DEFECTOR TELLS OF SPYING IN LATIN AMERICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 9, 2005
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9.pdf823.7 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9 THE EVENING STAR DATE ~ 4'',/F PAGE . STAT VOONIKOVA Defector Te1t Spying irt' Latin America WICO CITY (UPI) R}Wdsn Embassy employ&V11c dsikted last month said S&IW spyJig in this capital is air 4 a domination" of 1L lsy staff members in ikova !=Raya Kiseln conference S cited the example 44nt tdar workers who.s1N`srb d eight hours a week iau raa; and the rest of the .r7 1 : few Russians in WO eafft 4&W ld diplomall ri* =Job job in the em / me~iMsal section be q~r T Soviets are kee in information on 1 M o al situation, stud" aaMd s and military ma 804 aadw of tts hemisphere; ` ih fe ed reassignment is > ad -a possible "p " lb adi~Id for asylum in M.e eo Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9 WASHING v ?~r Release 2 1]j/21 : _l44 2-dO 7R0005002600 E 1 cret Docum6ft By FOX BUI3ERFIELD An extensive series of re- centiy disclosed confidential daCwments is providing China specialists with a rare insight istio the inner workings of the Chinese Communist party.: The documents - speeches, directives, and letters of Chair man Mao Tse-tung originally intended for distribution only whin the highest levels of the party--were acquired by the United States Government and sigh a Mao Excerpts from Mao documents will be found on Page 26 high-ranking partymembW one point he oontplainnej been printed in Red Guard party, Teng Elsiao-ping, pamphlets. consulted. him in " seven who have been enthusiasticallyl source of power was his-,; of the most important revel-where he applied "gua! _ 9Chairman Mao, an earthy, 9Chairman Mao assert had difficulty getting. nt ?nion began as early as private scholars after they hadifaced strong opposition Chinese Communists from caoetinuing their war ajainst **Nationalists, led by Chairman felt that siapepted him as a real Va gist only after China e+ eyed Korean war in 1950, r logically out of C limo's basic political ,tom the documents, it but rather a test dew by Chairman Mao to fin4 tee revolutionaries, The specialists believe tba documents represent e; mao~ jor breakthrough for sding China. 'With these papers w% elf 4onger say that Chi* is a Ott unknown, a great Adhm analyst has con: we know a great OW how the system toll' VwkL" rding to o Prof. erg of Columbia Ultl'Veri - East Asian Institute, one d%'-the documents is that they) y ,i vi4e insights into the policy- 1i ft lairman Mao's methodsi Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9 Secret Documents 'M, Insights on. Mao Tse-tung Continued From Page 1, Col. 7 of operating as a political leader. It is apparent, for example, that Chairman Mao eschewed a large staff, feeling that reli- ance on secretaries would. lead to bureaucracy and is "a mani- festation of degeneration in revolutionary will." It is also clear that Chairman Mao had difficulty obtaining information. "During the last decade," he wrote at the time of the failure of the Great Leap Forward, a crash program ( for economic development in 1958-59, "there was not a single comrade who suggested or dared to expose defects in our plans." Instead Chairman Mao got his information by being an avid reader. The documents are filled with his comments after reading reports on such varied subjects as the establishment of a work-study program in a provincial university or ways to improve local newspapers. During the Cultural Revolu tion, after reading a report on obstruction of the students movement, Chairman Mao wrote angrily to Defense Min aster Lin Piao, the party's dep- uty chairman, and Premier Chou En-lai: "I have gone through this case. Things can- not go on this way. Let the Central Committee issue an in struction against this. Next, i " wr te an editorial. Red Guards Got Papers The documents had been made available to the Red Guards when the Maoist lead- ership decided, as part of its general effort to revitalize the Party during the Cultural Revo- lution, to relax controls over the circulation of classified documents. Several of the phamphlets, whose title pages bear the warning, "Internal party docu- ment: take security precau- ti " ons, have been published in recent months by the United States Government. They deal with the period. from the late nineteen-fifties to the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Two more pamphlets, which cover the period from 1965 to 1967, have been made available by the State Department to The New York Times. In one of these new documents Chairman Mao asserted in 1965 that after l years in power there were still many people that his re- gime did not control. "Right now one-third of the nation's power is controlled by the enemy or enemy sympathiz- ers," he said to his chief ideo- logical adviser, Chen Po-ta. "After 15 years, we now con- trdl the other two-thirds." Because of the nature of the Mao papers and their slightly vague, never committing him-peasants, he suggested that it! self so that he can always be renamed the "Lords' Min- blame his subordinates if a po1- istry " . icy proves a failure. "The more books a person Another valuable feature of reads," he observed, "the more the documents, a Government stupid he becomes." specialist points out, is that In Professor Oksenberg's In- "you can almost see here the terpretation, the documents Cultural Revolution taking show that the Cultural Revolu- shape in Mao's mind, growing tion was not a power struggle, out of his vision of the ideal but rather a test designed and ' mysterious origin, at first somelso~ety and China s failure to doubts were raised about their authenticity. But after examina- tion, both academic and Gov- ernment specialists now feel certain that the documents are genuine. One Government analyst who has spent years studying Chair- " man Mao said, Whenever you get documents of this length, with exact date and place given, it is pretty hard to forge them. We would catch most fabrications." Chairman Mao's greatest power, Professor Oksenberg be- lieves, derived from his ability He notes two key themes in Chairman Mao's thoughts that culminated in the Cultural Rev- olution: his strong egalitarian bent, with his belief in the ne- cessity of keeping close to the masses; and a feeling that con- flict is inherently beneficial. "I have spent much time in the rural areas with the peas- ants and was deeply moved by the many things they knew " , Chairman Mao said in a 1966 speech. "Their knowledge was rich. I was no match for them." But the documents also show that Mr. Mao became increas- ingly u,n,',id d h urmg t e nme- tie prevented the formation Oflteen-.sixties that the party was an nnnncifinn 10- 1... ,.....~: