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Approved For ReNase's1003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508ROGSPI0AS0011-2 i NRO REVIEW COMPLETED 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A OPOSALJ1OR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM kte_ Set forth below are certain basic assumptions which determine the organisation appropriate for the administration and direction of the National Re cesutai mimic* Prograxn (NRP). rhsee assumptions reflect a general COPIII?aiiii of opinion of qualified individuals item the intelligence and scientific communities who have observed or participated in the National Reconnaissance Pregrara since 1934-.J A. The national character of this essential inteUlgence enterprise mast be maintained through a joint endeavor 014 the part of Del) and CIA. B, Tho potentialities of U.S. technology n&st be aggri.atvsty and imaginatively exploited to develop oyster" s for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to Intelligence needs and objectives. In the development of new systems maxisnaza use meet inp made of the onqperience, reeources, facilities and technical competence of appropriate components of the Defense Lmpartaranat and CIA. C. Scheduling and targotting of satellite and manned aircraft reconnaissance missions over dented areas should he Or responsii. bility of the DC! and the tlatva States Intelligence Board (USI:13). D. A new organisational framework is required which, particularly in the field of satellite rilIC01111111.igfille41 operations 11114 ayetenis development. will: (1) provirie a clearly ertabliebod delineation of the roles and responsibilities of components of the Governrs,ent engaged in these activities. anc (2) ensure atiective coordination of the.. activities -under centra.lized policy guidance and coritrol. Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71 ) 8R0001000 25X1A 4,9111,1111,17,Sii W VFW . Approved For Relgase42003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508R4i101011060011-2 25X1A 25X1A HANDLE VIA CONTROL SYSTEM T.14 " r. An Litecittive Committee. consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, *ill be eetablistissi te formulate. guide. sad regulate the NRF. Specifically the linecuatve Committee will: 1. Examine IhAs reconnaissance rim rentable provided by USIB against technical and fiscal capebilities, se ask to establish an appropriate level of effort for the IMP. bt this rola it 4411 rely largely as cost estimates and technical feasibility analyses prepared by the DNR and the component elitreente of the Nit Orgaaisation and MU; views expreured with knowledge of cost factors. 2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR program and Its budget as forwarded by the DNR. 01/1?411irfv" koit'ONAt I. Acting through the DNIt afloat's* respeessibilityd, to CIA andior DOD for research and preliminary design.. ' studies for "LOW systems. Dvv-A- t. Allocate development respassibilitylior specific ?-\-"--4/' TOCCUalial1141,14C ? progra-ns to DOD or CIA. and establish guidelines for mutual support upettere appropriate. It shall be tree to use technical advisory groups as necessary. S. Assign operational responsibilities to either DOD or CIA for various typos of L.:mimed overflight misSi03211t subject to the concurrence, as appropriate, of the 303 Co anthem,. 6. Review periodically the essentiaL features of the major program elements of the NRP. MA/41)LE VIA _ Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B0050EiR0001015'03001-1-4-- LiA1-65 Approved For Release 9i103/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508ROW4(00011-2 HANDLE VliTzt CONTR6L S CPNLY (1--1?- \ 1010 y kvd1- ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NA'r1014AL RECONNAIIIIIANCIt: To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance Activities a Director of National ROCOBibilie Mite* Will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence. He Mil prowl& a *Ingle point of Wegner!** for the planning and budgeting a the National Receenaisseace Pregrem and will be responsible to the Executive Committee for the estecutt of the program. Specifically, he will: 1. Assume such cern naad rs sponsibilitie is over DOD elements of the NRP as the Secretary of attestse may designate Ho will establish suitable lines of coardtinoties nith thee* Item components which do net respond directly to him. Z. Be kept fully and completely tafuri4 d of ..11 roweilmarbitio since activitios in CIA and DOD. 3. Schedule the use e: the space tau, hlag tvecldng and recovery facilities. 4. Review budget proposole submitted by apprepriato elements of CIA and DOD sad prepare mid submit a consolidated budget for *sambaed= and approval bi the Zsecutlyee Committee. S. Ensure the flow of feuds from the NRP appropriations to CIA and appropriate 1)01) elements in lump sum transfers each fiscal year. lacremectel fundiag from reserve or re- programming eources will be used for supplemental programa approved by .ExCorsi. 6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his deetwsated alternate on all matters of policy, coortination or guidisace. He will not exercise command control over subordinate elements of CIA or its personnel. 7. Sit v.4th the USIB for the matters affecting 25X1A 3. Appear before the 303 Committee to the extent ds.4rsd 25X1A by the DCI or the Deputy Secretary of betels.* to M44111190 approval for overhead 'swanned!! canes IWO clone. Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP7 Boo5orp997,ip,a9ooi 1-2 - 2 - HANDLE VIA itai4 Approved FoNRelehet 2003/03f 25X1A kiAND.L.Z. VIA CONTROL SYSTLIA ONLY NkP' I'4?FiTh3 ANDr-14,4LLY-LINARN VILA- I. EAR mai d% en roommate/mac* teekaology sad preliminary design of new systwas will be encouraged sad sappeorted, is bedit CIA and DOD. It wilt be suppoireed by a lamp 011D1 111000USIR fife= riRp feats to .ac -a grop at a level to be established by Ilb? c:xecutive Cora-nines. 25X1A 17.71-?; ? CIA-RDP71B00504R01194100030011-2 i. prescrtbed snipe:IC*1 times resources will be allesets4 for supper: of 'stoic research Gi seconnistssaace technology to nulate aad assi:re the bins* Tiro: f thist B&W. The OMR will be kept fully informed at all activities' and develeprosena in this consaction for the purpose of ea suiting appropriate coordination and preventing unwitting dilco:W*1AS well at eneettrogiag joint exploitation of new tschniquee. 1.3k Preliminary design and small teschrticel feasibility dermenstrutiesse el skew reconasissence piston-4s will also be Nailed from this ianovetion rioseurce. Suck work can grew autii Ts- quitirnents originating with Mai. the ilxCovm or the DWI ter littprevementa in existing capabilities. or can result from spooduneoet- leitiativa in the cif% end 00.1) participating ele-veate. lionvever, it is ape:taut that the DNR and ExCwm receive sack ronath a apirebeasive report on the initiation, status, or cearitssien01 ouch efforts. fa this .vay. competitive study efferts will be recognised, approved or diecoaraged, and cyndtreslised for later decision actions. It is intended that these lands sad tbortr produitt the flexible cutting edge of the POCOMIAMSJIMMICR program They Ouetati v5t be used te fend actual developatent or operational activities. `11 5vsT pir,VEL.011.4.484 1 . 1. 0, hitil a new syste'n coacept has been officiest, defined and its technical feasibility Issteblielarr-lb the eittieteittiort tue 1.11c...-.3 :rt, It ireettld he bscladed in the tawniery of the filtP. ^it this poi**, it should receive necessary funding limn line item. in the bedget identified With thta. ayetents. These its waste! then be sliecated to CIA and/or DOL. to sopecifie eievalop- toed by tb- ;::arC01-11., ApprOrMW eigattrAlettlitk.aCir-VRAAII0508R0001-00030011 -2 - 3 .A.,\NDL'AL ,TIAJ " 'lr 4 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A Approved Foragelevee' 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600588K0081$30030011-2 HANDLE VIA -C-O-FriRC?TnY=ENTUFILY 2. The *lenient of CIA and/or DOD assign.ed develops:taut responsibility for a new system will be responsible for eelectbiti and supervising capable contractors; for establishing such systems engineering support aa they deem necessary; for rendering periodic reports on program progress to the iaNit and i:;,x(,:Orn and generally for the success of the program. 3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are characterised primarily by the payload (cameras, spacecraft data recovery system) air well as by their boosters. /he interface between the launch system IMO the payload is of critical importance and planning for compatible checkout and launch facilities, boosters, tracking and recovery mast proceed with the payload develop Me nt. The DNR will be responsible for the mecums of this interface. 21 4 its a matter of principle. In order to avoid licatiort and ?mote efficiency and economy, devslopme res-ponei- bilitie will be rt?tgarod with 4. tr,iew to utilia to the fullest extent hie established corripetence cyst reemarees isadt or s as space ,and re-entry cl hoosteits-.,and reiated *qui ent. Ne bard find Is rule4-,c an govern deeteions allocating tee. .nubility for dove pment of systems or compri::- nents of system and general ciples of efficitioy, based on informed co sense iust prevail. A normal phas I. the initial flight t of the completed p coasducted by lauc nh and the direct of the re deveto per I satellite development programs orbit and engineering proof stem. These flight teats will be L responsible for assevnbly. vehicle, (pre surnably usher eue regard to\the adviceIY.w n CIA or DOhich has must obviously he ei an appropriate payload to he yload ? lament of ght 'control pervision of DNR) seentatives of the *ler* the payload. Flight test mod under circumstances whi rtunity for those who have develop/0 rd on matters which may affect their engineering...0r Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508R0001 - 4 - HANDLIC VIA ant SYV...i1m OIL) 4538-6i 25X1A 171. itt.01A.V31441: Approved Foriaelebee 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B005011,11009000030011-2 HANDLE VIA CONTR6L SYSTEM ONLY technical sta. nights wo expected to include as many tate (ince t rgets re cattaitt with the primary develop ctive so that any ilm recovered would have intents* us. Whim n a systirm had been successfully de strateclAint lasted operationally reliable. i ould enter the operation* se. itaint/WE OPERATIONAL PRASE: I. ils` hen the satellite payload has been successfully developed, it becomes a part 4.4 the operational asset* of the NR?. The payloads, together with appropriate boosters, launciwsre and tracking stations, represent the NAP cepability to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly represeat part of an orderly program to acquire intelligence in response to USIS requirements, target lists and priorities.\The DN must play the central role in planning this prograrrs. A involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious scheduling of operational launches from fixed resources, in eddition to development flight tests. ft requires a plan with sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations and the corresponding intelligence needs. it is a complex managerial task for which a single individual must in the last analysis be responsible. . Beth the long range requirements frsateUits :Mosier ? and he shifting targets for specific nigh come properly from the in Iligence community in -which al elan ents of the Government have a r ? e The community has mad COMOR as the staff to provide t se requirements in?orderly way, subject to approval by U 3. The Satellite equireisnts Progra Center, formerly known as the Satellite ations Center, is the next step In that sequence of events, Its action is to ntan specific mission coverage in light of C.,OMOR tar t airements. It does so by first studying the' spectrum of or. choices available. These r ? supplied by various groups on e West Coast and represent specific launch vehi141 propulsion IapabiUtina, Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000199paqmig viii "niFfre5L-Ttsntrurcivr: 25X1A Approved Forggelesee 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71 B005@fiROOPrb003001 1 -2 HANDLE VL Z; ON Tit OL SY :;T LL 25X1A 25X1D 25X1A curreht raiige safety rastrictioos. etc. Thee. feasibLe orbits a rs thea computer away sad in 0. itehington to optimise target overage in light of itul4 angli . predicted weather COTOlitio\au and target priorities. A4 orbit is selected and camera Orograt.a ?stablished for this mission./ This is basically an intelligence function. 4 . in the case of ZORON,A coverage. Requieements Progran. Center has play in cietermining\the ?pheirAsris of the mi comp,xterined glticiarics to the launch au sprin f 196). the Center was locate next to COMOR, nliert it was lured ? awl t.41CION1 flights nd was in I with trio ?st Coast acilities. e vita with a vie to extendi Satellite i.efttral role arid tranamftting ority. Until tbe t CIA Aeaciernerters clesively in CORONA eon .rounication It than moved to the should tie Qs* 41.1 to provide gulden& s of all satellite op will differ between syste unctions/ intelligent* tnous tor missies API ions recognising that procedu ea or example to the '3. Although most/ of the .-fa team 1.. fulfilled when a estellite , there are perstuasi;ve argurnerts wk develop Mont OtbetAld COAtilMe t 3 have operttional ;Alas*. The most compel payloads systesike are being 41311timusil should 13e. The remarkable irnproverne .7. onoscopic to stereo and then to tieubled double recovery vehicles is al *MAT: pie. are extremely delicate instruments and : 7 a given stern are quite aliko. This dosa Col T i Pti a 'contractor should fire a THOR ox the contrary ouch operational activitiee nit not a .Livided authority. it doss ONO lin that the ,int in the J r esc +Aron,* int , pr(xluction or ooerati &tbtlity of the deveioning load is ooclared operational, ee responsible for nein role io the rrAint is that improved -- and t ef CORONA fro= ? capacity via lrtherniore, these oftyloatis trot. n&n that the S. C.saito to e s is no nal eassiusitce NRO 25X1 25X1 25X1D Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508R00010 25X1A AN 1)14 E. SYSTZM ONLY at w hit ...III* can entirely elin iruate trie payload team 4, , l'ayloas grill be delivered in kccordane with agreed irchecteles for asserr into the laancli vehicle. During the assembly of boaster and 'pa load, there most be doquat. repreeentatten for ,3 poses \of advice sae consul tion frorn the Government agency as well** the contractor reaposibJe for developing t14.? NI load. Th?OsEPNR, dealt the Defense Department agency cesnonsible or boost r, asser.--bly and launching ( over which iie presumably s nagerial authority) and given staff authority on be the txecutter Committee should be able to see that this int* ? works. 6. Once a satel t. payloa is launched n orbit it enters a crucial pe od at real ti e tracking. monitoring and control. Trackin anci telemetry r cording from low attitude photography is by Air ce stations. MiS data is transn.ittecl 45 Sunnyvale, Caliternia? where the operatiOn is run. Liflight decisions inchado o recover if a male functi3_n is sitspected and traesmiesions of atnera program changes to'the satellite so as to take advent e of changing we at he r?Or other opportunities. The premise an intipiliganc re-3re sEntativ? available for consultation to the uthortty raspo1ibia for inflight control of the vehicle willte en re that these decisions are taken with appropriate regard for intelligence interest.. 25X1 A Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508R000100030011-2 HANDLE VIA 25X1A HANE,LE VIA vanz;a:eit, '2 OS LY U. Alternatives. 25X1A 25X1A 160050iatheir00030011-2 Alternative organisetional prep-oasis considered include: A. Allocation of exclusive responsibility tor the develop- ment and w.ration of satellite reconnaissance systems to: (1) an existing component of the Defense Departmeat. or (2) CIA. or (3) some new agency to be created along the lines of 1454A. 15. Authorisation to CIA and Dol) and its components to continue inuependently the development and operation of satellite reconnaissance system a subject tc arrangements for levying intelligence requirements an the exchange of iniermetion and provision of gradual support. with decisions concerning orate's* allocation and uitillaation to be cnade ad hoc by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI or the 303 Committee. C. Establishment of an institutional basis for centralised control ant, direction of the program based on; (1) an Natscstivs Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defease aad the DCI, responsible for the formulation of basic policy, budgetary decisions and the broad allocatioa of program responsibility (2) a Director of Malarial Reconnaissance responsible to the Executive ?S;omrnittee for coordination ot the entire program with staff responeibility for all components engaged in recenusi san.ce activities other than such si.erosixt* of the Defense liepartment or the Armed Services as may be assigned to his -,-Arect supervleiou by the Secretary of Defames; and (3) recognition ot the DC! and USIA responsibility for determinin requirements for mission coverage and frequency and ?stabtishrttent within CIA of faciiiiiire for the formulation and transmission of guidance governing intelligence targets and objectives insofar as these determise the epheinerie at all satellite reconoatesance missions. HANDLE VIA z-,ristifikoriffrEWM; - z . 4536-Or Approved For Release 2003/03/10 :CIA-RDP71600508R000100030011-2 25X1A HANDLE VIA CORTiOL gYSTZm ONLY 25X1A III. Discussion of Alternatives. A decision to assign exclusive control of the operetta= and development of all satellite reconnaissance systems to the Dufense Department would obviously be incompatible with the aoeumption Mit it is essential to preserve CIA's technical competence and experience as a contributing factor in the satellite pregram. Moreover, active participation by CIA in the research. development and production phases of satellite reconnaiseanCe Devisors waald *sem highly desirable for the puree** of ensuring that development or imprwrement of satellite payloads for reconnaissance purposes is fully and exclusively responsive to intelligence needs. Because of its charter respoesi- billties CIA's participation in reconasissance irysterns doiroloposont provides assurance that payload designs will not be diverted or degraded to iCCOXIAISIodate, non-intelligence gathering purposes. Allocation of &a eaChtaive franchise to CIA for all ',heaps of satellite reconeaissance would place responsibilities on CIA whisk exceed its capacities and provoke strong apposition, particulasty on the theory that this would create a third agency in apace with undefirebie consequences. A decision giving CIA exclusive rsspoasibility for payload development would deprive the program of resources enter Dol) control and glimisoto desirable competition. The proposal to create a new NSA-type organization responsible for all recoonaissaace activity offers few advantages. Implementation of such a proposal could involve the establishment within a now qiinet- autonomous agency of all the facilities and authority neeeppeary to carry out all aspects of the entire reCellaiLial&AUS pregren suck as launching. tracking, reeovery, and other operational, procurement and R&D facilities including assumption of CIA's present responsibilities ter covert relations with foreign governments in connection with U-4 operations and the DCI's authority to expend enveuchered funds wider Public Law 110. Or it could involve retention ef earns of thee* reeponsibilities and facilities in CIA and existing components of D.D. This altereative, therefore. either involves creation of formidable new agency with far reaching jurisdictional ireplicatiend in the spate, intelligence and RAID fields. Or it only serves to cemplicate rather than remakes the problem of achieving a coordinate( progratr under centralize( direction anAppeotettlFor Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508R000100030011-2 NDLE 25X1A The altereative u.ader which CU and keD would independently continue development and operation of reconsaisaance systems Ileidar a loose co?rdinating arrangement simply perpetuates the existing unsatisfactory and chaotic situation. Some *elution along the limes of alternative (paragraph In appears imperative. The broad outline, of such an arrangemeilit have been suggested by the DCI from time to time and were diseiseeed by hin with the Secretary of Listens, and the Leputy Secretart at Defense on 27 fehrsary. The details of the proposed institotienni arrangements are described and explained in some detail in a n emorandum outlining CIA orgasisatienal proposals for the organisation of the National Reconnalensace Program (sainexe4I as Tab 1). by way of introduction, however, it may be helpful to identify aome of the major organisational features of the proposed arrangement acid discuss very briefly sorra of the t:onsiderations which the organization suggests. a. Executive Committee. The proposal to zonfiren and formalise this con mines reflects recognition of am inevitabie duality of responsibility as between .0.1) anti LLk for the program as a whole. nits device appears to be about the only way to ensure contributions en a fully coordinated basis by subordinate elements of CIA and DOD to a 4:omplea progran ? which involves very substantial operational, develepnlental exad pro- curement responsibilities withou; doing vielence to the integrity of managerial lints of command. Given the importance and character of the program. it confidently be expected that officials at the level repreeentec on the k:xecutive Con rrittee will reach agreement on all issues sAbmitteo to the committee. provided they are properly staffed and presented. The moot serious objection to the arrangement is the demand which it creates on the time of the two officials involved. this burden however will be red.aced as the committee succeeds in establishing broad guideliees governing the allocation at 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508R0001C 4 - HANDLE: VIA CONTI IL S ON: 00300' 4154-f s 25X1A Approved ForReldheb 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508880151b0030011-2 HANDLE VIA CORTROL SYL )44 ONJ 25X1A research and other responsibilities and to the extent that the DNRO (contemplated in the proposal) succeeds in gaining the confidence of the committee and of participating agencies. b. DP4RO. Considerable concern has been expressed with the need to define the precise authority and responsibilities contemplated for this official. The proposal is that he would function in a nianner and with anti 3V ity substantially cortnieesurate with that of an Assistant Secretary of a large department. He would have fell access to all details of all activities and the right inherent in any staff officer to question program*, proposals or decisions; to saggest alternatives and to require review through the appronziate comsrand line or through appeal to the FAiscutive Committee, on whose behalf he functioas. To the extent that the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate, he would also assume direct managerial responsibility for con ponessts of the refense I epartn ent involved in the progran . c. Intelligence Input. Orbital plans for satellite in siert* timet LJS Sigrket to *aware: (1) that, to the extent that 1nteIlig*1.M targets deter mine an orbital mission plan, these targets will be Identified b MIL and incorporated into the flight pinn thrinigh an instrunkentality of CIA; atte. (2) that the intelligence comerainity will be in a position to be aware of the (logroe, if any, to which intelli- gence consideration* are subordinated to other nork-intitiligence considerations in the planning or execution of an orbital flight plan ilnd to protest, if necessary as. post fact*, if such subordination appears iinreasonaole ?r improper. Guidance q.ete ruining the ephemeris of a mission ultimately assumes computerise, form. It As here proposer that, lamas as the ephemeris is ?stitblishett by intelligence objectiveu, COTE paterize, guidance for the mission will be formulated b7- Requirements Progran Centre( analogous to the present 34 >C) under GLA. control. The process by which the Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71600508R00010 . VlA 1.73Y3' ?t pproved Ooregitlesete'2603/tAE.Ogitt0030011 25X1A HANDLE oONTROL SSM E ONLY 25X1A sphemeris of a satellite mission is determined is complicated by the necessity to incorporate guidance to accor..-Imodete considerations not related to intelligence, such as R&D, weather. "the health of the bird." etc. The intelligence and non-intellipince ioput? into the over-all computerised guidance nave to be related in a on plicated process reflecting a complex interrelatieaship. By reserving to CIA the authority to develop the computerised guidance relating to the intelligence objectives of a, particular r Julian, it is not intended to pre-empt or denigrate the sue:4dt' of the Defense Department over launching, inflight or recovery aspects of a mission. d. R&D. The research, development, testing and production responsibilities reserved to CIA in the proposed arrangement, to ensure utiliaation of CIA 8 special competence. are also est intended to impair the authority and responsibility of the Defense Department for assembling. launching, orbital control and recovery of reconnaissance satellites. The agency responsible for exercising the Defense Departinenti a authority in this respect can (it seems reasonable to assume) be No organised as to accommodate CIA representation, in conjunction with their contractors, at the point of assembly a a payload into a launch unit. ft can also, dorbag the test stages of a new payload, accommodate the presence of engineerifig end technical representatives of CIA and their con. tractors, as consultants to ensure that the flight is responsive te the technical and engineering objectives of the test. e. Budgeting. The entire process by which CIA obtains Its approprietions and by which Lands are authorised and allocated to the "black budget" for all purpose*. including the funding of national reconnaissance projects is complicated and probably deserves review. To the extent that the present organisational proposals involve budgetary procedures the intent is to make sure that funds will be allocated in bulk and in azr.ounts roughly commen- surate with the eatimated costs of programs responsibility for wlaiL:h has bean allocated as between agencies. The purpose of this is to encourage rather clear cut allocations of program responsibility (after aciequate study and evaluation) and discourage Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP711300508R00019 Approved Forlialeree 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508?00r00030011-2 25X1A HANDLE VIA dOPETROEITTErri-ONLY any propensity on the part of rutwordinato lodestone to nullify or ?reds docision? awarding program resoonsihility by withholding furics roqiiired for incrornontal aspects of a program the ovor-aii desirability of which has already boon approved at a polity lorvol. Nothing in this proposal is intsni.ot_ to limit the right, or elos responsibility of the DNR to rovisw progran account*, cost estimates, or budget, or to initiate reprogramming exorcises or, at any tin*, to oropoos reviow, modifications. or tormination og program decisions through this tins of command or ths Emoeutivs Committee. 25X1A 25X1A tiANDLE VIA Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100== s Y,,,,rfravt ?