federal financial assistance, should not be permitted to discriminate on the basis of race, and therefore the Commis- sion should be authorized to investigate their membership practices, "I know from my own experience on the Committee on Education and Labor," he told the House, "that the Fed- eral Government is perhaps the greatest con- tributor to many of these universities and colleges. But we say under this amendment that while the Federal Government can spend millions of dollars in these institu- tions, the Civil Rights Commission cannot investigate discrimination in these fraterni- ties." It Congressman Celler replied that "In the first place, sororities and fraternities are not supported by the Government. They receive no loans or funds directly from the Govern- ment." al Puciiaski agreed with the thrust of this argument, but maintained that "being on the campus of the university bene- fiting from these taxes, they are a part of the university and indirectly benefit from Federal assistance.", Congressman Oehler countered with the simple assertion that "I do not believe that is correct," 24 and the House proceeded to adopt the substitute amendment." When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law by President Johnson, it con- tained the Meader Amendment," which pro- vided that: "Nothing in this or any Other Act shall be construed as authorizing the Commission, Its Advisory Committees, or any person un- der its supervision or control to inquire into or investigate any membership practices or Internal operations of any fraternal orga- nization, any college Or university fraternity or sorority, any private club or any religious organization." This section made it explicitly clear that the Civil Rights Commission could not under the color of Federal law investigate the ac- tivities of carnpus fraternities. The private acts of discrimination by voluntary student groups were beyond the realm of Federal con- cern or, at least, beyond the realm of the Commission's concern. Congress, in various Titles of the Civil Rights Act, empowered specific Federal agen- cies to eliminate discrimination in the fields of educationa, employment,,, voting," and public accommodations." A key provision was Title VI, see. 601, which declared that -No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving-Fed- eral financial assistance." " This policy clearly applied in the area of education where millions of Federal dollars were being ex- pended annually in aid to colleges and uni- versities, both public and private. The imple- mentation of Section 601 of Title VI was to be effectuated through the issuance of reg- ulations by the Federal departments em- powered to extend Federal financial assist- ance." These regulations were to be "of gen- eral applicability", and "consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in con- nection with which the action is taken." 35 On December 31, 1964, Francis Keppel, U.S Commissioner of Education, senta memo- randum to the presidents of all institutions of higher education in the United States ad- vising them that the regulation of the De- partment of Health, Education, and Welfare authorized under Section 602 of Title VT had been approved by the President and promul- gated by the Department to become effective on January 8, 1965.35 Each college or univer- sity which received Federal funds was re- quired under Section 80.4 of the Department Regulation to file an Assurance of Compli- ance with the non-discrimination require- ments of Title VI. Unless the Assurance (HEW Form No. 441) Was flied with the De- partment, the institution would not be eligi- ble for Federal assistance. Mr. Keppel enclosed with his memorandum an Explanation of HEW Form No. 441, which presented examples of the type of discrim- inatory practices which were prohibited Under the Department Regulation." Of in- terest to educators were questions 8 and 9 which explained the effect of the Assurance of Compliance upon their administrative practices: "8. What effect will theatigulation have on a college or university's admission prac- tices or other practices related to the treat- ment of students? "A. An institution of higher education which applies for any Federal financial as- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 H 10186 Approved For IRet9m091/61%; 9,1k1W1J311W4R0003000400ber 29, 1969 Every year he has come in with a sched- ule or agenda of bills from his com- mittee. He has followed it, I believe, as religiously as any committee in the House has been able to follow an agenda, and he has done an outstanding job. He has been thwarted time and time again by the lack of authorizations and by mat- ters beyond his control, and I believe be- yond the control of the leadership in the House. But again, Mr. Speaker, I would like to go back to the subject of my request, and I want to emphasize to the gentle- man that as far as I am concerned I will be glad to meet every day of the week, every night of the week, to get au- thorization bills and appropriation bills through the House. I would also like to say to the gentle- man that I conferred some time ago with most of the committee chairmen about the possibility of adjourning at a fairly early date. We received reasonable as- surances, but there are two Houses of the Congress, and I was not able to get the same degree of assurance in some places as I was in others. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make the further observation that as we approach the 11th month of the year, the House has not done anything at authorizing the antipoverty program. That is another item on which the Com- mittee on Appropriations is stymied, and I am looking forward to some cold day in December when somebody may come racing in with his shirttail flying, want- ing us to bring in an appropriation bill for that. Let it be said that if those concerned do not get these authorization bills processed, we may not be able to take care of the appropriations for them. Mr. ALBERT. I have no argument with the gentleman, and I recognize the gen- tleman's position, and unless he wants to go to the Committee on Rules for a spe- cial rule he is of necessity bound by ac- tion on the part of the authorizing com- mittees. I believe the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Education and La- bor commented on the subject of the 0E0 authorization during some of the colloquy yesterday. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the gentleman from Texas for bringing this matter up on the floor of the House, and for this rather lengthy debate on the matter, because I think that right now we have got not only a deadline, but there is a serious question as to what is going to happen in the next 6 weeks, or by the end of the year. I would also like to say this: that al- ready the discussion is being held by vari- ous Members that from now on they would object to going over from now on, going over from one day to another, and I would even suggest that we might very well figure on starting working Fridays, and perhaps we should start working on Saturdays. I would like to ask the majority leader if he would tell us what he contemplates in the way of the legislative program for Monday and Tuesday in view of the re- quest that he has just made. Mr. ALBERT. We have the Private Calendar and the Consent Calendar. There is another bill or two out of the Committee on Rules that might be pro- gramed if the chairman of the commit- tee wishes to do so, and I will of course discuss this matter with the chairman. May I say just one other thing because I want the House to have full knowledge of what is before us. So far as I know, as of now there are only 3 days left in this year prior to Christmas which are recognized and accepted as days of national importance or national holidays and they are?election day on next Tues- day, Veterans Day on the following Tues- day, and Thanksgiving Day. We would be doing no more, insofar as I know on those days than just to accommodate Members on the Mondays before those two days, and on the Friday after Thanksgiving Day, and we are not contemplating any extended vacations. But we do think, being in session as long as we have been, that Members might be entitled to go home for Thanksgiving. Mr. ARENDS. Might I express the hope that the majority leader will also tell the "Tuesday to Thursday Club" that they may well expect to be here on Friday from now on? Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen- tleman will yield further, we have an- nounced repeatedly, during recent an- nouncements of the legislative programs that if it is necessary to clear the deck of bills that the chairmen are ready to bring to the floor that we will meet on Friday and if necessary on Saturday. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speak- er, I would like to make one further observation. Having served as a member of the Committee on Appropriations for 14 years, I have an understanding of the problems of the committee. I also know that their problems have been multiplied because of the proliferation of authori- zation bills. A proposal has been made, and I joined in cosponsoring it, that if an authorization bill is not a law by the 30th of June of a particular year, the Committee on Appropriations may there- after bring the appropriation bill to the floor of the House without the problem of a point of order being made against it. I think that proposal ought to be approved. It would be helpful for two reasons: First, in getting the authori- zation proposals through before June 30 and second, in helping the Committee on Appropriations to get its work done prior to June 30 or shortly thereafter. Mr. MAHON. I would pose the ques- tion, what kind of buzz saw might we encounter, for example, on defense if we, should bring up without authorization the defense appropriation bill, which, as the gentleman knows, has no enacted authorization this year because the com- mittees have not been able to finalize it for us in the last 10 months? I do riot know whether that would work or not. Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen- tleman will yield for just one further comment. I appreciate what the gentle- man has said. I hope his optimistic out- look of what he calls the optimism of the majority leader is not overly optimistic. We do want to finish just as fast as we possibly can. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and withdraw my reservation of objection. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Okla- homa (Mr. ALBERT) ? There was no o 'ecti . DISCUSSIONS, IF NOTHING MORE, MAY BE HELPFUL (Mr. SIKES asked and was given per- mission to address the House for 1 min- ute and to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, it is en- couraging that American and Soviet ne- gotiators are at long last prepared to be- gin discussions during November on arms limitations. The negotiations are a step toward world sanity in the arms race. But let us not place too much signifi- cance on what is happening. We should not assume that the negotiations would automatically insure progress. At this point they will show only that both sides are interested in finding out whether there is common ground to make further and more meaningfUl talks worthwhile. Previous history of negotiations with the Soviets would indicate that there is a long and difficult road ahead before any genuine rollback in strategic stock- piles can be accomplished. In the mean- time, it is important that the United States not indulge in the deadly luxury of unilateral disarmament. As a matter of fact, U.S. disarmament would prob- ably have eliminated any possibility of accomplishment toward arms limitations at the conference table. The Soviets are much too clever to give up anything without a quid pro quo. While we are effecting economies in defense expenditures we should also en- deavor to modernize and to strengthen our fighting forces. This the Soviets will understand, for this is exactly what they will be doing. The people of the world can draw some assurance from the fact that both we and the Soviets recognize the dangers of nu- clear war and the cost of an arms race. Both countries should be willing to seek relief from the growing economic bur- den which accompanies military pre- paredness. Hopefully, the talks can pro- vide the proverbial single step that marks the beginning of a long and im- portant journey. HIGHER PRICES? YOU CAN BE SURE IF ITS WESTINGHOUSE (Mr. PODELL asked and was given permisssion to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, periodi- cally a corporation shows true public spirit and tender consideration for con- sumers and their already devastated buy- ing power. Yesterday such a case came to light when Westinghouse Electric Corp. announced plans to raise prices on Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 October 29, 19 proved Fo ttetakg.sommotipofeFEIRA4R000300040001-0 H 10185 Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma. Mr. ALBERT. I am just as sensitive to the further need for getting authoriza- tion and appropriation bills out of the way as is the gentleman. I think that the gentleman's committee has had before it and has passed through the House all the appropriation bills, with the possible exception of one, for which there are existing authorizations. We have urged as the gentleman well knows, that au- thorizing committees complete action on the authorization bills as quickly as pos- sible. I cannot answer exactly whether the fact that we will not be programing suspensions on Monday will have any-/ thing to do with what the committe can do on Monday. I cannot answer t t. Mr. MAHON. We are on the thre old of the 11th month of the year an well over half of the President's approp4iation budget?some $81 billion, irk fact?has not been processed by the Hous " because of the lack of significant auth rizations. With only 2 months of the y r left, this is a most disturbing situation The Com- mittee on Appropriations h acted in every instance where we ought we could. But time is running, d is now short. I think we have to do mething In self-defense, and I do rise" self- defense. I now yield to the gentleman Michigan, who on yesterday seemed t attack the committee and the Congress for not having gotten more of-the appro- priation bills to the President We have virtually come to a grinding halt in our ability to bring out the appropriation bills within the rules. I repeat, we have tens of billions of dollars of appropria- tions bottled up because we do not have authorizations for them. What can the Committee on Appropriations do about it and what can the minorit,t. leader do about this situation, and does this request have any adverse impact on the unfor- tunate situation in which we find our- selves with respect to appropriations? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, would my good friend and former chair- man yield at this point? Mr. MAHON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I want to re- assure the gentleman that I did not at- tack the Committee on Appropriations and I did not attack the Congress but simply said that we are in this position? and the record shows that we arc -where only two appropriation bills for fiscal 1970 have reached the desk of the Pres- ident. I deplore this, and I am sure that the distinguished chairman ofi the Com- mittee on Appropriations deplores it. I would like to make an inquiry because I think what may come to the House Monday or Tuesday could give the green light to one of the appropriation bills still in the Committee on Appropriations. I understand that the conferees on the District of Columbia revenue bill have agreed, and it is my under-landing that the Committee on Appropriations has not acted on the District of Colum- bia appropriation bill pending this con- ference report from the legislative com- mittee. Is there any reason Why, if the conference report is ready, it cannot be considered Monday or Tuesday so that we could get the green light for this particular appropriation bill? Mr. MAHON. I would like to yield to the majority leader for a response to this question. Let me first say that if we bring out an appropriation bprior to the time that the legisla;the com- mittee has fully actepaatt -processed the related authorization, the legislative committee t s to be somewhat dis- turbed be?se they feel we are moving too fas nd getting the cart before the hors , so to speak. In any event, we have tcfiave a reasonable time for markup, jetting the printing done, and the report 'down. It takes about a week or 10 days or more to do that. We cannot be ex- pected to bring in our appropriation bill 30 minutes after the House has passed the related authorization measure. Mr. ALBERT. The leadership insofar as I know has not been advised what day the conferees on the District of Columbia revenue bill will call up that bill. I know of no reason why it cannot be called up on any day. I would like to to say to the gentleman that I would like to keep the discussion within the confines of my request. I have only asked that suspension bills be put over from Monday until Wednesday. I have not asked that any rollcalls be put over or that any other matters not be Programed on Monday or Tuesday. I would say this to the gentleman: s is not a matter which concerns just flex eek. Continually committee chair- men a the leadership to call up bills on a cert day and the leadership can- not ignore 'ese requests. In the same manner we ye requests from com- mittee chairmen sot to call up bills on certain days. We ttempt to schedule bills in accordance *th the request of the chairmen or me ers in charge of legislation reported fro ? their commit- tees. We have habitually ried to do this throughout the session an I think it can be said in all candor that 'nsofar as re- quests from committees re concerned and insofar as rules gra ted are con- cerned on bills on which co mittee chair- men desire to take actio we have dis- posed of such legislatio promptly. I know that the chairme ? of committees now considering autho zation and ap- propriation bills woul ike to have them disposed of as soon possible. Mr. MAHON. Wo d the distinguished majority leader us when we might have the authori tions relating to mass transportation, ? highway safety, and airport aid in rder that we can properly Incorporate ose in the transportation stppropri on bill. - Mr. ERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gen- tlem will yield further, the leadership is in no position to predict when a com- mittee is going to vote or when a chair- man is going to request a rule or when a rule will be granted. I can only answer the question in that way. I do not wish to direct my remarks to any committee. I think I can say in all candor that we have discussed the matters with the chairmen of the committees which have jurisdiction over authorization bills not only recently, but over the months. Mr. MAHON. Referring again the fact that we are on the threshold of the 11th month'of the year and the fact that we have had 14 bills and resolutions out of the Appropriations Committee this ses- sion, I wonder if the majority leader could tell us when we might expect an authorization on the foreign aiid bill. Trerillbeekmmittee headed by the gentle- man froths Louisiana (Mr. PAssmAN) finished its hearings some time ago. We want to bring in a bill. When can we ex- pect action on the foreign aid authoriza- tion bill? Mr. ALBERT. The distinguished gen- tleman from Ohio is present and is a member of that committee and I am sure can give the gentleman the most recent information with reference to it. Mr. HAYS." We voted the foreign aid bill out this morning. Let me say to the gentleman, however, that we did not get the administration's request an the foreign aid bill until the beginning of the new fiscal year. We got it in June. It has taken a long time for the administration to line up the dueks on their side and to line up the votes in order to get it out. There have been long hearings conducted on it. However, insofar as I am concerned? and I think I can speak for the chair- man of the Committee on Foreign Af- fairs?we have our local elections next Tuesday?he and I do?and I cannot ex- pect folks to vote in congressional elec- tions if I am not interested enough to vote in the local election such as the mayors elections, and so forth. I have noticed that the President took time out to do some campaigning in Vir- ginia yesterday and plans to-do the same thing in New Jersey today or tomorrow although I hope he does not have any success in either instance. But I am going to take time out en Tuesday to go home and vote. I could net care less whether the foreign aid bill comes up then or not, but it is not com- ing up because of that, so it will come up in a week or so, I think if the Com- mittee on Rules gives us a rule. And I might say to the gentleman that I do not even care whether they do that, but it is out of the committee. Mr. MAHON. The Defense appropria- tion bill involves a little over $75 billion of the appropriation budget. We do not yet have the enacted authorization for that. The military construction appro- priation budget is in the area of $1.9 billion, and there is no enacted authori- zation. Is the leadership able to tell the Com- mittee an Appropriations what we can do about those? Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman knows that the authorization bill has passed the House. The gentleman knows that the defense authorization bill was under consideration for a long time, and I am sure for the best of reasons, in the other body. All of these are matters we have dis- cussed with the appropriate committee chairmen. If the gentleman feels that by putting suspensions over from Monday to Wednesday would interfere with the consideration of appropriation bills, or If I did, I certainly would not make the request. Further, Mr. Speaker, I want to com- pliment the gentleman from Texas. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300040001-0 H 1?1711"'"' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE October 28, 1969 than 100 other minerals intact, after the House cut most of them by a quarter. House depletion changes would have raised an added $400 million annually in taxes from extractive industries?mostly oil and gas. This has now been scaled down to $155 million, a cut of nearly two-thirds. Again all Americans will be forced to subsidize oil profits abroad and at home. This winter we shall all be made to pay double the going world price for every oil product. It can only be compared to picking the pocket of a per- son who has just been run over by a truck. This, however, was still not enough. The depletion allowance permits oil and gas companies to deduct 2'71/2 percent of gross income from earnings before com- puting taxes. They cannot, however, de- duct more than 50 percent of pre-tax earnings. This provision was softened by permitting firms or individuals with gross oil or gas revenues of less than $3 million to use the depletion allowance for up to 65 percent of their earnings. This is public sanction of increased tax evasion by the rich with a vengeance. Almost all so-called independent pro- ducers, who are not a part of worldwide integrated oil companies, will slide neatly under this new $3 million limitation. Compared to a major oil company, the individual who grosses up to $3 million annually from oil or gas is small potatoes. But compare him to the average tax- payer, and he is massive privilege, in- deed, this, then, is the added privileged group aided by the Senate Finance Com- mittee. These operators, many of whom are already millionaries, do everything from extracting oil from the ground to marketing it at retail prices. In effect, the public has been told to shut up or else worse will follow. It makes as much sense as Mrs. Mao Tse Tung applying for D.A.R. membership. The Senate even raised a similar 50 percent limitation to 70 percent for gold, silver and copper producers, who now re- ceive a 15 percent depletion allowance. Under it poverty-stricken copper giants like Anaconda, Kennecott, Phelps-Dodge and American Smelting and Refining will save $10 to $25 million annually in taxes. Here then we have the spectacle of a group of Senators, mainly from oil States, ignoring the outspoken will of the mass of our citizens. Our tax system is a masterpiece of inequities. The country has demanded reform, which the House attempted to give it, in part. Now the Senate Finance Committee has blatantly attempted to strifie and suppress what we have painfully managed to accom- plish. I believe we are witnessing a de- liberate attempt to destroy the entire tax reform bill. The only historical comparison that can be drawn with this emerging abor- tion of a measure is the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. When need was greatest for swift tariff reductions, a privilege-oriented Congress produced the highest tariff schedules in American history up to that time. In this instance, demand for tax relief and erosion of accumulated oil tax privilege has been answered by a legis- lative nose-thumbing unmatched in modern times. The measure is becoming as festooned with amendments as a Christmas tree is with ornaments. A meaningful House-Senate conference will be impossible, almost guaranteeing no bill at all. To call this tax justice or relief is to try and pass off the Manhattan Tele- phone Directory as the Revised Statutes. Soon now, this legislative abortion will be wrapped in shiny tinsel, passed by the Senate and sent back to the House with somber ceremony anti howls of self - congratulation. It will be accompanied by a 2-minute ovation and 50 empty speeches, then sent to the House for decent burial. Mr. Speaker, a hard-hit- ting grocery advertisement would make more sense than this deliberate warping of the legislative process. This Congress, if it affixes its seal of approval to such a measure, will dissipate its diminishing share of national faith at an unprece- dented rate. I shall vote against any compromise such as that already emerg- ing from the Senate Finance Committee. I hope the majority of my colleagues will do the same. Yet this, of course, will ac- complish the goals for which the oil and gas industry has been so ardently and expensively lobbying. Nonetheless, in the moment of victory, they have sown the seeds of their even- tual defeat. A time of complete reform and total reckoning with this industry cannot be much longer delayed, even by their massed billions. The public has at last been enlightened as to the extent and depth of how much the oil and gas industry has been getting away with at the expense of urall. No industry in the land has abused its power more or shown such corporate blindness. They can best be compared to steel moguls of the last century, or coal barons of Theodore Roosevelt's day. During the Pullman strike, Mark Hanna was supposed to have said to George Pullman: Pullman, any man who won't meet his workers at least part of the way is a damn fool. Any industry which enjoys as much power and profits as the oil and gas in- dustry does should have yielded to the commonsense call for at least some re- form. This the oil industry, in its col- lective nonwisdom, has refused to do. Mr. Speaker, dire fates are promised looters, dissenters, radicals, and effete intellectuals. Those who laugh at and ridicule legitimate requests of the peo- ple are presumably safe, and will be ren- dered testimonial dinners by the oil and gas industry. (Mr. DEVINE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include ex- traneous matter.) [Mr. DEVINE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] THE NEWLY-CREATED GENERAL SERVICES PUBLIC ADVISORY COUNCIL (Mr. BLACKBURN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, the newly-created General Services Public Advisory Council met for the first time late last week. This national panel was created by Administrator Robert L. Kun- zig to more fully involve the public in the affairs of the General Services Adminis- tration, the multibillion dollar agency that acts as the business manager of the Federal Government. It pleases me greatly to note that one of the 16 members of the council is from Georgia. He is Mr. John T. Wiley of De- catur. He is the assistant vice president of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. Mr. Wiley is to be highly commended for donating his valuable time to the cause of good government. Of course, public service is nothing new for this gentleman. He is a member of the At- lanta Chamber of Commerce and has served as a director of Junior Achieve- ment of Greater Atlanta, the United Fund, March of Dimes, and the American Heart Association. He is currently a di- rector of the Georgia Agribusiness Coun- cil and is vice chairman of Government- al Department of the Georgia State Chamber of Commerce. Wiley is a mem- ber of the Atlanta Athletic Club, the Commerce Club, and the Gridiron Secret Society. Mr. Wiley's vast experience will con- tribute much to the Council. Mr. Speaker, it should also be noted that the creation of the General Services Public Advisory Council is another step in President Nixon's drive to make the Federal Government more responsive to the American people. TALKS AND MIRV (Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his re- marks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous material.) Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I am greatly encouraged by the announcement that the Soviet Union has finally accepted the American invitation to begin talks on the limitation of strate- gic weapons. It was announced this past weekend that preliminary talks will be- gin in Helsinski, Finland, on November 17, 1969. This is especially good news to those of us in the Congress who have expressed grave concern over the delay in strategic arms limitation talks?SALT?and the growing possibility of a new escalation in the arms race. The fact is that today we and the Russians are roughly at parity in terms of nuclear weapons and that we are both capable of destroying each other several times over. It would be sheer folly for either country to devote huge sums to the production of new and more horrible weapons when these resources could in- stead be devoted to peaceful purposes. There is a real need in this country to- day to divert these funds into domestic programs?programs designed to meet the crises of our cities, schools, and en- vironment. And I understand that the Soviet Union is faced with a very similar problem. As one of the principal sponsors of a House resolution proposing a mutual Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CFA-RDP71B00364R000300040001-0 October 28, 1969 I enclose an editorial from the Was ington Post of October 27, 1969: ME SALT TALKS: A Becrstrane It is good news that the Unit States States an the Soviet Union have at long laist agreed 0 a time and a place for the opening of th talks on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons. There was Mid news of another kind, as well, in Secretary Rogers' press conference remarks on the subject. l4_'or in an international negotiation eit this kind, there is much ongoing internal negotiation to be accomplished too?negotiatien within each government and among its fieparate competitive parts, each of which tries, quite naturally, to assert its particular Interest and make that interest controlling in the govern- ment position as a whole. We surely have much to learn, in the prolong id and ex- tremely difficult talks ahead, as to how the weight falls within the Admirdsiration's specially designated negotiating team and how that reflects the larger reality within the Administration itself. But for the mo- ment there is much reassurance to be h from the fact that Secretary Rogers nottjjy appeared as the President's spoktciii on this question, but that he spoke with emi- nent good sense. Mr. Rogers' remarks were lowAey, easy- going, uncontentious, and aboveAfl practical. Unlike those who have convefestly forgot- ten the Administration's n six-month postponement of the talks hf their e-eserness to tax the Soviet Union witl unconscionable delay, Secretary Rogers affaby observed, "I'm not sure that it would helpto speculate on the reason for the delay since probably wonder why we delayed from the time our Administration came into saTice un- til June?and we did it because we waited to review the situation carefully. I think that they probably have problems of one kind or another and they have now decided to have the talks." He bashed no drums and clanged no cymbals concerning either the_ hopes or the fears that -must necessarily attend such an exercise, pointing out that "we should not confuse the beginning of talks pith suc- cess," and stressing that what we aeught was a "limitation agreement [that is] mutually advantageous." His rationale for seeking such an agreement cut through a lot of_mislead- ing rhetoric on the alleged interooDuection or "linkage" of this problem with all other outstanding issues between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: "We are not talking about detente, or any- thing else. We are talking about vitae ther it makes- sense for the two of us to continue to spend immense amounts of money for the next five, or ten, or fifteen years on-atrategic weapons and end up at the end of WI, time- in the same relative position--or velsether it would be wiser to use the money for some other purpose. . . . I think they are ,ierious about it. You can always be wrong_ but at the moment I would say that their, attitude is serious and that they intend to approach it in the same attitude we do." Tone apart, two particular points of sub- stance deserve comment. One is that the de- cision to hold a preliminary conference to set things in motion, while remainbig, flex- ible about its form and content, probebly was wise; it would be good if whatever mutual procedural wrangling and wrestling might develop could be separated in some degree from the substantive talks that follow. The other is that, while declining to diselooe any moves the U.S. might be expected to make in Helsinski, Secretary Rogers showed him- self not inhospitable to the idea of working out a bilateral freeze or moratorium on MIRV tests in these preliminary sessions. Such an arrangement may or may nett come to pass, but gaining control over the rapid development of these destabilizing weapons should surely rank high on the Administra- tion's agenda. They are the weapons on which the clock is ticking. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE 11 10173 h- EDUCATION?THE KEY TO SURVIVAL (Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include e t er.) Mr. COHRT.A.N. Mr. Speaker, today this House will have the opportunity to vote on a continuing resolution for the Office of Education. I will offer an amendment to allow the Office of Edu- cation to expend funds at the previously House-passed levels. The urgency- and necessity of the full furitling for educa- tion programs iswffiely recognized both in this Cham and the Nation at large. I was gra ed to see that the Washing- ton P again took a strong editorial position favoring the full funding for cation. The editorial points out that ucation has been treated as a pesky Poor relation in the striving for limited resources. It is interesting to note that the Nation which prides itself as being the most Powerful and well endowed is now taking second place to many of the nations of Europe in education. The present admin- istration is not unaware of the need for more expenditures in education. Indeed, a task force commissioned by the Presi- dent himself recommended enormous in- creases in education. It seems to me that each Member should support the House- evel as a modest but necessary contributi a balanced and quality education. [From the Washingto ost, Oct, 28, 18691 Erescarrow?"Tne KEY"i,Q SURVIVAL" -Jefferson knew that the des y of Amer- ica was inseparable from educati ?that in the fulfillment of the promise of his new nation education would be the key . . Edu- cation, long the key to opportunity a d ful- fillment, is today also the key to sur -ival." So said Richard Nixon just a year ago hen he was a candidate for the presidency. And he went on to pledge that "my adrnin tra- tion will be second to none in its co ern for education." There has been no discernible move ent to redeem that pledge. Indeed, in the erce competition for attention and for f deral funds in a period when economy is n ad- ministration watchword, education s been treated as a pesky poor relation. T e Presi- dent has come forward with a dr atic new welfare proposal; but he has . - .layed only indifference to the urgent cational needs set forth by a dig ed urban educa- tion task force. He has proposed immense expenditures for a new maritime program designed to "replace the drift and neglect of recent years and restore this country to a proud position in the shipping lanes of the world"; but when the House of Representa- tives during the summer enlarged by a bil- liou dollars the meager appropriation he re- quested for federal aid to education, he op- posed the increase and threatened not to spend it if the Senate should endorse the House action. The President and his Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare persuaded one of the ablest and most thoughtful educators in the country, Dr. James E. Allen Jr., to leave the New York State, superintendency of edu- cation and come to Washington as U.S. Com- missioner of Education. But Dr. Allen h as been accorded scant influence since he came here, as though the administration desired a symbol of excellence rather than a pro- moter of it. This country, a pioneer in mass public education, is now second to many of the countries of Europe in literacy, the most ele- mentary index to educational attainment. Calling last ro.onth for a campaign to eradi- cate illiteracy in America, Commissioner Allen pointed to the shameful fact that in large city school systems in this country up to half of the students read below expectation and that about half of the unemployed youth between the ages of 16 and 21 in this country are functionally illiterate. "Drift and neglect" have been much more- and much more serioasly--the portion of the public schools in this country than of the merchant marine. For nearly half a century on one pretext or another?two world wars, two Asian interventions, a depression an inflation?the public schools of this country have been allowed to sink further and further in arrears of the demands made upon them. School construction has not kept pace with a growing school population; the number and the caliber of teachers?and of the counselors and equipment required to complement the teachers?have lagged increasingly behind the known needs of school children. The management of public schools is, and should be, a local responsibility. But the long neglect of the school systesn can be repaired only through a dramatic program of federal financial aid; the resources are simply mot now available at the local leveL More im- portant still, the drive and innovation and planning for a revitalization of the public schools must come on a nationwide basis. With the need for federal aid saurgeat and so great. It is a tragedy to hear from within the administration phlegmatic talk about concentrating on research instead of on ar, tion. It is true, of course, that intensive study of educational needs and aims =1St continue constantly. But the schools them- selves?and the children whose childhood op- portunities for education can never recur? cannot now wait upon research. There are plenty of pressing and indubitably construc- tive uses for the billion dollars of additional money a concerned Congress wants to apply to public education. There is plenty of knowl- edge in the U.S. Commissioner's aloe to put that money effectively to work at once. AMERICA'S COAT OF ARMS?AN OIL DERRICK RAMPANT ON A FIELD OF CASH (Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) Mr. PODELL, Mr. Speaker, our hopes for tax reform of a substantial nature lie dead, done in by the Senate Finance Committee, acting at the behest of America's oil and gas industry. The House had cut both foreign and do- mestic depletion allowances from 271/2 percent to 20 percent, the absolute mini- mum of reform. Many in this House, my- self among them, grudgingly accepted such partial tax relief. We hoped to at least make a start in eroding accumu- lated oil industry tax privileges, simul- taneously affording some aid to the average taxpayer. Now the Senate Fi- nance Committee has voted to restore much of what the House cut, leaving both foreign and domestic depletion al- lowances at 23 percent. Such an act is unacceptable, I consider it a legislative miscarriage, boldly offered and blatantly delivered. Our attempts at tax reform have been treated as a joke. Now they are turned into a knife aimed at en- larging oil industry preference at public expense. The Senate Finance Committee main- tained depletion allowances for more Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 October 969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE moratorium on multiple warhead missile testing, I am hopeful that a mutual MIRV test freeze will be one of the first items of agreement at the preliminary discussions. Secretary Rogers has pointed out that the SALT talks could last for several years. Unfortunately, we do not have that kind of time if we are truly interested in halting the deployment of MIRV since our own test series will be completed by mid=1970. And once MIRV is deployable it will be virtually impos- sible to control by agreement due to the complex problems of inspection that would be involved. We would thus be off to the races again as we both embarked on a costly and dangerous new arms buildup. It has been variously estimated that MIRVing our own land- and sea- based missiles will cost between $10 and $20 billion. But I think people are deceiving them- selves if they look on MIRV as only an unnecessary expenditure that will ulti- mately leave us where we now are?at a plateau of relative balance and stability. Two factors are being overlooked in such an assessment. First, during the buildup there are bound to be asymmetrical mo- ments when the balance of power will be upset and the risks of a nuclear exchange will, therefore, be greatly increased. And second, when both sides have MIRVed their missile force will still not have the stability which we enjoy today because there will be a distinct incentive for a nation to strike first with its MIRV force: since each MIRVed missile will in theory be capable of knocking out several missile silos, in time of crisis the edge will ob- viously be with the side which attacks first. While I realize that our own MIRV is not intended as a counterforce weapon, the fact remains that, with increased ac- curacy and yield, it has such a potential. And the Russians will be basing their judgments not on our intentions, but on our capabilities. For these reasons, I think it would be mutually advantageous for both us and the Russians to call a halt to MIRV de- velopment while there is still time. A mutual MIRV test freeze, based on na- tional means of verification, should be agreed to at the earliest possible date, and a formal agreement involving other means of inspection should be placed at the top of the SALT agenda. This pro- posal has the support of one-fourth of the House membership and nearly half of the Senate membership. It has been termed by President Nixon as "a very constructive proposal." I think President Nixon has been wise in rejecting calls for a unilateral Amer- ican halt in MIRV testing. Not only would this have been dangerous, but it would have encouraged the Russians to delay even further the commencement of SALT talks' while they continued to develop their own MIRV system. The subject of arms limitation must be ap- proached in a spirit of mutuality. Uni- lateral actions based on blind faith and trust would only generate distrust, fear and suspicion in the longrun and jeop- ardize the chances for a meaningful and mutual arms control agreement. I am sure I am joined by many of my colleagues in this body in hoping that the administration will seek to halt the development of MIRV by proposing to the Russians that we both discontinue our testing immediately and work for an agreement to stop the "mad momentum" of the arms race. At this point in the RECORD I include an editorial appearing in yesterday morning's Washington Post, entitled, "The SALT Talks: A Beginning." I am also including the transcript of the press conference with Secretary of State Rogers on the subject of SALT talks. The materials follow: [From the Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1969] THE SALT TAKES: A BEGINNING It is good news that the United States and the Soviet Union have at long last agreed on a time and a place for the opening of the talks on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons. There was good news of another kind, as well, in Secretary Rogers' press conference remarks on the subject. For in an international negotiation of this kind, there is much ongoing internal negotiation to be accomplished too?negotiation within each government and among its separate competitive parts, each of which tries, quite naturally, to assert its particular interest and make that interest controlling in the government position as a whole. We surely have much to learn, in the prolonged and extremely difficult talks ahead, as to how the weight falls within the Administration's specially designated negotiating team and how that reflects the larger reality within the Administration itself. But for the mo- ment there is much reassurance to be had from the fact that Secretary Rogers not only appeared as the President's spokesman on this question, but that he spoke with em- inent good sense. Mr. Rogers' remarks were low-key, easy- going, uncontentious, and above all practical. Unlike those who have conveniently for- gotten the Administration's own six-month postponement of the talks in their eagerness to tax the Soviet Union with unconscion- able delay, Secretary Rogers affably observed, "I'm not sure that it would help any to speculate on the reason for the delay since June. They probably wonder why we de- layed from the time our Administration came into office until June?and we did it be- cause we wanted to review the situation carefully. I think that they probably have problems of one kind or another and they have now decided to have the talks." He bashed no drums and clanged no cymbals concerning either the hopes or the fears that must necessarily attend such an ex- ercise. pointing out the "we should not con- fuse the beginning of talks with success," and stressing that what we sought was a "limitation agreement [that is] mutually ad- vantageous," His rationale for seeking such an agreement cut through a lot of mislead- ing rhetoric on the alleged interconnecting or "linkage" of this problem with all other outstanding issues between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: "We are not talking about detente, or any- thing else. We are talking about whether it makes sense for the two of us to continue to spend immense amounts of money for the next five, or ten, or fifteen years on strategic weapons and end up at the end of that time in the same relative position?or whether it would be wiser to use the money for some other purpose. . . . I think they are serious about it. You can always be wrong but at the moment I would say that their attitude is serious and that they intend to approach it in the same attitude we do." Tone apart, two particular points of sub- stance deserve comment. One is that the de- cision to hold a preliminary conference to set things in motion, while remaining flexible about its form and content, probably was wise; it would be good if whatever mutual 1110175 procedural wrangling and wrestling might develop could be separated in some degree from the substantive talks that follow. The other is that, while declining to disclose any moves the U.S. might be expected to make in Helsinki, Secretary Rogers showed himself not inhospitable to the idea of working out a bilateral freeze or moratorium on MIRY tests in these preliminary sessions. Such an arrangement may or may not come to pass but gaining control over the rapid develop- ment of these destabilizing weapons should surely rank high on the Administration's agenda. They are, the weapons on which the clock is ticking. SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26, 1969 Following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State William P. Rogers News Conference, which is authorized for direct quotation: Secretary ROGERS. Ladies and gentlemen, I thought that it might be helpful to get to- gether with you in view of the announce- ment that was made in the White House at 11:00 o'clock, because I thought you might have some questions on this subject. I will do my best to give you the information that you would like to have. Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a little bit on what will be treated at the preliminary discussions? And secondly, will you tell us if there's a possibility that President Nixon and the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, might formally open the second phase of serious negotiations on the substantive issues? A. On the second part of the question, I think the answer is no, there is no present intention of any procedure of that kind, and I don't believe that it will happen. As far as the preliminary talks themselves are concerned, we expect that they will be exploratory in nature. The purpose of the preliminary talks is to have a free discussion about how the negotiations can be con- ducted. Now, we are approaching these talks very seriously. Certainly, it's as serious a matter as we have in our nation today, and I think that the Soviet Union's attitude is the same. Certainly they say that they are very serious about these talks. So we want to discuss how we can best approach the talks in a serious, businesslike way that will be produtive. Q. Mr. Secretary. A. Yes. TheseQ. talks have been put off time and time again. What do you think is different now about this time? Why did the Russians agree now? A. Well, I don't know?and I'm not sure that it would help any to speculate on the reason for the delay since June. They prob- ably wonder why we delayed from the time our Administration came into office until June?and we did it because we wanted to review the situation carefully. I think that they probably have problems of one kind or another and they have now decided to have the talks. Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of MIRV, is it the intention of this Government to propose a freeze, a moratorium, or some other' device to halt MIRY testing at the beginning of this conference so that substantive issues can be dealt with through a moratorium or a freeze? A. Well, as President Nixon said in June, we are obviously considering the whole ques- tion of MIRY tests and possible moratorium on the tests; and that will be one of the sub- jects that will be considered when we start these talks. I think that it's a complex situation. Now that the talks are scheduled to start on the 17th, why we will consider how we approach that subject. We certainly don't intend to have any pub- lic discussion as we go along on each one of Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 1110176 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE Octooer ,e8, 1969 these issues. It's too serious a hiciness. We're going to try as much as possible to conduct these negotiations in private. Now, obviously, we'll keep our NATO Allies informed of the progress, and weill keep Congress informed. But as melee as possible, we want to do this in private and the Soviet Union indicates that that's their intention too, Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't understand what you mean by saying you don't Intend to have a public discussion because the issues are too serious. A. Well, I mean, at each step of the negotia- tion, obviously, we will hate a discussion. Eventually the public will budge, But while we are talking we think it's bettor to do it in a private session; and we would hope that with some exceptions they will be "private sessions. Do I make myself clear? Q. Yes. But could I ask one more tallow-up ques- tion? A. But let me say on that point, Mr. High- tower, that as I said, we will keep Congress advised, and we will keep the appropriate committees fully advised of the general ap- proach that our Government is taking. And we'll keep our allies advised. But we don't want to have each one of these negotiating sessions * public seesion, because it's a very complex subject, and we think it's so serious that it should be con- ducted in a businesslike atmosphere. And when it's appropriate to advise the public, we will. Q. So you expect some eitabilc information to come out from time to Univ. But the nego- tiations, as such, are to beprivate. A. That's correct. Q. Yes. At what level do you jean to open the talks? A. Well, we have our de:legation, that we have already announced, that is prepared to go to Helsinki on the 17th.. The Chairman of that is Ambassador Gerard Smith, the Alter- nate Chairman is Philip Parley, there's Paul Nitze, and General Allison, Llewellyn Thorne- son, and Dr. Harold Brawn, Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm not quite clear on whether there's going to be one meeting in Helsinki, or a series of meetings in Helsinki, that are ended by the ending of the prelimi- nary talks?and then the- beginning of the actual talks somewhere else? Or is It all go- ing to run together? A. Well, we can't predict it for certain. But I think it will run slienething like this: We would expect that preliminary discus- sions in Helsinki will rift for several days, maybe a few weeks, and at that time a deci- sion will be made about a permanent site. And also, decisions will he made about how best to conduct the permanent negotia- tions?how many should attend, how Many should be private, and whether there should be an agenda or not ha nie an agenda?those things. In other words, the purpose of the prelimi- nary talks is to work it but so that we are not arguing about details and we get right dawn to the business of serious negotiations when we get to the peratenent talks. Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any thought on our part of proposing some sort of limita- tion on anti-ballistic missiles? CIT does it ap- pear that the decision of both governments to proceed with limited deployment precludes this? A. Mr. Scali, we are not going to discuss in advance, and hopefully not while the negotiations are being conducted, specific proposals that we are gding to make. I think I should say that the negotiations will include both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. And as you know, under NPT Treaty, we have an obligation to do that, and we are going to fulfill that obligation. Chalmers? Q. Could I clarify something?some of the answers you have given? You are going to Helsinki to have a pre- liminary meeting of a few days to a few weeks. Now that is essentially to work out the techniques of how you have a longer range, more permanent meeting. Dees that mean that in the preliminary meeting there will be no possibility of dis- cussing a substantive question such as the freeze of MIRV while we're having the per- manent meeting? A. No. Q. That could happen at the Preliminary Meeting? A. Yes, yes. We are not going to exclude any subject from discussion at the preliminary meetings, and I don't want to be in any rigid position about how long these preliminary talks are going to last, or how we're going to discuss it. Our attitude is quite flexible. And I think the Soviet Union's attitude Is the same. We're serious about this, and we want to conduct the negotiations in a businesslike manner, and we hope that we can avoid long arguments about the agenda, and which item will come first, and whether there's a limitation on what we can talk about, and so forth. If we can have a more reasonable, flexible approach to negotiations, and if we can talk back and forth, and dot it with a serious in- tention in mind?then it's possible that these talks can be productive. Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an idea ?at least what you anticipate What the gen- eral course of things is apt to be?whether you want to?whether you prefer to start with existing weapons systems and then pro- ceed to---- A. No. I don't want to get involved in how we're going to do it?which we're going to take up first, and so forth. Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't think that Hel- sinki was our original preference, as far as the site is concerned. Do you have another preference for the permanent site of the talks? A. Well, I'm glad you raised that question, because there has been some misunderstand- ing about it. And let me tell you exactly how it developed: In my discussions with Ambassador Do- brynin in June, I think it Was June 11th, I said that we were ready to have talks, and that we would be prepared to have talks within a month. And I listed these places as possible sites for the talks: Geneva, Vienna, and Helsinki. Now we did suggest Helsinki, and when Ambassador Dobrynin responded the other day, he selected Helsinki, and that was one of the places that we had suggested. We have left open the question of the final site, and he was willing to do that, because there are some problems of communication and availability of space and other things. It's possible that some other site would be better. We look with favor on Vienna, for ex- ample, but we are not excluding the pos- sibility of Helsinki as the final site. But the reason I mentioned It that fully is we didn't have any argument about the site. Helsinki was a site that we proposed. Later on, we indicated we thought maybe Vienna would be better for the reasons I mentioned, but eve had no dispute about the site. Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us a more clear definition of the term "strategic arms?" Does this include, for example, land based intermediate ballistic missiles? A. No, I think ru leave that to the nego- tiators. That's a subject that they will have to discuss when they get there. Q. How does China's growing strategic power lit in, long range, with these negotia- tions with the Soviet Union? And the threat, presumably, to both countries? A. Well I don't think, at the moment, they are relevant. They haven't progressed far enough, and I think if we can work out something that is constructive from the standpoint of the two superpowers that we can deal with China's problem later on. Keep in mind that the word that was used was "curbing" in this release--"Limita- tion" or "curbing"?and even if we are suc- cessful at working out an agreement, both the Soviet Union and the United States are going to be way ahead of China for many years to come. Q. Mr. Secretary, could you, for the bene- fit of the public, estimate how long you think these talks might take place? A. No, I wouldn't want to do that. I try to resist doing that. I noticed the other day in "Meet the Press" I made a mistake ' and did indicate that I thought that the answer that the Soviets would give us would be within two or three months. So far, I've been batting pretty well, and I'm not going to make any further predic- tions. Q. Mr. Secretary, who do you expect will lead the Soviet Delegation? And have you any indication either from reading the Soviet press, or in any other way, what their atti- tude is toward things like a MIRV mora- torium, or an ABM? A. We do not know who is going to head their Delegation. At one time it was thought that Mr. Kuznetsov would be the Chairman, but I think that he's in China now, in ne- gotiations there, so we're not sure. And Am- bassador Dobrynan did not tell me. He did say that he thought their delega- tion probably would be about the same size as OUTS, five or six. Q. What mechanism will be used for con- sulting the NATO Allies? Will they be con- tacted individually, or collectively? A. Well, I think it depends, of course, upon what the consultation oonsists of. I would think, generally speaking, we'll do it through the NATO organization in Brus- sels, but not necessarily. I don't want to be confined to that as a possibility. In our discussions here?notification of our NATO Allies that the talks were going to start?we notified the Ambassadors in Wash- ington. Q. Mr. Secretary, there is bound to be speculation that the beginning of these take may have a larger meaning. Do you think that this might be the beginning of an era of negotiations? A. Well, let me see if I can answer your question: I think this is an important step that is consistent with the President's policy of an era of negotiation, and it could be a very important negotiation. It's possible it's one of the most important negotiations our country has been involved in. And certainly, it could be one of the most important that we ever undertook with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, we should not confine the beginning of the talks with success of the talks, necessarily?there is quite a dif= ference. These talks could be abortive, they could be fruitless, or they could be highly succees- ful in terms of mankind. And those things will be determined by the talks, themselves. So whereas we are pleased that the SoReet Union has agreed to have these talks?we think it is a good step?we also have to be quite conscious of the fact that the mere start of the talks, themselves, is not what counts. What counts, is how successful they are. Q. Mr. Secretary, if these talks are success- ful, could they lead to a form of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union? A. Well, words like "parity" I think are apt to be confusing. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 October"Mr1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms limitation agreement which will keep us in the same relative position that we are now?and which can be verified Now in order to accomplish the first pant of that formula, we have to be sure that the limitation agreement is mutually advantage- ous, that neither side gets an advantage because of the agreement. Secondly, we have to be sure that the agreement can be verified, because if it can't and one side can cheat, then it certainly is not a viable agreement. Now these things are very difficult matters to handle, and I don't think anybody should be confused about the fact that they are difficult. They are complex, there's mutual suspicion, the subject matter itself is very involved, and so we have to proceed with the hope that we can achieve some suc- cess?but with the fun realization that it's not going to be easy. Q. Mr. Secretary, it's almost exactly a year ago today, I believe, that Nixon, then a candidate, gave a speech in which he said he would approach such negotiations only on the grounds that the United States would be negotiating from a position of superiority. Now, at this point does the Administration feel that it's going into these talks in a posi- tion of superiority, or rough equality, or however you want to characterize it?with the Soviet Union? A. Well I don't, as you know, I think he's used the term "sufficiency" and I think that we feel now that this is an appropriate time to enter these discussions and enter them seriously, with the hope that we can arrive at an agreement that will be mutually ad- vantageous. And I don't want to characterize what we think. We think this is the right time to do it, and I think the Soviet Union does, too. Q. Will you take a question on Lebanon? A. I'll take it?f Laughter.] No, I'm sorry, I don't want to get involved in anything _else this morning. Q. By "agreement" as the objective, are you speaking of the treaty that would be submitted to the Senate for ratification? A. Well, I think that if we have an. agree- ment, a very confidential agreement, we are thinking in terms of the treaty. Yes. And I think that that is the most likely outcome, assuming we reach an agreement. On the other hand, I wouldn't want to be frozen in that position, because it's possible that we would want to have some kind of an agreement of a limited nature, that would not require a treaty. But in any event, I want to make it clear that if we did something other than by way of treaty, that we would keep Congress con- stantly advised, and consult with them, and be sure that it met with their approval, and we would keep our allies advised. ? In other words, I think the chances are that the agreement would be in treaty form; but I wouldn't want to necessarily be frozen In that position. Q. Mr. Secretary, having talked with Am- bassador Dobrynin, how do you characterize the Russian attitude? They are willing to talk, but are they enthusiastic, cautious, what can you tell us about that? A. Well, I had long talks with Mr. Gromyko on this subject, in New York. We talked three tidies for three or four hours' duration, total; and I would characterize his attitude as serious. He gave me the impression that the Soviet Union is serious about these talks. lie didn't indicate that they were entering the talk or about to enter the talks for purposes o propaganda and that th about the same as ours. It's a realistic atti tude. We are not talking about detente, or any thing else. We are talking about whether i makes sense for the two of us to continue to spend immense ambunts of money for th next 5, or 10, or 15 years on strategic weapons and end up at the end of that time in th same relative position?or whether it woul be wiser to use the money for some othe purposes. Now that's just a Matter of hardware. If we can work out that kind of an agree ment so that each of us feel it's to our ad vantage to enter that kind of an agreement and we're satisfied that the agreement can be verified so that neither side can cheat?. then it makes sense to do it. So, I think they are serious about it. You always can be wrong but at the moment I would say that their attitude is serious and that they intend to approach it in the same attitude that we do. Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect, sir, that the initiation of these talks will, itself, affect the general pattern of East-West relations? As these talks proceed, will they have, in your judgment, a relationship to the conduct of international affairs as a whole?in the Middle East, for? A. Well, let me say this: They are not con- ditional in any sense of the word. We haven't laid down any conditions for these talks. I suppose that when you're talking with the representatives of the Soviet Union in any field, it does tend to improve the rela- tions somewhat?especially if the talks seem to be succeeding. Now, we are talking with them on NPT for example. We hope that they will ratify NPT. We are talking with them in Geneva about Seabeds Treaty?and those discussions have gone rather well. We are going to talk with them further about chemical and biological warfare lim- itations. So I suppose that all of those things tend to improve the atmosphere between the So- viet Union and the United States. But I don't think anybody should be mis- led. The mere fact that those talks seem to be going well doesn't necessarily mean other things are going to go well. We would hope that they will, but I think that the invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that point. Just prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there was a feeling of detente in Europe, that things were going very well between the United States and the Soviet Union?between East and West?and unfortunately, that in- vasion of Czechoslovakia changed that. So to summarize, I think that it does tend, slightly to improve the atmosphere, but we shouldn't be euphoric about the fact that we are having talks. Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of that, the ques- tion about Viet-Nam, which may relate to this, has the fact that you have said we are de-escalating in Viet-Nam had an effect on the Soviet attitude toward these talks? A. Well as I say, I don't know what's had an effect on the Soviet attitude. There's no way of knowing for sure. I can speculate, but I don't think my speculation is worth any more than anyone else's. Q. Thank you. Q. You could try, sir. [Laughter.] H 10177 s, A. Well, I would rather read about it. I [Laughter.] as Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the United - States and the Soviet Union to enter these preliminary discussions with formal, sub- - stantive proposals on the 17th of November? t A. Well, I wouldn't think that we would start out that way, no. As I say, I think these e talks will be exploratory. I don't rule out, as Mr. Roberts asked, e whether we rule out any discussion of sub- d stantive matters, r The answer to that is no. But I wouldn't think that would be the way the discussions would start. - ? Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indica- - ton of what the Soviet position will be in , terms of willingness, or lack of willingness, to agree to things like a MIRV moratorium, or some agreements on ABM? A. No. Q. Thank you, sir. COAL DUST CAN BE SHARPLY REDUCED (Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, it is now possible, feasible, tech- nologically, and economically within reason to make a drastic reduction in the amount of coal dust at the working face of a coal mine. This fact is very dramati- cally illustrated in the Bureau of Mines Technical Progress Report entitled "Studies on the Control of Respirable Coal Mine Dust by Ventilation," to which I referred earlier today an the floor. The substance of this report reveals the results of cooperative tests with industry in five bituminous coal mines. In a re- lease dated October 28, the Bureau of Mines states that "improved ventilating methods were used to reduce the con- centration of respirable dust, the cause of 'black lung' disease." A high-pressure auxiliary fan in ventilating the working face resulted in a very marked reduction in the coal dust level after careful tests. At an early date, I shall make available the backup statistical data on which this report was based. I believe this report has great signi- ficance in relation to our debate over the proper dust standard to be included in the pending coal mine health and safety legislation. It is highly unfortunate that certain unidentifiable sources within the Nixon administration felt that this report should be suppressed instead of made publicly advailable. Only after I sent a telegram to the President late Monday urging that he direct the Department of Interior to spring loose this report did it see the light of day. I would certainly hope, Mr. Speaker, that the administra- tion would be more active in the future suppressing coal dust rather than sup- pressing reports. The text of this report is so significant that it should be available for the con- sideration of all Members. It follows: Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 H 10178 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE Octooer z8, 1969 miner were used as a basis for comparison. It would hare been desirable to use a per- sonal sampler on the machine operator as the reference point. However, in some mines studied, the machine operators performed multiple tasks, requiring several different op- erators for each machine on a given shift. Therefore, the operator's exposure could not be used for obtaining representative data. Baseline studies of respirable dust concen- trations were made wherever possible in the Pneumoconiosis, a respiratory disease Bureau's studies, to establish the effective- which is caused by inhaling fine particles of ness of the ventilation system being tested. coal mine dust, is recognized as a major oc- Figure 1 illustrates the system used cupational health problem in underground throughout this investigation. bituminous-coal mines. Consequently, the VENTILATION THEORY 8 Bureau of Mines has launched 3B63 effdrts?..... Following the introduction of continuous mining equipment to the bituminous coal- fields, increased production rates and rapid face advance led to increased frequency of methane ignitions from improper or poor face ventilation. As a part of a program to reduce this hazard, the Bureau of Mines ob- tained information relative to airflow pat- terns developed in the immediate face area by various combinations of ventilation methods and devices. Following these studies basic systems of air control were devised for dilution and removal of methane face emis- sions without accumulations of high concen- trations in the oceupied /ace region. Methane control and dilution was in all cases achieved lysing engineering studies by the by planned air circulation. Ines and the industry, it became Although continuing progress has been hat a method for achieving the made in face ventilation techniques, dust velocity was by using a high- loading in the face atmosphere clearly in- Mary fan and by maintaining dicates that ventilation Systems now used are e exhaust tubing about 5 feet often inadequate to Maintain respirable dust concentrations within acceptable limits. . This assertion was supported Settling rates of airborne particulates less [Bureau of Mines Mineral leaustry Health of the mine, the hazard due to methane will Program, Technical Progress Report 19, also be reduced. October 19691 3. Because of the effects of concentrations STUDIES ON THE CONTROL Or UESPIRABLE COAL of respirable dust in the incoming air the MINE DUST BY VIM; , LATION system investigated, by itself, is not a corn- (By D. S. Kingery,1 H. N. awns" E. J. Harris, te solution to the respirable dust prob- lem For the system to be totally effective, M. Jacobson,4 R. G. Peluso, J. B. ShutackS dust. controls must be applied at dust gen- and D. P. Schlick 7) erating points in the incoming air passage- [Figures and illustrations referred to in text ways. cannot be reproduced in the RECORD] ABSTRACT Experiments initiated by the Bureau of Mines on August 26, 1969, and recent work of others, have demonstrated the effectiveness of ventilation for controlling concentrations of respirable coal mine dust. Substantial re- ductions in dust concentrations have been attained by increasing the volume and rate of air movement across the race and by con- trolling the airflow pattern Ventilation experiments conducted by the Bureau using high-pressilie fans as auxiliary ventilation units showed th face-generated dust could be effectively controlled in five mines employing continuous mining ma- chines. Additional data was obtained on in- dustry installations in two mines using simi- lar ventilation systems. Hy maintaining an airflow approaching 100 fpin across the entry, the experimental system reduced the concen- tration of respirable dust by factors as great as 6.4. In all mines wherethe system was used the face-generated dust concentrations were reduced to below 3 mg/ins Total respirable dust in two cases was above the 3 nig/m" value because of the dust content of the in- INTRODUCTION to find ways for controll mine dust. Studies by til mining research agenc the efficient use of w resent the fundam tive dust control mining machin suppression m current spray on dust in t Calculat1 o ureau and other have indicated that r and ventilation rep- tal approaches to effec- Although water sprays on have beneficial effect as a ure for total airborne dust, techniques have little effect respirable range. s based on the theory of small particle berlavior and air motion indicated to Bureau linvestigators that an airflow of between 7r and 100 fpm across the entry should res It in significantly lower dust con- centration After a Bureau of apparent desired en take air. In some mines, depending upon pressure a type of coal being mined and other dust con- the end o trol factors in use, it wa,s possible to obtain from the fac concentrations of less than 2 mg/m". by the followi Although the technology for the applica- 1. Adequate ai tion of the dust control_ system investigated mine dust genera is readily available, it Is evident that addi- and captures dust tional engineering studies ;hould be made in be transported by the each mine where the system is to be applied. into the return entry, wh Conditions in some Mines may require a or collected. modification of the system. On the basis of 2. Previous studies conduc the Bureau's experience to date, further reau demonstrated the effec th studies will be made iso that the various tilation for the control of metha engineering parameters encountered in un- at the working face. Similar techniq derground coal mining can be evaluated, be effective for dust control. CONCLUSIONS METHOD OF INVESTIGATION The following conclusions can be made The Bureau's investigation Was center from this investigation: upon the use of an auxiliary high-pressur 1. Controlled face ventilation employing axial-flow direct-driven fan with variable a high-pressure auxiliary fan together with pitch blades. The original estimated power other components of the system will sub- requirements were from 20 to 40 hp. An ap- stantially reduce the concentration of re- proved fan with such requirements was not spirable coal dust at the working face of available and could not be quickly supplied underground coal mine*. By maintaining an by a manufacturer. Therefore, two fans, op- airflow from 70 to 100 flan across the entry, erating in parallel, each with horsepower suf- results showed in all instances that the aver- licient to produce 5,000 cfm, and a fan with age respirable dust connentration at the con- a 10-hp motor capable of producing 9,900 tinuous miner was reduced to less than elm, where used in the first experiment. This 3 mg/m0. Total respirable dust in two cases series was conducted in a mine where coal was was above the 3 mg/mli value because of the being extracted by a continuous miner, from dust content of the intake air. In some in- the Pittsburgh coalbed, averaging about 6 stances, however, respirable dust concentra- feet in height. tions were reduced to -lass than 2 mg/m". Although favorable results were=red 2. Through proper engineering design of in this initial study, the fans used not the auxiliary and main ventilating, system produce the desired entry velocities origi- nally specified by Bureau engineers. A sec- ond study was conducted using a 60-hp aux- ilitary fan from the Bureau's experimental mine in order to obtain higher entry veloci- ties. Because of the fan's size and power re- quirement, it could only be used in mines capable of accommodating it. In the second mine studied, coal was extracted with a con- tinuous miner from the Sewickley coalbed averaging 50 to 54 inches in height. Subse- quent studies were conducted in mines in the Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4, and Illinois No. 6 coalbeds. Dust measurements were made according to standard Bureau procedures. For the pur- pose of this report, samples collected with an MRE instrument contained in the instru- ment package mounted ozi the continuous concepts: ow at the face confines coal d ahead of the operator tidos. Dust can then tern and discharged e it can be treated by the Bu- ess of ven- released s could 'Acting director: Haab if and Safety Tech- nical Support Center, Bureau of Mines, Pitts- burgh, Pa. " Acting assistant direc tor?Mineral Indus- try Health, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C. Chief, Ventilation Support Group, Health and Safety Technical Support Center, Bu- reau of Mines, Pittsburgh. Pa. ? Acting chief, Pittsburgh Field Health Group, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa. 0 Mining engineer, Pittsburgh Field Health Group, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa. 0 Mining engineer, Ptttbilrgh Field Health Group, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa. Mining engineer, Mineral Industry Health, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C. than 10 microns in diameter show that dust in the respirable size range may be trans- ported for great distances by air currents. Because respirable duat generated at the face is transported by the air stream, venti- lation techniques originally designed to con- trol distribution and accumulation of meth- ane face emissions can be used to confine, capture, and remove airborne dust produced at the face. The theory for the control of coal mine dust is that dust particles smaller in size than 10 microns tend to behave in the same manner as a gaseous contaminant such as methane, Thus, the control of respirable dust is a function of the volume and velocity air moving across the coal face. Another quirement is to maintain the zone of con- t Mated air as close to the face as possible to nimize the exposure of face workers. eau studies on methane control meth- ods ave revealed definitive airflow patterns. The patterns are shown in figures 2 and 3. At t e strat of the investigation, information give on figure 2 was used to determine that exh sting air from the face in sufficient vol- assure a sustained velocity approach- g 100 fpm across the entry, would result n minimizing the concentration of respir- able dust. Diagrams shown on figure 3 estab- lished the need for maintaining the tubing within 5 feet of the coal face. Experiments performed at the Bureau's experimental coal mine related horsepower requirements to air velocity and air volume under a variety of operating conditions as shown in figure 4. From the data incorporated in figure 4 it was estimated that for entries having a 56 sq. feet area, a 15-hp, high-pressure, anxil- Luxner, James V. Face Ventilation in Underground Bituminous Coal Mines?Air- flow and methane distribution patterns in immediate face area-line brattice. BuMines Rept. of Inv. 7223, 1969, 16 pp. " Dalzell, R. W. Face Ventilation by Line Brattice and by Auxiliary Fans. Oral presen- tation at the National Safety Council, Chi- cago, Illinois, October 27-30, 1969. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 H 10152 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE October 28, 1969 Because the Marshfield Clinic and St. Joseph's Hospital are so impressive, I was particularly eager to bring the nation's top health officer, Bob Finch, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, here today so that he might get a first-hand look at these facilities and hear the success story di- rectly from those responsible for its opera- tion. I wanted him to see that what I've been telling him about the Clinic is not an inflated claim of a honletown booster. Bob Finch and I are here because we feel deeply the urgency of the problem of im- proving health care throughout the nation. Despite the miraculous advances that have been made in conquering disease, despite the fact that Americans enjoy a higher standard of medical care than the people of any other nation in the world, the nation faces serious problems in the field of health?particularly in the delivery of health services to people. One of the greatest bottlenecks is the shortage of skilled personnel. There are not enough doctors, nurses, and other trained personnel to take care of today's needs, and the outlook for tomorrow is grimmer. I feel the Defense Department can make an important contribution toward easing this problem. Some 30-35,000 military personnel who are qualified medical technicians or technologists?trained and experienced dur- ing their period of military services?re-enter civilian life each year. They include a vast galaxy of talent in 40 different skill categories as varied as a radio-isotope?technician to a renal dialysis technician. By bringing to- gether in some way these trained men and the jobs in civilian life in the field of health services for which they are qualified, I be- lieve we can help to improve health care and avoid a waste of skill and training. Consequently, I have directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Roger Kelley, to develop a plan that will maximize the opportunities to utilize in civilian life the valuable medical skills possessed by many servicemen. I can assure you that we will move promptly to devise and implement this plan. This is but one of several steps which the Defense Department is taking to make more widely available the special know-how that it possesses in the field of health care. We have a study under way called the New Gen- eration of Military Hospitals which is de- signed to improve service and reduce cost in the operation of such institutions. The results of this study will, I believe,' have an important impact on hospitals of the future, civilian as well as military, leading to better health facilities in the future for the entire nation. We also plan to draw upon our battlefield experience in the use of helicopters for the speedy evacuation of the wounded to places where-care is available. By use of the heli- copter we have saved many from death and from disability in Vietnam. The same means of swift transfer of accident victims from the scene of the accident to medical facilities can reduce the accident toll here at home. If present trends continue, more than 56,000 Americans are expected to be killed and two million to be injured on our high- ways this year. In remote and rural areas, the death rate is four times greater than in urban areas because of delay in administer- ing emergency medical treatment and trans- porting victims to medical facilities. Accord- ing to one authority, at least 25 per cent of the 170,000 Americans who will suffer perma- nent disability this year in highway accidents could escape disability if they had proper care shortly after their accidents. In order to reduce the frightful toll of death and disability on the highway, we in the Department of Defense have joined with Bob Finch's Department of Health, Educa- tion, and Welfare and other Federal agencies to form a committee that is now studying means of making the helicopter a flying am- bulance here at home as it is in Vietnam. We have great hopes for the potential benefits we can obtain from arlying what we have learned in Vietnam to the medical emer- gency we face here at home. Speaking of home, it is good to be back in Marshfield again, I congratulate all asso- ciated with the Marshfield Clinic and St. Joseph's Hospital for what you have accom- plished. I shall continue to watch?and en- courage?your progress in the important work you are doing. REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD BEFORE THE DEDICATION OF THE MARATHON COUNTY WORKSHOP FOR THE HANDICAPPED, WATJSAU, Those of us who have watched the growth of the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped since its beginnings five years ago have reason for special pride and satis- faction today. Five years ago the only home the Work- shop had from which to operate was a sta- tion wagon. Today we dedicate a building of 16,000 square feet as the new home in which the greatly expanded activities of the Work- shop are to be carried on. The Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped has indeed come of age. Physical facilities that men use for their ? activities take on a symbolic character. They become symbols of the qualities of mind and. heart evidenced in the activities which take place within their walls. This building which we dedicate will be a symbol of compassion, generosity, love, hope, and determination. For these are the quali- ties that will fill this structure as it is used as a place to learn and to work. This building also symbolizes a great American tradition?the tradition of volun- tary private action at the local level to help our neighbors. There is Federal money in these facilities?and I was happy to have been able to play some part as a member of Congress in securing the Federal funds that were made available to provide this new home for the Workshop. But what particu- larly pleases me is that today's dedication is one of the many concrete results of an amendment I was able to attach to an Ap- propriations bill back in 1964 which per- mitted private donations to be mingled with State funds in making up the State's share of the program. Two-thirds of the money that made this building possible was pri- vately subscribed. That is a gratifying sta- tistic to me because many people back in 1964 felt that the Laird Amendment would not produce the kind of results that I am proud today to see embodied in the Mara- thon County Workshop for the Handicapped. This Workshop was conceived, developed, and is being operated by private individuals, supported voluntarily by the people of this County acting in the American spirit of neighborliness. One of the things that President Nixon is trying to encourage and expand is problem- solving by voluntary action at the local level. The Workshop is an example of this type of activity. We did not wait for Washington to get around to providing this facility for us. We did not leave the planning or its execu- tion to an agency of the Federal Govern- ment. We who live in this section of Wiscon- sin saw some of our neighbors in need of help, and we acted to provide this help. The great social and economic problems which plague our Nation will not be solved by Government alone. They will be solved only if the kind of privately-initiated and privately-directed cooperative effort on the local level, represented by the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped, is duplicated, magnified, and intensified from one end of the Nation to the other. I want to pay tribute to Peter DeSantis an to all others who have made the Work- shop the success it has become. I need not recount this success story in detail, but let me mention a fact that gives one measure of the Workshop's accomplishments. This Workshop has been the entrance chamber to -productive lives for 160 people so far. The earning power of these people has increased from zero to 6500,000. There is no adequate measure of the gain in confidence, satisfac- tion, and self-respect that this transforma- tion has brought to these individuals. The past accomplishments of the Work- shop are, I am sure, going to be exceeded year after year. As we dedicate this building, we wish for all who deserve credit for bring- ing the Workshop from infancy to maturity long years of fruitful service in the future. EUROPEANS VIEW SALT TALKS (Mr. FINDLEY astlecid was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks,) Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, our allies in Western Europe are not the least bit nervous over the strategic arms limita- tions talks scheduled to begin November 17 in Helsinki. They seem to be thorough- ly confident their interests will be pro- tected fully by U.S. negotiators. The relaxed attitude was very evident during the just concluded sessions in Brussels of the North Atlantic Assembly, and it was in marked contrast with con- cern I had noted in sessions in earlier years. For the first time German, Italian, and French parliamentarians seemed to te completely at ease discussing privately the forthcoming talks. In earlier years they had shown anxiety about the course of bilateral talks between the super powers. This was especially evident in the comments of German delegates who said they felt their government had not been treated with proper consideration during the negotiations by the Johnson administration leading to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Italian, French, and British delegates had expressed sim- ilar concern. In the North Atlantic Assembly just concluded a new confidence was clearly present. In my view this restoration of European confidence in U.S. negotiators stands as a significant achievement of the Nixon administration. It results from two main factors: First. A series of NATO-wide private consultations held earlier this year in Brussels in preparation for the SALT talks. Our allies were impressed with the thoroughness and candor of the three- part series of day-long discussions which were spaced over a period of several weeks. This was a marked change from the SALT talk consultation plans made by the Johnson administration. I learned in Brussels that only a single 3-hour discus- sion had been tentatively scheduled. Second. The caution with which the Nixon administration has discussed both publicly and privately the prospect of SALT talks. The rhetoric has been re- strained with notes of optimism care- fully balanced with caution. These factors give substance the pledge President Nixon made during his Febru- ary trip to Europe, during which he promised close consultation with our NATO allies on all matters vital to Euro- pean security. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 October 28, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE 1110151 tee?SMC. SMC is the student counter- part of the New Mobilization Committee Against the War in Vietnam?MOBE. The New Mobilization Corrmiittee has substantially the same membership as the old mobilization comm1ttee which was headed by Dellinger, Hayden, and Davis. As would be expected, SMC is rep- resented on the steering committee of MOBE in at least two instances. And it has apparently begun to fill the political vacuum on college and Mali school campuses this year left by the factional breakup of he Students for a Democratic Society. An article entitled "Student Group Backs All War Protests" whiab appeared on page A-8 of the "Washington Post" of October 21, 1969, contained comments of SMC Executive Secretary Carol Lip- man who estimated that more than 1,500 SMC chapters have already been estab- lished on campuses in all 50 States. Ac- cording to this article, Lynn Glixon, SMC regional organizer, stated that SMC chapters are active on most of the major college campuses and at 45 high schools and junior high schools in the Washing- ton, D.C. area. She further stated that organization has begun even in elemen- tary schools and specifically mentioned that a SMC chapter is in the process of being formed at the Ben W. Church Ele- mentary School in the District of Co- lumbia. The SMC has called for a "national student strike" on November 14, 1969, to "show there is massive student solidarity against the war." This action is planned as a buildup to a major antitiar demon- stration planned for November 15, 1969, in Washington, D.C. Local colleges, uni- versities, and high schools are being sub- jected to organizing campaigns and some school administrators have _even pro- vided time and space for meetings. These campaigns are centered on "freedom of speech and expression" and sold as an extension of the "public discontent" with the policies of the present administration toward the war in Vietnam. Many students and their parents ques- tion the activities and motives of the SMC but find it difficult to combat the glib assertions of the organizers. Perhaps a look at the background of sane of the principal SMC activists appearing lo- cally would prove helpful Carol Lipman and Danny Rosenshine from New York City and Don Gurewitz from Cleveland are presently in the Washington, D.C., area specifically to organize SMC ac- tivities. Carol Lipman is national executive secretary of the SMC, which has its na- tional headquarters in New York City. Local offices are maintained at 1029 Ver- mont Avenue NW. During 1968 she served as editor of Young Socialist, a monthly publication of the Young Social- ist Alliance?YSA. The YSA is the youth affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyist Communist splinter group which has been cited by the Attorney General as subversive. She has worked for YSA in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and New York City before coming to Wash- ington, D.C. Having held national officer positions with YSA, she would also be a member of the parent Socialist Workers Party?SWP. She is also a member of the steering committee of MOBE. Danny Rosenshine has likewise been active for several years with YSA in Detroit, Cleveland, and New York City before coming to Washington, D.C. He presently serves on a full-time basis as YSA national organizer, having Previ- ously been national field secretary. He traveled to Cuba in 1960 with a group sponsored by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. In 1962 he attended the Soviet-dominated eighth World Youth Festival in Helsinki, Finland, and subse- quently toured the ' Union. In early 1969 eturned from spe several w s in Cuba. The Militant, published by SWP, issue of March 21, 1969, carri d an article captioned "Forty Campus Des Set for Speaker on Cuba," listing spea ing engagements arranged for Rosenshi e. His speeches predictably praised the C an brand of communism as practiced u er Fidel Castro and at the same time condemned the U.S. Gov- ernment. In late 1'948 he was on a speak- ing tour of New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, also 4vertised in The Militant. His topic ak that tune was "From Student RevoTht to Socialist Revolution." Don Burewitz grew up in e Washing- ton, D.C., area but has beenvesiding in the Cleveland area attendinek school in recent years. He has been acti antiwar movement, served as 1 the SMC in Cleveland, and also pated in the affairs of the YS SWP. In addition to serving as tonal organizer for the SMC 1 cruiting campaign in the Washin area, Gurewitz is also serving on Washington Action Committee of New Mobilization Committee the War in Vietnam, which is coor nating the demonstration sched November 15, 1969, in Washingt All prominent SMC leaders have similar background of activities a membership in the YSA and SWP. Lipman, Rosenshine, and Cure have all written articles for The M tant and Young Socialist. Both enshine and Lipman have served on the editorial board of Young Socialist, The September 1969 issue of "Young cial- ist" contains a lengthy article titled "YSA Program for the Camp evolt," proclaimed statement Executive Com e National YSA. A poster- type counterfold contains a likeness of "Che" Guevarra and the slogan "Smash Capital Now." Other articles include "Where Is America Going?" by Ernest Mandel, a leading European Trotskyist revolutionary who spoke at dozens of U.S. college campuses on a tour last fall. The June 27, 1969, issue of "The Mili- tant" contains an article by Charles Bol- duc, national chairman, YSA, entitled "Why Revolutionaries Belong in YSA." This article makes the point that YSA supports the Cuban revolution;. the struggle for socialist democracy in East- ern Europe; the antiwar movement; the black liberation struggle and the revolu- tionary nature of revolution for social- ism in the United States and other ad- Vanced capitalist countries. The Militant regularly carries re- e in the er of rtici- and na- re- ton the he To 1- uled on, D a md tz s- cruiting ads for YSA under such head- ings as "Fan the Flames of Discon- tent?Join YSA." Consideration of the foregoing devel- opment raises several questions. Is SMC promoting political dissent and protest, or revolution? Is the action proposed and organized by SMC an affirmation of the political system of this Nation, or de- signed to further the aims and objectives of those who would destroy this Nation? Should the activities be condoned as legi- timate expression of the attitudes of the youth of this country, or condemned as the workings of a disciplined cadre of revolutionaries seeking to deceive Amer- youth? Is SMC, controlled as it ob- vious is by YSA, seeking merely to exercise 1eedorn of political expression, or is SM actually seeking to destroy the political system? Students, parents, and faculty at our local schools should answer for them- selves the above questions before endors- ing or countenancing the activities of SMC. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FINDS TIME TO CONCERN HIMSELF WITH HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS (Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.) Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, all of us In the Congress are well aware of the tremendous contributions to the concept of improved health care made by Secre- tary of Defense Laird while he served as the ranking Republican member of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. While he has handled the awesome burdens of the Office of Secretary of Defense with the quality of excellence that characterized his service in the Congress, he still somehow finds time to concern himself with health care prob- lems, as evidenced by his remarks on Sunday, October 26, at the Marshfield Clinic in Marshfield, Wis., and on Mon- day, October 27, at the dedication of the Marathon County Workshop for the Handicapped at Wausau, Wis. In his address Secretary Laird pointed out that the Department of Defense is formulating a plan for opening up serv- ice hospitals to maximize the opportuni- ties to utilize in civilian life the valuable medcal skills possessed by many servce- men. He further states that the Depart- ment of Defense is cooperating with other agencies to make the helicopter a flying ambulance here in the United States as it is in Vietnam. Mr. Speaker, the texts of Secretary Laird's remarks on these two occasions follow: REMARKS OF HON. MELVIN Et. LA/RD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AT MARSHF/E'LD CLINIC, MARSH- FIELD, Wis., OCTOBER 26, 1969 We who look on Marshfield as home are proud of this Clinic. Its development to its present size and scope gives eloquent testi- mony to the devotion and skill of the many people who have labored to make this clinic a medical facility that ranks with the best in the nation. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 October 27, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 13297 Justice REED. You can't get as much from voluntary dollars as you can from dues? Mr. Marx. Well, sir, a union man thinks he has paid, when he has paid his dues, he thinks he has paid for bargaining, for legislation, and for political activity. He doesn't feel he should pay a second time for political activity. That is why it is so hard to raise voluntary contributions. Our constitution and the constitution of all unions set this up as a purpose, po- litical action. When he pays his dues, he has paid for his political action. He may give another dollar or two to some candidate for an office, but he doesn't feel he is going to give another some more money. We have collected a little, but never any- thing to do this job of making the public know our views. Justice FRANKFURTER. Was it only the other day that unions went into politics? For years we had a great leader of labor who thought it was very bad to go into politics for the union. Mr. RAUH. There was such a leader, sir. Justice FRANKFURTER. So if you say a hun- dred years of history, there is a good deal of history the other way. Mr. RAUIL. There has been history the other way, but political life has?there is history back a hundred years. There was a period, as you suggest, when this was the view of some leading labor leaders. So what does the Government suggest that is justi- fied? It was trying to minimize the influence? these are the Solicitor General's commend- able frankness?it was trying to minimize the influence of unions at elections. APPEND4X D Justice BLACK. What is the relevancy of the emphasis on the fact that it came out of union dues? Mr. faux. Well, sir, if it came out of vol- untary funds then everyone agrees that it is not a violation. There is nothing in the stat- ute that says that. For example, take COPE, that is the Com- mittee on Political Education of the AFL- 010. They get voluntary funds paid sepa- rately from union dues from a number of members. Everybody agrees that an expendi- ture or a contribution by COPE is legal. The reason everybody agrees to that is that I think the government is under some mis- understanding about the statute on this point but we agree as to the result. They think the statute does not apply because COPE is not a labor organization. In my judgment COPE is clearly a labor or- ganization under the statute but it does not apply if Your Honors please because Senator Taft made clear on the floor of the Senate that voluntary funds not part of dues could be used for any purpose and whatever you use the government's interpretation or ours the fact is that there has never been an in- dictment for voluntary monies? Justice FRANKFURTER. You don't need Sen- ator Taft's statement to reach that conclu- sion. If you will just read the statute, any labor organization that makes a contribu- tion?if you are just the conduit of other people's money, then you are not making the contribution. Mr. RAUH. That would be another inter- pretation to reach the same answer. Justice BLACK. Is there any other fact which attempts to regulate the way unions shall spend their dues? I don't quite under- stand the difference. It sounds as though the theory is that union members are to be pro- tected on how their dues are to be expended. Mr. RAUH. The government is contending, sir, that that is the justification for this stat- ute, that it is a protection of the minority members of the union. Justice BLACK. Is there any statute which has attempted to regulate the way the un- ions must spend its money or dues? Mr. Mull. No. When I come to this point I would like to point out that this statute is not directed to the minority but is to take unions out of politics. Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OF.VICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. THE STRATEGI LIMITATION TALKS Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the ad- ministration's decision to begin negotia- tions with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic armaments launches the hopes of the world once again on the difficult but redemptive road to peaceful coopera- tion among men. President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers should be commended for acting on their oft-expressed recognition that the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in restrict- ing the arms race and reordering national priorities. As an observer at the 18- nation disarmament talks in Geneva, however, I became aware of another equally important consideration. Most of the disarmament talks in the past have chiefly affected the smaller nations. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, for ex- ample, had little effect on the military capabilities of the great powers, which could test underground; but it virtually precluded advanced nuclear development by lesser powers. Similarly the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in effect was de- signed to preserve the nuclear oligopoly. It is being signed by other nations at least in part because it also pledges the major powers to negotiate further disarmament among themselves. I believe nuclear proliferation poses the greatest single threat of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. The great powers have their nuclear forces under effective control; they are experienced in dealing with nuclear technology. But the primitive nuclear contrivances of small countries could become a new and un- predictable catalyst of incalculable dangers. Yet the nuclear powers cannot expect the nonnuclear countries to accept per- manent nuclear privation in the face of great power determination to steadily expand their nuclear capability. The fact is that unless the great powers move to end the arms race the lesser powers will move to join it. This Damoclean reality will overshadow all the talk in Helsinki. So I can only urge the administration to act with the greatest sense of urgency. I would, however, at the same time offer a warning. Though the talks are urgent, they will be frustrating; and though agreement is imperative, it will not end the arms race unless it is accompanied by prudent strategic policies on the part of both great powers. For no treaty can be devised that can anticipate the ad- vance of technology and channel it into peaceful uses. In the end, the arms race will be disciplined not because both sides sign a piece of paper but because both sides have previously decided they have no interest in reopening the competition at a higher and more dangerous level. We should understand that the pres- ent high level of defense spending?and the resulting disorder of our national priorities?is not caused only by our past failures to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union. The largest surge in U.S. strategic spending?the surge that precipitated the current Soviet increases came at the very time that the Test Ban Treaty was negotiated those who might normally have opposed the enormous unilateral expansion o our forces after Eisenhower's year of sensible restraint were completely diverted by the test ban. Thus the importance of the treaty was exaggerated and led to the spirit of eu- phoria that was so rudely interrupted by the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, our defense spending soared; the balance maintained by Eisenhower was upset; and the Russians massively responded with spending of their own. That is our position today. We should understand it clearly. I celebrate the new negotiations?the SALT talks. I praise the administration's decision and particularly the effective role of the Secretary of State in achiev- ing it. But we should understand that the success or failure of the negotiations will be decided not in Helsinki or Geneva but in Washington and in the Pentagon and on the floor of the Congress where new systems will be debated. It will de- pend on all our foreign and defense pol- icies and on our resolution in the inter- national quest for peace. It will take more than a paper curtain to hem in the holocaust. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OsVICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY DELE- GATION OF JAPANESE GOV- ERNORS AND VICE GOVERNORS Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, it is my pleasure today to announce the visit in the Capital City of this great country of ours a delegation of Japanese Governors and Vice Governors. As Members of the Senate are aware, we have a Japanese-American Govern- ors' Conference which has been going on since 1961, I believe. Over that period of time several delegations of American Governors have visited our very friendly neighbor Japan, where we have had joint conferences and discussed mutual prob- lems that exist within both of our very friendly nations. It was my honor in 1965, as Governor of the great State of Iowa, to be a mem- ber of the International Governors' Con- ference held in Tokyo that year. As a Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 813298 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE October 27,1949 result we visited a number of the pre- fectures in the nation of Japan. In 1966 I had the pleasure of taking an Iowa trade mission to the great nation of Japan for the purpose of negotiating and discussing possible trade potentials be- tween the nation of Japan and my State of Iowa. I would like to call to the attention of Members of the Senate that my State of Iowa has a sister-State relationship with the prefecture of Yamanashi, Japan; and there is a sister-city relationship be- tween the capital city of Des Moines, Iowa, and the capital city of Kofu. Many Members of the Senate are former Governors of their States. As I look around the Chamber, I see that a vast majority of Senators now present were Governors of their States. They have, in the proceedings of those years, as Governors of their States, par- ticipated in the ongoing conference be- tween our two great nations. The con- ference in 1967 happened to be conducted in the capital city of my State, Des Moines, and was a beneficial and fulfill- ing conference for both countries. I might add, in the conference this Year, our former colleagues in Japan visited a number of American States, be- ginning in Hawaii, and then coming to California. I know they vt3ited Nebraska and South Carolina. They held this Year's annual conference hi the city of Cincinnati in the great State of Ohio. Mr. President, there are visiting in this country today eight Governors and Vice Governors and some of their ladies. We have been pleased to have the oppor- tunity to host them today at a luncheon at which the Japanese Ambassador, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and many Senators and Representatives have had the opportunity for friendly and neighborly discussions between the Japa- nese Governors and ourselves. I merely want to announce that this ongoing relationship between our two great nations has cemented our friend- ship further, as it has wasted us in the Past. From this level of political leader- ship, many times surfaces much of the national leadership of both of our two great nations and has resulted in friendly relations being established on a personal basis between the Governors of the pre- fectures in Japan and the Governors of the United States. We have many ongoing and continu- ing friendly relationships that enable us not only in private and business gener- ally, but in public affairs, further to ce- ment the warmth and understanding be- tween our two great nations. I merely wanted to call to the atten- tion of Members of the Senate that this delegation of visitors from Japan is among us, that they are among us in the Capital City of Washington today, and that we are deeply grateful to have the opportunity once again to be their host and bid them officially welcome to the United States of America and to hope that this relationship will continue in the Years ahead. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD the names of the members of the traveling party of Japanese Governors now visit- ing the United States. There being no objection, the names were ordered to beNprinted in the RECORD, as follows: MEMBERS OF TRAVELING PARTY, VISIT OF GOVERNORS OF JAPAN TO UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 1969 Japanese Governors and Vice Governors (by order of precedence) , and prefecture: Governor Ryozo Okuda (Vice President of the National Clove Leader of the D Governor Govern Masse, e. Gov Govern Sakae, K Vice Go Vice Gov Vice Clover Aides to Ja lzuchi, Deputy tional Governors' Ogawa, Chief, Forel tional Governors' Asso News Media: Mr. Tak sushin Press. 'United States Departme Yukio Kawarnoto, Escort 0 Tamura, Aide; Mrs. Paul Tam National Governors' Conferen 0 ? , a ion) , Nara. unkichi Takeuchi, Aomori. Satoru Tanaka and daughter, Gonichiro Nishizawa, Nagano. Saburo Kanemaru and wife, oshima. rn.or Shigeichi Iwase, Aichl. nor Tadashi Nakamura, Iwate. r Maseru Taki, Oita. nese Governors: Mr. Ryoji ecutive Secretary of Na- ?elation; Mr. IVIasakichi Affairs Division of Na- tion. Tagomori, Jijit- ? 0 of State: Mr. er; Mr. Paul a, Aide, ? Mr. Brev- ard Crihfield, Secretary-TreasurerXr. Gene Minogue, Travel Consultant; ss Lois Murphy, Assistant to Mr. Crihfield. Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, in\con- elusion, let me say that in the inteAten- \ ing years since the beginning of e Japanese-American Governors' Confe - ence, as delegations of Governors hay visited back and forth across the Pacific' Ocean almost every year since the con- ferences began, we have had the oppor- tunity to discuss issues such as juvenile delinquency in our respective countries, land recovery in our respective countries, air and water pollution, economic prob- lems in our respective countries, as well as trade relationships between Japan and the United States. I believe that such discussions are needed all over the face of the earth. This particular conference can serve as an ex- ample of what can be accomplished be- tween two great nations, if we merely set about on a personal relationship basis be- tween the executives of our States and the prefectures in Japan, as well as the congressional bodies of our two great ,, countries, further continuing the warmth-- and sympathetic understanding efe6o great peoples--.4apan_and?tbe--United States of America. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- Pore. The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr, KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. ADJOURNMENT Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate. I move1 under the or.-der pre- viously entered, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon to- morrow. The motion was agreed to; and (at 2 o'clock and 26 Minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, October 28, 1969. at 12 o'clock meridian. NOMINATIONS cutive nominations received by the Senat -October 77, 1969: IN TIM COAST GTJAILD The following-named regular officers of the Coast Guard for promotion to the grade of lieutenant {junior grade): David A. Potter George R. Perreault Fred L. Ames Ronald S. Matthew Walter F. Malec, Jr., Stephen R. Welch William R. Hodges, Jr. Ernest R. Riutta Normal V. Seurria, Jr. Edmund I. Kiley Glenn J. Pruiksma John A. Magiera Thomas H. Jenkins Peter M. L. Tennis Larry V. Grant James W. Miles Richard W. Schneider Glendon L. Moyer James T. Ingham James L. Rested Larry J. Olson Paul N. Fa.nolis Richard J. Asaro Edward C Ramis Terry R. Fondow John K. Kastorff, Jr. Gecege H. Mercier Richard L. Maguire Walter R. Guest James C. Haedt Phillip J. Stager James A. Smith Juan T. Sales Thomas E. Thompson Paul Ibsen Ronald L. Edmiston Normal C. Edwards Nicholas Strarnandi Victor P. Primeaux Michael J. Edwards Joseph F. Oliva, Jr. John T. Tozzi Frank J. Scaraglino Joseph E. Casaday John H. Legwin, HI Dennis P. Purges Mont J. Smith Paul V. Gorman, Jr. rthur W. McGrath, Robert B. Bower Jr. John. D McDevitt A?exander T. T. Richard R. Clark rolasky James C. Clow Ketkneth B. Allen Douglas A. Macadam Ric rd B. Meyer Stephen L. Swann Ralp W. Brown, Jr. Floyd W. Thomas Michel E Tovcimak Victor E. Hipkiss Ronalki P. Schafer Robert P. Bender Jamesp. Boland Richard L. Swomley Stanley M. Phillips Robert B. Vallesso Fedriet V. Minson. Arthur F. Shires John . Bastek Michael F. Herman RobertJ. Lachowicz Kenneth R. Riordan William F. Mueller Stanley C. Brobeck, Kenneth 3. MePartlin John J. Mulligan, Jr. Kevin V. Feeney Lsighton T. Anderson Dennis M. Majerski peter A. Poerschke Peter D. Lish ' William C. Hain II/ Lonnie E. Steverson James M. MacDonald EdwaXd. C. Cooke John R. Taylor Christopher F. John Daniel J. Schatte Ronnie L. Sharp Ronald F. Hough Joel N. Karr William J. Theroux Graham .7, C'hyno- Larry E. Parkin Gregory T. Wilson Brian P. M. Kelly Dennis L. Bryant Thomas S. Johnson, weal iii Robert E. Gronberg Ronald K. Losch. Dennis R. Srlandson Clifton K. Vogelsberg, Roger V. Mowery Jr. Anthony H. Schieck James T. Paskewich Jeffrey S. Wagner William R. Johanek Daniel A. Gary David L. Powell Mark 3, Costello Stephen J. Delaney James L. Lambert Daniel B. McKinley 7rank P. Murray John R. Ryland Roy C. Samuelson, Jr. Theodore J Sampson Boger B. Streeter Thomas H. *Collins Dennis L. MoCord Richard W. HauechildtRich,ard L. Caslalollar Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 13522 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE October 30, 1969 in Democratic times, or because they had offended Senators, or because in other offices they had followed objectionable policies. No one amid read the record without conclud- ing that Senators in those days felt quite free to make their own appraisal of any man chosen to say the last word in our constitu- tional system. Today, most Senators would be more so- phisicated and more restrained in the use of their confirmation power. Ironic excep- tions are Senators Thurmond of South Car- olina and Eastland of Mississippi, two of Judge Haynsworth's principal backers, who have not hesitated to oppose anyone sus- pected of liberal tendencies. They voted against the only three nominees to the War- ren Court who were put to a record vote in the Senate, Justices Harlan, Stewart and Marshall. The question for most members of the Senate in 1969 is not one dimensional. For example, the fact that a nominee is a so- callpd strict constructionist in constitutional matters would not necessarily make Senators of a different outlook oppose him; it is easy to think of judicial conservatives whose high intellectual qualifications would have smoth- ered the thought of opposition on philosophi- cal grounds. The point about Judge Haynsworth is that he does not have such high intellectual or legal qualifications. Few would call it a dis- tinguished appointment. POLICY AND ETHICS Along with that basic ground for opposi- tion are doubts about policy and ethics. Those who feel the doubts might say that Judge Haynsworth is a man from a narrow background who has not altogether sur- mounted it in his view of life and the law, and that in his commercial dealings while on the bench he has at best shown insensi- tivity to the appearance demanded of judges. In short, the argument against Clement Haynsworth is not that he is an evil man, or a corrupt one, or one consciously biased. It is that he is an inadequate man for a life- time position of immense power and respon- sibility in our structure of government. And any Senator who reaches that conclusion is quite entitled, in precedent and in reason, to oppose his configlizt SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS IS OUR HOPE, SAYS SENATOR RANDOLPH Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, it is encouraging news that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to con- duct preliminary discussions on the sub- ject of strategic arms limitations. No purpose is served by discussing the long delay In coming to this important decision, but there is no doubt in my mind that it has taken much too long. During the period prior to the agreement to begin preliminary talks, one could be excused for wondering if world powers did not understand the horrifying nature of the nuclear arms race. General of the Army Douglas MacAr- thur?a man associated with war who probably witnessed the development of armaments as intimately as any person of our century?stated realistically and eloquently the case for nuclear arniS lim- itations: Electronics and other processes of science have raised the destructive potential to en- compass millions. And with restless hands we work feverishly in dark laboratories to find the means to destroy all at one blow... Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. No longer Is It a weapon of adventure?the shortcut to International power. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does It passess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide. That our task in the development of substantive arms control talks is only beginning is understood. I think most of our leaders and the people generally of this Nation fully realize this. We harbor no false hope?no illusions?no euphoric optimism?that firm agreements will be consummated in a day or a week or a month. The task of negotiating effective and acceptable limitations on the devel- opment of strategic weapons will be ar- duous and frustrating. But we must have hope and, I emphasize, we must relent- lessly strive to achieve this objective. It is a frightening mistake to view our agreements for talks with Russia as merely another attempt to control the ever-expanding arsenal of nuclear weap- ons. This endeavor is possibly the most critical undertaking in the history of our Nation and of the world. The final out- come will determine whether the United States and the Soviet Union will be cast into the depressing role of spending more billions of dollars in the future on nu- clear weapons; whether our world will be confronted with the stark prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation; whether we will be sentenced to the terrible un- certainty of possible nuclear holocaust; and whether civilization as we know it will live or die. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the resolution expressing the need for a mu- tual halt to the testing of the multiple Independently targetable reentry ye- hicle?MIRV?I am convinced that this weapons system which possesses destruc- tive capabilities defying imagination must be a critical element in our discus- sions with Russia. The reports that this will be a focus in the first stages of pre- liminary talks are encouraging. Control of the development of MIRV must be pressed with a sense of urgency. To ac- cept the proposition that development of MIRV is inevitable does violent damage to the prospects for meaningful negotia- tions. Further, I caution?as I have in the past?against falling into the historical pattern of arms control negotiations. It is imperative that the negotiators chart a course away from the timeworn concept of "negotiating from a position of strength." Used by both sides, "negotiat- ing from a position of strength" creates a vicious circle. Every party to a discus- sion adopting this policy would be ex- pected to continue to escalate arma- ments to strengthen its position. There is no end to this. On the other hand it does not follow that any country should en- gage in unilateral disarmament. The United States will not do this?neither will Russia. But it does mean that the time has come to question the assumption that nations are adding to defense and security by increasing more and more the nuclear stockpiles which already con- tain an overkill capacity. Our negotiators are able. Their mission Is awesome. We share the hope and offer a prayer for their progress. ONE YEAR OF THE BOMBING HALT Mr. DODD. Mr. President, tomorrow, October 31, marks the first anniversary of the total cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. On tb,e occasion of this anniversary, it might be useful to reexamine the argu- ments that finally induced President Johnson, despite grave personal misgiv- ings, to call off the bombing of the north. And it might be useful as well to take a hard look at the record of negotiations since we made this major concession, for the purpose of deciding whether this de- cision made a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war more likely or less likely. The total cessation came about in two stages. On March 31, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson anounced the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam, except for a limited area immediately above the DMZ. This action was taken in response to the growing clamor in this country that we stop the bombing of North Vietnam because only in this way could Hanoi be induced to negotiate a reasonable set- tlement of the Vietnam war. It is true that Hanoi did come to the conference table. But there has not been a single iota of evidence to bear out the contention that such a concession on our part would induce Hanoi to negotiate in good faith. On the contrary, the record is clear that Hanoi only hardened its stance subsequent to the partial suspen- sion of bombing in March of last year. Even the major curtailment of our bomb- ing of North Vietnam was rejected as trickery. During the 1968 presidential campaign, the same critics of American policy in Vietnam again raised their voices, this time to demand the total cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Such a con- cession on our part, they assured us, would lead to peace. There were even some skeptics who went along with the demand for a, bomb- ing halt because they felt it was worth giving a try. If the bombing halt did not work, they said, there was nothing to pre- vent us from resuming the bombing and increasing the military pressure on North Vietnam. In yielding to this clamor and an- nouncing the total cessation of bombing on October 31, 1968, President Johnson once again called upon Hanoi to engage in serious negotiations. Once again the Communists respond- ed as they have always responded, and as they will always respond to every show of weakness or conciliation. Instead of becoming more reasonable, they became more intransigent than ever before. It is interesting to note in this con- nection that the Communists seem to have foreknowledge of the fact that in- ternal political pressures in this country would compel the Johnson administra- tion, despite its private statements, to agree to the total cessation of bombing without any reciprocal concession from the Communist side. There is in the Ries of American in- telligence a captured Communist docu- ment dated just prior to the bombing Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 October 30, 1,969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---- SENATE antilabor or insufficiently receptive to the civil rights cause. Others regardalas judicial record as that of a mediocre, an careless, roan. 8ta1.1 others feel he Inis devoted more than a judicious share of his tame and ef- forts to personal business. Many others, however, stranigy back his nomination. Almost all the Senators with these objec- tions are foment,- their public stettements on the ethical matters, sidestepping the trouble- some question of whether the Senate has the right to disapprove a Presidentha nominee just because it disagrees with his political philosophy. The statutory standard that the Senate must apply to the various questions about Judge Haynsworth is this: "Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which beans a sub- stantial interest . . or is so related to or connected with any party or his Attorney as to render it improper in his opinion, for him to sit." Judge Haynsworth's opponents have cited at least eight canons of ethics tbot they be- lieve the South Carolinian has vietlated. The principal ones are these: Canon 4: "A judge's official comilinct should be free from impropriety and the opearance of impropriety . . . and his pentonal be- havior, not only upon the bench and in his performance of judicial duties, bat also in his everyday life, should be beyond re- proach." Canon 13: "A judge . . . should -riot suffer his conduct to justify the impreeinien that any person can improperly Minim= him or unduly enjoy his favor." Canon 24: "A judge should not neccpt in- consistent duties . . . which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his de- votion to the expeditious and proper admin- istration of his official functions." Canon 25: "A judge should avoad giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he Is utilizing the powers or prestige of his -of- fice to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute . . . to the success or private business ventures." Canon 26: "A judge should abstain from making personal investment in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in the court." Canon 29: "A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any j4lenifal act in which his personal interests are Involved," Canon 33: "lie La judge] should th pend- ing or prospective litigation before tern be particularly careful to avoid such Salon as may reasonably tend to awaken the Manp10i= that his. . . busin.eas relations . consti- tute an element in influencing his4vidicial conduct." THE PURIM'S VIEW The third standard, the public's thew of how a judge should behave, cannot baao eas- ily determined. Generally, however, meet Sen- ators believe that public pressure dictates that a judge should demonstrate judgment In avoiding any appearance of unethical con- duct. The facts of the three ethical eniestiniss that form the core of the Haynsworta case end their interpretation by the judge's sup- porters and critics are as follows: Corporate subsidiary questions; In 1987 Judge Ilaynsworth sat on a case called Far- row v. Grace Lines, Inc., while he heed 300 shares of stock in W. R. Grace & Oa., the parent corporation of Grace Lines, Ina. In 1966 the judge sat on a case called Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Company while he owned 200 shares of preferred stock and 67 shares of common in American Gen- eral Insurance Company, of which Maryland Casualty was a subsidiary. Opponents of Mr. Haynsworth's nomina- tion contend that both these actions repre- sented violations of the statutory ban on a Federal judge sitting "in any case in width hs has a substantial interest" and of Canon 26, on personal investments, and Canon 29, on self -Interest Judge Haynsworth's supporters maintain that the judge's interest in each instance was not substantial and was not "in the case" but In a corporation not involved directly. In the Grade Line case, Senator Marlow W. Cook, Republican of Kentucky, argued, Li the full claim of $30,000 against the shipping Line had been awarded and assessed against the common stockholders, the value of Judge Haynsworth's interest would have been re- duced by 48 cents. HOLDINGS ESTIMATED In the Maryland Casualty ease, Senator Cook called it "highly doubtful that an ad- verse judgment would have any significant effect" on Judge Haynsworth's holdings, which he estimated at 0.0059 per cent of the preferred stock and 0.0015 per cent of the common stock. Litigant business relation questions: In 1950 Mr. Haynsworth was an organizer and founder of the Carolina Vend-A-Matic Com- pany, which was to install automatic vend- ing machines in industrial plants and other sites. His investment was $2,400, and he be- came vice president and a -director. When he went on the Federal bench in 1957, Mr. Haynsworth resigned orally as vice president of the company, he now says, but company records show him continuing in that office until 1963. In any event, be re- mained as a director until 1963. In September of 1963 he resigned his direc- torship in Carolina Vend-A-Matic pursuant to a new requirement for Federal judges promulgated by the Judicial Conference. Seven months later, he sold his stock for about $430,000. In 1961 and again in 1963 Judge Hayns- worth sat on a case called Darlington Manu- facturing Company v. the National Labor Relations Board. At that time, Carolina Vend-A-Matte had a $50,000-a-year contract with the Derrin.g-Milliken. Corporation, par- ent company of Darlington. While the litiga- tion was pending, a new $100,000 contract was signed. Between 1959 and 1963 Judge Haynswarth sat on five other came in which one of the two litigants were companies that were do- ing business with Carolina Vend-A-Matic, -with the volume of that business ranging from $16,000 to $174,000 a year. DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE Critics of Judge Haynsworth contend that he Should have disqualified himself from sit- ting in all these cases, under the Federal statute involving "substantial interest." They also argue that his participation in the de- cisions and his continued activity in the vending machine business violated all the canons cited above. Supporters of the judge maintain that he had no duty to disqualify himself in any of these cases because the Vend-A-Matte Com- party was not itself involved. In fact, they argue, he had a duty to sit. In the Darlington ease, the judge's backers sea, his personal interest in the business that Vend-A-Matic did with Deering-Milliken was only $390. In two of the five other cases tn- volving Vend-A-Matte customers, he voted against the customer; in two others, only procedural questions were involved; in the fifth he voted for the customer because the other litigant was guilty of fraud. Stock holding questions, in 1967 Judge Haynewortla sat on a case called Brunswick Corporation v. Long, which involved a dispute over bowling equipment leased by the manu- facturer to the operator of an alley. The case was decided on Nov. 10; on Dec. 26, a month before the decision was to be made public, Judge Heanasworth bought 1,000 shares of Brunswick stock for about $16,000. Opponents ea Judge lanynsworth say this action was clearly improper under both the S 13521 Federal statute and the canons of ethics. The judge admits that It was a mistake, some- thing he would not repeat either on the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. CASE HE'LD UNIMPORTANT But supporters of Judge Harnevrorth argue that the Brunswick case is not significant. The most the corporation could have bene- fited from a favorable decision was $90,000, and the judge had only bought 1,000 of its 18,480,000 shares. Thus his total maximum profit would have been less than $5. Attempting to apply the broad standard of Public opinion to all these cases, the Hayns- worth critics, led by Senator Birch Bayh, Democrat of Indiana, maintain that, oollec- tively they reveal a man not as sensitive to the necessity of maintaining the appearance, as well as the fact, of incorruptibility as a Justice of the Supreme Court should be. Senator Cook and his allies disagree. "If we now analyze these cases upon which Senator Bayh relies in terms of these com- mon-sense principles," Mr. Cook said on the floor last week, "I do not think that anyone can seriously doubt that Judge Hayn.sworth must be given a clean bill of health. "He not only was not In fact influenced by any personal interest in deciding the oases, but no reasonable person could think thathe was influenced by such interest." [From the New York Timm, Oct. 19, 19891 THE SENATE AND THE SUPRE/VIE COURT (By Anthony Lewis) WASHINGTON.?III their Irritation at the opponents of Clement Haynsworth, some Administration officials are now saying that the issue in the confirmation fight is nothing less than the President's right to appoint Supreme Court Justices. The Senate, they argue, is trying to undermine that preroga- tive; Senators should support a President's choice for the Court unless he can be shown to be corrupt or incompetent. But history contradicts that narrow view of the Senate's role. In fact., over the years, the Senate in considering nominations to the Supreme Court has rejected "a proportion far higher than for any other Federal office." So says a leading study, Joseph B. Hants's "The Advice and Consent of the Senate." In the nineteenth century, when senatorial scrutiny was at its most rigorous, 72 men were nominated to the Supreme Court and eighteen of them?one quarter?falled ot confirmation. The eighteen does not anelude a few others who declined the honor. Nominees were rejected for a variety of reasons, because of their philosophy or poli- tics or ability OT temperament. Some lost in formal votes of the Senate; other llomina- tions were withdrawn in the face of opposi- tion. President Madison, for example, nominated a Connecticut Collector of Customs, Alexan- der Wolcott, in 1811, Charles Warren, the great Supreme Court historian, said the gen- eral feeling was that Wolcott was a man of "somewhat mediocre legal ability." For that reason a Senate overwhelmingly of Madison's party rejected the nomination, 21 to P. GRANT'S NOMINATIONS Grant tried three times before he could get a Chief Justice cionfirnied. His first choice? George H. Williams, his Attorney General? was criticized as a "second-rate" lawyer. His second, Caleb Oue.hing, a fanner Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of line.ssachusetts, was eminently qualified. But Senators were uneasy at the fact that he had been succes- sively a Whig, Democrat and Republican. The opposition eventually found that he had written an innocent letter to Jefferson Davis during the Civil War and used that to rally opinion against him. Both nominations were withdrawn. Other nominees in the last century were defeated because they were partisan Whigs Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 13930 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 7, 1969 of their large number of surface-to-air mis- siles, or SAMs, be surreptitiously upgraded for attacking ballistic missiles?" Or, again, "Once MIRVs have been suc- cessfully tested, is there any way to monitocr a ban on their deployment without taking missiles apart at operational silos?" WHAT ARE MOSCOW'S VIEWS Another question [is] . . .: How do the Soviets view SALT? One obvious assumption is that the USSR has enhancement of its own national security as its primary objective. The USSR has, from time to time, expressed an interest in discussions and in doing so has noted that an agreement should apply to both offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles, and that the first step should be a limitation and not a reduction of armaments. But little or nothing is really known of Soviet views regarding the details of a possible agreement. The inter-action of negotiations is almost certain to affect the way we and the Soviets answer some of the questions I've cited. This, of course, raises the question as to what constitutes success. Certainly, a solid arrangement to limit strategic weapons sys- tems would be a great success, and that will be our objective. Not to achieve a specific agreement in our first efforts, however, need not signal failure. The talks could be of great value if we can establish a mechanism for contact with the USSR on strategic force matters and main- tain a dialogue, which hopefully would reduce uncertainty on both sides. BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY I feel sure that all of you here would agree that the road ahead_ for SALT negotiations will be long and difficult. We will be under- taking serious negotiations in a field that is extremely complex, full of difficulties in both political and military matters, and is so basic in nature that it involves the very essence of our national security. We are ready, willing and able to start the talks at any time and, as I have said before, are hopeful that at minimum, they will lead to a lessening of uncertainty on both sides and, at maximum, they will lead to substan- tive agreements to limit or even reduce strategic weapons. THE WORKINGS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the difficulties of managing a high-employ- ment economy, most particularly of keeping the Federal budget both fiscally responsible and socially adequate, have become familiar subjects today. Our the- oretical understanding of the workings of the modern economy has increased during the 23 years since the goal of "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" was explicitly set forth in the Employment Act of 1946, but so has our awareness of the difficulties of putting theory into practice. We have learned how a flexible fiscal policy can be much more difficult to practice than to preach. We have become familiar with the difficult dilemma presented by the independent pricing power of big busi- ness and organized labor. And we have recently begun to face up to the seem- ingly intractable problem of allocating our budget resources in line with ra- tional priorities. One of the most knowledgeable and perceptive observers of our progress and Our setbacks since 1946 is Edwin G. Nourse, the distinguished first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. In a scholarly but highly readable ar- ticle, Dr. Nourse has recently summarized what he believes to be the basic tenets which have guided economic policy dur- ing the 1960's. He concludes that the practitioners of this version of the "New Economics," in their emphasis on the need to cut taxes and thus avoid a "fiscal drag," gave too little attenion to the dif- ficulties of controlling Federal expendi- ture and of allocating our budget re- sources wisely. Now, it has become im- perative that we shift more of our atten- tion to the problem of Federal expendi- tures. I should like to read Dr. Nourse's con- cluding remarks: Leaders and people will have to be re- educated to the duties of citizenship, the enormous social needs of the impending years, the difficulties of curbing the arms race, the space race, and the power of the industrial-military complex. They will need to be rededicated to the basic democratic principle that the burdens of military de- fense and civil advancement must be shared by all. These two dilemmas of Employment Act fulfillment are not mere mechanical malad- justments, easily corrected with tools readily at hand. They run to the very fundament of human nature and the democratic way of life. They will not resolve themselves, nor will they go away just because we elaborately ignore them. They need to be faced?now? courageously?and as objectively as possible. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that Dr. Nourse's article, entitled "The Employment Act and the 'New Eco- nomics,'" published in the autumn is- sue of the Virginia Quarterly Review, be printed in the RECORD. [From the Virginia Quarterly Review, Autumn 1969] THE EMPLOYMENT ACT AND THE "NEW ECONOMICS" (By Edwin G. Nourse) Alvin Hansen, more than any other one individual the father of the Employment Act of 1946, has called it the "Magna Carta of American economic planning." That is a striking metaphor, but Magna Carta was a barons' revolt against an autocratic king, whereas the Employment Act declared the intention of an already free people to use their democratic government more actively and with greater economic sophistication to advance their common interest. Arthur Burns, easily one of the ten most wanted economists in the country, when Hansen one better by calling the Employ- ment Act our new economic Constitution. It does make new declarations of political pur- pose and establishes some new structures for economic operation. But a written constitu- tion is, after all, only a piece of paper, how- ever noble or shrewd the perception and in- tent of its drafters. It simply sets in motion an on-going process of interpretation and application that will reveal the new charter's potentialities and shape its operations to ever-changing circumstances. For a little more than twenty-two years prior to the inauguration of Richard Nixon, such an experimental process went forward under four successive Presidents, a series of seven chairmen and twenty-three members of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the rotating chairmen and changing membership of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. That experience falls naturally into three periods: the shake-down cruise of the Truman regime, disturbed by the storm of the Korean War; the re-examination period under President Eisenhower; and the period of dashing economic and political innova- tion under the Kennedy-Johnson succession, with Walter Heller as its presiding genius. The intellectual, material, and political legacy which the third period left to Mr. Nixon and his fellow-Americans is described, fondly by some and caustically by others, as "the New Economics." II It has been remarked, quite fairly, that the New Economics is what any up-to-date eco- nomist says it is. Nor is that altogether a criticism. Economics, as a social science, must not be limited to highly generalized truths formulated from long-past experience but must also be continually advancing to the understanding of new circumstances and conditions and to the proposal of intelligent ways of dealing with them. Probably a poll of economists and in- formed laymen would put "Keynesian eco- nomics" at the top of the list of explanatory labels. "Macroeconomics" might very likely come second, that is, the economics of the whole economy rather than of individual and group enterprises. Many would identify the New Economics with welfare economics or with the economics of planning. Some would see it as the economics of "deficit financing" and others more broadly as the economics of fiscal and monetary controls as a dependable apparatus of national growth and stability. Whatever the labels, one fact is clear. The New Economics is not merely an attempt to explain?and verify its explanation of? the basic forces of the economic process after the manner of a natural science. It is social and hence normative science of ends to be achieved and optimum means of reaching or consistently moving toward those objectives. For our present purposes, the essence of the New Economics theory may be put in the form of six major propositions, with several subdivisions. The first is really an axiom: For full use of national resources maximum production and employment?"aggregate purchasing power" or total spendings of consumers, business, noncommercial entities, foreign buyers, and government must be equivalent to the productive capabilities of the economy. If the ability or willingness to consume and/or invest falls below this level, there will be economic slack; if it rises ma- terially above it, there will be inflation of prices and "overheating" of the economy. The second proposition of the New Eco- nomics is that these capabilities are now so technologically great and growing that, at full employment of national resources, there would be a surplus of goods and services above the buying power of the private sector at existing rates of taxation and government spending. These tax rates, therefore, will act as a "fiscal drag" on the economy and must be lowered (or government spending expanded) if it is to attain that full pro- ductive potential. Third, today's econometric methods and computer facilities make it possible to pro- ject these productivity and revenue trends for several years in advance with enough accuracy so that the New Economists can pre- scribe both the dosage and the timing of tax (and public spending) adjustments so as to alleviate "fiscal drag" and facilitate a full-employment balance of maximum pro- duction and purchasing power. Fourth, concern about budget deficits and the size of the national debt is relegated to the limbo of "the Puritan ethic." Removal of fiscal drag (as postulated) will so unleash productive potential that lower tax rates ap- plied to an expanded national income will soon change deficit into surplus and call for another cut in tax ratec or facilitate the funding of larger social programs. Fifth, this activist fiscal policy must be kept flexible. Techniques of measurement and projection and of mechanistic and psy- chological analysis, though impressive, are Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 7, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 13929 ning Star of November 6, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GENERAL WOOD DIES AT 90, RETIRED HEAD OF SEARS CHICAGO.?Gen. Robert E. Wood, retired chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck & Co., died today. He was 90 years old. Gen. Wood, who was generally credited as the builder of the modern-Tay Sears, the world's largest merchandising firm, died in his Lake Forest home. Gen. Wood, a retired Army officer, joined Sears in 1924 as a vice president and went on to become president and board chairman. He also founded Allstate Insurance Co., a Sears subsidiary. Gen. Wood was regarded throughout the world as a great leader in the Merchandis- ing field. In 1924, the year he joined the firm, he proposed that Sears enter into the retail store field. He led the company from a strict- ly mail order house to a combined retail store and catalogue distribution system of inter- national scope. KANSAS CITY NATIVE The first Sears retail store opened in 1925 when the firm's mail order -wiles totaled about $200 million a year. Now It has more than 800 retail outlets, and the company's over-all sales total more than-37 billion a year. Gen. Wood became president of Sears in 1928 and chairman in 1939. He retired from active management in 1954 but continued as a director until May, 1968, when he was named the first honorary chairman of the board. His long career was distinguished by out- standing success in both military and busi- ness fields. Born in Kansas city, Mo., June 13, 1879, Gen. Wood was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1900 and later served 10 years in Panama during the building of the Panama Canal. There he rose to chief quartermaster in charge of all pur- chasing and distribution of siipplies. During World War I he was in charge of the Army Transport Service in France and England. At 39, he was recalled to Washing- ton, promoted to brigadier general and named acting quartermaster general and di- rector of purchases and storage for the entire United States Army. Gen. Wood returned to civilian life in 1919 and spent five years as a vice president of Montgomery Ward & Co., where he started his career, as a mass merchandiser, before joining Sears. FOUNDED ALLSTATE IN 1531 In 1931, after he became president of Sears, Gen. Wood founded Allstate Insurance. All- state now is the world's largest stock com- pany automobile insurer and a leader in other insurance fields. Gen. Wood guided Sears through the difficult depression and World War II years, continuing an aggres- sive expansion program. Under his direc- tion, stores were opened in Cuba and Latin America. Gen. Wood was the oldest of five children of Robert W. and Lillie Collins Wood. Both his maternal grandfather and his fa- ther served as captains in the Union Army during the Civil War. Survivors include his wife, the former Mary Butler Hardwick of Augusta, Ga., and five children, Robert W., of Palestine, Tex.; Mrs. Hugo V. Neuhaus of Houston, Tex.; and Mrs. William H. Mitchell, Mrs. Calvin Fentress and Mrs. A. Watson Arm ur III, all of Lake Forest. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMTTATION TALKS Mr. SCOTT, Mr. President, on Novem- ber 17, the long-awaited strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. will begin in Helsinki, Finland. Secretary of State William P. Rogers has described SALT action as "one of the most important that we ever undertook with the Soviet Union." On October 17, the Fourth In- ternational Arms Control Symposium met in Philadelphia. At that time Lt. Gen, John J. Davis, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency, spoke on the subject "Arms Talks With Russia." His lucid and perceptive account deserves the atten- -tion of the Members of this body. It is refreshing to read such a well-considered account by a military man. I recom- mend the article to the Senate and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Commanders Digest, Nov. 1, 19691 SALT AGREEMENT REACHED: ARMS TALKS WITH RUSSIA The control of nuclear weapons is one of the most serious challenges, if not the most serious challenge of our tim.e. Yet the chal- lenge has really been faced up to only recently. The United States, with the Baruch Plan, took the lead in trying to bring this powerful new force under international control, but not until the current decade has there been any meaningful progress. The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty were the initial steps, although they skirted the basic problem. Then came the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is directly aimed at one important aspect of stemming the arms race?that is, helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapon.s to Countries which do not now have them. . . As you know, the Seabeds Treaty, which is now in the throes of multilateral negotia- tions, would forestall another possible form of proliferation. But to limit or reduce nuclear weapons is clearly more difficult. The real forerunner of our current Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) efforts, however, was the U.S. offer in 1964 to the USSR to explore the possibility of a "freeze" on the number and characteristics of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear de- livery vehicles, including bombers, missiles, and ABM's. The USSR, although it did not categori- cally reject the idea, showed little interest. It asserted that the proposal was a scheme for inspecting without disarming and for perpetuating U.S. strategic superiority. President Johnson reopened the subject in January 1967 when he proposed, in a letter to Premier Kosygin, discussions on an un- derstanding to limit the further deployment of "strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers." When he received an encour- aging reply some weeks later, we provided Moscow with broad indications of the kind of agreement we had in mind. It would, we suggested, involve a levelling Off, not an outright freeze or reduction, of strategic nuclear delivery systems, offensive and defensive. We noted that reductions could be considered at a later stage. An agree- ment would apply to launchers, not missiles, for purposes of simplifying verification. Agreement was about to be reached on the date and place for the talks when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. That event disrupted the prospect of a meeting last autumn, and the change of administration in Washington necessitated further delay. The United States stated months ago that it is ready to start the talks , . . Meanwhile, we are persisting with our study of the very complex problems associated with strategic arms limitations. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES We believe that there are three prime ob- jectives: 1. To maintain and, if possible, improve U.S. security; 2. To maintain deterrence, and reduce the risk of outbreak Of nuclear war; and 3. To limit the upward spiral of strategic arms competition and reduce arms costs. We have been fairly secure-over the last decade in the sense that a relatively stable strategic relationship between the U.S. and USSR has prevailed?insofar as the use of nu- clear weapons has been concerned. At a mini- mum, then, limitations on strategic arma- ments should maintain the existing stabil- ity?stable in the sense of making the initia- tion of nuclear war unattractive and in the sense of controlling the arms competition. Many people believe that the action-reac- tion responses in strategic hardware devel- opment and deployment of both the U.S. and the USSR have resulted from the uncer- tainties involved?uncertainty due to lack of complete intelligence on both sides, and re- sulting uncertainties as to both capabilities and intentions. This has resulted in alter- nating policies of "keep ahead" and catch up. They further believe that if the uncertain- ties could be eliminated, then there would be good prospects for substantial strategic arms control agreements. Both sides would, of course, have to be assured that their own strategic posture was satisfactory and that their own security and that Of their allies would be adequately maintained on a con- tinuing basis. Needless to say, that is a large order. ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES Having worked out basic objectives, the next step in developing arms control options for consideration was to establish some prin- ciples or guidelines. It is generally acknowledged that an agree- ment should impose limitations on both of- fensive and defensive missile systems. This has been a basic principle of the U.S. posi- tion since 1964, and it is one which the USSR has recently emphasized. Another principle is that any agreement or reductions in strategic arms should be preceded by an agreement curtailing further build-ups. This, too, has been a fundamental U.S. view for some years. A third guideline is that any proposal for limitations, to be negotiable, would have to be considered by each side to be in its net security interest and compatible with its na- tional objectives. It was also agreed that any agreement would have to be subject to ade- quate verification. A CRUCIAL ISSUE : VERIFICATION A moment ago I alluded to one of the cru- cial issues, namely, the matter of verification. The basic question is whether we can rely solely on national means to verify an agree- ment or will have to insist on some means of on-site inspection?at least in some cases. We all realize, of course, from the nego- tiating history on other arms control pro- posals that insistence on on-site inspection could pose a major obstacle to an agreement. The U.S. Is not contemplating an arms con- trol agreement based on faith; on the other hand, it does not insist that "adequate" veri- fication necessarily means 100 per cent veri- fication. The risks involved must be thor- oughly understood. To mention weapons systems is to call to mind one of the most difficult issues con- fronting us; that is, the critkal interrela- tionships of various weapons systems. Here, one gets into such matters ea MIRVs and ABMs. A recent news article highlighted some of the problems by asking: "If the Russians agree to deploy only a thin anti-ballistie missile system, can some Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 13830 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE November 5, 1969 He urged that Congress wait for its Com- mission on Obscenity and Pornography, which has been conducting studies since it began operations last year, to report next July on what legislation is needed, how best to meet all constitutional questions, how pornography affects adults and minors and whether it causes antisocial behavior. But as letters from indignant constituents pour in?usually accompanied by choice ex- amples of eroticism received in the mail? Congressmen and other politicians pay less attention to cautionary advice. "Where is there any freedom of speech issue in that?" Representative Foreman shouted last week waving his copy of Screw. Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz of New York wrote the subcommittee that he was receiving many letters from parents who "justly complain" that the contents of lurid mail fall into the hands of their children. The Federal Government should do more to curb the spread of unsolicited smut mail," he declared. Each of the Congressmen who have testi- fied so far agreed. Most said they did not care whose bill was adopted so long as it would stand the scrutiny of court review. ELECTION DAY, 1969 Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the voters of two great States on the results of yesterday's elections. With Bill Cahill's landslide win in New Jersey, our Republican Party is now in control of the statehouses of all the large, northeastern industrial States. It is essentially in the statehouses where a larger, more comprehensive base must be built for our national Republican Party, and we now number 32 of the 50 in the Republican column. I am particularly proud of the voters of the Commonwealth of Virginia, where I spent a large part of my early life. With their election of Republican Lin- wood Holton to be their next Governor, we have certainly seen history, in the making. There is no doubt that the two- Party system, which has been growing steadily but surely in Virginia since 1952, is now an accomplished fact. Just two short decades ago, it was a difficult and lonely thing to be a Republican in Vir- ginia. What a change a relatively few short years can make. Not only will Vir- ginia have a Republican Governor for the first time since Reconstruction Days come next January; in last year's elec- tion five of Virginia's 10 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives went to the Republicans. My heartiest congratulations to the people of the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Virginia for their choices on election day 1969. NEW OPTIMISM IN VIETNAM Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, optimism inside Vietnam has seen a recent revival, as reported in the pages of the Wash- ington Post in recent days by Robert G. Kaiser in his series entitled "The New Optimists." In two installments, Mr. Kaiser reported on the success of today's pacification program, which his sources were more apt to attribute to the weak- ening position of the Vietcong in South Vietnam and the relative improvement of the Saigon Government's position in the countryside. The Vietcong's high-water mark was reached in the 1968 Tet offensive, Mr. Kaiser reports, and its influence in the countryside has been declining since. All this is not to say that the war in Vietnam is near to what we would call a success- ful conclusion or a victory. What Mr. Kaiser's "new optimists" are saying is that things are better and that an in- dependent Saigon Government can pre- vail with continued U.S. support. I ask unanimous consent that the sec- ond and third installments of Mr. Kaiser's series from the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington Post, Oct, 30, 1969] THE NEW OPTIMISTS?II: PACIFICATION, 1969 STYLE, SEEMS To BE WORKING (By Robert G. Kaiser) VINH LONG, SOUTH VIETNAM.?The French tried to "pacify" Vietnam, but they failed. So did Ngo Dinh Diem, and so have the many regimes that succeeded Diem's?all with enormous American aid. One year's progress in pacification has become the next year's disaster so often that the whole idea has an unshakably bad reputation with many Viet- namese. Many have stopped listening to the boasts. This year's progress has a new set of pro- moters, a group of new optimists?includ- ing many former pessimists?who believe that the Vietcong's revolution in South Viet- nam may have been defeated. The impending defeat of the local Viet- cong, which many Americans now claim to foresee, is usually not attributed to the spe- cific successes of current pacification pro- grams. Many believe that the paoffication programs have worked this year primarily because the Vietcong have lost the ability (or the will) to fight back. In the past pacification always failed be- cause the National Liberation Front (or the Vietminh before it) eventually proved strong- er than the regime in Saigon. Now the new optimists are predicting?privately, and not for attribution?that the Vietcong will not be able to come back, at least for many years, and never if the government can consolidate its apparent new strength. American officials have talked about the demise of the Vietcong before. But old hands here say the new optimism differs from its predecessors, if only because its adherents include many who were always pessimists or cynics before. The revival of optimism in the last few months has come after a long period of caution and doubt that followed the 1968 Tet offensive. The current pacification program is more than a copy of its predecessors. It is simpler and more radical. It has provided the first meaningful decentralization of government functions in the history of independent South Vietnam. And it appears more suc- cessful at the moment than any of its pred- ecessors. But it is also clumsy, often self deluding, and often ineffective, according to many of the men trying to make it work in the countryside. The pacification campaign is aimed at specific goals that seem little more than commonsense objectives. They are to pro- vide security, reduce the Vietcong's military and political strength, stimulate the econ- omy, resetttle war refugees, propagandize the government's cause and establish local government. The Vietnamese and their American ad- visors have agreed on a process for achieving these goals. Ideally, the process works like this: Government troops enter a contested area, establish outposts and force the enemy's military forces out of the area. Then teams of "revolutionary development cadre" (known less dramatically in Vietnames_ as Rural Development workers) come into the village. They undertake small public works projects, then a census of the population, conduct a flamboyant if elementary public relations campaign for the government and generally establish what is called the GVN's presence. They are followed or sometimes accompanied by appointed hamlet and vil- lage chiefs. (A village in Vietnam is a geo- graphic area of perhaps several square miles composed of, on the average, seven hamlets.) Once sonic security has been established, provincial officials and the new local ap- pointees begin to institute the government's basic program. The RD cadre, perhaps helped by American advisers, may try to open a new school. Representatives of the Open Arms (Chieu Hol) campaign will begin prop- agandizing for Vietcong to rally to the government side. The "Phoenix" program will begin to gather intelligence and track down Vietcong operatives. The government may provide financial or material aid to refugees who decide to move back to their old homes in a newly entered area. The government will organize a Peo- ples' Self Defense Force, give its members rudimentary training and arms. After a fc months elections will be organized to choose hamlet and village councils. The elected council is then supposed to select a new village chief to replace the government's appointee. In many parts of the country, some of these things are happening as planned. Elsewhere, some happen and some don't. Almost every- where the government's (and their U.S. ad- visers) performance is erratic, but on balance there is progress. On the ground, the ideal procedure is tempered by Vietnamese realities. Perhaps the harshest of these is the shortage of talented, and honest men to fill a growing number of government posts. At their worst, local officials can be appalling. CORRUPTION INEVITABLE A district chief only recently removed from his job, for example, was maintaining 10 ladies in 10 different houses, giving them about $80 a month pin money?financing the whole operation out of government funds. A certain amount of corruption is both expected and inevitable. Salaries of local officials are not big enough to support a man and his family. But the government is trying to apply?or says it is?new standards to the behavior of its officials. Village and hamlet chiefs are going to a special school to learn both good administration and honesty. The 7,800 Americans working on pacifica- tion are not all suited for the work. Some experienced Americans here bemoan the low caliber of U.S. advisers. "We've got a bunch of police advisers around here that are noth- ing but small town misfits and failures," said one senior adviser recently. All, but a few of the 6,200 soldiers assigned to pacifica- tion are in Vietnam on one year tours (which civilians often contend is too short a time to be useful). Vietnamese realities also mean that pro- grams described in glowing terms at head- quarters briefings occasionally can look dis- couragingly ineffective in the field. Someone' looking for weaknesses can find them. "My PP (popular force) platoons were sup4 posed to go on a joint night operation," a boyish American second lieutenant in the Delta explained to a recent visitor, "but they hadn't moved out, so I went down to the out- post to see why. It turned out that they were drunk?rice wine." STATISTICS IMPROVE The regional and popular forces have al- ways been the weak sisters of the Vietnamese armed forces, though American. and Viet- namese officials now regard them as crucial Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 5, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the REcoae, as follows: From Docigson, Lewis Carroll, book, p. 223, copyright 19311 "THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS" "What sort of things do you remember best?" Alice ventured to ask. "Oh, things that happened the week after next," the Queen replied in a careless tone. "For instance, now," she went on, sticking a large piece of plaster on her Anger es she spoke, "there's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last -of all." "Suppose he never commits tile crime?" said Alice. "That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said, as she bound the plaster round her finger with a bit of ribbon. Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of course it would be all the better,!' she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished?" "You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen: "were you ever punished' "Only for faults," said Alice. _ "And you were all the better for it, I anow!" the Queen said triannphantly, "Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for," said Alice: "that makes all the difference." "But if you hadn't done them," the Queen said, "that would have been better still; better, and better, and better!" Her voice went higher with each "better," till it got quite to a squeak at last. Alice was just beginning to say, 'There's a mistake somewhere?," when the Queen povters are as important as men have ever proposed. The survival of the human race may be at stake, and both sides are well aware of what is involved. CONTROL OF PORNOGRAPHY Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled, "Growing Public Outrage Over Pornography Stirs Congressional Response," published in the New York Times of Monday, No- vember 3, 1969. It seems to me that the time is long overdue for us to take af- &motive action to rid the mails of sala- cious and pornographic materials and literature, particularly that which is di- rected to young children. We now have before the Judiciary Committee proposed legislation dealing with this problem which I and a number of other Senators have cosponsored. President Nixon in his October 11, 1969, message on the admin- istration's legislative program has urged us to give high priority to legislation to control pornography. I urge bipartisan action on this most serious matter at the earliest possible moment. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [Prom the New York Times, Nov. 3, 19691 GROWING PUBLK OUTRAGE OYER PORNOGRAPHY STIRS CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE (By Donald Janson) began screaming, SO loud that she ha to WASHINGTON.?"The enclosed printed ma makes me speechless and aghast to think it can be circulated through the mail." leave the sentence unfinished. THE BEGINNING OF SA _ Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, at times an editorial is written which ex- presses accurately one's thinking on a particular subject. Such is the case with respect to an editorial entitled "The Be- ginning of SALT," published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. I ask 'unanimous consent that the log- ical and constructive comments ctintain- ed therein be printed in the RECOO. There being no objection, the eaterial was ordered to be printed in the RitORD, as follows: From the St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 20- 26, 1969] THE BEGINNING OF SALT News that the United States and the Soviet Union will begin Strategic Arms Limitation Talks three weeks hence in Helsinki comes none too soon, and the world will hope that agreements on ending the nuclear arms race can be reached before it is too late. ato one knows how long the conferences will con- tinue, but the fact that they are in progress will of itself be a deterrent of sorts. The Nixon Administration has been Iness- ing for the meetings since early in June, but the Russians have delayed a response, The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in Angust upset whatever plans may have been in the making, though it was in essence irrelevant. A likely reason for Soviet delay is the Hns- sian quarrel with China. With the recent start of Sino-Soviet talks this may be on the way to a solution, leaving Moscow free to turn it attention to SALT. In the course of time the conferences magi. to cover the whole range of nuclear weapon- ry?hydrogen bombs and delivery systems., multiwarhead missiles (MIRV) and anthills- sile defense systems. It goes without series that the meetings between the two super- The remark, from a doctor in Prospect, Conn., is from one of thousands of letters re- cently added to the bulging files of Congres- sional committees considering legislation to curb the country's increasingly aggressive pornographers. Representative L. H. Fountain, Democrat of North Carolina, testified before a House Judiciary subcommittee last week that he was receiving more mail from outraged con- stituents on the growth of pornography than on any subject in his 16 years in Congress. "OUTPOUR/NG OF FILTH" "People in my district are furious and can't understand why we can't put a stop to this outpouring of filth," he said. "If this Congress accomplishes nothing else, it should provide relief for the vast majority of our citizens who are demanding help in ridding their homes of this obscen- ity," said Representative Ed Foreman, Re- publican of New Mexico, as he waved a copy of the newsprint magazine Screw, with a two-page photograph of a nude matt and woman on the centerfold, in front of the committee. A staff member of a Senate Judiciary sub- committee investigating pornography said that subcommittee members were receiving more protests on pornography than on the Vietnam war. President Nixon noted in May, in asking Congress for three new laws to stop the flood, that "American homes are being born- barded with. the largest volume of sex- oriented mail in history." He reminded Con- gress OM weeks ago that none of his pro- posals had been passed and urged prompt action. There is little likelihood that lie will get it. Part of the reason is that Congressmen are so eager-to testify at subcommittee hearings In person rather than by submitting state- ments that additional hearings are being scheduled to meet the demand. Since early August, the Congressmen have been among witnesses before two House subcommittees. S 13829 Their interest is directly related to the spurt in the volume of mail they are receiving from back home. Five more Congressmen testified last week. They are among 175 who have introduced more than 200 anti-obscenity bills, including the Administration's proposals. HIGH COURT GU/DEL/NES Shaping final legislation from this tangle is not expected until next year, not just be- cause of the stampede to get into the act but also because of the difficult task of meet- ing tests of constitutionality required by Su- preme Court decisions of recent years. Under Supreme Court rulings, material cannot be banned unless it panders to a "prurient interest in sex," affronts "eontem- porary community standards" and is "utterly without redeeming social importance." But about 50 million pieces of lurid mate- rial are being mailed annually, including millions of unsolicited advertiallinents for books and films. New approaches are being sought to keep this third-class mail from reaching homes and offices. The President, declaring that the Adminis- tration had carefully studied "the legal ter- rain" of the problem, proposed the following curbs; Prohibiting use of the media to send to minors "material dealing with a sexual sub- ject in a manner unsuitable for young people." Barring use of the mails or other inter- state facilities for sending advertising in- tended to appeal to a "prurient interest in sex." Prohibiting, as an invasion of privacy, use of the mails to send sexually oriented adver- tising?even if it is not legally olascene?to any who says he does not want it. Protection specifically for minors has not been tried before on a Federal level. This ap- proach was prompted by a Supreme Court decision last year upholding a New York state law prohibiting the sale to minors of any- thing the law defined, using a separate stand- ard for children, as obscene for minors. The effort to bar "prurient" advertising rests on 1942 and 1951 Supreme Court de- sions that commercial advertising does not have the same constitutional protection as noncommercial speech. The invasion-of-privacy proposal would complement a law passed in 1967. It allowed anyone who received sex-oriented advertis- ing to cut off the flow by listing his objection with the Post Office. Bait the receiver had to initiate action against each publisher of smut who solicited him. The new proposal would let household- ers bar all such advertising from any source with a single protest in advance of receiving any smut. Advertisers would have to buy a Post Office master list of objectors and keep It current or risk heavy fines and long jail terms. These measures?the 1967 layS and the pro- posed expansion?were inspired in large part by a 1966 Supreme Court decision against Ralph Ginsberg, holding that, whether or not his magazine Eros was obscene, his man- ner of advertising it pandered to prurient interests. Last week, the Supreme Court said it would rule on the constitutionality of the 1967 law. The complementary proposal will probably stand or fall on that ruling. Publishers of Erotic wares contend that the first law vio- lates their right of free speech by restricting distribution of ideas. The other Nixon proposals, if adopted, would also face constitutional challenges. "The theory that the First Amendment does not protect commercial advertising is a very shaky one," Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington office of the American Civil Liberties 'Union, testified before the House Subcommittee on Postal Operations recently. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 November 4 AB36rred For 6 etlw.MASAIO ? 6511,1E7L1WRIM000300040001-0 1, tors in the consideration of the future of that country. DowNs. Is there any danger that the hard- liners will consider moving in that direction a defeat, even though it might fulfill the stated policy aim? MANSFIELD. No, quite the contrary. The President has made his declaration. It has met with unanimous approval as far as I know. And I agree with him one hundred percent. DOWNS. Thanks again, Senator Mansfield, for being our guest this mor ng. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, on Monday the United States and the Soviet Union will open very crucial talks in Helsinki on ways to scale down the strategic arms race. We cannot now tell what the out- come will be, but we are all hopeful that these talks will lead to a slowdown in the buildup of strategic nuclear weapons. Last night Secretary of State Rogers delivered a talk before the Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired which I feel sets the tone for the talks in Hel- sinki. The Secretary, of course, could not and did not detail the specific proposals which would be discussed at this first meeting in Helsinki. But he did broadly outline the desire of the United States to come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R. The Secretary's talk was filled with hope?a hope that sane men from the two most powerful countries on earth can curb what has been an unending com- petition in the strategic arms race. We have made some progress in limiting nu- clear weapons. More needs to be done. I feel all of us can agree with Secre- tary Rogers when he says that there is reason for hope because both superpow- ers are willing at least to discuss ways to limit the growing nuclear arsenal and in- creasing threat to world peace. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD the full text of the Secretary's remarks. There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE Next Monday in Helsinki the United States and the Soviet Union will open preliminary talks leading to what could be the most criti- cal negotiations on disarmament ever under- taken. The two most powerful nations on earth will be seeking a way to curb what to date has been an unending competition in the strategic arms race. The Government of the United States will enter these negotiations with serious purpose and with the hope that we can achieve balanced understandings that will benefit the cause of world peace and security. Yet we begin these negotiations knowing that they are likely to be long and complicated and with the full realization that they may not succeed. While I will not be able to discuss specific proposals tonight, I thought it might be helpful to outline the general approach of our government in these talks. Nearly a quarter of a century ago, when we alone possessed nuclear power, the United States proposed the formation of a United Nations Atomic Development Authority with a world monopoly over all dangerous aspects of nuclear energy. This proposal might well have eliminated for all nations the dangers and burdens of atomic weapons. Unhappily, as we all know, it was rejected. The implications were obvious. Others in- tended to develop nuclear weapons on a na- tional basis. The United States then would have to continue its own nuclear program. It would have to look to its own security in a nuclear-armed world. Thus we established a national policy of maintaining nuclear weapon strength adequate to deter nuclear war by any other nation or nations. It was our hope then, as it is now, to make certain that nuclear weapons would never again be used. The intervening decades have seen enormous resources devoted to the develop- ment of nuclear weapons systems. As both sides expanded their force levels an action/re- action pattern was established. This pattern was fed by rapid progress in the technology of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. The mere availability of such sophisticated technology made it difficult for either side by itself to refrain from trans- lating that technology into offensive and de- fensive strategic armaments. Meanwhile, strategic planners, operating in an atmosphere of secrecy, were obliged to make conservative assumptions, includ- ing calculations on what became known as the "worst case." The people responsible for planning our strategic security had to take account of the worst assumptions about the other's intentions, the maximum plausi- ble estimate of the other's capabilities and performance, and the lowest plausible per- formance of our own forces. The Soviets no doubt did the same. Under these circumstances it was difficult during these many years for either side to conclude that it had sufficient levels of de- structive power. II Yet that point in time has now clearly been reached. As absolute levels of nuclear power and delivery capability increased, a situation developed in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the society of the other, regardless of which one struck first. There are helpful mutual restraints in such a situation. Sane national leaders do not initiate strategic nuclear war and thus commit their people to national suicide. Also they must be careful not to precipitate a conflict that could easily escalate into nu- clear war. They have to take elaborate pre- cautions against accidental release of a nu- clear weapon which might bring on a nuclear holocaust. In brief the nuclear deterrent, dangerous though it is, has worked. The present situation?in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the other regardless of which struck first?radically weakens the rationale for continuing the arms race. Competitive accumulation of more sophis- ticated weapons would not add to the basic security of either side. Militarily it probably would produce little or no net advantage. Economically it would divert resources needed elsewhere. Politically it would per- petuate the tensions and fears that are the social fallout of the nuclear arms race. So a capacity for mutual destruction leads to a mutual interest in putting a stop to the strategic nuclear arms race. Nonetheless technology advances remorse- lessly. It offers new opportunities to both sides to add to their offensive and defensive strategic systems. Both sides find it difficult to reject these opportunities in an atmos- phere of rivalry and in the absence of a verifiable agreement. It raises temptations to seek strategic advantages. Yet now such advantages cannot be hidden for long, and both sides will certainly take whatever counter-measures are necessary to preserve their retaliatory capability. S 14359 This is the situation in which the two sides now find themselves. Where national security interests may have operated in the past to stimulate the strategic arms race, those same national security interests may now operate to stop or slow down the race. The question to be faced in the strategic arms talks is whether societies with the ad- vanced intellect to develop these awesome weapons of mass destruction have the com- bined wisdom to control and curtail them. III In point of fact, we have already had some successes in preliminary limitations. We have a treaty banning military activi- ties in Antarctia. We have a treaty banning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and prohibiting the establishment of mili- tary installations on the moon or other ce- lestial bodies. We have reached agreement with the So- viet Union on the text of a treaty forbidding the emplacement of weapons of mass des- truction on the ocean floors, about to be con- sidered at the United Nations General As- sembly. These are agreements not to arm environ- ments previously inaccessible to weapons. Manifestly there are fewer obstacles to such agreements than there are to agreements controlling weapons already deployed or un- der development. But even in already "contaminated" en- vironments there have been two important control agreements: We have negotiated and ratified a Test Ban Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. We have negotiated and are prepared at any time to ratify simultaneously with the Soviet Union, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It should be pointed out, though, that the main objective of a Nuclear Non-Prolifera- tion Treaty is to prevent non-nuclear powers from acquiring atomic weapons. The treaty does not restrain any of the present nuclear powers from further development of their capabilities. The non-nuclear countries there- fore tend to look upon the treaty essen- tially as a self-denying ordinance. Accordingly, during the negotiations they insisted upon assurances that the nuclear powers would seriously pursue strategic arms negotiations. We concurred and incorporated a paragraph in the treaty which would re- quire us to do so. I mention this to underscore two points. First, that the disarmament agreements pre- viously concluded have widely been re- garded as confidence building, preliminary steps which hopefully might lead to more meaningful agreements on strategic arms. Second, when the United States and the Soviet Union ratify the NPT, they will agree to undertake negotiations in good faith for a cessation of the nuclear arms race. IV However, given the complexity of the stra- tegic situation, the vital national interests involved, and the traditional impulses to seek protection in military strength it is easy to be cynical about the prospects for the talks into which we are about to enter. Nonetheless some basis for hope exists. First is the fact that the talks are being held at all. The diplomatic exchanges lead- ing up to these talks were responsible in na- ture. And the talks themselves will require discussion of military matters by both sides in which the veil of secrecy will have to be, if not lifted, at least refashioned. These factors lead us to the hope that the talks are being entered into seriously. Second is the matter of timing. Previous disparity in nuclear strength has been suc- ceeded by the situation of sufficiency of which I have already spoken. And because Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14360 Approved Formttsaglata? it$1651M71RWM0003000W1m-0 e ber 14, 1969 larization is dangeroUs. We do not need more intense rhetoric now. Rather we need a return to reasonable discourse and common sense. Mr. President, I believe that an edi- torial published in the Wort Gateway Guide of Waynesville, Mo., goes a long way toward bringing both reason and commonsense to bear on criticism of the military, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: NATION CANNOT AFFOIID CIVILIAN-MILITARY Maar Even the most hawkish supporters of America's involvement in Vietnam seem to have come to the conclusion that the war, as it has been fought, is not worth the can- dle. Its objectives, important as they were and are, have simply become outweighed by its immense costs in wealth, blood and do- mestic turmoil. In this sense, at least, there is a kind of unity in America, though the controversy rages over how to cut the costs of the war while not abandoning utterly whatever achievements may still be salvaged from it. Yet in our universal desire to end the war and our alarm at its divisive and inflationary effects at home, we are in danger of ignoring other, even more pernicious consequences of too precipitate and too complete a reversal of the policies and beliefs which led us into the conflict in the first place. One of these consequences is a growing antimilitarism, which la shared both by those who view the war as immoral from start to finish and by those who once favored it but now feel that the military has let us down. A recent news report told of widespread disillusionment among veteran career officers. "Many of my contemporaries with 15 and 16 years of service are packing it in," an Army liuetenant colonel was quoted as say- ing, "Pride of profession has kept them going, but that pride is taking a terrible battering these days." Air Force officer resignations jumped nearly 50 per cent in fiscal 1969 over fiscal 1968. Army resignations were up about 14 per cent. The climb was smaller in the Marine Corps while Navy figures remained the eame. The outlook for attracting new officers is dismal. ROTC recruitment on college cam- puses is expected to be noticeably affected by antimilitarism this year. Americans seem to have forgotten, or no longer believe, that in this country the mili- tary is controlled by civilians. It was net a general but a civilian president who com- mitted hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to a land war in Asia, against the long-standing warnings of some of our most eminent military men?Generals Gavin, Shoup and Ridgway, for example. Once in the war, the armed forces fought it as well as they could with the restrictions placed upon them?restrictions that were necessary to prevent the conflict from es- calating into World War III but which any armchair strategist OEM now see doomed it to the indecisive, endless struggle it became. The military may be accused of deceiving three or four administrations with constant promises of a turning point or the reaching of that elusive light at the end of the tunnel. But the responsibility ultiMately rests on those who gave them an impossible job to do. "It is unjust and unwise to attack the military because they have done their best to execute directions given them by the political leadership," Writes Anthony Hartley, editor of Interplay Magazine. "Unjust be- cause they are not responsible for initiating policy. Unwise because too constant and this condition will continue for the fore- seeable future the time then seems to be propitious for considering hew to curb the race in which neither side in all likelihood can gain meaningful advantage. Third is a mutuality of interest, Under Present circumstances an equitable limita- tion on strategic nuclear 'weapons would strengthen the national security of both sides. If this is mutually perceived?if both sides conduct these talks in the light of that perception?the talks may accomplish an historic breakthrough in the pattern of confrontation that has characterized the postwar world. May I pause to point out again that I do not wish to predict that the talks will be easy or that progress is imminent or for that matter likely. Mutuality of in- terest for states accustomed to rivalry is difficult to perceive. Traditions are power- ful. Temptations to seek advantage run strong. Developments in other areas are bound to have an impact on these dis- cussions. Both parties will approach the talks with great caution and pursue them with immac- ulate care, The United States and the So- viet Union are entirely capable of protect- ing ther vital interests and can be counted upon to do so. So there is little chance that either side would accept an outcome that leads to its net national disadvantage. In our case also we would not agree to any- thing adversely affecting the national in- terests of our allies, who will continue to be consulted as the talks develop. On the other hand we must also recognize that a prime technique of international politics?as of other politics?is talk. If these talks are serious they can teed to better understanding on both aides of the rationales behind strategic weapons decisions. This in itself might provide a climate in which to avoid compulsive decisions. Talks need not necessarily call for an explicit agreement at any particular stage. Whether we can slow down, atop Or eventu- ally throw the arms race into reverse, re- mains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether this be by a formal treaty or treaties, by a series of agreements, by parallel action, or by a convergence of viewpoints resulting from a better undestanding of respective positions. What counts at this point is that a dialogue Is beginning about the management of the strategic relations at the two superpowers on a better, safer, cheaper basis than un- controlled acquisition of still more weapons. The United States approaches the talks as an opportunity to rest our seourity on what I would call a balanced strategy. In pursuit of this balanced strategy of security we will enter the Helsinki talks with three objectives: To enhance international security by maintaining a stable U.S.-Saviet strategic relationship through limitations on the deployment of strategic armaments; To halt the upward spiral at slrategic arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race; To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation. Some say that there will be risks in such a process. But it is easy to focus too much on the risks that would accompany such a new environment and too little on the risks of the one in which we now live. Certainly, such risks are minimal compared to the benefits for mankind which would flow from success. I am confident that this country will not let down its guard, lose its alertness, or fail to maintain adequate programs to protect against a collapse or evasion of any strategic arms agreement. No delegation to any dis- armament negotiation has ever been better prepared or better qualified then the United States delegation. The risks in seeking an agreement seem to be manageable, insurable, and reasonable ones to rim. They seem less dangerous than the risks of open-ended arms ocaapetition--riaks about which we perhaps have become somewhat callous. I have mentioned the rewards of progress in terms of international security, world or- der, and improved opportunities for replac- ing a stalemated confrontation with a process of negotiations. But there are also other stakes in these talks that come closer to home. On both sides of this strategic race there are urgent needs for resources to meet pressing domestic needs. Strategic weapons cannot solve the problems of how we live at home, or how we live in the world in this last third of the Twentieth Century. The Soviet Union, which devotes a much larger proportion of its national re- sources to armaments than do we, must see this as well. Who knows the rewards if we succeed in diverting the energy, time and attention? the manpower and brainpower?devoted to ever more sophisticated weapons to other and more worthwhile purposes? Speaking before the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly two months ago, President Nixon said that he hoped the strategic arms talks would begin soon because "there is no more important task before us." And he added that we must "make a determined ef- fort not only to limit the build-up of stra- tegic arms, but to reverse it." Just last week President Podgorny of the Soviet Union said: "A positive outcome of the talks would undoubtedly help improve So- viet-American relations and preserve and strengthen the peace." To that I say "Amen." He added that: "The Soviet Union is striv- ing to achieve precisely such results.' Well, so are we; and in this we have the support of the military services, of the Congress, and of the American people. To that end this Government approaches the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in sober and serious determination to do our full part to bring a halt to this unproductive and costly competition in strategic nuclear arma- ments. NATION CANNOT AFFORD CIVIL- IAN-MILITARY RIFT Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it has become all too fashionable in this coun- try to criticize blindly those with whom we disagree. Overstated rhetoric and oversimplified conclusions serve to po- larize our politics and divide our society when polarization and divisiveness are already too prevalent. The military establishment has been a prime target of this counterproductive criticism. Some criticize the military because it is fighting the war in Vietnam or has not yet won it, while others complain that its needs devour too much of our na- tional budget. However, it is well to remember that civilian decisions have shaped our policy in Vietnam and the ground rules under which it is pursued; and Congress in the past abdicated its responsibility to judge Military spending. I do not wish to imply that the mili- tary is without fault. Overoptimistic military reports contributed heavily to the disastrous policy in Vietnam and often fearsome threats were found to justify military expenditures which later proved ludicrously wasteful. But who is at fault is not at issue. What is at issue is that continuing pa- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14346 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE November 13, 1969 per column which appeared locally yes- terday in the Washington Post. In the column, Messrs. Novak and Evans warned: The tens of thousands of well-meaning war protesters set to converge on Washington Sat- urday will be joining a demonstration planned since last summer by advocates of violent revolution In the U.S. who openly sup- port Communist forces in Vietnam. - Accordingly, whatever happens here Sat- urday, the Nov. 15 march on Washington will mark a postwar highwater mark for the American far left. Responsible liberals have been enlisted as foot soldiers in an operation mapped out mainly by extremists?testimony to the present ineffectiveness of nonviolent, liberal elements in the peace movement. After explaining the planning role for the moratorium which has been played by the Communist Party, U.S.A., and by the newly-invigorated Communist Trot- skyite movement, Evans and Novak stated that extremists in the antiwar movement have prepared "wild scenarios for storming the White House, the Jus- tice Department, and the South Viet- namese Embassy." As best I have been able to learn, Mr. President, the Justice Department and the South Vietnamese Embassy are still likely targets of the extremists. A coalition of 30 radical groups, calling Itself the Revolutionary Contingent, re- portedly plans to rally at Dupont Circle tomorrow evening and then march on the South Vietnamese chancery at 2251 R Street N'W., to serve an "eviction" notice on the occupants. There have been reports that one revo- lutionary group from New York City would like to blow up the embassy. That might have sounded a little farfetched a couple of weeks ago, but after the four serious bombings of buildings in New York City yesterday, we can believe that there are people who might go to such extremes. It is not clear as to just what Is in store for the Justice Department on Sat- urday evening following the mass rally on the Ellipse. On October 30, 1969, the Liberation News Service?which provides news for the underground press?reported that plans are being made for an attack on the Justice Department. I should like to quote a few paragraphs from the Liber- ation News Service story: NEW Yosx.?Get your red flags ready arid come to Washington, 13.0. on November 15. Plans are being forged for a militant "red flag" contingent to participate in the massive anti-war demonstration in Washington and to add an additional action: an attack on the headquarters of the Department of "Justice." . . The SDSers in Newark expect to organize an anti-imperialist presence within the main march on Saturday, November 15. This con- tingent will march together in a disciplined way, bearing red flags, NLF flags and other banners showing solidarity with the Viet- namese people . . . During the big rally, the Red Flag con- tingent will constitute an agit prop (agita- tion-propaganda turn-an) unit to work to bring people to the Justice Department. Mr. President, I understand that many citizens have deep convictions con- cerning the war. I, too, would like to see It come to an end. The moratorium, however, will not stop the fighting. It may even prolong it because the antiwar demonstrations give direct encouragement to the Com- munist forces in Vietnam. This encour- agement was summed up in a nutshell on October 22, 1969, in a broadcast of the National Liberation Front's clandes- tine radio station in South Vietnam. The NLF said: The American people's brilliant success of the 15 October movement is a source of strong encouragement to our troops and people. The fact of giving encouragement to the enemy should, in itself, deter Ameri- cans from participating in the mora- torium, Mr. President. I should also think that well-meaning citizens would want to stay out of Wash- ington so as not to further the destruc- tive goals of many of the moratorium planners. There is the real possibility of violence. The Federal Government did not invent Weatherman or the Yippies. It did not conjure up the Revolutionary Contin- gent. Such groups are inherently vicious and existed for no good purpose. Their primary goal is destruction and violence, and, while moratorium leaders may wish to disavow them, they are very much a part of the moratorium. Mr. President, I do not wish to predict violence during the moratorium. I hope that it will pass peacefully. But I be- lieve that the record and the published statements of certain extremist groups in the antiwar movement give us clear warning that we need to take every pre- caution against the possibility of trouble. Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield. Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, it was with interest that I listened to that part, of the statement of the Senator from West Virginia pertaining to violence and, at least, the natural appearing setup that Is being created by the perpetration of violence and our concern for it. It was with some curiosity that I lis- tened to a former Attorney General of the United States of America on the tele- vision, I believe it was last night, in which he deplored the idea of saying that violence is going to come out of this meeting. Apparently it was the thought of this former Attorney General that because It was the honest opinion of a present Deputy Attorney General of the United States that such violence will come about, and he says so and takes the precautions that he believes are necessary to deal with that situation, that that kind of talk will result in violence rather than avoiding and preventing it. My thoughts went back to October 1967, when the Department of Justice under a different administration was in charge of things and plans that were sub- mitted for the march on the Pentagon. And assurances were given that there would be no violence, that ground rules were established, that there were things that they would do and would not do, and that they would not go beyond cer- tain lines of demarcation, and .so forth. However, notwithstanding those assur- ances, violence did occur. And this Nation was submitted to the shame of the world because it was not able even to protect the sanctity of peace and order around its military headquarters in the Nation's Capital. I wonder if that is not the same type of thing that the Senator from West Virginia exercised or is certainly, at least, concerned about now, that it is nice to think in terms of coming events in a Pollyanna way, but at the same time it is well to have a little dry powder on hand and a little flint to insert in the powder horn just in case. Would that be in line with the think- ing the Senator from West Virginia has in mind with respect to the present situation? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, the Senator is correct. It would be. I heard the same former Attorney General last night on television. My thoughts went back to Resurrection City which was set up during his tenure of office as Attorney General. Mr, HRUSKA. Mr. President, I think we should have every sympathy for those who honestly, lawfully, and peace- fully demonstrate and petition their government and make their feelings and sentiments known. However, we ought to be a little realistic about it and not criticize those in charge now who are trying to be realistic and trying to do the things that they are entitled to do under the circumstances. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I yield the floor. CONSULTATION WITH SENATE ASKED ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIM- ITATION TALKS Mr. PELL. Mr. President, there seems to me a contradiction between the action of the White House of yesterday, pre- venting the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions from being consulted or briefed concerning the Helsinki Strategic Arms Limitation talks, and the President's statement to us of today that he intends to set up a procedure to consult with the Senate concerning the conclusion of international agreements. I would hope today's view would pre- vail and steps would be taken to insure that the Senate is consulted and briefed concerning SA In this coWiection, it certainly seems incongruous that 14 NATO nations are to be briefed tomorrow by our negotiators, although we in the Senate, who will eventually have the responsibility of con- senting to whatever may be the eventual treaty, are not being briefed. NEW MOBILIZATION MARCH IN WASHINGTON Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the Vietnam moratorium last month, mil- lions of Americans took part in peace- ful, orderly rallies and meetings to ex- press their strong desire for an early end to the war in Vietnam. I supported the goals of the October moratorium, and I support now the goals of the moratorium activities planned for today and tomorrow. If the activities planned for this week by the Vietnam Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Ayr oved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 13, 1 A 99 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I particul- arly thank my good friend from Nebraska at this time for his courtesy: Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the Senate has begun debate on the confirmation of Circuit Judge Clement Haynsworth to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. It may seem odd that the debate has just begun since it has been raging for several weeks, vir- tually since the President's announce- ment of the nomination. But formal debate began on November 1_3. The Committee on the Judiciary, by a vote of 10 to 7, has recomMended the confirmation of Judge Haynsworth's nomination. It is now the duty of the full Senate to advise and cons( tit or to withhold its advice and consent to the nomination. The vote will be wry close, In all likelihood. The outcome may turn on one or two votes. I hope, and I think, that Judge Hayns- worth's nomination will be confirmed. He is an outstanding jurist and will bring balance and judgment to the Court. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE As in legislative session, a message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of con- ference on the disagreeing vote., of the two Houses on the amendmeht of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 474) to establish a Commission on Government Procure- ment. The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 966) making further continuing ap- propriations for the fiscal year 1970, and for other purposes. ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (H.J. Res. 966) making further continuing appro- priations for the fiscal year IWO, and for other purposes, and it was signed by the Acting President pro tempore. (By order of the Senate, the following proceedings were conducted as in legisla- tive session:) APPOINTMENT OF ELLIS L. ARM- STRONG AS COMMANDER OF REC- LAMATION Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the Bu- reau of Reclamation now has on the job a new Commissioner, Ellis L. Armstrong, who was appointed by President Nixon to succeed my fellow Nebraskan, Floyd E. Dominy, who retired from the Federal service on October 31, after 36 years of service. Mr. Armstrong is a native of Mali but he has worked for the Bureau of Rec- lamation in Nebraska, and I have noted an editorial from the people who know him best, down in the southwest cor- ner of the State. The McCook Daily Gazette, whose editor is Allen D. Strunk, Js the voice of the Republican River Val- ley and it was particularly gratifying to me to read an editorial in the paper's edition of October 24. The headline is, "Ellis L. Armstrong Appointment Pleasing," and I want to say it is pleasing to me as well. I have full confidence that he will carry on in the best tradition of the Bureau of Rec- lamation in developing theh uzat.e?e- sources of Nebraska and.,alf-OT the West. I ask unanimoion-sent that the edi- torial be print in the RECORD ? There g no objection, the editorial was o -red to be printed in the RECORD, as OWS : is L. ARMSTRONG APPOINTMENT PLEASING Southwest Nebraska and Northwest Kansa s pleased and fortunate in the appointmen of Ellis L. Armstrong as Commissioner of th ureau of Reclamation. The appointment of this man is gratify I ? to this part of the country because of his fin, character and ability but particularly be- can we consider him a Nebraskan even thou his native state is Utah. From 1948 to 1954 Mr. Armstrong was project e ineer at Trenton Dam. During that time man persons in the McCook and Trenton area rew to know, respect and ad- mire Mr. Arms ?ng and his family. With the co letion of the Trenton project, he went on Wer accomplishments and became Deputy P ect Manager for con- sultants working for tht\Power Authority of New York State on the Lawrence Power ned to Utah in ghways, Utah ld this and Seaway Seaway project. He ret 1957 to become director of State Road Commission, and 'on until he was named Com issioner of Public Roads, U.S. Department of 'commerce. Since May 1968 he has been ',assistant regional director of Region Iv including parts of Utah, Nevada. Wyoming, COlorado and Arizona with headquarters in Salt Lake City. Among his honors is being the 29th per- son ever elected and elevated to national honorary membership in Chi Epsilon, na- donal civil engineering fraternity. Mr. Armstrong fills the seat held by Floyd-, E. Dominy, formerly of Hastings, h o likes Armstrong has had a warm spot in his heart \ for the reclamation interests of Nebraska and , 1 Kansas. t Mr. Armstrong's appointment is indeed ip pleasing to this area and puts two former / Nebraskans in key positions, the other bein former University of Nebraska Ch ancel Clifford Hardin now Secretary of Agricult We are confident both will continue outstanding jobs in serving the natio this area. S 14345 fort by the Government to scare people away from Washington. Spook was quoted in the Washington Post on No- vember 9, 1969, assaying: The government is trying in every way to Intimidate people who are coining here to protest against the war. Dr. Spook is totally wrong. The rumors ve persisted, not because the Govern- t is trying to scare anyone, but be- cause of the extremely violent nature of some of the groups which are planning to participate in the moratorium. These groups run the gamut of lef t- wing extremism, and the well organized and disciplined to fairly new brands of revolutionaries who have hastily gath- ered together and asstuned catchy names for the convenience of identification in the press. They are all planning to come, Mr. President?the Trotskyite Young Social- ist Alliance, Weatherman, the Crazies, the Mad Dogs, the Yippes, the Anarch- ists, the W. E. Dubois Clubs, and Youth Against War and F'acism. I am not talking about earnest young people or older persons who believe that, by their participation, they are fulfilling their constitutional obligation as citi- zens. I have reference, instead, to those for whom the politics of confrontation is an end in itself and for whom violence is an instrument to be used in reach- ing their goal? a goal nothing less than the destruction of an orderly society and constitutional government. These factions and certain others seek only to exploit the emotional issue of the war. While their ideological beliefs may differ, they are united in the cause of destroying our established institutions and replacing them with anarchy or a totalitarian regime. They are, of course, going, as it were, fter an elephant with a peashooter. ad they will not, of course, succeed in eir effort. But, as these radicals of the unatic fringe go about their business, hey may succeed in causing innocent eople to be hurt. I note that the so-called "reS t bl " a A .....??????????????=????.. e r ng and la sh a lements behind the moratorium are al- eady trying to disassocate themselves rom any violence which may break out ere either during or after the main emonstration. Pontius Pilate set a prec- dent for this kind of hand washing, Mr. resident, and as we all know, he was ot absolved for his actions. The New robe and anyone else who played a art in organizing the demonstration ould be held to account for attracting nd supporting these dregs of the New eft. COMMITTEE MEETIN DURING SENATE SESSION ? MORROW Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. Pres- id islative session, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate tomorrow. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. THE PROSPECT FOR VIOLENCE IN THE ANTIWAR DEMONSTRA- TIONS Mr. BYRD of West Virgin,a, Mr. Presi- dent, there have been persistent rumors that violence will accompany the 3 days of antiwar demonstrations which are scheduled to begin here this evening. These rumors were attributed by Dr. Benjamin Spook on November 8 to an ef- Spokesmen for Weatherman and the Yippes are being quoted now as saying that they intend to refrain from violence during the moratorium. But neither of these groups has displayed one iota of sanity or sincere conviction over any issue in the past and all of their activi- ties heretofore have been marked by ir- rationality and violence. So, I think it will be quite out of character if neither organization is capable of containing it- self during the 3 or more days of demon- strations which lie ahead. I would like to call attention to the widely-circulated Evans-Novak newspa- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14266 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 3, 1969 The United Kingdom sets quotas on vari- ous wool and man-made fiber products from Japan. Italy restricts imports of various wool and man-made fiber products from Japan_ Prance has similar restrictions on Japanese imports, but restricts imports from Hong Kong as well. West Germany has restrictions against Japan, Hong Kong, India and Pakis- tan. Austria has restrictions on Japanese textiles but also has an "anti-dumping and market disruption law" which permits auto- matic action when prices of specified textiles are considered too low. The Benelux coun- tries have a bilateral agreement setting quotas on Japanese textiles and apparel, while the Japanese-Canadian agreement im- poses quotas on some synthetics. Canada has similar agreements with Korea and Hong Kong. Denmark uses licenses to regulate tex- tile imports from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Switzerland employs a "price certificate sys- tem" for textile iMports under which textile Imports are kept out if prices are too low. This is administered through a system of import licenses for all textiles at the fabric stage and beyond, regardless of origin. How- ever, the licenses have been granted auto- matically to high-cost countries. Norway and Sweden have restrictions on imports from several Asian countries. Even Japan has a global quota on imports of woven woolen fabrics under which Japan sets quotas for France, Italy and the U.S. Mr. President, these facts amply illus- trate the dilemma with which this coun- try is faced. It is my hope this adminis- tration can reach a negotiated solution, but if our friends abroad think we lack the determination to pass a unilateral arrangement in the Congress, then they are sadly mistaken. Hopefully, such a solution will not be necessary, but let it be understood we stand ready to act if the present deadlock is not soon broken. SALT?GIANT STEP IN THE LONG '"-----JOURNEY TOWARD PEACE Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, November 17, 1969, the day set for preliminary discussions at Helsinki, Fin- land, on strategic arms limitation talks, commonly referred to as SALT, could mark a historic turning point in history. Since the first atomic bomb was ex- ploded in August 1945, mankind has lived precariously under what the late, great President John F. Kennedy described as "a nuclear sword of Damocles." In urging Senate ratification of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Presi- dent Kennedy, quoting an ancient Chi- nese proverb said, "A journey of a thou- sand miles must begin with a" single step." Since then additional meaningful steps have been taken toward permanent peace?the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons in outer space. Now, with the SALT negotiations, the oppor- tunity presents itself for a giant step forward on that long journey toward permanent peace. The armaments race between the ma- jor powers continues unabated. The in- sane nuclear arms and missile race be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union has brought all mankind nearer the possibility of total destruction. Many of these armaments systems are ob- solete before they even reach comple- tion. The emphasis may change from bombs to missiles, from missiles to anti- missile missiles, to anti-missile missiles, but the armaments race continues. Hun- dreds of billions of dollars and rubles are wasted on the seemingly insatiable demands of militarists of both nations for more and more weapons. After years of this dangerous rivalry, neither our Nation nor the Soviet Union is any more secure than it was at the be- ginning of this decade. Every effort to develop and stockpile new superweapons has only resulted in a similar action by the other side. After each nation has de- veloped a new one, the race starts all over again to produce new, more expen- sive and more sophisticated weapons. Despite assurances to the lesser pow- ers, the Soviet Union and the United States have used the 15 months since the signing of the Nuclear Nonprolifera- tion Treaty not to curb the armaments race but to proceed with the testing of new weapons systems. The first order of business at Helsinki must be to seek a mutual moratorium on all testing. Then, efforts may proceed toward more comprehensive arms agree- ment that can only be arrived at after years of difficult and painstaking nego- tiations. Senators will recall that it took years of such tedious and often discour- aging negotiations to arrive at the Lim- ited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It is of utmost importance that none of the superweapons be excluded from the discussions?the ABM, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehi- cles, commonly referred to as MIRV's, and others. The continuing development by the Soviet Union and the United States of the testing and deployment of MIRV systems and further deploy- ment of ABM systems must be halted. MIRV is the major factor that could cause a tragic spiral in the arms race and preclude for many years the oppor- tunity for meaningful arms limitation negotiations. Unless MIRV flight testing is halted soon, we may reach the point of no return toward being able to halt the mad momentum of the arms race. We may never have a better oppor- tunity to do so. Administration leaders and leaders in the Kremlin both ap- pear willing to negotiate seriously. More important, it appears that both sides can negotiate from a position of ap- proximate nuclear equality. The fact is that there is no such thing as nuclear superiority when each side has it with- in its capability to totally destroy the other. The President's decision to enter into SALT negotiations is, without a doubt, his most significant act since assuming office. These negotiations are only the beginning. We harbor no false hopes that firm agreements will be arrived at in a week, a month, or even a year. The ne- gotiations will be long, arduous, and frus- trating. However, the outcome will de- termine whether the United States and the Soviet Union will be forced to con- tinue to expend vast amounts of their re- sources and energy on nuclear weapons; whether mankind will be confronted with the bleak prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation; whether the horrible un- certainty of a horrible nuclear war will continue to hover over mankind; and possibly Whether civilization as we know It will live or die. Mr. President, I am proud to be a co- sponsor along with 41 of my colleagues of the resolution introduced by the distin- guished junior Senator from Massachu- setts (Mr. BROOKE), calling for a halt in the testing of all multiple-warhead mis- siles by the United States and the Soviet Union. I can think of no better way of expressing the good faith of our Nation in the SALT negotiations than by prompt approval by the Senate of that resolu- tion. Mr. President, in announcing that I would not be a candidate for reelection in 1970, I stated "the most important vote of my senatorial career to date was mat in support of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." In 14 months I shall retire from the Senate. It is my hope that before those 14 months have ended, I shall have the opportunity to cast an even more important vote?a vote for a meaningful Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. BILLS INTRODUCED Bills were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows: By Mr. CASE: S. 3138. A bill for the relief of Ruth E. Calvert; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. MONDALE: S. 3139. A bill for the relief of Grant J. Merritt and Mary Merritt Bergson; to the Committee on the Judiciary. ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF A BILL S. 2168 Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Score) be added as a cosponsor of S. 2168, the mink quota bill. The PRESIDING OrriCER. Without objection, it is so ordered. DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL- FARE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970? AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. 27.5 Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, today there are approximately 20 million Americans aged 65 or over in this coun- try. Of these Americans, 3.2 million are restricted in their movements or con- fined to bed; 3 million are classified as illiterate or functionally illiterate; 4.4 million live alone, many divorced from community life; and 1.2 million are con- fined to hospitals or other institutions. These people need more than a social security or welfare check to make their lives meaningful or comfortable. They need programs designed to meet their specific needs and to help them con- tribute to the development of their com- munities despite their advanced years. Title III of the Older Americans Act provides them with these programs by allocating money for training, planning, and service projects for the elderly. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE PRISONER EXCHANGE DOI:IL CRC WASHINGTON, October 22?State Depart- ment officials expressed doubt today whether North Vietnam had any interest in exchang- ing American prisoners of war for Black Panthers in the United States and said it had no information about such a proposed exchange. The report that Eldridge Cleaver, a Panther leader in self-imopsed exile, has e gun dis- cussion on an exchange with the enemy in Vietnam was issued in Chicago yeAerclay by Rennie Davis, one of the defendants in the Chicago Eight trial. A State Department spokesman said that "we have no information about this re- port." Later, other officials said privately they doubted that the enemy would be, in- terested in the proposed exchange. "Chtoramwomt" ,FREPARED SAN FRANCISCO, October 22?The Black ' Panther party said today that "the ground- work has been ser/for the relase of Ameri- can prisoners of w(r if jailed Panther leaders are freed. At a newsconfe nce this morning, David Hilliard, the party national chief of staff, said that the Panth s are seeking the free- dom of Huey P. New n and Bobby G. Seale, the party's co-founder In exchange for their lease, he said, the Government of North Vietn would free an unspecified number of Ame prisoners. Mr. Hilliard added that the " details" of the proposed exchange are being orked out by Eldridge Cleaver, the Panther's e ed minister of information. Mr. Hilliard said that the Vietnamese would ask that Rennie Davis and David Dellinger, two of the defendants in the Cbie.igo eight trial, along with Mr. Seale, act as Ike go- betweens in the proposed swap. The proposal could become active "as soon as Davis and Dellinger are cleared to go and meet with Eldridge," Mr. Dellinger a, id. CONSPIRACY TRIAL (By Tom Hayden) CIIICAGO.?The Conspiracy trial no longer seems to be the carnival it was in the first week. We no longer humorously refer to federal judge Julius Hoffman as "Magoo" (a refer- ence to a comic character the judge is said to resemble) but as "Adolph Hitler Herrman." The first 21 government witnesses have been from the Chicago police department and the FBI. Their testimony has unfolded as an attack on the movement, political ideas, language and style rather than on concrete crimes. The most concrete action charged a of the defendants so far was letting al out of police oar tires, throwin aaters at undercover agents and o riVia which defense attorney William Kuristler asserts be- long in a municipal police court, not before the federal bench. Occasionally there is a fantastic claim such as the one that Rennie Davis arranged for live television coverage in front of the Conrad Hilton hotel Aug. 27 and then ordered Mobi- lization marshalls to kick the line of police- men in the shins so demonstrators would be clubbed before the TV audience. On this par- ticular charge as on many others, gross-ex- amination revealed no shins were kicked. The heavy emphasis in the police testi- mony has been on the provocative language and identity of the defendants. With a pre- tense at embarrassment officer after officer tells the jury that the defendants shouted, LBJ," "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh" and other chants. When defense attorneys ask police if any obscenities were used by them while clubbing demonstrators, they are given pious denials. The most any police witness has acknowl- edged is that he heard one officer say to an- other, "These little are really tough . , ." The Conspiracy is attempting to pinpoint the blame for the Chicago melee on authori- ties at the highest level and show that the trial is an integral part of a national policy to institute a legalized fascism. The Nixon administration, according to the defendants, Is rigging the Supreme Court and Justice De- partment with reactionary political figures prepared to go beyond present Constitutional standards towards a new policy of reaction. As examples of a move toward fascism, there are the proceedings of the Conspiracy trial itself. For example, the government has admitted illegal wiretapping of defendants but asks the court to uphold wiretapping in the overriding interest of national security. Furthermore, the prosecution ease cites as -"evidence" of crime speeches given before and during the convention to public meet- ings where there was no evidence whatsoever of a "clear and present danger to the peace." The Conspiracy is waging a struggle co- ordinating the defense inside the courtroom With a political campaign on the outside LO stop the trial. The defense case will try to re-enact what happened in Chicago and bring political figures such as Lyndon Johnson and Mayor Richard Daley to explain their policies. Leaders of the civil rights, academic and lib- eral communities are expected to testify about what happened in Chicago as well as ordinary people who were beaten or gassed in the streets. The Conspiracy hopes to make part of its defense a "people's case" and encourages all witnesses to return to testify. Since the trial has sparked widespread in- ternational concern, the Conspiracy hopes to turn it into a political showdown. Dave Dellinger, at the request of the Black nther party, announced the possibility of Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 14169 been enlisted as foot soldiers in an opera- tion mapped out mainly by extremists? testimony to the present ineffectiveness of nonviolent, liberal elements in the peace movement. Moreover, heavy-handed Nixon administra- tion reaetion by Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst assures that any vio- lence on Saturday will be blamed by liberals on the government, and the avoidance of violence will be credited by these same lib- erals to the self-restraint of the far left. Although liberals belatedly spent this week in frantic eleventh-hour efforts to co-apt Saturday's march, they had plenty of ad- vance warning. The New Mobilization Com- mittee to End the War in Vietnam (New Mobe), sponsors of the march, was formed last July in Cleveland with an executive committee dominated by supporters of the Vietcong. The executive committe is moderate when compared with the 60-member steering com- mittee, studded with past and present Com- munist Party members (including veteran party functionary Arnold Johnson) . Far more important than representation by the largely moribund American Communist Party, how- ever, is inclusion on the steering committee of leaders in its newly invigorated Trotskyite movement. The steering committee began eclipsing the executive committee in recent weeks under the leadership of the Trotskyite So- cialist Workers Party and its fast growing youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance. Fred Halstead of the Socialist Workers Party took over planning for a march calculated to end in violent confrontation. Participating in planning sessions were elements even more violence-prone than the Trotskyites: extreme SDS factions calling themselves the revolutionary brigade. Wild scenarios for storming the White House, the Justice Department, and the South Viet- namese Embassy Were prepared. Furthermore, the New Mobe was in closer contact with Communist Vietnamese official circles than is generally realized. Ron Young, a member of the New Mobe steering commit- tee, journeyed to Stockholm Oct. 11-12 for a meeting attended by representatives of the North Vietnam government and the Viet- cong. Reporting on plans for Nov. 15, Young urged a worldwide propaganda campaign to boost the demonstration. The link between Hanoi and elements of the New Mobe was again demonstrated Oct. 14 when Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam sent greetings to American antiwar demonstrators. Halstead, the Trotskyite leader, drafted a friendly reply to Hanoi ap- proved by a majority of the New Mobe's steering committee. Its transmission was blocked only by the intervention of Stewart Meachem of the American Friends Service Committee, one of the New Mobe's moderates. Thus far-left orientation of the New Mobe for weeks has worried liberal doves, including the youthful leaders of the peaceful Oct. 15 Moratorium. Sen. Charles Goodell of New York, emerging as a leading congressional foe of the war, attempted?without success?to reduce extremist influence inside the New Mobe and argued against including far left- ists on the steering committee. But the liberals, having forgotten the fate of popular front movements a generation ago and unwilling to repudiate any antiwar forces, would not actually break with the New Mobe. Any chance of that was eliminated by President Nixon's relatively hardline speech Nov. 3 and government strategy laid down at the Justice Department by Klein- dienst. Goodell and Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota, after much deliberation, ac- cepted invitations to address the demonstra- tion in hopes of moderating it. Similarly, moratorium leaders this week have tried to - insinuate themselves into control of the march. But the march remains essentially a project of the far left, constituting a tragic failure of leadership by liberal foes of the war. THE MEANING OF PEACE Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the news media tell us that on this coming Satur- day, there will be a mass demonstration in Washington against the war in Viet- nam. According to what we read the demon- stration will focus upon a demand for immediate withdrawal of American forces in Vietnam. I am sure that many of those who make such a demand sin- cerely believe they are advancing the cause of peace. Now, Mr. President, I do not question in any way the right of Americans to protest and dissent peacefully?a right which is not enjoyed by those who live under Communist domination. But I believe it would be well if those who are about to demonstrate were also aware of another important difference between the free world and the Com- munists. I refer to the meaning and purpose of "peace." Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD an article written by Keyes Beech, the dis- tinguished foreign correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, which was pub- lished in the Philadelphia Enquirer of November 4, 1969. There being no objection, the ?article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: HANOI DEFECTORS WARNED UNITED STATES OF DUPLICITY, "PEACE" BLOODBATH (By Keyes Beech) Smcow.?One year ago four senior Com- munist defcetors from North Vietnam with a total of 89 years as loyal party members were interviewed on what they thought of the U.S. bombing halt over North Vietnam. In the light of what has happened since then their comments make interesting read- ing. Here are excerpts: Lt. Col. Phan Viet Dung, former Commu- nist regimental commander: "Hanoi wants this bombing stop and the apparent peace it will bring only so that she can better prepare to gain her ends . . . Even after the bombing is halted the Paris talks will yield nothing for the U.S. because Hanoi will then claim the halt proves the Americans were guilty. This will be just what they need to boost morale in the north." Lt. Col. Huynh Cu, 23 years a party mem- ber: "You must take a lesson from what hap- pened in Laos in 1962. When our North Viet- namese forces attacked we could easily have taken Vientiane. Then Ho (Chi Minh) or- dered the troops to pull back rather than risk any real military intervention by the U.S. "Now, if North Vietnam moves some troops out of the South in an apparent move to de- escalate, the South must not be fooled but must go and take back the land regardless of what Hanoi or anybody else says. "But I don't really understand what the Americans hope to gain. This is like any other kind of trading. If you give something, you must get something. But what are you going to get in exchange? Nothing but words . . . "I want to remind you what an important Japanese Communist has said. The Westerner believes war and peace are two different things. The Westerner thinks It is right to deceive people in wartime but not in peace- time. "The Communist believes that it is also right to deceive people in peacetime when making agreements with the enemy because the Communist believes war and peace are the same thing. "Mao (Tse-tung) said the closer to peace, the greater the danger. Now is the time to be most alert. The idea of peace may blind you." Lt. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen, 21 years a party member: "Stopping the bombing is only going to lengthen the war and eventually you will suffer greater, not lesser casualties. Also you will see the antiwar movement in the U.S. become greater. You will encourage the dem- onstrators by convincing them they are right. "When I first heard of the bombing halt I thought it must be a joke and I laughed. But when I realized the U.S. was serious I was dumfounded by their stupidity. "Of course your people want peace, but if a cease-fire comes don't be happy. There will be really nothing to be happy about, for it will be sure to lead to great suffering here and many, many deaths * * "You will see, the deaths here in the South will be at least one thousand times greater. But by that time your Western press will have believed that peace is here and they will have gone home and won't be around to see it happen. "Only the Vietnamese will be left for there is nowhere for them to go this time. There are 3 million people on the blood list and you will have condemned them." Col. Tran Van Dec, 24 years a party mem- ber, who led 8000 men in an attack on Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive: "It will be impossible to get Hanoi to keep her promises. The only promise they will keep is the one they have made to themselves that nothing can keep them from eventually con- quering South Vietnam. "If there is a cease-fire many people will think that peace has really come and let their guard down. Then the Communists will act suddenly. You must be warned that when it seems like peace has come, then it will be the most dangerous time of all." BRIEFING OF SENATORS ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS -- Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that a memorandum to the Foreign Relations Committee from my Subcommittee on International Or- ganization and Disarmament Affairs be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the memo- randum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, November 12, 1969. Memorandum to: All Members of Foreign Re- lations Committee. From: Albert Gore, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization and Dis- armament Affairs. The meeting in Executive Session of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, which was to be held at 4 o'clock this afternoon, is can- celled. As the notice sent to all members of the Committee yesterday inviting them to attend the meeting stated, the purpose of the Executive Session was to receive a brief- ing from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the forthcoming SALT talks. An authorized official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency informed a mem- ber of the. Committee Staff yesterday after- noon that the Agency had been instructed to refer all requests for briefings on the SALT talks, and all congressional liaison matters relating to the talks to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or to the Congressional Liaison office of the White House as the Agency had been directed not to conduct such briefings itself. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP7.11300364R000300040001-0 S 14170 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE November 12, 1.969 No one from the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Seenrity Affairs, the Congressional Liaison office of the White House, or the Department cg State (which has statutory responsibility in this field) has responded to the aforedescribed Subcommit- tee request for a briefing on the talks to begin on November 17th. This is the first time to my nnowledge that an Agency charged with a responsibility in the field of foreign affairs has not been will- ing, or, as in this case, free, tO meet with the Disarmament Subcommittee lin a subject on which the Subcommittee hail had jurisdic- tion. The reason for the prohibitien upon the Agency's freedom to meet With and brief the Disarmament Subcommittee is beyond my understanding. It is partinularly mystify- ing and disturbing in this aine since mem- bers of the Subcommittee have been in the forefront in not only urging the necessity of this conference but have been in the fore- front in both cooperation with previous Ad- ministrations and in securing approval of treaties and agreements in this held of arma- ment limitation and control. Inasmuch as the SALT talks will hopefully produce an agreement for EOM? limitations regarding nuclear weapons, it is regrettable that officials charged with ccffiducting these negotiations are prohibited from briefing re- sponsible Members of the Senate so that the Senate will be in a position conscientiously to discharge its Constitutional responsibili- ties. THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the St. Lawrence Seaway system is without doubt a major engineerine accomplish- ment and has stimulated the economic development and prosperity of the Great Lakes region. Although at present unable to support regularly scheduled U.S.-flag vessel service, the seaway is indeed en- titled to its description as the "fourth coast" of the United States, At the present time the Ilea way is $148 million in debt. This inclades $129 mil- lion of outstanding 50-year bonds and $19 million of accrued Interest debt. Lately, however, some Proposals have been advanced stating that the seaway's debt should be assumed by the Federal Government. Proponents of seaway re- financing contend that it IS the only fed- erally supported waterway that is re- quired to be self-supporting. They feel that this is discriminatory. Such a position was recently stated in the Senate. The question was posed: "If the Great Lakes are free and open to all, why should the seaway linking the lakes even have toll charges?" This is an important question. The answer is quite simple: the legislation authorizing the St. Lawrence Seaway De- velopment Corporation was accepted by the Senate in 1954 on the 'basis that the seaway would pay its own way. Let me for a moment refresh tbe memory of Senators and point out a statement made on the floor some 15 years ago by the late Senator Alexander Wiley. On Jan- uary 13, 1954, Senator 'Wiley, one of the seaway's most forceful advooates, upon calling up the seaway legislation summarized the five reasons why he felt it should be passed. The No. 3 reason was that "the project would pay for itself, and the pending bill would not put an additional burden on the Treasury." Senator Wiley no doubt felt then, as I do now, that the U.S. Treasury already has enough burdens without imposing additional and unnecessary ones. The basic point to stress is that the Senate authorized the St. Lawrence Sea- way on the condition and with the un- derstanding that the seaway would pay for itself. Any proposal to have the Fed- eral Government assume all or a part of the $178 million debt, thus permitting the seaway to forfeit its obligation, would constitute a breach of terms and have very serious implications indeed. OIL POLLUTION SE i LEMENT Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, as the conference between the Senate and the House approaches on the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1969 (S. 7 and H.R. 4148), I invite the attention of Members of both Houses of Congress to an article published today concerning the settle- ment of oil pollution claims arising from the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967. Although the Governments of France and England brought suits against the owners of the tanker for $22 million, the settlement was made in the amount of $7.2 million. As the article points out, Britain alone was estimated to have spent more than the amount of the set- tlement in clean up eosts, and no esti- mate was available from France. This settlement comes at an auspicious time, as our conference approaches and as the International Maritime Consulta- tive Organization meets in Brussels to consider changes in international mari- time law. I hope that both of these bod- ies will accept the principle which the Senate approved in passing S. 7 last month; that is, that the responsibility for cleanup of oil spill should not be borne by the public, but must instead be considered to be a risk of doing busi- ness. I ask unanimous consent that the ar- ticle, published in the Washington Post, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: FIRM PAYS Two NATIONS $7.2 MILLION FOR TORREY CANYON'S OIL DAMAGE LONDON, November 11.?The American own- ers of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon paid $7.2 million today to Britain and France in an out-of-court settlement for oil pollu- tion claims filed after the giant ship ran aground off southwest England in March, 1967. The payment, 'split evenly between the two nations, came from the Barracuda Tank- er Corp. in Bermuda, a subsidiary of the Union Oil of California. The 119,000-ton ves- sel was under charter to Union Oil when it broke apart and spilled about 35 million gallons of crude oil. The joint government announcement also said the owners had agreed to set aside an- other $60,000 to compensate any claims from persons not already reimbursed by the gov- ernments for their losses. BIGGEST SETTLEMENT British Attorney General Sir Elwyn Jones told the House of Commons it was "full and final settlement of the claims of the two governments." Lloyd's insurance brokers said they believed it was the biggest settle- ment in marine history for oil claims. Britain virtually assured itself of legal satisfaction recently when it taught the Tor- rey Canyons sister ship, the Lake Palourde, in Singapore harbor -when its captain put in for some minor supplies. In order to gain the ship's release, the Barracuda firm was required to post a bond of $7.2 million?the precise amount of to- day's settlement. $22 MILLION SOUGHT In the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon spillage, the two governments sued the tank- er owner for $22 million. But the owners claimed that under maritime law they were liable only for a certain value per ton of the ship's weight, which Would have been $4.2 million. In addition, there was a jurisdictional problem: the ship ran aground on the Seven Stones rocks off Land's End, which is British. But its cargo damaged 40 miles of French beach as well as 120 miles of English coastline. In view of the "uncertainties, inevitable delays and expense of litigation, complex and unique points of law involved in proving liability, and finally the difficulty in quali- fying and proving damages," Sir Elwyn told Parliament -this settlement is eminently fair and satisfactory to all parties." Britain was estimated to have spent more than $7.2 million in 1967 to save beaches and wildlife from the oil. An estimated 50,000 sea birds perished and more than 25 million gallons of detergent Were used to emulsify the crude oil so the beacheaand birds eould be cleaned. No French estimate was available. The British also wanted the payment to cover the cost of the Royal Air Force bomb- ing runs that finally destroyed the ship and sent it to the bottom. The _ship reportedly was insured for $14 million. Because the ship was registered in Liberia, a Liberian Board of Inquiry investigated and found Capt. Pastrengo Rugiati of Genoa, Italy, guilty of "a high degree of negligence." He is reportedly a broken man, his career and health shattered. The Settlement came while international lawyers are meeting in Brussels to consider revisions to maritime law covering oil tanker accidents. The Union Oil Co. also faces claims involv- ing an offshore rig in the Santa Barbara channel of California that leaked in January, creating an 800-square-mile oil slick that polluted more than 25 miles of coastline. LEROY G. AUGENSTEIN Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I invite attention to the unfortunate death of Dr. Leroy G. Augenstein, a personal friend and the distinguidhed chairman of the Biophysics Department at Mich- igan State University. He was killed Saturday, November 8, 1989, in the crash of his private plane. Dr. Augenstein served ably and with imagination as a member of the State board of education. His interests and pursuits were wide and varied. He was considered an expert in several fields of scientific endeavor. Regarded as a national authority in the field of genetics, he authored a book on the science of genetic manipulation en- titled "Come Let Us Play God." He had served as a research admin- istrator for the Atomic Energy Commis- sion. He was a national lecturer for the AEC, and was a consultant to the Amer- ican Institute of Biological Sciences. He had served as science coordinator for the Seattle World's Fair. Dr. Augenstein was also a theologian, Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 NEW YORK TIMES SkiliWieWi-ti_qtabieAsieg001/945010/A-RDP711300364W24MOOf2a01-0 ..,.? MIRV, Beipg By JOHN W. FINNEY special to The New York Ttmes HELSINKI, Finland, Nov. 16 ?Probably no issue will domi nate the American-Soviet talks on limiting strategic arms which begin here tomorrow, more than a weapon that both sides are testing with an ur- gent secrecy over their missile ranges in the Atlantic and Pa- cific Oceans. The weapon is known by one of those forbidding' acro- nyms of the missile age? MIRV, which stands for "mul- tiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle." Not since the hydrogen bomb was developed 15 years ago and then combined with an intercontinental missile has any weapon so threatened to accelerate and expand the atomic arms race as MIRV promises to do unless its de- velopment can be checked while it is still in the test stage. Huge Increase in Warheads With MIRV's each side will be able to increase greatly the number of thermonuclear war- heads it can launch without Increasing its number of mis- siles. Instead of just one war- head to a missile, there will be several up to a dozen on the United States Polaris missile, for example?that can be guided to widely separated tar- gets. Under current plans for "MIRVing" the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, the Unit- ed States would increase its strategic warheads from the current level of 2,400 to some 8,000. Similarly, if the Soviet Union places MIRV's on its large SS-9 intercontinental missile,, as predicted by the Pentagon, the Soviet stockpile of strategic warheads will mul- tiply from 1,000 to more than 5,000. With the seemingly inexor- able pace of weapons tech- nology, MIRV is placing deadline, still unacknowledged, on the outcome of the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Halfway Through Tests The United States is about halfway through a program of MIRV test flights that began in September, 1968, and by late next year it plans to start de- ploying the warheads atop Minuteman III intercontinental missiles and on the new Poseidon missile for the Polaris missile submarines. Over the last year the So- viet 'Union has been testing triplet warheads for its SS-9 missile, and the stated presump- tion of the Pentagon is that m?s 0 Tested by Both Sides, Is a Key issue at Arms Talks will begin ,to deployed "in the latter half of next year." .Whether the Soviet tiplet represents-anew oener f ? till r of consider S. The nrnnonderant o ? inior_of analysts is goviet triolet a .less 'ad- vanced generation knowrrs I' v;or - multiple re-efiltry v? ? " ke MI* v's, ono be weed to me rv ? ual Contradictor Testimony Nevertheless, in the course of arguing for the safeguard missile defense system, Penta- gon officials asserted that the Soviet multiple warheads seemed to be falling in an in- dividual and uniform pattern corresponding to the displace- ment of the United States' Minuteman missile silos. And in testimony in August before the House Foreign Affairs Commit- tee, Dr. John S. Foster, direc- tor of defense research and engineering, offered the judg- ment that "the Soviet triplet probably is a MIRV." As is being emphasized by Soviet as well as American scientists, if MIRV develop- ment is to be stopped, it will have to be in the flight test stage. Once MIRrs are' de- ployed, aerial photography can- not detect multiple warheads, and there is no way to check on them as part of an arms- control agreement except through on-site inspection of individual missiles?a step that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to accept. A crucial issue in the forth- coming talks, therefore, is whether either side is prepared to offer or accept a moratorium on MIRV tests. ? From all advance indications, the United States delegation is neither prepared nor authorized to propose a moratorium, al- though in a noncommittal fash- ion it may raise the idea to test Soviet reaction. Resistance Rises in Pentagon Even if the Soviet reaction is favorable, there is consider- able question whether the Nixon Administration, in the ensuing negotiations, would be prepared to propose a mora- torium. Considerable resistance to it is beginning to build up in the Pentagon, which in recent weeks has begun to emphasize the problems of effectively monitoring Soviet MIRV tests and to insist that no mora- torium should be entered into without an accompanying limi- tation on Sovielmialiqq.ywit p antiballistiC missWe, or M's._ Lit.P SW. 4 IV/ Irs. salt The New York Times Nov. 17, 1469 MIRV missiles may carry varying numbers Of warheads ment specialists inside and out- side the Government, the MIRV program illustrates how weap- ons are developed because they are technically feasible and then acquire a life and momen- tum of th6r own that cannot be stopped even though? their original justification has changed or disappeared. The MIRV program of the Air Force and the Navy had its con- ception in 1960-61 when the Pentagon first begin to pick up intelligence information that the Soviet Union might be prepar- ing to deploy antimissile de- fenses around its principal cities. To counter such a move, which threatened to nullify the United States retaliatory threat against Soviet cities, the Penta- gon began research on "pene- tration aids" to overwhelm any Soviet antimissile defenses. Decoys First Considered Initially the Pentagon thought in terms of unarmed decoys to confuse and overwhelm the Soviet defenses, permitting some of the actual warheads to get through to their targets. But according to well-informed of- ficials it was soon acknowl- edged that the decoys would have to be so heavy that it would be preferable to make "penetration aids" into actual warheads. The first step, therefore, was to develop multiple, or MRV, warheads, such as those now carried by the A-3 Polaris mis- siles. This approach was cast aside in 1964 when it was discovered that the Soviet Union was de- veloping the large Galosh mis- sile for its defenses, at least around Moscow. The Galosh missile?the name originated by NATO specialists ?could carry a large enough warhead to de- stroy simultaneously several closely grouped MRV warheads. As an alternate, therefore, the Pentagon began work on MIRV warheads, which had be- come feasible because of im- heads. The MIRV warheads, planners feel, would be too widely dispersed to be shot down by a single Galosh mis- sile. To avoid provoking the Soviet Union into a counterreaction, the MIRV prograni was carried forward with considerable se- crecy until 1967. Then, however, to combat military and Congressional pres- sures for more offensive and defensive weapons to offset the Soviet antimissile system, the Pentagon, by a decision of Robert S. McNamara, then Sec- retary of Defense, decided to publicize the MIRV program. At that point, the MIRV pro- gram acquired a new impetus and justification. As one former high-ranking official put it: MIRV's became the brainchild of the McNamara whiz kids. Aside from all the military ar- guments, the MIRV program now had a "cost effectiveness" justification: the McNamara ci- vilian analysts could advertise it as cheaper than building more offensive missiles to counter fbe Soviet antimissile threat. Only belatedly, as officials now acknowledge, did either the Defense Department or the dis- armament agency begin to con- sider the arms control implica- tions of the program and the way in which it was threatening to accelerate the nuclear arms race. Example of Key Cycle MIRV's represent an example of the "action-reaction" cycle thas has stimulated the arms race. One side builds an anti- missile system and the other starts developing multiple war- heads to penetrate the defense. But as one side acquires MIRV's, the other side begins to worry that its cities and its retaliatory forces will be de- stroyed by the new multitude of warheads so it begins building more defenses or increasing its number of offensive retaliatory missiles. Tril rqUIPIPPPelfin for example, was justified psi- materials to protect the _w_ar- madly on the premise that the Soviet Union was developing multiple warheads to destroy the retaliatory force of Minute- man missiles. But the Soviet in- tention may have ben different. Some former Pentagon scien- tists feel the Soviet purpose may have beeen to offset the American superiority in missile warheads. Nevertheless, for several years, according to Officials then in positions of authotity, the 'MIRV program continued on its own technological and military momentum without questions being raised as to what effect it was likely to have on the arms race. This oversight, as the offi- cials describe it, is attributed in part to the very secrecy of the MIRV program as well as to its espousal by the Mc- Namara group, which thought that with MIRV's it was keep- ing the military in check. But it also occurred partly because the Defense Department's Bu- reau of International Security Affairs -- then the Pentagon's disarmament faction ? was preoccupied with the antimis- sile issue and the Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency with negotiation of the treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The arms control issue was finally joined in June and July of 1968 when a decision had to be made on whether, to au- thorize a two-year MIRV tspt flight program, beginning in September, 1968. At that point the Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency made what former officials now contend was a crucial mis- take. The Johnson Administra- tion was preparing for the talks on limiting strategic arms, which were expected to begin in September. Rather than raise the issue of a halt in MIRV testing and thus cause a policy division with the military, the disarmament agency decided to present no objections to the MIRV test series. Instead, the agency decided to enter the talks with the hope that the moratorium Issue would be quickly raised, end- ing the Pentagon's test-flight series. Accuracy Is Doubted Because of the Soviet-led in- vasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, the start of the talks was postponed for 14 months. Meanwhile the MIRV test program has proceeded to the point where even with a moratorium the Russians might wonder whether the United States was ready to de- ploy multiple warheads. If one technical hope re- 040 01-0 mains for a moratorium, in the opinion of disarmament offi- cials, it is that neither side has yet developed multiple warheads with sufficient accu- racy to attack enemy missiles, thus presenting what is called a first-strike threat. Such a de- velopment would upset the present balance, which is based on mutual deterrence ? the principle that either side could destroy the other no matter which attacked first. ? So long as MIRV's are capa- ble only of hitting cities, pre- sumably each side would be willing to enter into an agree- ment to freeze missile devel- opment because of a realiza- tion that even with multiple warheads a country would not be able to prevent a retalia- tory strike. In arguing against a mora- torium on MIRV testing, Dr. Foster, the defense research di- rector, has stressed that the possibility that the Soviet Un- ion could develop high-accu- racy warheads through clan- destine means, such as guid- ance tests with single warheads that could not be monitored by the United States. Similar- ly, the Soviet Union could ar- gue that the United States could improve the accuracy of its Warheads, even with a mor- atorium. With its larger warheads, the Soviet Union does not need as much accuracy for the mul- tiple warheads of the SS-9, a point stressed by Dr. Foster. But Dr. Herbert F. York, a former director of defense re- search, pointed out in recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the United States in the last 10 years had achieved a ten- fold improvement in the accu- racy of its missiles. With only an additional two- fold improvement, he said, the smaller United States MIRV warheads probably Could be made accurate enough to at- tack Soviet missile sites?an I assertion presumably not over- looked by Soviet officials as they contemplate the desirabil- ity of a moratorium. November 17,Appgved For ItefteREM compromise agreed to by the House- Senate conferees. Enforcement experience has proven the wisdom of the House position. Both the Departments of Justice and Treasury feel that these recordkeeping require- ments are of little law enforcement value. These provisions are an unnecessary hindrance to legitimate sportsmen and provide a tremendous bookkeeping bur- den to the operators of small stores. Further, they are practically impossible to enforce. To alleviate this situation, I intro- duced, earlier this year, a bill that would exempt sporting ammunition from the law. This legislation has been passed by the Senate as an amendment to the bill to extend the interest equalization tax. When the House is asked to act upon the Senate amendments to the interest equalization tax bill, I understand that a motion will be made to instruct the man- agers on behalf of the House to accept the Senate amendment?I intend to support th:-.t motion. WHAT DO MOBILIZATION MARCH- ERS WANT HANOI TO DO? (Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was giv- en permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, over the weekend the news media, especially the newspapers reported extensively the events surrounding the mobilization march in Washington., I like everybody else, have an opinion about the mobiliza- tion march. Each individual is entitled to his or her opinion. I admit readily that there were any number of people?how many, I do not know, and neither does anyone else?who participated, who hon- estly thought they were doing what they ought to 'do to serve the best interests of this country to achieve peace. But, Mr. Speaker, for the life of me, I do not see how anybody can classify any individual who participated in that march who carried a Vietcong or a Com- munist flag as being friendly toward peace or us while chanting that Ho Chi Minh would win. Mr. Speaker, they are on the other side. For this group the mobilization march was a rally around the flag, but it was a rally around the Vietcong and Communist flag. The news media, including the news- papers and other sectors of the media, have reported their demands. They want the President to quit and 'bring the boys home now without concern for the con- sequences. They want peace, they say. I do not know an American who does not want peace. It must, however, be an hon- orable peace. I have done it before, but again I am going to ask, and I am going to keep ask- ing until somebody who supports this movement gives me an answer: What do you or they want the Vietcong to do? What do you or they want Hanoi to do? What are they being asked to do? As yet no demands have been made of the Viet- cong. I ask why? Do the supporters of the movement want Hanoi to go on and win, or do they just want us to quit? It is time to spehk up and rally around our flag. JA7RDP71B00364R000300040001-0 ILORD? HOUSE SECURITY OF UN ED STATES MUST NOT BE SACRIFICED BY ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT (Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the first of the preliminary talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on arms limitations begins to- day. Off and on for the last 20 years such discussions were planned, or thought about, or nearly begun, but they never really got meaningfully underway. In the United Nations disarmament talks are a perennial matter for useless ora- tory because nobody ever really gets down to serious discussion. Now, perhaps, meaningful negotiations dealing with the limitation of defense armaments can be taken up between the world's two superpowers. Talks, though, do not mean surrender. The U.S. defenses are the best in the world, a fact that is undeniable. What the talks hope to ac- complish, however, is a halt in further escalation of the arms race. It would be nice to be able to stop the useless stock- piling and duplication of first-strike and second-strike weapons. One strong word of caution is neces- sary though. The security of the United States cannot and must not be sacri- ficed in any agreement. For years, the Soviet Union has adamantly dismissed the proposal for an adequate system of checks. Unless we can be absolutely cer- tain that the other side is keeping its half of any arms limitation bargain, we cannot enter into such an agreemt and still feel secure as a nation against out- side aggression. History only too clearly shows that the Soviets say one thing and do another. An inadvertent weakening of our defense posture by any means is the one mistake that is only made once. THIRTEENTH ANkUAL REPORT OF SURGEON GENERAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE?MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ? UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 91-193) The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and ordered to be printed with illustrations: To the Congress of the United States: Pursuant to the provisions of title VII of the Public Health Service Act, as amended, I transmit herewith, for the 'Information of the Congress, the thirteenth annual report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service summarizing the activities of the Health Research Facilities Construction Pro- gram for fiscal year 1968. RICHARD NIXON. THE WHITE HOUSE, November 1, 1969, CONSENT CALENDAR The SPEAKER. This is Consent Cal- endar day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Consent Calendar. 1110897 PROVIDING FOR THE CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUC- TION, OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLA. The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 7618) to provide for the conveyance of certain real property of the Federal Government to the Board of Public Instruction, Oka- loosa County, Fla. The SPEAKER. Is there , objection to the present consideration of the bill? Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, since the majority leadership has seen fit to schedule this bill under a suspension of the rules, I withdraw my reservation of objection and ask unanimous consent that the bill be passed over without prejudice. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection. CONNECTICUT-NEW YORK RAIL- ROAD PASSENGER TRANSPORTA- TION COMPACT The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 14646) granting the consent of Congress to the Connecticut-New York Railroad pas- senger transportation compact. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill? Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I would like to have something in the as the record states it is going to cost if this compact is signed. I would first of all like to pose a question. Inasmuch as the RECORD states it is going to cost huge sums of money, I would like to know what it is going to cost for these two au- thorities to acquire the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. First, I am interested in what the total cost will be to acquire this system by these authorities. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin. Mr. ICASTENMEIER. I must advise the gentleman that it is not really the pre- rogative of the subcommittee of the Ju- diciary Committee to make inquiries into the actual financing itself. We merely grant consent for the entities, the Con- necticut and New. York entities, to act in concert with respect to their transporta- tion problems. One may note from the letter of the. Governor of New York how he hopes to acquire financing, but this is not up to the Judiciary Committee to verify. That is exclusively a problem for the entities of the two States, and they themselves will have to deal with it in due course. Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, the reason I am asking the ques- tion as to what the total cost will be is that the record before us indicates they are very proud they have already ar- ranged for some $58 million in State and Federal financing and hope it will go to $80 million. I wonder if this compact is agreed to today it will pave the way for a good Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 H1&898 Approved For Inadlign8/A3p kytair_191)8MR00030004000ta iv-uv-enruer 17, 1969 many hundreds of millions of dollars of Federal funds to do this, rather than for the authorities to go out and sell bonds and do it in a good, busineeilike way. Will the gentleman answer that question? Mr. KASTENMEIER. If the gentle- man will yield further, we do not tell the entities involved how they may do busi- ness in this connection, how they may finance their transportation authority. As the gentleman will note from the report, there are several activities which are authorized under the compact; namely, the acquisition of assets of the existing railroad, the repair and rehabili- tation of these assets, the disposition of these assets, and the operation of the service or contract for its operation. We do understand that there will be in connection with this an application for financing. This presumably will be Fed- eral, State, or other financing, but we are not in a position to dictate to the States or to these entities what mode they will use for financing of this particular authority. Indeed, if it is their intention to do so, they must come to the Federal Govern- ment in due course, or the State govern- ment or other entities, and make appli- cation for financing and obtain approval, from the Department of Transportation or other agencies. This was not within the purview of the Judiciary Committee in terms of making a judgment as to how they should proceed. Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut. (Mr. MESKILL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, HR. 14646 is a bill to grant congressional con- sent to an interstate railroad passenger transportation compact between Con- necticut and New York to improve com- muter transportation between the two States. The bill is cosponsored by all the members of the Connecticut delegation. It is cosponsored by members of the New York delegation representing areas in- terested in the improvement of commuter transportation. Similar legislation has been introduced on the Senate side and is sponsored by Senator Doan, Senator RIBICOFF, Senator JAVITS, and Senator GOODELL. This legislation has the support of both parties; it has the support of transportation-conscious Members of both States. As you are all aware, under provisions of article I, section 10, of the Constitu- tion of the United States,approval of the Congress is required for all interstate compacts. The legislation,nassed by the Legislatures of New York-and Connecti- cut require Congress to grant its approval before December 31, 19694 for the inter- state compact to become effective. The interstate compact itself is de- signed to allow New York and Connecti- cut to enter into an agreement to im- prove passenger railroad Bet vice between the two States. Commuter railroad serv- ice between New York and Connecticu is sorely deficient at the present. The service is undependable, unpleasant, in efficient, and unsafe. If Congress gives its approval to this interstate compact, New York and Con- necticut can 'begin to modernize their ailing commuter service. HR. 14646 will permit the two States to lease or acquire the assets of the old New Haven Railroad and contract wth the Penn Central Sys- tem to operate a modern, efficient com- muter service. As a result of the two-State agree- ment, $56 million would be made avail- able to improve service. The amount of $28 million will come from a grant from the Department of Transportation. In addition each State is pledged to put up $14 million of its own to buy new cars and upgrade the service. The Department of Transportation has given its approval to the compact. So has the Bureau of the Budget. The Judiciary Committee has recommended that Congress grant its assent to the compact. Mr. Speaker, improved railroad pas- senger service between these two States is essential. We need to diversify our sys- tems of ground transportation. Auto- mobile traffic clogs or highways. I am afraid it will worsen before it improves. We must act now to modernize this im- portant part of our transportation net- work. We must strive for a balanced sys- tem of transportation. This interstate compact is the main hope that something can and will be done to help the long- suffering commuter who would prefer to ride the rails than to sit in long lines of automobile traffic. Mr. Speaker, I ask the Congress to give its assent to this interstate compact. H.R. 14646 is vitally important to both Con- necticut and New York. Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, of course the gentleman has not really been able to answer the ques- tion as to how much money this propo- sal will cost and whether the major fi- nancing is going to be by the Federal Government. I have a suspicion that the Federal Government is the one which is going to buy this railroad and which is going to pay for operating it. It does not seem to me that anybody has made that point, as far as I know, that they are going to be privately fi- nanced by New York brokers and invest- ment people in New York. Mr. MESKILL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut. Mr. MESKILL. All we are being asked to do_ today is to confirm an agreement which has been entered into between the respective transportation authorities of the two States. This in no way com- mits the Federal Government to the ex- penditure of any funds. All we are doing, really, is giving our blessing to a legal entity which could then turn around and make application for funds. If this legal authority is not given, then there will be no legal entity to make this applica- tion. The House is not being asked in advance to commit itself to make an ex- penditure of funds. The only legislative bodies that have committed themselves t are those of the States of New York and Connecticut. Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further? Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Yes. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. PICKLE. I want to ask the gen- tleman from Connecticut if it is con- templated that you will ask the Federal Government for funds for the operation of this compact. Mr. MESKILL. Yes. The answer to the gentleman would be in the affirmative. It is contemplated that one-half of the $56 million would be applied for from the DOT. The DOT has already indicated its approval with knowledge of this, and the Bureau of the Budget has also in- dicated its approval. What has hap- pened here, I would tell the gentleman from Texas, is that the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad has been de- func?, and operating in the red and is at the point of bankruptcy. In order to continue the passenger services to the people of Connecticut, the Penn Central Railroad finally agreed to merge with and take over the New Haven Railroad, but it was only interested in taking over their freight services and not interested in their passenger services because they were not profitable. -Finally approval for the takeover was given provided that the passenger services were retained. In order to retain and improve the serv- ices it would be necessary for a sub- stantial expenditure of funds for the acquisition of rights-of-way, improve- ment of personal property and real es- tate, and also for the disposition of some property which was no longer needed. It was for the reason that the legislatures of the two States agreed to this compact, which, of course, needs the ratification of the Congress. I Would also point out we are not here emitting ourselves to the expenditure of funds, although we must state that there will be an ap- plication made for Federal funds of ap- proximately $28 millionAn amount. I would say further that time is of the essence here, because if this compact is not approved by the Congress by De- cember 31 of this year by this and the other body, then the actions of both legislative bodies of the States will be void. Mr. PICKLE. I notice that in the stip- ulation in the report action will be ex- pected by the end of this year, but this further complicates the -matter as far as I am concerned. Our Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House has been holding extensive hear- ings on this type of matter. How can we say what is the best approach to this railroad without having looked into it extensively? Over the years the Fed- eral Government has not involved itself in the operation Of any of these lines. Federal assistance in this area has been carefully avoided. If we try to find an approach to train and passenger service, I question the wisdom of comitting the Federal Government to amatter of help- ing individual rail lines at this point. It seems to me the entire question of passenger train service in this country ought to be tied together. I know that the New Haven is in trouble. I know many of the passenger -carriers of our country are in trottble. nut if we say to- day that we are giving a grant to this particular railroad and not to others, we might be indulging in an inconsistency. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 17, iimoved Fottf?,ttakts2swimoliewp_TAmeitR000300040001-0 S 14441 The Metropolitan's loans include an ala- baster fragment of a relief of the crucifixion that the museum purchased in 1936 but has never got around to exhibiting. Bret Waller, the director of the University of Kansas Art Museum, and J. L. Schrader, who with Waller arranged the exhibition and has written an excellent catalogue, found the fragment when they were allowed to go through the Metropolitan's storage rooms in their search for appropriate material. This doesn't mean that the show is made up of leftovers. Rather the reverse. It is an exhibition in which each piece is selected for its effectiveness in the development of a theme as well as for its esthetic quality. Asked how he negotiated so many impor- tant loans, Waller said that while "nobody wants to lend something beautiful to a mu- seum out in Kansas just so people can come and gawk at it," museums and collectors will go out of their way for an exhibition with a subject both imaginative and scholarly and with a serious educational reason for being. It is good to know that while the Metro- politan Museum subjects this city to an ex- hibition as vicious as the current "New York Painting and Sculpture," it is justifying its existence in another direction. Looking at this exhibition I kept thinking how much it would have meant to me as a student. Huizinga's book was required reading and I found it a combination of fas- cinating and far-removed. It took years of museum-going and travel to make it come alive, but a couple of hours in Lawrence made me want to read it again. This is the kind of thing museums should be doing, whether they are dealing with an- tiquity, the middle ages, or the 20th century. A SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the President's Commission for the Observ- ance of Human Rights Year 1968 com- pleted its activities on January 30, 1969, 1 year after its establishment by Ex- ecutive order. The purpose of this Com- mission had been to give the American people a greater understanding of the principles of human rights, as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December of 1948, and the Constitution and in the laws of the United States. The President's Commission issued a publication entitled "For Free Men in a Free World" which has as its purpose to survey human rights in the United States. The Commission's most distin- guished Chairman, W. Averell Harriman, stated: This publication aims to advance the President's purpose in establishing this Com- mission, and to fulfill the request of the General Assembly for a review of our domes- tic laws and practices against the standards set in the Universal Declaration. If this pub- lication can contribute to a pride in the past, and to an awareness of future needs, and a national determination to deal with the problems of human rights that confront us, it will have advanced the cause of freedom. I applaud the fine work by the Presi- dent's Commission in bringing together in a single publication such a fine com- mentary on human rights in the United States. During the next few days, I will offer a number of illustrations from this fine work to substantiate my continuing efforts to see the Senate ratify the Hu- man Rights Conventions on Political Rights for Women, on Forced Labor, and on Genocide. Certainly if the Senate will face these issues head on and meet our moral obligations to ratify them, then we will be able to say in Ambassador Harriman's word's, we will have "ad- vanced the cause of freedom." SALT TALXS Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today, the United States and the Soviet Union begin what Secretary of State William P. Rogers described last week as "the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken." Leaders from both countries have expressed the hope that for the first time since World War II, the two major nuclear powers can enter seri- ous negotiations on an agreement to control offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. Beginning with the first American proposal for the international control of atomic energy presented by Bernard M. Baruch at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1945, there have been repeated attempts to negotiate an arms control agreement. Our success has largely been in a number of peripheral pacts, including the most recent agree- ment to insure that the world's seabeds are reserved for peaceful purposes only and the nonproliferation treaty. Only by strenuous and often frustrating negotia- tions have we taken these initial steps. But these agreements provide a basis for today's negotiations, negotiations which will undoubtedly be strenuous and frus- trating. The American people must real- ize that there are no quick answers in these negotiations. They may proceed for months with little evidence of agreement, but a start must be made. Throughout the negotiations in Helsinki and thereafter, the United States must be patient and resourceful, as the United States and the Soviet Union move into a new phase of the arms race, more deadly and more expensive with the de- velopment of multiple-warhead systems for intercontinental ballistic missiles and by the creation of an anti-ballistic-mis- sile defense system. President Nixon stated the challenge in his inaugural address: After a period of confrontation, we are enterng an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open. . . . I know that peace does not come through wishing for it?that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and pro- longed diplomacy. Negotiation and even signing of an agreement to control strategic weapons will not bring peace to a troubled world. But this is a major step and one that we all hope will be successful. BIAFRA : A TRAGEDY FOR HUMANITY Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, Biafra continues to be a great tragedy for all humanity, a grim exhibit of hun- ger and starvation. It is important to remember that while tragedy only touches us periodically, Biafra's suffer- ing continues every day. This month's Harper's magazine con- tains an article entitled "My Summer Vacation in Biafra," written by Mr. Her- bert Gold. It serves as a reminder of the conditions that are destroying a genera- tion of Biafrans. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in tylie RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. Another noteworthy article on the sub- ject of Biafra was published in the Wash- ington Post of November 14, 1969. The article, written by Jim Hoagland, of the Washington Post Foreign Service is en- titled "How Many Children Dying in Biafra? No one Can Say?" I ask unani- mous consent that this article also be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The article in the Post contains some shocking revelations. 'It is there stated: How can I tell you how many children are dying a day? Dr. Aaron Ofekwunigwe, Biafra's leading child specialist, asked with exaspera- tion. "Pick any number you like and I'll say it. The point is they are dying." He spoke after walking through the grim last hope ward at the Santana Hospital, which houses 600 children suffering from Kwashiokor, the killing protein deficiency disease. Mr. President, I know the effort to feed the hungry in Biafra is being complicated and frustrated by the Nigerian blockade and Nigerian-Biafran relations. The shooting down of the Red Cross plane by the Nigerians on June 5, 1969, has pro- duced the worst crisis yet. As Father Byrne, a Catholic priest on Sao Tome? the jumping off point for relief flights? stated: We have the food; we just cannot get it to them. These children know nothing about secession, economic blockade, political in- volvement. They only know they are starving. Mr. President, this Nation and all other nations everywhere must take every means, seek every opportunity, and go to any reasonable length to bring about a resumption of a full contingent of relief flights immediately. Two months from now it may be too late. There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: MY SUMMER VACATION IN BIAFRA (By Herbert Gold) I am invited by telephone by a Committee for Biafran Writers and Artists and I accept at once. The lady at the other end of the wire in New York tells me about shots and preparations and then begins to giggle. "You mean you're really going? You're not going to think about it and call back and say you can't? Do you know there isn't any place to sleep and you may not eat for a week?" It's odd to hear her laughter across the continent. Thinking to get some information, I tele- phoned a Biafran relief organization in San Francisco. The reverend in charge was in conference, but I spoke to an assistant. "I'm going to Biafra on Monday," I said. "You're going to be off on Monday?" he asked. "Biafra!" I said. "Oh, Biafra," he said. "Yeah, man. Cool. Why?" Next I called an editor to whom I sug- gested writing about this trip. "Oh Jesus, we're up to our in Biafran babies." I agree. I skip those articles, too. I have an image of the swollen belly and the mournful Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14442 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE November 17, 1969 eyes, and it's classified like the Vietnam war: a horror with which I continue to live, like everyone else. GETTING THERE Biafra makes bad dreams for people who- refuse to dream. While the moon rocket splashee down, and all over the front pages, the red-haired babies are buried in the News of the Week in Review. I'd heard about kwashiorkor, "the- red-man's disease." But the hair looks more likea crispy grayish-red, and it doesn't look like hair?more like something weakly ex- truded by a disoriented body, and it looks- as if it would break if you bent it. "Hunger is a legitimate weapon of war," says one of the Nigerian generals. The Nigerians use it to destroy the Biafrans. Th Biafrans use it to try to arouse the atrocity- drugged conscience of the world. The chil- dren die to these purposes. These abstractions are not the truth of it. The truth here is suffering and the sufferers cannot tell it and I am trying to write my way out of shock. Floating through the suf- fering, immune and shaken, sleepless and immune, full of rage and immune. Our party: Leslie Fiedler, literary critic. Miriam Reik, Professor of English ("Just call me Dr. Reik"). Diana Davies, who calls her- self "The Pack-horse," photographer and black-belt judoka. H. Gold, who wonders what the devil he is doing here Jews and Ibos. "The Ibos should go home To their region."?Alhaji Usman Liman. "These people know how to make money."? Menem Muhammadu Mustapha Mande Gyari. "There are too many of them in the north. They were just like sardines"? spawned in some estaminet? as T. S. Eliot said?"and just too dangeroes."?Mallam Mukhter Bello. (These quotations are from at. address by Colonel Ojukwu to the African Unity Consultative Committee meeting, Ad- dis Ababa: August 5, 1968.) Fourteen million people in. Biafra! Hardly a tribe. We don't call the Irish or the JewS a tribe, not without some Malice in there someplace. I wouldn't have chosen this trip, but nei- ther could I refuse it. I can. only bear wits ness, and it's all I can do. Who is the med- dler described as having lost some fine opportunities to remain silent? "Captain Genocide" is the bomber pilot who boasts on the radio of killing children. He flies an Ilyushin, but they think he's a Belgian. About 40 per cent of the children are dead from starvation, so Captain G. IS not a major producer and packager of child mortality. He relieves the protein shortage by reducing the demand. "Stever to be born would be best for mortal man, but this hap- pens only to a very few." The melancholy joke has another meaning in. Biafra. Babies are born who are not born. Babies are born with death as their only and their immedi- ate future. Biafra was an ancient African kingdom of which little memory but the name endures. Howeeer, the name is magic and its history is becoming real again at the command of modern war. From the Guardian, May 28, 1969, an edie tonal urging freedom for Woie Soyinka, the Nigerian playwright held in prison beca,uee of his sympathy for the Biafraris: "In order to improve Nigeria's public relations, Gen- eral Gowon has lately made commendable efforts to scale down the bombing of Biafran civilians. He could win more sympathy by releasing an artist who is regarded abroad San Francisco-New York-Lisbon-Luanda- Sao Tome-Biafra. The crashing through tittle zones, confusion of nerves in day and night, is an appropriate prelude to mass murder and desperate hope in an African rain forest. THE PORTUGUESE ISLAND OF sAo TOME May 29: The Biafran official has a habit I recognize?the Haitian one of grabbing hie balls at odd moments when he needs re- assurance. I don't think it's merely the heat and tight underwear. "I went to law school at Tufts," he beams. We wait at the Geronimo Hotel for per- mission to fly in one of the relief planes, Caritas or World Council of Churches, Cath- olic or Protestant. We get drunk with the fliers. The pilots are (a) Steve McQueen, (b) Steve McQueen's Best Friend, the Crazy Kid, (c) The Old Boy Who Prinks Too Much But Give Me One More Chance, Steve. There are also the British flying officer who got into some unmentionable trouble with a guards- man, a smiling Japanese, a deformed Texan whom I think of as the Forceps Baby, and subsidiary do-gooders, ironic intellectuals, machined Canadians on leave from their air- lines?the full cast of an outmoded flick. They are idealists in it for the ideal of money: they can make up to $3,000 a week. I especially like one whose real name is Johnny Cash (he showed me his driver's li- cense to prove it) and another called Jack Frost from South of the Equator, Jack for short. When Jack heard Leslie and I are writers, he began to tell us about the Biafran children to whom he transports Formula 2, rice, and beans through the blacked-out, Mig-haunted sky. A crowd of us hangs around the airport, trying to catch on to a flight. "The Princess" flirts with a Biafran official; she looks like Princess Radziwill, but she's a real princess. Like stop-action photography of growing vegetables, first you see her in Pucci pajamas and then one frame later she's in starched combat suit and then in a sweet limpid little frock. We drink cokes with the pilots and nervously visit toilets overflowing 4 la portu- gaise. The weepy American who Wanted to rejoin his lbo wife, the Italian reported who has been turned away day after day, the Swedish team, the Swiss boy journalist, and the four of us with our letters, invitations, passes, and Dr. Reik to speak for us. Three of the six planes which went out returned without landing in Biafra. "Intruder" was back. The ground crews in shorts, stained T- shirts, with the frazzled faces of old softball coaches. "Jello and a coke!" one mechanic was yelling at the waiter. "No ice for the coke on this job." Jack Frost: "Now you just stick close to me if you want to know all about the war? what paper you say you write for?" Johnny Cash: "Now, here's my wife and here're my four kids in Glendale, . . ." Jack Frost (as we climbed on a Super Con- stellation) : "So you're playing Bet Your Life today, are you?" We signed the No Harm agreement. He told us the Joint Church Aid flights are called Airlines. He has a whole repertory like that. We lumbered off the runway on a Super- Connie called Snoopy with nineteen tons of rice and dried milk. We stretched out on the sacks. "You'll get rice mites if you sit on the rice," the pilot said amiably, "or milk worms if you sit on the milk." The radio man said, " , the Bomber used to fly with one of our pilots.-lie'd radio in and say, 'Man, I'll get you tonight.'" He was a South African. "What about the Migs? Don't you have any trouble with them?" He grinned. "Egyptians. Six Day War," he said. I fell asleep, rice mites and milk worms, as we droned through the sky over tropical sea and Nigeria into Biafra and Uli Airport. He wakened me with a grin to see the flak below?pretty tangerine flashes following the sound of the aircraft. T.ILI AIRPORT COMING We arrived in a pandemonium of blacked- out airfield. Planes unloading food, pilots screaming?they have to get out before dawn; they don't want to be bombed down here, either?trucks grinding and backing, officials greeting us and smiling. "welcome to Biafra. Welcome to Enugu." Though Enugu has long been in the possession of the Federals, they still carry on the fiction that the Uli airstrips are really Enugu Airport. Nearby, in a blacked-out building, I heard, no kidding, a band playing, "I Ain't Got No Satisfaction"?celebrating two years of free- dom. ' We wandered about helplessly, looking for our contacts, nameless officials in the face- less dark. Diana asked to take a flash photo- graph and immediately an eager-beaver sol- dier boy arrested us. While he went to get an officer. I wandered off toward the music' "I Ain't Got No Sat-is-fac-tion, unh, unh, UNIT!" Vaguely I understood we were under arrest, but at four in the morning in the tropics, in a strange land fighting a strange war, the music seemed realer to me than a red-tape misunderstanding. The soldier caught me at the door to the dance. "You move very fast," he said, and in his voice was hatred, suspicion, stupidity, and bucking for stripes. We Were passed from bureaucrat to bureaucrat. Finally we reached the commander of the base. The sly foolish soldier said, "She took a picture." "She did not. She asked if she could take a picture," I said. , the Committee ..for Biafran Writers and Artists is hereby dissolved!" Miriam cried. "In my opinion, sah." said the soldier, "she was ready to take a picture." The Commander said, "Tut-tut." lie had been a former school principal. He explained to us that they were fighting a war for sur- vival, to the soldier that we were friends of Biafra, and wrote out an official piece of paper declaring everyone innocent?us, sol- dier, officers, himself. We need this man in Berkeley. Somehow in the mess of being arrested, soaked in the rain, shuttled about, we lost our contact. We slept on chairs in the cus- toms house. Someone brought us cold corn and coconut far breakfast, and then coffee. A man from the Ministry of Information came to get us, carrying his copy of Le Grand Sommeil, par Raymond Chandler. He drove like a madman down roads blocked with stumps so the Nigerians could not use them at landing strips. At the check- points the guards said, "Welcome," as they pointed their antique weapons at us. Le Grand Sommeil? Is he putting us on? A DAY OR TWO LATER A blood vessel in my right eye has broken. Days without sleep, much heat, much strain. Our clothes aren't dry since the soaking of a few nights ago. Every official says, "This war, these conditions, things are rather dif- ficult, really. We are decentarilzed, you know." "Decentralization" is the ephemism for the capture of the capital, Umuahia, and all other cities. Though the Biafrans have re- captured Owerri and are moving services back into it, it is burned out, wrecked, nearly deserted, with a few stunned and starving people squatting beneath the riddled Pepsi billboard. Stopped by the side of the road, waiting for a pass, which we needed in order to get to the place where we could get a pass which would, in turn, enable us to get a pass, I handed out protein tablets which I had car- ried with me. They are compressed lumps of fishy dust which had turned my stomach When I sampled them in the States. They were delicious. Diana had water in her can- teen, a mouthful for each of us. The driver looked as if he were eating birthday cake and I gave him another handful, He was very thin and I asked him if he had lost weight since the war. "No, no, oh no, I was always like this." Ibo pride, ebullience, and optimism, Plus a bit of fibbing. We got gas at a military Camp. The Biaf- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14750 Approved For Rclogwintg/WRI,qt#agegiB.ospiroplopo3000LtqconAnber 20, 1969 ?used of an indisposition to detect a Red peril, backed up his deputy. President Nixon, in his Latin address Oct. 31, barely-touched on the threat of commu- nism or subversion, saying just that the ex- port of revolution could not be condoned and "a nation like Cuba which seeks to prac- tice it can hardly expect to share in the bene- fits of this inter-American community." In sum, the Nixon administration, to judge by the public record, is taking a rather calm approach to the vital question of whether Latin America needs to be more heavily mili- tarized for a crucial crunch ahead. The offi- cial Washington consensus, to say nothing of the liberal-academic-congressional con- sensus, is that Latin governments do not face a serious subversive challenge, Governor Rockefeller so far has failed to make a con- vincing case for strengthening military pro- grams and catering to military regimes. Presi- dent Nixon would make a gratuitous and costly error if he accepted Rockefeller's mili- tary advice. SALT?REACHING PEACEFUL PARITY Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, mil- lions of Americans are now vitally con- cerned and openly debate the relative merit of our military weapons systems. The era of unchallenged military spend- ing is ending. This is all to the good. But military spending all over the world races ahead; and unless positive actions are taken, such as arms-control agree- ments and a Soviet-United States de- tente in the arms race, this growth will continue to burden and depress us while reducing our security. With the hope and best wishes of peaceable men everywhere, United States and Russian negotiators this week meet in Helsinki. They are coming to the Fin- nish capital to start talks on the most vital and sensitive disarmament issue ever negotiated. The object of the Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks?SALT?is to find a way for both sides to agree on a plan that will limit, and perhaps some day reduce their vast nuclear arsenals. Until now the two superpowers have not touched upon the most fundamental nu- clear threat: their own armories. This time the common stake In getting off the nuclear escalator is vastly large. The two powers possess something close to mili- tary parity. Each, as Secretary Rogers said last week, "could effectively destroy the other regardless of which struck first." Both nations are distracted by se- vere foreign problems?Russia with China and Eastern Europe, the United States with Vietnam. Both may be losing their taste for continuing the arms race. We have reached the critical point where we must talk before it is too late. In the escalation of the arms race, our general policy has been to react to our estimates of what the Soviet Union's in- tentions would be. If we continue in this pattern, without agreement, there is nothing we can do to contain this in- evitable spiraling arms race. It is impera- tive that the United States take the ini- tiative. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has offered to suspend the development and testing of new weapons during the talks; and the precarious technological balance that helped to make the negotiations possible in the first place cannot be expected to last indefi- nitely. This country has more than 1,000 land- based intercontinental missiles. It has 650 nuclear armed strategic Air Force bombers. It has 41 Polaris submarines with 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. With 16 missiles each and with each missile soon to be armed with three to 10 warheads, our submarine fleet alone could destroy the world. In addition to this, we have tactical nuclear weapons in place in various spots throughout the world. Medium-range bombers and missile sites encircle the frontiers of our poten- tial enemies. From public sources it is known that the United States has more than 6,500 nuclear warheads. We have a military budget, including related space and AEC military require- ments, of almost $80 billion. There are 3.4 million men and women under arms; 1,300,000 civilians work for the Defense Department. And 100,000 companies, em- ploying 3.8 million civilians, fill defense orders. The military and civilian personnel not only work at home, but also, many are stationed at the 429 major and 2,972 minor bases scattered throughout 30 countries of the world. These are the military credentials we bring to the arms talks at Helsinki. An international research team fi- nanced by the Swedish Government pub- lished recently a bleak analysis of what was described as a runaway arms race. It found that the world was spending more for military purposes now than its total production of goods and services at the start of the century, that arms outlays were doubling every 15 years and that efforts to control them were mar- ginal if not illusory so far. The study illustrates the point that since the 1963 treaty prohibiting nu- clear tests in the atmosphere or under water, that nuclear testing had been stepped up. The report warns that time was short for the current talks on limit- ing strategic weapons because United States progress on the development of multiple warheads would reach "a point of no return" in 3 to 6 months. Mr. President, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues the arti- cle written by John Hess for the New York Times on this subject, entitled "World Study Finds Runaway Arms Race, With Outlays Soaring". In conclusion, I would like to say that "imperative" is a small word to use to emphasize the importance of the SALT talks and the need for United States' in- itiative to bring a halt to the arms race. I strongly endorse the importance of a Soviet Union-United States mutual sus- pension on the development and testing of new weapons during the SALT talks. Our best defense is peace. And we must make every attempt to bring peace to the world to give credence to our na- tional dialog and to leave not only dreams for our children?but ominous as it may sound, a world of our children. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the article by John Hess be printed in the RECORD, and I also ask that an encouraging, optimistic column on the Helsinki talks, written by Tom Wicker, also published in this morning's Times, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: [From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969] WORLD STUDY FINDS RUNAWAY ARMS RACE, WITH OUTLAYS SOARING (By John L. Hess) PARIS, November 19.?An international re- search team financed by the Swedish Gov- ernment published today a bleak analysis of what was described as a runaway arm,s race. It found that the world was spending more for military purposes now than its total production of goods and services at the start of the century, that arms outlays were doubling every 15 years and that efforts to control them were marginal if not illusory so far. The study demonstrated, for example, that nuclear testing had been stepped up since the 1965 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere or under water. The report warned that time was short for the current talks on limiting strategic weap- ons because United States progress on the development of multiple warheads would reach "a point of no retufn" in three to six months. The authors of the report believe that once that is achieved, the Soviet Union will be unwilling to halt development of com- parable weapons and counterweapons. Such weapons they hold, cannot become reliable from a military viewpoint without testing, Including the explosion of the hydrogen war- heads. BRITON HEADED TEAM A sharp rise in military spending set fri about 1965 and seems likely to continue; at present rates, arms outlays in the early years of the next century will exceed present world production of goods and services. Not only is spending on arms rising faster than total production of goods and services, the gap is wider for the poor countries than the rich. The study was sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, of which Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish econo- mist, is chairman, and Robert Neild, a Brit- ish economist and editor, is director. Another British economist, Frank Blackaby, headed the team that assembled the 440 pages of data comprising what is to be an annual yearbook on armaments and disarmament. The work is a scholarly compendium of the world's troubles-120 armed conflicts , since World War H?an analysis of arma- ments and the arms trade, and a history of the effort to control them. It is not opti- mistic. Allowing a wide margin of error for data concerning the Communist countries, the team found that the world spent $159.3-bil- lion for military purposes last year, using official Communist exchange rates, or $173.4- billion at rates adjusted for real buying power. The United States spent $79.3-billion of this, the Soviet Union $39.8-billion (at the adjusted rate) and Communist China?a hazardous estimate?$7-billion. From 1949 through 1968, the study found, world military spending rose at an average rate of 5.9 per cent a year, after allowing for inflation. But the rate in the last three years averaged 8.9 per cent?an acceleration of 50 per cent. SHARPEST RISE IN MIDEAST The acceleration was far from even around the world. The sharpest rise came in the Middle East-19.9 per cent annually over the last three years. It was notable that both the victor and the vanquished in the lightning war of June, 1967, have sharply increased arms spending. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 20, Plpwved Forciilifew3998Apftfamp71g3pfa6fp000300040001-0 S 1449 alliance among many other alb rices that they had always accepted. They did not realise, as we more aged Parliamentarians realise, that what the NATO Alliance really represents in the world to-day is the greatest step of any that has been taken in the last twenty years. I also felt that. there was a lack of understanding in the young of the policies that we were trying to pursue. There was a failure of communication with the age group with whom we were talking, or who _ were talking to us?because we all owed them free range to talk to us?and tile lines of communication were really not good. I will _ not say they were blocked; they were not; . but they were not good and we were not speaking the same language as they were _ speaking. It seemed to me most important _ that we should, somehow or Other, try to bring the young people of Europe to an un- derstanding of the importance of the NATO Alliance in any way that we possibly can. This leads me to ask the Government whether they will urge the recognition of the North Atlantic Assembly as an official body like the Council of Europe or W.E.U., able to speak to the NATO Council and give - their recommendations for discussion and advice. To-day the North Atlantic Assembly Is 15 years old, and it is still an unofficial body. If it became an official body it would strengthen the Alliance through the Parlia- mentarians as well as through the military men. I would urge the Government to ex amine this possibility, as I think it would n require a very great alteration in the v w they take of the North Atlantic Asse ly. My other comment on the gracious Sp ech must be on the United Nations and t r policies there. I should like to congratu the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, and t thank her very much indeed for her splendid work in New York. It is an extremely interest- ing assignment to be a delegate. as I myself know, having been for three years a delegate at three General Assemblies. It is also ex- tremely frustrating and, at times, irritating to a great degree. Year after year the same resolutions appear, and one would often think, looking at the agenda papers, that nothing ever changed. Nevertheless, it does; and things are done. And although often one gets despairing about the United Nations it is the one and only place where people can talk and discuss, and where things do hap-7- pen very often, and very often of great importance. There is only one subject that I want to mention to-day, and that is the Middle East and the Israel-Arab problem. The noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, has just made a very wise analysis of the position of the Four Powers in the Security Council, and the question of the Israel and Arab problem. I should like just to add my own thoughts on this matter. Israel is a State recognised by the United - Nations and by nearly all the nations, with, of course, the exception of the Arab States. I believe that even some of these would be prepared to accept the fact of Israel, given the help of European nations and the United States. By "help" I do not mean military help; I mean by world opinion simply stating the obvious, that Israel is there and will remain there for all time. Israel has said that negotiations with Arab States would enable both sides to talk peace, instead of carrying on war, whether guerrilla war or otherwise. I should like to ask: Cannot our Government use all its Influence direct to bring about a meeting between Israel and the Arabs? Instead, they support resolutions on this question which are sometimes toler- able and sometimes intolerable. The other day at the United Nations a resolution was put forward accusing the Israelis of responsi- bility for burning down the mosque of Al Aksa. There is no evidence at all that any Israeli would have been so foolish as to burn down any mosque. When I was in Israel after the Six-Day War I visited many mosques, one in Hebron, on a day reserved for Moslems, and the Israeli guard would not allow me to go and see it without the permission of the Moslem in charge on that day. Ong of the in- teresting results of the Israeli administration is the way in which all the Holy Places, _ whether Moslem, Christian, or Jewish, are carefully looked after and freely accessible to those who want to visit them. Surely in the interests of peace our delegate at the United Nations should have abstained in a vote which, at its simplest, is a case which we would consider sub judice, since the trial of a person is taking place at the moment and the question of who committed this tragic act is unknown. In my opinion, it is most un- likely that it would have had anything to do with the Israeli Government. For us to vote for so biased a resolution is, in my opinion, wrong, and I must say so Foreign affairs are newer static; changes come every day. I think that to-day we have ?the opportunity ott new Government in Ger- many, and a nolcmaratively new Government in France. I"have hopes that their policies may lead ))15 a d?nte in East/West relations, and ale /to a change in the policies towards us inrblation to the E.E.C. I also hope?and I a encouraged by what I have heard in this de ate?that a new look may come into Efirope, and that we shall not lose the op- ortunity of seeing that that new look leads us in further steps towards world peace. THE DARK MILITARY SIDE OF THE ROCKEFELLER REPORT Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the long- awaited Rockefeller report on Latin merles, generates two wholly different proposa s t- im ments in trade and economic aid ar fresh, creative, and promising. At the same time, however, the report advances a remarkably stale view of the military security needs of Latin America. Ignor- ing plentiful evidence that the chief po- litical trend in Latin America is toward militaristic nationalism, the report stresses development of U.S. military aid programs to strengthen Latin Amerian governments against Communist subver- sion. In a recent Washington Post column, Stephen S. Rosenfeld commented most perceptively on the anomalies in the Rockefeller military aid recommends: tions. I ask unanimous consent that his column be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1969] THE MILITARY SIDE OF ROCKY'S REPORT (By Stephen S. Rosenfeld) Nelson Rockefeller in effect gave the Presi- dent two reports on Latin America; they were released this week. One centered on the hemisphere's economic requirements and on how the United States should cooperate in fulfilling them. The other concerned what Rockefeller believes to be ever-expanding menace of Castroism, and the measures needed to meet that. So divergent in percep- tion and policy implications are these two elements?the one heading toward economic growth in peaceful circumstances and the other heading toward vigilence and possible military confrontation?that it is hard to see how they can coexist in a single statement. Yet there they are. To be sure, this kind of double vision is not new. Since the World War II period, when Axis penetration of the hemisphere was feared, Washington has divided its efforts between supporting Latin military establish- ments and helping Latin political oomniuni- ties. More recently, as John Plank of Brook- ings has written: "One strand of policy has run from the era of the `good neighbor' and the inter-American system . . . The other strand, which is not really compatible with the former one, derives from our conception of Latin America as an active theater in the cold war, one of the battlegrounds on which we engage those whom we have identified as our mortal enemies, the Communists." Thus in the 1940s and later, our military policy was directed at preparing the Latin military for a mission of heinispherie de- fense. In this period, the United States opened up the Inter-American Defense Col- lege and Defense Board, the military assist- ance programs, sales of destroyers and sub- marines, and so on. The rationale for or- ganizing the Latin military to repel a con- ventional foreign invasion has long since evaporated, but these programs limp on. Many Latinists believe the programs con- tribute heavily to Washington's militaristic reputation in the hemisphere. In the 1960s, chiefly because of fear of Cuba, the rationale (though not always the substance) of American military policy was shifted from hemispheric defense to "in- ternal security." Subversion, supported by or oriented toward Castro, was defined as the main enemy. The offiical view was that the Latin military constituted a "shield against insurgency"; behind that shield, the process of development?understood as a dis- ruptive one?would go on. This is Governor Rockefeller's view still "All the American nations are a tempting target for Comemmist subversion," his re- port says. "In fact, it is plainly evident that such subversion is al reality today with alarming potential ....f growing intensity." Predicting more Castros, he declares: "A '''Sastro on the mainland, supported militarily anconomically by the Communist world, woul& resent the gravest kind of threat to the sec ity of the Western Hemisphere and pose an tremely difficult problem for the U.S." This dia:-.4 osis led Rockefeller to recom- mend major increases in military programs, both on the emispheric-defense and inter- nal-security vels. Urban terrorism, an ac- tivity so far efying control, is his special concern. Aga t the claim that some Latin military me serve a conservative status quo, he arg s that there is "a new type of military m . . coming to the fore and often beco ng a major force for constructive social cha ge." Is not the military anti- democrat ? Rockefeller believes that few Latin c ntries have the sufficiently ad- vanced economic and social systems re- quire to support a consistently democratic syst ." Anyway, "the common heritage of r" 'ect for human dignity is evidenced in erent ways in different nations." As might be expected, many academics and liberals and U.S. legislators question Rocke- feller's judgments in the military sphere. Po- litically the most important questions, how- ever, come from the Nixon administration. The State Department's Latin chief, Charles A. Meyer, said last July that "Com- munist insurgencies are currently at a rela- tively low ebb." Che Guevara's Bolivian fi- asco "made the Cuban regime more cautious about initiating new areas of insurgency," he said. Meanwhile, Latin counter-insur- gency capabilities have improved, and the appeal of Cuban-style revolutions has de- clined. William E. Lang, deputy to Assistant Sec- retary of Defense G. Warren Nutter, scanned the hemisphere last ligay, found no insur- gencies of consequence anywhere, and re- ported that "we have not seen external evi- dence of Cuban support for insurgency in Latin America for some months . . . 12 to 18 months." Nutter, who cannot easily be ac- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 iPalik4ember 20, #ppooved FouggifoRiEgajfq1Un ?RIMED RTIONAME000300040001 -0 S 14751 With an aSsist from the Vietnam war, the United States provided the largest portion of the increase. Its long-term trend was an annual rise of 7.7 per cent; the recent trend was 12 per cent. With a lag of a year or two, the Soviet Union and its allies followed this stepup?but the allies of the United States in Europe did not, except for Portugal, en- gaged in colonial wars, and Greece. The increases work like compound inter- est, so that both the United States and the Soviet Union Show cumulative gains of about 40 per cent since 1965, now accounting to- gether for 70 per cent of the world total. The share of the poor countries is small but is rising faster than average. The study confirmed that arms were swal- lowing a sharply rising share of world income. Before World War I and between the two World Wars, it estimated, the military spent 3 to 3.5 per cent of the world's resourceS; since then the share has risen to 7 to 8 per cent. The change for the United States was more dramatic: from 1.5 per cent of the national product in 1913 to 2.5 per cent in the thirties and 10 per cent in the postwar period. viz 7.5 PCT. RISE IN POORER LANDS In the so-called developing countries arms spending has been rising at a rate of 7.5 per cent, as against a world average of 6 per cent, while output for both groups haS been ris- ing at no better than 5 per cent. Put another way, world production is found to have multiplied about five times in the last 50 years, while arms spending has multi- plied about 10 times. On the other hand, the study reports that armed manpower has not increased signifi- cantly. The Paradox is explained by the enormous rise in the cost of weapons: the technological armS race. Among the large Western powers, at least, it was found, the cost of military research far outshadows that of civilian research. For the United States, $62.20 of each $100 of mili- tary procurement is assigned to research and development, but they take only $7.50 of each $100 of manufacturing output. Smaller countries can hardly compete. To the extent that they try, they find that they must market their weapons abroad to remain competitive, but the United States and the Soviet Union dominate exports. In the race to supply the third world with weapons, the report concluded, the Soviet Union has caught up with the United States, owning largely to aid to the Arab countries. This estimate excluded shipments to North and South Vietnam. The study represents the testimony of Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, on how United States spending was sharply increased on an erroneous estimate of a Soviet buildup, and follows that with testi- mony by the present Secretary, Melvin R. Laird, on a new Soviet threat. The authors, limiting themselves to nu- clear tests reported by the Atomic Energy Commission for the United States and by a Swedish defense agency for the Soviet Union produce the following comparison of the average annual rate of testing before and after the ban: U.S. 'U.S.S.R. World Before 24.4 12.8 39.6 After 82.0 9.2 46.2 The study cites evidence that many un- reported tests have been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, and pos- sibly by Britain and France. Most of the tests, reported or otherwise, have, of course, been underground, but the authors observe that the power and military value of underground testing have been far greater than had been expected. [From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969] IN THE NATION: A GOOD START IN HELSINKI (By Tom Wicker) WASHINGTON, November 19.?Since it took so long to get strategic arms limitations talks under way, it may be a hopeful sign that reports from Helsinki suggest a cordial be- ginning. Neither Soviets nor Americans yield- ed to propaganda temptations in their open- ing statements, both sides seemed to be addressing themselves to the same general objectives, and Mr. Nixon's message used the reassuring word "sufficiency" instead of "su- periority" to describe the kind of nuclear arsenal he had in mind. Opening-day goodwill does not, of course, guarantee long-range results, but in this case It seems particularly important. The military- minded, and hawk circles generally; in Mos- cow apparently fear that the talks are simply an American fishing expedition for intelli- gence data; while high military reluctance in Washington caused American negotiators to arrive in Helsinki without any specific pro- posals. AVOIDING STALEMATE Thus, it is extremely important just to get things going in an atmosphere of reason and goodwill. Once both sides become convinced? if they ever do?that the other genuinely wants an agreement, its scope and details should not be impossibly difficult. Taking counsel either of political fears and technical complexities, on the other hand, can produce nothing but stalemate and a continuing arms spiral. That is why the use of the word "suffi- ciency" was important. "Sufficiency" is what both sides now appear to have in their nu- clear strike capacities. That is to say, neither can launch a nuclear strike at the other with any hope of so completely destroying the other's retaliatory capacity that it will not be able to deliver a devastating return strike. ELIMINATING NUMBERS GAME If that is in fact the case, if neither side can attack the other with reasonable im- punity, then each has a sufficiency of nuclear weapons to guarantee its national security, to the extent that it can be guaranteed. And this would be the case even if one or the other claimed more missiles, more warheads or more nuclear-armed submarines?as in fact the United States does claim. If some general understanding can be established that there is nuclear sufficiency on both sides, a difficult numbers question can be eliminated from the arms limitation problem. The Soviet Union would hardly ne- gotiate second place for itself, in numbers of weapons or total firepower, nor would the United States give up first place; but if it Is established that first and second place don't really exist, that enough is enough and there is a sufficiency on both sides, then at the least a freeze on the existing nuclear balance becomes possible. That much is crucial because the more the two sides go on with the nuclear arms race, either developing new and more awful weap- ons like MIRV, or tinkering with control and delivery and warning systems, the more it becomes likely that at some point one side or the other will score either an offensive or a defensive breakthrough. The danger in that is not just that a power that did so might launch a strike while it had the opportunity to do so; but also that both powers would be in constant fear of just such a break- through by the other, and would redouble their own spending, research and deploy- ment?an endless cycle. Moreover, it is hard to believe that any ultimate reduction in levels of armaments could be achieved before a period transpired in which both sides maintained, by agree- ment, an existing balance, during which not only the good faith of each but the best methods of policing and verifying the ar- rangement could be tested. THE COST ADVANTAGE From that kind of an achievement, it would become possible at least to have dis- cussions, on the basis of proven intentions, about mutual nuclear arms reductions. And another advantage of an initial nuclear arms freeze is that both sides could save substan- tial sums each needs for domestic purposes?. in the estimate of Jerome Wiesner, about $100 billion apiece in the next five years. Of course there would be risk but if the aim is to eliminate risk, neither an arms limitation agreement nor a continuing arms race will achieve it. And as Gen. James Gavin has observed: "We're extremely ven- turesome in war and we ought to be as venturesome in peace. The rewards are greater." RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled, "Israeli Knesset Appeals to World's Parliament To Help Soviet Jews Emigrate," pub- lished in the New York Times of Novem- ber 20, 1969. The article details the latest manifestation of religious persecu- tion in the Soviet Union's long and in: famous history of persecution of its Jewish citizens. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the New York Times, Nov. 20, 1969] ISRAELI KNESSET APPEALS TO WORLD'S PARLIA- MENTS To HELP SOVIET JEWS EMIGRATE (By James Feeron) JERUSALEM, November 19.?Israel's Knesset called today on parliaments around the world to "employ the full weight of their Influence" in assisting Soviet Jews to emi- grate to Israel, In a move confirming a major change in Israeli policy toward the Soviet Union, the Knesset (parliament) indicated that per- suasion would be replaced by pressure in seeking free emigration for Soviet Jews. Premier Golda Meir, in a major address opening the seventh Knesset, said a 50-year campaign by the Kremlin to silence Jewish voices in the Soviet Union had failed. Moscow should have the courage to realize this failure, Mrs. Meir said, "and allow every Jew who wants to leave the country to come here to us." Mrs. Meir followed the disclosure earlier this month of the names of 18 Georgian Jews who wanted to leave with a new list of Soviet Jews whose requests to come to Israel also had been turned down. The publicity surrounding the earlier an- nouncement had indicated a dramatic break in the long years of secret negotiations with the Soviet Union to open the doors for as many of the nation's 3 million Jews who wanted to come to Israel. In her speech to a packed Knesset cham- ber, Mrs. Meir indicated that the days of "quiet talks and quiet diplomacy" were over. She said "we shall see to it that every person possessed of a conscience, Jew and non-Jew, everybody to whom freedom is dear, will surely raise his voice for the freedom of others as well." laser Harel, former head of Israel's Secret Service and a new member of Parliament suggested during the general debate that dis- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14752 Approved For RV8miggla8/30 ? CIA-RDP711300364R000300040001-0 1U.LNAJ.: RECORD? SENATE November 20, titht--1" quiet among Soviet Jews might eventually "brccome a malady that could spread to other elements in the Soviet Union." "When that day comes," he continued, "and when the Kremlin's concern over the stabil- ity of its internal regime otittveighs Russia's interests abroad, they'll want to get rid of their Jews and they'll waa to get rid Of them fast." Taken with Mrs. Meir's speech, the impli- cation was that Israel, possibly with the help of other governments, would be seeking to generate the internal presaure that might lead to a change in Soviet policy barring free emigration for all citizens. There are Israeli officials who are aware of the risk entailed in the new Israeli pol- icy. Some have expressed concern over pos- sible recriminations against Soviet Jews who have given their names to the publicity com- ing from Jerusalem. CENSORSHIP BARS DET AILS Censorship in Israel has long prevented references to immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and even today bars speculation on the hearing this may now have on Israel's decision to apply public pressure on Moscow Mr. Ilarel's comment on Soviet interes abroad was an apparent allusion to Mft- cow's ties with Arab governments, wh leaders oppose any form of Jewish immi tion to Israel. Arab leaderi are convhiced that Israel is basically expansionist and that large immigration will justify greater; ex- pansion. Israeli immigration officials expect 34,000 to 40,000 newcomers this year, most of tient arriving with skills from affluent count es. In speaking of Soviet Jews the 71-ye old Mrs. Meir, herself a Russian-born Je said of masses of young Soviet Jews ha undergone an "awakening" as a result of the 1967 Israeli victory over the Arab states. HOLIDAY RALLIES NoTen She said no one could eXplain "in terms of cold reason" how young Jews in the So- viet Union, many of whose parents had tasted prison life or experienced years in Siberian work camps, now gathered by the tens of thousands around synagogue.t on Simhat Torah. This is a joyous holicIty that marks the completion of the annual round of read- ing of the Torah, the Jewish holy scrip- tures. ' Soviet Jews have become More courageous, Mrs. Meir said, and are nace declaring "that their homeland is the static of Israel." The Premier then read off the names Of those Soviet Jews who had written abroad in what she described as an attempt to publicize their inability to obtain exit visas. The hometowns of the writers included Mos- cow, Kiev, Riga, and Leningrad. She read an open letter to Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin from Tina Brodetskaya, a 34- year-old Moscow woman, who was seeking to join relatives in Israel. The woman wrote that her desire to emigrate stemmed from Zionist feelings and not from hostility to the Soviet Union. PRESIDENT NIXON'S .i.RADE MESSAGE TO CONGRESS Mr, JAVITS. Mr. President, the Presi- dent and the administration are to be commended for the proposed trade pro- gram forwarded to the Congress earlier this week. This program, which must be regarded as a holding action, is signifi- cant in that it again commits the United States to pursue a policy of freer world trade?despite the considerable protec- tionist pressures which are growing in our land. OIL INDUSTRY MULTIFACETED We in the Congress should support the Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, we statesmanship of the President as shown recognize that the oil industry as an in- by this message and give him the au- thority he requests to make modest re- ductions in U.S. tariffs. I would grant the President such authority, however, through June 30, 1972, rather than through June 30, 1973, since more com- prehensive action in the trade field should be enacted before then. The last tariff cuts of the Kennedy round nego- tiations will have become effective on January 1, 1972, and the administration and the legislative branch should regard this as the target date to enact new, major legislation in the trade field. At this time, the Joint Economic Com- mittee of the Congress, of which I am the ranking Senate minority member, is preparing a ehensive series of trade ngs, and, these hearings sho dovetail nicely the Com- m' ion on World Trade, *hich the Pres- ent has indicated he will appoint to 'examine the entire range of our trade policies. The Commission's Report should be available before the Joint Economic Committee issues its report. Because of this timetable, I would recommend that the President's authority to effect tariff reductions be extended only through fiscal 1972. The President's proposals of aid for industries affected by imports?adjust- ment assistance?are indeed welcome. In my opinion, one of the major flaws in the implementation of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was the extremely difficult .'teria which had to be met if trade ad- jus -3.v.exe, be granted. The liberalization of the critals, is wel- come and needed. Liberalization of escape-clause provi- sions is also to be welcomed so long as such liberalization is part of the phi- losophy which recognizes?as the Presi- dent's does?that "any reduction in our imports produced by U.S. restrictions not accepted by our trading partners would invite foreign reaction against our own exports?all quite legally" and that the "need to restore our trade surplus heightens the need for further movement toward freer trade." In my opinion, the President's request of the Congress for a clear statemen "with regard to nontariff barriers to asi- sist in our efforts to obtain _reciprogl lowering of nontariff barriers," is an portant call for cooperation. We s meet the President's request. In tl s re- elimi- a step ng non- mmend- know of this very uld gard, the President's proposal to nate the American selling price toward eliminating the prolif era tariff barriers to trade is most able?all of us in the Congre the difficulty in putting forwa needed proposal. Finally, it is my hope that Western Europe and Japan, too, will take such an important step down the road of freer trade?that such freer trade in agricul- tural and industrial products indeed will lead us "in growing and shared prosperity toward a world both open and just"?and that such an open world is, unattainable if reciprocity is not forthcoming. dustry is not composed of only major oil companies, although they are the most often heard from. I have repeatedly spoken of the differ- ence between the struggling independent oilman and the major ail companies which enjoy phenomenal profits. The April 1969 newsletter of the First Na- tional City Bank of New York indicated that of the largest 2,250 manufacturing concerns surveyed the 99 oil companies had 25 percent of the group's total profits. That should give you one indi- cation of the disparity between the small oilman who has to scrape and skimp to raise the funds to drill one well and the major oil companies who can afford to put up almost $1 billion just for the right to drill for ail in Alaska. Another group has recently taken heart and raised its voice, saying to the American public and Congress: Don't lump us together with the major companies. We don't benefit from all the federal subsidies enjoyed by the major oil companies, yet we are part of the "oil industry." This group is called the Oil Marketers' Committee. These are the small business- men who market the oil to the public. Although they exist at the will of the major oil companies, they, too, have finally had enough. They have shown the courage of their convictions and pub- lished an advertisement in the Washing- ton Post. I ask unanimous consent that the ad- vertisement be printed in the RECORD. Mr. President, it is quite clear from the advertisement that the only ones who really benefit from all these Federal sub- sidies to the oil industry are the major oil companies, the ones who need the gigantic subsidies the least. The time has come. Congress and the President must take action. If subsidies are necessary to insure a healthy oil in- i.dustry, let us give these subsidies honest- Let them pass through the same budgetary process that school lunch sub- sidies pass through. This will enable Congress and the public to see exactly who is getting what and how much. No longer would the major oil companies be able to skim off the cream of these Fed- eral subsidies and leave the dregs to the independent oilmen under the guise of giving incentives to the oil industry. The oil industry is not composed only of the major oil companies. We must recognize that and take action accord- ingly. There being no objection, the adver- tisement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: OIL MARKETERS SAY: MAYBE THE PUBLIC IS RIGHT ABOITT OIL IMPORT QUOTAS AND DE- PLETION ALLOWANCES We want to make it clear to our govern- ment leaders and the American public that no single group speaks for the entire oil industry. For example, this committee of marketers questions seriously whether the oil producers and major oil companies have applied any of their consumer subsidized gains to consumer needs and benefits. As oil marketers, we believe-- 1. The present Oil Import Quota system has the effect of subsidizing producers and major oil companies at up to 3c per gallon. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 WASHINGT ON P1014$71 DATE 2,0 (01 Approvea ror Release 20t)o/30-:-el-ATRI3PY-1S00384R17017317704000P1-AOGE 34) Interim Test Ban On MIRV Weighed By Warren Unna Washington Post Staff Writer The United States is consid- John Sherman Cooper (R-1y.) and Clairborne Pell (D-R.I.). Briefing them were Philip J. Farley, deputy director of the Arms Control Agency, Helmut Sonnefeldt, Soviet and disar- mament expert on the Na- tional Security Council staff, and William W. Hancock, gen- ering an interim arrangement With the Russians so that the testing of the multiple inde- pendently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) might be sus- pended while the current mis- sile talks are going on in Hel- inki. "The possibility of interim agreements, such as stopping the MIRV tests while the talks are going on, is not ruled out," Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) said after a closed-door briefing of the Senate Disarmament sub- Committee by officials of the Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency. eral counsel for the Arms Con- trol Agency. Security was so tight that the briefing not only was la- beled "secret", but the sena- tors were adominished three times to keep specific matters quiet. Another briefing on the Hel- sinki talks was given to Sen- ate leaders from both parties early Tuesday by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's as- sistant for national security af- fairs. Calms Apprehensions The briefings seemed to quiet last week's apprehen- sions when Gore's subconamit- tee first was promised a brief- ing before the SALT talks opened and then turned down. President Nixon reportedly was so concerned about antag- onizing a subcommittee that eventually may have to ratify a SALT treaty that he assured Congress, during his visit there last week, that the brief- ings would be forthcoming after the U.S. negotiators re- ported back from Helsinki. Also yesterday, Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) issued a statement terming it "unfor- tunate that the administration has set itself against the inclu- sion of senatorial observers or advisers to the SALT negotia. tions." Pleased by Briefing Case and Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), subcommittee chair- man, emerged from the hour- long eVening briefing seem- ingly more assured that the Nixon administration was pre- pared to enter into meaning- ful negotiations. "It was a good briefing," Gore said "I was pleased with the latitude available for ex- ploration. What's going on now are preliminary talks, They are not intended to reach any commitments." Gore said he now did not think _the U.S. negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki were being held on such a tight string by either the White House or the Pentagon that results couldn't be hoped for. 'Taxiing Gore and Case in yesterday's secret, unan- lonneed briefing were Sens. T. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chair- 4 the parent Senate For- aign Relations Committee, John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 19, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 14645 accordance with the standard procedure re- lating to compacts. PURPOSE The purpose of S. 2734, as amended, is to give consent of Congress to the Connecticut- New York railroad passenger transportation compact, adopted by New York on June 16, 1968 (sec. 1, ch. 824, laws of New York for 1968) and by Connecticut on April 21, 1969 (sec. 1, Public Act 46 of the laws of Con- necticut for 1969) . This legislation is sponsored by the Sen- ators from Connecticut, Mr. Ribicoff and Mr. Dodd and by the Senators from New York, Mr. Javits and Mr. Goodell and rec- ommended with a suggested amendment, whi h has been adopted by the Secretary of TraiznortatiOfl. STATEMENT The compact entered into by the two States relates to the continuation and improvement of railroad commuter passenger service over the Penn Central Railroad's lines between New York City, N.Y., and New Haven, Conn. It authorizes the metropolitan Transporta- tion Authority, a government corporation of the State of New York, and the Connecti- cut Transportation Authority, an agency of the State of Connecticut, acting individually but in cooperation with each other, and as oonventures where they deem it advisable, to do the following (where permissible under the enabling laws of their respective States) : (a) Acquire assets of the New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad (and its suc- cessors) where needed, (b) repair and re- habilitate such assets, (c) dispose of such assets where not needed, and (d) and oper- ate the service or contract for its operation. By its terms, the compact legislation lapses I! Congress fails to consent by December 31, 1969. A letter dated July 28, 1969 from the Hon- orable Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of the State of New York to Chairman Celler, re- questing the subject legislation reads as follows: "I am seeking your help in securing the consent of Congress to a compact entered into by the States of New York and Connecti- cut relating to the continuation and improve- ment of railroad commuter passenger serv- ice over the Penn Central Railroad's lines between New York City, N.Y., and New. Hav- en, Conn. That compact is evidenced by the enactment of two statutes, section 1 of chap- ter 824 of the laws of New York for 1968 and section 1 of Public Act 46 of the laws of Connecticut for 1969. A certified copy of the New York statute is enclosed, together with several uncertified copies of both acts. "The Metropolitan Transportation Author- ity for our State and the Connecticut Trans- portation Atuhority for the State of Con- necticut are hopeful of an early conclusion to their negotiations with Penn Central relat- ing to the modernization and improvement program for this vitally needed commuter service which Governor Dempsey and I en- dorsed in late 1966. These negotiations were delayed, seemingly interminably by a host of complicated problems. Indeed, they could not begin in earnest until this past January, when Penn Central finally agreed to merge with the New Haven. "Federal and State financing for the $56.8 million priority capital improvement program Is also assured. Moreover, we are hopeful that additional Federal funds will be granted, making possible the full $80 million capital program which the two States originally con- templated. To this end I am asking the MTA and the CTA to reinstitute their 1966 re- quest for funds under the Urban Mass Trans- portation Act of 1961. "If you or your staff needs any further as- sistance relative to the details of the compact, the status of our financing or the nature of the projected relationship with Penn Central, I would suggest that they be referred directly to Dr. William J. Ronan, Metropolitan Trans- portation Authority chairman. "The State of Connecticut has asked for assistance similar to that which we ask of you from their congressional delegation. You may wish to coordinate your efforts with them. "Please note that if the compact is not ap- proved by December 31, 1969, it lapses and the legislative process would have to be started all over again in both States. "Sincerely, "NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER." The first section of S. 2734 grants the con- sent of Congress to the compact. As noted in the above letter the committee finds merit in the compact and believes that Congress should grant its consent thereto, subject to the amendments herein made in article II of the compact. First, article II of the compact provides that amendments and supplements to the compact to implement the purposes thereof "may be adopted by concurrent legislation of the party States." Section 2 of S. 2734 makes clear that the consent of Congress to the com- pact does not constitute consent in advance for any amendments or supplements to the compact which may hereafter be adopted by concurrent legislation of the party States. Any such amendments or supplements would be adopted subject to the consent of Congress before being put into effect. Second, section 3 of S. 2734 reserves the right of Congress or its standing committees to require submission of information and data concerning operations under the com- pact. Third, section 4 of S. 2734 reserves the right of Congress to alter amend, or repeal the legislation. Attached hereto and made a part hereof is the report from the Secretary of Transporta- tion to the Honorable James 0. Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, dated November 12, 1969, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the Question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill (S. 2734) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate messages from the House of Representatives on S. 632, S. 499, and S. 757. RELIEF OF RAYMOND C. MELVIN The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be- fore the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 632) for the relief of Raymond C. Melvin, which were, on page 1, line 4, "2733" and insert "2733(b) "; and on page 2, line 3, strike out "July 4, 1964" and Insert: "or about July 6, 1964". Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana. The motion was agreed to. LUDGER J. COSSETTE The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be- fore the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 499) for the relief of Ludger J. Cossette, which was, on page 2, line 4, strike out "in excess of 10 per centum thereof". Mr. M_AnarIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the Motion of tlia Senator from Montana. The motion was agreed to. YVONNE DAVIS The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be- fore the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 757) for the relief of Yvonne Davis which was, on page 2, after line 3, insert: No part of the amount appropriated in this Act shall be paid or delivered to or re- ceived by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection, with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana. The motion was agreed to. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on Monday in Helsinki the United States and Soviet delegations met to commence the SALT negotiations. While the occasion-"=". day was largely ceremonial, there was a note of high purpose in the statements of both delegations. Serious discussions began yesterday in what could be the most portentous negotiations affecting the survival of mankind. As Secretary of State Rogers expressed it so aptly in his speech of November 13: The question to be faced in the strategic arms talks is whether societies with the ad- vanced intellect to develop these awesome weapons of mass destruction have the com- bined wisdom to control and curtail them. Let us hope that the enormous diffi- culties and complexities inherent in these Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14646 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE November 19, 1969 negotiations will be overbalanced by a recognition on both sides of the mutual and reciprocal advantageS to be obtained from viable arrangements to stabilize and control the strategic arms race. The negative incentive to agreement is sim- ilarly persuasive?the cost and the dan- ger to both sides inherent in an escala- tion of the nuclear arms race could cast a most ominous shadow over the con- tinued health and existence of both so- cieties. The immediate challenge to the United States and Soviet negotiators, once sub- stantive discussions begin, will be to seek mutually agreeable arrangements for containing the next generation of stra- tegic weapons now under development in both countries?ABM's and M1RV's. In my judgment, it is regretable that the U.S. negotiators have reportedly been instructed not to offer a mutual moratorium on the flight testing of MIRV's. The clock is rimming out on MIRV's, and if an agreement with re- spect to this new weapons development is not achieved prior to -the operational deployment stage?expected some time next year?hopes for a meaningful and verifiable agreement will be diminished. The clock is also running out with re- spect to ABM systems, but fortunately, the pace is slower in this instance be- cause deployed ABM systems are easily verifiable by aerial or satellite inspec- tion, while deployed MIRV's are veri- fiable allegedly only by onsight inspec- tion. The major address by Secretary Rogers on November 13 is a most salutory in- dication that U.S. policy with respect to the life and death issues?inherent in the SALT talks has not been defaulted to military authorities by the concerned civilian agencies of our Government? especially the State Department. I ex- press this view against the background of numerous press reports and "leaks" in recent weeks which have indicated that efforts by the military authorities have succeeded within the administra- tion in curtailing the brief and the ne- gotiating leeway of Ambassador Gerard Smith and his colleagues in the SALT talks. In his address to the Senate on No- vember 13, President Nixon assured us that he would seek to work out an ar- rangement for consultations with the Senate respecting the SALT talks which would meet our requirements and pre- rogatives. The President's thoughtful and cooperative remarks in this regard merit our respect and appreciation. In this spirit, I think it is imfortunate that the administration has set itself against the inclusion of senatorial observers or advisors to the SALT negotations. The implication in the administration's posi- tion that the necessary secrecy and dis- cretion might be comprised by the pres- ence of Senators is not one which the Senate could find acceptable as a reason. Extensive and detailed consultations regarding the U.S. negotiating position have been carried out with the goverti- ments of our NATO tallies. Virtually without exception our NATO allies have parliamentary forms of government. Consequently, the implication that the parliamentary leaders of Western Europe and Canada are more discreet than the congressional leaders of the United States is paradoxical and unconvinc- ing; especially in view of the history of the congressional representatives and committees handling the most secret Information. There is an invisible third dimension to the SALT talks which is seldom men- tioned?the specler of Peking. In the period since the 1962 United States- Soviet "eyeball-to-eyeball" confronta- tion over Cuba?and the emergence of Communist China as a thermonuclear power?it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that policymakers both in Wash- ington and Moscow have considered the potential future threat of nuclear war with China to be as real a threat as a United States-Soviet nuclear exchange. There is no doubt that calculations with respect to the potentiality of Chi- nese nuclear capabilities will be factored into the negotiating postures of both the United States and U.S.S.R. I regard this as prudent and unavoidable. Nonetheless, we must guard vigilantly against military hard-liners on both sides attempting to exploit the Chinese "threat" as an instrument to prevent agreements and controls on advanced weapons systems that are the very purpose of the SALT negotiations. Moreover, the SALT negotiators bear the additional responsibility for attempt- ing to shape agreements resulting from the SALT talks in such a way as to en- courage, rather than discourage, Peking from eventual cooperation with interna- tional nuclear arms control agreements. The U.S. negotiators bear an additional responsibility with respect to Communist China in the SALT talks. Our negotiators must scrupulously seek to avoid agree- ments with the Soviet Union which will create the impression of a United States-Soviet nuclear "ganging up" against Communist China. In my judg- ment, agreements of such a nature could serve to exacerbate the grave tensions between Moscow and Peking, as well as between Washington and Peking?rather than making nuclear war on the Asian mainland less probable. In this respect, I commend to my col- leagues' attention Harrison Salisbury's new book "War Between Russia. and China," which sets forth the dangers and implications of a Sino-Soviet war to the nuclear security of the United States in a most persuasive and sobering fashion. My purpose today is to hail the be- ginning of the SALT negotiations. I wish to conclude on a high note rather than a low note, for I am an optimist on the future of mankind. Accordingly, I be- lieve it is altogether fitting to close with a most sincere and' deserved tribute to President Nixon and the U.S. delegation led by Director Gerard Smith for the diligence of preparation, the dignity, and high seriousness of purpose with which these landmark negotiations have been opened. I believe they have every right so long as this attitude and atmosphere In the U.S. delegation persists to be con- fident of the support of the Senate in their crucial and urgent search for a viable means to cap the volcano of the nuclear arms race. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSI- NESS AS IN LEGLISLATTVE SES- SION Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, has morn- ing business been concluded? The PRESIDING OFFICER.. Is there further morning business as in legisla- tive session? If not, morning business is concluded. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE As in legislative session, a message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate: H.R. 1453. An act for the relief of Capt. Nelvin A. Kaye: H.R. 1865. An act for the relief of Mrs. Beatrice Jaffe; and H.R. 14794. An act making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes. ENROLLED BILL SIGNED The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 92) for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Wong Yui. HOUSE BILLS REFERRED As in legislative session, the following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred, as indicated: H.R. 1453. An act for the relief of Capt. Melvin A. Kaye; and H.R. 1865. An act for the relief of Mrs. Beatrice Jaffe; to the Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 14794. An act making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES The Senate, in executive session, re- sumed the consideration of the nomina- tion of Clement P. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be an Associate Jus- tice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Sen- ate will soon decide whether to approve the nomination of Clement F. Ilayns- worth to the post of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. For over 2 months this man has undergone an examination of character, ability, and philosophy which has not been duplicated since the inquisition. In an attempt to find some reason to justify opposition to Judge Haynsworth's nomination, critics have invoked a standard of behavior that, if applied to all future nominees to the Court, would guarantee that the Su- preme Court membership shall remain at eight until the millennium. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 NEW YRIVoraanFEd. Release 2001/08/30 : BOk- 300P0401 0 l The Nuclear A.rsenals:74. Balance of Terror By WILLIAM BEECHER Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Nov. 17? a surprise attack, the third As the United States and the Soviet Union began preliminary arms-cOntrol talks today in Hel- Strad, rmland, their respective nuelear arsenals were believed "zero to be in rough equilib- riuM. That is a condition many American officials say they hOpe to preserve. - The oviet Union, after a rather a1ljtious effort to catch More and bigger land-based in- tarcontljleJ,aI ballistic missiles than tile jjnited States and is the first to have actually de- ployed a working, though urn- fted defense. The United States still main- jain substantial lead over the Russians in submarine- based missiles and in long- range strategic bombers. In the expression often used by armaments experts, the two powers have achieved a bal- .! ariCe Of terror: If either were to stage a surprise attack, the rother would have enough sur- viving nuclear weapons to dev- astate the attackers. Thu.S.* by the premise on ,Agtierican nuclear strat- is based, both should be rred from initiating nu- ar war, for such a move could be an act of national sui- cide. An Early Question United States officials say they are not sure whether So- viet officials share this prem- ise. That is one of the first questions they hope to answer at Helsinki. Soviet strategic writings, al- most exclusively by military men, frequently scoff at the no- tion that if deterrence fails no one wins. Some Russian gener- als insist that the country with the most and best offensive and defensive systems will do the Malt damage to the enemy, pro- tect more of its population and thio win slich a war. Whether Riiosan political leaders share this view is unknown in the West. On the answer to that ques- tion hinges much of the hope for an agreement to limit arms. If the Russians, ultimately, Vfil agree that deterrence is all they really want, then an 4rderrierit may be possible to limit bah offensive and defen- sive _nuclear weapons, Ameri- cah,affigals say. ut a limita- tion agreement could prove elu- sive if the Russians insist on maintaining the potential to fight and survive a nuclear war, in case deterrence fails. Such a potential is known as "damage- limiting capability" or "war- fighting capability." A comparative look at the size and character of the two countries' nuclear stockpiles provides an insight into the na- ture of the arms race and of the task before the negotiators in trying to stop the arms mo- mentum caused by mutual fear. The American strateglearse- nal comprises three different gystems=1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II la.,41-base,cl inter- continental ballistic missiles, or ICBM's, 450 IA:52 and :86 B-58 bombers, and 41 Polaris sub- Marines carrying a total of 656 missiles. The stated purpAPitrPii,cgI4=i1- taining multiple offensive sys- tems is that if any one or two were substantially destroyed in could still retaliate overwhelm- ingly against the attacker's cit- ies. The United States has tested and is beginning to deploy a limited missile defense system, called Safeguard, around two Minuteman complexes in the up- per Midwest. The first of these defensive missiles, however, is not expected to be ready for operation until 1974. .A principal argument that the Nixon Administration used in winning a very close Congres- sional fight to permit this ini- tial deployment was that a larger - than - expected Soviet build-up of the giant SS-9 in- tercontinental missile, togeth- er with Soviet tests of multi- ple warheads for that missile, posed a serious potential threat to the Minuteman force in the event of war. Another illustration of how the actions of one country can speed the arms race by caus- ing a counterreaction by the other is in the case of the American MIRV, or multiple independently targetable re-en- try vehicle. In 1964, the Soviet Union be- gan deploying a new surface-to- air missile system across a wide arc in the northewestern part of the Soviet Union, passing through the city of Talinn. This was athwart the path that any missiles fired from the Un- ited States would have to travel in attacking Russia's cities in Europe. American planners con- jectured that since the United States was obviously concen- trating its efforts on missiles, not bombers, the Tallinn sys- tem must be a system to defend against ballistic missiles. The United States then de- termined to develop and deploy MIRV warheads that could overwhelm by sheer numbers even a heavy Russian anti-mis- sile system. While there is still much argument within the American intelligence commu- nity over whether the Tallinn system could easily be upgrad- ed to provide a good defense against intercontinental mis- siles, most analysts now agree that the existing system ap- pears designed to knock down bombers and missiles fired from bombers, not interconti- nental missies. Russians Were First While the Russians in the middle fifties were the first to develop and stress interconti- nental missiles over bombers as a fast, efficient system for de- livering nuclear warheads, an intense American effort in the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties ? spurred by "missile gap" alarms ? far out- stripped the Russians. For comparison's sake, the Soviet Union had about 250 working intercontinental mis- siles in June, 1966, when the American arsenal stood essen- tially where it is today. But in the three and a half years since then, the Russians are said to have achieved a fivefold in- crease, with about 1,350 mis- siles, including some that are still being installed. This repre- Lents._ about 30,Qor.e... la* taws-mastic-448m tittiAlks than the United States pos- sesses. About 280 of these Soviet The New York Tones Nov. 111;1969 Equipping most strategic missiles with separately target- able multiple warheads (MIRV's) could nearly triple war- head totals; 250 level indicates number needed to destroy 50 largest cities if attack were a surprise and unopposed. missiles are of the SS-9 type, which could carry a single war- head of up to 25 megatons (equivalent to 25 million tons of TNT) or three warheads of about five megatons each. Defense Department offi- cials have testified before Con- gress that 420 SS-9's ? if each carried a three-warhead MIRV with an accuracy of a quarter mile ? could destroy 95 per cent of the United States' Min- utemen on a first strike. Thus one objective of Amer- ican negotiators at Helsinki will be to freeze SS-9 construction before it reaches such poten- tially threatening proportions. The Soviet Air Force includes about 150 Bison and Bear long- range bombers. It has, in addi- tion, about 750 medium-range bombers that could be em- ployed against targets in the United States, either on one- way missions, or round-trip tuanteittOniMigN includes 28 nuclear-powered missile vessels, including a new type that resembles the Ameri- can Polaris and carries iqnis siles instead of the three mis- siles carried by earlier models. All told, this force mounts about 200 missiles. Some 120 more short-range missift Ihre carried by diesel-electric vsub- marines. On missile defense, the Rus- sians have 64 operational mis- siles deployed in a semi- circle about 50 miles outside the western reaches of ,Nlos- cow. They are known to be testing a much-advanced defen- sive missile. ? ? American analysts believe the current balance between the two countries represents a standoff, with neither having the ability to disarm the other with a surprise attack. But if either country moved to deploy heavy missile de- fenses, together with much larger numbers of accurately deliverable offensive war- 9thtlasnciendec eoC11.1dItt this possibility that the Helsinki negotiations are aimed at avert- ing. NEW YORK TIMES DATE tbieN PAGE N2 Approvea i-or Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP7I1300364R000300040001-0 COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS OFFENSIVE ?r- DEFENSIVE-1 ANTIMISSILE MISSILES 1.400 LAND-LAUNCHED MISSILES z 1,3504 1.100 ?U. S. I . 1,054? Low $OO SOVIET loo :7 200 1111111b 01 1 II1 1966 1967 1966 1969 SUB-LAUNCHED MISSILES S. ' 656 SOVIET 205 NIB MI IIII 1111110111 1 III 1966 1967 19611 1969 INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS 336 SOVIET 1 1 1 1501 1966 1967 1968 1969 30 NONE 1 644 .4 SOVIET SOVIET 25 _AV 0 II? 1966 )96? The New York Times These charts, showing U.S. ahead in submarine-launched missiles and intercontinental bombers and Soviet ahead In land launched and antimissile missiles, depict rough balance of strategic nuclear power. In the talks begun _ elev. 18, 1969 In Helsinki, U.S. hopes to freeze these weapons systems, except antimissile missiles, at about present levels. To defend against the bombers, both sides have numerous jet fighter planes and antiaircraft missiles and guns. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 ictK*.ift3ft9N9N3itE61119DP7s1E149i3f4R00030004000 Nov-ember 18 , AR?roved F 1-0S 14591 Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. AIKEN. I would suggest that a time which would be satisfactory to everyone would be 1 a.m. on Friday. Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 a.m.? Mr. AIKEN. Yes. Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I know one Member of the Senate who would be very much put out. Mr. AIKEN. Make it 6 a.m. on Friday. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I withdraw my request for the time being. I understand the distinguished Senator from Indiana has a request to make. Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, so that we may "sense" the sense of the Senate and move forward on this matter, with 2 further days of debate, with what is remaining of today as well?and I would think we could go on as long this evening and tomorrow as the leader and both sides thought necessary to accommodate those of our colleagues who have not been heard?let me propose a unani- mous-consent request that we consider voting at the end of the day on Thurs- day, 6 p.m. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request that a vote be had on Thursday next at 6 p.m.? Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I would be constrained to enter an objection, not on my own behalf, but on behalf of Sen- ators who want to speak, together with other Senators, at least one of whom comes from the other side of the aisle. As far as I know, he is not going to favor the position very meritoriously favored by the Senator from Nebraska, but be- fore he departed the Nation's Capital he said that if he were present, he would object to voting at any time on Thurs- day. So I do hope the Senator from Indiana will withdraw his suggestion so I will not be put to the duty of entering an ob- jection; and I do not think the Senator from Indiana wants me to do that. Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, it is difficult for me to imagine my friend from Ne- braska being objectionable in any way. I am glad to withdraw the request, faced with the cold facts as they are. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I re- new my request. Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, what is the request? May we have it repeated? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request that the vote on the nomination be set for Friday at 1 p.m.? Without objection, it is so or- dered. The agreement reduced to writing is as follows: Ordered, That at 1 p.m. on Friday. Novem- ber 21, 1969, the Senate proceed to vote on the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. [The following proceedings were con- ducted as in legislative session.] LEGISLATIVE ? PROGRAM?AN- NOUNCEMENT ON A POSSIBLE ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the Senate, this may be as good a time as any for me to make this announcement with respect to the rest of the year. During a recent discussion with the distinguished minority leader, an under- standing was reached that adjournment sine die would occur between December 15 and 23, probably closer to the 23d, 1969. Further, the second session of the 91st Congress will not convene before January 12, and possibly a few days thereafter. Legislation to be considered prior to adjournment includes the following: Six appropriation bills; a tax reform and tax relief measure; draft reform; a drug bill; a crime bill, a pornography bill; a gun bill?the Lesnick bill; and, if possible, elementary and secondary education. It is our intention to call the Senate into session early and stay late during the weeks ahead in order to finish this schedule. All Senators are advised that Saturday sessions will be scheduled dur- ing the deliberation of the tax bill. This information is provided in order that Senators may plan their schedules between now and the beginning of the second session of this Congress. And on that merry note, I will con- clude. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. McCLELLAN. Will our leader ad- vise us about next week? As I understood earlier, there had been an announcement that there would be some kind of recess over Thanksgiving. Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. May I say it is the hope of the joint leadership, in addition to disposing of the Haynsworth nomination this week, to take up the draft reform proposal, which should not take too long; the Les- nick gun bill, which was reported unan- imously? Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?which bill? Mr. MANSFIELD. The Lesnick gun bill, to provide that if one carries a gun in the perpetration of a crime, the carry- ing of the gun itself is a crime. Mr. McCLELLAN. That bill was re- ported today. Mr. MANSFIELD. Unanimously. Sentences would be mandatory, to a degree, and a sentence imposed in such a case would be in addition to the sen- tence imposed for the crime itself. Then it is my understanding that the Finance Committee may well place the tax reform-tax relief bill on the calendar Friday. It is the hope of the joint leader- ship to make that the pending business and to get started on the tax reform-tax relief bill on Monday, hopefully to finish it within two weeks or so. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, do I understand there will be a session this Saturday? Mr. MANSFIELD. Not this Saturday. At the conclusion of business on Wednesday next, the Senate will have Thanksgiving Day off and Friday as well. Mr. McCLELLAN. And Saturday and Sunday? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Mr. DODD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. DODD. I did not hear all the Senator said about the gun amendment. We did not report the amendment until this afternoon. Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, and I appre- ciate the efforts of the Senator and the other members of the Committee. Mr. DODD. I wanted to make that clear. Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. HART. I hope to make it clearer that the majority leader is not quite ac- curate when he says the gun bill was reported out of the committee unani- mously. I rise only to correct the RECORD. Mr. MANSFIELD. When we get with- in one of unanimity, I think that is pret- ty fair shooting. Mr. HART. The Senator did not come that close, but he came one step shorter. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, would the Senator consider bringing up the draft bill and disposing of it prior to the end of business on Friday? Mr. MANSFIELD. Hopefully, if condi- tions permit. I would like to see it dis- posed of this week. I would hope, when we take it up, that Senators would not spend too much time expounding their views, but would allow the matter to come to a vote as soon as possible, so that the matter could be sent to the Pres- ident as expeditiously as possible. Mr. BROOKE. If the debate on the Haynsworth nomination were concluded by Thursday, at the end of the day, would it be possible that the `draft bill would be taken up on Friday and laid before the Senate? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, or possibly be- fore, if conditions permit. Mr. HRUSKA. Or after the vote. Mr. BROOKE. Or after the vote; either. Mr. MANSFIELD Yes HELSINKI: A HOPEFUL BEGINNING Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the most momentous arms control discussions in history have opened. The United States and the Soviet Union have come together in Helsinki, Finland, to consider how best to promote their mutual security and the peace of the world through agreed limitations on strategic arms. Yesterday's opening statements by Finnish Foreign Minister Kaljalainen, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semye- nov, and US. Ambassador Smith offer clear testimony to the sober determina- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14592 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP1113003D4A0p0300040001-0 ivovembe CQNGRESSIONAL RECORD r 18, 1969 tion with which the parties approach these discussions and the profound con- cern which all nations have for them. As the Finnish leader put it, the so-called SALT talks "will largely determine, not only the prospects of further progress in the field of disarmament and arms control, but also the future trend of in- ternational relations as a whole." I believe that both Moscow and Wash- ington have conle to the negotiations with the most serious intentions to reach viable agreements. A broad variety of understandings may be feasible, espe- cially if it is made clear in these prelim- inary talks that the two States recog- nize that the only stable strategic bal- ance open to them is one founded on a clear recognition of the fact of mutual deterrence. While the urgency of the issues for negotiation is great, and heightened by the quickening pace of weapons tech- nology, there is yet time to address the problem of halting another spiral in the arms race. As Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared some months ago, "The arms race has long become sheer madness." On that conviction, which is certainly shared by Americans, a saner foundation for peace and security can be erected. All men can be heartened by the open- minded approach voiced at the opening ' session. In his charge to the American delegation, President Nixon left no doubt that the United States is ready to con- sider reasonable limitations on all major strategic systems, including the menac- ing new weapon known as MIRV and the planned ABM system. In the President's words: We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence... . We are prepared to deal with the issues seriously, carefully, and pur- posefully. We seek no unilateral advantage. NOT do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third par- ties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding polemics and extraneous matters. I take these assurances to mean that the administration is willing to consider any sensible proposal of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and the United States, including such suggestions as a moratorium of MIRV tests and a freeze on deployment of both offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet Union seems to bring a sim- ilar willingness to the conference table and does not appear to view the effort as another propaganda exercise. Moreover, in recent discussions with American par- ticipants in the so-called pugwash con- ferences, a number of prominent mem- bers of the Soviet technical elite ex- plicitly stressed that the priority task for SALT should be an early limit on both MIRV and ABM. Since Soviet com- mentatoks have long resisted any hint of aclmowlFdgement that ABM systems might have destabilizing implications for the strategic balance, their forthcoming stand in these conversations may herald a basic modification in the official Soviet position. That would be a hopeful de- velopment indeed, since the prospects for halting the insidious MIRV technology will certainly perish if there is no chance for an agreed limit on the anti-ballistic- missile systems they are designed to penetrate. Every informed person will be looking to Helsinki for the signs which will emerge there. The encouraging words I have cited are mere straws and the hard bargaining is yet to come. But the straws are bent the right way and all of us must pray that they point toward the historic agreements that will ultimately save mankind from the awesome weapons it has wrought. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the opening statements of the Helsinki conference be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the opening statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER or FINLAND, DR. ANTI KARJALAINEN Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Government of Finland it is a great pleasure for me to welcome to Finland today the dis- tinguished leaders and the members of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States. We are today witnessing a historioal occa- sion. Two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have decided to begin negotiations on a question whicfh has the utmost importance and urgency, not only for themselves, but for mankind as a whole. Never has the need for putting an end to the nuclear arms race been so universally recog- nized as it is today. By starting these discus- sions the two powers which are in control of the major part of the nuclear arsenal of the world have on their part acknowledged their supreme responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Even as we realize the complexity of the task, we believe that the starting of discus- sions between the two leading nuclear powers Is an encouraging sign of their willingness to advance in the field of disarmament and thus to continue along the road of arms con- trol in the spirit of the treaties on a partial test ban and on the non-proliferation of nu- clear weapons. There can be no doubt that the outcome of these talks will largely deter- mine, not only the prospects of further prog- ress in the field of disarmament and arms control, but also the future trend of inter- national relations as a whole. Ladies and gentlemen, as a neutral country which maintains friendly relations, with all nations across the dividing lines of military blocks and ideological alignments, Finland is ready to make every effort to serve the cause of peace. We are proud that you have chosen Helsinki as the site for your discus- sions. We wish to do our utmost to facilitate your efforts. As a spokesman for the host country I would like to express the hope that the arrangements made will meet with your approval and that the neutral ground which we offer you will be beneficial to the impor- tant task that you have before you. We will now give you the privacy that you will need. We wish you the best of success. Thank you. ADDRESS BY MR. V. S. SEMENOV, HEAD OF THE U.S.S.R. DELEGATION Esteemed Mr. Karjalainen, esteemed Mr. Smith, ladies and gentlemen, permit me first of all to express our sincere gratitude to Mr. Karjalainen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for his warm welcome and wishes for success in OUT work. The Government of the U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the negotiations on curbing strategic arms race. Their positive results would undoubtedly contribute both to improvement in the Soviet-American re- lotions and to the consolidation of universal peace. Unswervingly guided by the principles of ensuring lasting peace and international se- curity, laid down by V. I. Lenin into the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet State, the Soviet Union hnA always been a proponent of the implementation of the principles of peaceful co-existence, of effec- tive measures to end the arms race and of general and complete disarmament. The So- viet moves aimed at this goal are widely sup- ported by peace-loving states and peoples. It is our desire to see this meeting in Hel- sinki successfully solving its tasks. Curbing of the strategic arms race, limita- tion and subsequent reduction of such arm- aments?this is an important goal the achievement of which would meet the vital interests not only of the Soviet and Ameri- can peoples, but also of other nations of the world. Given genuine desire on both sides to seek mutually acceptable agreement without prejudice to the security of our states and all other countries it is possible and impera- tive to overcome obvious complexities and obstacles and to bring about reasonable solutions. As regards the Soviet delegation, our ef- forts at the talks will be directed towards this very end. On behalf of the U.S.S.R. delegation we extend greetings to Mr. Smith, Chairman of the United States delegation, to all its mem- bers and staff. We are hopeful that an ex- change of views between us will develop in a constructive manner and create the necessary foundation for further negotia- tions. In conclusion may I on behalf of the Soviet Government express our appreciation to the Government of Finland for providing oppor- tunity to hold this meeting in Helsinki. We regard it as an expression not only of the traditional Finnish hospitality but also of the active peace-loving foreign policy of the Government of Finland which has won re- spect throughout the world. STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION Foreign Minister Karjalainen, Minister Semenov, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the United States delegation, I want to thank you, Mr. Karjalainen, for your kind words of welcome. I would also like to express the appreciation of delegation for the hos- pitality and cooperation of the Finnish Gov- ernment in providing such a fine site for the preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation between the Soviet Union and the United States. May I thank you personally, Mr. Karjalainen, for your part in making avail- able the accommodations for the United States delegation in this lovely city of Hel- sinki, the capital of a neutral country of friendly and stouthearted people. I also wish on this occasion to extend greetings to you, Minister Semenov, and to the other members of the Soviet delegation. We look forward to working with you on the complex tasks before us. The start of these preliminary talks on strategic arms limita- tion is an historic occasion, for as the Secre- tary of State of the United States said last Thursday, the United States and the Soviet Union open today talks "leading to what could be the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken." Mr. Foreign Minister, Minister Semenov, I have a message from the President of the United States, which I would like to read at this time. "You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation. "I do not mean to belittle the past. The Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and most re- cently the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we hope will soon enter into force, were all Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 ? CIA-RDP71B00-364R000300040001-0 November. 18, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 14593 important steps along the road to interna- tional security. Other tasks remain on the agenda of the United Nations and the Con- ference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today, however, you will begin what all of your fellow citizens in the United States and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the buildup of strategic forces but to reverse it. "I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task: the nature of modern weapons makes their control an exceedingly complex endeavor. But this very fact increases the im- portance of your effort. "Nor do I underestimate the suspicion and distrust that must be dispelled if you are to succeed in your assignment. "I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day. "I am, nevertheless, hopeful that your negotiations with representatives from the Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual security. Such a result is possible if we ap- proach these negotiations recognizing the legitimate security interests on each side. "I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to pro- tect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it is possble, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mu- tually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals. "We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. As I stated in my ad- dress to the United Nations, we are pre- pared to deal with the issues seriously, care- fully, and purposefully. We seek no uni- lateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrange- ments which could be prejudicial to the in- terests of third parties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on con- crete issues, avoiding polemics and extrane- ous matters. "No one can foresee what the outcome of your work will be. I believe your approach to these talks will demonstrate the serious- ness of the United States in pursuing a path of equitable accommodation. I am con- vinced that the limitation of strategic arms is in the mutual interest of our country and the Soviet Union." The United States delegation is deeply conscious of the responsibility we have in these talks to try to limit strategic arms in the United States and the Soviet Union. This objective concerns not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but the whole world. AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY TO FILE ITS REPORT ON S. 849 BY MIDNIGHT TONIGHT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous con- sent that the Committee on the Judici- ary be authorized to file its report on S. 849, known as the Lesnick gun bill, by midnight tonight. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (Subsequently, as in legislative session, Mr. DODD, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported favorably with amendments, the bill (S. 849) to strengthen the penalty provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, and submitted a report (No. 91-539) thereon.) NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT? REPORT OF A COMMITTEE?IN- DIVIDUAL VIEWS (S. REPT. NO. 91-535) Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, as in legislative session, from the Committee on the Judiciary, I report favorably, with amendments, the bill (S. 1520) to exempt from the antitrust laws certain combinations and arrangements neces- sary for the surviVal of failing newspa- pers, and I submit a report thereon. I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed, together with the individual views of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA). The PRESIDING OFFICER. The re- port will be received and the bill will be placed on the calendar; and, without objection, the report will be printed, as requested by the Senator from Missis- sippi. AMENDMENT TO H.R. 13270 TO END THE INCOME TAX SURCHARGE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1970 AMENDMENT NO. 287 Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I sent to the desk an amendment to H.R. 13270, the tax reform bill. I ask that this amend- ment be printed. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. My amendment would end the surcharge on income taxes as of January 1, 1970. When the surtax first was imposed, it was described as a temporary tax. At the end of this year, it will have been in effect for 21 months for individuals and 24 months for corporations. It already has been extended once be- yond its original expiration date. In my opinion, extension of the tax beyond the end of 1969 would take it out of the "temporary" category. I give full credence to the President's good intentions in his pledge that the tax will be allowed to die as of July 1, 1970, but I fear that the temptation to extend it beyond that date will be very strong? just as was the temptation to extend it beyond its previous termination date of June 30, 1969. Each extension of a tax makes the next extension easier. Sooner or later?and I suspect the time is at hand?the Government begins to regard the temporary tax increase as a permanent part of the tax structure. I think that this must be avoided. I think that the Government must keep faith with the people. The way to keep faith with the people is to kill the surcharge on income taxes as of the end of this year. There is evidence that many Senators have serious misgivings about extending the surtax. When a vote was taken on the question in the Senate Finance Commit- tee, the count was only 9 to 7 in favor of extension. I recognize that there is a pressing need to combat inflation in this country. But I submit that the best way to fight the war on inflation is by reducing spend- ing?not by increasing taxes. During the recent debate on the mili- tary procurement bill, I remarked that it was essential to cut the fat from the military budget, but that we dare not cut the muscle. That statement applies with equal force to the whole budget. I am convinced that, despite the com- mendable efforts of the administration to reduce the budget, there remain sig- nificant areas of fat that can be trimmed. For one thing, the proposed budget for foreign economic aid is $2.2 billion. That is almost double last year's authoriza- tion?an increase of a billion dollars. I do not believe that the American people should be called upon to pay a surcharge on their income taxes to help finance this kind of increase. As a matter of fact, I am strongly inclined to vote against the entire appropriation for for- eign economic aid, for I know that there is $5.2 billion available in the pipeline to take care of contingencies. The anticipated revenue from the sur- tax at the proposed rate of 5 percent for the first 6 months of 1970 is approxi- mately $1.7 billion, according to the Budget Bureau's September estimate. Elimination of the foreign aid authori- zation would more than compensate for the loss of this revenue. As a matter of fact, if the surtax were to die on next January 1, foreign aid could be funded at a reduced level with- out changing the administration's budget goals. Foreign aid is not the only area of the budget in which there is considerable fat. I feel sure that reductions can be made without damage to the Nation in the antipoverty program?in which there has been much waste and inefficiency? and in a number of other domestic fields. Furthermore, the $2 billion reduction made so far in the military budget prob- ably is not the limit of what can be cut without risking our security. I admit that, if the surtax is elimi- nated, it will make the budgetary choices ahead of us more difficult. But I feel that we must undergo necessary discipline. We must control spending. In the long run, controlled spending? and not repeated extensions of tax in- creases?will best combat inflation. ORDER 'OF BUSINESS Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL in the chair) . The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. SENATE RESOLUTION 285?RESO- LUTION AUTHORIZING SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMIT- TEE TO STUDY POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERA- TION IN SPACE EXPLORATION Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in recent years, a number of Senators have been concerned over the high costs of the U.S. space program. Unfortunately, efforts to reduce these costs have been Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14594 Approved For Release 2001/08/30.: CIA-RDP7113003641100300040a01-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA1 t ivovember .18,1969 consistently met with the argument that man's thirst for knowledge and the ad- vancement of science compel us to keep our space program fully funded. However, a way does exist to sharply cut our costs on the space program with- out reducing advancements in this area. It involves sharing the benefits and costs of space exploration with the in- ternational community. Accordingly, Mr. President, as in leg- islative session, on behalf of myself and ? Senators GOODELL, HART, MCCARTHY, MCGOVERN, MONDALE, MUSKIE, NELSON, PACKWOOD, PASTORE, SPARKMAN, TYDINGS, and YARBOROUGH, I am today submitting a resolution which would authorize the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to undertake a comprehensive study of all possibilities for international coopera- tion in space exploration. The resolution reads as follows: Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations or any duly authorized subcom- including those in the solar system and those beyond the solar system, and no one would maintain that there is any national value in our taking that long step for mankind. Yet, we all know that it is going to be taken. Unless we move, and move soon, to be- gin to get an understanding of the possi- bilities of involving tries, our taxpayers are g to be o heavily burdened thaje ither they ar going to refuse to gd" ahead, understandably, or we are going to have a Very heavy burden of space exploration1 which, as I have said, will benefit all mankind, but the cost will be on the American tax- payer. Achievements in space inure to the benefit of all mankind, not just to citi- zens of any one nationality. Moreover, any psychological lift or entertainment value generated by space spectaculars is shared equally by the world community. If the benefits are shared on an equal mittee thereof, is authorized under sections basis, why not the costs? Hundreds of 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorgani- millions of dollars could be saved?and zation Act of 1946, and in accordance with should be saved?by encouraging other its jurisdiction specified by Rule XXV of nations to join us in the space venture. the Standing Rules of the Senate, to make a full and complete study of the possibilities In the past, NASA has repeatedly asked for international cooperation and cost shar- the Soviet Union if they would cooperate lug in the exploration of space, including\ and share expenses on various aspects of but not limited to, the desirability and ..,, the space program. A list of these efforts rough the end of 1967 was included in th earings on the NASA authorization bill fiscal 1970, and I should like to read thi "st because I think it sheds some light big., the way NASA has ap- proached this dupstion in the past: feasibility of? (1) establishing an international con- sortium for space missions, or (2) utilizing the United Nations Organ- IZation, or a subsidiary organization thereof, for securing international cooperation and participation in the exploration of space. SEC. 2. The Committee shall report its findings upon the study authorized by the resolution, together with such recommenda- tions, including recommendations for addi- tional legislation, as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than January 31, 1971. SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution the committee is authorized, through Feb- ruary 28, 1971, (1) to make such expendi- tures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ upon a temporary basis, technical, clerical, and other assistants and consultants; and (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to utilize the reimbursable services, infor- mation, facilities, and personnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Govern- ment. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, such a study has been sorely needed for a long time. The benefits from space ex- ploration are certainly international in character. We ought to realize that the moon flights, for example, are going to be just as beneficial to a person in West Ger- many or in England or in France or in Russia, for that matter, as to an indi- vidual American. The benefits are the satisfaction in seeing men in space and on the moon and the knowledge of how invitation. the moon, the earth, and the sun November 16, 19657---NASA inquired about evolved. Nobody is saying that we should the possibility of United States/U.S.S.R. com- munications tests via Molniya I. On January keep these secrets or that we are going 23, 1966, the Soviets replied that it was not to do so. possible to consider joint experiments "in So everybody is going to benefit almost the present conditions." equally, throughout the world. January 6, 1966.?Administrator Webb asked Academician Blagonravov, Chairman We all know that the space explora- of the Soviet Academy's Commission on the tion has no military value. This particu- Exploration and Use of Outer Space, for a lar space effort certainly does not. Of description of experiments on Soviet Venus course, we have to recognize the multi- probes then in flight in order that NASA billion dollar cost of future explorations, plans for Venus probes might emphasize ex- December 7, 195.,-NASA Administrator Glennan offered 'U.S. -&ssistance in tracking Soviet manned flights. The Soviets replied that they would be in touch if the need arose. March 7, 1962.?President Kennedy pro- posed an exchange of tracking and data acquisition stations. The SoViets did not accept. September 20, 1963.?Presidekit Kennedy suggested in a speech to the U.N.'Greneral As- sembly that the United Stat4 and the U.S.S.R. explore the possibility o joint ex- ploration of the moon. Presiden Johnson later reaffirmed this offer. There ha been no official Soviet response. December 8, 1964.--NASA proposed, an ex- change of visits by NASA and Soviet teams to deep space tracking and data acquisition facilities. The Soviets replied on August 13, 1965, that such visits were not then possible. May 3, 1965.?NASA suggested United States/U.S.S.R. communications tests via the Soviet Molniya I. There was no Soviet response. August 25, 1965.?At the request of Presi- dent Johnson, Administrator Webb invited the Soviet Academy of Sciences to Send a high-level representative to the launching of Gemini VI. At the same time, the President said that "we will continue to hold out to all nations, including the Soviet Ungil, the ation in the exciti lie al periments which could complement rather than duplicate Soviet work. Magonravov replied informally that he did not have authority to describe the experiments. March 24 and May 23, 1966.?Administra- tor Webb suggested to Academician Blagon- ravov that the Soviets propose subjects for discussion with a view to extending coopera- tion between NASA and the Soviet Academy. Blagonravov replied informally that the So- viets were not ready for further cooperation. September 22, /966.?Ambassador Gold- berg, speaking in the U.N. General Assembly, said that if the U.S.S.R desired tracking cov- erage from US. territory, we were prepared to discuss with the Soviets the technical and other requirements involved "with a view to reaching some mutually beneficial agree- ment." March 27, 1967.?President Seitz, of the National Academy of Sciences, proposed to President Keldysh, of the Academy of Sci- ences of the U.S.S.R. that the U.S.S.R. pro- vide the United States with some results of the Luna 13 soil meter experiment in ad- vance of Soviet normal reporting to the world scientific community in return for comparable data from future flights in the Surveyor series. President Keldysh replied 4 nionths later on July 28, forwarding data which had already been reported at the In- ternational Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) meeting in London. hand of co space exploratio us." The Soviets did years of for all of n6E accept this March 27-31, 1967.?Dr. Kistiakowsky, during the visit of a National Academy of Sciences delegation to Moscow, suggested small United States/U.S.S.R. meetings to consider such topics as cooperation in weather prediction, lunar and planetary re- search, and orbiting telescopes. At the same time, Dr. Brown proposed that representa- tives of the two academies consider joint space efforts in basic science, excluding rock- etry. The Soviets have not replied to these proposals. April 4, 1967.?Administrator Webb said in his statement on the death of Cosmonaut Komarov that NASA wished to make every realistic effort to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The Soviets have not responded. June 2, 1567.---Administrator Webb pro- posed to Academician Blagonravov that they meet in July at the time of the COSPAR meeting in London to review progress in the exchange of weather data as required every 6 months under bilateral agreements. Blagonravov replied on July 3 that he had been unable to arrange for the presence of the necessary Soviets experts. The required semiannual meetings had not been held since October 1965. October 10, 1967.?President Johnson, speaking on the occasion of the entry into force of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, listed previous U.S. offers of cooperation and said "We again renew these offers today. They are only the beginnings of what should be a long, cooperative endeavor in exploring the heavens together." October 18, 1967.?President Seitz of the National Academy of Sciences, in a telegram congratulating Academician Keldysh on the success of Venus 4, spoke of the need to further full and prompt exchange of data on planetary exploration. Keldysh's telegram of acknowledgement made no reference to data exchange. December 15, 1967.?President Seitz of the Nation-al Academy wrote to Academician Keidysh proposing a small working meeting between the Soviet Venera IV experimenters and the American Mariner V experimenters to compare results of the two Venus probes and to assist each other in understanding the significance of the measurements. Keldysh replied in a letter of January 24, 1968, that he would be sending proposals on this matter shortly. The proposals never came, and there has been no further Soviet response. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 November 18, 19 ocratimMtigit/3RiealcBD P7sM12160 R000300040001-0 S 14519 In addition, Dr. Panofsky notes that in terms of policing an arms control agree- ment the physical activity which we would undertake in deploying other kinds of weaponry, such as bomber defenses, probably cannot be readily discerned from the early steps in deployment of such provocative systems as ABM's and MIRV's. Hence, where inspection is con- cerned, he points out that? The more far-reaching the prohibition of the SALT treaty, the less important the question of cheating becomes . . . A freeze of the "status quo" at present levels of stra- tegic armaments is easier to police than a treaty specifying agreed numbers of com- ponents (missiles, radars, etc.) of permitted strategic systems. It is easier to recognize changes than to interpret in detail what is discovered. Approved F A bullet-pierced American helmet is half- covered by the sand. A tank track, churning over one of the execution trenches, has left a deep depression. The trench to be exoavated is clearly rec- ognizable; a long, three foot wide depression overgrqwn with bright green grass standing out amid the coarse scrub of the dunes. Women distribute surgical gloves and face masks. From a bottle they pour alcohol over the gauze. Eight grave-diggers, mostly barefoot and wearing shorts, begin to open the length of the trench. Three feet down, they find the corpses, stacked against each other in a straight line. With small shovels, sand is removed right and left of the line. With their hands, the workers lift the bodies from the graves onto plastic sheets. The grave-diggers lift the skull of every body out first, gently brushing away the sand. Two men check the dental structure and the length and color of the hair. They re- port the results through their facemasks to four young men and girls registering all identifications in pads. A number for fu- ture identifications is put on each skull. One unidentified victim is found to have a plastic image of Buddha on a slyer chain clenched between the teeth. The torsoes of the corpses, with arms and legs huddled in the crouching, kneeling posi- tion in which the victims were killed, are lifted out by grave-diggers. In monotonous voices, officials announce to the waiting men and women what they find as they rip clothing apart, search pockets for identification papers and military tags. Militiaman Nguyen My, who has stood be- side the trench for two hours, suddenly falls to his knee, howling like a wounded animal. Then his voice becomes a whimper and he touches a piece of uniform with the name tage of his brother Nguyen Due. With trem- bling hands he pulls his dead brother's pic- ture from his wallet, showing it around. The brother's remains are wrapped in a plastic sheet. The package looks like the mummy of a child. Two black-clad militiamen carry the corpse away on a makeshift bamboo stretcher. Sol- dier Nguyen My, crying, stumbles behind. The day before he had found his other brother, Nguyen Doan, in another mass grave. All three had been captured during the Tet offensive. Only Nguyen My escaped. As the hot day wears on, almost every yard of trench yields a body. The grave-diggers run short of plastic sheets and bodies are laid out in the sand. A woman, digging with her fingers through a heap of bones, shrieks and collapses, tears streaming down her face. She wails and beats her hands on the ground, rocking back and forth. After her husband's body is wrapped she embraces the bundle. Other women drag her away and support her as she follows the stretcher-bearers. Some of the women return after burying one relative, looking for others. One peasant woman found her husband and two sons within two days in different execution trenches. Such scences are repeated along the road, to which the bodies are carried and again at the schoolhouse where they are laid out and lists of identification marks are tacked to the walls. More than 300 unknown victims await a mass funeral unless relatives can identify and bury them in family plots. The number of persons waiting graves has become larger each day. Many citizens of Hue have tried to believe their relatives were taken away by the Viet Gong to serve as soldiers, laborers or just to be indoctrinated for the Communist cause. Now they know that the Viet Cong meant death. at the PRESIDENTIAL WORLD TRADE MESSAGE Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, President Nixon has presented a balanced approach to world trade. He has recognized the need for open markets but, more im- portantly, he has also recognized the hardship now faced by some of our domestic industries, such as textiles. Of additional importance to my own Com- monwealth of Pennsylvania is the rising level of shoe imports which I hope can be curtailed, or at least remedied, by means of effective legislation. The President's proposed Trade Act of 1969 will provide some remedy for those industries which are adversely affected by rising import levels. Whenever in- creased imports are the primary cause of serious injury, relief will now be avail- able to both the industry involved and its employees. I believe that the essence of the President's proposals lies in his assertion that? U.S. trade policies must respect legitimate U.S. interests, and that to be fair to our trading partners does not require us to be unfair to our own people. Free trade will not mean much to the working man who is out of a job. I hope that the President's plan will help to remedy the serious situations some of our industries now face in addition to holster- ing our position o siwo arket. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, on November 10, Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panof- sky, one of this country's most eminent scientific authorities, delivered what I consider to be an immensely important address at the University of Chicago, dealing with the Strategic Arms Limita- tions Talks?SALT?between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dr. Panofsky noted that several of the major strategic weapons systems which are coming of age at the present time have the inherent tendency to justify dif- fering Soviet conclusions about our in- tentions. Thus, while the Safeguard ABM is described as a means of preserving our deterrent, it is also consistent with a plan to develop a first-strike capability. While multiple independently targetable reen- try vehicles have been offered as a device for penetrating a Soviet ABM, they, too, can be viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union's deterrent forces?particularly when they are described as enhance- ments of our ability to strike hard tar- gets. The fact that we are moving ahead on both in combination gives special force to the arguments of those elements within the Soviet Union who ascribe war- like intentions to the United States. From this he draws a conclusion with which I heartily agree that? A small step in arms limitations may be harder to negotiate and be in fact more dan- gerous to U.S. and also Soviety security than a large step: Because of the multiple stra- tegic roles of these systems impeding devel- opment of just one of them may be danger- ous to ether side. The more restrictive the SALT treaty can be on the further evolution of MIRV's and ABM, the more substantial will be the success of the treaty in achiev- ing stability. It is my fervent hope that the Nixon administration recognizes the signifi- cance of these arguments, and that it is moving into the SALT discussions with a firm determination to achieve far-reach- ing agreements. I must say in this respect, however, that recent disclosures of the opening posture to be taken in Helsinki are most discouraging. I have been unable to see any Justification for the continuation of our MIRV testing program during the months immediately preceding the talks, and I am even more alarmed to note that our negotiators do not plan to seek a mutual moratorium on MIRV tests as the first order of business. This latter, minimal step has been urged by no less than 42 Members of the Senate who are sponsoring the resolution submitted by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE). Mr. President, because I believe it offers a high level of understanding on the relationships between weapons now under congressional consideration and the prospects for meaningful arms con- trol agreements, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed in the RECORD. There being ho objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION (By W. K. H. Panofsky) After World War II represenetatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have sat down together 5,000 times to discuss the limitations of armaments of their two na- tions. In spite of these efforts to do some- thing about the arms race both countries combined have spent $1 trillion, that is one thousand billion dollars, on military ex- penses. This sum is so enormous that it is difficult to visualize: It represents approxi- mately the total productive effort of the U.S. for a period of two years. Why can't we do better? It is obvious that both countries have over-riding interests to do something about this madness; both countries could have used this enormous ef- fort on more constructive pursuits than escalating the threat of one against the other. Both countries would have in fact greater security if neither had engaged in this arms race. The achievements stemming from these 5,000 meetings have been woefully inade- quate, although not totally negligible: We have the Limited Test Ban Treaty, we have the U.N. resolution banning nuclear weapons in space, and we have the beginnings at least of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nu- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14520 Approved ForetimORSAIO kiat9J'_71fffuff0003000y9i9einpber 18?.1969 clear weapons. Yet all this is very small rela- tive to the rate at which the arms race is progressing, and it does not take much mathematics to predict that the further we go along the road of military build-up on both sides the harder it will be to turn back without disaster. Most arms limitation negotiations involv- ing the Soviets and Americans have involved many other nations also; however the "strategic" arms race, that is the build-up of those weapons of mass destruction involving long-range nuclear weapons, is the province of the Soviet Union and the United States only; America and Russia possess a nuclear arsenal greatly in excess of any other nation and an arsenal vastly more than they would need to inflict total destruction on one another. It should therefore be more produc- tive to hold bilateral talks, that is directly between the Soviet Union and the U.S., to limit the strategic arms race rather than to negotiate in as complicated a forum as the 18-nation disarmament conference (ENDC) which has been going on in Geneva for several years. The idea of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was first proposed over three years ago and personally intro- duced to Mr. Kosygin by President Johnson and Mr. McNamara at their meeting in Glass- boro, New Jersey. It appeared the talks on strategic arms limitation, generally known as the SALT talks, would have a good chance to materialize before the end of the Johnson Administration, but the cooling off of rela- tions brought on by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia intervened and the Nixon Administration has taken its time to formu- late plans of its own. Now the U.S. officially had been prepared to start talking for some time but the Soviets have just now agreed to a specific time and place for preliminary talks, to begin at Helsinki in mid-November. All this delay has occurred in the face of the formal treaty obligation assumed by both nations in connection with the nuclear non- proliferation treaty to pursue seriously steps to limit their strategic weapons. Clearly all this hesitation in the face of an overriding common interest to get rid of the burden and dangers of strategic weapons must be the result of some serious indeci- sion and infighting on both sides of the Iron Curtain. What the conflicts are in the Soviet Union in arriving at definite plans we can only surmise?on the other hand from Con- gressional Hearings, public statements and newspaper "leaks" it is becoming fairly clear how the sides are drawn in the United States in trying to influence the U.S. position in the forthcoming SALT talks. Both sides in the strategic arms race suffer from the lack of a clearly defined policy on their strategic objectives, and how each side is willing to modify its strategic objectives as a result of the SALT talks. U.S. strategy has been described in many public state- ments and Congressional Hearings by such jargon as deterrence, damage limiting capa- bility, first strike capability, second strike capability, counterforce, countervalue, etc. What does all this mean? All this jargon is really a symptom of a dilemma. All military planners know "in their hearts" that should nuclear war break out, prediction of the out- come is really a hopeless task. The amount of destructive power available to both sides is so enormous that will all the computers and "think tanks" in the world one has little confidence in most conclusions of "war game" calculations. Therefore the primary stated policy of both nations has been pre- vention of nuclear war through deterrence, that is maintaining armaments at such a level that, should the one side attack first, then the other could strike back and destroy the opponent's society. Yet the lingering problem remains?what should be done in case deterrence fails, that is if war should break out anyhow by accident, by gradual escalation, or by inadvertent involvement of the two super powers in conflicts stirred up by third parties. To counter this possibility the strategists have invented "damage limit- ing" as a strategic objective, that is they would like to be prepared to minimize dam- age to the home country if deterrence should fail. What does a strategy of "damage limiting" imply? It means that we attempt to protect our population through Civil Defense and ABM, and that we direct some of our air- planes and missiles to destroy those few air- planes and missiles which have not yet been launched against us. But here we have the dilemma: the very things we would have to do to limit damage to the U.S. in nuclear war are qualitatively the same steps we would take if we planned a "first strike" against the USSR. As we in- crease the "damage limiting" forces we pos- sess, the Soviet side would conclude that we would be more difficult to deter from a sudden attack against them; in other words, if we protect our population if war should break out, then the other side would have to raise its total destructive power in order to be convinced that we would be "deterred" from striking first. Clearly this argument applies equally whether you discuss it from the point of view of the Soviets or the Americans. Therefore the strategy of deterrence and the strategy of damage limitation effectively countermand one another, yet in all official pronouncements both ourselves and the Soviets espouse both. This ambiguity in official attitude reflects of course an internal struggle on both sides of the Iron Curtain among the traditional military men who want to retain the ability to "fight a war and prevail" even in the nuclear age, and the group of advisors, among them the majority of civilian scientists, who see sanctuary only in prevention of nuclear war. It is clear that one can not hope for much progress in the SALT talks unless both sides implicitly or explicitly agree that re- ducing strategic arms to a minimum deter- rent level is the common objective worth striving for at this time. Both even with such a consensus there can be a wide margin of opinion as to how large a "minimum deter- rent force" should be. The current, much publicized debates on ABM and a moratorium on testing of MIRV's directly reflects the ambiguity of U.S. think- ing. Let me elaborate on these controversies and how they relate to SALT. As you know, ABM was first discussed as a defense of the cities and their population against Soviet long-range ballistic missiles. The opponents of massive deployment of ABM to defend cities, and I among them, have con- cluded that such a defense would be an enormously expensive technical enterprise and would buy very little; the protection offered could be negated by an increase of Soviet offensive forces at lees cost than what we would have spent in prOviding the de- fense; therefore the result would simply be another step in the arms race with no in- crease in protection for anyone, and with much greater destruction, should war break out. This type of criticism had apparently been accepted by the Nixon Administration and accordingly the President withdrew the Johnson "Sentinel" city defense plan and instead substituted the "Safeguard" system which is intended primarily to protect the Minuteman land-based missile forces in North Dakota and Montana. In this new role ABM would increase U.S. deterrence by defending our Minuteman forces: a first at- tack by the Soviets could not result in de- stroying the ability of Minuteman to strike back. Unfortunately this strategic decision was not paralleled by a corresponding shift in engineering of Safeguard?the actual sys- tem which is now approved for deployment will do very little in protecting Minuteman, and also can easily be interpreted to be actually a first step for a city defense. Safe- guard Phase II actually is intended to be a "thin" city defense against China, but its configuration is such that the Soviets may be forced to conclude that their deterrence against the U.S. is to some extent impaired. This situation illustrates that ABM can and does have an ambiguous role: It can either serve a purely deterrent role such as defending Minuteman, or it can assist in a damage-limiting role if It defends cities, and it is very difficult for an opponent to tell which Ls which. Our view of Soviet ABM is even more con- fusing since we can only interpret the limited information which we have; the only ABM system which we definitely know about is a very marginal deployment around Moscow; there have been "on again, off again" systems, and there are anti-aircraft defenses which may or may not also have a potential ABM role. The situation with MIRV is similarly am- bivalent as we shall see. The term MIRV stands for "Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles." This is a fancy way of saying that a single missile can carry a number of in- dependent warheads carrying nuclear weap- ons Which can be targeted against several objectives at once. MTRV's again have a dual function: On the one hand they can be used us a "penetration aid" against the enemy's defenses: the enemy's ABM can be penetrated if he has too many incoming warheads to shoot at. For this particular mission MIRV's would not need high accuracy. On the other hand if MIRV did have high accuracy then it would become a threat 'against the other side's retaliatory force; high accuracy would make it possible to take out simultaneously such a large number of the other side's im- placed missiles in a single strike to keep most of them from striking back. It is for this reason that widespread deployment of MIRV, combined with high accuracy raises a spectre of a first strike. This MIRV threat was pointed out by Sec- retary Laird when he advocated the Safe- guard as a defense against the Soviet SS-9, which he described as a potential MIRV. Actually the SS-9 missile, as far as we have observed, lacks essential elements to make it a MIRV; some versions of the SS-9 carry three separate warheads, but there is doubt whether each can be independently directed at separate targets. Nevertheless, because of the high explosive power of the SS-9 it would become ,a great threat against the U.S. Min- uteman silos should it be developed into a full-fledged MIRV. A halt on MIRV testing would eliminate this danger. The U.S. position in relation to its MIRV's has been far from unambiguous also. His- torically the decision to develop MIRV's in the U.S. came as a response to penetrate a surmised Soviet ABM system which, however, did not make anywhere near as much prog- ress as we had feared; yet our MIRV plans continued. U.S. MIRV tests appear further advanced than those of the Soviets?we have successfully tested MIRV's both for Poseidon and Minuteman; if forced to discontinue MIRV testing as a result of SALT, or a MIRV moratorium, we could still produce these devices with sufficient performance to serve in a deterrent role, i.e. to penetrate Soviet defenses. As I mentioned above, if penetrating Soviet defenses remained the only motive, then low accuracy for U.S. MIRV's would have been sufficient. However, last year the U.S. not only undertook extensive tests of its MIRV's but also proposed a program to increase the ac- curacy of U.S. missiles. This would be very difficult to justify if penetrating Soviet de- fenses were really the only objective. In fact Secretary Laird candidly testified in the Sen- ate that the purpose of increasing accuracy was to improve our efficiency against "hard targets." This is clearly inconsistent with the strategy of deterrence and unquestionably will give rise to Soviet fears of U.S. intent Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Anroved Foalaitles??MniatINE'7gERTHR000300040001-0 irrovember 18, S 14521 against striking first against their missile force. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Re- search and Engineering, tried to back-paddle from Secretary Laird's statement that up- grading of MIRV accuracy was intended against hard strategic targets: He testified in Congress that this increased accuracy was needed against such items as industrial tar- gets such as steel mills. This statement is technically insupportable. Even if one gives Industrial targets a rather substantial re- sistance to blast, the presently programmed yields and accuracy for both Poseidon and Minuteman III are fully adequate to give a very high probability to destroy such targets. The first slide shows a picture of the dam- age to a machine shop at Hiroshima caused by the first 20 KT nuclear bomb at a miss distance over half a mile. The presently pro- grammed MIRV's for Poseidon and Minute- man have explosive power considerably larger than that of the Hiroshima bombs and are designed for accuracy higher that the "miss" which caused the devastation in the picture. It appears difficult to justify an improved accuracy program to do better than this! What does all this discussion of MIRV and ABM have to do with the problem of formu- lating a U.S. position for SALT? The next slide summarizes the conclusions from the previous discussion about the ambivalence of ABM and MIRV. We can now understand that, depending on how MIRV's and ABM's are deployed, and depending on their phys- ical characteristics they can be viewed either as protecting the domestic deterrent forces or as threatening the deterrent forces of the other side. Specifically deployment of ABM by the Soviets has given the incentive for U.S. development of MIRV, deployment of multiple warheads by the Soviets has given an excuse for U.S. deployment of Safeguard, the possible role of Safeguard in protecting cities will give rise to Soviet fears of being able to maintain their deterrent against us, the possibility of improving the accuracy of American MIRV's appears to threaten Soviet missile silos etc. In short, because of this am- biguity, the whole ABM and MIRV complex becomes an inextricable part of the next large step of the arms race and the world would be better off without either. It is much easier to assure compliance with treaty terms which prohibit a weapons sys- tem entirely than with a provision which permits a specified number of weapons. A "zero ABM" provision in SALT would be much easier to enforce than an agreement limiting both sides to a level corresponding to to the U.S. Safeguard. Since ABM and MIRV's pose an inter-related set of prob- lems we can see that the Safeguard decision greatly complicates the SALT talks. It is this interwined situation which makes the conclusion clear that a small step in arms limitation may be harder to nego- tiate and be in fact more dangerous to U.S. and also Soviet security than a large step: Because of the multiple strategic roles of these systems impeding development of just one of them may be dangerous to either side. The more restrictive the SALT treaty can be on the further evolution of MIRV's and ABM, the more substantial will be the success of the treaty in achieving stability. Starting from this conclusion we are im- mediately thrown into the complex question of policing the terms of a treaty. We are liv- ing in an era of mutual mistrust between the Soviet Union and the U.S. This circum- stance, combined 'with the long-standing tradition of the Soviet Union for secrecy, raises both the question of cheating by the Soviet Union against the provisions of a treaty, and of abrogation of such a treaty fol- lowing clandestine preparations. We know relatively little about the decision-making processes in the Soviet Union's military stra- tegic issues; although our technical infor- mation on Soviet systems is remarkably good, it is nowhere as detailed as we think the in- formation is which the Soviets have about our systems. Most people are quite pessi- mistic that we will be able to negotiate into the SALT treaty a substantial amount of "on-site inspection" of Soviet installations, although this possibility cannot be excluded; most of you know that lack of agreement on such inspections proved to be the stumbling block which prevented the partial nuclear test ban treaty to become a Comprehensive treaty, including prohibition of underground nuclear explosions. Therefore a great deal of attention has been given to evaluating the extent to which the SALT treaty could be verified on the basis of "unilateral in- telligence," that is from information which we gather through our miscellaneous sur- veillance techniques of Soviet activities. How effective these techniques are in detail is impossible to discuss in public; suffice it to say here that even in private there is sub- stantial disagreement as to how good a job we can really do in verifying Soviet activi- ties. The opponents of a far-reaching SALT treaty tend to emphasize the ease by which the Soviet could clandestinely develop and test forbidden military systems and then suddenly "trot out" completely developed military systems which would endanger the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The spectre of "instant ABM" and "instant MIRV" suddenly appearing, fol- lowed by a Soviet ultimatum, is being raised. The fear of a superhuman clandestine effort on the part of the Soviets resulting in a sud- den shift in the strategic balance under a treaty, has caused our more conesrvative military planners to oppose far-reaching arms limitation moves in the past and they are expected to do so in relation to SALT. Yet it is true in general that under the more restrictive arms limitation agreements cheating will be much less dangerous toward upsetting the strategic balance than if the arms race continued with only small re- straints. This point was illustrated above in relation to ABM and MIRV. If one carries conservatism in military matters viewed in isolation to the extreme, any basis for a negotiable position is, of course, destroyed. The degree of absurdity to which this kind of thing can lead became apparent recently when one compares the testimony given by the Defense Department witnesses in support of the Safeguard ABM system with the testimony given to justify continued MIRV testing and deployment as needed to penetrate certain Soviet air de- fense systems (the SA-2 and SA-5 systems) In a possible ABM role. Specifically the SA-2 system is a very simple but very extensively deployed anti-aircraft defense in the Soviet Union; it has also been used in Viet Nam. The possibility was raised that the SA-2's would have some potential of shooting down incoming U.S. ICBM's and thereby would protect Soviet cities; the U.S. deterrent would then be endangered. At the same time when justifying the Safeguard System Defense De- partment witnesses maintained that a system as complex as the one proposed would be required to carry out the much simpler task, namely the job of protecting the hardened Minuteman sites. Next I am showing a comparison of the qualitative features of the Soviet SA-2 sys- tem and the U.S. Safeguard ABM. Clearly, in trying to be conservative our Defense De- partment is giving the Soviets credit for an incredible performance with a very primi- tive system which we deny exists for the much more sophisticated devices which we are proposing should be built. A similar degree of "one way" conservatism pervades the argument relating to our ability to verify possible Soviet violatilms of a SALT treaty. One of the frequently propOsed meas- ures to control the further evolution of mrav technology and deployment would be to prohibit testing of intercontinental bo.- listic missiles which appear to carry MIRV warheads, or even to prohibit or severely re- strict the test firing of such missiles entirely. The question then naturally arises as to how well we can monitor the firing of such vehi- cles by the Soviet Union, both in regard to the total number of firings and in terms of the characteristics of the devices under test. Naturally the experts differ in their assess- ment of our ability to find out what the Soviets are doing. However, as was again re- vealed in recent Congressional testimony, most of the debate deals with the wrong subject, namely whether we can correctly identify a few single test firings carried out clandestinely or specifically designed to hide their true purpose. What is ignored in these discussions is the total picture in which such "cheating" would have to be carried out: The Soviets would have to make a deliberate de- cision in the face of their treaty obligation to man a large-scale program starting from design and engineering, through a clandes- tine test program and leading to secret de- ployment, and they would then have to have the confidence that the resulting system would be reliable enough that it could be used in a first strike role against the U.S. to inflict so much damage that the U.S. could not retaliate. Even if single tests escape de- tection, the likelihood that this long se- quence of events will remain unnoticed and will have an important military consequence is very, very small. Focusing these discussions on the physical detectability of a single test tends to ob- scure the basic issue: Are the kind of risks which would be involved in pursuing cheat- ing on the scale required affecting the stra- tegic balance acceptable to the Soviet Union? What we face here is a symptom of the wrong avenues we are apt to pursue when purely technical reasoning, combined with highly conservative military planning, are being considered in isolation. We are con- triving situations in which the Soviets could accomplish technological feats which we could not conceive of performing ourselves and we are visualizing complex scenarios where the normally conservative Soviet mil- itary planners are pursuing a long-range, clandistine course which would shift their strategic pattern overnight once the covers were removed. Any decisions on arms limitations involve a balance of risks to the survival of the U.S. and the World. We cannot rationally pursue a course where we are willing to take no military risks at all in-pursuing arms con- trol negotiations, while we are willing to expose ourselves to the ever-increasing risk of war and annihilation which the un- checked growth of the arms race implies. A debate similar to the "MIRV" cheating controversy centers around possible Soviet evasion of limitations on ABM deployment. ABM's are complex systems: they require radars, computers, interceptor missiles, con- trol centers and communications. Yet many such facilities are also common to other mil- itary installations, in particular those con- nected with Air Defense: I mentioned pre- viously that in Congressional Hearings Defense Department witnesses raised a pos- sible threat that the Soviet SA-2 and SA-5 anti-aircraft defense systems could be "up- graded" into ABM. Without arguing about the technical feasibility and costs of such a move, it is clear that revamping of Soviet Air Defense into an effective ABM would be a very large scale undertaking. Such an ac- tivity would be almost impossible to con- ceal; to prevent evolution of ABM by these means under the guise of improvements of Air Defense installations it would be good if SALT would prohibit new or modified Air Defense installations also. This conclu- sion is again part of the general pattern demonstraed before: The more far-reaching the prohibition of the SALT treaty, the less important the question of cheating becomes. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 14522 Approved For RigeftggitiR/A3p :08&95'7:_1.150A4ft00030004M1Aber 18, 1969 A second, equally important conclusion is: t A freeze of the "status quo" at present lev- els of strategic armaments is easier to police i than a treaty specifying agreed numbers of components (missiles, radars, etc.) of per- mitted strategic systems. It is easier to rec- ognize changes than to interpret in detail what is discovered. 1 A "freeze" would tend to perpetuate for the time being many of the asymmetries between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: the Soviets are "ahead" of the U.S. in terms of total megatonnage of nuclear arms; we are ahead of them in number of bombers and missiles. Both nations could destroy the other's civi- lization many times over; neither side could hope to attack the other without risking its own survival. The strategic arms race would be halted and the way might be paved for future reductions. Yet only the future will tell whether in the present atmosphere of mistrust and under the spectre of large scale Soviet clandestine programs, agreement on such far-reaching, but simple, treaty terms can be reached. The spectre of sudden emergence of hith- erto secret Soviet ABM or MIRV systems de- veloped clandestinely under a treaty has given rise to another debate which is possibly of even more far-reaching significance than the debate about the SALT treaty itself. This is the controversy about the controls on the growth of technology. All of you have been exposed to the increasing clamor about man's need to put reins on the technology of his own creation lest technology control him. We have become painfully aware that when we make decisions to improve our standard of living through new technological devices we are often very short-sighted in assessing the consequences of each new step. We are apt to balance the short-range benefit of a new device only with the immediate monetary cost. What we tend to ignore are the long- range social as well as financial costs of many of our decisions in terms of disturbing the environment through pollution, through ecological damage, etc. In the military area we are now being faced with the claim of some of our military spokesmen that we must not impede development of new military technology in order to be prepared to cope with unexpected clandestine military devel- opments of an opponent. To put it in blunt terms?the military maintain that evolution of military technology is in- exorable and that we must adjust our lives and political and strategic decisions to live with that evolution. I claim that such an assumption is both dangerous to man's very existence and is also insupportable on its own merit. Our knowledge of science will in- deed increase continuously?the facts of na- ture are there to be explored and they will not remain hidden, nor should they remain hidden. However, the step from science to military technology involves a protracted series of planned deliberate steps extending over many years; man can decide through his political processes to either undertake such steps or not to. Although the Limited Test Ban prohibit- ing atomic explosions in the atmosphere and in outer space has been only a relatively minor move in the field of arms control it nevertheless is a major milestone in demon- strating that a barrier against unchecked evolution of military technology can be erected. This, of course, was the real reason why the Limited Test Ban was fought so vigorously. I see no reason why we should acquiesce to the development of the ever- increasing lethality of our weapons; if we subscribe to the belief that technology has a life of its own and that its progress in any direction, however anti-social, cannot be im- peded, then it is indeed true that man has lost control over his own destiny. I have gone far afield in discussing the specific issues underlying the debate in- volving the U.S. preparation for the SALT alks, and of course I do not know in detail what the issues are which are being debated n the Soviet Union and which keep the Soviets from responding to the U.S. requests to establish a firm beginning date for the negotiations. Part of the controversial issues within the Soviet Union, I am sure, are simi- ar to the ones debated in the U.S.; some of them may well have to do with the special problems which the Soviets are facing in re- gard to China, that is, how to design a pos- sible treaty which reduces the level of arma- ments in the bilateral race between the Soviet Union and the USA while leaving the Soviet Union freedom of action against China. Maybe the Soviet military planners are quoting Lenin who said: "Everyone will agree that an army which does not train itself to wield all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner." This sounds disturbingly similar to the philosophy of some of the U.S. military spokesmen; if such views prevail in either the USA or the Soviet Union, we will see the Arms Race continue unabated by the results of SALT. Whatever the real conflicts are on both sides of the Iron Curtain, it is clear they involve questions which both societies have to resolve internally before meaningful negotiations can result. I hope I have demonstrated to you that the nature of the questions underlying SALT is very profound; although many technical factors entering the decisions each nation faces are basically political. We must not identify narrow military planning with the "National Interest"; we should not confuse superiority in arms with "Security." SALT offers a new opportunity to redirect our na- tional priorities from an unproductive and dangerous technological contest to the solu- tion of urgent problems at home. At stake is the survival of civilization on this earth. There is very little time. In another quotation, Humphrey said: If the media are going to broadcast the emotional appeals of the Stokely Carmichael's and the other agitators, it is like throwing gasoline on the flames. This certainly indicates the then Vice President's displeasure with media cover- age. At any rate, I believe the articles referred to will be of interest. I ask unan- imous consent that they be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Birmingham (Ala.) News, June 25, 1968] HUMPHREY SAYS TV "HAS SPREAD THE MESSAGE OF RIOTING AND LOOTING" NEW Yoax.?Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey says television, "in particular," has "served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble" during riots. In an article in the current issue of Look magazine, Humphrey is quoted as saying: "I am convinced that just as the media can tell the facts to the people, they can also exag- gerate and inflame the situation. "I am not a wise enough man to make a judgment as to how the media should re- spond to this situation. But I do know that TV in particular has spread the message of rioting and looting, has displayed the carry- ing out of televisions, home appliances, groceries, etc., and has literally served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble." Discussing other phases of dealing with riots, the vice president and Democratic pres- idental hopeful, says "there must be rapid introduction of sufficient manpower." He adds, however, "The emphasis must be on men rather than guns." Humphrey also urges police to "use mini- mum force, but make arrests rapidly . . ? arrests rather than shooting." He says police should be trained in riot control and there must be "preplanning for the integration of state, local and federal forces" to enable them to work together efficiently. THE MEDIA Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it appears that former Vice President Humphrey has a short memory when he criticizes Vice President AGNEW for his statements concerning the news media. A story by William Chapman in today's Washington Post states: Humphrey's charges stressed that he con- siders Agnew's remarks and others' comments part of a premeditated and concentrated ad- ministration plan. In another portion of the story, Hum- phrey accused the Nixon administration of mounting a "calculated attack" on the- right of dissent and on the news media. Just to keep the record straight, I ask permission to have printed at this point in the RECORD excerpts from an article Published in the Birmingham News of Tuesday, June 25, 1968, and an article from the New York Times of June 25, 1968. It is not unusual for the former Vice President to be on both sides of an issue, but in this particular case his statement concerning the news media, particularly network television, makes Vice President AGNEw's statements mild in comparison. Former Vice President Humphrey charged that TV in particular has been used to spread the message of rioting and looting. Senators will note in the New York Times article that the Vice Presi- dent is quoted as saying that it was es- sential that television in particular, "and radio and press secondarily," accept re- sponsibility in riot situations. [From the New York Times, June 25, 19681 HUMPHREY CALLS TELEVISION A CATALYST Or RIOTS (By Val Adams) Vice President Humphrey charged yester- day that television "has spread the message of rioting and looting" and "has literally served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble." His comment was contained in a profile of Mr. Humphrey published in the July 9 issue of Look magazine which goes on sale today. The article included his views on how to control civil disorders and the responsi- bility of television, radio and the press in re- porting such events. The Vice President's criticism that TV added fuel to civil disorders was much more unfavorable than the recent report by the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which analyzed the riots of last summer. That report, noting instances of sensationalism, inaccuracy and distortion by newspapers, radio and television, con- cluded that the media "on the whole tried to give a balanced, factual account of the 1967 disorders." Asked to comment on Mr. Humphrey's charge, the National Broadcasting Company said it was essential to cover the news even if it were "unpleasant and unattractive." The American Broadcasting Company said it sought to televise balanced, objective reports that would not "inflame any situation." The Columbia Broadcasting System de- clined direct comment but referred to an earlier statement of policy that it must re- port any "significant trends in our society." Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 December 2, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE For example, the 020 lawyers in 1967 forced California Gov. Ronald Reagan to re- store a $16 million cut in the state's Medicaid program. Sen. Murphy and his oohorts think the taxpayers should not have to subsidize suits against themselves through the legal services program. On the other hand, the law is sup- posed to treat everyone equally, and if the poor don't know their rights they can't re- ceive equal treatment. This is not a question of subsidizing troublemakers to harass public officials. This is a question of guaranteeing an individual citizen the rights that are supposed to be his. The Amencan Bar Assn. calls Sen. Murphy's amendment "oppressive interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen." The head of the National Legal Aid and Defender Assn. says the amendment could cause the poor to look on the legal services program "as a paternalistic handout, meant to deceive . . . not to lielp effectively." 0E0 Director Donald Rumsfeld opposes the amendment and says he'll work against it in the House. If we're going to have law and order in this country, those virtues are going to have to apply across the board. That means the same law for rich THE ARMS TRADE?PART IX (Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.) Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, today I have introduced a bipartisan resolution, cosponsored by 29 of my colleagues, call- ing for the curtailment of the global trade in conventional weapons of war. This resolution urges the President to institute a thorough and comprehensive review of our military aid programs, par- ticularly those aspects concerned with arms sales. It also asks the President to take the necessary steps to have the trade in arms brought up as a topic for debate in the United Nations, to initiate multilateral arms control talks among the major conventional arms producing nations of the world, and to use the power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to work to check and control the trade. This resolution is not designed to pro- hibit arms sales to nations, such as West Germany and Israel, for reasons of self- defense; the purpose is to eliminate un- necessary oversupply of arms, particu- larly to underdeveloped nations. This oversupply constitutes much of the trade today, and contributes heavily to the current high level of international ten- sion. It is also my hope that this resolu- tion will, if passed, bring this entire problem to the general attention of the public. I am pleased to note that strategic arms limitation talks are currently tak- ing place in Helsinki between the United States and the Soviet Union. These talks offer, in my opinion, an opportunity for initiating discussions on controlling the rapidly growing trade in conventional arms. Mr. Speaker, since Hiroshima, man- kind has been rightly preoccupied with devising ways in which atomic weapons will never again be used. Yet, while we have focused our attention on this most worthy goal, we have all but ignored the critical need to control the vast prolifer- ation of conventional arms that has been a stark fact of life ,for the past 24 years. There have been 56 wars of significant size in the world since 1945, 54 of which have been fought in the underdeveloped areas of the world. The nations doing most of the fighting do not have the ca- pacity to make their own arms. Thus, the weapons they use to fight these wars have been imported from the major in- dustrial powers. Fifteen years ago, the worldwide vol- ume of the trade in arms was $2.5 billion yearly. Today, the trade has doubled to $5 billion a year. It is estimated that within the next decade the trade will double yet again to $10 billion a year. This trade is carried out today largely unimpeded by any international agree- ments or restraints. " The United States is the world's larg- est arms merchant. Through an .office in the Pentagon, it currently distributes in excess of $2 billion in arms a year to some 70 countries. The Soviet Union is the next largest arms merchant; it is distributing some $1 billion in arms a year, mostly to the Middle East. Its aid to Arab States, in fact, has been so great that these excessive arms have led the Arab states to provoke two wars in the last 13 years and now threatens to pro- voke a third. Vying for third are the British and French, each of which is selling $400 to $500 million in arms a year. Also intimately involved in the arms trade are Belgium, Canada, Italy, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Czecho- slovakia and Red China. In addition to these government arms merchants, there exist quite a few large private arms traders who buy and sell weapons for personal gain. Collectively, their volume of business runs to approxi- mately $100 million a year, only a frac- tion of what governments purvey. The largest private dealer in the world is the International Armament Corp., or In- terarms for short, which is located just across the Potomac River from Washing- ton in Alexandria. Since 1945 some $66 billion worth of armaments have been pumped into the world markets by both government and private arms merchants. This is a stag- gering figure. Of this total, the United States alone has been responsible for $50 billion. We often forget that in the Atomic Age it is these conventional arms that are doing all the killing, and virtual- ly nothing is being done to stop the proliferation of these weapons of death. There are virtually no international regulations or agreements controlling the international trade in arms today. The few domestic rules each country has on its book are breaking down, partly be- cause the trade is growing so fast that it is overwhelming the existing machinery, and partly because there has developed an excess of bureaucratic obscurantism, . intellectual rigidity and sheer human Ignorance and greed. Beyond the horror of the conventional wars that it has helped to induce, the real danger of the conventional trade in arms lies in the fact that it may be just these arms that will trigger a nuclear war. An atomic war could break out, because a conventional war, being fought among developing nations with pistols, H 11641 rifles, tanks, and jet planes, escalates out of control and involves the super powers. I am also concerned that the arms- selling nations are involving themselves in the trade less for real reasons of na- tional security and more in support of sions have become less important con- nomic reasons. In other words, nations are selling arms these days for expedi- ence and money. The fact that a nation does not need certain sophisticated weaponry and that such a transaction may have serious long-term repercus- sions have become less important con- siderations than the short-term advan- tage and the international balance of payments. This is a long way from the days when we provided allies with a rela- tively small quantity of arms strictly for military reasons. Selling arms, some say, is good for busi- ness, it brings in gold, keeps people em- ployed, strengthens international rela- tionships, keeps our friends up in the state of the art, and promotes the inter- national flow of technology. To me and many other people, this reasoning is not only specious but ultimately self - defeating. I can think of no more mis- guided policy than selling arms to ap- proximately 70 countries for the money? if that policy may result in either local killing or nuclear war. Equally important is the question of long-term national security versus short- term political advantage. Does the huge 1969 increase in our arms sales to Greece, Chile and Morocco, for example, result in increased national security or repre- sent an over-supply which may even- tually be used against our own interests? Has anyone asked what these arms are really for or who is their enemy? Are Greece, Chile, and Morocco under im- minent threat of attack, or are these arms to curry temporary favor with a government and more likely to be used for suppression or military adventures? It is time, therefore, that a full-scale review of our policy be initiated, that the subject be debated not only in Congress, but in the United Nations and, hope- fully, in other arms-selling countries as well. We want to see our arms aid pol- icy returned to the point where it is once again subordinate to our overall, long- term foreign policy, and that, in all cir- cumstances, it be flexible, reasonable and minimal. Today, it is none of these. To do this we need international under- standings. I have been in responsive contact with the administration on this question and have urged that useful discussions about controlling the international trade in conventional arms could take place at the SALT talks. This resolution will strengthen our Government's position and could be the beginning of a long and necessary proc- ess of re-examination. The resolution reads in full as follows: H. Its. 735 A resolution urging new initiatives to stem the escalating $5 billion yearly interna- tional trade in conventional weapons of war Whereas, the House of Representatives finds there exists a $5 billion yearly trade in conventional weapons of war throughout the world that threatens to double to $10 billion within the next five years, and Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 H 11642 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE December 2, 1969 Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that sold, bartered or given away arms have figured prominently in 56 wars of conse- quence since 1945, 54 of them fought in un- derdeveloped countries, and Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the United States Government sells more than $2 billion worth of conven- tional arms each year to some 60 to 80 na- tions while the remaining $3 billion are sold by 25 nations including major powers such as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, and Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the United States Government should supply arms to other nations only to the extent necessary for their self-defense and that over-supply fosters military coups d' etat, promotes economic and fiscal insta- bility and encourages military adventures that endanger peace, and Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the expanding trade in armaments fuels regional and localized conflicts that could escalate out of control to involve the nuclear powers in a catastrophic worldwide atomic war: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, it is the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) the President should immediately in- stitute a thorough and comprehensive re- view of the military aid programs of the United States, particularly with respect to the military assistance and sales operations of the Department of Defense, and (2) the President should take such actions as may be appropriate? (A) to initiate multilateral discussions among the United States, the Union of So- viet Socialistic Republics, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and other coun- tries on the control of the worldwide trade in armaments, and (B) to commence a general debate in the United Nations with respect to the control of the conventional arms trade, and (C) to use the power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the 'United come these additional retirements be- States to work actively with all nations to cause they undoubtedly would eliminate check and control the international sales and distribution of conventional weapons of the need for a part of the reduction in force which is already starting to take death and destruction. Joining me in this Resolution as co-spon- effect. sors are: I hate to see anyone lose his job, par- John B. Anderson, Republican, of Illinois. ticularly when it happens as a result of George E. Brown, Jr., Democrat, of Cali- circumstances over which the employee fornia. has no control. The Congress in this in- stance has control. I propose today a way Daniel E. Button, Republican, of New York. George Bush, Republican, of Texas. Shirley Chisholm, Democrat, of New York. through which we can exert a portion of John Conyers, Jr., Democrat, of Michigan. that control and in so doing give certain John R. Dellenback, Republican, of Oregon, employees a second opportunity to gain Don Edwards, Democrat, of California. maximum retirement benefits, permit Donald M. Fraser, Democrat, of Minnesota. others to retain their jobs, and still ac- Thorns S. Foley, Democrat, of Washington. complish the cutback in personnel cell- William J. Green, Democrat, of Pennsyl- ings which the administration has called Frank Horton, Republican, of New York. for. Albert W. Johnson, Republican, of Penn- The bill which I offer today would give sylvania. to all civil service employees who retire Edward I. Koch, Democrat, of New York. within 6 months after October 31 the Robert L. Leggett, Democrat, of California. same 5-percent increase in their retire- Paul N. McCloskey, Republican, of Call- ment annuities. fornia. Joseph M. McDade, Republican, of Penn- sylvania. Thomas J. Meskill, Republican, of Con- necticut. Abner J Mikva. Democrat, of Illinois. F. Bradford Morse, Republican, of Mas- sachusetts. Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat, of Michigan. Richard L. Ottinger, Democrat, of New York. Edward J. Patten, Democrat, of New Jersey. David Pryor, Democrat, of Arkansas. Henry S. Reuss, Democrat, of Wisconsin. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Republican, of Mich- igan. Herman T. Schneebeli, Republican, of Pennsylvania. Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Republican, Ohio. G. William Whitehurst, Republican, Virginia. of of FEDERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BILL (Mr. DOWNING asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Speaker, the Con- gress provided a great benefit to numbers of Federal employees this year with the passage of legislation which enabled them to retire on the basis of the "high 3" years of their employment. This be- came law with the President's signature on October 20. In order to gain maximuni benefits under the new law, employees had to retire no later than October 31 in order to take advantage of a 5-percent cost-of-living increase in retirement an- nuities. This gave theft a scant 11 days to make the decision, make their plans and retire. On October 29 a different complexion was added to the status of many em- ployees when the Department of Defense announced the first of sweeping cutbacks in its work force. Although additional reductions were announced November 14, it undoubtedly will be several months be- fore the full impact is known. There are numbers of employees today who would welcome the opportunity to reconsider retirement if it still were pos- sible for them to take advantage of the 5-percent increase which expired on Oc- tober 31. I am certain that administra- tive and personnel officials would wel- Now that he has accepted President Nixon's appointment as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, it is gratifying to see that, as his friends ex- pected, he has already taken positive action to assure greater local participa- tion in 0E0 programs. For example, the Director has had pre- pared, and is circulating for comment, a revision of 0E0's regulation on the Green amendment which is intended to make it easier for local governments to designate community action agencies of their choice and to improve the quality of broad representation. Some of the changes would: Ease the requirements relating to CAA program capability; Provide for waiver of certain personnel policy requirements where public agen- cies are restricted by civil service laws and regulations; Heighten requirements for private sector group representation on commun- ity action boards; Reduce the minimum standard; and Elimination of the restriction that changes in designations of community action agencies will take effect only at the ends of program years. In addition, 0E0 is planning specific program activities to increase communi- cation between 0E0 and local govern- ments throughout the Nation. For ex- ample, work already Is underway to fund innovative programs designed to find better ways for local government to serve the poor. Rumsfeld also has ordered the development of training programs for 0E0 personnel so that they get a better understanding of the problems faced by public officials at the local level in their attempts to find solutions for the diffi- culties faced by the poor. In my mind, these few examples dem- onstrate clearly to me that Don Rums- feld is fully attuned to the need for more local government involvement in the ac- tivities of the 0E0. He plans to be re- sponsive to local elected officials and their problems, and has, in fact, already taken significant steps in this direction. I commend him for his efforts in this regard. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, Don Rumsfeld, when he was our colleague here in the House, was convinced of the need for increasing the involvement of local governments in the conduct of com- munity action and other antipoverty ac- tivities. population POSTAL PROGRESS (Mr. OLSEN asked and was given per- mission to address the House for 1 min- ute and to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, all the major recommendations that came out of the Kappel Commission, after that Commis- sion spent a million dollars and an en- tire year, were embodied in an internal, administratively confidential task force report?of the O'Brien era?headed by Ronald Lee, Tim May, and Ira Kapen- stein. Mr. Kappel could have foregone the more than 2,000 pages and five vol- umes comprising the report if he had handed the Commission staff this 38- page internal report and said, "Gentle- man, this is it." In fact, the many similarities between the Kappel Commission million dollar tome and the task force report are so great that, as I recently compared the two, I could not help but think that Mr. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 E 10168 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks eningh people care about their terrible plight?starvation, despair, and almost inevitable death. Yet, Mr. Speaker, I have faith in the natural goodness of the American people. I believe they will respond and help the children of Biafra. I hope that every per- son who reads the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will send a post card or letter with the words "End the Starvation" to: Post Office Box FOOD, Somerset, N.J. I also want to insert a story from New Brunswick, N.J. the Home News: "Sim- ple Plea Snowballs To Aid Biafran Kids." It touches my heart and I hope it will touch the heart of every reader: The article follows: SIMPLE PLEA SNOWBALLS To AID BIAFRAN KIDS If the fact that one Biafran child dies every five minutes doesn't provoke some ac- tion from the nation's leaders, maybe a mil- Hon imploring letters on the Senate floor will, Jack Ellery, who does the morning show for WCTC radio station in New Brunswick, had that idea in mind last Thursday when he launched a write-in campaign that he hopes will snowball into a nationwide ex- pression of sympathy and concern for the war-torn people of Biafra. Ellery reacted to an Associated Press re- port last Thursday that claimed that "over 300 Biaf ran children die every day of starv- ation." On his show the following morning he asked his listeners to write the words "end the starvation" on a post card and send it in to WCTC. "We got a fantastic response," Ellery said later. Jack Sutton, a Franklin State Bank exec- utive, and Pete Sears of the Bound Brook Chronicle volunteered to help from a com- mittee with Ellery to organize the campaign. The Biafran Children Committee has now established a post office box, dubbed "FOOD," in Franklin. Over 400 letters a day stream into the box, and the number increases daily, according to Ellery. "Letters are starting to come in from New York and from Massachusetts, where we have our sister stations," Ellery added. "Our slo- gan is, 'Will you invest six cents of your money and five minutes of your time to save a life?' " "We're not political, we take no sides," Ellery explained. "We have no money and we seek no money. Some of our secretaries at WCTC and some listeners have volun- teered to handle and sort the mail." Ellery said he thought of advertising to help publiciZe his campaign, but that it was impossible since "New York radio stations are asking $180 per minute and the New York Times wants $7,800 for a full page ad." He has contacted a special representative from Biafra to the U.S., who labelled Amer- icans as "apathetic to the most tragic situ- ation since Nazi Germany." According to Ellery, only the French Red Cross has been successful recently in sneak- ing food past Nigeria's Russian Migs, but that even the nightly haul of 180 tons or food falls short of requirements. "The mini- mum starvation rate in Biafra is 2,100 tons of food a night," Ellery said. Ellery's volunteer staff sorts the mail geo- graphically, and will eventually mail each letter to the proper senator. "If I walk into the U.S. Senate with a mil- lion letters, someone's going to do something about it," Ellery promised. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION HON. ROBERT PRICE OF TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 1, 1969 Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I wholeheartedly support the international biological program?IBP?and I am pleased that the Congress also express its support. I trust all Federal agencies and interested organizations will assist the IBP in its activities. As a member of the House Science and Astronautics Committee, the committee which provided the primary legislative review of IBP, I am familiar with its or- ganization, its operation, and its goals. The international biological program is a worldwide effort by more than 50 na- tions to provide a truly international basis for managing the environment and preventing its further deterioration. At present, U.S. involvement with IBP is limited. Through joining in certain of its activities, we are attempt- ing to achieve a better understanding of the impact of: The population explosion, the effect of population increases on na- ture, and the effects that any changes in the balance of nature would have on mankind. Mr. Speaker, while our present in- volvement with IBP is an important one, I believe we should expand it to include the entire spectrum of environmental control. Pollution is a lethal menace to all mankind, and its eradication can best be accomplished if the world works to- gether. Pollution cannot be stopped on a nation-by-nation trial and error basis. The nations of the world must work to- gether; the stakes are too high for any other approach. The responsibility of the United States for environmental control is great. As a nation and as people, we have carelessly and thoughtlessly set in motion forces that threaten to ruin the air we breathe and the water we drink. In our Nation's cities, the menace is par- ticularly deadly. In New York, for ex- ample, badly polluted air frequently causes 10 to 20 deaths a day. In Buffalo, the number of children hospitalized with asthma and skin inflammation increases significantly when the air is particularly dirty. Environmental contamination is grow- ing worse all the time. Our cities are be- coming more smog-filled. Our streams are becoming more ridden with pollut- ants. Our air carries ever increasing amounts of chemical and industrial waste. Unfortunately, as a people, we seem to have adopted a wait-and-see policy. However, I fail to see what we are wait- ing for. Are we waiting until the streets are littered with corpses before the gen- eral public is mobilized in defense of hu- man health and survival? I certainly hope this is not the ease. Fortunately, certain Members of Con- December 1, 1969 gress, with the encouragement of inter- ested private and public organizations have spoken out on the issue, and intro- duced various legislative proposals to combat environmental pollution. In my view, many of these proposals, although motivated by high purpose, have been hastily conceived and poorly drawn. As a result, the Congress stands in sore need of coherent thinking and careful guid- ance on this issue. I have discussed my concern with President Nixon. He has advised me that he is preparing a comprehensive legisla- tive program to combat pollution. In concept, his program will provide the op- erating continuity which many of the present attacks on pollution so clearly lack. In addition, it provides a funding mechanism which will enable our Na- tion to conduct a long-term fight against this lethal menace in a reasonable manner. Mr. Speaker, I am looking forward to the President's environmental quality control program with great anticipation, and I know many of my colleagues share in my enthusiasm. While we are waiting for the President's program, I urge 111 my colleagues to lend their support to the IBP and to both publit and private appropriate domestic efforts that have as their goal, the restoration of a quality environment far all manki d. THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE HON. WALTER FLOWERS OF ALABAMA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 1, 1969 Mr. FLOWERS, Mr. Speaker, the total amount of all goods and services pro- duced by the entire world in the year 1900 was less than military spending alone in the year 1968: Of the $173.4 bil- lion spent on the world's military in 1968, the United States accounted for $79.6 billion and the Soviet Union $39.8 bil- lion, or a combined total of about 70 per- cent of it all. Mr. Speaker, lam informed further that the rate of such spending has been accelerating drastically in the last 3 years due to the increasing costs of sophisticated and highly technical modern equipment. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, as the United States and the Soviet Union opened their arms control talks in Helsinki on Novem- ber 17, there was .understandably great hope on the part of people everywhere that real progress would be forthcoming. For the first time since the advent of the cold war and the arms race, there seems to be at least a near meeting of the minds of the great powers to cope finally with this challenging problem. Failing this, the specter of the strategic arms race could overshadow the national life of both nations for years to come. It is in- deed encouraging that the first of these preliminary meetings has not set a stage for the Usual gesturing and desk pound- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 December 1, ii8Prc"reallgffirdimilreRiT9--'?- FElusliaoso34402,349040001-0 E 10167 all Government bonds with a maturity of more than 5 years at a substantial loss. This loss is so substantial that it would remove hundreds of millions of dollars from the members of the Federal Home Loan Bank throughout the country and actually throw this money away. The re- sulting loss can only mean that the as- sociations could make less home loans for our constituents. It seems obvious that we want to avoid this. This loss would be so substantial that it could cause many of these associations to go into bankruptcy or at the very least, deep indebtedness. This amount of money going down the drain would re- move an equal amount of money from the liquidity reserves of these associa- tions and force them to somehow furnish additional money for liquidity, thus tak- ing many more millions of dollars from its intended purpose of helping home owners acquire and keep their homes. Is it not true that long-term bonds can be sold and converted into cash in exactly the same time that it takes to sell short-term bonds? Of course that is true. Accordingly, the money invested in long-term bonds is as readily available for liquidity purposes as short-term bonds would be. Then why does the Home Loan Bank Board wish to enact, promul- gate, and enforce such a harmful regula- tion? When the savings and loan industry was required to furnish liquidity, the in- dividual associations were told that liquidity would be carried on their books at cost price until sold or until maturity. Any deviation from this promise would be very close to bad faith with the mem- bers of the savings and loan industry. Any losses taken on the sale of these bonds would be wasting the money at a time when cash is so vitally necessary to the country and to the industry. We should each make it or business to check on this situation and vigorously protest what appears to be a ridiculous and dangerous board decision. It would be very simple, I believe, for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to provide any addition to liquidity to be in the form of short-term maturities, and in a few years the old bonds would have matured. Ac- cordingly, the problem, if any, will have been solved without this terrific wasting of reserves and traumatic damage to the associations of the industry. This resolution also provides, in con- formity with Public Law 90-505, that liquidity be required also on the amount of short-term borrowings by the savings and loan industry, and "short-term bor- rowings" is defined as "notes due in 5 years or less." Of course, we all have some responsi- bility for passing Public Law 90-505, yet, it would seem to me that we might have been a little hasty. Certainly there is no reason whatsoever for a 4- to 8-percent liquidity on borrowed money. If a person wishes to make collection on borrowed money, he does not want to collect 4 to 8 percent of this money; he wants to collect 100 percent to this money. Four to eight percent is not a "drop in the bucket" toward paying off borrowed money. I am giving some thought to the possi- bility of our changing Public Law 90-505 and eliminating liquidity against bor- rowed money. Somehow, liquidity does not seem to be necessary. Resolution No. 23-377 is also being considered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and this resolution, simply stated, would en- courage the savings and loan industry, after it has "thrown this money down the sink," to carry this wasted and lost money as an asset on their statement for 10 years, charging off 10 percent every year. I do not believe that it is healthy for the industry to offer to the public a statement which comprises as assets moneys which have long since become substantial liabilities. I have personally written to the The Mounties received a standing Virnon from the 53,000 fans in attendance at the game. It was the first time such an honor had ever been accorded to a visiting outfit in the Atlanta stadium. Semicek noted that Robert Beierschmitt, leader of the Mounties, was shown on NFL television network program on Saturday and Sunday. Beierschmitt, one of the most color- ful scholastic band leaders in the East, was caught in action as he led the Mounties in Atlanta. . An appreciative community is planning to make it a big day for the Mounties tomorrow. eral Home Loan Bank Board wi ence to these matters, an of their reply I will be i to discuss it with e you. Meanwhile, any attention fellow Congre on receipt better position and every one of ill deeply appreciate d assistance you, my men, can give to this most tragic situa n. MOU CARMEL, PA., AREA HIGH SCHOOL BAND HON. RMAN T. SCHNEEBELI 8F,.ENNSYLVANIA IN THE HOUSE 6114,13,EPRESENTATIVES Monday, Decemb 1969 r, dur- ely Mr. SCHNEEBELI. Mr. Spe ing recent years a young but ext talented group of musicians has b distinguishing itself as a high school band?namely, the Mount Carmel, Pa., Area High School Band, more popularly known as the "Mounties." Under the ex- pert direction of Mr. Paul Semicek, the Mounties have performed around the United States and Canada, bringing fame and publicity to their home com- munity. Recently they performed at half time at the NFL football game be- tween the Atlanta Falcons and the Chi- cago Bears, and were lauded by CBS television sports for their performance, which brought the football fans to a standing ovation. On November 25, the proud and appreciative citizens of Mount Carmel honored the Mounties by cele- brating Mounties Day. The following -e-x--- cerpt from the Shamokin News-Item of November 24, will point up the high es- teem in which this outstanding high school band is held and the fine reputa- tion they have earned. I should like to join in saluting all of the Mounties and their director, Mr. Semicek: Congratulations are still being received by the Mounties on their excellent showing in Atlanta where they put on a half-time show at the NFL football game between the At- lanta Falcons and Chicago Bears. Typical of the greetings was one received by Paul Semicek, high school band director, from Howard Reifsnyder, producer of CBS television sports. The letter said: "Dear Paul: "Half time show featuring the Mounties of Mount Carmel Area High School for the Chicago vs. Atlanta telecast on November 16, 1969, was by far the best show I have seen this year and one of the best I have ever seen. The music was great as was the visual presentation. "Thanks for all your cooperation and it was good seeing you again. "Regards, "Howard Reifsnyder." A TRULY GREAT HUMANITARIAN CAMPAIGN: THE COMMITTEE TO HELP BIAFRAN CHILDREN HON. EDWARD J. PATTEN OF NEW JERSEY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 1, 1969 Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, the starva- tion of Biafran children is one of the most shocking and appalling tragedies in the modern history of mankind. When an Associated Press story re- ported in late October 1969, that "over 300 Biafran children die every day of starvation." Jack Ellery, who does a popular morning show on radio station WCTC, of New Brunswick, N.J., decided to do something about it. He started a truly great humanitarian campaign. Jack Ellery asked his radio listeners write the words, "End the Starvation" on . sost card and send it to WCTC. The respo e has been fantastic. With the help of k Sutton, a bank executive, and Peter ears, of the Bound Brook Chronicle, ck Ellery organized "The Committee TiHelp Biafran Children," Post Office Bo FOOD, Somerset, N.J. More than 40 i letters a day are being received and th number is increasing every day. - Mr. Speaker he Biafran war is now 30 months oh d the human toll is un- believable. ousands of children have died fr? starvation and thousands mor ill die unless something is done elp them. Jack Ellery, a young man of deep compassion for people and great love for children, believes that if the post card campaign produces 1 million cards or letters and they are delivered to the U.S. Senate, the pressure of pub- lic opinion will become so great, that there is a good chance action will be taken to finally stop the starvation of children in Biafra. This is not a campaign that is seeking money. Only post cards or letters are needed with the words "End the Starva- tion" and the sender's name and address included. Mr. Speaker, when many of us think of childhood, we often think of Samuel Woodworth's poem: How dear to this heart are the scenes of my childhood, When fond recollection recalls them to view. The orchard, the meadow, the deep-tangled wildwood, And every loved spot which my infancy knew. There will be no "fond recollection" for the children of Biafra, because they probably will not live long?unless Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 December 1, 10.?"vt1RageSiWeliffe8kSIL-111FeTtig9193?fliMPP940001-0 E 10169 big by the Soviets. Each side has seemed gentrinely eager to get down to the essen- tials of the long bargaining bound to pre- cede any arms agreement. Although more time will undoubtedly be spent by each side in testing the intentions of the other before thorough appraisals can be made, it is hoped that the substantive talks might begin in early 1970. Mr. Speaker, there have already been over 3 years of preparation and mostly unnecessary delay in getting these talks started. Under the guise of displeasure over our Nation's policy in Vietnam, the Soviet Union first delayed its endorse- ment. After their approval was finally given and plans were in the works, then came the Soviet invasion of Czecho- slovakia in August 1968, forcing cancel- lation by our Government. The new ad- ministration then delayed until June of this year while it reviewed U.S. policy and our bargaining position. And on October 25, the Soviet Union finally agreed to the present preliminary talks. Early this year, the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. William C. Foster, said: The technological stars and 'planets are now in favorable conjunction, so to speak? and they will not stay that way for long. I think it can safely be said that the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union are in somewhat of a state of balance at this time, although in dif- ferent areas one country or the other is dominant. This relative balance causes concern by those who feel that we should have a clear-cut arms superiority, but the present status may be the "favorable conjunction" that provides the-conducive climate for arms talks. Mr. Speaker, perhaps the most en- couraging factor of the new found in- terest of the Soviet Union in looking for a solution or alternative to the arms race is the suggestion that the voice of the people of Russia is being heard over the hard line Communists. The situation, in my opinion, has gotten entirely too criti- cal for either nation "to keep on keeping on" as we have been doing. I know that many citizens of the Fifth District of Alabama, that I have the privilege of representing, join in the hope and prayer that these preliminary talks will be the solid beginning of productive negotia- tions at an early date. REASONED WORDS OF GOOD COUNSEL HON. JAMES HARVEY OF MICHIGAN IN 'THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 1, 1969 Mr. HARVEY. Mr. Speaker, at a time when this House is again considering vital legislation to proclaim its collective viewpoints as to the absolute need of unity in behalf and for our country in its involvement in South Vietnam, it is my privilege to bring to the attention of all Members an excellent speech delivered recently by our colleague, the Honorable F. BRADFORD MORSE, Of Massachusetts. My remarks are somewhat slanted in- asmuch as I have long admired and re- spected Congressman MORSE'S good judg- ment and sound thinking. I think, when you read over and study his remarks made on November 13, 1969, at the Lowell Memorial Auditorium, Lowell, Mass., you will agree that he has masterfully clari- fied the hopes of all Americans?peace in Vietnam. He has, I believe, narrowed and elimi- nated false differences among Americans as to our Nation's hopes and desires. We all seek peace; we all want peace. The difference now is by what means do we achieve that goal. Congressman MORSE'S remarks fellow: REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN F. BRADFORD MORSE, LOWELL MEMORIAL AUDITORIUM, NOVEMBER 13, 1969 I come here tonight filled with respect? for you whose convictions about our involve- ment in Vietnam over the past several years have demonstrably hastened the pace toward peace?for others like those to whose memory this building is dedicated who died in battles not of their own choosing, for ideals which they may not fully have understood?who gave their lives for a cause to which all men of goodwill, of all times, have aspired. And I bring a growing measure of respect for a country?our country?whose national processes have been capable of changing the direction of our involvement in a tragic and ill-advised war in but a few months?fl coun- try strong enough, confident enough, indeed good enough to insure that the voices of those who disagree with national policy may be raised and indeed may be heard. I speak to you, not with any sense of chauvinism?for that concept had relevance only in an earlier, less complicated day. I do not urge unity for its own sake, for that unity would deprive our nation of the vitality that has given it strength in other difficult moments. I seek with you only rationality rather than irrationality; I plead only for thought- fulness rather than passion; I search for reasoned counsel which will lead to peace, rather than exercises which may delay?even thwart?its achievement. And I address my entreaty not only to those who are gathered tonight in this place and to the thousands of other like-minded Americans, with whom I have proudly iden- tified, who have sought for years to explain the error of our involvement in the war and have sought to correct it, but also to those other highly motivated people in our land who have supported the national leadership throughout the days of escalation and sup- port it now in these days of de-escalation. I trust that my comments will not be con- strued as a defense of the present Adminis- tration, which has been organized by my party according to the slim mandate of the American people a year ago, nor as a con- demnation of any previous Administration. For the hour is too late for partisanship. The storm is too near the horizon for any- thing less than an objective assessment of where we are and where we are going. The time is upon us when we must realize that the issue at stake is not Vietnam, but the United States. The time is approaching when the issue shall not be?in spite of any- one's rhetoric?the integrity of Vietnam, but rather, the integrity of America. To deny that polarization has been taking place in our society would be to deny that today is Thursday, November 13, 1969. To assign responsibility for that polariza- tion in this heated moment would be an ex- ercise in destructive futility. But to fail to recognize that that polarization can paralyze our society and have shattering effects on the hopes of people throughout he world who have found meaning in the basic values shared by all Americans, young and old, black and white, rich and poor, would be ir- responsible myopic. The time is upon us when we must recog- nize and reject demagogic posturings?be they the postures of the left or the right, of the hawks or the doves. The time has come when we must recognize that the differences among Amercans about Vietnam are today more illusory than real, in large measure because of the efforts of devoted Americans like you. You seek an end to the war?so does your government. You seek a withdrawal of American combat troops from Vietnam?so does your govern- ment. You seek an end to any American military presence in Vietnam?so does your govern- ment. ' You seek no American bases in Vietnam? nor does your government seek any. You want the people of South Vietnam to have the opportunity to choose their own leaders and to reject the leadership of the present regime if they so choose?so does your government. You want the casualties to cease, be they American, North Vietnamese or South Viet- namese?so does your government. You want our national attention and our national resources devoted, not to war, but to improving the quality of our own society? so does your government. You seek peace?and so does your govern- ment. So there is little division on goals; only the means to achieve those goals are the subject of debate. Let us therefore recognize that upon which our people agree. Let us all contribute to the attainment of peace?not by angry name- calling, nor by simplistic sloganeering, not by efforts that may frustrate and weaken the only institutions through which peace can be achieved. Instead, let us apply intellect, creativity and practical idealism to find those steps by which the common objectives may be earliest achieved. For free men to do otherwise would be a denial of their freedom?for compassionate human beings who cherish human life to do otherwise would be a denial of their compassion. It is my privilege to represent the five hundred thousand people who reside in the Fifth Massachusetts District in the Congress of the United States. You are among them. I ask of you, and the other Americans who have given me this trust, for reasoned coun- sel and thoughtful advice. I pledge to all of you that your voices shall be heard and your voices shall be heeded. SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAS ITS LIMITS HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 1, 1969 Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, one of the difficulties discussing an issue as emotional and complex as school integra- tion is that the gap between theory and facts is rarely bridged by the proponents of artificial integration. An editorial in the Monday, November 24 Chicago Tribune objectively states views which should be reviewed and properly calls attention to the inherent limitations of school integration. The editorial follows: Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 E10170 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks December 1, 1969 SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAS ITS LIMITS The futility of court decrees and adminis- trative plans for racially balanced public schools in cities with large concentrations _ of Negroes has been demonstrated by ex- perience. Accumulating evidence to this effect includes the board of education's 1969 racial headcount of students in the Chicago pub- lic schools. Residential movements in Chicago, as shown by the 1969 and previous headcounts, tend to integrate all-white schools and then resegregate them as all-black schools in a few years. Chicago's public school enrollment of 580,- 292 is 53.9 per cent black, 41 per cent white, 4.3 per cent Puerto Rican, and 0,8 per cent others. In 1968, the black enrollment was 52.9 and the white was 42.2 per cent. Theoretically, this racial division would permit city-wide integration according to the board's definition of an integrated school, one with between 10 and 90 percent enrollment for each race. Actually, in spite of the board's integration efforts, only 10.3 per cent of the city's black elementary school pupils and 26.9 per cent of its black high school students are enrolled in schools defined as integrated. Thus Chicago's schools are more segregated than those of the south as a whole. The best available estimate is that thruout the south this year between 30 and 40 pr cent of the Negro students attend formerly all-white schools. In the south, of course, the schools were segregated by state laws, which the United States Supreme court declared unconstitu- tional in 1954, whereas Chicago's "de facto" segregation is the result of housing patterns. The federal government, however, has suits pending in half a dozen northern cities to end de facto segregation, and the govern- ment's position has been upheld by federal District Judge Julius J. Hoffman in an order for the integration of schools in district 151, comprising most of Phoenix and flout ii Hol- land and part of Harvey. Judge Hoffman held that segregation, re- gardless of its cause, has the effect of stigma- tizing Negro pupils and retarding their edu- cation, a conclusion that is disputed by many competent authorities, including Negro edu- cators, Hoffman ordered district 151 to re- structure its grade organization and to bus about 55 per cent of its total enrollment to achieve racial balance. District 151 has appealed from this deci- sion to the 7th United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Which ruled in a similar case in- volving the schools of Gary, Incl., in 1963, that nothing in the Supreme court's decisions or the Constitution itself requires racial mix- ing. The appellate court held that the Con- stitution "does not require integration, it merely forbids racial discrimination," and the Supreme court refused to review the case. On Oct. 29, in a case involving 33 school districts in Mississippi, the Supreme court said "the obligation of every school district is to terminate the dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." The court has not said, however, whether de facto segregation is a dual or a unitary system, or what if anything can be done about it. In its 1951 decision, the Supreme Court held that segregation by law denies Negro children the "equal protection of the laws" in violation of the 14th amendment. But de facto segregation is a result of the facts of life, not of the laws. Racial discrimination is unconstitutional, under the Supreme court's ruling but it does not follow that racial inte- gration is compulsory or even possible. If children are assigned and transported involuntarily to schools far from their homes, solely on account of their race, black or white, they too are denied the equal protec- tion of the laws. A Constitution that is color blind protects not only the right of blacks to move into a neighborhood but also the right of whites to move out Enrollment in the public schools of Washington, D.C., be- fore the Supreme court's 1954 decision was only 40 per cent black; now it is 95 per cent. Drastic measures to integrate the schools of Chicago could produce the same results. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CONSERVATION HON. DURWARD G. HALL OF MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REP NTATIVES Monday, Dece ger I, 1969 Mr. HALL. Mr Speaker, at various times during th past few years, I have presented to t e House of Representa- tives Commit on Agriculture, a pro- posal designe to elevate the economy of this Nation' farmer, while at the same time, doing uch toward giving him more freedom in unning his own farm opera- tion. The pro sal called, the cropland and water rest' 'ation bill, has as one of its key featur the proper care and man- agement of ur precious topsoil. A recent tide, "Who Should Pay for Conservatio 9" which appeared in a magazine cal The Furrow, details in a most interest way, some of the prob- lems caused by p soil management. The article follows: WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CON TION? Soil erosion is bad for farmers, bu modern fertilizers it's not the horror it use to be. Rich, black dirt Is still precious but no longer priceless on much of North America's deep-soil farmland. At the same time, from the standpoint of the population in general, soil erosion is becoming ever more serious and costly. Sedimentation of rivers is a problem that will worsen even if levels of sediment don't increase. That's because of ever-greater and more-intense use of our available water. The cost of muddy water is already staggering. It includes direct cash outlays of $250 million per year in the U.S. to dredge harbors, lakes, and rivers. Every year silt displaces about a million acre-feet of storage space in reser- voirs?space that costs at least $100 per acre- foot to build. Add to this the cost of remov- ing silt from water for municipal and industrial use and you get an idea of the cash price everybody pays for dirty water. But there's more: many soils contain dura- ble pesticides that cling to soil particles. As soil erodes these enter into streams, rivers, and lakes, polluting the waters. Perhaps the biggest coat of dirty water is the immeasura- ble loss of aesthetic value in terms of natural beauty, fish, fowl, and wildlife. When soil erodes everybody loses, and when soil stays on the farm everybody gains. This is a key point because it appears that farmers are now expected to pay more than their Share of the cost of preventing siltation of waters. Under modern farming systems (which are necessary if we are to feed ourselves), some erosion is inevitable. This loss can be greatly reduced, however, through such practices as strip cropping, contour plowing, and main- taining year-round cover, along with use of grassed waterways, terraces, water channels, and check dams to store water, All these cast a farmer something in time, effort, conven- ience, and money, and they don't necessarily increase profit. Government funds have long been used in a cost-sharing arrangement to stimulate soil conservation. For certain erosion-control practices in the "preferred" category, the stated U.S. government share Is 60 percent. But it never quite works out that Sseil and farmers usually end up paying about half the cost. For some projects, farmers are quick to see the benefits to their business and glad to pay a 50-percent share. Other worthy proj- ects go begging because farmers can scarcely be expected to spend hard-earned cash if the main beneficiaries are several hundred thou- sand guys downstream. What's needed is a rebirth of the soil con- servation fervor of 25 years ago, along with recognition of this new reality; farmers have relatively less to gain now, so they should bear a relatively smaller share of the cost of soil conservation. A cost-sharing formula that doesn't take this into account isn't likely to salve the problem of muddy waters in our rivers and streams. CITY OF SANTA FE SPRINGS?BEST SISTER CITY AWARD HON. CHET HOLIFIELD OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, December 1, 1969 Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to call the attention of my colleagues to the splendid achieve- ments of the officials and citizens of one of the cities in the 19th Congres- sional District of California, which I am proud to represent. I am speaking of the city of Santa Fe Springs which has won the Reader's Digest Foundation Award for the best single sister city project for 'ty under 25,000 population in the Um States, 2 years in a row. In 19 as a result of the vigor and cooperatio of its officials and citizens, Santa Fe Sp ngs was awarded a prize for the donati of a badly needed fire truck and fire in e to its sister city, Nay- ojoa, Sonora, Me ico. In 1969, Santa e Springs was award- ed the prize for t e previous year's work in designing an building the interna- tional trophy w ning float for the 1969 Pasadena tou ? ment of roses parade. This float, wring many long hours of planning and work, was in honor of the city of Santa Fe Springs' sister city, Mersin, Turkey. This float, based upon the theme, "hands across the sea," viewed by millions of people on television, was an admirable action helping to ce- ment the bonds gf international friend- ship. I would like to have the text of the Santa Fe Springs award submittal print- ed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: 1969 READER'S D/GEST AWARD SUBMITTAL As part of the Santa Fe Springs Sister City Committee objective of planning and con- ducting projects which will foster mutual understanding and goodwill not only between our citizens and those of our sister cities but between people of all the world, the Santa Fe Springs Sister City Committee undertook, in conjunction with the City of Mersin, Tur- key, the ? Honorable Talat Kulay, Consul General of Turkey, and members of the com- munity to plan and construct a float to be entered in the 1969 Pasadena Tournament of Roses Parade. The parade, which is viewed by millions of people around the world, would be, we felt, an appropriate vehicle for expressing our regard not only for our Sister City of Mersin, but for the entire Sister City program. It was Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 December 15, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD? SENATE tary personnel, which can be used else- where. The basic issue was debated at great length on the authorization bill and ended in a 504o-50 tie vote. So this debate is not going to change, anyone's mind. If there has been any change of mind, that change has come before this debate. The purpose of this amendment is the opportunity for those of us who oppose the Safeguard ABM system to register our continuing opposition. An incidental use will be gained in that the vote will offer an opportunity for some to record their change of mind on this issue in changing their vote from their vote on authorization of the system. I want to clearly record the fact that I have not changed my mind. In fact, from what I have been told by some working on the Safeguard system?told since the authorization vote?I am all the more convinced that spending funds for the Safeguard ABM system is a tragic waste of funds and resources. I am confident that the very near future will demonstrate the tragedy of the Safeguard ABM system and in con- trast the superiority of a laser defense system. In short, I simply cannot vote to spend money and resources on what I consider to be a defective system. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO SECRETARY ROGERS Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had meant, during the morning hour today, to make a brief statement on the situa- tion in the Middle East. Since that op- portunity was not available to me earlier in the day, I take the liberty of detaining the Senate for a few minutes to make the statement now. Today's reports of the Pravda article commenting on Secretary Roger's con- troversial speech of December 9 clearly reveals Soviet intentions with respect to the Middle East?intentions that are most disquieting. While the world looks for a spirit of cooperation and respon- sibility in the SALT talks, the Soviet Union can hardly make a good impres- sion when it continues to take the low road in Cairo and Damascus, while seek- ing to appear to take the high road in Helsinki. Secretary Rogers' speech contained strong overtures to the moderate Arab governments and foreshadowed a tough U.S. stance vis-a-vis Israel's substan- tive position on the outstanding issues concerning a peace settlement. The ma- jor effort by the Nixon administration to. go the extra mile to bridge the gap in the Mideast?even at the cost of undermin- ing Israel's position?was motivated, I have no doubt, by a genuine desire to promote peace. A Soviet diplomatic offensive against the U.S. Middle East policy, which seems now to have been inaugurated, presents a challenge for debate on the international level, which the United States should not forego. The Soviet Union is either preaching to us or scolding us on our policy without itself making any contri- bution to peace in this area. The whole world agrees that there is a great danger in the Middle East, But the danger, I feel, is not so much between the great powers as it is in the possibility of the whole area once again plunging into flames with re- percussions which no one can predict. While the United States announced a policy of "balance" and sweet reason- ableness?a policy which I feel is well- intentioned but misguided?the Soviet Union engages in nothing more than pandering to the most intransigent posi- tions of its radical Arab clients.The ex- ercise is strictly one of seeking to dis- credit the United States without making any contribution to peace in the area. Whatever may be the Soviet Union's intentions elsewhere, it obviously intends to play a strictly opportunistic, irrespon- sible and power-grabbing role in the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. has now made It clear that its policy in the Mideast is to take a mile every time the United States gives an inch. Secretary Rogers' detailed state- ment of U.S. differences with Israel has not been paralleled by any Soviet indi- cation of any differences with the un- relentingly extremist position of its Arab clients. In fact, the U.S.S.R. in the few days since Secretary Rogers' speech has alined itself even more closely?if that is possible?with the straight propaganda line of President Nasser's United Arab Republic, even to the extent of backing the guerrilla movement in the Middle East. The U.S. concessions in Secretary Ro- ger's speech have been attacked in Pravda as "tricks" of "Washington prop- aganda" designed to "split" the Arabs. The new U.S. policy is described as one of "support to the Israeli ruling circles in their aggressive actions, in their stub- born attempts to annex territories." The 'U.S.S.R. obviously is seeking to draw the United States into a policy of entrapment there?one of extracting one U.S. "concession" after another? by constantly raising the bidding price. What is at stake is the very survival of Israel. No one can expect Israel to go back to the pre-June, 1967 situation, with Syrian guns firing down its throat from the Golan heights, with Jordanese me- dium artillery able to interdict the 12- mile waist of Israel and cut the country in two, and with Egypt able to cut the entry to Elath and to mobilize in the Sinai desert. It is a matter of gravest concern and regret that the Soviet Union continues to pursue such a dangerous and irre- sponsible policy in the Mideast. It is a real understatement to say that the U.S.S.R. Is not proceeding in the Mid- east with the spirit of cooperation and responsibility that we have some reason to suspect may be in the offing regarding the SALT talks and other overall U.S.- U.S.S.R. issues. In my judgment, it is time for the Kremlin to realize that if it does want to move?in President Nixon's memorable phrase?from the "era of confrontation to the era of ne- gdtiation" it cannot make an exception of the Mideast. The issues are too seri- ous there. It is clear that the Soviets are not prepared at this time to respond in any S 16771' reasonable, just, or responsible manner to Secretary Rogers' high-minded?but in my judgment misguided?effort to place the United States in an "even- handed," "balanced," and intermediary posture in the Mideast. The only visible results thus far have been a strong So- viet reiteration of down-the-line support of the radical Arab position. Also, the Soviets have for the first time expressed overt support for the Arab terrorist guerrilla movement. In this context, the low-keyed request of Prime Minister Golda Meir to Presi- dent Nixon, during her recent visit to buy additional defensive arms?hope- fully on less onerous terms?assumes a new urgency. If the United States does not lose its nerve and does not allow itself to be maneuvered into pressing Israel to ac- cept measures which could compromise its security, current radical Arab and Soviet policy will fail, the bankruptcy and total negativism of its premises will be exposed and a new era of opportunity and enlightenment can open in the Mid- dle East, But if Israel loses her viability as a free state?either because we unwit- tingly encourage her enemies to think they have a chance to wage one last holy war against her, or because our "balanced" policy forces Israel into bankruptcy to maintain her military de- fense against such a war?it would pose the gravest implications for the United States and for the peace of the world. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I asso- ciate myself with the remarks of the Senator from New York and congratu- late him for bringing the matter before the Senate today. I have also been interested in these developments. I have read with great concern the apparent further attempt at appeasement, which is exactly the thing that the representatives of Israel have worried about from the beginning. They were afraid that it would happen in the U.N. They asked to meet with the Arabs. The Israelis and the Arabs are the ones concerned. We seem now to be in the position of helping the real troublemakers in provid- ing them with the side entrance, so to speak, so that the real meeting between the Israelis and the Arabs could not take place. I think this is a great mistake. I think that the attempt is badly taken. And I think that the wisdom of it is very ques- tionable. I am certain that the position the Sen- ator from New York and the Senator from California have taken from the be- ginning is a proper position. I sincerely hope that the remarks the Senator has made today are transmitted forthwith to the Secretary of State so that he will know that some Senators are listening to this and are watching it and are knowledgeable and have some judgment as to the matter. Mr. JAVITS. Mr, President, I am very grateful to my colleague. . I will yield to no one in my desire for good relations with the Soviet Union. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 S 16772 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 15, 19C9 However, I also feel that we have to be., very clear in our own minds about certain things. We should realize that it has long been the practice of the Soviet Union to convey an attitude of cooperation and detente in one place?apparently there seems to be that kind of attitude in Helsinki?and at the same time to play the very dangerous game of brinkman- ship with peace without responsibility in another place?the Middle East. I have made my remarks today so that we may be conscious of the fact that the U.S.S.R. can carry on both kinds of poli- cies and that our policy must be adjusted accordingly. We cannot allow ourselves to be taken in by a cooperative atmosphere in an- other policy area so as to jeopardize the security of a very effective and durable ally. The adoption by the Soviet Union of an intransigent position, with which I have confidence the administration thor- oughly disagrees?that is the position of the Arab States?should not induce us to make unwarranted concessions. I think that under the guise of trying to be balanced and fair, we could be taken in. I have made my remarks today to call the matter to the attention of the Senate. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1970 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the bill (H.R. 15090) mak- ing appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) . I will be very brief here today because, as my colleague has pointed out, I think that most everyone has made up his mind and each has heard all of the arguments on the .ABM question. However, I should like to introduce a subject that was not involved in the previous debate?something that has come to be recognized as a new term by the Defense Department, called "cost growth." We used to call it "overruns" or the other terms that were given to it. They were meant to indicate that there was a change from the original estimate of a weapons system to the kind of figure we were dealing with when it finally ended up, or when we were making con- tinuing appropriations. Mr. President, I read from the state- ment of Mr. Packard, Assistant Secre- tary of Defense, when he indicated last spring, as appears in the RECORD of De- cember 12, 1969, on page S16601: Neither the Department of Defense nor the Congress will continue to tolerate large cost overruns which relate to unrealistic pricing at the time of award, or to inadequate man- agement of the job during the contract. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) , on December 1, issued a statement which included 35 weapons programs and the differences which we could expect to find with between the original cost estimate and the current cost, because of any "cost growth." In the 35 weapons systems, the ABM Safeguard was included. The chart which was released by the chairman indicated that the current estimate for the Safe- guard was the same as the original esti- mate?namley, $4.1 billion?and that, therefore, there had been no cost growth from the time of the original estimate to the time of the release, which was De- cember 1. Mr. President, I made some inquiries and I would like to report to the Senate some of the results of those inquiries. The total cost estimate of the Safe- guard ABM system has risen by $277 mil- lion since we last considered this issue. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee reported, as I have said, on December 1, 1969 that there had been no increase in the original $4,185,000,000 cost estimate, the Pentagon informed me Saturday, after persistent inquiry, that the cost had escalated , by this amount. The Defense Department has claimed that this 6%-percent increase has taken place since its last program status re- port of June 30, 1969. I do not know why such a cost growth was not reported on December 1, unless an increase of more than a quarter of a billion dollars has taken place in the 12 days since then. Increasing at a rate? of 6% percent every 5 months, the phase I deployment of the Safeguard system will not cost the taxpayers $4,185,000,000, as orginally claimed, but rather $13,700,000,000 by its completion in 1976. Such a projection is not at all unrealistic, for recent history has witnessed the cost of weapons sys- tems growing by such proportions. Further, the Pentagon's $4.185 billion estimate was only for phase I of Safe- guard, or deployment at just two sites. Should we proceed with phase II of the system, the original cost estimate of $10.3 billion could well rise above $25 billion. These are the expenditures that are ulti- mately at stake by our decisions today. We all know of the financial crisis within our land. All of us are alarmed by seemingly unchecked inflation. During the debate on the tax bill last week, time after time, colleagues have spoken about the absolute need for fiscal responsibil- ity. For instance, some argued that we could not give a deduction for the medi- cal expenses of those over 65 and not covered by medicare; we could not afford the $255 million this would have cost us in fiscal year 1970, it was said. But the increase in the ABM during just these past 5 months exceed that, and the total ABM funds in this appropriations bill are more than three times as much. In explaining the reasons for this cost increase to me, the Pentagon stated that Ws percent was due to "stretchout," 2 percent was due to "design and estimate changes," and VA percent due to infla- tion. I find this last cause to be some- what ironic. All of us would agree that a certain step toward the control of inflation is the reduction of Government expendi- tures. But the truth is that the most fiscally irresponsible Government spend- ing today is defense spending. One reason why the cost of weapons systems increases, then, is simply because massive funds are spent for them dur- ing this time of economic instability, becoming a primary cause of inflation. The reasons for not proceeding with ABM deployment at this time have been clearly set forth in the past. Today, in light of this new information, I wish to emphasize only one: We cannot af- ford it. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the fact sheet given to me on Saturday by the Pentagon confirming this cost increase be inserted in the RECORD. There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: FACT SHEET 1. Secretary Laird has placed great stress since coming into office on making the Pro- gram Status Reports submitted to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees an accurate reflection of the major weapons system acquisition programs, characteris- tics, and costs. The last Program Status Re- port submitted to you with regard to the Safeguard program was as of 30 June 1969, and showed the DOD acquisition, or DOD investment costs, expected for the Safe- guard program as $4185 M. These costs in- clude the DOD RDT&E, PEMA and MCA for Safeguard Phase 1 for the period FY 68 through deployment of the last site. 2. The next Program Status Report on the Safeguard program is now in its final stage of review. It is expected to be forwarded shortly to the Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The Report on Safeguard will show a cost increase over the earlier Safeguard reports and we wanted you to have this information as early as possible. The total increase shown in the new report will be $277 M, or a percentage increase from the earlier reported total of about 6% per cent. This increase is brought about by three basic causes. a. The largest cause is the inflation that has occurred. In this regard, initial estimates of March and those of the 30 June report were based on the price levels as of 31 De- cember 1968. We have now updated those costs to a 31 December 1969 level so that they will be in agreement with the budget and authorization submissions for FY '71 now being prepared. Approximately $136 M of the $277 M is due to this price level change, or 31/3 percent of the earlier reported total pro- gram investment costs. b. Then, too, as you realize, we have held back on major commitments for construc- tion and PEMA until after passage of the authorization and appropriation bills. This has necessitated our delaying the Equipment Readiness Dates of the two site complexes by 3 months each. Completion of deployment of the second site complex is now delayed from the earlier scheduled July 1974 to Oc- tober 1974. In other words, it has stretched out the deployment and the period over which our production/engineering base is maintained. This stretch-out has caused an increase of $55 1VI, or Ws per cent of the earlier reported total program investment costs. c. Finally, and the second largest, we have had certain changes in the estimates of sev- eral line items brought about by further estimation and study and a few necessary design changes. These together account for $86 M of the increase, or about 2 per cent of the earlier reported total investment costs. d. In summary, then, the total cost in- crease shown in the next Program Status Report will be one of about 6% per cent: of Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300040001-0