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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300020005-2C-401h1.bCtd;" Congress and She War ? 3 Congress and the Indochina War: 1970 Chronology Feb. 2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee made public a report., "Vietnam: December 1969," criticizing the Administration's Vietnamization policy. (Weekly Report p. 336) Feb. 18. The President issued a 40,000-word mes- sage to Congress, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace." (Text and summary, Weekly Report p. 509) Feb. 25, 26, 27. House Appropriations Subcom- mittee on Defense heard a report on the Vietnamization progress from Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. (Weekly Report p. 684) March 6. President Nixon lifted the official lid of secrecy on U.S. military involvement in Laos with a 3,000-word statement which drew sharp comment from members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Weekly Report p. 761) April 12. After a delay of more than five months, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee released a censored transcript of closed hearings held in October 1969 on U.S. military involvement in Laos. (Fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1243) April 30. President Nixon announced that American troops had been sent into battle in Cam- bodia. (Weekly Report p. 1151) May 2. Senators George McGovern (D S.D.), Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), Alan Cranston (D Calif.), Charles E. Goodell (R N.Y.) and Mark 0. Hatfield (R Ore.) announced plans to offer an amendment to elimi- nate spending for military operations in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by the end of 1970. (Weekly Report p. 1208) May 5. A May 1 Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee report on a resolution (S Con Res 64) to repeal the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution was recommitted to the Committee. (Weekly Report p. 1207) May 6. House passed a bill (HR 17123) authoriz- ing $20.2 million for military procurement and research in fiscal 1971 and rejected amendments that would have restricted use of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. (Weekly Report p. 1209) May 13. The Senate began debate on the Foreign Military Sales bill (HR 15628), the vehicle for an amendment offered by Senators Frank Church (D Idaho) and John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) designed to prohibit U.S. military activities in Cambodia. (Weekly Report p. 1272) June 6. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee released a report, "Cambodia: May 1970," disput- ing the military reason given by President Nixon for ordering the intervention into Cambodia and indicating that the military gains were outweighed by the risks of a broadened war in Indochina. (Weekly Report p. 1534) June 24. Senate adopted an amendment to repeal the 1964_,-Tonkin Gulf resolution. (Weekly Report p. 161T5)-) ) ( June 30'. The Senate by a 58-37 roll-call vote passed--41--tr1'odified: Cooper-Church amendment and the Milmtry,A441900.00TifillleSSMitG14#08/07 weinkst of debate, (WitiMilieport p 1671) President Nixon issued a statement on the o0-day U.S. operation in Cambodia stating it had been nuccuss- fully concluded and that no American ground personnel would re-enter Cambodia in the future. (Weekly Report p. 1673) July 6. A special House committee issued a report on "U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia" (II Redt 9i- 1276), after undertaking a two-week fact-finding mis- sion to the region. July 9. The House rejected a motion to instruct House conferees to agree to the Senate-passed Cooper- 'Church amendnie:rit....(Weekly Reporrp.-17797"-- July 10. The Senate Adopted by a 57-5 roil-call vote a concurrent resolution (S Con Res 64) reaffirming the repeal of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution. (Weekly Report-p77777)----vm Aug. 20, .21:-The Sensitp :approved amendments to t e-defenie procurement bill (Hir17123) to (telly T:17K-a11oWances to allied troops in South Vietnart. to be any higher than those paid to American troops and to forbid use of U.S. funds to pay foreign troop; fighting for Cambodia and Laos. (Weekly Report p. 2)72) Sept. 1. The Senate defeated by a 39-5i-, roll-call vote the Hatfield-McGovern amendment to I lit 17123 which would have imposed a deadline for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. (Weekly Report p. 2170) Oct. 7. President Nixon in a televised speech pro- posed a cease-fire in Vietnam and widened peace talks to include nations not present at the Paris peace talks. (Congressional reaction, Weekly Report p. 2495) Nov. 16. The House by a 288-39 roll-call vote passed a joint resolution (H J Res 1355) defining the war-making powers of the President. The bill then went to the Senate. (Weekly Report p. 2817) Nov. 18. President Nixon sent a message to Con- gress requesting $1 billion in supplementary foreign aid including $65 million for Vietnamization and $255 million in military and economic aid for Cambodia. (Weekly Report p. 2834) Nov. 23. Debate over U.S. policy revived in the aftermath of an attempt to rescue American prisoners of war near Hanoi and large-scale air strikes over North Vi nanC(Wechty Report p. 2874) Dec. 3./The Senate Appropriations Committee a ded. a-prohibition against the entry of U.S. ground- combat roops--in.to7"::Catribodia when it considered tile SW:billion fiscal 1971 defense .appropriations. bill (HR 19590). The Senate pIsied the bill Dec. 8. (Weekly Report p. 2933) Dee. 7. The House approved a resolution (H Res 1282) commending the courage displayed by the official command, officers and men involved in the Nov. 21 attempt to rescue U.S. prisoners believed to be held captive near Hanoi. (Weekly Report p. 2937) Dee. 9. The House Appropriations Committ;,e reported HR 19928, a $990 million suppletncntal foreign aid bill for fiscal 1971 including $255 million for Cilin- bodia. The House by a 249-102 vote passed a bill :1001-RDIEhla iHi- @26R@.CtO&0Ot2W3O5R2aid, incfuo- ing $255 million for Cambodia. (Weekly Report p. 2935.: roved Ftrdkuteit 6R000300020005-2 January 26, 1971tPP HANINICITE:6911151---)F-71198(49 El 201 health service areas, with advisory coun- cils on matters of administration at each such level. Local offices would have the responsibility of serving as ombudsmen for the consumer in the health system and of investigating complaints regard- ing the administration of the program made by consumers or providers in their area. Through its regulations, the Board would guide performance under the pro- gram; it would coordinate various activ- ities with the State and regional plan- ning agencies; it would provide an ac- counting of activities to the Congress; Ind it would engage in studies and proj- ects for evaluation and for progressive improvements of operations. The financial operations of the pro- gram would be managed through a health security trust fund?similar to the social security trust fund. One-half of the income for the fund would come from Federal general revenue with the other half coming from taxing individual Income up to $15,000 annually, employ- ers' payrolls and non-earned income. Each year, the Board?with the partici- pation of the Advisory Council?would make an advance estimate of the amount available for expenditure?to pay for services, for program development, and for administration?and would make al- locations to the several regions. These allocations would be subdivided among categories of services and designated for the health service areas, with paraticipa- tion by the advisory councils. Advance estimates, constituting the program bud- gets, would be subject to adjustments, as may become necessary, in accordance with guidelines in the act. The alloca- tions to regions and to service areas would be guided initially by the latest available data on current levels of ex- penditures; thereafter they would be guided by the program's own experiences in making expenditures and by evidences of need toward meeting the program's obligations and objectives equitably throughout the Nation. Thus, Mr. Speaker, the Health Se- curity Act we submit to the Congress and to the people of the United States differs from all previous proposals for national health insurance. It is not just another proposal for insurance. It is not merely an extension of medicare by stages to everyone. It is not an ill-conceived open- ended design for pumping more dollars into a chronically strained "nonsystem." It is not simply a bigger categorical pro- gram for the production of manpower and facilities without creating a system to employ them. Our program will build for the resi- dents of this country a rational system of national health security. It will not require an increased expenditure of funds, but will instead allow citizens to pay for their medical security during their income producing years in accord- ance with their level of earnings. The funds which we as a people can afford to provide will finance and budget the essential costs of good medical care. Simultaneously we will strengthen our capacity to deliver health services, and make good health care available without financial hardship for all families and individuals in the Nation, We take cognizance of the fact that organized medicine shares our concern that America faces a crisis in health care. We know that our goals are the same?to provide adequate health care services for all Americans. We would hope and expect organized medicine to make a substantial contribution in set- ting up the mechanisin for the health security program so that its long years of experience and the expertise of its members would be available for the ef- fective functioning of the program. As lay groups, the various advisory boards and advisory councils established under the Health Security Act would, I am sure, want to rely heavily on the cooperation and advice of organized medicine so as to insure that the highest possible qual- ity of medical care would be available to everyone and that an equitable dis- tribution of available funds would be maintained. We expect that the introduction of the bill and consideration of its companion that is being introduced in the Senate will spark the most intensive public de- bate on this subject in 20 years. We are aware that there are several legislative proposals for national health insurance before the Congress. But we hope that in the course of public discussion and con- gressional debate the all-inclusive pro- visions of the Health Security Act will be contrasted to the piecemeal ap- proaches of the other proposals. And we hope, too, that our colleagues realizing the seriousness of the health crisis in America will not delay in enacting this measure during the 92d Congress there- by insuring, for the first time in U.S. history, health security for all Ameri- cans. GENERAL LEAVE Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my speech, and to include ex- traneous matter. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Michigan? There was no objection. BANNING U.S. AIR OR SEA COMBAT SUPPORT FOR ANY MILITARY OP- ERATIONS IN CAMBODIA (Mr. BINGHAM askecl'arnas given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. BINGHAM. I am today reintroduc- ing with additional cosponsors the legis- lation I introduced last week amending the compromise Cooper-Church provi- sion adopted in the closing days of the 91st Congress so as to ban any "T.12S. air or sea combat supoort for any military operations in Cambodia." This brings to 69 the total number of Members who have cosponsored this measure. Reintroduction of this legislation to- day occurs amid renewed reports from Southeast Asia that the administration is violating both its own policy assurances with regard to the U.S. role in Cambodia, and the intent of the Congress r approv- ing the compromise Cooper-C it rch lan- guage as part of the Special I 3: sign As- sistance Act of 1971. Today's -?.w York Times reports that U.S. milit a officials in Southeast Asia have workec o it a plan by which U.S. military per, ,a nel will oversee the delivery and use 1 military aid to Cambodian troops with u ? assum- ing the role of "advisers." Su( ai plan is an exercise in "doublethink" a I a clear violation of the spirit and in cit, if not the letter, of the Cooper-Chi.rci policy. The argument made by U S officials that this program is made n .a 3sary by the rapid increase of U.S. mill a v assist- ance for Cambodia is a perfc a illustra- tion of the same cycle of en aaglement that we experienced in Sout rietnam. It was anticipation of just ich en- tangling developments that rompted some of us in the House to v t against this special military aid to .'-' 4mbodia. The clear intent of Cooper-C larch was to prevent us from repeatin he mis- takes we made in South Viet a m. That overriding intent was never co a romised. Yet, the administration is nov a fain fol- lowing the same misguided ingiC, the same path of deepening invo f nent, in Cambodia that we have lived -egret in South Vietnam. Reports from Southeast a act this morning also indicate that I rnerican combat forces, carrying we la ns and wearing combat boots but b i rwise in civilian clothes, have been eng ;e. !cl in op- erations in Cambodia to resc Le helicop- ters damaged in recent Com a mist at- tacks. How will this step la 4 cplained away? Mr. Speaker, we must ma -! clear to the administration, if it is m lear al- ready, that the Cooper-Churc anguage enacted by Congress must be i erpreted and observed as a strict bar n. direct or indirect U.S. combat suppo or mili- tary operations in Cambodia. !I at is the intent and purpose of my arm lament to Cooper-Church. I strongly m gc prompt hearings in the House on this ru asure so that the House may take pro a- .t action on it before it is too late. HEW AND SOCIAL SECUI 1( ARE CHEATING MILLIONS (F MEDI- CARE PATIENTS BY PAY N ) ONLY 50 PERCENT OF REP 34 )NABLE COSTS INSTEAD OF 80 1 E /CENT (Mr. STRATTON asked was a yen per- mission to address the House 'a ? 1 min- ute, to revise and extend h remarks and to include extraneous ms t r.) Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Spea .e I take this time this morning to bi to the attention of Members the fa that for some months now the U.S. L artment of Health, Education, and Na 1 are and the Social Security Administi .4 on have been seriously shortchanging i Ions of American senior citizens or iedicare rolls, in violation of law, w I ut any public admission or explan A n, and with widespread hardship anc c nfusion among one group of citizens f3st able to defend themselves from ti s icind of fiscal sleight-of-hand. It has come to my attention a ,at since last summer Federal medica e officials Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 II 202 Approved For Reftec2nggINR7A:ICItEMOBINNAM00300020095a-,3udtry 26, 1971 have been paying medicare clients en- "oiled under the voluntary doctors plan, and also under the hospital plan, ap- parently, only 50 percent of the cost of their doctor bills instead of the 80 per- 'ant legally mandated in the medicare law. What is more, they have done this without any public announcement or publicity, without any advance notice to medicare clients and without any ra- aal explanation. in fact the whole shortchanging opera- tion has been carried out with a degree secrecy and surreptitiousness that -volld put even the CIA to shame. Last January I wrote a detailed letter to '3ecretary Richardson to ask for a full ex- planation of what was going on, and to his day I have received nothing in writ- ing- from either the Secretary or anyone :n ,he Department that would even admit -the actinn that has been under way, let done give me the legal authority by which they claim to have justified their action. :Unofficially and over the phone I have Peen told by subordinate officials that cast summer the Department instituted a new, and obviously very quiet policy of iifiimbursing doctors services under which ithe year 1968 was arbitrarily selected to tetermine what "reasonable" charges amounted to, rather than fixing them ;.in the basis of current cost-of-living ures. Now where they get the authority to do where they get the legal right to -cake senior citizens, already more ii av- Jly hit oy inflation than anybody else, bear the full burden of inflation in the :iiedicare field I am still, 3 weeks after my otter to Secretary Richardson, at a loss to mderstand. But the practical effect of what the Department has done has been Jo .theat millions of medicare patients out of 30 percent of the money which Con- -cress authorized them back in 1965 to receive, and which they had a right to axpect when they first signed up for the voluntary reimbursement program. can only conclude that the Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare :;rying to balance its internal budget ,ialt of the hides of retired American citi- dms whom it was created primarily to (telp. Taresualably the Department is also try- ng to shift the blame for this cruel and underhanded action onto the doctors :themselves But if HEW is aware of what aaf; been happening to our economy in ';ite past 2 or 3 years, or if HEW has done Anything at all to order a freeze on doe- sirs' fees under medicare, or a rollback in fee increases, the record is thunder- oisly silent on both points. Obviously this policy cannot be tol- crated and the practice must be brought Lo a hal'. I am presently in the process of drafting legislation designed to do ex- icily that. Mr. Speaker, early in January, after I hal addressed my letter to Secretary Richardson there was some nationwide press covel-age of the questions I had raised with the Secretary. In response to fliese published reports I have received many letters from around the country substantiating the charges I had heard, and listing individual cases in point. Un- der leave to extend my remarks I include a sampling of some of these letters Also I include a letter to the 'Washingtor Post Cl November 16, 1970, which prompted nay original letter to the Secretary, a copy of that letter, and the Department's replies to me to date. 'ine material follows: MEDICARE PERCENTAGES Recently my father sent to Medicare his current docsor bills amounting to aperoxi- mately $10C. The check he received qaam was supposed to ccaer 80 pel cent of medical bills, was for a Attie than $5C, instead of about $80 which he eeaected. f,e called r;he accounting office of the linic where he receives medical care. He was told thew had been getting numerous compL lints o'. the same -,ype. He then Le, ephoned long distance te the Richmond cffice which handles Medicare for his area. Hi' was in:formed that orders had come from the Social Security Administra- Lee to pay 80 per cent of the rates 7, hich vieee in effect in 1968 instead of 80 per cent ? iihe actual bill at 1970 races, beginning in .1 ay, 1970. In effect, instead of paying al per cent of mecical bills, Medicare is now pay- ing only 50 per cent. Social Securit'y gives as an excuse fcr this policy their effort to indace the doctors to cut their rates. This measure has no effect w liaisoever en doctors. A great many of hem atm probabli unaware that this practiae is going on. Besides, they still get their money? f-ern the patients rather than from Social Se- ci iritv The peoole who are penalized by it are tziose least able to afford it--the old pectole on 1:mited fixed incomes. It merely means that these poor old folks are not receiving the benefits they had been led to believe they y a.e. entitled to, and were counting or a; far as I can determine by inquiring of a :umber of people, this matter has not t e'n given any publicity. None of there had "rd it on a news broadcast or read i; in a nea,spaper. Li fact, even the people who vierk at the Social Security-Medicare iefor- ciation office had never heard if it until I called them back to inform them about it a Ler I had talked to someone in the Medi- c.", claims department. lt is obvious that those responsible fir this nctinn did not wan; the general public to kn. )w what -,hey were doing. Why was in kept se quiet? Naturally I do not relish the idea oi laav- nisi, more or on salary withheld for soc'el se- c ii Howeaer, I do think the people who i- still working and earneng money an" the ? who can better afford it. But in at elec- tiee year what politician would sugges- -such a lining? It would be much better stratee,y to flake the noir, sick, retired neonle pay? with- ? . prior nctice of tnis added expense. E,RA N :3ES A. BROW .1.RLING TON. NGRESS CF THE UNITED STATES, FO USE OF REPRESENTATIVES, We shington, D.C., January 5, 1:,71. Fon. ELLI01 L. RICHARDSON , :i,-cretary, Department of Health, Educcticni, and Welare, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There came ii my at ention the other day a rather star iling report included in a letter to the edie a? of the Washington Post with respect to en-rent c aerations cf Medicare, which I am brir ging to your attention and which I belie,. 4- re- gores imnieciate and much fuller ciarifi- cai ion. .a.icording to this letter, a copy of which is c ',aimed, the Social Security Administeation ordered its regional offices to repay ledi- care accounts, beginning July 1970, 50 percent of the total bill rather than 8) per- c ens. Such action would appear to me to be not only contrary to the law but will obviously place very severe hardships on thousands of needy older citizer.s. I would appreciate it if you could tell me whether this account is true, and if so why this order was issued. Furthermore, I would like to know who issued the order, under what rules or regu- lations or legal authority it was issued, and in particular I would like to know whether. as the enclosed letter suggests, a deliberate effort has been made by the Social Secnrity Admtnistration, to keep this change of policy secret from the American public. I would also like to know, in view of the recent announcement that Medicare pre- miums will rise effective July 1971, just what the significance of this action will be for the future operation of the Medicare system. I will be interested in your reply. Sincerely yo ars, SAMUEL S. STRATTON. Member of Congress. -- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, January, R, 1971. Hon. SAMUEL STRAL TON, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mn. STRATTON : The Secretary has re- ferred your January 5 letter requesting in- formation regarding the current operation of Medicare, to the appropriate office. A reply will be forwarded to you as soon as possible. Sincerely, JERRY W. POOLE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Con- gressional Li 2ison. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE. Washington, D.C., January 14, 1971. Hon. SAMUEL S. STA ATTON, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. STRATTON: Thank you for your letter of January 5 concerning the method used in determinir.g medical insurance pay- ments under Medic-are. I have asked Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, to look into the specific questions you raised. Commissioner Ball will furnish me a repo:at and I will be in touch with you again as soon as I receive it. With best regards, Sincerely, ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, Secretary. PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 1, 1971. Hon. SAMUEL STRATTON, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: I am deeply grateful to you for calling public attention to this article appearing in the Philadelphia daily news. Thank you. Sincerely, MEDICARE PATIENTS BEING SHORTCHANGED? Is the Society Security Administration se. cretly refunding only 50 percent of Medicare charges instead ce' the legally required 80 percent? That's the highly pertinent question Rep. Samuel Stratton ( D., N.Y.) has bluntly put up t3 HEW Secretory Elliott Richardson. In a letter to the latter, Stratton states he had read a "startling report" that the Social Security Administration quietly ordered its regional offices to repay Medicare accounts. beginning July 1970, at 50 percent of the total bill rather than 80 percent. "Such action wculd not only be contrary to the law," Stratton told Richardson in a lettee, "but will obviously place very severe hardships on thousands of needy older citi- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300020005-2 January 21, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks boro by his devotion to high principles. These S. Moorhead, John E. Mos, tAtvid R. Obey, portrays a downhome, goofy, hapre, v lucky were best exemplified by his determination James G. O'Hara; character that has become one of 2 most to make the Sun a servant of the commit- Bertram L. Podell, David Pryor, Charles B. popular in all of television. nities which it served. He realized early in Rangel, Thomas M. Rect. Henry S. Reuse, Every Monday night he's lust pi ,IJ "Goo- his career that a newspaper must be a part Teno Roncalio, Benjamin 8 Rosenthal, J. ber," but the rest of the time hi u George of the community in which it lives; that it Edward -toush;Lindsey, a busy and happy man ; never R b 1 William IF Ryan Fer- misses an opportunity to pia in ug for nand St Germain, Paul S. Saroanes, James H. Scheuer, John F. Seiber mg, Louis Stokes, James W. Symingtor ; Frank Thompson, Jr., (Wow t 0. Tiernan, Morris K. Udall, Charles .11.. Vanik, Jerome R. Waldie, Lester L. Wolff, sidnev R. Yates, and Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. E 31 must supp munity; that they both will decline or pros- per together. This policy has never changed at the Sun and it will continue as a fitting memorial to this man whose dedication to the respon- sibilities of his profession guided him throughout his lifetime. t t( that coin- Edward R. oy a , AIR WAR IN CAMBODIA HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, January 21, 1971 Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, the air war now being carried on by the United States in Cambodia clearly violates the intent of the Congress in adopting the substance of the Cooper-Church amend- ment as a part of Public Law 91-652, the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. It also violates President Nixon's own statement of June 30, 1970, that: There will be no 'U.S. air or logistic sup- port (for South Vietnamese military opera- tions in Cambodia). Accordingly, I am today introducing, with the support of 64 of my House col- leagues, an amendment to the Cooper- Church provision of the Special Foreign Assistance Act so as to make clear that the prohibition contained in that act must apply to all American combat op- erations and all American operations in support of combat operations. The text of our clarified version of the Cooper-Church provision follows, along with a list of the House Members who have joined me in this effort: REVISION OF COMPROMISE COOPER-CHURCH Section 7(a) of the Special Foreign Assist- ance Act of 1971 (PL 91-652) is amended to read as follows: "Section 7(a). In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized or ap- propriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, to provide United States advisers to or for Cambodian military forces in Cam- bodia, OR TO PROVIDE UNITED STATES AIR OR SEA COMBAT SUPPCIRT FOR ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA." LIST OF ROUSE MEMBERS WHO JOINED IN EFFORT James Abourezk, Bella S. Abzug, Joseph P. Addabbo Genn M. Anderson, William R. An- derson, Herman Badillo, Bob Bergland, John A, Blatnik; Edward P. Boland, John Brademas, Phil- lip Burton, Shirley Chisholm, William Clay, John Conyers, Jr., Charles C. Diggs, Jr., John G. Dow; Robert F. Drinan, Don Edwards, Joshua Eil- berg, William D. Ford, Donald N. Fraser, Rob- ert N. Giaimo, Ella T. Grasso, Edith Green; William J. Green, Augustus F. Hawkins, Ken Hechler, Henry Helstoski, Robert W. Kas- tenmeier, Edward I. Koch, Robert L. Leggett, Torbert H. Macdonald; Spark M. Matsunaga, Romano L. Mazzoli, Abner J. Mikva, Farrell J. Mitchell, William JASPER, ALA., l'AYti its Th TO GEORGE "GOOBER L,INDSEY "Jasper, Alabama. And those opportunities are 1-a Iv. His recognition as a humorist has mat in the demand of such talk showii as ' i:- Mery Griffin Show," "The Johnny Cars Show," "The Mike Douglas Show," 'The J, 3ishop Show," and "The Steve Allen SI " As a popular country singer and hurnot .1 George has guest starred on "The Junath i Hinter Show," "Kraft Music Had," " 4 t. h-In,- "Love, American Style," anti num( visits as special guest star on "The Gies C ambell Show." He has just finished guest sta i on a "Johnny Cash Show." which will i shown in early February, in whicii he - a 13- minute segment about Jaspiir. George made his television deb. .A "The Jack Pear Show" in 1961. The sa e year he made his Broadway debut, as t ,omedy lead in. the musical "All A merle i at the Winter Garden Theatre. From t] s. George received his first movie role in "I it gn Pul- ver," directed by Joshua Logan e a had di- rected "All American." Last year, George returned to I 3 ey Stu- dios as the voice of the leading el .iters in "The Aristocats," a two-hour anin- t d movie now showing at the Alabama The i in Bir- mingham with an attempt. bele nade to book it at the Jasper Theatre i "George 'Goober' Lindsey Day", January 2 it . Versatility is a definitive part George Lindsey. He has appeared as t ost any conceivable character on more th et major television shows including "( imoke," "The Alfred Hitchcock Hour," rage To The Bottom Of The Sea," Twil Zone." and Disney's "Wonderful World Color." Than came "Goober" on "The A i Griffith Show," and his co-starring role ; Goober" on "Mayberry RFD." As a recording star, his first Ca it ii album "Goober Sings," was so sticcessf :oat the recording company rushed his 'I nd one, "96 Miles To Bakersfield' into enediate release. George has served as a judge c lie "Miss Universe Contest", makes a year nest ap- pearance on "The Gran Ole Op , the an- nual Country Festival of Mush t id tours on the midwest rodeo circuit. Humorist, singer, performer, a t 1 among stars, George's biggest pride is ii family: his wife Joy, and two children, 'urge Jr., and Camden Jo, with whom. he r. in San Fernando Valley, California , , t he still reserves a warm spot in his hea or class- mates and friends of Walker Co) -it Walker County High and Jasper Eleme: : -v school days. This is the man whom ), e wil i-laim on Friday, January 29th . . this the man who claims us every day cf the This is George Smith Lindsey! Jasper, Alabama yields - inly I layberry RFD" for 30 minutes eaiih M? iv night The rest of the time he's Jaspe Favorite Son." HON. TOM BEV1LL kV1 IN THE HOUSE OP' RE!'keP.L.;NTATIVES Thursday, Januory z 1, 1971 Mr. BEVLLL. Mr. Speaker. Friday, January 29 is George 'Goober" Lindsey Day in Jasper, Ala. The entire day has been set aside to honim Goober, one of Walker County's outstanding native sons. We are all proud of Goober. He is cur- rently appearing in the weekly television series "Mayberry RFD," He has appeared in several movies and made guest appear- ances on numerous other television shows. His warmth and spontaneous humor has made Goober a Hollywood favorite. And wherever Goober's busy schedule takes him, he never fails to put in a plug for his hometown and State. He is often referred ,e as Jasper's one man chamber of Commerce. I am pleased to have the opportunity of extending my vel y best wishes to George "Goober" Lindsey as Jasper hon- ors him with this special recognition. Under unanimout, consent, Mr. Speaker, I am enclosing, along with my remarks, a newspaper article taken from the Daily Mountain Eagle, of Jasper, which describes the activities planned to honor Goober and lists some of the ac- complishments and achievements he has earned during his illustrious career. LINDSEY 'S A BILJ SY Mt, ti uER'S No PLAIN GEL) it, 4, Friday, January 29th. Is George -Goober' Lindsey Day" in Jasper! The Jasper Area Chamber of Commerce has named it so . . . Lie Jasper City Com- mission and Mayor has proclaimed it so. . . but the versatile, warn., 'A v, movie and re- cording star, who will be (moored on that day, has made it so hv ta,Ing a -one loan chamber of commerce' Ior !as beloved Jas- per and Walker coi nes. Manama. A full day of actim ies aCid honors has been planned by the ipasner Area Chamber of Commerce for th,t UI y i. ncludes school, college and plant, visaataais, motorcades, bands, representatmus. couri.aouse step cere- monies and entertanimait The day will be cufninatect with a "Fa- vorite Son Award' at tile h annual mem- bership meeting anci Ifainniet of the Cham- ber to be held at Walktr College at '1:00 p.m. with George Lindsey as guest of honor. Tick- ets for the event are now on sale for chamber members and will be at anarne to the general public after January 12 at the Jasper Cham- ber office. Who is (iieorglAnasey? As "Goober", the co-star of CBS TV's "Mayberry RFD," Jasper's George Lindsey REFORMING FOREIGN ME I LABEL- ING PRACTICE.F. HON. ROBERT PR C OF TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESE I \FIVES Thursday, January 21 171 Mr. PRICE of Texas Mr. ,aaker, I rise to introduce legislation n ring im- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 E 39 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CONGRESS IONA L RECORD ? Extei,,:tons of Remarks ,Tan uai it 2 1971 ted meat and meat products to be led "imported" at all stages of the distribution chain. ' n. present laws and regulation,e. ign meat imported for manufactur- Ma or processing purposes is normally' .shippeet frozen and in 50- to 60-pound c)i-itairters. While these container,: seeeily countries of origin, no further 'c tcri.i identification is made after the ni ear, itself is processed by U.S. concerns As a matter of commercial practice, a sieniticant amount of this imported meas. ,iiawed, ground, blended with fa-. Ist .n.mings from domestic beef and then acid over the counter as hamburger. As s. cotise.quence of this, when a housewife, purchases a package of hamburger at her cieet et- grocery store, she has absolutebe no wav of determining the kind of mea: sho ,s getting for her money. on its face this seems innocuous enough, a moment's reflection reveal. that the current state of the law does present some undue health hazards for Un American consumer. Most obvious is the fact that since the imported meat is normally frozen before entering this century then thawed for processing, a subsequent refreezing by the ultimate' consumer raises potential problems. The very real danger of this is attested to by U.S. Department of Agriculture bulletins which state: .,tawed meat immediately or keep for e a esort time in a refrigerator. Avoid thawed meat. lespite this knowledge of the ,a.rcis of refreezing meat, we stand idly by while housewives across the country 1-1,12.1 that very same risk by refreezing. through their ignorance. packages of iiamburger containing previously thawed imported meats. , qn simply appalled, Mr. Speaker, thar, this condition has been allowed to perEii:3t. The public interest has been com- pletely ignored in favor of certain special interests. I say enough is enough. The rights of the American consumer to know what they are purchasing are more im- portant than continuing the privileges of S few to profit from legal loopholes. ere- my colleagues to -expedite ap- -al of this proposal: this is a non- partisan and nonpolitical matter. It thould be a mator concern to all those interested in maintaining high standards hadicr quality in the American diet. leRNEST PETINAUD HON. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR. OF MASSACHUSETTS IN 'V;-i ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES :fsday, , January 21, 1971 . O'NEILL, Mr. Speaker, one rarely enter:- the House Restaurant without being, warmly greeted by Ernest Peti- sauce, maitre d' of the House Restaurant no friend to all in Congress. ?.'?ia-e,,Es,:day was his 66th birthday and LIPA, is roe perfect opportunity to express thanks to Ernest for 34 years of superb service and the touch of elegance he has eontrf mted to the House. He as, over these years, made Lie more hjoyable, not only for thousands of Members of Congn ess.. but also many Sri s ads and visitor3 to the Capitol. He pet torms his duties with dignity and clip stn, con- stantb- striving to maintain perfection. More valuable than his amazi ig ability. to graciously host the dining mom is his friendship which he so generoi.sly offers to many leg-islators. Often, it is a sooth- ing word from Ernest that can. calm or cheer t weary Congressman. It has been my personal phstsure to have known Ernest for 18 yeals. These have been 18 years in which nothing but consideration has been shown so me. I owe mar.y happy moments to Esoest and I know rhat all in the House dn with me in wishing Ernest Petinau a very happy birthday, SWAN SONG HON. RICHARD BOLLING OF MISSOURI IN TEE HOUSE OF REPRESENT 'IVES garsday, January 21, 1)71 Mr. ROLLING. Mr. Speaker, Kenneth Crawfoe is at his best in the follow- 'rig coli mm in Newsweek of Deo' .inber 28 in which he philosophizes about -onie of the events he has covered since he ar- ived ir Washington in toe 192,:,:s. It is sits last column before his retirement. His observances on the Washin hon scene will be missed: SWAN SONG By Kenneth Crawford) Anyone who his lived as an ad:nil arough the last half century aware of what - Las going in has seea more history in the male ag than anyone who ever lived before him. T are has been mo :e change, more cataclysm, 211ore in- eention, more progress; In some a e'as and more deterioration in others than c er hap- pened in any previous 50 years. Anyone who has been a profess iai ob- :server of public affairs through this period, most of tee Lime here in Washington, as I .ave, has; never had a chance to Li ? bored. 'lett:her us he had much of a ceance to cogitate alicut the whither of ever, s or to acquire an- special wisdom. Anyway. :turnal- Lets aren t paid to be wise, only to ee agile --nought.clescribe what's happenin: while it ,)appens. It is left to Winer Men , think :enks to add it all up. 'racy try, bu im two ,ettks get quite the same answers. recers aelieve thn.t man euectle with the nuelear :Weap01:: ntlity provided. Others are c ? en,t he still destroy his environ eedy cirpidi--,T Still others exj breed lurnself out of living spec eel that laa ingenuity, cupidity a arrpetnatire urge, the very qualir -nreaten aim, will also save him, tha : .ine to ee that none of his ambit )e realized withont exercise of restri, iext 50 years will be crucial RESILIENT SPECIES This beir g my Last column before ::etire- ment, I mesh I had the :prescience tc 'redict lee outcome. All 3: have is a hunch. erived witr eta or the past, that man-- eotahly it merican man?has a future. He is .1 Lough rind resilient species. In my time he L been through two world wars and seven,. lesser wars, a Greet Depression and uncoun Cl coo- corn- ets in- vinced erit to him A few self- - that he well ;As can le The nomic recessions; he has survived Prohibi- tion, flood, hurricane, riot and his own fol- lies. He is not easy to stamp out. When I arrived in Washington in the 1920s the world was at peace. Coolidge slept in the White House and established Wash- ington correspondents wore spats, carried canes and gave themselves airs. Had there been cooling apparatus, a later development, this Capital would have been as comfortable as it was smug:. Hie Mencken jabbed at corn- :placency from one side and Norman Thomas from the other but nobody so much as said 'ouch." Hoover would soon be projectinetin liars for every garage. When Hoover failed to deliver, the laiasez- faire bubble burst, materializing Roosevelt and the New Deal. Washington has never been the same since. Neither has the try, nor, indeed the world. At last it was being recognized that a society run out of l'rontiers, sustreined by an increasingly com- plex and interdependent economy, had_ to submit to more government direction and control than ie liked if it was to avoid pe- rinclic paralysis and chronic chaos. SASS PLAY The second world war interrupted. but did not stop, the Roosevelt revolution. Europe had to be saved from Hitler and was. Few foresaw that Stalin would replace Hitler as a world menace once the war was won. But Stalin did and hot war passed into the eold war that is still going on, much as its on- going is denied by those determined to see no evil. Meanwhile, the struggle continues to achieve a workeble mixed economy, prive; ely ran but government manipulated, and a .ttel- fare state capable of giving practical expres- sion to the nation's compassion and sense of fair play, much as these sentiments are denied by those determined to see no god. To some of -is who have lived with his struggle over the years, the young and their journalistic spckesmen, who think they in- vented compassion and sensitivity to pit hire morals, are a little hard to take, Even their: ultimate example of immorality, the war in Vietnam, was in its genesis highly, if mis- takenly, moral--an undertaking to protect a weak but poientially free nation from a strong but regimented neighbor. We wceild perhaps be more tolerant of the young if we occasionally parsed to remember hcw we be- deviled the "merchants of death" of the first world war and the national leadership in 'he Coolidge and hover Administrations. As for myself [am hopeful that my grand. children will have a decent world to live in and that the nation will muddle through, as it always has. And I am grateful that wheel I left the campus, a certified B.A. but with no immediately useful equipment except ability to write a declarative set tenet'. I could think of no way to earn a living except in journalism. MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN----F1()W :LONG? HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE OF IOWA :24 SHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, January 21, 1971 Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?" Communist North Vietnam is sadisti- ca:ly practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,500 American prison- ers of war and their families. How long? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP7313002961W0300020095- S 638 CONGRESSION.X KEtA)RD ? SENA ? As was shown in Wons Is notoriously hit-or-mis; and maps of highly orgl the targets are jungle tr; fined villages on indeten rigged form of Russian ro The ultimate form of is the free-fire zone. In now also in Cambodia, El.: target where bombs ma!, criminately. So devastating is. the .: ct of the suffer- dence to the genocide convention. ing civilians seen I; I, first .1. / that Americans Again I turn to the testimony of Philip of a world order, tit a faith in the govern- working in Vietnam wed loved recently to Perlman before the McMahon Subcom- merit of law aim riot of men. This con- speak out. Forty-six doct Leachers, nurses, mittee on Genocide in 1950: vention ii neither the first nor will it social workers?some ve t U.S. government "The passage from the case of Geofroy V. be the last convention we evaluate. It is agencies, others with untary groups-- Riggs which speaks of restraints arising from my fervent hope Li /at it is one of a long wrote President Nixon d United Nations the nature of Government and the States, line of international law which will rid Secretary General U TI I The letter is a deeply disturbing (loom that got far too nations" (United States v. Smith, 5 wheat, ject. In addition. lite Constitution grants 157 (U.S. 1820)). to the Congress in article I, section 8, Thus, as the result of the situation created power to define and punish "offenses by the very terms of the convention itself, against the law ot nations." The world there is removed from consideration any notion that the treaty, if accepted, will bypass communit y by its widespread ratiflca- the Congress, or will in itself legislative tion of the Genocide Convention has de- Federal criminal laws (p. 30-31, Hearings), fined genocide as a crime against the law Last, Mr. President, I would like to - of nations. I concern myself with the relationship of stroni;ly urge me Senate to consider the Genocide Convention not only a body State jurisdiction in criminal jurispru- ? of international law, but a building block ey 1, 1971 ar II, bombing sspite the charts ed areas. Where and vaguely de- ate maps, it is a to. deadly roulette os, and perhaps 1 zone is an open unloaded indis- and restraint against change in the charac- this cart h nct only of the scourge o that of one of little attention. ter of the Government or in genocide, but war, famine, repression, tie ratification of this charter of the Nnembe the States, is used as another argument for It points to repeats and barbaric iniVernment. Geneva and other conve the existence of a constitutional limitation on the treaty power. It is argued against the I again unn? ; v convention as a whole that to impose a new convention the conduct of war. The e er quotes from a l body of treaty law which will become the do- paper of the Military : stance Command . describing the effects I the Communist nestic law of the United States is a change r in the structure of the relation of the States THE TOLL OE' ' ' AIR WAR IN troops of the bom,sing o i, ,-> Vietcong hospi- ?;olations of the ms, including the 'ribunal, covering and the Federal Government, and that toi.c.:?. A MBODIA tals in the Queson mu, e tins south of Da- deprive the States of a field of criminal juris- nang. "The two-hospil I finds could seri- Mr. CEURC'H. Mr. President, as Amer- e, Amer- prudence and place it in Federal jurisdiction ican ai ously hurt the NVA (Nr Vietnamese) and as to be in violation of the Constitution. r operations above Cambodia ex- vc (Vietcong) operatin i the Queson area If there were matters of criminal jurisdic- pand, many thousands of peasants are by almost eliminating 1 chance of inten- tion confided to the States so vital to their added to the list of helpless victims of sive medical care" existence that a change by the Genocide the widening Indochina war. In a per- ; Article 19 of the Gene / lonvention of 1949 Convention would destroy our dual system ceptive column, Mr. Marquis Childs states that "fixed entail ments and mobile of government, conceivably the problem sug- points this tragedy out: medical units of the / e' i cal service" shall under no circumstances s. attacked but shall fact is quite the opposite. Congress is in- - gested might be more than hypothesis. The Ilse voicelese deienseless peasants in the at all times be respects ad protected. vested by the Constitution with the power Jungle and 1.1e i ice paddies have no pro- "Nearly a third of the . sple of South Viet- to provide criminal sanctions for offenses tection I root the destruction rained down nam and Laos have hi r inoved from their against the law of nations, Constitution, from the skies. Even the choice of defection homes," the letter says. I est of them are the article I, section 8, clause 10. It has had that from the Vietcong. if they should want to victims of forced trans r oy the allied min- defect, is denied lhem, since the bombs and tary or saturation born rt i., or are farm pee- power since 1789, and the States expressly committed that field of jurisprudence to the the napalm knov, no political distinctions. plc who have seen thei I lid become unpro- Federal government. It is therefore of little More and (no] e, U.S. conduct in Indo- ductive because of the I 1 oliation." or no consequence in comparing the effect china is being seriously questioned by It is, to be sure, a g s -.11a war?a war of of the exercise of Federal criminal juris- unmitigated cruelty, tl ,.oby trap, the land many American citizens Mr. Childs cora:- prudence upon residual State criminal juris- s - ? ? mine. The inhumane t a; Anent of American diction that Congress may exercise its power eludes his column by raising this issne: prisoners of war eiolats . te Geneva Conven- tion on many scores. Es i presumably, some- day this conflict will e I ind the question is what will happel i to a pie ground down so close to the survival I a oy years of war. Sen. Edward M. KP '' .fly's subcommittee on refugees has been .. tost the only focus of concern for -he pi i L of helpless civil- ians showing how emp :- the official Ameri- can rhetoric out of V t sun about refugees resettled in supposed ./acified areas have been underwritt en by 1 General Account- to punish genocide pursuant to the au sty provided in article I, section 8, clause 10, of the Constitution, or pursuant to both sources of power. It is wholly unwarranted to say that, because another offense has beefl added to the list of the few now punishable as offenses against the law of nations, the States have been deprived of a field of crimi- nal jurisprudence. This area of the field they never possessed. Last year, in hearings before the sub- committee presided over by the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) , Rita E. Haus- er II S Representative to the United One of the seri, as charges leveled against the "good Germens, the solid middle class, under the Nazis was their professed igno- rance of or indtherenee to the systematic ex- termites./ ion of the Jews. Will the time come when we, the Americans, suffer in world opinion the ( barge of shutting our eyes to mass sutecim.i io.(i something like extermi- nation? I ask usiamilinde consent that Mr. Childs' column. entitled "Cambodia Air War: The ton Grows," be printed in the RECORD. Ther, being no objection, the article Nations Commission of Human Rights, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, pointed out that "ratification of the as follows: Genocide Convention is a proper exer- CADA B')DIA AIR WAR: THE TOLL GROWS cise of the treaty power." The conven- ( By Marquis Childs) tion flows from the provisions of the The expanded air war in Cambodia, con- U.N. Charter on human rights by which tradicting the President's pledge of June 30, an international organization was estab- is adding new thousands of helpless victims lished but which also comprises a code of to the iiwl in toil ei the conflict in Indochina. conduct binding to all members. The The voiceiet,s, usdenseless peasants in the scope of treaties since 1945 has been di- jungle and tile use paddies have no protec- tion verse; genocide is a matter of concern to from the dsvetruction rained down from the ski,s. At en ii:e choice of defection from all states and one requiring common the Vietcong, if I hey should want to defect, treatment. Massive horror anywhere af- is denied 1 i din since tne bombs and the fects all the world and is usually asso- napalm know i to political distinctions. elated at some point -with threats to or 'I'lle plighc 01 thousands?probably over breaches of international peace and se- the live yea's ot the bombing hundreds of curity. The fact that '15 states have en- thousands?of men, women and children is a grim side o- the war to which most of us toned into a treaty on genocide in and shut our e3 es. 1,1v hen to this is added the hap- of itself makes the subject one of inter- less stite o? several hundred thousands of national concern. And, if genocide is a refugees, together with the destruction of matter of international concern, then one-fifth to one-fourth of the productive the United States has the constitutional land by deloliation. a whole people is seen power to enter into a treaty on the sub- to be nearing a ;mini of no return. Ing Office. One of the serious the "good" Germans. under the Nazis was it .1 of or indifference to 1 E nation of the Jews. W we, the Arneric:..ns, s 1 the charge of shuttin fering and somethim This is not willful ix the Nazis, but in tit' of a war. In the GI gooks, faceless Asian E also human beings : and sorrow as thougt rges leveled against solid middle class, professed ignorance systematic extermi- ne time come when r in world opinion ir eyes to mass suf- ke extermination ermination, as with ? is the prosecution rot the victims are sants. But they are ,tpable of suffering cir skins were white. TRADE POLICY E .7iFt THE 1970'S Mr. BENNE'IT. President, in a speech given by I n Harold B. Scott, Deputy Assistant Lr ctor of the Bureau of International cc nmerce on Janu- ary 11, he sets fort , onsiderations for a new trade policy fo le 1970's. Mr. Scott outlined several ne- ? leas, which I found to be interesting, i; f rmational, and de- serving of our atte 1 t Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 1, 1971 CONGTF..!-- ()NM, RECORD SEN TE us It is one that should life ea, and is one eiso that should build for il of us the sarem-r,th we are going to need lietanci tne barbs of our critics." wIlea a President; speaks that way to the eion iiround him and when you see how fer- ,eally he means villa', he says, you under- ? id why he inspires such loyalty and corn- initnient in I he ninin around him. It needs to be iransmuted itaore widely, which is the aandat0 task in ali but I believe it will be rie Ce)NORESSIONAL POWER "UNDER e'lLe CONSTITUTION sliPROXMIRE, Mr. President, last discus-seri the objections to rati- ng -me Convention concern- me. ifro, Imitectich of persons that might .tried Ly an international tribunal for e of genocide. At the same time, , aiso disaussed the question of extradi- ion, (ally explained by George H. Ald- Deputy Leerol Adviser to the De- oartment ot State Today, I would like to concern myself 1.1 an examination of the constitutional s of support tor U.S. ratification of Geoo.-tide (717(07 vention, and w`tether sooport alter.,. in any way the power aTess limier the Constitution. se Live points have been the topic of eritecisra and objection of the U.S. ,.ial ratiftcarion. of the Genocide Corover, hon. I 1r1l,,l to show that these ,!riticeens and non "tions are wholly un- armed. The McMahon Subcommittee, in 1950, iititt.rci iron the ?ten Under Secretary oc state Dean Rush., who made some key 1 ai.tits come/ming r he Genocide Conven- he ooinT:ed out that in the history of Ole Convention in the United Nations, nt hi 't international orga- n-ISO' taa,.. declared that geno- is matter of international concern ni his t genocide is a crime under inter- i,i.i-Jfldl taw. All nave declared that in- 7 . Caorott on is needed to stop .ntice and 1.1-i it States have a duty such prachees within their own Thus. gen eoide is a subject with- onotitotleiri power of the Fed- t---: ho Congress?to de- offenses against the law ali?i T., section 8, clause i[1:7 P'S(7) noted 'UI cm does not repre- i t which the United ,,operated with other nations to lirdreil or enasiecreminal conduct toe , 'atter of In I. It. treaties raferred to ,--reetner t relating- to the ni-o- lOIS . protection of fur T-rth Pacific?I 911?sup- teade and. slavery-- of the abuse of liatv-1.97.2?all of polaht-ir.o.t of those on der-In:A in the hi the excellent r General Philip 13. a the constitutional laass eapport far the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention: (l) L., treaty power. In otr view the United ed ales has complete authority to en- ter int the Genocide Convention. The treaty pe -Cr is being invoked, and "that the treaty pe yea of idea United States extends to all prinni. subject of negotiation between our got ieurnent Ind the governments of other Ii: I, is Ci ser (Geofrey v. 1?;ggs, 123 U.S. 258 .i.1i6 ( 1w-it) ? A.,;alo,:ra Seattle, 265 If S. IS The treaty making ...ower omad enough. ti iinver all subjects that prere.rly pertain to our foreign rela- tions ' iSanto -.,taiceneo v. Eger., 284 U.S. :eh 40 fit.; The cottention inv.lneed by some of the critics ot the Coirivontion that these subjects must be ,ixclusivay "f)reign" or "interna- tional" t -external" overlooks the whole history treaty-dial:Mg which has, from the first dealt wit h matters having direct impact, subject: Intimately of domestic and lora ;?ticerti. To ci at some len!i-th from his teati- flit-ny, Is see I hat: Cienoceid is. . subject appropriate for action in, ,a? the treaty-making power seems to us ar wescapable conclusion. The his- torical biJ7 kground if the Genocide Conven- tion indica I es the view of the representatives In internal onal affiles of practically all the governmt ins of tilf World on the appropri- ateness at I desirahil tit of in internatamat agreemeri to -outlaw the world-shocking crime 0/ ienacide.' This government has shared ii ;his vieaa; in fact, has taken a leading pt et in thaping the convention. Mr. Pee: man. neet addressed himself to the question of coo stitutional limitations on the traE:aty power: It is aceerate to say that the treaty power extends t dl propel: subjects of negotiation ,vith other governrneLts, and tha.t genocide er the Genocide CC mention appears to be such a proiner subject of negotiatio.n. How- ever, it hie; been siegeated. by ceiti.cs of the convention that the treaty power "is not Without limitations. iind that the conven- tion or per, ; of it may conflict with these. The argui ants are ;rounded prim:lot-illy in statement contained in the case of Geofroy .Riggs (1 iS HS. 258 267 (.1890) ) : "The ti ;y power, as expressed in the Clonstituti ? e is in iehns unlimited except by those r.,i -mints hich are found in that instrumeni, ;against f it aration of the Govern- ment or of its depa.rianentia aid those arising, from the itiature of the Goeernmer.t itself and that or the Status, ft would not be con- tended thit: i.;. extents so far IS to at what the ..t.tritittritit n forbids, or a change ti:IP Ch': ["-" Lin* Of e Cr in that of cr,r, df cur c,,,,s1,)n if aiy oortarOOt , the ter,l; totr [17 Liiii[1.9.1"^c[t kv[[ - itS But with these tions, it is tit perce ilea that there it any ilmtl:a to ti questio.,s thrit earl be ail j Led touching a it? matter which is properly the sub,ject ,,2,;?:i.latio's with a foreign. ooilr- tiy." The coi . itutipm I re-araints or mi- lotions stee:::ested by this stateme.nt DP- pear to bf,- ri;,,t two kinds?exoress prohi- bitions, aloe those implied from the na- ture of Go;; .rnment and the States. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court may have wiu-C led dowr the breadth of the suggestion its lan7T opinion in itscikitre7 v. Seattle !265 iJ na R41 ,192.4)!) it. can 10 [117 [ [i[[; Vir[i;[`r the Tllitted ;States is n. ninited b-7 any ,Ixpress :ion of the uustitutior, and though it does not extend ti rt far as to, authorize what the Constitutie "nrhtcp,," t- does not eyterd to all :proper -31.1.bjects of nfgc)tiations bet ween our Government and other nations, In It is.!;ouri. v. Holland (252 U.S. 416 1920)), the Supreme Court specifically eliminated the 10th amendment to the Constitutlon as a possible limitation on the treaty power. What Mr_ Justice Holmes had to say for the court on the existence of limitations on the treaty p,awer generally is also of importance: Airts of Cotigress are -tile supreme law of :lie land only when made in pursuance of Constitution, while treaties are deetarea eiIsFC it, [:[i en made under the authority rsf lie United States. It is open to question .Ifiether the authority of the United States liteans more than the formal acts presc:ibed 7 make the convention. We do not mean imply that there are no qualifteations to he treaty-making power; but they must be se;certained in a different way. It is obvious hat there may be matte-es of the she rpiest nxigency for the national well-being that an act of Congress could not deal with but treaty followed by such an act could and is not lightly to be assumed that, in mat- eirs of requiring national action, "a power which must belong to and somehow reside I: . every civilized government"- is net; to found. The case before 118 IMUSt ae considered in the light of our whole ea- eerience and not merely in that of what ;as said 100 years ago. (2E2 U.S. at 433). It is signi:qcant, in this respect, that no ! reaty of the United States has been held ,nconstituti.onal. I would like here to delve into the ioestion of the express power of Cm- :!ress to define and punish offenses gairst the law of nations and whether tiiis is a limitation on the treaty power. J,JTain referring to Solicitor General Perl- man's testimony, we find: .A.n. argument is made by those who oppose e at, Genocide Convention as a whole that litticle 1. section 8, clause 10, of the Con- e itution, confers on Congress the power "to .ie rine and punish piracies iind felonies cern- edted on the high seas, and offenses against ai law of nations; and that for the Prest- !: int and the Senate to bind this country to a --eaty obligating the 'United States to pin- an offense under international law (per, t :en I of the Convention) is a usurpation of C legislative power, particularly if the is self-executing,, r order not to obscure the real argument assumpticns that are not factual, ,cold be observed at once that article V of Convention specifically contemplates theistic legislative action, in particular to eniacrihe penalties since none is provided. . e part; of the convention, requiring as .hes legislative action, is not self-execht- under the principles laid down by the j;rome Court. Foster V. Neilson (2 Pet. (U.S. 18291) ; and for the United eitaee1.e :inert the necessary legislation to give et to the 0rorision3 of the ronyeni : r w:th r its; (onstitutionit ? ovention art. V.), and tc try guilty per- c "by a competent tribunal cf the State inn territory of which the act was coed- ied" (convention art. VI), requires ne- n hy Congress prescribing the offenees p iiehable and conferring criminal juriad tt .n on the courts of the United States ( ri irds self-execution, see the exceilei; ,iysis prepared by the senhir Senator from York, Jacob Javits, on page 220-2i1 Genneade Convention, May 22, 1e)70 not s?ay that Congress inay nor, itt 1,r; discretion, use the de:at:rho:as of the of' sses under international law, in tins as contained in the convention, just es it as validity provided punishment for the C-7 f- privacy "as defined by tee of Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 S 530 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE Javuo 29, 1971 In particular, the Ambassador wished to clear up any misunderstanding re- garding extradition. On the subject of U.S. interpretation and policy as regards extradition, he said: United Sates law provides for extradition only when there is an extradition treaty in force. The Convention does not purport to be an extradition treaty. It would require only that the United States provide for ex- tradition for genocide in new extradition treaties which we might negotiate or in revisions of existing extradition treaties. Mr. Aldrich added that there are no such treaties now in existence in any country; that is, those countries making genocide an extraditable offense. He as- sured the committee that the United States would not negotiate such treaties nntil Congress had. passed legislation making genocide a crime in the United States because it was our policy not to make an offense extraditable unless it is a crime in both states involved. Another factor in any decision to nego- tiate an extradition treaty is whether the judicial process of the other country af- fords the persons who may be extradited a fair trial. Basic procedural protections have been built into the treaty at the beginning. For example: (1) any extradition treaty will require the State requesting extradition to produce suffi- cient evidence to persuade both a United States Court and the Executive that the per- son sought would be held for trial under United States Law if the offense has been committed here; (2) any extradition treaty will assure the person sought the right to the remedies and recourses provided by the law of the re- quested State (for example habeas corpus) and (3) any extradition treaty will preclude extradition when the person sought is under- going or has undergone trial in the United States for the same act. Mr. Aldrich also pointed out that in reference to article VI, on the trying of persons accused of genocide in the state where the act was committed, that? This provision contemplates the obligation of that State and does not exclude trial by other States having jurisdiction. The nego- tiating record of the Genocide Convention makes clear, in particular, that trial for acts committed in a foreign country could be held in the State of which the defendant is a national. We believe that the statute imple- menting the Convention should cover not only acts committed in the territory of the United States, but, in addition, acts com- mitted -eywhere by American Nationals. In the event that a case is presented involving an American national before criminal proceedings have been initiated in the United States, we would reserve discretion to initiate proceedings our- selves, rather than extradite. Furthermore, in answer to questioning concerning the policy of the Department of State on ratification of the convention and congressional passage of implement- ing legislation called for in article V of the convention, Mr. Aldrich referred the subcommittee of the intentions of the State Department, as enunciated in a letter to the chairman, Senator FRANK CHURCH, of May 22, 1970, as follows: It is the Department's intention to recom- mend to the President that this instrument of ratification to the Genocide Convention not be signed, and if signed not to be de- posited, until after implementing legislation for the Convention has been enacted. The subcommittee chairman, Senator CHURCH, also pointed out some legal precedents which undertook to define and establish an international crime and the obligations assumed by each signatory to pass domestic law that would conform. The Convention of Slavery was cited and the State Department furnished for the record conventions to which the United States is a party and in which the United States has undertaken an international obligation to punish as certain crimes certain actions described therein. These included the four Geneva Conventions on Protection of War Victims (1949) ; the Convention for the Protection of Whal- ing (1935) . the International Conven- tion for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954) ; and the single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, (1961). In summary, 1 would like to add the re- ply of the American Bar Association's Section of Individual Rights and Re- sponsibilities: One criticism of the Convention arose out of the possibility that under Article VI, a person accused of genocide could be tried by an international penal tribunal possibly without trial by jury and other safeguards to which a United States citizen is entitled under the Constitution. Again, the answer is simple. No such tribunal has been estab- lished. If one were established, parties to the Genocide Convention would have the option whether to accept its itirisdiction or not. For the United States, that option would have to be independently exercised through the Treaty Power, that, is only with the advise and consent of the Senate by two-thirds vote. Lastly, I sincerely doubt that a tri- bunal of International Law, set up under the auspices of the United Nations, would fail to have safeguards and protections inconsistent with the UN Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this sense, such a tribunal would un- doubtedly be consistent with the Ameri- can legacy of safeguarding each and every individual's sacred rights and liberties. I again urge this body to ratify this extremely important document. Our fail- ure to do so can only set back the noble concept of international law and world peace. CORRECTION OF THE RECORD Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, Tuesday, January 26, I delivered a speech on the environment. It begins on page S158. I request that a correction be made and printed in today's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The correction is as follows: On page 5158. third column, after the paragraph beginning, "From mercury and pesticide pollution to massive waste dumping at sea,' and before the para- graph beginning, "Environmental lobbies achieved hard-won victories from San Francisco Bay to Everglades National Park," add the following paragraphs which were left out of the text of the speech as I presented it: By any normal standards in this society, the environmental actions of the 91st Con- gress. the President and the public, consti- tuted signifioant progress. With the participation o leans, Earth Day last Apri c-monstrated an overwhelming concern. A Senate vote against II ST marked the coming of age of the envi e mental issue as a national political force. Taking halmark init -es, Congress passed the Clean Air. Env t ,mental Educa- tion, National Envmromn t al Policy, Re- source Recovery and Watei iality Improve- ment acts, and the first :tide pollution control measure. It also a r ved major new national parks and recreati 1 treas. The President's State t lie Union and environmental messages Congress and establishment of the Env' mental Protec- tion Agency, and suoseqm administrative conunitments against po ers were sub- stantial steps in the right'tion. a i[lions of Amer- DEVELOPMENTS II" (APODIA Mr. FULBRIGHT. P.!). President, I ask unanimous consent It have printed in the RECORD a compH a ion of state- ments by administration di ricials relating to developments in Cam ,0 Ha which was prepared by the Librar). tF Congress at the request of the COD 1 ittee on For- eign Relations. There being no objecti .1 . the compila- tion was ordered to Ix i. tinted in the RECORD, as follows U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMS ) SINCE MARCH i970 (Statements by President I 2, in, Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary o tense Laird) 1970, PRESIDENT RIC 1 D NIXON March 21?News confere 3. : ". . . we have . . estab : ; ed relations on a temporary basis with the r rnment which has been selected by the Pt I, iment and will continue to deal with th L government as long as it appears to be t government of the nation. ". . . we respect Camt c? a's neutrality, We would hope that Nort -ietnam would take that same position i -especting its neutrality. And we hope ti it whatever gov- ernment eventually preva ,s there, that it would recognize that the ? a ted States' in- terest is the protection of :s neutrality." April 30?Address ?..o the Ni ,tion: "Ten days ago . . . I ant s iced a decision to withdraw an addit tonal 0 000 Americans from Vietnam over the nex s ?ar, I said then that I was making that de, t kin despite our concern over increased e; a iv activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and jr S uth Vietnam. ". . . I warned that if ? included that Increased enemy activity in r of these areas endangered the lives of /L .icans remain- ing in Vietnam, I would nc, esitate to take strong and effective meas1 ? to deal with that situation. "Despite that warning. N a Vietnam has Increased its military aggre in in all these areas, and particularly in ( m oodia. . . . "American policy since ,54] has been to scrupuously respect the i itrality of the Cambodian people. . "North Vietnam, nowec r has not re- spected that neutrality. ". . . North Vietnam ha ncupied mili- tary sanctuaries all along t Cambodian frontier with South Viet's: . They are used for hit and run atta on American and South Vietnamese rs in South Vietnam. . . . "For 5 years, neither ti nor South Vietnam has me enemy sanctuaries because to violate the territory of Even after the Vietnamese gan to expand these sani ago, we counseled patienc Vietnamese allies and impe our own commanders Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 t:nited States against these v, did not wish eutral nation. rnmunists be- t iries 4 weeks 0 our South restraints on Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 faiwary 29, 1971 CONGR1 1.0NAL RECORD -- SEN ATE eranis to the states and localities. Subtract- ing eurrent federal expenditures for welfare :aid Medicaid?programs whose costs would ee absorbed in the future by our cash assist- ,1113.3.33 and National Health insurance propos- rederaograins-Iii-aid now total $19 bil- eudget cans for increasing that total b,111.cai Oy 1975, a proposal which would tie oatiected 1975 revenue gap an- ore,. 4,tei ?' a t.e.b....c service employment pro- each a.; toe one recently vetoed by adeon represents another impor- term tiseal relief. It would provide eid cities ;,,rith the funds to train and inn olovees needed to stag essential sem- i te ,1fl,t budgets cannot now sup- per, in areas in etcal demand Nch as health, edit; attain ranee protection mad pollution I Gill 222)1_ rieL311-33.3,33 a public servicet employ- ment: prog,rarn by 1975 of 875,000 jobs'ait a cost sm federat government of $4 billion. f;;Iptementnig all of the above proposals A:nein still le ive a sizeable disparity 'betcecen state and local expenditure needs and rev- C;a in 1975 simuld the states and localitiec saastantially increasing the !ea- of time: -;ervices. ,a mare? to expect Washington to etton am; lever difference remains even Ottal reamrees of that magnitude were R. For Congress might understand- iat to turn over huge sums of dee attronary teretral tax dollars without as- fu, 'y- ...4,4bute to the achievement of tiaeonally dented objectives. -; eerefore ic m highly probable that re- stra; fug iiscai health to state and local gov- erre ;lents a ii require increased revenue- r.1 etlert$ be these jurisdictions them- a;. The federal government can help and en, ',Itrage. no; cannot and should not do the. mb alone asertedingiv. we are recommending two i-riei,et. reyeette :-baring programs which will tribute ,o iridging the expenditure* rca-ni;; gap 'Allele providing incentives for eu Cs and came to increase the yields from Ii,,- own tax tease: iirst Is aeeneral sharing plan to divide Hull . on in iederal revenue among those at with gtaduated state income taxes. ; without such a tax would be ineligi- b1 ro receive any; of these funds. Past- . teta provistoits to ensure the cities a fair uf tile funds also would be mandatory. aerco3.1,1 r,!2,grain is one of general aid ; ;tar:aliens, could provide the states and 1,-ter;iilaes wi fa an additional $4 billion by trike fen z,eneral sharing pian, this iation assisatfice would be tied to changes is and 1,4,M tax practices: under our aould have to assume at least . of coin:Masi state and local education ?ie e; .101e. This would have the fect ree tieing the pressure on over- burdened itsial aroperty taxes while provicl- jije ,2itt!,1.Lion a tax lase with greater potentiai. dying the forms federal relief couid te41 fowever. is only hal4 the task. Any tibte,trosal for resetuing our states -U; i.eaes Dada their financialduress must tem; edit a Man oft: raising the additional re- 333,33_ i'ces required for this fiscal relief as well as usk he ii icrt.:xpenclit ure increases we rec- en meal I3utiget. this additional revenue tit be COile,2.;:ed from the following four sr/eel:es: Hann. vigorous national economic growth 'e 'h would produce additional federal tax Cu" -ones of nearly $75 billion between now 9'15. cats in existing federal programs sit a as our recommendations to reduce the cm- otoy budget $20 billion by 1975 and the acearatiturai subsidy program by $1 billion. Third: elimina Am of inequities in the fed- eral tax ;4ystern. And I ourth. a federal 10c,', tax surcharg on pet:senal and eurporaW income beginning. in 1974 tvhich, gtv en our assumptions abour econotria: growth and tax reform, would yiell about t;1"7 bielio n additional federal reve- nues !n 1.975. Luetosition of this surcharge WOUILI -make S0I1Se after we had returnee: to a 1,..1.-employ.nent eccnonay and after re- form. ,, rende:ed the federal income tax gradual, td in reaft y as well as n theory. Mr. Chairman, tne content of this strategt: is submet to del a;.e. But the process for de- vising I, is net. Put .i c problem;. cal:111A be attacked nt - tiena.;5 except in terms of conflicting neece curnpet,i,ig for 1; felted re sou rces . At the nm tiona level this means defining problems i,. the context of lie entire federal budget; cal eeeptid. LI:re tirc.sions.b3th in tern-, of ay ti able esem rues and spending afte, natiw-s Yet. es this Craximittee is well aware, Cm - gress et,,eks a vaitage point for such a corn- prehteceve view. For at no time is the federi: budget tfonsicierad in its entirety on Capite Hill. it, 13 ,:lear that a necessary con diya,i_et reordering national priorities mu. t: lee It- creation d apprcpriate structures 4: Camps, ,a fur a ce tinning the bndget as . whole. 'nos.i.rds tits t aid, the National Urban Coi- lition freicome the opportunity to pr, - sent eta; aiterna,i-re budget in public sessioi;; before thte full Appropriations Committee o, each sa 4.1:33V3 If I is members of this Commi:,- tee hateve it would be helpful to establist; this precedent we -would be pleased to ha-- youtoute.ristance, liff VIEW OF THE GENOCIDE C DNVENTION XL . PROXMIRE. Mr. President, April 2, 1969, Senator--.J. WILLIAM Fre - BRIG]I, chairman of the Senate Foreit n Heist ins Committee, indicated that his view the committee could resume cun- sideration of the Genocide Convention 11 any time. the members wished.' Ie noted anie ..ommittee3 disposition mayi be infi- 2.- enced .4' the A/Aerie:1n Bar Association were LU re. ocuitend rat itication. Or December 9, 1939, the Section on Indfce.anal Rig h-is and Responsibilitiek t the American Bar Association, under Chan lean Jei ome J. Shestack, recom- menden that ABA house of delegat enaci. a resoluta :an calling for the ratifi- cation of the Genocide Convention re the e-tenate. The 41-page report whir I amen ponied the resolution expanded on five major areas:: Ti.: Genocide Convention is a doco- ment of human liberty consistent and in further a ace of the American tr ditic- ii Ar international convention or treat is the most suitable form of addressin, the dangers of genocide. Ti.: Genocide Convention propel focuses both on states, and on individuals. The Genocide Convention is in all rt- specs consistent with the Constitutic the my vis and the ideals of the United States:. Tbe Genocide Convention remains lei issue of current importance. On February 19, 1970, just a few da: s before the house of delegates of the American Bar Association was to vote Da whether to change its position on the subject of ratification, President Nixon requested the Senate to renew its con- sideration of the Genocide Convention and to grant its advice and consent to ratification. The President asserted: We should delay no longer in taking the Med convincing, step which would reaffir:n that the United States remains as streng:y orposed to the crime of genocide as ever, by giving its advice and consent to ratificatien of the Convention, the Senate of the Unit al States will demonstrate unequivocally 0,1r country's desire to participate in the bullring; of international order based on lew and justice. Secretary of State Rogers, in his re- port to the President on the Conventio'a. recommended "an understanding to make clear that the, U.S. Government understands and construes the words 'mental harm' appearing in article II(912.) of this Convention to mean permanent impairment of mental facilities." Unforianately, on February 23, 1970. the American Bar Association house of delegates voted, 130 to 126, to adhere to its 1949 position against Senate .ratiti- cation of the Genocide Convention.. Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee took action to reconsider the Convention. A SPC eial subcommittee of the Genocide Convention, chaired by Senator FRANK Crroarn of Idaho. was an- pointed on March 20. The subcommittee held hearings on April 24 and April 27, 1970. In addition, hearings were brieily held on May 22, 1970. It is my intent this morning to answer some of the particular questions and oo- jections presented to the subcommittee as arguments against action on the Cola- ve.ntion. I would first like ta quote an ()been ton of my colleague from New Yo It Senator JAVITS, concerning this matter The protection of human rights is indeed a matter cf international concern. The United States has shown that it agrees \yid" this view by ratifying the World War II peace treaties, The United Nations Charter, tate Slavery Convention of 1926, and more re- eently the Supplementary Convention in Slavery (1967) and the Supplementary C,,n- vention on Refugees (1963). Charles Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, testifying on April 24, '1970: , It is my strong belief that ratitic.ion of tee Genocide Convention by the Uni.ed tes would substantially serve our na- -t,,,ohkal interest in two ways: First, by its ics. pact'.on world opinion, and second, by Is imp* on world law. It has been argued that under tele Genocide Convention individuals as tA, ell as persa,ns exercising governmental power would be subject to trial and punishment for offenses which have al- ways been regarded as matters fall; ag within the domestic jurisdiction of the various nations. George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Ad- viser, Department of State, in a state- ment presented to the Genocide Conven- tion Committee, replied in part to the above criticism: I shall direct my comments to the types of acts the Convention deals -with and to the ways in which such acts would be tried arid punished. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 29, 1971 CONGRESSION AL RI CORD ?SENATE "North Vietnam in the last 2 weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are en- circling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia and are encircling the capital. "Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of other nations, for assistance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier?a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat with- out fear of retaliation. . . . "Now confronted with this situation, we have three options. "First, we can do nothing. Well the ulti- mate result of that course of action is clear. . . . "If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band in Cambodia, or the entire country, it would mean that South Vietnam was com- pletely outflanked and the forces of Ameri- cans in this area, as well as the South Viet- namese, would be in an untenable military position. "Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia itself. Now unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of 7 million Cambodians whose country is being invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodian Army against the immediate threat. "With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equip- ment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense. But the aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other. "Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble. That means cleaning out major North Vietnamese and Vietcong occupied territories . . . "Now faced with these three options, this is the decision I have made. "In cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanc- tuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border. "A major responsibility for the ground op- erations is being assumed by South Viet- namese forces. For example, the attacks in several areas, including the Parrot's Beak that I -referred to a moment ago, are ex- clusively South Vietnamese ground opera- tions under South Vietnamese command with the United States providing air and logistical support. . . "Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Com.munit military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet- cong for 5 years in blatant violation of Cam- bodia's neutrality. "This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw. "These actions are in no way directed at the security interests of any nation . . . "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire." "I know that what I have done will ac- complish the goals that they [those who protest] want. It will. shorten -this war. It will reduce American ewer:titles. It will allow us to go forward with au r withdrawal pro- gram . . . It will It inv opinion serve the cause of a just peace in Vietnam.... "I found thai, the act ion that the enemy had taken in Cambodia would leave the 240,- 000 Americans who would be there a year from now without matte combat troops to help defend them, woule leave them in an untenable position. Tie, t is why I had to act.... Q. "Do the South Vietnamese abide by the same pull-out deadline as you have laid down for the Americen tract?" The President. "No, I ttey do not. I would expect that lee South V:etnamese would come out appr ixarti te,? at the same time that we do becauee \Alice we come out our logistical support at d ter support will also come out with tnem. "The action actually e; going faster than we had anticipated 'lee middle of next week the first uniti. American units, will come out. The end of rleXt week the second group of American unite will come out . . . Americans of rh kiads, including advisers, will be out 02 Cambodia by the end of June.... ". . . it is my betiet based on what we have accomplished to date, that we have bought at least 6 months and probably 8 months of time for tile training of the ARVN, the Army of South Vietnam. We have also saved, 1 think, hunareds, if not thou- sands, of Americans . by buying time, it means that if the ?inciny does come back Ito those sanctuaries next time, the South Vietnamese will be Axone enough and well Grained enough to handle it alone. "I should point out too, that they are han- dling a majority 01 toe assignment now in terms of manpower. Q. "What is your police toward Cambodia's future?" The President. -The United States is, of course, interested tr the future of Cambo- dia. . . However, the United States, as I indicated in what is called the Guam or Nixon Doctrine cannot take the responsibil- ity and should not take the responsibility in the future to send American men in to defend the neutrality oF countries that are unable to defend teenteelves. "In this area, what we have to do is to go down the diplomatic trail . . [to find] methods through v Lich the neutrality of countries like Cairib.)dia and Laos, who can- not possibly defend themselves, to see that that neutrality is guaranteed without hav- ing the intervention oi foreign forces." June 3 ?Report to tne Nation: ". . . Between APY il 20 and April 30, Com- munist forces launched a series of attacks against a number of key cities in neutral Cambodia. Their ollectiye was unmistaka- ble?to link together bases they had main- tained in Cairmodia tot 5 years in violation of Cambodian neutralit . . "This posed in au acceptable threat to our remaining forces in Sib Vietnam. . . . "I directed teat P nit; lean troops join the South Vietnamese 1? roying these major enemy bases alone, the Cambodian fron- tier. . . . "As of today call rcta,r1, that all of our major military }bee- Ives have been achieved. . . "General AbrOM,1 eat'. i. es me that 17,000 of the 31,000 At/lei-Jo:tee who entered Cam- bodia have already reter ned to Vietnam. The remainder wit. return by the end of this month. This incluil 1 American air sup- port, logistics, and re tn Lary advisory per- sonnel. ?The only rime-mine American activity in Cambodia alter July be air missions to interdict e mc vett tit tit of enemy troops and material where I Mad that is necessary to protect the liver; and recurity of our men In South VIel 11 CI. "Our discussions with the 1 ese Government indicate tha objective remains the securiti nam, and that their activity the future?after their withd sanctuaries?will be determi tions of the enemy in Camt "When this operation was critics charged that it would can casualties, that it would that it would lengthen our in It might postpone troop we the operation was undertald the opposite reasons?and it it the opposite effect.... "... Sixty percent of all the - ps involved in the Cambodian operatio t were South Vietnamese. The effectivenes: le skill, the valor with which they fungi 'or exceeded our expectations. Confidence e morale in the South Vietnamese Army 1 seen greatly bolstered. This operation has arty demon- strated that our Vietnemizan / program is succeeding. . . . "Secretary Rogers aidIlri been par- ticularly encouraged lay the i ,olve of 11 Asian countries at the Djalit t Conference to seek a solution to the pr o -en of Cam- bodia. Cambodia offers an ?I n'tunity for these 11 Asian ,nations, as e 'il as other countries of the area, to coe a 'ate in sup- porting the Cambodian Govt tent's effort to maintain Cambodia': neut ty, its inde- pendence, and its territoria itegrity. We shall do what we can to mak i possible for these Asian initiatives to sue June 30?Report by the' tdent: "Together with the South I namese, the Armed Forces of the United t z- es have just completed successfully the ti ruction of enemy base areas along I he Ca dian-South Vietnam frontier. All Americ r troops have withdrawn from Cambodia c lie schedule announced at the stall of -lit e)eration. "The allied sweeps into t North Viet- namese and Vietcong base t e t along the Cambodian-South Vietiiames order: Will save American and all-" lives in the future; Will assure that the withch can troops from South Vietn on schedule; Will enable our pros-rain tion to continue on its curre Should enhance the pros/ peace.. . "In assessing the April 30 do i against the North Viet]sInes sanctuaries in Cambodia. f, I must be remembered. "It was North Vietnam- ) we--which brought the Vietnam ar int I imbodia.... "It was the presence of No Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil tha- etributed to the downfall of Prince teihare . . "It was the government t, teointed by Prince Sihanouk and ratifte, N the Cam- bodian National Assembly? a a group of usurpers?which overt-I- rew F ,ith the ap- proval of the National Asses . . . "It was the major expansie e enemy ac- tivity in Cambodia that uli / ? rely caused allied troops to end five years i astraiht and attack the Communist base 't . . . "The prospect suddenly lot of Cambo- dia's becoming virtually one a _e base area for attack anywhere .nto h Vietnam along the 600 miles of the C todian fron- tier. . . . "We thus faced a rapidly Cl 'ng military situation from that which r ed on April S 531 F Viet tii,m- teir primary -3outh Viet- 'ambodin in til from the by the ac- ,. ?mnced, the 'ease Amer-- len the war, ernent that rawals. But '?//' precisely tad precisely ,1 of Aineri- an proceed 'Tietnamiza- tmetable: for a just on to move ti Viet Cong basic facts "Our military response to a enemy s es- calation was measurer, in e respect. It was a limited operation for I lilted period of time with limited obiectivi . . "We have eliminate? an ir T ,,iiate threat to our forces and to the se y of soutn Vietnam?and produced the I -.7 eect ol fewer American casualties in the f e . . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 lutkis ApprovietZelease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 THE NEW YORK 17,L2VI_LilS DATE Rogers, in Policy Report, Sees I ? 'Preoccupation' With Vietnam By TAD SZULC Specia to Tie New York Times ? ' WASHINGTON, March 27? lution new methods of interna- Secretary of State William P. tional organization and cooper- 'Rogers told Congress today that ative action are required. Secretary Rogers said that in '7.ithe United States' "National ;7joreoccupation with Vietnam preparation for the 1972 United as pre-empted our attention Nations Conference on the --from other areas of concern" Human Environment, the State the world. Department had recently named rui In an introduction to hi's re- a citizens' advisory committee -4>ort to Congress on "United to advise the Government. "An awareness has also come >-taites Foreign Policy-1969- ZO," Mr. Rogers commented: upon the world dramatically zialliy ending our involvement in that the increasing quantity of e war we will restore per- life directly threatens the qual- pective; by altering the char- ity of life,' Mr. Rogers declared. He said that the United Jacter of our involvement in the ,r`mworld we will re-establish a States was committed to a solu- alance in the conduct of our tion of the worldwide problem .telations." of population growth and that The 617-page report discusses in the current fiscal year it was dwAmerican foreign policy trends spending $100-million on re- under the Nixon Administration lated international problems, 20 'and gives a detailed account of times the expenditure of , four he 117 countries with which years ago. 4 ? athe United States has diploma- The report noted that if pres- ' 'c relations. It also discusses ent birth rates continUed, the ? ealings with Communist China, world population wciuld rise hich has not been recognized from about 4 billion this year iplomatically by Washington. to 7.5 billion in the year 2000 The State Department's re- and to 55 billion within 100 dxort follows President Nixon's years. It stressed that:hi 1970 l?.-tate of the World Message last alone the world's population .-Month to Congress. The depart- grew by 70 million. ent noted that the first such In his discussion of foreign , sport by a Secretary of State policy, Mr. Rogers said that the issued by Thomas idler- Nixon Administration sought a on in 1790 and the last pre- "national style which reflects ;Timis one by Richard Olney in confidence in our strength mod- (rover Cleveland Admin- crated by awareness of our tration in 1896. Periodic Report Planned "The objectives and policies ,kra' It said that the Secretary of the President has established," - tate would henceforth issue he said, "reflect a national atti- ,.foreign policy reports every tude that is neither ?domineer- wo years. The current report, Mg nor isolationist, neither 7-Containing Mr. Rogers' main messianic nor introverted. They "ail)olicy speeches and the texts reflect, I believe, an attitude of of international agreements practical involvement in the igned by the United States in world of today and tomorrow." ..o-the last two years, as well as Mr. Rogers sfressed tthat the the names of all United States American policy in Vietnam ?'Ambassadors abroad, will be on aimed primarily at "leading the sale starting Monday at the United States out of the war." .eGovernment Printing Office It was in this context that he -Jiere for $2.75 a copy- declared that the United States' ? Although Mr. Rogers devoted preoccupation with Vietnam much of his attention to ques- had "pre-empted" national at- ? tions of international security. tention. awsuch as the Indochina war, the The Administration seeks '10 --Middle Eastern crisis and the bring about a more normal pat- talks with the Soviet Union on tern of relations with the peo- 'limitation of strategic arma- ple's Republic of China," Mr. ents, and to economic affairs. Rogers said, even though it has added ecology as a new di- "no expectation" that its over- menension of foreign policy. In tures to Peking "will produce , his field, he said, "the realize- rapid changes.' ion that many solution must In the negotiations with t Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 THE NEW YORK TIMES DATE r " Appraising tylideaA Intelligence ? By MILES COPELAND LONDON?For reasons comprehen- sible only to those who have worked in a diplomatic service, no govern- ment can afford to keep its public fully informed on what it does in the ' field of international relations. Some- times it must conceal the reasons for its actions, and sometimes the actions themselves. In some rare instances. it must pretend to be takir ecklE of actions while actually t mer -r. other, and to present the pi whosi a largely fictional picture o and b is doing and why. ph This is especially true 1:11.?Inbe(c State Department comes up and problem such as the Arab-Isp.-ran filet. A diplomat newly assiiejur this particular problem finds the in the possession of "estimaterwarr situation" provided by the CdexP? Pentagon, and embassies ret? from Israel and the Arab cerravs then he begins to feel pressureto' , "domestic considerations"w hirlstro him and his colleagues toward p - other than those which the "est4 -v, of the situation" would clearly dictate. Finally, he tries to devise solutions which make sense in the light of the intelligence estimates, and which can be justified by explanations which have no relation to the estimate but which accommodate to the domestic considerations. For example: L Our intelligence estimators pre- sent frightening information concern- ing the Soviet build-up in Egypt, the increasing Soviet "presence" in the whole Mediterranean area, and the gains of Soviet naval strength east of Suez at the expense of the British. At the same time, they suggest, first, that Soviet gains have not been the result of Soviet actions, but of ours. The more we support Israel, the more the Arabs and their Afro-Asian friends wel- come the Soviets. Second, the Soviet build-up is not in preparation for con- quest?the Soviets would hardly try to gain by fighting what they can gain peacefully. 2. Daily, policy makers of the State Department read newspaper accounts of hawkish statements of Arab leaders: Syria's President proclaims loudly that his Government will "never" ac- cept the existence of Israel; Iraq's Pres- ident bitterly attacks Egypt's President for "defeatist tendencies," even though the speech in which the Egyptian is supposed to have shown such ten- dencies explicitly threatened war un- less Israel withdrew "from every inch of Arab territory." And as our diplo- mats read such accounts they are aware that these are also being read by American opinion makers who take them at face value. At the same time, they know from the Department's own information that the most belligerent sounding Arab governments have iri effect made peace with Israel already; such military preparations as these governments are making are strictly for internal purposes. 3. Our own press plays up the Soviet build-up in Egypt, and reports that "hot-headed young officers" are anx- ious for another round with Israel. Yet our State Department, depending not only on its highly competent diplo- matic staff in Cairo but also on infor- mation coming from decades-old intel- ligence penetrations of the Egyptian armed forces, knows full well that Egyptian officers are possibly "fascist" but certainly not Communist, that they have little confidence in Soviet military assistance and don't like their Soviet advisers any more than the Turks and the Iranians like American advisers, that they are ready to fight for Egypt but not for Palestine or for "the Arabs," and that without the irritat- ing presence of the Israelis in Sinai they would lack the motivation or morale to fight anyone at all. 4. Finally, our State Department offi- cials know that Israeli intelligence estimates are roughly the same as our own. Thus, it is inconceivable that Israeli spokesmen could be sincere when they argue that unqualified sup- port to Israel is the only way to halt the growth of Soviet influence in the area, that they are in constant dread of being overrun by the Arabs, and that they must hold on to Shann el- Sheik as a means of insuring passage through the Strait of Tiran. The Is- raelis know very well that they can take Shann el-Sheik any time they wish, no matter who occupies it, and that their presence there will only provoke revival of Egyptian hostilities. ?AC ; The Egyptians, seeing I e Israelis' reluctance to seize this un iuc oppor- tunity to make pea-e, at mt that they want a no-war-no-pea, a ittuation such as Nasser once want d and for similar (domestic) reasons. ?.oparently some of our NATO friend: hare the suspicion; so, increasingly, io some of our own diplomats. For vol. or for had, right or wrong, and w ,a ever the intimate effect on purely A at rican in- terests, we are behind the sraells one hundred percent. But we make Our own policy in Washingt r and not let the Israelis make it fo i.s in Tel Aviv. If domestic considera ic ns stand in the way, our diplomats a lc uld clear a path for themselves by re Taling the truth about the Arab-Israt; .;ituation they have known all alone ,ut have withheld from the public. Surely the American people will appr v of any position which is uncoi r romising enough in its support of I, even though it leaves it 10 Mr Meir to handle her own "domestic c,,nsidera- tions." Miles Copeland is a former i 4h-rank- ing official of the Contra/ i iligence Agency and author of "Th. ?;ame of Nations." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 VIA-A-244- '444?i"t- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 THE NEW YORK TIMES DATE A-PC1 PAC : ES, SELLING ISRAEL 12 MORE F-4 JETS, WEIGHS NEV BID Deal Made Last Autumn to Balance Mideast Arms- 8 Already Delivered MIG-23's NOW A FACTOR Soviet Aid to Egypt Is Said to Cause Further Request ?Allon in Washington By WILLIAM BEECHER Spedal to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 19? The United States is delivering 12 more Phantom fighter-bomb- ers to Israel and is considering a request for more, according to Administration officials. Officials said that the deci- sion to deliver the planes, pre- viously unreported, was made last fall to maintain Israel's balance of power wtih the Arabs and to convince Israel that the United States would continue the flow of advanced arms de- spite differences between the two countries on tactics in the Mideast negotiations. The latest request, the offi- cials said, stems from the ship- ment to the United Arab Re- public of nearly 200 Soviet fighter planes and fighter- bombers since the first of the year and the recent introduc- tion of a small number of very advanced fighters, identified as MIG-23's. The planned federation of Egypt, Libya and Syria might also affect Egypt's air power. But the French Foreign Minis- try said today that the deliv- ery of Mirage jets to Libya would be blocked if Paris found they were going to other coun- tries. At Rate of 2 a Month The 12 Phantoms for Israel ?8 have been delivered, the United States sources said? will bring to 80 the number of F-4 fighter - bombers that Washington has agreed in the last three years to sell Israel. Six reconnaissance versions or the F-4 are also being deliv- ered this year. On the matter of an addi- tional request, the Israeli De- puty Premier, Yigai Allon, speaking at Dulles Airport to- day, said that Israel was mak- inf no new requests for equip- ment "for the time being." The sources say that the newest deliveries have been made at a rate of two a month since the first of the year. The four remaining fighter-bombers are expected, to be sent next month. Deliveries of the Continued on Page 6, Column I mx reconnaissance Phantoms. which were part of a commit- ment made by President John- son, are scheduled to be com- pleted this month. Since the United States started delivering phantoms to Israel, in the fall of 1969, about nine F-4 fighter-bombers have been lost over Egypt or in, crashes, sources said. Soviet Shipments Described The Soviet shipments to! Egypt continue undiminsihed, one source said, adding that earlier this month two Soviet ships brought 18 combat planes to Egypt. So far this year, So- viet deliveries are said to have included more than 100 MIG8 21's nearly 60 MIG-17's and about 30 Sukhoi-7 fighter-bomb- ers. These shipments are in addi- tion ?to previous Egyptian air force totals, which are put at 130 MIG-21's, 150 MIG-17's and nearly 100 Sukhoi-Ts be- cause the Egyptians are short if fighter pilots, some Ameri- can analysts fear that the Rus-1 dans -may have to fly more of , he planes themselves, beyond .he 50MIG-21's they are be- ieve to have been operating n Egypt since early last year. [ Russian pilots will also fly :he MIG-23's, the experts be-, ieve. The analysts point Out that vhile the MIG-21 is a very naneuverable aircraft, having t maximum speed of 1,300 niles an hour, the 1,400-mile- in-hour F-4 is generally con- ddered a better all-around tircraft, not only in dogfights, nit in long-range bombing and trafing. Even with Russian pilots, our MIG-21's were shot down .ast July by Israeli F-4's near the Suez Canal. The MIG-23, the experts say, Is believed to have a top speed approaching 1,950 miles an hour, and can also fly higher than the F-4. At altitudes be- low 25,000 feet, it probably would be less maneuverable than the Phantom, the analysts say. But if it has an effective' radar-missile system capable of attackin low-flying aircraft, they continue, it could present problems for F-4's that came within its operating area. The MIG-23 can fly effectively at 70,000 to 80,000 feet; the F-4 has a maximum operating alti- tude of 71,000 feet. Israel's Air Force, the sources say, will have by the end of next month more than 70 F-4 fighter-bombers, more ; than 100 A-4 close support at- tack planes, nearly 50 Mirage-' III fighter-bombers, 20 Mys- tere-IV fighter-bombers and about 150 miscellaneous older fighters and training jets. No Immediate Threat Seen But since the Israeli Air Farce is considered markedly superior to the Egyptian Air Force both in terms of skilled pilots and maintenance men, American of- ficials generally do not be- lieve the comparatively larger numbers of planes in the Egyp- tian force immediately threaten a shift in the arms balance. Analysts are watching the situation closely, however, and one source said that if modern jets continued to pour into Egypt, the United States might agree to let Israel have 12 to 18 more phantoms later this year. Administ a ion officials have repeatedly ,e .d that the United States wov d not allow Mideast air power w develop animbal- wee to 1. reel's disadvantage. In the Icsing ciays of the John son xi .ministration, the United Sty te, agreed to supply Israel witl 4 i F-4 fighter-bomb-i ers and 6 roconnaissance ver- sions, the e?mnaissance planes to be del \it red in 1971. Last Ju v the Nixon Admin- istration -treed to supply 6 more F-4 ighter-bombers to take care of losses. Later in the sum- or the United States agreed to provide 18 more by December Then, i the fall, a decision was mad' .0 sell 12 more F-4 fighter-be rn -iers, with the deliv- eries o rade in the first five, months o :971. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 POST Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 DATE PAGE I t Renortedlv Gets New Air Defense Mil 4etl er Daft Writer indications Union has ypes of mo- ockets ? the alto Egypt in ueording to weapons, like vehicles, le SA-2 and air missiles ets emplaced around Cairo iez Canal last Israeli deep- ds. n, the new ned to repel high-altitude both missiles would be har- pilots to find new missiles a large-scale wiet personnel equipment in 1y this year. It 200 additional _ack planes, in- -six of the hot- et jet ? the lore Soviet per- been sent to ast two months, -otal to about rig to informed s say their re- ; additional So- ent remains re- hat most of the pment currently 1 to Israel is de- - the Pentagon is give Israel elec- .4 and jamming 3r Israeli planes 3viet anti-aircraft anti-radar mis- wk surface-to-air officials maintain en no new agree- more F-4E Phan- 3ombers to the Is- last fall, when agreed to provide es ? six of which were replacements for Israeli losses ? to augment the 50 originally granted by the Johnson administration. U.S. policy is to replace planes lost in combat or train- ing. At that time, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had asked for 100 more A-4 Sky- hawk attack planes to double the number Israel already had, plus 42 more Phantoms. Aside from the 24 planes last fall, the rest of the Israeli shopping list remains on file at the Pentagon. Phantoms Feared Whatever else the United States gives the Israelis, it is the Phantoms that the Egyp- tians fear. Not only is the plane an excellent fighter? which the Israelis are modify- ing to make even better?but it can carry three times more bombs than anything the Sovi- ets have given to Egypt. Thus, despite the Soviet buildup, U.S. officials do not view the balance of power as having been tipped in favor of Egypt now. Israel needs con- tinuing supplies of relatively unprovocative def ensiv e equipment for the time being, Pentagon officials say. Un- doubtedly, more planes would be provided if the situation should worsen. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird stressed in a news con- ference April 13 that the United States would not allow the arms balance to tip and that the administration hoped for a solution to the Middle East tension through "quiet di- plomacy." Recent press reports that the United States was in fact delivering an additional dozen Phantoms to Israel touched off a furor in the Arab press and led to Arab demands for U.S. explanations. Yesterday, State Depart- ment spokesman Charles W. Bray said that Arab govern- ments had been apprised of "inaccuracies either in fact or implication" in these reports. Visit by Rogers U.S. officials were at pains to clarify the situation be- cause of reports that anti- American demonstrations were being prepared in some Arab capitals that Secretary of State William P. Rogers is planning to visit in early May. Before the recent buildup of Egyptian air strength, Egypt was estimated by informed sources here to have about 365 jet fighters and fighter-bomb- ers. Now, the figure reportedly totals slightly more than 550, with about 200 of these be- lieved to be Mig-21s, the stand- ard Soviet fighter. Normally, the Mig-21 would give the Phantom a hard time, but the Israelis have been suc- cessful in shooting it down. To improve even more the Phan- toms superiority against the lighter, highly maneuverable Mig-21, the Israelis are said to be installing special slats on the leading edge of the Phan- tom's wings to make it turn more sharply. Another 100 of the Egyptian planes are said to be Su-7 fighter-bombers, a plane with far less fire power than the Phantom. Included in the new ship- meats are al o said to be about a squad -0 1?perhaps a dozen planes- o e the brand new Su-11 figh ei -bomber, and the six or so iii -23s. The re- mainder of th 1 wee is mostly older model M Although th vfig-23 can fly faster and h gner than the Phantom, mo t Pentagon ex- perts view ti e plane in the Middle East t n text primarily as a high-fl ilig reconnaiss- ance craft. Deploymen i .) Egypt of the new plane h aid to be the first time it b es left the Soviet Union by sl as mg high, the Mig-23 can i?main out of reach of any v capon the Isra- elis now have Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 The plan a new rad spot enem guide in i for the k gon expe. hard evict capability U.S. fight a few mor To coi forces, ti about 50 jets, whi t,ghters, Phantom T ??a French] kin planes, 400. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? S NATE Jaiuuiiy 29, 1971 -Ws have ended the concept of Cambodian eeetuaries, immune from attack, upon :relish the enemy military had relied for five Now that our ground forces and our logis- and advisory personnel have all been tierawn. what will be our future policy Cimbodia? e?he following will be the guidelines of our ri' in Cambodia: There will be no U.S. ground personnel C-,nabodia except for the regular staff of Falb:is:iv in Phnom Penh. ?_! 'here will be no -U.S. advisers with Cam- -sic'outs We ,vill conduct?with the approval of e is Cambodian Government?air interdic- d, missions against the enemy efforts to a eve supplies and personnel through Cam- bedia toward South Vietnam and to re- ash base areas relevant to the war in narn< We do this to protect our forces in aou th Viet nani. 4 We will turn over material captured in base areas in Cambodia to the Cambodian covernment to help it defend its neutrality a ci ndependence. 0. We will provide military assistance to the untodian Government in the form of small :ms and relatively unsophisticated equip- out in types and quantities suitable for ,eeir army To date we have supplied about 0 to Ilion of these items principally in the r,171fl of small arms, mortars, trucks, aircraft rts communications equipment and medi- .1 el:pplies. ii We will encourage other countries of the .r,: e.!'7011 to give diplomatic support to the in- d-:meadence and neutrality of Cambodia. We eseleorne the efforts of the Djakarta group of eountries to mobilize world opinion and en- erage Asian cooperation to this end. 7 We will encourage and support the ef- esas of third countries who wish to furnish o aetiodia with troops or material. We ap- p :cud the efforts of Asian nations to help e-,mlodia preserve its neutrality and inde- es,idence. Our undereianding of Saigon's intentions 4,4 i Vietnamese forces remain ready so prevent reestablishment of base areas South Vietnam's frontier. e South Vietnamese forces will remain aside to assist in the evacuation of Viet- esmese civilians and to respond selectively es appeals from the Cambodian Government snould North Vietnamese aggression make t.4 ttecessarv. 3 Most of these operations will be launched e :in within South Vietnam. There will be :.?s U.S. air or logistics support. There will not i3 J_S. advisers on these operations. -The great majority of South Vietnamese . so leave Cambodia. :a The primary objective of the South :eihamese remains Vietnamization within ir country. Whatever actions are taken in eamtiodia will be consistent with this ob- esti y I-- Television interview: sp. 'Do you feel that you can give cate- e sical assurances now that we will not eeld grmind troops back into Camobdia no e, esier 'eh President. "I can say now that we no time to send American ground e into Cambodia. We have no plans to at antedyleers into Cambodia. We have oniy to maintain the rather limited rl. at. natio establishment that we have in ;nom Penh and I see nothing that will s.otM-2,`e that at this time. . . Cite President of the United States has intension to send ground forces back Camboola, and I do not believe that see avdl be any necessity to do so. "When 1,01.1 say, can I be pinned down to t cat under no circumstances would the States ever do anything, I would not say t hat, but I will say that our plans do not ssountenaace it, we do not plan or. ie, and inder the circumstances, I believe I at Clue success or the operation which we ve uneertaken, a.; well as what the South V '1-- nameee will be able to do, will make it n- necsesarys. With regard to the South Vietnamese in Car ibodial, I pointed out on April 30th I at our air support would stop and there wc be a ) adviser.; with toe South Vietnam,- as, thas eny activities of the South Vietnam :se atter we left would have to be on t ,sir iiiriodia is in toe same category as incionesia. ft is. a neutral ccuntry. It a noemignaci comitry. We have 110 treaty v it. ' ,a; tar as Cambodia is concerned, ur onl s commitment to Cambodia is the c; 'n- mit talent that the United States for 190 y.irs has, had to the principle of international iw Lbs e a country that chooses to be nem-al slim 1 Lli have its neutrality respected. aew that means that we are iurnishine as you know, am Ili arms to them for their , or'! lice. It means that, in addition to 1, we :ire trying to give them the moral E por mat we (eel We are supporting the iv- tiw 0'43 of the 11 Asian nations who are tea. p Ling to stand with thas governmen in its aeutrality, but as far as military sum:, rt, the United SI ates moving forces into C ars- bathe for the purpose of helping them ,le- fent against enemy attack?tort we are I,ot req ered to do under -;reaty and that W4 do not intend to do. . . I am no: as bearish as some c so- meeiators have been about the future- of Cambedia. If I could digress a momeie I think this is a question thae our listeeers wostio be interested in?Cambodia's chan :es of s 'reviving as a neutral country are infine sey bet er now than they were on April leen, Arm they are oetter, first, because the Ni rth Vie: r amese have a 500-mile supply ne ratuer than a 40-mile supply line back to the sanctuaries which we have destroyed "Teey are better, also, because the C., _re bob can Government has far more sure et among the people, and the reporters Seam Phenin Penh generally have reported Thi-v are better, too, because the Cambocsan Go; ernment also has support from the- 11 Asian nations representing 300 million vet- ple. and I think also they are better tar the reason that the South Vietnamese ve been very effective when they have taker. on the North V esnamese in the Camboc .an area. . . " . we co not plan to go back , s to Cambodia. We do plan, however, and I e ill use slots ,bows,r?I am going to use, ss I shottA, the ar power of the United St, -es to 1r terdict all ows of men and aunt ees whica I consider are directed toward Si:- th Vie- raim. "Teat is rriv role Of defending Amer, an me s . , Mr. Preeident, in view of the COC,7 Amendment passed yesterday in he Senate, do yoi feel now obliged to suspend the negotiations with Thaila-nd about or paying and equipping their izoops that I ey were going to send into Cambodia?" 'foe Presidene 'Fortunately, our Fou ? 1- hag Mal great wisdom when they et lip v,.1 Houses of Congress. . . . ". think tie performance of the Ser ,te over she past seven weeks, going up ad down the hil. on Cooper-Church, has ct par e.:ularly datenguished that august is and the Cooper-Church that came out 'ass not a particularly precise document, sed wee somewhat ambiguous. "stow, fortunately, it now goes to ae Weise . And I believe that the confers: cc of ale. Senate and the House, when I. ev consader all of these factors, will first be sure that the power of the President of he United States to peatect American fcrces whenever they come into attack is in no way jeopardized.... "If this [the Cambodian operation] had been what some thought it was, an attempt to expand the war into Cambodia. to launch a war into Cambodia, then of course, I would have gone to the Senate. You can be sure that in. my administration we are not going to get involved in any more Vietnams weere we do not get the approval of theCongress. I will :not do this because I think we need Congressional support for our actions, and trust we do not hase to go to the Congress for that kind of support. "But when we have this limited, very precise action which 'Was limited in terms of the time, limited in terms of 21 miles as far as we were going to go, and which had for its purpose the protecting of American lives, I had to take the action when I did ...'' October 7?Address to the Nation: "When I authorized operations against the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last April, I also directed that an intensive effort be launched to develop new approaches for peace i:a "I am tonight announcing new proposals for peace in Indochina. "This new peace initiative has been dis- cussed with the Governments of South Viet- nam, Laos, and Cambodia. All support it.... "First, I propose that all armed forces 1.1iroughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remair. in the positions they now held.... "A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indo- china. Conflicts in this region are closely re- lated.... "A second point of 1:he new initiative for peace is this: propose an Indochina Peace Conference . . . North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossingl,00rders and establishing bases in South Vietnam?they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well. 'An international conference is needed to deal wath the conflict in all three states 01 Indochina. The war in Indochina has been proved so be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of out- break. "The essential elements of the Geneva Ac- cords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid its a basis for settlement of problems.,.," November 18?Message to the Congress Proposing Supplemental Foreign Assistance Appropriations: "The operations in the Cambodian border sanctuaries in May tend June helped assure the continued success of Vietnamization and of our trbop withdrawal programs. As we new at the time would be the case, the operations seriously impaired the enemy's ability to operate in South Vietnam, and contributed to the progress which has re- duced our casualties there to the lowest level since 1965. Continuing operations by South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces in the border areas will make possible continued progress. "Cambodia itself ,aas mobilized its own manpower and resources in defense of its independence and neutrality. . . . It is es- sential that we supp:Eernent Cambodia's own efforts by providing resources which are critically needed to enable it to continue to defend itself. Its ability to do so is a vital elemens in the continued success of Viet- namizstion. "Cambodia's needs have been urgent, and as Congress has been informed, I have di- rected that funds be transferred from other already severely limited programs to meet these critical needs. I am requesting $100 million to restore funds to such vital pro- grams as those for Taiwan. Greece Ind Turkey . . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL Ri A_c.)tt ? SENATE "To meet Cambodia's urgent needs for the remainder of this fiscal year, I require that the Congress provide $155 million In new funds to be directly allocated to the Cam- bodian program. . ." December 10?News conference: Q. ". . Can you foresee any circumstances whatever under which we would use ground troops in Cambodia?" The President. "None whatever. . . . Q. "Mr. President, how do you plan to keep your quarter billion dollar aid program for Cambodia from escalating into a guarantee of the survival of the Cambodian Govern- ment?" The President. "The quarter billion dollar aid program for Cambodia is, in my dpinion, probably the best investment in foreign as- sistance that the United States has made in my political lifetime. "The Cambodians, a people, 7 million only, neutralists previously, untrained, are tying down 40,000 trained North Vietnamese reg- ulars. If those North Vietnamese weren't in Cambodia, they'd be over killing Americans. That investment of $250 million in small arms of aid to Cambodia so that they can defend themselves against a foreign aggres- sor?this is no civil war, it has no aspect of a civil war?the dollars we send to Cam- bodia saves American lives and enables us to bring Americans home. . . ." 1970, SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM ROGERS March 23?News conference: "In Cambodia we recognize the neutrality, sovereignty and independence of Cambodia. We had nothing to do, directly or indirectly, with the events that transpired in Cambodia. We would hope that the events that trans- pired in Cambodia will not cause the war to be widened in any way . . . our program in South Vietnam . . . will not be affected by the events in Cambodia. , . Q. "Regarding the neutrality of Cambodia, I believe the policy of the U:nited States still is to sanction American troops going across the border if they are threatened. Does this in any way compromise U.S. respect for the neutrality and sovereignty of Cambodia?" A. "Not at all; and I don't believe that any troops, since the change of government, have gone into Cambodia. But we respect fully the neutrality of Cambodia and its territorial independence . . . Cambodia has not made any request for military assist- ance . . . No request has been made, and we don't anticipate that any request will be made. . ." Q. "Do you endorse the idea of having the ICC return to Cambodia to cheek on what is happening?" A. "Well, we don't endorse it, because this is a propose: made by Cambodia without any discussion with us or any activity on our part at all. As I say, this is a problem that primarily concerns Cambodia. We do think it is a very sensible Idea...." Q. "Is military aid [to Cambodia] incon- sistent with neutrality?" A. "No, I didn't say ? that neutrality and aid were inconsistent . . . Cambodia has not requested any such aid and we don't anticipate they will. If they do, we will have to consider it on its merits." April 18?Speech to the Cornell Alumni Association: "The rise of Cambodian hostility over the North Vietnamese presence came rapidly and dramatically. Most governments, including ours, were surprised at the ouster of Prince Sihanouk by the Cambodian Parliament. This was an internal Cambodian development... the Cambodian government remained cam- mittPd to a policy of neutrality and did not seek alliance with the West. "A year ago, before we reestablished diplo- matic relations with Cambodia with a small mission, we affirmed publicly our recognition and respect for the 'sovereignty, independ- ence, neutrality, and territorial integrity' of Cambodia within its praseiii, it outlets, The policy we expressed toward Cambodia then remains our policy toward Chrobod1a now We respect recent Camoodiae proposals to seek diplomatic measures of protection through United Nations actions and through a return of the International Control Com- mission established ka tae 1054 Geneva accords.... "rite possibility in unit warfare in Cambodia [has] midersaantiably caused con- cern among Americans. They ask if the war in Southeast Asia Is widening . . . They wonder if this mean:, that the period of American involvement will be lengthened . . . The objective of the Nixon administra- tion is to avoid both these results. "It is true, of course, that we cannot be indifferent to the military pressures by North Vietnam on the indepencietiae and neutrality of Laos ana Cambodia. raiev affect the safety of our own forces in South Vietnam . . . We continue to believe that eao ultimate settle- ment to the Vietriazneae wet must take Laos and Cambodia into accaunt However, we are determined not to reverse the long-term di- rection of our policy I oward fostering more self-reliance among Aiaaii states. . . ." April 25?Speeeh to American Society of International Law: ". . The violations of Liaise accords [1954 Geneva accords] by Nor to Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia are explicit, uncontested, open, and without any shred of international, sanction. Is it not time tor nations which are signatures to international agreements actively to support them? . May 3?Television tterview: "The reason for the Cambodian oper- ation] was to protec, tie. lives and safety of American men Ugh dug in Vietnam . . It's limited in the extent purpose and duration . . . We're not going to exceed those limita- tions of the sanctuaries on the border . . the purpose is to destroy the sanctuaries them- selves . . The President has made it clear that it's not going to last more than 6 to 8 weeks at the must . At that point the American troops and the South Vietnamese troops will withdraw iroin Cambodia. . "We made every possibie effort to get nego- tiations started in good taith, negotiations dealing with Laos end Cambodia . . . We would hope, now Lied, a's clear that the North Vietnamese have invaded Cambodia and it's clear that we've taken this action, that all states wouid become interested in discussing what they can do to guarantee the neutrality or Can ibtalia. . . this is a limited action. If we were going to stay in Cambodia on any sort of a permanent conditioa, permanently, or even of longer duration. then obviously we'd have to have the support of die American people. But I think the American people are going to support the Presider:a May 13--News conielence: "What is the policy el the United States Government on Sooth Vietnamese military assistance or eooperation with the Lon Nol government in Ca.mboitia?" A. "There is sonic iiooperation between the two governments. Naturally, we encourage that. The whole Nixon doctrine as pronoun- ced at Guam is that the Asians should work with each other to take care of their com- mon problems . I think there's a limit to what we shout' bat' ithOUt what South Vietnamese troops :ire aoing to do. Originally, it was contemplated teat most of the troops would be out of Cambodia by the end of July, but I don't know that I'd want to make commitment on behalf of the South Viet- namese . . the Atrium mean troops will be out of Cambodia by iale na of July and all the American troops nlh e out, including ad- visers. . . . "I said that if we did that, if we got in- volved in the support of the present govern- ment of Cambodia or any other government, that it would be oicooaistent with the policy of the government . . to we troops in an orderly way trom man . . . the United States hat tion of getting involved in Can American troops in support of government of Cambodia or ant ernment of Cambodia. . . "Are we concerned if South e earn be- comes active in Cambodia with e 1- troops, if that will make it more diffice I or us to withdraw our troops from Sou i Vietnam . . . Yes, we have made that poi 1 to South Vietnam, and they fully underst I that. In other words, that is not goim t disrupt the Vietnarnization program. . Q. "Could you clarify for us t e peratioa off the coast of Cambodia A. "Its purpose is limited. Its ; pose is to intercept shipments of ammurin e and sup- plies to the base areas in Can < ea which would be conducted by the Nomh k ortnamese or the Vietcong. It does not al to other powers, it applies only to re -nnent of supplies and ammunition t canctuary are"Haso.w. the Cambodians and th. .ath Viet- namese cooperate in the futur , going to have to be worked out betwei ?nem. Ob- viously, we will play a role i that; but whatever role we played would a be incon- sistent with the policy we hal. enounced, of getting out. . . . Q. "Are all those American c s lions, in- cluding the coastal patrols, to -1 ,topped, far as the Cambodian theater peration is concerned, by the end of :lune?' A. "Well, I wouldn't want ay that. I think we've said enough wit we've said what we are going to stop "Insofar as the riverine ope am is con- cerned, the Americans have ne e,.weeded the 21-mile limit, and we don't it to. "Insofar as getting America a out of the river in Cambodia is concern, the answer is: `Yes, that would be include( "So far as patrolling inter', d .nal waters is concerned, that's different I .mm not sure what we will do. My guess wo a be that we will continue. We have had tI. trol of in- ternational waters all t tie tin his is just extending it a little bit?so I 1 let want to make any predictions about ti Q. "Mr. Secretary, are you I mg out?or not ruling out?U.S. air acti t over Cam- bodia past the June ao dew i .e?" A. "No, I haven't ruled it on e all. We had air activity over Cambodia be e ? the change of the government, and we h said any- thing one way or the otner ac t it. Q. "And it also seemt post" that the air support, however, interdictin oe sanctuar- ies may continue. What at,. airpower in support of the Cambodian et ." A. "Well, that would appr o. We don't intend to become involved i m iarily in the support of the Lou Nol got alent or any other government.. , . "Now, in terms of aasistsa a. military as- sistance by way of supplies m therwise, the President has announced the are going to provide some assistance coo A mint with the present authority that we ha "Obviously, any larger pr . an would re- quire congressional approval ain't think we have crossed that bridge. We 1 ve no present plans to embark on that ki i a program. Q. "What you're ruling I only, is that we will not get involved di ,:y, militarily, in supporting the Lon Nol i ?ernment. A. "That's correct. ." June 8?"Pace the Nation "We certainly hope that t it government [of Cambodia] doesn't. fall; u the President has made it perfectly clear that we will not support the Lon Nol o ernment with U.S. troops. . . . "It is possible that the v :^r will be fought in a different place and it - sissible that It will continue with South I. tnamese forces and Cambodian forces, a ,c even possibly Thai forces, fighting a cor 1 )n enemy. But '3 533 c ..111 our +C Viet- inten- t's with present tier got- Approved For For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 531 CON1-; RESSION AL RECORD? ,,ENATF tioistidi mean that the United States sicea wad ha enmeshed in a combat in Cam- ' -? is interesting that for the first ie eta un eesintries in the area?Thailand, s? ales, Laos, and South Viet-Nam?are together. -The Sinitis Vietnamese have made it clear ,is the enemy tries to return to the sane- hey will reenter the sanctuaries, .. . Ai the ?nsiternment of Cambodia came into eplartientet it would be an renfavor- :tins ties?-S.:?esuent. We would hope that that it be `unacceptable' "? hogers: "No. not unacceptable in we would use American forces e government. . s is irrevocable that there will se American troops used in Cam- ?esi a, is natter what'?" eieerai - emgers: "There is no intention of s im forces in Cambodia? _ . Our hishe arts ee rig to be out of Cambodia by will have no military people .eartt at aii aelvisers or anything else. And we i.? rue-ition of having any American z?L,t,s, o Cambodia. Now. South Viet- , ???.at,-.1,ii, '' -- may return_ The President said !tc Interdiction to protect our , -.s - will not use American forces "-?in0testa, tf we did, it would enlarge the ?.. :i.e. and might mean that we'd be there on !. vai!ii-nerreattent basis, and we're not going : ?"..; Leh. Line -i---at?tement before Rouse Foreign :ore ??tee ? he Presegient decided that an attack on hiesies was necessary so that Viet- - heti ,itel the withdrawal of. our forces o could proceed. As far as i???? concerned, we want for it watt for itself?to he free soy- -- i.,. and unmolested. .ions, as the President said ley, have achieved our major tax anives and will facilitate and -.Test of our overall Viet-Nam mise- I add that the effectiveness ?-?e he South Vietnamese have ehodia increases our corifi- . tietnamization is the right .e --essess, conference ; e isseehtent's policy on air interdic- ? sa. the present time and after Cambodia, our Air Force .1 permitted to interdict the communication lines in ? .of cenress that there will es whet:. in the process of interdicting communication lines of the sieet will be of direct benefit government in Cambodia, ee main thrust of our policy e HT Force for the purpose of tine "7', ply lines end communica- tect Americans in South ary. I believe yesterday a the Cambodian Military El that American fighter -ing, missions in direct sup- ran fierees_ Now, was he I perceive a change in our that I ean See very well I might think it was help- ement when we fiv those ,t -lose to Interdict coin- ea:theme ,,rek supply lines of the enemy. titat s our purpose. That Is our . iTelmaints-s. ft may have a dual bene- tease eters, rem purposes and at the ' tine the Cambodian Govern-- stare,' . Satireei: re. you said that the main of Amarican air activity in Cambodia seise I in toteretseg American troops in. South rest-Nam. rs it not essential to the si ? urity &' :American troops that the governm it to.'. , hal, or at least some government n ??, un- esndly totally to the United States, certain Phnom Penh?" ..?. "I'm nee sure it's essential, but; thvi- c. i.e.y it's quite helpful if the governrn ? te: in Cs-Iliadia is neutralist and if there's Ste e.lity i , thsnabodi is . . I. we have a great in terest the !ease ri penple all over the world. a..I we assist, rig In some ways in Cambodie hut or purpose esas not to affect the cou of e_ .a.; in Cambodia as far as politic are e ei "Mr. Ste:al:tare, if it is our policy I. de- Si ai a neat-al or friendly goternmeie. in C ae-e we willing to provide arm: and tr ? 7'71 to keEp such a government in pc sr?" tWe have encoaraged Asian naticese to et end, thee could to help other Asia; :ta- n rI We are encouraged by the fact hat ef-te itedia,, for the fast time in :many rears, hes friendly relations and diplomatic ?!.:ea- tie e? with al: of its neighbors. . ' you kit a, the United States has !iro- etted, and ie now, assistant, to Cemisodia. this fiscal year it; amon ed 9 millien. and we are now consid,- eiag the eregram for next year. We do want I , do wIrv? we car to support the neutralit;of caeishodia, but we want to be sure the :s's no.: done in a manner which suggests e take reser the ?itesponsibility militaril to iris i inn any government in office. We w hose and We Are somewhat entionaageei eve I!. that Cs mboala will remain a tu- trs Ce 'Can p u state, Mr. Secretary, ?it Anthestan aircraft, or American pilots will hit fly !iiase air siipport for Cambotinn unit Styr tes Viet-mt.:mese units defending C n- boti i!,I positicn t'?" A I am not ming to make any stater. 'it tha. ? ''sight limit the use of our airpower eery -bat I have already said. And I d eet, see 1,1y why the United States she, Id constantly be put in the position where sie tell tee enemas exactly what we are goini to dn. fr? sr pol.c 5 as I have stated. And vs also slave saki that we would expect T. urns if the air flights of that tyne will at now In' South Vietnamese for(!es. ? Q hr. Secretary, can you tell us sten negctiations to send. Thai troaas into cambodia to support the governmen. A STall, Thailand now leas that uni-r crin!,?ii? 'ration. Whether they will, and who: etent aed so forth they haven't rot a U, ci un yet. So we haven't made a deck ois on oar mutt-tort. "I: tee is-upper/a Thai troops Ir Carnborn ??? we ,X .-V id have do it from Cambodian Me, is I ti or, ." 7?Coat 'Terme for Editors ter el Bross :.- caeteri? "Ci.i 7 purpose in Cambodia was limited - - to istaties the North Vietnamese saaictuat whiee ;sere -..Tp,rtl he the enemy V Isondu the--a in Vlet-Nam and to capture and !? ? desta ,e his sepoltes and equipment . . 'Tat militare r peratic.ns in Carn'eodla, ? e have si!dieeded. First the cantle, ? of the enemv to c?anduct attacks against ot force.. . s Viet-Nase has been seventy 'tan nt. tiseie bete been a dramatic ii crease in the cm fidence and canahility ? the I - th the-on:mese foreee. And time ? prospeies for the Vietnernization nrogran hate ? !r tecre 'Ti:s isTorth Vas-I.:name:se are attempting t use C. e!bodian .!reeritory to reesta"stish the, 7 diSrlip" ,e1 lines; e f supplies and communica - tion te earry on the war :as South Viet-Nan Anairisen airpower is being used to faustrat, these ,Vorts. PT,-sident 'Itileu has said tha : South ihetnamese ferries may cont .nue te engage the enemy in Cambodia; thus?anti I think 'his is a pcint that should be under-- scored-ethos the P1107,7 rnn no lOng,er emir' January 29, 1971 on a, safe haven in Cambodia to attack out forces "We are providing limited amounts of small arms to the Cambodians and will con- tinue to provide additional amounts of arms and other equipment, to help them maintain their independence and neutrality. "We support and encourage Cambodia"; expressed desire to remain neutral. We have no other objective than to have its neu - trality respected be all nations. We have no desire to associate it with SEATO or to seek to have it aligned with ourselves or with anyone else.. , "Some have asked if our e'forts in Cam- bodia modified our basic policy in Viet-Nam The answer is no. We will, of coarse, adeast our actions in the light of events. and Presi- dent Nixon has made it clear that if the enemy takes action which endangers our troops, he will respond. But our policy re- mains; constant: We would prefer a nego- tiated settlement which results in all foreign troops leaving South Viet-Nam. .. "The situation in Cambodia has, af course, highlighted the regional aspects cf the Viet- Nam war "We are continuing to press our effort for negotiations on the problems of Indo- china.... "There's nothing about a war that's pleas- ant, and we have made every effort to avoid any ciiiilian casualties. And certainly in Cam- bodia we've made very strenuous efforts to be sure that they wouldn't occur. "But the Government of the United States regrets the whole war.... "We believe . . that the difference be- tween the future and the past is that in the future they the Communists] will have to face Cambodian troops, South Viermaraese troops, and possibly interdiction by Ameri- can airpower?whereatt before, they could maintain these sanctuaries with complete safety. They didn't have to concern them- selves with the safety of their bases, which probably was an anomaly of warfc re. . . Q. "lit the war goes badly against the pms- ent government in Cambodia, and if the Communists win, as they seem to be tieing right now, will the United States da nothing except provide air support?" think we've been pleasantly surprised about the stability of the Cambodian Gov- ernmeni up to this lime, and I would not want to make any predietion about the milt- ?iary future in Cambcdia except to say t tat we are pleased at the way the young people are supporting the present government, she way this Intellectuals are supporting the present government, and the way the pres- ent government has been able to recrult srmed forces. ... "We will not send American ground troops into Cambodia again . We will use cur airpower to interdict the supply lines, the communication lines, but we will not use American ground troops. Our policy both in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, is to re- place American troops with Asian troops. , _ "We hope that the present government, or a; least a neutral government of Cambodia, continues to survive in Cambodia . ,.? July 15--News conference: "In Japan we had a meeting, the Ambassadors front 14 nations its the "In the course of my discuss:ohs, hr if is lot of time to deal With the topic tie nature of Cambodia; and al-though we didn't make clireca requests of any government, 'es did make it clear that we thought that the Arian nations should help the present Gov- ernment cif Cambodia maintain its neatrality. Paid contrary to some o I the stories that, I've seen written, I feel quite confident that '-here will be geod results from those discussions. "I am not at all pessimistic about tilts prospect of Asian nation; assisting Cambodia, beitaisse they recognize the importance or tb, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 29, 1971 CONGRESSION AL RECORD ? SENA neutrality of Cambodia to the security of "But despite a high degree of national that area. . unity, Cambodia still lacars the wherewithal "I think that the success of the incursion to carry on the fight . . For the immediate in Cambodia, because it contributes to the future?and particularly in the face of a pos- success of Vietnamization, does increase the sible enemy offensive during the coming dry probabilities that the enemy, somet'here season?additional aid will be urgently along the line, will negotiate. . . needed. . "The South Vietnamese forces are quite "The $70 million requested for economic strong now. They have well over a million assistance is essential to sustain the Cam- men well equipped, well trained; and now bodian defense effort and is designed only in they've?at least to some extent?have part to offset the loss of normal export earn- proven themselves in Cambodia. And they ings. Cambodia is not creating an elaborate have a morale that didn't exist at all last military machine. Rather it is set on keeping year . . . So we think it's quite possible that in the field units that can be rapidly trained they can defend themselves against the corn- to cope with the North Vietnamese efforts to mon enemy. . . . reestablish supply lines and harass the Com- "I found that the Asian nations . .. realize bodian Government wherever possible, that the only obstacle to the neutrality of "Over 70 percent of the military assistance Cambodia is the presence of North Vietnam- request for Cambodia is for ammunition. The cue troops remainder will be used jar small arms, trucks, . . . ." October 9?News conference: a small number of propeller-driven aircraft, "We haven't attempted to make any state- communications equipment, river patrol meat about who might attend an Indochina boats, and similar items peace conference, because we think it is pre- "The United States is not alone in pro- mature. We do feel that the principal parties aiding help. Military or humanitarian aid has also been forthcoming from neighboring are the governments now in power and those South Viet-Nam and Thailand, and from who are opposed to them on the battlefield. "As far as Sihanouk is concerned, he Australia and Japan doesn't enter the picture, I think, here. The Our basic objective in Cambodia is to forces in Cambodia facing the present Gov- protect Vietnarnization and our withdrawal ernment of Cambodia are North Vietnam- program. . . We believe the best way to gain ese. . . ." the objective is to assist?with air support October 11?"Issues and Answers": and aid, not military advisers or ground "Our troops are not going back into Cam- troops?Cambodia's efforts to defend itself. bodia. President Nixon. has made that quite This request for military and economic assist- clear. We think that the Cambodian Army ance would do just that. If Cambodia proves and the South Vietnamese Army, working to- unable to wit hstand North Vietnam's ag- gether, can handle any situation that might gression, Vietnamization and the troop with- develop there. . . ." drawal program will suffer a serious set- November 25?Statement before the House back . . In may testimony before Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs: last April . . . I stressed our determination "Cambodia's involvement in war is the re- to avoid a lasting military presence and a suit of events over which that small country military commitment to the Cambodian gov- has had little control. The North Vietnamese, ernment I made clear that we had no inten- who had long occupied Cambodia along the tion of letting Cambodia become, in terms border provinces, decided last April to corn- of American involvement, another Viet- pound their violations of Cambodia's tern- nam. . . . tories by undertaking actions throughout "We adhere to those principles. . . . much of the country. This left the Cambo- ". . . we feel that the money involved is dian Government no choice but to defend certainly a small price compared to what itself. Realizing this would require a good we believe is the salety of American lives. deal of outside help, the Cambodians reacted We have not planned, and we have no present initially by submitting to us a request for plans for providing, any sophisticated mill- $400 million in assistance. The aid they asked tary equipment . . . They are also getting for would have included many expensive and help from South Vietnam. so we believe that sophisticated weapons. they will be able to maintain their armed "Sympathetic as we were to Cambodia's forces succstully with this help. plight, and much as we realized that what "The Cambodians provide intelligence in- it contemplated doing would contribute to formation to the South Vietnamese. And we our own goals in Viet-Nam, we did not agree in turn get that information. Now we still to this approach. We recognized that if we are pursuing a policy which is to prevent complied with the Cambodian request we Cambodia from being used as a base for might have had to establish a large American attacks against mu forces, and in that con- presence to go along with the aid. We were nection we try to interdict supply lines and concerned that we would be gradually sucked communication lines. So from time?and Into greater and greater involvement as we there has never been any hesitation in saying had been in Viet-Nain and finally would be this?we do bomb in Cambodia. and I can see pressured into extensive use of ground forces, why some Cambodian might have said that "Instead, we decided to use our aid in a he has sent word out to the South Vietnamese totally different way, taking advantage of about the presence of North Vietnamese Cambodia's principal assets: its strong sense troops and later on attacks were made. of nationalism and patriotic determination to repel the North Vietnamese invaders. Thus it was that our cross-border operations last spring were limited in time, in area, and in objective. They succeeded in depriving the North Vietnamese of free use of the border- sanctuary areas, and they greatly assisted our troop withdrawal program in Viet-Nam. They also gave the Cambodian Government an opportunity in cooperating with other neighboring nations to establish its own sub- stantial military forces. "Since last spring, our aid to Cambodia has taken the form of providing weapons and into Cambodia has increased the prospects ammunition that the Cambodians are fully for a negotiated settlement . . . I think the capable of using themselves . . . We have no incursion into C'embodia would have in- military forces or advisers in Cambodia, nor creased that incentive . do we intend to send any. Q. "When did we first get an urgent re- "The Cambodians have made it clear that quest for arms lino material from Cam- they want to do the job themselves. . . bridle?" "We have no treaty obligation with Cam- bodia, and we have made no commitment with them . . . we do not plan to build up a large mission in cam buena. We are going to do it with a modest number of people . . . we are going to do aii we can to keep our presence small .. we on not considering the type of ?pet talon that we considered in Vietnam." December 10? 9'est,mony before Senate Foreign Relai ions Committee: "it is my judgment that the incursion TE S 535 A. "It was . . . sometime u :arch of this year . . . the Cambodian g4 mment has reduced the amount that a -y have re- quested by a great deal, and a have com- pletely changed the chara.cte the equip- ment they asked for . . . ti 'quest they make is now quite realistic I think it would be a very serious matt, or the Cam- bodian government if this applemental is not approved . . . But I ti . the intelli- gence that we get indicates I f, the present government is doing quite s L. . . this re- quest will undoubtedly be fo ved by other requests. The magnitude of a use requests will depend on events . . . a a we ask for military assistance and emu 1'3 in assistance for Cambodia, we cerUinly c ake on some Obligation for some continui "We have not taken on any t urnitment to the government of Cambodi We have ex- plained to them clearly th. . any fighting has to be done by the Camber a is and by the South Vietnamese and no my American forces. . . . "We do not intend to hay: s MAAG or an aid mission ... We do not int r- i to use mili- tary advisers.... "What would happen if or r -coops in any particular spot were 'rimer , I wouldn't want to say. That would be :c to the Presi- dent. But I think that, in vi .% of the place- ment of our troops, that is t it likely . . . I don't think we would get ar .ply involved in Cambodia and certainly 'a t in war un- less we send U.S. troops in. . "Some Cambodians will trained in South Vietnam, but they al I be trained largely by the South Vietne .1! se . . . There will be some training in Thai .1 d...." 1970, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE A [VIN R. LAIRD May 6?News briefing: "... I supported fully the rations to de- stroy the facilities in the a .1, 'mary areas. I supported the use of Amen i .A ..s as required to carry out this very im i Cant mission, which I thought was needcl ind necessary in order to protect our Viet .a!nlzation pro- gram and also to reduce t :.e possibility of American casualties.. . "In the Parrot's Beak are; entlemen, it's a little different mission lit as use you have to use tactical air there. Yo- annot use the B-52s because of the civ :1; a population that's involved. There is no '; rnbodian pop- ulation in this other area, i -ompletely oc- cupied by North Vietnames nd VC forces. When you're in these target t !at sort of op- eration has to be approved n me. . . . "Many people fail ta reali a that we [had] had incursions into the e ctuary areas. These particular incursion tarted during the month of April and the ere carried on an in-and-out basis entire oy the South Vietnamese and by the Arm ( the Republic of Vietnam forces. As far qoing forward with the introducing Soul.] ' ietnaxnes and American troops for 7 10 clw C. ,erations, that particular plan had been ked on and I had presented it to the a ,L1 onal Security Council but the National -e tufty Council decision and the Presidenth ecision to im- plement the pl...n did not ss i illy take place until Monday evening or To a. ay morning... Q. "Mr. Secretary, was th a any amphibi- ous undertaking under cone .1, ration regard- ing Silianoukville at any tis a " A. "I tell you, we have a sorts of con- tingency plans.... "I want to make it clear We're not go- ing to become bogged dos ci these sanc- tuaries.... ? Q. 'Why didn't you ask 'c igress for ap- proval for the Cambodian m) eration before you did it?" A. "It was not necusary c use this Cam- bodian operation is a pari the Vietnam program.... May 22?Television inter a : ". . . the time table wh al has been set by the President for the wit :d awal of Amer- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 36 CONG R ESSIO \ AL RECORD ? S ['NATE Jamtary c, 1971 an troops from. the Cambodian sanctuary the std. of teat unit. Can you foresee 'tat above what the Vietnam war was costing ration will be met in every respect. I hatesenin.g irk the months or years to come? otherwise? it would be a mistake, however. to P General Wheeler: "I can only cite 'e .at A. Secretary Laird: "There will be no midi- :eke a firm time table and establish it the President said, He said he was going to tional cost as far as the Vietnam operations here tor the Vietnamese forces. I personally use air power to interdict the movement of are concerned. This s'S budgeted in. the I.970 763 stecretary of Defense, if the occasion emitter supplies and men within Comb:seta, operational budget for our troop operations sore when the South Vietnamese if -Piet prover tifteeesary to :protect the lises within Vietnam. . . ' tee emed eh into the sanctuary areas at of emerican troops. I don't think I cot eh Q. Me. Novak: ". . ,. Do you think they tiealien the sanctuaries are rebuilt: wit si propriete, go any further than tiseat, (the South Vietnamese) could have handled theire are North Vietnamese occupy- Mr l'hancellor, the incursion into 'Cambodia without the iste oartitiular territory, I would recom-. Ci Mr. Beecher "Mr. Laird, I would eke help of U.S. troops? that tery be used if they so desire, to up a little bit on that qua' )n A. Secretary Laird: "No, the operations stated be a decision that would be worked abchr Amere ati air power in Cambia:ea could not have been carried out as success- -, ceeperation with the Cambodian Gov- aga -t in , eleton and supply targets : fully, but I do not want to take away from istit and the South Vietnamese ? low re the tvi ,hdrawal of our ground tries es the South Vietnamese by answering that r wet he no American advisors in the ?1-7 at the end of the month, particular question. di,., an:er .June 30th. The President has " I a we assume that such. air strikes ill Q. Mr, Novak: ". . Why do you say it see: this Ca r This operation has been a not h. limitee so the approximate depti. of couldn't have been carried out without :sit ractissat success and it has exceeded 21 iseies from the Vietnam herder that , American troops, since they have done so tape/state-ins of General Abrams thus ?nee to our ereund combat. forces, but .n well? - ter as destroying facilities, uncover- fact could extend far Into Cambodia if Ole A. Secretary Laird: "In the Fish Hook intelinition and food. This was the pri- tareees ere far trio Cambodia? area we would have had to move the 25th e ere miesson -room a tactical standpoint . A eetsretary Laird: "We w,,11 carry cn ie division or the First Air Cavalry Division be- the things that had a tre- best kind ef :IL: interdiction campaign ssse cause they had the security responsibility riseirmue umilence. I think, on this whole ie-ration hat( possibly can, Whether that air interdict sen opposite that area. So we would have had been the successes of the can carried sort the best in Laos or in Cas,:e. to move the Americal out and move the isth Vietnamese. ? the morale has been bodes is a question that will have to ise South Vietnamese in. It would have been a aamendnits--,the morale buildup?they'll be resm ved after tee 30th of jtsine, when ell tremendous logistics problem. eiire to go in-country and strengthen their Amerioans yell be withdrawn from Cambre,..i, Q. Mr. Novak: "Wouldn't the logistical ty efferts within country . Q. Ser. Beecher, "In other words, if I untie:- Mconvesnience have been worth it, consider- -every American will be out of Cambedist stard you, sir---let me ask this at a cense .ng the political' damage done to your ' 30th of June. We've already reduced lion Should the North Vietnamese est-'- Administration at home? emerican presence in the sanctuary nsh a new supple system deeper inside Cass a A. Secretary Laird: "Personally, I believe eta. and the only place they have operated hod a ought we apply air power there as e that the political damage that you talk hoer. In the sanctuary areas?the cc- have along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Li- ts about will be non-existent in a few months, rest- m territory of Cambodia which is CC- for serne time^ because this operation can be judged on the roe" by the North Vietnamese . . . The A. ericretary Laerd: think a judgm t short term tactical successes, which have e Vietnamese have had the major re- would have to be made at that time, and I been tremendous. But the operation really atensi hintv . wou a not wart to make that judgment ea will be judged on the long term strategic Link. OW primary interest in Cam- sesita and (Roo i this program. But it wculd seem to me ti t successes, and that will be based on the s the effect that Cambodia arm the eiterdiction might be carried on mete progress towards Vietnm aization. . . eres have Orion our Vietnamization pro- reasenably in the Ho Chi Minh Trail becai -se Q. MI', Spivak: ". . . Our operation in grain end the American presence and the and protection of the American troops of th 2- row number of choke points that woe Cambodia highlights -the importance of seis site ete ,eh are en Vietnam be ire:shied. But I don't believe that; it wotad having it friendly got ernment there. What e eerie: any useful purpose for its to disci.' s will the U.S. do if the government is min- s far as rebuilding the Army of Cam- the -peciflcs of operational orders. These tarily threatened by the enemy, as it may this would be a very long process. You ordeis will be cerried out in the best vele well be? ,(1i: go forward in the matter of weeks that '1.ey can be carried out in order to pe - A. Secretary Laird: "Personally, as Secre- or ,noriths to modernize that particular army. tect entericans that are serving in Vietnate. tary of Defense, I believe that we best keep siee problem that we have to look at here and 'I,,' purpose of any air interdiction ; ." our eye on the ball, and that is Vietnam. ' etf,ci the North Vietnamese in- supp.ies or material commg down from Nor- I believe that the success of the Cambodian -on and occupation in certain areas of sad ea-tein areas of Cambodia on our Vietnam. through the Ho Chi Minh Tr's ,1 operation should be judged in terms not of s VI-, naftt program . ." throi elsi Laos Is ti Cambodia, the purpose :f the success of the government in Carnbodia. 4,---"Nfeet the Press" (with Genera/ any enerdiction eampaign will be to proteti. but the success of the Vietnamization pro- Amertcans and reduce American casualtic gram arid our withdrawal program. Per- es- a Wheeler, Chief. JCS): as ic is a m s Americans a:7e present in Sous:. smelly, as Secretary of Defense. I believe Sit Per- ot-alloy': "Will the South Viet- ittlraw fromVieti. eel. that the emphasis must be on the Vietnam- Cambodia corn- Q. Or Brandon: "General Wheeler, wot, ieation program and not on the rise or fall 'lacy rtaird: "I would not antic:- you re e out I'M, reentry of American grotme 0.1 any other government. t tile South Vietnamese would eye troop m .; into Cabodia? Q. Mr. Chancellor: ". . . What if the A. eatt I' ieral Wheeler: " would have to, be si - Rusans are reading the ability of the tee sai le time table that the United States 4: cause .tie Priest le ye e nt has said that we American. President to move in an unprif- (0. o. Hewever, the South Vietnamese i edieated that they have a primary withdraw from Cembodia, and while I can detable way, a way thet the policy planners 77.117 an within th.eir country, and I would be back within forest a ail of the circumstances that miget cannot predict? This was at least part of the ea : i arise the tutu re, I think his intent is the: Cambodian. operation. And If it makes this s ; t hat teat- would soon sauritre we wsi not reenter Cambodia, cciuntry have a sort of nervous breakdow sit /teesl feet night the President said Q. ,,t, Brandt ni "We have atm been tot' as it went through for a few days after this . , 21117 remaining American activity that a" North Vietnamese are row buile operation, do you believe that that limits . rta erelta will Ise air missions to interdict ing tp a new tiaaettrary in South Laos,, the options of the President for acting in tnevement or enemy troops and mate- woridsr now uneertant is it and what yo : other parts of the world? . . . in. :etre teed the President, 'find this is plan si tie about ic? A. Secretary Laird: ''I first want to sey - orrtitect the lives and security A. late-feral Weeeler: "What thin/ are at that it never was anticipated by anyone that ,-,tirr,Fis 7, ernith Vietnam, tuella doing, Mr. Brand:tn. is that they ars there would be a Kens State or a Jackson this reeen helicopter gun ships or extending the hese complexes farther to the situation developing, ar.d that was indeed an 1:17 t, the military prognosis on north in a sense but also nether to Ms.- unfortunate tragedy in both cases. But I 1-.0 smith. 'old we mill take the appropriate A," fest that the importane thing that is being I imarese rier inheeler "I think be was talk- Chancellor, about the use i tion -Ctn. we na re taken against other ba' accomplished in this Administration is tie e,' : areas, 0th :aaos and es in Cambodia. Lt cablishrnent of credibility, as far as ties s tr-hen nem aircraft, or larger aircraft other iterds, we vie use air power agonise. WAS is co:acerned. And the important Jude- i :- that E ;actuary area, or that base area. merit will be made on the 30th of June tha t Ile iitiils--,triter gun ships, Again. how- wou it,tt, like to foreclose on the Q. Mr grandma "Only air power" we meet this deadline the time that has been set by the President of the United ! sseee esss , because it will depend A. c:reeral WI eider: "That, Is corntrt, Srtates, just as he has met every other dead- ii : ..1 target which would be the Q. I tr. Novak: ",!ecretary Laird, when ye ? lir.e on troop withdrawal. I think this is the r taruriEn ;? of war to use. were , ?a.eittniale cengressman yrs' were important thing in the long run, to restore (iisit.tietilor: "Theoretically, sir. a very c teal of tie', Democratic AO tYli nistrs. - this credibility, as far as Southeast Asia is : I - are worried that if a unit tion I not lath t the truth ahteit how concerned, and to move forward towards the s melte emsnarnese Army is in trouble much mey the war- was Posting. Could yoi Nixon doctrine, which :des as its overridine ar might be ineluctable say le w much th s Cambodian artry?thit goal the ;avoidance of "hi s kind of groun.I on the United States to come to cane)/ exert- Si' Is goingto cost over ant, involvement in Southeast Asia. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL R LCORD ? SENATE June 26?Interview by Newsmen: Q. ". . . has the policy of interdiction and bombing of Cambodia been extended to in- clude the combat air support of both the ARVN and the Cambodian armies in Cam- bodia? A. "I made it very clear, as I testified before the Foreign Relations Committee back early in May, a policy that our government would pursue as far as air support was concerned. After the Cambodian operation, which will end as far as Americans are concerned on the ground on June 30, we will carry on an air Interdiction campaign and any airpower that is used in Cambodia will be based upon the interdiction of supplies, or personnel, that threaten the Vietnamization program, that threaten Americans, that are engaged in mili- tary operations in Vietnam.. The primary em- phasis will be on the interdiction of supplies, materiel and personnel. ". . . the primary reason for the air activi- ties will be the protection of Americans in South Vietnam, but I would be less than frank or candid with you if there would not be a side effect as far as Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops operating within Cambodia, but the primary reason for the air operations still will be in accordance with the testimony which I gave to the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States' Senate. . . . Q. "Do you rule out close air support for the Cambodians in the future? A. "I do not believe that it's good practice as far as military planning is concerned to give fiat answers on operating orders as far as the future is concerned. I can assure you, however, that the primary reason will be as I stated before the Foreign Relations Com- mittee, the primary reasons for carrying on air activities in Cambodia, will be the inter- diction of supplies and materiel, interdic- tion of personnel, to protect Americans in Vietnam, to protect our Vietnamization pro- gram, to make withdrawals of American troops a continuing process and to reduce American casualties. ". . . the supply routes through Cambodia have had in the past, and could have in the future, an effect as far as our Vietnamization program is concerned, and we will continue to carry on an interdiction campaign in this area in order to protect our Vietnamization program. . . . Q. . . would a Communist takeover of Phnom Penh jeopardize ....Vietnamiza-tion seriously? . A. "We have had periods of time when the supplies coming in through Cambodia were a very serious problem as far as the IV Corps and the III Corps area is concerned, and I would be less than frank with you if I did not indicate that the supplies through Cam- bodia, coming through Sihanoukville, have had an effect, a very substantial effect, on the war effort in Vietnam, and we are going to do everything we can to see that our in- terdiction campaign of these supplies and personnel is successful in order to protect our Vietnamization program. . , ." July 23?Speech: "As the threat from the Cambodian sanc- tuaries has been, blunted, and as the Viet- namization Program continues to move for- ward, evidence multiplies that the Presi- dent's strategy and his doctrine are pro- ducing the desired results. Concern for the lives of our servicemen and for their safe return to the United States was the key deciding factor that caused the President to conduct the limited operation in Cam- bodia. . . ." August 6?News conference: Secretary Laird: "I think the situation in Cambodia today is better than I had ex- pected it would be at this time. .. . "As far as the improvement of the Cam- bodian Army, I think they have shown good progress.... ". . . I am concerned about the use of the sanctuaries, the use or supplying forces that can attack Americans and can jeopardize the Vietnamization program, and our troop withdrawals, and the reduction of American casualties. ... "... I also am concerned about the use of the harbor at Sihanoultville?and the use that was made of abat harbor for logistics support operations, ooth for the VC and the North Vietnamese. It is very important?and it has been of considerable help?to have that avenue or logistics support shut off. I certainly feel it is te the interest of our pro- gram in South Vietnam to keep the sanctu- aries shut off, to interdict the supplies and personnel, whether ahey are coming through the opening of the He Chi Minh Trail on down through Laos, the use of the Mekong, or efforts to reopen Sihanoukville. Q. "There has been some rather explicit reporting out of Cambodia that American airplanes are provitiing direct combat sup- port to the Canibodian troops. Secretary Laird: 1. am not going to dis- cuss operating orders, but I can tell you that we will continue to interdict supplies, per- sonnel and logistic routes. There will be cer- tainly ancillary benefits, too, that will affect Cambodian operation.s. however, our primary mission, as far as the use of our air?whether it be in the southern part of Cambodia or along the sanctuary areas, or along the river routes?will be interdiction of supplies and personnel. I have been noticing these news- paper stories. I would Just direct your atten- tion to when I was hit at Andrews Air Force Base as I came back fromn my trip to Europe and the NATO meetings. I outlined that policy very clearly at that time. [See June 26 entry]. I have had personal contacts with General Abrams, prior to his going to the hospital, about. the use of air interdiction in Cambodia. We are still following that policy. Q. "Mr. Secretary, I am very much dis- tressed . at the difference between the policy that we are told exists and the per- fectly obvious. implementation of it, and most specifically John Wheeler's story from the scene this morning in great detail . . That is not interdiction by any stretch of the imagination. sir; that is close air sup- port operations All tile talk between the airplanes and the ground controllers was recorded in this dispatch. Bow do you square the difference between what is reported by an eye witness with long experience with the stated policy et interdicting only those things which can jeopardize us in the South? This is an operation in a new part of Cam- bodia. . . Secretary Laird: -Well, in that particular area it is very much related to the opening up of the sea area lor supplies, etc. I would merely state that the neclsion was made by the Commanders in the field that it was an important interdict ion mission to destroy? I believe, in ,his case, personnel. But this Is a decision which certainly can be made by the commander COMUSMACV has that authority to interdict. personnel and to in- terdict supplies. "We have stayed by [hal authority and he (COMUSMACV) has used that authority. I have no criticism of the use of the author- ity in Cambodia. I saw one report that every request was adhered so. That certainly is not the case. These interdiction missions are flown when it is felt personnel, or supplies, or the buildup is 01 sufficient magnitude, or it has an effect upon the overall program which we have in Vietnam. Q. "But 300 yards in !runt of ground forces under control of forward ground controller In. an OV-10, sir. is not interdiction. Secretary laird: -Well, it depends on what you refer to as at. interdiction, I think. I believe it is. It is von % difficult to get these forces together in large numbers and to get concentrations of supplies. The VC and the North Vietnamese tire now. following the S 537 policy of trying to coacent their sup- plies and their buildup of sir .p les, material and men around popuiatio enters. You have to have forward air con ?.( iers, so that you can, be in a pos tion 're you can protect civilians. "I can assure you that C USMACV in his use of this interdiction as t rrity is mak- ing every effort, with a bsolui )ositive con- trol, so that civilians will i 0 be involved in any way with the Interc ,on missions flown by the United S:ates r gorce. I be- lieve that it was wise to -r forward air controllers under conditions 3 .ch as these, in order to protect the 11% .1 of innocent people. ". . I know that it has .5 .1 helpful to us as far as our program in a 11am is con- cerned. Now as far as wving I ctual assess- ment of its effect on he Cu a .odian situa- tion, I am sure it has. beet t .ipful, but I can't give you a percen age n ;Lye you that kind of a judgment. . ? . ". . . MACV's judgment. It .ed upon its effect upon our operations. Q. "I'm just trying to find how serious the military situation was i r Cambodia. Could that government haw rvived with- out the benefits they receivei le side bene- fits they received from our Gerdiction? Secretary Laird: "I would I irk that this would have helped materia a but I can't make the positive judgment it and give you percentages. I think, ce :nly, the an- cillary benefits have been ul from the interdiction campaign. Q. "Mr. Secretary, are th many cases where they asked for help I ii, they would consider close air support ant a a denied it to them, because it was not Sr in benefit to do so? Secretary Laird: "Yes, of ae, there are cases. There are cases when v e can't posi- tively control the aircraft ii re we would be in a position where we a 'old not use them. Q. "Can you break that it ell with any kind of percentage basis, 0 number, or total number of requests, r. a, many are honored? Secretary Laird: "I can't g 't you the per- centage. No, but it is a sue s Alai number that aren't, because they d fit in with our overall guidelines in th irea and our overall operations. September 2?News aonfei r. .e: "When I have been asker le questions, even before the Senate Fr a an Relations Committee, in early May, v nether there would be a limit on the us airpower in Cambodia and whether the A ,Tle limit ap- plied to ground forces I ant -ed that very categorically that there WC be no such limit. I just don't be ieve t. anyone can find a case where I've shied v ay, have not given you complete md information. "The number of sot- les is natter which I have not released, 10 d we riot releasing the sortie levels . . . we're IS r.g air power in Cambodia to destn.y sup .1 'ti, to destroy buildups, to destroy ,terser s buildups as well as supply buildups, been we feel that this is important from the s ipoint of our activities in Vietnam. I've t % you that we have a commitment to Cam tra, our com- mitment was a free and op, -1 -ommitment. it's $8.9 million in :Minas issistance in Fiscal Year 1970." Q. "Did you say there wa i lommitment to Cambodia?" A. "$8.9 million as far as a- nary assist- ance, this is a commitmen hat we have made. It is $40 million of m: zy assistance in Fiscal Year 1971 and ti .t commitment soon after it was made, as S on as I was asked about, I told of that ? imitment. In addition to that, we have i commitment which has been made on s a ral occasions by the United States, as wc LS the Soviet Union, to the neutrality of ii Government of Cambodia. This was ma a in April 16, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 58 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SI NATE Javoitarti 29, 1971 we came out and outlined this commitment strough the Australian Amlaasador in Phnom Penh. When I was asked the qudestion of synether we had a military commitment as 'at! the use of American manpower to ratinbodia ? , I answered that question in negative because as far as military man- r is concerned, we have no commitment there, The SEATO commitment that was im- rated by the SEATO agreement when the einATO treaty was signed, that particular military commitment was renounced by the Cambodian Government itself, This is a mat- ter en record I can go through this and item:anent every statement I have made in rearard to Cambodia, Now, when you ask me about sortie rates, I've always said we weren't geetg to arnoonce the sortie rates. , altarber I l?,Television interview: -That question of [Communist control n" 'r that rano area is merely a control ti tine the Cambodian Arm.y is not making , it the area.. .. its it:e question of control in a stand- pia . er an ,npla,ce cease-fire, I don't think yeti wouie find that the North Vietnam- on e are in a position where they would aelmalty truly control that land area. They are controlling certain sections of the land area, because they are not being challenged at :he ,aresent rime except along the Vietnam- ese border They are being challenged along Um Vietnamese border by South Vietnamese lot': es and by some Cambodians that have ho ii trained in South Viet-Nam,,,," attober 12--News briefing: "stvery effort is being made by our forces to interdict, suoulies and personnel as they move into hams and as they move within Cambodia.. This interdiction campaign is pregressing very well and the results have exceeded our expectations. , ." N] "would we consider going back to pre- vent them I the Cambodian sanctuaries] omit, building back up"? ,t "the South Vietnamese have come in contact with North Vietnamese operating alma?: the border areas of Cambodia. There hatm not been substantial movements, how- eve?r or North Vietnamese forces and Viet Coag forces into these sanctuary areas. The contact in these areas is being made by the Sou in Vietnamese at the present time and we believe that. the South Vietnamese forces earl tra.ndle the situation very adequately." wember 35 Statement before the House Foreign. Attairs committee: tsre support we have provided them [Cam- bodia's forces is directly related to our own interests because Cambodia's ability to de- fent t ttaelf is a vital element in the continued sumess of Mietmunization. Of particular im- porriterme to the fact that the diversion of theimands ot North Vietnamese main-force troops to Cambodia, has resulted in a sharp ;fret, in EaS casualties in Military Region III af :Matta Viet-Nam. convinced that our continued atmeact of Cambodian self-defense is a mat- ter er high priority. As an indication of the ?arneecy; of this request, I would mention lam: 70 percent, of the supplemental funds li be used for ammunition, N,,vember 25--Testimony before the House committee on Appropriations: e; net believed that the increase in military and economic assistance to Carnho- ' ei getting the United States too deeply lil- ted in Cambodia. We have made and are :i ng every snort to restrict our presence anti itivalvement in Cambodia. We have pro- aided military assistance to maximize the eapacity or the Cambodians for 'doing it enetirselyest as envisaged under the Nixon doctrine, As the President explained on June ere we have no ground personnel in Cam- bodia e.scept sox the staff of the Embassy, which is small, nor do we have an U.S. ad- eaters with Cambodian units, We do conduct ;.,,ir interdiction in a portion of Cambodia. but lois is to protect our farces in Soil h Vietnam. In atm, our aid is designed to is se the am bodiars tee wherewithal to fight Me North Vietnamese, rather than uf, doing it r ,r there The Cambodians have shown good he:- rale and great resolve to run their cm I.. affair: . will ec-iduct--with tart approval d the tr tambodia i Goverliment--air intecd: ?- tion nission against the enemy efforts ? o mos - supplies FlUil personnel through Cat - hod: toward 3outh Vietnam and to re a tablis I base area; relevant, to the war in V ?-? ? - narn We clo this se protect our forces it Soul -i Vietnam . "Tarere art, undroximately 1.4.000 of Me enenir tinerating in Cambodia. It is of very grea' .mportan re to our Vietnamization pl., ,- grar, that the Cambodians have the capab.?- ity 1,,, meet that military force. We are co.,- fidete, that the Cambodians can make it e kind ef effort that is necessary to protes?t thentsiaves if tire can. go forward with fl mill's asistance program "A- t he time of the Cambodian sanctus otter Men. in w rich American forme were - volvc it along with South Vietnam forma then vas a total of about 38 North Vietnam- ese battalions finaaged in that area. Carnes - than farces, alones with some help from tee Sold 1 Vietnamese forces, are meeting Um t, milita iv challenge at this time. If we are g e- ing t ; continue our troop reduceions in Vie' - nam beyond the May 1 announcement win; a has already been made by the President the I i, red States, it is absoltmely essent:?., I that `A', keep the enemy's Cambodian logist i?- supp,y route to \nettle:en closed, particular: the r art formerly called Sihancukville. TI: is has a ttibstantial effect on the protection ' the I VPS of Ameriean service :aereonnel, aim stabi I v of HI and IV Corps as tar as Viet- nam s ooncerned "Pmer to the change of policy by Cane bodia ,ind the strutting off of the logiste supple routes, most of the logistic supplim for III and IV corps carte in thr?augh Cam- bodia Closing t hese routes has been of vet:, great ;assistance to the force; in Vietnam, It is e real plus aa far as providing increased. possibilities for f .tether troop reductions Vietre en are ceneerned. It is a very sine it investment to provide this tnoney in the form re:: militate/ assistance to the forces at Carnleatia, whet'. arm considers the daily co e of this war in Vietnam, partioularly at high level at I Jets Dec', idler It- neestimeny be fors the Sc. ate Pareign Relations Comrniatte: "In nambodie at the present time, Use Cambedian. regain, forces are tying don over M.000 regular North Vietnamese force In ad ttion to (sat, they are tying down ie 000 or more Vet forces that are operati r: within their no intry We b,ilieve thie when the CamIxellart governin,srit has it volun 1 curs, but does not have the militate equip esnt they reed. it is better for us equip : hose volormeers to meet this fort than i involve American eornbat forces.. Q " Carnhotlia is in danger of fa ing. ? what tw tad yee recommend tlh; we do ' Wee the erim thintr, that would re; - ammo it . wo 11,1 be to enenitrage a great ? em use of South Vietnamese foreP.S thou, they te requested by the Cambodian govern ars seeing the Nixon Doctrine at work. Asian men t nations are joining together in ground corn- There ore no approved 'contin ? bat against the Communist aggression, There gency I://IS which contemplate the use nations am providing the manpower for their Amen:17,S in Carabedia as erourat combs, forces . own defense. As has been stated repeatedly since the. President enunciated the Nixon Dc,ctrine in Guam in 1959. the United States would be and is prepared to provide mate- rial assistance and air and sea assistance te our allies and our frienes in Asia. ". . They [the Cambodians} have tee support on the ground of their neighbors, the forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The pee-. plc'of Cambodia know that there will be no (American) ground combat forces committed missions are limited to ground concentra- ttons, movement of supplies, at cetera,., The South Vietnamese are conducting some close air support. We do net have U.S. ground spotters positioning our U.S. Air Force at- -tacks. We have very stringent rules . Those rules provide that there will be no use of in- iterdietion missions by the 'U.S. Air Force near villages or cities where there are concentra- tions of population . . If a target involving personnel or logistic supplies is in an area where it can be hit without damage to civil- ians or populated areas, we do use air power to destroy it.... We have flown interdiction missions in all areas of Cambodia at the request of the Cambodian government.... "The only involvement we have with Cam- bodia is in the military assistance area, and in the economic area . . I would assume that we would continue for some period of time to give military assistance and eco- nomic assistance, but that is the extent of our involvement,.,," 1971, SECRETARY OF DEI`ENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD January 11?On Arrival at Hickam A.B., Q. "Mr. Secretary . . could you give us an idea if in fact, it seem, to you that the Com- munists are switching focus of their offense in South Vietnam to Cambodia?" Secretary Laird: "I think the enemy threat in South Vietnam is not as great as it was, a year ago. The threat in Cambodia remains about the same, but the threat in South Laos is increased considerably during the last twelve months.... ". . members of my party visited Cam- bodia and reports on the progress being made with the new military assistance program, which has been approved by the Congress by an overwhelming vote, would indicate that the military situation was improving, and that the Cambodians were making some progress with the Military Assistance Pro-- gram. Of course, it's only had about four weeks to be implemented, but the 'progress, thus far, I believe, is adequate. Q. "Sir, do you read the Congressional mandate on the non-use of American troops in Cambodia to permit the use of American airpower that you feel is necessary to break the stranglehold on the highways around Phnom Penh?" Secretary Laird: "Yet, I do. , Q. "Is there going to be an airlift in Phneem Penh'?" Secretary Laird: "There has been an airlift in Phnom Penh. There has beers material that has been airlifted. The South Viet- namese have had several airlifts in there, and I would assume that air, waterway, the other means, would be used to deliver the military equipment that has been authorized by the Congress. I think it was a rather substantial development as far as the Congress was COI, - cerned, that we had this overwhelming von' in favor of the Military Assistance Program for Southeast Asia. It shows the true applica- tion of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine, in which we move from military manpower in Southeast. Asia to military assistance. January 20?News conference t "Members of my party. including Adminit Moorer, visited Cambodia. In Cambodia we, "If ;r el take toe soma- Lion tha t exists!, t earlier tins year the air war in Cambodi has detreased. IT has substantially increased durine the past month ES far as the South, Vietnamese forces ore concerned. but to number of missions flown by U.S pilots mm compared with South Vietnantese pilots, i much smaller. . "The t7 S. Air Farce is flying irterdictior: MiSSiO in Cambodia. These interdiction Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE to their country, but they also know?and this is most important?that they have the support of the American people as expressed In the overwhelming vote of the United States Congress in favor of military assist- ance to that country to help themselves in their defense. "In short. the United States is fulfilling its pledge under the Nixon Doctrine to assist our friends and allies, but not become in- volved in ground combat. This is really a case of ground combat personnel, no; mili- tary assistance, yes. It is a case of manpower, no; but assistance, yes. . . . Q. ". . . In June of 1970, Mr. Nixon and others in the White House indicated that there would be an end to combat air sup- port and our logistics support directly in Cambodia once our troops on the ground had left there. This policy seems to have changed In recent weeks. Can you explain what this change in policy is?" Secretary Laird: " . . the President said, I believe on June 30, that air support would not be used or not necessary during the termination of those sanctuary operations. This was a correct statement, because the South Vietnamese Air Force at that time felt that they could perform the air support that was needed and necessary to finish up those sanctuary operations prior to the rainy season setting in, which of course terminated that phase of the Cambodian operation as far as the South Vietnamese were concerned. "We did, however, use air power in Cam- bodia, and we have continued to use it, al- though it was not directly related to the South Vietnamese sanctuary operation. We have continued and as the President said in that same statement on June 30, he said we will conduct with the approval of the Cam- bodian Government?I am paraphrasing this?air operations against enemy forces as they move supplies and personnel through Cambodia towards South Vietnam and re- establish their sanctuary areas. "I don't want to get into a semantic prob- lem here of what this mission is called, or that mission. I have always called it 'air ac- tivities,' 'air support' as far as Cambodia is concerned. and I don't care to get into a question of semantics on that. We will use air power, and as long as I am serving in this Job, I will recommend that we use air power to supplement the South Vietnamese forces, as far as the air campaign in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. . . . "The South Vietnamese will be in a posi- tion, as the Cambodians will be in a better position. The South Vietnamese are acquiring the air capability, and the movement that we've made with the transfer of well over 300 helicopters in this last year, I think is significant progress. The progress we are mak- ing as far as the fixed wing aircraft is con- cerned is important. But we are going to supplement as far as air power is concerned. "I don't want anyone to leave this room with any other understanding. I have out- lined that to the Congressional committees. We have this authority. It was spelled out clearly in the Congressional legislation which passed. The authors of the amendments which limit ground combat activities, which I support, and which I will see are lived up to by this Administration and by the Depart- ment of Defense. "We will follow those Congressional man- dates. But as far as air and sea activities, the law is very clear that as far as the sanctuaries or as far as protecting the Vietnamization program, protecting American lives, insuring withdrawal, all of these terms are written very emphatically and clearly into the Con- gressional legislation, which passed in this last session of Congress. We will abide by those Congressional mandates and we are living within those Congressional mandates today.. . . "... supplemental air power has been used to supplement the forces of South Viet- nam . . . the vas,, maiority of all of the supplies that moved MLO III and IV Corps did originate in 'hal area near the Port of Sihanuokwhe This route to the sea is important, and every effort will be made to see that it eannot he used as far as a supply route by the enemy. "The South Viel daniese contrary to some reports went into this area on the ground, and there hat. been seine airlift within the area, which both Lee south Vietnamese and the United States have provided. There has been air support 110w ii by the South Viet- namese, the Carrtiodinos and `the United States Air Fen ces. I consider this an import- ant use of ftil POA,O.r. :111d believe that it is important to see :hal. the logistics supply routes and the reilocking of the sanctuaries be made as difficult; as possible during this very important dry seii,;on . We have re- cently received a avrrabie vote, an over- whelming vete if-nrn ne House and the United States Senate to support a military assistance program lot Cambodia. . . Q. "Mr. Secretate , von are talking about the Nixon Doctrine and Voll are talking about material assistance have you broadened it by saying It a,so includes air assistance and seapower assis.,ance?" Secretary Laird: " We are making it Clear . that our assistance will be in the way of material: vial be maintained in the form of sea and air power but that we do not place the reliamte on the commitment of ground combat fon es I eat the previous ad- ministration die in this tires,. Q. "Are you iavin ?; that the Nixon Doctrine only preclude:- the use of ground combat forces, period?" Secretary Laird: "The Nixon Doctrine ap- plies to building up the strength of our allies in that area .Lnd. performing the needed and necessary support requirements in order for us to maintain an adequate deterrent as we move towards nence in that area, and it does place the emphasis Le the idea of partnership and strength Q. "Does that mean an open ended com- mitment to all nountries of the Southeast Asia with the exeentien that no combat ground troops win a- .0n-emitted there? Secretary 1,airci " the emphasis Shifted away horn tee reliance on American ground combat forces We're not, using any ground combat forces in Cambodia. And I Can assure you that we will not. Q. ". Does this mean that there might be other ground ferees ,etroduced? Second- ly, does the Nixon VirrontRtratiort feel that no matter what has been said at one time, that it has no right to ehaege its mind and take a different stet) if tee exigencies of the situation demand it lout it is not outlawed by Congress?" Secretary Laird: nink it is important that we maintain our reeltionships as clearly ELS possible and live within the Congressional mandates that we have and we are doing that . . . We ate gime do our best here in the Department of Defense and within this Administration o feffaire that this mili- tary assistance prop's II will be carried out as effectively and a, efficiently as possible. "This will reisiiirs ..irse that we audit the delivery of equialec I and ammunition under the milli ary Les, amae program . . . that audit re ;r..on- , will be carried out by our Ili lt ..'!.iipment delivery teams . . we will he in delivery assistance teen s at a If ry minimum level. I think yon !),',.1 iff Cod that the Gen- eral Accounting Office w f have more people checking it the we lot he-sure we are mak- ing an all-out effcte, if, keep the military presence, as far La tlis 'VI!! f-irv delivery teams are concerned r) 11, 31,, hire minimum. Q. "Mr. Secretary is o your contention that if anyone it, irp, at the use of helicopter guwhifis end nr other aircraft, which appear to be triei,, ling close air sup- port, that they did 1 Ot ,,tiersan-nd properly S539 what you and Secretary Re a said in your appearance on the 11111 WI a some people got the impression that wit ,,ou were say- ing is that you planned to C ee or sharply limit or indeed even ban the i lerican use of close support air power to getting us involved deeper in Canibodif: ' Secretary Laird: "As I hi e ,aid here be- fore, I don't want to get ie ) -lie semantics over what we call it I in e .:ailed it 'air support.' It's to stop the n I Lnent of per- sonnel; to stop the moven t of supplies; to put a halt to enemy buil L. is and to give the kind of air and logistics rport that are needed and necessary where : c. South Viet- namese forces cannot sup ei it for them- selves and the priority first L to the South Vietnamese forces to use th m jr asset and, as they are acquiring more L ii more, they will have more and more fonsibility in this area. ". . . If you will read ovt 1.e "Meet the Press" statement, witri all s apologies to you, in which I was of, a pre to with Sena- tor Church and Sem tor C loll, you will find that both of them in 1 erpreting the most restrictive language th lad been pro- posed . . . indicated . . tit . hat language did not limit air support. Q. "Mr. Secretary .. . is It dr inference to conclude that if the Soul aetnamese in any operations get in over ti ,4 heads in the area of transporting troop r supporting them with firepower Tt'om air, that we will help them out?" Secretary Laird: ".. . I th I !.?ou will find that we did not give air sup' r as the tuary operations closed up i, far as the South Vietnamese were cot e ned, but we were flying air operatiens in a ebodia, Laos, South Vietnam. I thnk tl must be a misunderstanding on the pa r,at some over the number of sorties. The n 'a her of sorties being flown at the present in the last two months, or compared s t the sorties flown during the summer of a t year, there were more sorties flown last s. n riser than are being flown today in Cambod the situation Is such that we have de-esca r the war... Q. "Mr. Secretary, have v art ourselves committed to the defense t nmbodia, to the point that if it anpearc lout to fall because of its importance is continua- tion of the Vietnamieation 'ogram, you might have to consider gel 2 to Congress and ask permission for them Ise American ground combat troops in Ca' I ,dia. Secretary Laird: "No, the - ire no such plans. The situation it, firs- e are going to make every effort to see ti t 'his military assistance program, wl ich v a loproved by such an overwhelming vote. . iccessful as far as Cambodia. "Secondly, and I wil' repe els, we will not?and I repeat it again, in commit U.S. ground combat forces to Ca; I elia directly or indirectly. "In the third place, as Cambodia is concerned, we are sapper the ARVN in Cambodia with air activ a; which are designed to prevent the reel t lishment of the sanctuary areas and the stic supply routes into those sanctuary a "It is obvious, I think, the - ese air and logistic activities help all e le friendly ground forces as far es Cmi: .ita is con- cerned. But the primer.' ernr t _a, as far as we are concerned and s-;. far or Govern- ment is concerned, is that th being car- ried on as part of the ce?erall et to inter- dict and to stop the now mae emy forces which would have an cpport' to attack U.S. personnel stationed in Vi sm. "I recognize that there f hose that criticize this position which I ^ and which is the position of the Admi .atiaa. But so long as I am Secre;,ary q'ense and have this responsibility, I wou ouch rather endure the criticism than ? permit the enemy by an uninhibited ft a ef supplies and personnel to be in a posit, LI where they Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 S :#40 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CON GR I NE RECORD --- SEN E January zo, Jo, I could ientee, i ties anu attacks on Amex:I- -ea!: isl Itary personnel as we continue, as we C011t,1111.1e LO remove Americans from South Vieet "You haven't said what we would do taint:a:ha male. Mr, secretary. earE tare Laird: "I don't anticipate that Ca :abodia will fall if our military assistance pa teram is successful. This is a critical period, as I have said earlier, When you go from 30.,,ed to ever 200,000 in the military force, k,ave Cue will, they have the desire to 3tiet L tile enemy, the invaders from the Nearth. I aro confident that they will be sue- ui in 61.,eir efforts. But I want to make earn:Ian civ evident to you, Bill, tnat there in no ground ferces involved and there will aoi noah forces involved. qr. Secretary, as I read the President ea:, Jule ad, he would permit interdiction au ...tatty it Cambodia after the withdrawal of ,:mr troops, but would preclude both close I >pat t and logistic support. As I understand you say that close support and lett:Pith: support however described, are now p oil ted. erFitary Lanci: "I don't use those terms. .1X :Mout air support. have always talked a" it air support. t,-). 'That kind of activity, however de n: bed, is permitted by two things: One, a definition of what the Nixon Doctrine is ically all about: and, two, the fact that the Ceogress Mein t preclude this kind of activity it t Vo-:,ing a supplemental and restricting ground comoat activity?" tteggetary Laird: ''You are correct in both ea. The Congress did not preclude this, aiid I, hats always been anticipated by me -ii al,3f my testimony that air support would used, -laic use ol rielicopter gun ships and the it, ..irovemente :.hat we have made in the last the helicopter gun ship has been portant It s been much more effectively and some of the other gun ships are aeb snore effective than they were a year av.ia; far as stepping logistic movement. . . .. 'Do yatu anticipate that this commit- :tact of air support, as you put it generally, eiing to he nh-permanent or for the next years"?' getary Baird: "No, I don't. As a matter e ? fttet, inst we are In this period when the Cembodialia are building up their military gth and they are going forward with et tirogram and have made what I believe toed progress for a short six months. tar aSt he Phase II of the Vietnamiza- program which I have discused with all ye- you many times, that program does take thaii the turn over of the ground eerehat reimorisibilities because of the train- halie utvolved. But the South Viet- eemeee oe in a position where they will ?- have ce eall on additional assets in the - LAD luture. 1ori-t -vane to give the number of months atuoteet of time that's involved in eat, beta:Ise we are not making forecasts ? p !ojeo tons in this department as long ?t. :nu -tie-irridiry of Defense. We make cer- e,iti stia temen ts and we deliver on them, but :41 not :waling up some target goals that- - can't il.diiver on. I can assure you that the gee'ees is with that training. As far as wina aircraft is concerned anci as far tarv ittritaft, the South Vietnamese are =,t1 sisiteLtig good progress. -Does rte letter and the spirit of your ,i late .r,tit the Congress and from the indiude U.S. ground forces in Cam- i widen are not combat troops? In other woMil your mandate permit the send- a ,,t, turn ,shications unit or a held hospi- lit which is not directly cam- . ,:rctaly leiird: "So far as the law is con- e:ellen, it woulh not prohibit that. It does not ,,e e terse military assistance delivery team:, does a it prohibit seas ea aim rose , opera e einrit and the letter of the law woul - be 10. wed and you could do the things the: you 1 et imed I don't want to give the that we have plans to go beyonte the I ntary delivery teams whieb we wIt have -;,ipervisin ; the programs. Q. !low many et those will be ,nvolvec Se, tatt-,ary Laij d: -The number of people Q. 'sea, sir Secret ary Laird "The number of people Ii volteti :it the jaresent time in military de liver - don't Mild me to this too closelv. three 1e- four on either side, give me a litt leeway is 12 Q. AS the let:gelation is drawn lie you a: discue fag it. d you consider yourself pre - eluded from operating, say, divisaen or ree - men :al level act:tie:ors, to the Cambodians al, the -"loath ale ;Lam ese operating in Cas - bodi:- - Set retary Lai 'd: Q, Q. "Mr. Secretary, how much more a r power are we lirepared to use in Cambuc Ibidtile present itt els'?" Secretary Litra: I would (loam that wouel get up t( the level os last year, but a a coOl'I don't want to be in a position putteig a sortie lunitation as fir as Ow: - bodhe if that s what you atant. am 1.1, goine to do that. Because I have told Ge, - eral Abrams that I want nira to do eves - thing lie can to continue to keep Americe,i casu,-Ities Q ? Mr. Secietary. does that mean ti there ere no 1r hibitions of any kind on I t use t?.,1 American air power in CamOodia?' Se atetary Ls rd ? "I don't care to discii s the eperating orders I have never discuss t d the aierating orders which 1 have approN. in Sill Lance. I can only say tc, you that th,--e are certain, protections written into the e orders, there are certain controle that . e writ cil into tlf3se orders.- Emphasizes that aged Americana use on less than half the income of those under age 65, despite the stopgap 15- percent social security increase of DP- comber 1969.. Report's that a new group of aged poor may be n the making among those now 55 to 59, because one ,out of every six men now in that age group will be out of the work force by the time he reaches his 65th birthday if present trends continue. Points out that so-called older work- ers?those 45 years or older?are hard hit by current unemployment. Since Jan- uary 1969, the number of jobless men in this age group has jumped from 596,000 to 1,017,000. The report says: Their unemployment lasts longer than that of younger workers, and the older person has greater difficulty in finding work at the same pay level after a prolonged layoff. Descrbes the problem of the elderly homeowner who finds it increasingly difficult to pay property taxes, including one woman who paid more than half of her total income of $1,958 for taxes and a special assessment. Household costs take about 34 percent of the average re- tired couples budget. Criticizes the forthcoming Mores se, from $5.30 to $5.60 a month, in the medi- care part B premium. The report says that the average health bill in fiscal year 1969 was $692 for a person past age 65, six times that for a youth and 21/2 times that for persons from 19 to 64. Medicare pays less than half of the total medical care costes a the elderly. Warns that inflationary pressures are especially severe on elderly homeowners because of the direct relationship be- tween the local property tax and high- cost local government services. Among the recommendations made in the report were the following: That Congress speedily enact the :so- cial security amendments adopted by he Senate; modified to include the House- passed provision for financing cost- of- living increases. That the 92d Congress gives early at- tention to major changes in social secu- rity benefit levels that are needed to pro- vide meaningful economic security for those who retired and to assure that workers retiring in the future will real- ize their full stake in retirement security. That serious consideration be given to the use of general revenues in the financing of the social security program. with the share identified through a for- mula spelled out in the legislation.. That the Federal commitment to the elderly undertaken through the Family Assistance plan be translated into a whole-hearted corainitment, with 100 percent Federal fiaancing and Federal administration. Turning to private pe:nsions, the com- mittee recommended that immediate at- tention be given to the special problem of safeguarding the retirement income of workers who lose their jobs as a result of plant shutdowns, commonly after long service and who?like the deteriorating . plants that are first to be shut down? are likely to be middle-aged and older. That the 92d Congress give prompt consideration to legislation?establishing an Institute on Retirement Income. The "ECCeNOMIC El OF AGING" REP01-: 1' PRESENTS GRIM FACTS Nee_ WILL P MS. Mr. President, Sen ite Special Committee on Aging Is: wition recent days, released a rep, st called "Economics of Aging: Toward a Ful' Share in Abundance." Tnet repent follows a 2-year inqu, dune which the committee took me ce thao 2,000 pages of testimony and e lath] ahdition, the committee re- ceis iin eight working papers or :inforn. ton sheets peepared by task forces or L d1171.:ilsal nut! or;. I: es no exaggeration to say that Hie committee effort is the most .searcheig con eressiona: evaluation of what mie ht be elled the oersonal economics of agte.g. Our goal wes to show exactly what is ha seeming tc, individual older Americei who inust ateempt to live on inadeque,:e, fife'e. income while expense:; of daily Ly- ing steadily rise. The committee ts.ok mc j..1 testimony, not only from authe tot e expert but from the elderly the:a- sel 'es. Our firril renort includes extene. ye eat ':'pts frem the testimony of b,,th sumnisr.ze very briefly, the reps, st: la,elares t..-eit poverty increased among 65-- Has Americans by 200,000 between 191,e and 1969, and by 12,000 for th fse from ages 10 to 64, or ail other 'Age firel ins, poverty declined by 1.2 million s Amer cans are twice as likely as :o,!tiler persons to be poor: 4.8 mil eon 65 -plus indiaiduals were living in pole-sty in 1069, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 28, ihriproved Fomme2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 utttsNIONAL R WORD SENATE rounding the world became seriously harmed by thick, noxious clouds of pol- lution. Toxic pesticides and detergents, oil slicks of frightening proportions, un- controlled waste and effluent spoiled and destroyed our rivers and lakes. Eminent biologists warned us that the precious oceans might be devoid of productive sealife in 50 years at the present rate of pollution. This policy of trading away the future for the luxurious and easy present led us, perhaps by default rather than by design, to a point where we found our- selves, in the words of Pete Seeger, "standing knee deep in garbage, throw- ing rockets at the moon." The issues comprehended within the Genocide convention are almost always associated with threats or breaches of international peace and security because of armed conflict. Yet the threat posed by an environmental catastrophe is just as serious as that posed by genocide or war. The right to a decent, environment is protected by the United Nations in its Declaration of Human Rights. Both are vital to preserving human liberty and freedom. Each day as we read the newspapers, we hear of one more animal being placed on the endangered species list; one more lake or ocean being ravaged by oil; one more timberland being cut to ribbons by the menacing jaws of the lumber indus- try. We hear of watersheds and grass- lands, owned by the public, being de- stroyed by the hooves and teeth of flocks of sheep. One Member of this body de- scribed this tragic state of affairs as buying "environmental disaster on the national installment plan." Again and again, we hurl crude clubs against the fragile web of life on earth. Again and again, we dismiss the warn- ings of eminent biologists and scien- tists. One-third of the world's original forests are gone; over 280 million acr of crop and range land have been de- graded in our history as a country one-third of our 9 inches of preciou I a Ii es tional cooperation is necessary to p vent genocide and ?reserve human di nity and freedom vet it is also extremely important, to prevent enviro mental destruction, The challenge bei ore us is one of ep proportions. All the talent, resourc and energy of mansand will have to harnessed if we are to restore the heal of Mother Nature. It reauires not onl a reordering 01 priorities, but almost total change in national outlook a thinking; it requires a concern for t quality and not quantity of life: a s ciety that conserves resources and do not consume them at hizarre rates; society that values its environment something more precious than all th trinkets o consumerism : a people th cherish all life, animal or human. Th environmental crisis a Ilbrds us, ironica ly, the opportunity to engage in fa reaching intern at:lo ne] cooperation , t harness the common concerns of man kind for a healthy, 1101 and dignifie life. Nations who one oelv spoke to eac other with weapons, can open dialo of international concern over the de struction of the environment. Tt is to th hope of international cooperation tha the Genocide Convention sneaks; it is t this dream of r nein. ind that we mus address ourselve; We cannot spook ( f re-eventing geno- cide and preserting human dignity and freedom and ignore the threat of en- vironmental suicide The challenge of preserving man's health and that of Mother Nature addresses itself to the question of how tar man can use knowl- edge and human re, mirees in shaping his destiny. For top rr a nv veers we have stood aloof from this ritieition as regards the Genocide Convent on T hope the Sen- ate will act on the Gencir rite Convention at the earliest poseible oneertuniy. S 461 re- battlefield in South Vietnan ir another g- in Cambodia and Laos. Jus s we seem so to be vacating one area eierations n- where military success wa rapossible, we are plunging hip deep s a worse ie place. es, The political stabiliy oi rabodia is be far less than that we mans i to bring th into being in South Vietni :/ Any in- ? volvement in Cambodia brii about al- a most immediate intertwinen in Laos. nd Military ability of this inner v r of Indo.. he chineses states is as lacking a l ieir polit- e_ ical stability and institution es We are plunging into the .1 crior of a a vast area replete with more i= raphical as obstacles than South Vietna -I Virtually e impenetrable jungles lenge( at ranges. Diseases medicine ha, e heard of. Wildlife that preset- dangers to troops. Is this Sf r_ our decade-long involvemer O Vietnam not taught us irnytl- _ doomed to repeat past mists d Mr. President, as the mint/ h deteriorates, we are faced wi a, predictable timetable. All-on _ by our forces has not &Howe bodians, even with substai t Vietnamese military aid. to fi topsoil has been washed away. The iri- dustrial nations of the world, like hungry beasts, scour the earth to sat- isfy their rapacious appetites. In the board rooms of giant corporations, de- cisions are made that vitally affect the life of millions and the health of Mother Nature herself. In this decade, it would be wise for us to ponder what it means to go to the moon and still have millions starve; to transplant human hearts, yet continue to refuse "medical aid" for the environ- ment; to travel to Paris a little faster in a giant boondoggle SST, yet find it im- possible to travel to work easily and cheaply; to have instant replay for mil- lions of TV viewers, yet find our priceless wilderness areas vanishing from sight, impossible to bring back by any techno- logical feat. It is clear that international coopera- tion on an enormous scale is an impera- tive if mankind is to avert ecological catastrophe. With the ratification of the Genocide Convention, we can take a much needed step toward building a body of international law?a prerequisite for international cooperationi. Interne,- mountain -ely even ncounted ble? Has la South a 2 Are we v ituation an easily : ir action he Cam- South C: the mili- tary tide. Deepening nivolt ent can only drag us in on the grout-. Reports of an airlift ea Them -,ops into southern Laos adds another r a. nous as- pect to this total picture. lie Red Chinese have a substantial m: 1 try pres- ence in that area. A road ha: 1 'en built from the Chinese border acrr s much of Laos. Thousands of Red Chi r troops are in segments of Laos, gut r rag that artery. If our surrogates the ' s s, come with 1 oe back I 'eater of aerican if these may be into actual contact ai.d co these Red Chinese troops, w them? Will we open up anothe war against Red China Tin , people have a right to kncr Zazuations and the decisi, tl sked to make. I feel strongly that we she! c -lot ex- change one arena of futile / eat for another at may prove even r we use- less and draining. Congress a. spoken firmly against commithant , e Indo- chinese interior of America.n I r rss. The administration can and must s :ilia this solemn drawing of lines. hay - desire to see more billions of doll: -: hurled away into the teeth of an all- turning Asian wind. Those boys are ne here, Those dollars are despei a tely tired at home?in a thousand cities an ,wns. I am not a peace-at-any-p; Mem- ber of this body. Yet there is at a con- sideration as the exercise of e lantary commonsense. America's people want an e Go our massive involvement in South I Asia. Arms and training for out ante : le well and good. But another Vietnal ' elever. --17? 'ffets7Ve YET ANOTI IP P. Cn. (MIRE? Mr. MONTOY.a Mr -13,-esictent it is ncreasingly obvious that thr situation in ambodia is deteriera tine alarmingly in ilitary terms. The te ration's armed orces are unable to cape with the mill- ary situation. Much. if not most, of its erritory is under effective Communist ontral. Phnom Penh, tee capital, is in virtual state of siefe es vital supply nes are choked off is 'useless to deny he actuality of i slip) In retrospect, itailitainns of American strike forces into the so-called sanctu- aries last year have pr'01.7(s11: to be futile from a military viewncinr_ Our efforts to assist the Cambodians to defend them- selves seem to have erre/aea as a sterile exercise. Yet now it seeim t hat even more substantial American nee tary involve- ment is underway. As I read matters, this would be a twin mistiike Toirst, it is a violation of restrictions ipid upon such involvement by Bat of the Senate of the United States. Second, it is futile in a strictly military sense. We are throwing good resources after wasted ones. If such steps were useful in a political sense, I could see necessity for it Yeti it is not. We are again thrashing anout in the in- terior of Indochina, gaining.. no signifi- cant geopolitical Further, we are seemingly exci lararInc ,rtt. military LABOR UNIONS Mr. FANNIN, Mr. Preside,t labor unions hold awesome power in S ir Na- tion. Labor officials are virtual I_ eators in a number of industries. I am concerned about wh t these unions have done and are .c. ng to American business. Unreasoi ma de- mands have driven wages so Ii el as to wipe out many plants, busine ; and even entire industries. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 162 CONC RESSIU.NAL RECORD ? EN ATE January 0, 1971 nut more important is the fact that aiese powerful union leaders hold such anirer over the economic life and death et individual Americans. ( was; appalled that the Supreme Court ad the United States recently struck down a Georgia law authorizing a person to !iiet off dues checkoff at any time. It is un- reasonable to require a person to con- tinue paying union dues for a year or in re atter fie has declared his desire to rant a union. Another battle against unreasonable anima ...aewer has been launched by iseumnist - commentator William F. eickley, ?fa. He is challenging the Ameri- eeviesation of Television and Radio rtiste_ 'rhe Tuceon_Daily Citizen, in its Jan- tiny LO, till, editions, ran an editorial ,satceroing this suit. I ask unanimous itertsern that the editorial be printed in no Roeue Thera being no objection, the editorial teas ocaeja,a to be printed in the RECORD, leWS Braeetutz's BATTLE that William F. Buckley, Jr. has elertaken in attacking the constitutionality foreed limon membership has meaning for ail Americans. Tlec, hooular editor and columnist (whose ),...auron will begin appearing on this page next monda ) has sued the American Federation et 're E?eits.ion and Radio Artists. He charges union shop, of which he is an , ?vc,,iii)a,are member in order to moderate the weekly discussion program_ "Firing Line," r,e)itna II a, "form of vassalage." Mr. ;3)f ckley told a news conference that )(le ;rement that an individual pay dile; L.) a private organization in order to ).)e)rk es a modern writ of indenture, the ?ep;:ct zee. that he do the same in order tAprees an opinion over the public air- ways involves an act of coercion by a private rgani4at)on operating under government 'and fa et.' ? Bee:, use Arizona is a right-to-work state, )zetes are not subject to such coercion. Jul t ri it tai tely for Mr. Buckley, New York ':4 iiit,41.,2 of the 19 states that bans the ,.aoecti ma p. Tlea rient, to work simply means that an intli.,1)1da) has the right to join a union and careliare right to refrain from joining a amen )A,ii_ilout losing his job. It ) ; a right that should be in effect in .fvery t:r. Perhaps that will be the case if Mr. d ick..,ey succeeds in his suit. Bee HIALSe Mr. Buckley's suit claims that his c als;ttutional rights under the first, lift') a71,1 ninth amendments are being bre.):eied. its results could have nationwide imoate itaeVISED PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT ti ,PULAR ELECTION OF THE nt,ESIDENT Irk finlY1.1. Mr. President, nothing is 15101? important to the confidence of the Artoeuean people and to the permanence and stability of our Government than the lust and equitable- selection of the r' 'a and Vice President. For 5 yours I nave fought for enactment of a. constitutional amendment allowing di- re 'L popular election of the President and Vice President. And in the 92d Con- e-ries:a am introducing a revision of my proposal for electoral reform, designed to maintain this vital principle while reroginaing the threat of electoral chaos w eon we riust avert before the '1'2 n evidential election. My revised proposal contains liree in al or features. First, the proposal would retain the fur damental principle of election direct- ly by the nxyple, the only system that is truly democratic, truly equitable, and ti lily reflective of the will of the m ijor- a. Second, the proposal eliminate- the fie titre of direct election which has provoked the most vocal, and ren sited csiticism, the runoff election. Instead, in ie unlikely event that no candidwe re- c yes 40 percent of the popular vol 'J.. the. President and Vice President would be !cted in the alternative manner Jirig- litany suggested by Senators Glt ? :1 Ty din gs. Third, because direct election J ould rejuire a 2-year period for the peasage , f implementing legislation after rati- ecation, il could not be in effect it time 15 prevent the danger of electoral mis- in 1972 Therefore, my propossd re- Helen lipflies the so-called autnnatic sn to any election during this :-year interval, eliminating the dangers - t the faithless elector and the archaic ani un- lencocratia procedure in elections de- aided by the Congress. Arthur Kroek wryly commenter: more then 20 -years ago: The road to reform in tie method ol boos- . A", the Presdents and Vice President: of the IThited States is :,ittered with the Nrecks ? previous ;attempts. For more than a century and half, Mr. Pres dent, we have recognized the eerils of s system that leaves the ,Jhoice of President to a group of independent cle.ctors--electors whose freedom 'o dis- regard the will of the people is presently atiarannext by the Constitution. We have nicegnized the inequities in a etheme that allocates all of a State's ejectoral votes to the candidate who wins a popu- lar vote plurality in that State, iegard- live of W ?-iether that plurality is c ne vote er 1 minion votes?a scheme, I should ;add, that is nowhere to be found in the a'onstitution itself. We have rectionized tile grave risks that the popular will of the people can easily be thwarter' either by the strange arithmetic of the ?1,?ctoral .7,7stem or by the mischievous iejeds of a handful of power brokers. Having long recognized these abvious inadequacies, we have yet to correct 'Why? Because repeatedn in the last we have failed to achieve agreement ? Lo tli? most desirable route to reform. For that matter, there has alw lys been near unanimous agreement as to '.tie need referm. but never before h s there been a n.ationai concensus as la what specific type of reform was needee. Tadao we have that elusive eational concensu.s. That is why now is he best time to reform. In February 1966, Mr. Presiesnt, the American Bar Association estateished a special commission on electoral: reform. As sonic Members of this body will re- call, the American Bar Association, with a similar commission, was very helpful to us in preparing the groundwora for the consideration of the 25th amendment, and :I thought it would be heltaful, and indeed it has proved to be very helpful, for the bar association to appoint an- other such commission to help us with this different constitutional problem. The commission was composed of dis- tinguished political scientists, lawyers, legal scholars, public officials, and other leaders from every section of the coma- try and reflecting various political views It studied the present electoral system and considered all of the various pro- posals for reform After an extensive 10- month study, the commission concluded that: The existing electoral system is archaio. undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, in direcl and dangerous. The bar as focation's blue-ribbon commission further concluded that While there mal be no perfect method ))!' electing a President, we believe that direct. nationwide popular vote is the best of )ill pos- sible methods. It offers the most direct and democratic way of' electing a President and would more accurately reflect the will of time people than any other system. In urging the abolition of the present electoral system and replacing it with direct popular election, the commission foreshadowed an emerging national con- census on the Question of electoral re- form. The Harris and Gallup polls have shown, for exact pie, that 78 percent and 81 percent of the American people, re- spectively, favor direct popular election. The extent of this feeling, it is important to note?is nationwide?and fairly evenly distributed throughout the country. To quote excerpts from one of Mr. Gallup's polls, the figures reveal that 82 percent of the people in 'the East, 81 percent in the Midwest, 76 percent in the South, and 81 percent in the West think direct popular election is both desirable and necessary, lfri addition, direct popular election has been publicly endorsed by a unique and formidable array of national organiza- tions, among them the American Bar As- sociation, the chamber of commerce, the AFL-CIO, he United Auto Workers, the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Small Business Association, and the League of Women Voters?indeed a rather prestigious group of organizations representing' broad philosophical and nationwide support. For years, one of the arguments often raised against direct popular election was that it could not be ratified by the legis- latures of three-fourths of the States. In fact, even a few direct popular election supporters, including the late Senator Estes Kefauver and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, were deterred from push- ing it becauee of their doubts as to whether direct election could be ratified. In 1966, the distinguished Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Buitoicx) dra- matically refoted this argument by poll- ing 8,000 State legislators and finding that of the 2,500 who responded, nearly CO percent favored direct election. The results, once, again revealed very little variation from State to State. More re- cently, Senator GRIFFIN polled 4,000 leg- islators from the 27 States thought most likely to oppose direct election?and 64 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 January 27, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL Ritt )RD - SENATE ment of U.S. Forces from Sowthe to aid in the release of Americo prisoners of war. On December 28 the Semite (.1 the conference report because another proviso added in conferei TRIBUTE TO THE LATE SENATOR RUSSELL Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, although I did not have the pleasure of serving with the late Senator Richard B. Russell, I was very much aware of the significant role he played in guiding our Nation during the past four decades. My father served with Senator Russell and was, in fact, a member of the Armed Services Committee when it was chaired by our late colleague from Georgia. My father always spoke of him in the highest terms, describing him as a man of great strength, fairness, competency, and above all great dedication to his State, to his Nation, and to this Senate. Senator Russell dedicated his life to the cause of constitutional government at home and unquestioned military strength broad. His constancy in the pur- suit of these goals made him a pillar of strength to six Chief Executives. Those of us who are new to this body have been denied the opportunity to serve with a great Senator and a great American. LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF THE RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO gaija0DIA Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, in view of recent developments in Cam- bodia, I think it would be helpful to Senators and readers of the RECORD to have available a summary of the some- what complicated legislative history of the restrictions passed by Congress last year concerning U.S. involvement in Cambodia. I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD two memo- randums, one setting forth the most sig- nificant actions on the Cooper-Church amendment and the second summariz- ing actions concerning the prohibition on U.S. financing of South Vietnamese or other forces in actions in support of the Cambodian or Laotian Governments. There being no objection, the memo- randums were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO THE COOPER-CHURCH AMENDMENT I. FY 1970 DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL On December 15, 1969, Senator Church of- fered an amendment as a substitute for an amendment offered to the Defense Appro- priation bill by Senators Cooper and Mans- field. The Church amendment, as modified, read: 'Sec. 643. In line with the expressed in- tention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand." It was adopted by a vote of 73-17 and the Cooper-Mansfield amendment was subse- quently adopted by a vote of 80-9. It FOREIGN MILITARY SALES BILL-H.R. 15628 Following the President's decision to send U S. military forces into Cambodia, Senators Church, Cooper, Aiken and Mansfield intro- duced an amendment to H.R. 15628 designed Debate on the bin began in the senate on May 13 and endea on Julie 30 after the amendment, with ceri sin cnanges, was adopted 58-37. The conenonielita offered to it, and the action takei, in them, were as follows: 1. Cooper--Rewrite of Lilo prearYlOAtiar lan- bill was returned to the conferen guage; adopted 82-1) on May Sb. tee. It was reported from conte' 2. Dole-Make amendinee I. inoperative if on December 29 after deletng bc. President determines POW', were being held viso and "Cambodia" fron. cove in Cambodia; rejected 3e-54 un June 3. amendment, thus leaving i lie ter 3. Byrd of W. Va.-Al:ow President to re- adopted in the FY 1970 Defense tam U.S. forces in Camoodot ii he thought tion Bill. In the meantime, t it necessary to prol eel; toe oves of American Church amendment to the Si forces -defeated 47-50 i,n one fl. Foreign Assistance Bill was as 4. Mansfield-No iinnugnifig of the Con- December 22. stitutional powers ./1 Da foesident---adopted Iv. SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN A& 91-0 on June 11. AUTHORIZATION BILL- -1-I.R 5. Byrd of W Va --13.elating to the Con- On December 13 the Commit/ .5 adopted, stitutional powers of toe President as Com- without opposition, an arnendn to the mander-in-Chief -adopted '79-b on June 22. Supplemental Foreign Assiatanc/ Ithoriza. 6. Javits-Relating the Constitutional tion Act, proposed by Senat Cooper. powers of the Congress-- ariopted 73-0 on Church, Javits, Case, and Man: which June 26. prohibited sending U.S. groin. 'crops or 7. Griffin-To permit s to pay for for- military advisers into Caanbodi second eign military advisers arm mercenaries in amendment, sponsored primarily r Senator Cambodia--rejected 45-50 (a. June 30. Javits, specified that ani U.S. i should 8. Jaekson--Allowing air activities if not be construed as a commitme .) defend not in "direct' support. oh Cambodia,- Cambodia. The text of the two odments adopted 69-27 on Julie ace follows: The text of the Couper-clirirch amend- ..sec. 6. (a) In line with 1.1 rxpressed =Lent, to H.R. 15628. ak. ha.,,r,ea by the Sen- intention of the President of United rite, was: States, none of the funds auth/ or ap- "Sec. 47. Limitations on United States In- propriated pursuant to his o . ny other volvement in Cambodia.----in concert with Act may be used to finance t. ,/ mtroduc- the declared objective:, of the President of tion of United States ground ai at troops the United States to avoid the involvement into Cambodia, or to provide t ed States of the 'United States Camoodia alter July advisers to or for Cambodian Sr. iry forces in Cambodia. "(b) Military and economic 9.1- ance pro- vided bsathe United States to C iodia and authorized or appropriated pur. ? r ot to this or any other Act shall riot be a/ .1- rued as a commitment by the United St, / to Cam- bodia for its defense." The amendment was not con Senate and the bill passed on The amendment was accepted I conferees--and both the Hea Senate agreed to the coo:fere/ e December 22. S 369 Asia or acid as reed to his and and the ..nnmit- .e again -,he pro- of the ? it was propria- Cooper- "mental o to on ; -(NCR 1, 1970, and to expedite the withdrawal of American forces from Cambodia, it is hereby provided that unless specifically authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds author- ized or appropriated porsuant to this Act or any other law may be expended after July 1. 1970. for the purposes of- " (1) retaining U nu hi,o les iorces in Cambodia; "(2) paying the compemation or allow- ances of, or otherwise supporiing, directly or indirectly, any Unitea Stales personnel in Cambodia who furnish military instruction to Cambodian forces Or engage in any com- bat activity in support of uambodian forces; "(3) entering 1111:0 or carrying out any contract or agreemen:. m provide military instruction in Cameo/nit or to provide per- sons to engage in any can, oat activity in sup- port of Cambodian ror. es, or "(4) conducting any (,,inbat activity in the air above Cain0000t le direct support of Cambodian force;." Subsequently, in view oi .111- passage of the order to authorize specifically Cooper-Church a menenie, i to the Supple- of Vietnamese or other Tree" mental Foreign Assisrait.,e mil, the amend- operations in the "sanctuary ; ment was deleted from 11 11,028 by the con- bodia. The Senate Armed Servo ferenco commit tee report on the bill stated. howe, was "... no intent to pm mit 1,1 In. FY 197 I DIF T1N ;OTT, ;1?; appropriations under this auti port Vietnamese and other fre The Defense Api ruprla Bill was in actions designed to provide amended by the ;ieviati Appropriauions Com- port and assistance to toe Ca mittee at the reque .1 Senators Cooper ernment." Senator Fulbright and Church to add Carnbouat to the prohibi- amendment to the bill t,-,/ carr tion against invellement or U.S. ground per- tent and to prohibit U.S. fin, sonnel in Laos and Thailand. The bill was such activities in Laos as va approved by the Sei4rte mi December 15, Fulbright amendment proil without any objection to Inds provision. The special allowances to foreign conference committee reported back with a than the rate of combat ray pa, proviso which made the eeetiOn read as fol- The amendment was odopte lows (proviso added ia s derence is under- ate without opposition on A lined) : was accepted without coange "SEc. 843. In hoe w ine expressed inten- conferees. The text of the tion of the President of toe United States, with the Fulbright amenda none of the funds appropriated by this Act follows: shall be used to finauce ihe introduction of "(a) (1) Not to exceed $2,801 to prohibit further U.S. involvement in Cam- American ground comeat troops into Laos, funds authorized bodia, except the furnishing of military aid. Thailand, or Cambodia: Provided, That noth- use of the Armed Forces of tlx and limited air action, without Congressional ing contained in thi, section shall be con- under this or any other Act approval. On May 11 the amendment was straed to prohibit the Pi esident from taking to be made available for tie adopted, with modification, by the Commit- action in said areas acsigned to promote the poses to support: (A) Vietnai teo by a vote of 9 to 5. safe and orderly twi/Buadya OT disengage- free world forces in support /id in the ember 16. .he House and the leport on SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATIVE H 1 ;IT OF THE FULBRIGHT AMENDMENT RI:LA : TO PAT - MENT FOR FOREIGN MILI i?ARY ATIONS IN CAMBODIA OR LAOS I. DEFENSE AITTHORIZATIO;s7 BD,' The Defense Authorize, ion B language carried in defense and appropriation bills in pre, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 - R. 1712:1 evised the ? borization r, years in I financing .rid forces of Cam- ? _ ommittee r 'hat there ;e of DOD ly to sup- , orld forces iitary sup- dials gov- r an It that ill- ag of any A secono , a paying ,ps greater ' S. troops.) ; the Sen- f: ost 21 and the House ire section Italicized ,,,000 of the on for the ? ited States t, authorized ? stated pur- .e e and other .1 Vietnamese 7;) Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CW-J7,RES:?:ION A FCORD - SF NA TE ;eree., d teral tercee In LaOS and Thailand: etr related costs, during the fiscal year et7t an mirth terms and conditions as the era of Defense may determine. None eeei mule appropriated to or for the use- -'erdied Forces of the United. States eerie tie used tor the purpose of paying any allowances per diem allowance, or eny ether addition to the regular base pay eerson serving with the free world )7e,e in south Vietnam if the amount of lea] nlvrnent would be greater than the aeeeet ,e special pay authorized to be paid iemivalent, period of service, to mem 'au Armed Forces of the United States on 310 of title 37, United States eer,dng in Vietnam or in any either i area, except for continuation of e dm-let-ire; of. such additions to regular base is ieed in agreements executed prior . a70. Nothing in clause (A) of the -0.-?c? of this paragraph shall be con- i.ialltori.?iing the use of any such ??itt, '0 ricpport Vietnamese or other free ,I' in actions designed to provide , port and assistance to the ai,,e 4 44 atimondia or Laos. ,? ??? -,? ' APPROPRIATION BILL-51,5. 1 959 0 eiefeiage in the authorization bill_ .e- neeeeing the funding of Vietnamese and. )reien. tomes, has traditionally been in the Defense appropriation bill also. The el bright amendment added to the au- reorizafton bill was not included in the Itouse version of the Defense Appropriation l3111, tI It 19590. If the language had not been earriett ,)ver from the authorization bill there -.1111( have been no practical restrictions on eee teet'enee funds to pay for Vietnamese or 'fat,' emerations in Cambodia or Laos_ At der:ever Fillbright's request, the restrictive la 11g1.1.:te was included in the bill reported by Se1e':,7 Appropriations Committee and no eldece 07 'NaS raised to the item on the Sen- iii': . .-rencp added a proviso to the late mete t which made it, read as follows oroviee edeed in conference italicized) : areeeeeied. further, That nothing in clause . or hrst sentence of this subsection tai eeneerued as authorizing the use of -I lids to support Vietnamese or -'rid forces in actions designed to eeldary support and assistance to eeerement of Cambodia Cr Laos: Pro- -, thee; That nothing contained in this be construed to prohibit sup- , Torld or local forces in actions promote the safe and orderly ? r disengagements of U.S. Forces 'at Asia or to aid in the release ns held as prisoners of war," . emee report, was rejected by the vote. on December 13 be- do; item and the addition of a III 'as mr, to the Cooper-Church amend- he second conference modified, but ttO, tn., ill ate, the proviso. After consider- ..eie uselon in the Senate about the .a,!tin;-:, and intent of the provision, the -ee -,,,reeee report was afTeed to on Decem- .. 'tele entire text of the section as eeeeel. wit's the revised proviso italicized, ?St,',r_fport of free world forces ? , Nlot to exceed $2,500,000,000 aipriations available to the Dc- "-'tense during the current fie- be available for their stated emend,: (1) Vietnamese and Id forces in support of Viet- 4-u' e (2) local forces in Laos and .ert or related posts, on such terms as the Secretary of Defense fie1,1' le ea . Toat none of the funds appro. hy in Act may be used for the pur- e:eying any overseas allowance. per wa:i.ce, or any otheraddition to the -e],e oav of any person serving with :he free emeld f)rees in South Vietni ,n if the .).mounr. ef such payment would be greaeer ,itan the -1.rnount of special pay auth,dzed to OP paid, 'Or' an equivalent period of service, -o trier/there of the Armed Forces oft.)e Unit- "5 fetes (ender section 310 of title Unit- ed States Cede) serving tri Vietnam c r in any 0-her hot: el!e fire area, eXcept for cc i;tintia- ! ion of peyenents of such additions -a- regu- ler base pee- provided in agreements f ,..nUted :etter Sr j ily 1. 1970. Provided furth., -, That t,hiij ia -,lanse ;11 of first sen .-;nce of tet eadise el ion shall be construed as eethor- , Thg the it of any auch funds to etpport e el.- other ftec world force.. in as- 'a,- date ailed to peevide military eipport eels) 411.57:.;51 Ince to the Government Ccam- or I. Ptorided further, Tho!- noth - ? eonere nee?. 1:n this section shall ?.? con- t y rohtOit support 91 actions ;itfuired it? 0isitre ;he safe and orderly withthlwal or eeigareete Of of ft S. Forces from So;- itheast or to aid in the release of ''cans ar .soee rs of war." ? T ,.T 3 A COMMU:';IST 71:7,ICE STATE ALLOTT, Mr. President, ti evi- &lice cart:rams to inaunt?steadil and fredictalry--that Chile is becom ng a ,minunist police state. The sad but undeniable fact that nem: President, the Corm amist ....1.1vador Allende, acts like a Comm .mist, meals the U.S. Government must vive high priority to high-level policy decisions about how we can isolate this hemisphefe s newest Communist dicta.- rship. recei t days a number of new, :stor- from Chile indicate Allende's deter- aation cc- establish conuriunism with otire. that, deliberate speed. For evam- on Jr nuary 10 the Baltimore Sun ca Tried a story by Mr. Robert A. Erland- sdn cone amp the establishment 4c so- (-Al led peoples tribunals in Chile. The tri- unals will judge the antisocial behavior f citizens who seem insufficiently en about the emerging dictato74up. on January 15 the New York Times c ?o.rried a story from Chi:e by Mr. Ju ..n de Oris, reuniting on the arrival in Chile of 7'1, Brazilian revolutionaries who had freed hi exchange for a kidnapped diplomat. It is obvious thar the ...luticnaries knew they would be afel- u-1?.0 in Cl lie, This must raise anx eties a.tiong Chile's neighbors. 2,1r. President, Allenele's behavie: in guiding Ch lo into the Communist t -drip ,1041 ey 27, 1971 Frein the Baltimore Sun, San, 10, 1971/ Crui.E's 'PEOPLES COURTS.' MAY BE A DANGER ? 'ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR.' WILL BE TARGET OP :LOCAL TRIBUNALS (By Roeert A. Erlanctson) R10 DE JereEnec.---Chile's Marxist president. Salvador Allende, has taken his first?and peehaps most potentially dangerous--step to- ward communizing Chile wish the announee- ment that "peoples tribunals" will be set up to judge "anti-scci-il behavior." Such tribunals, which amount to "revolu- tiorutry justice" or drumhead colirts-martiel. are point 38 of the 40-point "basic progrem of the popular unity government," which is Clule's new bible, and which calls for,",, Ii end to class justice." EMASCI7 LATER) P Y ITS. St However, they will merely establish utie class of justice for another, and from the traditionally Denmeratic Chilean viewpoint Will effectively emasculate the judicial sys- -t err. Sloth -peoples tribunals- have an historic:di record of permittnig personally vengeful de- nunciations, spying on one's neighbors, friends and family--an in the end giving the government a network of informers which al - Iowa near-absolute control of the population by fear. Those with the best political cormectione become the judges of their less influential countrymen, and the term -anti-social be- havior" has extensive, and potentially eve. ramifications. "People's tribunals" are the mark of total- itarianism, and the hand of Presider], Alle:ade's Communist supporters can be seer, In their creation. Although the Communists represent only one faction of hit six party popular unitt coalition, they are the best organized, dis- ciplined and financed, They also provide the- new president wide his ideological "braie truTs1-1,:e.- Communists, according to informed sources in Chile, controlled more than 80 per cent of the 8.000 "popular unity com- mittees' formed to work in the Allende, cam- paign. Immediately after the election, it was re- ported that new committees were being formed and that I-he Communists were ac- tively extending their control over the exist- ing ones, This then was a grass-roots netwerk of control which, in combination with the nes "peoples tribunals' should, within a feu years give the Coirununists an almost ull- breaka3le grip on Chile. With the court announcement was another of lesser importance, but nonetheless signi- ficant, that honoriacs such as ' excellency" and "your honor," traditional in Spanish- speaking countries will be abolished is arlditioitvfly depressing?if red un- President Allende and his cohorts refer to d:.r.5.--evicicnce of the extent to whic:i the the people and each other as "carnpanero"? which can be translated as companion?or Monroe Doctrine is a dead letter, dead "comrade.'" fisfal exposure to the weak and vac 1 hit- ii, policies of the early 1960's. leviollsie- there le little this Natior can or :nould da to influence the election.a in ail, her sovereign nation. But that L: not the issue. Calle has probably had its last nee election. Now the question is how to iselate the discs, cc that has infected nat 1)11 I/eric na tion r President, so that all Senators :an P0A.der the grim facts about Allen de's err tring despotism, I ask unanimaus co.asent for Mr.. Erbincison's and Mr de 01:1;?s ilium la a ting articles to be priifed in zife Recoan. "I'aere being no objection, the articles we ordered to be printed in the Rsc, MD, as fofiows [Prom the New York Times, Jan. 15, 19711 SEVENTY FREED BY Brtazre FOR ENVOY i',RRTVE JUBILANTL 2' IN SA NT [AGO (By Juan de Onisp SANTIAGO, CHme.--4.3eventy Brazilian revo- lutionaries, jubilant over their release from prison in exchange for a kidnapped Swiss diplomat, arrived in Chile today and were granted political as3;lurn. The leftist Chilean Government of Presi- dent Salvador Allende. Gossens, while giv- ing the Brazilians a warm welcome, took pains to prevent any statements by them that might offend Brazil s military Government. The freedom of the prisoners had beer, de- manded by the kidnappers of the diplomat Giavanni Enrico Bucher. He was ;abducted in Rio de Janeiro Dec 7_ Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 NEW ydeffravieagr Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP731300196R060300020005-2 WIII OVERSEE LONIBODIANW USE OF ARMS SUPPLIES Delivpry Teams Will Tour Countryside to Assure Proper Deployment ADVISORY ROLE BARRED But Pentagon Says Aides Might Show Allies How Equipment Works 16-Man Force It was described as an effort by the United States to make "end checks" of the rv.,arly $200-million allocated since last spring to the Cambodian military effort to defeat the Vietcong and North Vietnam- ese invaders. As authoritatively described Ihere, the program would in- volve at the start about American military men under Ithe jurisdiction of the Unite.:1 1States Ambassador, who wou!cl ;check on how effectively ..American military aid was be- ing used by the Cambodians. The Americans would have no authority to advise the _ Cambodians on how t use that equipment more effectively. the sources said. They asserted the program would not conflict with the Congressional prohi- bition against United States ground combat forces or advis- ers in Cambodia that was adopted last month in a $1 billion supplemental military aid bill. In fact, the sources asserted Congress would probably wel- come the program as a check on the deployment of United States military? aid in Cam- bodia. At present, they said. the United States has no wa of ascertaining what happen: to the American military equip. ment granted the Cambodians "We only know what tilt, Cambodians tell us," one high official said. The program would be centered in Saigon. ! seat of the United States mili tary command for Vietnam asi well as Cambodia and Laos.I The program would use the ac- counting facilities of the com- mand in Saigon while operatim; By RALPH BLUMENTHAL Special to The New York Times PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Jam 25 ? American officials have developed a program for a "military equipment delivers team" that would send United 1States military representatives through the Cambodian coun- tryside to check on deployment of American military equip- ment. Qualified American officials who disclosed the plans said the Americans "would not fall into an advisory role." [In Washington, a Pentagon spokesman said, however, that those military men work- ing out of the American Em- bassy in Pnompenh who turn over military aid equipment to the Cambodians might from time to time show them how it works.] Officials said the program was still being discussed be- tween United States authori- ties in Washington, Saigon and Pnompenh, but it was under- stood that plans were well ad- vanced and awaiting final American approval and agree- ment of the Cambodians, who have not yet been informed of the program. under the Ambassador. }mon- C. Swank, in Pnompenh through the office of his mili- tary-political counselor, Jona- than F. Ladd. Rapid Increase in Program The program was made necessary, officials said, by the rapid increase of the United I states military assistance pro- gram for Cambodia. When started last spring, shortly after the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk by Premier Lon Nol, the United States military aid prograrn totaled less than $9-million. It Approve Tyr iftWitehrtf by nS14-hiillion. otticrais sate tnere now was to accurate way of determining how the military equipment nought with that money was being used by the Cambodians. In anticipation of the pro- gram's start, the embassy's mili- tary political office under Mr. Ladd, former commander of ,pecial forces in Vietnam, has recently been increased from three to nine with prospects of adding seven more. Those Americans, described! as military men by qualified sources, would travel around the country wherever United states equipment was being sent to make sure the equip- ment reached the proper hands. Drawing a Fine Line Ihey would not be authorized to advise the Cambodians how to use the equipment, the sources said. However, they conceded there was a fine line between overseeing the use of the equipment in the field and .uggesting how it might be bet- ter employed. The 300-man program, the sources said, was "nothing" compared with the United States military advisory assist- ance program installed here since 1963. The sources said I the date for the start of the jprogram would probably be de- cided upon in the next few I weeks. Cambodian officials have for some time asked the American Embassy for an advisory pro- gram but they said they were always rebuffed by the Ameri- cans. Meanwhile, it was learned I today that the United states,1 had already flown in two heli- copters to replace two of the 1: four destroyed in the Fridayli raid on the Pnompenh airport. il Another two helicopters will i be flown in soon, authoritative sources reported. In addition, the sources said, I the United States will replace imost of the 15 aircraft de- stroyed in the attack. However, the - the replacements will come out of the $185-million military aid budget for Cambodia this fiscal year and thus. the Cambodians will have less funds for other military purchases. Pentagon ib Maeda/ to The WASHINGTC Pentagon spoly Friedheim, said gressional limit terpreted them. the sending of tary instructor so long as the signed as advise military units. Responding his daily new Friedheim sal States had no tablishing an A training progri But he said flu men working o can Embassy turning over m ment to the C; from time to -r e show them switch is." E !tense Melvin r Ars conference oade the first o the fact that ,tt were being if to oversee the v Ty of military id equipmen- o Cambodian; forces. He Mit would be ser sources later ,ins Stand ork 'Times L Jan. 25?A ? S 16384 Approved For immogy=pmr fpffliv_31499moo30002oo8i2oi, And the article reports that the Defense Department is going ahead with plans to expand MEDT?the Military Equipment Delivery Team?forces to 500 by the end of next year. According to Newsweek? There are signs that the military men al- ready in Cambodia are getting more directly involved in the fighting there. American heli- copters have reportedly begun transporting Cambodian troops into battle areas and sup- plying them with ammunition. And at Po- chentong Airport in Phnom Penh, U.S. forces recently opened a radio center (officially called a "navigation aid") to coordinate air support for Cambodian troops. But planned escalation is not confined to personnel increases alone. Although this year's aid program for Cambodia calls for $211 million in military aid, $110 million in economic assistance and $20 million in agricultural commodities for a total of $341 mllion--a net increase of $59 million over last year?the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently want another $52 million for military aid. According to a story in the New York Times October 13, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designed a costly program of "pacification" and other "unconventional warfare" for Cambodia, as well as ways to get more money to implement it than Congress is willing to authorize. According to the Times, the Joint Chiefs have devised a battle plan to out- flank the intent of Congress. According to this report the Chiefs offered four differ- ent ways of generating--on the sly?the additional $52 million they want: The first way would be simply to transfer $52 million from the economic aid program to military spending, which can be done later in the fiscal year simply by the Administra- tion's notifying Congress. The second way would be to use the economic aid fund for the purchase of all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military RS well as civilian value, thus freeing other mili- tary funds. A third way would be to increase procure- ment for the United States Army by $52 mil- lion and give the materiel to the Cambod- ians, for "repayment" later. The fourth way would be to make some exceptions in De- fense Department supply regulations, declar- ing additional equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians. Mr. President, if these reports are true, and past experience suggests that they probably are, it appears that the United States role in Cambodia is escalating significantly as more American dollars and more American personnel are becom- ing more involved in the war there. The pattern is all too familiar to re- peat: A tentative commitment becomes firm; a temporary presence becomes permanent; a limited role expands, and the executive branch of Governmeent cir- cumvents or ignores the advice and in- tent of Congress, if not the actual provi- sion of laws. And the unanticipated results, as we have found in Vietnam, can be disas- trous. Mr. President, the Senate will soon be making important decisions regarding the amount, scope, and type of aid to Cambodia when the Foreign Assistance Act comes to the floor. The Foreign Relations Committee has taken an important step toward limiting the scope of our growing involvement there by voting to impose a $250 million ceiling on military and economic aid and to limit the number of T.T.S. civilian and military personnel to 200. Since I came to the Senate in 1969, Congress has been attempting to restore the constitutional balance in the war- making power. Many Senators have rec- ognized that executive branch ability to snake war Unilateral y is a very real dan- ger to democracy As Senator Ram STEN- NIS stated the other day before the For- eign Relations Comnuttee while testify- ing on bills dealing with congressional war powers The President is lectid with difficult day- to-day decisions in the Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy and the temptation is great to rely upon the threat of military force against a parthailarly troublesome or recalcitrant opponent But he went on to point out: But the ccostit,itif,n has placed the re- sponsibility for deryol tIF whether or not that force is to be tiseo in the hands of the Leg- islative Branco_ Thus il is not only our right but our Constitutional duty to insist that the President obtain the sanction of' the Con- gress, the peoples- representatives, before he actually involves I i.e nation in war. Mr. President, it is clear that Executive decisions have shaped the course of the Indochina war and that an indifferent Congress provided little or no restraint on Executive actions. I recognize that some politicians will continue to prefer inaction or deference to the Executive in the exerciae of a policy that could re- sult in war. for scapegoats are often pop- ular in polities and the assumption of responsibility often is not. I feyerently hose that such failure to accept responsibeity is a thing of the past. If the renorts al Cambodia are true, as I believe they are it should be clear that current and planned executive branch actions could take us into another ill-advised military adventure. Congress has the ability to set wise lim- its on such dangerous Executive policy. The Foreign Relations Committee has given us a vehicle, in the Symington-Case amendment. for setting a proper limit in Cambodia. Mr. President. I am pleased at this time to yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE). The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized for '7 minutes. [THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE CEILINGS ON U.S. SPENDING AND PERSON- NEL IN CAMBODIA Mr. CASE. Mr President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me. I commend him for the remarks he has made and for the activities he has engaged in on this matter on several occasions in the past. He has been most helpful to the Senate and to the Nation M regard to the prob- lems we are facing here. I am happy that his remarks preceded mine on this sub- ject Mr. President the time has come for the United States as a. Nation to decide what to do about Cambodia. -EvL157ttAL_ 19, 1971 Recent press reports it ate what the Joint Chiefs of Staff fe.( oust be done if we are to bring about , nilitary solu- tion in Cambodia. The ri Chiefs' plan calls for a doubling of sr ary expendi- tures and almost a five I I increase in the size of the Cambodia rmy. Those are very disturb ii proposals. In no event, however, 1 'uld the fun- damental question of wilt I tr the United States becomes even more It eply involved in yet another Southeas jsian country be decided within the it: S etive branch under a veil of secrecy. I thought we had pa ally learned this lesson from our Viet] se experience, but the reports on the e tit Chiefs of Staff plans for Cambodst v ould seem to indicate the strong post o ilty that we may be about to repeat ? mistakes. My own view is that th erwhelming majority of Congress an. ee American people do not wish to rept the Vietnam example. We on the Foreign I bons Com- mittee have on several isions asked the Secretary of Defense f, r the 5 year plans for military Assist - it programs. We have always been re i ,1:1 access to these documents. It is indeed unfortunai hat we have to rely on leaks of secre ; apers to re- ceive the plans for Caml is. But con- sidering the vast scope the Joint Chiefs' proposals for that s ,tintry. I can understand why the Pen' on has been reluctant to expose its th 'II ing. The aid levels and force levels d a -ibed in the New York Times and c Washington Post are so large that it it A ificult to be- lieve they could stand Am either con- gressional or public -:crut: If the proposals of ti': Toint Chiefs were put into effect. Cam '0 ha would be turned into an armed Cl i e absolutely dependent on us for its stence. And this would not just he foi A year or two, but for the indefinite flu The Joint Chiefs project an expans i of the cur- rent 170,000 man Care c, ban armed forces, 863,000 by.1977. I country of less than 7 million people. would then be supporting a military e tablishment which would be the mot tional equi- valent of more than 5 mi i ( ri Americans under arms. It is of course the Ile the Cam- bodians to decide how la ii their army will be, but it becomes much our concern when the Americ 1 taxpayer is asked to pay the bill A i !.here is no question that the United I i. es would be paying virtually all the 4 e tit The war has left the Cambodia s themselves nearly without resources tong as the fighting continues, they v it be deprived of their three principal t1. eces of for- eign exchange: rice, rubbe .nd tourism. Moreover, as we found (a ti Vietnam, our other allies will do lit r if anything to share the costs. The Joint Chiefs In .1 er propose that we get involved at all e 'els of Cam- bodian society with pat fi !ation pro- grams, psychological war' it programs, and even unconventional e arfare pro- grams directed by the CIA ...gain, as we learned in Vietnam, these I .1 ds of Amer- ican supported programs tad to deep- er and deeper entanglemer Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CONGRE1ONAL RECORD ?SENTE - 19. 1971 ihey do dot have access to all the texts that the President has. i Members are angry about the Prest- neat s refusal to give Congress all the facts, ,lekdot no anything because it is uncoil- s 1 it i i i Lona,. to subpoena a Presidential fact ,viiiii .ifid askaiim 'what's going on in the Gov- eentue ot Nothilig can be dour in February be- 'ins e ,to ,i many meembers have out-en-town coear.tng engiu;ementaat Lincoln Day dinners lierfon-Jackson Day dinners. la Nothing can ioe -Came about foreign ?ff apt , oecame it is unconst1Vmonal for mem- hers ;,) interfere with the lqesidem a con- dues oil foreign pc icy. \ 14 P,fothing can be done abo* the Presi- \ dent c usurpation of Congress's con itutional rigiS to declare War because it is sill in this inotiern day anns age, for a rinkydinallotatlit 1:ke t :.)tigress to :accuse the President oun- cons ..i ii.utional behavior. , \ ; iehe semort - v system prevents memoeits t sen' 'tong anytiiing. \ If. Nothing c.: a be done because of the il 'ter iiialde of the leadership. is !I,nitit:r and members' wives and it pen] are eraeybeating them to go away pa' aca [Mils. IL this strained atmospnere o, cern airead.- tired of long months of turieus idleoess, are in no mood to do any- Linea', 1- The peiis suggest that nobody has ht aboila Congress for months, but may, fibers do anytning. Atter Mt.:firing months at not cutting , he 1imi,agoit c iv.eapons budget, Congress is ,..:pen i; iai. no 5 dything. 7:? Although members suspect that the Air Force's new it .clear-powered, supersonic, : tio 4 -takeoff- a mIslanding surrey with a irinee on the Lop will be a multibillion-dollar 'mat dc thing can be done because the Penta- :nus is only as.kang for token funds for a - 'fifty sittelV Altinnien members realize that the '11,5 an eihnsfrite underwater tank leaks Vi: ' Lirotigh r.:iie TV aerial holes and sinks N-1. heavy icss of life every time it is tested, :feu eig can be done about spending $1 bil- ffei: more or perfect it because, otherwise, 1hie jafi billion affeady spent would have to be wriiitin oil iis wEsted. in be done because of the fil i ? i "ter. Since ;he President will do anything th,r:. needs to be done, there is no point in, ceie,-ress done, anything, particularly sincee. tn.: 'Supreme Court, will have to do it if th.e lei7 e aite sit 5,:tinie :. . ? Not ceong anythine is safe. 'There Ir: ED, modern precedent foR'cioing nines . in .te oi i .p e and seenti. 111,-futfid other hen itia for is Cace.clity. Congress/is not en- 163 6 people .tipprove of the President's post- Missouri is now recognized ior freeze eeonornica plan. exceed 15 minutes. The-e being no objection, the surven was ordered to be printed in the RECORD - ? THE AMERICAN PROFILE IN CAM.- a Do ? Cr APPROVE. OF PE.ESIDENT :Nif:SON'S :D.:01,70MV-s PLAN'? :HON "YOU y Yes:i O 1 9 percent No' oercen:-.. sAMPI,E "CiS (7; "Nis: is doine his best to help coon try" . .. "The unions needed to of? put it their p. n'e" . . "Let's the poor guy chance' . 3elieve Nixon has saved is - from another depression" . . "I hope la? ? freezes flakes, too' . . "Although it might ts too lit it e. too late" .....It's the only way b? keep pieces and unions from going wild" "This should be adopted on a permaneu basis" "I'm far anything that will bene- fit our ,ffnintry" shotild nave hap - Nened -.-Yo years ago' ..."It's about time the g e nt took over frcm the unions- . ?.7 or can't lead us around by the nose,' BOLD ACTIONS 13.Y THE PRES ti/EN \, T. 'ST WEEK Mr titCOV, Mr. President, ts,L wee was .a very 'good weec for pile Unite State t. The Pr ident achieved tnree nn objecti- . Firi,t . his anllo1Mceflle,kn cif the forth - comini journey to Voow for the put winch can leaiii pose iiDt discussing to pear, is and a relaxt-a n of tensions. Second, the Prasiden skillfully man- aged to obtain the coop iation of lathe: and inalustry in his pay ai price boare setup The Presid.ent will sec.d up a bi coveratia phase II of his ecoNanic pla today. whith will provide for av impor- tant extension of powers unqer Emeriti incy Stabilization Act ari alst standby powers on interest and divi nd , with itanialties :Ind provisions for judi review "In a very real sense, this is one wEr. satl BOD] A Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President. a months ago, on April it) and11, 1 wen ti to Phnom Penh, Cavibodia, to a,: ses4peasonally the situayan and the extenL of direct America involvement in ti'a war there. I was plea d and impressed as Am- bassador ry Swank pointed with pride to e "low American profile there any expressed his desire to itreea it that y/ay. Swank asserted: ri trouble comes, our Einbasy stc eah ck up and get out on one plane, hree days later I visited ikitlit the an who was responsible for our low /profile in Cambodia, Jonathan Fred Ladd, who was hospitalized in solaces with a bad back. Ladd had been a Spe- cial Forces commander in South Viel - nam. He knew the value of relying' on the Cambodians' will to fight rathrr than on ever-increasing dependeltce on U.S. advisers, air support and the so- phisticated weaponry of war with which we have smothered the South Vietnam- ese. He believed that if the Cambodians had the will to fight they would sut- vive, but that if they lacked the will, the United States could not save them. Sophisticated U.S. weapons, methodii. and advisers would create more prob- lems than they -solved, Ladd believed. Again, I was impressed. From what I could gather, Cambodia appeared to be the first real test for President Nixon's "Guam" doctrine of limited ti- sistance and self-help. When I returned from Southeast Asia I wrote a reprea which, then, included the following observations: -lease c Asian for en t? the President secured the rt t the import surcharge to severe ,tountries, notably Japan in retur important textile agreement. Mr President, this is real action. IN.. othei ll'resident has been as innovatn and i., -,)old in n .y time or has int roducf a lid ,uccessfullY foliov, ea up such - men:- valuaidi.5 objet Lc, es as ,ins Pres dent. enpotent. Sometime late n'ext year the ? Al members /will persuade Of tea 1,1 ita, deserve to tic/re-elected. ? N PRESIDENT NIXON S Supre GAME PLAN miss, Mr/President, on Onto- Non outlined phase two ic/ game plan. It is very Is n A'ri, lie American peotLe. Just v'cl-1 r a people quickly supported iu esicie at 'Iter his initial announce- of ,ne ..yage-price freeze in Ad- r support will continue into -I- t ?: period. A telephone sue- tit:rider:tee by the Philadelphia In- - sivricer..: those approving of tile 110'E1 bent s et-et ,notnic policy leading by a 'oh St -nous consent to slate tile _ in the RECORD. Wincil of the rnericin n" us have seen and heard crit President, completely- devoid ho hEivi. sought vainly to crit IUS notions as non ior Li , se Court in mil, ante of their so by toe President. ? It iii 01(1 oe 1,11 01.St Oi grace u,..t of goed judgment if the over. and overly ambitious crit-i eathhol 1 judgment until they fit i the F resident is going to noir athink .hen iu?,h ,o -.CUE tht ,fl Itt ove.:' that of the President y. It dixs not ieflect on the Pre: - dein much as it does on then. :TIESIDENT pro tem pore. T ? mile 'Senator has ex:pired. aR'ThF F, OF i'iZESI.DENT pro temp :)re Un, r t attars order, Cr n a t ffr tic , Ambassador Emory Swank as he briefed \on my arrival at Ph110M, Penn the capi? ettv. t is "one war" now, e)Vering tbr., Fre snug In d et ermt. sive ITS, properly. imdians to ch :Indochina. And yet, defferently in Cambodia.. .. nbcdia, the United Sten, .Se not to stumble into anotlier ni., orrunitment like Vietnam. Qu I'' emphasis is on supplying CA: -- ht for triernselves, SrII,, fighting for What Camboi. needs is time to a build its army Wi out the nustal:eil or 'iit- namiz?ation. Su far, that time In: 10 purchased by a am ive American t,resen and I was impressed Ambassador S?Jiali determination that it tit not be. . Last year, I voted agalst military and economic ai to Cambxlia ' e cause I feared it would be t opening wee ge of a Viel.nam-type commitm This :fear I would support U.S. economic a istance. ple- yided that the present hands-ol direction DE cur policy in that country is Con. - 1,1 , That American policy in CarniNoell a a o_ rears to be changing The October,13 e,li- tion of Newsweek contains a article which indicates that our -low p!o- file" policy in Cambodia is being esii Now Ambasasdor Swank reiers t) profile" as the American pres- ence in Phnom Penh has jumped from few ET 60 officials to more than I i0. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 /*roved For ItcyR Eertnig :fftBRI37_3_12?10A6R00300020005-2 October 19, Last year Congress expressed its clear will to avoid such an entanglement when it acquiesced in what was described by the administration as a modest level of assistance for Cambodia. Aid was given to Cambodia only with the accompanying limitations that no American military forces or advisers would serve in Cam- bodia?Cooper-Church amendment? that the aid was not to be construed as a commitment to the Cambodian Govern- ment?Javits amendment?and that there could be no transfers of additional assistance to Cambodia without prior no- tice to Congress--Case-Symington amendment. Congress insisted on these limitations because it wanted to assure that Cam- bodia would not become another Viet- nam. The President concurred and signed into law all the congressional limitations. Yet the thrust .of the Joint Chiefs' me- mo goes considerably beyond the clear intent of Congress to limit our involve- ment. And the Joint Chiefs apparently plan to do this without any additional legislative authority or public debate. Perhaps the Congress and the Ameri- can people are now willing to make the kind of commitment to Cambodia that the Joint Chiefs propose. My own view is that they are not willing. If anything is clear, it is that the United States wants to disengage itself from Southeast Asia. In any case, these are questions for the Congress and the people to decide in con- cert with the executive branch. The press reports listed four methods proposed by the Joint Chiefs that could be used to skirt congressional authoriza- tions on spending in Cambodia. I cate- gorically reject this approach of sur- reptitiously siphoning off money from other parts of the budget to provide funds for Cambodia above and beyond what Congress approves. Such methods are totally inconsistent with our constitutional system. If loop- holes exist in the law that allow funds to be shifted around so easily, then those loopholes should be closed. The so-called discretionary powers contained within the foreign aid laws were only included in order to give successive administra- tions sufficient flexibility to react quickly to unforeseen events abroad such as an earthquake in Peru or famine in Pakistan. The intent of Congress was not to provide the kind of flexibility which would allow the Executive to request a certain amount of money for a program with the expectation at the time that more money would immediately be needed and that it could be secretly di- verted from other parts of the budget. I have had drafted legislation which would attempt to close each one of the four loopholes listed by the Joint Chiefs. But on reflection, I have decided that to close specific loopholes is not the an- swer, although I might later introduce such legislation if other efforts fail. The Executive, if it is so determined, can always find ways to get around particu- lar prohibitions. A good example is the case of Thai troops in Laos. Last year the Congress passed an amendment banning the use of foreign troops in Laos paid for by U.S. funds. The President. signed this provi- sion into law. Then this year, we learned that the United States was indeed pay- ing for Thai troops in Laos, but some- how these Thai troops were not consid- ered to come under the ban because they were so-called volunteers and thus not foreign troops. In July, I introduced an amendment which would tighten the language on the use of foreign troops in Laos to include "volunteers." Similarly. I have pending five additional amendments which would close other loopholes or loosely worded provisions. But the law seems like a leaky dike with new holes appearing just as quickly as we close the old ones. It is for this reason that I have intro- duced with the senior Senator from Mis- souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) an amendment which would place an absolute ceiling on all American expenditures in Cambodia. Moreover. Senator SYMINGTON is joining me in my earlier amendment which would freeze the number of Americans in Cambodia at 200 U.S. Government em- ployees and fix third-country employees at 50. Our amendment states that total American spending in or for Cambodia cannot exceed $250 million. This figure, unfortunately, if considerably below the $330 million the administration is re- questing and even further below the roughly $380 million the Joint Chiefs would like to spend. However, it would maintain our programs in Cambodia at about current levels. I am extremely pleased that the Case- Symington amendments have been tenta- tively approved by the Foreign Relations Committee. It is essential in authorizing foreign aid for 1972 that Congress shows that our commitment to Cambodia is not open ended. The Senate recently approved a similar Symington proposal for Laos which would place a $350 million limit on expenditures in that country. We should do the same for Cambodia and with great urgency, for in Cambodia we at least have not yet passed the point of no return with our involvement. It is now clearer than ever that the ad- ministration should come to Congress and the American people with our future plans and intentions for Cambodia. We should not have to be dependent on leaks of secret documents for our information, and we certainly cannot rationally make decisions without sufficient information. In the meantime. the United States should take no action which would in any way increase our commitment to Cam- bodia. We should go no further without a clear understanding of the stakes in- volved in creating yet another client state in Southeast Asia. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD several recent newspaper articles on Cambodia, including the October 13 article from the New York Times, an excerpt of which was printed in the RECORD at the request of the junior Senator from Missouri. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: S 16385 [From the New York Tim . Oct. 13, 19711 JOINT CHIEFS SAID TO I ISE COSTLY CAMBODIA WAR AN WASHINGTON.?The Jointiefs of Staff are said to have designed a , ly program of "pacification" and other nconventional warfare for Cambodia to pi i ot South Viet- nam's western flank as At !cans continue their withdrawal from Inct Ina. They have also prl nosed cries of budget devices to augment I he fu 2 that Congress will be asked to provide 1 r expanding the Cambodian Army over the 1, xt five years. The Chiefs submi, ted t ar program last month to Secretary of D f use Melvin R. Laird, according to Cong -i.onal sources. Mr. Laird, who has been bu tining with the Chiefs since June about t e cost of the ef- fort, is described as still rt. u tant about the latest version, which dot spending to about $500-million a year .7. 1977. The final decision. howe ti will rest with a senior policy review gro r run by Henry A. Kissinger, the Presiden adviser on na- tional security affairs. How to protect Cambott rom the North Vietnamese forces and der nem the use of Cambodian territory for r7,tacks against South Vietnam's populatic !enters has be- come a major probl,no for I a agon planners. As the American forces it \ tetnam are re- duced to 50,000 men, at tl nost, and come to rely on air power for ope .1 ions in the rest of Indochina, the planne are looking to indigenous forces to can the burden in ground combat. With a first-year grant 1185-million in military aid and $70-millio economic aid, the Cambodian Army has a Ntady been ex- panded from 30,000 men i- April, 1970-- when American troops n led the North Vietnamese "sanctuaries" a Cambodia?to a current strength of at a t 180,000. The Cambodians are said to ha,. ought well, but most of them are no mat. ,et for the 60,- 000 North Vietnamese I their country, mostly east of the Mekong i er. SAIGON TROOPS IP rITLAR South Vietnamese troop. I. lye periodically moved into Cambodia to 1 -'ii out, but they are no more popular among ,mbodians than the Communists forces fr, a the north and will in any case be needed 'a. the defense of their own territory. When the Joint Chiefs .f Staff first con- sidered the problem last Ji I, they proposed a 1971-'72 military add pro a in of $350-mil- lion, Congressional inforn m i report. Sec- retary Laird said that h? tild not, afford that much and that 'Oongr a. would not sup- port such an increase. The chiefs said that wi, i;200-million in military aid they could no ) :crease the size of the Cambodian Army, lx or $275-million they could expand it to 2 .000 men. Mr. Laird's' budget pruners s, ci that such an increase in strength co k probably be achieved with $252-millior But as finally submitter Congress, the Cambodian aid program ei I, 1 for $200-mil- lion in military aid, $110-n? I on in economic assistance and $15-million v irth of agricul- tural commodities, for a ?1 LI of $325-mil- lion. This was a net Imre a of $61-million over last year's allocations. ALTERNATE PLANS ,1 .ERED Nonetheless, in el:plaint! :,heir elaborate military plans to Mr. Lair n a memoran- dum dated Aug. 30. the i a Chiefs indi- cated that they could get ,und the limit on military spending and a weed with the build-up. According to informant lie Chiefs of- fered four different ways I generating an additional $52-million so -s to add 40,000 troops to the Camib,odian A, .n 'and also raise the "paramilitary" farce t rmed civilians to 143,000. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 ? (-;:titi Approved For Release 2001/08/07 ? CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CUNGRE)SIONA RECORD ?SENATE Oober 19. 1971 eat would be simply to transfer ii him from the economic aid program titian, spending, which can be done later .iscal year simply by the Administra- eotitying Congress. The second way 00 to use the economic aid fund for _._/11.1Le of all "common use" items such c is sal 1cups, which have military as ash n value, thus freeing other mill- i midis. rd way would be to increase procure- air the S tilted States Army by $52- nt 'tt .ui.l itive the materiel to the Camtio- sita tr eepayment" later. The fourth way vie ci se to make some exceptions in De- 11enee Departmeut supply regulations, de- stataie, adchtimial equipment to be "excess" to. ciiiiivertng it, to the Cambodians. Pente.gen planners said they were utr aa to further increases in the so that it would number i.e'ill Sit mid-1973 and more than 1100.i100 men by 1977. The paramilitary beitc?me, must be augmented to -100.000 he mid-1973 and more than 100 a0-i0 in 1977. This would mean arming ateeit, i0 pc,rce n' of Cambodia's population a earner:, or nearly half the adult male arse, Mai ion, :Jets would provide for a ;ne;:-.titi;ized bricsade, and artillery brigade ;Led coastal patrol units, as well as ground irceies and eidasisive logistic support. They south oak to the Agency for International St lii mem sei help finance the parliamen- ;ars detente forces, including the police. The itee ',rat Lntelireenc,e Agency would be asked to ;aeon iteditsonal programs and to pro- sicitii cli lift site-port. a -se rarograrn of activity drawn up by the Chiefs Ti. divided into four headings, iii: ted 'Patent i, "Unconventional War- or Operations" and "Civil 'The country would be divided into pacification areas and this program Cot 11 .me supervised by a new United States bassaciar?as in South Vietnam? e: new etetheasti structure. iie.riette.on would also establish a three- ealton. military eommittee with the Combo- has:a and South Vietnamese, in which the lieranse Department would be represented Slir; tipli Gcn. Frederick C. Weyand, the dep- uty ci unnallee.11 of American forces in Vie :Atari. ITS-it:re the Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1971i CAllEcD.T.i. AID LIMIT PUSHED ? Spencer Rich) ienete riareign Relations Committee visaed 1' to 4 yesterday to clamp an absolute M11; Of $250 mill ion on all forms of U.S. mill- ' sod economica.ssiatance to Cambodia in 01 1972. arovisti was added to the foreign aid tem: isti the motion of Sens. Clifford P. Case lat--.4.J I anti Stuart Symington (D-Mo.). use said IT is intended to prevent an "in- :Ina-1i oscaiation- of U.S. outlays for Cam- ton .s The Pascal 1971 aid level is also about 12. n this'll eat the administration had anein $341 malion for Fiscal 1972. e second part of the amendment puts a ;eel p ci tice, iie the number of U.S. person- tie ',t to prevent a buildup of the n ilitare equipment aid group. U.S. el ',bete now nu.mebr 150. 1 a tI:prq trt of the amendment limits .riber of third-country nationals who be paid from U.S. aid funds to 50. This aesitned -to prevent use of U.S. funds to operators, mechanics and supply acin sera nations as Thailand, the Pa tipines and Korea. No such personnel shire now, out sources said there were Isle's; 1:i hire Lot, or more, is Ii C tote was taken on the Case- ii li:1,On amendment. sponsors accepted a,cldit, al word ng by Sen. Jacob K. Javi (R-ti Y I stating that the provision of mile- tarp arid economic assistance to Cambodia within the lam to imposed, does not cat stitute it U.S. oommitmeht to she defense that se entry. The Oase-Eivralegton measure original'' imposed a $200 million EAU limit ard a 151-- man cev log on 11.3. personnel. But Case sat the ffeetaii; were reamed ir committee to hid cate its it "this wattle; intended to be a share reduc i as of existing programs, but a lint on indHi.nite e; c dation ' to give Congree - time e studs low Ear the United Stati shoula ars in sepporting the war in Can bodia aid he; ir eirelinont WE :S particularl timet-, I view et' reports that the Jon Chief .r Staff It a, -.idvisf.d Defense Secretai Mel vi li, laied -t,-) bring about a mil- tary ;Winn it Carriwtdia " J,i,fl militate aid w t Id have rise to :noire than $500 me - lion be 1977. Ace acting to maneselonal soitrces, thi Joint Chietc, adtised Laird that the numn of reg ,t Ar Comb thirsts troops?now at 180,0C: a year airo--would have to lump to 300,00( by 1.91-1 and part pill [tree's to 500,0111- by thee The 1: ports so ci that the Joint Chiefs cot siderea. the $211 million military assistant; portion of the air -ministration's total resale; ; for 1.9-1:: Eff $351 riblion too small, and had dc viseci Lans for shifting $52 million froi... other -; ances to the military aid program. This :was intended to boost the reguls Comb ;titan army' to 220,000 men by the en; of Lao sear and the "paramilitary- forces 1- 143,000 The repons said the JCS had devise: vantai a methods of transferring funds from: one aeteunt to it other or of using "excess rani Isr .equipmti t. ('as-- ,aid his Ennenament clotted all loot holes aeainst a ma- such shifts,. Laird, at :. press a inference, neither confirmed nor di nied tte existence of the reported Joh Chief,' iecommendatems, but did say no at Our C tebodia beyond the $341 million a ready requested varuld be sought this year. Like an earlier Symington amendment it the it i tory pr c cerement bill limiting Lae aid te $350 million., yesterday's Cambodie prOvi,-;U, cover only military and econorna assastatire and tic not restrict spending U.S. al seissiot a flown over Cambodia. '11,1 'Ii- the vi te, Senate Majority Lead. MikeMansfield (D-Mont.) said its a floes speech that before the Sihanouk governmee was eieit-thrown, Cambodia was "an oasis 4 order war-tam n Tndochina," Reit now, be cause the United Stater had helped dra a Cambodia into ;he war, "Cambodia is bean- reducitil to chao; MCI devastation" [Prose ihe New Vork Times, oot 14, 1971 Sistievoi *Tarr Viters $250-MitutoN LIMIT C versos-mete AID T'y ii ho W. Fix ney I WA.. le laGTON.--1..the Senate Forcigia Relit tions Committeo voted today to impose a $250-1thiliOn cellirg on rrilitar3 and econorr ic aid 7:: the Ca hoocican Government in tle curreti I fiscal year 1.-ae \dministi a ion has requested author ity t, spend ir. Cambodia- about oa in military aid and the eer in economic assistance. Au smendmert Incorporated into the For eign ii. Authorization 13111 by :the conunt tee w -pad also Unit to 200 the number .'- Amert :i.n civilian and m.litary personnel as. signet: to Cambodia.. ADMINT3TaATION is oarosre The sommittee amendment, co-sponsor." by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat o" Misso in. and Sextator Clifford P. Case, Re publican of New Jersey, was adopted by 10-3 eate over the opposition of the Adminis tration, which Warned that the limitations ivoitild undermine the Cambodian Govern- ment and endanger American troops as they are withdrawn from Vietnam. In a letter to the committee, Under Sec- retary of State John N. 'Irwin said that the Administration's requeE.t was "the minimum. Which is essential to helo Cambodians con- solidate their independence." The committee's action was prompted in part by the disclosure that the Joint, Chiefs of Staff had recommended a langrange pro- gram that by 1977 would bring military pad to Carnbcdta to $500-million, roughly donne that now being spent. The Joint Chiefs are reported to believe that increased military assistance to Canis bodia is necessary to protect South Viet-- mina's western flank as American troops are withdrawn from Indochina. But to malty members of the Senate committee, the pro- posal represents a growing Americau con i- mitment to Cambodia similar to that set a decade ago in South Vietnam. "AilmED AMD" :FoRESEEN Senator 'Symington, in an interview, ex- pressed fear that the meal intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to "shore up, the borders of Thailand by establishing positions of strength in Cambodia and Laos "where we could remain indefinitely." Senator Case, in a statement, said that; the recommendations of the joint Chiefs "-would entirely destroy Cambodia's own economy and turn that country into an armed cama, altogether dependent on United States dol- lars, arms and food for its continued exist- ence." He emphasized that the limitation on spending was a "holding action" designed to force a full-scale review of future American policy in Cambodia and said: "We should go no but-them in increasieg our commitment to Carnloodta. at least not without a firm decision by Congress and the American people that an expanded war it Cambodia is the course our country should fallow." In a statement on tae Senate floor, Sen- ator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, said: "The Cambodian expesrien.ce is an admoni- tion to curb the easy outflow of the financial resources of the people of this nation which., for years, has been legislated in the name oi national defense and foreign aid. "In the case of Cambodia, the hundreds of millions of dollars already spent in a year and a half have done hardly anything for the defense of this nation except, perhaps, to weaken it by wastage. Nor have these expenditures helped the Cambodian people, Who have now been reduced to the cammcn denominEttor of the -irrelevant devastation which has been suffered in Laos and Vier:- Senator Mansfield ionatested that "the trend of present Cambodian policy, insofar as I can see, runs strongly counter not or ay to the expressed incliaations of the Con- gress but also to the Nixon doctrine which was supposed to provide the guidelines of that policy." In the year and a half since the Govern- ment of Prince Sihanouk was overthrown and the United States conducted military 'operations against Comm-mist sanctuaries in Cambodia, he said, Carribcdia has become "the enemy sanctuary,' the nation is "being reduced to chaos and devastation," and American support has 'oecome "the sole sig- nificant prop which keeps the political-mili- tary structure in Pncmpenh from falling apart." "T sometimes wonder,- he said. "how we let ourselves get involved in these travesties of foreign policy which, rather than serve the interests of this nation, give every ap- pEaranee of being at complete odds with those interests." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 October 19, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE [From the Baltimore Sun, Oct. 14, 1971] SENATE PANEL APPROVES CEILING OF $250 MILLION ON CAMBODIA Am (By Gene Oishi) WAsIIINGTON.?The Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee approved by a 10-to-3 vote yesterday a $250 million ceiling on expendi- tures in Cambodia?$80 million under what the administration is requesting for fiscal 1972. The amendment to the foreign aid author- ization bill also contains a declaration of policy stating that the authorization of funds for military and economic aid to Cam- bodia does not constitute a U.S. commitment to defend the country. Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.), who of- fered the amendment together with Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), also issued a statment expressing concern over a report that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed a plan for military aid to Cambodia that would reach $500 million a year by 1977. "These recommendations," Mr. Case said, "would entirely destroy Cambodia's own economy and turn that country into an armed camp, altogether dependent on U.S. dollars, arms and food for its continued existence." The Case-Symington amendment had originally called for a $200 milion ceiling on expenditures in Cambodia, but the spending limit was increased to $250 million in com- mittee. The authorization for fiscal 1971, which ended June 30, provided $185 million in military aid and $70 million in economic as- sistance for a total of $255 million. For fiscal 1972, the administration is re- questing $200 million in military aid and $130 million in economic assistance. Senator Case indicated to reporters that the $250 million ceiling approved by the committee could be further compromised when the foreign aid bill reaches the floor. The administration is opposed to a ceiling on spending, because such a limit would eliminate its flexibility in shifting other de- fense funds into Cambodia. Senator Case said the purpose of the amendment was not to force sharp cuts in U.S. expenditures in Cambodia, but rather to hold the line on spending until a full congressional inquiry into U.S. policy for Cambodia can be made. Mr. Case in his statement said It would be "tragically wrong" to seek a military solu- tion in Cambodia, and that 'is what Joint Chiefs are apparently contemplating. From the Washington Post, Oct. 17, 19711 REVIEW IS SLATED ON OPTIONS FOR NEW BuILDOP IN CAMBODIA (By Spencer Rich) A high-level Nixon administration meeting with grave consequences for the fate of Cambodia is expected to take place this week, according to congressional sources. On Monday, a "senior review" group of persons at the level of CIA Director Richard Helms, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson is scheduled to consider "options" for U.S. policy in Cambodia. One alternative expected to be considered is an Aug. 30 "five-year plan" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on how to win in Cambodia?. "winning" being defined as building up the strength of Cambodian forces to the point where they could drive all North Vietnamese troops out of the country. The Pentagon has never acknowledged existence of the plan, nor plans for the meet- ing. A spokesman said yesterday, "We have nothing to add" to what Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said last Wednesday. Laird, questioned about the alleged plan following press reports on it, had neither confirmed nor denied its existence. Congressional sources insisted, however, that such a plan does exist, that it was drafted as a result of a June 11 request for "options" by Presidential Assistant Henry A. Kissinger, and that it calls for a buildup of Cambodia's regular and "paramilitary" forces with U.S. supplies. to 863.000 men by 1977. A congressional staff member estimated that the cost to the U.S could reach anywhere from $500 million co $1 billion a year by 1977. He said Laird has !tuned down several earlier versions of the plan as too expensive. Emphasizing that neither Laird nor the State Department has yet "bought" the plan?and may even be somewhat dubious about it solar?the staff member gave this description of the proposal: The plan would he a classic application of the Nixon doctrine, with the U.S. furnishing military supplies and economic aid to support military operations by indigenous Cambodian forces. It envisions a force structure with "sophisticated" American-supplied trucks, tanks, armored cars, and artillery brigade and coastal patrol boats. A key feature would be anti-guerilla war- fare, with the establishment of a commando- type Green Beret force manned by specially trained Cambodians The JCS document is said to state. "Cambodia represents perhaps the classic case for the employment of un- conventional warfare by the allies," and, fur- ther, that there should be "the highest pos- sible priorities given to neutralizing the Khmer (Cambodian) Communist infrastruc- ture," that is----infiltrating and destroying the Communist Party inner structure. The plan calls ior a massive escalation of U.S. aid to Cambodia over the next five years. At present, the U.S. aid level?already vastly increased from two years ago?is $185 mil- lion for military equipment, $70 million for supporting assistance (special aid to the economy to keep it going despite defense bur- dens and $9 million from sales under the overseas food program This is a total of $264 million. The plan is said to call for a boost to $377 million in fiscal 1972 and $390 million in fiscal 1973. Some $52 million of the 1972 figure would not be drived from congressional appropriations but from trans- fers from other accounts or "excessing" of U.S. military supplies. (Military supplies which the Pentagon declares "excess" may be sold or given away to other nations at well below actual cost."1 No cost estimates for years beyond that are contained in the plan. The plan calls for increasing the Cam- bodian regular army from 170,000 in fiscal 1971 to 220,000 In 1972. 256.000 in 1973 and 306,000 in 1977. ")'aramilitary" forces?local militia and special forces--which are now at an undetermined level?would rise to 143,000 in 1972, 197,000 in 1973 and 557,000 in 1977. Combined regular and paramilitary forces would thus total 863,000 in 1977. The number of U.S. personnel on military equipment delivery teams in Cambodia?now 23?would jump to 104 in fiscal 1972. The number of Americans in South Vietnam en- gaged in channeling supplies to Cambodia, now estimated at 60, would rise to 400. Some 96 nationals of other Southeast Asia nations would be breught into Cambodia at U.S. ex- pense to help provide a "clerical infrastruc- ture" for the supply and training operations. The village pacification program would have eight different aspects, including village de- velopment and primary education. [From the New York Times, Oct. 17, 1971] U.S. AND CAMBODIA 7 DOWN THE "SLIPPERY --;D,Pr: AGAIN? By Jonn vv Finney) WASHINGTON.--When he issue of supplying military and economic aid to Cambodia was first before Congress last year, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, with obvious refer- ence to the Vietnam involvement, gave assur- ances that -we have no intention of slipping into the mistakes of the pa question of whether the Un e ing down the same "slippe bodia was revived by the Se A tions Committee as it set a 2 on United States spendin the current fiscal year. The ceiling?incorporau ment in the foreign aid al 1 was at least $100-mIllion ministration plans to pr and economic aid to the ( .T rnent this year. And it phi, ( in clear opposition to a i o gram of the Joint Chiefs o the Cambodian armed fora The stage was thac set fc contests between the Sen A tions Committee and the - that for 18 months- since a Prince Sihanouk and the sion"?have so often cent 1 policy in Cambodia. Last y succeeded in passing an ;2. hibiting the introducti. ground combat troops or into Cambodia. This year 1 over limiting military am Cambodia, which started c t last year and shows every i a multi-year program cost' g lars. Not unexpectedly, the fi t administration reaction was a dire warni, a John N. Irwin H, Under Secretary of Stat . wrote the com- mittee that the proposed It would "great- ly disheartin" the Cambo a. ti Government, "seriously threaten" its c a city to defend Cambodia, "greatly encou aja. a step-up of North Vietnamese aggress", (lion" in Cam- bodia and "significantly in case" the threat to American forces in Viete But Mr. Irwin seemed o a significant step further when he deft .e. the American purpose in Cambodia as o e of "supporting the Government of the R r. er Republic in their efforts to maintain e . independence and neutrality of Camboo a which in turn enhances the prospect for .1. imate peace in Southeast Asia." To inemb? s af the commit- tee, that statement had a -'- 'dedly different ring from the repeated A r inistration re- assurances last year that itary and eco- nomic aid did not represent a 'ommitment to the survival of the (iambi i ii Government but rather was designed, 1 livening North Vietnamese forces, to prof the American troops as they were withdra 'ram Vietnam. For the dovish members f ,,he committee, It was just that type of rh rical escalation that contributed to the A, 'man entangle- ment in Vietnam. And th r leers that the United States was going dc ex the same road In Cambodia were compour if I by last week's report that the Joint Chief c Staff had pro- posed a costly five-year p ) ram for Cam- bodia, including paciticatic !id clandestine warfare by the Central 1 o,-ence Agency. The Joint Chief's repor ( rationale was that such a program?we a could double American spending :n Cat a dia, by 1977? was necessary to protect S th Vietnam's western flank as American tops are with- drawn from Indochina. 0 he face of it, that seemed to be a iogica e tension of the original justification for m' I ay aid to Cam- bodia. As American troops a >outh Vietnam are reduced to a residual ( .ce or perhaps withdrawn completely, the .th Vietnamese forces, it can be argued, the -Ives need pro- tection against Cominunis -anctuary" on their Cambodian border. But to members of the 2 ,ign Relations Committee, the Administra: and the Joint Chiefs seemed to be off en a a prescription for indefinite military inve .7, nient in Cam- bodia, with the undesiralal ale-effect of a growing commitment to ti- . amvival of the Pnom Penh Government, eenator Stuart Symington of Missouri exp e sed fears that the real intention of the Jc a Chiefs was to S 16387 Last week the States was go- dope" in Cam- Foreign Rela- .0-million limit . Cambodia in as an amend- .irization than the Ad- ea in military .bodia Govern, the committee ,,'ted new pro- tiff to build up 'other of. those Foreign Rela- ,,iutive branch e overthrow of ierican "incur- 1 on American the committee ,endment pro- of American ,litany advisers e fight will be onomic aid to it $255-million 11 of becoming billions of dol- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 LCIA-RDP73B002R6R000300020005-,2 CONGRI ,SIONAL RECORD SET.; ATE ()el o er 19, 1971 ?ithe:e ,n" ite liorders of Thailand by estab- lishing positions of strength in Cambodia esici Laos **where we could remain indeti- to be seen whether through the .levniti: of a spendin.g limit the committee reverse tbe trend in Cambodia. The raie ilenal Approach has been to cut funds I. tie carom:it:tee employed that weapon chopped nearly $850-million eilemnistration's $3.3-billicn for- ., lit reo !lest, including $140 million from i15 1 Ui-in I'd requested for military aid essigis rem:dries, including Cambodia. saiing limitation is 1 new approach tor .:e-arretteti. and one that apparently the by surprise. irtiei is-n absoleite spending limit, nominee's standpoint, is that it icionlioE,3:. the Executive branch has ircraieer of funds or provision lite; v.:eine:us?to increase aid to a bseseri im amount appropriated by vionsi aptinding limit, therefore, re- sit-1e: I.hc. leideilitive's policy flexibility. Is e: ;;t' bil,;t,e, the principle of Executive :ass. i 9:I hi to Congress, on what it is iii a esi 'I 01.01 o-. 'riding limit may also force Mee at ihe Administration's long- tin' Ililno tic C/ milaoclia. thus permi-Uting a rad:: ei debaie before the nation has slipped jai::: oopey u; Executive discretion. If so. xc "reign Relvtions Committee, which ad- s:Olt-die iormulate policy, will have ,cin ever. ore of its principal objectives of Jolliet:ming honey before it is made. MANSFIELD and Mr. SYMING- e-Tr ie [dressed the Chair. PI-ZanlIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator from New Jersey has expired. MAINNFIT,MD. Mr. President, may 1 b. iecogtiO:efi? ii PRESIDENT pro tempore. The narrator frore Montana is recognized for "eited -kMBODIA INSIPIELD. Mr. President, I e ant the distinguished Senator from tied Jersey as well as the distinguished mane. Senator from Missouri for the elet .arients tnev have just made, and also I he distinguished senior Senator from Midnead for Lie initiative he has shown :1;.4 reenact. 1 'lare the eencern expressed by Sen- who have spoken today and who speak later on the continuation of really amounts to a broadening of 1, he aaf. e are eel:trig out of South Vietnam, hut it looks like we are getting into Can Wodia. appears to me that the old eannen is peroaps being repeated; that he handwritiag is on the wall for an- tilt's Vietnam, despite all disclaimers . a-m,,rary being in the offing. :.ealernbe.r being in Phnom Penh in ,9Ca, after President Nixon recognized hip government of Prince Norodom Sitanioak. There were two people at the ,iini:as,sy their At the time of the over- jig 'iv of Sihanouk, there were 11. Today e are something in excess of 150, and the tread ts no, The public press carries ,tortes to the effect that there is a 5- yea- military plan in existence for Cam- bodi a. 1. -ainuent it was the intention of this (Lica 411-ument to get out of all the old In- docamese states, and not to get into anoth,r one on toe scale in which we ar alreany in Cambodia, because Cambodia has been opened by the Defense De- pa,rtn,ent for ,:nilitary operations, oer- tairfn; from the air. I would assume thar the Cooper-Church intention is bein overridden; that the intention of th7 Symine ton proposal is being ignored: an,: it apaietrs to me that the only way in which this Congress?this Senate, a - least- aan avoid loopholes and angles i to face ap to the IllEirmate weapon in on e inven: ena, and :hat is to cut off funds. iii, oing to de hard. It is going to tan, a, lot oi determ.nation, but we have trie, everyte mg we can to confine this wai to limit it, to ?,.et us out, and it seemn we are' ehwarted at eveey turn. So, as fa.' as the Senate,: frcm Montana is con - 'conic, he has :nadir up his mind. Re ha no in- cation to w-.)te for funds in the gra) bag int own as the foreign aid authoriza- tion t, el, nor win he vote for aopropria - tons. The inter, hen of Congress has bee,., overreaten too many times and too con - sistenth,' and it is about time to stand un and be eounted. I am sorry am so lat( but there is an old saying, 'Better latee than ,adere' I commend the distinguished Senater from hew Jersey on his remarks todas Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen- ator T. Mr. ,IANSF1.ELD. Yes, indeed. Mr. nASE. a want to commend the majon y leaden ]E-Ls leadership in thi area is well known to all of us. The PRESIDENT pro tempore, The time 01 the Senator has expired. Mr. ieYft`D 01 West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident. 1 yield ray 3 minutes to the dis- tinguee led majority leader. Tht- n-RESIDT,NT pro tempore, is there ?Oleo ? Wit hoot objection, it, is order. e. Mr vrANSFIIMD. Mr President. yield to the Senator from New Jerse:v. Mr. LASE. It is not he who is late. I think it is all of us who are late in fol- iowine nis leadership, and we are vera grateit... as is the country, for it. I again than1 ',he Senator, and I am deep], gratel i. Mr e resident, if I may-, I yield bacl: the balance of lie 3 minutes to the Sen- ator netm Mon;a.n.a so the Senator from Missouri may have a:a opportunity to engage in any actoquy with him. Th. ,i'RESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL- LEN I, lalue Senator from Missouri is rec - ognized for 3 minutes. Mr. ,dYMIN(..)TON. Mr. :President, thank the distraguished senior Senato: from tic ?ler ;ey, have read his talk and ant much impressed with his logic_ I would assanace myself with him in cdnur ending the majority leader for the work he has been doing with respect te our potion in Cambodia, trying to geL us reatiy out cf this war. We all knote he is i expert ri this field. I an: also giad to join with the abla Senator froml\ew Jersey, as well as with my die ,iinguished colleague from Mis- souri, to supporting the pxition pre- sented by the able Senator from Nen- Jerse7a Mr. President, it occurs tort remark': made tint the President of the United State e en June 30, 1970, are applicable ta what we are discussing this morning. President Nixon stated at that time: Now that our ground forces and our tic and advisory personnel have all bees with.- drawn, what will be our future policy for Cambodia? The following will be the waidelineE of our pclicy in Cambodia: I. There will be no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of our Embassy in Phnom. Penh. But our regular staff has increasad tenfold: 2. There will be no U.:3, advisers wita Cam- bodian units. I. We will conduct?with the approval et' the Cambodian Government--air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to mose supplies and personnel :though Cambodia te- ward South Vietnam aud to reestablish bace areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam. Note his words, "air interdiction mis- sions.'" But we are now offering the South Vietnamese troops in that -country close air support: I. we will turn over material capt.tred in the base areas in Cambodia to the Canthr,diaii Government tohelp it defend its neutralil y and independence. 5. We will provide military assistance In the Cambodian Government in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated equipment in types and quantities suitable for their army. To date we have s applied about $5 million of these items principally in the form of small arms, mortars, truck 3. aircraft parts, communications equipmeitt and medical supplies. Putting it mildly, however, the char- acter of our military aid program has changed: 6. We will encourage other countries of the region to give diplomatic support to the in- dependence and neutrality of Cambodia. We welcome the efforts of the Djakarta group of countries" to mobilize world opinion and encourage Asian cooperation to this end. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's time has expired. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I yield my 3 minutes to the Senator from Min- souri. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Missouri is recognized for 3 additional minutes. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the dis- tinguished Senator from Louisiana: 7. We will encourage and support the re - forts of third countries who 'wish to furniell Cambodia with troops or material. We ap- plaud the efforts of Asian nations to help Cambodia preserve its neutrality and incir- pendence. The only trouble about that Mr. Presi- dent, is the fact that n.o aid from other ccuntries has been forthcoming. The President continued: I will let the Asian Governments speak fer themselves concerning their future policies. I am confident that two basic principles will govern the actions of those nations laelping Com.bodia: They will be at the request of, and in close concert with the Cambodian Government. They will not be at -the expense of those nations' cyvn defense?indeed they will con- tribute tO their security which they see Pound up with events in Cambodia. The South Vietnamese plan to help. Of all the countries of Southeast Asia, South Vietnam :aas most at stake In Cambodia. A North Vietnamese takecver 'would, of course, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RD,P73B002R64,000300020005-2 October 19, 1971 CONGRESSION Al, have profound consequences for its security. At the same time, the leaders of South Viet- nam recognize that-the primary focus of their attention must be on the security of their own country. President Thieu has reflected these convictions in his major radio and TV address of June 27. Our understanding of Saigon's intentions is as follows: 1. South Vietnamese forces remain ready to prevent reestablishemnt to base areas along South Vietnam's frontier. 2. South Vietnamese forces will remain ready to assist in the evacuation of Viet- namese civilians and to respond selectively to appeals from the Cambodian Government should North Vietnamese aggression make this necessary. 3. Most of these operations will be launched from within South Vietnam. There will be no U.S. air or logistics support. There will not be U.S. advisers on these operations. 4. The great majority of South Vietnamese forces are to leave Cambodia. But there are still some 10,000 mem- bers of the South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia: 5. The primary objective of the South Vietnamese remains Vietnamization within their country. Whatever actions are taken in Cambodia will be consistent with this objective. In this June 27 speech President Thieu emphasized that his government will con- centrate on efforts within South Vietnam. He pledged that his country will always re- spect the territory, borders, independence and neutrality of Cambodia and will not interfere in its internal politics. His govern- ment does not advocate stationing troops permanently in Cambodia or sending the South Vietnamese Army to fight the war for the Cambodian Army. Mr. President, I read those remarks in the RECORD, because in themselves, they emphasize the great importance of the speech given this morning by the distinguished Senator from New Jersey. Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield. Mr. CASE. I want to say to the Sena- tor, as he know already, how deeply I appreciate his assistance in this matter. I think it is only fair to him and to me, too, to say that the figures ? named in the amendment we have under dis- cussion are not our first choices. I would have preferred a considerably smaller amount of money, and I know the Sena- tor would join me in advocating a con- siderably smaller sized American con- tingent in Laos than that permitted by the amendment. We were dealing, how- ever, not with a theory but with a con- dition. We needed action, and this com- promise proposal would at least hold things approximately the way they are now. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President. I agree with the able Senator and have been privileged to work with him on this matter. We have one primary interest, to get American troops out of Southeast Asia. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an article published in the Washington Post of Thursday, September 16 of this year, written by Peter Osnos and entitled "Cambodian Town Destroyed by Napalm From U.S. Planes." There being 21 oh leeti011, the article was ordered to to ;31:flied in the RECORD, as follows: CAMBODIA 'ras Di sis . : Inty ic Komeorm. finona Se-it bombers leveled most napalm lust two week, rancid with tile SIT en I he monsoon rains. Nearby, villagers di- In, NAPA1M FROM iiniber 15. --American 01 this town with wzo and the air is still dampened by bed today how the planes, too fast in lie: the propeller-driven 'r-28s of tile tiny arida-Khan air force, streaked by and (11.121I711 'heir stocks on the Communist noon; who were fiercely resisting government pressint ( it the ground. Before the war, lime were some 10,000 people living here. a sough with almost every building noiv destroyed, it's hard to imagine where. The people have scattered. Many fled closer to Pit am Penh, some went with the enemy. a fens remain in the debris. Kompong Thom is it, a strategic crossing point on Highway 0 ar, a it 75 miles northeast of the capital. No long after the Vietnam war spread to can- tiodtt. in March 1970, the iown and tine villages all around it fell to the Vietcong :did t DDI 1 am hod] an allies, the Khmer Rouge There was neavy mg and destruction in the towns of bloji. And Tangkouk some twenty miles away. but Kompong Thmar was spared and local oAle.,11: say that life under the Vietcong went, on more or less as before. Then, almost a mon, P ago, a 15,000-man force. supported ainiotil daily by American air strikes. began mitt is along Highway 6 in a determined ett,r1 retake the road and sweep the Comnumist, Iroin the rice paddies and rubber plan ha ion:, around it. The eventual oh,erir a is in link up with iroops operating IF .in :lie provincial town of Kompong Thom, bit r !mounded by the enemy. It is one of I he Ofrensives mounted by the Cambodians i I a tar tbal from Saigon or Washington se( mi perhaps. more static than it actually is Lt. Col. Ph Snout ,.,.ailander of the 1st Infantry Brigade Orono said his troops oper- ating on the road 'net vol Ii little serious re- sistance until they reat- lied Korn pong Thmar, an important link in the Communist supply system extending to lie capital from the northeastern f( Vii I Kratie. He said his troops, hr battalions. arrived at positions around the Town about 5 p.m. on Aug. 31, but the Viet non!r held them off with Chinese-made 75 11:Elinialer howitzers "It was a very had h, lie the colonel said proudly, as he gazed Si a map of the area laid out on a Sinai woo.ien able in lhe neighbor- ing town ol Barav I be drive is now neadquartentd. N What; made the airpower. The colonel , geant, trainee la 001.1 United States aIr trikT observation planes an; I by the napalm-caiTi.i,,, 1,--4 Phantoms. ',lice apparently was ish -speaking ser- i Vietnam to call in went to work and Pd quickly followed t, rainibers, probably The colonel alor e wrong; his officers, said the planes were tl, e i-maner A- 37s. He also maintained, unlike the others, that much of the damage to the town was caused by the Vietcong who expIaled ;tramp/titian dump they were keeping I nein Casualties from g are unknown. Cambodians claim none 01 their troops were killed at the lime anti only one since. As for the villagers. all were said to have fled before the bombing began Only three enemy bodies were discovered, ono officer reported, the rest having been burneo or earned away. Cambodian soldiers are I destroyed school outside the cong troops were camped Or The Communists have pull crackling sound of tmnfir some are still very close by. WIVES ANII CHM, Beginning in Skoun, Cam much in evidence dug in p. the road (accompanied by children) but none oL the have retaken fared an vwher. Kompong Thmar. The heaviest U.S. itirstrii concentrations in a rubber Chankar Andong. Col. Suong said his two no gence reports show 200 ene with a heavy regimebt On them up. The plantation is a highway, beyond the aopull From the standpoint of the current operation, know- has been an enormous suct ing back under Phno.n Per portant part of a vita, popu portation corridor. Even w Kompong Thmar, the cost low, Cambodian officers sal. .1. S 16389 ied now in a a where Viet- .i month ago. ,ack, but the clieates t,hat ). Ian troops are .ons alongside 1 -jr wives and I towns they ar as badly as iit at enemy tation called .? recent intern- soldiers there way to back lie east of the areas. government, ? Tchenla Two, io far, bring- :-.11trol an im- ,, on and trans- he razing of t teen relatively PSYWAR CAMPP. To consolidate its gains the army has mounted a p fare campaign headed up brother of the prime minis' terday in Baray a ceremony renewed government pres monk spoke, comedians per awards were handed out. people were on hand, and 11,000 people in all remain Another part of the calm publicize Communist atroc . occupation. Much has be. Phnom Penh press and rad' of multiple graves where nated by the Communists government estimates that killed this way, but fewer to been turned up so far. The Cambodians are anxi to its old pre-war pat-erns sible and, unlike South Vie pacification seems relativel port for the government ap the most part. But in Kompong hmar recapturing of the past. "We will wait for peace will bebuild," said I there. lu the people. Iological war- - -ol. Lou Non. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE October 19. 19:1 te for ie. .1 purpose that the Senator it Keinalcio: (Mr. COOPER) and I have I another amendment to the for- aid bill It is offered in furtherance s_ same objective, pulling up on the wan strings to restrict the theater of A a.' alibi e.sbetiite the total withdrawal of erican military forces still remain- [radix, Inn a. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will Senator yield? I am happy to yield to Senator irom Missouri. ?. S ymfr000; eaken steps to ms,i the e,?,inomic burhens imposed upon tiles... and not ,,rly held their own again.' t enem? attack, bat have regained control subs> ,tial pop da-ted areas which were prc vioue overrun b,1 the enemy. We belie that-e th continued United States assistan at the .evels req Jested by the Administratior , the Cambodians with some exeernal logisti; and ale intenan ie support 'wt.' continue 71 max& progre:is ii defending their count -from in'. arum. Vic be n a-re it clear there is - clvil act- in Cambodia. The Khmer people have ;ea attac ted by the North Vietname.,., who itire not succeeded in drawing me.: ; than ,i small number of Khmer to their site We an- support sng tne OKR in their effort.; to trnt dAin tile independence and neutron- e of Ceebiudia inch in turn enhances tie, pompa for c ltimate peace in Southea., Aena. Tee, ^..dminlet 'salon's best judgment is th ? an aelstance peckage of $330 million in F 72 is 1.17.e minimiun essemial to help the Call? bodisis conso? le ate t.neir independenc,. furthef more, the President must retain a ? - thori- ?.0 so-rate additional amounts assist., Ive if eineTencies arise. It may be 1 he mix between economic and mil- -- tory ;..;...stance rar.y change somewhat as coll- ditioi.s change norrig the course of the yete We ; sire the c oiace.rn expressed by the Coe - gross r sending large numbers of Americe poise lel to Caerilladia and have made a el-. libers:, effort I o keep our personnel ther at the ()west no ;s?ble level. Of the 143 Amer. - cans - irrently ,in-mloyed in the Embassy Phooe; Penh. 511 are directly involved in tl military assistan?x, program. Although antic nate that ;; taff adjustments may flares ?:in the future in order to assure that aid to Cambodia is handled in 117- crude are with c ix rent legislative and regull - tory !eouireniertv., it will continue to be ce nolt to maintain American staffing ? C;ariale ,r1 is at a n Lini mum. e;te eerety yours. faun N. law iN Acting Secretary. At COOPER. Mr. President, I shiti. addr myself briefly to the statement.; of the Senator from New Jersey (Air. CASE and the Senator from Missouri (Mn'. 5VMIN,TOti I. I may say ti at the amendments whie have :seen offered cause me some diri - culty. and I has expressed my probleee to bo(ii my col Leagues. Oi une one aand, the approval of as amendment might be considered as ati- proval of operations in these countria, ? for ?Lich Con nests has given no au- thorn.::. On the other hand, if supper.; is 04., ? limited it could lead to an ee,:i- patisitql of tile vtar such as we have see:t. hi Vie So atter mi .ch thought, believe lim itations should be placed, as are offere by m Lt colleague-s I ? L hld poi it out that these amend Merles, aticl the problems they cause brir up a tain the 7,ragedy of this war. The,;e coanrles are involved not because the wan to be ni leaved, but because the Unit ai States is involved in war in Vie; nam with the North Vietnamese, wl,t) were the first aggressors, without quo tion [ believe that as long as we a then: because of the involuntary iii- volvement of these countries, we should, as a of justice, provide them some econanie aid mid some limited milita]?t- aid io protect themselves. But I subrri that iii this leacis to only one conclusion The way these countries---the Mel countries of Laos and Cambodia?as well as the United States, will be freed from this war is by the complete United States withdrawal from the war, not a with- drawal with a remaining residual force, because if that occurs, fighting will con- tinue in these countries. The President has reversed past poli- cies, he's winding clown the war, and for this I praise him, and he should be praised, but I hope he will determine that we should withdraw completely all our forces--land, sea, and air. If that occurs, I believe that peace will come to the poor countries of Laos and Cam- bodia. There will be some chance for an international arrangement for them to have peace, at least surcease from fight- ing, as there will be in Vietnam. So I hope that this effort, which our colleagues have so eloquently advocated on the floor today, will be followed by further action on the part of our Presi- dent, who is reducing and bringing our forces home, to simply say that we are going to get out all .forces. I hope very much that the amendment of the Senator from Montana will be approved by the House, as an expression of the Congress, that it is our sense that this war should be ended. Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen- ator yield? Mr. COOPER. I yield. Mr. CASE. I just want the time to ex- press appreciation to Senator COOPER and Senator CHURCH for their additional backing of the effort we are making here. I agree wholeheartedly with Senator COOPER in his observation that we are faced with no other real choice for end- ing the situation than the one he sug- gests. I have suppor'red his approach in voting for the Hatfield-McGovern amendment and then for the excellent proposal of the majority leader. the Ntansfied amendment. I hope the Mans- field amendment will be accepted by the House. If none of this is successful. I plan to support the new Cooper-Church proposal, which has not yet been un- veiled, but which I am confident the Sen- ator from Idaho and the Senator from Kentucky will offer as a means of accom- plishing this result. fhey are absolutely right. In the meantime, it,: is essential that we do not increase either the size or the intensity of the war in Cambodia or any- where else in Indochina. Mr. SYMINGTON Mr. President. will the Senator yield? Mr. CASE. I yield. Mr. SYMINGTON'. Mr. President, I, too, would express my appreciation to the able Senator from Kentucky for his remarks with respect to the efforts of the Senator from New Jersey and my- self and would also associated myself with the remarks a! the Senator front Idaho on this all important subject. 1: would again present to my colleagues the apprehension growing in my mind tnat the increased interest in Cambodia, along with the long-standing interest in Laos, is but outward expression of an inward decision to c:?eate and support a military bastion in Thailand, which country is not a part of Indochina, with plans to stay there indefinitely. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 '41 . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 October 19, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL it ECOR D ?SENATE It is for that reason particularly that I look forward to the new Cooper-Church amendment currently being considered according to the Senator from Idaho. ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now pro- ceed to the transaction of routine morn- ing business. UNITED STATES-CANADIAN FRICTION Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I would like to take this moment to express my deep concern about the increasing anti- U.S. sentiment in Canada. During the last decade, Canadians have been moving toward the conclusion that they are, in effect, subservient to the United States, and they are searching for peaceful ways to reassert their national independence. Where this search will lead them is still unclear, but the growth of Canadian nationalism is a reality which we, in the United States, must reckon with and acknowledge. Living, as it does, next door to an eco- nomic and political colossus which en- gulfs its neighbors with the incessant ex- port of its capital and culture, Canada is undergoing a serious identity crisis. As Prime Minister Trudeau stated in a recent speech, the "overwhelming pres- ence" of the United States is endanger- ing Canada's "national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps military point of view." Such an assertion is not altogether un- founded. Statistics indicate that Ameri- can investment in Canada totals almost $34 billion, with about two-thirds of this amount representing direct investment in industry. U.S. businessmen own or control about 85 percent of Canada's mining companies, 90 percent of its elec- tric utilities, and almost 95 percent of its auto industry. In reaction to this overreaching, Canada has verred sharply away from U.S. policies. In 1970, Prime Minister Trudeau sought closer diplomatic rela- tions with mainland China, and moved to apply Canadian pollution standards to shipping in the Artie within 100 miles of Canada. He resisted President Nixon's bid for a common policy for the use of North American energy sources, and he extended Canadian fishing limits by ex- cluding foreign vessels from huge areas of Canadian coastal waters. This impulse of Canada to find a more independent course in foreign affairs has its roots in the events of the 1960's. The shocked reaction in Canada to racial con- flict, riots, and political assassination in the United States, along with Canadian distaste of the Vietnam war, fostered a wave of anti-Yankeeism which swept through Canada's intellectual and ar- tistic community. Unfortunately, these ill-feelings not only continue to persist, but the admin- istration's August surtax on imports from Canada has exacerbated them still further. It is possible that President Nixon has been badly informed about Canadian circumsta nc, is a r d, as a result, is insen- sitive to their predicament. This is evident from the -U.S. rejection of Canada's plea for an exemption from Ihe import surcharge. Certainly, if there is any one country Ulm deserves an ex- emption. Canada is that country. Some 20 to 25 percent of Canada's gross na- tional product in voives international trade and two-thirds ot this is with the United States. In la. our exports to Canada amounted to s9 billion, nearly .ivice as much as we export to any other foreign country. Our imports from Can- ada totaled $11.09 billion. The Canadian- American Committee. sponsored by the National Planning Association of the United States ard the Private Planning Association of Canada, stated in 1967 that the United States-Canadian trade is not only the largest bilateral flow in the world but the greatest trade volume that has occurred between any two nations in all of history. Before the import surcharge, about 70 percent of our imports from Canada entered this country duty free and some 64 percent of our exports to Canada were similarly duty I ree. Moreover, Can- ada has long since allowed her currency to "float free" so as to avoid any artifi- cial advantage in exchange rates vis-a- vis the U.S. dollar. Even though Canada refrains from re- taliating in kind to our surtax, the Nixon package may produce other harmful ef- fects. This is the third time in a decade that Canada has unsuccessfully appealed to Washington for an exemption from a balance-in-payments measure. Also Can- ada's unemployment rate has now reached 7.1 percent. clinsiderably higher than our own. Mr. Trudeau has always regarded Ca- nadian nationalism as a regressive force. Nevertheless, events and public opinion are forcing him to make policy decisions which reassert or even extend the area of Canadian national control. As the next Canadian election rapidly ap- proaches, all signs seem to indicate that it will be fought on fiercely nationalistic lines. I only hope, in order to stem the ris- ing tide of anti-Yankeeism now swelling in that country, that future U.S. foreign policy decisions show more deference to Canadian sensitivities. In an effort to illustrate my concern, I have assembled an assortment of art- icles concerning Canada's political life, economic develoments. and foreign af- fairs. I ask imam m oils consent that these articles on modern-day Canada be printed at fins point in the RECORD. There being no oblection, the articles were orderel to he ; ,raded in the RECORD, as follows: PAHL" I.- -UN! ? ANADIAN TioN r ATic:,Ns !From the :New 111/les, pen. '7, 1971] CANADA: .ff,CONONITO NVfloNALISAI?TNCREASING AMERICAN ILNV!01,1, IS STIe RISING OP- POSITION swan TORONTO - e.dert y once powerful mem- ber of the Liberel oarty was asserting the other day that the natty has become more illtereSTea a t'ctt usa I,' /IR Ii0/1aliSITI in the last year. When asked wile party s nationalists were, the former Minister hers of the Ontario Legisla liamentary backbenchers, one Cabinet member whosi c out of Canada's running 0) and how to restrict United In Canada for the sake ; dependence. Unintentionally, tile old firmed that Canada's Lit t governed this country for years, are less susceptible t 1 the nationalists than hay' I generally. Yet, the present Lilac t headed by an economically posite, Pierre Elliott Tru toward the new style of days ago, after eight years ises, it introduced ,egisla Canada Developmen. Cor. bination merchant bank company charged wittl the I the Canadian economy m* e less American. In a similar spirit the ment has blocked America finance company and a ura by broadening earlier restr investment in banks, ins* I utilities, publishing end lar undertaken a broad rev', * vestment policy. Last week, the Governm everything possible" to bl take-over of the Home ( largest Canadian-con trolls Ashland Oil, Inc., of the Ur, Historically, striving to rate Identity has been par I at least since the annexati 1 Some historians believe Si 19th century the infant 01 had not risked fiscal ruin continental railroad, Cana [I have succumbed to t-ae pol of natural north-south tre of trade and migration. Traditionally, the Come;* Canada's nationalists, at In fact, their high tariff * " foreign capital, a result th- Only in the last decade r alism come to mean oppe i Investment. Now, even Tru 2 professional moneymen ar 1 that direction by a ,:urrer ion that seems to be widei In banking and securitie t fashionable to say, "I'm a t anat." One then hastens kind?certainly not the the socialist, left winq; of ti party. More probable, om who opposes restricting vestment but favors tight ? eign subsidiaries. Why is Canada becomn istic even as Western Euro from nationalism? What re dubious about American vision, movies, maga.zines, agers? The answers have to do sense of identity in a forr that feels itself being sue) of the superpower next dm buys two-thirds of Canace to do also with a new se: States as a place not to e is a 180-degree swing in C with the Intellectual-: in 11 The view that UM ,ed St * the entering hedge if poli domination, not to ment cost of such invest.nent, s "Silent Surrender, sod Mt t poration In Canada," by .; Levitt is an economist in hi . at McGill University in M. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 S 16391 led two mein- r, several par- t, tentatively, !ties keep him le on whether '..55 investment 2anadian in- nor had con- is, who have the last 35 teachings of -en Canadians Government, !ervative corn- has moved otism. A few Thiberal prom- * to create a ttion, a com- a investment . on of making tianadian and iBeau Govern- ake-overs of a :A mine, there- ins foreign ice companies, casting. It has of foreign-in- vowed to "do the proposed Company, the i company, by 1 States. kytain a sepa- Canadian life War of 1812. if in the late a Government -build a trans- by now would it implications 'order patterns 'yes have been rhetorically. fled to attract ries desire. =o has nation- eon to foreign ii Liberals and ong carried in public opin- : each year. tuses, it is now *Allan nation- explain what ho belongs to ,tw Democratic eans the kind American in- -mtrol of for- t tore national- moving away Canada more estment, tele- !sic and man- an emerging British colony nto the wake neighbor that 'sports. It has of the United ' ite?and that dian thinking, ? -in, investment is and cultural the economic articulated in -National Cor- -: Levitt. Mrs. who teaches and is do- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 i399 CONGRI RECORD ?SENATE Oci`ober 19, 1971 fatup t-oittput study for the Dominion fpareat of Statistics. She tam that the $4.95 paperback edition has said more than 4,000 copies, according to lie publisher. Macmillan of Canada, To- :am arobanty discloses something about aiceativity to economic nationalism 'i-Amencanism. if Cce'S:4 of "Silent Surrender" may be latue'd o is good notices, to its polemical sma te de timeliness. A small army of rani ie,tive economic nationalists, mostly armee and Eastern, has been waiting to be armee with ammunition such as Mrs. ' , one reviewer, Hugh Thorburn of Que University, said that Mrs. Levitt he most scholarly and convincing - American "ownership and con- I'll rim ray.- t, I f adduces figures that demon- :drie lee growing American role in autos, 71mm:cals, electrical equipment, farm mai,:linery, en and gas, mining and smelting. it' 's to the share of capital under Ameri- :am 'on ,roi exceeds 60 per cent. .,?r Ut Itree relate research and develop- eimentinures to manufacturing sales, iii the ratio lower in Canada than in ti .ed 1aie. f,f,.(,ws that a large part of the t?ree t if Memen. subsidiaries in Canada has Heel, nnanoed hy them out of profits or do- t al': ;)Orr.),Ar1.1.1g and not by the im.porta- tresh eanital. This leads Canadians :er, "They're buying us out 0,1u'Li money." email'. salient Surrender" is not all eco- ao I. Client are bracing passages of soul sr ' Levitt... a soft-spoken, caring woman wa.s raiseci in Vienna and who is the faart Polanyi, the late eccinomic lam 3.11. %-ri" 'Although branch-plant in- Mee es. braliril-Mant. trade unions, branch- ,:ulture aati branch-plant universities - Ile : u.siermannat traditional Canadian values, !; values persist. Respect for law and I rd regard tor civil rights, abhorrence of /eel' zaugsterism (whether practiced our or the top of the social scale) sliP tralitional respect for Ottawa as the ill mai Government of the country are still y felt in Ena,lish Canada. These are the ,qeiner1O1 of 6fo4 ash-Canadian patriotism and ISO' define the English Canadian, as dis- mm the American. This value system an ne branch plants. It is the source silt'rourislies English-Candian national- reinforced by every action of the bolted Slates which violates these A SIt. 711n balk or boggle at this dis- ame me A erawing number of Canadians Al, 1 ete diets a theory of direct invest'. .101 eill Lima'. aggression: "The global blity of the international corporation ed by every influence which elimi- ...aitural. resistance to the consump- or patterns ex tne metropolis. The corpora- baa a vested interest in the destruc- , uleoral differences and in a hornoge- ',ray oi Me the world over." ihaed answer to the nationalist is Mat Canada needs more foreign capital. Mrs. aeyi and otaers dispute that. "There is a laek tenther of savings nor of opportunities Mr ? imatable economic activity," she writes. ?ada prov.des the classical case of a rich, ndertieveloped economy in which the capital mart :et :s too narrow to channel local savings fecal investments." s: asraitely. Mrs. Levitt does not tell late. e rechannel savings. More unfortunate- alisent from her book is a con- e bong chapter of prescriptions, or at least app. ]acaes, af should Canada do about Canadians limest ip the New York stock market? Sta, a the eacessive number of refrigerator prti..: S e that overworked example of the "mini e ere renIce.'" effect? About American subsirliaries that refuse to sell to Cube :- About the making in New York or Detroit decish,ms that affect Canada? About America t. subsicE tries that borrow Canadian dollars with welch to make more profits in Canada for Atm-rican canal's? About limiting Unite it State, ievestmer t in Canada without thwar - ing tie search for new enterprises and joie for hi eh dinemplaement regions such as No Scot is sd Quebec Mrs Levitt explained a few weeks age that s'i., had onatied such a chapter because it weir ? I, I have I alien another year of wor and sae wanted ta get the book into prire Howe er, in a Lam:, informal conversatio she ne, de recommendations and also ex - presse some of idte feeling that impel man Canaan:. its to Want, to disentangle their comi - try ft', er the Unh.ed States. Some ief her real mks follow: "I 1: to see c marnunities which are sma! enougli that they in some way can sort ea contri . heir destiav. I have a ratia horror large eild huge political entities like the Unite- States at d the Soviet Union becaus I thin ie they have tote; of depersonalizing in- fluent a " eseet . too big. Any individue is ver, very jar from the center of powei In fae- ..ine son eAmes gets the impressich that e me the Pr-tsclent. of the 'United State iSn't in cor trot. "cia mitt is lees el a jungle. There ?17 ? more r ions 0,1 nf?ople'S antisocial be - has to"Ms: ? A ne 'aIt. investment togetheJ with : ee, y 'it tastes and culturai patter trough: through the similar con ? sumer aeciels his i ertalnly strengthened th trend le''rd em .t. rental integration or an nexat, , "Th:: entawa d merriment should set some 't: of re:,,ulation governing take- overs Can ad :al hi-ms by foreign companiee but a neapally really directed at furtheo take-a ere by American companies. There shoe III re some sre.-is of aotivilies in whicle take-c -ore shoelc. Ire probabited ... the media . 5 really :era sensitive, sensitive?it terms I a natioes eultural guts area, "Timm ,s a ,i,rong case for same pub- lic sec r investmerit in resources, some got - ernme . prese ice tb insure th.t greater benefli :ii: a res write an a covintry over . long p "Tb. Canacila,i Goaernm.ent hasn't bar . gained enact enemata Canada has resource. and tae, United States has markets. Whei the Ual tad States. Leeds our resources, I thinl we UI "I then, ...Way too easily, aecause politic it pressures- -pressures from provincia. govern :taints. pressures fcr elections, an-I:Mem with Canada in some way is just mat we'y affen too blasted rich. We have ? pile of escurces and we have ti-. sort os arise that We can always sell them ol to matti, a fast b Itt,k. But if a country i seriom- :Lbout ir si wing Mr its future viz, - bility eld its fatiee prosperity, you dons' just se a off ever-inane for a fast buck. An, I thin this has been the mentality of Cr - nadiar business Alid. Canadian Government: Canad:sa business sells out anything for fast a,ellar. Aml Canadian Government' , really .1 too nu sa: different." [Front s Wash it .gton Post. Feb. 14, 197] PENET, I I,,N BY 1,0REIGN BUSINESS MAKE., 5,11,5 ,DA UNEASY I By SI ix Harrelson) OTT, i, t ?Caned ens are ueing remindec constaiinv of the extent of Americans' hole: on tips country's business affairs. Many o! them axe chagrined, and effort; to curb the increa. Lag foreign owners:alp of industry amt resouo es are getting attention from Prime Minister Pierre E.liott Tradeau. The total U.S. Alike in Canada is reckonea at more than $34 billion. 'They may not seen) much to Americans, who have a trillion-dol- lar economy and a gross national debt eN- oe..eding $350 billion. Canada, however, has only a tenth of the U.S population and a lot less money and credit far development on its own. There is widespread concern that the cur- rent trend, if continued, would threaten Canadian independence. A recent Gallup poll indicated that 62 per cent of Canadians feel that the :country al- ready has enough American capital, and the Trudeau administration proposes the creation of a development corporation "10 help develop and maintain strong Canadian.- controlled and Canadian-managed corpora- tions in the private sector." There are signs that other measures are on the way, most likely including tax revisions placing foreign investoes at a disadvantage, and perhaps limiting the scope of future investments. There is not much likelihood of such ex- treme steps as nationalization, as arged by the left-wing New Democratic party, or try- ing to buy back controlling interests in com- panies now owned by U.S. investors. Spearheading the drive for curbs is the newly organized Committee for an Inde- pendent Canada, which is pushing for a program of government action, generally ac- knowledged to be moderate. In addition to backing the creation of 1, development cor- poration, the group seeks a federal agency to regulate and supervise the conduct of for- eign-controlled corporaeions and to pass on proposed takeovers of Canadian firms The issue is being pressed because U.S. takeovers are continuing to increase. Ameri- can invessors have obtained control of 1,000 Canadian companies since 1960. In all. about 8,000 companies are under foreign tIontrot, which means mainly U.S control. Foreign control of Canadian inclastry-- steadily increasing foe two decades?has reached 57 per cent of manufacturing, 83 per cent of oil and gas, 42 per cent of metal /Inning and 85 per cent of smelting. Canada has already taken action to pro- hiloit foreign ownership of such industries as railroads, airlines, banking. insurance companies radio, television, newspapers, magazines and uranium raining. Whatever actions the government takes it must consider whether cuts in foreign in- vestment would reduce the opportunities for Canadians to earn a living [From _11.S. News 4: World Report., July 19, 19711 Is CANADA TURNING AWAY FROM U.S.? OTTAWA ?In a countey where anti-Amer- icanism is a way of life for many, some Canadians are starting to worry openly about worsening relations witle the United States. Main target of criticism is their colorful andcontroversial?Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The worry is that Mr. Tru- deau is turning the coantry away from an old friend without making dependable new ones. Since he became Prime Minister in April, 19,38, Mr. Trudeau haa?among other ac- tions?spoken out against U.S. policy in Viet- nam and Cuba, halved Canada's troop strength in the Atlantic Alliance, recognized Communist China and signed an agreement with the Soviet Union calling for periodic high-level talks between the two countries. OVERWHELMIN,S PRESENCE While in Moscow in May--the first visit to Russia by a Canadian Prime Minister-- Mr. Trudeau also criticised the "overwhelm- ing presence" of the U.S., which he said is endangering Canada's 'national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps even military point of view." Critics of Mr. Trudeau charged that he was allowing the Soviet Union to drive a wedge beaween the U.S. and Canada. Mr. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 October 19, Aypiroved Forl6filteR2ffili/M9FL: RVO3lityp_INRRAIn00300020005-2 Last year Congress expressed its clear will to avoid such an entanglement when it acquiesced in what was described by the administration as a modest level of assistance for Cambodia. Aid was given to Cambodia only with the accompanying limitations that no American military forces or advisers would serve in Cam- bodia?Cooper-Church amendment? that the aid was not to be construed as a commitment to the Cambodian Govern- ment?Javits amendment?and that there could be no transfers of additional assistance to Cambodia without prior no- tice to Congress?Case-Symington amendment. Congress insisted on these limitations because it wanted to assure that Cam- bodia would not become another Viet- nam. The President concurred and signed into law all the congressional limitations. Yet the thrust 'of the Joint Chiefs' me- mo goes considerably beyond the clear intent of Congress to limit our involve- ment. And the Joint Chiefs apparently plan to do this without any additional legislative authority or public debate. Perhaps the Congress and the Ameri- can people are now willing to make the kind of commitment to Cambodia that the Joint Chiefs propose. My own view is that they are not willing. If anything is clear, it is that the United States wants to disengage itself from Southeast Asia. In any case, these are questions for the Congress and the people to decide in con- cert with the executive branch. The press reports listed four methods proposed by the Joint Chiefs that could be used to skirt congressional authoriza- tions on spending in Cambodia. I cate- gorically reject this approach of sur- reptitiously siphoning oil money from other parts of the budget to provide funds for Cambodia above and beyond what Congress approves. Such methods are totally inconsistent with our constitutional system. If loop- holes exist in the law that allow funds to be shifted around so easily, then those loopholes should be closed. The so-called discretionary powers contained within the foreign aid laws were only included in order to give successive administra- tions sufficient flexibility to react quickly to unforeseen events abroad such as an earthquake in Peru or famine in Pakistan. The intent of Congress was not to provide the kind of flexibility which would allow the Executive to request a certain amount of money for a program with the expectation at the time that more money would immediately be needed and that it could be secretly di- verted from other parts of the budget. I have had drafted legislation which would attempt to close each one of the four loopholes listed by the Joint Chiefs. But on reflection, I have decided that to close specific loopholes is not the an- swer, although I might later introduce such legislation if other efforts fail. The Executive, if it is so determined, can always find ways to get around particu- lar prohibitions. A good example is the case of Thai troops in Laos. Last year the Congress passed an amendment banning the use of foreign troops in Laos paid for by U.S. funds. The President signed this provi- sion into law. Then this year, we learned that the United States was indeed pay- ing for Thai troops in Laos, but some- how these Thai troops were not consid- ered to come under the ban because they were so-called volunteers and thus not foreign troops. In July, I introduced an amendment which would tighten the language on the use of foreign troops in Laos to include "volunteers." Similarly, I have pending five additional amendments which would close other loopholes or loosely worded provisions. But the law seems like a leaky dike with new holes appearing just as quickly as we close the old ones. It is for this reason that I have intro- duced with the :enioi. Senator from Mis- souri (Mr. SYMINGToN ) an amendment which would place an absolute ceiling on all American expenditures in Cambodia. Moreover, Senator SYMINGTON is joining me in my eat lier amendment which would freeze the number of Americans in Cambodia at 200 U.S. Government em- ployees anti fix third-country employees at 50. Our amendment states that total American spenoine in or for Cambodia cannot exceed $250 million. This figure, unfortunately, is considerably below the $330 million the administration is re- questing and even further below the roughly $380 million the Joint Chiefs would like to spend. However, it would maintain our programs in Cambodia at about current levels I am extremely pleased that the Case- Symington amendments have been tenta- tively approved by the Foreign Relations Committee. It is essentia. in authorizing foreign aid for 1972 that Congress shows that our commitment to Cambodia is not open ended. The Senate recently approved a similar Symington proposal for Laos which would place a $350 million limit on expenditures in that country. We should do the same for Cambodia and with great urgency, for in Cambodia we at least have not yet passed the point of no return with our involvement. It is now clearer than ever that the ad- ministration should come to Congress and the American people with our future plans and intentions for Cambodia. We should not have to be dependent on leaks of secret documents for our information, and we certainly cannot rationally make decisions without sufficient information. In the meantime. the United States should take no action which would in any way increase our commitment to Cam- bodia. we should go no further without a clear understanding of the stakes in- volved in creating vet another client state in Southeast Asia: Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD several recent newspaper articles on Cambodia, including the October 13 article from the New York Times. an excerpt of which was printed in the RECORD at the request of the junior Senator from Missouri. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: (From the New York Tin JOINT CHIEFS SAID To CAMBODIA WAR WASHINGTON.?The Join said to have designed a "pacification" and othe warfare for Cambodia to r. nam's western flank as A their withdrawal from Inc They have also pr ,pcser devices to augment the ft will be asked to provide Cambodian Army over th( The Chiefs submitted , month to Secretary of Laird, according to Cont Mr. Laird, who has been b Chiefs since June smut I fort, is described as still r latest version, which do about $500-million a year The final decision howl a senior policy review gr, A. Kissinger, the Presiden tional security affairs. How to protect Cambod Vietnamese forces and de Cambodian territory for ! South Vietnam's populatit Come a major proble n for As the American forces duced to 50,000 men, at ti to rely on air power for op( -a of Indochina, the piano( ; Indigenous forces to car ground combat. With a first-year grant I military aid and $70-millie the Cambodian Army ha: a panded from 30,000 men when American troops Vietnamese "sanctuaries- a current strength of a. r. Cambodians are said to ha c most of them are n mat a 000 North Vietnamese mostly east of the IV1,-kong SAIGON TROOPS South Vietnamese troop moved into Cambodia to are no more popular among the Communists forces fr ii will in any case be needed their own territory. When the Joint Chiefs sidered the problem last J a. a 1971-72 military aid pr.( r. lion, Congressional inforn rotary Laird said that he r that much and that Congr port such an increase. The chiefs said that wi military aid they could no of the Cambodian Army, b, they could expand It to Laird's budget pruners ft. increase in strength Co achieved with $252-millior But as finally submittec I Cambodian aid program ci lion in military aid, 1.110-n _ assistance and $15-million w tural commodities, jar a A lion. This was a net mere over last year's allocations ALTERNATE PLANS ?I Nonetheless, in exolainn military plans to Mr. Lair dum dated Aug. 30, the i Gated that they could get on military spending and a build-up. According to informant fered four different ways f additional $52-million so ts troops to the Cambocian A. the the "paramilitary" f )rce to 143,000. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2 S 16385 Oct. 13, 1971] VISE COSTLY !. AN ,efs of Staff are tly program of unconventional ,ct South Viet- mans continue anti- eries of budget ; that Congress expanding the xt five years. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : GIA:13DP73a00226R000300020005-2 CONGRESSIONAL RE LOH D SENAl October 19, 1971 tint wears would be simply to transfer nhiori from the economic aid program ii liarS spending, which can be done later escal year simply by the Administra- tion. ; notifying Congress. The second way wee, si be ie. use the economic aid fund for met! ;i. lia.seof an. 'common use" items such f ?it mu uns, wMcii have military as i e iv I ie 0 rati ue, th us freeing other mei- ! I. CIS. ioU way mold be to increase procure- ?r the steited States Army by $52- in;Me mat:el-Jet to the Combo- : 'zi,eavniclit" later. The fourth way iii -.e some exceptions in De- lieparimeet supply regulations, de- ' :Mei iniefe equipment to be "excess" :ever-diet :t to the Cambodians. . planners said they were further increases in the , so that it would number men ite mid-1973 and more than men by 1977. The paramilitary aey beheee. must be augmented to 0-0.000 ire mid-1973 and more than in lee; i. This would mean arming aifre(el: of Cambodia's population rime,sr: Liearly half the adult male on. :foie , e.fs weirdi provide for a .zed brieade, and artillery brigade end.iii. sLid plier.(1 units, as well as ground irfs:;;s enn exteesive logistic support. 'They faief!.4. f -iota te ;Le Agency for international iii aiei.'L ti eelp finance the parliamen- ; lerties, including the police. The fee Intelligeece Agency would be asked 0 mil at addittanal programs and to pro- eife- einift :support. rogram m activitt. drawn up by the Chiefs aivided into four headings, (dee bed `Pael teed ton," "Unconventional War- -'aseceoleeleal Operations" and "Civil :fine The ceentry would be divided into paced:idiom areas and this program Teem. ire stip-ervised by a new United States 1.e Ambassattor?as in South Vietnam? (few embaass structure. eentagon :could also establish a three- dee- .rnilitar); .omrnittee with the Cambo- dia,i,; and SCULL: Vietnamese, in which the Ire'partment would be represented trip :age Clem Frederick C. Weyan(i, the ciep- e111111a/Uil::: of American forces in /hi ,trtItington Post, Oct. 14, 19711 ma AID LIDArr PUSHED Spencer Rich) aereign Relations Committee ereet 9 to 4 yeseerclay to clamp an absolute :111 $259 million on ail forms of U.S. min- ter- artd to Cambodia in tee 97%. provht;t) tAtas added to the foreign aid tt. the rd,ttion of Sens. Clifford P. Case she as next Symington (D-Mo.). :laid it, entendeci to prevent an "in- a siecaltifesei" of U.S. outlays for Cana- n./;; :he tt4/ttt 1971 aid level is also about sit the administration had te; ia rei felon for Fiscal 1972. perm of the amendment puts a 2f1e fin the number of U.S. person- , bonia. to prevent a buildup of the uliirr:2to t,t_ tilpmen t aid group. U.S. f nee" /192:te now numebr 150. ittticttt: :.,rt of the amendment limits .laird-country nationals who fie paid faren U.S. aid funds to 50. This d to prevent use of :U.S. funds to radio 'fin sirs, mechanics and supply edefiri L'rore steer nations as Thailand, the re !.:(rmines and Korea. No such personnel ere there now.. but sources said there were eiff es La iii7e 10(.' or more. t the vete was taken on the Case- eteare amendment. sponsors accepted addite nal word! me by Sen. Jaccb K. Javite (R-N.7-7.) stating that the provision of mili- tary aeit econonde assistance to Cambodia. within tre lirni e imposed, does not con- stitute i U.S. comnitmere to the defense cef that c eintry. The Case-Syrr higton measure ortginalle imposed a $200 million eel limit and a 150- man c nine on I a. personnel. But Case sale the lie Ares were -a sed in committee to indf- cate Li a' "this wasn't intended to be a share- reduc, .( .1 of ext.. Lug programs, but a lime on indt,:laite es ;illation' to give Congrea; time 10 study 1.ew ear the Uri:Jed State-, eaeule a.) in se ?porting the war iT1 Cam- bodia. Gas- endinelit Was pereculeal timell, view o repoi Is that the Join : Chiefs , .iitaff hi d advised Defense Secretar Melt ii P Laird hat "to bring abcut a mili- tary s lion it: Cambodia," U.S. militar - aid ;sae I'd. have 0 io more than 5e00 mil - lion b 1977. Ace '-Smug to c mgressional sources, th Joint efaiefs adiv eat Laird that the number of reg ml trt Carnba d an trctsins?now at 180,00,. a year eeo?wou d nave to jump to 300,00e by 19 -7 and paeaeralitarv forces to 500,0(1., by Lin ri The 'a, its 412 that the Joirit Chiefs eon - sideree I lie $211 million military assistane - portioil ei the at ministration's total reticles: for 1.9:." of $351 n union too small, aed had de- vised mans for shifting $52 million from other iices to time military aid pn.gram. l'hL,mois intUa,led to boost the regular Cartiteatian armj :0 220,000 men by the en,i of the pter arid (1 e ''paramilitary" forces . 143.0Ce. :The rept rt s said the JCS had devisee various methods ci traniferring funds frome one at e -int to eninher or of using -'excess mill La ie equipmer Caso :aid his Amendment closed all loop - holes eeiirist amy such shifts. Laird, at press eflierence .).either confirmed nor de - Med he exists ice of ',he reported Joint Chiefs recomme Mations but did sae: no at for Li eodia bijou(' the $341 million a. ready :t quested vi Slid be sought this year. Liko earlie - Symington amendment the film any procurement bill limiting Lac:: aid to $.150 mi lmon yesterday's Cambodil prover a cover i my military lard econorn.f- aSsister.ce and no not restrict spending fm r U.S. inisstoAtts flown over Cambodia. dittittt., the NJ( to Senate Majority Leade: Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said, in a flee t: speecte that before the Sihanouk governmet was a aria:mown. Cemoodia was "an oasis c Order ill war-torn Indochina." Eut now, b.' cause the United State; had helped dra Camb Alia into the war, "Cambodia is belie:: reduc-e to chan; and devastat on." "Pron.- t he New Nola-, Times, Get 14, 1971. SENAT!'7 tsvr V. 'eta $25C?-Minnrcar Intiarr tie C 5.7`neornALI Am CPR re hn W. Finney; i . GT07.4.- Senate Foreign Reif .-- tions Committee voted today to impose 7, $250-raelion ceiling on military and econone lc aid to the Ca Mardian Government in t.17. curve:, T ye,,r The Adminisla a ion has requested anther ity te spend $3,11-million in Cambodia-. about :1",20-0-mill oa in military aid and the rernale ier in ec;:rxnic aasistance. tiendment Incorporated into the F02-- eign ::feld Authorization Bill by she commi: tee a vs d also 'unit to :200 the number ef Amer; civilian and military personnel at- signeci Cambc:d: a. ADMINI;TRA.TION IS OPPOSED The committee amendment, coasponsorce by Senator Staters Symington, Democrat of' Missoice, and Senator Clifford :P. Case, Re- publican of New Jersey, was adapted by a 10-3 I ote over tie opposition of the Adminks- tretion, which Warned that the limitations would undermine the Cambodian Govern- ment and endanger American troops as they are withdrawn from Vietnam. en a letter to the committee, Under Sec- retary of State John N. Irwin said that the Administration's requess was "the minimum which is essential to help Cambodians con- solidate their independence." The committee's actimi was prompted part by the disclosure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a longrange pro- gram that by 1977 wou:d bring military aid to Cambodia to $500-million, roughly double slut now being spent. The Joint Chiefs are reported to believe I-hat increased military assistauce to Cam- boclia ts necessary to protect South WeE torn flank as American troops are withdrawn from Indochina. But to many members at the Senate committee, the pro- posal represents a growing American com- mitment to Cambodia einiilar to that set decade ago in South Vie triarn. -ARMED CAMP" FORESEEN Si-,na,.;Or Symington, in an interview, ex- pressed fear that the real intention of the Jient Chiefs of Staff was to "shore up" the borders of Thailand by establishing positions of strength in Cambodia and Laos "where we could remain indefinitely." Senator Case, in a statement, said that the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs "would entirely destroy Cambodia's own economy and turn that country into an armed camp, altogether dependent oa United States dol- lars, arms and food for its continued exist- ence." He emphasized that the limitation cm spending was a "holding action" designed to fca:ce a full-scale review of future American policy in Cambodia and said: "We should go no further in increasing or commitment to Cambodia, at least not without a firm decision by Congress and the American people that an expanded war in Cambodia is the cc-urse our country should follow." In a statement on the Senate floor, See:- ator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, said: "The Cambodian experience is an admoni- tion to curb the easy outflow of the financial resources of the people of this nation which, for years, has been legislated in the name of national defense and foreign aid. In the case of Cambodia, the hundreds of millions of dollars already spent in a year said a half have done hardly anything for time defense of this nation except, perhaps, to weaken it by wastage. Nor have these expenditures helped the Caratiodia,n people, Wao have now been realer:ed to the common denominator of the irrelevant devastation Winch has been suffered in Laos and Viet- nam." Senator Mansfield protested that "the Lu end of present Cembodian policy, insofar as I can see, runs strongly counter not only to the expressed inclinatic)ns of the Con- gress but also to the Nixon doctrine which was supposed to provide the guidelines of that policy." In the year and a half since the Govern- ment of Prince Sihanau.k was overthrown and the United States conducted military 'operations against Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, he said, Cambodia has become "the enemy sanctuary,' the nation is "being reduced to chaos and devastation," and American support has :aecorne "the sole sig- reficatret prop which keeps the political-mili- tary structure in Pnc-mpenh from falling apart." "I sometimes wondee," he said. "how we let ourselves get involved in these travesties of foreign policy which, rather than serve the interests of this nation, give every ap- pearance of being at complete odds with those interests." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300020005-2