DEFECTOR TELLS OF SPYING IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9
THE EVENING STAR
DATE ~ 4'',/F
PAGE .
STAT
VOONIKOVA
Defector Te1t
Spying irt'
Latin America
WICO CITY (UPI)
R}Wdsn Embassy employ&V11c
dsikted last month said S&IW
spyJig in this capital is air 4 a
domination" of 1L
lsy staff members in
ikova
!=Raya Kiseln
conference
S cited the example 44nt
tdar workers who.s1N`srb
d eight hours a week iau
raa; and the rest of the .r7
1 : few Russians in WO
eafft 4&W ld diplomall ri*
=Job job in the em /
me~iMsal section be
q~r
T Soviets are kee
in information on 1
M o al situation, stud"
aaMd s and military ma
804
aadw of tts hemisphere; ` ih
fe ed reassignment is >
ad -a possible "p " lb
adi~Id for asylum in M.e eo
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9
 WASHING v ?~r Release 2 1]j/21 : _l44 2-dO 7R0005002600 E 1
cret Docum6ft
By FOX BUI3ERFIELD
An extensive series of re-
centiy disclosed confidential
daCwments is providing China
specialists with a rare insight
istio the inner workings of the
Chinese Communist party.:
The documents - speeches,
directives, and letters of Chair
man Mao Tse-tung originally
intended for distribution only
whin the highest levels of the
party--were acquired by the
United States Government and
sigh a Mao
Excerpts from Mao documents
will be found on Page 26
high-ranking partymembW
one point he oontplainnej
been printed in Red Guard party, Teng Elsiao-ping,
pamphlets. consulted. him in " seven
who have been enthusiasticallyl source of power was his-,;
of the most important revel-where he applied "gua!
_ 9Chairman Mao, an earthy, 9Chairman Mao assert
had difficulty getting. nt ?nion began as early as
private scholars after they hadifaced strong opposition Chinese Communists from
caoetinuing their war ajainst
**Nationalists, led by
Chairman felt that
siapepted him as a real Va
gist only after China e+ eyed
Korean war in 1950,
r logically out of C
limo's basic political
,tom the documents, it
but rather a test dew
by Chairman Mao to fin4
tee revolutionaries,
The specialists believe
tba documents represent e; mao~
jor breakthrough for
sding China.
'With these papers w%
elf 4onger say that Chi* is a
Ott unknown, a great
Adhm analyst has con:
we know a great OW
how the system toll'
VwkL"
rding to o Prof.
erg of Columbia Ultl'Veri
-
East Asian Institute, one
d%'-the documents is that they)
y ,i vi4e insights into the policy-
1i ft lairman Mao's methodsi
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9
 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000500260016-9
Secret Documents 'M, Insights on. Mao Tse-tung
Continued From Page 1, Col. 7
of operating as a political
leader.
It is apparent, for example,
that Chairman Mao eschewed
a large staff, feeling that reli-
ance on secretaries would. lead
to bureaucracy and is "a mani-
festation of degeneration in
revolutionary will."
It is also clear that Chairman
Mao had difficulty obtaining
information. "During the last
decade," he wrote at the time
of the failure of the Great
Leap Forward, a crash program
(
for economic development in
1958-59, "there was not a single
comrade who suggested or
dared to expose defects in our
plans."
Instead Chairman Mao got
his information by being an
avid reader. The documents are
filled with his comments after
reading reports on such varied
subjects as the establishment
of a work-study program in a
provincial university or ways
to improve local newspapers.
During the Cultural Revolu
tion, after reading a report on
obstruction of the students
movement, Chairman Mao
wrote angrily to Defense Min
aster Lin Piao, the party's dep-
uty chairman, and Premier
Chou En-lai: "I have gone
through this case. Things can-
not go on this way. Let the
Central Committee issue an in
struction against this. Next,
i
"
wr
te an editorial.
Red Guards Got Papers
The documents had been
made available to the Red
Guards when the Maoist lead-
ership decided, as part of its
general effort to revitalize the
Party during the Cultural Revo-
lution, to relax controls over
the circulation of classified
documents.
Several of the phamphlets,
whose title pages bear the
warning, "Internal party docu-
ment: take security
precau-
ti
"
ons,
have been published in
recent months by the United
States Government. They deal
with the period. from the late
nineteen-fifties to the start of
the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
Two more pamphlets, which
cover the period from 1965 to
1967, have been made available
by the State Department to The
New York Times. In one of
these new documents Chairman
Mao asserted in 1965 that after
l years in power there were
still many people that his re-
gime did not control.
"Right now one-third of the
nation's power is controlled by
the enemy or enemy sympathiz-
ers," he said to his chief ideo-
logical adviser, Chen Po-ta.
"After 15 years, we now con-
trdl the other two-thirds."
Because of the nature of the
Mao papers and their slightly
vague, never committing him-peasants, he suggested that it!
self so that he can always be renamed the "Lords' Min-
blame his subordinates if a po1- istry
"
.
icy proves a failure. "The more books a person
Another valuable feature of reads," he observed, "the more
the documents, a Government stupid he becomes."
specialist points out, is that In Professor Oksenberg's In-
"you can almost see here the terpretation, the documents
Cultural Revolution taking show that the Cultural Revolu-
shape in Mao's mind, growing tion was not a power struggle,
out of his vision of the ideal but rather a test designed and
'
mysterious origin, at first somelso~ety and China
s failure to
doubts were raised about their
authenticity. But after examina-
tion, both academic and Gov-
ernment specialists now feel
certain that the documents are
genuine.
One Government analyst who
has spent years studying Chair-
"
man Mao said,
Whenever you
get documents of this length,
with exact date and place
given, it is pretty hard to forge
them. We would catch most
fabrications."
Chairman Mao's greatest
power, Professor Oksenberg be-
lieves, derived from his ability
He notes two key themes in
Chairman Mao's thoughts that
culminated in the Cultural Rev-
olution: his strong egalitarian
bent, with his belief in the ne-
cessity of keeping close to the
masses; and a feeling that con-
flict is inherently beneficial.
"I have spent much time in
the rural areas with the peas-
ants and was deeply moved by
the many things they knew
"
,
Chairman Mao said in a 1966
speech. "Their knowledge was
rich. I was no match for them."
But the documents also show
that Mr. Mao became increas-
ingly u,n,',id d h
urmg t e nme-
tie prevented the formation Oflteen-.sixties that the party was
an nnnncifinn 10- 1... ,.....~: