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January 13, 1972
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Approved For Release 2M"PVUE1KJ4AfiB004 15R000400010018-4 JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL Thursday - 13 January 1972 2. (Confidential - JMM) Informed Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, of the above, explaining that we were following well-established ground rules under which we would be of course prepared to brief Senator Symington himself, as a member of our oversight Committee, on the matters in question but could not discuss them with staff investigators of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Braswell said he thought our position was reasonable and clear and saw no need to alert Senator Stennis. 25X1 3. (Unclassified - JMM) On the Director's instructions, I met with Senator John Sherman Cooper, just returned from travel in the Middle East and Europe (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, Athens, Vienna), and said we would like to have him visit the Agency for a lunch or breakfast and share his obversations with some of our specialists. He said he had little new to contribute but had several interesting conversations in Cairo and Athens and found grounds for cautious optimism regarding the SALT talks in Vienna. He accepted our invitation and said he would call me next week to arrange a breakfast visit. Approved For Release 2009/72 I.QTT46e0415R000400010018-4 S 18286 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 14, 1972 11 with tallow. She glided to anchorage some 100 yards away. Volunteers on board fired 16 rounds in salute; they were answered by artillery in the Navy, Yard. The spectators around the ship yard and on boats dotting the harbor erupted in loud cheering. After the rejoicing of that early morning crowd in 1797, the Constellation had a long and noble career. She fought and defeated British and French men o' war, was instru- mental in crushing the Barbary Pirates, and, in the 1840's, helped open China to Western trade. During the Civil War she protected Union interests by blockading against Con- federate raiders. Then, even after the golden age of sailing ships had dimmed, she con- tinued to serve her country in a high ca- pacity when, on President Roosevelt's orders, she became the flagship of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World War II. The Constellation was towed home to Baltimore in 1955, and this month she will be feted in honor of her one hundred and seventy-fifth year. These celebrations could not be possible were It not for the Constella- tion Restoration Committee. In fact, there would be no Constellation at all if the com- mittee had not fought to save her-from the Navy itself. In her last years with the Navy, the frigate decayed badly, and In 1953 Naval officials announced their intentions to scuttle her. Concerned Baltimore businessmen, who now make up the committee, initiated political action to save the Constellation; they brought her to Baltimore: The committee, a private, nonprofit body, has labored throughout the ensuing 17 years to raise enough money to restore the ship. Close to $1.4 million has been gathered, but an additional $500,000 is needed to complete restoration-and further sums will be re- quired for maintenance thereafter. Earle Burger, an assistant director of the project, says that although no federal grants have been forthcoming, the committee re- ceives matching grants from the city and the state. Constellation commemoration medals, struck about ten years ago from copper bolts withdrawn from the hull dur- ing early restoration, sell "very, very well" at $2 each. Requests for them are received from all over the world. But most of the funds come from visitors to the ship, who pay an admission charge of $1. Mr. Burger says that at one time a peak of 60,000 people a year paid to see the man-of-war, but be- cause the temporary berth at Pier Two was a poor location, receipts dropped badly. He looks to an upswing in people visiting the frigate when she moves to her new home at Constellation Pier. The 18th century ship which visitors see today is largely the result of restoration by Baltimore naval architect Leon D. Polland. Mr. Polland, who has been chief of construc- tion and repair since work began in 1958, said recently, "The ship, when we got her, was what everyone calls a hulk, and I must admit they were close to the truth." Mr. Polland, an average-sized man with short, gray hair and steel-rimmed glasses, stood on the top deck of the Constellation. "Nothing you see here-the spar deck, the bulwarks, the masts-existed as you see it when we received the ship. In addition to re- cent decay, naval modifications in 1853 had masts came from Portland, Oregon; the ropes modernized her into a fast corvette. We are were made in New Bedford, Connecticut; and in the process of rebuilding her into a fri- deadeyes, round wooden blocks used to gate." tighten the shrouds, were carved in Ports- A frigate, Mr. Polland explained, has two mouth, England. Wherever possible, Mr. complete decks of guns, A corvette has only Polland prefers to buy American" and to cannons one. In the 1853 refitting, Constellation was for use the gun products deck, made for r instance, Baltimore. are The being cast cast "razeed," or out down, and newer, heavier, in fiberglas by McClean Brothers of Balti- guns were installed on the remaining deck. more. Mr. Polland explained that Iron guns "During our restoration," he said, "we rem would be too costly to handle because of their great weight. (An 18-pounder cannon weighs 5,200 pounds.) McClean's cannons will look "Just like the real thing," he says. If people express disappointment that parts of the Constellation are "modern," it can be answered that Williamsburg is even less genuine. Constellation should be con- sidered an authentic 18th century man-of- war, and repairs and replacements have been made only where necessary. When Constellation has taken her place as one of the great tourist attractions of Baltimore's new Inner Harbor, she will look much as she did shortly after that Sep- tember morning 175 years ago when the citizens of Baltimore came to cheer her at the start of her long career. T HE SALT TREATY AND THE l._- INTERIM AGREEMENT Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, last week the President signed the SALT Treaty and the Interim agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union re- garding the limitation of strategic arms. This vital step, approved by the Senate, was an important move toward the vital goal of reducing the risks of global con- flict and destruction. The interim agree- ment lays the groundwork for what we all hope will be fruitful negotiations in the second round of the SALT talks di- rected toward a permanent treaty to end the deadly spiral of the arms race. For too long both of the great superpowers have devoted themselves to increasing their armaments and increasing the stakes in a worldwide balance of terror. Now we can begin to halt this perilous and wasteful process, and get on with the business of making our world safer, not more dangerous. I believe that this interim agreement represents an important measure of progress toward the goal of a safer world. For the first time, both of the great nu- clear powers have agreed to place some limits upon the scope of their awesome weaponry. Hopefully, the next round of negotiations will make some progress to- ward reducing the amount of destructive force that each nation has at its com- mand. Arms reduction should be our ulti- mate goal; I am hopeful that this arms limitation agreement will be but the first step toward that vital end. The President is to be commended for obtaining this agreement. The SALT negotiators worked long and hard to pre- serve U.S. security, and at the same time to provide significant and lasting limita- tions on strategic weapons. I believe that they drove an acceptable bargain in this round of talks. Had this interim agree- ment not adequately reflected the gen- uine security needs of the United States, I am confident that the President would never have approved it, and if I did not feel that way, I would not have voted to approve it. I believe that this interim agreement provides the United States with a subtantial margin of security, and that it can point the way for meaningful and fruitful negotiations in the next round of SALT talks. I say this despite the long debate, and eventual approval of the Jackson amend- ment to the joint resolution approving the interim agreement. I do not believe that the United States got the worst part of the bargain at the SALT I talks, Nor Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 built the spar deck, which Includes a fore- castle and a quarter deck aft. Thus she again became a frigate." Mr. Polland is guided in his work by David Steel's Dimensions, an extensive list drawn up in England in 1790. The original ship was almost certainly built to similar specifica- tions. "These figures are based on centuries of experience. You need dependable references and sources-no one can just builr: a frigate," he smiled. Other sources include drawings of sister ships such as The Congress. But great care must be taken to make every detail the right size. "The masts and spars, for In- stance, are all in a certain proportion to one another. Aside from the, purely functional purpose, a shipbuilder invariably attempts to create something proportionally perfect for others to admire. He looks upon a well-pro- portioned ship as something akin to a beau- tiful woman." The 'beautiful woman" now berthed c Pratt Street has been the center of a raging controversy. Even though copper pins bear- ing the date 1797 and the name of the ship- builder, David Stodder, have been discovered, some people have refused to believe that the Constellation is an 18th century ship. "We guess around 25 per cent of the ship is original," stated Earle Burge in the fri- gate's defense. "That's quite a lot in a ship of Constellation's age. With wooden ships in salt water, the rate of replacement is quite high, Timber might be replaced every ten or 12 years-though wood in the lower decks and lower hull might last much longer." Other details believed to have been on the ship since 1797 include the carved gang- boards on the top deck, the hawser clamp for the old hemp anchor rope, iron hooks to hold the crew's hammocks, many of the "knees.' or naturally curved beams connecting the sides of the ship to the decks, and the bilge pump. (There is a similar one on the Con- stitution, the only other U. S. ship of 1797 In existence.) The bases of the Constellation's masts are girdled with iron hoops or bands of mid-19th century vintage. "The wooldings-the word simply means windings-were originally rope," he explains. "Iron fastenings had not been Invented when Constellation was built, and all rigging fit- tings consisted of rope instead of iron. Iron fittings were invented in the 1840's and forged in the shipyards. But the iron bands are so much stronger and so much more permanent than rope that I would hesitate to take them off." Precisely the same decision, he added, was reached by the caretakers of Boston's Constitution and the H.M.S. Victory in Portsmouth, England. The iron hoops are the only iron to remain, however; the remaining fittings of the rest of the masts and of the spars have been recreated in the original rope. The latter iron fittings will be displayed below decks to show the development of naval architecture. The topmasts and topgallants are the latest parts to be reconstructed. Mr. Polland's team of 12 craftsmen ("They do the work of 30 men-if we had sufficient money the job could have been completed in 12 months") should finish the renovation of Constella- tion by the end of this year. Most of the carpentry has been carried out here, but materials have often come from far away. The upper sections of the Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 October 14, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Mr. President, it is clear that FRED HARRIS has committed himself to bring- ing about needed change in many areas, of our national life. He has served with', distinction in this body, and I regret ~, very much that he will not be once again taking his seat here when the 93d Con- gress convenes in January. However, I know that FRED and his wonderful wife LaDonna intend to remain in Washing- ton, each continuing the fine work they have been involved in, and I think all Senators would agree with me when I say I am very glad that they will. RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES RAPER JONAS Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, this week House colleagues from both sides of the aisle and from States scattered throughout the Nation paid well-deserved tribute to an out- standing North Carolinian, Representa- tive CHARLES RAPER JONAS, who is retiring after an illustrious 20-year career. I am proud today to join in that salute and to bring to the attention of the Sen- ate some of the reasons for that general acclaim. One of the explanations, surely, is the fact that from the very start of his Capi- tol Hill career he established a reputation as a highly knowledgeable Member with a tremendous capacity for hard work and attention to detail. He also demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility and integrity in both fiscal matters and questions of legislative principle. Although he was just the second Re- publican Member of Congress to repre- sent a North Carolina district in this century when elected in 1952, he has shown throughout his career a capacity for putting the needs of the State and country above purely partisan considera- tions. Those qualities have earned him the respect and admiration of all who have known him and had the opportunity of either serving with him or observing the results of his work in the House. Thesame attributes account for his as- signment to the Appropriations Commit- tee, a highly coveted position, early in his career and for the widening scope of his influence on the committee and in the House as a whole in the ensuing years. The hallmark of his career and the trait for which he is best and most widely known has been his continuing battle against carelessness and waste in Gov- ernment spending. A colleague from another State said of him the other day that his contribu- tion to the cause of good government is virtually immeasurable. If the taxpayers of the Nation knew how many millions of dollars CHARLIE'S prudence- had saved them, they would rise up to thank him with one resounding voice. To that, those of us who have served with him in North Carolina's delegation for so long can say a fervent "amen" as well as "Godspeed." RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ALTON A. LENNON Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, as the second session of the 92d Congress draws to a close, I think it appropriate to bring to the Senate's attention the fact that it marks the end f the congressional career of a distin uished North Carolinian whom sour nators will recall as a colleague in th' dy. speak in that regard of H n. AL N A. LENNON who is retiring a er eig terms in the House as Represe ta- tive om North Carolina's Seventh is- trict. He as elected to that seat afte serv- ing as Member of this body by ber- natorial ppointment in the earl 1950's upon the eath of Senator Willi Smith. His wor has been of a dist' guished caliber refs ting great credit t himself and to his ate during both haws of his Capitol H' career. While serv' with distin d as a member of the House Arm d Services Committee and the Mere nt Marine and Fisheries Co ittee, h' most note- worthy House ac omplis ments have been in the area of luarin resources re- search and development " his capacity as chairman of the u committee on Oceanography. He was signally hon ed recently by the National Oceanogr l is Association which presented him th"its first Man of the Year award f the`, marine re- sources programs de eloped .under his direction. \ That was but one the honoie he has been accorded at var ous times dul'ing his career in which heas attained the re- spect not only of h s own delegatioiia,but of the House as a hole for his legi a- tive knowledge, fo his close attention issues affecting t interests of his State.. and for his dedi ation to duty, and un- flagging integrit . North Carol' a and the Nation have benefited Brea y from his service and, as one privile d to work with him as a friend and co league during most of his years in Wasllington, I am proud tobring his accomplishments to the attention of the Senate. THE 175Th ANNIVERSARY , OF THE U.S. FRIGATE "CONSTELLATION" Mr. BE. LL. Mr. President, it is with great per$onal satisfaction that I-report to you today on the success of the recent celebration in connection with the 175th anniversary of the launching of the U.S. frigate Constellation. This vessel is now permanently docked at Pier 1, in her home port of Baltimore. Congress recently passed and Presi- dent Nixon signed into law S. 2499. This legislation, which I sponsored, author- izes the Secretary of the Treasury to strikd up to 100,000 commemorative med4ls marking this anniversary. The design and specifications for these med- als drill soon be determined by the Con- stellation Committee and the Treasury Department. I believe that these medals will be an enduring and fitting tribute to this historic ship, the first ship of the U.S. Navy. The funds raised by the sale of these medals will substantially aid ,the untiring efforts of the Constellation Restoration Committee to return this 18th-century ship to its original condi- tion, minus the structural changes neces- sitated by long years of service. Already, my office has received numerous in- quiries regarding the purchase of these commemorative medals. I wish to thank all Senators and the Members of the House of Representa- tives who supported this legislation, and to let them know that, by so doing, they shared in and contributed to the week- long dockside activities in honor of this vessel. These festivities culminated Thurs- day, September 7, 1972. At this time I had the privilege of participating in a ceremony which served to remind all of us standing on the new Constellation Pier in Baltimore of our Nation's early struggles for freedom and liberty. We were pleased to have present the Soviet square rigger Tovarish, under the com- mand of Captain Candenko, and a com- plement of Soviet cadets who were vis- iting Baltimore to honor the Constella- tion. We were especially pleased to have as our guest of honor Mrs. David Eisen- hower. Mrs. Eisenhower graced not only these ceremonies, but the city of Balti- more and the State of Maryland as well, and I am happy to say that she was welcomed with warmth and enthusi- asm. Both Senator MATHIAS and I were proud and honored to welcome these dis- tinguished guests as they joined Balti- more in paying tribute to the Constel- lation. During these ceremonies it was my pleasure to present to the Constellation Committee a framed copy of Senate bill 2499, a copy of the public law bearing the President's signature, and the pen used by the Chief Executive to sign this legislation into law. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent Iat the article entitled "The Con- stellation at 175," published in the Sep- tember 'issue of Baltimore magazine be printed iwii the RECORD. The article sum- marizes the current activities of the Constellation, Committee and indicates future plans \for this noble and aged vessel. There being fio objection, the article was ordered to be' Tinted in the RECORD, as follows: THE "CONSTELLATION" AT175 (By Christopher T. George) One hundred and seventy-five years ago this month a large crowd gathered at a Fell's Point shipyard. They had Cpme to see the 9 a.m. launch of the frigate Constellation, the second ship to be launched by the fledg- ling U.S. Navy and the first to put to sea. (The frigate United States had been launch- ed several weeks before.) To a succession of drum rolls, men removed wedges that held the ship above the dark waters of the Patapsco. The Constellation then slid slowly downward on ways greased Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 October 1.4,, 197, proved For CONGRESSIONAL RECORDP7 SENATER000400010018-4 S 18287 do I wish to commit our negotiators at the SALT II talks to any hard and fast formula for the next agreement, even before negotiations have begun. Nor do I wish to commit the Senate-which is constitutionally required to advise and consent to any treaty that may arise out of SALT II-to some formulation of policy which may not even be appli- cable for years to come. Yet that is one way in which the Jackson amendment might be construed. Senator JACKSON's amendment urges the President not to agree to any further agreement with the Soviets which "limit the United States to levels of intercon- tinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union," and specifically sets forth as the standard by which "inferiority" is to be judged, the numerical equality expressed in the re- cently ratified ABM treaty. The Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) stated repeatedly on the Senate floor that he did not believe that any agreement which did not provide for "equality" between the United States and the Soviet Union would be acceptable to him. Let me state, Mr. President, that I would heartily agree with Senator JACKSON on the point. We live in an extremely dangerous world, unfortunately, neither side of the global conflict has ever been able to bring itself to rely on the other side's professed good intentions. And so we have both built up these huge arsenals with which to deter the other side from launching any suicidal assault against the other. I believe that at a minimum, our deterrent capability should and does rest upon equality of forces with the Soviet Union. I believe that this has been-and should continue to be-the basis of our defense posture. I can see no greater risk in these times of high peril and uncertainty than creating or presenting a condition of strategic inequality; a condition which might prove a deadly temptation to the other side to attempt to gain some ad- vantage from its own superiority. So I believe in strategic equality. With- out it I do not believe that we can main- tain our own security; nor could we play our role in the maintenance of the se- curity of our friends and allies in other parts of the world. And it is precisely because I believe in strategic equality that I opposed the Jackson amendment. Senator JACKSON suggests that the only equality that counted was the strict nu- merical parity of intercontinental land and undersea-based missiles, and strict parity of throweight on a megatonnage basis. This narrow definition of equality of strategic forces would actually make more difficult the negotiation of a further arms limitation and reduction agree- ment. . This narrow definition of "equality" simply makes no sense in terms of pres- ent-day defense realities. The United States presently enjoys greater than a 2- to-1 advantage over the Soviet Union in the number of targetable, deliverable nuclear warheads. In 5 years, we hold the same advantage, some 10,000 war- heads to the Soviets' approximately 4,000 warheads. How can it be said then, that an agreement which does not exact as one of its terms strict numerical equal- ity of missiles-of missiles, not targetable warheads-provides for strategic inferi- ority? Yet this is precisely how Senator JACKSON interprets his own amendment- that no matter how great our advantage in warheads, we must have numerical parity in intercontinental missiles, or we will be in an "inferior" position. I cannot agree with this analysis, for our strategic strength is based upon our entire array of weapons systems deployed around the globe. Our national security is adequately protected not only by our intercontinental missiles, but by our sea- based Polaris force, and by our strategic bombing capability. In fact, any of these three forces is sufficient in and of itself to deliver the kind of destructive blow to any enemy that should deter that enemy from launching a first strike at the United States. Even under the most des- perate type of circumstances, where a successful first strike could manage to destroy every last one of our land-based missiles, the nuclear destruction capable of being unleashed by our submarine- launched missiles and by our bombers would be sufficient to destroy any enemy many times over. And our submarine- based missile deterrent is as close to in- vulnerable as is possible. Our strategic bombers are in the air around the clock. Our security, in short, depends on no single element of our strategic forces. And thus, the level of strategic force which is necessary for us to deter any aggression against us need not be hinged upon any single element of weaponry. Our superior technology has enabled us to develop weapons far more sophisti- cated than our adversaries. We do not need the same numbers of missiles to ac- complish the same destructive results. Our MIRV warheads make possible the utilization of a single missile to produce far more destruction than our adver- saries can produce with larger numbers of missiles. And our more compact war- heads are equal in deadly force to the larger, heavier warheads of the Soviets. Since we are some 2 years further ad- vanced in the technology warhead deliv- ery than are the Soviets, we have been able to amass an intercontinental stra- tegic force which is far superior to the Soviets, and will continue to remain so. Under these circumstances, there was no need for the Senate to pass the Jack- son amendment. Indeed the language of the Jackson amendment might be termed meaningless-that is, in terms of strategic realities. However, it could have a most unfortunate effect. Through its insistence that we attain numerical par- ity with the Soviets in missiles, in addi- tion to our overwhelming superiority in warhead technology, the Jackson amendment may have the effect of con- vincing the Soviets that we were not sin- cere in reaching an agreement to limit strategic arms. Indeed, given our great advantage in warhead technology, strict adherence to numerical equality in mis- siles-that is, delivery vehicles-might mislead the Soviet Union into fearing that we were preparing for a preemptive first strike capability. If this were to de- velop, I fear that the real incentive for the Soviets would be to step up develop- ment of their own MIRV technology, and to accelerate the momentum of their al- ready burgeoning nuclear submarine fleet. I am sure this was not the result in- tended by Senator JACKSON. But I fear that this might follow from such a con- struction of the Jackson amendment. In- deed, although spokesmen for the ad- ministration declared that the adminis- tration supported the Jackson amend- ment and the concept of "interconti- nental strategic equality," the adminis- tration also made it clear that they did not support Senator JACKSON'S interpre- tations of his amendment. This rather confusing distinction, I must confess, made it more difficult to gather exactly what was the position of the administra- tion. But the crucial factor is that it will be the Executive who will be negotiating the next round of strategic arms agree- ments, and not the Senate. We will have our chance to advise and consent to agreements presented to us. It seems to me that that is the time for debate and decision as to the proper shape of these agreements-not before they are signed, much less negotiated. Mr. President, recognizing the need to move forward to SALT II, I voted to approve this interim agreement despite the unfortunate and, I believe, unwise tacking on of the Jackson amendment. I am prepared to exercise my judgment upon any finished agreement when the proper time comes. I shall do this with an eye on protecting the security of the United States. That cannot be negoti- ated away. I hope that my reservations about the deleterious effect of the Jack- son amendment are unfounded, and that the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union can move on now toward concrete agreements which will serve the cause of peace, in our ime, and for all the generations to come. ENCOURAGEMENT FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, America must have a strong economy if we are to remain a strong Nation and if we are to solve the multitude of social problems today. The only way we will have a strong economy is to have a healthy climate for business and industry. Yet today we find business under strong attack. We find a frightening lack of knowledge and understanding as to how our business enterprise system works, and how it must work to sup- port the society we all want. People who want a better life for everyone should seek to encourage busi- ness enterprise, not tear it down. Mr. President, an excellent speech on this subject was delivered on August 3, 1972, by William P. Reilly, a civic leader and the chief executive officer of Arizona Public Service Co. The Arizona Legisla- tive Review recently printed this speech which was delivered before the Business Political Committee of Arizona. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000.400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 1., 197,,! ENCOURAGEMENT FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE Fellow members of productive America: You are highly complimented by being so addressed-all of us here represent the Pro- ductive America sector of our economy, And, we are bi-partisan which means active in both parties. This is a far cry from being non-partisan which means inactive in both parties. Productive America carries the burden of responsibility for providing the means for successfully meeting the total needs of the people of America-and large portions of the world. 't'here is a difference between those who produce and consume-and those who con- su_Ime without producing. You are producers. Let's look at where we are- 209 million people 70 million under 18-not in work force 22 million over 64-not in work force 7 million-sick, lame and lazy So, half of our people are not pan of our productive work force. How about the other half- First, let's divide them-men and women, about 52 million each. When you deduct people in schools and colleges, members of the armed services, in prisons, the young anti-establishment people who roam the country-the noble women who stay home to take care of their fam- ilies-we get down to a labor force of about 85 million, of which about 30 million are women-thus you have 85 million men and women taking care of the 209 million. But, within the 85 million labor force are those who provide services financed by the gross national product of America's produc- ive system. These people include those who 1-1111 our federal institutions, our state, county, mu- nicipal governments, our schools, etc., etc.- who are entirely dependent for their liveli- hoods on the fruits of the productive sector. Then there are those who depend on the voluntary contributions supported by busi- nesses taking care of local unmet needs- and the foundations financed by the wealth of the nation to study and condemn our >stems- And, there are the unemployed who, through no fault of their own. are between jobs. There is talk about a 4-day work week, more recreation, more leisure time activi- tes-and at the same time a need for 35 mil- lion more jobs by 1980. The reality to be faced is-all but those 17 and under can vote-producer or no:n-pro- dricer, and the non producers outnumber the producers. Productive America provides the means- and is virtually non-existent in policy roles- taxation without representation was never greater. Did you see one business executive at the last convention-one representing a large taxpayer-or a larger employer? (Editor's Note: Reference is to the Democratic Na- tional Convention. Mr. Reilly's address was delivered prior to the Republican conven- tion.) Did we see one on the list of Arizona dele- ;.stes? Did you read the platform adopted? Did it sicken you as a productive Ameri- ,'au? Are we not somewhat responsible for this? Does it not bother you that we are left nut of decisions? That we are led instead of leading? During the next few months we will be under a barrage of criticisms- And when it comes will we run and hide- or will we redouble our efforts to educate people-our employees, our customers--- Will we work harder to support candidates who know and understand the benefits of a productive America-and vote to preserve its benefits? Recently I heard the statement made in an addres8 that "The Business of America is Business." The theme of this talk attacked the tee that has made this country what i~ is today. The business and industrial sector of America was castigated--portraying them as elements that are out to reap the highest profit possible, with Tittle or no regard for the consequences of their actions. In so doing, the speaker joined the ranks of an ever-increasing chorus of people who have launched an assault on the reputation of America. These people question many of our na- tional institutions, including our economic system. They crusade for radical changes in our system of corporate ownership, changes so drastic that they would all but destroy free enterprise as we know it. Their beliefs, their purposes, their actions run contrary to the principles of the majority of our peo- ple. Deliberately or not, they are also weaken- ing our free competitive system. And they are having an impact that s frightening to behold. In one survey conducted recently, :Au- dents on campuses from coast to coast were asked whether they agreed with this propo- sition: "Business is overly concerned with profits and not with public, responsibili t.y." Sixty-one per cent of all students said they agreed strongly and another 34 per cent agreed partially. Only five per cent disagreed. Its pretty obvious that the image of busi- ness in the eyes of college students isn't what it ought to be. If you were so inclined you could write that off on the basis that college students are a relatively small portion of the total popula- tion. But, let's look at another survey-which asked a representative sample of the Ameri- can public: "Just as a rough guess, what per cent profit on each dollar of sales do you think the average manufacturer makes, ai ter taxes?" The median public estimate of a manufac- turer's after-tax profits was 28 per cent. But the correct answer for that particular poll was 4 per cent-and that figure has not been as high as 6 per cent since 1950. It's a little disconcerting to know that at a time when profit margins for American industry are close to the lowest in a quarter of a century, the American public's estimate ofprofit is at its highest. And this fallacy about profit is not limited to one segment of our population. The mis- conception exists among every group sur- veyed: men and women, young and old, whites and blacks, manual workers and farmers, Republicans and Democrats, Ameri- cans with high incomes and low incomes, those with some college education and those with none, those who own stock and those who don't. All guessed wrong, and all by a very wide margin. Disturbing? It is to ine. And I'm sure it is to you. Surprising? Not a bit. Especially when you consider that few, if any, teachers in our high schools and universities have ever had basic courses in economics-and few, if any, have been exposed to the working world as employees of Productive America. I'm sure all of you in recent months have seen results of surveys that paint an equally bleak picture. They paint a picture of more than 200 million people supported and sustained by a system that is an integral facet of their daily lives-but about which they know or understand very little. From the halls of Congress to the campus lecture circuit and the TV talk-show, every type of platform is being used to convince the American public that private business !s a sinister influence on our society. The words and the bias may differ from person to per- son, but the basic contentions are always the same-our products are shoddy . . . our ad- vertising is deceptive . . our prices are rigged . . . our profits are excessive . our plants are the major sources of pollution . . . and our economic and political power is enormous. That's the picture some people would like to paint of America, and its business system. But that's not my picture, and I'm sure it's not yours. My picture of America, though, contains exactly the same words I referred to at the outset. But when you put them in their proper position in a sentence structure, you get a much more accurate and positive view of this country and its business enterprises. That's why I think: "The Business of Bust- ness is America." That statement gives me a picture of a life support system for this country. There are nine million or so individually owned businesses of every conceivable type that provide jobs and goods and services for all the people of America. Corporations alone, which seem to be the form of business that is the favorite target, number more than one and a half million. In addition to the direct payroll that these businesses and corporations provide, they are also the major source of revenue for taxation at nearly every level of government. They, therefore, provide the foundation for additional millions of jobs at the federal, state and local level. In addition to that, they provide much of the dollar support for ours schools, police and fire protection, construction of public faci'.l- ities, roads, buildings and the sundry other governmental services. And by far not the least, they provide much of the support for the defense of our country. The reason that business is able to play such a major role in the support of life in this country today is because business is de- signed to operate at aprofit-and share its profits with its owners, its shareholders, its employees, the various governmental taxing agencies, the volunteer service organizations and the preservation and defense of the na- tion. The sharing of its profits through divi- dends paid to investors underlie the integrity of our insurance policies life, health and lia- bility, which give us such peace of mind. This is just one example of benefit to the Ameri- can system of sharing in the country's pro- ductivity. Let me give you an example of revenue sharing-by our company in one year-- 1971- $37 million collected from our customers went into coffers of taxing agencies- t/2 of our profits went to Uncle Sam--and he does not have-one-penny invested in our company but shares equally in our profits through his income tax portion- When we needed a rate increase of $10 mil- lion-we had to ask for $20 million-!/2 to the company and viz to Uncle Sam. This is infla- tion producing! Each one of you is in the same boat-it will get worse instead of better- Our first job, of course, is in Arizona--let's get with it. What will you do about assuring that the Business of Business Is Arizona and America. NEED FOR FEDERAL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STANDARDS Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, when a worker is injured on the job today, his or her economic outlook is bleak. Dis- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 October 12, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE quake, fire, wind and flood problems that lead to disasters, and will examine and develop means for preventing or controlling disasters. Particular attention will be given to disasters that may result from combined actions, such as, earthquake and fire, fire and wind, earth- quake and tsunami flooding. An important component of the program is the formation of a disaster information cen- ter which will serve as a library of pertinent publications on natural disasters, as a stor- age of general information, and as a data bank. This will serve as the main unifying element of the program. The disaster infor- mation service will also be a source of data and informtaion for others concerned with natural disasters. It should be especially help- ful to government agencies, private organiza- tions, and practicing engineers who are in- volved with problems of natural disasters. Another important element of the program involves short-term interdisciplintary stud- ies, of two to six weeks duration, during which a particular problem or event will be studied by a group of faculty, research fel- lows, students, and a much larger number of active participants. who can contribute spe- cial knowledge, and who have special need to solve problems posed by natural disasters. The basic objectives of the program are to determine why natural events lead to dis- asters and by what efficient means they can be controlled or prevented. CORRECTIONS OF THE RECORD Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I find, to my great dismay, that on yesterday, when I had spoken devoted and affectionate words in respect of my colleague, Sena- tor COOPER, the RECORD, through a print- ing error, failed to show that I had spok- en them, and by implication attributed them to another Senator. I ask unanimous consent that the REc- ORD be corrected at the top of the third column on page S17408 by inserting my name before the words "This is a very personal matter to me." The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cor- rection will be made. CEDITORIAL COMMENTS ON SALT INTERIM AGREEMENT Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, since the passage of my amendment to the SALT interim agreement resolution, con- siderable editorial comment has come to my attention, some of it published during the Senate debate on the amendment. I am encouraged to note how much of the comment supports our effort to secure passage of the amendment and recog- nizes that our demand for equality in intercontinental strategic forces in any future strategic arms limitation agree- ment is in the best interests of a sound and prudent national security posture for the United States. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that a representative selection of the editorial comment be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the REg ORD, as follows: [From the Columbus (Ga.) Ledger, Aug. 23, 1972] SENATOR JACKSON Is RIGHT-EQUALITY IN MISSILE STRENGTH There can be no sound argument advanced against the position Sen. Henry Jackson (D- Wash.) has taken on the October renewal of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. Sen. Jackson has offered a new preamble to the interim agreement ratified by the Senate as a result of the first round of SALT. Essentially, it urges the United States to seek equality with the Soviets in levels of inter- continental strategic forces during the Octo- ber phase of negotiations. Senators backing the Jackson guidelines are remarkable for their political diversity. Senators Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond and Gale McGee of strong views on defense have joined such senators as Robert Pack- wood, Lawton Chiles and David Gambrell, none of whom are particularly known as hard liners on defense matters. Sen. Jackson has, by what amounts to an individual crusade, found 30 co-sponsors for his resolution, a tribute to his ability to educate his fellow senators and draw support. The Jackson measure says that we can't rely on the negotiators of the first round of SALT to produce a satisfactory deal on offensive weapons, an equal number of mis- siles, for each side, unless there is strong congressional opinion forcing them to do it. The deal which allows Russia numerical su- periority in misslies and submarines is his target. Equality in numerical strength is his goal. Welcome as the news of successful negoti- ations with Russia on this complex subject was to all Americans, there is rational op- position to the particular quotas of weap- onry which are involved in possible agree- ments on offensive missiles and submarines. We believe Sen. Jackson is correct. We believe equality is the minimum re- quirement for American security in any deal with Russia or any other major potential enemy. We prefer superiority but if equality is accompanied by improved and beneficial relations with potential enemies which makes them become potential friends, we support that much of a gamble because we believe the future of mankind and the world de- mands it. We can't support agreements which would make us subject to potential blackmail if we allow ourselves to assume an inferior position to Russia or anyone else, however. Sen. Jackson has done well and he is correct. We believe he must achieve support of enough people to influence enough more: of his fellow senators to get his guidelines made official. [From the Greensburg (Pa.) Tribune-Review, Aug. 25, 1972] ARMS INFERIORITY-SALT STACKED DECK AGAINST U.S. SECURITY (By W. J. -Griffith I[I) For a man who prides himself on being an excellent poker player, President Nixon has managed to stack the deck against him- self-and the security of the United States. That's the basic assessment of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., regarding the anti- ballistic missile treaty and the five-year nu- clear weapons "moratorium" agreement which evolved from the Strategic Arms Limi- tation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Noting that the U.S. SALT negotiators themselves admitted the "mora- torium" is unsatisfactory as a premanent solution, Jackson has proposed a resolution which would put the Senate on record oppos- ing any more SALT agreements locking the United States into arms inferiority. Jackson charges that the "moratorium" is onesided, limiting the United States to the present 42 nuclear submarines and 1,054 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles while permitting the Soviets to continue con- struction of both weapons systems until they have 62 nuclear subs and 1,618 land-based ICBMs stationed in permanent silos. The Washington senator adds that while Wash- ing unilaterally renounced construction of mobile ICBMs, Moscow is free to build as S 17627 many as it wants without violating the agree- ment, as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird acknowledged. Further, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Pentagon chief of research and engineering, warned: "Although the United States has a lead in deployed technology -hat now offsets this imbalance, (in numbers), Soviet exploitation of their numbers and throw-weight capabil- ity could adversely effect the strategic balance." Nevertheless, Laird contends that both sides gave up something in the disarmament negotiations. Laird says that "we are stop- ping our momentum in the ABM field. They are stopping their momentum in the offen- sive weapons area." Foster offered a different analysis in June-July hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Sen. Howard W. Cannon, D-Neb., asked Foster: "Is it not true that the Soviets will not have to exercise restraint in their mo- mentum, that is, they will not have to curtail their current building rate of submarines for at least three years and perhaps more?" Foster: "Yes, six; that is correct" Cannon: "On the other hand, the United States has agreed to give up something this year, and that is work on three ABM sites at the Minuteman missile installations. in fact, we will actually be dismantling work ,already started at Malmstrom Air Force Base ..." Foster's reply: "Yes, that is cor- rect." In the hearings, Jackson asked Gerard Smith, chief U.S. SALT negotiator, how much Soviet momentum in offensive nuclear weapons had been slowed by the "mora- torium." Smith answered: "I do not think you can answer that ... I do not think you can get a specific answer to that question." Smith couldn't answer a number of other questions, as well, about what the United States agreed to in SALT. Jackson asked Smith what "under construction" meant in regard to submarine production. Smith's answer: "We do not have an agreed defini- tion." Further, the chief negotiator admitted that "we were not able to negotiate a defini- tion of what constitutes a heavy missile." Yet the USSR is allowed 313 heavy missiles while the U.S. is permitted none. The "moratorium" is vague on othef mat- ters, too. For example, Jackson asked: "Did you try to negotiate a throw-weight freeze?" (Throw-weight is the payload a missile can throw or carry.) Smith answered: "No, sir." Jackson asked why there was no limit on diesel subs which carry nuclear missiles. Smith replied: "I don't consider a 700- or 400-mile SLBM (submarine launched bal- listic missile) a modern missile." Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, chief of Naval oper- ations, stated, however, that "a 700-mile range missile could do catastrophic damage to a substantial portion of our people and cities whereas it could do very little damage to theirs." When Jackson tried to find out what, exactly, the United States bargained away during the negotiations, Smith refused to answer, stating that "I would not like to identify publicly what our position was." Jackson presented figures he said repre- sented the American position on Aug. 4, 1970: The United States demanded parity on all long-range missiles but eventually set- tled for 1,710 while giving the Soviets 2,358. Originally the Nixon administration pro- posed 250 heavy missiles for both sides but finally agreed to build none while Moscow was granted 313. U.S. SALT negotiators two years ago de- manded a ban on all mobile land-based ICBMs. Washington announced in May it would build none but the Soviets can con- struct as many as they want. Dr. William Van Cleve, a SALT adviser for the U.S. from 1969 to 1971, agrees with Jackson's assessment of what the Nixon ad- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 17628 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 12, 1972 nonistration gave up. Van Cleve was the only person outside the government who was called upon to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the June-July hearings. "Those agreements," Van Cleve noted, "do not resemble those deemed acceptable in i )69 or 1970," which was nuclear equality. In.. fact they don't resemble what Laird lbought was acceptable four months before they were signed. Last February, Laird warned that "if we were placed in an in- ferior position where the Soviet Union would have substantially more ballistic mis- ,ae submarines than the United States hid . this could have a tremendous effect upon the future course of the United 6,:ctes." [from the Greenburg (Pa.) Tribune- Teview, Sept. 6, 1972] ONLY ONE WINNER ,;en. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., has received a powerful assist from organized labor in their battle to prevent any more White House agreements, accepting American military in- feriority. he AFL-CIO executive council states: "American labor is firmly opposed to a treaty on offensive weapons that would limit the United States to levels of interconti- nental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." the Washington Democrat has jointly ;,,ponsored a bi-partisan Senate amendment to the five-year "moratorium" on offensive weapons which grew out of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This agreement lays the groundwork for a treaty which would permanently freeze levels of nuclear arms. Jackson has pointed out that the "mora- torium" is basically unilateral. The Soviet Union is free to go on building up a tre- mendous edge in,both nuclear missile sub- marines and intercontinental ballistic mis- siles while the United States has agreed to maintain its present levels. Even If the Kremlin should honor the "moratorium," at the end of five years it would have three ICBMs and nuclear missile subs for every two of ours. The AFL-CIO warns: "If these disparities were made the basis for a follow- on treaty in this period of rapidly changing technology, the United States would be placed in a position of strategic inferiority." Organized labor, in fact, is understating the danger. As Dr. John S. Foster Jr., direc- tor of Pentagon research, acknowledges, So- viet weapons technology could surpass that of the United States before the five-year period has expired, which would further en- danger American security. Up until recent years, the United States had always maintained nuclear superiority- a strategy that has prevented a major war between the free world and the Communist bloc. It is a policy that should not be abandoned, even for a short span. In the arms race there is only one winner; the rest are losers. ,From the New York Post, Sept. 12; 1972] A CRITICAL HOUR (By William F. Buckley, Jr.) When on accepting the renomination of his party at Miami Beach a few weeks ago Richard Nixon said that he would never ne- gotiate an arms limitation agreement from a position of inferiority, he ran a terrible risk. The risk was that someone would read out to him from the transcript of the vari- ous press conferences in Moscow in which Henry Kissinger gave out the details of the SALT Treaty. I counted seven times that Mr. Kissinger defended relegation of the U.S. to inferiority on the grounds that after all we were talking not about an ideal situation but about the current situation. Mr. Kissinger's point was that the Soviet Union has been going hell- bent for strategic armament for three years while we have been coasting, and that we are better off more or less freezing the situation than waking up a year or two from now to find the Soviet lead drastically lengthened. In other words, we negotiated from in- feriority. The scandal of creeping American arms in- feriority is easily the best kept secret in the world. notwithstanding that the facts are widely available and have been remarked by the Chiefs of Staff and by the Reader's Di- gest, who between them cover just about everybody. Fortunately, the facts are well known to a group of senators who are right this minute engaged in one of the toughest and most important parliamentary mane~z- vers of the decade. They are fighting for what we call the Jackson-Scott-Allott amendment to the In- terim Agreement. Now that amendment does several things. But mostly what it does is to address the President of the U.S. thusly: Friend, when you come back to us in a couple of years with SALT II-the treaty that is supposed to incorporate-a permanent lessening of the strategic potential of the Soviet Union and the United States-do not present this chamber with a document that grants the Soviet Union superiority. As things now stand under SALT I, the Soviet Union has a 50 per cent advantage in launching sites and a 400 per cent advantage in payload, once they are done Mirving. Meanwhile, between now and the time you come back to us with the treaty, we in the Senate will from time to time question the Executive on what strides are being made to narrow the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, within the terms of the current agreement. What kind of re- search are you doing, for instance? And when we say equality with the Soviet Union, we mean equality of the kind spelled out for instance in the ABM Treaty, not the fancy-talk equality by which such as Sen. Fulbright transmogrify a 4 to 1 disadvantage into equality, on the nice metaphysical prin- ciple that every Russian can only die-once. The doves, sensing a great danger to their vision of a disarmed America, are horrified to note that Sen. Jackson's got himself 44 co- sponsors for his amendment. With 44 co- sponsors, one can assume a great many others will vote with the 44 easily enough for a swollen majority. What will be left over is a highly visible minority who actually are voting against American equality in strategic arms, not the most attractive record to offer their constituents in an elction year. The doves then fought back with a Mans- field amendment about playing fair under the rules of SALT I, but the Jackson people completely outwitted them by going for it 100 per cent (the vote was 85 to 1) on the, grounds that the language of the proferred amendment was totally harmonious with that of the Jackson amendmnt=thus stripping it of any real meaning. The doves talk now about throwing out the Jackson amendment at a conference with the House (which did not come through with a comple- mentary measure), but the Senate strategists don't particularly care. SALT II is projected as a treaty, and is subject therefore to rati- fication by the Senate. By two-thirds of the Senate. Richard Nixon is actually encouraging the Senate realists. He desires them to tie down his hands, and why should he not? Richard Nixon is not the only American who knows what the Russians have been secretly up to in recent weeks and months in the field of arms research and development. Hubert Humphrey also knows about it. It` is only the American people who don't know about it but, inevitably, will know about it soon. They can reasonably demand to know how their Senators voted on the Jackson amend- ment at that critical hour. From the Kansas City Times, Sept. 14, 1972] AFOUL OF MISTRUST ON ARMS PACT The Soviets are on weak grounds in object,, ing to the views of the Pentagon and of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) on the arms control agreement signed in Moscow last May. A statement by Izvestia, the government newspaper, charges the U.S. secretary of de.. Tense, Melvin It. Laird, with violating the spirit of the Soviet-American pacts limiting strategic arsenals and thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of the agreements. Izvestia spe- cifically accuses Laird of pressing for the development of U.S. offensive systems. Laird is indeed working for that purpose. He is asking Congress for funds to finance accelerated development of the new, longer- range Trident underwater missile and the B-1 strategic bomber. The terms of the Mos- cow treaty on offensive weapons do not forbid. such programs. In fact the pact asserts the right of both the U.S. and Russia to pursue weapons development during a 5-year in- terim period before a full-fledged agreement, is reached. Why, then, are the Russians complaining? It is a fair question, particularly since the 5-year freeze applies to numbers of offensive nuclear weapons. But it does not prevent the Russians from proceeding with their as yet untested version of the SS9 multiwarhead missile, believed capable of carrying three warheads, each with a punch of 5 million tons of TNT. The U.S. has no comparable weapon. What the Soviets apparently want is for the U.S. to deny itself more advanced weap- ons, as permitted in the temporary treaty, while they move ahead to establish an ad- vantage. In seeking an advantage they strengthen the skepticism of those Ameri- cans who are wary of accepting any arms control understanding with the Soviet Union. Senator Jackson has warned that the in- terim agreement is subject to unilateral in- terpretations. The Soviet protest tends to bear out Jackson's point. He is therefore try- ing to attach a rider that would require fu- ture agreements to be based on the princi- ple of equality of forces. His proposal would not alter the treaty in its present form. And it might facilitate Senate approval of the treaty-something that needs to be done promptly so that the two governments can proceed next month with further arms con- trol negotiations. It is in this round of talks that any objections by Moscow can be prop- erly dealt with. From the Oregonian, Sept. 15, 1972] TESTING THE RUSSIANS The Senate's adoption of Sen. Henry M. Jackson's amendment requiring the United States to seek in a permanent treaty with the Soviet Union equality in "intercontinen- tal strategic forces" is a proper action after a month-long debate which has produced a new awareness in Congress and the nation. Once that hurdle was passed, after rejec- tion of substitute amendments by Sen. J. W. Fulbright and other Foreign Relations Com- mittee doves that would have weakened the directive .to "over-all equality, parity and sufficiency," approval of the five-year interim agreement signed by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev in Moscow May 26 was a foregone conclusion. We see no danger and some benefit in the Jackson amendment holding the Russians' feet to the fire as a test of their sincerity in Phase II of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. If the Russians really want a stand-off permitting reduction in the insane arms race, rather than a threatening dominance in offensive power, this is the time to find out. The principle of equality in defensive weapons was recognized in the treaty limit- ing deployment in both the United States and the Soviet Union of anti-ballistic mis- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 A__pp'roved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 October 12, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE riles, already ratified by the Senate. All that Sen. Jackson asked was that the U.S. nego- tiators be instructed to insist on equality in offensive weapons. There are differences of opinion and in statistical reports on the relative missile power of the two nations at present; and the potential for each under the five-year interim agreement. Sen. Jackson has demonstrated, however, that the Soviet Union could build 62 nuclear submarines of the Polaris type under the interim agreement while the United States would be limited to 44. He has shown that the Russians could replace their obsolete SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs with new submarine-launched missiles on a one- for-one basis, but the United States, which has already retired its Atlas and Titan I mis- siles, has no such trade-in privilege. He has said- the Russians are developing new ICBMs which would increase their "throw weight" advantage without going beyond the 1,618 ICBMs permitted under the interim agree- ment. Sen. Jackson may be overly impressed with the statistics of overkill, but his oppo- nents were even less realistic in favoring what amounts to a U.S. policy of unilateral arms limitation based on faith in the Rus- sians. The American. negotiators of the next step in SALT are certainly aware of the sta- tistics of offensive capabilities, of first-strike dangers and of second-strike limitations. It should strengthen the handsof the diplo- mats, however, that Congress has added its voice to that of the Nixon Administration in demanding treaty equality in offensive weap- ons. No less will be accepted by the American people. [From the New York Daily News, Sept. 16, 1972 ] SALT MAKES THE GRADE The five-year interim agreemnet between the U.S. and the USSR on limitation of stra- tegic weaponry was approved Thursday by the Senate, but only after adoption of a com- mon sense amendment put forward by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.). This proviso urges President Richard M. Nixon, in the next- phase of SALT negotia- tions, not to settle for less than numerical equality in major arms with the Soviets. American bargainers settled for less than parity in the present pact, conceding Mos- cow sizeable margins in land-based and un- dersea missile strength. Superior U.S. tech- nology, particularly in multiple warheads, is supposed to make good the deficit in num- bers. But this nation would assume a foolish risk if it depended, as Sen. J. William Ful- bright (D-Ark.) contends it should, on main- taining its scientific edge indefinitely. Ful- bright apparently has learned nothing from the quick Russian catch-ups in development of A-bombs, H-bombs and long-range mis- siles. DEFENSE BUDGET We're happy the Senate heeded the far more hardheaded and realistic Jackson in this case, and we hope the rider will survive the coming Senate-House conference on the SALT resolution. Favorable House action on the Defense budget indicates the lower cham- ber may be more than willing to go along. In okaying the $74.6 appropriation bill on Thursday, the House gave Mr. Nixon just about every cent he requested for develop- ment of the Trident submarine missile sys- tem and the new B-1 manned bomber. Lack of those -advanced weapons, as the President has stressed repeatedly, would greatly handicap our negotiators in trying to obtain a long-range treaty on arms ceilings. The notion that new defense programs will offend the Communist enemy is absurd. Time and time again. the Kremlin has shown that it respects strength and determination, just as it despises and exploits weakness. [From the Ogden, Utah, Standard-Examiner, Sept. 16, 19721 SENATE OK'S SALT The U.S.-Soviet agreement on strategic arms limitations (SALT) is a more realistic document as it leaves the Senate than it was when originally drafted at the Kremlin. The agreement, as approved late Thurs- day by an 88-2 vote in the Senate, includes Sen. Henry M. Jackson's amendment requir- ing numerical equality in intercontinental weapons that carry nuclear warheads. This, if accepted by the U.S. House of Rep- resentatives and authorities in the U.S.S.R., would modify - the original pact that had taken into consideration the American su- periority in multiple warheads. Sen. Jackson argued, and we agree, that this U.S. advantage could easily be wiped out by Russian advances during these next five critical years. The goal of SALT from'the start has been to curtail the arms race in nuclear weapons- including both land and sea missiles and aircraft. This objective can better be achieved under the Jackson amendment than in the treaty as signed in Moscow during President Nix- on's historic visit to the Soviet Union. Once in force, SALT's agreement will be In the best interests of world peace. [From the Birmingham News, Sept. 16, 1972] JACKSON'S FIRM STAND A healthy skepticism regarding Soviet mili- tary Intentions and determination on- the part of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Washing- ton) has resulted in a sounder Soviet-Amer- ican approach to slow the arms race. The Senate approved the five-year pact which President Nixon brought home from the Moscow summit, but served notice that the temporary agreements, specifically re- garding numbers of nuclear warheads, would not be acceptable to serve as a basis for a permanent treaty. Approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 87 to two, the agreement for the first time set limits on the number of offensive mis- siles deployed -by the United States and the Soviet Union at least for the next five years. Sen. Jackson, from the beginning of the debates,,worked long and hard for the amend- ment which demanded strict, numerical equality in missiles for the two countries. Jackson's logic for numerical equality is sound. "The present U.S. advantage in strategic weapons technology, which now offsets Soviet numerical superiority," Jack- son argued on the floor of the Senate, "can- not be assured in a long-term treaty. What would be a tolerable basis for an interim agreement, therefore, would be Intolerable as the basis for (permanent) treaty." Jackson also asked the Senate to join with him in calling upon the Soviet Union to "reverse its weapons build-up and content itself with equality with the United States in strategic offensive weapons." The senators who opposed Jackson's amendment did so out of fear that instead of the Russians reducing number of nuclear submarines and missiles to the U.S. levels, the U.S. would accelerate its nuclear pro- gram to reach the same numbers the Rus- sians project, and that this see-sawing back and forth would result in another uncon- trollable arms race. The doves also have bought the "doctrine of strategic sufficiency"; that is, the U.S. needs only sufficient missiles to assure the de- struction of the Soviets in case of nuclear attack. Anything more, they argue, is fool- ishness and waste. The problem with the "doctrine of suf- ficiency" is that more and more sophisticated defense technology can radically alter what is sufficient to knock out a potential enemy. Jackson argued that Russia's numerical S 17629 superiority in numbers of weapons would, in. only a matter of time, be supported by a technology equal or even more advanced than that of the United States. The amendment Jackson pushed and which was backed by the White House should pre- sent no insoluable problem for the Soviets, if their real intention is peace. If their real intention is -not peace, and they are simply seeking time to achieve an insurmountable superiority, it is best we discover it now. Sen. Jackson has served his nation well in doggedly insisting that the administration, the Congress and the Soviets confront what could be a key issue in the pursuit of a new era of peace. [From the Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 17, 19721 ARMS EQUALITY WITH RUSSIA Sen. Henry Jackson's misgivings about Rus- sian intentions in the strategic arms race are widely shared and altogether justified by the record. While the Russians were spinning out the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) at Helsinki and Vienna, they were continuing to deploy land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles until they had acquired their present advantage which is frozen into the Interim agreement the United States Senate approved the other day. But the persistent Jackson was successful in attaching to the agreement an administra- tion-backed amendment which calls on Pres- ident Nixon to seek equality in "levels of in- tercontinental strategic forces" in negotia- tions for a permanent treaty. Jackson had observed that the interim treaty gave the Soviets "more of everything; more light ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), more heavy ICBMs, more subma- rine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM (anti-ballistic missile) radars." He had said the Soviet ad- vantage in offensive weapons covered by the interim agreement was "on the order of 50 per cent." Opponents of his amendment-notably Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Senate For- eign Relations Committee, Sen. Jacob K. Jav- its, R-N.Y., and Sen. Stuart Symington, D- Mo.-argued that this country's forward bases in Europe and its superiority in missile accuracy and multiple warhead technology gave it an overall adavntac;e. It's true that the Russians haven't yet de- veloped a MIRV (multiple independently tar- getable 're-entry vehicle) capability. But they're working on it, and Sen. Jackson cor- rectly points out. that the U.S. advantage in this respect is temporary. He has said that if the Russians "were to aggressively pursue a silo-killing MIRV pro- gram for their force of SS-9 type heavy mis- siles, they could, within the lifetime of the interim agreement, develop the capability to destroy virtually all of our land-based mis- sile forces." The interim agreement has a five-year life. Senate foes of the Jackson amendment argue that insistence on numerical equality with the Soviet Union would jeopardize the pros- pects for a permanent treaty on strategic arms limitation. But to permit the Russians to widen their superiority would lessen their need for any kind of understanding. Worse still, it would lay this country open to nuclear blackmail five years from now. [From the Dallas Times-Herald, Sept. 17. 1972] A VOTE FOR SECURITY One rejoices that the Senate backed Henry Jackson in his call for U.S.-Soviet equality in number of missiles. Not that we are out of the woods, of course, in our effort to negotiate a satisfactory arms control treaty with the Russians. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 17630 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 12, 1972' glut passage of the so-called Jackson Amendment was absolutely vital to U.S. se- curity. Under the SALT agreement (which is no:; a treaty in final form). the United States over the next five years is permitted 1,054 land-based ICBM missiles and 710 underwater launchers; the Russians can have 1,618 1Ct3Ms and 950 underwater launchers. this is scarcely the kind of military in- feriority which most Americans would like to sea written into treaty form. Therefore, Jack- so.,; urged the Senate to demand in advance a treaty that provides numerical equality in intercontinental weaponry. With the President's backing, Jackson last Thursday shepherded the amendment through the Senate. A conference committee could scrap the amendment. But Jackson says this doesn't matter. It is the Senate whose opinion counts, inasmuch as any fixture treaty will be submitted only to the Senate, nos the House. predictably, Sen. Fulbright, the Ozark oracle, protested against the Jackson Amend- ment, basically because we have more nu- clear warheads than the Russians, even if we have fewer missiles. Yet Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute estimates that the Soviets have the capability of deploying "ten thousand or more MIRV (Multiple Independ- ent Re-entry Vehicle) warheads on their allowed booster force within the lifetime of this agreement"-enough to "wipe out vir- tually all of our Minuteman force , . tloreover, Jackson notes how "People and nations attach meaning to the relative stra- tegic position of the two superpowers." It is not necessarily how strong we are that mat- ters: it is howstrong we look. That is what weighs with our allies no less than our enemies. A good arms limitation treaty-one that does not create too many advantages for the Soviet Union-is going to be hard to nego- tiate. It will be immensely harder if the So- viets think us inclined to accept nuclear inferiority. They may think this of us any- way, but they are much less likely to now that the U.S. Senate has upheld Henry Jack- son. [From the Augusta, (Ga.), Chronicle-Herald, Sept. 17, 19721 WILL To SURVIVE l'he U.S. Senate's vote, 56 to 35, calling for quantitativeequality for the United States to any future arms agreements with the So- viet Union, was a victory for practical men who desire intensely the survival of the United States in an age of flagrant Conimu- mat aggression. "'lie overall interim agreement on arms, approved 87-2, is not affected by the contro- versial amendment. The effect of approval is to ratify the freeze President Nixon nego- tiated a few months ago in Moscow. This interim agreement, to last only five years, permits a marked lead for Russia in the num- ber of missiles and submarines, by approving the number now completed or under con- struction. 'f 'lie disparity in numbers-that-will result lieu in the phrase, "or under construction." it means that the United States stands still, wi' iie Russia goes ahead with what are being built, the final approved figures being 1,618 intercontinental missiles for Russia as con- trusted to only 1,054 for the U.S.; and with 62 Russian nuclear submarines, equipped wi':h 950 missile launchers, in contrast to the United States' 44 submarines and 710 launchers. '-he numerical-equality amendment which has just won 56-35 Senate approval was op- posed by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) ana others who have objected to stronger U.S. defenses. Their claim was that since we have superior technology, the capabilities of our missiles and submarines are equal to the far greater numbers which the interim agreement authorizes for the Communiwas. Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), whose support for the numerical-equality amend- ment won White House support, replies that the U.S. technological advantage is tempo- rary. In five years' time, he points out, a continuation of the numerical advantage for Russia can mean an advantage in flrst-strh:e effectiveness which would threaten the secu- rity-indeed the very existence-of America. Thus, he argues, the only safe policy is to set up now a policy of future parity in nuns- bers of strategic weapons. With all due acknowledgement of ' .e idealistic dedication to absolute equality by Senator Fulbright and others who follow 'is lead, we must conclude that Senator Ja-:t- son's concern seems more than justified. The security of the United States is too -,r- gent an issue for our government to indulge in armament guessing games that might prove to be wrong. We must remember that Russia has not agreed to any inspection sys- tem, nor does it show any indication of do:;ig so. And we may doubt the permanence of satellite reconnaissance ability to keep tabs. Agreements on arms limitations with Com- munist Dowers -committed to our destruction are a hazardous matter at best. The least v:e can do is what a substantial majority of t'le Senate vote demanded-give away nothing to aggressor states in the way of military advantage. [From the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Press, Sept. 17, 1972] SENATE SERVES NOTICE After more than a month of heavy debate, the U.S. Senate has approved a five-year ms- sile-limitation agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States-with the Jack- son "rider" included. The Jackson rider was what the long de- bate was all about. In the end, Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington succeeded in persuading the Senate to his resolution. It merely says it is the opinion of the Senate that in future arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States should not consent to any ar- rangement which leaves this country with inferior numbers of offensive strategic weapons. The live-year, or interim, agreement was reached by President Nixon and Soviet lead- ers on Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow last May. Its chief purpose, apparently, is to hold the line on weapons developments until a new round on negotiations on arms limitations can get under way. Both Senate and House now have approved this five-year agreement, but the House reso- lution does not include the Jackson rider.. In the compromise between the two houses the rider n1ay get dumped. But, as Sen. Jackson says, no matter. It is the -Senate which acts on treaties, arnd the 5G-35 vote by which the Senate adopted the Jackson rider serves notice on both So- viet and U.S. negotiators that the Senate is nob apt to okay a treaty which could le-:,.,'e the United States in an inferior position. In. short, the Senate announces that ':he seeming advantages which Mr. Nixon granted the Soviet Union in an effort to get mare arms-control negotiations under way is not, to be taken as a precedent on which to base future treaties. And that is a useful service. [From the Tucson (Ariz.) Daily Citizen, Sept. 18, 19721 NOCLEAR TREATIES OPEN NEW ERA Following more than a month's debate, the U.S. Senate has ratified the second of two arms control treaties signed by President Nixon during his visit to the Soviet Union. This one places limitations on each country's offensive strategic weapons. More than a month ago, the Senate gave approval to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. This pact-of unlimited duration-restricts each nation to two defensive ABM systems, one "centered in the party's national capi- tal," and the other elsewhere. Verification of each party's compliance will be "through national technical means," that is, spy satellites. Senate ratification of the second treaty. an interim agreement on offensive weapons, was delayed as a result of a proposal by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, which was finally adopted. Sen. Jackson wanted the Senate to go on record as reserving to the United States the right to scrap the agreement if future Soviet actions threaten to wipe out a major part of our deterrent force. According to Sen. Jackson, a sound critic of strategic arms limitation accords, the in- terim agreement gives the Soviets an advan- tage in offensive weapons "on the order of 50 per cent," based on the highly complex rules of nuclear arithmetic. Under the interim accord, which is to last five years, the Soviets are allowed a numeri- cal superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile-launching sites. Although many military- experts regard the United States as having a big lead in what is described as multiple-warhead technology, Sen. Jackson does not want any treaty which "would limit the United States to levels of intercontinentalstrategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." The House of Representatives earlier had approved the second treaty, without provi- sions contained in the Jackson amendment. Now it goes to a House-Senate conference. [ From the Denver Post, Sept. 18, 1972 ] A STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT The Senate's approval of a five-year U.S.- Soviet interim agreement setting limits on offensive nuclear weapons is an overdue, but welcome, action. It now remains for a Senate-House confer- ence committee to work out the differences which include a Senate amendment calling for parity on strategic arms. The White House had expressed concern that further delays in approving the interim agreement-carefully worked out earlier this year by President Nixon and Soviet leaders in historic strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)-could impede other U.S.-Soviet ac. cords. The Senate gave overwhelming support to the first part of the SALT agreements by rati- fying on Aug. 3 a treaty setting limits on de- fensive missile units. Since then the Senate had been debating the arms parity amend- ment principally by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash. The Nixon administration would have pre- ferred no amendments, but went along with a revised version of the Jackson amendment deemed more conciliatory to the Russians. Under the circumstances, this was a sound move for the administration to make. The Jackson amendment should help calm fear:; that the Soviet Union will gain a strategic advantage through the SALT accords. It remains to be seen whether the amend.. ment approved by the Senate will survive the conference committee deliberations. But it is really an academic question be.. cause theinterim agreement on offensive nu- clear arms, which requires approval by both houses of Congress, is intended to be suc- ceeded by a treaty which only the Senate can ratify. The potential treaty, therefore, will not be a matter for House action, and the administration and the Senate have now made clear where they stand on the issue. Only experience gained during the next five years can determine what shape such a treaty will take-or even if there will be a treaty. More permanent limitations on strategic arms will be considered during the SALT 2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 A roved-For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 October 12, 19FF CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE discussions, which are expected to get under way in Geneva during the fall. Final approval of the interim agreement by both houses of Congress ought to help launch SALT 2 in the right channel. [From the Detroit News, Sept. 18, 1972] IN NUCLEAR ARMS PACT-PARITY IS U.S. GOAL Senate approval of .the U.S.-USSR agree- ment to limit offensive nuclear weapons as- sures congressional adoption of the five- year pact. But it does not halt the arms race or the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve su- periority over this country. In fact, the interim agreement assures the Soviet Union a lead in some weapons. It freezes intercontinental ballistics missiles to those deployed or under construction, an estimated 1,618 for the USSR and 1,054 for the United States; limits the Soviet subma- rine force to 62 with 950 missile launchers, and restricts the U.S. underwater fleet to 44 submarines and 710 launchers. Most of the debate in the Senate came over an amendment by Senator Henry Jack- son, Washington Democrat, which finally was adopted. It calls upon'?the President to seek a future treaty on offensive nuclear weapons that "would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." In negotiating the agreement, U.S. officials had accepted the higher figures for the So- viet Union on the grounds that the United States is ahead in multiple warheads (MIRV's) for each missile, U.S. submarines have forward bases which improve their relative efficiency and the United States has a numerical superiority in bombers, carriers and fighter-bombers based in Europe. and the Far East and not subject to the new treaty. However, Robert W. Bowie, director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, has pointed out that while the agreement achieves a rough parity between the USSR and the United States at present, that status is "not likely to endure." He said that within three to five years, the Soviets can be ex- pected to perfect their own MIRV's and then could take advantage of their much larger and more numerous launchers. In ad- dition, new Soviet subs with longer radius would reduce the advantage of U.S. bases. "In short, the existing parity is likely to be eroded as the Soviets catch up in tech- nology in view of their 50 percent or greater edge in launchers," he wrote recently. "For the interim needed to negotiate a permanent treaty these are satisfactory risks but this would not be a satisfactory basis for a per- manent treaty." Even if the present U.S. deterrents were sufficient to avoid war with the USSR, no- body knows what kind of political leverage and blackmail the USSR might impose on other nations if it achieved superiority over the United States. So what Jackson really was asking for, and the Senate adopted, was a statement of warning to the then presi- dent to maintain parity when the permanent U.S.-USSR pact comes up for negotiation and adoption. [From the McKeesport (Pa.) News, Sept. 18, 1972] EXPECTED ACTION Senate approval of the U.S.-Soviet interim agreement on offensive arms limitations was a foregone conclusion following earlier ap- proval of a defensive missiles pact. It is elementary that one treaty alone is worthless, for to curb defensive weapons sole- ly without a similar limitation on offensive missiles would set off a staggering arms race and invite a first strike. Approval of the five-year offensive agree- ment freezes ICBMs to those deployed or un- der construction, an estimated 1,618 for the S 17631 Soviet Union and 1,054 for the United States. Thus a limited measure of progress on inter- The pact also limits Russia to 82 submarines national arms control has been chalked up and 950 submarine missile launchers, and the with the way open to further and more com- United States to 44 submarines and 710 prehensive agreement. launchers. It was the numerical edge given the Soviets that caused a delay in approval by the Senate by a 88-2 vote. The House had approved the agreement earlier. The Senate dispute was resolved by adopting an amendment calling for equality in long-range weapons in any future agreement. The treaty had been viewed with some ap- prehension by some lawmakers, notably Sen. Henry Jackson who is noted for his deep con- cern over U.S. defenses. This group read into the terms a decided advantage for Russia. Such an interpretation understandably breeds misgivings. Other lawmakers saw the U.S. with a decided superiority in missile accuracy and multiple warhead technology. Apparently the White House has no serious objections to the amendment since a spokes- man says that President Nixon "obviously was very pleased" with approval of the agreement. Jackson, author of the amendment, voiced unconcern whether or not the "equality" amendment would survive a Senate-House conference since what is involved is a future treaty upon which the Senate alone will act. There is reason to regard Jackson's reserva- tions about the interim pact as a contribu- tion to a rational defense posture. And his amendment puts the Soviets on notice that when the next round of strategic arms nego- tiations gets under way that American Sena- tors, who have the final say, will be keeping a close eye on developments. [From the Kansas City Star, Sept. 20, 1972] POSTSCRIPT TO THE MOSCOW PACT Superiority or inferiority, no. Equality, yes. That, greatly simplified, was the majority position of the U.S. Senate when it came to approving the offensive arms agreement signed by President Nixon in Moscow last May 26. The handling of this pact in Congress was unusual for two reasons. First, President Nixon is not required by law or the Consti- tution to obtain the sanction of Congress for an executive agreement such as the une covering offensive weapons. Second, the con- troversial amendment by Sen. Henry M. Jack- son (D-Wash.) calling for equal strategic strength has no direct bearing on the 5-year accord with Russia. Instead it is intended as a guide to the kind of permanent arms con- trol understanding that the U.S. will work for in the coming SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Senate line-up for and against Jack- son's proposal in general followed the pattern of voting on Senator McGovern's recent at- tempt to cut the military spending bill by $4 billion. The Democratic nominee lost that one by a margin of 59 to 33. The vote on Jackson's amendment was 56 to 35. Where- upon the Senate approved by 87 to 2 the actual 5-year arms agreement whose terms were not changed by the Jackson amendment. Thus the group of liberal Democratic sen- ators who embrace what has been called "the Proxmire philosophy" on defense spending continues to be thwarted. There are enough Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress to knock down any move that smacks, of 1-way disarmament. The majority, by approving funds for the advanced Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber to replace the overage B-52, has said that the improvement. of weapons systems, as permitted by the temporary Moscow pact, is still necessary. That position was the essence of the Jack- son amendment in so far as any early mean- ing it may have. By not forfeiting strategic strength now, the U.S. will have much greater bargaining power at the next round of SALT. But the resillts of SALT I are now certain of final ratification by both houses of Congress. HEARINGS ON LIFE-THREATENING MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I am pleased to read on page S17281 of the RECORD of October 10 that the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, the senior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN- NEDY), expects to hold hearings early next year on the subject of life-threat- ening medical experiments. I have urged such hearings for almost 2 years, in part because of totally unsubstantiated state- ments and charges made by Senate staff members and the press relating to a total body radiation project carried on at the University of Cincinnati Medical College. These statements have been damaging to professional men of the highest caliber, to a fine institution, and possibly to some of the patients involved. My prior state- ments on this question are set out on pages S21665-S21668, December 15, 1971; S40-S46, January 19, 1972; S12381- S12384, August 1, 1972; S16561-S16562, October 2, 1972, of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. It is therefore more in sorrow than in anger that I note another totally er- roneous statement of the Senator from Massachusetts reported on page S17281 to the effect that the Cincinnati project made patient care secondary to experi- mentation. The project was thoroughly reviewed and given a complete vindica- tion against such charges by a compre- hensive peer review of the American Col- lege of Radiology, a report of which is set out on page S40 of the RECORD of Janu- ary 19, 1972. In view of this, I believe that the hear- ing planned should now also undertake an investigation of irresponsible, inac- curate, and preconceived staff actions and statements of Senate committee and staff employees. BOMBING OF HANOI Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, news reports over the past 24 hours strongly suggest that American bombs are re- sponsible for the damage to the French and Algerian legations in Hanoi, and the personal injury and the loss of life that has apparently occurred. - Just 2 weeks ago, on September 28, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman, held a hear- ing on the impact on civilians of the air war over North Vietnam. In both open and closed sessions, administration witneses assured us again and again- but without much proof-that what of- ficials call "collateral damage" was min- imal and that every precaution is taken to avoid air strikes over civilian and non- military areas. In this connection, Hanoi and other cities in North Vietnam were singled out by the witnesses. Maj. Gen. John W. Pauly, Vice Director for Oper- ations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had this to say about Hanoi in the closed session: Hanoi city area has been relatively un- targeted. The only things that have been Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 17632 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 12, 19'72 targeted at all are those that are in the fringe at 4 or 5 miles out from town that I have mentioned. These are the war-making facilities. '1 he only exception to this are the two bridges I mentioned that were taken out with LGl3's. We have verified that there was no collateral damage. When we have a sensitive siuation, we will be looking specifically for collateral damage. Those were taken out clean and the downtown Hanoi area, as we will mention later, has relatively no damage. The only collateral damage that we have been able to identify in the specifics that have been provided (by the subcommittee) have been tied in the immediate vicinity of a strike against nearby military targets in which a stray bomb had gone off or where the strike force had, in fact, for various reasons, missed their target. And so, Mr. President, there is "col- lateral damage" In Hanoi-and, based on testimony before the subcommittee, a great deal more, including several disas- trous mistakes, in Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, and other cities and towns in North Vietnam. in this connection, let me say that the much emphasized smart bombs are hardly used. The Defense Department informed me yesterday, in response to questions raised in the hearing, that: The percentage of smart bombs dropped in North Vietnam since thecurrent campaign began in May is 1.77 percent. The growing collateral damage in North Vietnam raises troubling questions about the purposes of the President's air war over North Vietnam, and about the rules of engagement covering the bomb- ing and shelling over all of Indochina. Our country is apparently responsible for another disastrous mistake. For most Americans today the whole war is a mis- take-and each day that this carnage is allowed to go on simply compounds that mistake. DEATH OF FORMER SENATOR BUSH Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, upon the death of former Senator Prescott S. Bush, many newspapers throughout the State of Connecticut expressed the deep respect which all of us in the State have long felt for this fine man. I ask unani- mous consent that nine of the editorials which have appeared over the last sev- eral days be included in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: From the Greenwich (Conn.) Time] EDITORIAL Prescott S. Bush died Sunday at the age of 77. Thus ended a life remarkable for its many contributions to society and mankind. Mr. Bush epitomized the characteristics associated with the 'idealized version of the public official candor, integrity, consistency, dedication. And another, which perhaps many of his constituents weren't as aware of- deep, human compassion and an unshakable sense of justice. In the rough and tumble arena of politics, the humanitarian per- suasions of Pres Bush weren't as widely known. A deeply religious man, it could be said of him he was one of the rare ones who tried to carry through the precepts of his religion into his everyday life. ' 110 list the accomplishments of this neigh- bor of ours can be done if you have sufficient space to catalogue a staggering array of achievements in many, many diverse fields. To him, the pinnacle of his career was the U.S. Senate, which he loved and served so well. In Greenwich, we also Insist on placing high on the record the 15 years that Pres Bush served as Moderator of the Representa- tive Town Meeting, a towering presence of firmness and fairness as he presided over the sometimes turbulent sessions. His dignity, authority, grace and-praise be, a good sense of humor-had a lot to do with the shaping of this community during those Important years. Pres Bush, as everyone knows, got his po- litical indoctrination by heading Republican fund-raising efforts in the state. When he was persuaded to try for state office he was still not very well known. He made his first run in 1950 but was de- feated by Bill Benton by a slim majority of 1,000 votes. He liked his first taste of big league politics, good naturedly listened to the advice and ribbing of friends who felt they had to guide him into the "realities" of politics and bridge the gap between "the people" and the patrician world in which Bush moved. These friends quickly found out that Pres Bush was inately a good "people" man because he too began to enjoy his ex- panded association with various types and groups he probably never would have been exposed to had he not plunged into the political picture. He once told a friend visiting him in his Senate office: "I've been very fortunate In my life and I've enjoyed it. But I love this United States Senate job more than any- thing I've done. It gives me a chance to try to be of real service to the people of the state and my country. But most of all, it's taken me out of the routine so familiar to all of us in Greenwich and _ I have been en- riched by meeting andgetting to know some wonderful people all over this state--ethnic groups, upstate farmers, Portuguese fisher- men-you name it, we've got it in Connect- cut. This was a dimension of Pres Bush that not everyone got to know, for his general demeanor was dignified and restrained. Some, in the way folks tend to stereotype people in the public eye, even though he was stand-offish and aloof. No point to quar- rel now-how could they know, as did those close to him, what a warm and vivacious man he could be. A fine singer (former Whiffenpoof) witty parodist, quick to ap- preciate a good line or anecdote, a man with a twinkle in his eye. Friend and golfing associate of the late President Eisenhower, Pres Bush moved in the top echelons of power politically, social- ly and in the business world. His manner and attitude were the same in any milieu. He operated- with the graceful ease of a man whose upbringing and career were almost of story-book nature: Yale, baseball at Yale, Whiffenpoofs, national senior golf champion in 1951, tennis player, swimmer, World War I captain, partner in Brown Brothers Harri- man & Co., prominent civil leader, club man, successful party fund-raiser, head of a fine family. If such a shiny life should tempt a man to self-complacency, it didn't have that effect on Pres Bush. He plunged into the political arena with gusto. He took his first defeat, bounced off the floor and waded right in again. Next time he ran for the Senate he won, handing Abe Ribicoff one of the few de- feats that worthy has ever sustained. Pres Bush was an excellent Senator. He was reelected to a full term in 1956 and probably would have been reelected in 1932 had he not decided to eschew the run because of health problems. Frankly, it is extremely difficult for us to contemplate a Greenwich minus Prescott Bush. Reality says we must. The great con- tributions he made to our town and state are part of our very fiber. But we'll miss more than that-we'll miss a great human being, a friend, a wise counselor, a man who cared a great deal, a man of probity and honor, a man of character. We take some solace in seeing several sons in the political vineyard, so the name and the high purposes of Senator Bush will be carried on. To them, to the wonderful widow, Dottie, to all who have lost a fine friend and respected fellow townsman, our con- dolences. We are all truly the poorer today for his loss. [From the New Haven (Conn.) Register, Oct. 10, 19721 EDITORIAL During his years in the U.S. Senate, Pres- cott S. Bush had performed to the fullest measure of his abilities, as any good man in office does, but with many essential dif- ferences that set him apart from many of the household names of his day: His achievements were without fanfare or self-glorification. Mr. Bush, a tall, regal looking man with an aura of ivy league about him, with fash- ionable Greenwich as his home and a Wall Street career as an investment banker, was as unlikely a poltiician as one would ex- pect to find in ethnic-conscious industrial Connecticut. He was a relative political amateur when he first bobbed to attention in a 1950 race for the Senate, but he made it close enough to gain a second chance two years later, when he went on to victory. Mr. Bush was more than a man for his time. Hard working and vigorous, a man of deeply felt convictions, the Senator was not one to seize upon issues of the moment, but to perceive and put his energies behind issues that were of moment. He recognized- fully the urban blight that beset the cities and rallied early to their cause, playing a major hand in the shaping of the father of all redevelopment legisla- tion, the Housing Act of 1954. He championed urban renewal at every turn. Beyond promot- ing and supporting legislation in Wash- ington, Mr. Bush took the lead in bringing the message of urban renewal home to Con- necticut's cities and towns, and played a vital role, in New Haven's urban renewal fortunes. The former Senator was among the first to recognize the danger of Joe McCarthyism, and his mark was that he could oppose the latter, but in never but a gentlemanly fash- ion. The other tactics were alien to Mr. Bush's character. Mr. Bush's deep interest in urban renewal was matched by his equal deep concern for civil rights, better education, a strong U.S. military posture and fiscal responsibility in federal government, including the control of inflation. He predated much of the later day civil rights struggle with his battles against racial discrimination in FHA Hous- ing and in employment, the latter among both management and unions. Hishumane- ness showed in his persistant efforts on be- half of flood and storm victims. He was an advance man for ecology interests with his involvement In flood control and beach erosion problems. Mr. Bush, a Yale graduate who had served 12 years as a member of the Yale Corp., was in retirement when he passed away Sunday at the age of 77. He will be remembered as a man of compassion and integrity whose distinguished service for his state and coun- try will offer challenge to others to emulate. [From the Waterbury (Conn.) Republican] EDITORIAL Prescott S. Bush was a distinguished gentleman who looked and acted like a U.S. Senator. He was a great credit to the State Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 ,4or Release 2005/12/14 ~ih RDP 4B00415R000400010018-4 NEW YORt~ pfff 4. DATE 'e,? PAGE SENATE APPROVES PACT WITH SOVIET ON STRATEGIC ARMS But It First Accepts Jackson Amendment on Numerical Equality in New Accords CLOSURE BID SUCCEEDS House Conference Is Next-- $74.5-Billion Defense Budget Advances By JOHN W. FINNEEY Special to ThaNew York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 - After more than a month of debate, the Senate approved to- day the United States-Soviet agreement to freeze a major part of their offensive nuclear, arsenals for five years. H ti, ever, it stipulated that t1 re should be equality in the n Pe her of weapons in any fu treaty governing strategic ao tercontinental arms. ter The agreement, which wan limit the number of offer 0l; land-based and submada borne missiles possessed b3 be United States and the Sv Union, was approved by a vi of 88 to 2, with only Serno James B. Allen of Alabama ml Senator Ernest F. Holling Ce South Carolina, both D, crats voting against it. K Jackson Amendment Vot Earlier, the Senate had vc In 56 to 35, in favor of the Si troversial amendment si w sored by Senator Henry d,, Jackson of Washington that. caused the delay in approv$' the arms-limitation accord. y amendment, which was initially endorsed by the Nixon Admin- istration, calls upon the Presi- dent to seek a future treaty on offensive nuclear weapons that "would not limit the %.uiiultellGar strategic forces in- ferior to the limits provided for, the Soviet Union." The Senate rejected repeated attempts to eliminate-or modify the Jackson amendment, which, was attached to a resolution ap- proving the interim accord on arms signed by President Nixon and Soviet leaders in Moscow in May. Since the House of Represent- atives adopted a simple resolu- tion of approval in mid-August, the matter now goes to a Sen- ate-House conference. Permanent Limitation Sought The interim accord, which aims at limiting the arms race while the two sides attempt to negotiate a permanent treaty on offensive weapons, was one of two agreements concluded by Mr. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the . Soviet Com- munist party leader. The other was a treaty limiting anti- ballistic, or defensive, missiles. The Senate gave its approval to the defensive-weapons treaty -the only act of Congress actually required by law-in August, but Mr. Nixon has withheld ratification of the treaty pending approval of the interim agreement on offensive weapons by the House and the Senate. After today's votes, Admin- istration officials privately ex- pressed the hope that the Jackson amendment would be dropped in the Senate-House conference. The Administration hope, it appeared, may be re- alized since the Senate will be represented in the commit- tee by members of the Foreign Relations Committee, who felt that the amendment's insist- ence on numerical equality would undermine chances for permanent agreement on of- fensive weapons. The White House endorsed the amendment in what some Administration officials private ty described as a political favor to a Senator who had consist- ently supported the Administra- tion on national security policy. The Administration also took tyre position that the Jackson A Matter of Judgment welidmept represented merely For many Senators, their an expression of Senate opinion votes turned not so much on at was not binding upon the the strategic issues of the de- ,4dministration. bate as on whether- they re- In other. Congressional action spected the judgment of Senator on defense today, the House Fulbright or Senator Jackson n more. As he has in all defe e years, Sena passed and sent to the Senate a debates s passed recent X74.5-billion deefnse appropria-. tor Jackson prevailed. tions bill that contained virtu- In some ways, the Jackson ally all the funds required to amendment was out- start a multibillion dollar pro growth and reaction to the in- terim agreement, which grants gram of improving the nation's nuclear arsenal. It had been re- quested by the Administration in the wake of,the agreements on arms with the Soviet Union. Included in the bill-which provides $4.3-billion less than the Administration's military request in the current fiscal year-were almost $1-billio4 to start construction ofthe Trident missile - launching submarine and $445-million to continue development of the B-1 super- sonic strategic bomber. About the only major strategic pro- gram left out of the bill was a Safeguard antiballistic missile site around Washington, as per mitted under the defensive- weapons treaty. End-War Proviso Beaten The House again refused to attach an end-the-war amend- ment to the defense bill. After less than 15 minutes of debate, the House, by a vote of 208 to 160 rejected an amendment by Representative Joseph P. Ad- dabbo, Democrat of Queens, that would have required the wihdrawal of all American forces from Indochina in four months, subject to the concur- rent release of prisoners of war. ,There never had been any d&ubt that the Senate would approve the interim agreement, b.qt in the protracted debate stirred up by the Jackson amendment, it finally took a closure vote. After discussing it;.since Aug. 2, the Senate ap- proved today by yote of 76 to 15 a motion to limit debate and force a vote on the Jackson amendment and the offensive- weapons agreement. ,In some ways, the debate turned into a personality con- tct and a clash between Sena- tor Jackson, a senior member of the Armed Services Commit- tee with close ties to the mili- tary, and Senator J. W. Ful- bright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee. the Soviet Union a numerical advantage in land-based and submarine-launched missiles. defending the agreement, the Administration has argued that this Soviet advantage would be offset. by American technologi- cal and numerical superiority in bombers, carriers and fighter- bombers based in Europe and the Far East. United States to levels egved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14758 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE September 13, -1972 All of this action took place subsequent [From Fortune magazine, September 19721 their strategic strike forces at a rate of some to attacks by the President against the THF. SALT NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES ARE 100 sea-launched and 200 land-launched miS- 92d Congress for delaying and a re- TROUBLED BY WHAT WE GAVE AWAY IN THE silos a year. The U.S, last added launchers to sponse to that charge delivered by Sen- Moscow ARMS AGREEMENTS its strategic inventory in 1967. ator MANSFIELD on September 8. (By Charles J. V. Murphy) The decision to hold down our numbers was reached hack in the early 19G0's by De- Mr. President, I also stated on Mon- The agreements reached in the Strategic fextse Secretary Robert S. McNamara. The day that the work of the subcommittee Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have had a growth of the Minuteman force was to be on surface mining legislation could not rather remarkable record in the U.S. Senate. halted when it reached 3,000 launchers, the have been accomplished without "tile The first of the two major agreements, the Polaris force was to hold at its present level great and full support of the minority Antiballistic Missile Treaty, sailed through of forty-one hulls, and an advanced bomber members of the subcommittee." The last month by a vote of 88 to 2. The ABM proposed by the Air Force was rejected. In Senator from Idaho (Mr. JORDAN), the treaty binds tis and the Russians to confine the wake, of the Cuban missile crisis, it ap- the defenses against each other's missiles to pears, the Kennedy men were determined to Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), two fixed sites, at least 800 miles apart, each reduce the risk of another nuclear confronta- and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. to have no more than 100 interceptor rock- tion; they hoped that if we did not add to BELLMON) were prime supporters of the cts-a token number. The other major SALT our nuclear advantage and let the Russians subcommittee and worked tirelessly. I agreement, which put limits on offensive rise to parity, the arms race would slow as chairman of the subcommittee, and I laud their efforts now. It was because of their great and faithful dedication to the task of draft- ing the surface mining legislation that I was doubly shocked to find not one of them at the executive session and there- fore expressed my dismay that their failure to attend might have political overtones. Perhaps my frustration under extreme pressure and urgency induced me to speak more bitingly than I should have done. So if my criticism on Monday was unwarranted, I apologize. I am most pleased that a full quorum was in attendance at the Interior Com- mittee's executive session today and that we did, indeed, report a bill to regulate surface mining, subject to amendments to be proposed on the floor of the Senate. amount of controversy about the conditions On the evidence, the Russians certainly that should he attached to it; but there was made the most of this singular opportunity. never the slightest possibility that the Sen- As Kissinger pointed out in Moscow, the sit- ate would reject it. This "interim agreement" cation in which the U.S. found itself nine fixes future ceilings for the two nations on years later, particularly with regard to sub- the number of strategic nuclear submarines marines, was hardly "the most brilliant bar- each may have (luring the next five years, the gaining position" for our negotiators. Presi- total number of missiles these vessels may dent Nixon has suggested that if the U.S. carry, and the number of land-based stra- were to set out now to redress the balance. tegic missiles each nation may separately immediate additional investments in strategic deploy. systems on the order of $15 billion a year What is remarkable about the Senate rec- would be necessary. And Congress, given its ord is that virtually none of those who are present massive mistrust of just about any responsible for the agreements are happy military investment, would certainly never with them. Not President Nixon. Not Henry yield up such funds. It has persistently Kissinger, who with the President took part skimped on the strategic programs and the in the final horse trading in Moscow and R, and D. account through the past four composed a dazzling if not wholly convinc- years. log political rationale for the trade. Not Sec- Thus our bargaining position in the SALT retary of Defense Laird. Not the Joint Chiefs talks was a steadily weakening one. We had of Staff. Not even the principal negotiators. no ongoing weapon systems in development One adviser to our negotiating team, Wil- and deployment, while the Russians had at liam R. Van Cleave, observed sadly in testi- least three: a class of heavy Inultimegaton mony before the Senate Armed Services Coin- ICBM's, which we call the SS--9's; a class of mittee that the agreements were "a light- light ICBM's called the SS-11's; and a class SALT NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES year removed from the outcomes contem- of strategic-range missile submarines called SEE PROBLEMS IN THE ACCORDS plated in the studies and planning for SALT Y, for Yankee. In bargaining for a future .. There has since the start of SALT been ceiling on the Soviet strategic offensive force, Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I wish a constant erosion of U.S. SALT positions and we really had only one thing to put up for to invite the attention of the Senate to a expectations." bid: the Safeguard ABM, a more promising detailed and thoughtful analysis of the The private unhappiness with the agree- property than is commonly appreciated. "On the offense side," says Dr. John S. Foster SALT accords that appears in the Sep- menu is focused on several problems. First, Jr., director of defense research and en=i- tember 1972 issue of Fortune.Its author, the interim agreement leaves the Soviet veering, "our margin of advantage was melt- Mr. Charles Murphy, has delved into the union with a three-to-two lead over us in ing fast. The Russians knew this and why. the number of land-based strategic-missile They were hardly likely to yield to the Presi- problems of strategic arms limitation launchers-now the central element of mill- dent what Congress would not give." with energy thoroughness, produc- tary striking power; concedes them at the ing one of the most comprehensive and end of the five-year life of the agreement an To the degree that the agreements brake balanced press interpretations of SALT equal superiority in strategic missile sub- somewhat the accumulation of city-destroy- t0 date. marines, where we now have a three-to-two ing weapons, they are certainly all to the lead over them; and gives them a three-to- good. The destructive power of the weapons Mr. Murphy's article reinforces the already advantage in the weight of the nuclear y plied up passes all rationality. And testimony already on the record, that of_ warheads that the ICBM's can deliver. Sec- their costs now border on the lunatic. We ficials who played key roles in concluding ond, the agreement leaves the Russians in have at least begun the effort to construct ca the interim agreement-notably the a position to make far more technological system in which these costs will be less nec- chief negotiator, Ambassador Gerard improvements in their strategic weapons essary; we have again demonstrated awill- Smith-consider that the present in- than we can hope to make. The U.S. has ingress before the world to do what we can terim agreement Is not acceptable as a frozen itself, says Dr. Edward Teller, the dis- to stop the arms competition. permanent agreement. tinguished physicist and weapon expert, In In other respects, though, the SALT agree- In short, Mr. President, it is clear that a position that Is difficult and dangerous." ments are undesirable, It is one thing, se- the interim agreement does not provide A SINGULAR OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RUSSIANS rious enough in itself, to slide into a situa- tion in which the Russians gain an advan- the kind of strategic equality necessary If this is the practical outcome, what was tage in numbers of strategic weapons; it is for a stable, long-term, arms control Nixon after in the SALT exercise to begin quite another matter to regularize this ad- agreement. This is the serious concern of with? The short answer is that he was try- vantage in a formal agreement. Furthermore, the sponsors and supporters of the Jack- log to prevent an even worse outcome for the the agreement enables the Russians to raise son-Scott amendment. I commend Mr, U.S. As Kissinger put the Nixon choice in the power of their strategic forces still fur- Moscow, the value of the interim agreement ther by technological improvement, and so Murphy's article to the Senate. is to be judged not by assessing "whether Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- the freeze make their advantage more griati Is, perpetuates a Soviet numerical May, toward the climax of the e ne negootiations, sent that the article entitled "The SALT superiority" but by what "this margin the U.S. delegation warned that If the next Negotiators Themselves Are Troubled By [would] have been without the freeze." Tho round of SALT talks failed to impose a real What We Gave Away in the Moscow primary American objective was to brake the check on strategic power, "U.S. supreme in- Arms Agreements" be printed in the spectacular momentum the Soviet Union terests could be jeopardized." The most se- RECORD. has lately acquired in the deployment of rious defect of all is that the agreements on strategic ICBM's Inside the Soviet Union and defensive and offensive weapons do not com- There being no objection, the article missile-launching submarines in both the plement one another; indeed, they are in- was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By Kissinger's herently ? Incompatible. Van Cleave com- as follows: figures, the Russians have been adding to lalned: "W arMITI ng i levels of ABM Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R00040601 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S14759 with levels of ABM and offensive levels with ago the Russians, realizing that they were vided on the point, a strong body of opinion offensive levels, which is politically impor- on an unpromising path, tore down much of Is increasingly suspicious that the Galosh taut and which may be strategically impor- what they had built and started all over complex may be only the tip of the real tant, but which blurs the really significant again, this time putting up two huge phased- Soviet ABM iceberg. During the past fifteen offensive-defensive relationship and the need array radars, each as long as two football years the Russians have assembled over their to match defense to offense and vice versa. fields, the costliest structures of their kind Immense geography a surface-to-air missile if ABM is to be limited as stipulated by the in the world. The radars are first class, but defense, originally called the Tallinn system, treaty, the offensive capability permitted the the revamped system still appears to be which has no counterpart anywhere else. It Soviet Union is intolerable. If such offensive faltering because of the well-known Soviet includes at least 10,000 interceptor missiles capability is to be permitted, higher levels of lag in computers and other data-handling and hundreds of radars. The system un- ABM are necessary " On these same gear. The Russians may well have decided doubtedly has an antibomber function. But grounds, Dr. Donald G. Brennan of the that a defense against the thousands of Dr. Foster has steadily argued that with the Hudson Institute, another defense analyst American warheads is at present beyond dot of thihuge landscape, surveillance whole appara- of high repute, deplores the treaty. 'The ABM them. treaty," that treaty," he argued recently, "does the wrong Meanwhile, they might well have been tus could be tied together fairly rapidly into thing well, and the interim agreement on alarmed by the superior showing of Safe- a vast ABM system. This is only a surmise. strategic weapons does the right thing badly." guard. The Army over the past several years The treaty itself explicitly prohibits any ABANDONING THE SHELTER has put our ABM system through rigorous move toward a country-wide system. Never- There is no question that the ABM treaty tests on the Pacific missile range, which ex- theless, there remains a brooding suspicion in has transformed our defense posture. Our tends from California to Kwajalein Atoll In our defense community that those radars Safeguard system was earlier supposed to the mid-Pacific, 4,200 miles away. Out of may signify a Soviet intention to cheat. plexes to twenty-nine attempted interceptions, Years ago McNamara remarked to Foster, consist of twelve antiballistic earlier missile com- across the land. Their function was to twenty-five were successful. These trials "They never would deploy so many missiles provide defense for our cities against a light were all, to be sure, carefully orchestrated; simply for an air defense, considering the attack-e.g., of the kind the Chinese might none of the experts, not even Safeguard's thousands of winged interceptors they have. launch-and, more important, to ensure that stoutest champions, claim that the system They must intend to make the system over even a massive attack on our land-based mis- can be made to provide anything approach- into an ABM system." siles and strategic bombers would not destroy ing a leakproof defense against a severe nu- A NEW SET OF PROBLEMS clear attack. Nevertheless, the development In any case, and whatever their reasons, s them. Additionally, Safeguard was t of high-capacity computers (Sperry Rand), y sh helt ter what the prevaling jargon de- - memory storage banks (Lockheed), and pro- the Russians have most certainly induced scribes as the National Command Authority me memmory techniques (I.B.M.), d) c and pro- Nixon to administer the coup de grace to (NCA)-meaning particularly the President Safeguard, his single contribution to U.S. and his staff, the high military command, tion with phased-array radars (Raytheon strategic assets. The program now is a and the members of Congress. and Bell Telephone Laboratories) and an in shambles. So far, $5 billion has been obli- gated for Safeguard, most of it for R. and D. Now, under the ABM treaty, the concept tegrated command system (Western Elec- the uP a country-wide ABM defense for of for the mastering uric), has the finally stupefying created the volume of means data, for If the Washington complex goes forward, the man u of been abandoned. forces, let alone for the upon which the tracking-aiming-firing-in- final cost of the two sites would be an esti- has and sians ciies ruhave been restricted dour ourselves We to token okeken deRde-- tercepting sequence ultimately depends. mated $8.5 billion. When the agreement ib ele- "The theory," says Dr. Foster, "now rests on came, Defense a De artm grudging ent Congress had authorized construction of but four moym-ts a mite for of two Tense of single demonstrated principles. A workable ADM p mints limited force in defense of a single system can be put together." sites, and active construction was under way ICBM complex in the field, and another on only two. limited force in defense of our respective M'NAMARA'S UNEASY SURMISE At Nekoma, North Dakota, close to the capitals-the NCA role, that is. This was the It is now plain that the numerous skeptics Manitoba line, on the northernmost edge of outcome most ardently desired by the Krem- about Safeguard were grossly wrong. Paul the ninety-mile-long Minuteman field that lin. The Russians were not seriously inter- Nitze, when he was Deputy Secretary of De- starts at Grand Forks, the earth moving and ested in limiting strategic weapons. What fense under Lyndon Johnson, made himself structures are about 90 percent completed; they were adamant about, through the criti- a lay expert of sorts in this strange new mili- however, it will take another two years be- cal exploratory phases of SALT negotiations, tary science. In the SALT talks he was the fore the radars, computers, power genera- was finishing off Safeguard. The Kremlin advocate of the American position where tors, and command-and-control mechanisms began the horse trading on offensive strategic technical points in the ABM matter were are installed and made operational. At weapons only after the ABM issue was settled concerned. "As a defense for hardened silos," Malmstrom Air Force Base in western Mon- pretty much to its satisfaction. Nitze has concluded, "Safeguard can be tana, 600 miles away, construction was For many Americans, this Soviet attitude made effective. It's expensive, but it's going about 10 -percent advanced, work having was entirely welcome They interpret the to be more expensive to deploy an offensive been delayed by a long strike. At the two Soviet abandonment of antiballistic defenses missile capable of defeating it." remaining complexes--one at Warren Air as a tardy conversion to the "mutual assured And so the Russians may have concluded Force Base in Wyoming and the other at destruction" theory of strategy promulgated that they faced the prospect of our having Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri-the by McNamara and the school of defense an effective ABM technology and their being ground had not even been broken for the scientists and analysts to whom he looked without one. A U.S. defense analyst who had construction. Now the Grand Forks com- for counsel. That proposition holds that numerous conversations with his Soviet plex is to be finished, but Malmstrom is be- where both sides are entirely vulnerable to counterparts says, "Though they never ing dismantled, and work at the other sites nuclear attacks, neither side will dare to came right out and said so, I got the feeling has ceased. launch one-that nuclear war becomes pos- that they were afraid we Americans would Meanwhile, there is a large question about sible only when there are defenses against be tempted to move on to still better radars, the NCA complex permitted for Washington. the attacks. It was on this line of reasoning more interceptors; that we would go from a The defense authorization request for fiscal that so many in Congress and the academic thin to a thick ABM cover, while having the 1975 asks for $28 million with which to start community fiercely opposed the Safeguard advantage of the MIRV technology. They work, and the Army hopes to shift there the system when Nixon announced it three and may have realized that the combination of radars and computers on order for Malm- a half years ago. the two would swing the strategic ascend- strom and Whiteman. But Congress is now THE TROUBLE WITH GALOSH ancy back to us." stone cold on the ABM proposition, and we it is possible that the Soviet leaders now It should be noted that there is a much may not even elect to build the NCA com- agree with these critics about the benefits more pessimistic view of their reasons for plex we are allowed under the treaty. of mutual assured destruction. But it seems wanting the ABM treaty. Teller, for one, And so the ABM treaty leaves us with a more likely that the Russians, who are by believes that the Russians know more about good many problems. In February, 1970, in tradition defense-minded, believe in ABM's- the effects of high-yield nuclear explosions a message to Congress, Nixon deliberately and that they opted for the ABM treaty only on warheads, structures, and command-and- raised the question whether it is a good thing because their own defensive system was so control systems than we do. They are also for V. President to be left with the single far behind ours. As early as the mid-1960's said to know more than we do about the option, in a nuclear attack, of ordering a they had begun to raise around Moscow an electromagnetic effects produced by nuclear strike back at the adversary's cities, knowing elaborate ballistic defense, which the West explosions outside the earth's atmosphere. that this would bring a mass slaughter of named Galosh. From satellite photographs During the extensive nuclear tests that the Americans. "Should the concept of assured and study of energy emissions, U.S. intelli- Russians ran in 1961, American surveillance destruction be [so] narrowly defined and gence judged the system a mediorcre one. It systems verified the stunning revelation, should it be the only measure of our ability depended upon clumsy mechanical scanning which the Kennedy Administration sup- to deter the variety of threats we face?" radars for aiming the interceptor missiles. pressed, that the Russians had staged sev- Obviously, the President's answer then, in These radars could track but a single missile era-1 interceptions of missile warheads by Washington, was no; but the treaty he signed at a time, or a cluster. The interceptor exploding nuclear devices outside the at- in Moscow constitutes a yes answer. In the rockets were huge, and interception could mosphere. immediate future, cities and people will re- take place only in outer space. Four years While the intelligence community is di- main defenseless. As Brennan has observed, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14760 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13, 1972 "We and the Russians have agreed not to defend ourselves, not only against each other, out, interestingly, against anybody else." liutual assured destruction, he argues, is not ro much a theory as "a fashion"-a night- _narish notion that "nuclear stability resides Jr. high hostage levels." Now the question arises: just how mutual is the mutuality of destruction likely to be? On this point, the arithmetic suggests that ,ve shall end up a good deal less mutual than I hey. i ;COUNTING UP THE LAUNCHERS U.S. satellite photography shows that the oviet Union has deployed precisely 1,527 'CBM's of various character. Silos for ninety- one more, not yet emplaced, have been marked. The agreement on offensive weapons permits unfinished work to be carried for- ward to deployment, and no doubt these empty holes will be loaded, giving the Rus- sians a total of 1,618 ICBM launchers. In- asmuch as the U.S. has no unfinished ICBM systems in the works, our inventory of launchers must remain at the level of the past five years. It consists of 1,000 Minute- men deployed in six fields and fifty-four Titan missiles. Furthermore, the lead that the U.S. still retains in submarine-launched ballistic mis- siles (SLBM's) will soon be erased and here, tooo, we shall slide Into an inferior numerical Position. By our count, at the time the in- terim agreement was signed, the Russians had twenty-six to twenty-eight Yankee-class missile submarines at sea, and fifteen more building These are nuclear-powered, and Viose at sea, each have tubes for sixteen ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 miles. A new class has lately appeared, having only twelve tubes; these are being armed with a 3 000-mile missile. U.S. intelligence had credited the total Soviet submarine force, in being and in assembly, with an aggregate inventory of 710 SLBM's. The Russian nego- tiators startled our delegation with the dis- closure that the true number was forty-eight submarines and 768 missiles. The agreement allows both sides to enlarge and modernize their SLBM forces in ex- change for cutbacks of older missiles. Here again the Russians, who had more obsolescent missiles and fewer modern submarines, will benefit most. They are permitted to move on to a fleet of sixty-two submarines having a total of 950 missiles in their tubes. To reach that level they are bound to retire 2-0 of their pre-1964 land-based ICBM's (liquid-fueled rockets in the SS-7 and SS-8 classes) as well as thirty fairly short-range ballistic missiles deployed at present on ten older nuclear H class submarines, also verg- ing on obsolescence. The U.S., for its part, is allowed to add three submarines to its present fleet of forty-one sixteen-tube Po- laris/Poseidons, and to raise its present In- ventory of 656 SLBM's to an eventual aggre- gr.te of 710. This gain in sea-based launchers would be at the expense of the fifty-four land-based Titans, the oldest and heaviest ICBM's in the U.S. strategic forces. At the end of the period covered by the Moscow agreement, then, the Russians could have 1,408 land-based launchers to our 1,054; and, since the three additional submarines al- lowed us are hardly likely to be built in the next five years, they could have 950 launch- ers at sea to our 656. Considering the advantages that the Rus- sians already had on the ICBM side of the strategic equation, the stubbornness with which they held out for a roughly equivalent advantage in numbers of SLBM's was dis- turbing to the American negotiators. "The submarine ratio," one of Kissinger's lieu- tenants says, "was the knottiest issue of all. There was no give on the other side." The ratio was finally settled directly between Nixon and Brezhnev in the Kremlin at high noon on the day of the signing, while the Soviet and U.S. negotiating teams were still deadlocked over numbers in Helsink', 550 miles away, in an atmosphere that one ob- server has described as "frantic." One justification advanced for this really extraordinary concession on our part is that the Russians, lacking forward bases similar to those the Polaris/Poseidon force uses at Holy Loch in Scotland, Rota in Spain, and in the Pacific, are able to keep their sub- marines on station only half as long as we are, and accordingly need a larger force in order to have an equal number of SLBM's in position at any given time. This argument is not altogether persuasive, however; some defense analysts have suggested that there are ways for the Russians to operate their submarines more efficiently. In any case, the 3,000-mile SLBM's with which the new Y class submarines are being armed should minimize their problems. THE MEANING OF MIRV Calculating the military value of the op- posing missiles is trickier than just adding up launchers. The "throw-weight" of the missiles, i.e., the military payload carried, varies considerably from one launcher to another. The number of warheads and their accuracy, range, and explosive yields also bear on the potential value of the payload. Henry Kissinger has said that the U.S. has a two-to-one lead in numbers of warheads. Furthermore, Soviet warheads are not new as accurate as ours-on the average, their missiles will hit about three-tenths of a mile farther from target than the Minuteman will-but their greater yields offset their in- accuracy. The Soviet SS-9 missile, for ex- ample, weighs about 500,000 pounds. It lifts a 12,000- to 14,000-pound warhead having a twenty-five megaton yield. Other land-based Soviet missiles are smaller; still, aggregate throw-weight of all classes of Soviet ICBM's is estimated to be around three times the Minuteman's 2,400,000 pounds. (The Min' te- man's gross weight is about 70,000 pounds. It can throw a single warhead with a yield of 1.5 megatons or three warheads with a total yield of 600 kilotons.) Is our disadvantage in throw-weight a crucial one? Defenders of the SALT agree- ment think not. They argue that bombers must be counted in the balance and that our Strategic Air Command is clearly superior to the Soviet bombers. More important, our development of MIRV (for multiple inde- pendently targeted re-entry vehicles, i.e., war- heads) enables us to put more warheads on our launchers than the Russians have been able to fit on theirs-three on the Min'ite- man. as many as fourteen on the Poseidon. A number of targets, tens, even hundreds. of miles apart, can be attacked with extraor- dinary accuracy from a single launch. But this technology, which is now an American monopoly, is almost certainly wiih- in the Russians' grasp. Defense Secretary Laird recently informed Congress that the first Soviet MIRV is expected to be tested this winter. If the test Is successful, a thorough refitting of the Soviet missile forces Is expected to be under way within two or three years. A STRANGE PAUSE IN DEPLOYMENT Once they have mastered the MIRV tech- nique, it should not be excessively difficult for the Russians to fit a huge SS-9 warhead a new strategic submarine (which would not with from six to twenty separately steered be operational for more than five years). Sen- warheads, all more powerful than those lifted ator Proxmire of Wisconsin has served notice by either the Minuteman or the Poseidon. that the procurement programs are in for a The strangepause that settled over the vast hard time. Proxmire has been supported ex- SS-9 deployment program during the winter tensively by a broad coalition of antimilitary of 1970-71, after 288 missiles had been de- lobbies and "think tanks" that have become ployed and with some twenty-five silos still a powerful influence in shaping the behavior empty, is now believed to reflect a decision of Congress on defense spending. In the coali- to replace the entire SS-9 force with a new tion are such bodies as the Federation of generation of MIRV warheads. There are American Scientists, the Council for a Livable also signs that the SS-11 force is to be re- World, SANE, the Coalition on National placed methodically with a new MIRV'd class Priorities and Military Spending, the Arms of relatively "light" ICBM's, and that some Control Association, and the Institute for two score other silos in SS-11 fields, as yet Policy Studies. unfilled, will get MIRV'd weapons too. These groups and their allies in Congress Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Finally, the Russians have about a dozen new silos that are even wider than those in which the first-generation SS-9's are emplaced; and a huge new missile has been spotted on a Soviet test launcher. Its payload is estimated at between 24,000 and 28,000 pounds-it is at least double the size of the SS-9-and Senator Henry M. Jackson has said the mis- sile may be armed with a fifty-megaton war- head. What kind of threat does this emerging So- viet capability represent to the U.S.? No one can speak definitely to this question, but there are some fairly pessimistic answers around. Teller, for example, believes that a combination of improved SLBM's and im- proved SS-9's might conceivably give the Soviet Union a capability over the next sev- eral years to wipe out the U.S. Minuteman and strategic bomber forces on the ground. Actually, to destroy ICBM's in their silos, warheads are not needed in fantastic nuin- bers. In the absence of ABM, it is easy enough, given data on accuracy and yield, to calculate the number of missiles needed to destroy just about all of an enemy's silos. If the Russians should finally begin to approach U.S. standards of accuracy, they should soon have enough SS-9's and SLBM's to annihilate our land-based strategic forces. They could use those two strike elements alone, holding the SS-11's in reserve to retaliate against our cities in the event that our sea-based forces struck at theirs. There are all sorts of reasons for doubting that the Russians actually intend to launch any such first strike. Nevertheless, the fact that they had a first-strike capability would cast a long shadow over world events. And the fact-if it ever came to pass-could not be hidden. In an age of satellite cameras and computers, the adding up of opposing strengths can be done swiftly and accurately. Long before any crisis came to a boil, the behavior of our political leaders, and theirs, would be influenced heavily by that arith- metic. Confidence in Minuteman is a polit- ical factor of prime importance, for us and for our friends and foes. During the five-year life of the interium agreement, it seems clear, the Russian stra- tegic forces will benefit more than ours will from technological improvements. This is all the more reason, many of our defense analysts believe, for the U.S. to be investing heavily in the kinds of advanced technology that we are allowed under the agreement and that might make a difference toward the end of the decade, if the present agreement is not meanwhile replaced by one more favorable to us. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, a sailor of vast experience and uncommon sense, says, "The side which masters the technological open- ings should prevail. The chiefs and I under- stand this. We insisted, on that account, that the agreements shelter three rights : the right to modernize, the right to keep R. and D. alive, and to look and see." Few question the need for surveillance-- i.e., looking and seeing. But there is an ex- tremely serious division in Congress and the scientific community over the Defense De- partment's desire to proceed forthwith with the development of a new strategic bomber Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 14761 would hold investment in the strategic area to a level that would keep R. and D. barely alive. And they are strongly against any move into production-to the creation of new forces in being. A CASE FOR THE TRIDENT Both of the two new strategic systems that the Defense Department wants to develop have been before the country, in one form or another, for quite a few years. One, the Tri- dent system, seeks to replace the Polaris/ Poseidon submarine missile force in the 1980's with a more advanced combination of hull and missile. The other, the B-1, in- volves the large-scale production of a super- sonic, swing-wing intercontinental bomber, to be ready for initial deployment in the late 1970's. At this point, the funding re- quired to take the two systems further along in the R. and D. and prototype cycle comes to only about $1.3 billion in the current budget. In the production and deployment phases, the aggregate costs would of course be $25 billion at the least, and might even be twice that. As a matter of fact, the Trident is in the process of being invented. All that is certain about it now is that the hull will have about twice the displacement of the Polaris sub- marines; the Trident will carry twenty-four missiles, versus sixteen, will be faster, quieter, and much more versatile, will ttake five years to build, and will cost at least $1.3 billion for each vessel (the figure includes R. and D..and missile costs). In simplest terms the Trident is being invented for the purpose of exploit- ing one available new technology, and to anticipate and evade another that is preg- nant with menace, but which has not yet materialized. The menace lies in the knowledge that if the Russians, with their fast and growing flotillas of attack submarines, should de- velop a means of detecting and tracking the Polaris force-and we and they both know the theortical solutions to the problem- the elusiveness that has been the singular merit of the system would be lost. As Teller recently observed, "a single big discovery in oceanography-the detection of sub- marines-could wipe out our last deterrent." The available new technology would bring within the Navy's reach a 6,000-mile mis- sile-Trident II-that can (like the Poseidon missile) be launched from a submerged ves- sel. The Poseidon missile now has a maximum range of about 3,000 miles. This means that when the vessel is on station it must linger fairly close to the Eurasian land mass if the missile is to reach worthwhile targets, and that requirement considerably narrows the ocean areas where the adversary has to look for it. A 4,000-mile missile, Trident I, is in development now and could presently replace some of the Poseidons. With the full-range missile, the Trident will have just about the whole expanse of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in which to maneuver. SECOND THOUGHTS IN CONGRESS Unfortunately, the Trident costs a mint. The Navy contemplates an initial buy of ten vessels, as replacements for the first ten Polaris vessels (which will be twenty years old early in the next decade). That means a capital outlay of between $13 billion and $15 billion, as a starter. A total of $164 mil- lion has already been committed to R. and D. In fiscal 1973 the Defense Department has asked for a total of $977 million. Of this sum, $555 million is to extend the research looking to the eventual design of the hull, further improvement in the missile, and superior communications. Another $361 mil- lion is mostly for developing the reactor, a five-year task, and buying some hardware. Until a year or so ago, even the leading congressional and other skeptics on defense favored moving on to an improved submarine missile force. A sea-based deterrent has long been attractive to many of these skeptics, be- cause it promises to draw fire away from the homeland (and also because it requires no A.BM to protect it). But the looming cost of the system, together with the now-familiar argument that another U.S. SLBM would only provoke the Soviet Union into developing another of its own, has brought a change of heart. A parade of defense analysts before the various congressional military committees has recommended that we stand pat with the Polaris/Poseidon force. In June the Trident seemed to be in big trouble in Congress; the Navy's request for immediate production money came within one vote of failing to win approval of the Seante Armed Services Com- mittee. In July, however, the mood of the Senate seemed to undergo a change. An amendment to restrict Trident funding to R. and D. was defeated, forty-seven to thirty-nine. Six days later, the Navy's entire request passed the Senate, as part of the $20.6-billion military- authorization bill. A VERY EXPENSIVE BOMBER The B-1 is the intercontinental bomber that the Strategic Air Command has longed to suit up for ever since McNamara virtually scrubbed the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) about ten years ago. The airframe for the first of three prototypes is to start through North American Rockwell's jigs in October. General Electric is running tests at its Evendale, Ohio, plant on the 30,000- pound-thrust engines. (They are designed to deliver twice the thrust of the engines used in the F-4.) In April, Boeing was awarded a contract for integrating the avionics system. By and large, the program is on schedule. The first test flight is scheduled for April, 1974, only a year and a half away. If the machine eventually makes it through Congress, it should cut quite a fig- ure in the air. Its gross weight of about 360,000 pounds will be about three- quarters that of the B-52, but will in- clude a bomb load that will be twice as large. Furthermore, its top dash speed is better than mach 2-i.e., more than twice the speed of sound-but the real difficulty for an enemy will be the B-1's ability to maintain almost supersonic speeds over hundreds of miles at earth-hugging, rooftop level on the way to the target. The B-1, using the terrain-follow- ing radar successfully developed for the otherwise ill-starred F-111, will be able to arrow over hostile lands at speeds never be- fore attained by machines moving so close to the earth. The problem about the B-1, as about the Trident, is its staggering cost. So far, close to $700 million has been spent on develop- ment, and the Air Force asked for $445 mil- lion more this year. Carrying the program through the prototype will cost an estimated $2.6 billion. The Air Force is counting on a total buy of 241 machines, with spares. That would put the total cost of the program at about $11.1 billion, an average of $45,500,000 per plane. (The avionics alone will cost $5 million per plane). Given such costs, and the likelihood that they will soar further in the production and deployment phases, it is unlikely that Congress will give the Air Force anything like the numbers it wants. The penalty for excessive costs, in bombers as in submarines, is likely to be a loss in effective numbers-ever fewer machines for the mis- sion. For the moment, however, the Air Force's progress to the prototype has been virtually assured by the Senate's all but unanimous approval of the entire B-1 pack- age. A year and a half ago, the Defense Depart- ment's Dr. Foster made public certain cal- culations regarding Soviet investment in the military technologies. The burden of his findings was that Soviet spending on R. and D. alone was exceeding U.S. spending by a margin of $3 billion to $4 billion a year. U.S. outlays for all military R. and D. was run- ning around $7 billion to $8 billion a year the Soviets rate had risen to $10 billion to $11 billion. These estimates were based upon a close scrutiny by the various intelligence agencies of some five score Soviet military programs. Foster acknowledged that his esti- mates might be off by as much as 20 percent on the high side, but they could also err on the low side. His point was that an invest- ment program like that on the Soviet scale, which appears to have acquired its present momentum in the 1968-69 period, is bound to produce technological surprises. "The de- velopment cycle," Foster noted, "runs from four to seven years. The satellite cameras can't see through a roof. But whatever has been in preparation in the plants should be- gin to come out into the open before long." It is a mistake to believe that satellite re- connaissance, technically brilliant as it is, can keep us apprised of all the important military work that may be going on in- the Soviet Union. A camera cannot see through a layer of cloud, and sizeable stretches of the Soviet Union are hidden by cloud 80 per- cent of the time. We were a year or more dis- covering an ICBM field in a locality previ- ously judged to have no military facilities. The Chinese Communists actually finished a whole new gaseous-diffusion plant under the all but everlasting Himalayan cloud cover before a clear, bright day exposed it to a camera in space. We Americans have lived on the high side of the strategic equation for a quarter of a century. Living on the low side is certain to be a lot more dangerous. We might well have ended up on the low side in the years ahead even if there had been no SALT talks at all; but the outcome of the talks, by formalizing our inferior status, and limiting our options for changing it, have made our situation still more precarious. The numerical inferiority we accepted in 1972 will become tolerable only if the So- viet Union is prepared to restore a more satisfactory balance in SALT II, which may begin soon. It would seem to be mandatory that, despite the considerable costs entailed, we exercise the options we have and look to- ward a time when we may end our strategic inferiority. THE JAWS OF THE WHALE Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, at its annual meeting, recently held in London, the International Whaling Commission failed to adopt a recommendation by the United Nations Conference on the En- vironment at Stockholm for a moratori- um on the killing of whales. The rejec- tion of this proposal was a severe blow to conservationists and other concerned individuals all over the world who have long maintained that a moratorium on whaling is imperative in order to save many species, whose future survival is already in question. Although, unfortunately, the morato- rium was not adopted by the Commis- sion, several important actions, including the setting of quotas for all major ex- ploited species, were taken. While not all that we had hoped for, these efforts are nevertheless a step in the right direction. Mr. Scott McVay, a member of the U.S. delegation to the International Whaling Commission and Chairman of the Com- mittee on Whales, Environmental De- fense Fund, whose efforts to save whales and other sea mammals are well known, has written an interesting and informa- tive article outlining the actions of the Commission which appeared in the New York Times on Sunday, September 3, 1972. In his article entitled "The Jaws of the Whale," Mr. McVay notes that the Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14762 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13, M2 Commission asked the United States to halt the killing of porpoises during commercial fishing operations. This serious problem is of great concern to conservationists and others who fear that the continued loss of 200,000 to 400,- 000 of their numbers each year is se- verely depleting the populations of this species of whale. I was most gratified when the Senate adopted an amendment that I cospon- sored to S. 2871, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which establishes the goal of reducing the number of porpoises and dolphins killed during fishing oper- ations to levels approaching a zero mor- tality and serious injury rate. I am hope- ful that our actions in behalf of marine mammals during this session of Congress will serve as an example to other nations of our concern for these creatures of the sea and our commitment to their preservation, thus helping to bring about an agreement to halt the killing of whales at the next meeting of the Inter- national Whaling Commission. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE JAWS OF THE WHALE (By Scott McWay) PRINCETON, N.J.-Advocates of a moratori- um to stop killing whales-which was urged by the United Nations' Conference on the Environment at Stockholm-were disap- pointed by results of the recent Interna- tional Whaling Commission meeting at Lon- don. But the moral imperative of the Stock- holm decision, persistently voiced by Russell E. Train, leader of the U.S. delegation, did contribute to a number of positive actions. Intensive efforts the previous year had al- ready achieved regional observer plans in the North Pacific (Japan, U.S. and U.S.S.R.), North Atlantic (Canada, Iceland and Nor- way), and South Atlantic (Australia and South Africa). The observer agreement for the Antarctic, involving Japan, Norway, and the U.S.S.R., was finally signed in London. The exchange of observers is a major, far- reaching accomplishment. There were other affirmative notes. The "blue whale unit" (one whale equalled two Fin or six Sei whales) was finally elimi- nated, and for the first time quotas were set for every major exploited species, including the Minke whale. The Fin whale quota was reduced by about one-third in the North Pacific and Antarctic. (Even when a moratorium is achieved, how- ever, the Fin will need 30 to 40 years to re- cover to a level of."maximum productivity.") Quotas were set for the Sei whale at levels believed to be at "maximum sustainable yield" but they do not provide an adequate margin for safety if the estimates are wrong. Quotas for male and female Sperm whales were set separately, as recommended (but, unfortunately, at levels higher than would Have been the case with the combined quota). The Commission asked the United States to halt, as the Norwegian commissioner put it, "the strangulation and drowning of por- poises in tuna nets" by which some 260,000 porpoises perish annually. An Argentine resolution was approved ask- ing the Secretary General of the United Na- tions to urge nations which are whaling out- side the Whaling Convention to join the In- ternational Whaling Commission and abide by its rules. The Mexican commissioner questioned the prevailing assumption that to know more about whales we must continue to kill them in vast numbers. She was appalled to learn "that to have a meaningful voice in the pro- ceedings we have to kill what are probably the most amazing of nature's creatures, and to kill them for profit." Such an encrusted pattern of thinking contrasts sharply with President Luis Echeverria Alvarez's recent action to establish a haven for whales in the peninsula of Lower California. A permanent secretariat of the commission will be established and its convention brought up to date. An international decade of cetacean research was declared, giving impetus to studies of the living whale. Used whaling equipment will not be sold to nonmember nations. The moratorium idea, which has taken hold in the West in the past two years, caught the Soviets by surprise. Not the Japanese. They were at Stockholm. They feel world opinion more strongly and may have to harken to it, especially when threatened by a boycott of Japanese cameras, cars and radios. Also, the Japanese people, including many gifted writers and scientists, are sick of whaling and no longer find whale meat very palatable. The problem is profit. While only 17 per cent of the fishing effort of one Japanese company is directed at whales, more than 50 per cent of its profits are from butchered whales. In the Soviet Union, environmental con- cern has not yet gotten into public con- sciousness nor pricked the public conscience. The whale has not yet become the symbol of a world habitat ravaged by man-as seems to have happened at Stockholm. Yet those who celebrate the whale should remember that the Soviet Minister of Fisheries, Alek- sandr Ishkov, who banned the kiling of por- poises as "cousins to men" in 1966, displayed considerable faith in the whale family again in 1967 In Vancouver, British Columbia. when he put his head into the open jaws of a killer whale. One day we may earn the reciprocal faith of the whale. THE ADMINISTRATION ACTS TO AID PENNSYLVANIA'S FLOOD VICTIMS Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, an article published in the September 9 Philadel- phia Inquirer points out the extensive Federal effort being waged to aid Penn- sylvania's hard-hit flood victims. As I believe the facts noted in the article speak for themselves, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a report of the Honorable Frank Carlucci, Deputy Di- rector of the Office of Management and Budget, the remarks of the President at Wilkes College, and a fact sheet on the extent of the tropical storm Agnes re- covery effort. There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: UNITED STATES OUTSPENDING STATE 11) TO 1 IN FLOOD RELIEF HARRISBURG.-Both the Federal ant: state governments, after checking to see who s pay- ing what for flood relief in Pennsylvania, have found the figure comes to $403 r_ illion, most of it coming from the Federal Treasury. Put another way, the state has spent about a dime for every Federal dollar. Gov. Milton Shapp, in a running fei:d with the Nixon administration about who should pay for what, has said on numeroue; occa- sions Washington isn't meeting its obliga- tions to Pennsylvania, which tropical storm Agnes hit harder than any other state in late June. Damage in Pennsylvania was estimated at more than $2.5 billion. Shapp blames. flood-relief delays on a slow moving national bureaucracy that almost couldn't get started administering aid and he says it is still not moving fast enough. Some of Shapp's cabinet members have caustically remarked that Pennsylvania would have fared better in getting relief if it had been the Saigon government. "We are the U.S. government," one said, "yet we might have gotten - quicker help if we could have gone to the United Nations." Federal relief officials admitted to bureau- cratic snags in the beginning. But Washing- ton has been following a line of silence to- ward Shapp now-except for an occasional countercharge alleging political motivation on the part of Pennsylvania's governor. It seems to prefer to let the facts speak for themselves. Here are figures, as of the end of August. supplied by the Federal and state govern- ments. The Federal government has spent or has under contract about $365 million for state- wide flood relief. State government has spent $38.9 million. About 70 percent of the money has gone to the hard-hit Wyoming Valley jr. the northeastern part of the state. The Federal government predicts spending another $1.2 billion in the future. State gov- ernment has appropriated $150 million from its budget for flood relief but most of it is sitting idle in the various departments. Another $1.75 million in state money, drawn from the general fund right after Agnes hit, went for flood relief. Shapp appropriated that $1.75 million under emergency powers granted the governor by the state Constitution. All the $150 million in state money hasn't even been earmarked by departments. About $23.5 million is being held without designa- tion in the general fund. Additionally, a $100 million bond issue for flood relief thatShapp proposed Is still hang- ing in the legislature. And there's been talk from his office of additional bond issues and the possibility of raising the state gasoline tax by 2 cents a gallon. Morever, much of the money the state might spend will be reimbursed. Charles Mc- Intosh, the state budget secretary, figures at least $50 million might be reimbursed.-if certain funds are ever expended. He referred to a $50 million, short-term loan fund for businesses set up in the Commerce Depart- ment. Only two loans totaling $8.5 million-$4 million to the Piper airplane firm at Lock Haven and $2.5 million to a Wilkes-Barre heating company-have been made from that fund. Commerce Secretary Walter Anader figures he might loan another $10 million by December. The Commerce Department received $51.8 mililon of the $150 million state appropria- tion. REPORT ON AGNES RECOVERY EFFORTS IN WYOMING VALLEY (Memorandum for the President from lion. Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director, Office of Managementand Budget) During our meeting before you sent me on August 12 to the flooded areas of Pennsyl- vania as your personal representative, you spelled out definitive instructions in :four areas. 1. Work closely with the flood victims themselves. Meet with them. Visit their homes and businesses. Listen. Seek their ideas and criticisms as my guide to actions. 2. Combine all available talent, not only in Pennsylvania but in the entire Federal Gov- ernment, into one effective, well-coordinated team geared to meet the immediate and long-term needs of the people. 3. Within the law, change or discard any rule if it will help even one family. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 5AAI- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 14765 Consider this one: "I have a secret plan to end the wax." Who said it? Why, Richard Nixon of course. When? On March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H.. Or did he? Everybody says he did, carefully using quo- tation marks to show the "secret plan" was right out of the 1968 candidate's mouth. As George McGovern put it in 1971: "Three years ago, Richard Nixon campaigned on the pledge that he had a secret plan to end the war.' ..." McGovern returned to the theme in his acceptance speech: "I have no 'secret plan.' . . ." John Lofton, editor of the Republican National Committee's weekly publication, "Monday," has made a hobby of writing a polite query to everybody who quotes Richard Nixon directly as having used the words "secret plan." Once in a while he gets a reply. The most forthright of these came from Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, who wrote in October 1969: "I think you have caught me in a mistake. The truth is I wrote that out of the same general impres- sion that so many people seem to have. But I have now checked back through our files and agree with you that I cannot find the precise phrase 'a plan' in what Mr. Nixon said during 1968." What Mr. Lewis did find, and what is most often cited as the basis for "secret plan," was this remark of Mr. Nixon's on March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H.: "And I pledge to you the new leadership will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific. .' In late 1970, John B. Oakes, editor of the eitorial page of The New York Times, responded to a new query on another use of the "plan" by citing the same quotation and asking: "How could he make such a pledge if he didn't have a plan?" The Times editor argued: "It seems obvious that Mr. Nixon implied that he had a plan when he gave his pledge. But, as I say, it was doubt- less an error to put the words in quotes and if that is what you want me to admit, I am glad to do so, and to state that it won't appear that way in this context again." Nor did it-in The Times. Noteveryone was willing to stop using the phrase when its unrealibility was pointed out. N.B.C.'s Edwin Newman replied: "When I spoke of a secret plan, I did not mean' it as a quotation. It was shorthand, which is sometimes unavoidable, for a plan that the President said he had and the particulars of which he said he could not divulge without impairing the plan's chance of success." (Italics mine.) Did Mr. Nixon ever say he had a "plan," secet or otherwise? He did not; nobody who has been challenged on the use of a direct quotation on this has ever come up with the citation of time or place. Mr. Nixon never said it; the use of quotation marks is in- accurate, unfair and misleading. But it con- tinues, error feeding on error, as a myth becomes accepted as truth. The question then becomes-if he did not actually say it, did he imply that he had a secret plan? His remarks on March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H., were a pledge "to end the war and win the peace." He continued he had no "push-button technique" in mind, but would "mobilize our economic and dip- lomatic and political leadership." Not surprisingly, both press and political opponents came back with the question "How?" Newsmen pressed for details, and when no plan was set forth, its absence was noted. The first use of the word "plan" that I could find was in the March 11, 1968, New York Times subhead: "Nixon Withholds His Peace Ideas/Says to Tell Details of Plan Would Sap His Bargaining Strength If He's Elected." The Associated Press lead three days later added to the idea of a specific plan, necessarily cloaked in secrecy: "Rich- ard M. Nixon says the reason he is not ready to spell out the details of his plan to end the war in Vietnam is because he is reserving his 'big guns' for use against President Johnson if he wins the Republican Presidential nom- ination." In that A.P. story, Mr. Nixon stressed that he had "no magic formula, no gimmick. If I had a gimmick I would tell Lyndon John- son." The furtherest he would be drawn into a discussion of a "plan" was this: "But I do have some specific ideas on how to end the war. They are primarily in the diplomatic area." That's as much as the clips I have seen show about the "plan." Would a fairminded person say they constitute the basis for an inference that the candidate possessed a de- tailed, and necessarily secret, panacea for the conflict? I think not--no more than one would infer that Senator McGovern has a "secret plan" to fulfill his pledge to bring back the prisoners in ninety days. Throughout the campaign and on into the years ahead, we can expect to hear some ora- tors and commentators use a little inflection around "secret plan" that makes it sound like a quotation. The quotation thereof is no dark media conspiracy, just an example of how some writers and cartoonists, too lazy to check source materials, casually pick up and perpetuate an error. A small but hardy band of newsmen, with no constituency but ob- jectivity, will wince when they see the non- quote quoted. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tenl- pore. Is there any further morning busi- ness? If not, morning business is con- cluded. INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITA- TION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the un- finished business (S.J. Res. 241), which the clerk will report. The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Calendar 929 (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing the President to approve an interim agree- ment between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The ACTING PRESIDENT - pro tem- pore. What is the will of the Senate? CALL OF THE ROLL Mr. FULBRIGHT. - Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arkansas not lose his right to the floor. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll and the following Senators answered to their names: - [No. 420 Leg.] - Allen Byrd, Robert C. Jackson Buckley Fulbright Mansfield Byrd, Hughes Harry F., Jr. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. A quorum is not present. Mr, ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be instructed to request the attendance of absent Senators. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Vir- ginia. - The motion was agreed to. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate. After some delay, the following Sen- ators entered the Chamber and answered to their names: Aiken Fong Nelson Anderson Gambrell Packwood Bayh Goldwater Pastore Beall Gravel Pearson Bellmon Griffin Pell Bennett Gurney Percy Bentsen Hansen Proxmire Bible Harris Randolph Boggs Hart Ribicoff Brock Hartke Roth Brooke Hatfield Saxbe Burdick Hollings Schweiker Cannon Hruska Scott Case Humphrey Smith Chiles Inouye Spong Church Javits Stafford Cook Jordan, N.C. Stennis Cooper Jordan, Idaho Stevens Cotton Long Stevenson Cranston Magnuson Symington Curtis Mathias Taft Dole McClellan Talmadge Dominick Metcalf Thurmond Eagleton Mondale Tower Eastland Montoya Weicker - Ervin Moss Williams Fannin Muskie Young - Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs. EDWARDS), the Senator from Massachu- setts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Sen- ator from New Hampshire (Mr. McIN- TYRE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Cali- fornia (Mr. TuNNEY) are necessarily ab- sent. I further announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) is absent on official business. Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), and the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MuNDT) is absent be- cause of illness. - The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAM- BRELL). A quorum is present. - The Senator from West Virginia is recognized. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, with respect to the cloture vote which will occur on tomorrow, I ask unanimous consent that all amendments at the desk at the time of the vote be considered as having been read in order to meet the reading requirement under rule XXII. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. - Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Arkansas is recognized. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as we resume the discussion of the interim agreement, I wish to say that I am in- deed very sorry that the leadership felt compelled to file a cloture motion. For the record, I would like to state Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14766 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13, 1972 that, from the beginning, my position and the position, I believe, of those asso- ciated with me in the effort to approve, without qualification, the interim agree- ment that the Senate should proceed under the rules of the Senate in the regular manner and that any amend- ments to the resolution of approval should be presented and be subject to debate and amendment. The sponsor of the proposed amend- ment which gives rise to this situation, the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACK- SON), has taken the position that he is unwilling to submit his amendment to the resolution in the absence of what is called a package agreement, that is, an overall agreement to limit time on all amendments to his amendment and provide for a specific time for final action on amendments and the resolution itself. That has been the reason why we have not been able to proceed in the usual manner for the discussion of and action upon amendments to the Interim Agree- ment. As I said before, I consider the Interim Agreement a most important measure. It, together with the ABM Treaty, is, I be- lieve, a most significant step if we can succeed in carrying through with it and proceedings to phase II negotiations. This is the most significant step since World War II toward some kind of reconcilia- tion between the Communist nations and the non-Communist countries of the world. If we take this first step we might look toward a period of detente and pos- sibly even a period in which the United Nations might be infused with new strength and hope. I would remind the Senate that this agreement was negotiated over a 3-year period between our officials and the Rus- sians at both Helsinki and Vienna. Those negotiations led to agreement at a meet- ings. We approved it unanimously and President Nixon in Moscow. The Committee on Foreign Relations approved this agreement after full hear- ings. We approved it unanimously and with no amendments. We specifically dis- cussed the possibility of various amend- ments and decided that amendments of any kind would be inappropriate. Since the committee reported the resolution, of course, amendments have been of- fered specifically the Jackson amend- ment, compelling us to review this posi- tion, and I have done so with other Mem- bers. Therefore, we will offer amend- ments to the Jackson amendment; if the Jackson amendment, in any form is adopted, other amendments will. be of- fered, which are at the desk. The President and his spokesman stated categorically at the time we re- ported this matter that the interim agreement adequately provides for our security. Numerous quotations from the President's statement in Moscow and in Washington, and also his spokesman, Mr. Kissinger, support this position. The President stated that at a minimum the United States has overall equality in strategic weapons. In some categories, of course, we arefairly superior; that is, in such things as nuclear warheads, for example, we have more than the Rus- sians. We have superiority as a result of MIRV and also as a result of the sta- tioning of our nuclear weapons in Europe. We have some 14 operational aircraft carriers and two under con- struction, I believe, and we will thus have about 16 very large, very expensive, very powerful aircraft carriers which can, as we know, be maneuvered close to the Soviet Union or any place else. In heavy bombers we also have about an advantage of three or four to one, with over 500 heavy bombers, whereas the Russians have about 150. These are ap- proximate numbers. We have bases over- seas for our submarines, and we have been told by experts that because of this geographic advantage for the U.S. it is necessary for the Soviets to have about three submarines for every two of the United States to keep the same number on station. In other words, the overseas bases we have in Spain, Scotland. and the Pacific enable our submarines to stay on station without going back and forth across the ocean for refueling, sup- plies, and so on. So overall I think it is clear we have at least equality in some cases superiority. The only area in which the Russians have numerically more weapons is in the in- tercontental ballistic missiles, which are roughly in the position of 1,618 to 1,054. Here again there is some slight differ- ence in those categories as to size and throw weight, but difference is of very minimal significance because from testi- mony we had both recently and at the time of the ABM debate, it was quite clear that each side has far more des- structive capacity in these missiles than is necessary to inflict what is called un- acceptable damage to the other. Mr. President, you will recall at the time of the ABM debate Secretary of De- fense McNamara and others were talk- ing about the mutual capacity to kill 100 million Americansand 100 million Rus- sians and destroy 75 percent of all indus- trial capacity in either country, and so forth. These figures were bandied about in those hearings, but the significance is that we both have what is generally con- sidered to be overkill capacity; that is, both sides have the capacity in the ab- sence of an effective defense to destroy effectively the industrial capacity and an enormous number of the inhabitants of each side. The ABM treaty, of course, recognized that neither side has an effec- tive defense against a nuclear attack. If it could be assumed the ABM was an ef- fective defense to the missiles then there would be a more complex situation, but now we have had almost unanimous ap- proval of the ABM agreement. The effect is that both sides give up the idea of try- ing to create an effective ABM defense weapons system, effective against the in- tercontinental ballistic missile. That is a very significant agreement. I am very glad the ABM Treaty has been approved. But accepting that at its true value, and I have no reason to be- lieve either side does not intend to abide by it, then the question is how much overkill, how much surplusage of de- structive power is needed when we both can inflict unacceptable damage on the other. That gives us a very different picture. The argument about superiority of num- bers on the one side as opposed to the other has become almost irrelevant. However, that the core of the argument now being used is that westill must have superiority. Mr. President, much has-been written to the effect that the President has lent the prestige of his office to support the amendment by the Senator from Wash- ington (Mr. JACKSON), the amendment to the resolution authorizing the Presi- dent to accept the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons, the agreement the President signed in Moscow, subject to congressional approval. I am struck by the irony of the situa- tion. The most prominent, vocal critic of the Moscow agreements, the Senator from Washington, has enlisted the sup- port of the President in opposition to, the principal agreement the President brought back from Moscow, an agree- ment the President himself hailed as tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nu- clear war. An agreement which, said the Presi- dent, will provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can suc- ceed in building a lasting peace. The President is supporting the prin- cipal critic of these agreements--the Senator who has characterized the In- terim Agreement negotiated by the President as one which puts the United States in a position of subparity. Here are the words on August 7 of the Senator from Washington, Mr. JACKSON: We have, in the few brief years since the Kennedy Administration, gone from strategic superiortty to parity to sufficiency-whatever that means-to interim subparity. Who got the United States into a posi- tion of interim subparity? None other than the President of the United States, says Mr. JAcKsoN. The President signed the agreement which Mr. JACKSON describes as putting the United States in a position of interim subparity. Lest there be doubt, the Sen- ator from Washington removes it in these words: "in the interim agreement before the Senate we have subparity." The Senator from Washington was referring to the interim agreement signed by President Nixon in Moscow in late May-let me make that crystal clear. I happen to agree with the Nixon who in late spring described the agreements to Members of the Congress and the American people as agreements in which "neither side won and neither side lost- if we were to look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won." They were the words of President Nixon. I find myself in agreement with the position which the President took in late May-but opposed to his position in mid- summer. The careful examination which mem- bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions gave the interim agreement sup- ports the proposition that the interim agreement is a good and significant first step. But a first step must be followed by a Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14767 September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE second, and a third, so that finally we We should also be wary that by RP- Jackson amendment and Mr. Ziegler may begin to move toward some control proval of the language of the Jackson said: of man's ingenuity to the President of Tonkin resolution not endorsing oa Gulf f the feel that that is the Jackson consistent with our Now it appears that tposition but we do not endorse separate elaborations himself is beginning to have doubt about arms race. of that amendment. We feel the amendment, the wisdom of the first step he took in i anticipate that if this amend- as offered, speaks for itself. late May. ment is approved, in the years to come The officials who negotiated the agree- we will be confronted, each year, with the Mr. President, I once again emphasize ment, Ambassador Gerard Smith and statement, "Well, you already approved these are the words of Mr. Ziegler. The others, have been left dangling, not know- it." It will be argued that we will need words which I have quoted in other parts ing what is going on. At a time when the more and more intercontinental ballistic of my statement indicating support for White House needed people who could missiles, and cruise missiles, and every the agreement as negotiated were, in read the fine print in amendments such other imaginable kind of weapons sys- many instances, the words of the Presi- as that proposed by the Senator from tems in order to comply with the inter- dent of the United States. He stated di-agreement Washington, the expertise was lacking. pretation of the language of the Jackson eetly that this s was a interest and that What I find most disturbing about the amendment. and that i In our waffling of the administration on the lan- I think the amendment of the Senator it was quite adequate for our safety. Also guage of the Jackson amendment is that from Washington should be examined Dr. Kissinger at the White House in the it does not seem to realize that this very carefully as to what it really means, presence of about 100 Members of Con- amendment not only condemns - the I personally have no intention of voting gress was introduced by the President agreement which this administration for it, nor shall I vote for the resolution who said, after he had made a statement negotiated, but that it ties the hands of if it contains the Jackson amendment, of his own: beliauthabout oriz this. Kissinger to speak on my not amended-in dto n oche words, it our negotiators when the next round of even as negotiations come up. said: It was the President who announced during this debate. The President I have another engagement, but Mr. Kis- many months ago that our nuclear ar- I think the administration should be senal should be determined by the con- absolutely clear on the meaning of every cept of sufficiency. But the sponsor of word. The President has himself, so far the proposed amendment which he asks as I know, never given a definitive state- I consider these statements to be more we adopt, refers to sufficiency as some- ment on his position on the Jackson significant bh n those made at a press thing he does not understand; sufficiency, amendment. conference Mr. . - , in view c any of t Wa h ng that is, said the Senator from memIt was suggesd by some committee bers that it wou d help if the minor- versy, I find itestrange th at thhis P esident whatever' Washington. has not seen fit to issue directly, over Sufficiency, to me, and I believe to the sty leader would get a letter signed by men who negotiated the accords, means the President making his position quite his own signature or in person, a defini- that there is a limit to the need to have clear. This was not done, and we were Senate to stateith ment about tt this situation iagreementn he respect . capacity to kill. told it could not be done. Fourth. One must ask, "What goes The chairman of the Armed - Services It is not enough to issue vague state- Committee told us a few days ago that ments through a press secretary, as was onWho interprets Mr. JACxsoN's lan- stroy U.S. nuclear submarine could de- done recently. stroy 25 percent of Soviet cities which Are Members of this body to accept a guage-Mr. JACKSON, or the White have a significant industrial potential. statement from Mr. Ziegler that "We"- H been so rampant that Surely 20 or 30 times that amount is and I do not know who "we" is, "We en- Confusion has it has been necessary for the rampant that sufficiency. dorse the Jackson amendment but we do But the thrust of the Jackson amend- not endorse the separate elaboration of Union to issue a clarifying statement, ment-the thrust which the administra- the amendment." Confusion about the meaning of the tion does not seem to comprehend, is that This, I think is, at best, a very ain- Jackson amendment led to stories in the sufficiency is no longer to be the under- biguous or ambivalent statement. press suggesting that the amendment by girding of our negotiating posture. The WAFFLING ON TIIE JACKSON AMENDMENT Mr. JACKSON had either been submitted new word is superiority. First. In early August, a version of the to, or cleared by, the Russian Embassy. If we are to base our negotiations on Jackson amendment was circulated and But the Soviet Embassy, in order to the concept of superiority, we might as sponsors were invited to join it on the clarify the situation-this is rather un- well save the time and effort of our nego- ground that it was endorsed by the White usual, I may say-issued the following tiators because the other side will believe House. That was the amendment which statement, and circulated it to a num- Mr. JACKSON, not the President, and will stated that Congress would consider ber of Senators, I being one of them, al- see us moving once again toward the con- action on deployment by the Soviet though I know that others have received cept of a first strike. Union, having the effect of endangering it as well. if the administration has not seen the the survivability of the strategic deter- It was a simple statement, on one writing on the wall, as it is revealed most rent forces of the United States, whether page, which read as follows: skillfully in the Jackson amendment, or not such action or deployment was In connection with the reports published surely they must see it in the rash of undertaken within the terms of the in the American press to the effect that So- news stories in recent days which show interim agreement referred to in section viet diplomats were consulted on Senator our Military Establishment moving to- 2, to be contrary to the supreme national Jackson's resolution etand mbaallegedly gas Sevier ward cruise missiles, not covered by the interests of the United States. This was Union would oke it the dmb sesy the Soviet there is no accords, and toward hardened war heads an invitation to the Soviet Union to de- truth i these epoots. capable of a first strike designed to de- nounce the agreement. stroy retaliatory weapons in the hands of Second. When the White House read That is a rather unusual statement to the Soviet Union. this fine print, and received word that a be issued by any foreign embassy that I The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. number of Senators were appalled by this know of. I do not recall any precedent BROOKE) has properly asked the Presi- language,- the White House found it quite like it from the Soviet Union. dent to tell the Senate what is up. I think necessary on August 7 to abandon this Mr. President, there have been some he deserves an answer. language and to approve some substitute very good discussions about the signi- For months now we have been told how language. On that date the White House ficance of overkill, the significance of inferior the United States is in weapons stated in a press conference that "the the development of the enormous capac- of all kinds. Jackson amendment is consistent with sty for destruction that exists in nuclear This is part of the annual rite by which the undertakings in Moscow." weapons, and the distinction which the Department of Defense gets appro- Third. Two days later, on August 9, should be drawn between ordinary con- that houd be smart enough to the Whe House found it o clarify its attitude necessary toward the customed to fighting realize with, such weapons priations. We thnow. again t Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14768 Approved For Rele 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 RESSIONAT. R FC0R n __ cFly A rrr rya w~ ua wuria war ii, for exam- under the aegis of the Kennedy adminis- ers on continuous, quick-reaction alert pie, and nuclear weapons. So I shall tration. status and a fleet of 41 nuclear address myself for a few minutes to this By the midpoint of the 1960's, the at- submarines, each of which carries 16 subject. ta,inment of an invulnerable deterrent medium-range Polaris missiles over WHAT IS AT ISSUE posture by the Soviet Union had changed half of which remain constantly on oper- Over the weeks since Mr. Nixon visited things a great deal. Despite the repeated ational patrol. Each of these additional Moscow to sign the strategic arms limi- political crises and conflicts which beset force categories would complicate the tation agreements, the Senate has gone it, the Soviet-American relationship had Soviet Union's war-planning effort enor- to great lengths to learn as :much as come to assume a remarkable degree of mously. The B-52 bomber contingent possible about these agreements and stability at the strategic level. The main- has the capability of being launched on their implications. Now the Senate must spring of that stability was, and A ill is, sufficiently short warning to stand a decide whether to support those agree- the mechanism of mutual deter rence, good chance of evading destruction on ments or not-and, if it chooses to sup- created and maintained by the existence the ground by any incoming missile at- port them-what the nature of that of credible second-strike nuclear forces tack, and these aircraft still possess a support will be. Will the Senate express in the strategic arsenals of each side. respectable capability for penetrating unequivocal support for a limitation of These forces, in the form of hardened Soviet air defenses and geting through the arms race Or will the Senate qualify land-based ICBM's and submarine-de- to their assigned targets. The Polaris its support by appending an ambiguous ployed medium-range missiles, gave both fleet, for its part, is virtually invulner- statement of philosophy heavy with sus- countries the assured ability to ride out abel to attack and will remain so un- picion and distrust? The Jackson amend- a premeditated nuclear first strike with til the Soviets can acquire an antisub- ment is an amendment with serious im- enough residual arms to guarantee a marine capability, a development which, plications and it deserves therefore the crippling reprisal against the attacker. according to all testimony, lies far be- serious consideration of every Senator. The paradoxical result was that each yond any foreseeable technological hori- With the knowledge, born of experience, country, though totally vulnerable as zon. Thus the Soviet Union's defense that such resolutions may well acquire never before, now assumed an unpre- would have to depend solely upon ABM's even greater importance as time passes, cedented degree of security from its op- to sustain the brunt of retaliation. And the Senate should not now give voice to ponent's certitude that starting a gener- so the fear that either side might, a statement of philosophy without first al nuclear war would be suicidal. As a through an ABM-MIRV combination, .;edging carefully its full implications. consequence, nuclear weapons had be- suddenly emerge wtih a-first-strike capa- The Jackson amendment hinges upon come both self-negating and substantial- bility is still ill-founded. Even if either its contention that a stable strategic bal- Iy devoid of political exploitability. side undertook to acquire that vastly ex- ance is difficult to preserve. The amend- The recent advent of ABM and PMIIRV pensive combination, it would still be vul- ment implies that we must be ever vigi- technology and the continued expansion nerable. It is ironic that the Senate has, lant, else the other side suddenly emerge of the Soviet ICBM force throughout by approving the ABM treaty, now re- one day with a power that renders us the past half decade, however, have moved even the assumptions behind this "inferior." Is this a possibility? if it is aroused widespread fears among some illusory ABM-MIRV first-strike possibil- not, then the Jackson amendment should Americans that the Soviet Union is now ity; but we are still left with the cli- ne rejected: for the assumption that we somehow set on a course of acquiring mate of fear engendered by the advent are threatened by inferiority leads something called strategic "superiority." of MIRV and ABM technology. inevitably to far-reaching conclusions. In its more alarmist variations, this a:rgu- Eventually, what all Americans must We are quickly led to believe that we must ment maintains that the Soviet Union is be brought by their leaders to recognize be satisfied in future arms agreements moving dangerously close to achieving a is that the United States and the Soviet only with some kind of measurable nuclear first-strike capability against Union have long since reached a plateau equality. And we are quickly convinced the United States, that Moscow's appar- in their strategic relationsip. The terms that, in the meantime, we must continue ently eouneiliatory conduct in the SALT "mutual deterrence" and "nuclear stale- to purchase every available weapons sys- talks has been only a ruse to lull us into mate" both describe it appropriately. tem not specifically limited by agree- a false sense of security, and that we are From a strategic nuclear perspective, ment. Those are weighty and expensive now in jeopardy of having our deterrent both sides are now inexorably equal, re- conclusions. If the assumption from capacity compromised. gardless of the further numerical addi- which they are drawn is faulty or mis- THE DURABILITY OF MUTUAL DETERR#XCE tions or qualitative improvements in conceived, then we will have erred seri- All of these apprehensions are built either side's arsenal. This is a funda- ously. So that assumption must be care- upon the assumption that there are cer- mental and critically important point: fully examined: Could we become "in- tain inherent qualities in such weapons we are equal not because we have nu- ferior?" as MIRV's and ABM's which make them merically equivalent arsenals; our equal- BACKGROUND fundamentally different from existing ity arises from the fact that we are alike Beginning back in the mid-1950's, after weapons systems. The idea has emerged in being deterred. This equality is not the Soviet Union had acquired a nuclear that, because MIRV's provide their pos_ subject to sudden change or gradual delivery capability, we began to realize sessors with at least a fourfold increase erosion in the foreseeable future. It can- that our ability to deter an attack upon in deliverable warheads, either side might not be altered by the deployment of ad- us rested in our ability to convey to any be able to almost completely disarm its ditional weapons today, nor is there fore- opponent an absolute certainty that any opponent's land-based missile force by seeable technology that could alter it. attack, however massive, would be an- attacking it with a skillfully planned THE "SUPERIORITY" FALLACY swered by an unacceptably devastating MIRV barrage. If the attacker also had Somehow, the notion that the United reprisal. We began to appreciate that if an effective ABM system, according to States should maintain strategic "super- a combined bomber and missile strike this conception, it could blunt any small iority" over the Soviet Union, or that against us could succeed in decimating retaliatory strike that the attacked we should live in anxiety about the pos- our nuclear forcesto the point of virtual country might still be capable of. Thus sibility that they will attain "superi- uselessness, we would in fact have no the advent of ABM's and MIRV's have ority," has for years enjoyed an almost deterrent. That realization had a revolu- revived the specter of a first-strike pos- mystical fixation in our thinking. Per- sionary impact on the pattern of our sibility. If both sides, by deploying an haps this fixation can be partly explained strategic thinking. We began to reassess appropriate ABM-MIRV combination, by the natural psychological and chau- some of the assumptions underlying our developed such a first-strike capability, vinistic satisfaction that Americans tra- defense posture and we decided that the then we would be returned to the "deli- ditionally have drawn from being American deterrent was in need of some cate balance of terror" which existed in "stronger than," "better than," or drastic revisions. The ultimate outcome the 1950's. "ahead of" their Communist adversary. of this reassessment was the far-reach- But the ABM-MIRV first-strike threat For the most part, however, it ing decision to expand, disperse, and pro- is deceptive. For the U.S. retaliatory ca- seems to have arisen from a gen- tect the American retaliatory force, a pability consists of a good deal more nine belief that "superiority" some- decision made during the latter years of than just land-based missiles. It Includes how would give us advantages-either the Eisenhower era and carried through also a sizable number of manned bomb- political or military or of some other sort. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14769 Septe,niber 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Indeed, even some strategic analysts have requiring a full retaliatory response off, President Kennedy was more realis- been quick to assume that U.S. "superi- against the Soviet Union. Kennedy did tic about the outcome. He said that the ority" has been the determining factor in not, however, promise or threaten the Soviets had backed down, in the final various foreign against therSov et Un on.oS ch an successes failed to with their missiles from C ba. wrong land that, atbsome future time, if nter interests to protect, theyh It might sumption widely agreed, f course, that nu- retaliation in the event that the missiles had vital thought clear weapons perform a deterrence func- were actually fired. His threat may or very well not back down. In other words, tion: They deter a premeditated attack may not have been believable-perhaps they might choose to fight, even with a directly upon one's homeland. ; This is a tit was. But the main point is that his so-called hreat concerning our retaliating was not cumstanc sllcwere inferiority, I Kennedy, rather o not have g function; thew but directed toward the objective of getting much to his credit, realized that we had pone do not have to do anything but the Soviet missiles physically removed been lucky in the Cuban crisis. Under merely exits at can retaliate quantity against from Cuba. If he had threatened a nu- other circumstances, he realized, with anyone else's we can upon us. F or thise clear attack against the Soviet Union if mutual deterrence preventing either side function, o el's first strike discussed, relative they did not remove their missiles, they from employing nuclear weapons, the So- numbers in has been discus, strategic air surely would not have believed him. viets might have felt that they had con- senals are, the and large, unimportant. owever greater our nuclear forces may ventional superiority and that the battle sepals are, s and large, unimport. have been in terms of numerical quan- was worth fighting. I would say that that All one needs for that strength is is on less, 'in tity, they were not enough to perform a is probably true with respect to their ex-stre quan ati even if s, t than that of in successful first strike. The Soviet Union ploits in Eastern Europe. adv terms, than that of the even with far less numerical strength, To underscore this point, we need only adveerairyrsary. . still possessed a second strike capability, recall the success of the Soviet Union in But some people have adopted the tea and everyone on both sides knew it. occupying Hungary in 1956 and in build- secondlefthat function nuclear :weapons pons even can without perform a a Of course, it can be asked: why, then, ing the Berlin Wall in 1961. In both cases, That, first-strike capability, they can provide did Khrushchev back down) And for the the United States had a so-called "su-k to power, nuclear periority" other and it a foreign of lever we act pursuit of our tors-apart from so-called Amer can facu-- not change a thing. The Soviets had dhe can get psome olicy objectives: a uIn out this oview, we ur nu- clear superiority. First of all, the crisis force of resolve and conventional supe- clear get weapons, over an above outour pri- took place virtually within an arm's riority on their side, and we were un- mary of deterring an attack k on our willing to risk war in order to avert their mart' mde, of demour adversaries r n our preach onderance of on ent conventional power in a this lans. In none of these crises-Hungary, fearful omelan that, making akin with oua ea From the Soviet point of view, once Berlin, Cuba, or, I might add, Czechoslo- h will ubj wth our they saw that we were concerned about vakia-did the strategic nuclear equation global activities, shey they interfere selves ohpossibility subject them- the missiles, there was no guarantee really play any significant role in shap- edible a losses, either lity c because we al- that we would not use this conventional ing the outcome of events. Indeed, it is crediively against their interf retaile capability to remove the missiles from one of the greatest ironies of the nuclear fate massively confrontation could es- Cuba forcibly. That would have been a age that while enthusiasts in both Wash- serious humiliation to the Soviet Union, ington and Moscow have often lauded c because fee Now, it could possible pa alate out of control. . Now, it is possible much worse than that which occurred "superiority" as a goal, neither side has been performed kind of function weapons could have when they removed the missiles on their ever behaved internationally as though ingn that when wapondues own decision under the terms of an un- it mattered. The meaning of this is pro- was that period hnn the Unisetem. i t derstanding. foundly important: unless a nation was probably as pro onlynation to believable to other o othsthem. It nations A second factor was that we had the uniquely possesses a first-strike capa- bility-something no longer a possi- in the immediate postwar years-after we force of resolve on our side. The Soviet ility-then nuclear longer give no had shown ourselves willing to drop two Union had created the problem by alter- advantage. Our nuclear weapons eervo atomic bombs on the cities of Japan- ing the status quo; we had responded only . urncucla depo any eve al us-t hie. that we might use such weapons against by making it clear that we found that the onone enemy y from from FOR ARMS hi CONTROL those who confronted us around the presence of Soviet weaponry in the West- tential one world. But today is far different. Now ern Hemisphere posed a direct threat to REASONS that other nations possess these weapons, our interest. The burden of responsibility Now the question might be asked: If any threat-implied or otherwise-that for ending this tension was thus placed mutual deterrence is so durable and mere we would resort to their use to support upon the Soviet Union. And third, when numerical superiority gives no advan-tage SALT have then why agre our objectives would certainly be met Placed a naval quarantine and threatened to launch anua rr all? That is a question worth cons dering v to be sushown utter disbelief. We Cuba strike against the missiles already there, carefully. The administration, of course, with incredulity, have, to be sure, shown ourselves upon a gonn a we placed the onus of decision directly has to its credit the achievement of hav- co wreak massive destruction upon the Soviets: any Soviet ship at- ing negotiated these agreements. Regret- Vietnam-but is cannot unlikely strike that anyone a tempting to run the blockade would have tably, however, they have given a sort of d o such to face the possibility of being sunk by distorted justification for having done so. in the world believes we would d to the in Vietnam anywhere else-if our naval forces. While Khrushchev may According to the administration, we thereswer any possibility we have wanted the missiles in Cuba to start needed these agreements to keep the there were any red, even at all that t wack with, he was certainly under no obliga- Soviet Union from rushing ahead and would c attacked, even a small attack, tion to risk armed conflict of any kind to gaining "superiority"-as if that were to be lebe sure, weapons. theere have been many keep them there. something they could actually do. By giv- Now, with nuclear occasions when the Soviet Union has So it is in these more conventional, ing credence to the idea that there backed away from crises when confronted less apocalyptic factors that the explana- such a thing as "superiority," the admin- with American diplomatic and military tion of that classic and often cited epi- istration has, indirectly, given support to pressure. The question, however, is sode must be found. It was a case not those in our country who are unhappy whether it was some kind of strategic where nuclear "superiority" triumphed, about the agreements and suspicious of "superiority" or really other factors but where the United States was able, the Soviet Union. For now that the no- which were the deciding elements in our by threatening the Soviet Union with tions of superiority and inferiority are favor. The Cuban missile crisis is the the prospect of conventional war, to abroad in the land, many people are classic example often cited. In his famous make the Soviet Union change its plans. doing a lot of mathematics and coming nationwide television address, President The whole episode would very probably to alarming conclusions. They are say- Kennedy did indeed state that it would have occurred in the same way even if ing that, in negotiating these agree- be our policy to regard any nuclear mis- nuclear weapons did not exist. After- ments, we lost. We are in danger, they sile launched from Cuba against any na- ward, although there was a good deal of say, because even with the agreements, tion in this hemisphere as an attack by self-congratulation about how our nu- the Soviet Union may be able to acquire the Soviet Union on the United States, clear superiority had scared the Soviets "superiority." Of course, the administra- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 8 14770 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September- 13, 1972 tion has its reasons for wanting to keep method of stepping off the treadmill the specter of superiority alive. In this together, cay, they can frighten the Congress and Second. Nuclear proliferation. The sec- the people into paying billions more for and reason for supporting the offensive- new weapons systems-the Trident, the weapons limitation has to do with the B-1, and so on-as the only way, even rest of the world. Today, as both the with the agreements, of preventing the United States and the Soviet Union have Soviet Union from acquiring "superi- apparently recognized, we live in a world ority." that is not very easy to control. People 6o it is worthwhile to look carefully at everywhere are nationalistic; they care the reasons for having and supporting more about themselves and their own a limitation on offensive weapons. This countries than about the ideologies of the agreement should be supported not be- two so-called powers. They are, as they cause it offers a techni ue of k i th q eep ng ehld b ittb soue,nracale-going their own Soviet Union from acquiring a nuclear way in the world. But it is a world in "superiority;" the possibility of "superi- which nuclear weapons technology has ority" is an illusion. There are other rea- become virtually a free-market commod- sons far more sound for supporting such ity. And many of the countries on the agreements: threshold of acquiring a nuclear capa- First. Rationality and economy. First, bility have made it abundantly clear that there is the very rational justification a precondition of their acceptance of that the agreement provides each side nonproliferation must be a demonstrated with a systematic, fear-reducing method willingness on the part of the superpow- of cutting back its vast expenditures on ers to modulate their own nuclear arms new weapons. As it is, each time either race. When the United States and the side spends billions of dollars on a new Soviet Union i th s gned e nonproliferation weapons system, that expenditure proves treaty, they acknowledged that precon- to have no significance other than waste. dition. Now we are obliged to follow We are on a treadmill. Each side has al- through with substantive action. To do ready gained from its nuclear weapons otherwise-preaching the virtues of non- as much securit lif i thi y as e n s age will allow. Thus the new weapons which each ;ide continues to acquire, each in emula- ion of the other, provide no gain. Like Mice in Wonderland, it takes all the run- aing we can do just to keep in the same xilace. If we stood still, we would get just :io far. And if these new strategic weap- ons have nothing to offer, then it it pat- ently wasteful to expend the gargantuan amounts of our national resources which are necessary to produce and maintain them. As everyone now knows, modern weapons systems are enormously costly to create, develop, and deploy. If we spend our moneys and our energy on i.liern, then we cannot do other things. President Eisenhower understood this perfectly: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spend- iag money alone. It is spending the sweat 'Ir its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the 1;opes of its children. The cost of one mod- ern bomber is this: a modern brick school in raore than 30 cities. It is two electric power- ilants, each serving a town of 60,000 popula- tion. It is two fine, fully equipped hospi- tals.... We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay i.,r a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. proliferation while at the same time con- tinuing on as we have-would be seen, and rightly, as a kind of double dealing. It could only serve to aggravate the prob- ability that those nations with the sci- entific ability to develop nuclear weapons will do so. Third. The value of dialog. A third cogent reason for supporting the SALT limitations is that these continuing negotiations, and the contact they pro- vide. afford us an opportunity to get to know the Soviet Union better. And like- wise for them to know us better. Not nearly enough attention has been paid, either by scholars or government officials, to the persistent mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings which have con- tinually plagued Soviet-American rela- tions. More often than not, these mis- perceptions and misunderstandings have been substantially due to distorted im- ages generated by insufficient informa- tion. Much of this groping in the dark can be significantly reduced in the course of the continuing dialog we have now begun. While the subject matter will often be weapons interactions and strat- egy trade-offs. which are technical mat- ters, we eventually in such discussions begin to learn a great deal about the fears, calculations, and motivations which move the two sides. These con- These astounding sacrifices of needed tinuing talks give us the opportunity to trod, housing, and social services are now learn from experience, in a way that no i;eing made on both sides, so much so preaching or theorizing can teach us , that there are probably no two countries what the other side Is really like. Viewed with this perspective, it be- in the world in greater need of a radical Fourth. Tension reduction. Finally, we comes clear that the current Senatorial shift in economic priorities than the should support the SALT agreements be- debate over the Jackson amendment rep- United States and the Soviet Union. A cause our own country, and surely the resents a very fundamental choice. The truly rational decision by either side Soviet Union as well, needs some psychic argument is not between those who ad- would be to step off the nuclear arms relief from the breathtaking pace and vocate American strength and those who treadmill unilaterally, for each side al- continuing tension of the nuclear arms think we can get by with weakness. The ready has enough. But that kind of su- race. Whether or not we have in recent argument is not between those who trust preme rationality on either side is un- years been secure in any objective sense, the Soviets and those who do not. The likely in the real world. This is why the we have certainly not behaved like a argument is between those who still be- SALT agreements are so valuable and nation which felt secure. Perceptions of lieve that security in the nuclear age so deserving of our unequivocal support: security are, at bottom, rooted In obscure depends upon the numerical measure- they offer both sides a calm, calculated processes of the mind; surely they do not ment of destructive power and those who come from the logical deductive schemes of the strategic theoretician. The arms race, as it continues, may not alter the security of either side at all-objectively, it almost surely would not-but the race does tend to maximize each side's inner feeling of insecurity and to heighten the compulsions which we feel: to be "vigi- lant" and ever watchful of new danger, unseen but just around the corner. Arms control, as we begin slowly to perform it with these first agreements, can help us to begin to eliminate the sources of these perceived insecurities. And by doing that, arms control can reduce the tension, both within each of the two superpowers and between them. CONCLUSION Twice in the past 20 years, we have had to accommodate, in our thinking and planning, qualitative changes in our strategic nuclear position. The first came in the early 1950's, when the Soviet Union initially acquired an air-deliverable nu- clear capability, and we were confronted for the first time with the realization that an unrestricted war could now mean un- imaginable destruction to both sides. We had lost our nuclear monopoly. The second change, described earlier, came in the later 1950's, as the Soviet Union attained a large enough strategic capability to place our vulnerable retali- atory forces in possible danger of being destroyed by a surprise first strike. We realized that such situation was un- stable, and we moved to harden and dis- perse our strategic arsenal so as to pro- vide a guaranteed nuclear second-strike capability. The Soviet Union followed suit shortly thereafter with a similar hardening and dispersal program of its own, and the nuclear era evolved from its second phase-a delicate balance of ter- ror-into its third and present phase of stable mutual deterrence. Somehow the heightened activity of recent American and Soviet weapons- development programs has led many Americans to fear that the East-West nuclear equation is once again on the verge of a qualitative shift. But, particu- larly in light of the open abandonment by each side of the attempt to shield itself with antiballistic missiles, there is simply no reasoned basis for this fear. The Soviet-American strategic relation- ship has become firmly immobilized-at least for any foreseeable future-by the durability of mutual deterrence; and while new weapons deployments by either or both superpowers may induce numeri- cal fluctuations in the strategic balance, neither the stability of that balance nor the security it provides will be signifi- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 14771 September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE realize that we have entered an era in Mr. President, there is another item can Bar Association urges the Senate and which such measurements no longer have that I wish to draw to the attention of House of Representatives to authorize ap- proval by.the President Representatives the United States any meaning. In sum, we can choose now the Senate. of the interim agreement on certain meas- between continuing to deploy newer and The House of Delegates of the Ameri- ures with respect to the limitation of stra- ever newer weaponry in a perpetual yet can Bar Association has passed a reso- tegic offensive arms, and the associated pro- illusory pursuit of additional security lution firmly supporting the interim tocol, all of which were signed at Moscow and Nixon and Gen- Brezh sident and additional advantage or we can ren- agreement between the Soviet Union and on Secret26, ary 1972 der firm and unequivocal support to a the United States on the limitation Of al a further resolved, That the President meaningful and productive arms-limits- strategic offensive arms. or hBe It is designee be authorized to appear be- The association urges that the COn- tion dialog with the Soviets. fore the appropriate committees of the Con- Much of the importance of the SALT gress authorize approval by the Presi- gross in support of such action; and agreements arises from their symbolism. dent of the agreement and the associ- 'Be it further resolved, That the American They represent the realization by both at protocol. The association also asks UBar nited AssociStatesation urges s the Governy meto of the sides that arms spending is inherently that- to limiting the and red Soviet ucing Union strategic on fur furthher wasteful and that neither side, with all The Government of the United States agremeeememesent with er uci and comclof- its astronomical spending, is achieving seek promptly to reach agreement with the sur arms, and on general anything by it. The creation of that sym- Soviet Union on further measures limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms, and disarmament, in accordance with the pro-and bsllsm is actually the most important on general and complete disarmament, in said treaty and of a table VII of ticleinte iof said aspect of what has thus far been accom- accordance with the provisions of the pre- agreement. plished; for neither side has yet agreed amble and Article XI of said treaty and of J. BURNS, Jr., to give up a great deal in substance. We Article VII of said interim agreement. KENNETH Secretary of the American Bar Association. have, however, made a of thinking g about I ask unanimous consent that the tele- weaponses anew represents way of tan mp rtnt gram from the Secretary of the Ameri- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I first tep in bringing them underl control. can Bar Association be printed in the mhave, of en to the Jacksssubmitted an t mend- But that symbolism is delicate. It could RECORD, half t myself Jackson I amend men nine other still be destroyed, and with it the spirit There being no objection, the telegram half of m. As I said believe, beginning Of of trustful negotiation for mutual benefit was Ordered to be printed in the RECORD, alf o my rel s yore. As Foreign Relations g of , the which has now been born. Were the Sell- as follows: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., mittee has long felt that this resolution ate to approve the Jackson amendment, , August 17,1972, approving the Interim Agreement should it would not only jeopardize that spirit, Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, not have any amendments whatever to it would compound our mistake by giving Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Com- detract from its significance. voice to outmoded notions of nuclear inittee, New Senate Building, Capitol the House of Representatives, I un- superiority that can only lead to the Hill, D.C.: derstand, has passed a resolution in that further purposeless waste of our re- On Wednesday afternoon, August 16, 1972, form. I offer my amendment to the sources, energy, and national spirit. the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the following resole- Jackson amendment regretfully because Mr. President, in connection with my tions: I would not have offered a clarifying earlier comments on the mutual sufTi- Whereas, the United States has under- amendment of any kind except for the ciency we and the Russians have to de- taken by the terms of article VI of the non- doubts the Jackson amendment has cre- stroy each other, on September 7, there proliferation treaty of 1968, to which it is a ated as to the serious intent of the Presi- was an interesting report from the Inter- party, to "pursue negotiations in good faith dent to negotiate further nuclear weap- national institute for Strategic Studies on effective measures relating to cessation ohs limitations. I want to make that very in London. I wish to read an article en- of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty clear. titled "Nuclear Aggressor Doomed, Study on general and complete disarmament under If my amendment is agreed to, its Finds," published in the Washington Post strict and effective international control", effect would be to clarify the significance on September 8, 1972. It reads as fol- and expressed a similar intention in the pre- of the whole question. I believe that the lows' amble of the limited test ban treaty of 1963; Jackson amendment is ambiguous. It has NUCLEAR AGGRESSOR DOOMED, STUDY FINDS and been packaged and sold so that many that its purpose is to LONDON, September 7.-The International Whereas, it has for some years been a ma- understand Institute for Strategic Studies said today jor objective of the United States to reduce People that nuclear parity has made it impossible the risk of military confrontation with the provide guidelines for future negotiations for the United States or the Soviet Union Soviet Union, particularly if involving the requiring our negotiators to seek equality to launch a nuclear war without incurring use of strategic or nuclear weapons; and of strategic nuclear forces with the So- "obliteration." Whereas, it has also been a major objec- viet Union. This seems reasonable. Who Neither superpower can disarm the other tive of the United States to slow down and could be against equality? arrest the escalation of armaments, in par- However, the implication is quite b a "first seicles ike" and and each has enough ay titular in the field of strategic weapons; and livery v vehs weapons "to destroy any the needs of the people, in the clear from the way it was phrased that conceivable combination in a second-strike Whereas, United States and elsewhere, require the al- the Interim Agreement is not based upon weer' territory tl the The location of greater financial and other re- a one for one equality of strategic forces. sttuts within a the i Military said in a survey report ent itled "The sources, some of which might not be avail- The real meaning of the Jackson amend- "Whatever r detailed iled calculations e able if increased military expenditures oc- ment calling for equality is not that there "Whate may be cur; and be overall strategic equality of nuclear e overer Whereas, the United Nations and various constructed, have neither any ny significant t superpower advantage can consider itself t to o ha av have for many years urged force, but numerical equality and, one the other in terms of freedom to engage in of its committees strategic nuclear arms control and disar~na- could say megatonnage equality, if he nuclear war without incurring obliteration," ment measures; and wishes. However, if there is required to it concluded.itute said 1972 could be viewed Whereas, the United States and the Soviet be one for one specific numerical equality The Institute because t SALT Union have sought since 1967 to begin ne- with respect to ICBM's, submarines, and as a "turning point" Uniof the SALT gotiations on agreements to limit strategic other items which are covered in the lan- agreementa between the United States and weapons, and began such negotiations in guage of the Jackson amendment's refer- Russia. November 1969, and have reached certain ence to "intercontinental strategic The Institute, founded in 1968 as a re- agreements expressed in a proposed treaty is inequality or su- ,"y then search center on problems of defense, secu- and interim agreement, both signed in Mos- forces," our there part, because we are su- rety and arms control, describes itself as in- cow on May 26, 1972, by President Nixon and p dependent of governments. It has an inter- General Secretary Brezhnev; and ahead of the Russians when one takes national council and staff. Whereas, the Senate, on August 3, 1972, ad- into account MIRV weapons, geographi- Mr. President, I might add that that vised and consented to the ratification of the cal factors, war heads, et cetera. institution over the years has had a repu- said treaty; and But in any case I believe it is the over- Whereas, negotiations on further agree- all equality in strategic nuclear weapons tatian for being extremely conservative ments will be facilitated by approval by the in these matters. This report conforms Congress of the said interim agreement as that the President had, in mind as a basis with my earlier remarks about our nu- well; and for the agreement. In fact, I am con- clear deterrent. Therefore, be it resolved, That the Amer- vinced of that. The agreement was nego- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S14 72 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13, 1972 hated on that basis. It did not include such items as aircraft carriers and for- ward based nuclear attack weapons and bombers. At this stage, those factors were too difficult to reconcile. But this agree- ment is a first step, achieved with great difficulty. It has been suggested by some of those "upporting the Jackson amendment- ;uggested privately; I am not sure I heard it publicly-that after this long period of dearly 3 years of negotiations with no agreement having been achieved, the 'resident, for his own purposes, this be- ing an election year, was determined to ;et an agreement. It has been suggested by some in my presence that the Presi- dent went to Moscow and accepted an im- oroper, improvident, and unwise agree- ment, because of his anxiety to obtain an =agreement now, so that it could become it foreign policy asset in his election this year. I have heard this suggested in the last 2 days. This is the kind of statement or sug- gestion that I guess is intended to appeal to Democrats and persuade them to sup- p?ort the Jackson amendment. I reject that. Obviously I am not a greater sup- porter or confidant, politically speak- Lig, of the President. I do not believe he went to Moscow, not having achieved an agreement in Helsinki or Vienna, and insisted on an agreement against the in- terests of the United States. After long and thorough study of the agreement I do not believe it is against the interest of the United States, and I do not think Caere is any real substance to the argu- ment that we have an inferior position. It is incredible to me that there are people in this body who on one occasion brag about the technical superiority of the United States, about the efficiency of our private enterprise system-people who state we are the most advanced country in the world in the field of in- dustrialization, that we have done the most in the highly sophisticated realm of computers and guidance systems, and so :forth, and they brag on it; and then, when we come to an argument like this, suddenly we become inferior, and sud- dt>nly, although we have spent far more money on weapons than the Russians, we become inferior. They cannot have it both ways. Mr. President, one cannot in 1 day engage in self-adulation and brag about our superiority-as a matter of fact I subscribe to our superiority. If we had not wasted our resources on the war in Vietnam we would have outdistanced all countries. We still are the most indus- trialized Nation. But you cannot, on the one hand, say we are far ahead in our technological capacity to produce and then turn around and say that we are inferior by 3 to 2. We cannot say we have a far more sophisticated populous, people trained in the sciences and math- ematics, and so forth, and far superior to the Russians, and then say we do not get our money's worth when we buy weapons. Mr. President, these arguments do not pan out. We are either efficient or we are not. I believe we are. We have more and better weapons than any nation in the world, including Russia. I do not mean by that they do not have the capacity to September 5, 1972, entitled "Soviet Says build weapons; of course, they do. But Pentagon Violates Arms Spirit." we are told the implication of the Jack- There being no objection, the article son amendment is that we are inferior was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, and rapidly deteriorating. as follows: We made deliberate choices in past SOVIET SAYS THE PENTAGON VIOLATES ARmus- years and I think they were correct. We PACT SPIRIT made these choices when there was not Moscow, September 4.-The Soviet Union an ulterior motive. We were told that a accused the Pentagon today of violating the choice between the Minuteman and the spirit of Soviet-American agreements limit- Titan was a good choice; that it was effi- ing their strategic arsenals and jeopardizing cient to make smaller weapons rather their effectiveness by pressing for acceler- than larger weapons. Even small and ated development of new American offensive large are not good descriptions because military systems. a small nuclear weapon is so large it can izvestia, the Government newspaper, wreak havoc on any city in the world, this fall pointed to the nexxt t round of negotiations broad- destroy tens of thousands of people ening the agreesaidnnents that "will ill be possibilities deettermfarined, in and determined, in if dropped in the middle of New York or many respects, by the degree to which the Moscow. But we were told we made a sides observe not only the letter but also the So tar as I can see it is a good choice. Data supplied to the committee still sub- stantiates that. But what of the future? What is the motive for continuing the arms race? What could be the possible objective of sabotaging our effort to approve the first phase of the'SALT talks? What can pos- sibly be accomplished by raising doubt that the first agreement made in this area by the President of the United States is a dubious agreement and that it does not provide for the security of this country, and that in the future we have to resume the concept of superiority, phrased in the terminology of equality in certain areas? It can mean nothing else but that we are not content with over- all equality, or parity, or sufficiency, such as the President stated, but that we are to return to negotiations based on the concept of superiority. We already have superiority. As I said, with respect to aircraft carriers and bombers, there is no prospect whatever that the Russians plan to build aircraft carriers, because they are very vulnerable. No other coun- try in the world in recent years has built them, The British have stopped it. But in any case this interim agree- ment is one of the most important mat- ters we have to deal with this year. If we cannot make any progress in this area, I see no end to the arms race. This would be a most serious setback if at this late date, after all the attention given to this matter we should be qualified in our ap- proval of this agreement. As I-said in my prepared remarks about symbolism, there are many implications. Many things indicate the reaction of the Russians. If we adopt the Jackson amendment, unamended, the Russians will take it to mean we are not serious position of Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird that the Pentagon could not support the agreements signed in Moscow last May unless funds were voted by Congress for acceler- ated development of the new longer-range Trident underwater missile and the B-1 stra- tegic bomber. FIRST ATTACK ON POSITION Although the commentary did not men- tion Mr. Laird by name, this was the first time that his position had been so forth- rightly attacked in the Soviet press since President Nixon's visit here in May. The lengthy Izvestia commentary also re- newed earlier Soviet objections to Senator Henry M. Jackson's effort to attach condi- tions to a Congressional resolution approving the interim agreement to limit offensive nu- clear arsenals. It was seen as an effort by Moscow to dis- courage support for the Washington Demo- crat's maneuver when the resolution comes up for a vote in the Senate. The House has already overwhelmingly approved the reso- lution, Senator Jackson is trying to attach a rider that would require future agreeemnts-to be based on the principle of equality of forces because of his objections to certain numeri.- car advantages granted to Moscow under the current formula. Today's commentary was directed not only against such a move, which it dismissed as an unwarranted re-interpretation of the agreement, but also against the longer-terra programs of the Pentagon although they do not abrogate any specific terms of the accords. "Opposition to the Soviet-American agreements, mostly coming from the Penta- gon and industrialists linked with it, stands in the way of limiting the arms race and general prospects for disarmament," Izvestia said. The commentary told Soviet readers that expenditures sought by the Pentagon for the new bomber and the underwater missile were being justified not so much because of their desirability but on the contention that they were necessary "to force the U.S.S.R. to take trol. They would take it to mean that further steps" to curb the arms race. "It is evident," paxen Ia asserted, "that Congress is still determined to go forward without to acquire new superiority or possibly letter ter of app the parent l ly formally violating the Moscow agreements, one can even resumption of the concept of try- still fundamentally violate the general spirit ing to acquire a first-strike capability, of the agreement by unilateral acts,. thus That concern is strengthened by both jeopardizing the effectiveness of the agree- the Jackson amendment and the recent meat itself." discussion of further steps to create Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this weapons to destroy hard-site missiles. is simply an indication of the first reac- However, the Senator from Massachu- tion, to my knowledge, on the part of the setts (Mr. BROOKE) has an amendment Soviets to both the enormous increase dealing with this subject, which we have just authorized in our I ask unanimous consent to have new weapons systems, specifically the printed in the RECORD at this point an Trident and the B-l, and the Jackson article from the New York Times of amendment. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE I wish to make this record as complete to the Moscow "basic principles of revela- as I can, because I anticipate this will be tions" and that we can expect to see a lot the last primary discussion of this mat- more "confrontation" along with future "ne- gotiation." Indeed, the "trust" about which ter, and I ask unanimous consent to have Kissinger spoke seems close to non-existent. printed in the RECORD an article by Chal- Jackson made his own motivation clear mers Roberts in the Washington Post on enough. He considered the offensive weapons the 16th of August, entitled "Promise of agreement put the United States at a disad- SALT: What's Happening?" which I vantage and he used the amendment device think is an interesting observation. to lock the administration into a SALT II of n.ecentine nothing less than what was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: BACKWARD OR FORWARD?-PROMISE OF SALT: WHAT'S HAPPENING? (By Chalmers M. Roberts) Less than three months ago Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed their names to "basic principles of relations" between the two superpowers, a sort of codification of the President's pledge that the United States would move from "an era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation." The Nixon- Brezhnev "principles" included a statement that "differences in ideology and in the social systems" are not a bar to normal relation- ships, that both nations "will always exer- cise restraint in their mutual relations" and that both recognize they should eschew "ef- forts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." Three days earlier the two leaders had signed the strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreements. In assessing the Soviet-Amer- ican atmosphere at the end of the Moscow summitry Henry Kissinger remarked that "I think trust has developed but not the point that it could survive a major challenge that one side would put to the other that affects its own estimate of its vital interests. " It is against this background, it seems to me, that one should assess the Jackson amendment to one of the two SALT pacts, that limiting offensive weapons. The fate of the amendment is far less important that what the discussion of it disclosed about the post-summit attitudes in Washington. The same is true of the related new, more accurate and more powerful American missile war- heads that the administration has requested. Like a summer lightning storm the discus- sion suddenly illuminated the landscape in this capital, both in the Senate and in the White House and elsewhere in the executive branch. "Confrontation" and "negotiation" are not, of course, mutually exclusive and that is just as true in Moscow as in Washington. Mr. Nixon last July 27 said that "the deci- sion with regard to the SALT agreements involved a fight between the hawks and doves" in his own administration. On July 15 Kissinger remarked at a congressional brief- ing that during the SALT negotiations "we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at work in Soviet policy"--in other words, the hawk-dove problem in the Kremlin. In asking both for congressional approval of the two SALT pacts and for money for the Trident submarine and B-1 bomber pro- grams the President said Brezhnev and his colleagues "made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements." Soviet sources in a position to know about those conversations, however, contend that Mr. Nixon's version stretched Brezhnev's remarks for his own purposes. But American sources, equally in the know, contend Brezhnev left no doubt about what Mr. Nixon said he said. Jackson commented that he was "disturbed by the report of the President" on Brezhnev's remarks. What the Jackson amendment affair plus the revelation of the new missile warhead program demonstrates is the limited meaning being applied by the Nixon Administration he supplied on what constitutes "parity" made it clear he meant what those Americans who negotiated the agreements and many others consider old fashioned "superiority." What Jackson could not do by direction-de- feat the agreement in the Senate-he sought to do by indirection-tie the administration's hands in the negotiations ahead that are de- signed to turn the five year agreement into a permanent treaty. The Kremlin reaction to all this is unclear but not difficult to imagine. Quite probably the Moscow hawks have gained a point in their continuing suspicion of arms agree- ments with the United States. Whatever chance there was for both Washington and Moscow to exercise mutual restraint by not doing what they legally could do within terms of the SALT pacts has been diminished. The history of the action-reaction phe- nonemon in the Soviet-American arms race clearly indicates that the dominant pressure in both capitals is to build those arms not forbidden by agreement out of fear that the other side will do so to its own advantage. The tragedy is that the long history of the Cold War, of Soviet-American ideological differences on top of clashes of national in- terest, makes mutual restraint exceedingly difficult to achieve. As Jerome H. Kahan of the Brookings Institution put it to the Sen- ate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28: "In theory, both nations ought to exercise unilateral restraint and pursue purely sta- bilizing strategic policies. But experience shows that neither nation has taken such initiatives." The promise of SALT was more than just the important limitations for the first time on both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. The hope of Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit, in Kissinger's words, was that it would "mark the transformation from a period of rather rigid hostility to one in which, with- out any illusions about the differences in social systems, we would try to behave with restraint and with a maximum of creativity in bringing about a greater degree of sta- bility and peace." Hence the language of the "basic principles" signed in Moscow. Hence Mr. Nixon's remark in his address to Congress that his Moscow and Peking trips had done away with "the kind of bondage" of which George Washington had said: "The nation which indulges toward another in habitual hatred is a slave to its own ani- mosity." In this larger context both the Jackson amendment and the new missile warhead program represent backward, not forward, steps. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I also noticed in this morning's newspaper a significant article, which does not bear directly upon this agreement, but which revives memories of the period of Khrushchev. When Khrushchev visited the United States, he visited the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations. The reason why he visited the Committee on Foreign Relations was that the House of Repre- sentatives had an antagonistic attitude toward, him, and the Speaker of the House refused to have a joint session for the leader of one of the most powerful nations in the world, with whom our re- S 14773 lations are so important. so as a resuia, as a sop to him, the Foreign Relations Committee was asked to receive Mr. Khrushchev. He went about this country, visited Iowa, and was shown the corn- growing operations there, and so on. As I look back on that period-not only I, but many people, astute observers, in my opinion-feel the United States missed an opportunity at that time to take steps toward the improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union which could lead to a limitation of arms, to an increase in trade, and so forth. I believed-others shared that view; I .have read that-that Khrushchev was making gestures, within the climate in his own country that would allow him to do so, suggesting better relations with us, and during his trip he made many statements which the record in our com- mittee indicated were designed, in many cases, to show that he wanted to imitate the economic accomplishments of the United States. On the whole, we rejected any such overtures. Our reaction and particularly the Cuban affair led to the removal of Khrushchev. His polities of rapproche- ment with the United States had proved to the Russians that he was ineffective and futile, and he was removed. I believe that was one of the principal reasons why he was removed. This morning in the Washington Post there is an article by Mr. Victor Zorza, who, I believe, is admitted as being an expert on the Soviet Union, entitled "Storm Brewing for Brezhnev." His arti- cle is related to the point I have dis- cussed. I ask unanimous consent that that entire article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STORM BREWING FOR BREZHNEV (By Victor Zorza) The storm clouds gathering over the Krem- lin could be the first intimation of a new conflict in the Soviet leadership. This year's disastrous harvest is being blamed on the weather, while the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt is blamed on the undependable Arabs, but a good management team in Moscow might have averted both mishaps. This at any rate, is what would be said by those who have been kept off the team by Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party's general secretary, and who believe that they could have done better, as unsuc- cessful aspirants to high office everywhere believe. In the West, they would have an oppor- tunity to trumpet their claims from the election hustings every four years or so. in the Soviet Union, they have usually had to wait for an accumulation of bad luck and political errors on the part of an incumbent leader to trip him up. The first indications of leadership trouble are usually provided by the Moscow rumor mill, and by indications between the lines of the Soviet press that not all is well. The U.S. embassy in Moscow has now picked up enough of the background noise to send Washington a dispatch detailing the reasons $rezhnev's position might be re- garded as somewhat shaky. Both the harvest and the Middle East fiasco loom large in its assessment. The United States has made use of Brezh- nev's political need for foreign grain and Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13, 1972 other goods to force him into concessions. The bombing and mining of North Vietnam just before the May summit was the stick, and the possibility of large and promptgrain supplies to avert a domestic crisis was an important part of the carrot. Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz was ent to Moscow to explore the possibilities just before the summit. On his return, he said that the Russians "understand the lan- guage of naked power-the kind of language President Nixon is now speaking." The Soviets virtually abandoned Hanoi, and pressed it so hard to make a deal with the United States as to cause the North Viet- namese press to hint at betrayal by Moscow. Soon after that American grain began to flow to the Soviet Union. But this was before the full extent of the harvest failure became evident even to the Russians. Further indications of future food shortages have become available since then, and present sabotages are already being re- ported from such sensitive areas as the high- ly industrialized Gorky Province. Brezhnev's need for foreign grain is likely to become greater, not less, and so is his vul- nerability both to pressure from abroad, and to criticism at home. The critics could blame him first for fail- ing to put agriculture on its feet, which he promised to do when he overthrew Khru- :hhchev, and then for making concessions to he United States in exchange for the grain he has failed to produce himself. Khrushchev's own position was weakened considerably by his agricultural failures and his decision to pour Moscow's precious hoard of gold into capitalist coffers in exchange "or grain. Brezhnev's failure in Egypt is also linked with his dealings with the White House. Cairo ,laims that it ordered the expulsion oY the Russians only after Brezhnev had committed himself at the Moscow summit to withhold the arms Egypt wanted. Brezhnev's domestic t;lie basic Intention of this is to establish ment will contribute to "Fiialandizing" tend- research laboratory engaged in technical the beginnings of a freeze on strategic of- enoles in the policies of our allies. studies for the Government. In addition to ?ensive forces. The trouble is simply that it Fourth, enshrining this degrees of Soviet his technical research there, he devoted sub- is a bad beginning, not that the objective superiority as a substantially permanent stantial time to studies of arms control and ioielf is unwise. On many occasions in the thing will almost certainly have adverse con- national security problems. past, both in published articles and in lee- sequences in any serious crisis that may Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms con- tures, I have urged a freeze of some kind develop. For instance, we could not reason- trol began in 1957, when he was organizer for offensive forces. However, I never sup- ably expect as favorable an outcome in a of a group that led to the 1958 Summer posed that the United States would formally replay of the Cuban missile crisis. (The suc- Study on Arms Control held in Cambridge, accept ceilings that, in every particular con- cess of that outcome did not reside so much Massachusetts, under the auspices of the trolled by the agreement, allowed the Sov- in the immediate outcome in Cuba as that American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He lets substantially greater capability than the Soviets were deterred from counter- was an organizer and co-director of the 1960 permitted the United States. escalating in Turkey, or, especially, in Ber- Summer Study on Arms Control, again held The Interim Agreement does exactly that. Lin, a fact that apostles of parity find con- in Cambridge under American Academy aus- It may be that, in some particulars not con- venient to ignore.) pices. He was a member of the Academy's trolled by the agreement, such as members of It is in a certain sense true that different Committee on International Studies of warheads, the United States still retains degrees of superiority can in the last ana- Arms Control in 1961-66, serving as its chair- some kind of lead; however, under the terms lysis be translated only into different degrees man In 1961-62, and has been a frequent ,of the agreement, it is open to the Soviets of "victory" that would in any event be participant in international conferences re- to close the leads that we have, and then Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated obser- lating to arms control. some, while it Is not open to us to close the vation conveniently ignores the fact that Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to Soviet leads. most political leaders and many military the Department of State, the Department of The payload capacity, or "throw weight" leaders are not academic strategists: These Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament as it is often called, permitted the Soviets leaders not only count weapons, they tend Agency, the Executive Office of the President, in their ICBM and SLBM forces is perhaps to think in terms of who will come Out and to several research organizations. He is 'our times ours. The throw weight of a "ahead," and their (perhaps simplistic) at- editor of the well-known anthology, Arms strategic force is unquestionably the most titudes about these matters will influence Control, Disarmament, and National Security important single parameter for characteriz- their expectations, demands and flexibility (New York, George Braziller, 1961), spon- ing the potential of that force, even though in a crisis (other things-such as the guts sored by the American Academy of Arts and other parameters-notably the number, yield and the political support of the leaders on Sciences, and guest editor of its predecessor, and accuracy of warheads that can be de- the scene-being equal). Therefore, a eom- the special (Fall 1960) issue of Daedalus on livered--are of more immediate importance. mitment to a position of strategic disad- "Arms Control". He has edited studies of If the Soviets choose to do so, they call vantage is. at least in some statistical sense, future military technology and several pub- deploy as many warheads per ton of throw an invitation to be pushed around in the lications on arms control. He has contributed -weight as we can, and since they are per. next crisis, The Soviets understand this very articles on arms control to a number of :witted roughly four times as many tons, well. journals and books, and has lectured on na- they can ultimately deploy roughly four In a press conference in Moscow on the tional security subjects at many universi- times as many warheads as we. They may occasion of the signing of these agreements, ties, the U.S. National, Air, and Naval War not choose to do so; they may choose some Henry Kissinger repeatedly made the point Colleges, The Canadian National Defense other way of using their payload; but the that the terms of the Interim Agreement College, and defense study centers in Lon- important fact is, we have signed an agree- were influenced by the fact that the Soviets don, Bonn, Paris, and Oslo, among others, went that says, in effect, that we have not had ongoing ICBM and SLBM construction and has given seminars on arms control in only become, but are willing to remain, the programs, while we did not. As he put it on Moscow. He is a frequent witness at Con- second nuclear power. one occasion, it was not the most brilliant gressional-hearings concerned with national The real Administration argument for the bargaining position he would recommend security affairs. Interim Agreement is that it will limit people to find themselves in.. He could not Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut, the extent to which the Soviets will achieve reasonably have made the point in that set- Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955) and strategic-force lead more reliably than any ting that, if the American Government found Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from other approach in sight. But that Soviet itself in that uncomfortable position, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, advantage, by any reasonable assessment, is responsibility must rest with the American where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and re- already real, and may well become greater Government: but I can, and do, make that ceived other graduate and undergraduate as the Soviets deploy MIRVs and otherwise point here. There has been a collective prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T., upgrade their permitted force in the coming failure. he was engaged in radio engineering as a years. The political consequences of this This brings me to the final point of wheth- registered professional engineer in the State superiority, or more precisely of the general er to recommend acceptance or rejection of of Connecticut. He is a Senior Member of the public recognition of it, are several, and all these agreements. The argument can reason- Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engi- bad. ably be made that, although both agree- neers and a member of Sigma Xi, the Ameri- First, it will reinforce and confirm pre- ments represent important failures, the best can Mathematical Society, The Council on viously established Soviet, images and ex- course of action in view of current political Foreign Relations, and the International In- pectations of a declining American role in realities is simply to accept them. I am sym- stitute for Strategic Studies. He was a mem- world affairs. Within the past two years, pathetic to this argument. I also doubt very ber of the President's National Citizens' Soviet commentators on the American scene much whether any recommendation of mine Commission on International Cooperation have exhibited increasing contempt for the will alter the expected acceptance of these Year in 1965. United states, its power and its role in in- agreements. ternational affairs. For instance, Soviet ana- But it seems appropriate that someone [From the National Review, June 23, 1972[ lysts often make such remarks as: "The should say, unambiguously and on the rec- SALT HITS THE FAN United States must be adjusting itself, in ord, that both of these agreements are (By Donald G. Brennan) the manner of the United Kingdom at the wrong, that the United States ought not to INTRODUCTION end of World War II, to its loss of power and be in the position these agreements will influence in the world." The Soviets cor- leave us in. and that the country would ulti- On Friday, May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon respoudingly think of themselves as very mately be best off by rejecting them both (for the United States) and Leonid Brezhnev much in the ascendant. These Soviet atti- and then doing what is right. I hereby take (for the Soviet Union) signed what will prob- tudes and expectations will be reflected in this position. ably prove to be the most important arms- their peacetime bargaining and will increase I shall be pleased to answer any questions, control agreements yet negotiated in the nu- their aggressiveness in possible crisis Con- BIOGRAPHICAL, SKETCH clear era-or, it may be, in any other era. But Irontations. their Indubitable importance does not, un- Second. the Agreement and the Soviet Donald G. Brennan Is a mathematician fortunately, automatically make them a lead it establishes will do much to establish and student of national security problems. cause for rejoicing; the San Francisco earth- an image of American inferiority in American His special interests are in advanced mili- quake, for instance, was important too. It government circles. The effects of this, of tary policy, alliance relationships In Europe, remains to be seen whether the agreements ,-nurse, will be the obverse of those to be ex- and selected areas of arms control, such as of May 26 will prove to be more or less of a petted from the attitudes in the Soviet bu- policy issues relating to ballistic missile de- disaster than the earthquake. Unlike the reaucracy, though probably less marked in fense. earthquake, there is some possibility, not as degree, Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of large as we should wish, that the agreements Thard. the new imbalance of power will which he was President from July, 1962 until will not be a disaster at all; and some very lleccine established in the minds of our May, 1964 and where he now conducts re- remote chance, which neither the American allies. which will ultimately lead them to be search studies, Dr. Brennan worked for nine body politic nor the Administration bureauc- more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, years as a research mathematician and com- racy deserve, that they will prove a resound- ,;o Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. munication theorist at Lincoln Laboratory ing success. 1'o awe the current jargon, the Interim Agree- of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Whatever their chance of success, they are Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Jane 30, 19proved For Re18I9S t T~I; 1 Ec!P74B00415R000400010018-4 - SENATE S10959 profoundly unwise. And the unwisdom is not permitted. Fifth, it is provided that corn- Soviets a throw weight roughly four times confined to the United States merely; it is pliance with the agreement shall be moni- ours, with present booster technology. Either certainly shared by some of our Allies, and tored with "national technical means of veri- side is a liberty to improve its booster tech- may well be shared, though in reduced de- fication", meaning such things as reconnais- nology; in fact, the Soviets have recently gree, by the Soviet Union. sance satellites, and it is also agreed not to given evidence of a new model of SS-9 that The agreements are two: A proposed treaty interfere with each other's means of obser- might have perhaps twice the payload capa- limiting the deployment of defense against vation or to use deliberate concealment meas- bility of earlier models. ballistic missiles, called the Treaty on ABM's, ures that could impede that verification. Some Administration analysts argue that and a proposed Interim Agreement limiting The intended immediate purpose of this the Soviets do not now have MIRV technoI- certain kinds of strategic offensive forces, agreement is to freeze strategic offensive ogy and could not deploy significant num- namely ICBM's and SLBM's (Inter-Continen- forces where they now stand, understanding bers of MIRV warheads within the lifetime tal and Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles, re- that whatever is under construction at the of the Interim Agreement, which is limited spectively). The problems of these two are prescribed date is to be included as if fin- to five years. However, we ourselves devel- very different, ished. Such an objective, is not fundamen- oped MIRV from "scratch" in about six years, The Interim Agreement enshrines, not tally irrational; I have myself urged consid- and the system development for the ad- merely Soviet parity, but Soviet strategic oration of a different freeze in other times vanced specific systems probably did not take superiority, of a potentially substantial de- arcircumstances. The difficulties with this more than three or four years. Since our own gree. The unwisdom of this agreement resides Proposal stem largely from the fact that the MIRV programs have been noisily advertised in the dramatic proclamation it provides that United States strategic forces have not to the Soviets since early 1968 (and public the United States has not only become, but changed very much in basic capacity for the mention of the Idea can be found as far is apparently willing to remain, a second- past eight years, while the Soviet payload back as 1963), it would be very surprising class power. This foolishness is, of course, in capacity-the amount of weight their mis- indeed if the Soviets did not by now have no way shared by the Soviets; indeed, as one sile force could deliver on targets, sometimes some very advanced ideas on how to do prominent American. strategist put it, the called the "throw weight"-has increased MIRV. And some Administration analysts do Soviets must be pinching themselves to make enormously since 1966, and it now stands at in fact believe that the Soviets could achieve sure they are not dreaming, something perhaps four times the payload substantial MIRV capability within the life- The ABM Treaty is more symmetric in its capacity of the American force. A secondary time of the Interim Agreement; for instance, immediate effects; in contrast to the Interim problem resides in the extraordinarily gen- Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Agreement, iemen, it doss not contrast the Soviets Interim erous terms given to the Soviets for convert- Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in his statement as much o we are allow the Apart from four ing some of their obsolete missiles into addi- before the Senate Armed Services Committee a limited es ht we re a weed. A m tional modern SLBM's and submarines, on 15 February that: " . our intelligence aense of national capittlapotentially and a limited significant) (and de- Supporters of the agreement will point specialists believe that by the mid or late strategic ally anal capitals, and a li of d d out, and correctly, that, while the Soviet Un- 1970's the Soviets could have MIRVed deefnse fields, is and the Soviets have agreed not ion has more launchers than does the United SLBM's in their operational forces." to defend ourselves-not only against each States, we have-we believe-many more Thus, published comparisons of Soviet and other, but, Interestingly, against anyone else warheads deployed on those launchers. This American missile forces showing a substan- either. On the American side, this agreement estimate stems from the belief that the dial American lead in warheads, as for in- stems purely from ideology and fashion, and American technology for MIRV (Multiple In- stance in a chart on the front page of The is pure insanity; on the Soviet side, the dividually-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) Is New York Times for May 27 showing 5,700 is pure In may have aecSovie the some much further advanced than the Soviet tech- warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 warheads for ideology, in which case they share a hall a nology, and that we have deployed MIRV the Soviet Union, should be understood as the insanity. It which is we as if e and a the Soviets warheads on a substantial fraction of our having, in all probability, a highly limited had become seized with a theory that motor strategic force while the Soviets have scarce- lifetime of validity. It should also be under- vehicles were bad for us, and, proceeding ly started, if they have begun at all. However, stood that, even at present, these Soviet war- from that were ba we both agreed to destroy if the Soviets wish to achieve large numbers heads are very much larger and more de- from t motor vehicles we of all agreed kinds we pro- of warheads by deploying lighter MIRV war- structive than ours. (The Soviets also derive all tthe hin the future. This example kin illwe pro- heads within their existing payload capacity, certain other technical advantages from that the mere fact that we and the Soviets the technology for doing so is easily within their large payload capability. ) might agree on some completely symmetric their reach; we are precluded from Supporters of the agreement have already arrangement would not of itself prove that achieving the payload capacity of the Soviets argued, and will surely further argue, that the arrangement was in our interest. In my by the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Soviets cannot deploy large numbers of view, the ABM Treaty provides an equally The throw weight of a strategic force is MIRV warheads within the lifetime of the good illustration. unquestionably the most important single agreement. In evaluating this position, at In the immediately following analysis of parameter for characterizing that force, even least two points should be borne in mind. the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treat though other parameters--notably the num- First, if no better agreement is negotiated I In r m greem t their shBM Treaty, ber, yield, and accuracy of warheads that can as a successor to this one before its expira- I shall return later to the circumstances and be delivered-are of great importance. Some tion, there will very likely be intense pres- forces that led to these agreements. examples of how payload capacity can be sures simply to renew it. Second, the ?esti- used may be instructive. For example, the mates that the Soviets could not get substan- II. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT maximum capacity of a Poseidon launcher tial MIRV capability come from the same ment are as The basic provisions of the Interim Agree- is probably In the region of 3,000 pounds. It community of Intelligence analysts who, for First undertake notlo start construc ion of addi- missile been Mat can accommdorted that the Poseidon to from 10 to 14 MIRV Namara to announce former in the mid-1960's tional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after warheads, which must therefore weigh the Namara Soviets to aocpen permanent str tgic July 1, 1972. Second, it is agreed not to con- something in the neighborhood of 300 inferiority, and who were confident in ado vert land-based launchers for "light" ICBM's pounds each. They would be relatively vance o into launchers for "heavy" ICBM's. Third, "small" weapons of perhaps 50 kilotons each, October, b the first Chinese nuclear be a it is agreed to limit SLBM launchers and but they could attack 10 separate targets. plutonium , 1964, device. that bomb would uranium submarines therefor to the numbers opera- Some models of the Soviet SS-9 missile have bomb; . It proved to be a operm and it is easy point that an operat- tional and under construction as of the date only a single large warhead, and some might ing diffusion plant for separating U-235 is of signature (May 26), except that additional think that, at least for many purposes, a very much harder to conceal than a MIRV launchers (and appropriate numbers of sub- single Poseidon missile was worth 10 SS-9's. test, marines) may be constructed as replacements In fact, however, that single SS-9 warhead I myself believe that, if the Soviets have for an equal number of obsolete ICBM is often estimated to be perhaps 25 mega- paid any significant attention to MIRV tech- launchers or for launchers on older submna- tons, which would suggest that the missile nology in the past, as is very likely, it would rives. In a protocol appended to the Interim payload capability should be in the region of be well within their capability to deploy up Agreement, this is spelled out; the U.S. may 12,000 pounds, or about four time the pay- to 10,000 or more MIRV warheads on their have no more than 710 SLBM launchers, and load capability of a Posidon missile. There- allowed booster force within the lifetime of no more than 44 submarines; of those, fore, if a Poseidon booster could launch 10 this agreement if they choose to do so. They launchers above 656 and submarines above MIRV warheads, the SS-9 could launch 40 could do this with sufficient yield in war- 41 (the current numbers) must be replace- of the same kind. The SS-9 probably has heads, combined with sufficiently upgraded ments for equal numbers of obsolete ICBM from 5 to 10 times the payload capacity of guidance in their missiles, so that they could launchers (in our case, the Titan II), The our various models of Minuteman missile, virtually wipe out the whole of the Minute- Soviet Union may have no more than 950 and the Soviet force of approximately 300 man force with less than half of their missile SLBM launchers and no more than 62 "mod- SS-9's would alone probably have two to force. ern" submarines therefor; of those, launch- three times the payload capability of our en- This Is not to say that the prospect of ers over 740 (the presumptive current num- tire Minuteman force. However, the Soviets launching such an attack would be attrac- ber) must similarly be replacements for older have perhaps another 1,300 ICBM's in' ad- tive to the Soviets under ordinary circum- ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. dition to their SS-9 force, most of which are stances; the United States has important Fourth, subject to the foregoing restrictions, also larger than our Minutemen. Considering offensive forces other than Minuteman, and modernization and replacement of strategic both SLBM and ICBM payload, it is probably these other forces will, in all likelihood, re- offensive ballistic missiles and launchers is that the Interim Agreement will allow the tain considerable deterrent persuasiveness. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 30, 197: 311t the lopsided nature of this situation would likely have important adverse oonse-? '.(uences, as discussed below. The estimates that are given for the Soviet ICBM force, incidentally, such as the num- ber 1.618, are all derived from American In- telligence; the Soviets have firmly resisted confirming these estimates. Hence, the limi- tation in the Interim Agreement on num- bers is stated as a prohibition on new silo starts, not as an absolute ceiling on numbers. Thus, our estimates of the Soviet strategic forces are really lower bounds. If we later discover a whole field of ICBM's, which I am told has happened in the past, there may he some controversy over just when it was started. There may also be possible room for controversy over what constitutes "light" or "heavy" ICBM's. The chief justification heard within the Administration for not only accepting, but engraving this embarrassing posture In a formal agreement, is that the Congress would not in any event provide the money to pro- vide the forces that would be necessary to equalize the Soviet strategic force. Inndeed, i.t is believed, and sincerely, that, if it were not for this agreement, the Soviets would increase their margin of superiority to some even larger, and perhaps Indefinitely in- creasing, extent. For example, the current rate of construction of Soviet ballistic-mis- sile submarines is around 9 or 10 per year, and if that rate were continued, in five years the Soviets could have not 62, but perhaps 00 modern missile-launching submarines. Therefore, instead of having the 50 percent superiority in submarines the agreement will give the. at least potentially, they could have a two-to-one margin on the assumption that Congress would not provide the several billion dollars necessary to keep such Soviet supe- riority from developing. While this argument is perhaps fairly widely believed within the Administration, it is at the bery least not seriously tested, and may well be false, as I shall indicate later. Some Administration analysts would also like to argue that the degree of strategic superiority given the Soviets by the Interim Agreement, while admittedly large, is never- theless less than I have depicted it above. The chief arguments they would advance are. (a) the agreement does not include bombers, in which we have substantial su- periority; ( b) the agreement also omits what are called the "Forward-Based Systems", i.e., nuclear delivery systems we have based. in Europe; and (c) the apparent Soviet su- periority in submarines (62 Soviet versus 44 American subs allowed) is not real, since the Soviets do not or cannot operate their sub- marines as efficiently as we can with our bases (in Rota and in Holy Loch) closer to the Soviet Union. These arguments, in fact, are much more cosmetic than tenable. As for (a), it is possible to believe in the su- periority of American bomber forces only as long as Soviet medium bombers are not counted; they have some seven hundred of these, for which they have refueling capa- bility sufficient to enable them to attack targets in the United States and continue on to :airfields in Cuba and Mexico, so they do nol even have to rely on suicide missions, for (b), the Soviets have some seven hundred ICBM's or MRBM's that can attack European targets, to which our Forward Based Systems are mainly in response, and these Soviet missiles are in no way con- strained by the agreement; they can build as many more as they please. As for (c), there is nothing to prevent the Soviets from adopting more efficient means of using their submarines; for instance, they could re-sup- ply the submarines, and change their crews, from ocean-going tenders so as to enable them to keep a larger fraction of the sub- marines on station a larger fraction of the time. Of course, the Soviets may not do this, but it would certainly not be difficult for them to do so and there is no obligation in the proposed agreement for them not to do so. The real argument for the Interim Agree- ment, in the minds of its supporters within the Administration bureaucracy, is that it will limit the extent to which the Soviets will achieve srategic superiority more reli- ably than any other approach In sight. But that Soviet strategic superiority, by any reasonable assessment,- is already real, and will likely become more stark with the passage of time as the Soviets deploy MIRV and otherwise upgrade their permitted force. The political consequences of this superior- ity, or more precisely of the general public recognition of it, are several, and all bad. First, it will reinforce and confirm Soviet images and expectations already established of a declining American role in world affairs. Within the past two years, Soviet commenta- tors on the American scene have exhibited increasing contemptuousness of the United States, its power, and its role in interna- tional affairs; for instance, Soviet analysts can often be heard or seen making remarks such as: "The United States must be ad- justing itself, in the manner of the United Kingdom at the end of World War II, to its loss of power and influence in the world." The other side of this coin, of course, is that the Soviets correspondingly think of them- selves as very much in the ascendant. These Soviet attitudes and expectations will pre- dictably be reflected bothIn their peacetime bargaining positions and in their aggressive- ness in possible crisis confrontations. Second, and conversely, the agreement will: more clearly, widely, and unambiguously es- tablish an image of American inferiority in many pertinent minds in the bureaucracy of the American Government. The effects of this, of course, would be the obverse of those to be expected from the attitudes in the Soviet bureaucracy. Third, these attitudes and expectation will become much more clearly and firmly established in the minds of our Allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more re- sponsive, and perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives To use the jargon currently used by profes- sionals in regard to these matters, the In - terim Agreement will contribute to "Finland - izing" tendencies in the policies of our Al- lies. Fourth. enshrining this degree of Soviet superiority as a substantially permanent matter. and therefore Inculcating attitudes and expectations of the type mentioned above, will almost certainly have advertise effects in any serious crisis that may develop. For instance, we could not reasonably expect nearly as favorable an outcome in a replan of the Cuban missile crisis. (The success of that outcome did not resideso much in the immediate outcome in Cuba itself as in the fact that the Soviets were deterred from counter-escalating in Turkey, or, especially, in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find convenient to ignore.) There is, of course, a certain sense in which it is true that different degrees of superiority could in the last analysis only be translated into different degrees of "vic- tory" that would in any event be completely Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated ob- observation conveniently ignores that most political leaders, and many military leaders, are not academic strategists: these leaders not only count weapons, they are prone to thinking of such questions as who will come out "ahead", and their (possibly simplistic) attitudes about these matters will Influence their expectations, demands, and concession in a crisis, other things (such as guts and political support of the leaders on the seer-e) being equal. Therefore, a commitment to a position of strategic inferiority is, at least in some statistical sense, an Invitation to being pushed around in the next crisis. Mr. Nixon has just engraved this Invitation and handed it to the Soviets in Moscow on a platter. III. THE ABM TREATY The key terms of the Treaty on ABM's are as follows. To begin with, "Each party un- dertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this treaty." Thus, the basic philosophy is clear: apart from the excep- tions indicated, we may not defend our homeland against missile attack. Second, Article III provides for a limited defense of one hundred interceptors of Moscow and Washington, and another defense system similarly limited to one hundred intercep- tors of ICBM silo launchers in some area remote from the defense of the national capitals. Third, both we and the Soviets un- dertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Fourth, it is prohibited to transfer ABM systems or their components to other states or to deploy them outside Soviet and Ameri- can national territory. Fifth, it is provided that compliance with the provisions of the treaty shall be monitored by "national tech- nical means of verification", as in the In- terim Agreement, and similarly there are obligations not to interfere with such means or to use deliberate concealment measures. Many readers will not be familiar with the bizarre rationale on which this proposed treaty rests. It may therefore be useful to explain the conceptions that the architects of this treaty had in mind, and to show that the ideology on which the treaty rests is, in fact, just as bizarre as it seems. American strategic nuclear policy has been dominated in recent years by an Idea called "assured destruction." This concept is that the dominant task of the U.S. strategic forces is to be able to amount a nuclear attack that would reliably destroy a substantial fraction of the Soviet society, even after a major So- viet strike on American forces. Recent public statements of the Nixon Administration have emphasized a doctrine called "strategic suffi- ciency", but it is clear that something like the concept of "assured destruction" still do- minates American strategic policy, even If the terminology itself is no longer used in offi- cial statements. This domination extends to strategic arms- control matters. It is widely argued that the most peaceful, stable, secure, cheap, and gen- erally desirable arrangement is one in which we and the Soviets maintain a "mutual as- sured destruction" posture, in which no seri- ous effort is made by either side to limit the civilian damage that could be inflicted by the other. Most of the opposition in the West to substantial systems of missile defense for cities, including the opposition embodies in the proposed ABM Treaty, derives from the alleged benefits of such a posture. And much of the opposition to the Safeguard ABM system, which was not intended to provide a substantial defense of cities, stemmed from a concern that it might expand to provide such a defense. I believe that the concept of mutual assured destruction provides one of the few instances in which the obvious acronym for something yields at once the appropriate description for It; that is, a Mutual Assured Destruction pos- ture as a goal is, almost literally, mad. MAD. If the forces of technology and interna- tional politics provided absolutely no alterna- tive, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of It as desirable-for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms-control negotiations, as the current SALT proposal automatically assumes-is bizarre. This can be made very clear by con- sidering the simplest and most effective means of realizing it. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 J2tne 30', 19 proved For R je c - AL C4# 0SAq4?Q0400010018-4 S10961 At present, we and the Soviet achieve a While these advocates are undoubtedly sin- no doubt that Soviet strategic views favored MAD posture by means of long-range missiles cere, and many of them are even intelligent, heavy emphasis on active defense, at least and bombers armed with thermonuclear I believe they have been bemused by then- up through 1968 and at least some portion weapons. There are, however, many problems retical models of strategic interactions, of 1969. Beginning in about 1969 or 1970, associated with these forces; missiles and models which seem sophisticated and In- either the Soviet Government began chang- bombers may be attacked before they are tellectually appealing but which are in fact ing its views, or else they decided at least to launched, they may fall to perform proper- much oversimplified descriptions of reality. make us think they had changed their views, ly, or they may fail to penetrate enemy de- Indeed, some few technical people, who have and the overt indications in the negotiations fenses. Concern about such vulnerabilities in at least had the integrity to follow the logic in the SALT for the past two years have sug- our posture helps drive the arms race. These of their analysis to its conclusion, have been gested whole-hearted Soviet acceptance, at forces are also expensive; the U.S. alone so bemused by these models that they have least at the top of the Soviet Government, spends about $8 billon a year on them, seriously advocated the actual deployment of the MAD Philosophy. Now, if it were genuinely desirable to have of a mined-city system. If the Soviets have indeed accepted this a MAD posture, we could achieve it far more Well, if an institutionalized MAD posture position, they had a good deal of American effectively, reliably and cheaply than at pres- is not desirable as a permanent way of life, help in getting there. Throughout almost ent. We and the Soviets could have an arms- and it is not, what alternative is available? the whole of the 1960's, almost every Ameri- control agreement to mine each other's cities. The answer is to provide increasing emphasis can who argued with almost any Russian We could install very large thermonuclear on defense, and corresponding reduction in about arms-control matters tried to make the weapons with secure firing arrangements in the relative effort devoted to strategic often- point that missile defenses were wicked. This Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and so on, while sive forces. stemmed, of course, from the commitment in the Soviets could install similar weapons and There is much controversy about just how certain American quarters to the MAD ideo- arrangements in New York City, Chicago, effective defense (such as ABM) can be made logy. Up until 1968, the universal Soviet re- Los Angeles, and so on. against current offensive forces, or against action to this argument was a polite It is technically feasible to make such a further enlarged offensive forces. I cannot raspberry. system very secure, and the vulnerabilities discuss this controversy here. However, there However, some of the spokesmen from mentioned above could be eliminated, which is very little controversy over the fact that whom they heard could not be easily ignored. Would reduce arms-race pressures. While defense can be made quite effective if the op- In particular, Mr. McNamara did his very such a system would have its own technical posing offense is suitably reduced, while al- best to persuade the Soviets of this philoso- problems, simpler to analysis y indicates than ic those they the would be lowed defense is built up. This Is precisely phy, both in his public statements (such as pres- the direction that the Strategic Arms Limi- the successive "Posture Statements") and in ent system. It would also be much cheaper tation Talks should have taken, but did not. his private meetings with Soviets, notably than the current system; it could save bil- Even if it were held that currently achiev- at the Glassboro Conference in June 1967, lions. able defense is too ineffective to be useful when he forcefully argued the case for a sibs et a emos afveryone will considerat judge it sta key y against even a suitably reduced offensive MAD posture directly to Kosygin. The Soviet threat (a position that few informed per- Premier did not assimilate this idea, at least a mined-city system is clearly the best way sons would believe), it makes little sense to at that time. Another forceful input to the of realizing a MAD posture, it follows that a preclude the possiblity of a more effective Soviets came from then-President Lyndon B. MAD posture as a goal is itself fundamentally defense being found in the future. The cur- Johnson, who, according to his memoirs, sent absurd-it is, indeed, mad. rent proposed treaty would do so. Premier Kosygin a secret letter In January This reduction-to-absurdity argument is It might be possible to achieve similar 1967, warning him that the incipient de- useful for sharply drawing attention to the effects simply by sharply reducin offensive ployment of Soviet missile defenses had put fact that something must be wrong with forces, without any defense, if i t were not him under pressure to "increase greatly our MAD as a way of life. However, one can dis- for two factors: (a) there are other coun- capabilities to penetrate any defensive sys- cuss the problems of MAD directly. There are tries in the world besides the United States tems which you might establish". Johnson at least three interrelated problems. and the Soviet Union, and (b) perfect in- continued: "If we should feel compeled to The first is that, in spite of our best efforts, spection of sharply reduced offensive forces make such major increases in our strategic a major nuclear war could happen. An in- probably cannot be achieved, and defense can weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that stitutionalized MAD posture is a way of in- provide protection against clandestine wea- you would in turn feel under compulsion to suring, now and forever, that the outcome of pons. do likewise." It seems very likely that this such a war would be nearly unlimited dis- The MAD philosophy originally took hold letter was stimulated by McNamara. aster for everybody. While technology and in the American arms-control communit Perhaps the most politics may conspire for a time to leave us yin persuasive argument temporarily in such a about 1960. This might have been ultimately brought to bear on the Soviets was not an posture, we should unimportant but for the fact that Robert argument per se, but the American decision not welcome it-we should rather be looking S. McNamara became a fanatic adherent of of late 1967 and early 1968 to proceed with for ways out of it. And they can be found. this school, and he imposed an "Assured De- a major MIRV program for the American The second fundamental difficulty is, in struction" philosophy on the civilian staffs strategic offensive force, leading to the de- essence, political: The body politic of the in the Pentagon with the full force of his ployment of Minuteman III and Poseidon. United States did not create a Department arrogance. This was, in some sense, a tour This program was intended to add something of Defense for the purpose of deliberately de force, because at the time he did so, the like five thousand additional warheads to making us all hostages to enemy weapons. Soviets conspicuously did not share this the American offensive force. The almost The Government is supposed, according to philosophy, although he often asserted that theological, not to say fanatic, attachment the Constitution, to "provide for the com- they did. But the evidence is enormous that, Mr. McNamara had for the MAD philosophy mon defense", and plainly most Americans at least up until the late 1960's, the Soviets is reflected in the fact that, while he viewed would revolt at the idea that a mined-city did not hold the view that a MAD posture the beginnings of a Soviet system for the system is a sensible way to do this. They was desirable. For instance, Premier Kosygin defense of their homeland as highly provoca- would be quite right. The Defense Depart- himself, when asked about a moratorium on tive, he apparently saw nothing provoca- ment should be more concerned with assur- missile defenses at a presaconference in Lon- tive in spending several billion dollars to add ing live Americans than dead Russians. don on February 9, 1967, replied, in part, "I several thousand additional warheads to the The third fundamental difficulty is moral. believe that defensive systems, which prevent American force, especially at a time and We should not deliberately create a system attack, are not the cause of the arms race, under circumtances that would have made in which millions of innocent civilians would but constitute a factor preventing the death it impossible for the Soviets to know what by intention be exterminated in a fail- of people. Some argue like this: What is accuracy these weapons might achieve. ure of the system. The system is not that cheaper, to have offensive weapons which For whatever combination of reasons, the reliable. If we accept a MAD posture as an can destroy towns and whole states or to have Soviets have now either accepted the MAD interim solution, we should be seeking ways defensive weapons which can prevent this philosophy or have at least decided to humor out of it, not ways to enshrine it. destruction? At present the theory is current us by pretending that they have. It should y, then some advocat ere that stem MADhpostu e? The dv cates ic nvolved are,ein shouldhbe developed. Such so-cal led theo eti- on mentioned that, to the time of writiphng, i- the main, technical or technically oriented cians argue to the costs killing a maple one losophy inth cannot the tect ma rrsny of signs Soviet this ees people accustomed to theoretical models, and O $100,000. Maybe other colonels the arguments involve appeals to "stabil- system i is more expensive than an toffensive writing for only other in at t the m; sa wehas ity" of various kinds and reference to other system, but it is designed not to kill people not this may onp Indicate qu tyre message has sophisticated jargon-jargon that I under- but to preserve human lives. I understand yet eome down adequately from the top. stand very well, having helped to articulate that I do not reply to the Some well- Ame ans, very y have in ly, at it a decade or more ago. For instance, one asked, but can dryourselves theiaa ap rro was aicece A of mer the i cans, ABM very privately, will n, eh- argument sometimes heard-it is, e.g., re- ate conclusions." This does not sound like tate acceptance a major doctrinal overhaul Treaty will the Soviet flected in the preamble of the proposed ABM the comment of a man who was friendly m to a military st , and may in well Soviet Treaty-is that this posture will best establishment, shmenty weer require pro- moratorium on missile defense. a considerable shuffling of ma of senior personnel. tect against nuclear war altogether, but this Many other Soviet pronouncements, both It will be interesting to watch if such a proposition Is very dubious indeed, public and private, official and unofficial, left development does in fact come to pass. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release, MR5k'2/AJ-8DP57 R0 5R000400010((8g4 10, 1972 5 10962 CONGRESS Some kinds of ABM systems could be de- tect Minuteman against the threat now per- .o bat for his military establishment, apart ployed for some objectives that would be mitted the Soviets under the Interim Agree- from Vietnam. The Congress may make an compatible with a generally prevailing MAD ment; yet we have negotiated away all but easy scapegoat, but the Congress cannot posture. In fact, the Sentinel ABM system a small part of that Safeguard System, to say fairly be reckoned the chief villain of the iece when has initiated by McNamara in September, 1967, nothing of the capability to add additional pone to the cthe President ain that ve r once and the Safeguard System that the Nixon active defense. Administration has been constructing, were Evidently the gains of this agreement are tary posture was in jeopardy and that more both designed to be compatible with a MAI) not to be found in terms of the often- money was needed for strategic forces. If us chosen believe to that lead on n this posture. This compatibility resided in the expressed objectives of the Safeguard pro- the President t had fact that the defense of the entire country gram. There are two possible intellectual matter, well have fbut the ex- what these systems would have provided was justifications for accepting this treaty, in try might t w never have followed; ol what :s called a "light" or "thin" defense; the light of the objectives the Government periment buyer tried. force behind the bureaucratic a large and sophisticated attack, such as the has expressed. The first is that, while these The main was for Arms Control ABM reament Treaty known as nDA_ Soviets would be capable of mounting, would agreements themselves are inadequate, sup- proposed has had a easily have overwhelmed a thin overall de- plementary agreements to be sought in fol- and r staff Ayewas enc agency tense of our cities. (At McNamara's instruc- lowing negotiations will redress these im- Most the commitment to a MAD posture, tion, the Sentinel system design also had balances. However, the Soviets will surely e g degree to of opposition posture, some specific weaknesses intended to make have very little motivation to degrade the and theological a active defenses corresponding ng cities, years. lves for Ir Soviets.) Such a light area defense was in- I do not believe an argument of this form other agencies, especially tended, in the case of the Sentinel System, should be given any significant weight. The can the be Department found found in in oi of State, and are mainly to provide protection of the entire country other possible justification would be of the in less ideological and character; against possible Chinese attacks that may form that, while the agreements may in but but not wholly, ys etss deolo in become feasible if the Chinese develop an some sense constitute an immediate strategic some for means of s v- money, or as a additi al ICBM force. loss, the various political and economic gains ing the momentum of the strategic arms The Nixon Administration retained the that may develop as a consequence of these reduce and are simply less conratngd with anti-Chinese light area defense objective of agreements in the future will more than race, raceinc and between defensive and offensive with the Sentinel System and added additional compensate for the strategic costs. An argu- above objectives for the Safeguard System, chiefly ment of this form is in fact indicated in forces. prospect And ome a are ach simply ieving pessimistic teout sufficient the provision of added protection of our President Nixon's last foreign policy state- the ospect off ss h missile defense, now ical futvee. ICBM and bomber forces. The three-fold ob- ment. While this argument cannot be dis- nor in jectives of the Safeguard program have been missed, there is no doubt that such a calcu- One of the more interesting bureaucratic stated many times by the Nixon Administra- lation of gains and losses requires consider- case studies, in relation to these agreements, tion; for instance, as given in the most recent able optimism about the consequences of can be found in the Department of De, "Posture Statement" issued by Defense See- having these agreements and considerable fence. A decade ago, it would have been abso- retarv Melvin Laird in February 1972 (p. 76) : pessimism about the future if the agree- lutely inconceivable that, for instance, the "Protection of our land-based retaliatory ments were not in force. I shall return to Joint Chiefs of Staff would have approved forces against a direct attack by the Soviet this issue below. either of these agreements, much less both Union; defense of the American people rv. WHAT BROUGHT US HERE? of them. Their approvalwould have been al- against the kind of nuclear attack which The question of what brought us to the most as unthinkable five years ago, and they the People's Republic of China is kdly pro- point of accepting these agreements can be probably would have resisted the agree- be able to mount within the decade; and pro- answered at several different levels, and In ments as recently as three years ago. Within tection against the possibility of accidentas terms of several different individuals and the past three years, however, and especially attacks from any source." These objectives groups within the Government. within the past two, a very noticeable loss made sense, even within the framework of a President Nixon, for example, genuinely of morale has been detectable within the MAD posture, and the program was accord- wants peace, he genuinely would like to save Defense Department. In the face of the ingly 11 supported, especially in its early phases money, and he genuinely would like to be bueffeetiirom he have President received ro the Con- ,were in 1969 and 1970, by many people who re-elected. With respect to this last objective, gr, willing to accept such a posture. he obviously understands quite well that the Budget, and from the general public, it is instructive that nothing in either negotiation of these agreements, especially the military staffs themselves have been Moscow agreement provides a substitute if they are accepted without too much of a looking increasingly to the SALT to help means (to Safeguard) for satisfying these objectives. - "save" their situation. battle, will be of substantial domestic Polit even to the time, however, it is of fnt_ our land- land- not ical value. I believe it is quite fair to say m present suffiThecient Interim protection Agreement-does based provide that this fact contributed significant pals- oat implausible that the Joint Chiefs could regard these agreements with enthusiasm; tack d by retaliatory the Soviets he Sv(Iforces a shall givv e e a evideden ect fo- sure to the American negotiators. However, more likely they simply faced their own set t this shortly), and of course ge nothing in ce ePer' ither it would be quite wide of the mark to think of the agreements merely as a cheap elec- of unpleasant alternatives, and judged these agreement does or can do anything about the toral trick or to think that the agreement3 agreements to be the least unpleasant. Th acce iility of nuclear attacks from China or do not have a substantial base of support bureaucratic history of the proposed g accidedental attacks from any source. There- in the bureaucracy. ments probably contributed some share of fore, the Administration's previously de- Many people in the Executive office-i.e , the unpleasant way the alternatives were claret objectives for Safeguard combined the President's own staff-place considerable structured. with the current proposed agreements con- emphasis, in justifying these agreements, on. Some comments in the press have tended inters a strategic non sequitur. the argument that-as concerns the Interim to suggest that Henry Kissinger was the The worst aspect of this relates to the pro- Agreement most especially-the Congress chief architect of these agreements. It would iection of our retaliatory forces. The repeat- would not provide the wherewithal to close probably be much more accurate to think edly declared Administration objective in an increasing gap in strategic forces. of him as presiding over the national se- linking the negotiation of an ABM agree- While this argument is probably sincere, it curity apparatus as a sort of chairman, and anent to an agreement limiting strategic of- is possible to believe that it may in fact be attempting to impose some degree of order Pensive forces was that it was necessary to less important than a perception that is less and competence on that apparatus, than as Limit the threat to Minuteman in order to frequently articulated, but which is likely a personal mastermind of the agreements. accept constraints that would limit our abil- held by the President and by some of his key Kissinger's main (and very considerable) ity to protect Minuteman. However, we are people in the Executive Office, that money for strength is in international politics; perhaps quite some distance from having achieved military purposes would be very scarce even because of the technical components in- that; link-up. To quote again from Secretary if Congress itself were not an obstacle. Trying solved, he has never been as strong with i',aird's most recent Posture Statement (P. to find several billion dollars a year in stategic nuclear issues. Kissinger's personal 78) "With significant qualitative improve- extra money for the Defense Department at contribution toevents can probably be found meats in Soviet ICBM's even without in- the present time would entail choices among much more in the President's determined creases in the number of Soviet ICBM's I i.e., very unpleasant alternatives, such as rais- resistance to cutting American troop levels exactly the situation permitted by the in- ing taxes, attempting some kind of tax in Europe, and in the missions to Peking and term Agreement], the postulated threat to reform, or taking large amounts of money Moscow, than in these two strategic agree- Minuteman in the last half of the 1970's out of other programs the Administration ments. Their origins are both more diffuse in could grow to a level beyond the capabilities was only recently supporting. These alter- character and remote in time. of ,he four-site Safeguard defense of Min- natives would, of course, look especially un- V: WHERE NEXT? uteman. Therefore, we propose [initiating an pleasant in an election year. It is clear that these are not the arms- additional ABM defense program for protect- This perception is probably at least par- ing Minuteman beyond the four-site Safe- tially responsible for the high hopes that control agreements one would wish to have guard System]." Thus, even the full four- many Administration people have placed on in an ideal world. I personally have sup- site Safeguard System, which would have achieving suitable agreements in the SALT. ported, and without serious reservation, entailed many more than 100 Interceptors, It may also be related to the fact that the every arms-control agreement or treaty that was judged by Mr. Laird inadequate to pro- President himself has not conspicuously gone has come up for acceptance or ratification Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 30, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE since World War II. For the first time, I find it doubtful that one should counsel acceptance of these agreements. (The ABM Treaty will require a two-thirds vote for ratification in the Senate; the Interim Agree- ment will require a majority vote in both houses.) The basic difficulty, of course, Is that one does not have a free choice to start over again to produce better agreements; it would otherwise be easy to advise rejection. But the choice Is not free. In view of all the cir- cumstances prevailing, both domestically and internationally, should one therefore ac- cept a conspicuous American declaration of strategic inferiority, and accept the con- spicuous idiocy of a permanent commitment to a MAD posture, and simply hope that the agreements will ultimately contribute to the evolution of a secured peace with freedom? Or should one attempt to insist that the President should do what is right, and the Congress should do what is right, and the public should do what is right, including a willingness to spend much more money if the Soviets are recalcitrant about establish- ing more sensible agreements-and, inci- dentally, almost surely lose the battle? I do not know, and I can believe that honest and intelligent men, who understand the issues thoroughly, and who are as hostile as I am to the agreements, could easily differ on the answers. At the very least, the debate associated with these agreements, in the Congress and out of it, should force attention to a number of im- portant questions. Some of these concern technical details, but which may be of suffi- cient importance to influence the accepta- bility of the agreements. For example, in the ABM Treaty, why should a local defense of ICBM silos limited to 100 interceptors re- quire the astonishing total of 20 radars? With respect to the Interim Agreement, what kind of confidence can the Administration have that the Minuteman force is not seri- ously jeopardized? Is there any sensible way to require, as a condition of acceptance, that the Soviets must at least provide declara- tions of their own force levels? Other types of questions should concern more basic phil- osophical issues, such as whether we wish to live forever under a MAD posture or whether we wish to provide formal acknowledgment (via the Interim Agreement) of Soviet su- periority. It may well be that some judicious reservations could be attached to these agreements that would lessen their unfor- tunate effects. The United States has suffered something like wounds from a number of sources in recent years--Vietnam, student activism, de- clining credibility of both the Government and the media, and, not least, a declining American role in world affairs, occasioned largely by declining morale at home. Many of us will feel that Mr. Nixon has now rubbed SALT in our wounds. But we should not for- get that there are, in fact, good reasons to slow down the strategic arms race; and If the agreements are accepted, we must, of necessity, share Mr. Nixon's hope that their positive effects will, over the long term, out- weigh their immediate strategic costs. The costs are real. THE WAR STILL TEARS AMERICANS' CONSCIENCES Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, opposi- tion to our military adventurism in Southeast Asia continues to flow deeply In the conscience of the Nation, despite the gratifying reduction In American troop casualties. While our troops in Vietnam have fall- en below 50,000 for the first time in 8 years, there has been a relentless In- crease In the number of American fight- ing men stationed in Thailand and with the 7th Fleet In the South China Sea. With this manpower, the intensity of our unilateral air war has escalated to its highest pitch ever. The massive de- struction from our tons and tons of bombs and thousands of gallons of na- palm has laid waste a productive land and killed and maimed its people. A decade ago, many Americans felt that altruism and brotherhood were jus- tification for our forcible intervention in Vietnam. Today, those same humanistic feelings have become the basis for the pity and mercy that a majority of the citizens of this country now hold out to the hundreds of thousands of Indochi- nese civilians whose lives and families have been shattered by our impersonal bombing from on high. The executive refuses to end this war, so the legislative branch must-totally and at the earliest practicable time. That is the message that I am receiv- ing In letters from around the country, and I am sure other Senators are receiv- ing the same message from thousands of Americans. One notable example of this feeling came in my mail yesterday, and I want- ed to share it with the Senate. It is a pe- tition from 256 faculty members of Iowa State University at Ames, Iowa. There are 25 graduate assistants among the signatories, but all the remainder are members of the faculty. Mr. President, I sincerely welcome the receipt of this petition and ask unani- mous consent that it be printed in the RECORD along with a letter from two members of the faculty council, trans- mitting the petition. There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY, Ames, Iowa, June 26, 1972. Hon. HAROLD HUGHES, U.S. Senator, Senate Office Building, Wash- ington, D.C. MY DEAR SENATOR HUGHES: At Its regular meeting on May 9, 1971, the Faculty Council of Iowa State University passed a resolution providing for the Initiation and distribution of the enclosed petitions among the faculty of this university. We feel that it would be helpful to outline the debate which took place that evening. At the request of a constituent, the Coun- cil considered a motion which would have put the Faculty Council on record as oppos- ing the mining of the North Vietnamese har- bors by American forces. A full discussion followed during which it was pointed out that the Faculty Council, as a body representing many Individual faculty members, should not take sides on highly controversial issues, The motion was defeated. Following this, a motion was introduced that the Faculty Council Initiate the distri- bution of a petition expressing opposition to the American posture In Indochina and to the mining of the harbors in order that faculty members, as individuals, might express their opinions, The motion passed, and the peti- tions enclosed are the result of that action. A third motion, which would have Involved the Council in initiating a petition to be sent to you and to Hanoi condemning the actions of the North Vietnamese was discussed. It was noted that faculty members at Iowa State S 10963 do not participate in the election of the gov- ernment of North Vietnam, so that our stand- ing in relation to that government does not lend itself to petitioning. The motion was de- feated. These petitions have been signed by faculty members of this University and, where in- dicated, by graduate assistants. We respect- fully submit them to you for your considera- tion. For the Faculty Council, BENJAMIN S. COOPER, Assistant Professor of Physics. W. DOUGLAS PRITCISARD, Associate Professor of Music. On May 9, 1972, Faculty Council at Iowa State University voted to authorize the estab- lishment and distribution of petitions in op- position to the American posture in the In- dochina conflict. The resolution stipulates that the petitions be sent to the President of the United States as well as to all mem- bers of the Iowa delegation in Washington, D.C. "We, the undersigned Faculty Members, stand in opposition to the U.S. military pres- ence in Indo-China and to the current escalation of the conflict as manifested by the President's mining of the harbors in North Vietnam." D. K. Bruner, English, James A. Lowrie, English, N. W. Yates, English, R. W. Daven- port, Speech, Pearl Hogrefe, English, Lillian 0. Feinberg, English, James Weaver, Speech, Richard L. Herrnstadt, English, Richard Gus- stafson, English, R. E. Hoover, English, Will C. Jumper, English. Robert R. Bataille, English, Frank E. Hag- gard, English, Genevieve Meininger, Foreign Language, George Lopos, English, Julie Braun, English, Leonard Feinberg, English, Albert L. Walker, English, Gordon W. Herb- ster, English. W. Douglas Pritchard, Music, Richard H. von Grabow, Music, Charles Stark, Music, Mildred Laughlin, Music, Ruth Wagner, Music, Laurie Ticehurst, Music, Martha N. Folts, Music, Marion Barnum, Music, Gary 0. White, Music, Jerry Pruett, Music, Joseph Messenger, Music, Carl O. Bleyle, Music, Ilia Niemack, Music. Jeanette Bohnenkamp, Food and Nutri- tion, Edythe Glass, Child Development, Willa Choper, Child Development, Donna C. Nel- son, Child Development, Patricia A. Johnson, Linda Carson, Joan Herwig, Child Develop- ment, Carol L. Anderson, Child Development Extension, Michael Jacobowitz, Child Devel- opment, Jeanne Dixon, Child Development, Shirley Shaw, Child Development, Lynn M. Graham, Child Development, Stefan M. 511- verston, Computer Science, D. L. Ulrichson, Computer Science. Alan F. Wilt, History, Dan Robinson, Edu- cation, Suzanne Robinson, Reg Smith, Dan- ielle Harder, Sociology. Patrick Kavangh, Mechanical Engineering, E. E. Anderson, Mechanical Engineering, Premo Chiotti, Metallurgy, Arnold Kahn, Psychology, Kenneth Carlander, Zoology and Entymology, Mike White, Math, Clair W. Kel- ler, History and Education, Mark E. Neely, History, Marvin C. Papenfuss, Math, H. C. Brearley, Electrical Engineering and Com- puter Science, J. W. Menne, Psychology. Richard Van Iten, Philosophy, Barton C. Hacker, History and Mechanical Engineering, Wayne S. Osborn, History, Steffen Schmidt, Political Science, J. B. Scheeler, Civil En- gineering, Richard W. Pohl, Botany, Richard Koupal, Music, Thomas A. Weber, Physics. Joseph H. Kupfer, Philosophy; John W. Elrod, Philosophy; Harold I. Sharlin, History; Adrian A. Bennett, History; Philip B. Zaring, History; Achilles Avraamides, History; James W. Whitaker, History; Richard N. Kottman, History; Philip H. Vaughan, History; Faye P. Whitaker, English; Kenneth G. Madison, His- tory; Dorothy Schwieder, History; John Han- naway, History; George T. McJinlsey, History; Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 8 10964 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE June 30, 197 Don C. Rawson, History; James B. Sinatra,, Landscape Architecture; Robert S. Hansen, Chemistry. Benjamin S. Cooper, Physics; Robert A. Leacock, Physics; D. M. Roberts, Nuclear En-? ?;ineering; N. W. Dean, Physics; S. A. Wil- liams, Physics; Bing-lin Young, Physics; Mike It. Haas, Physics; Laurent Hodges, Physics; David R. Torgeson, Physics; James W. Bloom, Physics; P. Spencer Young, Physics; Stan W. Kocimski, Physics; William C. Egbert, Phys- ics; R. H. Good, Jr., Physics; L. D. Krase, Physics. Joseph J. Fitter, Physics; Cheryl Cate, Physics; M. S. Haque, Physics; Tom Corrigan, Physics; E. M. Jensen, Physics; Robert M. Jacobel, Physics; James R. Toplicar, Physics; Fred L. Ridener, Physics. Duncan Mallem, English, C. Buell Lipa, English, Dale McCay, English, Keith G. Hurt- tress, English, Gretchen Hettinga, English, Rachel M. Lowrie, English, M. B. Drexler, Speech. Sherry Hoopes, Speech, Eric G. Clemens, Architecture, Linda R. Galyon, English, J. D. Beatty, English, Gayle Emmel, English, Bev Benson, English, A. E. Gaylon, English, Eliza- beth Bukels, English, Charles H. Sohn, Eng- lish, M. H. Dunlop, English, Phyllis Glass, English, Donald Dunlop, English, Patrick D. Gouran, Speech, Dalnis Bisenieks, English. Betty Morgan, Speech, Robert F. Charles, Speech, N. E. Hagler, Speech, Frank E. Brandt, Speech, Jane Cox, Speech, Claudia Edwards, English, Pearl Zinober, English, Russel O. Peterson, English, Paul B. Nemiroff, Speech, Terrence Horland, Speech, Patricia Hendricks, English, Janellyn Staley, English, Ronetta Kahn, English. Carol Harms, English, Cheryl Marsh, Eng- lish, Alan D. Beals, English, Victor Vrbano- witz, English, Robert S. Boston, English, Mary Spraggins, English, Cynthia Davenport, Eng- lish, Richard Phenegar, Speech, Max K. Cul- ver, Speech, Owen D. Thorson, Speech, H. C. Eichmeier, Speech, Barbara Matthies, English, Mary Catherine Limbird, English, Frances Pedtke, English, Candace Strawn, English, Judi Berzon, English, Annabelle Irwin, Eng- lish. Hugo F. Franzen, Chemistry, Jerome W. McAllister, Chemistry, B. G. Gerstein, Chem- istry, R. E. McCarley, Chemistry, G. J. Small, Chemistry, W. Trahanovsky, Chemistry. George Zyskind, Statistics, H. T. David, Statistics, Oscar Kempthorne, Statistics, Barry C. Arnold, Statistics, Glen Meeden, Statistics, Dean Isaacson, Mathematics, K, Robert Kern, Extension, Marjorie Graves, Ex- tension, D. Candace Hurley, Extension, Joy C. Banyas, Extension, Leon E. Thompson, Extension, Carl Hamilton, Vice Pres. for In- formation & Development. Robert P. Hogan, Information Asst., Don- ald J. Wishart, Extension, James L. Warner, Information Service, Paul Lem, Extension Visual Planner, J. Clayton Herman, Exten- sion, Larry R. Whitting, Editor, C.A.R.D.. Virginia Harding, Extension, John F. Heer, Editor, Ag., David L. Lendt, Asst. to Vice Pres., Ellis A. Hicks, Zoology & Entomology, Cordon Munson, Information Assistant, Rob- ert W. Pritchard, Extension. George G. Koerber, Electrical Engineering, W. B. Boast, Electrical Engineering, .J. P. Basart, Electrical Engineering, J. W. Nilsson, Electrical Engineering, John R. Pavlat, Elec- trical Engineering, Thomas M. Scott, Elec- trical Engineering, M. H. Mericle, Electrical Engineering, E. C. Jones Jr., Electrical :Engi- neering. Clayton G. Holloway, English, Richard R. Wright, English, James R. Dow, Foreign Lan- guage, Helga B. Van Iten, Foreign Language, Dennis Phillips, Foreign Language, G. Bu- ford Nosman, Jr., Foreign Language, Ann Vinograde, Foreign Language, Rainer Rum- old, Foreign Language, Patricia Sullivan, Foreign Language, Barbara von Wittich, For- eign Language, Raymond Vondran, Library, Joanna Courteau, Foreign Language. Fred- erick Schwartz, Foreign Language, Harry A. Kahn, Foreign Language, Margaret S. John- son, Foreign Language, Charlotte Bruner, Foreign Language, Allen S. Grossman, Physics. J. C. Mathews, Mathematics, George Sei- fert, Mathematics, Norman Parker, Mathe- matics, K. A. Heimes, Mathematics, D. E. Sanderson. Mathematics, Chuck Riley, Mathematics, R. W. Neufeld, Mathematics. J. Colby Kegley, Mathematics, David F. Wooten, Mathematics, George W. Peglar, Mathematics, Edward S. Allen, Mathematics. C. J. Triska, Electrical Engineering. A. V. Pohm, Electrical Engineering. C. S. Comstock, Electrical Engineering. T. A. Smay, Electrical Engineering. R. J. Zingg, Electrical Engineering. C. L. Townsend, Engineering Extension. Robert E. Post, Electrical Engineering. Paul R. Bond, Electrical Engineering. Glenn E. Fanslow, Electrical Engineering. Robert L. Samuels, Electrical Engineering. Richard C. Morrison, Physics. David W. Lynch, Physics. Ronald Fuchs, Physics. Richard G. Barnes, Physics. Kenneth L. Kliewer, Physics. Michael Yester, Physics. F. C. Peterson, Physics. Lester T. Earls, Physics. Charles L. Hammer, Physics. James L. Wolf, Physics. John R. Clem, Physics. G. C. Danielson, Physics. Jon J. McCarthy, Physics. Clayton A. Swensen, Physics. William J. Kernan, Physics. Percy Carr, Physics. Sunil Sinha, Physics. C. Stassis, Physics. D. K. Finnemore, Physics. UNION CARBIDE CORP. AWARDS SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CITIZEN- SHIP EDUCATION Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, last week our Government renewed its commit- ment to the youth of America with the President's signing of the Higher Edu- cation Act of 1972-S. 659. Just as the Government has Its stake In our Nation's young people, so do many in the private sector. Among these Is the Union Car- bide Corp., which this week is sponsoring a constituent of mine, Miss Katrina Knox, of Columbia, Tenn., for participa- tion in the Washington Workshops Congressional Seminar. Each year the Union Carbide Corp. selects a number of highly qualified high school students to join in the fine learning experience offered by the Wash- ington Workshops, and I congratulate Katrina on her being chosen as a Union Carbide scholar. In spite of the brief time the par- ticipants are on Capitol Hill, valuable experience in the legislative process is gained. Such experience cannot be acquired in the classroom, the media, or from books on the subject, but only through direct involvement in the daily activities of Congress. Mr. President, the image held by many people who have not had the oppor- tunity to be involved in such activities, differs widely from that held by the Sen- ators, Representatives, and the Capitol Hill staff. Katrina and the other students will leave after a week on Capitol Hill with a greater understanding of and new insights Into the legislative process. Katrina is one of 200 Washington Workshops students directly learning about American Government this week on Capitol Hill. I heartily commend Union Carbide and the many private or- ganizations who make such scholarships available to outstanding young Ameri- cans. JACL CONVENTION Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, this week representatives of the Japanese Ameri- can Citizens League-JACL-are hold- ing their biennial convention in Wash- ington, D.C. It is my pleasure to note their presence in this city, our Nation's Capital, and to welcome them. Concurrent with this meeting is the exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution concerning the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans during World War II. This exhibit serves to remind all Americans of the terrible injustice which was inflicted on our Japanese American citizens at that time. Japanese Americans have good reason to be proud of their heritage and their traditions, of their culture and the ex- ample they set of constructive citizen- ship. I welcome those who have come to Washington this week, and I send best wishes on this occasion to all Japanese Americans throughout the land. ANNOUNCEMENT OF POSITION ON LEGISLATIVE ROLLCALL NO. 265 Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLEN- DER) was unavoidably absent from the Senate yesterday at the time of the final passage of legislation to amend and ex- tend programs administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity. I wish to announce that Senator EL- LENDER desires to be recorded in favor of the legislation. CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATION OF CARROLL G. BRUNTHAVER, OF OHIO, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRE- TARY OF AGRICULTURE FOR IN- TERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND COM- MODITY PROGRAMS Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, on June 22 the Senate confirmed the nomination of an exceptionally qualified man, Mr. Car- roll G. Brunthaver, of Ohio, to be Assist- ant Secretary of Agriculture for Inter- national Affairs and Commodity pro- grams. Carroll G. Brunthaver has been deeply Involved in agriculture all of his life. Born in Fremont, Ohio, on March 27, 1932, he grew up on his family's grain and livestock farm, and later farmed it with his father. Mr. Brunthaver's brother still operates the home farm. Mr. Brunt- haver was active in 4-H and FFA, earn- ing the F'FA State Farmer degree in his senior year of high school. He received his B.S. degree in agricul- tural economics from Ohio State Univer- sity in 1954, and after 4 years as an Air Force jet pilot he returned to Ohio State and received his Ph. D. in agricultural economics in 1960. Mr. Brunthaver has served as an as- sistant county extension agent, and on Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 30 Y~roved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 10905 be voting this afternoon. I am sorry West Virginia has interposed an objec- dress the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the that this is the way it has gone. tion to the unanimous-consent request, American Nuclear Society here in Las Vegas, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- and the junior senator from Alabama Nevada. I shall not speak this evening on ator from Oklahoma has the floor. has withdrawn his suggestion of the ab any of the more familiar topics which have Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, sence of a quorum. been discussed at great length in the past will the Senator from Oklahoma yield? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, trolled daynucl cleaewr as fusion, but siting or cress Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield would the Senator from Oklahoma yield myself f n to what I , consider nbut rather the most to the distinguished acting majority me 1 minute? of to be the most leader. significant achievement of the 1970's-the Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, 1 minute to the Senator from West Agreements in Moscow, May 26. I say to the distinguished Senator from Virginia. The agreements are historic for many rea- New York that I have no feelings on this Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- sons, but none so persuasive as what they matter one way or the other. The only dent, I extend my appreciation to the w w repres orldorld. T .e Tt in hough terms only a oa hope for beginning, the agree- reason - that I objected was that we have junior Senator from Alabama for with- ments constitute the first time since man gotten a hangup now on the debt limit holding his suggestion regarding the ab- developed the atomic bomb, that he has bill. The bill seemed to be moving rather sence of a quorum, because I was only stepped away from the brink of nuclear dis- well before this discussion developed. The interested in moving the program along, aster rather than closer. As such, these his- distinguished Senator from Massachu- Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I appre- blong oric agreements mark the beginning of a setts (Mr. KENNEDY) is here and ready elate that. when an all and dmankind mighty toward awe day to offer his amendment. Once we get M1. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. awesome world, through with the debt limit bill, we could Presi- at last free e from m the e awesomme e threat t of nu- then move rapidly, because the two re- dent, as I said, I had no feeling one way clear war. then m items rapidly, t have re- or the other on allowing committees to the We cannot realistically ining nuclear w expect u of exist- r agreements thereon. meet. I l~,d intended to call up some ence, but we can minimize the potential for Once we finish the debt limit bill, later consent items on the calendar at this its usage and thereby minimize its threat. this afternoon, I would not object. But time. However, I think I have imposed This is what the soviet Union and the for the moment I object for the reasons on the time of the Senator from Okla- stated. homa too much already. I shall defer The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- calling the consent items, and I thank ator from Oklahoma has the floor. the Senator from Oklahoma very much Senator yield? (This marks the end of the colloquy Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield which took place earlier in the day and to the distinguished Senator from 'III- which, by unanimous consent, was or- nois. dered to be printed at this point in the RECORD.) Mr PERCY M . . r. President, i feel it very important that we establish in the RECORD that the minority as of this mo- ment, 12 o'clock noon, has removed its objection and we stand ready to move forward with the legislation that over- whelmingly passed the Senate in 1970. We are, I think, within an hour or two of finishing the markup of the bill and reporting it. I deeply regret this. I fully take into account that other Senators do have th o er things on their schedule. How- ever, I want to make it absolutely clear that the minority stands ready now to move the bill out of the committee so that it can be reported to the Senate. Mr. JAVITS. And the agreement would only have to apply to this one committee. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Oklahoma has the floor. Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, i yield to the Senator from Alabama. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Alabama is recognized. Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Alabama stated when he reserved the right to interpose an objec- tion to the unanimous-consent request that he would not interpose an objection, but he thought it was only fair, since at the time he originally planned to object to the request, he was the only Demo- cratic member, out of some 10 members of the committee, who was present on the Senate floor.- And since this seemed to be a colloquy between Members on the other side of the aisle, he thought it only fair that the Democratic members of the committee be consulted as well. So to that end he wished to suggest the ab- sence of a quorum. The distinguished junior Senator from ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, June 30, 1972, he present- ed to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills: S. 1893. An act to amend the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act to restore the Golden Eagle Passport Program, and for oth- er purposes; S. 3338. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the rates of com- pensation for disabled veterans; and S. 3715. An act to amend and extend the Defense Production Act of 1950. ADDRESS BY SENATOR BAKER ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the dis- tinguished senior Senator from Tennes- see (Mr. BAKER) drafted an excellent speech on the Strategic Arms Limita- tion Agreements in which he described the signing as "the most significant achievement of the 1970's." Although he had intended to deliver the speech as the keynote speaker at the 18th an- nual meeting of the American Nuclear Society, several critical votes made it impossible for him to attend the meeting in Las Vegas. As a fellow member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy I ask unanimous consent to have the re- marks of Senator BAKER printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ADDRESS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. Good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am indeed honored to have been asked to ad- cord on these first Strategic Arms Limita- tion Agreements. The premise upon which these agreements were based, their effect, and prospects for further limitation shall be the subject of my talk tonight. To say that the SALT agreements were plistic for there were hundreds of factors that played a role in the four long years of negotiations, but for reasons of time, I should like to boil down all of those factors into two basic concepts which I believe were at the heart of our position-Nuclear Suffi- ciency and Mutual Vulnerability. Sufficiency is the cornerstone of our posi- tion and appropriately so, for it represents the unalterable view that while we must al- low virtual parity or equality to exist before both sides would find it to their mutual ad- vantage to negotiate limitations, we must never negotiate from a position of clear stra- tegic inferiority. It is for this reason that neither side found it to their advantage to unilaterally disarm and that the decision of the Congress to fund construction of an Anti-Ballistic Missile system proved, In retro- spect, to be a wise one. During the mid-1960's, when we noticed that the Soviets were constructing nuclear missiles and submarines at an alarming rate and that the clear first-strike advantage that we had held for some twenty years was beginning to diminish, we changed our strat- egy and undertook to establish a credible deterrent capability. The fact that many were unsure about the effectiveness of our ABM became inconsequential to the Soviets who primarily took note of the fact that we were constructing a $10 billion system to de- fend our second-strike capability. Had we not begun construction of an ABM system, the Soviets very easily could have felt that a massive first-strike would inflict such heavy damage upon the 'U.S. that we would be rendered virtually impotent to retaliate, and even if we did retaliate, the damage would be so slight as to make the price worth paying. But, the Soviets were not of- fered such an opportunity and were instead faced with the very real probability that if they attempted a surprise first-strike attack, they, too, would suffer massive damage and loss of life. Once both nations knew that the other had the power to inflict irreparable damage, the question became how fast and how ir- reparable. Fortunately, this is a question that neither side could find a satisfactory an- swer to, and so they turned to negotiations. The purpose of such negotiations was to as- sure that neither side found an answer to Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 rl-S 10906 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S 15R000400010gJ1k# 30, 1972 - Cae question: the question of Mutual Vul- nerability. Mutual Vulnerability depicts the situation lii which both nations consider their defen- sive capability inadequate to avoid massive toss of life in the result of a nuclear war and therefore consider nuclear war too costly to initiate, it is a little frightening, but in my view, very realistic. You may recall that before the 'soviet Union had the bomb, Bernard Baruch recommended that we share all secrets with the Soviets in return for guarantees that I he atom only be used for peaceful purposes, lout the Soviets refused. They refused be- cause they felt that they were at a distinct disadvantage and they were determined to catch up with the United States. At any rate, the agreements just signed, more than any- thing else, serve to guarantee that we remain mutually vulnerable. The Defensive Agreement, which is in the corm of a treaty, limits each side to two ABM sites: one for defense of their national capital and one for defense of an ICBM field. Each site would consist of 100 ABM inter- ceptors or a total of 200 per country. The limitation on number of sites and missiles, in addition to the limitations on radar and the stipulation that the two ABM sites be no closer than 1300 kilometers or 800 miles, guarantees that huge populated areas of both countries will be exposed or vulnerable. This was the intent of the treaty. t on the negotiate further limitations. It should be creased dramatically in number so that noted that the United states offered to ban they are located in every State except testing of the multiple warhead before we Montana and Wyoming. ever tested ours, but the Soviet Union re- The President's action, therefore, can fused. It should also be noted that the B-1 only inhibit the local service which such supersonic bomber and the Trident subma- rine programs are not projects to increase the size of our bomber or submarine fleets. As part of my longstanding commit- but rather to replace the aging B-52 and the ment to public broadcasting I shall do old Polaris which have been around for years. my utmost to help override the Presi- Frcan this position of strength, we shall dent's veto. In view of the overwhelming proceed with caution to negotiate what is majority, 82-1, by which H.R. 13918 now called SALT II or the second round of passed the Senate, I believe the possi- the arms limitation talks. Goals for these bilities are good for favorable action talks include a more permanent offensive agreement which might result in reductions here. I am less optimistic about the of the large SS-9's in exchange for an ag- chances in the House of Representatives, gregate reduction on the part of the United however. States, limitations on "throw-weight" or Nevertheless, we cannot allow a pro- megatonnage, and limitations On technical which has given the American peo- advances in warheads such as the MIRY. le so much, and has the potential to These are all obtainable goals if both sides p work in earnest toward their achievement give even more, wither for want of ade- and abide by the spirit of the first agree- quate funding. Long-range financing is menta. Without trust, negotiations are an ex- still the absolute necessity if public ercise in futility. It is my hope, as I think it broadcasting is to succeed. In the mean- is of most Americans, that we canWroceed to- time, the administration which is re- gethertnand disargmaamendifficult ' fof sponsible for initiating such a plan, our own sake, but for the sake of all mankind should not be allowed to hinder- even the whose hope hofor a world, free from the locaust indeed, hdaag puminimal blic broadcasting which the 2-year au- become a reality. thorization in H.R. 13918 would provide. The Interim Offensive Agreemen , other hand, is much more complex and THE PRESIDENT'S VETO OF THE slightly different in intent. It limits each PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT country to the number of ICBM's that are currently deployed or under construction Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, to- at the time of the signing of the treaty or day the President has seen fit to veto July 1. This means that the Soviet Union is H.R. 13918. In doing so, he has left the limited to about 1618 ICBM's and that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting United States is limited to 1054. Although without an authorization of funds for fis- the Soviet Union will be allowed about 313 cal year 1973, which begins tomorrow: large under the agreement, they will be prohibited from converting other ICBM mand o substantially to reduced individual amount States to Other silos Vcan be modified, but not "sig- nificantly." Construction of submarine launched bal- listic missiles on all nuclear submarines will be frozen at current levels. This means that SLBM's may be constructed only to replace either land based ICBM's or older submarine launchers. The results of these freezes are that the United States accepts a position of inferiority to the Soviets in number of missile launch- ers (2,359 to 1,710), but this numerical in- ferlority is not to be confused with any sort of qualitative inferiority and those worried by the numerical question may rest assured that the nation's security t has in been disadvantage- jeopardized by the apparent fact, to the contrary. Nidlifying the effect of a numerical in- feriority in missiles is the fact that not only does the UnitedStates possess signifi- cantly more nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles in strategic bombers, but it also holds a decisive advantage in sophistica- tion of warheads. Some experts estimate that are at least two Years ahead of the CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1973 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAF- FORD). Pursuant to the previous order, the Chair now lays before the Senate, House Joint Resolution 1234, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: H.J. Res. 1234, making continuing ap- propriations for the fiscal year 1973, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the joint resolution? There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolu- tion. ORDER OF BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would ask the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN) if he will kindly defer so that the Senate may receive a mes- sage from the House of Representatives. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE A message from the House of Repre- sentatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 15390) to provide for a 4-month extension of the pres- ent temporary level in the public debt limitation, requests a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS of Arkansas, Mr. ULLMAN, Mr. BURKE Of Massachusetts, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BETTS were appointed managers of the conference on the part of the House. Mutiple Independently-targetaote ne-eMry h_&% received hundreds, even thousands, Vehicle (MIRY). ,rich an advantage currently gives the of letters from grateful mothers tellin United States a clear edge in effectiveness of of their esteem for these wounderful pro - how in President his Nixon wec.awns, but this edge will not last for long, grams. answer wor wthern onder for under the agreements, modernization is would allowed to continue, and the Soviets have an- today. nounced that they will proceed with their The program for construction of ed_.- work on the MIRV, as they expect us to pro- recd with construction of the 13-1 super- cational broaeasting facilities began in sonic boniner and the new Trident missile 1962 has suffered as well today. This launching submarine, and proceed we must, program has enabled the individual Although a continuation of the arms race States to build educational radio and seems inconsistent with the goals of the 1stt- television stations which in turn serve eat agreements, it is, in fact, quite consistent the individual communities and regions of throughout the country. These individ- for it continues our position of s a cnce of strengtth h serves to maintain the ba la stre between the two forces, a balance ual stations are the cornerstone of public without which there would be no reason to broadcasting. Since 1962, they have in- construct educational broadcasting fa- cilities. In its short existence, the Corporation has been responsible for "Sesame Street." "Misterogers Neighborhood," the "Electric Company" and many other such programs which have not only edu- cated our children, but inspired them to become better human beings. The Corporation has been able to do this, and more, while still in its infancy and operating without permanent fi- nancing as promised by this adminis- tration and the preceding one. The administration has not submitted an alternative-a permanent financing plan as promised-and it has, by vetoing H.R. 13918, left public broadcasting with no alternative. At a time when the Surgeon General of the United States has told us we need more of the-prosocial programs provided PUBLIC DEBT LIMITATION Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representa- tives on H.R. 15390. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 THE EVENING STAR DATE '_ )C"T New Panel to Monitor Arms Curb Compliance New York Dimes New Service TLS. intelligence officials have establis e a comma ee- _ cow on n May 26. The five-man committee is to begin functioning on Satur- day, the cutoff date agreed on by the two governments for the construction of new sites for offensive missiles. Administration officials said the committee was set up to avoid the repetition on a broader scale of the violation of the Suez Canal truce in Au- gust 1970, when the Soviet Un- ion and Egypt moved into po- sition SAM-2 and. SAM-3 anti- aircraft missiles after the cease-fire with Israel. At that time, U.S. intelli- gence services were unpre- pared to monitor Soviet and Egyptian fulfillment of the truce terms. This was a source of major embarrassment to the United States, which had negotiated the truce, and the incident nearly led to the col- lapsed of the cease-fire. .Jhe new committee, officials cQn yernon A a tors, ceuu- -- Its members are to be Lt. G ld V. Benn head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Q- l c (!lino irector of the State Department's In- telligence and Research Agen- cy; Andrew Marshall +ntelli- gence coordinator of the Na- tional Security Council at the White House; and p CIA offi- cial still to he desicnated T h e committee, officials said, will be linked to the, White House verification pan- el, a senior body of the Nation- al Security Council responsible for the strategic arms negotia- tions. The Moscow agreements on the limitation of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons for- mally come into force on rati- fication by the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet. However, both sides have agreed to abide by the treaty from the date it was signed by Presi- dent Nixon and Soviet Party Leader Leonid I. Brezhnev. PAGE Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 26, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks Can we not show a love for our country? A love that surmounts all fears, all weak- nesses and dedicates men to preserve with their lives the land they love? I am not asking that we dedicate our- selves to becoming a nation of warmongers. No, I ask that we dedicate ourselves to work for peace. I firmly believe a strong aggressive, defensive posture is the best offense avail- able to a country whose democratic ideals prevents it from initiating an attack against any enemy unless provoked beyond endur- ance. Until we have made our country so im- pregnable, so invulnerable that an attack would be suicidal, will our enemies keep their distance. Until we have done this, the possi- bility of America becoming a major battle- field in a new world conflict becomes more apparent with each passing day. Gentlemen. Now is the time for us to look to our defenses, time to follow the heritage which is ours. The time to demon- strate, once again, to all the world, that democracy is a living thing, transcending all other ways of life, and worth protecting at any cost. VA DIRECTOR JOE ANDERSON HONORED FOR SERVICE HON. ED EDMONDSON OF OKLAHOMA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 26, 1972 Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, prob- ably no other Member of this body is more aware than yourself of the many outstanding abilities of the man who served as your administrative assistant for nearly 3 years, Mr. Joe Anderson. Since leaving your staff and becoming Muskogee Regional Director of the Vet- erans' Administration, Joe Anderson has unselfishly dedicated his time and efforts in behalf of the veterans of Oklahoma and our Nation. I was recently provided with a resolu- tion adopted by the Disabled American Veterans of Oklahoma which indicates the very high regard and appreciation felt for Joe by all veterans in Oklahoma. This recognition of Joe's consistent and tireless efforts, above and beyond the call of duty, demonstrates the outstanding record he has achieved as our Regional Director for the Veterans' Administra- tion, and I include the text of the DAV resolution at this point in the RECORD: RESOLUTION Whereas, the Disabled American Veterans of Oklohoma hold many meetings each year at. the state, district, and chapter level to inform veterans and their beneficiaries of changes in laws and regulations affecting veterans' programs; and Whereas, Joe W. Anderson, Director, Vet- erans Administration Regional Office, Musko- gee, Oklahoma, has contributed significantly to the success of these meetings by having himself and/or other members of his staff present to discuss various phases of veterans' programs. Many of the meetings convened on weekends, but participation of the Direc- tor and his staff was not reduced on this account, and, now, therefore, be it Resolved, that the Department Convention, Department of Oklahoma, Disabled American Veterans, held in Lawton, Oklahoma, June 9, 10, and 11, 1972, does hereby express and record its appreciation to Joe W. Anderson and his staff for outstanding service far be- yond normal duty requirements to the ex- servicemen of Oklahoma; and, be it further Resolved, that copies of this resolution be sent to Joe W. Anderson, Director, Veterans Administration Regional Office, Muskogee, Oklahoma; to Donald E. Johnson, Adminis- trator, Veterans Affairs, Veterans Administra- tion Central Office, Washington, D.C., and to the members of the Oklahoma Congressional Delegation. HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 26, 1972 Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speak- er, last Saturday the Washington Post carried an excellent background article by Chalmers Roberts on the strategic arms limitation agreement reached in Moscow. Mr. Roberts notes that the con- cessions made by both sides involved a mixed nuclear basket of apples and oranges, and the ability to reconcile this mix has produced an agreement which is a sensible and stabilizing step in the di- rection of curbing the arms race. In discussing the prospects for SALT II and the use of the proposed Trident submarine and B-1 bomber as bargaining chips, Mr. Roberts says: A good many in and out of Congress de- ride the bargaining chip argument. I do not. History teaches that Moscow respects muscle, not weakness. I thought there was validity in years past to the contention that keeping the American ABM program going was a bargaining chip; I think it proved so. The same argument now has validity. Mr. Roberts concludes that the SALT agreements are very important in them- selves, but that they are far more im- portant in terms of a continuing process of attempting to achieve "a more stable and rational relationship. " Mr. Speaker, at this point in the RECORD I include the Roberts article and commend it to the reading of my colleagues. The article follows: JUDGING THE MERITS OF THE SALT AGREEMENT (By Chalmers M. Roberts) In judging the merits of the strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union it is necessary to do two things: first, to ap- praise the meaning of the anti-ballistic mis- sile (ABM) treaty and the details, includ- ing the numbers, of the interim agreement on offensive weapons; second, to judge the twin pacts in the larger context of the changing Washington-Moscow relationship. The two seem to me to be inseparable. The ABM treaty has the great virtue of so limiting such defensive measures as to re- move fears on either side that the other could indulge in a first strike attack. If such an attack could ever be conceivable to any rational leader, it would become so only when he felt that his own weapons and the bulk of his population would be so protected by an elaborate nation-wide ABM system as to make a second or retaliatory strike by the other nation a risk worth taking. Given the undoubted ability of the offen- sive to overwhelm the defensive and given the grave doubts by many experts as to the efficacy of any ABM system, such fears doubtless have been gravely exaggerated in both Washington and Moscow. But that does not detract from the fact that such fears have existed, that they impelled vast ex- penditures regardless of their validity and that under terms of the SALT treaty on ABMs this should come to a halt if not an end. "Zero ABMs," which means a complete abolition by both sides of any ABMs, would have been better than the two site option agreed upon. But two, at least, is far, far bet- ter than unlimited ABMs. So at least one factor that threatend to destabilize the balance of terror has been cut back to manageable proportions. It seems to me it would make sense for Con- gress to refuse funds for the building of an ABM around Washington despite the asym- metry that would involve, given the exist- ence of a site now in existence around Mos- cow. Likewise it would make sense for the Soviets not to build their second site around an offensive missile field. Should Congress so decide, the Moscow decision is most likely to be affected by the Soviet perception of a changing Moscow-Washington relationship. Now turn to the offensive weapons agree- ment. It is evident enough that the Nixon Administration paid a stiff price, negotiated at the finale in Moscow, to win Soviet assent to inclusion of a limitation on submarine launched missiles (SLBMs). I think, how- ever, it was a price worth paying. The United States long has had a triad of strategic weapons systems: ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers. According to the figures presented to the Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the sum total of the rival triads (one bomber being equated with one missile) will be 2,499 for the Soviets to 2,167 for the United States, Even these figures are not the whole story, however. The total megatonnage in the So- viet arsenal under the agreements is much the larger but the total number of American warheads, due to the American multiples (MIRVs), is far larger than that of the Rus- sians. In sum, the Apples and oranges of nuclear weaponry have been added up to what can fairly be termed rough parity for weapons of one nation that can reach the soil of the other. Even here, it should be noted, some of the American apples have been excluded from the basket: the fighter-bombers based in Western Europe and on carriers, known as forward based systems (FBS). It seems to me the net of all these figures and factors is that the offensive agreement is a good deal for both superpowers. In reading over all the official American explanations, by the President, Secretaries Laird and Rogers, Adm. Moorer and above all by Henry Kissinger, one is struck by a single theme: it would have been much worse if there had been no agreements reached. It is an uncontroverted fact that, as See. Laird kept saying so loudly and so long, the Soviets did have a great momentum going on offensive arms, from the giant SS-9 missiles to submarines. So, as the admiral put it, "we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about three to two in their favor." I have no doubt he Is right because I have no doubt that Moscow would have gone on building, lacking an agreement, to something like that amount of superiority. At some point the United States would have responded with a new program of its own. The action-reaction phenomenon in stra- tegic arms has been evident for years, for decades in fact. The current Soviet momen- tum clearly dates from the humilitation Mos- cow suffered in the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. The American preponderance at that time, in turn, was the result of early Ken- nedy Administration decisions to build a vastly superior force, rather than to accept some form of parity. President Nixon was the first chief execu- tive to accept parity as a principle though he sought to soften the blow to American pride by using instead the word "sufficien- cy." Whether he did so as an intellectual exercise, or whether he did so because he Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 E 6462 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 26, 1972 knew the Congress and the country simply would not put up the money for superiority in such costly weapons, is not material. That can be left to the historians. The fact is he did so. And only because he did so Is there the agreement now before Congress for ap. proval. Perhaps the best clue to Mr. Nixon's submarine decision was Dr. Kissinger's re- mark at a Moscow press briefing. Discussing the high price paid for the submarine sec- tion of the agreements, Dr. Kissinger re- marked that "the United Stacey was in ;a rather complex position to recommend a submarine deal since we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommend people find themselves in." In discussing the agreements, Secretary Laird has said he accepted them only on the premise that the United States will go for- ward with the multi-billion dollar Trident submarine and the equally costly B-1 bomb- er and some other programs as well. In es- sence, this is the old bargaining chip idea now being applied to the SALT II round due to begin this fall. The hope is to reach a per- manent treaty covering offensive weapons systems to replace the five-year interim agreement now before Congress. A good many in and out of Congress de- ride the bargaining chip argument, I do not. History teaches that Moscow respects muscle, not weakness. I thought there was validity in years past to the contention that keeping the American ABM program going was a bar- gining chip; I think it proved so. The same argument now has validity. But that is not to say that everything that Sec. Laird and the Joint Chiefs would like is necessary, or even desirable at the speed they request. It seems to me further funding of the Trident project makes sense, in part because it will tend to move the core of the strategic power more to sea where it is least vulnerable. The B-1 is of lesser value, in my view, and should receive only limited funding at this point. In hisremarks at a Moscow dinner for Mr. Nixon, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny re- marked that despite "differences of social sys- tems," there are "objective factors that deter- mine similarity of interests" that influence Soviet-American relations. It was of course such a Kremlin view that permitted the So- viet leaders to let the President come to Mos- cow at a time he had challenged Soviet in- terests by mining the harbors of North Viet- nam. It was simply one more demonstration of practicality over principle. One could say the same thing about Mr. Nixon's climb down from "superiority" to "sufficiency." Tb is sort of thing was codified in the dec- laration of basic principles signed in Mos- cow by President Nixon and Soviet Commu- nist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev. They said, among other things, that the two nations "will proceed from the common determina- tion that in the nuclear age there is no alter- native to conductingtheir mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." Or as Dr. Kissinger put it to members of Congress at the White House: "We are compelled to coexist." This theme, of course, is not new. Back in 1954 President Eisenhower declared that "since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alter- native to peace, if there is to be a happy and well world." Just as many Americans have difficulty ac- cepting parity instead of superiority, so the Russians have difficulty abandoning the secrecy on which they have so long counted, from Stalin through Khrushchev. This is evident in their refusal to give the numbers of their own ICBMs or to agree to a definition of "heavy" missiles and other pertinent terms. In short, the old suspicions of the Cold War are far from gone. It took a long time, on our side, for officials to abandon such terms as "international Communism." It would be useful for Secretaries Rogers and Laird to abandon the phrase "negotiating from a position of strength," which they both used in their testimony to Congress. And it would be useful for the Soviets to abandon some of the jargon of their own ideology such as "the Imperialists." The SALT agreements seem to me to be very important in themselves. But they are far more important if they form part of what Dr. Kissinger has called "vested inter- ests in a continuation of a more formal rela- tionship" between the two nations. We should, as Dr. Kissinger went on to say, "have no illusion" that such will occur or that, if it does, it will be quick and simple. The Ideological differences, and the national rivalries too, remain. But there are, as Pod- gorny said, "objective factors" as well which tend to force each nation to move in the direction of a more stable and rational rela- tionship. Each side interacts on the other. In the past when the Soviets were weak the Ameri- cans sought to exploit that weakness. If America becomes weak, I have no doubt the Soviets will exploit that weakness. The changes therefore must be gradual, not pre- cipitate. To me, theNixon demand-as speci- fied by Sec. Laird-for massive new arms goes too far. But so, in the other direction, does the budget cutting program of Sen. George McGovern. It is up to Congress, as it approves the SALT agreements, to find the mean between the extremes. If it does, then 1972 could well become a date to remember when hope superceded fear without allowing illusion to supplant rationality. HON. JAMES ABOUREZK OF SOUTH DAKOTA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 26, 1972 Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. Speaker, when talking about educational problems, the word "crisis" automatically springs to mind. One year there is a crisis in sci- ence education and we are not keeping ahead of the Russians. The next year we discover a reading crisis and that Johnny cannot read. The year after that it is something else. The fact of the mat- ter is, there are crises. But they are symptoms of a much bigger, more per- vasive, and continual crisis that has been present in education for some time and has been growing worse and worse. That is the financial crisis. The real irony of this situation is that in terms of supply and demand, there are almost enough qualified teachers to pro- vide the needed educational services of our society for the first time since World War II. Yet we find that because of cost factors and inflation, school district after school district cannot take advantage of the supplyand instead find themselves cutting back in terms of educational services. This means that instead of smaller classes, there are larger ones. In- stead of more individualized instruction, there is less. Instead of more time to meet the pupils' needs, the teacher has less. Then comes the demand to cut back on the frills. I do not believe that special teachers for art, music, drama, indus- trial arts, and physical education are frills. Yet these are the first to go. I want to make- it clear that I do not believe that the culprit in the increasing cost of education and the cutbacks is teachers' salaries. It is true that teach- ers' salaries have gone up-but at a pace that is behind and not ahead of other professional workers. This despite the fact that teacher salaries have long been considered notoriously and even scan- dalously low in our society. For the most part, one cannot fault the efforts that have been made at the local level to provide adequate funding to meet the educational needs of the community. Since 1966 when the Ele- mentary and Secondary Act went into effect, State and local taxes have sup- plied an additional $15.7 billion for schools raising the total revenue collected from their own tax sources to $39 billion. Over the same time, funds from the Fed- eral Government have increased from $900 million to $2.9 billion. It is clear that States and localities cannot continue their massive efforts without help. I recognize that there are many problems with Federal aid to ed- ucation that must still be worked out. For all of that, the Federal Government remains that last major untapped source of adequate funding to meet the financial crisis about which I have been talking. I was pleased to have been a supporter of the Quality Education Appropriations Amendment to the Office of Education Appropriations bill. This successful amendment added nearly $354 million to key education programs. This is an en- couraging step for those of us who be- lieve in a reordering of our national pri- orities. Education must come higher on our list of national concerns. IN MEMORIAM-MARTHA TURNER LONG HON. BILL CHAPPELL, JR. OF FLORIDA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 26, 1972 Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Speaker, I want to join the people of Marion County, Fla., in acknowledging their deep sense of loss at the untimely passing of Martha Turner Long at the young age of 35. Mrs. Long gave 7 years of loyal, efficient, and devoted service as secretary to the Marion County Planning and Zoning Board and its director. By her courteous and polite manner, she brought great credit and recognition to herself, her office, and to Marion County. She was a dedicated wife and mother, held in high esteem by all whose lives she touched. Her exemplary life has contributed to our heritage and traditions and will serve as a goal that we and future gen- erations should strive to attain. I wish to express my sympathy to the family of Martha Turner Long, an ever-faithful servant of the public and a contributor to good government. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 SAIT THE W I q,5$~ ,fie 2005/12/14: CIA-nP, O4o"Kf0'MOOI 4G7 Inspector Satellite to Police SALT Weighed by Air Force BY George C. Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer U.S. Air Force is taking a. new Too s es_ at could rocket into space an} spect forei spacecraft lool- ]}iaht now. both the 17pi d The arms control agreement with the Soviet Union has given impetus to proposals for such inspector satellites. Presi- dent Nixon has assured Con- gress that the United States will keep track of the Soviet missile buildup, a promise hinged on the ability to keep counting missiles with observ- ation satellites. interfered with the oche contrast to Russi desperate e o o noc own spv planes which used to fly over her territory-an effort that rs. Nevertheless, ITninn over the last fe ears inspector effort has been heav- has conducted several sets of exercises which many Western space specialists see as-de- ace to perlect sau nrtes The United States is be and Russia in this field. The Air Force has sponsored a number of studies but has yet to fly the first inspector satellite. One argument against doing it has been the fear of looking provocative and extending the arms race to outer space. In the environment of the recent Strategic Arms Limita- tion Treaty (SALT), aerospace companies see their chances improved for getting beyond paper studies and individual pieces of hardware. inspector._ Several of the companies are preparing proposals for submission this week to the Pentagon in hopes of obtain- ing one of two Air Force study contracts for the satellite Soviet' The off-and-on ily classified by the Pentagon through the years. But the basic idea has not changed much since former Defense Secretary . Robert S. Mc- Namara told Congress in se- cret testimony in 1968 that "we are exploring the develop- ment of a non-nuclear surveil- lance or destruction capability against hostile satellites ..." McNamara said any one of a number of rockets could carry the satellite inspector into space-the Spartan, Polaris,, Thor or Minuteman. One way for the satellite to home in on another would be by the heat it would give off in space-so- called infra-red sensors. LTV Aerospace worked with the Air Force on a sensor for a satellite inspector under a secret project called 922. The ensor was launched into pace successfully from Cape Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018; June 22, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS HON. HASTINGS KEITH OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, June 14, 1972 Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of our former colleague and friend from Mas- sachusetts, Philip Philbin. Phil had many virtues, among which were numbered kindness, competency and, above all, in- tegrity. I would like to make the observation that during all the years I knew Phil not once did I hear him make a remark criticizing another person. This rare trait has and will always come to mind when I think of Phil, for it is indeed rare to know a man of such great benevolence, During his 26 years in the Congress Phil never turned a constituent or a fel- low colleague away who came to him for help. Even while he helped others he went about his own work quietly and ex- pertly and diligently. On Saturday I, with many of my col- leagues, traveled to Clinton to pay my last respects to this man I had known so well and had liked so much. I would like to share with you.the words of the pastor of Our Lady of the Rosary Church in Clinton-a tribute delivered from a fellow Clintonian on behalf of all of us who had the privilege of knowing Phil Philbin. At the time when Congressman Philbin retired from public life we who were his col- leagues and friends gave him testimony of our love and affection. Today we are again gathered together, this time to mark his passing on to eternal life. This is another expression for a beloved friend. As a Congressman, Philip Philbin worked with you as a colleague or served you as Representative; as a fellow Clintonian he was a life-long friend to his town and its people; and as a faithful Christian he shared the same hope and ideals we are expressing today. Congressman Philbin was a politician here in his district-that is a title of respect- none of this cynicism is attached to it which is found in some other places. Here we have his example of 28 years of integrity and hon- esty in public service. The newspapers have recorded the accomplishment of those years of service but this morning we have another sort of testimony-the presence of so many of his former colleagues. This confirms our high opinion of the job he did in Washing- ton. Perhaps an even greater tribute is the presence of the so many people he served- those for whom he managed to make the im- personal procedure of the Government per- sonal and for whom he removed the road- blocks of bureaucracy. Phil Philbin was also our fellow Clintonian. Years of service in Washington never sepa- rated him from his home town. He always found the time to keep up contact with its people. He had a keen sense of family ties and local tradition. You could not meet him without being reminded of some family mem- ber he knew of or inquired for. A fine example of his capacity for friend- ship was his association with the late Sena- tor David I. Walsh. His loyalty outlasted death, for each year since Senator Walsh's death, Phil Philbin arranged for memorial ceremonies, and so kept alive the memory of another great Clintonian. Lastly, Phil Philbin was a faithful Chris- tian-which is not a separate title but the sum of all his roles in life. It is our sincere hope that today, together with his namesake, the Apostle Philip, his wish has been fulfilled. To this we add our love and affection for a friend we will greatly miss, but never forget. CS'Aj HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, June 21, 1972 Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, Gen. Thomas S. Power, "Design for Survival," said: It is, therefore, up to the American people to decide which road to survival they want to choose. The choice is by no means easy. The active proponents of one-world govern- ment have a very saleable product to sell- peace without an arms race-and they are both vocal and convincing.... Unfortunately, however, our approach-survival through military supremacy-ostensibly entails far greater sacrifices and risks, and therefore has less appeal to those who seek a quick and easy way out. Still, it is the only approach which will permit national survival, This is the approach we have followed to this day, and it has proved successful.... The two ap- proaches permit of no compromise because they point in exactly opposite directions. Therefore, in making their choice, our citi- zens must select one or the other, realizing that once they have chosen the road to dis- armament and one-world government, there can be no turning back. The principal features of the SALT arms limitation agreements made in Moscow between the United States and Soviet Russia, and soon to be presented to both Houses of Congress, are sum- marized as follows by a select group of Senators including BARRY GOLDWATER and JAMES BUCKLEY : The Moscow agreements freeze the United States at a 4-to-1 disadvantage comparing our overall missile payload to that of the Soviet Union; The Soviet Union has three missiles for every two of ours, theirs are sub- stantially larger, and the agreements guarantee that this gap will remain and probably widen; Soviet missiles carry payloads several times larger than those of U.S. missiles, an advantage which the agreements not only protect, but allow to be enhanced; The agreements forbid the United States to increase the number of its nu- clear submarines while authorizing the Soviets to continue building them until they equal and then surpass the United States. On the House Floor recently some fis- cal conservatives were trying to cut ap- propriations to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I raised the question: For what purpose are we supporting a Disarmament Agency in Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 E 6389 any form? The fact is that since 1962 we have been enagegd in formal dis- armament negotiations in Geneva, con- ducted by this Agency, always with the stated purpose of "the total elimination of all armed forces and armaments ex- cept those needed to maintain internal order within states and to furnish the United Nations with peace forces." It is significant to note that Paul Nitze, As- sistant Secretary of the Navy in 1962 under a Democratic administration when these negotiations began, reappears 10 years later under a Republican adminis- tration as a leading big-name negotiator of the SALT agreements. Reducing American forces to a level of permanent inferiority to the Soviets is a long step toward the kind of disarmament sought since 1962, most likely to be followed, once accomplished, by a push to limit U.S. arms to the point that they are inferior to those of the United Nations as well. Such disarmament is buying national suicide on the installment plan. Last year Gen. Curtis LeMay, former Air Force Chief of Staff and founder of the Strategic Air Command, warned that if present trends in arms limitation con- tinue, this country can look forward within 18 months to some type of ulti- matum from our principal arms rivals. Even the disarmament-prone New York Times pointed out in an editorial June 5: That [Soviet] edge includes 40 per cent more intercontinental ballistic missiles (1408 to 1000) and missile-launching submarines (62 to 44), one-third more submarine- launched ballistic missiles (950 to 710) and a_ threefold Soviet advantage in megaton- nage of total missile payload. Much of this appears in writing in the five-year agreement freezing strategic offensive missiles. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird ad- mitted a year ago that "we have been in a period of almost moratorium since 1967 on new strategic weapons deployment" while noting in the May 4, 1972, issue of Commander's Digest that we are "in a period of vigorous Soviet military expan- sion at sea, on the land, in the air and in space." Shortly before the SALT agreements were finalized in Moscow, the Senate Ju- diciary Committee released an updated study pointing out that of 25 agreements signed at previous summit meetings, 24 had been violated. So we dare not even fall back on the forlorn hope expressed in a recent State Department briefing for congressional wives, admitting that the SALT agreements establish a missile gap favoring the Soviet Union, but neverthe - less justifying them on the grounds tha'k without the agreements the gap would expand. If we abide by the agreements, we can be sure that the gap will expand as soon as the Soviets decide that the time has come to break it. Let the State Department be advised never to talk to women, especially when one of those women is my wife. Let the American people be advised that we must pay heed to General Power's warning and fight for America's national survival. SALT must be returned to its proper place-the dinner table. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 22, 1) 2 OF NEW YORK ?N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, June 21, 1972 Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, to follow is the full text of House Concurrent Reso- lution 634 which I have introduced. It is my fervent hope that this resolution will make it possible for this Chamber to en- dorse a goal of peace in Vietnam with a unanimity to which it is seldom ac- customed. The resolution follows: HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 634 Whereas the continuing war in Southeast Asia is of great concern to the people of the United States: Whereas the current military invasion of South Vietnam by the forces of North Viet- nam has contributed to the escalation of the war; Whereas a lasting peace in that region can be achieved only through agreement between the Great Powers, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the Republic of (South) Vietnam, and the indigenous people of the latter two countries; and Whereas the United States Congress can- not by a leigslative Act impose an agreement upon the parties so as to end the war, guar- aantee the release of the prisoners of war, settle political issues, guarantee the peace, alleviate human suffering in the region, guarantee self-determination of the people of Vietnam, and reunite the American people: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (-qte Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the policy of the United States for the promotion of peace in South- east Asia should be to immediately resume and continue negotiations to achieve the fol- lowing objectives and agreements: 1, An immediate cease-fire by all forces; 2. Complete and total withdrawal by the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam of al men and equipment from the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; 3. Concurrent withdrawal of all remain- ing military forces of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and of the Soviet Union, and all other foreign military forces, from Vietnam: 4. A cessation of the shipment of arms and war materials to the Democratic- Repub- lie of (North) Vietnam and to the Republic Of (South) Vietnam; ii. Free elections, supervised by the United Nations : (a) to determine whether the two coun- tries should be reunited under a common government; (b) to determine the form of government for the reunited country if a reunited coun- try is preferred by the people of both countries: (c) to determine the form of government for each country if separate and sovereign countries are preferred by the people or each country: 6. Supervision and enforcement of the neace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by the United Nations: and 7. Economic aid to the countries of South- nsst Asia by the United States and other members of the United Nations: Be it fur- her h.esolved- A. That in order to facilitate negotiations ohward the objectives and agreements enum- erated above. it is the sense of Congress that immediately after the achievement of a cease-fire, all prisoners of war then held by the Democratic Republic of (North) Viet- nam, the Republic of (South) Vietnam, :aid by insurgent forces, be released, under the supervision of the International Red Cross for voluntary repatriation, and that all parties to negotiations prepare and exchange lists of the missing and unrecovered dead so that the International Red Cross may make a full accounting for all missing persons. B. Immediately after the confirmation by formal agreement of the policies and pro- cedures set forth in this resolution between the national parties named herein and any necessary additional parties and the comple- tion of action taken to return all prisoners of war, as specified in paragraph A; the parties to this agreement shall announce a certain date for the complete and final withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from all [ndochina, and the total withdrawal must take place on or before December 31, 1972, ZION. HAMILTON FISH, JR. OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIP ES Wednesday, June 21, 1972 Mr. FISH. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, June 19, 1972, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board held a licensing hear- ing at Croton on Hudson concerning the licensing of a proposed atomic enc cgy plant known as Indian Point No. 2. Due to severe environmental effects caused by Indian Point No. 1 plant which is in operation, the present proposal to license a second nuclear energy plant in the same location has caused grave con- cern among residents of that area. At the June 19, 1972, hearing I made a limited appearance before the Board and issued the following statement. I include it in the RECORD so that my position in this matter will be known not only to the Board, by to my colleagues in the House : STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAMILTON FISH, JR., BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LI- CENSING BOARD Mr. Chairman, I am Hamilton Fish, Jr., Member of Congress representing the 26th Congressional District of New York. My pres- ent District includes four counties which border the Hudson River and the entire area I represent has had a long continuing, his- toric interest in the Hudson for transporta- tion, fishing and recreation. Further, I am now running for re-election in the new 25th Congressional District. which contains Dutchess, Putnam and Northern Westchester Counties, as well as parts of Ulster and Co- lumbia Counties. All of these counties border on the Hudson River. Most significantly. the Indian Point plant is physically located in the new 25th. Thus, it is for the purpose of protecting these traditional interests of my present and future constituents that I am making this limited appearance before you today. I am appearing to express my concern over the possible consequences of a nuclear accident at this plant, as well as the environmental and public health implications of the pro- posed routine emission of radioactive mate- rials from this plant into the water and into the air. THE CRAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASLB Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues have a grave responsibility, one that demands the best of scientific and technological com- petence on one hand and the rare ability to integrate into your deliberations, consid- eration of. public welfare on the other, You have before you a record in which the utility argues strongly about the need for this ad- ditional generating facility and warns of the potential power shortages that could occur should this project be delayed. It further asserts that the anticipated environmental effects are at least balanced in the scale of public values by the benefit of the electrical output of the plant. To counter the powerful voice of this utility, which is well amplified by the voices of its experts, there is only the feeble voice of the intervenors, who lack the resources to launch the exhaustive analysis of the assumptions, oversights, or even pos- sible errors in the analyses of the utility and of the AEC itself. So the fundamental thought I would leave with you is that this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should assert to the utmost its independence under AEC regulations, and that it probe deeply and incisively into the assertions of the utility. Further, that it treat with close at- tention the views of the intervenors, for in those views may be contained the kernels of some fundamental truths that bear directly upon the issue whether this plant should be licensed to operate, and, if so, under what special conditions. ATTENTION TO NONRADIOLOGICAL FACTORS Mr. Chairman, at this stage of the licensing process for the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant, you have to dal with the non-nuclear environmental effects. You well know, the Calvert Cliffs decision with its judicial react- ing of the National Environmental Policy Act. You may know that in the Congress, I was an original co-sponsor of this legislation and have since been a vigorous supporter of it. Because of the interest of my constituents in the Hudson River, in preserving its quality and character, I particularly welcomed that part of this decision having to do with AEC's responsibility to consider the effects of nu- clear power plants upon water quality. I would recall for the Board part of what Judge Skelley Wright wrote. He said, and I quote: "NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgement on the part of federal agencies. In each individual case, the particular eco- nomic and technical benefits of planned ac- tion must be assessed and then weighed against the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which would affect the balance of values. . . . In some cases, the benefits and possible costs may. lie anywhere on a broad spectrum.... The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, with possible alternations, the optimal) y beneficial action is finally taken." Going further, the Court made it abun- dantly clear that while the granting of a license by the AEC is contingent upon a water quality certification, the AEC is not precluded from demanding water pollution controls from its licensees which may be more strict than those demanded by the certifying agency. The Court clearly expects the Commission to balance the overall bene- fits and costs of a particular proposed proj- ect, and consider alterations (above and be- yond the applicable water quality standards) which would further reduce environmental damage. Yours is the heavy responsibility of giving substance to this judicial reaffirma- tion of the purposes of NEPA. THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION At the outset let me say that I do not pre- tend to know about the intricacies and sub- tleties of design of a nuclear power plant. I am not a professional nuclear engineer. nor a health physicist, nor an expert in the effects of waste heat and what to do about it. I-arn none of these. Rather what I have to say re- flects my continuing awareness as a Member of Congress who has strongly supported and closely followed the enactment and subse- quent application of the National Environ- mental Policy Act. THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE INTERVENOR In preparing this statement of concern, I have come to learn something of the built- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9968 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74BOO415ROO0400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 22, 1972 Campanella arrived later to thank Locust and pick up his car, Locust had paid a $20 wrecker charge, taken the car home, bought parts and re- paired the defects himself. He did that not with the idea of being repaid but to help his new-found friends. Campanelli finally persuaded Locust to ac- cept partial repayment, but it was only after he had stayed the night and promised to call if the car broke down on the way to New York. Peking, and two summit meetings having difference is Whether they are actually out, been held-it seems to me this scenario is or what is an agreement to get them out, quite clear. We are very close to some kind and I would be willing to settle for an agree- of understanding. ment, because I can't imagine Hanoi not ob- Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, are you express- serving that agreement if they signed and ing a personal opinion? You are often privy sealed it, to what is going on In the administration at Mr. CLARK. To get back for a moment to the highest levels. Do you have reason to what is going on currently, we have had a believe that we are close to reaching an un- brief moratorium on the bombing of Hanoi, derstanding? the Hanoi area, while President Podgorny Senator JACKSON. It is a personal judgment was there. Would either of you feel that this on my part but there are other factors that might be the time, again, to call a temporary I think give some credence to that personal halt in the bombing of North Vietnam u til share that optimism? about U wnt in bring Mr. AXBE, Mr. President, President a negotiated settlement n Paris which Nixon returned from Moscow with two Senator PERCY. There is no hard evidence would end this war totally and completely- important agreements on strategic arms at ha that we are close to ant understanding. not just our involvement but for everyone- limitations. These agreements are a good resuming there the Paris peace talks. There may be e I a would certainly support it, but we would first step toward eventual lessening of evidence now that Henry Kissinger does in- have to have some evidence that it would _bring that about. the arms race. tend to discuss Vietnam in Peking, and from Mr. CLARK. Senator Jackson, you have been The SALT agreements have been in- Mr. Podgorny's statement alone there is evi optimistic that something is happening. appropriately criticized. Some people dente now for the first time that the Soviet Would you stop the bombing? claim we are defenseless or might be left Union is attempting to work toward some Senator JACKSON. I am not saying they are defenseless. The fact is we can destroy sort of a cease-fire across the board, and about to settle this long, drawn out conflict def sel es many tact i over. an me Sroy assist in this regard, all of which, I think, but before we stop the military pressure ea_ is part of the initiative undertaken by the which obviously is having some impact, I ators are saying we did not get as much President to have a new solid foundation on would certainly say that it would be manda- as we gave. Still, we must begin some- Which we can build our relationships with tory that we have a definite understanding where, and again the fact is that we can the Soviet Union. There is hope, but nothing that there is going to be some kind of resolu- both destroy each other, hard in evidence today that would say that tion within a period of time. Otherwise we It is true that the agreements were not we are on the brink of an understanding, get into this old filibuster business that has final. We must continue to develop some Mr. KOPPEL. Well Senator Jackson, let me been going on over four years now, the Paris new weapons systems to be prepoed some approach this from a slightly different angle, talks, and I want to get all our men out, I You have expressed some fear that perhaps want to get all our prisoners out, and I want the next round of talks. But we must be- the President settled for a weaker kind of to get our involvement to an end. But I think gin somewhere. We must make serious SALT agreement simply because this is a po- we would have to have some kind of very attempts to talk to the Soviets and the litical year. Can we take that similar approach clear and unambiguous arrangement by Chinese. on the Vietnam settlement, wouldn't it be- which the final phases of the talks could be In all the debate, the Senator from Il- hoove the President before early November held and terminated. lanais (Mr. PERCY) has been outstanding to reach some kind of settlement, even if it Mr. CLARK. So until you see more concrete in his ability to pick out the important is less than we should be settling for? signs of what is going on you would not issues. ability He need to has tocpick out the m o tant Senator JACKSON. I don't think there is call a halt to the current bombing of North any doubt about that. The President, of Vietnam2 reasonable risks for peace. His June 18, course, modified in his speech his position Senator JACKSON, No, I would not. 1972, interview on ABC's "Issues and An- regarding a settlement on Vietnam. You will Senator PERCY. The most hopeful thing swers," along with the Senator from recall that he agreed to have all of our troops would be to have a stand-still cease-fire Washington (Mr. JACKSON), is an excel- out in four months, provided that our prison- right now. All bombing, all ground action, all lent example of Senator PERCY's defense ers are returned. There Is an immediate sea action stopped. If we stand on that of President commendable and stand-still cease-fire. And that got lost in ground, then I would tend to say the chances c futious first Nixon's ixop tow omd ending the the rhetoric of the moment. And the facts of working out something are better. But as are that this was quite a significant con- long as the hostilities are carried on at the arms race. cession made by our government. Therefore present level that they are, working the rest I ask unanimous consent to have the I wouldn't be surprised that we are able to of it out is much more difficult. text of the program printed in the reach some understanding on a stand-still Mr. KOPPEL. Now Senator Percy, the Presi- RECORD. cease-fire. There isn't any doubt that the dent suggested just that a couple years ago. There being no objection, the program North Vietnamese are really being hurt now, We haven't heard a great deal about this was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, and they are in a better position on the stand-still, or cease-fire in the past two as follows: ground than they were a few months ago years. To the best of your knowledge does because of the invasion across the DMZ. that offer still stand? "ISSUES AND ANSWERS," JuNE 18, 1972 Mr. KOPPEL. Well Senator Percy, other than Senator PERCY. I think it certainly would. Guests: Senator Charles H. Percy (R. Ill.) the proposals that the President made on I would support such an offer. and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash.) May 8 can you see the United States making Senator JACKSON. I happened to have been Interviewed by: Ted Koppel, ABC news any more concessions? We have been very the author of course of the bipartisan letter diplomatic correspondent; and Bob Clark, tough up until this point and yet now we that went to the President in September of ABC News Capitol Hill correspondent. seem to have made about as many conces- 1970 suggesting a stand-still cease-fire. I Mr. CLARK. Gentlemen, welcome to "Issues sions as we can. If it turns out in a few weeks supported it. and Answers." that we have given away something more Senator PERCY. And I remember co-spon- We want to get your reaction first if we would you be satisfied with a settlement like soring that. It was a fine initiative. may to some mysterious signs that something that? Senator JACKSON. That's right. And the is going on in various capitals of the world Senator PERCY. I want to see us get out of President utilized a part of that In connec- in a new effort to end the Vietnam War. Vietnam and settle this war and end our in- tion with these talks that were held in secret Soviet President Podgorny was interviewed volvement in it, totally and completely. I through Dr. Kissinger, when he revealed that in India this morning on his way back to think the President's proposals are imagi- we had done that. But now, you see we are Russia from Hanoi and he says among other native, creative, and they do not leave our in a little different context, are we not, we things that the Soviets will do everything pos- destiny in the hands of South Vietnam. They are in the context of there having gone over sible to bring about deescalation of the war are agreements that we can reach directly the DMZ, holding certain areas of South in Vietnam, and he also told newsmen that with Hanoi. I fully support his initiatives in Vietnam, and I believe the President's re- he expects the Vietnam peace talks in Paris this regard. quirement, of course, involves the tying of will be resumed soon. Senator JACKSON. I think there Is a clear all three 'things together. Do either of you think that we are at long point we want to get out, but we want to get Mr. KOPPEL. But I mean the President has last succeeding in enlisting the support of our prisoners of war out, and this is the big not withdrawn that offer, has he; it is still the Communist powers in bringing the Viet- hang-up. Let's not kid ourselves. This is the on the table? nam war to an end? hang-up about getting our prisoners of war Senator JACKSON. That may be technically Senator JACKSON. I really think there is out. Every time we get down to, about to true, but I believe what we are really talking some movement here. It is my judgment that reach some kind of general understanding, it about now is a standstill cease-fire as a part we are very close to reaching an understand- is always on the prisoners of war, plus other of a package involving all of our troops being ing. Certainly Podgorny wouldn't be in demands. out in four months and a return of our pris- Hanoi, and the top Hanoi representative in Senator PERCY. But this is one of the three oners. That Is it. It is 1, 2, 3, and I support Peking and Dr. Kissinger about to arrive in parts of the President's proposal. The only that move. I think it makes sense. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 22, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 9967 On the House side, this critical situa- Our society and the technology which TROUBLE-PLAGUED FAMILY FINDS FRIEND tion has been actively studied by the dis- supports it continue to increase in coin- IN DURHAM B Jim Lasley) tinguished chairman of the House Re- plexity and require individuals possessed y publican Task Force on Labor-Manage- of more sophisticated educational back- There will forever be a place in the hearts Auburn ment Relations, Representatije SHER- ground and preparation. In addition, one Lof an ocust of bur , New York, family for Lewis MAN P. LLOYD, of Utah. RepreVentative of the dominant features of contempo- two days he assumed the responsibil- and LLOYD put his finger on then of the rary life is change. It is all about us, For matter when he declared on th floor of its pace increasing, its impact on our ity of r the family's welfare, r did not s because they were friends or family but sim- the House recently that Congres should lives more insistent. ply because of his concern. be taking advantage of this resent High technology, population growth, Locust was recognized at a Durham City respite from recurring transpo tation greater human density, unprecedented Council meeting Monday night and is sched-ognition strikes and emergency atmospher they advances in communications and data night by additional ecl Human next engender to enact a permanent in cha- processing, the systematic pursuit of Tuesday lotions Commission. nism to prevent future crises. knowledge, and the managerial revolu.- He rescued Mrs. L. J. Campanelli and her Mr. President, I applaud the dis- tion have stamped the present and the five children when their car broke down on tinguished gentleman from Utah fo his future with the characteristic of con- Interstate 85. Never having seen them before perceptive remarks, which I believe re tinual change. he.took the six into his home, gave them worth repeating for thoughtful consl' - Things are moving so fast we are be- money to continue the trip by train, repaired eration by the Members of this Chamb ginning to suffer from what author Alvin their car and later received Campanelli into home. as well. Accordingly, I ask unanimou Toffler calls future shock. He contends his Locust did all that, and more, because he consent that they be printed in the that the rapid pace of change is not thought it was the right thing to do. but ? ed society han ti , g ng a c "I didn't think it was going out of my way RECORD. merely crea There being no objection, the remarks developing an entirely new society. or it was an imposition. You just don't put were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, The study of the future as a way of a lady and five children out on the side of as follows. ining a firmer grasp on the prese, the road," he said. Locus eteran t [From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 24, h s begun to attract the attention f at No ht Carolinaa vet U iverndystudent 1972, page H4953] an increasing number of scholars d that anyone with any concern for humanity COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR CONGRESS anNysts. The presence of change p ces would have done the same. Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, our existing labor laws provide cooling-off periods for the par- ties to negotiate a settlement free from the heated and emotional atmosphere of a strike. We are all too sadly familiar with the tragic and economically devastating consequences which result when they fail to effectively use these "cooling-off" periods. Mr. Speaker, from recent accounts in the press, it appears that the threats of a re- newed dock strike and a nationwide railroad strike have apparently dissipated. This is news for which I know everyone is most grateful. Beyond that, however, Congress has in a very real sense now been given its own cooling-off period-in other words, a chance to debate and vote a permanent mechanism to prevent damaging transportation strikes free from a crisis atmosphere. Mr. Speaker, in testimony earlier this year, our Task Force on Labor Management Relations warned that continued congres- sional inaction in this area would be an open invitation to repeated tragedy. In this regard, we cannot ignore the fact that a number of major labor contracts in We transportation industry will be expiring next year. Mr. Speaker, Congress must act before the present cooling-off period expires. SALUTE TO EDUCATION Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish to join Senators in a salute to education. Education plays a critical role in the lives of all Americans. More than 60 mil- lion Americans are now full-time stu- dents; 3.3 million more are professional staff. These figures do not include the millions of children who watch "Sesame Street," or the millions who receive for- mal education each year from industry, the Peace Corps, the military, Federal manpower programs, and adult and con- tinuing education. When we include all of these people, 125 million Americans are part of this country's education system. Expenditures for formal education ex- ceeded $65 billion last fiscal year and were handled by 50 States, five terri- tories, the Federal Government, 18,000 operating school districts, and more than 2,500 institutions of higher education. gre stress on education. In e rher "They were just nice people," he said. "And time for example, we could off rd to you treat nice people right.... I don't think of education as preparat' n for think I've done anything so great." life. O r society, our technology, ur way Campanelli, however, was overwhelmed by of life volved at a comparat' ely slow Locust's actions, so much so that he wrote pace so'ithat each of us coulft prepare Mayor James R. Hawkins. for a ca er upon which we ould then "Mr. Mayor," the letter said, "If your city has a man of the year award, or it you award enter and emain. a citation for exceptional deeds or acts of Now we perience thre , four, or five kindness I would be most pleased if you were career than s in the cou se of our lives. to submit the name of Lewis Locust. . . . Old techniq s and s - s become ob- "Unselfish actions such as those can be ex- solescent; ne ones ne to be acquired. pected from family or best friends, but from Education is st 1 prep ation, to be sure, a complete stranger I would call this extraor- but it now m st b preparation for dinary." For Campanelli and his wife it was a les- Change. And euC tion has become son in action, something they maybe never equally important, s a continuing or would have truly gotten across to their recurrent activity, ollowing us along in children. our professional a personal lives to the "With today's constant reference in news- point of retirem t and beyond. papers and on TV concerning the problems I am sure th with proper leadership between blacks and whites this experience and appropri e Bove ental assist- was the living proof for my children, of what ance our edu ational stem will meet we have tried to instill in them, that regard- less of color it is the individual that counts." the challeng of the fut1 'e. Locust is black; the Campanelli's are white. INASMUCIt AS YOU HAVE DONE IT UNTO ONE OF THE LEAST F THESE Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Dur- ham, N. O., Morning Herald for ednes- day, Jt he 7, 1972, contains an rticle entitled "Trouble-Plagued Family nds Campanelli told it: Locust was at a service station filling up with gas. Mrs. Campanelli and her children were on the way to Miami to meet Cam- panelli. There was trouble with the car. She pulled in at a service station and asked the young man for help. Repairs were made by Locust Lewis Locust, of Durham, befriendeal a interstate highway when the brakes failed. famiry of strangers who virtually became The car went out of control but didn't wreck. stratlided in Durham when their car,,,, Locust took charge, transferring belong- it. Gospel according to Matthew, chapter Train time was that night, so Lewis took 25, verse, 40, where the King says: the family to the zoo, lunch, and a movie, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of paying for everything himself. the least of these my brethren, ye have done At the end of the day Locust was still in it unto me. charge. He saw the family on the train, I ask unanimous consent that this hu- leaving them with a container of fried chick- en to eat on the way. man interest story be printed in the As the train was leaving, he shook hands RECORD. with Mrs. Campanelli, pressing $48 in her There being no objection, the article hand for emergencies. was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, In the next few days Locust had the car as follows: repaired. It was ready and paid for when Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 22, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE Mr. CLARK. Senator Jackson, you have been leading almost a one-man fight in the Senate protesting the nuclear arms agreements that were signed in Moscow. There appears to be at this moment overwhelming support in Congress in favor of those agreements. Do you have any new evidence or any rea- son to believe that somehow you can turn the tide and convince Congress that these nuclear arms pacts are dangerous to the United States. Senator JACKSON. Well, I think this coming week as the hearings get under way we will try to find out what is in the agreement. You know, there are a lot of misconcep- tions, The American people have the idea that this is going to end the arms race.. It is a license on both sides to spend tens of bil- lions of dollars. Mr. KOPPEL. Senator Jackson, you were just about to outline what you consider to be some of the major weaknesses of the SALT agreements. Senator JACKSON. Yes. We all want to see an end to the arms race. We all join in that effort. We all want to see less tensions in the world. The problem, I think, is that the public has certain misconceptions. They think that this is going to mean an end to the arms race. The facts are, on both sides, under the agreements, tens of billions of dol- ars will be invested on the part of the respec- tive countries on strategic arms. The Rus- sians will spend more; they will get more. We don't have parity. Most Americans thought we would end up with parity. We don't know how many missiles we are talking about that are decontrolled. We have a lot -of miscon- ceptions about what is in this agreement. Mr. KOPPEL, Well now, Dr. Kissinger was talking about, for example, the figure of 1618 offensive missiles. Senator JACKSON. Yes, sir, and I asked him the question, why is it that we have in the agreement a specific limitation on the num- ber of Polaris-type submarines with missiles, but we don't have it on land-based missiles, and he has told me he doesn't know for sure why that is the case. What we are relying on is our estimate of what the Russians have land-based. I think it is a good question. Why are we specific on one and not on the other? Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, Dr. Kissinger did say at that briefing you both attended at the White House this past week that our detection procedures are good enough that they can't be off significantly; that 1618 figure might be off slightly, but not signifi- cantly. Senator JACKSON. Let me give a simple ex- planation to that question. All we have to do is watch one place where the submarines are turned out. That task is totally differ- ent than watching the whole Eurasian land mass, where the land-based missiles are de- ployed. This is why the Russians agreed on the number of submarines, but didn't agree on the number of land-based missiles to be deployed. Now, this can be an element of great con- troversy because the cut-off date is coming soon, July 1st, and it is the number of mis- siles deployed or under construction. I think we have to know, don't we, how many we are talking about? Mr. CLARK. Do you really feel the Russians might have substantially more than 1600 missiles? Senator JACKSON. What do you mean ny "substantial?" These are significant. This is part of the problem. We have got to nail it down. I think the constitutional responsi- bility of the Congress is to nail down these ambiguities. Who ever heard of an agree- ment being worth anything that failed to be explicit? What we want to do is to avoid future tensions so there are misunderstand- ings. We want to see a stabilization of rela- tions, not a destabilization. Mr. KOPPEL. Senator Percy, Senator Jack- son believes there is a very broad issue, and an important one: The question of American intelligence-gathering abilities. Can we really keep accurate track of how many land-based missiles the Soviets have? Senator PERCY. I think that Senator Jack- son himself, who incidentally I believe is performing a great service, in exactly what the President would want the Congress to do, a searching inquiry into these agreements and every conceivable question that can be asked about them, and we will begin that process in the Foreign Relations Commit- tee tomorrow with Secretary Rogers and Sec- retary Laird. But Senator Jackson has himself revealed movements the Soviet Union have made, dig- ging more holes, enlarging those holes. He revealed intelligence reports which he felt was for the good of the country and I agree with him. Our aerial reconnaissance is so accurate and so good I do not doubt that we can verify these agreements and maintain them. Our technology in that area is absolutely superior, and I will admit there are certain phases of the agreement that should be brought out. I go back to this premise: No agreement we have ever entered into with any other nation has ever been more thoroughly and exhaustively researched and prepared for. No; one is more confident to put a final seal of 'approval on those agreements from the Executive Branch than President Nixon. He has thoroughly done his homework over a lifetime and particularly intensively for three and a half years so I believe these agree- ments will be Supported by the Congress but we will be performing our separate and ab- solute obligation that we have to ask the searching questions that Senator Jackson has been asking and will be asking. Mr. KOPPELL. Senator Percy, you had a dis- tinguished record in business. Would you enter into a contract where the considera- tion and basic subject matter is not spelled out on a bilateral basis? Senator JACKSON. Now, this is what we are talking about and this, of course, is one of the key questions that we want to ask this coming week. It is spelled out on' submarines. Why didn't we get the Russians to agree on the same basis on land-based missiles, and I am not- Senator PERCY. You have asked the ques- tion and I will try to answer it. I have negotiated international agreements in busi- ness over a period of a quarter of a century. I have never seen as thoroughly prepared a set of agreements as these. I have never entered into one that didn't have some area of disagreement as to interpretation. Senator JACKSON. But, Senator, this is the heart of the whole agreement; it isn't a minor detail. Senator PERCY. Mr. Brezhnev and the Presi- dent initialed, even, a memorandum which interpreted the agreement, to try to nail down every single thing that they could, and I really feel that these have been as thor- oughly prepared as any agreements that could possibly be entered into. Senator JACKSON. How do you explain why you have spelled out the number-there is 62 Polaris-tye submarines, and agreed to, but they are not spelled out on the biggest part of the agreement and that is on land-based missiles. Now how would you explain-how would you write a letter and explain it? Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, if we could relate this to your specific concerns what is it you are worled about, that somehow the Russians are going to cheat on this agreement? Senator JACKSON. No, I think that the key thing that we must do first of all is to nail down these ambiguities. It is that simple. If you don't, you are immediately going to be in a debate here----- Mr. CLARK. Except the agreement.has al- ready been signed with the Russians. How do you nail it down now? S 9969 Senator JACKSON. Well, I think you nail it down' by calling-there are a lot of things- this is what we will get into. You can have reservations, you can have understandings. After all, bear in mind, Mr. Clark, they sent up not just these agreements, but they sent up understandings that are a mile long, and there are our interpretations not joined in by the Russians. It is obvious there has to be further clarification. Senator PERCY. Well, there is going to be, too. We know this is just the beginning phase-we trust a period of refined agree- ments that will cover everything, mutual re- duction of forces, that will cover bombers. They could well say "Why don't you cover bombers? You have got far more bombers than we have, why don't we cover the inter- mediate missiles?" Senator JACKSON. Why don't we cover spe- cifically what we are talking about first. How can you possibly have an on-going viable agreement that will stand up and not cause conflict? I want to get an agreement that' will work, and this is just but one example. What is a heavy missile? It is not defined. Senator PERCY. Fine. What do we consider is an SS-9? Senator JACKSON. Well, that is not defined. Can you take that kind of missile and put it in another missile of that size. We think they are allowed 313. Senator PERCY. In the memorandum of in- terpretation they have said if you increase the size of the missile by more than 15 per- cent, this is substantial upgrading of that missile. I think that interpretation was very clear- Senator JACKSON. We say it is 313. The Rus- sians don't agree as to the number, and that again is an example of the kind of clarifica- tion I think that we need to have. What we want is- Senator PERCY. You are asking the question will we strengthen SALT II negotiating hand in nailing down some of these things? Mr. CLARK. Gentlemen, if we can go back very briefly to the Moscow Agreements, they would permit each of the two countries, Rus- sia and the United States, to complete two ABM sites. The United States is completing one in North Dakota. The Administration also wants to ring the capital, to ring Wash- ington with a defensive missile system. Are each of you ready to vote the money to complete or to start-we haven't started yet-a defensive missile system around Washington? Senator Percy. Senator PERCY. I much preferred a zero ABM all along. I much prefer a single site to a double site. I would want more evidence as to what the ABM around Washington will really accomplish. Mr. CLARK. At the moment you would not expect, to support the Administration on this, Senator Jackson? Senator PERCY. It is a quarter of a billion dollar decision. Senator JACKSON. Well, this is one of the great mistakes the Administration made. They are on notice that they can't get the fight through on Washington. We voted it down two years ago in the Armed Services Committee. I led that effort, and I also led the effort to save the ABM, but this is a silly arrangement that was made, in my judg- ment, and at best they will get the one site in North Dakota. Mr. CLARK. So you would agree then that is unlikely the President is going to gat a defense missile system- Senator'PERCY: It would be quite a strug- gle- Mr. KOPPEL. Well, gentleman doesn't that kind of eliminate one of the crucial aspects of the SALT agreement? Do we still have an agreement- Senator JACKSON. Well, we are not required to-we are permitted to, but we are not re- quired to. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 9970 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -. SENATE June 22, 1972 Mr. KOPPEL. Will it considerably weaken us, enough, Senator. Senator JACKSON. Absolutely. The real :.iagedy-the Administration had held out what all of us had fought for, and that is a s wo-site minimum, to defend Minuteman. Now, that makes sense because we did not :'dd on to our offensive forces, and I sup- l7orted that effort. But to turn around and l=our hundreds of millions of dollars into de- landing Washington, which is not defend- able in a missile context that we are talking sbout, to me makes no sense, and they were zaware of it and they were on notice and that is why I think the ABM agreement was an a.nwise one, because we came out on the short end of the stick. Moscow's not dismantling anything. We are dismantling the site in Montana. They get to go forward with the site they already have, this huge complex around Moscow, whichalso covers some of Liseir- Senator PERCY. But, as you say, if it makes no sense at all, why do we care if they want to make a mistake, rather than our making a. mistake? Senator JAcxsoN. Senator Percy, their site is Moscow also covers some of their offensive systems, which an ABM site here will not do. Senator PERCY. A system around Moscow isn't worth a thing. You cannot defend that an a practical basis. Mr. KOPPEL. Gentlemen, while we are on tae subject of money, though, I would like to ask what seems to me to be a very basic question: The administration seems to have rationalized this kind of agreement to the public at large on the basis of cutting mili- tary spending. Instead we find that we are going to have a larger military budget next year than-we have this year. Why? Senator PERCY. Our budget request is $83.4 billion. We are going ahead apparently, ac- cording to the administration, with two sites Instead of twelve. They are prepared to cut out three-quarters of a billion dollars right away because of the SALT agreements, and that should multiply many fold In future years. Mr. KOPPEL. But we do have a bigger mili- tary budget upcoming for next year than we had this year. Senator PERCY. That is mainly because of pay Increases which now constitute 54 per- cent of our whole budget. Mr. KOPPEL. What I am concerned about, Senator, is that we seem to be getting into kind of a spiral where Dr. Kissinger, for example, the other day says we have to o ahead with certain programs, otherwise we are weakened in our negotiations in SALT-II. I can just see this going on for years where the administration will be saying: We are not going to be able to trust the Russians, or if the Russians break an agree- rnent, we still have to go along preparing the same kinds of systems, new systems, that we have all along. Senator PERCY. Assume that this agree- ment will suddenly and dramatically cut our defense budget in half and that would be a delusion. We are not implying that at all. But it is the beginning of arresting an >.nlimited nuclear arms race and that is what it is. It is a beginning. You have to begin this journey at some point, and it has now begun. Senator JACKSON. Ted, let's be frank about this. The administration's presentation of this proposal makes it mandatory for Con- l;ress to increase funds for strategic arms. It is going to increase our budget. It is not ?;oing to cut it in half, it is not going to decrease it, it is going to increase it. Not this coming year, but the year after and the rear after. Now that is what is involved here. Now let's get these facts out on the table. We are going to start doing It in the Armed Services committee on Tuesday, and they are going to build the so-called new 'ype of ULMS submarine which will cost $1 bil- lion a boat. Now that is what the admin- istration is proposing. Senator PERCY. I don't agree with thaw at all and I will have no part in that kind of an escalated step-up because of the agree- ment. Senator JACxso:N. That is your President's proposal. Senator PERCY. Absolutely not. That is a misinterpretation of what his intention is. Senator JACKSON. Well that is his proposal. The budget is already up there. Mr. CLARK. I would like to ask you at least one political question. You are still a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, though you dropped out of the primaries. Senator McGovern Is expected to pick up some 200 votes on Tuesday in the New York primary which will put him within almost 200 votes of the number he needs to go over the top. Is McGovern stoppable at this stage? Senator JACKSON. I believe that he is run- ning into real resistance. It is possible. but not probable. Mr. KoPPEL. On that note, thank you very much, Senator Jackson, Senator Percy for being with us on Issues and Answers. GETTING THE MOST OUT OF OUR SCHOOLS Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, two re- cent articles by Sylvia Porter tell us how communities across the Nation often ig- nore one of the their most valuable re- sources, their schools, through "wasteful disuse." And Miss Porter goes on to sug- gest that the community education con- cept is one of the best ideas she has found to stop this extravagance and make the schools full-time partners in the community. As the Porter articles make clear, the benefits of a community school program can be made available through only a modest increase in the school budget. The school can become a total commu- nity center for people of all ages, operat- ing extended hours throughout the year. To get the most out of our schools, I have introduced S. 2689, The Commu- nity School Center Development Act, which would promote the development and expansion of community schools in all 50 States. Senator WILLIAMS joined me in introducing this bill last fall, and 20 other Senators have since become co- sponsors. I invite more Senators to join in sup- port of S. 2689. Sylvia Porter's articles point to many of the compelling reasons why such support is in the best interests of citizens of all ages throughout the Na- tion. Mr. President. I ask unanimous con- sent that these articles be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Evening Star, June 13, 1972; WASTEFUL DISUSE OF SCHOOLS (By Sylvia Porter) in one rural area near New York, property taxes have just about gone out of sight-pri- marily, of course, to finance the handsome, beautifully landscaped elementary and high schools. In a matter of days, these schools will be closing for the term and in large part will be unused and wasted until the, kids go back in the fall. This is a real squandering of resources. This Is, in the words of. Sen. Frank Church, ID- Idaho, "a kind of disuse of schools and ex- travagance that modern America cannot abide." This is, in today's environment plain stupid. Last year property taxes climbed more than 9 percent, on top of a 35 percent upsurge be- tween 1967 and 1970. Many older Americans are now paying 20 to 40 percent of their incomes to the local tax collector. So distasteful and oppressive have local property taxes become that only 47 percent of local school bond issues were approved during the last fiscal year, a new record low and- a resounding come-uppance for school officials-for the biggest chunk of all property taxes goes for schools. Also, the National Education Association points out, local school districts bear more than half of school costs today; the state kicks in 41 percent, the federal government about 7 percent. Yet, while the cost of supporting the ele- mentary and high school system has nearly tripled during the past decade to almost $50 billion, the typical school is locked up about 50 percent of the time. The majority of the schools are used only five days a week, 39 weeks a year. The schools are restricted to the formal education of Americans between the age of five and 17 or 18. Even pre-school "Head Start" children have been banned from the elementary school in some cases. Meanwhile, there is a mounting need for further education of the older American- ranging from vocational retraining to retire- ment preparation and planning, consumer education, nutrition, music, arts, crafts. What's the answer? One is to find new ways to use idle public schools, And this answer also would help to slash local tax bills by avoiding the need to build additional expensive facilities and by keeping more real estate from falling off local town tax rolls. In fact, some 300 U.S. communities have done precisely this-with a wondrous array of activities and services and with refresh- ingly positive results. For instance: In Gloucester City, N.J., a broad tutorial program has been set up, using the elderly along with elementary school students to "help kids with their homework" and per- sonal counseling. In Salem, Oregon, about 100 different classes and activities are going on, with some 2,000 attending each week-ranging from knitting lessons to mountain climbing and small business administration. One lady in- volved in the program noted tartly that this was the first time she had set foot in the local school in 32 years. The extra cost of expanding the Salem school has been about 6 percent of the regular budget. "With that 6 percent, the time the school is open can be increased by two-thirds," say officials in charge. Your local school could be, in the words of Barry E. Herman of New Haven's Winches- ter Community School, a place where: Children and adults can study and learn and where learning can take place 18 hours a day or more; Educational or vocational skills of people of all ages can be upgraded for the benefit of the individual and the community; People of all ages can take part in such activities as sports, physical fitness programs, informal recreation, arts and crafts, musical programs, civic meetings, adult education, home economics, tutoring; People can find health services, counseling services, legal aid, employment services, homemaking help; Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9844 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 21, 1972 are "more than five years behind the U.S." in narcotic crisis, pushers continue to ply for at least 30 days of treatment. The most multiple warhead technology. their dirty trade in cities and suburbs Draconian fact-by American standards- There is no doubt that the Soviets are alike. We passed new laws to combat is that each addict's treatment begins with somewhat behind on MIRV technology, be- narcotics, but more and more narcotics "cold turkey," or withdrawal unassisted by cause they took the wrong road to begin chemical crutches such as methadone. with. But in numbers of missiles, in war- flow into the country from places like The ordeal can be excruciating. Early in head weight, and in all other respects one Southeast Asia, Turkey, and France. The the process, which can take a week or ten can think of, the Soviets now have every ad- fact is, hard drugs are now easier to get days, the addict's eyes water and his nose vantage that a MIRV technologist could ask than ever. Moreover, they are cheaper. runs while sweat pours from his body. By for. They also have excellent scientists. Hard drugs are one of the few commodi- the third day, he is likely to be wracked by If the Soviets are going to go "all out," ties in America which have escaped the severe intestinal cramps, diarrhea, vomiting therefore, they sould soon be MIRVing their effects of inflation. Heroin is actually get- and nerve spasms. Goose bumps cover his SS-9 missiles, and also the still bigger mis- ting cheaper, reportedly costing on the body; they make his skin resemble that of a siles they will soon be deploying. They may street now only about co 40 percent of plucked fowl and give the process its name even multiply greatly their MIRVing capa- in the U.S. Cold turkey is rarely fatal- bility, by adapting the "cold launch" tech- what it cost in 1965. the Japanese claim 100% survival for those nique of our Polaris-Poseidons to their SS-9 As addiction increases, so does crime. treated in hospitals-but the urge to commit missiles. The crime rate in the United States runs suicide can be strong. The calculated risk in SALT, in short, is an about 10 times higher than our popula- VERGE OF IIELL immensely big risk. If we do not want the tion growth. Addicts, men, women, and most disagreeable kind of surprise, we have children, turn to lawlessness and vio- to do three things, regardless of cost. We have to go ahead, full speed, with lence in order to support their habit. the ULMS or Trident program. We have to go Drugs and narcotics are unraveling the ahead with the B-52 replacement, the B-1 country's moral fiber, turning human be- bomber. Above all, we have to go ahead ings into desperate animals and making with maximum improvement of the Minute- cities unsafe for law-abiding people. The man system-which can more or less true problem is particularly acute among our up the nuclear-strategic balance in a fairly young people. There are daily reports of short time. drug traffic and addiction in our col- This will cost a lot of money. The arms race will not end, as the Whl a House warned leges, high schools, and even elementary the congressional leaders. That leads to the schools. real criticisms of the President. First, he did If the ever-increasing rate of drug ad- not directly ask the country, three years ago, diction is any indication, if higher and for the kind of maximum effort that might higher crime is any indication, our Na- have prevented the present imbalance. tion's approach to narcotic control and The President did not do this because he enforcement is a failure. We seem to be thought he could not defeat the Democratic trying to shovel out the ocean with a tea- opposition in Congress. Against the back- spoon. ground of the SALT agreement, however, the President will again have great difficulty To my way of thinking, there could be with Congress in doing what needs to be no penalty too harsh for someone who done now. One has to conclude that he is peddles the ruin, the wasted lives, and gambling, probably quite shrewdly, on a human suffering and agony that comes much more pliant Congress after election from drug addiction, Drug traffickers are JAPAN'S FIGHT AGAINST ITS DRUG AND NARCOTIC PROBLEM Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I in- vite the attention of the Senate to an article published in the June 19 issue of Time magazine, which recounts Japan's fight against its drug and narcotic prob- lem. About 10 years ago, Japan cracked down on the hard drug problem with a vengeance. It is a harsh program which confines addicts for a minimum of 30 days of treatment, and forces them to go through the pain process of "cold tur- key"-withdrawal unassisted by chemi- cal crutches. It is a program of tough law enforcement, which hands out a life sentence for narcotic pushers. But, more important, in terms of the overall well-being of the Japanese so- ciety, it is an effective program. Heroin use in Japan has been virtually elimi- nated. Even organized crime there has wu ao oiiuti LIiuLueL"CIS, auU Lriey snouia be treated as capital felons. We need a nationwide assault on il- legal drugs and narcotics, at every level of government, Federal, State, and local. We need tougher laws and tougher en- forcement and tougher courts that will take narcotic pushers off the streets and put them away where they will no longer be a menace to the American society. I ask unanimous consent that the Time magazine article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:. [From Time magazine, June 19 19721 Many U.S. physicians believe that such agony is neither necessary nor desirable. They prefer to assist the addict through his with- drawal with other drugs (TIME, Jan. 4, 1971) and even to keep a patient on a heroin substi- tute indefinitely if necessary. But the Jap- anese, who have always taken a puritanical attitude toward drugs, regard this as a con- tinuation of addiction. The country's first antidrug law, adopted in the 1880's, prescribed zanshu, decapitation with a samurai sword, for those trafficking in narcotics. Opium eating, a major problem in 19th century China, never caught on in Japan. After World War II, however, heroin began to gain a foothold. Rival gangs pushed the drug among prostitutes and in the un- derworld generally, bringing Japan to what Tokyo Social Worker Michinari Sugahara called "the verge of hell." The authorities moved to end heroin use before it spread to the country's teen-agers. A government-financed public relations cam- paign, assisted by the press, lectured the pub- lic on the drug's social, moral and medical dangers. The 1963 statute persuaded drug abusers that the government meant business. Some pushers reacted to the new law by sim- ply dropping out of the business. In some brothels, the gangsters themselves forced girls to go through cold turkey; those reluctant to kick the habit were sometimes tied to their beds until withdrawal symptoms ended. Others were put in government-run hospitals that had been constructed specifically for drug offenders. The medical profession cooperated fully with law enforcement agencies, taking the attitude that addiction is not merely a per- sonal medical problem but an offense against society. Says Tokyo Narcotics Agent Hiro- masa Sato: "Addicts found no alternative but to capitulate, and eventually submitted to cold turkey. Sayonara." NOT FOR EXPORT SAYONARA HEROIN Drug abuse has not been completely era- era- dicated, of course. Youngsters now go in for Only a decade ago, a heroin epidemic glue sniffing and amphetamines, and a heroin threatened Japan. An estimated 40,000 ad- arrest is still made occasionally. But Japan's dicts provided a market for the growing traf- success has been dramatic enough to awe fic in hard drugs, and some users brazenly visiting American experts. Can the Japanese mainlined on street corners in such areas as system be exported to the U.S.? Many U.S. Yokohama's Kogane-cho (Gold Town). To- exports think not. Japan's population is day, says Dr. Yoshio Ishikawa of the Serigaya- homogeneous, generally law-abiding and, on mental hospital, heroin addiction "has where national goals are concerned, respon- become~a subject without a living example sive to official appeals for cooperation. Ameri- The , in that the U.S. Government might Vvery out seeing an-actual addict. Police and nar- particular, insist increasi reaching. onyasserrting well examine closely. Although some peo- cotics agents face the same triumphant their "individual rights." Many officials feel ple might flinch at the toughness of scarcity. that it would be difficult to get wide support Japan's crackdown on drugs, it produces Heroin use in Japan has been virtually for a system that emphasizes the punishing the desired results of protecting in- eliminated by stringent enforcement of a process of withdrawal. dividuals in society from the evils of drug 1963 law that provided for harsh handling Dr. Vincent Dole of New York's Rockefeller abuse and addiction. of both pushers and addicts. A life sentence is University Hospital, a pioneer in the use of This is not the case here in the United meted out for selling butsu (the Japanese methadone, argues that physicians should States, where drug addiction has become gangsters' untranslatable coinage for heroin). relieve, not increase, the suffering of the hero- hero- State ere drug possession can mean several years in in addict. Most drug users apparently agree. virtually epidemic. jail. To out off the demand, the government Addicts are far more likely to turn them- In the midst of the national drug and required that every user caught be confined selves in for treatment if chemical substitutes Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 21, 1972 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 9843 the association to seek a college degree in their chosen field of endeavor. Mr. President, I know my colleagues will join me in saluting the Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association for its good works and dedication to repatria- tion of the POW's and MIA's. Our hats off to the River Rats. ;SALUTE TO EDUCATION Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, today's Salute to Education comes at an. :appropriate time, just as teachers and -parents, school administrators and gov- ernment and judicial officers are ponder- ing the means by which we can best furnish quality education and equality of educational opportunity to all the Na- tion's children. America's schools should be compli- mented on the way they have performed a difficult task that involved 46 million children and $45 billion last year, each figure a substantial increase over the year before. The task will be no easier in the future. Problems of higher enrollments, prob.. lems with school support and financing of facilities are becoming more and more complex. We are all confident that the good work will continue and will improve just as it has for almost 200 years-since the Government first granted funds and de- termined that an education should be the right of every child. American citizens, involved in a re- sponsible partnership of local, State and Federal governments, will keep in sight the goal of ever improving education for their children. A MONUMENT TO THE BLACK SOLDIER Mr, MATHIAS. Mr. President, on June 12, the city of Baltimore unveiled a new sculpture in Monument Square in the heart of the city. The Memorial to the Black Soldier, sculpted and presented to the city by Prof. James E. Lewis of Morgan State College, represents long- overdue recognition of the contribution which our black community has made and continues to make to Maryland and to this Nation. Both in military and ci- vilian endeavors, the black citizens have been full participants in meeting the ob- ligations of citizenship, in spite of the fact that they have not always been par- ticipants in enjoying the benefits of citi- There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Mayor Schaefer has asked me to preside on this significant occasion, and I am honored by the request. Mayor Schaefer's administration has been marked by an earnest desire to bring the different peoples of Baltimore together. This ceremony today is part of that kind of pro- gressive administration all cities need if they are to thrive. This ceremony is also symbolic for another reason. We are, with this monument, trying to erase some of our errors of the past. In this country we have done the Blacks two types of disservice. We have either excluded Blacks altogether from an area of activity or we have let him participate but never ac- knowledged his participation. The total ex- clusion of Blacks can be seen in such an area of American life as professional baseball where for years Blacks were so excluded that they had to form their own leagues. The tragedy is that there languished probably some of the great baseball players of the age. We can see how many by just looking at how many Black stars appeared once the odious color barrier was lowered. But the second form of discrimination? letting Blacks participate but ignoring that participation, has been as tragic. We have, for instance, let Blacks fight in our wars but we have done little or nothing to recognize their contribution. Our history books were blank. Our newspapers were vacant. Our ar- chives are bare. Blacks have fought for this country, died Tor this country, and, yet, one would hardly know it by looking around. This discrimination of silence has had its corrosive effects as much as the discrimina- tion of exclusion. Not only have Blacks been denied pride in their own people's accom- plishments, but we have been kept ignorant and stifled about our true history and our common humanity. As with all other forms of discrimination this, too, has served to im- poverish both those discriminated against and those discriminating. A hopeful sign is that we are finally try- ing to do something about it. Our schools are beginning to teach Black history. Our tele- vision stations are starting to run programs on Black culture. Our government is trying to acknowledge the contributions of the Blacks. This monument and this ceremony are part of that effort. But monuments are static sym- bols of the past unless they spur us to ac- tion. Our former silence will be truly broken when we recognize by word and deed that Blacks, who have been slaves in this land, have contributed significantly to the prog- ress of America because they, too, believe this can be a Promised Land. Letour history books and our governments and our newspapers and our television sta- tions recognize this, but most importantly, let each of us remember the important part Blacks have played and are playing in Amer- zenship. ican life. The new monument is also indicative of the efforts of Mayor William Schaefer THEY'LL GO ALL OUT tion of Baltimore to- l th a e popu to bring gether, to emphasize the unity requisite Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the dis- Third, however, that last "if" is certain to to the survival of our cities. tinguished columnist, Joseph Alsop, in be decisive. There is zero room for maneuver The master of ceremonies at the dedi- an article printed today in the Wash- if the U.S. government's optimists (who in- cation was the Honorable Theodore R. ington Post points out some of the poten- clude the people in the White House, for McKeldin, twice Governor of Maryland tial danger to the national security once) prove to be as wrong as usual. and twice mayor of Baltimore. Governor should the Congress fail to provide an One thinks of 1949, when the great Dr. Vannevar Bush had to tear a whole chapter McKeldin has, during a long career of adequate defense budget. from his forthcoming book, because the So- dedicated service to Maryland, gained a Mr. Alsop points out that the reason viets had just tested their first nuclear wea- deep appreciation for the commitment of some have criticized the SALT agree- pon. (In the chapter, he had said this could our black citizens. I ask unanimous con- ments with the Soviet Union is that in not happen for fifteen years!) 'nt that, for the benefit of my colleagues, 1966, "the United States began to One thinks of 1949, in turn, because the vernor McKeldin's remarks at the neglect the nucelar-strategic balance." White House has alsobought the view of the riling of the Monument to the Black The columnist contends that Persident Bush-like people in the U.S. Intelligence '.r be inserted in the RECORD. Nixon, to meet his duty to insure the na- community. These people hold the Soviets tional security, was forced to negotiate the SALT agreements because- The Joint Chiefs judged that if we start from scratch, where we are now, and the Soviets go on at their present tempo, the Soviets will be even further ahead five years from now without the SALT agreement. He says that we can expect the Soviets to "go all out" in an effort to achieve maximum strategic weapons develop- ment. Mr. President, the Congress must examine carefully all of the facts and probabilities in consideration of the stra- tegic arms situation and apply those findings accurately in development of a sufficient defense budget. I ask that Mr. Alsop's article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington Post, June 21, 19721 THEY'LL Go ALL OUT (By Joseph Alsop) Privately, both President Nixon and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger have warned congres- sional leaders that they still expect the Soviets to make a "maximum" effort of stra- tegic weapons development, within the limits of the SALT agreement. "They'll go all out," is the quoted assess- ment on this highest of all levels. If this is the message that Moses-Nixon has brought down from the mountaintop in Mos- cow, a serious question arises. The question is why it is sensible to sign a SALT agree- ment, aimed to halt the arms race, which will admittedly do no such thing. The answer comes in three parts. First, the SALT agreement writes into a treaty and the accompanying executive agree- ment what seem like great advantages for the Soviets; yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff were strongly favorable. The JCS are favor- able, in turn, because they believe that in the existing situation, the U.S. will be worse off without the SALT agreement's extremely modest limits on Soviet weapons-deployment. In other words, the Joint Chiefs judged that if we start from scratch, where we are now, and the Soviets go on at their present tempo, the Soviets will be even further ahead five years from now without the SALT agree- ment. This is the bitter result of the follies committed since 1966, when the U.S. began to neglect the nuclear-strategic balance. Second, no sort of change in the basic pat- tern of Soviet behavior is promised by the Nixon-Kissinger warning, "They will go all out." But there is a real chance of this kind of change if the United States also does what needs to be done about the nuclear-strategic balance in the vital interval just ahead. We got a SALT agreement, such as it is, because we rejected the advice of the wise fools who favored unilateral disarmament. Conceivably, at this strange stage in history, we may get something like enduring stability for this weary world, if we just do a bit more to keep our guard up in the years immedi- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9836 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 1972 and rivers. We cannot neglect our other conservation practices on the land. There is also a need for more county SCS technicians to help with technical assist- ance, and early announcement of the pro- gram in July so lay-out and survey work can be done in the fall and plans drawn up during winter months. Our county had 4 and 6 county SCS technicians about 5 years ago. Now we have only 2 and 3. In many cases today, the. $2500.00 limit that each farmer can earn, does not cover but 25% of the cost of large pollution control practices, and many erosion control structures, if they are large, due to the fact of increased coats in the last five years. Cost of earth moving equipment has raised from 1.5 to 25 dollars per hour. With this great part of the cost that must be born by the farmer, he cannot afford to control the problems on his farm. Many young farmers today do not have over 10% net worth in their operation, and can- not borrow the additional money needed. I urge you to consider that this cost share limit be raised to $5,000, for large pollution and erosion control practices. I also urge that Congress continues to permit ASC Com- mittees to maintain practices of 1970 and earlier years in their county programs where they feel the need arises. Farmers should have 100% cost sharing on a stream bank fencing practice as he is giving up land on each side of the stream or river, from which he has no source of income. Keeping cattle out of streams is the greatest method I know to stop stream bank erosion. When local, state. and private individuals contribute 114 million dollars per year to help out on water shed protection and for conservation practices and soil surveying; and the farmers have and are willing to match every dollar the federal government will provide in REAP funds; let it not be said by future generations that their fore- fathers did not care or understand the nec- essity of controlling erosion and pollution. Now man has only one choice left. To con- serve what he has left of the soil and water, or face poverty and starvation as many of the older countries of the world that did not conserve their soil, have experienced. This is God's land for today's generation to use and preserve for future generations. Remember, man cannot survive without the fertile soil and unpolluted air and water. Let us get closer to the problem by putting ourself in the place of a raindrop. A RAINDROP FELL "There's nothing unusual about that, but its environment decides whether it will cause destruction or add to the bounties of the earth. "I fell to earth, I know not where, but the soil was hard and barren. Small as I was, I moved a small particle of soil. In no time at all, there were millions more like me, and now we formed a body of water. We started moving, taking the path of least resistance, which was easy because there was no plant cover and the soil was smooth. As we moved, we picked up particles of soil, making us more abrasive, causing other particles to move. Soon we had a small ditch started, and as we moved along at an ever increasing speed, we loft much damage behind us on the field. Not many of us stayed behind to soak into the soil. "We met many others coming from another direction, also seeking a lower level. We were no longer a trickle, we were now a stream with considerable more power. Look! There's a sharp curve ahead! It looks like some be- fore had started to cut the bank. We are strong, fortified with good top soil. Each one of us took on a little more, making a great cut in the bank. What was that? A tree just fell behind us I We washed the dirt away fuom its roots. So on we go, ever increasing in size and power until the river banks will not be able to hold us within its bounds. Just as I thought, we are now beginning to spread out over lush farm land where there is some- thing planted in rows. The dirt is loose and moves very easily. Soon the plants have be- come our victims and travel along with us. The plants caught on to something, probably a fence which caused us to slow down and back up and spread out over more fertile fields until we can break down the fences. As we slow down, we are losing the soil par- ticles. They are settling back on the ground. Many of these particles we have moved hun- dreds of miles. "At last we are back in the banks of the river, leaving destruction untold behind. Some buildings destroyed, roads washed out, crops destroyed, bridges washed away and huge piles of earth moved to where it is of no value, so man will have to move it in order to farm his land. Also along the way we have picked up chemicals and much un- purified sewage, we are not pure and clean like we were when we started out. Certain species of fish cannot live in our environment any longer. As we slow down, we deposit acres of new land that was not here years ago. Now we are mixing with other water which seems salty. We must have reached the ocean! What will my destiny be? "A few years later! Something is happen- ing! I'm being picked up as vapor into the air and carried by wind and clouds out over the land. Suddenly some cold air is encoun- tered and condensation takes place. Down I come as a rain drop once more. Where will I land? If it is the same area as before, great changes have taken place. This is called con- servation, maybe even a watershed area. That was a soft landing. Either trees or grass has been planted here. There are millions of us here, but we aren't moving fast. Many of our number are soaking into the soil, as we move slowly down the slope, to provide moisture for the crops until more of us arrive. "At last we are forming a body of water, but we are quite clear yet. We have very little soil with us. Maybe we can move some now. Guess not! This must be a terrace as there is not much slope and we move very slow. What's ahead? Looks like a creek, but it seems different. It must be a sod waterway or a diversion. "There is grass on the bottom and on the sides, and we are moving toward a larger body of water. Must be a structure to hold water back, but I am clean, and not carry- ing much soil with me. I think there are fish in my presence. Look! On the bank there is a boy and a girl fishing. Is it a farm boy and girl, or is it a boy and girl from the city, who may never have come so close to nature before? "Well, I must say, this journey was shorter than the last one, and not as exciting as I caused no destruction. But I am proud that someone was caring for his land and conserv- ing the water for the benefit of all mankind." Thank you, gentlemen, for the opportunity of sharing some of my views with you today. A TRIBUTE TO EDUCATION Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, edu- cation has played a unique role in the history of our country. Our educators are probably best known as innovators, but let us also remember-that we are the first country in the world to have pro- vided universal education for our chil- dren. We are continuing to devote in- creasing resources to the education of our citizens. The presence of not only a literate but also a knowledgeable citizenry has con- tributed to the rapid economic develop- ment which has characterized our past. It has also been essential to the proper operation of our political process. If we are to continue to improve the quality of life for all of our citizens, we must place high priority on education in the future. We must be willing to pro- vide educational opportunities which satisfy the needs of our diverse citizenry. Only when we have an equality of op- portunity, allowing people to develop their talents to the limits of their abili- ties, will education have gained the posi- tion which it must have in our society. BARBITURATE LEGISLATION SUP- PORTED BY SENATOR FRANK E. MOSS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMIT- TEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss) for his support of two bills which I have in- troduced relating to barbiturate drugs. S. 3538, would require all manufacturers and producers of solid oral form bar- biturates to place identifying marks or symbols on their products. This would facilitate police efforts in tracing bar- biturates diverted to the illicit market back to the original production and dis- tribution sources. S. 3539, would provide for the rescheduling of four commonly abused short acting barbiturates from schedule III to schedule II of the Con- trolled Substances Act. This change would subject these particular barbitu- rates to stricter production and distribu- tion controls as well as to more stringent import and export regulations. These two bills attempt to deal with the most significant aspects of production, distribution, and diversion of the short- acting barbiturates. I welcome Senator Moss as a cosponsor of both of these needed pieces of legislation. Mr. President, Senator Moss has sup- plied a statement for the hearing record relating to barbiturate legislation that I held on June 12 and 13, 1972. For the benefit of Senators, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK E. MOSS Subject: S. 3538 and S. 3539, to curb Drug Abuse, Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the Subcommittee for holding hearings on these bills (S. 3538 and 5.3539), which place mis- used drugs under greater restrictions. All too many of our citizens-and our young people especially-are using, and mis- using, barbiturate drugs. Because they are inexpensive, they are readily available. We have all known young men and women whose wide use of "Downers" has brought tragedy into their lives. The abuse of psychotropic drugs has been increasing at an alarming rate. On the street these sedatives are known as "Red Devils," "Red Balls," "Rainbows," "Goofers," and "Downers." This abuse, however, is not limited ex- clusively to the street culture. More and more these drugs are being introduced into our American way of life. Drug abuse has been introduced into such diverse groups as col- lege, high school, and junior high school stu- dents, industrials workers, businessmen, mid- dle-class party-goers, and members of the Armed Forces. Even children in the fourth grade of grammar school are not immune to the dangers of these drugs. It has been estimated that as many as four million school age youth have abused barbi- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE I ar afraid the administration must be eourued among them-who argue that be- vause we now have more MIRV (multiple-in- dependently-targeted reentry vehicle) war- heads than the Soviets it is safe for the resident to have granted the Soviets (as he has done) a license to outdistance us by 4 -l. in payload capacity. But MIRV is not frozen under this agree- ment. The Soviets, therefore, can-and will- procead very rapidly under the agreement to catch up with us in the MIRV field. We 'snow they are hard at work on it. Since the Soviets are permitted so many more missiles than we have and so many missiles many Limes more powerful than our own (as much as tour or five times as large), the Russians could end up overwhelming us in numbers of warheads as well as numbers of missiles and missile size. In the course of our Senate hearings on SALT-long before the Moscow summit-we warned the administration many times that the Congress, at my initiative, had turned down funds for an ABM site around Wash- ington, D.C., on the grounds it would not be effective. The Soviets could easily overwhelm that ABM site. I was amazed, therefore, to learn that the President had signed an agree- ment in Moscow that called for a deployment on our part that the Congress had previously rejected while abandoning a sensible deploy- ment that the Congress had approved-- namely, additional ABM sites to protect our deterrent land-based missile forces. I think we must also recognize that the next phase of the SALT negotiations cannot help but be influenced by the outcome of SALT I. Within the five-year life of the in- terim arms agreement, that is, by mid-1977, we will be In the position of having to ask the Soviets for parity. In other words, we will be asking them to give up in SALT II what they have gained in SALT I. Yet what pos- sible reason is there to expect that the So- viets will be willing to do this? Or, more to the point, what political and diplomatic con- cessions will we be forced to make so that the Soviets will not further widen their margin of superiority? For is it reasonable to believe that the Soviets will not attempt to gain po- litical and diplomatic benefits from the stra- tegic arsenal in which they have invested so heavily, and which we have now licensed them to expand? I have said on several occasions that in- creased Soviet strategic capabilities can em- bolden the Soviets, can increase their will- ingness to take risks, can harden their bar- gaining position in negotiations, and can therefore lead to new instability in interna- tional affairs. Operating from a much more favorable correlation of forces, the Soviet leaders could be expected to seek fresh ad- vances, especially in the third world. Nothing that has happened in recent months-whether on the Indian subconti- nent, in the Mideast or with the Soviet sup- plied North Vietnamese offensive across the DMZ-can be cause for altering this assess- ment. Summits are difficult at best and a summit in an election year before a nationwide TV audience is a very doubtful instrument of sound diplomacy. One must ask whether we would not have been much better off to con- tinue the SALT I negotiations, do some tough bargaining, and seek secure agreements ra- ther than insist on the hasty signing of less secure ones. The American people will be bitterly dis- appointed if the many serious problems in the SALT accords have the effect of both diminishing our security and forcing In- creases in the defense budget. As the ad- ministration has presented its program, there will be no savings in the defense budget as a result of SALT, and already there are pro- posed increases. As much as I can understand the desire to believe that the Moscow summit heralds a new era of peace and cooperation, I must say S 9835 that there Is no substitute for facing facts. conservation treatment as follows: 3.2 mil- The Moscow arms agreements, I believe, raise lion acres need planting; 3.6 million acres as many questions as they answer. 3 needs Timber Stand Improvement. With these needs and interest by farmers to carry out these practices, many farmers' requests THE COUNTY ASC COMMITTEES have to be turned down, due to a shortage Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, some- times, because of our frustrations with modern problems, we tend to overlook the great good being accomplished by many American citizens in on-going, long-term Government programs. A pro- gram of this nature which very much deserves credit is that of the county ASC committees which function throughout the Nation in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Just recently I was reminded of this again when I read the testimony given before the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Appropriations by Mr. Boyd Frank of Clear Lake, Wis., which hap- pens to be my hometown. Mr. Frank, as his testimony demonstrates, is the type of selfless American who makes our Government function at its best. His thoughtful and constructive testimony epitomizes the excellent approach of a good organization to one of those per- sistent problems, soil erosion, that wor- ries all thoughtful Americans But while many of us just worry, Mr. Frank and his associates are working diligently and intelligently on our behalf. Because of the importance of his work, I askunani- mous consent that Mr. Frank's thought- ful testimony be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF BOYD FRANK Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com- mittee: I am Boyd Frank of Clear Lake, Wisconsin. I am a dairy farmer and operate a 200 acre farm. I have also served for 13 years on the County ASC Committee and have had a great interest in the conservation of our soil and water of our County, State and Nation. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear today in support of increased funding for the Rural Environmental Assistance Program to 500 million dollars, which was authorized by Congress in 1936. Much has been accomplished in the years past, under the program known as the Agriculture Con- servation Program, more recently named the REAP (Rural Environmental Assistance Program). In our State of Wisconsin which I am familiar with and also in other States, I am sure this program has offered much in its more than 35 years of existence. According to the latest survey of Wiscon- sin, 521,% of our cropland, or 6.4 million acres needs conservation practices applied. Of the 6.4 million acres, 3.6 million acres need the extra protection of terraces, stripcropping, contour farming, grassed waterways and other water outlets and diversion terraces, to properly manage runoff water. 541,000 acres need annual cover of crop residues or other cover crops for protetcion to meet conserva- tion needs as well as pollution abatement. 566,000 acres need a permanent type of grass or legume cover used in a long rotation so that land is under cover for a longer period of time, maybe five years at a time. 482,000 acres should be planted to trees or left in grass on a permanent basis. Also, there are 1.2 million acres that have too much water and need proper drainage. Of our 2.8 million acres of pasture land, 72% needs conservation practices applied. Nearly 1 mil- lion acres need to be re-established to grass and legumes which require lime and fertilizer. Forest land-14 million acres-48% needs of funds each year. (As of this date, more than $70,000.00 in requests remain unap- proved in our county). With this great amount of our land that is not under erosion control practices, it is no wonder that the mouth of the Mississippi River is constantly being moved south. As I stood by the Mississippi River in New Orleans, I was told that the mouth of the river was originally at that point, but now it is many miles south and the Mississippi delta :which covers 15,000 square miles of land had passed this point. I realized that some of it was from our county and state, and that it was the best part of our soil; the organic matter which is the easiest to move. This is in fact the greatest loss of our na- tion's assets, as It is top soil that cannot be replaced by man, but only by nature. It would take 1000 years to build one inch of soil by natural decay of plant growth. With this loss of 1/3 or 3 inches of our top soil, it is causing the use of larger amounts of fertilizer to be applied to produce crops, and greater losses of fertility due to elements leaching out of the soil. There is a direct relationship between the amount of organic matter and calcium (commonly called lime) in the soil and the amount of nutrients and moisture it will absorb and hold. As farms get larger, machinery must also get larger to operate these farms. The fields have doubled and tripled in size, causing more opportunity for erosion. There are also larger concentrations of cattle on given areas. As 1 see it, our problem of soil erosion and the pollution of our lakes and streams is becoming greater because the amount of land we have to raise crops and use for recre- ation is less each year. Also, more and more of our land is being covered with concrete, asphalt, or buildings, which causes greater water run-off. In my observation concerning how govern- ment money Is spent to control water and prevent soil erosion, certainly that spent on small structures and practices on the land are far more important and outweigh the benefits of those for large dams. For example-a Corps of Engineers dam in our county and an adjoining county, about 10 million dollars was spent to protect one city, but it did nothing for the protec- tion of soil and control of water on farm land except right near the river below the dam. If this had been used in REAP prac- tices, I am sure all the run-off water and erosion in the county could have been con- trolled. We also have a watershed that has done a wonderful job. It consists of 11 major dams, and several small dams in the area constructed under ACP funds. This only cost about 1.5 million dollars and covers about 36,000 acres. I cannot emphasize enough that the duty of sharing the cost of preserving our soil and water, is the duty of each and every citizen. Therefore, the federal government should surely share In the cost with the farmers, who are caretakers of the land only for their generation. The time has come when we can no longer move on to new land, when what we have is the spoils of man's neglect. Today we also haveother problems arising. Air and water pollution from many sources. The one covered by REAP funds pertains to animal waste, which again is brought about by larger units of farming operations where large numbers of livestock are confined in smaller areas. Farmers are aware of what is happening, and are willing to try and do something about it, but they cannot stand the cost involved to correct them without cost sharing. Because of this, there is a greater need to Increase REAP funds to in- clude this part of pollution of our streams Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE that there is a clear margin of benefits over the costs, for Indians. TO ESTABLISH ELIGIBILITY OF URBAN AND RURAL INDIANS What are clearly required to y are specific actions by the Federal G vern- ment to end its long history of b "ken commitments to the Indian peo e. I strongly believe, for example, that the concept of trust responsibility ext ds to all Indian people, regardless of wh re pleted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which calls for extending eligibility for Federal services to three main groups of off-reservation Indians-urban, rural, and state reservation. The time has come to fulfill the commitment of the United States to all of the 800,000 Indians who for too long have known only the re- peated violation of their civil rights, a struggle against ill health, malnutrition, and poverty, and the dental of equal op- portunity in education and employment. It is particularly important that all relevant programs and services be coor- dinated under the Bureau of Indian Af- fairs to reach those Indians who are iso- lated in rural poverty or condemned to an existence of despair in the city, for their migrations can be traced precisely to the encouragement provided by a fed- eral policy or program. I strongly supported the enactment of the Indian Education Act of 1971, subse- quently incorporated in the Education Amendments of 1972 passed by Congress. This act launched the needed shift in eligibility policies in authorizing in- creased Federal financial assistance to meet the special education needs of In- dian children. For it based this new assistance directly on the number of Indian children enrolled. The clear in- tent of Congress is that the discrimina- tory allocation of educational services for Indians under Public Law 874 shall end forthwith. A further important provision in this legislation calls for direct Indian participation in education policy deter- mination, from the local to the national level. I have also joined several Senators in immediately communicating to the Sen- ate Appropriations Committee our strong support for additional funds recently passed by the House to establish addi- tional urban Indian service centers. It is important to recognize that this appro- priation will help the BIA extend its services to off-reservation Indians for the and to obtain vital health, educational, and employment services. ; TO PROVIDE JOBS AND ECONOMIC OPPORT NITY I believe the decade of the 1970' must be the decade of decisive advan in In- dian economic Self-developm t. The economic condition of the 450, 00 Ameri- cans of Indian ancestry living on or near a federally recognized reservation, col- ony, rancheria, or pueblo is appalling, not to mention the desperate plight of In- dians who have relocated into urban and rural poverty. I have long been involved in encourag- ing corporations to locate on or near res- ervations, including the Navajo lands, to provide critically needed jobs. I am fully aware of the problems which must be met, but I strongly believe this direc- tion must be pursued to promote eco- nomic self-sufficiency among the tribes. I am committed to a Federal Policy of Indian self-determination, without termination of the legal and historical relationship between the Indians and the Federal Government. And I have jointly sponsored, with Senator HENRY JACKSON, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to contract with tribal organiza- tions so they may directly plan and ad- criti Finally, I have ly supporte the establishment of an\ American ndian Development Bank, to ssist Ind ns and e elopm t of in- Indian tribes in the des dustrial and agricultur fac' ities and enterprises, and in the v opment of their natural resources. believe the initial capitalization fort s dank should With 80 percent of re rvatio Indians living in poverty, a otal app ach to Indian socio-econom developIn e t must be launched witho t delay. Urba In- dians must also b enabled to unde ake development. needs of rura S 9833 key to social mobility and the self-ac- tualization of countless individuals in our society today. As indication of the impact of educa- tion, in 1971 estimated fall enrollment in our public schools was 46.1 million; projected figures reveal that by the fall of 1978, 6.2 million more students will have enrolled-an increase of nearly 1 million students per year. During the same 7 years, college enrollment is ex- pected to increase by 63 percent. These young people will comprise the future leadership of our country. Education has played a vital role in preparing them to deal with the complex problems of today. The mainstay of our education system is the dediction of teachers throughout this Nation. Approximately 2 million men and women have given their time and talents to the education not only of our children, but also of adults interested in continuing their education. During the fiscal year 1970, over 8 million adults were enrolled in education programs- Ex as parents how to make education more vital to their children. More important, librarians across the country have given their time so that many public schools library facilities can stay open at night for community use. All of these programs are possible because teachers are willing to devote their extra energy to special evening programs in addition to regular daytime classes. Of course higher education is increas- ingly crucial in this technological age. This year, Congress passed a bill, S. 659, which promises to have a revolutionary impact on our system of higher educa- tion. The bill attempts to establish access to higher education as a basic Federal right by providing financial assistance to all those who need it. The bill also pro- vides desperately needed operating sub- sidies to help meet the skyrocketing costs nf educatinn Congressional passage of ooperatives is+now required me particular pride. I personally would ans and to end their exploitation than to again stand with pride and to have hope in the tomorrows of this great land. We must acknowledge the rich heritage this pluralistic Nation enjoys in the traditions and values of the In- dian people, and the strength it can receive from their direct involvement in its economic, educational, social, and political life. SALUTE TO EDUCATION Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I commend the National Education Association for initiating a salute to education today, June 21. Education continues to hold the administrators or education, and count- less individuals who have contributed to the\passage of this legislation. Women are ow guaranteed equal opportunities in admissions, scholarship aid, and fac- ulty status. The academic community is to be commended for its continued advance- ments-not only in the area of improved teaching techniques,. but also in the effort to expand equal educational opportunity to all. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FAILS IN ITS DUTY-WHAT DO THEY HAVE TO HIDE? Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am sorry to report that the Federal Reserve Board ducked, misled, hid out, avoided calls, and gave us the idiot treatment in connection with my request Monday for a report to me on the name of the bank Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9834 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 1972 or banks involved in issuing the $100 Federal Reserve bills found on the men caught bugging the Democratic National Committee. I think their refusal to cooperate was both a despicable act and unworthy of tl iem as an arm of the Congress. As the ranking Democratic member of the Senate Banking Committee and as chairman of the Financial Institutions Subcommittee, before 10 a.m. on Monday, June 19, I not only requested the names of the bank or banks which issued the notes but also the name of the person or persons receiving the funds--esti- mated at $6,300-the source of the check or financial instrument used to purchase the $100 bills, and other pertinent details. FEDERAL RESERVE KNOWS WHO ISSUED $100 BILLS t did this for several reasons. First, Federal Reserve notes were involved, they were in numerical sequence, and com- mercial banks keep details of transac- tions of this size. Those who paid for this job could be traced through the bills. Second, in this case the executive blanch is a party of interest. One of the men caught was directly connected with the Nixon campaign. I hope that higher ups may be innocent of these wrong- doings. But with the executive branch having a conflict of interest, it was essen- tial that the Federal Reserve Board, which is an agent of the Congress, should give Congress the facts promptly, fully, and completely. WRONG AND MISLEADING INFORMATION Until 4 p.m. on Tuesday, the Federal Reserve gave us the run-around. For example, at the same time that the FBI told my staff on Monday they had al- ready been in touch with the Federal Reserve to identify where the bills came from, Chairman Arthur Burns wrote me that : We at the Board have no knowledge of the Federal Reserve bank which issues those particular notes. Until 4:00 p.m. Tuesday, even after news men had traced the bills to the Miami and Philadelphia Federal Reserve Districts, the Federal Reserve was telling my staff they had no information and the Reserve Bank at Philadelphia refused to return our calls. Finally, at 4:00 Tuesday the Federal Reserve stated that the information ". . . should not be released to anyone other than the investi- gative authorities," namely the FBI and Jus- tice Department. FEDERAL RESERVE FORGETS IT IS AN AGENT OF CONGRESS The fact that the Federal Reserve, an agent of Congress and independent of the executive branch refused to cooper- ate with Congress while falling all over itself to aid the executive branch sug- gests they have something to hide. One would have to be extraordinarily naive not to feel the Federal Reserve may be covering up for someone high In the executive branch of our Government who is directly involved with the espionage action against the Democratic National Committee. Chairman Arthur Burns should reread the Constitution. It provides that Con- ress, not the executive, has the money power. Under our Constitution the Fed- eral Reserve Board is directly obligated to Congress and is independent of the executive branch. Certainly with the President of the United States and his supporters a party at interest, the Federal Reserve Board should recognize their clear constitu- tional obligation to the Congress. In this case they have failed to do so. SALT: SOME BASIC QUESTIONS "-Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in con- nection with the scrutiny by Congress of the Moscow arms limitation agreements, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my article raising some basic questions about SALT, which was published in Newsday on Sunday, June 18, 1972, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: From Ideas, Newsday's Journal of Opinicm, June 18, 19721 ARE WE No. 2? (By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON) With President Nixon to the Moscow sum- init went the hopes of all Americans for pro- gress toward a lessening of international ten- sions and the instabilities that cause wars. Individual views of the results of the sum- mit may vary, but I believe all Americans respect the President's sincerity and thescale of his efforts in Moscow. President Nixon has now submitted the strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow to the Congress for its advice and perhaps consent. The Congress, in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities, must :study carefully the impact of these agree- ments on our deterrent posture and the fu- ture foreign policy of this country. One can- not give a responsible final judgment until all of the hearings have been held and until all the evidence is in. I will endeavor to play the role of a good lawyer in examining the witnesses and pursuing the facts. I must say, however, that what I already know is enough to raise some very serious questions that go to the heart of the security of the United States and the future of indi- vidual liberty. All Americans want to see the strategic balance become more stable. We all desire the increased security that flows from a potential aggressor's knowledge that he simply can't execute a disarming first strike against our deterrent forces. Unfortunately, I see nothing in the present agreements that lessens the threat to security of these deter- rent forces. On the contrary, far from placing us in a condition of stable deterrence, the agreement permits the Soviet Union to con- tinue its offensive build-up in a way and on a scale that could prove highly dangerous. Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything: more light ICBMs (In- tercontinental ballistic missile), more heavy ICBMs, more submarine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM (anti-ballistic missile) radars. In no area covered by the agreement is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union. Something was basically wrong with the administration's approach to such difficult and vital arms control negotiations. In May 1971, the agreements existed only in outline and many critical issues were still outstand- ing. Nevertheless, President Nixon publicly announced that there definitely would be a U.S.-USSR agreement on thestrategicarms. In effect, he said we had decided to pur- chase the house even before knowing the price! The administration then compounded its error by instructing our SALT delegation to see to it that President Nixon had a final agreement ready to sign at the Moscow sum- mit. We thus put ourselves over a barrel. As in all bargaining, the side more eager for agreement at a specified date will pay more to get it. There is clear evidence that the self-imposed deadline led to major conces- sions by the United States that have had the result of gravely increasing the disadvan- t ges to us of the agreements. For example, on May 20, just six days be- fore the signing, the U.S. caved in to the Russians and withdrew our key proposal to include in the agreement a mutual ban on the deployment of land-mobile ICBM launchers. On May 26-the very day of the Moscow signing-the President capitulated on the vital requirement to get agreement with the Russians on a common definition of the all important term "heavy missile."' The administration resorted to a weak and unilateral assertion as to what we under- stand a "heavy missile" to be, while the So- viets have chosen even to withhold com- ment on our definition. The failure to re- solve disagreement on this term raises doubt about the central claim that is being made for the agreement: that it will prevent the Soviets from deploying more huge SS-9 type missiles. The pressures imposed by public relations requirements at the summit made matters even worse. We were still negotiating on the plane carrying the two SALT delegations from Helsinki to Moscow for the signing cere- monies. There existed no copies of the agree- ment other than the ones signed by the prin- cipals so that the press corps was left to rely on vague and partly misleading briefings about the contents of the agreements. The initial press, radio and TV reports from Mos.. cow were full of misinformation. As a re- sult, the false figures circulated in these early stories confused most Americans. Top administration officials are still contradict- ing each other about what these agreements mean. The full content of the agreements-- essential to any evaluation of their import-- was not given to the Congress or made avail- able to the public until 19 days after the Moscow signing. It was only after I made repeated demands for these additional "private understandings" that the administration admitted their ex. istence and announced its willingness to re- lease them. This is no way to negotiate. If you nego.. trate this way you inevitably end up with unsatisfactory agreements. And as Robert A. Lovett has warned: "Do not give unilateral concessions, particularly to the Russians. They will not feel gratitude. They will feel contempt for your gullibility." The strategic arms agreements have one overriding fault: They freeze the United States at a serious numerical inferiority in both ICBMs and submarines while they authorize the Russians to continue their buildup. Not only do the Soviets get 1.618 ICBMs to our 1,054 ICBMs, but they are per- mitted to exercise options that would give them 62 modern nuclear ballistic missile submarines to our 44. The crucial question for the nation and for the cause of world peace is whether these numbers add up to stable parity or unstable inferiority. Now there are some who argue that "num-? bers don't matter-that both sides have "sufficiency" and that therefore the strategic balance is stable. Wishful thinking springs eternal and strong. How curious it is that the people who hold to the "numbers don't matter" doctrine are the same ones who believe that without an immediate arms con- trol. agreement the world is in danger of a greater nuclear war. Either numbers matter or arms limitation agreements don't-you. can't have it both ways. Among those who acknowledge that num- bers do indeed matter there are those-and. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 9845 are offered than if the prospect is cold turkey. The flaws in that argument are that Ameri- can treatment programs have a high relapse rate and that the addiction epidemic is no- where near being checked in the U.S. r. STEVENSON. Mr. President, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., in the June edition of Scientific American, gives us a schol- arly description of the nuclear deterrent on which the United States increasingly relies for its defense-our submarine- based nuclear missiles. He points out that from submarines alone the United States will soon be able to deliver 5,540 nuclear warheads against 5,120 targets. With a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on the limita- tion of ABM's, our invulnerable subma- rines will continue to have the power to virtually destroy the U.S.S.R. In short, our submarine-based deter- rent is secure. The restraint with which Dr. Scoville describes the administra- tion's plans to inflict a new $40 billion missile submarine fleet upon the taxpay- ers is admirable, if unwarranted. These new nuclear submarines would be larger than the Soviet's newest cruiser, so large I am told, that we will not have bases ca- pable of serving them. The bases will be constructed or expanded at an additional cost. The environmental and political consequences of a sunk Trident subma- rine armed with perhaps 240 nuclear warheads are rarely considered, even by Dr. Scoville. And for the phenomenal ex- pense and all the implicit dangers, the greatest of which is the destabilizing ef- fect of another lurch forward in the arms race, we gain at best a marginally im- proved strategic submarine force. It was not long ago that Mr. Laird said the United States had to proceed with a 15-percent increase in strategic programs for fiscal year 1973 because we could not bank upon a SALT agreement. Now he says that we must go forward because we do have a SALT agreement. I urge Members of Congress to read Dr. Sco- ville's article before accepting Mr. Laird's logic, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: MISSILE SUBMARINES AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Land-based missiles are giving way to sub- marine missiles as a secure deterrent to a nuclear first strike. The question now is whether or not the U.S. should spend per- haps $40 billion on a new missile fleet) The primary attribute required of any de- terrent force is the ability to survive a "coun- terforce," or preemptive, attack. Ballistic- missile submarines are almost ideally suited to satisfying this requirement. Although they are expensive compared with other strategic weapons (more than $100 million per subma- rine exclusive of the missiles), their mobility and invisibility make them virtually immune to destruction in a surprise attack. In con- trast, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) can readily be located with the aid of surveillance satellites, so that they must be regarded as "targetable" in the event of an enemy first strike. Attempts to "harden" such fixed missile-launchers (that is, to Increase their resistance to the effects of nuclear explosions) are in the long run doomed to futility, since in the absence of qualitative arms-control agreements improve- ments in offensive missiles, particularly im- provements in accuracy, will inevitably make fixed missile-launchers vulnerable and hence reduce confidence in their deterrence value. The advent of multiple independently tar- getable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), which are currently being deployed on a large scale by the U.S., creates a situation in which the "exchange ratio" strongly favors the attack- er. Thus a single missile with, say, six war- heads can potentially destroy six enemy ICBM's if they are caught in their silos. Moreover, strategic bombers are extremely vulnerable while they are on the ground and would therefore be very susceptible to anni- hilation in a surprise missile attack. At- tempts to avoid this weakness by maintain- ing aircraft on continuous airborne alert have proved to be expensive and potentially dangerous. Even the current 15-minute ground alert is not completely satisfactory, since adequate warning would be more diffi- cult to obtain if fractional-orbital-bombard- ment systems (FOBS) or depressed-trajec- tory missiles launched from submarines were used to attack the bombers. Hence given the present state of military technology and reasonable anticipated ad- vances, the primary element in the strategic- deterrent forces of both the U.S. and the U.S S .R. will continue to be the ballistic- missile submarine. All other strategic sys- The submarines must also be able to navi- tems will remain secondary. Moreover, it gate accurately, so that after they have seems likely that any agreement that may moved through the oceans into their opera- emerge in the near future from the strate- tional areas they will always be in a position gic-arms-limitation talks (SALT) will fur- to fire their missiles at predetermined tar- ther enhance the relative importance of the gets. High navigational accuracy is not as the chances great a requirement for a retaliatory strike that MIRV's will be limited forces. Since by a that SALT against cities as it would be if the subma- become extremely l l el y low, ICBM's will rines were to be used in a counterforce role becoomme e increasingly vulnerable. The more for destroying such "hard" targets as enemy likely limitations tanti-ballistic-missile other hand, , would missile sites. In fact, if one side wishes to hand, would use missile submarines only as deterrent (ABM) guarantee systems, the the retaliatory the capability weapons, then it is important that the ac- rine-launched comparatively arat small all ballistic mnummberberissiles of of subma- curacy-yield combination of the system not 's) . The expected failure to limit antiaircraft be so great as to give the other side con- defenses and to restrain qualitative improve- cern that the submarines have a first-strike ments in offensive-missile systems would capability against land-based ICBM's; other- further decrease the value of strategic bom- wise the position of mutual stable deterrence bers. Although there will probably not soon will be eroded. be restrictions on antisubmarine-warfare With these general principles in mind, let (ASW) measures, the technology in this area us examine how the U.S. missile-submarine In recent years, as the nuclear-weapons is so far behind that it could not possibly forces have developed over the years. The U.S. arsenals of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. threaten the submarine deterrent, if it can launched the first Iiuclear-powered subma- have continued to grow, the concept of de- threaten It at all, until far in the future. rine, the Nautilus, in 1955, but it was not terrence has become almost universally ac- In sum, the Navy will increasingly be the until the late 1950's that development of cepted as the key to maintaining national principal military guardian of our national long-range missiles had proceeded to the security and preventing the outbreak of a security. point that these could be installed in such nuclear war. "Winning" a nuclear exchange What characteristics must an SLBM force submarines. The first ballistic-missile sub- is no longer regarded as a rational strategic have in order to fulfill its function as a marine, the George Washington, became op- objective;. in such an exchange everyone, par- deterrent against the initiation of nuclear erational in November, 1960. It was armed ticipant and nonparticipant alike, would be warfare by the U.S.S.R.? (Since China is with 16 solid-fuel Polaris A-i missile, which a loser. In keeping with the deterrence prin- so far behind both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could be fired at a rate of about one per ciple President Nixon affirmed in his State in this respect, the same forces would be minute. The range of this missile was about of the World Message of February 9 that "our more than adequate to deter China as well.) 1,200 nautical miles and the warhead yield forces must be maintained at a level sufficient First of all, the submarines should be de- about one megaton. The submarines were de- to make it clear that even an all-out surprise signed to operate in, and fire their missiles signed to fire their missiles while sub- attack on the U.S. by the U.S.S.R. would not from, large enough ocean areas in a variety merged, using compressed gases to expel the cripple our capability to retaliate." For the of directions around the U.S.S.R. so as to missile; the rocket engine is then ignited Russians to feel secure they must have a decrease their vulnerability to ASW detec- after the missile has cleared the surface. By similar capability; only then would a stable tion and tracking and to facilitate the pene- 1963, 12 more Polaris submarines were oper- strategic balance exist. tration of any ABM system. The closer these ational. areas are to ports in the U.S.,.the less will be the time lost in moving to and from operational stations and the less will be the need for overseas bases. Higher submarine speeds will also reduce this travel time and increase the ability to break contact with a trailing ASW submarine or surface vessel. The gains here may be marginal, particu- larly since tracking vessels will probably be faster than any missile submarine. The fast- er a submarine moves through the water, however, the more noise it will produce, and in countering ASW measures quietness may be much more important than speed. The reduction of submarine noise is the most critical element in preventing detection and continuous covert tracking, both of which must rely on passive acoustic sensors. If an ABM defense is a realistic possibil- ity, then the submarine missiles must have enough payload capacity to allow the use of multiple warheads and other penetration aids. The entire submarine force should be large enough so that the destruction of a few submarines by a concerted enemy at- tack, by slow attrition or perhaps by a series of accidents does not seriously degrade its overall capability. If continuous tracking by antisubmarine submarines or other ASW ves- sels ever becomes a realistic operation on a large scale, then the more vessels there are in the missile-submarine fleet, the harder it will be for this tactic to be successful in de- stroying the entire force. Ballistic-missile submarines cannot be used to attack other submarines and are no threat to the SLBM deterrent of the other side. In addition to an adequate number of sub- marines, missiles and warheads, it is essen- tial to have secure and reliable communi- cations between these vessels and their com- mand. authorities. It is not enough to send the submarines to sea with sealed orders. Controls to prevent inadvertent or unau- thorized firing are an absolute necessity, and reliable methods for ordering retaliation in the event of a surprise attack are required. These communications must be jam-proof; the potential attacker cannot be allowed to hope that a communications failure might Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 1972 Meanwhile the development of more ad- vanced missiles continued. The next genera- tion missile, the A-2, had a range of about 1,500 nautical miles. The first test of the A-3 missile, with a range of 2,500 nautical miles and a "triplet" reentry vehicle, was conducted from a submerged submarine In the fall of 1963. The triplet reentry vehicles, which could carry three individual nuclear warheads each, did not have independent guidance; the three warheads were intended to reenter the atmosphere in a shotgun- pat- tern with the target at the center. Since such warheads cannot be aimed at separate tar- gets, they do not alter the exchange ratio and do not provide any first-strike advan- tage. Their advent was therefore not in itself regarded as destabilizing. In the early 1960's there was considerable debate over the appropriate size of the Polaris fleet. The Navy originally sought 48 ships, and the final decision was to build 41. One factor limiting the number of submarines is the problem of manpower recruitment. Nuclear- submarine duty, which involves 60-day un- derwater cruises, calls for a certain type of person who is not easy tofind and who must be highly trained. Normally each vessel has two crews of about 140 men who go on alter- nate patrols. By the end of 1966 all 41 Polaris submarines were operational; eight carried A-2 missiles and 33 were eventually fitted out with A-3's. Thus the force carried a total of 1,712 war- heads, but since the triplet warheads cannot be aimed separately, 656 was the maximum number of separate targets that could be hit. Of course, not all of these submarines can be kept at operational stations at all times. In general a submarine spends 60 days at sea and 30 days in port for maintenance. In addition the submarine might take five or more days to move from the U.S. to its launch point and the same period to return. If a submarine wished to avoid detection by mov- ing quietly and therefore slowly, the travel time would be even greater. Thus the number of submarines at launch stations at any one time could be reduced to some 20 to 25 ships. The situation is improved by using forward bases (on Guam, at Holy Loch in Scotland and at Rota in Spain), which reduces the time needed to reach launch stations from five or six days to one or two days. With a range of 2,500 nautical miles, a submarine-launched missile can hit Moscow from most of the North Atlantic (inside an arc extending from the tip of Greenland to North Africa), from the Mediterranean and even from some parts of the Indian Ocean, a total sea area of about six million square miles [see illustration below]. The sea area from which a submarine-launched missile could hit important targets other than Mos- cow, say targets only 200 miles inside the U.S.S.R., is even larger [see illustration on opposite page]. One high-ranking Navy of- ficer reported in 1964 that a Polaris sub- marine equipped with the A-3 missile could operate in 15 million square miles of ocean area while covering its targets In the U.S.S.R. No land target anywhere in the world is in- accessible from attack by the A-3 missile. Although mobility provides a submarine with the tremendous advantage of improving its survivability, it creates a new problem: the determination of its location at the moment when the missile is to be launched toward its target several thousand miles away- Unless the missile is provided with some means of determining its position during flight or with a terminal-homing capability, the ac- curacy at the impact point can never be better than the uncertainty in the launch point. To determine the launch position calls for accurate submarine navigation, which is made more difficult by the requirement that in order to avoid disclosing its presence the submarine shouldnot surface to determine its location. The attitude of the ship with respect to the vertical and true north at the time of the launch is also needed. When the missile force is being used for deterrent pur- poses, an accuracy greater than a few thou- sand feet is not needed; it Is only necessary to be able to hit a large urban complex. Today this order of accuracy in locating the posi- tion and attitude of a submarine can be readily achieved. The U.S. has made tre- mendous advances in the development of inertial-navigation systems in recent years, and reasonably accurate position fixes can be obtained even after the submarine has been submerged at sea for many days. The inertial-navigation system in a Polaris submarine is a complex system of gyroscopes, accelerometers and computers that relate the movement and the speed of the ship in all directions with respect to true north. If an initial position is known, then this system will provide continuous data on the ship's position. For an absolutely stationary submarine, or one whose motion can be cor- rected for, inertial sensors can determine without external data the vertical, the true north, the latitude and all velocity compo- nents by inertially sensing the earth's gravi- tational and rotational vectors, but there is no way of determining the longitude by inertial means. Submarines that have been voyaging at sea for protracted periods and whose inertial-navigation errors may have become unacceptably large can, by trailing an antenna while they are still submerged, get a radio "position fix" from navigation satellites or land-based transmitters. It may also be possible to locate a submarine by reference to accurately known geographical landmarks on the ocean bottom such as sea- mounts. In sum, the present technology has advanced to the point where the location and attitude of the submarine could In prin- ciple no longer be the critical factor in ob- taining missile accuracies down to less than an eighth of a mile. A deterrent force must also be able to re- ceive communications from national com- mand centers. Direct command and con- trol originating with the President and with many verification checks is vital to prevent unauthorized launching; it is also essential that command authorities be able to com- municate in times of crisis with the sub- marine captains without fear of interference by the other side. Otherwise communication would be the Achilles' heel of the submarine deterrent. There are a number of means of communicating with a submarine, at least one way from shore to ship, that do not require the submarine to surface. Very-low- frequency (VLF) radio waves can penetrate a short distance into the water, so that a receiving antenna does not need to be ex- posed at the surface. Moreover, the sub- marine can operate at a considerable depth, since it can trail an antenna as much as several hundred feet above its deck. The U.S. has a number of land-based VLF trans- mitters at various locations around the world for communication with Polaris submarines, and more recently an airborne VLF system has been devised in order to eliminate the possibility that the fixed land-based stations would be destroyed in a surprise attack- The use of satellites for relaying mes- sages to submarines provides an alternative means of communication. Recently much research has been devoted to extremely-low- frequency (ELF) waves, which can penetrate even deeper into the water. The Navy proj- ect named Sanguine proposed to set up a vast antenna for this purpose In Wisconsin. The data rate of such a system would be quite low, but it would be adequate for command-communication purposes. The project has run into difficulties with local residents because the large antenna currents and the potential hazard to living things. For comunication from a submarine to the command center the problem is more diffi- cult; it calls at the very least for trailing an antenna close to the surface and must in any case be avoided in order to prevent disclosure of the submarine's location to listening enemy radios. Fortunately such communica- tion is not essential to the viability of the submarine deterrent force. By the end of 1966 the U.S. submarine- missile force together with its support sys- tems was by itself more than adequate to deter any nuclear attack on the U.S. It had more than enough missiles and warheads to devastate the U.S.S.R. even when only a fraction of the submarines were on station. It could operate in ocean areas on all sides of the U.S.S.R., and the Russians ASW capa- bility was quite rudimentary, with virtually no ability to "draw down" the size of the U.S. fleet. At that time the Russians had no ABM system deployed. Military technology did not, however, stand still. The need to operate in restricted sea areas close to the northern coast of Eu- rope and the Mediterranean in order to reach Moscow and other interior Russian cities created fears that someday ASW measures might become a threat. More important, con- cern that the U.S.S.R. might deploy a large ABM system capable of coping with our mis- sile-submarine force was becoming more acute every day. The Russians were in the process of deploying an ABM defense around Moscow, using a large interceptor missile es- timated to have a single-warhead yield large enough to destroy all three warheads of the Polaris A-3. In addition they were deploying radars and defensive missiles in the "Tallinn system" widely throughout the U.S.S.R. Some "worst case" analyses of U.S. planners, particularly during the early phases when that hese facilities were for ABM defense. factual information was limited, postulated that these facilities were for ABM defense. Later, as more data became available, the predictions were scaled down to the effect that the Tallinn system was an antiaircraft defense that could perhaps be upgraded to provide an ABM-capability. (Now even this upgrading Is not considered practicable by most experts.) As a result research and development pro- ceeded on a next-generation missile for the Polaris submarine that would give increased future assurance of penetrating any ABM de- fense and would at the same time give the submarines enough flexibility to operate at greater distances from the U.S.S.R. To in- crease either the payload or the range signifi- cantly called for a larger missile, and the re- sulting Poseidon missile required enlarging the launching tubes in the Polaris subma- rines, a costly and time-consuming task re- quiring 13 or more months. Since many of the submarines were due for overhaul in any case, however, the two shipyard activities could be combined with a minimum loss in operational readiness for the fleet as a whole. The cost of converting a Polaris submarine to carry the advanced Poseidon missiles is on the average $29 million, with another $38 million for normal submarine overhaul and replacement of the nuclear fuel. The new Poseidon missile Is about twice as heavy as the Polaris A-3 and. has a payload about four times as great. Although its nominal range of about 2,500 nautical miles is the same as that of the A-3, a trade-off be- tween range and payload is always possible, so that the potential range of the Poseidon is somewhat greater. The new missile in- corporates MIRV technology, that is, the ability to disperse many warheads aimed at separate targets. The technique developed for this purpose employs the "bus" approach, in which shortly after burnout of the propul- sion stages the missile's final stage (the bus) is aimed at a first target point and releases a warhead, which then follows a ballistic tra- jectory to that target while the bus is re- directed toward a second aim point. The same procedure can be repeated until all the war- heads have been sent to Individual targets. If a single target is to be attacked, then MIRV technology allows the warheads to Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 9547 approach the target at widely spaced inter- therefore had limited endurance and cruising no locations available for forward bases, vals and on different trajectories so that no ing range. Their first nuclear-powered mis- more time is wasted getting submarines on more than one warhead can be destroyed by silo submarine carried only three missiles station and it takes more submarines to a single ABM Interceptor. The Poseidon is with a 300-nautical-mile range, which in maintain the same deterrent force opera- reported to be capable of carrying 14 war- later models was extended to about 700 nau- tional at any one time. It would take Rus- heads, each with a.yleld of about 50 kilotons, tical miles, sian submarines a minimum of six days in several times the yield of the bomb that de- By the late 1960's it must have been ob- the Atlantic and eight days in the Pacific to stroyed Hiroshima. Warheads can be traded vious to military planners in the U.S.S.R. reach the nearest launch stations, so that off for either ABM penetration aids or in- that their land-based ICBM's would become the transit time to and from home ports, creased range. The nominal complement is increasingly vulnerable to the U.S. MIRV's, in many cases a quarter to a third of the usually taken as being 10 MIRV warheads, which were then under development and duration- of the patrol, seriously degrades Department of Defense officials have repeat- which had been publicly justified as provid- the operational - readiness of the Russian edly stated that these warheads do not ing an improved counterforce capability. The fleet. This disadvantage can be only partly have the accuracy-yield combination to pro- Russian deterrent needed shoring up with alleviated by using submarine tenders for vide a first-strike capability against hard- a more effective SLBM force, whose value maintenance and crew exchange at sea. ened silos (a "circular-error probability" of had been demonstrated by the U.S. In 1966 Moreover, In any East-West comparison the about an eighth of a mile or better would the U.S.S.R. launched its first Y-class sub- small British and French missile-submarine be needed with that yield), but the Russians marine, which carries 16 missiles with a fleets, each of which may eventually consist might still be concerned on this score. reported range of 1,300 miles. This class of four submarines and 64 missiles, must be As with the Polaris A-3, a Poseidon mis- of vessels was similar to the Polaris sub- added to the U.S. total.. Thus, whereas the sile with a range of 2,500 nautical miles can marines, which the U.S. had put into oper- Russians now have an adequate missile- launch warheads at Moscow not only from ation seven years earlier. All the Russian submarine deterrent, their fleet is markedly large areas of the North Atlantic and the SLBM's deployed so far have had storable inferior to that of the U.S. and its allies and Mediterranean but also from some parts of liquid fuels, whereas all the U.S. missiles provides no threat to the U.S. deterrent. the Indian Ocean, a total area of about six have had solid fuels. The Russians appar- As the first phase of SALT is drawing to million square miles. Targets within 200 ently decided to continue with the Y-class an end, then, it is becoming universally miles of the border of the U.S.S.R. can be design and began building submarines at a recognized that ballistic-missile submarines reached from some 15 million square miles. rapid pace, initially at the rate of six to are the essential foundation of a secure and These large ocean areas present great prob- eight per year and currently at nine per year. stable strategic balance. Under these circum- lems for any possible future ASW system. Two shipyards are engaged in this work, one stances it is only natural to investigate ways To deploy detection and tracking systems at Severodvinsk on the Arctic Sea and one to still further improve submarine missile throughout these waters is a prodigious, if in Siberia on the Pacific. At present the Rus- systems. The U.S. has had a research and not impossible, task. Furthermore, on short sians have about 26 Y-class submarines oper- development program in this area for several notice these areas might be somewhat en- larged if it ever became critical by reduc- ational and another 16 under construction. years, so that the developments at the fron- ing the Poseidon payload, either by elimi- Although the Russians have tested a new tiers of technology could be incorporated in nating penetration aids or by cutting down missile with a range of about 3,500 miles, the successor to the Polaris-Poseidon system. the number of warheads, in each missile. John Stuart Foster, Jr., chief research scion- The particular system proposed by the Navy The first Poseidon missile was tested in tist for the Department of Defense, recently for this role has been called ULMS, for un- August, 1968, and the development of the reported that this missile was so long that dersea long-range missile system. entire Poseidon system was completed two he did not believe the Y-class submarine One obvious way to improve the present years later. The first Polaris submarine went could be modified to launch it. The Russians submarine missile would be to extend its to sea with Poseidon missiles in March of have never even tested multiple warheads on range, making possible the launching of mis- last year. At present about 10 submarines their submarine missiles, let alone MIRV's. siles from larger ocean areas in all directions have been converted. The program calls for Their missiles are each armed with a single around the U.S.S.R. Increasing the missile's modifying 31 submarines to carry these new warhead with a yield of about one megaton. payload would allow the incorporation of missiles, leaving 10 to be equipped with the These missiles have no capability for attack- more warheads per missile or additional older A-3's. When the program is completed ing our ICBM silos, but it has been postu- ABM-penetration aids. Payload can, of course, in 1976, the U.S. submarine force will be able lated that they might be employed to at- always be traded off for range. A longer- to launch 5,440 warheads at 5,120 separate tack our bombers on the ground and our range missile would reduce the time required targets. It should be possible to keep con- command and control centers, using a de- to move from U.S. ports to launching areas siderably more than half of these submarines pressed trajectory to achieve the necessary and thereby reduce the need for overseas on station at all times, and in times of surprise. The missiles have not, however, basing in order to maintain the submarines crisis the operational readiness can be been tested in this mode, and this approach on station for a larger fraction of their cruis- stepped up if necessary. This is an awesome would,. in any case, entail a reduction in ing time. With a range of 4,500 nautical miles force, capable of overwhelming even a mas- their already limited range. a missile could reach Moscow shortly after sive ABM defense system. There is, of course, The U.S.S.R. will have a slightly larger the submarine leaves the U.S., whereas with no evidence that the Russians have Any in- ballistic-missile submarine fleet than the a range of 2,500 nautical miles at least three tention of building a large ABM system with U.S. when it completes those vessels now days' travel would be required. Thus for a nationwide coverage, and it is highly likely under construction (42 to 41). Even then, 60-day cruise lengthening the missile range that such a system will be precluded in the however, the capabilities of the Russian fleet by 2,000 miles could increase the period of first stage of a strategic-arms-limitation will be far inferior to those of the U.S. operational effectiveness by about 10 percent treaty. Polaris fleet. President Nixon in his 1972 if forward bases were abandoned. Even one missile submarine can launch State of the World Message said that "our More advanced guidance systems employ- 160 warheads at separate industrial centers missiles have longer range and are being ing terminal control (the ability to change in the U.S.S.R., an attack that the Russiains equipped with multiple independently tar- the path of the warhead during reentry) are could not afford even if the U.S. had been getable warheads. Moreover, our new subma- being developed to avoid interception by annihilated. This means that any ASW sys- rines are now superior in quality." The ABM systems or to improve accuracy. Higher tem would have to be able to eliminate al- shorter range of the Russian missiles requires accuracy obtained by this means or others is most instantaneously every single submarine, that their submarines operate fairly close not required if missiles are to be used as a herculean task. Today it is difficult, if not to the U.S. coast in order to be able to deterrent weapons. Indeed, it might be con- impossible, to destroy even a single subma- strike inland U.S. targets; this makes the strued by the other side as an attempt to rine that follows skilled evasion tactics. Yet Russian submarines potentially more vulner- attain a counberforce capability for a first if ABM defenses were forbidden by treaty, able to a U.S. ASW system [see illustration strike. Although it is more difficult to acquire an ASW system that has still to be devised on page 201. On the other hand, the popula- such a capability with a submarine missile would be the only threat to the submarine tion centers and industrial complexes on system than with an ICBM because of the deterrent. That is one reason why an ABM the east and west coasts of the U.S. can be inherent limitations on the payload and the agreement at SALT would by itself be such reached from much larger ocean areas, and nuclear explosive yield and because of navi- an important gain to the security of both the these targets would be quite satisfactory if gational complications, there are no scientific U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the SLBM's were to be used for deterrent barriers to its achievement. The greatest The U.S.S.R. has always lagged consider- purposes [see illustration on page 21]. The technical restriction on the use of SLBM's ably behind the U.S. in the development of restricted range would be a serious factor for a counterforce first strike may lie in com- nuclear submarines and SLBM's. The first only if the SLBM's were to be used against mand and control. It may be feasible to pre- Russian nuclear submarine was built about our bomber bases or missiles In the interior program and command the initial launch- four years after the Nautilus, and Admiral of the U.S. ings, but there will inevitably be failures. Hyman 0. Rickover, the director of the U.S. There are other reasons why the parity The difficulties of directing subsequent fir- nuclear-submarine program from the begin- between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in opera- ings to destroy the silos missed the first time ning has made it clear he believes the Rus- tional submarines cannot be evaluated on appear to be virtually insurmountable. sian submarines are technically inferior to numerical grounds alone. Since bases in the The submarine itself can be improved by the U.S. ships. The first Russian ballistic- U.S.S.R. are farther from the operational making it quieter as it moves through the missile submarines were diesel-powered and launching areas and since the Russians have water, thereby rendering detection and track- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9848 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 19721 ing by passive acoustic techniques more dif- ticult. Although increasing the speed of the submarine will make it somewhat harder for enemy ASW ships to follow it, the higher speed will also raise the level of noise pro- duced by the submarine. In any case it Is probably -a losing proposition for a missile submarine to try to outrun an ASW vessel, which can always be designed to move faster. High speed will enable the submarine to reach its launch area more rapidly and thus reduce the time it spends in a nonopera- tional condition, but again the potential ' gins are not large, and they may be out- weighed by the disadvantages. If all other factors are equal, it will require a bigger power plant and larger submarine, both of which will increase cost and detectability. In- creasing the depth at which a submarine can Operate is not particularly significant, at mast for the depths that are likely to be achieved In the next generation of subma- rines; submarines can be detected acousti- cally and destroyed by nuclear depth charges or homing torpedoes at any reasonable depth. If space for more and larger missiles is needed to increase the destructive capacity and the ABM-penetrability of any single submarine, then larger submarines with bigger power plants will be required. The larger the submarines, however, the fewer the ships that will be available for the same investment. Therefore, If funds are limited (and they always are), this means a smaller fleet, which is more vulnerable to being wiped out in a simultaneoussurprise attack. Thus there are many trade-offs in system de- sign, and the final decision on a successor to the Polaris-Poseidon system should be based only on the nature of the specific threat. In 1971 $104.8 million was appropriated for the advanced development of ULMS. Al- though this evpenditure still left options through this expenditure still left options procuring a specific new submarine system. This year the Department of Defense is seek- ing $977 million for ULMS. If that amount is authorized, the U.S. will be irrevocably committed to a large and very expensive new shipbuilding program. Unclassified details of the proposed ULMS program are still scarce, but It appears that the submarine in the system would be quite large (more than twice the size of the Polaris ships) and that t would be capable of launching 20 to 24 large missiles equipped with MIRV's. It is proposed to have a higher maximum speed and to incorporate the latest available silenc- ing techniques, although these two objectives are competitive. The ULMS program has been divided Into two parts. The first stage (ULMS 1) would involve a new missile with a range of about 1,500 nautical miles capable of being deployed in the present Polaris submarines as well as in any new vessel. The second stage (ULMS I) would include the development of the new submarine and a still more advanced missile with a rangeof about 6.000 miles that would be too big to be substituted for the ,'oseidon in the existing Polaris ships. A maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) Is also Icing developed for the new ULMS missiles. According to one estimate, the total cost of a program for 30 such ULMS vessels would be 339.6 billion [see illustration at right[. So far no convincing case has been made or the need to proceed with a replacement -or the Polaris-Poseidon system and for mak- 'ng a commitment to a new large, high-speed submarine. Russian construction of SLBM's no justification for ULMS; the Russian msissile submarines do not in any way !,hreaten the Polaris deterrent. Numerical superiority in launchers Is meaningless; all au.thorlties agree that the U.S. Is far ahead qualitatively and can deliver from sub- muarines about 5,000 warheads to fewer than "00 for the U.S.S.R. Even if we foolishly choose to race the Russians In the number o;f SLBM's, ULMS is certainly not the way to do it; each ULMS system will probably cost five or more times per missile launched than the Russian Y-class system. The Poseidon with 10 or more MIRV's on each missile has a far greater capability than is needed to overwhelm any Russian ABM sys- tem that can he foreseen at present. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in February that "the Moscow ABM system even with improved radars andmore and better interceptors could still be saturated by a very small part of our total missile force. In any event, the pro- grammed Minuteman III and Poseidon Forces, with their large number of reentry vehicles, provide a hedge against a future large-scale Soviet ABM deployment." Since such a large- scale ABM deployment will almost certainly be precluded by a first-stage SALT agree- ment, there is nothing in the ABM area that would require replacement of the Poseidon; in fact, even the Poseidon MIRV's will not be needed If a SALT ABM treaty is realized. Therefore it is necessary to examine anti- sn.''marine warfare to determine if there is anything that would currently justify the major ULMS step. Without going into a de- tailed analysis of possible ASW measures and cou itermeasures, suffice it to say that no evidence has yet been presented that the Russian ASW program could present a threat to the Polaris deterrent in the next decade, [An article on the ASW situation by Richard L. Garwin will appear in next month's ScIEN- TiFrc AMERICAN.] Admiral Levering Smith, director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Proj- ect, testified in 1969 that even the new gen- eration of Russian ASW submarines will not be able to follow our Polaris submarine, and that the U.S.S.R. has no specific new ASW methods that would make the Polaris fleet vulnerable to attack. That is still true to- day. The U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars on ASW efforts over the past 20 years and still does not have any system that could even begin to approach the kind of capability that would be needed to elimi- nate 20 to 30 missile submarines almost simultaneously. The Russians are far behind the U.S. In this area, and they have the se- rious geographical disadvantages of remote- ness from and unavailability of land areas contiguous to the oceans in which this ASW systems would have to operate. Since the nature of the potential ASW threat to the Polaris-Poseidon system cannot even be fore- seen at this point, ULMS, if built now. may be designed to cope with the wrong threat. The most obvious improvement to Polaris- Poseidon would be to increase the range of the missile in order to enlarge the ocean areas from which missiles could be launched. The deployment of such a new long-range missile might cost nearly seven billion dol- lars, however, and in any case, as the reaps on pages 18 and 19 how, the Poseidon sys- tem already has a tremendous operational flexibility and is not threatened in its pres- ent launch areas. Thus there are strong arguments for keep- ing both the ULMS missile and the ULMS submarine options in the research and early development stage. This would allow the ex- ploration of all approaches, Including smaller, slower but quieter submarines, and would avoid the making of a premature commit- inent to a large, expensive submarine and missile program. We must not fall into the trap of buying new military hardware just be- cause we have made technological advances; there is no quicker way to price ourselves out of the security market. The submarine missile force is the backbone of our deter- rent; its present strength and invulnerabil- ity obviate the nee for Its replacement for at least a decade. DEATH OF HAROLD WESTON Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on Monday, April 10, Harold Weston, past president of the Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, and chairman of the Na- tional Council on the Arts and Govern- ment, died at his home. Mr. Weston was long one of the leaders championing the concept of Federal sup- port for the arts. Indeed, he was one of the first witnesses in the early 60's when hearings were held on what was to be- come the legislation which established the National Endowment for the Arts. From that time on, Mr. Weston contin- ued to work with the Special Subcommit- tee on Arts and Humanities. His views were incisive and of much value, and his death deprives us of a leader in this field. I ask unanimous consent that this obit- uary, biography, and eulogy be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the New York Times, April 12, 19721 HAROLD WESTON, LED ARTISTS' FEDERATION Harold Weston, artist and past president of the Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, died Monday at his home, 282 Bleecker Street. He was 78 years old and lived also at St. Hubert's, N.Y., in the Adirondacks. Mr. Weston prepared at Phillips Exeter Academy for Harvard, from which he was graduated in 1916. A volunteer Y.M.C.A. sec- retary in World War I, he served with British forces in India, Mesopotamia and Iran, and then traveled in that area, picking up themes for his first one-Ivan show here in 1922. His last was in 1961. In between, his works included murals in the lobby of the Federal Procurement Build- ing in Washington, 1936-38, and many paint- ings in the Phillips Gallery and other col- lections. Mr. Weston, as vice chairman of the Na- tional Council on the Arts and Government, was active in urging art patronage by the Federal and state governments. In World War II he was director of Food for Freedom. Inc., urging relief measures. Surviving are his widow, the former Faith Borton; 2 daughters, Mrs. Esty Foster Jr. and Mrs. William H, Sudduth Jr.; a son, Bruce; and 11 grandchildren. BIOGRAPHY OF HAROLD WESTON Harold Weston, painter, etcher, muralist and author, was born In Merlon, Pennsyl- vania, on February 14, 1894, and died at his home in New York City on April 10, 1972. Mr. Weston attended Phillips Exeter Acad- emy, class of 1912, and was graduated from Harvard in 1916, magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa. He began painting as a child, influenced, perhaps, by winning fist prize in a children's competition at John Wanamaker's store in Philadelphia. His first one-man show of oils, consisting of 150 Adirondack and Persian landscapes, was held at the Montross Galler- ies in 1922. His canvases of that period, exe- cuted in brilliant color with bold outlines and distorted forms, were widely publicized and created for the artist an immediate reputation. Forty one-man exhibits of Weston's oils, watercolors and etchings have been held in New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Chi- cago, St. Louis, San Francisco, Paris, arid other cities. He has participated in numerous group shows in the United States and Europe. He received the Third Prize for American Painting at the Golden Gate nternational Exposition in 1939. Paintings and etching by Harold Weston are owned by many private collectors, and over 300 examples of his work are in museums or public collections, among them: Phillips Collection, Washington; Whitney Museum of American Art; Museum of Modern Art; Fogg Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9698 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 20, 1972 Public Law 119, 84th congress, approved collected in the past from other Government June 30, 1955 (69 Stat. 225); agencies. Public Law 295, 84th Congress, approved August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 580). ORDER OF BUSINESS ved Public Law 632, 84th Congress, appro June 29, 1956 (70 Stat. 408). Public Law 85-471, approved June 28, 1958 (72 Stat. 241). Public Law 86-560, approved June 30, 1960 (74 Stat. 282). Public Law 87-305, approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 667). Public Law 87-505, approved June 28, 1962 112) (76 Stat . . Public Law 88-343, approved June 30, 1964 (78 Stat. 235). Public Law 89-348, approved November 8, 1965 (79 Stat. 1310). Public Law 89-482, approved June 30, 1966 (80 Stat. 235). Public Law 90-370, approved July 1, 1968 (82 Stat. 279). Public Law 91-151, approved December 23, 1969 (82 Stat. 856). Public Law 91-300, approved June 30, 1970 (84 Stat. 367). Public Law 91-371, approved August 1, 694) 1970 (84 Stat . . Public Law 91-379, approved August 15, resent probably the most important in- 1970 (84 Stat. 796). ternational accords presented for con- Public Law 92-15, approved May 18, 1971 gressional approval since the Versailles (85 Stat. 38). Treaty following World War I. I think Titles II and VI termin une 30, 1953. it is highly significant that the President 1953. Th ept himself made this analogy, in his re- The ies remaining andaining V powers terminated of ed April titles I 30 (e,xccept section 104), title III, and title VII (except marks to Members of Congress at the sections 708, 714, and 719) under present White House on June 15. It is an analogy law will terminate June 30, 1972. which highlights the authority and re- RECORDS OF EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD sponsibility of Congress with respect to During the hearings on S. 699 and S. 1901, these agreements-and the life and death the Comptroller General testified about access issues they deal with. The SALT agree- to information on the Lockheed loan guar- ments are easily the most outstanding antee. The Comptroller General indicated. achievement of President Nixon's ad- that while the GAO has received all the ministration-an administration which data it has requested from Lockheed Air- already had a number of outstanding office of has the not been Emergency able Loan to diplomatic accomplishments to its credit. obtain craft Corp., certain r records his Guarantee Board established by the Emer- Thus far, the role of the executive gency Loan Guarantee Act (Public Law 92- branch has been primary with respect to 70). These records involve the information these agreements; and its conduct of the on which the Board relied in approving a $250 complex negotiations leading to the million loan guarantee for the Lockheed Air- craft Corp., including several credit analyses Within the spectrum of the negotiating of the company prepared by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The Act requires the possibilities, the results must be judged Board to make certain statutory findings be- a maximal rather than a minimal fore approving a loan guarantee, including a achievement. finding that the prospective earning power But, the focus of attention now has of a loan guarantee applicant furnishes rea- shifted to the Congress, and particularly Congress role with respect to the vital issues involved in these particular agree- ments, and the constitutional question of the relationship of congressional and Ex- ecutive authority on arms agreement and warmaking powers. I believe that President Nixon by unty- ing our hands on the new offensive weap- ons systems has consciously create an opportunity for us jointly to restore a good measure of the proper constitu- tional balance between the Executive and the Congress in national security af- fairs and thus to reduce the strain which has resulted from the constitutional im- balance which reached crisis proportions with respect to the Vietnam war. In his June 1 report to the Congress at the conclusion of his trip to the So- viet Union, President Nixon said: We can undertake agreements as impor- tant as these only on a basis of full partner- ship etween the executive and legislative branches of our Government. This statement, together with the very act of making an immediate report to a joint session of Congress, represents a marked departure from the approach contained in President Nixon's April 26 and May 8 speeches in which he took the position that the strength and authority of the office of the President is the key- stone to our national security and mo- rality. On June 15, in quite a different vein, President Nixon told Members of Con- gress: I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only In that way will the Na- tion also be convinced ... What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation and not just rubber-stamping by the House anji the Senate. That is essential because there must. be follow-through on this and the members of the House and Senate, it seems to me, must be convinced that they played a role as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a role in this very, very important field of arms control. In the same spirit, on June 19 Secre- tary Rogers told the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee: sonable assurance that the loan will be re- the Senate. In my judgment, the Sena a We are pleased to know that the Congress paid. already has played a very important role The Comptroller General has testified that plans full consideration of these two docu- the chairman of the Emergency Loan Guar- in success of the SALT negotiations. The ments, both with officials of the Executive antee Board has clearly violated the Budget great Senate debates of 1968, 1969, and branch and with the public. This is a process and Accounting Act of 1921, as well as other 1970 on strategic arms issues helped im- that Is fundamental to our American system. statutes in not giving the GAO access to the portantly to guide the executive branch This new spirit in the executive branch aforementioned records of the Emergency of our Government and the Soviet Gov- respecting the authority and responsi- Loan Guarantee Board. On the other hand, ernment-for we know that the Soviets bility of Congress in national security the General Counsel of the Treasury has avidly read the Senate debates. The matters could lead to enactment of a war written that the Board is not legally required issues and the principles which were powers bill, settle vexing questions of the to make such information available to the established and clarified in the Senate General Accounting Office. debates have now found expression in the invocation of executive privilege and This committee does not wish to referee a agreements. overclassification of documents, and legal dispute between the Comptroller Gen- SALT limit the use of executive agreements eral and the Emergency Loan Guarantee I urge the President to accelerate the without congressional consent. It could Board. However, there are certain overriding pace of negotiations with the Soviet in this way signal an important trans- questions of public policy which transcend Union to limit these weapons systems formation in the politics of our Nation the legal arguments involved. In view of the which might be pursued by each as "bar- and help significantly to restore unity highly controversial nature of the Lockheed gaining chips," so that both sides can and concord within 'our deeply' divided loan guarantee and the size of the U.S. finan- cial commitment, this committee believes the avoid expenditures and obligations for society. Healing the wounds of Vietnam Emergency Loan Guarantee Board should new weapons systems which could be is an overriding challenge and a neces- cooperate fully with the GAO in making its justified only as "bargaining chips." The sity to our well-being as a nation. records available. In passing the Emergency relationship established with the Soviet As the President himself has said in a Loan Guarantee Act, the committee does not Union should now be such as to make spirit of respect-cooperation by the believe that Congress intended to deny to the this entirely feasible. Congress does not mean "rubberstamp- GAO any information of a type which it has customarily collected in the past from other As the primary role with respect to ing"-if the Congress is to fulfill its own Government agencies, or authorize .GAO ac- the SALT agreements now passes to Con- responsibilities. With respect to the cess to records which it has not customarily gress we should consider at the same time SALT agreements the - President has The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The distinguished Republican lead- er is now recognized. Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back my time. ORDER OF BUSINESS The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Under the previous order, the dis- tinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is now recognized for not to ex- ceed 15 minutes. THORITY AND THE SALT AGREE- MENTS Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the SALT agreements now before the Congress rep- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Senate "'he Senate met at 9 a.m., on the ex- piration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., a Sen- ator from the State of Virginia. PIIAYER The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer: Almighty God, before whom the gen- erations rise and pass away, we thank Thee for days that are past and work that is done. We thankThee now for the new day and for work yet to be done. By Thy strength and in Thy wisdom help us to undertake our tasks as did our fore- fathers, holding firmly to truth and jus- tice, striving for the better world that is yet to be- "March on, 0 soul, with strength, As strong the battle rolls, Gainst lies and lusts and wrongs, Let courage rule our souls : In keenest strife, Lord, may we stand Upheld and strengthened by Thy hand." -GEORGE T. COSTER. We pray in the Redeemer's name. Amen. APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESI- DENT PRO TEMPORE The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. ELLENDER). The second assistant legislative clerk read the following letter: U.S. SENATE, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, Washington, D.C., June 20, 1972. To the Senate: Being temporarily absent from the Senate on official duties, I appoint Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., a Senator from the State of Vir- ginia. to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence. ALLEN J. ELLE President proND empore. Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore. THE JOURNAL Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, task unanimous consent that the Jour al of the proceedings of Monday, J e 1.9, The ACTING PRESIDENT/pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is, 4o ordered. COMMITTEE MEETIN(AS DURING SENATE SESSION Mr. MANSFIELD. President, I ask unanimous consent A.Kat all committees may be authorized o meet during the session of the Senate today. TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1972 (Legislative day of Monday, June 19, 1972) The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950 Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate pro- ceed to th4 consideration of Calendar No. 829, S. 3745. The AC'H`ING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The bill will be stated by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: S. 3715, to mend and extend the Defense Production Act of 1950. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Is there, objection to the present consideration 61 the bill? There being uo objection, the Senate proceeded to coh.sider the bill, which was ordered to be engrossed for a third read- ing, was read the':third time, and passed, as follows: S. 3715 Be it enacted by tide Senate and House of Representatives of the united States of Amer- ica in Congress asseipbled, That sectl9n 303(b) of the Defen Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U'6S.C. App. 2093.) ), is amended by striking dut "June 30,'197,6-- and inserting in lieu they f "June 36, 1965". SEC. 2. The first sentenc :of sec,Yon 717(a) of the Defense Production`, Act. of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. ApP\,./216d(a)), is amended by striking out "Ju e 30; 1972" and inserting in lieu thereof dun 30, 1974". Mr. MANSFIELD,Ir. President, I ask unanimous cons to have},printed in the RECORD excerpt from 'the report (No. 92-M85explaining the p& poses of the measure. k -1 There being no objection, the' xcerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: PURPOSE OF THE BILL The bill would extend the Defense Pro- duction Act of 1950 for 2 years-from 14he present expiration date of June 30, 191, to June 30, 1974. The bill would also amen may be entered into concerning materials in the Defense Production Act inventory. GENERAL STATEMENT The bill would extend for 2 additional years, through June 30, 1974, the remaining temporary powers of the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950. These include power to establish priorities for defense contracts; power to allocate ma- terials for defense purposes; authority to guarantee loans made in connection with defense contracts; authority to make loans and purchases to build up our defense ca- pacity and assure supplies of defense ma- terials and to carry out existing contracts; authority to employ without compensation and when actually employed employees, in- cluding advisers and consultants; and pro- vision for the establishment of a reserve of trained executives to fill Government po- sitions in time of mobilization. The Act also establishes the Joint Committee on Defense Production. These powers are scheduled to expire on June 30, 1972. They must be extended. Some of the powers are needed now to maintain production schedules on missiles and all other defense contracts; others are needed for longer range preparedness programs; and other powers must be maintained in readi- ness for immediate use in possible future emergencies. The bill would also amend section 303(b) of the act to extend from June 30, 1975, to June 30, 1985, the authority to enter into commitments to purchase materials for the Defense Production Act inventory and sell materials already ontained in that inven- tory. The exte on of this restriction is important not ly from the standpoint of new purchases hick might be contemplated, but it is Grit' al from the standpoint of on- going disp I programs for the sale of ex- cess Gov meat contracts which would ex- tend b and 1975. The bulk of the remain- ing Tense Production Act inventory con- sist of materials which can best be dis- p ed- of through long-term contracts which markets with minimum disruption. The Gen- eral Services Administration would be pre- cluded from entering into favorable long- term agreement for the disposal of such excess materials unless this extension is made. The most recent amendment of this section was contained in Public Law 88-343, approved June 30, 1964, which extended from June 30, 1965, through June 30, 1975, the maximum period which these sales could be made. Hearings were held on two bills to amend the Defense Production Act, S. 669 and S. 1901, on April 12 and 13, 1972. Testimony was received from Gen. George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Prepared- ness, Hon. Elmer B. Starts, Comptroller Gen- eral of the United States, and other inter- ested persons. The committee voted unani- mously to report this committee bill to the Senate. PREVIOUS LEGISLATION The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub- lic Law 774, 81st Congress, 64 Stat. 799, 50 app., U.S.C. 207) was approved September 8, 1950. The original act contained seven titles: Title I. Priorities and allocations. Title II. Authority to requisition. Title III. Expansion of productive capacity tnd supply. Title IV. Price and wage stabilization. `Title V. Settlement of labor disputes. stat credit. Tit VII. General provisions. The arious titles of the act were amended, extended,,, or 'terminated by the following Public Law 69, 82d Congress, approved June 30, 1951 (65 Stat. 110). Public Law 96, 82d Congress, approved July 31, 1951 (65 Stat. 131). Public Law 429, 82d Congress, approved June 30, 1952 (66 Stat. 296). Public Law 94, 83d Congress, approved June 30, 1953 (67 Stat. 121). Public Law 95, 83d Congress, approved June 30, 1953 (67 Stat. 129). Public Law 94, 84th Congress, approved June 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 180). S 9697 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 20, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE thereby facilitated a responsible and in- dependent role for Congress. The main issue before the Nation is not ratification of the SALT agreements. The treaty and agreement, quite rightly, enjoy over- whelming support in the Congress and will certainly be approved, but the key question is what the United States should do respecting new offensive stra- tegic weapons systems not prohibited by the SALT agreements. What is there to the bargaining chip arguments as to induce Congress to authorize major weapons systems as bargaining chips? President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, quite properly, have forcefully stated the sincere view of the executive branch that rapid development of such new offensive strategic systems as the B-1 bomber and the Trident/ULMS subma- rine system are needed for national se- curity-and especially as "bargaining chips" for the next round of SALT nego- tiations. But quite significantly, Dr. Kissinger, speaking for the President respecting the relationship between the SALT agree- ments and the new arms requests, said: Our position is that we are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of na- tional security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs, and we hope that the Congress will approve both of these pro- grams as it examines each of them on its merits. In this respect, the President has left us free by untying our hands on the new weapons systems issue for the next 5 years. It is a tribute to the President, as well as to the Congress that he has chosen to do this, without of course sacrificing his own right of advocacy and persuasion. Together with some of my colleagues, I approach the need as well as the pru- dence of pushing ahead with expensive new offensive strategic weapons systems with concern and doubt. I shall, of course, reserve final judgment on each system respectively pending full investigation of all the pertinent considerations respect- ing each system. The reasons for my skepticism con- cerning the need to push ahead now with new offensive weapons systems, as well as my concern regarding the efficacy of such measures as "bargaining chips" for SALT II, found expression in Dr. Kissin- ger's own extraordinary briefing of June 15. On that occasion, Dr. Kissinger told us: But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal ad- vantages over an opponent, it no longer ap- plies. The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age . . . now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength. With modern weapons, a poten- tially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being over- taken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.... In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive.... There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal ad- vantage in local crises or in military com- petition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches. Later on in his briefing, Dr. Kissinger told us: As long as it-ABM Treaty-lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of suffi- ciency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive. Dr. Kissinger also told us: The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own. It is evident that the issue resolves down to the question of basic judgments respecting the best way to enhance our national security and strengthen the structure of world peace. As a Senator and member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am deeply gratified by the approach taken by President Nixon in the SALT agreements and in his attitude of partnership with the Congress. It is the duty of Congress to reciprocate and to join with the President in finding the best means to protect our security. Equally, we must respond to the offer of partnership by seeking a new stability of relationship between Congress and the Executive on national security issues. I hope the new partnership can be con- summated by enacting, with Presidential concurrence, the War Pow r Act recent- ly adopted by the Senat COMPREHENSIVE HEADSTART, CHILD DEVELOPMENT, AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT OF 1972 The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.). Under the previous agreement, the Chair lays before the Senate S. 3617, which the clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: Calendar No. 760 (S. 3617), a bill to strengthen and expand the Headstart pro- gram, with priority to the economically dis- advantaged, to amend the Economic Op- portunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes. ORDER OF BUSINESS The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The pending question is on agree- ing to the amendment of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DoMINICK), which the clerk will report. The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 16, lines 5 and 6, beginning with the word "which" strike all through the word "sponsor" in line 6. On page 18, line 8, beginning with the word "except" strike out through line 10. On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following new paragraph: "(2) In the event that a state has sub- mitted a prime sponsorship plan under sub- section (a) of this section to serve a geo- graphical area covered by the plan of an applicant under paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a), the Secretary shall desig- S 9699 nate to serve such .area the applicant which he determines has the capability of more effectively carrying out the purposes of this title with respect to such area." On page 20, line 4, strike out "(2)" and in- sert in lieu thereof "(3) ". The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The Chair will state that debate on this amendment is limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DoMI- NICK) and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) or his designee. Who yields time? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged against both sides of the bill. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. AMENDMENT NO. 1251 Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes and call up my amendment No. 1251. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The clerk will read the amendment. The legislative clerk read the amend- ment (No. 1251) as follows: On page 16, lines 5 and 6, beginning with the word "which" strike all through the word "sponsor" in line 6. On page 18, line 8, beginning with the word "except" strike out through line 10. On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following new paragraph: "(2) In the event that a State has sub- mitted a prime sponsorship plan under sub- section (a) of this section to serve a geo- graphical area covered by the plan of an ap- plicant under paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a), the Secretary shall designate to serve such area the applicant which he de- termines has the capability of more effective- ly carrying out the purposes of this title with respect to such area." On page 20, line 4, strike out "(2)" and insert in lieu thereof " (3) ". Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, the committee, in drafting the legislation which we have before us, foresaw and provided for the possibility of two or more local applicants seeking designation as the prime sponsor to serve the same area, insofar as the child development facilities may be concerned. What they did not do, however, was to make any determination, except by implication, as to what should be done where a State and local applicant also applied to be the prime sponsor in any given geographical area. It strikes me that, instead of setting up a predetermination, which the com- mittee bill has in fact done, to see that whenever there is an application by a local sponsor for a geographic area and by the State which would cover the same area, the local sponsor would succeed in this, what we really should do is give the Secretary the discretion to select, from among competing applicants, the one Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 6323 for its fine work toward the goal of im- proving the quality of education for all of our citizens. But, moreover, I think that this is an appropriate time to pay tribute to education itself. As a former educator I am familiar with the value that a good education has for our young peo e. I have no fonder memories than oft a times in my high school classes when I uld broaden the world of my studen with new knowledge and new underst nding. To be complete men and wome we must all try to expand our views of e world around us. We must learn tolera ee and understanding by becoming more Umil- iar with the hopes and fears of our n6jgh- bors. We must employ our talents knd abilities to the fullest possible extent by being better informed of the many op'. cency and honest scholarship we urge yo portunities which exist in our society. to publicly withdraw your name from thj Education is an invaluable tool in ` book and to dissociate yourself from ti{is achieving these necessary elements of insidious campaign. community, and since coming to Con- gress I have sought to do everything pos- sible to see that the good educational system in our country is maintained. HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 19, 1972 Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, last fall I agreed to write the introduction for a most interesting and significant book by Gary Allen entitled "None Dare Call It Conspiracy," which I will soon be bring- ing before you serial fashion in the RECORD. It explores the evidence for a concerted plan and pattern in the many reverses freedom, law, and faith have suffered in this century. This book included a prediction that, like virtually all others on this subject, it would be attacked by the Anti-De- famation League of B'nai B'rith-an or- ganization which, as William Buckley once said, itself frequently engages in defamation. This prediction was right on target, and the attack began with the letter to me which follows, together with reply : ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, June 1, 1972. Hon. JOHN G. SCHMITZ, Irvine. Calif. DEAR CONGRESSMAN SCHMITZ: We were dis- tressed to read your introduction to and en- dorsement of None Dare Call It Conspiracy by Gary Allen, and we hereby call upon you to withdraw your endorsement and repudi- ate this anti-Semitic propaganda book. Because you are a political scientist, we would have expected you to detect quickly the long discredited anti-Jewish charges that allegean insidious role being played by so- called "international bankers" which this book exhumes. Despite Mr. Allen's pitifully weak dis- claimer about anti-Semitism, his book re- vives anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1920's carried out by agents of the late Henry Ford, Sr. through the Dearborn Independent-- charges later repudiated publicly by M:r. Ford-and again revived in the 1930's by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the notorious radio-priest. We can only assume that you read the book too quickly or that you did not read it at all, a not uncommon problem plaguing very busy public officials who, too often, un- fortunately rely upon the judgment of others. As a political scientist, we urge you to check with Professor Carroll Quigley, of Georgetown University, whose writings are cited extensively in None Dare Call It Con- spiracy as being supportive of Gary Allen's thesis, whereas the exact opposite is true. The Birch Society's campaign to distribute millions of copies of None Dare Call It Con- spiracy is a very serious matter because the kinds of anti-Jewish lies contained in the Allen book have been used by hate groups throughout the world for more than 50 years to foster hatred of Jews. During the 1930's and the 1940's we saw the ugly consequences of such campaigns. Mr. HARVEY B. SCHECHTER, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Los Angeles, Calif. DEAR MR. SCHECHTER: Your let Dare Call It Conspiracy, ocgasioned by the fact that I wrote the Intro uction to it. is one of the most remarkable /confirmations of the book's thesis I have sen. For if you turn to pages 39 and 40, you /will read: The Jewish members of /the conspiracy all honest scholarship on ,ti ernational bank- ers and made the subject t4boo within uni- versities. "Any individual or 'book 'Vxploring this subject is immediately!attacked,by hundreds of A.D.L. committees.' all over he country. The A.D.L. has never: let =s r logic in- terfere with its hily al smear jobs. When no evidence is app ent, the A.D.L., which staunchly opposed o-called 'McCarthyism,' accuses people of be g 'lat- ent anti-Semitics.i Can you imagin how they would yowl a/id scream if someo a ac- cused them of beia9g 'latent' Communist? "Actually, nobody has a right to be n re angry at the hschild clique than th fellow Jews. T44ee Warburgs, part of th Rothschild empire, helped finance Adolf Hit- ler. There were' few if any Rothschilds or Warburgs in tie Nazi prison camps! They sat out the wa# in luxurious hotels in Paris or emigrated Ito the United States or Eng- land. As a gro p, Jews have suffered most at the hands of here power seekers." Gentlemen you are right on cue. Of course, I would not deny that some bigoted indi iduals might distort the facts and conclu ons in Gary Allen's book to fit their own Prejudices, just as they might do with manyjother books, As a Catholic, I have seen anti-Catholic bigots do this just as anti- Semites have done it. Gary Allen specifically warns on page 10 against those who "be- cause of racial or religious bigotry ... will take small fragments of legitimate evidence and expand them into a conclusion that will support their particular prejudice, i.e., the conspiracy is totally 'Jewish.' 'Catholic' or 'Masonic.' These people do not help to ex- pose the conspiracy, but sadly play into the hands of those who want the public to be- lieve that all conspiratorialists are screw- balls." But if the possibility of distortion is to be accepted as a reason for the suppres- sion of truth, then all of us are the losers. Insofar as you speak for one of the world's major religious faiths, going back to Abraham who is the "father in faith" for Christians, Jews and even Moslems, I believe you have a duty to make an objective examination of the evidence which suggests that many of the principal manipulators of twentieth cen- tury history are characterized by a deep and abiding hostility to any genuine belief in and worship of God and any attempt to live and work according to His commandments. My experience in public life has shown me that I have much more in common with be- lieving Jews than with the secular human- ists who have gained such a predominant position in our nation today. It would be rllost interesting to see with which of these two groups you find yourself and your or- ganization most often in alignment. There is not a word in Gary Allen's book which could possibly be construed by any reasonable man as an attack on any religious faith. Rather, he points out repeatedly that the conspirators of our time are dedicated to the destruction of all religious faith. Even for those who do not accept his thesis, the hostility of the dominant forces in the mod- ern world to religion is very obvious and should provide a solid basis for cooperation and alliance among all believers as against nonbelievers. Gary Allen and I and The John Birch Society and many others are ready and eager for such cooperation and alliance. We have not attacked your faith. Why then do you attack us? As for your objections to his thesis itself, it is a subject on which reasonable men may differ-but not one which you can reasonably claim to be "discredited." The arguments for it deserve to be considered on their merits. Your letter gives no indication that you haves done so. In fact, I can only describe your po- sition on the issues raised by this book as betraying a deeply entrenched intellectual bias of your own. In the interest of the hon- est scholarship to which you refer in your concluding paragraph, I would urge you and your colleagues to try to free your minds of this bias and then take another look at this question. . Jews and Catholics suffered and died to- gether in both Nazi and Soviet concentra- tion camps. You may have read of the recent beatification at the Vatican of Blessed Father Maximilian Kolbe of Poland, who was starved to death in a Nazi death camp after volun- teering to take the place of a young father originally i elected for the same kind of death. By your campaign against those who are making every effort to arouse the American people to the danger of totalitarian world conquest, you are making it more likely that similar horrors will take place here in Amer- ica. If this happens, those on what you call "the right" will be among the first victims- I sincerely hope, not with your approval. Yours very truly, JOHN G. SCHMITZ, Member of Congress. MASS INHUMANITY TO MAN- HOW LONG? HON. `WILLIAM J. SCHERLE IN THE HOU OF REPRESENTATIVES Monda June 19, 1972 Mr. SCHERLE". Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is dA, dy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" iQ wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dea ?" Communist North Vietnam is sadisti- cally practicing spirit al and mental genocide on over 1,600 A'srierican prison- ers of war and their families. How long? Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 6325 The ongoing U.S. deployment of Multiple indeed, in the new strategic environment cient shrouds over the advanced technology Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles the effect of MIRV systems is not to bolster of both sides may now be partially removed. (MIRY) on both Minuteman III and Posei- deterrence by hedging against a non-existent Even without local inspection, however, a don missiles is sure to maintain that advan- ABM system but to weaken it by posing a stringent prohibition against testing multiple gage for the period of the agreement; the threat to the survivability of land-based payloads could be verified reliably; since U.S. warhead inventory may well exceed ICBMs. Thus, in light of the guiding stand- neither side could maintain MIRV systems 10,000 by 1977. and of stable deterrence, both sides should and crews without frequent operational tests, Having flight-tested no MIRV system to perceive their common interest in seeking a this kind of ban would provide high, con- date, the Soviet Union can hardly convert its ban on MIRV systems. fidence that neither, was retaining such throw-weight advantage into a warhead ad- The potential centerpiece of SALT II could weapons. Elimination of large, "MIRV-able" vantage during these years. Even if they suc- well be a trade of the U.S. MIRV systems boosters would mean that any clandestine cessfully develop MIRV technology, only the now in deployment for a comparable number work on a Soviet MIRV would be futile, since larger Soviet missiles look promising as MIRV of Soviet missiles, including the gigantic there would be no significant force to carry platforms, and it is not realistic to expect a SS-9s which have caused such consternation. such payloads. complete replacement of their existing mis- Land-based forces might be phased down to In short, having forestalled the instabilities sile force with MIRV-capable boosters. Judg- 500 single-warhead systems, while the U.S. that might flow from large-scale ABMd de- ments may vary, but no one can doubt that Poseidon fleet could be converted to single ployment, the two powers could drastically Soviet acceptance of continued U.S. MIRV warhead systems, reduce the potential installibities on the deployment represents a concession of the The Soviets have been reticent about en- offensive side by precluding MIRV systems. first magnitude. tering a MIRV limit until they perfect the And such a measure could be enforced The Stough Soviet delegation made other technology, but skillful diplomats should be through precisely the kinds of test con- adjustments In its original positions, as did able to underscore the advantages Moscow straints they are relying on to verify com- the American team. The illustrations here would reap by foregoing MIRV development pliance with the ABM limitations. suffice, however, to highlight the fact that in return for a suspension of U.S. MIRV pro- ANTI-SUBMARINE WAREPARE SALT I began an important learning process grams before they are fully deployed and re- If limits on MIRV would enhance the sur- for both sides and persuaded each that its fined to pinpoint accuracies, The President vivability of the land-based deterrent, there own security required realistic consideration has stressed that U.S. MIRV systems are in- is comparable value in measures to reduce of the other's security needs. There were no tended exclusively for retaliatory purposes, the likelihood that sea-based forces will be- one-sided or disproportionate concessions. but the Sovhes must realize that unrestricted come vulnerable. This suggests that SALT II testing snthe future may push th e e technol- should give intensive study to controls over PRELUDE TO PARITY agy to such precise delivery accuracies that anti-submarine warfare capabilities. One can only appraise the achievements even relatively small U.S. warheads would A first and rt urgent goal would be to limit of SALT I by examining the agenda for jeopardize hardened missile silos. That pros- the number of urgent -oill wool be to s and hunter SALT II, the second phase of the negotia- pect is still some years away, but only con- other number forces to levels subm nine wand ASW tions which is expected to begin later this certed measures to inhibit MIRV testing and SLBM year. The true worth of the ABM treaty -and deployment can guard against it. the fleets. It may maximum be helpful to survivability yon of f the certain in- the five-year missile freeze lies in what Each side clearly has a greater interest in undersea sayvbelhelp systems, since cer in- President Nixon has rightly termed the "un- persuading the other not to deploy MIRV undersea sur ei the subs hinges teethe paralleled opportunity" they create. than it has in deploying such systems itself. vulnerability lir ability to evade detection. One impor- surrounding may damn the frenetic atmosphere So long as the United States persists in its that possibility would et c carve out por- surrounding the last hours of diplomatic ac- own MIRV deployment, It cannot hope to able areas it the oceans would be SLBM saoutsize tivity, although the issues resolved in those induce the Soviet Union to refrain from Simi- able areas ASW forces would nanctu ins final moments were relatively marginal ones lar weaponry. There is a powerful case for the trade. on which the options had been thoroughly United States to slow its MIRV programs and third major objective of the coming phase explored in advance. Arms control advocates to offer SALT II a chance to devise mutual re- A of arms control discussions ought to be e may lament the tardiness and scope of the straints on this provocative and unnecessary of arms come ban on nuclear ought to tests. strategic freeze. Yet the delay in setting the technology. There h growing confidence that national freeze may prove invaluable, because the MIRV is the principal qualitative innova- means of verification can monitor such an long and methodical diplomacy preceding it tion which might undermine the quantitative meraeement and the administration is actively has engendered a degree of mutual confi- limitations sketched by SALT I. Henry Kis- agreement the proposal. administration By inhibiting fur- toward which is indispensable to further steps singer has intimated that "questions of tech- considering the of warheads for either offur- toward reinforcing strategic stability. SALT nological change" will be addressed in SALT tier refinement or missiles, an end h oft under- at has made the cautious decision; the time is II. The ABM treaty not only facilitates such nucsive tests missiles, could contribute hand for bolder action, an effort; it offers vital precedents, for it -sive uor nd to other efforts told prevent ribur- desta- moved tight limits 'on ABM have virtually re- specifically establishes a number of qualita- gro marked yr okotheughs. moved the threats to stability which might tive limits on defensive systems. Under the bilizg and other options for arise from defensive deployments. The press- treaty, development, testing and deployment In SALT II a weighing cardinal rule of systematic armr ing need now is to curb the instabilities of rapid-reload launchers and multiple- control comes into play. It is extremely helps which might arise through offensive deploy- interceptor launchers are banned. Sea-based, col to have a broad and diverse set l rein- side's threatening the survivability of either air-based, space-based or mobile ABM com- forcing agreements, the violation Of of in- side's deterrent weapons. Ambassador Gerard Ponents are ruled out and radars are strictly forcing would ithe viola t to des any Smith stressed this point on May 9 when he controlled in numbers and characteristics. of quite sufficient destabilize Indicate told the Soviet SALT delegation that the Test activities are restricted to designated the h that one cauld e b other side s was acting in bad the follow-on negotiations should seek "to con- ranges and the upgrading of anti-aircraft tith. Conversely, compliance with a num- strain and reduce on a long-term basis systems is closely regulated. bar of interlocked arrangements would testify threats to the survivability of our respective All of these controls deal with qualitative ante to the continued deould ion strategic retaliatory forces." Both countries features of defensive systems. Parallel con- powerfully hi partners t the common edicatit enof well understand that, unless progress is made trols applied to offensive systems and moni- shrined n the ogteemcom. on this front, the ABM limits may not en- tried by the highly effective means planned As the two countries approach SALT It, ide a strong ld ro p v dure. for the ABM treaty cou they face a special hazard. Both sides may be Two central threats loom on the offensive barricade against destabilizing modifications so busy hedging against possible violation of side of the equation: (1) Highly accurate, of offensive missiles. the first accords-by all-out programs to multiple warhead systems which could de- A sensible course would be to limit future modernize their allowable missiles, subma- stroy land-based ICBM silos, and (2) develop- missile tests to perhaps 10 or 20 a year, rines, and bombers-that they will lose sight ments in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and to specify that there be no testing at all of the unprecedented chance to reduce their capabilities which might jeopardize the sea- of multiple warheads or penetration aids. need for such hedges. based forces, To convince the Soviet Union that the United, President Nixon has won some vindication The logic and the structure of the ABM States actually eliminates its existing MIRV for his thesis that he needs on-going strategic treaty open promising possibilities for co- boosters should pose no difficulty. Satellites programs to gain bargaining leverage in the ping with these problems. The prohibition of could monitor the destruction of Minuteman negotiations. But it would be tragic indeed if extensive defenses greatly simplifies the de- III silos, just as they could the SS-9 and that proposition were taken to warrant full- terrent problerri. No feasible attack could de- other complexes. speed ahead on a host of possibly superfluous stroy all oo' either side's retaliatory weapons; In the radically altered setting of joint programs. That tragedy can only become even a small fraction of surviving, single- planning for mutual security, it is conceiv- more likely if the administration feels com- warhead systems would be able to deliver un- able that the two sides can agree to more pelled to defend the agreements of SALT I acceptable damage to an attacker. intimate inspection to guarantee that Posei- by buying off its critics with promises of Thus, there is no longer any need for the don and analogous Soviet missiles are carry- major new weapons. United States or the Soviet Union to retain, ing only single warheads. The exchange of The United States certainly will wish to the option of MIRVing its boosters, since technical information and crew training ar- continue gradual improvements in its arsenal, MIRV is superfluous to deterrence in a situa- rangements for the proposed joint space but SALT I justifies a moderate, not an ac- tion where there are no defenses to penetrate. venture afford encouragement that- the an- . celerated, pace in this-realm. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 , E 6326 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 19, 1972 From the diplomatic standpoint, it is for- tunate that the planned modernization ef- forts take time; for example the Soviets could not reach their potential ceilings on SLBM deployment for several years. The U.S. Trident SLBM system would not go on sta- tion until late in the decade and the B-1 bomber, if approved, is some years away from operation. There is ample time to use them as bargaining chips, and absolutely no necessity to become wedded to them before diplomacy determines whether both sides can safely content themselves with lower hedges against some hypothetical future attempt to upset the equilibrium. The imperative task now is to sustain the momentum toward a reliable system of mu- tual security, a momentum which will be seriously threatened if either nation embarks on a campaign to pacify domestic criticism by intensifying the qualitative arms race. Nothing Richard Nixon has done speaks so well of his judgment and his courage as the beginning he has made on strategic arms limitation. If SALT II Is to fulfill the im- mense. promise of SALT I, the President's diplomacy needs-and deserves the confidence of the Congress and the country. He has earned it.,, jif HON. JAMES J. DELANEY OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 19, 1972 Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, so often we take for granted many of our national Institutions. For this reason millions of people were shocked to learn that one of America's great and revered insti- tutions, the Honorable James A. Farley, former chairman of the Democratic Na= tional Committee, distinguished prior Postmaster General, statesman, and a legend to legions, had been incapacitated by exhaustion and forced to rest in the hospital, Jim Farley has for so many years shared his wisdom, counsel, and insight with the Nation at large it somehow seemed he would go on and on, not even having time to rest. I know his great multitude of friends will be delighted to know that he is re- covering quickly and will soon resume his arduous schedule. In this connection, I would like to share with my colleagues a recent article by Ernest Cuneo concern- ing the hectic pace maintained "Genial Jam," which recently appeared in the Paterson, N.J. News. The article follows: How DARE FARLEY GET CHEST PAINS (By Ernest Cuneo) WASHINGTON.-A wave of indignation swept New York City, as it became known that the ubiquitous General James A. Farley, follow- ing a few pains in the chest, had ordered himself off to a hospital for an examination. It must be explained to outsiders that the health of General Farley, eighty-four this month, is regarded as the final proof that New York City is the healthiest city in the world, come hell, high water or smog, which, incidentally, frequently happens. Farley fans were quickly reassured, how- ever, as the burly giant from Grassy Point brushed aside the medicos to issue his own bulletins. He was feeling fine, he reported, but the doctors had insisted on a rest and, a reasonable man, he had met them more than half-way. He would confine his working day while in the hospital to a strict eight hours and utilize only two of his battery of secretaries. Incoming calls would be restricted to mem- bers of his family because, following the old Farley formula, if you receive one you receive all, and there's no point in tying up the switchboard of the hospital. He also agreed to restrict outgoing calls: this he has faithfully done, confining them to his famed-far-flung network of prominent Democrats, and confining his inquiries into the health of his beloved Democratic party. which, of course, has been in more or less failing health since Mr. Farley departed as its national and New York State chairman. The Hon. James A. noticed the pain in his chest as he prepared to go to a banquet. He has attended 105 banquets and 131 luncheons within the last 12 months, which is enough to give most people a pain just to think of it. :During this time, an average of 120 let- ters a day went out over his famed green-ink signature. At the end of this month, as he has for years, he will receive over 6,000 birthday cards from every state of the Union and every quar- ter of the globe, remarkably enough. Even more remarkably though, they will be an- swered on a first name basis. His record of personal thank-you letters still stands, and presumably will for sometime. More particularly, after the 1936 Presiden- tial Election, James A. satdown and dictated no less than 36,000 letters to the Democratic workers, precisely enumerating what each did and assuring each that his efforts made the total possible. This crash job wore out six secretaries; it was completed just in time to get out the Christmas cards. Let no man decry the power of the letter. On contributed volume alone, James A. Far- ley was entitled to hold his Cabinet office of Postmaster General. Actually, however, the general dates his success in politics to a sin- gle letter he wrote when he was a young Democrat in a Republican county. His town was about even when James A. became a candidate for town clerk, which he won by one vote. As the new town clerk made his way down the village street in the fall night, an elderly pillar of the Republican party accosted him. "Jim," he said, "I voted for you, because you were the only one who wrote us a letter of sympathy when our daughter died. I think anybody that much interested in other people would be good for the town -as its clerk" Well, of course, letters have taken Amer- ica's most prolific letter writer a long way since-and so has his interest in people. It is said of him that he is the only man who can walk from Seattle to Key West and never be out of hailing distance of a friend. The personnel is different, of course, but the patttern is the same; younger people come up to him and say, "Mr. Farley, you were my father's friend, and you wrote him when he was ill," etc. etc. The Hon. James A. Farley doesn't smoke, and pursuant to a promise he made his moth- er when he was a boy. he has never taken a drink, nor indeed, does he take the Lord's name in vain. All this adds up to proof that none of these are needed to be the merriest man and the warmest companion in New York City. Like Central Park, James A. Farley is a New York landmark, the living symbol of its open-handed and open-hearted tradi- tions. That's why everybody is a bit indignant at the general, in violation of his own ebul- lient tradition, getting a pain in the chest. Thousands, of course, have written him in conventional manner. This, perhaps, explains his terrific spirit, hospital or not; James A. Farley always feels well when there are moun- tains of mail to answer, and from the amount of it being delivered where he's at, it is per- fectly apparent that the U.S. Mails are about to receive another massive transfusion of James A. Farley's famous green ink. CAPT. ROLAND BRANI-AN OUT- STANDING POLICE OFFICER HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 19, 1972 Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to the memory of Roland Bran!, who died recently after having served as a member of the Cicero, Ill., police department for three and a half decades. During my postcollege days when I was a news reporter and columnist, I had occasion to cover the Cicero Police De- partment and local court sessions. It was during this time that I met and came to know Patrolman Brani. He was a sincere, dedicated officer of the law who moved from the bottom of the ladder in his de- partment to the rank of captain and then chief of detectives. He maintained this post up until the time of his death. One of the truly great tributes paid to him was by the International Association of Chiefs of Police which voted him one of the 10 outstanding police officers in the Nation. Certainly the best way to judge an individual and his professional worth is by the esteem in which he is held by those who are most closely asso- ciated with him in his field. Mr. Speaker, the town of Cicero has adopted a resolution which I insert in the RECORD as further recognition that Captain Brani served his community with great distinction throughout his long career. The resolution follows: RESOLUTION Whereas, the Good Lord Is his infinite wis- dom has chosen to take unto his fold Cap- tain Roland Brani, an outstanding member of the Police Department of the Town of Cicero for the past 35 Years, and Whereas, notwithstanding his-mild, friend- ly and modest nature, he was the recipient of the greatest respect of each and every man who served in his command, and Whereas, Captain Roland Brani, known by his many friendsas "Beef", had achieved an enviable record, second to none in the entire Nation, filled with feats of bravery, courage, wisdom and accomplishment in the finest tradition of American Law Enforcement, and Whereas, his reputation-as a "Law Enforce- ment Officer" was justly recognized and com- plimented when he was chosen by the Inter- national Association of Chiefs of Police, an organization comprising over 400,000 mem- bers, as one of the "Ten Most Outstanding Police Officers In The Nation", Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Presi- dent and Board of Trustees of the Town of Cicero, individually, and as duly elected representatives of the industrial, commercial and residential citizens of the Town of Cicero, and on behalf of the many Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Court Person- nel, Police Officers throughout the State, and all others who had the privilege of knowing or working with the "Captain," we offer his bereaved family our deepest and most sin- cere sympathy for the great loss they have suffered by his passing. Be it further resolved that Captain Brani will forever be in our hearts and thoughts and we shall be eternally indebted to him for the unselfish and total dedication of his entire self to the health, welfare, safety and betterment of this Community and all of its people, and "Our Captain Roland Brani" will always be remembered by the proud citizens Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9596 Approved. For Oelease ISNAZ14xEEEFP7 Q4 M1VR00040001001&Ae 19, 1972 in danger of becoming delinquent. There- fore, the training authority established un- der title II of the Juvenile Delinquency Pre- vention and Control Act has been retained. The committee also understands that YDDPA's responsibility for providing train- ing will cease when and if H.R. 45 is enacted into law. H.R. 45 would establish an Institute for,Continuing Studies of Juvenile Justice, one of the primary purposes of which is to provide training. The committee also recognizes the im- portance of the Federal role in providing technical assistance to State, local, and private agencies in the area of delinquency prevention and rehabilitation. The 1972 amendments retain the technical assistance authority contained in title III with the re- quirements that particular emphasis be placed on technical assistance relating to the development of juvenile delinquency plans. The special expertise developed under the act should be readily available to LEAA and to state planning agencies in the prepa- ration of comprehensive State juvenile delin- quency plans. The committee retains its concern about the administration of the 1968 act, partic- ularly with regard to the level of funding. The 1972 amendments provide for a $75 mil- lion authorization. However, the pattern of severely limited budget requests and appro- priations appears to be a continuing prob- lem. In fiscal 1972, for example, although $75 million was authorized, only $10 million was requested and $10 million appropriated. In fiscal 1973, although the committee's amend- ments contain a $75 million authorization, only $10 milion has been requested. In reporting the 1972 amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con- trol Act, the committee accepts the YDDPA program in its present form as a possible means for improving the administration of tion next year. Those committee members who supported a longer extension of the act were concerned about the difficulties of ad- ministering the program on a short-term basis. However, a majority of the committee is agreed that the 1972 amendments are no substitute for the vigorous national leader- ship, coordinating authority, and substantial resources necessary for an effective Federal response to the problems of juvenile delin- quency. The amendments were agreed to. The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed. FLAMMABLE FABRICS ACT-AU- THORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- TIONS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote by which H.R. 5066 was passed last Fri- day, and its third reading, be reconsid- ered, for the sole purpose of offering a technical amendment which is made necessary by the changes that were made in the bill by the floor amendments adopted by the Senate last Friday. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the bill will be stated by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows : H.R. 5066, an act to authorize appropri- ations for fiscal year 1972, to carry out the Flammable Fabrics Act. standard he promulgates for Children's Sleepwear, but the standard once developed will not wait for the routine twelve months delay for it to take effect. As a result of the action of the Senate, if joined in by the House, the standard for Children's Sleepwear will be effective not later than July 1, 1973. I commend the able senior Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CorroN) and the other able members of this body who worked with me to arrive at a solution to the problems confronting our nation's children arising out of the intrinsic flammable character of most fabrics. I am looking forward to the support of the members of the House and the responsible members of industry. The Secretary of Com- merce will need our support as he seeks an appropriate standard. If this effort receives the attention it deserves there should be a major improvement in the availability of flame resistant farbrics for all types of chil- dren's garments in the marketplace within the next few years, and at least for children's, sleepwear, an absence of any garment which does not meet an adequate test for flame re- sistance, after July 1, 1973. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 5066 be printed as it passed the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the hearings on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty start this morning in the Committee on Foreign Relations. They will be most im- portant, I think, to the future of this Nation, to the Soviet Union, and very likely to the rest of the world. The President has indicated that one of his principal goals is a generation of peace. I want to assure him that that is the goal of the Senate, the Congress, and the American people, as well. I wish to express the hope that the hearings will be gone into in detail and that then a favorable report from the Committee on Foreign Relations will be issued expeditiously so that the Nixon- Brezhnev treaty can be taken up on the floor of the Senate as soon as possible. If things work out, I would hope it would be possible to do so before we recess at the end of this month. If not, then certainly when we come back be- tween the two national conventions. The Senate proceeded to consider the bill. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: On page 1, after line 7, insert: "SEC. 2. That the Flammable Fabrics Act be amended by adding a new section at the end thereof, as follows. The amendment was agreed to. The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) I ask unanimous con- sent to insert a statement regarding the Flammable Fabrics Act amendments adopted by the Senate on Friday. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON the act, but does not consider this to be a comprehensive response to the delinquency crisis. At the April 28, 1972, hearings, a repre- sentative of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) testified that the youth service system is a worthwhile con- cept but does not present the total answer to the national problem of juvenile delin- quency prevention. The NCCD concluded that the low level of funding fo YDDPA as well as the emphasis on utilizing existing services assures that juvenile delinquency prevention will be an appurtenance to other program goals. In moving into programing youth services systems, YDDPA has relinquished responsi- bility for coordinating the current diverse array of juvenile delinquency programs. The need for such coordination remains. At the April 28 hearings, representatives of the De- partment.of Health, Education, and Welfare and LEAA testified favorably on the progress of the Interdepartmental Council. The Council, under the chairmanship of the At- torney General, has met regularly during the past year to review ways In which the Fed- eral effort might be made more effective. Since the Council appears to be a useful mechanism for providing communication be- tween Federal agencies concerned with juve- nile delinquency, the committee recom- mends the transfer of the annual reporting requirement regarding Federal juvenile delin- quency activities from YDDPA to the Inter- departmental Council. In reaching its decision to recommend a two year extension of the Juvenile Delin- quency Prevention and Control Act, the com- mittee had extensive discussion of how long an extension would be appropriate. Some members were concerned that the 1972 amendments might be regarded as a com- prehensive answer to the delinquency prob- blem of this Nation. They emphasized the need for continued study of the entire Fed- eral juvenile delinquency effort with a view toward enacting new comprehensive legisla- On Friday the Senate took a major step toward protecting our nations' children from the risks of injury by fire from childrens' sleepwear. Our amendment to H.R. 5066, adopted as amended by a vote of 65 to 0, directs the Sec- retary of Commerce to promulgate a flamma- bility standard for children's sleepwear to be effective no later than July 1, 1973, Under the procedures of the Flammable Fabrics Act routine standards are not of-, fective for one year after the date of their final promulgation. However the Act does contemplate some occasions when more rapid ma f fl Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD three editorials which were published in the Great Falls Tribune of Great Falls, Mont., under date of May 25, 1972, en- titled "Generation of Peace May 28, entitled "The Arms Treaty"; and June 6, entitled "Harnessing the Missiles"; and an article entitled "The Rationale for Defense Spending Grows More and More Irrational," written by D. J. R. Bruckner, and published in the Los Angeles Times of June 19, 1972. There being no objection, the editorials and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GENERATION OF PEACE am action is necessary. In the case o ity standards for Children's Sleepwear, sizes A "generation of peace," which President 7 to 14, the secretary is directed to utilize Nixon has declared is one of his principal the procedures of the Act in so far as prat- goals, may be assured it he and Russian Party ticable. This means that he will hold -hear- Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev agree on an arms ings and receive public comment on the limitation program. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 197J`pproved For Rc3 Sa?SSiONAI : CIA- D 74BFN 158000400010018-4 5 9595 authorized under title III are made, so that Prevention and Control Act. However, only Federal effort was coordinated and efficient. special emphasis will be placed on providing $15 million was requested and only $10 mil- The 1971 amendments also gave YDDPA an technical assistance in the development of lion appropriated. In fiscal 1971, $75 million additional year to prove its effectiveness in juvenile delinquency prevention and control was authorized, $15 million requested, and the fight against juvenile crime and to de- plans. Further, the requirement of making $15 million appropriated. From 1968 to 1971, velop a strategy which would efficiently cle- an annual report is shifted to the Interde- HEW requested only $49.2 million for opera- ploy the limited resources of HEW. partmental Council, established by the 1971 tion of the act out of a total authorized amendments, as a means of increasing co- amount of $150 million. The serious deficien- NEED FOR LEGISLATION ordination among Federal agencies respon- cies in HEW's administration of the Juve- Juvenile crime in this country has reached sable for juvenile delinquency prevention and nile Delinquency Prevention and Control crisis proportions in the past decade. Arrests control. The amendments also provide ade- Act are further demonstrated by the failure of juveniles for violent crimes have increased quate fiscal authorization for the operation of of YDDPA to expend the limited resources by 167 percent. Arrests of juveniles for prop- the act. appropriated. From 1968 to 1971, out of the erty crimes, such as burglary and auto theft, 33ACKGROUND small sum of $30 million appropriated, only have jumped 89 percent. Almost two-thirds '.'he Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and half, or $15 million, was actually expended, of all arrests for serious crimes are of young Control Act was enacted by Congress in 1968 The fiscal record of the administration of people under the age of 21. Our failure as a to help States and local communities the 1968 Act reflects HEW's limited view :?u nation to deal with this crisis is tragically strengthen their juvenile justice programs. the Department's role in developing a pro- clear. The recidivism rate for institutional- 'I'bis assistance was to be broad in scope in- gram commensurate with the delinquency ized delinquents Is the highest of any age eluding courts, correctional systems, police problem. Thus, the fulfillment of the oriV- group-between 74 and 85 percent. Many if agencies, law enforcement, and other agencies inal purposes of the act has been rendered not most adult criminals have a juvenile which deal with juveniles, and was to en- virtually impossible because of inadequacies record.. compass a wide range of preventive and re- both in appropriations and in admini.stra- Congress responded to the alarming in- habilitative services to delinquent and pre- tion. crease in juvenile crime by enacting the Ju- delinquent youth. The act also provided for One of the major problems In the admin- venile Delinquency Prevention and Control the training of personnel employed or about istration of the 1963 act has been the con- Act in 1968. The first 3 years of the act's to be employed in the area of juvenile de- fusion of roles In the juvenile delinquency operation were marked by administrative linquency prevention and control, and for field between HEW and the Law Enforce-- weakness and lack of direction. In extending comprehensive planning, development of im- meet Assistance Administration of the De- the act for i year, in 1971, Congress clearly proved techniques and information services partment of Justice set up under the Omni- indicated its intention to review carefully in ,he field of juvenile delinquency. The De- bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of the administration of the 1968 act. partment of Health, Education, and Welfare 1968. Under the Juvenile Delinquency Pre- At committee hearings on April 28, 1972, was charged with administering the act, be- ventlon and Control Act of 1968, HEW wa, representatives of the Department of Health, cause that Department was believed to have intended to provide assistance to states in Education, and Welfare testified on the prog- particular expertise in dealing with the pre- preparing and implementing comprehensive ress that YDDPA has made during the past ventive and rehabilitative aspects of delin- State juvenile delinquency plans. But LEAA. year in increasing its effectiveness. In defin- quency. with vastly larger resources than YDDPA ing the Department's role in preventing juve- 'the report accompanying the act clearly soon became dominant in the criminal jus- nile delinquency more clearly, YDDPA has sets forth the congressional intent that the` tico planning field. specifically concentrated its work on the de- act be administered as part of an integrated In an exchange of letters on May 25, 1971 velopment of systems which provide coordi- network of antipoverty, antislum, and youth the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney Gen- nated youth services as well as funds for ini- programs. The report states that the legisla- oral acknowledged the existing inadequacy tiation of needed services which are other- tion should not be just another categorical in coordinating the juvenile delinquency wise not available. Twenty-three youth serv- program administered in relative isolation activities of their respective agencies. The ices systems were started in fiscal 1971, and from much larger efforts such as the com- May 25 letters specified that each State YDDPA estimates that there will be 13 more munity action program, model cities, and the should develop a single comprehensive crimi- such systems by the end of fiscal 1972. Manpower Development and Training Net. nal justice plan which would comply with YDDPA also testified that the present act, Thus, Congress clearly intended that the pro- the statutory requirements of both the with its emphasis on state juvenile delin- grams administered under the act serve to Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets quency planning perpetuates the confusion coordinate all Government efforts in the area Act and the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention about HEW's role In the criminal justice of juvenile delinquency and to provide na- and Control Act. The Secretary and the At- planning process and in providing grants for tional leadership in developing new ap- torney General agreed thatHEW was to con- preventive and rehabilitative services. preaches to the problems of juvenile crime. centate its efforts on prevention and rehabil- It was in light of this testimony that the As the committee noted in the report ac- iiation programs administered outside the committee developed the 1972 amendments companying the 1971 amendments, the orig- traditional juvenile correctional system while to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and anal promise of the Juvenile Delinquency LEAA was to focus its efforts on programs Control Act. These amendments are de- Prevention and Control Act has not been ful- within the juvenile correctional system. De- signed to reflect the focus on youth services filled. The first 3 years of the administration spite this allocation of responsibility for de- systems which HEW itself feels would be the of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and linquency prevention to HEW, the minimal most effective use of its limited resources in Control Act of 1968 were marked by delay level of funding for the operation of the the juvenile delinquency area. The principal and inefficiency in implementing the broad Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con- amendment, the new title I, would encourage legislative mandate. More than a year and a trol Act raises serious doubts about the pos- the development of coordinated youth serv- half elapsed before a Director was appointed sible effectiveness of YDDPA in providing ices systems separate from the juvenile jus- for the Youth Development and Delinquency national leadership in the prevention of tice system through grants to public or non- Prevention Administration, the agency with- delinquency. profit private agencies. YDDPA is to serve as in HEW charged with administering the act. The problems of the role of HEW under the a catalyst to bring together resources from a To date, only one annual report has been Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con- broad range of public and private health, published, despite a legislative requirement trot Act should be viewed in the larger can- education, employment, and other agencies that such reports be made each fiscal year. text of the lack of primary responsibility in which would provide services to delinquents In this March 1971 report, YDDPA conceded any one Federal agency for all juvenile de- or youth in danger of becoming delinquent its own failure to implement the goals of linquency programs. Juvenile Delinquency and their families. YDDPA's funds will be the 1968 Act. With the exception of the or_ programs are presently spread among more concentrated on selected youth services sys- tion of the YDDPA budget s par- than 40 different agencies. There are no cen- tems to maximize fully the- impact on this pent on State tral goals and priorities to guide the plan- program. comprehensive juvenile delinquency plan- ning and development of these diverse and ning, funds were spread throughout the The committee believes that the adminie. country in a series of underfunded, scat- scattered programs. The national direction tration of the Juvenile Delinquency Preven- Lered, unrelated projects. The subcamreat- and coordination of delinquency programs Lion and Control Act has improves during tee fthat projects delinquency pro- envisioned by the Juvenile Delinquency Pre- the past year and can be substantially im- tee lound have not been a major vention and Control Act for HEW has not proved in the future by defining the scope grams priority of the engaged in that De artment. Department of Health, Education, and Wel- In P of its menttces in accordance with the 1972 rare even though it has had responsibility a response to the. clear need to develop amendments. Therefore, the committee ree- fer administering the Juvenile Delinquency more effective coordination of the Federal ommends repeal of the sections of the. 1968 Prevention and Control Act. j in the 1971 amendments to the uvenile delinquency effort. the committee act relating to grant authority for State This lack of priority by HEW has been corn- linquency Prevention and Control Actrestab- tive services. Underethet1972came dme its, riounded by the consistent failure of the De- lished an Interdepartmental Council consist- grants may be madefor preventive and re- ,)artment to request more than a small pro- ing of representatives of the major Federal habilitative services if such services are part ssortion. of the amount authorized by Con- agencies Involved In the area of juvenile de- of a coordinated youth services system and g ress for each fiscal year, resulting In piti- linquency. The Council was to meet on a are not already available in the community. fully small appropriations for YDDPA. In regular basis to review the efforts of the vari- The committee recognizes the great need fiscal 1970, example, $50 million was au- ous agencies In combating juvenile delin- for improved training of personnel working thorized under the Juvenile Delinquency quency and make certain that the overall with youths who are delinquent or who are Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 Approved Formf N0 ij~ff- 1N74 1ff000400010018-4 President Nixon's journey to Moscow al- HARNESSING THE MISSILES ready has succeeded in several significant The nuclear arms limitation treaty which areas. The delegations of the two superpowers President Nixon signed in Moscow May 28 have agreed to cooperate in.research on en- has been greeted with a favorable response vironmental problems. They also formalized throughout the nation but also has raised an earlier agreement for coordinated health strong opposition in many quarters. research on cancer, heart disease and environ- The treaty, which must be ratified by the mental health. It's encouraging that President Nixon and Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev are realistic enough to attempt to set limits on the nu- clear arms race. Each knows that the chances for peaceful coexistence in a troubled world will be enhanced greatly if the superpowers agree to establish a ceiling on both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. President Nixon and Party Chief Brezhnev know that the two nations now have a nu- clear capacity to destroy the world, that each power has sufficient intercontinental nuclear missiles to accept a devastating surprise strike and still have enough nuclear might to destroy the attacking nation. They know that the U.S. has an estimated nuclear capacity equivalent to 18 billion tons of TNT and that Russia has an estimated 19-billion-ton arse- nal of nuclear weapons. There won't be much left on earth if the weapons in the two arsenals are exploded. The best wishes of the entire world, con- cerned about the possibility of a nuclear holocaust if an atomic war breaks out, will rest with President Nixon and Party Chief Brezhnev. THE ARMS TREATY The nuclear arms limitation agreement signed in Moscow Friday by President Nixon and Russian Party Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev marks an historic milestone in world history. The treaty, if ratified by the U.S. Senate, may bring an end to the costly arms race in which both superpowers have been compet- ing for more than two decades. Without such a treaty, the two great nations will continue the shaky state of equilibrium called the "balance of terror," a state in which each nation has more than enough nuclear weap- ons to demolish the other within a few hours. Under the arms limitation agreement, each of the superpowers still is left with the abil- ity to accept a surprise strike and be able to retaliate with sufficient power to destroy the attacking nation. Military experts say the U.S. has nuclear warheads with the power of 18 billion tons of TNT and that Russia has a nuclear arsenal with the power of about 19 billion tons of TNT. The other nuclear nations, Britain, France and China, also have nuclear weap- ons so the total world nuclear tonnage is equivalent to more than 40 billion tons of TNT. Only two atomic bombs have been ex- ploded in war. The first killed 78,150 persons in Hiroshima, Japan, Aug. 8, 1945; the sec- ond killed 73,394 persons three days later when dropped by a U.S. plane over Nagasaki, Japan. The two bombs, each with an atomic power equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT, injured about as many persons as they killed and the effects of radioactive damage still linger In the two cities. The two bombs dropped over Japan are baby ones when compared to the giant nu- i t ti t 1 is nen a m i th d debated thoroughly in Congress in coming weeks. Many who are criticizing the agreement are saying that the pact gives the Russians an edge in the nuclear weapon field. Presi- dent Nixon answered such fears by saying that the nation will continue to be stronger than any other nation on earth. Opponents apparently fail to understand that each of the two superpowers has an overkill capacity almost beyond comprehen- sion. Each nation possesses the nuclear capability to accept a surprise attack and still retaliate with sufficient might to de- stroy the attacking country. Many fail to appreciate that war has changed so radically in the nuclear age that began at the end of World War II. In that war, the United States exploded a total ton- nage of bombs equivalent to 2 million tons of TNT-bombs dropped over a period of four years. Two of the 200 nuclear-tipped Minuteman missiles now deployed in Montana pack as much explosive fury as all the bombs we dropped over Germany and Japan in World War II. A Minuteman missile can race through space at 15,000 miles per hour and rain nuclear death on an entire city within a half hour from the time the signal is flashed in Washington, D.C. The Minutemen missiles In Montana have 100 times more explosive power than all the bombs we dropped in World War II. The Montana missiles are only part of the 1,054 intercontinental missiles in the U.S. arse- nal-which also include powerful missiles in our submarines-and giant nuclear bombs in our bombers. Military experts estimate the U.S. has a nuclear arsenal equivalent to 18 billion tons of TNT and that Russia's arsenal may be equivalent to 19 billion tons of TNT. . That's enough nuclear power to devastate the entire earth-a fact opponents of the arms limitation treaty may want to think about as they attempt to defeat the treaty. THE RATIONALE FOR DEFENSE SPENDING GROWS MORE AND MORE IRRATIONAL (By D. J. R. Bruckner) NEw YoRx-Early this year the Adminis- tration justified its increased military budget requests by arguing that it would need funds for new weapons if the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks failed. Last week it was arguing that it needs more funds for new weapons to give the Russians an incentive to proceed with SALT II and agree to a treaty limiting offensive weapons. Some congressional critics of the military budget have been trying to find a way to tie the arms agreements to the debate over spending, in an effort to cut funds, but the Administration could have ignored that S 9597 suggested to its constituency that security might be best achieved by disarmament rather than by armament. In fact, the chief U.S. arms negotiator Gerard Smith told the Russians on May 9 that an objective of the Salt II talks on offensive weapons "should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces." That means, in translation, that our safety lies in our un- restrained ability to bomb one another to hell. Mr. Nixon displayed his mastery of this weird language of the politics of war when he told the congressmen that the Russians told him that "they were going forward with defense programs in the offensive area . His conclusion was that "since they will be going ahead with their programs, for" the United States not to go forward with its programs would mean that any incentive that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow- on agreement would be removed." -Do you understand? This is all of a piece with the American threat to abrogate and ABM treaty if SALT II does not produce an offensive weapons treaty within five years. Henry Kissinger ac- tually argued in the congressional briefing at the White House that it was our deploy- ment of the Safeguard ABM missile that made the new ABM limitation treaty possi- ble. We are invited to conclude that, if one step up in the arms race made one treaty possible, another step up will make another treaty possible. The theory that an increase in military spending will encourage Russia to make more arms limitation treaties gains an illusory persuasiveness from the fact that there is an ABM treaty before Congress. But why would not a cutback in military spend- ing encourage the Russians to negotiate just as well? We do not know; we have never tried that method. The proposed $83.2 billion Defense Depart- ment budget includes initial funds for Min- uteman II and Poseidon missiles, a new B-1 bomber for the strategic arsenal, a new Tri- dent submarine to cost something more than $1 billion. Wonderful. In 25 years we have spent more than $1,000 billion on our war, machine. This commitment, we are supposed to believe, has persuaded the Russians to sign a treaty limiting additions to one part `off the machine; spending billions more to im- prove other parts of the machine will lead to another treaty. And then? If a new and different reason is needed to justify this increased military budget, you must expect that one will be found, treaty or no treaty. We have seen the unsettling spectacle of Admiral Thomas Moorer, chief of the Joint Chiefs, telling Congress that the military might withhold its approval of the ABM treaty unless the military budget for offensive weapons goes up. Defense Sec- retary Laird then issued a warning that the Russians are building multiple warhead mis- siles, although it turns out in fact that there has been no testing of such weapons by Russia and that the situation has remained unchanged all year. Then Laird was up in the Capitol arguing that the arms limitation agreements would be dangerous unless we be- come better armed. - e n ercon n clear warhea s siles Russia and the U.S. are able to launch . President finds some advantage in co-opting Interntaional affairs might be in fact as at 15,000-miles-an-hour speeds against tar- the tactic of his critics; it is probably a totally unreasonable, perhaps lunatic, as gets as far as 10,000 miles away. political advantage in an election year. these guys want to make us believe. But I President Nixon and the Russain lead- The rot set Into our thinking about the suspect there is another angle to this effort, ers know that if the nuclear weapons are military when Congress agreed 25 years ago a political angle. A storm will be stirred up in turned lose, no nation will win-that it will to eliminate the War Department and call Congress, but Mr. Nixon's treaty and agree- be a case of murder-suicide if one nation the new combined services agency the De- ment will be approved anyway, and he can starts such a nuclear war. fense Department. And last week the Presi- go before the voters as a victor in a tough President Nixon and the Russian leaders dent was telling more than 100 members of fight with a stubborn Congress. And Sen. rate a "thank you" from all nations for Congress at the White House that his aim Hubert Humphrey, in his California cam- agreeing to limit the nuclear race. President is to insure the "security" of the nation. The paign, demonstrated to the White House the Nixon is entitled to great personal credit for Russian leaders were telling their people the effective use of frightening people about any his efforts to obtain the agreement, one he same thing in one of those long, allusive, cuts in the military budget, convincing them has maintained is needed to assure a "gen- code-worded articles In Pravda defending that restraint is weakness abroad and a eration of peace." the summit agreements. Neither leadership source of unemployment at home. effort safely. The arms agreements and the budget are two quite distinct matters which could be handled separately. Evidently the Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 19, 1972 'he words are used in different ways now, of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will convinced that they played a role as they and the arguments sound different, but in then make a statement, and then it will be have up to this point, and will continue to fact, the condition of the war machine will open to questions to members of the corn- play a role in this very, very important field be a chief concern of this campaign as it has mittees who are present here. of arms control. been the chief concern of every campaign In order to facilitate recognition of Mezn- Now, let me go to the agreements, them- since 1940. hers, someone who knows all of the Members selves, and express briefly some of my own +,Ir. SCOTT. Mr. President, I merely who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate views that I think are probably quite familiar want to SCOTT. Mr. the statement just ely the question and answer period, but we will to you, but which I think need to be under- try to be just as fair as possible among the lined. made by the distinguished majority members of the committees and between I have noted a great deal of speculation leader that the hearings on the Nixon- the House and the Senate, and Clark will, of about who won and who lost in these ne- Brezhnev treaty began at 10 a.m. today. course, be responsible in the event it isn't gotiations. I havesaid that neither side won I hope that they can be conducted as fair. and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, expeditiously as is necessary for a full In any event, let me come directly now to if we were to really look at it very, very m own remarks, which will not be too ex- fairly, both sides won, and the whole world if we hearing. It could act td w on n this excellent treaty ty thing before tended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be won. presenting the Presidential views. He will he Let me tell you why I think that is im- we adjourn for the first of the two na- telling you what the President's portant. Where negotiations between lion l n..,,ve tior,s If not of course T participation _ great it between the conventions. But I hope we can do it. as the distinguished major- ity leader says, in the near future. '!'here is, so far as I know, no great, no massive objection to the terms of the treaty in any area of which I am aware. It is another way to bring about a better- ment of our chances for peace. It is an- other step in the search for peace. Mean- whle, other steps are going on with Mr. Podgorny in Hanoi, Mr. Kissinger in the People's Republic of China and, perhaps, Mr Le Due Tho in the People's Republic of China. 'l.'he number of nations interested in putting an end to this ulcer which bleeds away the strength of the North Viet- namese, the South Vietnamese, the United States, and its allies is, of course, of the greatest importance to all of us. It is the prayer of all Americans and. of people of good will everywhere that we find an end to this utterly miserable con- dition in which we find ourselves. We wish success to all who are engaged in this common search for peace. L11 AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last will express I have gone over with him in other loses clearly, then you have a built-in great detail, and I will stand by them. tendency or incentive for the side that loses I noted in the press that it was suggested to break the agreement and to do everything that I was calling down the members of these that it can to regain the advantage. committees for the purpose of giving you This is an agreement which was very a pep talk on these two agreements. Let me toughly negotiated on both sides. There are lay that to rest right at the outset. This is advantages in it for both sides. For that rea- not a pep talk and Dr. Kissinger is not going sons, each side has a vested interest, we be- to make you a pep talk either. lieve, in keeping the agreement rather than When I came back from the Soviet Union, breaking it. you will recall in the Joint Session I said I would like you to examine Dr. Kissinger, that I wanted a very searching inquiry of and the other witnesses, before the commit- these agreements. I want to leave no doubt tee on that point. I think you also will be about my own attitude. convinced that this was one of those cases I have studied this situation of arms con- where it is-to the mutual advantage of each trol over the past 31,~ years. I am totally con- side, each looking to its national security. vinced that both of these agreements are in Another point that I would like to make the interest of the security of the United Is Presidential intervention in this particular States and in the interest of arms control matter, Presidential coordination, due to the and world peace. fact that what we have here is not one of I am convinced of that, based on my study. those cases where one department could However, I want the members of the House take a lead role. and the members of the Senate also to be This cut across the functions of the De- convinced of that. I want the Nation to be partment of State, the Department of De- convinced of that. fense, it cut across, also, the AEC, and, of I think that the hearings that you will con- course, the Arms Control Agency. duct must be searching because only in that Under these circumstances, there is only way will you be able to be convincing to one place where it could be brought together, yourselves and only in that way will the Na- and that was in the White House, in the tion also be convinced. National Security Council, in which all of In other words, this is not one of those these various groups participated. cases where the President of the United There is another reason, which has to do States in asking the Congress and the Nation with the system of government in the Soviet to take on a blind faith a decision that he Union. We have found that in dealing with has made in which he deeply believes. the system of govenment in the Soviet Union, I believe in the decision, but your ques- that where decisions are made, that affect the tions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and vital security and in fact, the very survival others in the Administration for the purpose of a nation, decisions and discussions in of finding any weaknesses that you think in those cases are made only at the highest level. the negotiations or in the final agreements Consequently, it is necessary for us to have that we have made. discussions and decisions at the highest level As far as the procedures are concerned, as if we are going to have the breakthroughs you know, you will be hearing the Secre- that we have had to make in order to come tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the to this point of a successful neeotiation. head of the CIA, and of course, Ambassador The other point that I would make has Smith, in the sessions of your various com- to do with what follows on. The agreement mittees. that we have here, as you know, is in two I know that a number have suggested that stages: One, the treaty with regard to ABM Dr. Kissinger should appear before the com- defensive weapons; and second, the offensive mittees as a witness. I have had to decline limitation, the Executive Agreement, which that particular invitation on his part, due to is indicated as being, as you know, not a the fact that Executive privilege had to pre- permanent agreement-it is for five years- vail. and not total.- It covers only certain categories On the other hand, since this is really an of weapons. week the President and Dr. Henry Kis- singer met with approximately 130 Members of Congress to discuss and ex- plain the Moscow agreements on the Arms Limitation Treaty and Agreement. Because these talks encompassed such vital elements on these particular mat- ters, I ask unanimous consent that the President's statement, Dr. Kissinger's statement, and the question-and-answer session-all at the White House-be in- serted at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE WHITE HOUSE REMARKS of THE Pea,sr- DENT-'PHE STATE unprecedented situation, it seemed to me Now we are hoping to go forward with the DINING ROOM that it was im ortant th second t h d f p a roun e appear before o neotiations. That second Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning the members of the committee in this for- round will begin, we trust, in October. That a little late because I understand traffic is mat. This is on the record. means that we can begin in October, pro quite heavy around the White House this All of you will be given total transcripts of vided action is taken on the treaty and on morning due to the arrival of the President what he says. All of you will have the op- the offensive agreement that we have before of Mexico. We must go forward with the portunity to ask these questions and In the you at this time, sometime in the summer schedule, because there is a Joint Session, event that all of the questions are not asked months; we would trust before the 1st of as you know, today and we do want the mein- on this occasion, he, of course, will be avail- September. I don't mean that it should take hers of the committees present here today to able to answer-other-questions in his office that long, but I hope you can finish by the be able to attend that session. We will have from members of the committee as time goes 1st of September so we can go forward with to adjourn this meeting at approximately on, during the course of the hearings. the negotiation in October. 12:00 o'clock, or at best, five minutes after What we are asking for here, in other The other point that should be made with 12:00, to give you plenty of time for ques- words, is cooperation and not just rubber- regard to the follow-on agreements is not re- tions. stamping by the House and the Senate. That lated to your approval of these agreements. A word about the format of this meeting. is essential because there must be follow- It is related to the actions of the Congress I will make a statement, and then I will have through on this and the members of the on defense. I know there is disagreement to depart in order to prepare for the arrival House and Senate, it seems to me, must be among various Members of Congress with re- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R0004000100188-44 E 6324 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 19, 1972 ELT: THE ACCORD DESERVES OUR strategic weapons the first priority of the given the Soviets more than 80 missile- SUPPORT SALT negotiations. While a freeze then launching submarines by 1977, just as their would have set somewhat lower and more present pace of ICBM construction would advantageous ceilings, the Moscow agree- have produced by that year a land-based HUN. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER ments contain a reasonable approximation force alone in excess of 2,800 missiles. OF ILLINOIS of this objective-which was recommended The blunt truth is that no U.S. effort, even by an overwhelming majority of senators. on a crash basis, could have matched this IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES The proposed treaty limits anti-ballistic Soviet rate, launcher for launcher and boat Monday, June 19, 1972 missile deployment to no more than two sites for boat, during the five years governed by with a maximum of 100 defensive missiles the interim agreement. The Interruption of Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, Alton each, a force totally insufficient to weaken the massive Soviet building program is a Frye, a joint fellow of the Council of For- the credibility of either side's capacity to stupendous gain to American security and eign Relations and the Woodrow Wilson retaliate and hence to deter war. The interim international stability. International Center for Scholars has agreement on offensive weapons halts ICBM. Any genuine negotiation must produce written a number of studies on the deployments at the existing levels (about movement toward accommodation by both foreign strategies as 1,618 on the Soviet side and 1,054 on the parties. One can only gain a distorted pic- United States and American) and limits modern submarine- ture of the process by focusing exclusively well as foreign policy. launched missiles (SLBMS) to those now op- on the concessions made by one side. Yet He has written an extremely detailed erational and under construction (710 on the some commentators have done precisely that, article in the Sunday Star of June 18 in Soviet side and 656 on the American). implying that the United States has been too which he says: Unnecessary confusion has grown out of eager in conceding presumed advantages to Nothing Richard Nixon has done speaks so the provision permitting conversion of some the Soviets. As a partial corrective, one ought well of his judgment and his courage as the land-based missiles into sea-based weapons; to understand the numerous and substantial beginning he has made on strategic arms briefly put, the Soviet Union can build to a concessions made by Moscow in its deter- limitation. total of 950 missiles on subbmarines but only mination to promote a mutually acceptable if it phases out 240 launchers already de- balance. ? In view of the length of the SALT talks ployed, i.e., if it actually reduces its land- The-foremost issue on which the Soviet and the details that were considered as based force to 1,400 missiles or so. Union yielded is one which casts an utterly well as the need of the discussions, I felt In sum, the ceilings provided in the in- different light on the gross balance in ICBMs sure my colleagues would want to read terim agreement would permit the Soviets to and Strategic Land-Based Missiles. At the con- the splendid article by Mr. Frye titled, deploy up to 2,350 long-range missiles on outset the Russians had insisted with con- land and sea, compared with a total of 1,710 siderable justification that a fair definition "SALT: The Accord Deserves Our Sup- for the United States. It is the starkness of of "strategic weapons" would include all sys- port." this numerical contrast which suggests, at tems capable of delivering a nuclear attack The article follows: first glance, that the United States accepted on the homeland of the other party. In or- [From the Washington Star, June 18, 1972] less equitable terms than it should have de- der to facilitate a preliminary understanding manded. they reluctantly agreed to treat only long- SALT: THE ACCORD DESERVES Oua SUPPORT But these gross figures do not reflect the range missiles, excluding not only the U.S. (By Alton Frye) crucial dimensions of the strategic bargain strategic bomber fleet of about 460 planes Cynics say it is a typical American failing struck at SALT. Imbedded in that bargain but also the enormous number of forward- to know the price of everything and the are other commitments and detailed re- based systems maintained by the United value of nothing. This human frailty is se- straints which leave little doubt that the States in Europe and on aircraft carriers. rious enough in the routine exchanges of outcome of SALT is a decisive turn toward These latter types of weapons are unique everyday life. In the great transactions of greater security. It is remarkable how far to the United States, in the sense that Mos- international politics, the tendency can be these understandings go toward fulfilling the cow has no true carriers and no forward fatal to the most enlightened and essential U.S. conceptions of the requirements of bases from which to mount a strike on this undertakings. strategic stability. country with tactical flghter-bombers. The point comes to mind because of the The United States sought explicit confirma- What this means is that the Soviets have surprising reaction in some quarters to the tion that mutual deterrence would be the historic Nixon-]3rezhnev agreements to limit basis for erecting a stable balance. The granted the Americans at least for the short Soviets agreed. By curtailing ABM deploy- run, more than 2,000 additional aircraft strategic arms. The general enthusiasm for capable of devastating all of the Soviet this momentous breakthrough in the Stra- ment, both sides have ratified the principle Union west of the Ural Mountains. Further- tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) has that mutual deterrence depends on mutual more, the U.S. B-52s are being modernized been tempered not only by grumblings on vulnerability. They may not welcome the with the Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) the far right but by the disturbing response condition of reciprocal terror, but they rec- which will vastly increase the lethality of the of a few respected commentators and con- ognize the fact and acknowledge that force; each plane can carry 24 such missiles. gressmen., neither has yet conceived a safe way to alter And, expensive though they are, the B-52s it. . Crosby Noyes alleges in The Star that the The United States sought explicit accept- have demonstrated over Haiphong in recent agreements give Russia nuclear "superiority ante of the de facto "open skies" arrange- days that they can survive and function in on a silver platter." Seeking to ward off un- ments, through which satellites keep each the densest anti-aircraft environment yet justified euphoria. The Wall Street Journal side appraised of the other's strategic inven- tested in combat. wonders whether the accords should be ap- tory and innovations. The Soviets agreed. By Those who are tempted to toss off the sig- ' proved "anytime during a presidential cam- committing themselves to avoid interference nificance of the Soviet concession on th)s paign." Paul Warnke terms the agreement to with observation- satellites and other veri- point should ask themselves how we would limit offensive weapons "slightly worse than flcation techniques, and by foregoing delib- view an understanding which left the Rus- none at all," although he warmly endorses erate measures to conceal strategic capabil- sians with a free and unrestricted ride on the ABM treaty. Sen. Henry Jackson, D- ities from observation, the two countries have more than two thousand delivery vehicles, Wash., reserves his final judgment on the installed a necessary building block for con- each one of which is quite capable of de- understandings, but blasts the "comic opera" fident progress on more substantial arms ar- inolishing any city in the United States. Had procedures in Moscow and charges that the rangements. the Soviets been adamant in demanding im- agreements give the Soviets "more of every- The United States sought to test Russian mediate limits on forward-based systems- thing." acceptance of the principle of mutual deter- which play a dual conventional-nuclear role These are thoughtful and knowledgeable rence by demanding that the overall freeze in the NATO posture-SALT could well have observers. Their opinions will carry weight include a firm limit on the gigantic SS-9 collapsed. with many of their fellow citizens. But close class missile, weapons which have perplexed Clearly, SALT II and the coming confer- analysis reveals that the hasty critiques of U.S. planners because of their'potential ca- exces on European security will face hard the SALT agreements share a common fault: pacity to destroy American missile silos. The and complex negotiations on these systems They are preoccupied with short-term Soviets agreed. The interim agreement sup- and similar Soviet weapons targeted on balances which are totally inadequate to presses the number of supersize boosters to Western Europe, including particularly the measure the long-term investment in mutual around 300, a level well below the danger several hundred Soviet intermediate- and security which the United States and the So- point calculated by the Department of De- medium-range ballistic missiles, viet Union have now made. And even in fense. Another factor is central to evaluating the gauging the short-term balances, they badly The United States insisted that the freeze simple numbers of launchers controlled by misread the ledger written in Moscow. In ef- cover ballistic missile submarines, since the the interim agreement. The superficial Soviet feet the early criticisms of the Moscow sum- Soviet Union has been building such systems advantage in numbers and sizes of missiles mit overstate the price and understate the at a rapid clip (eight or nine a year) while is paired against a staggering American ad- value of what was done there, Let us see why the United States in the next five years will vantage in deliverable warheads. Roughly de- this is so. add no subs to the 41 it now has in service. scribed, the Soviets will have a three-to-one THE CONTEXT OF SALT In a decision critical to the success of the lead in "throw-weight" or megatonnage, In 1970 the Senate urged President Nixon negotiation, the Soviets agreed. Without such while the United States will have a three- to make a freeze on further deployment of a limit, the present building rate would have to-one lead in warheads. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 6323 for its fine work toward the goal of im- We can only assume that you read the Insofar as you speak for one of the world's proving the quality of education for all book too quickly or that you did not read it major religious faiths, going back to Abraham of our citizens. But, moreover, I think at all, a not uncommon problem plaguing who is the "father in faith" for Christians, that this is an appropriate time to pay very busy public officials who, too often, un- Jews and even Moslems, I believe you have a fortunately rely upon the judgment of duty to make an objective examination of tribute to education itself. others. the evidence which suggests that many of As a former educator I am familiar As a political scientist, we urge you to the principal manipulators of twentieth cen- with the value that a good education check with Professor Carroll Quigley, of tury history are characterized by a deep and has for our young people. I have no Georgetown University, whose writings are abiding hostility to any genuine belief in ' fonder memories than of t high school classes when I with new nding. To ce and understanding by becoming more YAmil- iar with the hopes and fears of our neigh- bors. We must employ our talents ',nd abilities to the fullest possible extent by being better informed of the many op' portunities which exist in our society. Education is an invaluable tool in achieving these necessary elements of adulthood. I am proud to have been a part of the educational system in my community, and since coming to Con- gress I have sought to do everything pos- sible to see that the good educational system in our country is maintained. HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ OF CALIFORNIA THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 19, 1972 Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, last fall I agreed to write the introduction for a most interesting and significant book by Gary Allen entitled "None Dare Call It Conspiracy," which I will soon be bring- ing before you serial fashion in the RECORD. It explores the evidence for a concerted plan and pattern in the many reverses freedom, law, and faith have suffered in this century. This book included a prediction that, like virtually all others on this subject, it would be attacked by the Anti-De- famationLeague of B'nai B'rith-an or- ganization which, as William Buckley once said, itself frequently engages in defamation. This prediction was right on target, and the attack began with the letter to me which follows, together with reply: ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, Hon. JOHN G. SCHMITZ, Irvine, Calif. cited extensively in None Dare Call It Con- and worship of God and any attempt to live spiracy as being supportive of Gary Allen's and work according to His commandments. thesis, whereas the exact opposite is true. My experience in public life has shown me The Birch Society's campaign to distribute that I have much morw in common with be- millions of copies of None Dare Call It Con- sieving Jews than with the secular human- spiracy is a very serious matter because the ists who have gained such a predominant kinds of anti-Jewish lies contained in the position in our nation today. It would be Allen book have been used by hate groups most interesting to see with which of these throughout the world for more than 50 years two groups you find yourself and your or- to foster hatred of Jews. During the 1930's ganization most often in alignment. and the 1940's we saw the ugly consequences There is not a word in Gary Allen's book of such campaigns. which could possibly be construed by any Mr. Schmitz, in the name of human de-.' reasonable man as an attack on any religious cency and honest scholarship we urge yolli faith. Rather, he points out repeatedly that to publicly withdraw your name from this the conspirators of our time are dedicated book and to dissociate yourself from t7N is to the destruction of all religious faith. Even insidious campaign. ! for those who do not accept his thesis, the We await your reply. hostility of the dominant forces in the mod- Sincerely, / ern world to religion is very obvious and Los Angeles. Calif. / have not attacked your faith. Why then do DEAR MR. SCHECHTER: Your let r of June you attack us? I to me regarding Gary Allen's /book None As for your objections to his thesis itself, it Dare Call It Conspiracy, oc9~sioned by is a subject on which reasonable men may the fact that I wrote the Introduction to it. differ-but not one which you can reasonably is one of the most remarkable konfirmations claim to be "discredited." The arguments for of the book's thesis I have se?n. For if you it deserve to be considered on their merits. turn to pages 39 and 40, you /will read: Your letter gives no indication that you have The Jewish members of ;the conspiracy done so. In fact, I can only describe your po- have used an organization palled the Anti- sition on the issues raised by this book as Defamation League as`,an ii$lstrument to try betraying a deeply entrenched intellectual to convince everyone thflt spy mention of the bias of your own. In the interest of the hon- Rothschilds or their alliq.4s an attack on all est scholarship to which you refer in your Jews. In this way they save stifled almost concluding paragraph, I would urge you and all honest scholarship on ddternational bank- your colleagues to try to free your minds of ers and made the subject tgboo within uni- this bias and then take another look at this versities. question. "Any individual or fbook""exploring this Jews and Catholics suffered and died to- subject is immediatelyiattacke4 by hundreds eether in both Nazi and Soviet concentra- of A.D.L. committees .all over 'the country. lion camps. You may have read of the recent The A.D.L. has neverr"let truth r logic in- beatification at the Vatican of Blessed Father terfere with its hi ly professiidpal smear Maximilian Kolbe of Poland, who was starved jobs. When no evi ence is app ent, the to death in a Nazi death camp after volun. A.D.L., which stau~ichly opposed o-called teering to take the place of a young father 'McCarthyism,' acc4ses people of be g 'rat- originally :;elected for the same kind of death. ent anti-Semitics.' Can you imagin how By your campaign against those who are they would yowl ajhd scream if someo a ac- making every effort to arouse the American cused them of bei~ig 'latent' Communist ? people to the danger of totalitarian world "Actually, nobody has a right to be more conquest, you are making it more likely that angry at the Rothschild clique than thkr similar horrors will take place here in Amer- fellow Jews. T e Warburgs, part of tho, ica. If this happens, those on what you call Rothschild empire, helped finance Adolf Hit_\' "the right" will be among the first victims- ler. There were/ few if any Rothschilds or \I sincerely hope, not with your approval. Warburgs in the Nazi prison camps! They Yours very truly, sat out the wad' in luxurious hotels in Paris JOHN G. SCHMITZ, or emigrated to the United States or Eng- Member of Congress. land. As a gro~p, Jews have suffered most at the hands of these power seekers." Gentlemen you are right on cue. Of course,/i would not deny that some MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN- bigoted indi*iduals might distort the facts HOW LONG? and conclusions in Gary Allen's book to fit their own Prejudices, just as they might do with many/other books. As a Catholic, I have HON,'ILLIAM J. SCHIiRLE seen anti-Catholic bigots do this just as anti- OF IOWA DEAR CONGRESSMAN SCHMITZ: We were dis- tressed to read your introduction to and en- dorsement of None Dare Call It Conspiracy by Gary Allen, and we hereby call upon you to withdraw your endorsement and repudi- ate this anti-Semitic propaganda book. Because you are a political scientist, we would have expected you to detect quickly the long discredited anti-Jewish charges that allege an insidious role being played by so- cailed "international bankers" which this look exhumes. Despite Mr. Allen's pitifully weak dis- claimer about anti-Semitism, his book re- vives anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1920's carried out by agents of the late Henry Ford, Sr. through the Dearborn Independent- ch:axges later repudiated publicly by Mr. Ford-and again revived in the 1930's by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the notorious radio-priest, conspiracy is totally 'Jewish,' 'Catholic' or "How is my son?" 'W wife asks: "Is my 'Masonic.' These people do not help to ex- husband alive or dea ?" pose the conspiracy, but sadly play into the Communist North 'etnam is sadisti- hands of those who want the public to be- Gaily practicing 5pirial and mental lieve that all conspiratorialists are screw- balls." But if the possibility of distortion is genocide on over 1,600 A'iserican prison- to be accepted as a reason for the suppres- ers of war and their families. sion of truth, then all of us are-the losers. How long? Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 should provide a solid basis for cooperation and alliance among all believers as against nonbelievers. Gary Allen and I and The John Birch Society and many others are ready and June 19, 1972Approved For CONGRESSIONAL ftEGOI~I3 745~iVA'1ff000400010018-4 S 9599 gard to what our defense levels ought to be. vital interests? Second, will they lead to a admit of resolution by victory in the classi- I think, however, I owe it to you and to the more enduring structure of peace? cal sense. We are compelled to coexist. We Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his col- In the course of the formal hearings over have an inescapable obligation to build leagues made it absolutely clear that they the coming days and weeks, the Administra- jointly a structure for peace. Recognition are going forward with defense programs in tion will demonstrate conclusively that they of this reality is the beginning of wisdom the offensive area which are not limited by serve both of these goals. I will begin that for a sane and effective foreign policy today. these agreements. process this morning by offering some general President Nixon has made it the starting Under those circumstances, since they will remarks on the agreement, after which I will of te United States policy Is s ssine 1969. be going forward with their programs, for the be happy to take your questions. point ch isaaAdministration's being polibacy on occas nally United States not to go forward with its pro- UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE grams-and I am not suggesting which ones 1970'S ciples of the classical balance of power. To at this point; you can go into that later- The first part of my remarks will deal with the extent that that term implies a belief but for the United States not to go forward U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these that security requires a measure of equi- right to validity. eh its offensive programs, or worse, for aments. The agreement which was signed tibonal nleader has the certain th the mortgage the United States s unilaterally to reduce its gree 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on survival of his people to the good will of offensive programs would mean that any in- the evening of May 28th by President Nixon e that the Soviets had to negotiate the and General Secretary Brezhnev is without another state. We must seek firmer restraints follow-on agreement would be removed. precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all on the actions of potentially hostile states It is for that reason, without getting into relevant modern history. than a sanguine appeal to their good nature. the specifics as to what the level of defense Never before have the world's two most But to the extent that balance of power should the offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that powerful nations, divided by ideology, his- means constant jckfit noa longer tort' and conflicting interests, placed their vantages over an opponent ,fit ap if we want the follow-on agreement, we have central armaments under formally agreed plies. The reason is that the determination to take two steps: First to approve these limitation and restraint. It Is fair to ask: of national power has changed fundamentally agreements; and second, we need a credible What new conditions now prevail to have in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the defensive position so that the Soviet Union made this step commend itself to the calcu- primary concern of most national leaders will have an incentive to negotiate a perms- fated self-interests of both of the so-called has been to accumulate geopolitical and mili- nent offensive freeze. That is what we all superpowers, as it so clearly must have done tary power. It would have seemed incon- want. for both willingly to undertake it? ceivable even a generation ago that such These are just some random thoughts that Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of power once gained could not be translated I had on this matter. I will simply close by the broad design of what the President has directly into advantage over one's opponent. saying that as one stands in this room in this been trying to achieve in this country's rela- But now both we and the Soviet Union have house, one always has a tendency to think of tions with the Soviet Union, since at each begun to find that each increment of power some of the tragedies of history of the past. important turning point in the SALT nego- does not necessarily represent an increment As many of you know, I have always been, and tiations we were guided not so much by the of usable political strength. am, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. As tactical solution that seemed most equitable With modern weapons, a potentially de- you , ws of that after know h e came the back great with tragedy of o his sty or prudent, important as it was, but by an cisive advantage requires a change of such was Versailles and u oNations, due underlying philosophy and a specific percep- magnitude that the mere effort to obtain to ineffective and the League h Senate due tion of international reality. it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-re- jected the treaty y and consultation, and rejected the the League. The international situation has been un- tat reaction to each other's programs of a d decade ago is in danger of being overtaken We, of course, not want that to happen. dergoing a profound structural r since by a more or less simultaneous and contin- have por think k that it will happen. We at least the mflation s The post-World W- uous process of technological advance, which have appreciated eciated the consultation we have II pattern n of relations among the he great pow- p had up to this point, and we are now going ers had been altered to the point that when opens more and more temptations for seek- this Administration took office, a major re- ing decisive advantage. I fo will with only say tgay- that in lati in l this ooking timate.what assessment was clearly in order. A premium is put on striking first and on will a defense to blunt the other side's Wilson said during that debate, when he The nations that had been prostrate in creating a capability. defense to In other words, mars was traveling the country, he made a very, 1946 had regained their economic strength foci additions power o cannot be de- ment. seemed to me, moving and eloquent state- and their political vitality. The Communist cisive. of pow decisive additions be d- ment. He said: "My clients are the children. bloc was divided into contending factions, sial additione. Potentially the quest for e ex- My clients are the future generation." and nationalistic forces and social and eco- tremely are destabilizing. The argument that arms This is an election year, and i realize nomic pressures were reasserting themselves are produce war has often been at arms exagger that in an election year it is difficult to move within the individual Communist states. races The nuclear has if overshadowed by as objectively as we ordinarily would move Perhaps most important for the United its peril . T. on any issue, but I would respectfully re- States, our undisputed strategic predomi- All this was in the President's mind as quest the Members of the House and Senate, nance was declining just at a time when d the new directions of American Republican and Democratic, to approach this there was rising domestic resistance to mili- he at mapped the outset of ecti Administration, in the spirit that Wilson explained in that tary programs, and impatience for redistribu- policy There was reason out t f this that the Soviet period when they were debating whether they tion of resources from national defense to might also be thinking the Soviet along should go forward with the League of Na- social demands. leaders lines the repeated failure of tong simil as Lions, remembering that our clients are the Amidst all of this profound change, how- attempts to gain marginal advantage in local next generation, that approval of these agree- ever, there was one important constant-the crises or in military competition underlined ments, the treaty limiting defensive weap- continuing dependence of most of the world's the limitation of old policy approaches. one, the agreement limiting offensive weap- hopes for stability and peace upon the ability The President, therefore, decided that the ons in certain categories, and also the con- to reduce the tensions between the United United States should work to create a set of tinution of credible defense posture, will States and the Soviet Union. circumstances which would offer the So- mean that we will have done our duty by our The factors which perpetuated that rivalry viet leaders an opportunity to move away clients, which are the next generation. remain real and deep. from confrontation through carefully pre- Thank you. We are ideological adversaries, and we will pared negotiations. From the first, we re- CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY A. in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable jetted the notion that what was lacking was KISSINGER future. a cordial climate for conducting negotia- We are political and military competitors, tions. Dr. KISSINGER. Gentlemen, the President and neither can be indifferent to advances by Past experience has amply shown that has asked me to present to you the White the other in either of these fields. much heralded changes in atmospherics, but House perspective on these agreements, and We each have allies whose association we not buttressed by concrete progress, will re- the general background, with the technical value and whose interests and activities of vent to previous patterns, at the first sub- information and some more of the details to each impinge on those of the other at numer- Sequent clash of interests. be supplied by the formal witnesses before ous points. We have, instead, sought to move for- your various committees. each possess an awesome nuclear force ward across a broad range of issues so that I will read a statement to you which we We created and designed to meet the threat im- progress in one area would add momentum will distribute. It is still in the process of licit in the other's strength and aims. to the progress of other areas. being typed. p licit hoped that the Soviet Union would In considering the two agreements before Each of us has thus come into possession acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of nego- the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of power singlehandedly capable of extermi- tiations and that it would become con- of available missile systems and the interim nating the human race. Paradoxically, this vinced that its interests would be best served agreement on the limitation of offensive very fact, and the global interests of both if the entire process unfolded. We have arms, the overriding questions are these: sides, create a certain commonality of out- sought, in short, to create a vested interest Do these agreements permit the United look, a sort of interdependence for survival in mutual restraint. States to maintain a defense posture that between the two of us. At the same time, we were acutely con- guarantees our security and protects our Although we compete, the conflict will not sicous of the contradictory tendencies at Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 aaa Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19,' 1972 work in Soviet policy. Some factors--such as the fear of nuclear war; the emerging con- sumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society- have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the United States. Other factors-such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic ef- fect of turmoil In peripheral areas-have prompted pressures for tactical gains. The President has met each of these man- ifestations on its own terms, demonstrating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which the two sides could communicate candidly and settle matters rapidly. The President was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of arma- ments in isolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions on military competition because they contribute little to the kind of .stability that makes crises less likely. In re- cent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accommo- dation of interests wtih the USSR, in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element. This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. it stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad under- standing about international conduct ap- propriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. The agreements on the limitation of stra- tegic arms is, thus, not merely a technical accomplishment, although it Is that in part, but is must be seen as a political event of some magnitude. This is relevant to the ques- tion of whether the agreements will be easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one can answer that question with cer- tainty, but it can be said with some assur- ance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumven- tion of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that It will be placing in jeopardy not only a- limited arms contml agreement, but broad political relationship. PRE. PARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS Let me turn now to the more specific de- cisions we had to make about what the agree- ment should do and how it could be achieved. We knew that any negotiations on arms control, especially ones Involving those cen- tral weapons systems which guarantee each side's security, were found to be sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high- level decisions. The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions of a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet rela- each approaching the anti-missile problem In the spring and summer of 1970, each from a different standpoint. The Soviets country put forward more concrete pro- wanted to protect their capital. The United posals, translating some of the agreed prin- States' program concentrated on protecting ciples into negotiating packages. During this our retaliatory forces. Both sides also pos- period, we, on the American side, had hopes sessed weapons which, although not central of reaching a comprehensive limitation. How- to the strategic balance, were nevertheless ever, the initial search for a comprehensive relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at solution gradually broke down over the ques- forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet tion of defining the scope of the forces to be Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate- included. range missiles able to attack our forward The Soviets believed that strategic meant bases and devastate the territory of our allies. any weapons system capable to reaching the A further complication was that the com- Soviet Union or the United States. This position of forces on the two sides was not would have included our forward-based air- symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given craft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet priority to systems controlled within its own intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe territory while the United States had turned and other areas. increasingly to sea-based systems. We opposed this approach, since it would The result was that they had a panoply have prejudiced our alliance commitments of different ICBM's while weessentially had and raised a distinction between our own se- one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, curity and that of our European allies. together with a more effective and modern We offered a verifiable ban on the deploy- submarine force operating from -bases over- ment and testing of Multiple Independent seas and equipped with longer-range mis- Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by siles. offering a totally unverifiable production ban, All of this meant that even arriving at a while insisting on the freedom to test, thus basic definition of strategic equivalency placing the control of MIRV's effectively out would be technically demanding and polit- of reach. ically intricate. At this juncture, early in 1971, with the Looking beyond to the desired limitations, stalemate threatening, the President took a it appeared that neither side was going to major new initiative by opening direct con- make major unilateral concessions. When the tact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the national survival is at stake, such a step SALT discussions and for that matter, the could not contribute to stability. The final Berlin negotiations, and providing progress outcome would have to be equitable and to could be achieved on these two issues, to ex- offer a more reliable prospect for maintain- plore the feasibility of a summit meeting. ing security than could be achieved without The Soviet leaders' first response was to the agreements. Insist that only the ABM's should be limited, With these facts In view, the President, and that offensive systems should be le7t In the spring of 1969, established a group of aside. But as far as we were concerned, the senior officials responsible for preparing and still incipient ABM systems on both sides conducting the SALT negotiations. were far from the most dynamic or dan- I acted as Chairman, and the other mem- gerous factors in the strategic equation. It bers included the Under Secretary of State, was the Soviet offensive programs, moving the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chair- ahead at the average rate of over 200 land- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director based and 100 sea-based missiles a year, of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the which we felt constituted the most urgent Director of the Arms Control and Disarma- issue. To limit our option of developing the ment Agency. ABM system without at the same time check- This group, called the Verification Panel, ing the growth of the Soviet offensive threat has the task of analyzing the issues and fac- was unacceptable. tors and submitting for the President's de- Exchanges between the President and the cisions those options which commanded sup- Soviet leaders embodying these views pro- port in the various departments and agen- duced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As cies. any workable compromise In the field must The Verification Panel analyzed each of the do, that understanding met each side's es- weapons systems which could conceivably be sential concerns. Since the offensive systems involved in an agreement. It compared the were complex and since agreement with re- effect of different limitations on our program spect to all of them had proved impossible, and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the it was agreed that the initial offensive set- resulting balance. It analyzed the possibili- tlement would be an interim agreement and ties of verification, and the precise risk of not a permanent treaty, and that it would evasion, seeking to determine at what point freeze only selected categories at agreed evasion could be detected and what meas- levels. ures would be available for a response. This On the defensive side, the understanding was done In various combinations so that if called for negotiations towards a permanent one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to a common conclu- sion. This left two major issues for the negotia- tors, the precise level of the allowed ABM's, and the scope of the Interim agreement, spe- cifically what weapons would be included in the freeze. Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The United States had virtually completed Its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were working on the second site at Malmstrom Hence was in terms of armaments in place and other components of a particular negotiating under construction; what realistic alterna- package. tives we had at the negotiating table; and Our aim was to be in a position to give how a tentative or partial agreement would the negotiations a momentum. We wanted compare with no agreement at all. to be sure that when stalemates developed, For various reasons during the 1960s, the the point at Issue would not be largely tac- United States had, as you know, made the tical, and that the alternative solutions strategic decision to terminate its building would be analyzed ahead of time and ready programs in major offensive systems and to for immediate decision by the President. rel Instead on ualit ti i y q a ve mprovements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or plan- ned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic mis- siles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally Five to ten years. At the same time, both sides were in the initial stage of strategic defense programs, SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS , we pro- posed freezing deployments at levels opera- In the first round of the talks, which be- tional or under construction, that is to say, gan in November of 1969, the two sides two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow established a work program and reached defense on the other. some tentative understanding of strategic The Soviets objected this would deny them principles. the right to have any protection for their For example, both sides more or less agreed ICBM's, a new formula was then devised al- at the outset that a very heavy ABM system lowing each side to choose two sites, one each could be a destabilizing factor, but that the for national capital and ICBM defense or precise level of ABM limitations would have both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the to be set according to our success in agreeing ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs on offensive limitations. of Staff, supported by the Secretary of De. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 9601 tense, decided that a site in Washington to nor the freeze of submarine-launched mis- the B--i is within the purview of the freeze defend the National Command Authority siles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not and since the ULMS submarine system is was to be preferred over the second ICBM- an American concession. On the contrary, in not, or never was planned for deployment protective site at Malmstrom, They reasoned both cases it was the Soviet Union which until after 1977. The agreement will stop that while a limited defense would not as- reluctantly acceded to American proposals the Soviet Union from increasing the exist- sure the ultimate survival of the National after long and painful deliberation. ing numerical gap in number lchers. which umeber of of i interp to the Command Authority, it would buy time PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT Finally, there are a against a major attack while the radars in I will not spend this group's time in further tive Congress along statements with hi the agreements. These both the NCA defense and the defense of review of the frequently arduous negotia- statements Initialed are Initialed in seveveraal l forms: deleg Agreed ICBM's would provide valuable warning. tions in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the Interpretations d Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the summit in Moscow leading to the final agree- by common a under- of National Command Authority in the event ment. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of agreed standings which were interpretations not or set down formally of a small attack by some third country or the President to Ambassador Smith and his and initialed, unilateral Interpretations to --even an accidental or unauthorized launch delegation, whose dedication, negotiating our position clear in instances where could not do tclea tin instances of a weapon toward the United States. skill and patience contributed decisively to make The President accepted their recommenda- the outcome. we ake In any negotiation total a this complexity, tion. Let me summarize the principal provisions which What about the offensive weapons freeze? of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty there parties willinevitably be agree. details made upon cwhich Early in the discussions about the Imple- allows each side to have one ABM site for the he statements agree. order We insure mentation of this portion of the May 20 un- defense of its national command a}ithority unilateral our positions these details was ire derstanding between the President and the and another for the defense of interconti- t our negotiating record and under- the leaders, it was decided to exclude from nental ballistic missiles. that that stood u o the nby the other side. the freeze bombers and so-called forward- The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, The agreed Interpretations and common based systems. To exclude, that is, the weap- or 800 miles apart in order to prevent the ons in which this country holds an advan- development of a territorial defense. Each understandings for the most part deal with tage. ABM site can have 100 ABM Interceptors. detailed technical aspects of limitations on We urged the Congress to keep this fact The treaty contains additional provisions ABM systems and offensive weapons. For ex- in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios ample, it was agreed that the size of missile ase for either rabase prohibit for ththee the defense e o off silos could not be significantly increased and weapons which are subject to the offen- which et of a radar effectively sive freeze, populated areas or the attainment of cap- that "significantly" meant not more than There was also relatively. rapid agreement abilities to intercept ballistic missiles by 10 to 15 percent. following the May 20 breakthrough that in- conversion of air defense missiles to anti- In the more important unilateral declara- tercontinental ballistic missiles would be ballistic missiles. tions we made clear to the Soviets that the covered. This left the issue of the inclusion It provides for withdrawal by either party introduction of land mobile ICBM's would of submarines. on six months' notice, If supreme national be inconsistent with the agreement. Since With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the interests are judged to have been jeopardized the publication of the various unilateral in- situation was as follows: The Soviet Union by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to terpretative statements, suggestions have had been deploying at the average annual ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates been heard that the language of the treaty rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles ones area of potentially dangerous defensive and agreement in fact hide deep-seated dis- and 100 sea-based ballistic, missiles a year. competition, but it reduces the Incentive for agreements. But it must be recognized that The U.S. had completed deployments of continuing deployment of offensive systems, in any limited agreements, which are be- Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces tween old time adversaries, there are bound in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are en- have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. to be certain gaps. gaged in increasing the number of warheads Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, In this case the gaps relate not so much ences in numbers are therefore not conclu- to the terms themselves, but rather to what on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched differ- missiles. We were, and are, developing a new save. it was impossible to Include. The interpreta- submarine system, although it cannot be The interim agreement on offensive arms tions do not vitiate these agreements, but deployed until 1978 or until after the end is to run for five years, unless replaced by a they expand and add to the agreements. of the freeze. In other words, as a result of more comprehensive permanent agreement WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN? decision in Bible with th the made time- the frame 0 1'x, of and the not protected rever- which will be the subject of further negotia- Taking the longer perspective, what can sable wimd tions, or unless terminated by notification we say has been accomplished? agreement, there would be a numerical gap similar to that for the treaty. First, it is clear that the agreement will against us in the two categories of land- and In essence this agreement will freeze the enhance the security of both sides. No agree- -based th re was issile meneteors shout whether an a oagreene- numbers of strategic offensive misssiles on ment which fails to do so could have been then wag agree. Wi thout - both sides at approximately the levels cur- signed in the first place or stood any chance nett, the gap would steadily widen. rently operational and under construction. of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to The agreement would not create the gap. For ICBM's this is 1054 for the United States gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic It would prevent its enlargement our aand 1618 for the Soviet Union. Within this field must be self-defeating. advantagesea-base systems In short, a freeze ve ICBMs and n overall limitation, the Soviet Union has ac- The President has given the most careful in the United States' ould be overwhelmingly cepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, consideration to the final terms. He has in the e baassic Statinterest. considerations undoubtedly the weapons most threatening to our strate- asked me to reiterate most emphatically this These bubteem gis forces. morning his conviction that the agreements impelled the recommendation on of the was e to There is also a prohibition on conversion fully protect our national security and our which Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze include the of lights ICBM's into heavy missiles. These vital interests. summand their support must are buttressed by verifiable pro- Secondly, the President is determined that possible alternative uwas based a crasystem, sh rash program The only for only building ldihe visions and criteria, specifically the prohibi- our security and vital interests shall remain tion against any significant enlargement of fully protected. If the Senate consents to explored e idea The missile silos. ratification of the treaty and if the Congress President Presidexplothis this idra with the Set The submarine limitations are more com- approves the interim agreement, the Admin- tary Chiefs of of f Staff, and and the the e Chief of Chairman Naval of the Joint - plicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to istration will, therefore, pursue two parallel Chi their claimed current level, operational and courses. Their pions. program wa firm judgment was that such a under construction, of about 740 missiles, On the one hand, we shall push the next pro- duce results was before 1976-that undesirable. It is, not some of them on an older type nuclear sub- phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks very end of projected freeze-and , toward othe by by marine. They are permitted to build to a with the same energy and conviction that building end of a erof submarine i similar only nl ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only have produced these initial agreements. ent a fleet, type d and of without mthe e our if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine- On the other hand, until further Arms 1980's and beyond. based missiles to offset the new construction. limits are negotiated, we shall push research tares current most needed for the many he The President once again used d his s direct This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and development and the production capacity channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to and some 30 missiles on some nine older to remain in a fully protected strategic pos- urge the Inclusion of missile-launching sub- nuclear submarines. Bombers and other air- ture should follow-on agreements prove un- marines in the offensive agreement. craft are not included in this agreement. attainable and so as to avoid giving the other After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet In sum, the interim offensive agreement side a temptation to break out of the agree- leaders agreed an principle at the end of will keep the overall number of strategic ment. April. Final details were worked out in Moe- ballistic missile launchers both on land and Third, the President believes that these cow between the President and the Soviet at sea within an agreed ceiling which is agreements, embedded as they are in the leaders. essentially the current level, operational or fabric of an emerging new relationship, can My purpose in dwelling at such length under construction. It will not prohibit the hold tremendous political and historical sig- upon the details of our internal delibcra- United States from continuing current and nificance in the coming decades. For the first tions and negotiations has been to make one planned strategic offensive programs, since time, two great powers, deeply divided by crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBMs neither the multiple-warhead conversion, nor their divergent values, philosophies, and so- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 139602 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1972 cial systems, have agreed to restrain the very 1977 without a freeze? Considering the cur- pressed concern about the agreements not armaments on which their national survival rent momentum by the Soviet Union, in both because they object to their terms, but be- depends. No decision of this magnitude could ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic cause they are afraid of the euphoria that have been taken unless it had been part of missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agree- these agreements might produce. a larger decision to place relations on a new ment can only be interpreted as a sound ar- But surely we cannot be asked to maintain foundation of restraint, cooperation and rangement that makes a major contribution unavoidable tension just to carry out pro- steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of to our national security. grams which our national survival should agreements on joint efforts with regard to Does the agreement jeopardize our secu- dictate in any event. We must not develop the environment, space, health, and promis- rity in the future? - a national psychology by which we can act fug negotiations on economic relations pro- The current arms race compounds num- only on the basis of what we are against and vides a prospect for avoiding the failure of bers by technology. The Soviet Union has not on what we are for. the Washington Naval Treaty and the proved that it can best compete in sheer Our challenges then are: Can we chart a Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which numbers. This is the area which is limited new course with hope but without illusion, collapsed in part for lack of an adequate po- by the agreement. with large purposes but without sentimental- litical foundation. Thus the agreement confines the competi- ity? Can we be both generous and strong? The final verdict must wait on events, tion with the Soviets to the area of technol- It is not often that a country has the op- but there is at least reason to hope that ogy? And, heretofore, we have had a sig- portunity to answer such questions meaning- these accords represent a major break in the nificant advantage. fully. We are now at such a juncture where pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confron- The follow-on negotiations will attempt to peace and progress depend on our faith and tation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet rela- bring the technological race under control. our fortitude. tions for a generation. The two great nuclear Until these negotiations succeed, we must It is in this spirit that the President has powers must not let this opportunity slip take care not to anticipate their outcome by negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit away by jockeying for marginal advantages, unilateral decisions. that he asks the approval of the treaty and Inevitably an agreement of such conse- Can we trust the Soviets? the Interim Agreement and that I now stand quence raises serious questions on the part The possibility always exists that the So- ready to answer your questions. of concerned individuals of quite different viets will treat the Moscow agreements as persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of they have sometimes treated earlier ones. as them here. Let me deal with some of the just another tactical opportunity in the pro- QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION AFTER A most frequently asked since the agreements tracted conflict. If this happens, the United BRIEFING BY Da. HENRY KISSINGER were signed three weeks ago. States will have to respond. This we shall Mr. MACGREGOR. Gentlemen, as the Presi- Who won? plan to prepare to do psychologically and dent indicated in his report to the Joint The President has already answered this strategically and provided the Congress ac- Session of Congress two week ago tonight, he question. He has stressed that it is inappro- cepts the strategic programs on which the places the highest importance on executiVe- priate to pose the question in terms of vic- acceptance of the agreements was predicated. legislative partnership in the further carry- tory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, I have said enough to indicate we advocate ing forward of the constitutional process either both sides win or both sides lose. This these agreements not on the basis of trust, with respect to the treaty and the agreement. will either be a serious attempt to turn the but on the basis of the enlightened self-in- This session this morning is designed to world away from time-worn practices of terests of both sides. This self-interest is further that commitment on the President's jockeying for power, or there will be end- reinforced by the carefully drafted verifica- part and to give to you and through you less, wasteful and purposeless competition in tion provisions in the agreement. Beyond the the American people, an opportunity for the the acquisition of armaments. legal obligations, both sides have a stake in fullest possible debate and the fullest range Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. stra- all of the agreements that have been signed, of questions. tegic disadvantage? and a large stake in the broad process of im- The President has asked me, and I would We reject the premise of that question on provement in relations that has begun. The like to do so, to recognize the Chairman of two grounds. First, the present situation is Soviet leaders are serious men, and we are the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on balance advantageous to the United confident that they will not lightly abandon Senator Fulbright. States. Second, the Interim Agreement per- the course that has led to the summit meet- Senator FuLBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Mac- petuates nothing which did not already ing and to these initial agreements. For our Gregor. exist in fact and which could only have own part, we will not abandon this course Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that gotten worse without an agreement. without major provocation, because it is in was an extraordinarily thorough and en- Our present strategic military situation is the interest of this country and in the in- lightening statement. The only regret I have sound. Much of the criticism has focused on terest of mankind to pursue it. is that he didn't make it public so all the the imbalance in number of missiles between PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE country could have heard it, because I think the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, it is a very great description, I think, of only examines one aspect of the problem. the President and General Secretary Brezhnev what these agreements mean. To assess the overall balance it is necessary signed a Declaration of Principles to govern I am thoroughly in accord with the spirit to consider those forces not in the agree- the future relationship between the United with which you have given them and the way merit; our bomber force which is substan- States and the Soviet Union. These Principles the President has presented this agreement tially larger and more effective than the state that there is no alternative to peaceful for our country. I have only one serious Soviet bomber force, and our forward base coexistence in the nuclear age. They commit question about it. systems. both sides to avoid direct armed confronts- There does appear to me to be an in- ''he quality of the weaponsmust also be tion, to use restraint in local conflicts, to as- herent inconsistency in the attitude as ex- weighed. We are confident we have a major sert no special claims in derogation of the pressed by the Secretary of Defense the other advantage in nuclear weapons technology sovereign equality of all nations, to stress co- day. For background, I will read one sentence. and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our operation and negotiation at all points of This is a quote from his testimony before the MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in our relationship. Armed Services Committee: "I could not sup- numbers of warheads and this lead will be At this point, these principles reflect an port the agreements if the Congress fails maintained during the period of the agree- aspiration and an attitude. This Administra- to act on movement forward of the Trident ment, even if the Soviets develop and deploy tion will spare no effort to translate the as- system, the B-i bombers or other programs MIRV's of their own. piration into reality. We shall strive with that we have outlined to improve our stra- 'l'hen there are such factors as deployment determination to overcome further the tegic offensive systems during this five-year characteristics. For, example, because of the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming pre- period." difference in geography and basing, it has emptive actions which have characterized the Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger been estimated that the Soviet Union re- Cold War, has made about maintaining our security quires three submarines for two of ours to Of course the temptation is to continue during the five-year period I accept as a be able to keep an equal number on station. along well worn paths. The status quo has general statement, but in view of the fact When the total picture is viewed, our stra- the advantage of reality, but history is strewn that we know the Soviets have no aircraft tegic forces are seen to be completely sufii- with the wreckage of nations which sought carriers whatever, they have a very small and cient. their future in their past. Catastrophe has not very modern bomber force, they have The Soviets have more missile launchers, resulted far less often from conscious deci- no forward bases similar to ours, unless you but when other relevant systems such as sions than from the fear of breaking loose consider Cuba perhaps a forward base. bombers are counted there are roughly the from established patterns through the inex- But so far, we have no evidence that it is same number of launchers on each side. We orable march towards cataclysm because no- being so prepared. They are not planning a have a big advantage on warheads. The So- body knew what else to do. The paralysis of Trident system that I know of. Their system viers have an advantage on megatonnage. -policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would of submarines is traditional and similar to What is disadvantageous to us, though, is surely destroy the world if we let it happen the ones they already have. the trend of new weapons deployment by the again in the nuclear age. In view of this, it seems to me to couple Soviet Union and the projected imbalance Thus the deepest question we ask is not the approval of the ABM and the interim five years hence based on that trend. The whether we can trust the Soviets, but agreement with Congressional approval of relevant question to ask, therefore, is what whether we can trust the Soviets, but whe- these vastly expensive programs raises a seri- the freeze prevents; where would be be by ther we can trust ourselves. Some have ex- ous question about our determination to Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74BO0AT 1 R000400010018-4 S 9603 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENE accept this agreement in the spirit In which he spelled out the reason why this had to press here? Anyway, the reservation I have is I think it was negotiated and the spirit be done in Moscow at such a high level, be- on this surveillance, our power to detect any which you have stated. That is a gradual cause it crossed over so many agencies and cheating. That hadn't been gone into here relaxation of the tensions, and not to use because of the form of government of the and it hasn't been gone into in other briefings these agreements as an excuse for a greatly Soviet Union. that I have been to, and I don't insist on enlarged arms system of our own. He also ended up by saying that you would any question being answered on it, but I This is the only thing that has bothered not be available for testimony on Capitol raise that point. me about them. I, of course, am personally Hill, in which I agree. But I just wondered, If you want to comment on it, you may. extremely pleased with the overall. agree- with the five committees who are represented I want to make this observation. I think that ments with the sole exception, do we mean here today, who are going to consider over we are more than doers out there in the it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, in the Senate side the Treaty of the ABM's Congress. We are not going to say just Yes r put yourself in the place of the Russians, and over on the House side this, the limita- the or Noon this, and to takeactivelposit ma for up our if we proceed immediately to a very large tion that has been set by you expansion of our weapons system, would this President, of September 1, whether you generations. not leave in the mind of General Grechko would be available by these committees for I believe that will help us approach it. Do and his colleagues a question about our sin- consultation as we go along. you want to comment on that detection and cerity in really moving toward a reduction ewith KISSINGER. committees delighted to in suDr.iKISSINGER. Well, I am sure that when members of would these be in the in the arms race. meet on an individual basis, or in the kind Mr. Holms testifies in executive sessions, This is the only question I have and it you groups, the one which bothers m me e and I wish you of setting that we have worked out before, that he can go into more detail than I can. In would enlarge upon the necessity of proceed- in which I will meet with the committees at fact, all I can do is to make the statement ing at once and tying these agreements with the invitation of the Chairman in some set- that we are confident that national means the approval of programs about which there ting that maintains the position of Execu- of verification are sufficient to monitor the tive privilege. numerical limitations of this agreement. were serious questions r before suques- agree- ment was made, , there e were e very serious qBut I will be fully available to answer any We studied this problem in great detail tions about the A-14 and B-1 before these questions and we are prepared to go as far before we entered negotiations, and deter- negotiations were agreed on, as is humanly possible with respect to Execu- mined for each category of weapon the mar- Now, we seem to be put in the position privilege. gin of error that we thought our collection being pressured into o that in order to o get get of an certainly, to make available to the Con- systems had and what we could do to react agreement with which I thoroughly in accord. gress any answers that we can. once we found out that there had been a Dr. KISSINGER. As the President pointed Congressman MORGAN. I want to assure you violation. out, and as I also said in my statement, Mr. that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will go In each of these cases, we found that the Chairman, we intend to move on two tracks: to work on this as soon as we get back from margin was well within tolerable limits. In One, we hope to start the second round of the Democratic Convention. this case, however, where we are dealing with SALT negotiations as soon as the Senate Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure we would like numbers, we are confident that the national ive ratifies the treaty and the Congress approves to hear from the Chairman of the Senate means of verification are sufficient nee that give t us the the highest est degree of lived confidence a that we the interim agreement. Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable us If the schedule that was tentatively sug- John Stennis. gested to you by the President were met, Senator STENNIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, and will know it almost immediately if it is not that is to say, approval by the end of August, colleagues of the Congress, I certainly didn't lived up to. we would hope to have the first session of come here to make a statement. I came to lis- Mr. MACGREGOR. The President Is aware the second round of SALT sometime during ten and to learn. I did respond when I walked that the members of the Joint Committee on October and then to begin the process again. In, to a request that I would say just a word. Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous We will pursue those negotiations with the Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, expertise which applies directly to the Stra- attitude towards bringing about a change in I have been on the Armed Services Commit- tegic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the in- the international climate that I have' de- tee since before we had ICBM's and I have terim agreement and we are delighted to see thought many times the growing realization the Chairman of the Joint Committee on scAbed. I had of what these could mean and now what Atomic Energy, the Honorable John Pastore, At the same time, the question arises s of they do mean in our hands and then this from Rhode Island. we In what posture should do g our national ee i- same weapon in the hands of our adversaries. Senator Pastore, do you have a question? tions. I while been ngage in these this Ad- So, I have been driven Into a corner of Senator PASTORE. Not exactly a question ministration bons. It has bethat we must he mucontinue continue roue these ese wanting very much to have some kind of an for the moment because I have asked it be- programs which preserve our strategic posi- agreement that would be the germ, perhaps, fore fhink and the I one think it has dominant been question answerbreded. I is tion. I do not, in this setting, want to go into of something that would relieve the tensions whether or not in these agreements we have each individual weapon system because I be- and assure our safety. whetve r or ourselves e the a regimen potehave lieve that the appropriate committees will I do have one major reservationabout this that will co ourselves a deterrent against an examine the Secretary of Defense and the situation I am going to mention, but I do attack upon fit, and also errent whether or not in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with believe if we can approve it, it is a start, consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff respect to them. maybe not much of a start, but it Is a start. they are all unanimous that this is a good Our view, however, is that we must con- That is the biggest thing I see about it. agreement. tinue those strategic programs which are I do have one major reservation about this Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, we would permitted by the agreement and those re- situation I am going to mention, but I do be- not have entered into this man, we if we search and development efforts in areas that lieve if we can approve it, it is a start, maybe thought it impaired our capacity for deter are covered by the agreement in case the not much of a start, but it is a start. That is rence. houg As was pointed out in my statement agreement cannot be negotiated. the biggest thing I see about it. r e believe tit maintains my the capacity Our experience has been that an on-going May I just respond one moment to the very w dbelieve that and at the same time, enables program is no obstacle to an agreement and, major point that the Senator from Arkansas the world to start toward turning away from on the contrary may accelerate it. That was made, about if we get these agreements, why the arms race as well as improving the whole certainly the case with respect to Safeguard. go on with the ULM's. I remember so well the nternationcl climate. We are in the position with respect to vari- ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The Secondly at every stage of this agreement ous categories of weapons that the Soviet most outstanding point in my mind, I was we consulted in the greatest detail with the Union has an accelerated program, and we convinced that the great probability was that Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed have none. Therefore, our position is that by putting in the ABM for whatever it was we are presenting both of these programs on worth, it might increase the chances of get- out, both throughout in m my the stateworkmofent, the but it it was Verification done one their merits. We are not making them con- ting some kind of a start on agreements. Pnel in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the ditional. We are saying that the treaty is Not that I have any perception, but as I a and at every justified on its merits, but we are also say- have understood, from the President at other decision that is President made, the In- ing that the requirements of national seen- briefings, they thought that was a major tecisional Security Council rity impel us in the direction of the strategic point in getting this. I do not know of any significant decision- programs, and we hope that the Congress This same reasoning applies, I think. I am I don't know of any decision with respect to will approve both of these programs as it going to support the B-1 and the ULM's and this agreement that was made which the examines each of them on its merits. frankly, I am going all of the way on ULM's Joint Chiefs of Staff have not unanimously Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure if the President now, even though I had in mind supporting it supported. were here, he would like to have recognized only for a limited amount this year, and not During the final stages of the negotiation the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs on an all-out program. in Moscow, we were in direct touch with the Committee, Chairman Morgan. I have in mind now, the statement you Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals Congressman MORGAN. Thank you, Clark, made, Dr. Kissinger, but I am not under its unfolded, and, of course, you will be calling and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger in inviting impact exactly, and I have said these things Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain us to brief us on it. because they were old thoughts. But It is. that he will confirm the unanimous support When the President appeared here in the quite helpful. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agree- short appearance he made before this group, By the way, is this an open meeting, is the ment. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9604 Approved For ~OM R%RA Y~ 749E0 a E000400010018June 19, 19 / 2' Mr. MCGREGOR. Yes, Congressman, push forward for authorization and construe- a precise characteristic is because un-. Congressman NEnzI. Dr. Kissinger, on tion of this system around Washington and doubtedly they are planning to modernize March 14, the President gave as a rationale how important Is It to the credible defense within the existing framework some of the for the broad safeguard system, part of his to which reference was made that we do pro- weapons they now possess. rationale, was the defense of the American ceed to authorize and construct this protec- The agreement specifically permits the: people against the kind of nuclear attack tion for the Nation's Capital? Will our posi- modernization of weapons. There are, how- which the People's Republic of China is tion be significantly weakened In terms of ever, a number of safeguards. First there is likely to be able to mount within the decade. future negotiations if we fail to take this the safeguard that no missile larger than the las anything happened to that threat, and step? heaviest light missile that now exists can be in that connection, are you able to tell us Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, we will request substituted. anything about your forthcoming visit to this authorization. Secondly, it was the judg- Secondly, there is the provision that the China? ment of our senior military leaders that a silo configuration cannot be changed in a Jr. KISSINGER. Our estimate of the Chinese second site in the Capital area would be significant way and then the agreed interpre- u.uclear capability is still approximately what more useful than a second site In Malstrom. tive statement or the interpretive statement it was at the time that Safeguard was devel- It would give additional warning time in which we made, which the other side stated oped. Our estimate of the likelihood of our case of a major attack and it would give reflected its views also, that this meant that being involved in any nuclear conflict with protection against an attack by a third it could not be increased by more than 10 the People's Republic of China is considerably country. It is for this reason that we are to 15 percent. less than it was at the time that the Safe- recommending to the Congress and request:- We believe that these two statements, guard program was submitted to the Con- ing the Congress to authorize its construe- taken in conjunction, give us an adequate gress, because of the political developments tion. safeguard against a substantial substitution that have happened since then, specifically Senator JACKSON. Dr. Kissinger, first I of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we the opening toward China, want to compliment you on a very fine think we have adequate safeguards with Therefore, we accept now that in the over- statement. I think we all want to see an respect to that Issue. all context of the contribution that this end to the arms race, but I think we all It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that agreement could make toward world peace should agree that if you are going to have within these limitations, improvements, and toward improving general relationships, an agreement it should be one that will qualitative improvements, are possible which and in the light, also, of improvement of re- stabilize and not destabilize. When you have will increase the capabilities of each of these lations with the People's Republic of China, a number of ambiguities such as we have missiles and this is one of the reasons why that we could pay this price of foregoing the in the present arrangement, I think it is we have advocated qualitative improvements additional protection that the President re- fraught with some trouble. in our strategic forces. But as far as the break quested in his original statement. For example, I just want to illustrate a between the light and the heavy missiles is `hie could do this all the more so because if couple: There are a lot of them. But we do concerned, we believe that we have assurances our estimates turn out to be incorrect., we have, for example, a bilateral understanding through the two safeguards that I have have such an overwhelming retaliatory capa- on the number of advanced strategic type mentioned to you. bility vis-a-vis any other country other than submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is de- Congressman STRATTON. Dr. Kissinger, I the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third fined specifically. But there is no specific have one question with regard to one of the nuclear country attacking the United States limitation other than our unilateral state- unilateral statements that was published the is a rather remote possibility ment as to the number of land-based mis- other day. Under the agreement, as I under- Congressman NEDZI. Didn't we have it three sales, intercontinental, that are permitted. stand it, we have 41 Polaris submarines and months ago? Would you comment? The same is true of we could go to 44 if we turned in our Titans. Or. KISSINGER. I was talking about the jus- "What is a heavy missile?" But the Soviets say that they are considering tification which the President gave when he Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the num- the British and the French Polaris sub- started the Sagefuard Program. I don't know hers of- missiles actually being deployed, the marines to be part of our force and that if what March 14th statement you are talking Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant the total goes over 50 they will consider the about. It must have been March 14, 1969. to specify precise numbers, that is true. We agreement breached. The British have four. Congressman NEDZI. My apologies, have operated with a number of 1618. There The French have one and three others in Dr. KISSINGER. It was not March 14th of is absolutely no question that if our intelli- constructton, which means that if the French this year. gence should reveal that the Soviet num- ones are completed, then we could only have Congressman NEDZI. I stand corrected, hers significantly exceed that figure that the 42 without putting it over the total of 50. Dr. KISSINGER. That was 1969. Then with whole premise of the agreement will be in Could you comment on how we can hold respect to my visit to the Peoples Republic of question, down the British and French as part of this China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Com- Now. what will maintain this agreement agreement? munique. It was tentatively agreed to at the Is not the fact that we can wave these pro- Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, the Soviet Union time of the President's visit to Peking that visions and take it to court at any partic- has not said that they would consider the sometime during the course of the summer ular moment, but what will maintain this agreement breached. The Soviet Union has Ave would send a senior representative to the agreement is the consequences the other side said that they would then reserve the right Peoples Republic. We intend to review the will face if it turns out that it has turned to whole range of international problems as they into a scrap of paper and that it is being Secondly, e additional compensation. c for d we have emphatically rejected affect American-Chinese relationships. circumvented. that interpretative recitation and have Mr. MACGREGOR. When I recognized Con- If this agreement were being circum- written our rejection of that into the record. gressman Nedzi. I was looking unsuccess- vented, obviously we would have to take So, we do not consider that we have agreed fully for the Chairman of the House Com- compensatory steps in the strategic field. But to this Soviet Interpretation. You have to mittee on Armed Services, Congressman beyond-that, as is pointed out in my state- remember the Interpretative statements are Hebert of Louisiana. I don't see Eddie, but I ment, the two countries have a unique op- in a number of categories. There are those do see the ranking majority Member of the portunity right now to move into an entirely that are agreed and initialed. There are Committee, and the Vice Chairman of the different relationship of building additional those orally agreed. There are those that are Committee on Atomic Energy. I would like to trust. unilateral and not challenged and then there recognize Congressman Mel Price. If it turns out that through legalistic in- are those that are unilateral and challenged. Congressman PRICE. Mr. MacGregor, Mr. terpretations of provisions of the agreement I would think that a unilateral statement Hebert has important business in Louisiana ofthrough failing to specify numbers about that was challenged at the time it was made today and could not be here. But I would like which we have left absolutely no doubt as would not be the most determining feature to advise the group that the committee will to our interpretation and where are hereby in our own policy with respect to this. mark up the Procurement Bill and all the reaffirmed, if it should turn out that those But, finally, the provisions that permit the items in there are going to be approved this numbers are being challenged in any signifi- afternoon. cant way at all, then this would cast a do not trading have of one type of missile for another have the . ve to be implemented. We have the enator BENNETT. My question is partly a doubt. It would not only threaten disagree- request for additional clarification. Do I un- ment, but it would threaten the whole basis trade in the e Titans for additional , but a't re the obligation, that Mr. Kissinger's statement will of this new relationship which I have de- ines and given our consttruction on roam derstand - be available to us as well as that of the scribed. ants aruc p b subma- at this moment, with no additional subm a President? We are very confident that our national rines of the Polaris type being built, we may Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct. means of detection give us the highest de- well decide not to exercise the option and Congressman HANSON. Dr. Kissinger, as I gree of confidence that these numbers car.- keep the Titans, in which case your question understand the ABM Treaty, it anticipates not be exceeded without our knowing and would be moot. the tai of each construction of the two site e at the capi- that If T ne Cnare exceededl that the conse- But in any event, we have not accepted "bO Now, with respect to the definition of Congressman PIKE. Dr. Kissinger, if I un- Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct. heavy missiles, this was the subject of ex- derstand the philosophy whereby one of these Congressman HANSON. With -respect to an tensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, agreements requires a treaty and the other ABM system to protect our Nation's Capital, and finally Moscow. No doubt, one of the Is an executive agreement, it has to do with is it the intention of the Administration to reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify the fact that the executive agreement is lim- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ited to a term of years. As we look ahead to SALT II, I would like to ask this question: For how long a period of years could an ex- ecutive agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years, for example? I would also like to ask a question in this regard: the tentative agreement was fairly well leaked or publicized in some manner be- fore the President went to Moscow. I would simply like to ask whether there were any substantive changes made at Moscow. Dr. KISSINGER. The first question is an im- portant Constitutional question: At what point does an executive agreement achieve character of such permanence that it should really more properly be in the form of a treaty? There were two reasons why the executive agreement was put into that form. One was because of its limited duration and secondly because of its limited scope. That is to say, here we had an agreement, the major cate- gories of which were going to be included again in a more comprehensive negotiation leading to a more permanent arrangement. For example, the disparity which is in- volved for a limited period of time might not prove acceptable for a more permanent arrangement. For this reason, that is to say, the limited duration and the limited scope, it was de- cided that an Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to the entire Congress, was more appropriate. If you got to the point where you made a 25-year agreement, I don't want to prejudge that issue, but as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, it would look more like a treaty to me. But I don't want to get into that. Now, with respect to the second question, the general outlines of the agreement were shaped, really, in three ways. One was by negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna, which did most of the detail. But the policy de- cisions that were brought about through di- rect contact between the President and the Soviet leaders which led to the May 20, 1971 breakthrough and then, again, to the for- mula which led to the inclusion of the sub- marines-which we were in Moscow there were four major issues that had not been resolved in Helsinki, which were known as issues, but the solution of which could not have been leaked because it hadn't been achieved. Those were the subjects that were most intensively discussed between the Presi- dent and the General Secretary, primarily the issue of how you calculate the submarine limits, and at what point the replacement of submarines has to Start, and which sub- marines had to be counted for replacement purposes, and questions of this type. There were subsidiary issues having to do with the silos, I mentioned interpretative statements, and matters of this kind, none of which had been settled in Helsinki, and had to be settled in very extensive conversations between the president and the General Sec- retary and between members of our delega- tion in Moscow and their Soviet colleagues. Mr. MCGREGOR. Senator Javits? Senator JAVITS. I would like to revert to the question asked by Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis, because they raise some, to my mind, very serious points. On the assumption that the treaty can be denounced in six months, but the agreement S 9605 systems to come within the next five years where we were talking about two sites, the that we are going to have to authorize be- Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of cause we have made this deal? Staff concluded that if there were to be two Dr. KISSINGER. First, I think it is not cor- sites, they would rather have the second rect to say that you have been asked to au- site around the National Command Authority thorize weapons because we have made this than in Malmstrom. Whether we could have deal. All of the weapons that you are being obtained Soviet acquiescence in two ICBM asked to authorize had been requested prior sites rather than having the second site in to the deal and were judged to be necessary Washington, we cannot judge today, because before the deal. The question is not whether we accepted the recommendations of our the deal impels them, but whether the deal military leaders that if there were to be a makes them dispensable. second site, that second site should be in This is the shape of the debate. Washington. Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the Congressman FASCELL. Dr. Kissinger, what withdrawal provisions of the defensive agree- does the protocol address itself to, and what ht it h brou hi s g c w ment. I thought it had the same withdrawal were the circumstance provisions. about; and, seco _dly, we know what is ex- It is my impression that the offensive cluded from the Interim Agreement and we agreement has exactly the same withdrawal know what we can proceed with in terms of, provisions of the defensive treaty, so that qualitative improvements because they won't we are protected. be deployed until 1975. What is it that the Thin-ly, as I have said, we are requesting Russians have excluded from the Interim both of these programs on their own merit, Agreement and what is it that the Russians t decide how to deal with them. Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to first express that in dealing with our two major adversaries, you will always be as skill- ful and successful as you have in skirting around the Executive privilege question. I think in the case of the treaty and the agreements, you have been, and the Presi- dent has been, and Secretary Rogers. My question pertains to the second allow- able site that each party can have. Neither one of us has even begun the preparation of those two sites. Neither one of us have either site in our original defense strategy plan. Is it possible that we could reach an agreement that neither one of us go ahead with those two sites and would we take the initiative in suggesting that might be a possibility? Dr. KISSINCER. The question of the defer- ral of the second site had been considered and had been rejected by both sides. The Soviet Union had taken the position that it could not agree to an ABM limitation that did not give it the right as long as we were in a position to defend ICBM's in which they could not also defend some ICBM's of their own. So, therefore, our failure to go ahead with our second site would, in effect, give them two sites to our one. The only possibility for us would have been to scrap the site we had and build an entirely new one in Washing- ton, and it seemed to us not a good policy to begin a disarmament agreement by which we had to scrap everything that we had done in order to build something entirely different from what we started out to do. Mr. MACGREGOR. If you have any complaint about this process, I am the one to complain to, but I have not identified to date the following hands, and I would like to recog- nize you in this order, if I may. Senator Ervin, Congressman Gubser, Congressman Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congress- man Frelinghuysen, and then we will go on from there. Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask this question. I think we had the wisest of all Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he said, "Beware of being lulled into dangerous security." My question is this: Wouldn't a ratification of the treaty and the approval of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all the more imperative for us to go forward with the Trident and with the B-1 bomber, and other programs to keep from being lulled into a dangerous sense of security? Dr. KISSINCER. That is the position of the Administration. cannot be denounced at all, it is is breached, either party can treat it as an end. What do you advise us to about the September 1 date the President names, if by then we have not determined that we wish to authorize any additional weapons systems in view of the fact that the President has made it clear that he made this agreement on the assumption that we, too, would press forward with our weapons plans as the Russians are? And the second part of that question is: Is this the total bill or are there more weapons Congressman GussER. I seem to get from ligence ys adequate to tell us when they are your remarks that we do, under the treaty, putting submarines at sea, and how many have the option of going ahead with Maim- submarines are under construction in the Strom instead of the protection of the Na- sheds at any given moment, there is some tional Capital. Is that correct or was that difficulty in defining the term "under con- possible at one time? struction." Dr. KISSINGER. This was considered at one If you start the process of "under con- time, and then when we reached a point struction" when the hull sections are being il provement that might not be deployed un after 1975? Dr. KISSINCER. The protocol came about because the submarine question could have been an extraordinarily complicated one, and the complicates s arose from this fact. We do not have a program for building missile- carrying submarines until 1978 at the earliest. The Soviet Union had been producing over the last last few years at the rate of eight missile-carrying submarines a year. It has built additional facilities which would en- able it nearly to double this production rate, although up to now they have used it mostly for the conversion cf older submarines into more modern types. But they do have a very substantial production capability. Therefore, a freeze on submarine con- struction was bound to stop a very dynamic Soviet program, and it was not affecting any on-going American program. Therefore, a formula had to be found which at one and the same time met our needs for some equivalent, and took account of the reality that the Soviet Union without this agree- ment could have produced at the rate at least of eight to. nine a year, so that over the period of the freeze, the Soviet Union could have built up to eighty to ninety sub- marines, that is an additional 40 to 45 to something like 43 to 44 they now have under construction. This was the situation we faced. So we developed a formula which enabled the So- viet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their present level up to 62, which is well short of their capacity, but only at the price of trading in some of the older ICBMs and some of the older missiles on earlier nuclear sub- marines, so that the Soviet Union has to trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to build up to this agreed level. So the submarine agreement has the dual advantage of stopping the Soviet program on construction well short of its capacity; and secondly, retiring for the first time by in- ternational agreement a substantial number of other missiles that we, in our annual statements, had been carrying as part of the Soviet missile force. So we needed a protocol to determine those things. Then there was the second question of at what level does the process of trading-in start? That is to say, at what point do you determine that the Soviet Union must trade in these ICBMs and older submarine mis- siles for newer ones. The ambiguity here Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S~ 9606 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1972 built, before they are moved into the sheds, zero defects and a third of a mile CPI. It is year and last year we saw a $6 billion in- you get a different figure than if you get the hard to conceive that they are obsolete or crease in defense spending requested and if figure In the sheds. Therefore, this was a sub- will be. the estimates given us by the Assistant Secre- ject of some complicated negotiation to de- Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to go into the tary of Defense Moot are correct, we can ex termine the level at which the trade-in technical weapons characteristics. I think pect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia. would start, which is, as expressed in the you will get more competent witnesses than I have seen before the tide was even out, communique, at the level of 740 ballistic me on that subject. before our committee, hundreds of millions missiles on submarines, which includes 30 Congressman FREYLINGHUYSEN. I am sure of dollars sought for additional spending in older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the we all appreciate both your presentation and the procurement bill for the betterment of level of 704 to 710 of the newer submarines, the question and answer period which you systems that were not part of your agree- 'I'bis is the explanation for this rather have given us. I would like to congratulate ment in Russia. complex calculation of the protocol. you on a masterful presentation, I think On three levels I am puzzled, one, sound Now as far as the Soviet Union is con- Clark is to be congratulated on the music economic policy which appeared to be both cerned, their bombers are outside of this that he has provided to supplement the centered in the White House as a concern system and theoretically they could start high points. prior to the present occupancy in the White building up their bomber force without be- My question gets back to this level of de- House looking toward the era of 1964 and ing, limited by this agreement. fense spending. The President and you both 1968, public confidence that has been led to historically, the Soviet Union has not put said you hoped for an earlier resumption of believe that somehow out of this whole busi- the emphasis on its bomber force that we the SALT talks. Assuming ratification of the ness will come a reduction, not an increase, have. Its operating procedures and expert- treaty, you didn't really answer Senator Ful- in the overall spending In the defense area, once is far below the level of our Air Force. bright's question as to whether the Soviets and in general, whether or not In going- to We do not consider it probable that they might not consider defense spending an in.. these talks you didn't have enough of an, will make a maior effort in that field, but dication of our sincerity or Insincerity. Do outline of questions in coming before Con- this is one field in which they could make you think that there is any chance that there gressional committee and members of the progress. is not an expectation. on the part of the Executive Branch did to be able to live this. The field in which it is most likely that Soviets with respect to defense spending that year with the procurement and appropria- they will make progress is in the moderniza- might jeopardize successful talks following tions bill as they were without adding to tion of the missiles that are permitted un- the ratification of the treaty? them in the way and with the timing I der the agreement. That is, they will not In other words, does the other side hook think has been chosen to do it. violate the numbers of the agreement, but our spending and our attitude towards de- I would like to have you address yourself they will improve the quality, accuracy, fense to further talks? to some of those considerations, particularly number of warheads and this is what will Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, this last round as a constituent might say to me "What do represent a threat to our strategic forces. of talks took nearly 21/2 years. So, even if the you mean it is going to cost more for de- Congressman LEGGETT. Doctor, I waist to talks start again this fall, they are likely to fense? I thought you fellows were negotiat- commend you-and the Administration on the be prolonged. We would expect that the ing for reductions in tensions and costs." I negotiation of what I think is an extremely first session will deal with general princi- think that is the problem most of us have. remarkable agreement. I have my reserva- ples rather than with detailed negotiating Dr. KISSINGER. It is our intention and con- tions that perhaps the Department of De- packages. viction that as these talks proceed into other fense is stampeding in the opposite direction, All the more so in the next round, we are areas that we will be able to bring about though, of the spirit of the negotiations. getting into the more complicated issues of a substantial reduction in defense expendi- I am concerned that in the bill that we how to control technological change where tures as a result of these talks. marked up yesterday in the Armed Services national means of inspection are not as relia- There are, of course, certain savings in Committee we increased the hard site Snrint ble as they are with respect to sheer num- the ABM program. What we are finding out nuclear program clearly outlawed as far as bers. is that the combination of certain trends deployment 100 percent. Now, there Is no question that the Soviet has produced requirements which are not We accepted the budget figures which had Union will judge our intentions in part by themselves the cause of the agreement, but a 900 percent increase in the ULMS or Tri- the level of our defense spending, for good or which have come to a head at about the dent program. Of course, the answer you evil, and that we cannot take the position same time by accident as the agreement. originally gave was that we needed this as a that our defense spending is irrelevant to One of these problems is that for a num- bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, our general political relationship. her of years we had significantly slowed down however, it seems to me we have successfully The question is: If we speed too little on the modernization of our strategic programs negotiated the limitation on the number of defense, if we create such a unilateral weak. so that our strategic weapons now were es- land-based missiles without an accelerated ness then we destroy their incentive to nego- sentially designed in the early 60s, while program, limited the submarine tubes with- tiate seriously. If we spend too much and those of the Soviet Union were designed in out an accelerated program. give them the idea that we are gearing up the late 60s and this has created a certain We perhaps have wasted several million simply for getting a tremendous spurt to get technological requirement. dollars in tha ABM program in making that a ahead of them, then we create the other This is the reason for this additional ex- bargaining chip and aren't we perhaps doing problem. penditure. This other figure for Southeast the same thing in developing the big bar- So our problem is to get our defense ex- Asia that you mentioned is a projection for- gaining things which obviously will never be penditures at a level that does not create a ward of current rates and may or may not be deployed if you are successful in your ne- unilateral weakness and give them pressure necessary, depending on how long current gotiating program? for agreement but does not get us into an rates are being sustained. Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: One, area where it had the counter-productive Congressman HARRINGTON. I am quoting it is not easy to prove the motivations of the tendency of generating a new round on their Assistant Secretary Moot. other side in making an agreement. I would side. Dr. KlssINGER. I know and he projected think it probable however that we could not We believe that we are navigating that them forward over a period of months which have negotiated the limitations on offensive course. But it Is a serious question and it may or may not be necessary because he was weapons if it had not been linked to the is a serious problem and we have to be alert being proper with the Congress by giving his limitations on defensive weapons and to their to both of these dangers. best estimate, but he was projecting current desire of stopping the deployment of the ABM Mr. MACGREGOR. John Hunt wishes to make expenditure rates. system. a statement in explanation for the departure If there were negotiations, for example, if So, what drove these negotiations for the of a number of members of Congress. the offensive slows down, there are many fac- first year was their desire to limit our ABM Congressman HUNT. Let me thank you for tors that could affect this. I am just trying deployment. And it was not until we insisted the clear and concise explanation of your to give you an idea. that we could not agree to an ABM treaty mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Thirdly, the Increase in the defense spend- without offensive limitations that they re- Services Committee, you will notice some of Ing has been caused to a considerable extent luctantly Included the offensive limitations, us are leaving. It is not because of any dis- also by military pay increaess which now Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if courtesy to you, sir, or because we are not consume about 54 percent of our defense we are successful in the negotiations that it interested, budget. I have seen a chart-I think the is very likely we will deploy ULMS and Tri- The fact is we have a conflicting schedule Secretary of Defense can do it much better dent and then retire a similar number of the of subcommittees that are getting ready for than I-that shows what the present defense older submarines, use them for replacement an important mark-up of the legislation this establishment would cost if the pay scales purposes rather than additions to the cur- afternoon in the absence of Mr. Hebert. were still those of eight or 10 years ago. rent submarine fleet. So, if you permit me for a moment to ex- So, it is a combination of these factors So, I cannot fully accept the assumption plain, that is the reason they are leaving, that have produced the increase of defense that they will not be deployed. What would Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you. I thought they costs while forces have actually been shrink- almost certainly happen though If an agree- were like my Harvard students. (Laughter.) ing. ment were successful is a substantial re- Congressman HARRINGTON. At the risk of Senator COOPER. I would like to join with placement of the older Polaris boats. being repetitive, to follow on Congressman others in thanking you and showing appre- Congressman LEGGETT. Of course, those old- Freylinghusen's question and Senator Ful- elation for your very fine statement. er Polaris are a quarter billion dollars a piece, bright's question, I am puzzled that this The first question I will ask is not one Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 19, 1972 ' ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE that I suggest myself, but it was asked the day the agreement was announced. I am sorry Senator Jackson is not here, but he wouldn't mind my saying he asked the ques- tion. Are there any other understandings, se- cret understandings, which have not been made public or will not be made public? I think we will be asked, and it is just as well to ask it now. Dr. KISSINGER. There are no secret under- standings. We have submitted to the Con- gress the list of all the significant agree- ments and interpretive statements, and so forth. What we have not done is to go through the record to see whether Ambassa- dor Smith might have said something that they interpreted in a certain way, and this is why we put on the qualification "signifi- cant", because otherwise we would have to submit the entire record. According to the best of our judgment, there are no secret understandings, and all the significant interpretive statements have been submitted to the Congress. Senator COOPER. May I ask one more ques- tion? I notice in your explanation, it is said that the United States asked for a prohibi- tion on mobile land-based missiles. You lat- er withdrew that. But you did say that if the Soviet Union went ahead with deploy- ment, you would consider it serious enough to break the agreement. Is the Soviet Union going ahead with mobile land-based mis- siles? Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make one other comment with respect to the first thing about secret understandings. There are, of course, in the discussions, general statements of intentions. For exam- ple, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I have also said here publicly on the record: that the option of converting the Titans into submarines, given our present construction program, was not something we would nec- essarily carry out. But we do not consider that as a secret agreement, that sort of thing. This was simply a statement of general uni- lateral intentions. Now, with respect to the land-based mo- bile missiles, we have made an interpretive statement according to which the deploy- ment of land-based mobile missiles would be inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement. Then this raises the question of whether our national means of verification are adequate to monitor this. The national means of verification are adequate to monitor over a period of time whether a land-based mobile missile is being deployed. The margin of error with respect to total numbers would be great, if you have a margin of error of five percent, and I am giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 1,9 percent with respect to mobile missiles. But the fact of the matter is, what we have to monitor is not total numbers of land mobile missiles; what we have to mon- itor is the fact that they are deploying any of them. We are quite confident that within a reasonable period of time after the initial deployment, and maybe not in the first month, but over a three- to four-month pe- riod, and well before they can develop a substantial capability, we will be able to tell whether they have deployed a land mobile missile and we can draw the appropriate conclusions. So as to the fact of deploying a land mo- bile missile, we are confident that we will discover it well before they could deploy enough to have any effect. Congressman MONAOAN. Dr. Kissinger, you have said that these agreements, our confidence in them, is not based on trust, but enlightened self-interest, and yet I think you would agree with any bilateral arrange. ments, with the credibility of the other party to the contract, where that is very impor- tant, you have also said that there is reason to believe that the area of distrust and sus- picion may be at an end. I just wonder, in view of that question of credibility, is there any specific reason that you have for coming to this conclusion? Dr. KISSINGER. We are not basing this agreement on trust, and we believe that this agreement can be verified; and secondly, that it has adequate safeguards to prevent its being violated. We also believe that we have started a process by which we can move international relations into a new era, and we base this on the fact that we agreed with the Soviet Union over the past two years on the issue of Berlin, which has removed one of the primary causes of tension in the world for the foreseeable future, and a whole spec- trum of agreements on health, space, envi- ronment, rules of navigation, that we are on the verge of making progress with them in other fields such as commercial agreements, and finally, we have signed a Declaration of Common Principles which it would have been no point to sign unless we meant to move in a major effort in that direction. So, for all of these reasons, we believe that there is a basis, that we have an opportunity both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, to move into a new era. Whether both sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if they have the wisdom they are not caught by events in areas in which they cannot con- trol their decision, this remains to be seen. But I think we have the opportunity to turn a significant page in history, and as far as this Administration is concerned, we are going to make a major effort in that direc- tion. Senator PELL. It is an excellent presenta- tion. I have three short questions. First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms remains static, or should decline, or ours go up, wouldn't that have a reverse effect on their willingness to move into SALT II? Secondly, are any of the provisions of the seabed disarmament treaty in conflict with our own treaty which you have negotiated, in view of the fact that we apparently still consider the possibility of weapons of mass destruction stored on the seabed floor, and they are prohibited by the seabed disarma- ment treaty? Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was the constitutionally normal course of Con- gressional consultation, advise as well as consent, not engaged in? Mr. MACGREGOR. When did you stop beating your wife? Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the seabed, I am not aware that we have any intention of deploying weapons on the seabed, and we have no intention of violating the seabed agreement, so unless you know of some weapon that I am not aware of, I would have to say that this is not planned. We believe that the defense expenditures will stay roughly in balance and that the Soviet incentive to come to an agreement will not be reduced by our being stronger. On the contrary. So the judgment has been that our strength, if anything, gives them an additional incentive to make a negotia- tion, if we do not carry it to a point where they are convinced that this is just a sub- terfuge for a massive effort to get ahead of them. If that should become their convic- tion, then, in fact, we have a problem. I have to repeat: We have to navigate be. tween that, on the one hand, weakening our- selves unilaterally, and on the other hand between having them see these negotiations simply as a stage by which we try to achieve superiority. Either of these things would be self-defeating. As for the process of consultation with the Senate, as Senator Fulbright knows, this is not my specialty, but it has been my under- standing that Mr. Smith and the appropriate Secretaries have been in close consultation, and we have tried from here to be on a per- sonal basis in contact with key Senators. S 9607 Mr. MACGREGOR. Might I add in that respect, Senator Pell, that at least since I have been here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has been Ambassador Gerard Smith's intention, following the directions of the President, to make himself readily available to the Mem- bers of the Senate and the House of Repre- sentatives, here in Washington as well as in Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted to talk to you further about that, but I had thought that was worked out to the reason- able satisfaction of the Members of the Con- gress. Congressman FRASER. Dr. Kissinger, let me say first that I have thought that the con- sultations with Ambassador Smith have been good, both here in Washington and in Vien- na. I listened with some care to the answer you gave to Senator Percy's question on the ABM sites. I can appreciate the Soviets would want to have a symmetrical arrangement with ours, but I was not quite clear from your answer whether in fact you have evidence that the Soviets intend to go ahead with their option to protect an offensive missile site. The reasons I ask that is that since build- ing the National Capital Defense is not a bargaining chip clearly because we have now put a cap on ABM and since we have a two to three times lead over the Soviet Union building a site over the Capital is not going to give us any significant benefit from the possibility of attack. It will not even give us more time. Unless we already know the Soviets are going to build a second ABM, why couldn't we wait on ours and save the taxpayers sev- eral billions of dollars? Dr. KISSINGER. It depends on how you de- fine "how do we know". We have no evidence that they have started construction. We have the impression that they have the firm inten- tion of proceeding. I have no evidence what- ever to the contrary that they do not intend to proceed. All the conversations the Presidential party had with them left the impression that they have a firm intention of proceeding with their second site. As for the argument of how much time you gain, the effort to over- whelm, in itself, is apt to give some addi- tional time but I would not insist that this will add a huge span of time to the warning. Congressman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Kissinger, the President and you have made it quite clear that it would be desirable to have the treaty ratified and the Executive Agreements ap- proved by Congress in order that Phase II could begin in October. We fully understand the system of the So- viets and there is no ratification on their part as we have it here, and I am sure the Soviets understand that this is an election year and we have political conventions and there may be an opportunity not to meet, that is a ratification and approval of the Executive Agreements. Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty be ratified and Executive Agreements ap- proved by Congress before Phase II can begin, sometime in October? Indeed, cannot Am- bassador Smith meet with his counterparts, even though the Senate and the Congress have not finished their work as far as the treaty and Executive Agreement are con- cerned? If I may ask just a second question, I think it is in the report, but what problems were there, or why didn't we pursue with greater determination the inclusion of MIRV's in the Executive Agreement? Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the first question actually, the Soviets do go through a ratification procedure. They have their Su- preme Soviet approve it but with all respect, it is a little more tractable than our Con- gress. The reason why, really, we can have some exploratory informal talks and we probably Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 S 9608 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 19, 1972 will at various levels, but the reason it would be difficult to start formal sessions is because we have to know from what base we are operating. It is rather an- embarrass- ing position to have a senior negotiator op- erate on the basis of the assumption of a rati- fication. Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous towards the Congress to assume a ratification that has not in fact taken place. Yet, on the other hand, unless you make some assump- tion, you really have not got a fixed base from which you-can operate. Therefore, the beginning of the second phase of SALT really has to follow congres- sional ratification. We understand the pres- sures of this year and this is simply a fact. Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a com- plex issue for this reason: You can count numbers with national means of verification, but it is much more difficult to determine how many warheads are confined in the mas- ter warhead. Now, you have some indications but it is not very easy. Therefore, with respect to the deployment of MIRV, the inspection require- ments have to be a little bit more rigid than would be otherwise the case, Now, we have made two proposals, two linked proposals, one is a ban on the testing of MIRV, this we are prepared to monitor by national means of inspection, and second, a ban on the deployment of MIRV for which we asked for spot-checks on on-site inspec- tion. Now we considered the test ban ab- solutely crucial because we could have been somewhat more lenient on the frequency of on-site inspection if there had been a test ban on MIRV's because without testing, by definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It is, in fact, impossible to deploy them. The Soviet Union, for not ununderstand- able reasons, because they are behind in MIRV technology, refused a test ban. They also refused a deployment ban as such. What they proposed was a production ban but without inspection. A ban on production is totally unverifiable in the Soviet Union while they could verify ours through our budget and other methods through which our in- dustrial production generally becomes known. do, the Soviet counter-proposal for a pro- duction ban without a test ban was gen- erally unacceptable to us and when we reach- ed that stalemate, we could not proceed any further. This was the obstacle to proceeding on the MIRV's. Congressman ZABLOCItI. What encourage- ment do you see, or optimism that this may be an area that in Phase II we may find some common ground on? Dr. KISSINGER. Phase II, Mr. Congressman, will be very much more difficult than Phase I, because there, we will deal with tech- nological problems and there we will require even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II than was shown in Phase I. if one can have optimism with respect to it, it is because now the Soviet technology has gone somewhat further probably so that they may be more willing to accept a test ban which will at least put a limit on further deployments, and secondly, you will remem- ber when we started these negotiations in 1969, we were going through a crisis in the Middle East and the Berlin Critis. We 'were emerging out of this whole miasma of sus- picion and it was the first time we engaged with the Soviets in any major negotiation, so the climate was different. Now, we have established a pattern in which the Chief of State on our side, the President and their political leaders, can be in constant contact with each other and I believe we can perhaps move a little more creatively in the early stages of SALT II than we could in the early stages of SALT I. L must also say that the subject is more difficult. Certainly, we had conversations of the breadth and precision in Moscow that would have been unimpaginable three or four years ago with respect to strategic ques- tions, but this gives us some hope that at least we can talk about the gut issues. Senator FULBRIGHT: Can I ask you to comment on one aspect, on the significance of ABM, so much more has been said about the agreement. How do you evaluate what appears to me to be a renunciation of the effort to create a defense? What you have left in the ABM Is, surely nothing more than a token. Hasn't each country, in effect, said, "We recognize, we have no defense to almost total devasta- tion in view of the capacities for destruction, or within the existing weapons", and if that is true, isn't this the experience, and I don't know why you would say it would be much more difficult. If they live up to that and we give them no reason to believe we haven't accepted in good faith that our population is hostile to their weapons, and vice versa, and it seems to me it ought not to be more difficult if you believe in that. Dr. KISSINGER: I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is a very good point. The limit on ABM's or effective ABM's of both sides, really cre- ates a situation, as I said in my statement, in one sentence, in which the offensive weap- ons of both sides really have a free ride into the country of the other. So that therefore, the difference in num- bers is somewhat less signficaiit than you would assess otherwise. There is still a dam-?er that one side will get such an enormous numerical advantage in warheads that it can completely obliterate the force of the other. But in the absence of significant defenses, even relatively small forces can do an enor- mous amount of damage. Therefore, too, if we can move into the second phase of SALT, into an explicit rec- ognition that both sides will try to stay away from counter-force strategies, from the one danger that now exists, or the over- whelming danger, that they will try to de- stroy each other, then perhaps the premium on MIRV's will be reduced, because, as you remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MER.V's were developed at first as a hedge against ABM. So I think we will find, in perhaps unex- pected ways, that the new strategic relation- ship that is created by this treaty will create realizations on both sides as to the signifi- cance of usable strategic power that over a period of the next negotiations could have quite dramatic impacts. I am very glad that you asked that. Mr. MACGREGOR: It is very close to 12 noon. We appreciate your participation and your presence and your patience, and we thank you for launching what the President has called aid effective Legislative-Executive partnership. I MEXICO'S PRESIDENT-AN OUT- SPOKEN VISITOR Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article published in the U.S. News & World Report for June 26, 1972, entitled "Mexico's President- An Outspoken Visitor." There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: MEXICO'S PRESIDENT-AN OUTSPOKEN VISITOR It is a concerned and frank-speaking Presi- dent of Mexico who has been touring the United States on a six-day visit. From the start, Luis Echeverria Alvarez made it clear that he had no intention of confining himself to the sort of "hands across the border" platitudes that have character- ized previous state visits between the two nations. Addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress, President Echeverria strongly criticized an American foreign policy of com- ing to terms with other strong countries while "ignoring the rights and interests of less-developed nations." Mexico's leader noted that the U.S. "is encouraging dialogue with other world pow- ers that have different ideologies"-namely, Russia and Communist China. "Nevertheless," Mr. Echeverria told Con- gress, "these changes have not yet been re- flected in the policy of the United States toward the Third World and toward the Latin-American countries, in particular." The Mexican President, both in his speech to Congress and in talks at the White House, pinpointed specific problems that, in his view, now cloud relations between his nation and the U.S. Biggest of these is the high salt content of the Colorado River. The U.S., in agreeing to share its water, had also agreed to improve its quality. Mexicans maintain the salinity in the Mexicali Valley and sharply reduced farm output. "It is impossible to understand," Mr. Eche- verria told Congress, "why the United States does not use the same boldness and imagina- tion that it applies to solving complex prob- lems with its enemies to the solution of simple problems with - its friends." The Mexican leader's words drew a quick response. President Nixon next day agreed that Mexican farmers should get water as pure as Americans do. He pledged prompt action to achieve this. TRADE PROBLEMS Trade between the two nations has emerged as a special concern of President Echeverria, who warns of the damage caused by protec- tionist measures taken at the behest of American "minority groups." An example cited by Mr. Echeverria is imports into the U.S. of Mexican winter fruits and vegetables. These now are con- trolled by strict "voluntary" quotas set in consultation with Florida and California growers. They sometimes have forced the Mexicans to destroy strawberry and tomato harvests. Another worry "south of the border" is the possible passage of a measure currently be- fore Congress, which would affect more than 300 "in-bond" factories, American-owned, op- erating in Mexico. Organized labor in the U.S. is giving considerable support to the bill as a means of blocking the "export of U.S. jobs." On this point, the Mexican President is be- lieved to have received assurance from Presi- dent Nixon of his opposition to the bill, as well. Studies carried out for the White House conclude that the bill would cause little change in the job picture-and might even worsen it. The bill's prospects for passage are rated as "very dim." The visit of President Echeverria is a break with the past in another important respect- after two days in Washington, he became the first Mexican President in history to cross the U.S. on a series of personal appearances. Cities on the schedule included New York, Chicago, San Antonio and Los Angeles. President Echeverria's plans on this whirl- wind tour of major cities include meetings with Mexican-American groups. The changes in Mexico's foreign policy that caused President Echeverria to do things differently on this U.S. trip have been dic- tated by economic problems at home as well as by a changing world picture. Mexico, after years of rapid growth, is be- set with the sort of economic headaches that plague many other developing countries. It runs a trade deficit of 1 billion dollars, has a foreign debt of 4.5 billion dollars, and a heavy debt-servicing burden. DRIVE TO EXPORT To improve its foreign-payments position, the nation has pushed a major export drive, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 H 5640 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 14, 1972 rents with that of other areas, can intensify the plague on other localities. The air we breathe knows no city, county and state boundaries. When a polluter in Pennsylvania can put a Miamian in the hos- pital, the problem obviously is nationwide, not local. It behooves every citizen to de- mand strict Federal action to control the smokey stacks even a thousand miles away; the cough he prevents may be his own. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle- woman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG) is recognized for 30 minutes. [Mrs. ABZUG addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EDITH GREEN (Mr. SIKES asked and was given per- mission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, those of us who have enjoyed the privilege and honor of serving in the House with Representa- tive EDITH GREEN, know of her dedication to America and of her valuable contri- butions to sound legislation, particularly in the field of education. Long known for her distinguished work in that field, she has again been brought deservedly to the attention of the entire country through a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor. It appeared on Monday, June 12, 1972, under the heading "School-Trend Watcher." In this article Mrs. GREEN talks with a reporter about her views on education, the finan- cial difficulty facing our schools, and mis- use of schools as a tool for social change. No one is better qualified than Mrs. GREEN to speak on this matter. I commend the article to my colleagues and I congratulate Mrs. GREEN not only for what she has said but for the out- standing work she has done in this most important field throughout her career, The article is reprinted below. CONGRESSWOMAN GREEN-SCHOOL-TREND WATCHER (By Marion Bell Wilhelm) When Edith Starrett, the bright-eyed daughter of two dedicated teachers, yearned to become an electrical engineer, she was advised not to try for a "man's career." Her second choice was law. Again, she was counseled out of a profession that would rel- egate a young woman to a "back office." So Edith Starrett grew up to become a teacher, as was advisable for a woman look- ing for regular employment in the 1930's. To- day she is one of the most powerful spokes- men for American education in the U.S. Congress. After 18 years on the House Education and Labor Committee, Rep. Edith Starrett Green (D) of Oregon says philosophically: "As it turned out, the career that was chosen for me has been invaluable to my work in Congress, and I suppose it even makes me a patient with those of my colleagues who have never taught school." As the chairman of the Special Subcom. mittee on Education, Mrs. Green keeps her eye on trends and changes throughout the 50 states and the District of Columbia. She has sponsored major legislation to help rescue the nation's schools from the gathering storms of "a social hurricane." DECLINE OF CONFIDENCE All over the United States, she notes, school tax levies and bond issues are being defeated. Property taxes are high and uneven. Too often, she says, those making school polio. are untrained in educational and professional skills. "People seem to be losing confidence in the public schools," she observed in a recent interview. "I fear the day may be coming when we just won't have an educated citi- zenry. Already, we can see some evidence of this in some of our big cities." Representative Green's goal is to see the federal government eventually take over 35 percent of all educational costs from kinder- garten through college. This would help equalize education for all Americans, she believes, while maintaining the quality of their best schools. She calls the coming changes in the financing of education "revo- lutionary." However, the trend toward national financ- ing contains some pitfalls, she cautions. In a number of states, she points out, suits have been brought by citizens questioning the equality of education in school districts with widely divergent tax revenues. If the local property tax is abandoned for some kind of statewide tax, parents in states such as Mississippi or Alabama might also bring suits claiming inequality with states such as Con- necticut. National equalization, though ben- eficial in some ways, could be disastrous, in Mrs. Green's opinion, "if we settle for medi- ocrity." LEGISLATION INTRODUCED "I introduced a bill last year in which I proposed that the federal government by the year 1976 would contribute 25 percent of the total cost of education in the average dis- trict," she says, "and this session I am in- troducing a bill that would provide one- third of the cost. At present, we are contrib- uting 7 or 8 percent. "But I am not persuaded that money alone is going to buy quality. Here in the District of Columbia, for example, our schools are decaying before our eyes. And yet they have the highest per capita expenditure for educa- tion of any city of similar size in the nation." Nor does Mrs. Green-think that busing is the way to achieve the best education. She says: "I think a careful reading of the evidence shows that a child's education and his ability to be educated depend more upon the environment in which he lives than on the six hours a day in which he is trans- ported to a school outside his neighborhood. I think that the task is much greater than we have assumed. We're going to have to change homes, and we're going to have to change neighborhoods." TOO BIG A BURDEN Any attempt to place the major responsi- bility for social reform on the schools alone is doomed to failure, she asserts. "It may be that a youngster who is at- tending a very poor school and is bused has an opportunity for a higher quality of edu- cation," she adds, "but I think that, overall, the reverse is accomplished. I had lunch with some school-board members in Los Angeles, for example, a year and a half ago. This last year they had to cut out $50 million in pro- grams and services for children in the Los Angeles schools because they didn't have enough money. "Then a state court came along and said, 'You're going to have to desegregate.' The superintendent's office told me last Novem- ber that for the first year their estimate on the cost of buying buses and hiring bus drivers will be $42 million." (Mr. SIKES asked and was given per- mission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) [Mr. SIKES' remarks will appear here- after in the Extensions of Remarks.] KISSINGER TESTIFIES IN NIGHT- CLUBS BUT NOT BEFORE CON- GRESS (Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, Presi- dential Adviser Henry Kissinger is a law unto himself. While his `ee wheeling antics make him a one-man successor to the old rat pack which used to be fash- ionable at the White House, he appar- ently holds out a double standard on his briefings. Rarely will he be quoted. He will not testify before congressional com- mittees and yet, according to an article in the May 29, 1972, International Herald Tribune, he ,s Qwed no 9ualms a.t "tas- tifvin " in a. Mnc~nw mrrhf elnh shout T.S. defense and negotiation information which-should be treated - i no Secret. will he make the same statements before appropriate con- gressional committees or does he limit his discussions of our Nation's secrets to bars and the jet set crowd? According to that news report, Mr. Kissinger discussed the balance of Amer- ican-Soviet nuclear weaponry in the dim Skylight Room of the Intourist Hotel. The account noted: To American newsmen based in Moscow, it was astonishing to hear the principal stra- tegic adviser to the American President dis- cussing the level of both nations' nuclear ar- senals in a Moscow nightclub. Astonishing to them, possibly, Mr. Speaker, but not astonishing to many Americans who do not trust Mr. Kissin- ger. One of the reasons that many of us have so little confidence in President Nixon's foreign policy conduct is Mr. Nixon's confidence in Mr. Kissinger and his coterie. There are many reasons for firing Henry Kissinger. This is probably the least of them and yet it is a part of the story of arrogance at the seat of power and national security in Washing- ton. The entire story is included at this point: KISSINGER TELLS ALMOST ALL: STORY OF SUCCESS COMES OUT IN MOSCOW NIGHT- CLUB (By Murrey Marder) Moscow, May 28.-None who experienced it will quickly forget the climax of an im- probable diplomatic presentation that leaped between the Kremlin Palace of the Czars; a well-worn diplomatic bargaining room in Helsinki; the American Embassy here, and ultimately the nightclub of Moscow's In- tourist Hotel. No one fully orchestrated this production, which dramatized the world's first nuclear arms limitation. In the seductively dim Skylight Room, which happens to be on the hotel's ground floor, between a bandstand and a circular, raised dance floor, against a background of champagne buckets, President Nixon's Inex- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June 14, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE exercise, weight control, stress, hyper- tension, and cigarette smoking. Fifth. Better administration, to be achieved by giving the National Heart and Lung Institute greater authority to coordinate the activities of the Federal Government relating to heart diease. Sixth. Closer cooperation between the National Institute, the medical profes- sion, and the concerned public. The ve- hicle for this will be a restructured Na- tional Heart and Lung Advisory Council, in which Federal officials, medical ex- perts, and public representatives will participate. The prospects are good that we will see enactment of this legislation before the end of this year. In the House, floor action on the proposals which I am sup- porting should take place in a few weeks. In the Senate, a similar bill, which in- corporates - all of the principal features of the legislation pending in the House, has already been passed. The proposals now being considered in Congress will give a strong impetus to the campaign against heart disease, but success will not be possible' without the active involvement of concerned citizens throughout the country. HEART ASSOCIATIONS That is why it is essential to have the continued support of heart associations. These organizations bring together peo- ple who want to do something about heart disease in communities in all parrs of the United States. They provide a val- uable link between the medical profes- sion and the general public. They have helped build the foundation of popular support that has made it possible to win Congressional approval of expanded Federal heart programs. Volunteers are the most important re- source of every heart association. Thanks to the support of public-spirited persons who are. willing to contribute their time and skills, heart associations have compiled an impressive record of accomplishments. These associations have helped to in- form the people about the symptoms of heart disease and to alert them to the risks inherent in smoking, improper diet, overwheight, and high blood pressure. This has involved the distribution of school health kits, the organization of nutrition and weight control classes, and the provision of speakers and informa- tional materials. The heart associations have intro- duced a new preventive technique, sounds in school-age children. Another valuable association servi is supplying data on the latest develo nurses. Training sessions in mouth- mouth resuscitation and closed chest heart massage have prepared firemen, police, school personnel, and other in- dividuals to give emergency assistance to heart attack victims. Volunteers have made all of these pro- grams possible. Volunteers will be needed to continue and expand them so that your association can contribute to the stepped-up campaign against heart dis- case that is now commencing. With the vigorous support of heart association members throughout the United States, I am confident we can look forward to new progress in con- trolling the ravages of heart disease. TAXATION WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House. the gentle- man from North Carolina Mr. GALIFI- without representation op- merican people. Two hun- but without justification. rogress, but I doubt it. Mr. GAL 1772 taxatio pressed the withheld unn American tax for up to 1 ye compensation. The excuse, of situation is the she, we are told, sense tooverdecl This is no m provisions of In realit and inepti Govern the A Pell uld have had enough personal exemptions, uld s the at crime. to the U.S. Treasury. eral of my colleagues ecting this gross inequity without s stantial damage to the fight against i flation. and the administration to expedite its consideration of this subject and make a prompt effort to right this obvious wrong. iy opinion the mistake. The quately alert POLLUTION RESPECTS NO BOUNDARIES The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle- man from Florida (Mr. GIBBONS) is rec- ognized for 5 minutes. Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, much of Florida was plagued earlier this month by smog and haze which has been traced, by weather satellite photographs and other means, to smokestack emissions from as far away as Ohio. Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. H 5639 In some areas of Florida these air pol- lution conditions caused a significant in- crease in respiratory ailments and in hos- pitalizations for these ailments. The situation in Dade County, Fla., became so bad that county officials have threatened Federal court action against these out of State polluters. I think that this incident is just one more indication that we are going to have to be sure that strict Federal air pollution standards are enforced na- tionwide if any of us are to live to enjoy the benefits of clean air and clean water in our local communities. It also serves as a warning that we as a community of nations are going to have to do a good deal more than we are now doing if we are to stop the pollution of our planet. At this point in the RECORD, I would like to insert an editorial on the recent "out of State pollution" problem in Flor- ida which appeared in the Tampa Tribune of June 2: POLLUTION RESPECTS No BOUNDARY LINES A complaint from Dade County this week emphasizes that the problem of air pollu- tion is national, not local, and why national standards are so important. Dade County (as was much of the rest of Florida) was blanketed with haze last week. In the Miami area particularly, there was a notable increase in respiratory attacks and hospitalization of victims. In a protest to Federal officials and pol- lution control directors of three states, Peter Baijet, Dade pollution control chief, said weather satellite photographs and other studies had clearly established that smoke- stack emissions from Ohio, Pennsylvania and Tennessee had ridden air currents south- ward, and a temperature inversion had trapped the smog over Florida. Baijet asked the three states and the U.S. Environmental Protective Agency to act im- mediately against offenders. He said under the Federal anti-pollution act the county could go into a U.S. court for injunctions against out-of-state polluters, and threat- ened to do so "if the administrative route fails." That the Environmental Protection Act has sufficient teeth in it to assure clean air for everyone was made plain Tuesday by the action of U.S. District Court Judge John H. Pratt in Washington. Judge Pratt, acting in a suit brought by four ecology groups, ruled that the Federal law requires not only that states adopt pollution standards, but that. they also prohibit high-quality air from de- teriorating even to the level of the standards. He ordered William D. Ruckelshaus, di- rector of the EPA, not to approve statepol- lution control standards unless they ex- pressly contained the non-degradation ele- ment. The four plaintiffs argued that Congress, In enacting the law, held its pur- pose was to protect and enhance air quality. and Judge Pratt, agreeing, stated, "On the Ruckelshaus responded that he doesn't lieve he has the authority to require a if Nudge Pratt is upheld the courts must deft a the principle clearly enough for him to w to appropriate regulations. He said the court's decision would open up a new area of standards for state anti-pollution plans. including those nine states, Florida among them, whose rules have received final Fed- eral approval. Judge Pratt's ruling, however, makes spe- cial sense in light of Dade County's plight. Even mild pollution at the point of emis- sion, when combined in the upper air cur- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 June .14, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE haustible security adviser, Henry A. Kis- singer, gave the American version of what Mr. Nixon described as the "enormously im- portant" strategic arms agreement signed two hours earlier in the Kremlin. LL KISSINGER HUMOR the sobering statistics of nuclear warfare and grueling around-the-clock sessions of inten- sive bargaining here, was on display in an incongruous setting. Pressed by American newsmen to supply hard details on the bal- ance of American-Soviet nuclear weaponry. Mr. Kissinger was saying: "The Soviet Union has been building missiles at the rate of something like 250 a year. If I get arrested here for espionage, gentlemen, we will know who is to blame." To American newsmen based in Moscow, it was astonishing to hear the principal stra- tegic adviser to the American President dis- cussing the level of both nation's nuclear arsenals in a Moscow nightclub. The nightclub revelation was anticipated by no one, including Mr. Kissinger. The road to it was long, tortuous, and constantly sub- ject to the unpredictable interplay of inter- national developments that reached from Moscow and Washington to the mined har- bors of North Vietnam. It was learned here yestreday from Nixon administration sources that one critical breakthrough to an American-Soviet agree- ment on strategic arms limitation was reached during Mr. Kissinger's initially secret Moscow talks with the Soviet Communist party's general secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, April 20-24. In their meeting, which centered both on Vietnam and the scheduled summit talks, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev reached basic agreement, it is said, on including a limitation on nuclear missile-firing subma- rines in a first-stage SALT agreement. The accord was considered a breakthrough for the United States, which pushed hard for submarine limitations, although later new problems were to arise over exactly how the complex submarine freeze would be applied. Simultaneously, the United States and the 'Soviet Union were sliding toward new ten- sion over the American bomber attacks on the Hanoi and Haiphong region prior to Mr. Kissinger's arrival in Moscow. That slide to- ward the risk of a great power confronta- tion sharply accelerated with President Nixon's May 8 decision to order the mining of North Vietnam's harbors to try to cut the Soviet Union's sea supply line to its allies in Hanoi. American-Soviet developments were heading in exactly opposite directions at the same time: toward high prospects of coexistence, and toward confrontation. The total inside story of the tense days Moscow May 22 Is still buried in secrecy. But as portions of the tale emerge they reveal in- summit from postponement or collapse over President Nixon's mining order was that by then the two nations were deeply involved in negotiating subjects of superior mutual inter- est-most especially SALT. By the time Mr. Nixon arrived here last Monday, it was expected on both sides that a SALT agreement would be reached during his visit because the basic political decisions and most of the technical decisions has been thrashed out during 30 months of negotiat- ing, with meetings alternately in Vienna and in Helsinki. But last-minute bargaining hangups, it was conceded, might possibly extend beyond the summit: So the pressure was on for both sides. On Tuesday, Mr. Kissinger said., the Presi- dent and Mr. Brezhnev spent the afternoon and evening on four unresolved SALT dis- agreements, resolving all but two of them. One group of remaining problems concerned the terms for interchanging land missiles with submarines, and another obstacle was how to deal with older Soviet submarines. STALEMATES BROKEN By noon Friday, the stalemates were broken, and the Russians were anxious to announce the result Friday night to avoid disrupting the summit schedule. Joint in- structions were flashed to the U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki, and the final agree- ment was literally pieced together by Ameri- can Ambassador Gerald C. Smith and chief Soviet negotiator Vladimir S. Semyonov on an American plane that brought them to Moscow Friday evening. But the task of publishing the agreement and explaining it to the world was barely beginning at that point, with a signing cere- mony set for 11 p.m. in the Kremlin. At 10:02 p.m., American newsmen travel- ing with the President were assembled in the U.S. Embassy for an on-the-record briefing by Ambassador Smith and Mr. Kissinger, both operating under heavy strain. Mr. Smith called it "the freshest treaty that I have ever talked about." In fact, it was so fresh that no one in the room had a copy to show to newsmen. That produced tumult. Criticism already was being raised in Con- gress about the still-unseen treaty, especial- ly charges that it gave lopsided submarine advantages to the Soviet Union. Mr. Smith and Mr. Kissinger firmly denied that, and then-in an unusual sequence-began re- vealing, in Moscow, intelligence information to sustain the American assurances. This session, and the one afterward in the Intourist Hotel, produced on-the-record ex- changes between American newsmen and of- ficials never before heard in Moscow. Reporter: "The basic story (about the treaty) is going to go out of this session. I think we have to get figures on submarines and other estimates, otherwise the story will go out in a garbled way ... Is this figure of 42 Y-class submarines an accurate one that they will be allowed to complete, and we with 41?" Mr. Smith: "I don't know about this figure of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agree- ment, if the Soviets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial number of other important strategic weapons systems, they can build additional submarines." NOT AS CONSTRAINED Reporter: ". . . I think you are evading the point . Mr. Smith: "I am purposely evading the point because that is an intelligence estimate that I am not in a position to give out . , . Mr. Kissinger: "ySincg I am not quite as constrained or don't feel Ac crrA;nP. A4 assador Smith. Irnt ?,Pbv;td un a nro- ~fottnd atmosphere of mystery about the s - Tna a issuTll S, gh teen I ou a can "i base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our in- telligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested." Question "41 to 43?" Mr. Kissinger: "I am not going to go be- yond what I have said. It is in that general range. The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely." (Laughter). The briefing was interrupted for the 11 p.m. signing ceremony. The frustrated news- men watched the three official documents be- ing signed on television. They still had no copies of the "landmark" treaty. Later, over 100 weary, deadline-stricken U.S. reporters were assembled to meet with II 5641 an equally tired Mr. Kissinger in the only available hall, the Intourist Hotel nightclub. As he proceeded through 45 minutes of ex- hausting questioning, Mr. Kissinger, sleepless most of the past furious week of diplomacy, still displayed his whimsical aplomb and command of detail on a subject that has pre- occupied him for years before and since he came to the White House, NO SPRINKLING OF LEVITY There was no sprinkling of levity to ease tension, however, when Mr. Kissinger was asked if "the United States got stuck with a submarine deal." Replied Mr. Kissinger firmly "that is an absurdity. It is a total absurdity. It was the United States which insisted that the submarines be included.... So this is not something that the Soviets forced on us. It is something we urged on the Soviets . If this "important first step" in limiting defensive and offensive nuclear missiles suc- ceeds, said Mr. Kissinger, "the future will record that both sides won." (Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) [Mr. ASHBROOK'S remarks will ap- pear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] NETWORK ANTI-NIXON BIAS DOCUMENTED (Mr. DEVINE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) Mr. DEVINE: Mr. Speaker, the pub- lication known as First Monday, spon- sored by the Republican National Com- mittee, revealed some very interesting facts about the networks, as well as their commentators. Although First Monday is a political- ly oriented journal, the revelations in the June 5 issue should have much broader exposure for the benefit of the public; thus I am including the following: SOVIET SUMMIT LEAVES MEDIA CHICKEN LITTLES WITH EGG ON THEIR FACES (By John Heywood) The U.S.-Soviet summit meeting has among other things, left the media Chicken Littles with egg on their faces. The President had barely faded from the TV screen on May 8 when the network sneer- leaders, hand-wringers and hand-shakers went to work. As a result of the President's just an- nounced initiatives in Vietnam, steps taken to protect American lives and prevent a Com- munist take-over of South Vietnam, CBS's Eric Sevareid stated flatly: "I would suspect that the summit will not come off." His CBS colleagues Marvin Kalb and Coiling- wood voiced similar opinions. Collingwood said "... certainly the Moscow summit meet- ing, from which so much had been expected, is now in jeopardy ..." Kalab declared: "One casualty of the President's milting andblock- ade may well be his upcoming summit to Moscow. Those who began packing and dreaming of caviar in Russia are beginning to unpack and return to some dry cereal." CHANCELLOR: SUMMIT IN JEOPARDY NBC's John Chancellor said on May 8: "The summit is in jeopardy today." Saying the USSR "can't sit still for this," NBC White House correspondent Richard Valeriani asked "How can they receive him (the President) now?" Edmund Stevens of NBC observed: "The President's announceemnt will be pretty hard Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4 1V CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -E ",)USE June 14, 1972 "'--r them (the Soviets) to swallow . . , it oracticaIly killed the prospects (of a sum- mit) .". ABC's Ted Koppel said: "I don't see how he (the President) can go." Characterizing the President's actions as a "threat to the peace of the world," inviting "Soviet retaliation," the New York Times ccii.torialized that "a big question mark hangs over projected summit" and "there remains no certainty that it will take place." Times columnist Wicker branded the President a "true emperor" and worried about the world turning into an "ash." Not to be out-done in their denunciation of the President, the Washington Post opin- ionized: "The Moscow summit is inthe bal- ance, if it has not yet toppled over." In an- other editorial wondering about the national inierest and the self-respect of the Soviet Union, the Post foresaw a possibility that "the China glow," "the Moscow summit," and "the prospects of reaching SALT, trade and European agreements before next January" might all go down the drain. Post columnist, Joseph Kraft proclaimed the summit "in hazard" and blasted the President for putting up for grabs "the structure of world order, and the lives of thousands of Vietanmese and hundreds of Americans." The fact of the matter is, as columnist Joseph Alsopput-it: "The Soviet response to the mining of Haiphong harbor was about as tough and stiff as a length of sadly over- cooked spaghetti." Those who made hysteri- cal predictions conjuring up the wildest sort of apocalypse performed a disservice to their readers and viewers in that their ravings contributed to an irrational dialog on a sub- ject of the utmost sensitivity, a subject which cried out for sensible discussion. In short, much of the media's post-May 8 commentary on the President, Vietnam and the summit gives reasons to question not the judgment of the President, but rather the perspicacity of those who so badly misjudged him and subsequent events. CBS NEWS ACCENTUATES NEGATIVE, DISTORTS L''ACTS IN REPORTING VIETNAM ACTION During the past several weeks since the North Vietnamese Invasion of South Viet- nam, the First Monday Media Monitor has picked up a few Items of interest, Items which show that when it comes to astigma- tisms nothing sees things quite like the CBS eye: "DEFEAT" NOT A DEFEAT ()it the evening of May 6, 1972, CBS Eve- ning News viewers were greeted by anchor- man Roger Mudd telling them: "The South Vietnamese suffered two more defeats today trying to push back the Communists in the Central Highlands." One of the "defeats" cited by Mudd was at Firebase 42 where enemy forces reportedly killed or wounded at least 100 South Vietnamese in a three-hour assault. Meanwhile. on NBC, Don North was re- porting from Firebase 42 and his more de- tailed account showed that the battle wasn't quite the defeat CBS had made it out to be. Pointing out that the attackers were an estimated company of North Vietnamese sappers ("probably the most feared enemy soldiers in Vietnam"), North reported that the base had been destroyed but "if the enemy mission had been to overrun and hold this firebase, as they have so many others, they failed," North said the base was not overrun due to the fighting of the elite South Vietnamese airborne unit that had "beaten off" the attack by the North Vietnamese. VOLUNTEER ARMY MISREPRESENTED La the same May 6 CBS Evening News broadcast, there was a film report from Rue, South Vietnam, showing a volunteer army marching through the streets. As the cam- era focused on a close-up of a man who looked like a 150-year-old Ho Chi Minh in a helmet, CBS reporter David Henderson ::r; Hue) intoned ominously: "Led by a brass band playing patriotic marching tunes, the local militia for the ancient imperial capital of Hue paraded through the streets today to show off their strengths. The ragged army of volunteers will be the first line of defense when the expected enemy attack comes. The militia is made up of men too old or too young to be in he regular army, veterans--some of them ciis- abled, local officials and teachers." Henderson went on to point out that the parade was throuph mostly empty streets because most of the people left as "they were not impressed with the militia to pro- tect them. Local armies in this country have a reputation for panicking and running away when attacked." NOT FIRST DEFENSE LINE The fact of the matter is that the volu-i- teer army shown on CBS News was not and is not the "first line of defense" of the city of Hue. As an Associated Press story re- ported: "The government has provided 20,000 weapons for volunteers to defend the city if the army cannot hold off the North Viet- namese." The AP report labeled the local militia "the last-ditch volunteer defenders of Hue." Thus, by presenting this disorga- nized group of volunteers as the primary defenders of Hue, CBS gave their view-Ts a much gloomier picture than the facts war- ranted. The final items involve CBS reporter Bob Simon and things he said and didn't say. Tn in April 29 report from Hue, Simon was reporting on the Communist shelling of Highway One and the thousands of refu- gees on the road. Commenting at one point on how the people had to learn for them- selves that the road was being bombarded. Simon said: "The Communists were not aim- ing for civilians, at least one can't Imagine why they would, there were more important targets on the road ..." COMMUNIST TERROR TACTIC at one can't imagine is why Simon would wonder why the Communists would shell civilians. They have done so as a terror tactic since the beginning of the Vietnam war. Just last week in a press conference, De- fense Secretary Laird cited facts and figures to show the Communists "complete lack of regard" for civilians: Since the Communists invaded six weeks ago, the South Vietnamese city of An Loc. a two square mile area con- centrated with a civilian population, has been hit by 35,000 rounds of enemy artillery. The four days before Quang Trl fell, the Communists were putting into that civilian population area a total of 3,000 rounds a day. The last day before it fell, the city took 4,600 rounds. As Laird put it: "They sprayed artillery into those civilian centers just as if they were using a water hose." Another Simon report, April 28, ended on- a very moving note. As the camera pans,. slowly showing the bodies of dead and in-? jured men, women and children, South Viet- namese refugees, strewn across a road after their truck had hit a Communist mine, SI- nion says: NOTHING LEFT TO SAY? ??By evening government spokesmen :,se saying another grand victory has been won In Quang Tri province, the situation is once again stabilized. But there will be more fight- ing and more words. Words spoken by gen- erals, journalists, politicians. But here on Route One, it is difficult to imagine what those words can be. There is nothing left to say about this war. There is just nothing left to say." Nothing left for Bob Simon to say obvi- ously. But Is there really nothing left to say about a truckload of innocent refugees killed and maimed by a Communist mine put there by an enemy who throughout the entire war in Vietnam has deliberately mur- dered civilians as an Instrument of national policy? Is there really nothing left to say about an enemy who after years of aggression continues to try and enslave his fe cvr countrymen by force and violence? Is therg nothing to be said about how 12 of Nortg) Vietnam's 13 regular army divisions are, ngvr engaged in aggression outside Its borders against Laos, Cambodia and South Viet- nam? Is there nothing to be said about North Vietnam's violation of the 1954 Geneva Ac- cords and the 1968 understandings which led to a cessation of U.S. bombing? Is there nothing to be said about North Vietnam's truculence and refusal to negotiate in good faith an end to the war? Of course there is plenty to be said about; the war. But the odds are you won't hear it, or see it on CBS. (Mr. GUDE asked and was given per- mission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) [Mr. GLIDE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] THE ABSURDITY OF SOME FEDERAL PROGRAMS (Mr. SKUBITZ asked and was given permission to extendhis remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex-, traneous matter.) Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, it is not often that I find myself unable to re-, spond to inquiries from my constitu- ents. Some 30 years on Capitol Hill, as an aide to two Senators and as a sitting Member of this honorable body, have, given me the experience not to be sur- prised by any inquiry, to expect almost anything from a citizen and even more and stranger things from Government, and to cope with all of these. But I confess that two recent letters from constituents have me nonplussed. I am chagrined at my own ignorance of what brought the circumstances about, when and how I, as one Congressman, supported such a proposition, what to do about it, and how to answer the plain- tive comments of my constituents. In the interest of brevity, I want to read the two letters. I have, of course, deleted the names of the writers and other personal references. -, KANS., May 2, 1972. Hon. JOE SKUBTTz, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR JoE: Curiosity combined with anger (perhaps you have heard from others before now) prompt this letter to you. and his wife , who live about one and a half blocks east of me in and who have lived on welfare all of their life are building a new house and it's noth- ing small. Of course, it can't be because they have either thirteen or fourteen chil- dren. By the grape vine-they got an FHA loan and are to repay It at forty something dol- lars a month. Those of us who work for a living, pay our taxes, contribute to all drives, etc., can't even consider such a thing as a new home-many of us even have to study all circumstances before we can even invest in a car. Yet we have to support such as this and can't help but wonder how such things are done. 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