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Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 28, 2002
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May 20, 1965
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COQ:t~;N7 L' Approved Fc,r Release 2002/11/13 : CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110008-8 20 Yay 1965 ASSt TIOITS WITH XCT TO UM WORLD SITUATION ON WHICH Z4ImIT w RESTED A L G-TEm PIA ' FOR U8 I I 1. Giiveni The exercise involves planning for fifteen years. Under the present terms of reference, this period is divided into three sub-periods of five years each, i.e., 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80- 2. The assumptions section-should probably begin with a paragraph or a table which takes account oft a) estimated US population in 1970, .75, and .30; b) estimated US Q1P for these years; c) estimated US budget for these years. With respect to the budget estimates, some cognizance must be taken of the possi+ bility of wide swings in the overall, defense component which in turn is likely to depend in large measure on other ass=* tions relating to the degree of tension in the world situation. 3.. The kind of world situation which the US must confront and the US intelligence effort to be meshed into it will probably be a function of various combinations at Approved For Release 2002/11/13: CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110008-8' Approved F eleaQ'~2003/1 i/1-:P:'CIAi DP71 B00822R000100110008-8 r the following two factors: a) the number of power centers of the first and perhaps second order of i portance, and b) the degree of international tensions" I? The moat dangerous world situation would be that characterized by many power centers and a high order of ternaion between them. II. Next leas dangerous, a few power centers with a high level of tension. III, Next less dangerous, many power centers 'With a low level of tension. IV. Least dangerous, few power centers with low level of tension. Power Cen~ t~ rs. Wo may asap with a fair degree of confidence that the n=ber of power centers between now and 1970 is moat likely to remain "a few." However, looking ahead more than five years, our confidence factor begins to decline. At this moment, the Chinese Communists seven the likeliest ndidate to be joining the povcr center club. Obviously we cannot exclude Ger any, or oven Japan for .that matter. Less likely, but still to be taken into account, are the UK, rx=ce; perhaps India and Indonesia. There'are other potentials 'Which are -father far out. Approved For Release 2 /h ~/1` "I 71'B00822R000100110008_8, Approved For Releas & 1't/ P71 BOD8822R000100110008-8 NOW 5. International Tenn. The rise and fell of intercational tension is in itself a function of many things, some of then wholly unpredictable. A principal cause for heightoned tensions over the entire period will inhere in the relationship between states cporatix under one or another trnnifestation of Corsnunist ideology, and those wanting no part of Csm. Second will be the nationalistic initiatives undertaken by new and backward states, often egged on by one or more Co mmn1 st status. The above is the prescription for '% ars of national liberation" which in the right circumstances can bocome quite substential wars, bringing Stith them dramatic rises in the level of international tensions. Thirdly, there are in today's world a dozen, a score, or a few score - depending on how you measure them ?- of :Friction ~ points. Just for example, today we have, Viet, Berlin, the Dominican Republic. '& morrow, we =y have an ominous flash in Korea, in the Taiwan Strait, on India's northern boundary, in Indian4'ak relations, in Arab-Israeli relationts, and so on and so on. 6. AaGiurptiona for the period 1965n7 taw The most valid assumptions for this period are 11 and IV. With respect to II, the real power centers for the next five years are most likely to remain the US and USSR. Approved For Release 2002/11/13 ti CIA.RDP7 Q0822ROO0100110008-8_ tf t 1 . ? -. ' tt Approved For Release 2002/11/13 CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110008-8 roar ~~ For the short-term at least, there will be a high degree of tension between the US and Counist China and a growing tension between the US and the USSR. However,, the force of mutual deterrence will make the comity ; of all-out war between the US and USSR highly unlikely. Chinese nuclear capabilities will almost certainly not have grown in the five year period to the point where the Chinese could contanDlate a nuclear attack on the US or allies of the US. nevertheless., a substantial non.nuolear armed conflict with the C nUUG ion possible, Should this oEcur* world tensions would r n high and the risks of general. nuclear war by?sralculation would rise appreciably. 70 We nay lik se assume that the Chine9e are presently running coraothing of a bluff is the teeth of over whc]ming tZ nuclear sugeriority and finding little or no support from the Soviet 'Union will tezaporarily knuckle under. Should this occur there wuuld be a period again of only two power centers and a relatively low level, of world tensions (IV) . Approved For Release 2002/11/13 : CIA-RDP71'B00822R000100110008-8 Approved For Releas,0,0211111.3 ;-CLP- DP71B00822R000100110008-8 j,~... s $. Note that the above rests on still other assu tioas, z mel.y no general war occasioned by accident or niscalcul tion,'no universally recognized disarrameat t- reemeut with sure-fire census and verification procedures, no dremtie proliferation of nuclear powers conscqueat to technological break- throughs in the AR and delivery systems fields. g. Assurrmtions for the c~ 1970. and on to 1984. For this period ire must assume a growth in the number of over centers.' Unless nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities are destroyed .in the proceeding period.. Peiping will be very much in the Big League in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. As noted above,, the Fc-deral Repubx,ic of Qeroany y have kicked over the Maces and cone nuclear;; ss'runce'e force de fLaae my have become a reality. There nay be other signi- ficant emergent power centers. The most likd.y world situation in these circumstances would be I. )1owever, III is possible. 10. The above also rests on still other aesumptionz. For ox le, subsunin3 I is China's achievement of a considerable nuclear status -? so also with the FIG and France. Subsuming III is the possibil ty that humanity? r 5 w Approved For Release 2002/11/13 : CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110008-8 Approved For Release fl?J1.1h13=r-C51A{371 B00822R000100110008-8 every day more acrd copra mare of the suicidal course of events, will have frighteacd itself Into taking acme sort of corrective action. Ziis will brave to involve such startling developmenta as the voluu:tary acceptance of limitations of sovereignty in behalf of collective security. 11. Over-aU. Uhatevcr the status of the world situation in the next fifteen years.. we may assume that there will never be a coo cat when the US can be wholly, certain of laic--guardizz itc national security by non- military means. Whatever the degree of dotent a world tensions will never drop to the vanishing, point. ~"urthermoro, whatever the crate and nature of a=ament or diaaxament, there will have to be a large and' cortinuin, national iate cnce effort to guide the one and :police the other. + ~? ~.a:,..,y as ai9r, Approved 'For Release 2002/11/13 : CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110008-8