TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE BRITT BEFORE THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: May 5, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE BRITT
HEARING
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE' INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER, INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-432 WASHINGTON : 1971
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
SAM J. ERVIN, Ja., North Carolina HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Ja., Maryland
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California
SUBCOMMITTEE To. INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
SAM J. ERVIN, Ja., North Carolina STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
J. G. SotrawiaD, Chief Counsel
JOHN R. NoaPDa, Director of Research
A.LTONso L. TARABOCIIIA, Chief Investigator
RESOLUTION
Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, that the testimony of Lawrence Britt
taken in executive session on May 5, 1971, be released from the in-
junction of secrecy, be printed and made public.
Approved : July 14;,1971.
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE BRITT
WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1971
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHERINTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee .met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room
155, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Edward J. Gurney, presiding.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Samuel Scott, associate
counsel; Alfonso L. Tarabochia, chief investigator; and David Mar-
tin, investigation analyst.
Senator GURNEY. The subcommittee will come to order.
Will your raise your right hand, Mr. Britt?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. BRITT. T do.
Senator GURNEY. Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make, a brief pre-
liminary statement.
Mr. Britt has testified under his real name, and is so testifying, but
he is a refugee and because of that, and facts that would develop
through his testimony, he has been helped to create a new identity.
The committee is aware of the new identity, but with the Chair's per-
mission, we will not refer to it at this time so our record will try to
protect that identity.
Senator GURNEY. I understand.
Mr. SoURWINE. Sir, what is your nationality?
Mr. BRITT. My nationality is Czechoslovak.
Mr.--SOURWINE. Where were you born?
Mr. BRITT. I was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
Mr. SoURWINE. What was your education?
Mr. BRITT. I got my education at Charles, University in Prague
in the Department for International Relations, and I graduated; in
1954. Later in 1964 I enrolled in_the Charles University again, studied
at the Department for Journalism and graduated in 1967.'
Mr. SOURWINE. What has been your employment since you got out
of there?
Mr. BRITT. Several weeks before my graduation in 1954, I was
invited by the Center Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia and I was recruited as an intelligence officer for Czecho-
slovak Intelligence Service. I served in this capacity until September
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
1968 when I defected and a, short time later I asked the American
authorities for political asylum.
Mr. SOURWINE. I will say, Mr. Chairman, that the committee is
aware of how Mr. Britt got to the United States and where he en-
tered, but again if the Chair will permit, we will not go into that on
the record.
Mr. Britt, what rank did you achieve in the Czechoslovak service?
M r. BRITT. I was a major.
Mr. SounwINE. How high do the ranks run in that service?
Mr. BRITT. The highest rank in the Czechoslovak Intelligence Serv-
ice was the rank of colonel, so it was a high rank.
Mr. SouRwINE. How many majors were there approximately at
the time you were in it?
Mr. BRITT. I would say about, between 70 and 100.
Mr. SounwINE. Have you any idea how many men altogether were
in that service?
Mr. BRITT. There were about 1,500 people in the Czechoslovak In-
telligence Service.
Mr. SouRwINE. I am talking about officers in the Intelligence
Service.
Mr. BRITT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SoURWINE. What was the nature of your assignment? And if it
changed, tell. us about that.
Mr. BRITT. At the beginning I got an intelligence schooling. I went
through a 6-month intelligence school in Prague and then at the be-
ginning of 1955, I was appointed a research officer in the Department
for Research and Analysis. I worked there until 1958, when I was
appointed operational officer, an officer of the operational depart-
ment for intelligence activities against Germany.
In 1961, I was sent to Berlin as a member of the so-called resi-
dentura there, covered as a cultural attache of the Czechoslovak Em-
bassy in East Berlin. I stayed there until January 1963 When I re-
turned to Prague to the headquarters of the Czechoslovak Intelli-
gence Service and shortly after that, in February.of 1964, I was
appointed deputy chief of the new Department for Disinformation.
Actually in the parlance of the Soviet-bloc intelligence services, it
was called the Department for Active Measures. I served as deputy
chief of this department for 2 years, until 1966, when I was appointed
,in officer of the Czechoslovak intelligence station in Vienna.
Mr. SouRwINE. Who was your chief in the Department of Dis-
information when you were deputy?
Mr. BRITT. My chief was Maj. TiH Stejskal.
Senator GURNEY. What does this Department of Disinformation
mean; that is, the word "disinformation" ?
Mr. BRITT. Yes, actually it prepares and carries out disinforma-
tion, black propaganda and so-called influence operations. These op-
erations, first of all, aim at influencing the sphere of public opinion
of the non-Communist world, trying to deceive the world public opin-
ion, to undermine the American positions all over the world.
The second direction of these activities is deceiving deeisionmakers
of the non-Communist countries, and to bring them to false decisions.
In the parlance of the intelligence services it means to "feed"them
with false information and expect that they will then use it as a basis
for wrong conclusions and measures.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
Senator GURNEY. I understand. I suppose false information would
be a good description of the word "disinformation."
Mr. BRITT. Yes, sir; but, it is used in the intelligence services, it is
a common term.
Mr. SounwINE. To expand on that a little, with the Chair's permis-
sion-is it true that the disinformation operation includes a number
of specialized techniques? For instance, the Chair spoke of the actual
dissemination of false information.
Mr. BRITT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. And there is the discrediting of factual information?
Mr. BRITT. Right.
Mr. SouRwINE. And of true informnat'ion.
Mr. BRITT. Right.
Mr. SotRwINE. Then there is the slanting with respect to public
information, with a view, as you said, to bring about bad judgments
and false decisions?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Mr. SoURwINE. Now, are there other specialized techniques which
you recognize and can tell us about atthis time?
Mr. BRITT. Well, I think there are basically three types of opera-
tions : disinformation, which means to feed an enemy, it can be the
United States, Germany, Britain, any non-Communist country, with
false information so that the counterpart, the enemy, takes wrong
decisions.
Second type are propaganda operations. It may seem strange that
Soviet-bloc intelligence spends so much time .and effort on propaganda
when every Communist-bloc country has a large official apparatus for
the same purpose. It is true that Soviet-bloc intelligence takes
over the role of a propagandist abroad whenever for ideological, moral,
or tactical reasons the official propaganda institution can't do that. So
for example, Eastern European intelligence services do not hesitate to
do propaganda of fascist character in the name of some nonexistent
Fascist organization if it serves the purpose. It is actually black propa-
ganda as the real source is covered and the world public opinion doesn't
know that it was initiated in Eastern Europe.
Then, there is the third type called influence operations which are
the most demanding and very rare.
These operations are based on the activities of so-called influence
agents, Communist agents working in non-Communist countries, who
have important positions in the government, political parties or in
Parliament. They can got instructions from East European Com-
munist intelligence services, for instance, how they should react in
Parliament, in a parliamentarian discussion or if they occupy an im-
portant position in an enemy's intelligence service, what to do, in
order to make it less efficient.
Mr. SouRwINE. Are there persons of that nature in the United
States, to your knowledge?
Mr. BRITT. I have no knowledge of this kind of person in the
United States.
Mr. SouRwINE. I do not mean, sir, individuals whom you know per-
sonally or know to be, but do you have reason to believe there are
such individuals in the United States?
Mr. BRITT. Yes, I suppose so, yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You don't have any examples?
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
Mr. BRITT. No, because the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service maybe
was not as well established in the United States as, for instance, the
Russian Intelligence Service could. As far as the operations carried
out directly on the American territory are concerned, during the pe-
riod between 1964 and 1966 when I was a deputy chief of that de-
partment, this was very, very rare. Actually, I remember only one op-
eration which was carried out anonymously in the United States in
1961 during the presidential campaign. It was a propaganda opera-
tion against the presidential candidate, Mr. Goldwater, but it was not
too successful because it was only a drop in the ocean of really existing
anti-Goldwater opinions and propaganda.
Senator GTTRNFY. You are saying we are doing a pretty good job
ourselves without, the help of the Czechs?
Mr. BRITT. Yes, that is true.
Mr. SOURwiNE. Can you give us an example of an operation of this
type in any country with which you are familiar?
Mr. BRITT. First of all, I would like to underline that most of these
operations are parasites on the existing anti-American movements all
over the world. It is very easy for the Communist intelligence service
to start an anti-American operation in Africa, Asia, or Latin America
because of anti-American movements and opinions which objectively
exist there. Disinformation operations of the Communist intelligence
services parasitize on these existing anti-American streams.
I can give you an example of an operation which was carried out in
1964 and 1965, aiming at undermining American positions in Africa.
Three forgeries of American documents were produced in Prague.
The purpose was to reveal the United States as the major conspirator
and enemy of the left-oriented African regimes. The first one was a
forgery of a. letter by American Ambassador in Leopoldville to the
Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I think. Together with the
other two written in similar spirit, these forgeries were to prove
American conspiracy against the leftist Tanzanian Government. They
were leaked, to Tanzanian governmental officials but unfortunately I
can't. say who was used as a channel because the Disinformation De-
partment was not informed about the names of agents. We were
responsible for preparation of these operations without being allowed
to know the identity of people involved.
Senator GmtwFY. Who would know these, within your intelligence
svstem ?
Mr. BRiTT. The so-called operational departments who are respon-
s ble- to carry it out with the help of their agents. The Disinformation
Department didn't have any agents, it prepared these operations, but
didn't direct any agents. That was the responsibility of the so-called
operational departments.
Senator GURNEY. I take it your operation was somewhat compart-
mentalized so one part would not know another part, where it was
operating or what the names of the people were in another depart-
ment.?
Mr. BRITT. Yes, in order to protect agents. Well, in this case, in
this operation Oscar Kambond, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Tanzania, presented the forgeries to the public as a proof of the Amer-
ican conspiracy.
And that was the start of a big anti-American campaign, not only
in Tanzania but I would say all over the African continent. Tanzanian
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/1%: CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
President Nyerere hesitated to believe in these forgeries, he asked the
American authorities for proof and shortly after that the American
authorities presented the facts proving that all these documents were
forgeries. President Nyerere accepted that, but the campaign contin-
ued, because actually the press did not want to believe that they were
forgeries.
The second stage of the operation took place several months later
when the Congolese rebellion forces were supplied with another for-
gery, confirming, or trying to confirm, the American antileftist activi-
ties in Africa.
The forgery was published when Thomas Kanza, the Congolese rebel
foreign minister, gave an interview to the East African Standard. Mr.
Kanza said that the Congolese revolutionaries had documents prov-
ing that the United States, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, South Africa,
and Rhodesia had prepared the return of Morse Tshombe to the Congo
and presented as a proof that forgery. And shortly after that Mr.
Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister, made a similar attack at
the meeting of African politicians in Nairobi, in March 1965. Many
African news media published these pseudo-facts about the American
conspiracy and the campaign continued for another few weeks or
months.
I think one of the reasons why this campaign, this operation was
successful was that most of the African leftist leaders, politicians or
journalists wanted to believe in that disinformation message. They
were not careful enough to find out whether the documents were forged
or not. They wanted to believe in them because they confirmed their
opinion. I suppose that was one of the reasons why this operation, and
many other operations, were successful.
Senator GURNEY. Are we through with Tanzania?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Senator GURNEY. Let us go back to this United States political
campaign of 1964.
Can you describe the efforts and the techniques used by the Czechs
in the political campaign?
Mr. BRITT. As far as the technique is concerned, it was very primi-
tive because the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service produced several
forged documents and they were very cheaply forged. I can explain
why. For instance the letter written by the American, supposedly
written "by the American Ambassador to Mr. Tshom'be
Senator GURNEY. I'm talking about the 1964 political campaign
here.
Mr. BRITT (continuing). You mean the presidential campaign?
Senator GURNEY. That is right; not the Tanzanian matter.
Mr. BRITT. I think that it was a leaflet of several pages attacking
Mr. Goldwater as a racist. Some facts in this leaflet about Mr. Gold-
water were picked up from American books and newspapers and
they were mixed with. sensational ingredients attacking Mr. Gold-
water as a racist.
Senator GURNEY. How were these distributed?
Mr. BRITT. They were distributed anonymously. I think that these
letters were sent to the United States in diplomatic bags and mailed
by the members of the Czec'hoslovakian 'intelligence station in the
United States.
Senator GURNEY. In other words, mailed here.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
6
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Senator GURNEY. Do you know to whom they were mailed?
Mr. BRITT. The names were usually selected from various address
books, "Who's Who," and similar publications.
Senator GURNEY. In other v, ords, there was ,a mailing list of various
sorts.
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Senator GURNEY. How many were there, do you know?
Mr. BRITT. I would say there were several thousand copies of this
leaflet mailed.
Senator GURNEY. Was there any other effort in that political
campaign?
Mr. BRITT. No, no other effort. That was the only operation which
the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service carried out in the United States
of America in 1964.
Senator GURNEY. Now, how about 1968?
Mr. BRITT. I can't say because at, that time I was not in the Dis-
information Department any more.
Senator GURNEY. Do you know whether any other Communist
country in Europe, either Russia or Iron Curtain countries, do this
as a routine thing in political campaigns?
Mr. BRITT. The 'intelligence services have a green light to do it.
There are no restrictions; but, they are careful, very careful, because
it is dangerous from the operational point of view and from the po-
litical point of view as well. It is dangerous to be directly involved,
to have direct connections with dissidents, with the ultraleftists in
the United States or in other non-Communist countries. It represents
an execessive risk. because if the Soviet-bloc perpetrator is disclosed
by a counter intelligence service, it would cause serious political harm
to the Soviet Union and her prestige.
A safer way how to misuse the ultraleft - of the non-Communist
world is ideological influencing, leaving the initiative for individual
violent or nonviolent actions in the hands of its leaders and that is
not the job of Soviet bloc intelligence but supreme Communist party
bodies. It is true that many Communist intelligence disinformation
and propaganda operations are accompanied by outbursts, but they
erupt spontaneously, inspired by disinformational messages rather
than on direct initiative of the Soviet-bloc intelligence.
The only case of direct involvement of the Czechoslovak Intelli-
gence Service in organizing demonstrations and riots I know,
happened in Panama in 1965.
The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service didn't have any agents in
Panama but had a lot of them in Mexico. Some of them were, I sup-
pose, students, and again I don't know neither the identity nor the
number of them because I was not allowed to. With their help the
operation was carried out in Panama in 1965, a year after the clashes
between American military forces and the students in Panama during
which several people were killed. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Serv-
ice decided to use the incident as a motive and base for an anti-Amer-
ican operation there and develop a tradition of anti-American
struggle, a day of fight against American imperialism.
Every anniversary of the death of these Panamanian students was
supposed to be commemorated by demonstrations and riots. The
Czechoslovak Intelligence Service succeeded in instigating these riots
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/19 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
in 1965 with the help of the Mexican agents but a year later it didn't
work any more and that was the end of the operation. This operation
was the only one I know about when students were directly used or
misused.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?
Senator GURNEY. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Two different facets of that, one, leaving for a
moment the activities in Latin America which we will come back to,
I wanted to go back and lay a little foundation and ask a few ques-
tions. The foundation lies in your use of the phrase "the United States,
the enemy."
It could have been any free country, I take it, that means that the
intelligence service of Czechoslovakia, and I presume of other Iron
Curtain countries, regards every free country in the world as an
enemy, is that correct?
Mr. BRITT. The reason why I used the term is that United States
is characterized in the long-range plans of the Soviet-bloc intelligence
as enemy No. 1. There are certain priorities.
Mr. SOURwINE. Why?
Mr. BRITT. Because the United States is the most important rival
of the Soviet Union, so not only the Soviet Intelligence Service but
all satellite intelligence services as well consider the United States
the enemy No. 1.
Mr. SOuRWINE. Now, I want to get to the question, with that back-
ground : Why was the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service interested in
the Barry Goldwater campaign? What was the objective, what did
they expect to gain, why were they attempting to discredit Mr. Gold-
water as, as you say, a racist?
Mr. BRITT. The reason why, I think was that Mr. Goldwater was
considered a dangerous rival.
Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you did this because he was an anti-
Communist?
Mr. BRITT. Yes, strongly anti-Communist.
Mr. SouRWINE. Opposed to the U.S.S.R.?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Was he opposed to Czechoslovakia?
Mr. BRITT. No, not .at all; the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service
was only an instrument of the Soviet Intelligence Service.
Mr. SouRwINE. Is that true in general?
Mr. BRITT. Yes, it is. It sounds unbelievable or ridiculous that
Czechoslovakia, a small country in middle Europe with the help of
her Intelligence Service is involved in Latin America, Africa, Asia,
and so forth. Doing things which don't correspond with real interests'
of Czechoslovakia at all. This is not typical for Czechoslovakia only,
all satellite intelligence services are primarily Soviet foreign policy
instruments.
Mr. SOURWINE. When you operated in Panama, your objective was
a certain impact on the United States, isn't that correct?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Mr. SoURwINE. But when you operated with regard to Barry Gold-
water, your objective was, as I understand your testimony, only to
hurt an individual who, as an individual, was an enemy of the Soviet
Union?
Mr. BRITT. That was one reason. Another reason was to show an
62-432-2
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
8
American presidential candidate as a racist and to influence the black
part of the American population. against him.
Mr. SOIIRwINE. Were you then making international propaganda
against the United States by this charge of racism against Goldwater?
Mr. BRITT. Yes; thousands of these anti-Goldwater pamphlets
printed in English, French and maybe in Spanish too were distributed
throughout the Third World pointing the United States as the enemy
of nonwhite nations, but the effect was very limited.
Mr. SouR.wINE. Now, I wanted to ask a few questions about the
area of operations in Latin America that you opened up. You spoke
of Panama. Do you have any knowledge of operations of the Czecho-
slovak Intelligence Service in Cuba?
Mr. BRITT. I know that Czechoslovak Intelligence Service had a
large intelligence station in Cuba, in Havana.
Mr. SOURwINE. When was this put in ?
Mr. BRITT. I'm not quite sure, gut I think it was established in 1960
or maybe 1.961.
Mr. SOURwINE. Was this residentura operating against Cubans or
was it using Havana as a base?
Mr. BRITT. This residentura had to 'help the Cubans to learn the
espionage business. At that time I think the Czechs were more ac-
ceptable than the Russians.
Mr. SouRwINE. You mean you were training Cubans in the intelli-
gence business?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Mr. Sou wINE. To operate where ?
Mr. BRITT. Especially in Latin America.
Mr. SourwrNE. Did you train Cubans in the intelligencebusiness to
operate as agents in the United States?
Mr. BRITT. That is only my supposition. I think yes. I wasn't in-
volved in operation activities against the United States, but accord.-
ing to my knowledge, I would say "yes."
Mr. SouRwINE. Are you aware of the operations of the International
Union of Students in Prague in training Puerto Ricans to operate
as agents in the United States?
Mr. BRITP. I know that in Prague there was a large Cuban intelli-
gence station which operated with the help of the Czechoslovak In-
telligence Service.
Mr. Sou rwINE. Cubans were sent to Prague for training in large
numbers?
Mr. BRITr. Yes, many people from Latin American countries who
were supposed to be trained[ came to Prague. Maybe I don't know
how, whether they came over Canada or through other countries, but
they came to Prague and they were trained there. How far Czecho-
slovak Intelligence Service instructed them there, I don't know, but
certainly there was, cooperation between the Czechoslovak and the
Cuban Intelligence Services in Prague. The Cubans had ,a large villa
there and a permanent Czech liaison officer was in daily contact with
them.
Mr. SouRwlxu. Do you have any knowledge of cooperation between
the 'Czechoslovak Intelligence Service or its residentura in Havana
and guerrilla operations run by Cubans elsewhere in this hemisphere,
the Guevara type of operations ?
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/19 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
Mr. BRITT. I don't have any knowledge about it, but I can say my
opinion on it. I would say that Cuba represents an important base
for the penetration of the United States, certainly there are many
refugees in the United States who could have been recruited not only
by Cuban Intelligence Service but Czechoslovak Intelligence Service
or Russian Intelligence Service as well.
Mr. SOURwINE. This is a speculation based on your background
knowledge, it is not an indication or statement that you know of this?
Mr. BRITT. This is my speculation.
Mr. SOURWINE. May I say something off the record?
Senator GURNEY. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SouRwINE. May we go back on the record?
Senator GURNEY. Yes.
Mr. SOURwINE. Do you have any information about the use of
Cuban exiles in connection with guerrilla operations elsewhere
in Latin America, either for or against such operations?
Mr. BRITT. No, not at all. During the period between 1964 and 1966,
the Department for Active Measures was not involved in influencing
or directing guerrilla acts in Latin American or Asian countries, not
at all.
Mr. TARABOCIIIA. May I inquire?
Mr. SouxwiNE. Mr. Tarabochia is our chief investigator and has
special knowledge. May he ask any questions that occur to him?
Senator GURNEY. Yes, at any time.
Mr. TARABOCIIIA. You mentioned about the falsification of docu-
ments, an accusation of the United States, an anti-Communist ele-
ment in the Congo. '
Are you aware that Che Guevara fought in the Congo against the
government forces?
Mr. BRITT. No, I didn't know about that.
Mr. TARABOCIIIA. Did the misinformation or Disinformation De-
partment of the Czechoslovak Intelligence ever mention the use of
anti-Castro Cuban exiles fighting in the Congo?
Mr. BRIT r. No, never.
Mr. TARABOCIIIA. Going back to Panama, the riots January 9, 1964,
were the direct result of agitation 'b student leaders who were mem-
bers of 'the International Union of Students. Are you aware that the
International Union of Students is based, the secretariat is based
in Prague?
Mr. BRITT. I would like to say that the riots in 1964 were the in-
spiration for the later operation, but the Czechoslovak Disinformation
Department was not involved in these riots in 1964, only later. I know
about the fact that the International Union of Students has its head-
quarters in Prague. I was personally in contact with the chairman of
this organization who was my university colleague, Mr. Vokrouhlicky,
but during the period 1964-66 'there was no direct influence of the
Czechoslovak Disinformation Department on the International Union
of Students.
It is true that the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service planned to
misuse 'the World Congress of that organization which was supposed
to be held in Algeria for anti-American propaganda. However, Pres-
ident Ben Bella was arrested and the congress didn't take place
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CI- RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
there. A year later, I think it was in 1965, the congress was to be
held in Ghana and the same thing happened there. President
N'krumah was overthrown and the congress had to be postponed
until 1968 when it took place in Bulgaria, and I doubt whether the
Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was involved there.
Mr. TARABOCITTA. Did the name of Floyd Britton surface during
the operation in Panama? Does the name of or are you familiar with
Floyd Britton?
Mr. BRITT. No.
Mr. TARABoor-TIA. He was the leader of the students during the dem-
onstrations which were supposed to take place in 1965.
Mr. BRTrr. The problem is, following-I think you were not here
when I spoke about the position of the Disinformation Department-
the Disinformation Department was responsible for the preparation
of all these operations but not for the execution of them because we
were not informed about the channels, the names of the agents which
was supposed to carry out those operations, for security reasons.
Mr. TARABOC I-H A. That is all.
Senator GTTRNEY. Mr. Britt, le't's go back to your statement that
the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service was realy an extension of So-
viet foreign policy; and as I also understood, you stated that is true
of the Iron Curtain countries.
Could you give uiis more detail on how this is done, for example
does the head of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service report directly
to Moscow? Do you go there for training? Do Russians come to Prague
and tell them what to do? Give us some of the techniques involved
here.
Mr. Br,TTT. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service after 1948 was
built. up according to the Soviet pattern. Starting with 1949-50, many
Soviet advisors came to Prague to direct the activities of the Czech-
oslovak Intelligence Service. They stayed formally as advisors until
1961 when the official 'title changed to liaison officers. Anyhow, that
was only a formal change. They still had the, same power as before.
The mechanism of t6 Soviet influence is very powerful.
The system of advisors is one way how the Soviets direct satellite
intelligence services. Until 1963, every operation, even the most unin-
portent one, had to be approved by an advisor first. When a Czecho-
slovak intelligence officer wrote an operation proposal he had to visit
his advisor, discuss it with him, rewrite it according to the advisor's
critical review and only after that he submitted it to his Czechoslovak
chief. The system of advisors is hierarchically structured. There are
advisors who direct .activities at the department level, advisors who
check everything at the level of the chief of the intelligence service,
and finally there is a chief advisor for the Ministry of Interior who
serves as the personal advisor for the minister. Understandably the
advisors at the higher level have the right to veto all decisions of
the subordinate advisors.
Then there are. of course, other ways of the Soviet influence. If the
Soviets need something from the Czechoslovak, East German, Hun-
garian or Polish Intelligence Service they approach directly the chief
of such service who gives the orders to the departments. Thus, people
involved in such operation very often don't know that they are doing
something for the :Russians because they got; instructions from the
Czechoslovak Intelligence Service chief.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/44 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
Then there are many people in the satellite intelligence services who
have been professionally educated in the Soviet Union in the Intelli-
gence School there. Until 1964 the intelligence school for Czecho-
slovak officers took 2 years. After that, it was changed to 1 year only.
Anyhow there was an order in 1964 that every chief starting with the
position of a deputy chief of a department was supposed to be pro-
fessionally educated in Moscow. Many of the officers who went to
Moscow and carne back were critical of the Moscow intelligence
school standards. The Russians didn't give them too much of their
own experience .and newest techniques.
The intelligence school in Moscow is another form of Soviet influ-
ence. It dives the Russians a chance to get acquainted with the Czecho-
slovak dicers, to study their character, their strength and weaknesses,
level of the ideological indoctrination and devotion to communism.
This kind of information is very valuable. For example in Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 they knew very well who their people were, whom
they could rely on.
The influence of the Russian Intelligence Service on the Czecho-
slovak or other satellite intelligence services is intensive, actually, the
Russians can do with the satellite intelligence services what they want.
Senator GURNEY. The school in Moscow, as I understood your
testimony, is more to determine if students from Czechoslovakia are
reliable and ideologically safe for Russia, rather than teach them
intelligence techniques?
Mr. BRITT. Right.
Senator GURNEY. I think your testimony is, if I understand you
correctly, that the school did not really give the Czechoslovak too
much information on how the Russian Intelligence Service worked?
Mr. BRITT. Right.
Senator GURNEY. This method of direction by the Russians of the
Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, and supervisions that you have
described, was that still going on when you defected from Czecho-
slovakia?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Senator GURNEY. So far as you know, that is still true today?
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Senator GURNEY. So far as you know it is really a Russian Intelli-
gence Service?
Mr. BRITT. Yes; they get every piece of information, every mem-
orandum they are interested in. They know the identity of all Czech-
oslovak agents abroad, everything about the Czechoslovakian codes,
the system of communications. Really, they have the whole Czecho-
slovak intelligence net completely under their control and the same
ap lies to other satellite services.
Senator GURNEY. Do you know if the Russians divide areas of the
world into assignments say to Czechoslovakia and Hungary and some
of the others in order to make the intelligence coverage as wide as
possible?
Mr. BRITT. Again, I have, not read any document which I could
reproduce, but I can tell you my own judgment, my own opinion
about it.
Until 1968, the Czechoslovak Intelligence 'Service was after the
Soviet Intelligence Service the most efficient one of all the satellites.
The situation has changed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia because several Czechoslovak intelligence officers defected which
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
12
represented a considerable loss for the Soviets. Many Czechoslovalk
agent nets were, destroyed or made inactive.
The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service before 1968 used the broL,.t
scope of 'Czechoslovak diplomatic relations for its activities. As far
as America is concerned it operated in Canada, the United States,
Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. In Europe
it was Great Britain, France, West Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Netherlands, Scandinavian countries Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, aid
Greece. In the Middle East and Aftrica the following countries be-
longed to the primary targets or operational bases : Lebanon, Syria,
United Arab Republic, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea,, Ghana,
Congo, Tanzania, and Kenya. Southern Asia and the Far East was
covered by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in India, Indo-
nesia, Japan, and maybe Ceylon.
Speaking about Japan, only the Department for Scientific-
Technical Intelligence operated there, not the departments for politi-
cal intelligence as Japan was considered the domain of the Russian
Intelligence Service.
Senator GURNEY. You mentioned Poland, East Germany, and
Hungary.
Mr. BRITT. Yes.
Senator GURNEY. I haven't, noticed that you mentioned Rumania or
Yugoslavia. Is there any intelligence service under Soviet control
there, as far as YOU know?
Mr. BRITT. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, there was no coopera-
tion or connection between the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Intelli-
gence Services and I am sure that the same applies to the relations
between Yugoslav and other Soviet-bloc services, the Soviet Service
included.
As far as the Rumanian Intelligence Service was concerned, start-
ing with 1962 the relations deteriorated and Rumania, even if it was
still a member of the Soviet-bloc intelligence community, it was not
trusted any more as a reliable partner. There were still connections
at the highest official level between the chiefs, but I would say that
those were really only official formal connections, not efficient and
productive ones.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to digress, but may I
go off the record a moment?
Senator GTTRNEY. Yes.
(Discussion Or the record.)
Senator GURNEY. Back on the record.
Mr. SOURWTNF. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Britt has written a book on the
subject of "disinformation" growing out of his own experiences and
knowledge. I understand the book is going to be published and I do
not want to try to beat him to the punch with his own book, so to
speak, but there are a number of technical questions I should like to
ask while Mr. Britt is here, if I may ask those at this time.
Senator GURNEY. Very well.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Mr. Britt, will you tell us as much as you can of
the organization of the disinformation department of which you
were an assistant director?
Mr. BRTTT. Well, the organizational structure of the Czechoslovak
Disinformation Department changed in details several times during
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/13: CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
the time I worked there as its deputy chief, but the basic scheme re-
mained unchanged.
The Department was headed by a chief and one deputy chief. Four
territorial sections formed a backbone of the Department. It was
German-Austrian section, European section, covering the rest of the
non-Communist Europe excluding Germany and Austria, American
section and the section covering the developing countries of the Middle
East, Africa, Southern Asia, and the Far East.
Then there were three specialized sections, the first for disinforma-
tion activities against foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
services, the second for coordination of military disinformations and
the third for economic disinformation.
All of these sections were responsible for developing new ideas and
plans which were then carried out with the help of the operational
territorial departments of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service.
Finally there was a section for analysis and documentation and an
archive collecting signatures, letterheads and all kinds of model letters
and documents which could be used as patterns for forgeries.
Mr. SOURwINE. Mr. Britt, give us the names and positions and
duties of top officers of that department as best you remember them?
Mr. BRITT. There were about 20 people working in the disinforma-
tion department. According to security rules they were supposed
to address each other only under cover names. That's why I don't re-
member all real names of my subordinates even though I was entitled
to know them.
The department was headed by Maj. Tiri Stejskal who until 1963
was the chief of the Latin American Operational Department. In the
mid-fifties he served in Austria and was expelled from there as per-
sona non grata,. As his deputy I was responsible mainly for the men-
tioned territorial sections. In 1966 I was succeeded by Liev. Col. Karel
Frerund who for a long time had been the director of the Ministry of
Interior Press Department.
The people working in the department were mostly experienced
intelligence officers who had spent several years abroad and had the
necessary knowledge of the problems and mentality of countries they
covered. Thus, for example Maj. Ludvik Neckar who was respon-
sible for operations on the American continent had spent 4 years in
Brazil, Maj. Vaclav Louda a specialist for developing countries had
worked for several years as the chief of the North American Terri-
torial Operational Department and had spent some time in Canada
and Great Britain. Maj. Jaroslav Nemec was specialized in opera-
tions against foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services. His
name became famous in 1959 when he had to leave Austria in a hurry.
He was a member of the Czechoslovak intelligence station in Salz-
burg at that time and was instructed to deliver laxabive powder into
Radio Free Europe-RFE-dining room saltshakers in Munich
through one of his agents. The operation didn't succeed as the agent
was in fact an American double agent, Nemec was exposed and im-
mediately for security reasons had to leave Austria. Maj. Jardslav
Kazbal covering Europe had spent several years in Great Britain,
I think, and in Turkey or Greece. This very short and basic charac-
teristics give you at least a very brief idea what quality of officers
worked in the department.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
14
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Britt, tell us what were the major and minor
objectives of your department and how they were related to each
other?
Mr. BRITT. The major objectives of the Disinformation Depart-
ment were summed up in a long-term plan of disinformation opera-
tions covering the period of 5 to 7 years.
The Czechoslovak plan which was worked out in 1965 under the
Soviet; supervision characterized the United States as the enemy No. 1.
The primary goal was to isolate the United States in Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa morally and politically and to promote the
withdrawal of American military from Europe.
As far as priorities are concerned the NATO was the second most
important target. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service together
with other Soviet-bloc intelligence services was supposed to work for
disintegrating of the NATO countries partnership to the extent that
the Atlantic Alliance wouldn't be renewed in 1969. As you know this
didn't happen.
German Federal Republic followed as the third most important
target. According to the long-term plan disinformation operations
were to aim at weakening the alliance between West Germany and its
Western partners presenting West Germany as a Nazi seedbed.
The territory of developing countries represented the main battle-
field in anti-American activities as the majority of operations was
carried out there and it was the territory where the Czechoslovak In-
telligence Service registered greatest successes.
Mr. SotrrwINE. Please go into detail with regard to the types of
operations that were carried out, using as many examples of actual
operations as you think would be necessary to make it a clear and
comprehensive exposition of what was done.
Mr. BRITT. Operation called Research, conducted in the mid-fifties`
was directed against North American influence in Latin America. The
Czechoslovak Intelligence Service noted the unsuccessful American
efforts to survey public opinion in Latin America which became
famous as the Project Camelot, and decided to continue in the name
of the United States. In forged questionnaires, the respondents were
asked to answer a battery of very personal and sensitive questions con-
cerning themselves, .and they have been even asked to characterize po-
litical orientation of their friends which reeked of denunciation. The
whole survey could be construed as American interference in the in-
ternal affairs of the countries involved. The completed questionnaires
were to be sent to American Embassies. Among the addresses were a
significant number of peopla known to Czechoslovak Intelligence
Service for their anti-American opinions, who could be relied upon
to arouse, scandal and agitation over the brutal methods of American
inquiry. The calculation was correct. The Americans became once
more target No. 1.
As an example of an operation directed against an individual can
serve .a Russian operation scandalizing Mr. Anthony Courtney, Con-
servative member of the British Parliament. On one visit to the Soviet
Union, Courtney invited a woman employee of the Soviet State Tour-
ist Office to his hotel room. The result was a series of intimate p'hoto-
m aphs taken and published by the Soviets in the form of a pamphlet
and sent to prominent British citizens and newspapers. There was a
difference of 4 years between the hotel adventure and the distribution
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/1015CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
of the pamphlet. In all probability, the Soviet Intelligence Service
hoped to use the compromising, photographs for recruitment. When
it realized that it was not possible, it decided to use the material for
a subversive public relations campaign against Courtney. The leaflet
provided impetus to jokes circulating among the British political
aristocracy. It is difficult to estimate what degree British public
opinion was influenced. The fact remains, however, that Anthony
Courtney was not reelected as a member of the Parliament in the next
parliamentary elections.
Mr. Souizwzxr. Please discuss specifically the exertion of influence
with special. reference to the influential individual that you mentioned
earlier in your testimony.
Mr. BRITT. Your question, as I understand it, relates to the category
of the so-called influence operations or influence agents. As I have
already mentioned, the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service certainly
didn't have as many influential agents as the Russian service had or
has, nevertheless, there were several developing countries where the
Czechoslovak Intelligence operated successfully with the help of these
agents. It was, for example, the United Arab Republic. The Czecho-
slovak Intelligence Service had several agents there, in the state hier-
archy, who served as disinformation channels for material produced
in Prague and Moscow. Their prominent positions offered Moscow
a chance to leak disin form ation.al material directed mainly against
the United States of America and to a lesser degree against the German
Federal Republic and Great Britain. This material consisted of forged
data on various anti-Arab plans and subversive activities by the United
States.
In this connection I would like to mention one thing. It would be
a big mistake to make a conclusion that Communist agents have suc-
cessfully penetrated all. the non-Communist world and that they are
responsible for all its trouble and problems. This espionage paranoia
typical for the 1950's can actually only innerly weaken the democratic
world. In the present competition between the Communist and the
non-Communist world, Soviet-bloc intelligence is only one of many
foreign policy instruments, ,and certainly not the most important one.
Communist disinformation, propaganda and influence operation can't
win that competition. The new Communist espionage paranoia would
be a tragic mistake for many reasons, and I would like to mention
at least one. It creates dirty waters in which especially the Commu-
nist intelligence knows how to fish and thus it would be completely
counterproductive. It was not a good fortune that the Communist
intelligence services registered their greatest successes in the 1950's.
The atmosphere of those years was a fertile soil for their activities.
Mr. SOURWINE. Finally, please tell us as much as you can from your
own knowledge about the operations of all disinformation agencies
of Iron Curtain countries, or perhaps you should tell us what you
know of any other Iron Curtain countries' operations.
Mr. BRITT. The Soviet Disinformation Department which repre-
sented a center for disinformation activities of the Soviet bloc was
established in 1959, and headed by General Agayants, an Armenian
with intelligence experience going back several decades.
The Czechoslovak Disinformation Department between 1965-66
maintained direct contact not only with the Soviets but the Hun-
garian and East German counterparts as well. According to the Soviet
62-432-3
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : frIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
idea this was supposed to be .a way to make the disinformation ap-
paratus more productive and efficient. The East German department
was headed at that time by Liev. Col. Wagenbrett and the Hungarian
department by Maj. Janos FYarjes. While the East German depart-
ment scored most successes in West Germany the Hungarian Depart-
ment spent most of its energy fighting against the Hungarian desk of
the Radio Free Europe.
Three were several more or less ineffective operations which the
Czechoslovak Disinformation Department carried out together with
these satellite copartners, mainly against West Germany and Austria.
The situation radically changed in 1968. Czechoslovakia, once a part-
ner and very productive source of disinformation and propaganda
operations against the non-Communist world became herself a target
and victim. The Soviets with the help of satellite intelligence services
and Stalinists from the Czechoslovak state security organs launched
a series of operations of this kind against the democratization move-
ment and its representatives using forgeries, anonymous threatening
letters, a special newspaper, radio broadcasting, leaflets, books, and
many other forms of persuasion. They even hid weapons on the Czech-
oslovaa-k territory and anonymously informed the Czechoslovak police
about the hiding place, trying to create an impression that the weapons
belonged to the counterrevolutionary underground and had been de-
l ivered by Western intelligence services. Despite this extensive effort,
disinformation, propaganda, and influence operations against Czech-
oslovakia totally failed. It was the Soviet Army which defeated the
new Czeehoglovak regime, not the Soviet Intelligence Service.
For me personally this was a period of reevaluation of my life. I
identified myself openly with the new regime in Czechoslovakia and
after the invasion refused to follow orders from the occupied Prague
headquarters. The only solution left for me was a life of a political
exile. Maybe; I am too personal in this part of my testimony, but I
think it belongs to the "corn" of the problem we are speaking about.
In 1968 looking back into my own past I realized that the psycho-
logical warfare operations I participated in during my appointment
in the l)isinformnation Department was .a bad service especially for
my own country. It was one of the reasons why I defected.
Mr. Sounw 1cn. 1VIr. Chairman, may I ask if anybody here has fur-
ther inquiry or anything he would like to have opened up on the record
again?
All'. MARTIN. I have one question. I wonder if the witness would
have any information on contacts between disinformation apparatus
and elements in the American media, that is, with or without the
knowledge of these elements in the American media. When they were
in contact with members os the disinformation apparatus, did you
consistently try to use contacts in the American media for spreading
disinformation in this country?
Mr. RRTTT. I. understand. There were several levels of disinforma-
tion influence on t'he mass media. There were newspapers which were
owned by Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. Then there were news-
papers where one member of the editorial staff was recruited as an
agent.
:llr. SonRWINE. Talking about newspapers in the United States?
Mr. BRrrT. All over the world. I will specify it later, as far as the
United States is concerned.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/1011 CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
The third and most of often way of influencing mass media was called
"anonymous way." Letters have been produced in name of various
individuals which pretended that the letter writer for patriotic or
nationalist reasons, hatred toward Americans or for other reasons
decided to publicize a sensational document-mostly a forgery-which
was enclosed.
Until 1964 the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service owned a news-
paper in Brazil. After the coup d'etat there the publication of the
newspaper was ceased by the new government and the Czechoslovak
service lost that propaganda channel.
Mr. SouawiNun. Do you know where in Brazil that paper was
published?
Mr. BRITT. It was in Rio. Later the Czechoslovak Intelligence
Service changed this practice and didn't buy newspapers abroad any-
more as it was disadvantageous both from the operational and the
financial point of view. After the coup in Brazil, the newspaper was
stopped and the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service lost not only the
channel but the money it put into this project as well. That's why the
Czechoslovak service later relied more on recruiting individuals in
editorial staffs.
According to my experience, most of them were in second- or third-
rank newspapers. I have no knowledge about any agent who would
be established in the most important newspapers of the world like, for
instance, the New York Times, the British Times, Le Monde, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, and so forth, because these editorial staffs,
these newspapers are financially strong and the correspondents are
mostly experienced people who are aware of the danger of Communist
intelligence services.
On the other hand, it was easy to recruit second- and third-class
journalists in small newspapers, mostly in developing countries, which
were permanently in financial trouble.
As far as the United States is concerned I don't know about any
journalists recruited for the Czechoslovak or any other Soviet-bloc
intelligence service and I don't know any newspaper under direct
influence of Communist intelligence either.
Mostly what happened was that a newspaper was supplied with
documents or forgeries through the mail, and it depended on the
newspaper whether it believed in it and accepted it or not.
Mr. MARTIN. It would also depend on the quality of the forgery
or disinformation that had the quality of apparent authenticity, even
an intelligent man might be disposed to accept it?
Mr. BRIT'r. Yes; I might say not all the operations were based on
forgeries. There were even operations which used genuine American
documents.
For instance, in 1969, at the time I was already in the United States,
reading foreign newspapers I discovered a new disinformation and
propaganda operation against the United States which I think, is of
Russian origin. Several editorial staffs in Europe, in West Germany,
Italy, France, and Great Britain received a letter with top secret
American military documents. The documents wore mailed from
Rome and accompanied by an anonymous letter explaining that the
letterwriter was a friend of General Wendland, who as a deputy chief
of the West German Intelligence committed suicide in 1968. According
to the letterwriter General Wendland was disturbed by the content
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :1SIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
of the American documents because Europe including the territory
of W'st Germany was supposed to become a major battlefield and
target for American atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons in
case of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Sev-
enl nowspapers and magazines devoted a lot of space to these docu-
ments, some of them even mentioned the Soviet Disinformation Serv-
ice as a possiible initiator but the edge of critique aimed at the United
States. The campaign continued for several months. Anyhow, it was
clear that the documents were not valid anymore otherwise the Soviets
would not use them for propaganda purposes. The Russians got the
documents from an American sergeant who was arrested in the United
States in 1964.
Senator GURNEY. Does anyone have any more questions?
Mr. MARTIN. I just wanted to ask whether you have named two
different ways in which the disinformation apparatus worked through
the free world, three ways actually-first, by recruiting agents; sec-
ond., by feeding documents which are in fact forgeries but which ap-
pear authentic to innocent members of the press or innocent editors;
and, third, by feeding to the press documents which are genuine but
whose publication serves the interest of the Soviet Union.
Are there any other ways, to your knowledge, which the disinforma-
tion apparatus works through the free world media?
Mr. BRITT. Well, certainly there are other ways. Once the Czecho-
slovak Disinformation Department had a professional schooling, an
educational session on. professional disinformation techniques and var-
ious new methods were discussed. Czechoslovak officers were impressed
by the propaganda success of an operation which might have been
initiated by the East German Intelligence Service. Two television
journalists got an interview from a man who had spent several years
in Congo as a mercenary and was known in Germany as Congo-Muller.
He thought that he was giving the interview for a West German tele-
vision station. Under the influence of alcohol he lost all moral inhibi-
tions and started to boast of his military career in Congo. Several
weeks later the interview was broadcast to his large surprise by the
East German television. In 1968 the East Germans registered a sim-
ilar success with Dr. Walter Becher, spokesman of the rightest
Sudeten (erman movement in West Germany. I can't and I don't in-
tend to impiicate the two journalists as East German intelligence
agents as I don't know anything about them, but propaganda success
of tlreir operation was remarkable.
The is another thing that I should mention. When the Disinforma-
tion Department wanted to carry out a big campaign in one country,
it used to surface the disinformation message in another coup-try in
order to protect the people who were directly involved. For instance, I
remember that an anti-American black propaganda campaign in
Indonesia in 1964-65, initiated by Prague, started with an article pub-
lished in a Ceylonese newspaioer. Only after that, first publication it
was transplanted on the Indonesian press. At the beginning of my
testimony I mentioned the three basic types of operations disinforma-
tion, black propaganda and influence operations. You can hardly find
pure types as mostly every operation involves elements of all types,
but the majority of these operations can be characterized as black
propaganda operations. They are the easiest for an intelligence service
can execute them even without hell) of agents. The operational depart-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
19
ments of the Intelligence Service, and I believe the reaction is the same
in the Russian Intelligence Service as well as in the Czechoslovak In-
telligence Service, do not like operations involving their agents. The
operational departments don't like to risk their agents because their
primary task is to gather information with the help of these agents.
When the agents are involved in disinformation or propaganda opera-
tions, it is risky, and all operational departments try to avoid that risk.
That's why the disinformation message is most often delivered
anonymousl~yy.
Senator GURNEY. Does anyone have any further questions?
Mr. SouRWINE. If we close the record here, we will not be foreclos-
ing the witness from providing any additional information that may
occur to him, because he will have an opportunity to correct the record
after it is filed.
I am sure the committee is appreciative of your helpfulness in
coming down, Mr. Britt. We will get this transcript to you as soon as
possible.
Senator GURNEY Thank you again, Mr. Britt, for your helpful testi-
mony.
The committee will now adjourn, subject to call.
(Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing this day was concluded.)
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
INDEX
(NOTE.-The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization
in this index.)
A Page
Africa ------------------------------ 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14
----------------------- :Agayants, General --------------------------------------------------- 15
Algeria --------------------------- ---- 9,12
Anti-American -------------------------------------------------- 4, 6, 7, 9, 14
Anti-Communist ----------------------------------------------------- 7,9
Argentina ----------------------------------------------------------- 12
Asia --------------------------------------------------------------- 4,7,14
Atlantic Alliance ---------------------------------------------------- 14
Austria ---------------------------------------------------------- 12,13,16
B
Becher, Dr. Walter--------------------------------------------------- 18
Belgium ------------------------------------------------ --- -- - 5,12
Ben Bella, President------------------------------------------------- 9
Berlin -------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Bouteflika, Mr. (Algerian Foreign 5
Brazil ----------------------------------------------------------- 12,13,17
British Times (newspaper)------------------------------------------- 17
Britt, Lawrence ----------------------------------------------------- 1-19
Britton, Floyd ------------------------------------------------------ 10
Bulgaria ------------------------------------------------------------ 10
C
Canada ----------------------------------------------------------- 8,12,13
Castro, Fidel ------------------------------------------------------- 9
Ceylon ------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Charles University ---------------------------------------------------- 1
Chile --------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Communist --------------------------------------------------------- 3,6,15
Intelligence ---------------------------------------------------- 3,4,17
Party, Center Committee of_______________________________________ 1
Congo, the ------------------------------------------------------ 5, 9 12X18
Congo-Miill.er ------------------------------------------------------ 18
Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs_________________________________ 4
Courtney, Anthony --------------------------------------------------- 14,15
Cuba -------------------------------------------------------------- 8,9,12
Havana --------------------------------------------------------- 8
Intelligence Service --------------------------------------------- 8,9
Cuban exiles -------------------------------------------------------- 9
Czechoslovakia ------__ _- 1, 7, 11, 16
Department for Disinformation__________________ 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16,18
Intelligence Service ________________________________________ 1,2,4-17,19
Prague ------------------------------------------- 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18
D
Department for Active Measures_________________________________________ 2,9
Department for Research and Analysis-------------------------------- 2 Department for Scientific-Technical Intelligence________________________ 12
E
East African Standard (newspaper) ---------------------------------- 5
East German Intelligence Service_____________________________________ 10,18
Embassy of Czechoslovakia, East Berlin__________________________ ____- 2
Europe -------------------------------------------------- 3,6,7,12-14,17,18
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73BOO296ROO0200170082-2
II
F
Page
Far East -------------------------------------------------------------
12,13
Federal Republic of Germany ------------------------------------------
14,15
Foreign Minister of Algeria-.------------------------------------------
a
France ---------------------------------------------------------------
12,17
Frankfurter Aligemein Zeitung (newspaper) --------------------------
17
Fremund, Liev. Col. Karel ------------ .--------------------------------
13
Fiirjes, Maj. Janos----------------------------------------------------
16
G
Germany -------------------------------------------------------------
2, 3, 13
Ghana --------------------------------------------------------------- 10,12
Goldwater, Barry ----------------------------------------------------- 4, 5, 7
Great Britain -------------------------------------------------- 3, 12, 13, 15, 17
Parliament ----------------- --------------------------------- 14,15
Greece ---------------------------------------------------------------- 12.13
Guevara, Che -------_._ --------- 8,9
----------------------------------------
Guinei ------------------------ ------------------------------------- 12
Gurney, Senator Edward J---------------------------------------------- 1-19
II
Hungary ----------- ------------------------------------------------ 11
Intelligence Service ----------------------------------------------- 10
I
India ----------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------- 12,18
Intelligence school _ ---------------------------------------- 11
International Union of Students -------------------------------- 8,9
Iran ------------------------------------------------------------------ 12
Iraq 12
Iron Curtain-------------------------------------------------------- 6,7,10,15
Italy ------------------------------------------------------------------
12,17
J
Japan ----------------------------------------------------------------
K
Karnbond
Oscar -------------------------------------------------------
4
,
Ii.anza
Thomas --------------------------------------------------------
0
,
Kazbal
Maj. Jardslav---------------------------------------------------
13
,
Kenya ------------------------------------------------------------------
12
L
Latin America ----------------- ----------------------------------- 4,7,8,9,14
Latin American Operational Department------------------------------
13
Lebanon ------------- ------------------------------------------------
12
Le Monde (newspaper) ------------------------------------------------
17
Leopoldville --------------------------------------------------------
4
Louda, Maj. V, clay -------------------------------------------- - -
13
Martin,
M
David ---------------------------------------------------------
1-19
Mexico
---------------------------------------------------------------
6,12
Middle
East --------------------------------------------------------
12,13
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tanzania -----------------------------------
4
Ministry of Interior-------------------------------------------------- 10
Press Department------------------------------------------------ 13
Morocco---------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Moscow------------------------------------------------------------ 10,11,15
N
Nairobi---------------------------------------------------------------
5
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) --------------------------
14
Neck?ir, Maj. Ludvik-------------------------------------------------
13
Nemec, Maj. Jaroslav--------------------------------------------------
13
Netherlands, the ---------- -- - -
1
2
New York Times (newspaper) -------------------------------------------
17
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73BOO296ROO0200170082-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/1pl: CIA-RDP73BOO296ROO0200170082-2
Page
N'krumah, President-------------------------------------------------
10
Non-Communist------------------------------------------------- 2, 3, 6,
13, 15
North American Territorial Operations Department--------------------
13
Nyerere, President ---------------------------------------------------
5
P
Panama--------------------------------------------------------------
6,10
Parliament-----------------------------------------------------------
3
Polish Intelligence Service--------------------------------------------
10
Portugal--------------------------------------------------------------
5
Project Camelot------------------------------------------------------
14
R
Radio Free Europe___________________________________________________
13,16
Rhodesia-------------------------------------------------------------
5
Rome, Italy----------------------------------------------------------
17
Rumania-------------------------------------------------------------
12
Intelligence Service-----------------------------------------------
12
Is
Salzburg--------------------------------------------------------------
13
Scott, Samuel J------------------------------------------------------
1-19
Sourwine, J. G-------------------------------------------------------
1-19
South Africa---------------------------------------------------------
5
Southern Asia--------------------------------------------------------
12,13
Soviet-bloc------------------------------------------------------- 6,14,15,17
Intelligence------------------------------------------------------ 2,3
Soviet Union (Russia)-------------.---..--------------------- 6, 7,10-12,14,18
Army------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Disinformation Department--------------------------------------- 15,18
Intelligence Service---------------------------------- 4, 9,11,12, 15,16,19
State Tourist Office----------------------------------------------
14
Spain -----------------------------------------------------------------
5
Stejskal, Maj. TIN---------------------------------------------------
2,13
Sudeten German movement-------------------------------------------
18
Switzerland -----------------------------------------------------------
12
Syria----------------------------------------------------------------
12
T
Tanzania--------------------------------------------------------------
5,12
Government of---------------------------------------------------
4
Tarabochia, Alfonso L------------------------------------------------
1-19
Third World --------------------------------------------------------
8
Tshombe, Moise -----------------------------------------------------
5
Turkey -------------------------------------------------------------
12,13
U
United Arab Republic------------------------------------------------ 12,15
United States ------------------------------------------------ 2-9,12,14-18
Ambassador -----------------------------------------------------
4,5
Uruguay ------------------------------------------------------------
12
V
Vienna, Austria -----------------------------------------------------
Vokrouhlicky, Mr. ---------------------------------------------------
W
Wagenbrett, Liev. Col. ----------------------------------------------
16
Wendland, General --------------------------------------------------
17
West Germany ----------------------------------------------- 12,14,16-18
Intelligence -----------------------------------------------------
17
World Congress -----------------------------------------------------
9
Y
Yugoslavia ----------------------------------------------------------
12
Intelligence Service ---------------------------------------------
12
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73BOO296ROO0200170082-2