JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000400010018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 151
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 13, 1972
• Content Type: NOTES

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JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Thursday - 13 January 1972
2. (Confidential - JMM) Informed Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel,
Senate Armed Services Committee, of the above, explaining that we were
following well-established ground rules under which we would be of course
prepared to brief Senator Symington himself, as a member of our oversight
Committee, on the matters in question but could not discuss them with
staff investigators of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Braswell
said he thought our position was reasonable and clear and saw no need to
alert Senator Stennis.
25X1
3. (Unclassified - JMM) On the Director's instructions, I met with
Senator John Sherman Cooper, just returned from travel in the Middle East
and Europe (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, Athens, Vienna), and said we would
like to have him visit the Agency for a lunch or breakfast and share his
obversations with some of our specialists. He said he had little new to
contribute but had several interesting conversations in
Cairo and Athens and found grounds for cautious optimism regarding the
SALT talks in Vienna. He accepted our invitation and said he would call
me next week to arrange a breakfast visit.
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 S 18286
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 14, 1972
11
with tallow. She glided to anchorage some
100 yards away. Volunteers on board fired
16 rounds in salute; they were answered by
artillery in the Navy, Yard. The spectators
around the ship yard and on boats dotting
the harbor erupted in loud cheering.
After the rejoicing of that early morning
crowd in 1797, the Constellation had a long
and noble career. She fought and defeated
British and French men o' war, was instru-
mental in crushing the Barbary Pirates, and,
in the 1840's, helped open China to Western
trade. During the Civil War she protected
Union interests by blockading against Con-
federate raiders. Then, even after the golden
age of sailing ships had dimmed, she con-
tinued to serve her country in a high ca-
pacity when, on President Roosevelt's orders,
she became the flagship of the U.S. Atlantic
Fleet in World War II.
The Constellation was towed home to
Baltimore in 1955, and this month she will
be feted in honor of her one hundred and
seventy-fifth year. These celebrations could
not be possible were It not for the Constella-
tion Restoration Committee. In fact, there
would be no Constellation at all if the com-
mittee had not fought to save her-from the
Navy itself.
In her last years with the Navy, the frigate
decayed badly, and In 1953 Naval officials
announced their intentions to scuttle her.
Concerned Baltimore businessmen, who now
make up the committee, initiated political
action to save the Constellation; they brought
her to Baltimore:
The committee, a private, nonprofit body,
has labored throughout the ensuing 17 years
to raise enough money to restore the ship.
Close to $1.4 million has been gathered, but
an additional $500,000 is needed to complete
restoration-and further sums will be re-
quired for maintenance thereafter.
Earle Burger, an assistant director of the
project, says that although no federal grants
have been forthcoming, the committee re-
ceives matching grants from the city and
the state. Constellation commemoration
medals, struck about ten years ago from
copper bolts withdrawn from the hull dur-
ing early restoration, sell "very, very well"
at $2 each. Requests for them are received
from all over the world. But most of the
funds come from visitors to the ship, who
pay an admission charge of $1. Mr. Burger
says that at one time a peak of 60,000 people
a year paid to see the man-of-war, but be-
cause the temporary berth at Pier Two was
a poor location, receipts dropped badly. He
looks to an upswing in people visiting the
frigate when she moves to her new home at
Constellation Pier.
The 18th century ship which visitors see
today is largely the result of restoration by
Baltimore naval architect Leon D. Polland.
Mr. Polland, who has been chief of construc-
tion and repair since work began in 1958,
said recently, "The ship, when we got her,
was what everyone calls a hulk, and I must
admit they were close to the truth."
Mr. Polland, an average-sized man with
short, gray hair and steel-rimmed glasses,
stood on the top deck of the Constellation.
"Nothing you see here-the spar deck, the
bulwarks, the masts-existed as you see it
when we received the ship. In addition to re-
cent decay, naval modifications in 1853 had masts came from Portland, Oregon; the ropes
modernized her into a fast corvette. We are were made in New Bedford, Connecticut; and
in the process of rebuilding her into a fri- deadeyes, round wooden blocks used to
gate." tighten the shrouds, were carved in Ports-
A frigate, Mr. Polland explained, has two mouth, England. Wherever possible, Mr.
complete decks of guns, A corvette has only Polland prefers to buy American" and to
cannons
one. In the 1853 refitting, Constellation was for use the gun products deck, made for r instance, Baltimore. are The being cast
cast
"razeed," or out down, and newer, heavier, in fiberglas by McClean Brothers of Balti-
guns were installed on the remaining deck. more. Mr. Polland explained that Iron guns
"During our restoration," he said, "we rem would be too costly to handle because of their
great weight. (An 18-pounder cannon weighs
5,200 pounds.) McClean's cannons will look
"Just like the real thing," he says.
If people express disappointment that
parts of the Constellation are "modern," it
can be answered that Williamsburg is even
less genuine. Constellation should be con-
sidered an authentic 18th century man-of-
war, and repairs and replacements have been
made only where necessary.
When Constellation has taken her place
as one of the great tourist attractions of
Baltimore's new Inner Harbor, she will look
much as she did shortly after that Sep-
tember morning 175 years ago when the
citizens of Baltimore came to cheer her at
the start of her long career.
T HE SALT TREATY AND THE
l._-
INTERIM AGREEMENT
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, last week
the President signed the SALT Treaty
and the Interim agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union re-
garding the limitation of strategic arms.
This vital step, approved by the Senate,
was an important move toward the vital
goal of reducing the risks of global con-
flict and destruction. The interim agree-
ment lays the groundwork for what we
all hope will be fruitful negotiations in
the second round of the SALT talks di-
rected toward a permanent treaty to end
the deadly spiral of the arms race. For
too long both of the great superpowers
have devoted themselves to increasing
their armaments and increasing the
stakes in a worldwide balance of terror.
Now we can begin to halt this perilous
and wasteful process, and get on with
the business of making our world safer,
not more dangerous.
I believe that this interim agreement
represents an important measure of
progress toward the goal of a safer world.
For the first time, both of the great nu-
clear powers have agreed to place some
limits upon the scope of their awesome
weaponry. Hopefully, the next round of
negotiations will make some progress to-
ward reducing the amount of destructive
force that each nation has at its com-
mand. Arms reduction should be our ulti-
mate goal; I am hopeful that this arms
limitation agreement will be but the first
step toward that vital end.
The President is to be commended for
obtaining this agreement. The SALT
negotiators worked long and hard to pre-
serve U.S. security, and at the same time
to provide significant and lasting limita-
tions on strategic weapons. I believe that
they drove an acceptable bargain in this
round of talks. Had this interim agree-
ment not adequately reflected the gen-
uine security needs of the United States,
I am confident that the President would
never have approved it, and if I did not
feel that way, I would not have voted to
approve it. I believe that this interim
agreement provides the United States
with a subtantial margin of security, and
that it can point the way for meaningful
and fruitful negotiations in the next
round of SALT talks.
I say this despite the long debate, and
eventual approval of the Jackson amend-
ment to the joint resolution approving
the interim agreement. I do not believe
that the United States got the worst part
of the bargain at the SALT I talks, Nor
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built the spar deck, which Includes a fore-
castle and a quarter deck aft. Thus she
again became a frigate."
Mr. Polland is guided in his work by David
Steel's Dimensions, an extensive list drawn
up in England in 1790. The original ship was
almost certainly built to similar specifica-
tions.
"These figures are based on centuries of
experience. You need dependable references
and sources-no one can just builr: a frigate,"
he smiled. Other sources include drawings of
sister ships such as The Congress. But great
care must be taken to make every detail the
right size. "The masts and spars, for In-
stance, are all in a certain proportion to one
another. Aside from the, purely functional
purpose, a shipbuilder invariably attempts to
create something proportionally perfect for
others to admire. He looks upon a well-pro-
portioned ship as something akin to a beau-
tiful woman."
The 'beautiful woman" now berthed c
Pratt Street has been the center of a raging
controversy. Even though copper pins bear-
ing the date 1797 and the name of the ship-
builder, David Stodder, have been discovered,
some people have refused to believe that the
Constellation is an 18th century ship.
"We guess around 25 per cent of the ship
is original," stated Earle Burge in the fri-
gate's defense. "That's quite a lot in a ship of
Constellation's age. With wooden ships in salt
water, the rate of replacement is quite high,
Timber might be replaced every ten or 12
years-though wood in the lower decks and
lower hull might last much longer."
Other details believed to have been on the
ship since 1797 include the carved gang-
boards on the top deck, the hawser clamp for
the old hemp anchor rope, iron hooks to hold
the crew's hammocks, many of the "knees.'
or naturally curved beams connecting the
sides of the ship to the decks, and the bilge
pump. (There is a similar one on the Con-
stitution, the only other U. S. ship of 1797 In
existence.)
The bases of the Constellation's masts are
girdled with iron hoops or bands of mid-19th
century vintage.
"The wooldings-the word simply means
windings-were originally rope," he explains.
"Iron fastenings had not been Invented when
Constellation was built, and all rigging fit-
tings consisted of rope instead of iron. Iron
fittings were invented in the 1840's and forged
in the shipyards. But the iron bands are so
much stronger and so much more permanent
than rope that I would hesitate to take them
off." Precisely the same decision, he added,
was reached by the caretakers of Boston's
Constitution and the H.M.S. Victory in
Portsmouth, England.
The iron hoops are the only iron to remain,
however; the remaining fittings of the rest
of the masts and of the spars have been
recreated in the original rope. The latter iron
fittings will be displayed below decks to
show the development of naval architecture.
The topmasts and topgallants are the latest
parts to be reconstructed. Mr. Polland's team
of 12 craftsmen ("They do the work of 30
men-if we had sufficient money the job
could have been completed in 12 months")
should finish the renovation of Constella-
tion by the end of this year.
Most of the carpentry has been carried
out here, but materials have often come
from far away. The upper sections of the
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October 14, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
Mr. President, it is clear that FRED
HARRIS has committed himself to bring-
ing about needed change in many areas,
of our national life. He has served with',
distinction in this body, and I regret ~,
very much that he will not be once again
taking his seat here when the 93d Con-
gress convenes in January. However, I
know that FRED and his wonderful wife
LaDonna intend to remain in Washing-
ton, each continuing the fine work they
have been involved in, and I think all
Senators would agree with me when I
say I am very glad that they will.
RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE
CHARLES RAPER JONAS
Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr.
President, this week House colleagues
from both sides of the aisle and from
States scattered throughout the Nation
paid well-deserved tribute to an out-
standing North Carolinian, Representa-
tive CHARLES RAPER JONAS, who is retiring
after an illustrious 20-year career.
I am proud today to join in that salute
and to bring to the attention of the Sen-
ate some of the reasons for that general
acclaim.
One of the explanations, surely, is the
fact that from the very start of his Capi-
tol Hill career he established a reputation
as a highly knowledgeable Member with
a tremendous capacity for hard work and
attention to detail.
He also demonstrated a strong sense of
responsibility and integrity in both fiscal
matters and questions of legislative
principle.
Although he was just the second Re-
publican Member of Congress to repre-
sent a North Carolina district in this
century when elected in 1952, he has
shown throughout his career a capacity
for putting the needs of the State and
country above purely partisan considera-
tions.
Those qualities have earned him the
respect and admiration of all who have
known him and had the opportunity of
either serving with him or observing the
results of his work in the House.
Thesame attributes account for his as-
signment to the Appropriations Commit-
tee, a highly coveted position, early in
his career and for the widening scope of
his influence on the committee and in the
House as a whole in the ensuing years.
The hallmark of his career and the
trait for which he is best and most widely
known has been his continuing battle
against carelessness and waste in Gov-
ernment spending.
A colleague from another State said
of him the other day that his contribu-
tion to the cause of good government is
virtually immeasurable. If the taxpayers
of the Nation knew how many millions
of dollars CHARLIE'S prudence- had saved
them, they would rise up to thank him
with one resounding voice.
To that, those of us who have served
with him in North Carolina's delegation
for so long can say a fervent "amen" as
well as "Godspeed."
RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE
ALTON A. LENNON
Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr.
President, as the second session of the
92d Congress draws to a close, I think it
appropriate to bring to the Senate's
attention the fact that it marks the end
f the congressional career of a distin
uished North Carolinian whom sour
nators will recall as a colleague in th'
dy.
speak in that regard of H n.
AL N A. LENNON who is retiring a er
eig terms in the House as Represe ta-
tive om North Carolina's Seventh is-
trict.
He as elected to that seat afte serv-
ing as Member of this body by ber-
natorial ppointment in the earl 1950's
upon the eath of Senator Willi Smith.
His wor has been of a dist' guished
caliber refs ting great credit t himself
and to his ate during both haws of
his Capitol H' career.
While serv' with distin d as a
member of the House Arm d Services
Committee and the Mere nt Marine
and Fisheries Co ittee, h' most note-
worthy House ac omplis ments have
been in the area of luarin resources re-
search and development " his capacity
as chairman of the u committee on
Oceanography.
He was signally hon ed recently by
the National Oceanogr l is Association
which presented him th"its first Man
of the Year award f the`, marine re-
sources programs de eloped .under his
direction. \
That was but one the honoie he has
been accorded at var ous times dul'ing his
career in which heas attained the re-
spect not only of h s own delegatioiia,but
of the House as a hole for his legi a-
tive knowledge, fo his close attention
issues affecting t interests of his State..
and for his dedi ation to duty, and un-
flagging integrit .
North Carol' a and the Nation have
benefited Brea y from his service and,
as one privile d to work with him as a
friend and co league during most of his
years in Wasllington, I am proud tobring
his accomplishments to the attention of
the Senate.
THE 175Th ANNIVERSARY , OF THE
U.S. FRIGATE "CONSTELLATION"
Mr. BE. LL. Mr. President, it is with
great per$onal satisfaction that I-report
to you today on the success of the recent
celebration in connection with the 175th
anniversary of the launching of the U.S.
frigate Constellation. This vessel is now
permanently docked at Pier 1, in her
home port of Baltimore.
Congress recently passed and Presi-
dent Nixon signed into law S. 2499. This
legislation, which I sponsored, author-
izes the Secretary of the Treasury to
strikd up to 100,000 commemorative
med4ls marking this anniversary. The
design and specifications for these med-
als drill soon be determined by the Con-
stellation Committee and the Treasury
Department. I believe that these medals
will be an enduring and fitting tribute
to this historic ship, the first ship of the
U.S. Navy. The funds raised by the sale
of these medals will substantially aid
,the untiring efforts of the Constellation
Restoration Committee to return this
18th-century ship to its original condi-
tion, minus the structural changes neces-
sitated by long years of service. Already,
my office has received numerous in-
quiries regarding the purchase of these
commemorative medals.
I wish to thank all Senators and the
Members of the House of Representa-
tives who supported this legislation, and
to let them know that, by so doing, they
shared in and contributed to the week-
long dockside activities in honor of this
vessel.
These festivities culminated Thurs-
day, September 7, 1972. At this time I
had the privilege of participating in a
ceremony which served to remind all of
us standing on the new Constellation
Pier in Baltimore of our Nation's early
struggles for freedom and liberty. We
were pleased to have present the Soviet
square rigger Tovarish, under the com-
mand of Captain Candenko, and a com-
plement of Soviet cadets who were vis-
iting Baltimore to honor the Constella-
tion. We were especially pleased to have
as our guest of honor Mrs. David Eisen-
hower. Mrs. Eisenhower graced not only
these ceremonies, but the city of Balti-
more and the State of Maryland as
well, and I am happy to say that she
was welcomed with warmth and enthusi-
asm. Both Senator MATHIAS and I were
proud and honored to welcome these dis-
tinguished guests as they joined Balti-
more in paying tribute to the Constel-
lation.
During these ceremonies it was my
pleasure to present to the Constellation
Committee a framed copy of Senate bill
2499, a copy of the public law bearing
the President's signature, and the pen
used by the Chief Executive to sign this
legislation into law.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent Iat the article entitled "The Con-
stellation at 175," published in the Sep-
tember 'issue of Baltimore magazine be
printed iwii the RECORD. The article sum-
marizes the current activities of the
Constellation, Committee and indicates
future plans \for this noble and aged
vessel.
There being fio objection, the article
was ordered to be' Tinted in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE "CONSTELLATION" AT175
(By Christopher T. George)
One hundred and seventy-five years ago
this month a large crowd gathered at a
Fell's Point shipyard. They had Cpme to see
the 9 a.m. launch of the frigate Constellation,
the second ship to be launched by the fledg-
ling U.S. Navy and the first to put to sea.
(The frigate United States had been launch-
ed several weeks before.)
To a succession of drum rolls, men removed
wedges that held the ship above the dark
waters of the Patapsco. The Constellation
then slid slowly downward on ways greased
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 October 1.4,, 197, proved For CONGRESSIONAL RECORDP7 SENATER000400010018-4 S 18287
do I wish to commit our negotiators at
the SALT II talks to any hard and fast
formula for the next agreement, even
before negotiations have begun. Nor do
I wish to commit the Senate-which is
constitutionally required to advise and
consent to any treaty that may arise out
of SALT II-to some formulation of
policy which may not even be appli-
cable for years to come. Yet that is one
way in which the Jackson amendment
might be construed.
Senator JACKSON's amendment urges
the President not to agree to any further
agreement with the Soviets which "limit
the United States to levels of intercon-
tinental strategic forces inferior to the
limits provided for the Soviet Union,"
and specifically sets forth as the standard
by which "inferiority" is to be judged, the
numerical equality expressed in the re-
cently ratified ABM treaty. The Senator
from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) stated
repeatedly on the Senate floor that he
did not believe that any agreement which
did not provide for "equality" between
the United States and the Soviet Union
would be acceptable to him. Let me state,
Mr. President, that I would heartily
agree with Senator JACKSON on the point.
We live in an extremely dangerous world,
unfortunately, neither side of the global
conflict has ever been able to bring itself
to rely on the other side's professed
good intentions. And so we have both
built up these huge arsenals with which
to deter the other side from launching
any suicidal assault against the other. I
believe that at a minimum, our deterrent
capability should and does rest upon
equality of forces with the Soviet Union.
I believe that this has been-and should
continue to be-the basis of our defense
posture. I can see no greater risk in these
times of high peril and uncertainty than
creating or presenting a condition of
strategic inequality; a condition which
might prove a deadly temptation to the
other side to attempt to gain some ad-
vantage from its own superiority.
So I believe in strategic equality. With-
out it I do not believe that we can main-
tain our own security; nor could we play
our role in the maintenance of the se-
curity of our friends and allies in other
parts of the world. And it is precisely
because I believe in strategic equality
that I opposed the Jackson amendment.
Senator JACKSON suggests that the only
equality that counted was the strict nu-
merical parity of intercontinental land
and undersea-based missiles, and strict
parity of throweight on a megatonnage
basis. This narrow definition of equality
of strategic forces would actually make
more difficult the negotiation of a further
arms limitation and reduction agree-
ment.
. This narrow definition of "equality"
simply makes no sense in terms of pres-
ent-day defense realities. The United
States presently enjoys greater than a 2-
to-1 advantage over the Soviet Union
in the number of targetable, deliverable
nuclear warheads. In 5 years, we hold
the same advantage, some 10,000 war-
heads to the Soviets' approximately 4,000
warheads. How can it be said then, that
an agreement which does not exact as
one of its terms strict numerical equal-
ity of missiles-of missiles, not targetable
warheads-provides for strategic inferi-
ority? Yet this is precisely how Senator
JACKSON interprets his own amendment-
that no matter how great our advantage
in warheads, we must have numerical
parity in intercontinental missiles, or we
will be in an "inferior" position.
I cannot agree with this analysis, for
our strategic strength is based upon our
entire array of weapons systems deployed
around the globe. Our national security
is adequately protected not only by our
intercontinental missiles, but by our sea-
based Polaris force, and by our strategic
bombing capability. In fact, any of these
three forces is sufficient in and of itself
to deliver the kind of destructive blow to
any enemy that should deter that enemy
from launching a first strike at the
United States. Even under the most des-
perate type of circumstances, where a
successful first strike could manage to
destroy every last one of our land-based
missiles, the nuclear destruction capable
of being unleashed by our submarine-
launched missiles and by our bombers
would be sufficient to destroy any enemy
many times over. And our submarine-
based missile deterrent is as close to in-
vulnerable as is possible. Our strategic
bombers are in the air around the clock.
Our security, in short, depends on no
single element of our strategic forces.
And thus, the level of strategic force
which is necessary for us to deter any
aggression against us need not be hinged
upon any single element of weaponry.
Our superior technology has enabled
us to develop weapons far more sophisti-
cated than our adversaries. We do not
need the same numbers of missiles to ac-
complish the same destructive results.
Our MIRV warheads make possible the
utilization of a single missile to produce
far more destruction than our adver-
saries can produce with larger numbers
of missiles. And our more compact war-
heads are equal in deadly force to the
larger, heavier warheads of the Soviets.
Since we are some 2 years further ad-
vanced in the technology warhead deliv-
ery than are the Soviets, we have been
able to amass an intercontinental stra-
tegic force which is far superior to the
Soviets, and will continue to remain so.
Under these circumstances, there was
no need for the Senate to pass the Jack-
son amendment. Indeed the language of
the Jackson amendment might be
termed meaningless-that is, in terms of
strategic realities. However, it could have
a most unfortunate effect. Through its
insistence that we attain numerical par-
ity with the Soviets in missiles, in addi-
tion to our overwhelming superiority in
warhead technology, the Jackson
amendment may have the effect of con-
vincing the Soviets that we were not sin-
cere in reaching an agreement to limit
strategic arms. Indeed, given our great
advantage in warhead technology, strict
adherence to numerical equality in mis-
siles-that is, delivery vehicles-might
mislead the Soviet Union into fearing
that we were preparing for a preemptive
first strike capability. If this were to de-
velop, I fear that the real incentive for
the Soviets would be to step up develop-
ment of their own MIRV technology, and
to accelerate the momentum of their al-
ready burgeoning nuclear submarine
fleet.
I am sure this was not the result in-
tended by Senator JACKSON. But I fear
that this might follow from such a con-
struction of the Jackson amendment. In-
deed, although spokesmen for the ad-
ministration declared that the adminis-
tration supported the Jackson amend-
ment and the concept of "interconti-
nental strategic equality," the adminis-
tration also made it clear that they did
not support Senator JACKSON'S interpre-
tations of his amendment. This rather
confusing distinction, I must confess,
made it more difficult to gather exactly
what was the position of the administra-
tion. But the crucial factor is that it will
be the Executive who will be negotiating
the next round of strategic arms agree-
ments, and not the Senate. We will have
our chance to advise and consent to
agreements presented to us. It seems to
me that that is the time for debate and
decision as to the proper shape of these
agreements-not before they are signed,
much less negotiated.
Mr. President, recognizing the need
to move forward to SALT II, I voted to
approve this interim agreement despite
the unfortunate and, I believe, unwise
tacking on of the Jackson amendment.
I am prepared to exercise my judgment
upon any finished agreement when the
proper time comes. I shall do this with
an eye on protecting the security of the
United States. That cannot be negoti-
ated away. I hope that my reservations
about the deleterious effect of the Jack-
son amendment are unfounded, and that
the Governments of the United States
and of the Soviet Union can move on
now toward concrete agreements which
will serve the cause of peace, in our ime,
and for all the generations to come.
ENCOURAGEMENT FOR BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, America
must have a strong economy if we are
to remain a strong Nation and if we are
to solve the multitude of social problems
today. The only way we will have a strong
economy is to have a healthy climate for
business and industry.
Yet today we find business under
strong attack. We find a frightening lack
of knowledge and understanding as to
how our business enterprise system
works, and how it must work to sup-
port the society we all want.
People who want a better life for
everyone should seek to encourage busi-
ness enterprise, not tear it down.
Mr. President, an excellent speech on
this subject was delivered on August 3,
1972, by William P. Reilly, a civic leader
and the chief executive officer of Arizona
Public Service Co. The Arizona Legisla-
tive Review recently printed this speech
which was delivered before the Business
Political Committee of Arizona. I ask
unanimous consent that the article be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 1., 197,,!
ENCOURAGEMENT FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
Fellow members of productive America:
You are highly complimented by being so
addressed-all of us here represent the Pro-
ductive America sector of our economy, And,
we are bi-partisan which means active in
both parties. This is a far cry from being
non-partisan which means inactive in both
parties.
Productive America carries the burden of
responsibility for providing the means for
successfully meeting the total needs of the
people of America-and large portions of the
world.
't'here is a difference between those who
produce and consume-and those who con-
su_Ime without producing.
You are producers.
Let's look at where we are-
209 million people
70 million under 18-not in work force
22 million over 64-not in work force
7 million-sick, lame and lazy
So, half of our people are not pan of our
productive work force.
How about the other half-
First, let's divide them-men and women,
about 52 million each.
When you deduct people in schools and
colleges, members of the armed services, in
prisons, the young anti-establishment people
who roam the country-the noble women
who stay home to take care of their fam-
ilies-we get down to a labor force of about
85 million, of which about 30 million are
women-thus you have 85 million men and
women taking care of the 209 million.
But, within the 85 million labor force are
those who provide services financed by the
gross national product of America's produc-
ive system.
These people include those who 1-1111 our
federal institutions, our state, county, mu-
nicipal governments, our schools, etc., etc.-
who are entirely dependent for their liveli-
hoods on the fruits of the productive sector.
Then there are those who depend on the
voluntary contributions supported by busi-
nesses taking care of local unmet needs-
and the foundations financed by the wealth
of the nation to study and condemn our
>stems-
And, there are the unemployed who,
through no fault of their own. are between
jobs.
There is talk about a 4-day work week,
more recreation, more leisure time activi-
tes-and at the same time a need for 35 mil-
lion more jobs by 1980.
The reality to be faced is-all but those 17
and under can vote-producer or no:n-pro-
dricer, and the non producers outnumber the
producers.
Productive America provides the means-
and is virtually non-existent in policy roles-
taxation without representation was never
greater.
Did you see one business executive at the
last convention-one representing a large
taxpayer-or a larger employer? (Editor's
Note: Reference is to the Democratic Na-
tional Convention. Mr. Reilly's address was
delivered prior to the Republican conven-
tion.)
Did we see one on the list of Arizona dele-
;.stes?
Did you read the platform adopted?
Did it sicken you as a productive Ameri-
,'au?
Are we not somewhat responsible for this?
Does it not bother you that we are left
nut of decisions? That we are led instead of
leading?
During the next few months we will be
under a barrage of criticisms-
And when it comes will we run and hide-
or will we redouble our efforts to educate
people-our employees, our customers---
Will we work harder to support candidates
who know and understand the benefits of
a productive America-and vote to preserve
its benefits?
Recently I heard the statement made in
an addres8 that "The Business of America is
Business."
The theme of this talk attacked the
tee that has made this country what i~ is
today.
The business and industrial sector of
America was castigated--portraying them as
elements that are out to reap the highest
profit possible, with Tittle or no regard for
the consequences of their actions.
In so doing, the speaker joined the ranks
of an ever-increasing chorus of people who
have launched an assault on the reputation
of America.
These people question many of our na-
tional institutions, including our economic
system. They crusade for radical changes in
our system of corporate ownership, changes
so drastic that they would all but destroy
free enterprise as we know it. Their beliefs,
their purposes, their actions run contrary
to the principles of the majority of our peo-
ple. Deliberately or not, they are also weaken-
ing our free competitive system.
And they are having an impact that s
frightening to behold.
In one survey conducted recently, :Au-
dents on campuses from coast to coast were
asked whether they agreed with this propo-
sition: "Business is overly concerned with
profits and not with public, responsibili t.y."
Sixty-one per cent of all students said they
agreed strongly and another 34 per cent
agreed partially. Only five per cent disagreed.
Its pretty obvious that the image of busi-
ness in the eyes of college students isn't what
it ought to be.
If you were so inclined you could write
that off on the basis that college students are
a relatively small portion of the total popula-
tion.
But, let's look at another survey-which
asked a representative sample of the Ameri-
can public: "Just as a rough guess, what per
cent profit on each dollar of sales do you
think the average manufacturer makes, ai ter
taxes?"
The median public estimate of a manufac-
turer's after-tax profits was 28 per cent.
But the correct answer for that particular
poll was 4 per cent-and that figure has not
been as high as 6 per cent since 1950.
It's a little disconcerting to know that at
a time when profit margins for American
industry are close to the lowest in a quarter
of a century, the American public's estimate
ofprofit is at its highest.
And this fallacy about profit is not limited
to one segment of our population. The mis-
conception exists among every group sur-
veyed: men and women, young and old,
whites and blacks, manual workers and
farmers, Republicans and Democrats, Ameri-
cans with high incomes and low incomes,
those with some college education and those
with none, those who own stock and those
who don't. All guessed wrong, and all by a
very wide margin.
Disturbing? It is to ine. And I'm sure it
is to you.
Surprising? Not a bit. Especially when you
consider that few, if any, teachers in our
high schools and universities have ever had
basic courses in economics-and few, if any,
have been exposed to the working world as
employees of Productive America.
I'm sure all of you in recent months have
seen results of surveys that paint an equally
bleak picture.
They paint a picture of more than 200
million people supported and sustained by
a system that is an integral facet of their
daily lives-but about which they know or
understand very little.
From the halls of Congress to the campus
lecture circuit and the TV talk-show, every
type of platform is being used to convince
the American public that private business !s
a sinister influence on our society. The words
and the bias may differ from person to per-
son, but the basic contentions are always the
same-our products are shoddy . . . our ad-
vertising is deceptive . . our prices are
rigged . . . our profits are excessive . our
plants are the major sources of pollution . . .
and our economic and political power is
enormous.
That's the picture some people would like
to paint of America, and its business system.
But that's not my picture, and I'm sure
it's not yours.
My picture of America, though, contains
exactly the same words I referred to at the
outset.
But when you put them in their proper
position in a sentence structure, you get a
much more accurate and positive view of this
country and its business enterprises.
That's why I think: "The Business of Bust-
ness is America."
That statement gives me a picture of a life
support system for this country.
There are nine million or so individually
owned businesses of every conceivable type
that provide jobs and goods and services for
all the people of America.
Corporations alone, which seem to be the
form of business that is the favorite target,
number more than one and a half million.
In addition to the direct payroll that these
businesses and corporations provide, they are
also the major source of revenue for taxation
at nearly every level of government.
They, therefore, provide the foundation for
additional millions of jobs at the federal,
state and local level.
In addition to that, they provide much of
the dollar support for ours schools, police and
fire protection, construction of public faci'.l-
ities, roads, buildings and the sundry other
governmental services.
And by far not the least, they provide
much of the support for the defense of our
country.
The reason that business is able to play
such a major role in the support of life in
this country today is because business is de-
signed to operate at aprofit-and share its
profits with its owners, its shareholders, its
employees, the various governmental taxing
agencies, the volunteer service organizations
and the preservation and defense of the na-
tion. The sharing of its profits through divi-
dends paid to investors underlie the integrity
of our insurance policies life, health and lia-
bility, which give us such peace of mind. This
is just one example of benefit to the Ameri-
can system of sharing in the country's pro-
ductivity.
Let me give you an example of revenue
sharing-by our company in one year--
1971-
$37 million collected from our customers
went into coffers of taxing agencies-
t/2 of our profits went to Uncle Sam--and
he does not have-one-penny invested in our
company but shares equally in our profits
through his income tax portion-
When we needed a rate increase of $10 mil-
lion-we had to ask for $20 million-!/2 to the
company and viz to Uncle Sam. This is infla-
tion producing!
Each one of you is in the same boat-it
will get worse instead of better-
Our first job, of course, is in Arizona--let's
get with it.
What will you do about assuring that the
Business of Business Is Arizona and America.
NEED FOR FEDERAL WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION STANDARDS
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, when a
worker is injured on the job today, his
or her economic outlook is bleak. Dis-
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October 12, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
quake, fire, wind and flood problems that lead
to disasters, and will examine and develop
means for preventing or controlling disasters.
Particular attention will be given to disasters
that may result from combined actions, such
as, earthquake and fire, fire and wind, earth-
quake and tsunami flooding.
An important component of the program is
the formation of a disaster information cen-
ter which will serve as a library of pertinent
publications on natural disasters, as a stor-
age of general information, and as a data
bank. This will serve as the main unifying
element of the program. The disaster infor-
mation service will also be a source of data
and informtaion for others concerned with
natural disasters. It should be especially help-
ful to government agencies, private organiza-
tions, and practicing engineers who are in-
volved with problems of natural disasters.
Another important element of the program
involves short-term interdisciplintary stud-
ies, of two to six weeks duration, during
which a particular problem or event will be
studied by a group of faculty, research fel-
lows, students, and a much larger number of
active participants. who can contribute spe-
cial knowledge, and who have special need
to solve problems posed by natural disasters.
The basic objectives of the program are to
determine why natural events lead to dis-
asters and by what efficient means they can
be controlled or prevented.
CORRECTIONS OF THE RECORD
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I find, to
my great dismay, that on yesterday, when
I had spoken devoted and affectionate
words in respect of my colleague, Sena-
tor COOPER, the RECORD, through a print-
ing error, failed to show that I had spok-
en them, and by implication attributed
them to another Senator.
I ask unanimous consent that the REc-
ORD be corrected at the top of the third
column on page S17408 by inserting my
name before the words "This is a very
personal matter to me."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cor-
rection will be made.
CEDITORIAL COMMENTS ON SALT
INTERIM AGREEMENT
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, since
the passage of my amendment to the
SALT interim agreement resolution, con-
siderable editorial comment has come to
my attention, some of it published during
the Senate debate on the amendment. I
am encouraged to note how much of the
comment supports our effort to secure
passage of the amendment and recog-
nizes that our demand for equality in
intercontinental strategic forces in any
future strategic arms limitation agree-
ment is in the best interests of a sound
and prudent national security posture
for the United States.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a representative selection of
the editorial comment be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the REg ORD,
as follows:
[From the Columbus (Ga.) Ledger, Aug. 23,
1972]
SENATOR JACKSON Is RIGHT-EQUALITY IN
MISSILE STRENGTH
There can be no sound argument advanced
against the position Sen. Henry Jackson (D-
Wash.) has taken on the October renewal
of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the
Soviet Union.
Sen. Jackson has offered a new preamble
to the interim agreement ratified by the
Senate as a result of the first round of SALT.
Essentially, it urges the United States to seek
equality with the Soviets in levels of inter-
continental strategic forces during the Octo-
ber phase of negotiations.
Senators backing the Jackson guidelines
are remarkable for their political diversity.
Senators Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond
and Gale McGee of strong views on defense
have joined such senators as Robert Pack-
wood, Lawton Chiles and David Gambrell,
none of whom are particularly known as hard
liners on defense matters. Sen. Jackson has,
by what amounts to an individual crusade,
found 30 co-sponsors for his resolution, a
tribute to his ability to educate his fellow
senators and draw support.
The Jackson measure says that we can't
rely on the negotiators of the first round
of SALT to produce a satisfactory deal on
offensive weapons, an equal number of mis-
siles, for each side, unless there is strong
congressional opinion forcing them to do it.
The deal which allows Russia numerical su-
periority in misslies and submarines is his
target. Equality in numerical strength is
his goal.
Welcome as the news of successful negoti-
ations with Russia on this complex subject
was to all Americans, there is rational op-
position to the particular quotas of weap-
onry which are involved in possible agree-
ments on offensive missiles and submarines.
We believe Sen. Jackson is correct.
We believe equality is the minimum re-
quirement for American security in any deal
with Russia or any other major potential
enemy. We prefer superiority but if equality
is accompanied by improved and beneficial
relations with potential enemies which makes
them become potential friends, we support
that much of a gamble because we believe
the future of mankind and the world de-
mands it.
We can't support agreements which would
make us subject to potential blackmail if
we allow ourselves to assume an inferior
position to Russia or anyone else, however.
Sen. Jackson has done well and he is correct.
We believe he must achieve support of
enough people to influence enough more: of
his fellow senators to get his guidelines made
official.
[From the Greensburg (Pa.) Tribune-Review,
Aug. 25, 1972]
ARMS INFERIORITY-SALT STACKED DECK
AGAINST U.S. SECURITY
(By W. J. -Griffith I[I)
For a man who prides himself on being
an excellent poker player, President Nixon
has managed to stack the deck against him-
self-and the security of the United States.
That's the basic assessment of Sen. Henry
M. Jackson, D-Wash., regarding the anti-
ballistic missile treaty and the five-year nu-
clear weapons "moratorium" agreement
which evolved from the Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Talks between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Noting that the U.S. SALT
negotiators themselves admitted the "mora-
torium" is unsatisfactory as a premanent
solution, Jackson has proposed a resolution
which would put the Senate on record oppos-
ing any more SALT agreements locking the
United States into arms inferiority.
Jackson charges that the "moratorium" is
onesided, limiting the United States to the
present 42 nuclear submarines and 1,054
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
while permitting the Soviets to continue con-
struction of both weapons systems until they
have 62 nuclear subs and 1,618 land-based
ICBMs stationed in permanent silos. The
Washington senator adds that while Wash-
ing unilaterally renounced construction of
mobile ICBMs, Moscow is free to build as
S 17627
many as it wants without violating the agree-
ment, as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
acknowledged.
Further, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Pentagon
chief of research and engineering, warned:
"Although the United States has a lead in
deployed technology -hat now offsets this
imbalance, (in numbers), Soviet exploitation
of their numbers and throw-weight capabil-
ity could adversely effect the strategic
balance."
Nevertheless, Laird contends that both
sides gave up something in the disarmament
negotiations. Laird says that "we are stop-
ping our momentum in the ABM field. They
are stopping their momentum in the offen-
sive weapons area." Foster offered a different
analysis in June-July hearings before the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
Sen. Howard W. Cannon, D-Neb., asked
Foster: "Is it not true that the Soviets will
not have to exercise restraint in their mo-
mentum, that is, they will not have to curtail
their current building rate of submarines for
at least three years and perhaps more?"
Foster: "Yes, six; that is correct"
Cannon: "On the other hand, the United
States has agreed to give up something this
year, and that is work on three ABM sites
at the Minuteman missile installations. in
fact, we will actually be dismantling work
,already started at Malmstrom Air Force
Base ..." Foster's reply: "Yes, that is cor-
rect."
In the hearings, Jackson asked Gerard
Smith, chief U.S. SALT negotiator, how much
Soviet momentum in offensive nuclear
weapons had been slowed by the "mora-
torium." Smith answered: "I do not think
you can answer that ... I do not think you
can get a specific answer to that question."
Smith couldn't answer a number of other
questions, as well, about what the United
States agreed to in SALT. Jackson asked
Smith what "under construction" meant in
regard to submarine production. Smith's
answer: "We do not have an agreed defini-
tion."
Further, the chief negotiator admitted
that "we were not able to negotiate a defini-
tion of what constitutes a heavy missile."
Yet the USSR is allowed 313 heavy missiles
while the U.S. is permitted none.
The "moratorium" is vague on othef mat-
ters, too. For example, Jackson asked: "Did
you try to negotiate a throw-weight freeze?"
(Throw-weight is the payload a missile can
throw or carry.) Smith answered: "No, sir."
Jackson asked why there was no limit on
diesel subs which carry nuclear missiles.
Smith replied: "I don't consider a 700- or
400-mile SLBM (submarine launched bal-
listic missile) a modern missile."
Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, chief of Naval oper-
ations, stated, however, that "a 700-mile
range missile could do catastrophic damage
to a substantial portion of our people and
cities whereas it could do very little damage
to theirs."
When Jackson tried to find out what,
exactly, the United States bargained away
during the negotiations, Smith refused to
answer, stating that "I would not like to
identify publicly what our position was."
Jackson presented figures he said repre-
sented the American position on Aug. 4,
1970: The United States demanded parity on
all long-range missiles but eventually set-
tled for 1,710 while giving the Soviets 2,358.
Originally the Nixon administration pro-
posed 250 heavy missiles for both sides but
finally agreed to build none while Moscow
was granted 313.
U.S. SALT negotiators two years ago de-
manded a ban on all mobile land-based
ICBMs. Washington announced in May it
would build none but the Soviets can con-
struct as many as they want.
Dr. William Van Cleve, a SALT adviser
for the U.S. from 1969 to 1971, agrees with
Jackson's assessment of what the Nixon ad-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 12, 1972
nonistration gave up. Van Cleve was the
only person outside the government who
was called upon to testify before the Senate
Armed Services Committee in the June-July
hearings.
"Those agreements," Van Cleve noted, "do
not resemble those deemed acceptable in
i )69 or 1970," which was nuclear equality.
In.. fact they don't resemble what Laird
lbought was acceptable four months before
they were signed. Last February, Laird
warned that "if we were placed in an in-
ferior position where the Soviet Union
would have substantially more ballistic mis-
,ae submarines than the United States
hid . this could have a tremendous effect
upon the future course of the United
6,:ctes."
[from the Greenburg (Pa.) Tribune-
Teview, Sept. 6, 1972]
ONLY ONE WINNER
,;en. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., has received
a powerful assist from organized labor in
their battle to prevent any more White House
agreements, accepting American military in-
feriority.
he AFL-CIO executive council states:
"American labor is firmly opposed to a
treaty on offensive weapons that would limit
the United States to levels of interconti-
nental strategic forces inferior to the limits
provided for the Soviet Union."
the Washington Democrat has jointly
;,,ponsored a bi-partisan Senate amendment
to the five-year "moratorium" on offensive
weapons which grew out of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks. This agreement lays
the groundwork for a treaty which would
permanently freeze levels of nuclear arms.
Jackson has pointed out that the "mora-
torium" is basically unilateral. The Soviet
Union is free to go on building up a tre-
mendous edge in,both nuclear missile sub-
marines and intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles while the United States has agreed to
maintain its present levels. Even If the
Kremlin should honor the "moratorium," at
the end of five years it would have three
ICBMs and nuclear missile subs for every
two of ours. The AFL-CIO warns: "If these
disparities were made the basis for a follow-
on treaty in this period of rapidly changing
technology, the United States would be
placed in a position of strategic inferiority."
Organized labor, in fact, is understating
the danger. As Dr. John S. Foster Jr., direc-
tor of Pentagon research, acknowledges, So-
viet weapons technology could surpass that
of the United States before the five-year
period has expired, which would further en-
danger American security.
Up until recent years, the United States
had always maintained nuclear superiority-
a strategy that has prevented a major war
between the free world and the Communist
bloc. It is a policy that should not be
abandoned, even for a short span.
In the arms race there is only one winner;
the rest are losers.
,From the New York Post, Sept. 12; 1972]
A CRITICAL HOUR
(By William F. Buckley, Jr.)
When on accepting the renomination of
his party at Miami Beach a few weeks ago
Richard Nixon said that he would never ne-
gotiate an arms limitation agreement from
a position of inferiority, he ran a terrible
risk. The risk was that someone would read
out to him from the transcript of the vari-
ous press conferences in Moscow in which
Henry Kissinger gave out the details of the
SALT Treaty.
I counted seven times that Mr. Kissinger
defended relegation of the U.S. to inferiority
on the grounds that after all we were talking
not about an ideal situation but about the
current situation. Mr. Kissinger's point was
that the Soviet Union has been going hell-
bent for strategic armament for three years
while we have been coasting, and that we are
better off more or less freezing the situation
than waking up a year or two from now to
find the Soviet lead drastically lengthened.
In other words, we negotiated from in-
feriority.
The scandal of creeping American arms in-
feriority is easily the best kept secret in the
world. notwithstanding that the facts are
widely available and have been remarked by
the Chiefs of Staff and by the Reader's Di-
gest, who between them cover just about
everybody. Fortunately, the facts are well
known to a group of senators who are right
this minute engaged in one of the toughest
and most important parliamentary mane~z-
vers of the decade.
They are fighting for what we call the
Jackson-Scott-Allott amendment to the In-
terim Agreement. Now that amendment does
several things. But mostly what it does is
to address the President of the U.S. thusly:
Friend, when you come back to us in a
couple of years with SALT II-the treaty
that is supposed to incorporate-a permanent
lessening of the strategic potential of the
Soviet Union and the United States-do not
present this chamber with a document that
grants the Soviet Union superiority.
As things now stand under SALT I, the
Soviet Union has a 50 per cent advantage in
launching sites and a 400 per cent advantage
in payload, once they are done Mirving.
Meanwhile, between now and the time you
come back to us with the treaty, we in the
Senate will from time to time question the
Executive on what strides are being made
to narrow the gap between the Soviet Union
and the United States, within the terms of
the current agreement. What kind of re-
search are you doing, for instance? And
when we say equality with the Soviet Union,
we mean equality of the kind spelled out
for instance in the ABM Treaty, not the
fancy-talk equality by which such as Sen.
Fulbright transmogrify a 4 to 1 disadvantage
into equality, on the nice metaphysical prin-
ciple that every Russian can only die-once.
The doves, sensing a great danger to their
vision of a disarmed America, are horrified
to note that Sen. Jackson's got himself 44 co-
sponsors for his amendment. With 44 co-
sponsors, one can assume a great many others
will vote with the 44 easily enough for a
swollen majority. What will be left over is a
highly visible minority who actually are
voting against American equality in strategic
arms, not the most attractive record to offer
their constituents in an elction year.
The doves then fought back with a Mans-
field amendment about playing fair under the
rules of SALT I, but the Jackson people
completely outwitted them by going for it
100 per cent (the vote was 85 to 1) on the,
grounds that the language of the proferred
amendment was totally harmonious with
that of the Jackson amendmnt=thus
stripping it of any real meaning. The doves
talk now about throwing out the Jackson
amendment at a conference with the House
(which did not come through with a comple-
mentary measure), but the Senate strategists
don't particularly care. SALT II is projected
as a treaty, and is subject therefore to rati-
fication by the Senate. By two-thirds of the
Senate.
Richard Nixon is actually encouraging the
Senate realists. He desires them to tie down
his hands, and why should he not? Richard
Nixon is not the only American who knows
what the Russians have been secretly up to
in recent weeks and months in the field of
arms research and development. Hubert
Humphrey also knows about it. It` is only
the American people who don't know about
it but, inevitably, will know about it soon.
They can reasonably demand to know how
their Senators voted on the Jackson amend-
ment at that critical hour.
From the Kansas City Times, Sept. 14, 1972]
AFOUL OF MISTRUST ON ARMS PACT
The Soviets are on weak grounds in object,,
ing to the views of the Pentagon and of Sen.
Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) on the arms
control agreement signed in Moscow last May.
A statement by Izvestia, the government
newspaper, charges the U.S. secretary of de..
Tense, Melvin It. Laird, with violating the
spirit of the Soviet-American pacts limiting
strategic arsenals and thus jeopardizing the
effectiveness of the agreements. Izvestia spe-
cifically accuses Laird of pressing for the
development of U.S. offensive systems.
Laird is indeed working for that purpose.
He is asking Congress for funds to finance
accelerated development of the new, longer-
range Trident underwater missile and the
B-1 strategic bomber. The terms of the Mos-
cow treaty on offensive weapons do not forbid.
such programs. In fact the pact asserts the
right of both the U.S. and Russia to pursue
weapons development during a 5-year in-
terim period before a full-fledged agreement,
is reached.
Why, then, are the Russians complaining?
It is a fair question, particularly since the
5-year freeze applies to numbers of offensive
nuclear weapons. But it does not prevent the
Russians from proceeding with their as yet
untested version of the SS9 multiwarhead
missile, believed capable of carrying three
warheads, each with a punch of 5 million
tons of TNT. The U.S. has no comparable
weapon.
What the Soviets apparently want is for
the U.S. to deny itself more advanced weap-
ons, as permitted in the temporary treaty,
while they move ahead to establish an ad-
vantage. In seeking an advantage they
strengthen the skepticism of those Ameri-
cans who are wary of accepting any arms
control understanding with the Soviet Union.
Senator Jackson has warned that the in-
terim agreement is subject to unilateral in-
terpretations. The Soviet protest tends to
bear out Jackson's point. He is therefore try-
ing to attach a rider that would require fu-
ture agreements to be based on the princi-
ple of equality of forces. His proposal would
not alter the treaty in its present form. And
it might facilitate Senate approval of the
treaty-something that needs to be done
promptly so that the two governments can
proceed next month with further arms con-
trol negotiations. It is in this round of talks
that any objections by Moscow can be prop-
erly dealt with.
From the Oregonian, Sept. 15, 1972]
TESTING THE RUSSIANS
The Senate's adoption of Sen. Henry M.
Jackson's amendment requiring the United
States to seek in a permanent treaty with
the Soviet Union equality in "intercontinen-
tal strategic forces" is a proper action after a
month-long debate which has produced a
new awareness in Congress and the nation.
Once that hurdle was passed, after rejec-
tion of substitute amendments by Sen. J. W.
Fulbright and other Foreign Relations Com-
mittee doves that would have weakened the
directive .to "over-all equality, parity and
sufficiency," approval of the five-year interim
agreement signed by President Nixon and
Chairman Brezhnev in Moscow May 26 was
a foregone conclusion.
We see no danger and some benefit in the
Jackson amendment holding the Russians'
feet to the fire as a test of their sincerity
in Phase II of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks. If the Russians really want a stand-off
permitting reduction in the insane arms
race, rather than a threatening dominance
in offensive power, this is the time to find
out.
The principle of equality in defensive
weapons was recognized in the treaty limit-
ing deployment in both the United States
and the Soviet Union of anti-ballistic mis-
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October 12, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
riles, already ratified by the Senate. All that
Sen. Jackson asked was that the U.S. nego-
tiators be instructed to insist on equality in
offensive weapons.
There are differences of opinion and in
statistical reports on the relative missile
power of the two nations at present; and the
potential for each under the five-year interim
agreement. Sen. Jackson has demonstrated,
however, that the Soviet Union could build
62 nuclear submarines of the Polaris type
under the interim agreement while the
United States would be limited to 44. He
has shown that the Russians could replace
their obsolete SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs with
new submarine-launched missiles on a one-
for-one basis, but the United States, which
has already retired its Atlas and Titan I mis-
siles, has no such trade-in privilege. He has
said- the Russians are developing new ICBMs
which would increase their "throw weight"
advantage without going beyond the 1,618
ICBMs permitted under the interim agree-
ment.
Sen. Jackson may be overly impressed
with the statistics of overkill, but his oppo-
nents were even less realistic in favoring
what amounts to a U.S. policy of unilateral
arms limitation based on faith in the Rus-
sians. The American. negotiators of the next
step in SALT are certainly aware of the sta-
tistics of offensive capabilities, of first-strike
dangers and of second-strike limitations. It
should strengthen the handsof the diplo-
mats, however, that Congress has added its
voice to that of the Nixon Administration in
demanding treaty equality in offensive weap-
ons. No less will be accepted by the American
people.
[From the New York Daily News,
Sept. 16, 1972 ]
SALT MAKES THE GRADE
The five-year interim agreemnet between
the U.S. and the USSR on limitation of stra-
tegic weaponry was approved Thursday by
the Senate, but only after adoption of a com-
mon sense amendment put forward by Sen.
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.).
This proviso urges President Richard M.
Nixon, in the next- phase of SALT negotia-
tions, not to settle for less than numerical
equality in major arms with the Soviets.
American bargainers settled for less than
parity in the present pact, conceding Mos-
cow sizeable margins in land-based and un-
dersea missile strength. Superior U.S. tech-
nology, particularly in multiple warheads,
is supposed to make good the deficit in num-
bers.
But this nation would assume a foolish
risk if it depended, as Sen. J. William Ful-
bright (D-Ark.) contends it should, on main-
taining its scientific edge indefinitely. Ful-
bright apparently has learned nothing from
the quick Russian catch-ups in development
of A-bombs, H-bombs and long-range mis-
siles.
DEFENSE BUDGET
We're happy the Senate heeded the far
more hardheaded and realistic Jackson in
this case, and we hope the rider will survive
the coming Senate-House conference on the
SALT resolution. Favorable House action on
the Defense budget indicates the lower cham-
ber may be more than willing to go along. In
okaying the $74.6 appropriation bill on
Thursday, the House gave Mr. Nixon just
about every cent he requested for develop-
ment of the Trident submarine missile sys-
tem and the new B-1 manned bomber.
Lack of those -advanced weapons, as the
President has stressed repeatedly, would
greatly handicap our negotiators in trying to
obtain a long-range treaty on arms ceilings.
The notion that new defense programs
will offend the Communist enemy is absurd.
Time and time again. the Kremlin has shown
that it respects strength and determination,
just as it despises and exploits weakness.
[From the Ogden, Utah, Standard-Examiner,
Sept. 16, 19721
SENATE OK'S SALT
The U.S.-Soviet agreement on strategic
arms limitations (SALT) is a more realistic
document as it leaves the Senate than it
was when originally drafted at the Kremlin.
The agreement, as approved late Thurs-
day by an 88-2 vote in the Senate, includes
Sen. Henry M. Jackson's amendment requir-
ing numerical equality in intercontinental
weapons that carry nuclear warheads.
This, if accepted by the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives and authorities in the U.S.S.R.,
would modify - the original pact that had
taken into consideration the American su-
periority in multiple warheads.
Sen. Jackson argued, and we agree, that
this U.S. advantage could easily be wiped out
by Russian advances during these next five
critical years.
The goal of SALT from'the start has been
to curtail the arms race in nuclear weapons-
including both land and sea missiles and
aircraft.
This objective can better be achieved under
the Jackson amendment than in the treaty
as signed in Moscow during President Nix-
on's historic visit to the Soviet Union. Once
in force, SALT's agreement will be In the
best interests of world peace.
[From the Birmingham News, Sept. 16, 1972]
JACKSON'S FIRM STAND
A healthy skepticism regarding Soviet mili-
tary Intentions and determination on- the
part of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Washing-
ton) has resulted in a sounder Soviet-Amer-
ican approach to slow the arms race.
The Senate approved the five-year pact
which President Nixon brought home from
the Moscow summit, but served notice that
the temporary agreements, specifically re-
garding numbers of nuclear warheads, would
not be acceptable to serve as a basis for a
permanent treaty.
Approved overwhelmingly by a vote of
87 to two, the agreement for the first time
set limits on the number of offensive mis-
siles deployed -by the United States and the
Soviet Union at least for the next five years.
Sen. Jackson, from the beginning of the
debates,,worked long and hard for the amend-
ment which demanded strict, numerical
equality in missiles for the two countries.
Jackson's logic for numerical equality is
sound. "The present U.S. advantage in
strategic weapons technology, which now
offsets Soviet numerical superiority," Jack-
son argued on the floor of the Senate, "can-
not be assured in a long-term treaty. What
would be a tolerable basis for an interim
agreement, therefore, would be Intolerable
as the basis for (permanent) treaty."
Jackson also asked the Senate to join with
him in calling upon the Soviet Union to
"reverse its weapons build-up and content
itself with equality with the United States
in strategic offensive weapons."
The senators who opposed Jackson's
amendment did so out of fear that instead of
the Russians reducing number of nuclear
submarines and missiles to the U.S. levels,
the U.S. would accelerate its nuclear pro-
gram to reach the same numbers the Rus-
sians project, and that this see-sawing back
and forth would result in another uncon-
trollable arms race.
The doves also have bought the "doctrine of
strategic sufficiency"; that is, the U.S. needs
only sufficient missiles to assure the de-
struction of the Soviets in case of nuclear
attack. Anything more, they argue, is fool-
ishness and waste.
The problem with the "doctrine of suf-
ficiency" is that more and more sophisticated
defense technology can radically alter what
is sufficient to knock out a potential enemy.
Jackson argued that Russia's numerical
S 17629
superiority in numbers of weapons would, in.
only a matter of time, be supported by a
technology equal or even more advanced than
that of the United States.
The amendment Jackson pushed and which
was backed by the White House should pre-
sent no insoluable problem for the Soviets,
if their real intention is peace.
If their real intention is -not peace, and
they are simply seeking time to achieve
an insurmountable superiority, it is best we
discover it now.
Sen. Jackson has served his nation well in
doggedly insisting that the administration,
the Congress and the Soviets confront what
could be a key issue in the pursuit of a new
era of peace.
[From the Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 17, 19721
ARMS EQUALITY WITH RUSSIA
Sen. Henry Jackson's misgivings about Rus-
sian intentions in the strategic arms race are
widely shared and altogether justified by the
record.
While the Russians were spinning out the
strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) at
Helsinki and Vienna, they were continuing to
deploy land-based and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles until they had acquired
their present advantage which is frozen into
the Interim agreement the United States
Senate approved the other day.
But the persistent Jackson was successful
in attaching to the agreement an administra-
tion-backed amendment which calls on Pres-
ident Nixon to seek equality in "levels of in-
tercontinental strategic forces" in negotia-
tions for a permanent treaty.
Jackson had observed that the interim
treaty gave the Soviets "more of everything;
more light ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic
missiles), more heavy ICBMs, more subma-
rine-launched missiles, more submarines,
more payload, even more ABM (anti-ballistic
missile) radars." He had said the Soviet ad-
vantage in offensive weapons covered by the
interim agreement was "on the order of 50
per cent."
Opponents of his amendment-notably
Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, Sen. Jacob K. Jav-
its, R-N.Y., and Sen. Stuart Symington, D-
Mo.-argued that this country's forward
bases in Europe and its superiority in missile
accuracy and multiple warhead technology
gave it an overall adavntac;e.
It's true that the Russians haven't yet de-
veloped a MIRV (multiple independently tar-
getable 're-entry vehicle) capability. But
they're working on it, and Sen. Jackson cor-
rectly points out. that the U.S. advantage in
this respect is temporary.
He has said that if the Russians "were to
aggressively pursue a silo-killing MIRV pro-
gram for their force of SS-9 type heavy mis-
siles, they could, within the lifetime of the
interim agreement, develop the capability
to destroy virtually all of our land-based mis-
sile forces."
The interim agreement has a five-year life.
Senate foes of the Jackson amendment argue
that insistence on numerical equality with
the Soviet Union would jeopardize the pros-
pects for a permanent treaty on strategic
arms limitation.
But to permit the Russians to widen their
superiority would lessen their need for any
kind of understanding. Worse still, it would
lay this country open to nuclear blackmail
five years from now.
[From the Dallas Times-Herald, Sept. 17.
1972]
A VOTE FOR SECURITY
One rejoices that the Senate backed Henry
Jackson in his call for U.S.-Soviet equality
in number of missiles. Not that we are out of
the woods, of course, in our effort to negotiate
a satisfactory arms control treaty with the
Russians.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 12, 1972'
glut passage of the so-called Jackson
Amendment was absolutely vital to U.S. se-
curity. Under the SALT agreement (which is
no:; a treaty in final form). the United States
over the next five years is permitted 1,054
land-based ICBM missiles and 710 underwater
launchers; the Russians can have 1,618
1Ct3Ms and 950 underwater launchers.
this is scarcely the kind of military in-
feriority which most Americans would like to
sea written into treaty form. Therefore, Jack-
so.,; urged the Senate to demand in advance
a treaty that provides numerical equality in
intercontinental weaponry.
With the President's backing, Jackson last
Thursday shepherded the amendment
through the Senate. A conference committee
could scrap the amendment. But Jackson says
this doesn't matter. It is the Senate whose
opinion counts, inasmuch as any fixture
treaty will be submitted only to the Senate,
nos the House.
predictably, Sen. Fulbright, the Ozark
oracle, protested against the Jackson Amend-
ment, basically because we have more nu-
clear warheads than the Russians, even if we
have fewer missiles. Yet Donald G. Brennan
of the Hudson Institute estimates that the
Soviets have the capability of deploying "ten
thousand or more MIRV (Multiple Independ-
ent Re-entry Vehicle) warheads on their
allowed booster force within the lifetime of
this agreement"-enough to "wipe out vir-
tually all of our Minuteman force , .
tloreover, Jackson notes how "People and
nations attach meaning to the relative stra-
tegic position of the two superpowers." It is
not necessarily how strong we are that mat-
ters: it is howstrong we look. That is what
weighs with our allies no less than our
enemies.
A good arms limitation treaty-one that
does not create too many advantages for the
Soviet Union-is going to be hard to nego-
tiate. It will be immensely harder if the So-
viets think us inclined to accept nuclear
inferiority. They may think this of us any-
way, but they are much less likely to now
that the U.S. Senate has upheld Henry Jack-
son.
[From the Augusta, (Ga.), Chronicle-Herald,
Sept. 17, 19721
WILL To SURVIVE
l'he U.S. Senate's vote, 56 to 35, calling for
quantitativeequality for the United States
to any future arms agreements with the So-
viet Union, was a victory for practical men
who desire intensely the survival of the
United States in an age of flagrant Conimu-
mat aggression.
"'lie overall interim agreement on arms,
approved 87-2, is not affected by the contro-
versial amendment. The effect of approval
is to ratify the freeze President Nixon nego-
tiated a few months ago in Moscow. This
interim agreement, to last only five years,
permits a marked lead for Russia in the num-
ber of missiles and submarines, by approving
the number now completed or under con-
struction.
'f 'lie disparity in numbers-that-will result
lieu in the phrase, "or under construction."
it means that the United States stands still,
wi' iie Russia goes ahead with what are being
built, the final approved figures being 1,618
intercontinental missiles for Russia as con-
trusted to only 1,054 for the U.S.; and with
62 Russian nuclear submarines, equipped
wi':h 950 missile launchers, in contrast to
the United States' 44 submarines and 710
launchers.
'-he numerical-equality amendment which
has just won 56-35 Senate approval was op-
posed by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.)
ana others who have objected to stronger
U.S. defenses. Their claim was that since
we have superior technology, the capabilities
of our missiles and submarines are equal to
the far greater numbers which the interim
agreement authorizes for the Communiwas.
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), whose
support for the numerical-equality amend-
ment won White House support, replies that
the U.S. technological advantage is tempo-
rary. In five years' time, he points out, a
continuation of the numerical advantage for
Russia can mean an advantage in flrst-strh:e
effectiveness which would threaten the secu-
rity-indeed the very existence-of America.
Thus, he argues, the only safe policy is to
set up now a policy of future parity in nuns-
bers of strategic weapons.
With all due acknowledgement of ' .e
idealistic dedication to absolute equality by
Senator Fulbright and others who follow 'is
lead, we must conclude that Senator Ja-:t-
son's concern seems more than justified.
The security of the United States is too -,r-
gent an issue for our government to indulge
in armament guessing games that might
prove to be wrong. We must remember that
Russia has not agreed to any inspection sys-
tem, nor does it show any indication of do:;ig
so. And we may doubt the permanence of
satellite reconnaissance ability to keep tabs.
Agreements on arms limitations with Com-
munist Dowers -committed to our destruction
are a hazardous matter at best. The least v:e
can do is what a substantial majority of t'le
Senate vote demanded-give away nothing to
aggressor states in the way of military
advantage.
[From the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Press,
Sept. 17, 1972]
SENATE SERVES NOTICE
After more than a month of heavy debate,
the U.S. Senate has approved a five-year ms-
sile-limitation agreement between the Soviet
Union and the United States-with the Jack-
son "rider" included.
The Jackson rider was what the long de-
bate was all about.
In the end, Sen. Henry M. Jackson of
Washington succeeded in persuading the
Senate to his resolution. It merely says it is
the opinion of the Senate that in future arms
negotiations with the Soviet Union, the
United States should not consent to any ar-
rangement which leaves this country with
inferior numbers of offensive strategic
weapons.
The live-year, or interim, agreement was
reached by President Nixon and Soviet lead-
ers on Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow last May.
Its chief purpose, apparently, is to hold the
line on weapons developments until a new
round on negotiations on arms limitations
can get under way.
Both Senate and House now have approved
this five-year agreement, but the House reso-
lution does not include the Jackson rider..
In the compromise between the two houses
the rider n1ay get dumped.
But, as Sen. Jackson says, no matter.
It is the -Senate which acts on treaties, arnd
the 5G-35 vote by which the Senate adopted
the Jackson rider serves notice on both So-
viet and U.S. negotiators that the Senate is
nob apt to okay a treaty which could le-:,.,'e
the United States in an inferior position.
In. short, the Senate announces that ':he
seeming advantages which Mr. Nixon granted
the Soviet Union in an effort to get mare
arms-control negotiations under way is not,
to be taken as a precedent on which to base
future treaties. And that is a useful service.
[From the Tucson (Ariz.) Daily Citizen,
Sept. 18, 19721
NOCLEAR TREATIES OPEN NEW ERA
Following more than a month's debate,
the U.S. Senate has ratified the second of
two arms control treaties signed by President
Nixon during his visit to the Soviet Union.
This one places limitations on each country's
offensive strategic weapons.
More than a month ago, the Senate gave
approval to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty.
This pact-of unlimited duration-restricts
each nation to two defensive ABM systems,
one "centered in the party's national capi-
tal," and the other elsewhere.
Verification of each party's compliance will
be "through national technical means," that
is, spy satellites.
Senate ratification of the second treaty. an
interim agreement on offensive weapons, was
delayed as a result of a proposal by Sen.
Henry M. Jackson, which was finally adopted.
Sen. Jackson wanted the Senate to go on
record as reserving to the United States the
right to scrap the agreement if future Soviet
actions threaten to wipe out a major part
of our deterrent force.
According to Sen. Jackson, a sound critic
of strategic arms limitation accords, the in-
terim agreement gives the Soviets an advan-
tage in offensive weapons "on the order of 50
per cent," based on the highly complex rules
of nuclear arithmetic.
Under the interim accord, which is to last
five years, the Soviets are allowed a numeri-
cal superiority in intercontinental ballistic
missiles and missile-launching sites.
Although many military- experts regard the
United States as having a big lead in what is
described as multiple-warhead technology,
Sen. Jackson does not want any treaty which
"would limit the United States to levels of
intercontinentalstrategic forces inferior to
the limits provided for the Soviet Union."
The House of Representatives earlier had
approved the second treaty, without provi-
sions contained in the Jackson amendment.
Now it goes to a House-Senate conference.
[ From the Denver Post, Sept. 18, 1972 ]
A STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT
The Senate's approval of a five-year U.S.-
Soviet interim agreement setting limits on
offensive nuclear weapons is an overdue, but
welcome, action.
It now remains for a Senate-House confer-
ence committee to work out the differences
which include a Senate amendment calling
for parity on strategic arms.
The White House had expressed concern
that further delays in approving the interim
agreement-carefully worked out earlier this
year by President Nixon and Soviet leaders
in historic strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT)-could impede other U.S.-Soviet ac.
cords.
The Senate gave overwhelming support to
the first part of the SALT agreements by rati-
fying on Aug. 3 a treaty setting limits on de-
fensive missile units. Since then the Senate
had been debating the arms parity amend-
ment principally by Sen. Henry M. Jackson,
D-Wash.
The Nixon administration would have pre-
ferred no amendments, but went along with
a revised version of the Jackson amendment
deemed more conciliatory to the Russians.
Under the circumstances, this was a sound
move for the administration to make. The
Jackson amendment should help calm fear:;
that the Soviet Union will gain a strategic
advantage through the SALT accords.
It remains to be seen whether the amend..
ment approved by the Senate will survive the
conference committee deliberations.
But it is really an academic question be..
cause theinterim agreement on offensive nu-
clear arms, which requires approval by both
houses of Congress, is intended to be suc-
ceeded by a treaty which only the Senate
can ratify. The potential treaty, therefore,
will not be a matter for House action, and
the administration and the Senate have now
made clear where they stand on the issue.
Only experience gained during the next
five years can determine what shape such a
treaty will take-or even if there will be a
treaty.
More permanent limitations on strategic
arms will be considered during the SALT 2
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discussions, which are expected to get under
way in Geneva during the fall.
Final approval of the interim agreement by
both houses of Congress ought to help launch
SALT 2 in the right channel.
[From the Detroit News, Sept. 18, 1972]
IN NUCLEAR ARMS PACT-PARITY IS U.S. GOAL
Senate approval of .the U.S.-USSR agree-
ment to limit offensive nuclear weapons as-
sures congressional adoption of the five-
year pact. But it does not halt the arms race
or the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve su-
periority over this country.
In fact, the interim agreement assures the
Soviet Union a lead in some weapons. It
freezes intercontinental ballistics missiles
to those deployed or under construction, an
estimated 1,618 for the USSR and 1,054 for
the United States; limits the Soviet subma-
rine force to 62 with 950 missile launchers,
and restricts the U.S. underwater fleet to 44
submarines and 710 launchers.
Most of the debate in the Senate came
over an amendment by Senator Henry Jack-
son, Washington Democrat, which finally
was adopted. It calls upon'?the President to
seek a future treaty on offensive nuclear
weapons that "would not limit the United
States to levels of intercontinental strategic
forces inferior to the limits provided for the
Soviet Union."
In negotiating the agreement, U.S. officials
had accepted the higher figures for the So-
viet Union on the grounds that the United
States is ahead in multiple warheads
(MIRV's) for each missile, U.S. submarines
have forward bases which improve their
relative efficiency and the United States has
a numerical superiority in bombers, carriers
and fighter-bombers based in Europe. and the
Far East and not subject to the new treaty.
However, Robert W. Bowie, director of the
Harvard Center for International Affairs, has
pointed out that while the agreement
achieves a rough parity between the USSR
and the United States at present, that status
is "not likely to endure." He said that within
three to five years, the Soviets can be ex-
pected to perfect their own MIRV's and
then could take advantage of their much
larger and more numerous launchers. In ad-
dition, new Soviet subs with longer radius
would reduce the advantage of U.S. bases.
"In short, the existing parity is likely to
be eroded as the Soviets catch up in tech-
nology in view of their 50 percent or greater
edge in launchers," he wrote recently. "For
the interim needed to negotiate a permanent
treaty these are satisfactory risks but this
would not be a satisfactory basis for a per-
manent treaty."
Even if the present U.S. deterrents were
sufficient to avoid war with the USSR, no-
body knows what kind of political leverage
and blackmail the USSR might impose on
other nations if it achieved superiority over
the United States. So what Jackson really
was asking for, and the Senate adopted, was
a statement of warning to the then presi-
dent to maintain parity when the permanent
U.S.-USSR pact comes up for negotiation
and adoption.
[From the McKeesport (Pa.) News,
Sept. 18, 1972]
EXPECTED ACTION
Senate approval of the U.S.-Soviet interim
agreement on offensive arms limitations was
a foregone conclusion following earlier ap-
proval of a defensive missiles pact.
It is elementary that one treaty alone is
worthless, for to curb defensive weapons sole-
ly without a similar limitation on offensive
missiles would set off a staggering arms race
and invite a first strike.
Approval of the five-year offensive agree-
ment freezes ICBMs to those deployed or un-
der construction, an estimated 1,618 for the
S 17631
Soviet Union and 1,054 for the United States. Thus a limited measure of progress on inter-
The pact also limits Russia to 82 submarines national arms control has been chalked up
and 950 submarine missile launchers, and the with the way open to further and more com-
United States to 44 submarines and 710 prehensive agreement.
launchers.
It was the numerical edge given the Soviets
that caused a delay in approval by the Senate
by a 88-2 vote. The House had approved the
agreement earlier. The Senate dispute was
resolved by adopting an amendment calling
for equality in long-range weapons in any
future agreement.
The treaty had been viewed with some ap-
prehension by some lawmakers, notably Sen.
Henry Jackson who is noted for his deep con-
cern over U.S. defenses. This group read into
the terms a decided advantage for Russia.
Such an interpretation understandably
breeds misgivings. Other lawmakers saw the
U.S. with a decided superiority in missile
accuracy and multiple warhead technology.
Apparently the White House has no serious
objections to the amendment since a spokes-
man says that President Nixon "obviously was
very pleased" with approval of the agreement.
Jackson, author of the amendment, voiced
unconcern whether or not the "equality"
amendment would survive a Senate-House
conference since what is involved is a future
treaty upon which the Senate alone will act.
There is reason to regard Jackson's reserva-
tions about the interim pact as a contribu-
tion to a rational defense posture. And his
amendment puts the Soviets on notice that
when the next round of strategic arms nego-
tiations gets under way that American Sena-
tors, who have the final say, will be keeping
a close eye on developments.
[From the Kansas City Star, Sept. 20, 1972]
POSTSCRIPT TO THE MOSCOW PACT
Superiority or inferiority, no. Equality, yes.
That, greatly simplified, was the majority
position of the U.S. Senate when it came to
approving the offensive arms agreement
signed by President Nixon in Moscow last
May 26.
The handling of this pact in Congress was
unusual for two reasons. First, President
Nixon is not required by law or the Consti-
tution to obtain the sanction of Congress for
an executive agreement such as the une
covering offensive weapons. Second, the con-
troversial amendment by Sen. Henry M. Jack-
son (D-Wash.) calling for equal strategic
strength has no direct bearing on the 5-year
accord with Russia. Instead it is intended as
a guide to the kind of permanent arms con-
trol understanding that the U.S. will work for
in the coming SALT II negotiations with the
Soviet Union.
The Senate line-up for and against Jack-
son's proposal in general followed the pattern
of voting on Senator McGovern's recent at-
tempt to cut the military spending bill by
$4 billion. The Democratic nominee lost that
one by a margin of 59 to 33. The vote on
Jackson's amendment was 56 to 35. Where-
upon the Senate approved by 87 to 2 the
actual 5-year arms agreement whose terms
were not changed by the Jackson amendment.
Thus the group of liberal Democratic sen-
ators who embrace what has been called "the
Proxmire philosophy" on defense spending
continues to be thwarted. There are enough
Republicans and Southern Democrats in
Congress to knock down any move that
smacks, of 1-way disarmament. The majority,
by approving funds for the advanced Trident
submarine and the B-1 bomber to replace the
overage B-52, has said that the improvement.
of weapons systems, as permitted by the
temporary Moscow pact, is still necessary.
That position was the essence of the Jack-
son amendment in so far as any early mean-
ing it may have. By not forfeiting strategic
strength now, the U.S. will have much greater
bargaining power at the next round of SALT.
But the resillts of SALT I are now certain of
final ratification by both houses of Congress.
HEARINGS ON LIFE-THREATENING
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I am
pleased to read on page S17281 of the
RECORD of October 10 that the chairman
of the Health Subcommittee, the senior
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN-
NEDY), expects to hold hearings early
next year on the subject of life-threat-
ening medical experiments. I have urged
such hearings for almost 2 years, in part
because of totally unsubstantiated state-
ments and charges made by Senate staff
members and the press relating to a total
body radiation project carried on at the
University of Cincinnati Medical College.
These statements have been damaging to
professional men of the highest caliber,
to a fine institution, and possibly to some
of the patients involved. My prior state-
ments on this question are set out on
pages S21665-S21668, December 15, 1971;
S40-S46, January 19, 1972; S12381-
S12384, August 1, 1972; S16561-S16562,
October 2, 1972, of the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD.
It is therefore more in sorrow than
in anger that I note another totally er-
roneous statement of the Senator from
Massachusetts reported on page S17281
to the effect that the Cincinnati project
made patient care secondary to experi-
mentation. The project was thoroughly
reviewed and given a complete vindica-
tion against such charges by a compre-
hensive peer review of the American Col-
lege of Radiology, a report of which is set
out on page S40 of the RECORD of Janu-
ary 19, 1972.
In view of this, I believe that the hear-
ing planned should now also undertake
an investigation of irresponsible, inac-
curate, and preconceived staff actions and
statements of Senate committee and
staff employees.
BOMBING OF HANOI
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, news
reports over the past 24 hours strongly
suggest that American bombs are re-
sponsible for the damage to the French
and Algerian legations in Hanoi, and the
personal injury and the loss of life that
has apparently occurred. -
Just 2 weeks ago, on September 28, the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees,
which I serve as chairman, held a hear-
ing on the impact on civilians of the
air war over North Vietnam. In both
open and closed sessions, administration
witneses assured us again and again-
but without much proof-that what of-
ficials call "collateral damage" was min-
imal and that every precaution is taken
to avoid air strikes over civilian and non-
military areas. In this connection, Hanoi
and other cities in North Vietnam were
singled out by the witnesses. Maj. Gen.
John W. Pauly, Vice Director for Oper-
ations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had
this to say about Hanoi in the closed
session:
Hanoi city area has been relatively un-
targeted. The only things that have been
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 12, 19'72
targeted at all are those that are in the
fringe at 4 or 5 miles out from town that I
have mentioned. These are the war-making
facilities.
'1 he only exception to this are the two
bridges I mentioned that were taken out with
LGl3's. We have verified that there was no
collateral damage. When we have a sensitive
siuation, we will be looking specifically for
collateral damage. Those were taken out
clean and the downtown Hanoi area, as we
will mention later, has relatively no damage.
The only collateral damage that we have been
able to identify in the specifics that have been
provided (by the subcommittee) have been
tied in the immediate vicinity of a strike
against nearby military targets in which a
stray bomb had gone off or where the strike
force had, in fact, for various reasons, missed
their target.
And so, Mr. President, there is "col-
lateral damage" In Hanoi-and, based on
testimony before the subcommittee, a
great deal more, including several disas-
trous mistakes, in Haiphong, and Nam
Dinh, and other cities and towns in
North Vietnam.
in this connection, let me say that the
much emphasized smart bombs are
hardly used. The Defense Department
informed me yesterday, in response to
questions raised in the hearing, that:
The percentage of smart bombs dropped
in North Vietnam since thecurrent campaign
began in May is 1.77 percent.
The growing collateral damage in
North Vietnam raises troubling questions
about the purposes of the President's air
war over North Vietnam, and about the
rules of engagement covering the bomb-
ing and shelling over all of Indochina.
Our country is apparently responsible
for another disastrous mistake. For most
Americans today the whole war is a mis-
take-and each day that this carnage is
allowed to go on simply compounds that
mistake.
DEATH OF FORMER SENATOR BUSH
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, upon
the death of former Senator Prescott S.
Bush, many newspapers throughout the
State of Connecticut expressed the deep
respect which all of us in the State have
long felt for this fine man. I ask unani-
mous consent that nine of the editorials
which have appeared over the last sev-
eral days be included in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
From the Greenwich (Conn.) Time]
EDITORIAL
Prescott S. Bush died Sunday at the age
of 77. Thus ended a life remarkable for its
many contributions to society and mankind.
Mr. Bush epitomized the characteristics
associated with the 'idealized version of the
public official candor, integrity, consistency,
dedication. And another, which perhaps many
of his constituents weren't as aware of-
deep, human compassion and an unshakable
sense of justice. In the rough and tumble
arena of politics, the humanitarian per-
suasions of Pres Bush weren't as widely
known. A deeply religious man, it could be
said of him he was one of the rare ones who
tried to carry through the precepts of his
religion into his everyday life.
' 110 list the accomplishments of this neigh-
bor of ours can be done if you have sufficient
space to catalogue a staggering array of
achievements in many, many diverse fields.
To him, the pinnacle of his career was the
U.S. Senate, which he loved and served so
well. In Greenwich, we also Insist on placing
high on the record the 15 years that Pres
Bush served as Moderator of the Representa-
tive Town Meeting, a towering presence of
firmness and fairness as he presided over the
sometimes turbulent sessions. His dignity,
authority, grace and-praise be, a good sense
of humor-had a lot to do with the shaping
of this community during those Important
years.
Pres Bush, as everyone knows, got his po-
litical indoctrination by heading Republican
fund-raising efforts in the state. When he
was persuaded to try for state office he was
still not very well known.
He made his first run in 1950 but was de-
feated by Bill Benton by a slim majority of
1,000 votes. He liked his first taste of big
league politics, good naturedly listened to
the advice and ribbing of friends who felt
they had to guide him into the "realities" of
politics and bridge the gap between "the
people" and the patrician world in which
Bush moved. These friends quickly found out
that Pres Bush was inately a good "people"
man because he too began to enjoy his ex-
panded association with various types and
groups he probably never would have been
exposed to had he not plunged into the
political picture.
He once told a friend visiting him in his
Senate office: "I've been very fortunate In
my life and I've enjoyed it. But I love this
United States Senate job more than any-
thing I've done. It gives me a chance to try
to be of real service to the people of the
state and my country. But most of all, it's
taken me out of the routine so familiar to
all of us in Greenwich and _ I have been en-
riched by meeting andgetting to know some
wonderful people all over this state--ethnic
groups, upstate farmers, Portuguese fisher-
men-you name it, we've got it in Connect-
cut.
This was a dimension of Pres Bush that
not everyone got to know, for his general
demeanor was dignified and restrained.
Some, in the way folks tend to stereotype
people in the public eye, even though he
was stand-offish and aloof. No point to quar-
rel now-how could they know, as did those
close to him, what a warm and vivacious
man he could be. A fine singer (former
Whiffenpoof) witty parodist, quick to ap-
preciate a good line or anecdote, a man with
a twinkle in his eye.
Friend and golfing associate of the late
President Eisenhower, Pres Bush moved in
the top echelons of power politically, social-
ly and in the business world. His manner
and attitude were the same in any milieu.
He operated- with the graceful ease of a man
whose upbringing and career were almost of
story-book nature: Yale, baseball at Yale,
Whiffenpoofs, national senior golf champion
in 1951, tennis player, swimmer, World War
I captain, partner in Brown Brothers Harri-
man & Co., prominent civil leader, club man,
successful party fund-raiser, head of a fine
family. If such a shiny life should tempt a
man to self-complacency, it didn't have that
effect on Pres Bush. He plunged into the
political arena with gusto. He took his first
defeat, bounced off the floor and waded right
in again. Next time he ran for the Senate he
won, handing Abe Ribicoff one of the few de-
feats that worthy has ever sustained.
Pres Bush was an excellent Senator. He
was reelected to a full term in 1956 and
probably would have been reelected in 1932
had he not decided to eschew the run because
of health problems.
Frankly, it is extremely difficult for us to
contemplate a Greenwich minus Prescott
Bush. Reality says we must. The great con-
tributions he made to our town and state are
part of our very fiber. But we'll miss more
than that-we'll miss a great human being,
a friend, a wise counselor, a man who cared
a great deal, a man of probity and honor,
a man of character.
We take some solace in seeing several sons
in the political vineyard, so the name and
the high purposes of Senator Bush will be
carried on. To them, to the wonderful widow,
Dottie, to all who have lost a fine friend
and respected fellow townsman, our con-
dolences. We are all truly the poorer today
for his loss.
[From the New Haven (Conn.) Register,
Oct. 10, 19721
EDITORIAL
During his years in the U.S. Senate, Pres-
cott S. Bush had performed to the fullest
measure of his abilities, as any good man
in office does, but with many essential dif-
ferences that set him apart from many of
the household names of his day:
His achievements were without fanfare
or self-glorification.
Mr. Bush, a tall, regal looking man with
an aura of ivy league about him, with fash-
ionable Greenwich as his home and a Wall
Street career as an investment banker, was
as unlikely a poltiician as one would ex-
pect to find in ethnic-conscious industrial
Connecticut.
He was a relative political amateur when
he first bobbed to attention in a 1950 race
for the Senate, but he made it close enough
to gain a second chance two years later,
when he went on to victory.
Mr. Bush was more than a man for his
time. Hard working and vigorous, a man
of deeply felt convictions, the Senator was
not one to seize upon issues of the moment,
but to perceive and put his energies behind
issues that were of moment.
He recognized- fully the urban blight that
beset the cities and rallied early to their
cause, playing a major hand in the shaping
of the father of all redevelopment legisla-
tion, the Housing Act of 1954. He championed
urban renewal at every turn. Beyond promot-
ing and supporting legislation in Wash-
ington, Mr. Bush took the lead in bringing
the message of urban renewal home to Con-
necticut's cities and towns, and played a vital
role, in New Haven's urban renewal fortunes.
The former Senator was among the first
to recognize the danger of Joe McCarthyism,
and his mark was that he could oppose the
latter, but in never but a gentlemanly fash-
ion. The other tactics were alien to Mr. Bush's
character.
Mr. Bush's deep interest in urban renewal
was matched by his equal deep concern for
civil rights, better education, a strong U.S.
military posture and fiscal responsibility in
federal government, including the control
of inflation. He predated much of the later
day civil rights struggle with his battles
against racial discrimination in FHA Hous-
ing and in employment, the latter among
both management and unions. Hishumane-
ness showed in his persistant efforts on be-
half of flood and storm victims. He was an
advance man for ecology interests with his
involvement In flood control and beach
erosion problems.
Mr. Bush, a Yale graduate who had served
12 years as a member of the Yale Corp., was
in retirement when he passed away Sunday
at the age of 77. He will be remembered as
a man of compassion and integrity whose
distinguished service for his state and coun-
try will offer challenge to others to emulate.
[From the Waterbury (Conn.) Republican]
EDITORIAL
Prescott S. Bush was a distinguished
gentleman who looked and acted like a U.S.
Senator. He was a great credit to the State
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DATE 'e,? PAGE
SENATE APPROVES
PACT WITH SOVIET
ON STRATEGIC ARMS
But It First Accepts Jackson
Amendment on Numerical
Equality in New Accords
CLOSURE BID SUCCEEDS
House Conference Is Next--
$74.5-Billion Defense
Budget Advances
By JOHN W. FINNEEY
Special to ThaNew York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 -
After more than a month of
debate, the Senate approved to-
day the United States-Soviet
agreement to freeze a major
part of their offensive nuclear,
arsenals for five years. H ti,
ever, it stipulated that t1 re
should be equality in the n Pe
her of weapons in any fu
treaty governing strategic ao
tercontinental arms. ter
The agreement, which wan
limit the number of offer 0l;
land-based and submada
borne missiles possessed b3 be
United States and the Sv
Union, was approved by a vi
of 88 to 2, with only Serno
James B. Allen of Alabama ml
Senator Ernest F. Holling Ce
South Carolina, both D,
crats voting against it. K
Jackson Amendment Vot
Earlier, the Senate had vc In
56 to 35, in favor of the Si
troversial amendment si w
sored by Senator Henry d,,
Jackson of Washington that.
caused the delay in approv$'
the arms-limitation accord. y
amendment, which was initially
endorsed by the Nixon Admin-
istration, calls upon the Presi-
dent to seek a future treaty
on offensive nuclear weapons
that "would not limit the
%.uiiultellGar strategic forces in-
ferior to the limits provided for,
the Soviet Union."
The Senate rejected repeated
attempts to eliminate-or modify
the Jackson amendment, which,
was attached to a resolution ap-
proving the interim accord on
arms signed by President Nixon
and Soviet leaders in Moscow
in May.
Since the House of Represent-
atives adopted a simple resolu-
tion of approval in mid-August,
the matter now goes to a Sen-
ate-House conference.
Permanent Limitation Sought
The interim accord, which
aims at limiting the arms race
while the two sides attempt to
negotiate a permanent treaty
on offensive weapons, was one
of two agreements concluded
by Mr. Nixon and Leonid I.
Brezhnev, the . Soviet Com-
munist party leader. The other
was a treaty limiting anti-
ballistic, or defensive, missiles.
The Senate gave its approval
to the defensive-weapons treaty
-the only act of Congress
actually required by law-in
August, but Mr. Nixon has
withheld ratification of the
treaty pending approval of the
interim agreement on offensive
weapons by the House and the
Senate.
After today's votes, Admin-
istration officials privately ex-
pressed the hope that the
Jackson amendment would be
dropped in the Senate-House
conference. The Administration
hope, it appeared, may be re-
alized since the Senate will
be represented in the commit-
tee by members of the Foreign
Relations Committee, who felt
that the amendment's insist-
ence on numerical equality
would undermine chances for
permanent agreement on of-
fensive weapons.
The White House endorsed
the amendment in what some
Administration officials private
ty described as a political favor
to a Senator who had consist-
ently supported the Administra-
tion on national security policy.
The Administration also took
tyre position that the Jackson A Matter of Judgment
welidmept represented merely For many Senators, their
an expression of Senate opinion votes turned not so much on
at was not binding upon the the strategic issues of the de-
,4dministration. bate as on whether- they re-
In other. Congressional action spected the judgment of Senator
on defense today, the House Fulbright or Senator Jackson
n
more. As he has in all defe e
years, Sena
passed and sent to the Senate a debates s
passed recent
X74.5-billion deefnse appropria-. tor Jackson prevailed.
tions bill that contained virtu- In some ways, the Jackson
ally all the funds required to amendment was a.direct out-
start a multibillion dollar pro growth and reaction to the in-
terim agreement, which grants
gram of improving the nation's
nuclear arsenal. It had been re-
quested by the Administration
in the wake of,the agreements
on arms with the Soviet Union.
Included in the bill-which
provides $4.3-billion less than
the Administration's military
request in the current fiscal
year-were almost $1-billio4 to
start construction ofthe Trident
missile - launching submarine
and $445-million to continue
development of the B-1 super-
sonic strategic bomber. About
the only major strategic pro-
gram left out of the bill was a
Safeguard antiballistic missile
site around Washington, as per
mitted under the defensive-
weapons treaty.
End-War Proviso Beaten
The House again refused to
attach an end-the-war amend-
ment to the defense bill. After
less than 15 minutes of debate,
the House, by a vote of 208 to
160 rejected an amendment by
Representative Joseph P. Ad-
dabbo, Democrat of Queens,
that would have required the
wihdrawal of all American
forces from Indochina in four
months, subject to the concur-
rent release of prisoners of war.
,There never had been any
d&ubt that the Senate would
approve the interim agreement,
b.qt in the protracted debate
stirred up by the Jackson
amendment, it finally took a
closure vote. After discussing
it;.since Aug. 2, the Senate ap-
proved today by yote of 76 to
15 a motion to limit debate and
force a vote on the Jackson
amendment and the offensive-
weapons agreement.
,In some ways, the debate
turned into a personality con-
tct and a clash between Sena-
tor Jackson, a senior member
of the Armed Services Commit-
tee with close ties to the mili-
tary, and Senator J. W. Ful-
bright, the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.
the Soviet Union a numerical
advantage in land-based and
submarine-launched missiles.
defending the agreement, the
Administration has argued that
this Soviet advantage would be
offset. by American technologi-
cal and numerical superiority in
bombers, carriers and fighter-
bombers based in Europe and
the Far East.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE September 13, -1972
All of this action took place subsequent [From Fortune magazine, September 19721 their strategic strike forces at a rate of some
to attacks by the President against the THF. SALT NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES ARE 100 sea-launched and 200 land-launched miS-
92d Congress for delaying and a re- TROUBLED BY WHAT WE GAVE AWAY IN THE silos a year. The U.S, last added launchers to
sponse to that charge delivered by Sen- Moscow ARMS AGREEMENTS its strategic inventory in 1967.
ator MANSFIELD on September 8. (By Charles J. V. Murphy) The decision to hold down our numbers
was reached hack in the early 19G0's by De-
Mr. President, I also stated on Mon- The agreements reached in the Strategic fextse Secretary Robert S. McNamara. The
day that the work of the subcommittee Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have had a growth of the Minuteman force was to be
on surface mining legislation could not rather remarkable record in the U.S. Senate. halted when it reached 3,000 launchers, the
have been accomplished without "tile The first of the two major agreements, the Polaris force was to hold at its present level
great and full support of the minority Antiballistic Missile Treaty, sailed through of forty-one hulls, and an advanced bomber
members of the subcommittee." The last month by a vote of 88 to 2. The ABM proposed by the Air Force was rejected. In
Senator from Idaho (Mr. JORDAN), the treaty binds tis and the Russians to confine the wake, of the Cuban missile crisis, it ap-
the defenses against each other's missiles to pears, the Kennedy men were determined to
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), two fixed sites, at least 800 miles apart, each reduce the risk of another nuclear confronta-
and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. to have no more than 100 interceptor rock- tion; they hoped that if we did not add to
BELLMON) were prime supporters of the cts-a token number. The other major SALT our nuclear advantage and let the Russians
subcommittee and worked tirelessly. I agreement, which put limits on offensive rise to parity, the arms race would slow
as chairman of the subcommittee, and I
laud their efforts now.
It was because of their great and
faithful dedication to the task of draft-
ing the surface mining legislation that I
was doubly shocked to find not one of
them at the executive session and there-
fore expressed my dismay that their
failure to attend might have political
overtones.
Perhaps my frustration under extreme
pressure and urgency induced me to
speak more bitingly than I should have
done. So if my criticism on Monday was
unwarranted, I apologize.
I am most pleased that a full quorum
was in attendance at the Interior Com-
mittee's executive session today and that
we did, indeed, report a bill to regulate
surface mining, subject to amendments
to be proposed on the floor of the Senate.
amount of controversy about the conditions On the evidence, the Russians certainly
that should he attached to it; but there was made the most of this singular opportunity.
never the slightest possibility that the Sen- As Kissinger pointed out in Moscow, the sit-
ate would reject it. This "interim agreement" cation in which the U.S. found itself nine
fixes future ceilings for the two nations on years later, particularly with regard to sub-
the number of strategic nuclear submarines marines, was hardly "the most brilliant bar-
each may have (luring the next five years, the gaining position" for our negotiators. Presi-
total number of missiles these vessels may dent Nixon has suggested that if the U.S.
carry, and the number of land-based stra- were to set out now to redress the balance.
tegic missiles each nation may separately immediate additional investments in strategic
deploy. systems on the order of $15 billion a year
What is remarkable about the Senate rec- would be necessary. And Congress, given its
ord is that virtually none of those who are present massive mistrust of just about any
responsible for the agreements are happy military investment, would certainly never
with them. Not President Nixon. Not Henry yield up such funds. It has persistently
Kissinger, who with the President took part skimped on the strategic programs and the
in the final horse trading in Moscow and R, and D. account through the past four
composed a dazzling if not wholly convinc- years.
log political rationale for the trade. Not Sec- Thus our bargaining position in the SALT
retary of Defense Laird. Not the Joint Chiefs talks was a steadily weakening one. We had
of Staff. Not even the principal negotiators. no ongoing weapon systems in development
One adviser to our negotiating team, Wil- and deployment, while the Russians had at
liam R. Van Cleave, observed sadly in testi- least three: a class of heavy Inultimegaton
mony before the Senate Armed Services Coin- ICBM's, which we call the SS--9's; a class of
mittee that the agreements were "a light- light ICBM's called the SS-11's; and a class
SALT NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES year removed from the outcomes contem- of strategic-range missile submarines called
SEE PROBLEMS IN THE ACCORDS plated in the studies and planning for SALT Y, for Yankee. In bargaining for a future
.. There has since the start of SALT been ceiling on the Soviet strategic offensive force,
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I wish a constant erosion of U.S. SALT positions and we really had only one thing to put up for
to invite the attention of the Senate to a expectations." bid: the Safeguard ABM, a more promising
detailed and thoughtful analysis of the The private unhappiness with the agree- property than is commonly appreciated. "On
the offense side," says Dr. John S. Foster
SALT accords that appears in the Sep- menu is focused on several problems. First, Jr., director of defense research and en=i-
tember 1972 issue of Fortune.Its author, the interim agreement leaves the Soviet veering, "our margin of advantage was melt-
Mr. Charles Murphy, has delved into the union with a three-to-two lead over us in ing fast. The Russians knew this and why.
the number of land-based strategic-missile They were hardly likely to yield to the Presi-
problems of strategic arms limitation launchers-now the central element of mill- dent what Congress would not give."
with energy thoroughness, produc- tary striking power; concedes them at the
ing one of the most comprehensive and end of the five-year life of the agreement an To the degree that the agreements brake
balanced press interpretations of SALT equal superiority in strategic missile sub- somewhat the accumulation of city-destroy-
t0 date. marines, where we now have a three-to-two ing weapons, they are certainly all to the
lead over them; and gives them a three-to- good. The destructive power of the weapons
Mr. Murphy's article reinforces the already advantage in the weight of the nuclear y plied up passes all rationality. And
testimony already on the record, that of_ warheads that the ICBM's can deliver. Sec- their costs now border on the lunatic. We
ficials who played key roles in concluding ond, the agreement leaves the Russians in have at least begun the effort to construct ca
the interim agreement-notably the a position to make far more technological system in which these costs will be less nec-
chief negotiator, Ambassador Gerard improvements in their strategic weapons essary; we have again demonstrated awill-
Smith-consider that the present in- than we can hope to make. The U.S. has ingress before the world to do what we can
terim agreement Is not acceptable as a frozen itself, says Dr. Edward Teller, the dis- to stop the arms competition.
permanent agreement. tinguished physicist and weapon expert, In In other respects, though, the SALT agree-
In short, Mr. President, it is clear that a position that Is difficult and dangerous." ments are undesirable, It is one thing, se-
the interim agreement does not provide A SINGULAR OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RUSSIANS rious enough in itself, to slide into a situa-
tion in which the Russians gain an advan-
the kind of strategic equality necessary If this is the practical outcome, what was tage in numbers of strategic weapons; it is
for a stable, long-term, arms control Nixon after in the SALT exercise to begin quite another matter to regularize this ad-
agreement. This is the serious concern of with? The short answer is that he was try- vantage in a formal agreement. Furthermore,
the sponsors and supporters of the Jack- log to prevent an even worse outcome for the the agreement enables the Russians to raise
son-Scott amendment. I commend Mr, U.S. As Kissinger put the Nixon choice in the power of their strategic forces still fur-
Moscow, the value of the interim agreement ther by technological improvement, and so
Murphy's article to the Senate. is to be judged not by assessing "whether
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- the freeze make their advantage more griati Is,
perpetuates a Soviet numerical May, toward the climax of the e ne negootiations,
sent that the article entitled "The SALT superiority" but by what "this margin the U.S. delegation warned that If the next
Negotiators Themselves Are Troubled By [would] have been without the freeze." Tho round of SALT talks failed to impose a real
What We Gave Away in the Moscow primary American objective was to brake the check on strategic power, "U.S. supreme in-
Arms Agreements" be printed in the spectacular momentum the Soviet Union terests could be jeopardized." The most se-
RECORD. has lately acquired in the deployment of rious defect of all is that the agreements on
strategic ICBM's Inside the Soviet Union and defensive and offensive weapons do not com-
There being no objection, the article missile-launching submarines in both the plement one another; indeed, they are in-
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By Kissinger's herently ? Incompatible. Van Cleave com-
as follows: figures, the Russians have been adding to lalned: "W arMITI ng
i levels of ABM
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September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S14759
with levels of ABM and offensive levels with ago the Russians, realizing that they were vided on the point, a strong body of opinion
offensive levels, which is politically impor- on an unpromising path, tore down much of Is increasingly suspicious that the Galosh
taut and which may be strategically impor- what they had built and started all over complex may be only the tip of the real
tant, but which blurs the really significant again, this time putting up two huge phased- Soviet ABM iceberg. During the past fifteen
offensive-defensive relationship and the need array radars, each as long as two football years the Russians have assembled over their
to match defense to offense and vice versa. fields, the costliest structures of their kind Immense geography a surface-to-air missile
if ABM is to be limited as stipulated by the in the world. The radars are first class, but defense, originally called the Tallinn system,
treaty, the offensive capability permitted the the revamped system still appears to be which has no counterpart anywhere else. It
Soviet Union is intolerable. If such offensive faltering because of the well-known Soviet includes at least 10,000 interceptor missiles
capability is to be permitted, higher levels of lag in computers and other data-handling and hundreds of radars. The system un-
ABM are necessary " On these same gear. The Russians may well have decided doubtedly has an antibomber function. But
grounds, Dr. Donald G. Brennan of the that a defense against the thousands of Dr. Foster has steadily argued that with the
Hudson Institute, another defense analyst American warheads is at present beyond dot of thihuge landscape, surveillance whole appara-
of high repute, deplores the treaty. 'The ABM them.
treaty," that
treaty," he argued recently, "does the wrong Meanwhile, they might well have been tus could be tied together fairly rapidly into
thing well, and the interim agreement on alarmed by the superior showing of Safe- a vast ABM system. This is only a surmise.
strategic weapons does the right thing badly." guard. The Army over the past several years The treaty itself explicitly prohibits any
ABANDONING THE SHELTER has put our ABM system through rigorous move toward a country-wide system. Never-
There is no question that the ABM treaty tests on the Pacific missile range, which ex- theless, there remains a brooding suspicion in
has transformed our defense posture. Our tends from California to Kwajalein Atoll In our defense community that those radars
Safeguard system was earlier supposed to the mid-Pacific, 4,200 miles away. Out of may signify a Soviet intention to cheat.
plexes to twenty-nine attempted interceptions, Years ago McNamara remarked to Foster,
consist of twelve antiballistic earlier missile com-
across the land. Their function was to twenty-five were successful. These trials "They never would deploy so many missiles
provide defense for our cities against a light were all, to be sure, carefully orchestrated; simply for an air defense, considering the
attack-e.g., of the kind the Chinese might none of the experts, not even Safeguard's thousands of winged interceptors they have.
launch-and, more important, to ensure that stoutest champions, claim that the system They must intend to make the system over
even a massive attack on our land-based mis- can be made to provide anything approach- into an ABM system."
siles and strategic bombers would not destroy ing a leakproof defense against a severe nu- A NEW SET OF PROBLEMS
clear attack. Nevertheless, the development In any case, and whatever their reasons,
s them. Additionally, Safeguard was t of high-capacity computers (Sperry Rand), y
sh helt ter what the prevaling jargon de- - memory storage banks (Lockheed), and pro- the Russians have most certainly induced
scribes as the National Command Authority me memmory techniques (I.B.M.), d) c and pro- Nixon to administer the coup de grace to
(NCA)-meaning particularly the President Safeguard, his single contribution to U.S.
and his staff, the high military command, tion with phased-array radars (Raytheon strategic assets. The program now is a
and the members of Congress. and Bell Telephone Laboratories) and an in shambles. So far, $5 billion has been obli-
gated for Safeguard, most of it for R. and D.
Now, under the ABM treaty, the concept tegrated command system (Western Elec-
the uP a country-wide ABM defense for of for the mastering uric), has the finally stupefying created the volume of means data, for If the Washington complex goes forward, the man u of
been abandoned. forces, let alone for the upon which the tracking-aiming-firing-in- final cost of the two sites would be an esti-
has and
sians ciies ruhave been restricted dour ourselves We to token okeken deRde-- tercepting sequence ultimately depends. mated $8.5 billion. When the agreement
ib ele- "The theory," says Dr. Foster, "now rests on came, Defense a De artm grudging ent Congress had authorized
construction of but four
moym-ts a mite for of two Tense of single demonstrated principles. A workable ADM p
mints limited force in defense of a single system can be put together." sites, and active construction was under way
ICBM complex in the field, and another on only two.
limited force in defense of our respective M'NAMARA'S UNEASY SURMISE At Nekoma, North Dakota, close to the
capitals-the NCA role, that is. This was the It is now plain that the numerous skeptics Manitoba line, on the northernmost edge of
outcome most ardently desired by the Krem- about Safeguard were grossly wrong. Paul the ninety-mile-long Minuteman field that
lin. The Russians were not seriously inter- Nitze, when he was Deputy Secretary of De- starts at Grand Forks, the earth moving and
ested in limiting strategic weapons. What fense under Lyndon Johnson, made himself structures are about 90 percent completed;
they were adamant about, through the criti- a lay expert of sorts in this strange new mili- however, it will take another two years be-
cal exploratory phases of SALT negotiations, tary science. In the SALT talks he was the fore the radars, computers, power genera-
was finishing off Safeguard. The Kremlin advocate of the American position where tors, and command-and-control mechanisms
began the horse trading on offensive strategic technical points in the ABM matter were are installed and made operational. At
weapons only after the ABM issue was settled concerned. "As a defense for hardened silos," Malmstrom Air Force Base in western Mon-
pretty much to its satisfaction. Nitze has concluded, "Safeguard can be tana, 600 miles away, construction was
For many Americans, this Soviet attitude made effective. It's expensive, but it's going about 10 -percent advanced, work having
was entirely welcome They interpret the to be more expensive to deploy an offensive been delayed by a long strike. At the two
Soviet abandonment of antiballistic defenses missile capable of defeating it." remaining complexes--one at Warren Air
as a tardy conversion to the "mutual assured And so the Russians may have concluded Force Base in Wyoming and the other at
destruction" theory of strategy promulgated that they faced the prospect of our having Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri-the
by McNamara and the school of defense an effective ABM technology and their being ground had not even been broken for the
scientists and analysts to whom he looked without one. A U.S. defense analyst who had construction. Now the Grand Forks com-
for counsel. That proposition holds that numerous conversations with his Soviet plex is to be finished, but Malmstrom is be-
where both sides are entirely vulnerable to counterparts says, "Though they never ing dismantled, and work at the other sites
nuclear attacks, neither side will dare to came right out and said so, I got the feeling has ceased.
launch one-that nuclear war becomes pos- that they were afraid we Americans would Meanwhile, there is a large question about
sible only when there are defenses against be tempted to move on to still better radars, the NCA complex permitted for Washington.
the attacks. It was on this line of reasoning more interceptors; that we would go from a The defense authorization request for fiscal
that so many in Congress and the academic thin to a thick ABM cover, while having the 1975 asks for $28 million with which to start
community fiercely opposed the Safeguard advantage of the MIRV technology. They work, and the Army hopes to shift there the
system when Nixon announced it three and may have realized that the combination of radars and computers on order for Malm-
a half years ago. the two would swing the strategic ascend- strom and Whiteman. But Congress is now
THE TROUBLE WITH GALOSH ancy back to us." stone cold on the ABM proposition, and we
it is possible that the Soviet leaders now It should be noted that there is a much may not even elect to build the NCA com-
agree with these critics about the benefits more pessimistic view of their reasons for plex we are allowed under the treaty.
of mutual assured destruction. But it seems wanting the ABM treaty. Teller, for one, And so the ABM treaty leaves us with a
more likely that the Russians, who are by believes that the Russians know more about good many problems. In February, 1970, in
tradition defense-minded, believe in ABM's- the effects of high-yield nuclear explosions a message to Congress, Nixon deliberately
and that they opted for the ABM treaty only on warheads, structures, and command-and- raised the question whether it is a good thing
because their own defensive system was so control systems than we do. They are also for V. President to be left with the single
far behind ours. As early as the mid-1960's said to know more than we do about the option, in a nuclear attack, of ordering a
they had begun to raise around Moscow an electromagnetic effects produced by nuclear strike back at the adversary's cities, knowing
elaborate ballistic defense, which the West explosions outside the earth's atmosphere. that this would bring a mass slaughter of
named Galosh. From satellite photographs During the extensive nuclear tests that the Americans. "Should the concept of assured
and study of energy emissions, U.S. intelli- Russians ran in 1961, American surveillance destruction be [so] narrowly defined and
gence judged the system a mediorcre one. It systems verified the stunning revelation, should it be the only measure of our ability
depended upon clumsy mechanical scanning which the Kennedy Administration sup- to deter the variety of threats we face?"
radars for aiming the interceptor missiles. pressed, that the Russians had staged sev- Obviously, the President's answer then, in
These radars could track but a single missile era-1 interceptions of missile warheads by Washington, was no; but the treaty he signed
at a time, or a cluster. The interceptor exploding nuclear devices outside the at- in Moscow constitutes a yes answer. In the
rockets were huge, and interception could mosphere. immediate future, cities and people will re-
take place only in outer space. Four years While the intelligence community is di- main defenseless. As Brennan has observed,
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 S 14760
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13, 1972
"We and the Russians have agreed not to
defend ourselves, not only against each other,
out, interestingly, against anybody else."
liutual assured destruction, he argues, is not
ro much a theory as "a fashion"-a night-
_narish notion that "nuclear stability resides
Jr. high hostage levels."
Now the question arises: just how mutual
is the mutuality of destruction likely to be?
On this point, the arithmetic suggests that
,ve shall end up a good deal less mutual than
I hey.
i ;COUNTING UP THE LAUNCHERS
U.S. satellite photography shows that the
oviet Union has deployed precisely 1,527
'CBM's of various character. Silos for ninety-
one more, not yet emplaced, have been
marked. The agreement on offensive weapons
permits unfinished work to be carried for-
ward to deployment, and no doubt these
empty holes will be loaded, giving the Rus-
sians a total of 1,618 ICBM launchers. In-
asmuch as the U.S. has no unfinished ICBM
systems in the works, our inventory of
launchers must remain at the level of the
past five years. It consists of 1,000 Minute-
men deployed in six fields and fifty-four
Titan missiles.
Furthermore, the lead that the U.S. still
retains in submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles (SLBM's) will soon be erased and here,
tooo, we shall slide Into an inferior numerical
Position. By our count, at the time the in-
terim agreement was signed, the Russians
had twenty-six to twenty-eight Yankee-class
missile submarines at sea, and fifteen more
building These are nuclear-powered, and
Viose at sea, each have tubes for sixteen
ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 miles.
A new class has lately appeared, having only
twelve tubes; these are being armed with a
3 000-mile missile. U.S. intelligence had
credited the total Soviet submarine force, in
being and in assembly, with an aggregate
inventory of 710 SLBM's. The Russian nego-
tiators startled our delegation with the dis-
closure that the true number was forty-eight
submarines and 768 missiles.
The agreement allows both sides to enlarge
and modernize their SLBM forces in ex-
change for cutbacks of older missiles. Here
again the Russians, who had more obsolescent
missiles and fewer modern submarines, will
benefit most. They are permitted to move
on to a fleet of sixty-two submarines having
a total of 950 missiles in their tubes. To
reach that level they are bound to retire
2-0 of their pre-1964 land-based ICBM's
(liquid-fueled rockets in the SS-7 and SS-8
classes) as well as thirty fairly short-range
ballistic missiles deployed at present on ten
older nuclear H class submarines, also verg-
ing on obsolescence. The U.S., for its part,
is allowed to add three submarines to its
present fleet of forty-one sixteen-tube Po-
laris/Poseidons, and to raise its present In-
ventory of 656 SLBM's to an eventual aggre-
gr.te of 710. This gain in sea-based launchers
would be at the expense of the fifty-four
land-based Titans, the oldest and heaviest
ICBM's in the U.S. strategic forces. At the
end of the period covered by the Moscow
agreement, then, the Russians could have
1,408 land-based launchers to our 1,054; and,
since the three additional submarines al-
lowed us are hardly likely to be built in the
next five years, they could have 950 launch-
ers at sea to our 656.
Considering the advantages that the Rus-
sians already had on the ICBM side of the
strategic equation, the stubbornness with
which they held out for a roughly equivalent
advantage in numbers of SLBM's was dis-
turbing to the American negotiators. "The
submarine ratio," one of Kissinger's lieu-
tenants says, "was the knottiest issue of all.
There was no give on the other side." The
ratio was finally settled directly between
Nixon and Brezhnev in the Kremlin at high
noon on the day of the signing, while the
Soviet and U.S. negotiating teams were still
deadlocked over numbers in Helsink', 550
miles away, in an atmosphere that one ob-
server has described as "frantic."
One justification advanced for this really
extraordinary concession on our part is that
the Russians, lacking forward bases similar
to those the Polaris/Poseidon force uses at
Holy Loch in Scotland, Rota in Spain, and
in the Pacific, are able to keep their sub-
marines on station only half as long as we
are, and accordingly need a larger force in
order to have an equal number of SLBM's in
position at any given time. This argument
is not altogether persuasive, however; some
defense analysts have suggested that there
are ways for the Russians to operate their
submarines more efficiently. In any case, the
3,000-mile SLBM's with which the new Y
class submarines are being armed should
minimize their problems.
THE MEANING OF MIRV
Calculating the military value of the op-
posing missiles is trickier than just adding
up launchers. The "throw-weight" of the
missiles, i.e., the military payload carried,
varies considerably from one launcher to
another. The number of warheads and their
accuracy, range, and explosive yields also
bear on the potential value of the payload.
Henry Kissinger has said that the U.S. has
a two-to-one lead in numbers of warheads.
Furthermore, Soviet warheads are not new
as accurate as ours-on the average, their
missiles will hit about three-tenths of a mile
farther from target than the Minuteman
will-but their greater yields offset their in-
accuracy. The Soviet SS-9 missile, for ex-
ample, weighs about 500,000 pounds. It lifts
a 12,000- to 14,000-pound warhead having a
twenty-five megaton yield. Other land-based
Soviet missiles are smaller; still, aggregate
throw-weight of all classes of Soviet ICBM's
is estimated to be around three times the
Minuteman's 2,400,000 pounds. (The Min' te-
man's gross weight is about 70,000 pounds.
It can throw a single warhead with a yield
of 1.5 megatons or three warheads with a
total yield of 600 kilotons.)
Is our disadvantage in throw-weight a
crucial one? Defenders of the SALT agree-
ment think not. They argue that bombers
must be counted in the balance and that our
Strategic Air Command is clearly superior
to the Soviet bombers. More important, our
development of MIRV (for multiple inde-
pendently targeted re-entry vehicles, i.e., war-
heads) enables us to put more warheads on
our launchers than the Russians have been
able to fit on theirs-three on the Min'ite-
man. as many as fourteen on the Poseidon.
A number of targets, tens, even hundreds. of
miles apart, can be attacked with extraor-
dinary accuracy from a single launch.
But this technology, which is now an
American monopoly, is almost certainly wiih-
in the Russians' grasp. Defense Secretary
Laird recently informed Congress that the
first Soviet MIRV is expected to be tested
this winter. If the test Is successful, a
thorough refitting of the Soviet missile forces
Is expected to be under way within two or
three years.
A STRANGE PAUSE IN DEPLOYMENT
Once they have mastered the MIRV tech-
nique, it should not be excessively difficult
for the Russians to fit a huge SS-9 warhead a new strategic submarine (which would not
with from six to twenty separately steered be operational for more than five years). Sen-
warheads, all more powerful than those lifted ator Proxmire of Wisconsin has served notice
by either the Minuteman or the Poseidon. that the procurement programs are in for a
The strangepause that settled over the vast hard time. Proxmire has been supported ex-
SS-9 deployment program during the winter tensively by a broad coalition of antimilitary
of 1970-71, after 288 missiles had been de- lobbies and "think tanks" that have become
ployed and with some twenty-five silos still a powerful influence in shaping the behavior
empty, is now believed to reflect a decision of Congress on defense spending. In the coali-
to replace the entire SS-9 force with a new tion are such bodies as the Federation of
generation of MIRV warheads. There are American Scientists, the Council for a Livable
also signs that the SS-11 force is to be re- World, SANE, the Coalition on National
placed methodically with a new MIRV'd class Priorities and Military Spending, the Arms
of relatively "light" ICBM's, and that some Control Association, and the Institute for
two score other silos in SS-11 fields, as yet Policy Studies.
unfilled, will get MIRV'd weapons too. These groups and their allies in Congress
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Finally, the Russians have about a dozen new
silos that are even wider than those in which
the first-generation SS-9's are emplaced; and
a huge new missile has been spotted on a
Soviet test launcher. Its payload is estimated
at between 24,000 and 28,000 pounds-it is
at least double the size of the SS-9-and
Senator Henry M. Jackson has said the mis-
sile may be armed with a fifty-megaton war-
head.
What kind of threat does this emerging So-
viet capability represent to the U.S.? No
one can speak definitely to this question,
but there are some fairly pessimistic answers
around. Teller, for example, believes that a
combination of improved SLBM's and im-
proved SS-9's might conceivably give the
Soviet Union a capability over the next sev-
eral years to wipe out the U.S. Minuteman
and strategic bomber forces on the ground.
Actually, to destroy ICBM's in their silos,
warheads are not needed in fantastic nuin-
bers. In the absence of ABM, it is easy
enough, given data on accuracy and yield, to
calculate the number of missiles needed to
destroy just about all of an enemy's silos. If
the Russians should finally begin to approach
U.S. standards of accuracy, they should soon
have enough SS-9's and SLBM's to annihilate
our land-based strategic forces. They could
use those two strike elements alone, holding
the SS-11's in reserve to retaliate against
our cities in the event that our sea-based
forces struck at theirs.
There are all sorts of reasons for doubting
that the Russians actually intend to launch
any such first strike. Nevertheless, the fact
that they had a first-strike capability would
cast a long shadow over world events. And
the fact-if it ever came to pass-could not
be hidden. In an age of satellite cameras
and computers, the adding up of opposing
strengths can be done swiftly and accurately.
Long before any crisis came to a boil, the
behavior of our political leaders, and theirs,
would be influenced heavily by that arith-
metic. Confidence in Minuteman is a polit-
ical factor of prime importance, for us and for
our friends and foes.
During the five-year life of the interium
agreement, it seems clear, the Russian stra-
tegic forces will benefit more than ours will
from technological improvements. This is all
the more reason, many of our defense analysts
believe, for the U.S. to be investing heavily
in the kinds of advanced technology that we
are allowed under the agreement and that
might make a difference toward the end of
the decade, if the present agreement is not
meanwhile replaced by one more favorable to
us. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, a sailor of vast
experience and uncommon sense, says, "The
side which masters the technological open-
ings should prevail. The chiefs and I under-
stand this. We insisted, on that account, that
the agreements shelter three rights : the right
to modernize, the right to keep R. and D.
alive, and to look and see."
Few question the need for surveillance--
i.e., looking and seeing. But there is an ex-
tremely serious division in Congress and the
scientific community over the Defense De-
partment's desire to proceed forthwith with
the development of a new strategic bomber
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September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 14761
would hold investment in the strategic area
to a level that would keep R. and D. barely
alive. And they are strongly against any move
into production-to the creation of new
forces in being.
A CASE FOR THE TRIDENT
Both of the two new strategic systems that
the Defense Department wants to develop
have been before the country, in one form or
another, for quite a few years. One, the Tri-
dent system, seeks to replace the Polaris/
Poseidon submarine missile force in the
1980's with a more advanced combination
of hull and missile. The other, the B-1, in-
volves the large-scale production of a super-
sonic, swing-wing intercontinental bomber,
to be ready for initial deployment in the
late 1970's. At this point, the funding re-
quired to take the two systems further along
in the R. and D. and prototype cycle comes to
only about $1.3 billion in the current budget.
In the production and deployment phases,
the aggregate costs would of course be $25
billion at the least, and might even be twice
that.
As a matter of fact, the Trident is in the
process of being invented. All that is certain
about it now is that the hull will have about
twice the displacement of the Polaris sub-
marines; the Trident will carry twenty-four
missiles, versus sixteen, will be faster, quieter,
and much more versatile, will ttake five years
to build, and will cost at least $1.3 billion for
each vessel (the figure includes R. and D..and
missile costs). In simplest terms the Trident
is being invented for the purpose of exploit-
ing one available new technology, and to
anticipate and evade another that is preg-
nant with menace, but which has not yet
materialized.
The menace lies in the knowledge that if
the Russians, with their fast and growing
flotillas of attack submarines, should de-
velop a means of detecting and tracking the
Polaris force-and we and they both know
the theortical solutions to the problem-
the elusiveness that has been the singular
merit of the system would be lost. As Teller
recently observed, "a single big discovery in
oceanography-the detection of sub-
marines-could wipe out our last deterrent."
The available new technology would bring
within the Navy's reach a 6,000-mile mis-
sile-Trident II-that can (like the Poseidon
missile) be launched from a submerged ves-
sel. The Poseidon missile now has a maximum
range of about 3,000 miles. This means that
when the vessel is on station it must linger
fairly close to the Eurasian land mass if the
missile is to reach worthwhile targets, and
that requirement considerably narrows the
ocean areas where the adversary has to look
for it. A 4,000-mile missile, Trident I, is in
development now and could presently replace
some of the Poseidons. With the full-range
missile, the Trident will have just about the
whole expanse of the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans in which to maneuver.
SECOND THOUGHTS IN CONGRESS
Unfortunately, the Trident costs a mint.
The Navy contemplates an initial buy of ten
vessels, as replacements for the first ten
Polaris vessels (which will be twenty years
old early in the next decade). That means a
capital outlay of between $13 billion and
$15 billion, as a starter. A total of $164 mil-
lion has already been committed to R. and
D. In fiscal 1973 the Defense Department
has asked for a total of $977 million. Of this
sum, $555 million is to extend the research
looking to the eventual design of the hull,
further improvement in the missile, and
superior communications. Another $361 mil-
lion is mostly for developing the reactor, a
five-year task, and buying some hardware.
Until a year or so ago, even the leading
congressional and other skeptics on defense
favored moving on to an improved submarine
missile force. A sea-based deterrent has long
been attractive to many of these skeptics, be-
cause it promises to draw fire away from the
homeland (and also because it requires no
A.BM to protect it). But the looming cost of
the system, together with the now-familiar
argument that another U.S. SLBM would only
provoke the Soviet Union into developing
another of its own, has brought a change of
heart. A parade of defense analysts before the
various congressional military committees
has recommended that we stand pat with the
Polaris/Poseidon force. In June the Trident
seemed to be in big trouble in Congress; the
Navy's request for immediate production
money came within one vote of failing to win
approval of the Seante Armed Services Com-
mittee.
In July, however, the mood of the Senate
seemed to undergo a change. An amendment
to restrict Trident funding to R. and D. was
defeated, forty-seven to thirty-nine. Six days
later, the Navy's entire request passed the
Senate, as part of the $20.6-billion military-
authorization bill.
A VERY EXPENSIVE BOMBER
The B-1 is the intercontinental bomber
that the Strategic Air Command has longed
to suit up for ever since McNamara virtually
scrubbed the Advanced Manned Strategic
Aircraft (AMSA) about ten years ago. The
airframe for the first of three prototypes is to
start through North American Rockwell's jigs
in October. General Electric is running tests
at its Evendale, Ohio, plant on the 30,000-
pound-thrust engines. (They are designed to
deliver twice the thrust of the engines used
in the F-4.) In April, Boeing was awarded a
contract for integrating the avionics system.
By and large, the program is on schedule. The
first test flight is scheduled for April, 1974,
only a year and a half away.
If the machine eventually makes it
through Congress, it should cut quite a fig-
ure in the air. Its gross weight of about
360,000 pounds will be about three-
quarters that of the B-52, but will in-
clude a bomb load that will be twice as large.
Furthermore, its top dash speed is better than
mach 2-i.e., more than twice the speed of
sound-but the real difficulty for an enemy
will be the B-1's ability to maintain almost
supersonic speeds over hundreds of miles at
earth-hugging, rooftop level on the way to
the target. The B-1, using the terrain-follow-
ing radar successfully developed for the
otherwise ill-starred F-111, will be able to
arrow over hostile lands at speeds never be-
fore attained by machines moving so close
to the earth.
The problem about the B-1, as about the
Trident, is its staggering cost. So far, close
to $700 million has been spent on develop-
ment, and the Air Force asked for $445 mil-
lion more this year. Carrying the program
through the prototype will cost an estimated
$2.6 billion. The Air Force is counting on a
total buy of 241 machines, with spares. That
would put the total cost of the program at
about $11.1 billion, an average of $45,500,000
per plane. (The avionics alone will cost $5
million per plane). Given such costs, and
the likelihood that they will soar further in
the production and deployment phases, it is
unlikely that Congress will give the Air Force
anything like the numbers it wants. The
penalty for excessive costs, in bombers as in
submarines, is likely to be a loss in effective
numbers-ever fewer machines for the mis-
sion. For the moment, however, the Air
Force's progress to the prototype has been
virtually assured by the Senate's all but
unanimous approval of the entire B-1 pack-
age.
A year and a half ago, the Defense Depart-
ment's Dr. Foster made public certain cal-
culations regarding Soviet investment in the
military technologies. The burden of his
findings was that Soviet spending on R. and
D. alone was exceeding U.S. spending by a
margin of $3 billion to $4 billion a year. U.S.
outlays for all military R. and D. was run-
ning around $7 billion to $8 billion a year
the Soviets rate had risen to $10 billion to
$11 billion. These estimates were based upon
a close scrutiny by the various intelligence
agencies of some five score Soviet military
programs. Foster acknowledged that his esti-
mates might be off by as much as 20 percent
on the high side, but they could also err on
the low side. His point was that an invest-
ment program like that on the Soviet scale,
which appears to have acquired its present
momentum in the 1968-69 period, is bound
to produce technological surprises. "The de-
velopment cycle," Foster noted, "runs from
four to seven years. The satellite cameras
can't see through a roof. But whatever has
been in preparation in the plants should be-
gin to come out into the open before long."
It is a mistake to believe that satellite re-
connaissance, technically brilliant as it is,
can keep us apprised of all the important
military work that may be going on in- the
Soviet Union. A camera cannot see through
a layer of cloud, and sizeable stretches of the
Soviet Union are hidden by cloud 80 per-
cent of the time. We were a year or more dis-
covering an ICBM field in a locality previ-
ously judged to have no military facilities.
The Chinese Communists actually finished a
whole new gaseous-diffusion plant under
the all but everlasting Himalayan cloud cover
before a clear, bright day exposed it to a
camera in space.
We Americans have lived on the high side
of the strategic equation for a quarter of a
century. Living on the low side is certain to
be a lot more dangerous. We might well have
ended up on the low side in the years ahead
even if there had been no SALT talks at all;
but the outcome of the talks, by formalizing
our inferior status, and limiting our options
for changing it, have made our situation still
more precarious.
The numerical inferiority we accepted in
1972 will become tolerable only if the So-
viet Union is prepared to restore a more
satisfactory balance in SALT II, which may
begin soon. It would seem to be mandatory
that, despite the considerable costs entailed,
we exercise the options we have and look to-
ward a time when we may end our strategic
inferiority.
THE JAWS OF THE WHALE
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, at its
annual meeting, recently held in London,
the International Whaling Commission
failed to adopt a recommendation by the
United Nations Conference on the En-
vironment at Stockholm for a moratori-
um on the killing of whales. The rejec-
tion of this proposal was a severe blow
to conservationists and other concerned
individuals all over the world who have
long maintained that a moratorium on
whaling is imperative in order to save
many species, whose future survival is
already in question.
Although, unfortunately, the morato-
rium was not adopted by the Commis-
sion, several important actions, including
the setting of quotas for all major ex-
ploited species, were taken. While not all
that we had hoped for, these efforts are
nevertheless a step in the right direction.
Mr. Scott McVay, a member of the U.S.
delegation to the International Whaling
Commission and Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Whales, Environmental De-
fense Fund, whose efforts to save whales
and other sea mammals are well known,
has written an interesting and informa-
tive article outlining the actions of the
Commission which appeared in the New
York Times on Sunday, September 3,
1972. In his article entitled "The Jaws
of the Whale," Mr. McVay notes that the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13, M2
Commission asked the United States to
halt the killing of porpoises during
commercial fishing operations. This
serious problem is of great concern to
conservationists and others who fear
that the continued loss of 200,000 to 400,-
000 of their numbers each year is se-
verely depleting the populations of this
species of whale.
I was most gratified when the Senate
adopted an amendment that I cospon-
sored to S. 2871, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, which establishes the
goal of reducing the number of porpoises
and dolphins killed during fishing oper-
ations to levels approaching a zero mor-
tality and serious injury rate. I am hope-
ful that our actions in behalf of marine
mammals during this session of Congress
will serve as an example to other nations
of our concern for these creatures of
the sea and our commitment to their
preservation, thus helping to bring about
an agreement to halt the killing of
whales at the next meeting of the Inter-
national Whaling Commission.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE JAWS OF THE WHALE
(By Scott McWay)
PRINCETON, N.J.-Advocates of a moratori-
um to stop killing whales-which was urged
by the United Nations' Conference on the
Environment at Stockholm-were disap-
pointed by results of the recent Interna-
tional Whaling Commission meeting at Lon-
don. But the moral imperative of the Stock-
holm decision, persistently voiced by Russell
E. Train, leader of the U.S. delegation, did
contribute to a number of positive actions.
Intensive efforts the previous year had al-
ready achieved regional observer plans in the
North Pacific (Japan, U.S. and U.S.S.R.),
North Atlantic (Canada, Iceland and Nor-
way), and South Atlantic (Australia and
South Africa). The observer agreement for
the Antarctic, involving Japan, Norway, and
the U.S.S.R., was finally signed in London.
The exchange of observers is a major, far-
reaching accomplishment.
There were other affirmative notes.
The "blue whale unit" (one whale equalled
two Fin or six Sei whales) was finally elimi-
nated, and for the first time quotas were set
for every major exploited species, including
the Minke whale.
The Fin whale quota was reduced by about
one-third in the North Pacific and Antarctic.
(Even when a moratorium is achieved, how-
ever, the Fin will need 30 to 40 years to re-
cover to a level of."maximum productivity.")
Quotas were set for the Sei whale at levels
believed to be at "maximum sustainable
yield" but they do not provide an adequate
margin for safety if the estimates are wrong.
Quotas for male and female Sperm whales
were set separately, as recommended (but,
unfortunately, at levels higher than would
Have been the case with the combined
quota).
The Commission asked the United States
to halt, as the Norwegian commissioner put
it, "the strangulation and drowning of por-
poises in tuna nets" by which some 260,000
porpoises perish annually.
An Argentine resolution was approved ask-
ing the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions to urge nations which are whaling out-
side the Whaling Convention to join the In-
ternational Whaling Commission and abide
by its rules.
The Mexican commissioner questioned the
prevailing assumption that to know more
about whales we must continue to kill them
in vast numbers. She was appalled to learn
"that to have a meaningful voice in the pro-
ceedings we have to kill what are probably
the most amazing of nature's creatures, and
to kill them for profit." Such an encrusted
pattern of thinking contrasts sharply with
President Luis Echeverria Alvarez's recent
action to establish a haven for whales in the
peninsula of Lower California.
A permanent secretariat of the commission
will be established and its convention
brought up to date. An international decade
of cetacean research was declared, giving
impetus to studies of the living whale.
Used whaling equipment will not be sold
to nonmember nations.
The moratorium idea, which has taken
hold in the West in the past two years, caught
the Soviets by surprise. Not the Japanese.
They were at Stockholm. They feel world
opinion more strongly and may have to
harken to it, especially when threatened by
a boycott of Japanese cameras, cars and
radios. Also, the Japanese people, including
many gifted writers and scientists, are sick
of whaling and no longer find whale meat
very palatable. The problem is profit. While
only 17 per cent of the fishing effort of one
Japanese company is directed at whales, more
than 50 per cent of its profits are from
butchered whales.
In the Soviet Union, environmental con-
cern has not yet gotten into public con-
sciousness nor pricked the public conscience.
The whale has not yet become the symbol
of a world habitat ravaged by man-as seems
to have happened at Stockholm. Yet those
who celebrate the whale should remember
that the Soviet Minister of Fisheries, Alek-
sandr Ishkov, who banned the kiling of por-
poises as "cousins to men" in 1966, displayed
considerable faith in the whale family again
in 1967 In Vancouver, British Columbia. when
he put his head into the open jaws of a killer
whale. One day we may earn the reciprocal
faith of the whale.
THE ADMINISTRATION ACTS TO AID
PENNSYLVANIA'S FLOOD VICTIMS
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, an article
published in the September 9 Philadel-
phia Inquirer points out the extensive
Federal effort being waged to aid Penn-
sylvania's hard-hit flood victims. As I
believe the facts noted in the article
speak for themselves, I ask unanimous
consent that it be printed in the RECORD.
I also ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD a report of the
Honorable Frank Carlucci, Deputy Di-
rector of the Office of Management and
Budget, the remarks of the President at
Wilkes College, and a fact sheet on the
extent of the tropical storm Agnes re-
covery effort.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
UNITED STATES OUTSPENDING STATE 11) TO 1
IN FLOOD RELIEF
HARRISBURG.-Both the Federal ant: state
governments, after checking to see who s pay-
ing what for flood relief in Pennsylvania,
have found the figure comes to $403 r_ illion,
most of it coming from the Federal Treasury.
Put another way, the state has spent about
a dime for every Federal dollar.
Gov. Milton Shapp, in a running fei:d with
the Nixon administration about who should
pay for what, has said on numeroue; occa-
sions Washington isn't meeting its obliga-
tions to Pennsylvania, which tropical storm
Agnes hit harder than any other state in late
June. Damage in Pennsylvania was estimated
at more than $2.5 billion.
Shapp blames. flood-relief delays on a slow
moving national bureaucracy that almost
couldn't get started administering aid and he
says it is still not moving fast enough.
Some of Shapp's cabinet members have
caustically remarked that Pennsylvania
would have fared better in getting relief if
it had been the Saigon government.
"We are the U.S. government," one said,
"yet we might have gotten - quicker help if
we could have gone to the United Nations."
Federal relief officials admitted to bureau-
cratic snags in the beginning. But Washing-
ton has been following a line of silence to-
ward Shapp now-except for an occasional
countercharge alleging political motivation
on the part of Pennsylvania's governor. It
seems to prefer to let the facts speak for
themselves.
Here are figures, as of the end of August.
supplied by the Federal and state govern-
ments.
The Federal government has spent or has
under contract about $365 million for state-
wide flood relief. State government has spent
$38.9 million. About 70 percent of the money
has gone to the hard-hit Wyoming Valley jr.
the northeastern part of the state.
The Federal government predicts spending
another $1.2 billion in the future. State gov-
ernment has appropriated $150 million from
its budget for flood relief but most of it is
sitting idle in the various departments.
Another $1.75 million in state money, drawn
from the general fund right after Agnes hit,
went for flood relief. Shapp appropriated that
$1.75 million under emergency powers granted
the governor by the state Constitution.
All the $150 million in state money hasn't
even been earmarked by departments. About
$23.5 million is being held without designa-
tion in the general fund.
Additionally, a $100 million bond issue for
flood relief thatShapp proposed Is still hang-
ing in the legislature. And there's been talk
from his office of additional bond issues and
the possibility of raising the state gasoline
tax by 2 cents a gallon.
Morever, much of the money the state
might spend will be reimbursed. Charles Mc-
Intosh, the state budget secretary, figures
at least $50 million might be reimbursed.-if
certain funds are ever expended. He referred
to a $50 million, short-term loan fund for
businesses set up in the Commerce Depart-
ment.
Only two loans totaling $8.5 million-$4
million to the Piper airplane firm at Lock
Haven and $2.5 million to a Wilkes-Barre
heating company-have been made from that
fund. Commerce Secretary Walter Anader
figures he might loan another $10 million by
December.
The Commerce Department received $51.8
mililon of the $150 million state appropria-
tion.
REPORT ON AGNES RECOVERY EFFORTS IN
WYOMING VALLEY
(Memorandum for the President from lion.
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director, Office of
Managementand Budget)
During our meeting before you sent me on
August 12 to the flooded areas of Pennsyl-
vania as your personal representative, you
spelled out definitive instructions in :four
areas.
1. Work closely with the flood victims
themselves. Meet with them. Visit their
homes and businesses. Listen. Seek their
ideas and criticisms as my guide to actions.
2. Combine all available talent, not only in
Pennsylvania but in the entire Federal Gov-
ernment, into one effective, well-coordinated
team geared to meet the immediate and
long-term needs of the people.
3. Within the law, change or discard any
rule if it will help even one family.
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September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 14765
Consider this one: "I have a secret plan
to end the wax."
Who said it? Why, Richard Nixon of course.
When? On March 5, 1968, in Nashua, N.H.. Or
did he?
Everybody says he did, carefully using quo-
tation marks to show the "secret plan" was
right out of the 1968 candidate's mouth.
As George McGovern put it in 1971: "Three
years ago, Richard Nixon campaigned on the
pledge that he had a secret plan to end the
war.' ..." McGovern returned to the theme
in his acceptance speech: "I have no 'secret
plan.' . . ."
John Lofton, editor of the Republican
National Committee's weekly publication,
"Monday," has made a hobby of writing a
polite query to everybody who quotes Richard
Nixon directly as having used the words
"secret plan." Once in a while he gets a
reply.
The most forthright of these came from
Anthony Lewis of The New York Times,
who wrote in October 1969: "I think you
have caught me in a mistake. The truth is
I wrote that out of the same general impres-
sion that so many people seem to have. But
I have now checked back through our files
and agree with you that I cannot find the
precise phrase 'a plan' in what Mr. Nixon
said during 1968."
What Mr. Lewis did find, and what is most
often cited as the basis for "secret plan," was
this remark of Mr. Nixon's on March 5, 1968,
in Nashua, N.H.: "And I pledge to you the new
leadership will end the war and win the
peace in the Pacific. .'
In late 1970, John B. Oakes, editor of
the eitorial page of The New York Times,
responded to a new query on another use
of the "plan" by citing the same quotation
and asking: "How could he make such a
pledge if he didn't have a plan?" The Times
editor argued: "It seems obvious that Mr.
Nixon implied that he had a plan when he
gave his pledge. But, as I say, it was doubt-
less an error to put the words in quotes and
if that is what you want me to admit, I am
glad to do so, and to state that it won't
appear that way in this context again." Nor
did it-in The Times.
Noteveryone was willing to stop using the
phrase when its unrealibility was pointed out.
N.B.C.'s Edwin Newman replied: "When I
spoke of a secret plan, I did not mean' it as
a quotation. It was shorthand, which is
sometimes unavoidable, for a plan that the
President said he had and the particulars
of which he said he could not divulge without
impairing the plan's chance of success."
(Italics mine.)
Did Mr. Nixon ever say he had a "plan,"
secet or otherwise? He did not; nobody who
has been challenged on the use of a direct
quotation on this has ever come up with the
citation of time or place. Mr. Nixon never
said it; the use of quotation marks is in-
accurate, unfair and misleading. But it con-
tinues, error feeding on error, as a myth
becomes accepted as truth.
The question then becomes-if he did not
actually say it, did he imply that he had a
secret plan? His remarks on March 5, 1968,
in Nashua, N.H., were a pledge "to end the
war and win the peace." He continued he
had no "push-button technique" in mind,
but would "mobilize our economic and dip-
lomatic and political leadership."
Not surprisingly, both press and political
opponents came back with the question
"How?" Newsmen pressed for details, and
when no plan was set forth, its absence was
noted. The first use of the word "plan" that
I could find was in the March 11, 1968, New
York Times subhead: "Nixon Withholds His
Peace Ideas/Says to Tell Details of Plan
Would Sap His Bargaining Strength If He's
Elected." The Associated Press lead three
days later added to the idea of a specific
plan, necessarily cloaked in secrecy: "Rich-
ard M. Nixon says the reason he is not ready
to spell out the details of his plan to end the
war in Vietnam is because he is reserving his
'big guns' for use against President Johnson
if he wins the Republican Presidential nom-
ination."
In that A.P. story, Mr. Nixon stressed that
he had "no magic formula, no gimmick. If I
had a gimmick I would tell Lyndon John-
son." The furtherest he would be drawn into
a discussion of a "plan" was this: "But I
do have some specific ideas on how to end the
war. They are primarily in the diplomatic
area."
That's as much as the clips I have seen
show about the "plan." Would a fairminded
person say they constitute the basis for an
inference that the candidate possessed a de-
tailed, and necessarily secret, panacea for the
conflict? I think not--no more than one
would infer that Senator McGovern has a
"secret plan" to fulfill his pledge to bring
back the prisoners in ninety days.
Throughout the campaign and on into the
years ahead, we can expect to hear some ora-
tors and commentators use a little inflection
around "secret plan" that makes it sound
like a quotation. The quotation thereof is no
dark media conspiracy, just an example of
how some writers and cartoonists, too lazy to
check source materials, casually pick up and
perpetuate an error. A small but hardy band
of newsmen, with no constituency but ob-
jectivity, will wince when they see the non-
quote quoted.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tenl-
pore. Is there any further morning busi-
ness? If not, morning business is con-
cluded.
INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITA-
TION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order, the
Chair lays before the Senate the un-
finished business (S.J. Res. 241), which
the clerk will report.
The second assistant legislative clerk
read as follows:
Calendar 929 (S.J. Res. 241) authorizing
the President to approve an interim agree-
ment between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The ACTING PRESIDENT - pro tem-
pore. What is the will of the Senate?
CALL OF THE ROLL
Mr. FULBRIGHT. - Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Arkansas not lose his right to the
floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
called the roll and the following Senators
answered to their names: -
[No. 420 Leg.]
-
Allen Byrd, Robert C. Jackson
Buckley Fulbright Mansfield
Byrd, Hughes
Harry F., Jr.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. A quorum is not present.
Mr, ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I move that the Sergeant at Arms be
instructed to request the attendance of
absent Senators.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The question is on agreeing to the
motion of the Senator from West Vir-
ginia. -
The motion was agreed to.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Sergeant at Arms will execute
the order of the Senate.
After some delay, the following Sen-
ators entered the Chamber and answered
to their names:
Aiken
Fong
Nelson
Anderson
Gambrell
Packwood
Bayh
Goldwater
Pastore
Beall
Gravel
Pearson
Bellmon
Griffin
Pell
Bennett
Gurney
Percy
Bentsen
Hansen
Proxmire
Bible
Harris
Randolph
Boggs
Hart
Ribicoff
Brock
Hartke
Roth
Brooke
Hatfield
Saxbe
Burdick
Hollings
Schweiker
Cannon
Hruska
Scott
Case
Humphrey
Smith
Chiles
Inouye
Spong
Church
Javits
Stafford
Cook
Jordan, N.C.
Stennis
Cooper
Jordan, Idaho
Stevens
Cotton
Long
Stevenson
Cranston
Magnuson
Symington
Curtis
Mathias
Taft
Dole
McClellan
Talmadge
Dominick
Metcalf
Thurmond
Eagleton
Mondale
Tower
Eastland
Montoya
Weicker -
Ervin
Moss
Williams
Fannin
Muskie
Young
-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs.
EDWARDS), the Senator from Massachu-
setts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from
South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire (Mr. McIN-
TYRE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr.
SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. TuNNEY) are necessarily ab-
sent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) is absent
on official business.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
and the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER)
are necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
South Dakota (Mr. MuNDT) is absent be-
cause of illness. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAM-
BRELL). A quorum is present. -
The Senator from West Virginia is
recognized.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
with respect to the cloture vote which
will occur on tomorrow, I ask unanimous
consent that all amendments at the desk
at the time of the vote be considered as
having been read in order to meet the
reading requirement under rule XXII.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered. -
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Arkansas is recognized.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as
we resume the discussion of the interim
agreement, I wish to say that I am in-
deed very sorry that the leadership felt
compelled to file a cloture motion.
For the record, I would like to state
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S 14766 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13, 1972
that, from the beginning, my position
and the position, I believe, of those asso-
ciated with me in the effort to approve,
without qualification, the interim agree-
ment that the Senate should proceed
under the rules of the Senate in the
regular manner and that any amend-
ments to the resolution of approval
should be presented and be subject to
debate and amendment.
The sponsor of the proposed amend-
ment which gives rise to this situation,
the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACK-
SON), has taken the position that he is
unwilling to submit his amendment to
the resolution in the absence of what is
called a package agreement, that is, an
overall agreement to limit time on all
amendments to his amendment and
provide for a specific time for final action
on amendments and the resolution itself.
That has been the reason why we have
not been able to proceed in the usual
manner for the discussion of and action
upon amendments to the Interim Agree-
ment.
As I said before, I consider the Interim
Agreement a most important measure. It,
together with the ABM Treaty, is, I be-
lieve, a most significant step if we can
succeed in carrying through with it and
proceedings to phase II negotiations. This
is the most significant step since World
War II toward some kind of reconcilia-
tion between the Communist nations and
the non-Communist countries of the
world. If we take this first step we might
look toward a period of detente and pos-
sibly even a period in which the United
Nations might be infused with new
strength and hope.
I would remind the Senate that this
agreement was negotiated over a 3-year
period between our officials and the Rus-
sians at both Helsinki and Vienna. Those
negotiations led to agreement at a meet-
ings. We approved it unanimously and
President Nixon in Moscow.
The Committee on Foreign Relations
approved this agreement after full hear-
ings. We approved it unanimously and
with no amendments. We specifically dis-
cussed the possibility of various amend-
ments and decided that amendments of
any kind would be inappropriate. Since
the committee reported the resolution,
of course, amendments have been of-
fered specifically the Jackson amend-
ment, compelling us to review this posi-
tion, and I have done so with other Mem-
bers. Therefore, we will offer amend-
ments to the Jackson amendment; if the
Jackson amendment, in any form is
adopted, other amendments will. be of-
fered, which are at the desk.
The President and his spokesman
stated categorically at the time we re-
ported this matter that the interim
agreement adequately provides for our
security. Numerous quotations from the
President's statement in Moscow and in
Washington, and also his spokesman,
Mr. Kissinger, support this position. The
President stated that at a minimum the
United States has overall equality in
strategic weapons. In some categories, of
course, we arefairly superior; that is, in
such things as nuclear warheads, for
example, we have more than the Rus-
sians. We have superiority as a result
of MIRV and also as a result of the sta-
tioning of our nuclear weapons in
Europe. We have some 14 operational
aircraft carriers and two under con-
struction, I believe, and we will thus
have about 16 very large, very expensive,
very powerful aircraft carriers which
can, as we know, be maneuvered close to
the Soviet Union or any place else. In
heavy bombers we also have about an
advantage of three or four to one, with
over 500 heavy bombers, whereas the
Russians have about 150. These are ap-
proximate numbers. We have bases over-
seas for our submarines, and we have
been told by experts that because of this
geographic advantage for the U.S. it is
necessary for the Soviets to have about
three submarines for every two of the
United States to keep the same number
on station. In other words, the overseas
bases we have in Spain, Scotland. and
the Pacific enable our submarines to
stay on station without going back and
forth across the ocean for refueling, sup-
plies, and so on.
So overall I think it is clear we have at
least equality in some cases superiority.
The only area in which the Russians have
numerically more weapons is in the in-
tercontental ballistic missiles, which are
roughly in the position of 1,618 to 1,054.
Here again there is some slight differ-
ence in those categories as to size and
throw weight, but difference is of very
minimal significance because from testi-
mony we had both recently and at the
time of the ABM debate, it was quite
clear that each side has far more des-
structive capacity in these missiles than
is necessary to inflict what is called un-
acceptable damage to the other.
Mr. President, you will recall at the
time of the ABM debate Secretary of De-
fense McNamara and others were talk-
ing about the mutual capacity to kill 100
million Americansand 100 million Rus-
sians and destroy 75 percent of all indus-
trial capacity in either country, and so
forth. These figures were bandied about
in those hearings, but the significance is
that we both have what is generally con-
sidered to be overkill capacity; that is,
both sides have the capacity in the ab-
sence of an effective defense to destroy
effectively the industrial capacity and an
enormous number of the inhabitants of
each side. The ABM treaty, of course,
recognized that neither side has an effec-
tive defense against a nuclear attack. If
it could be assumed the ABM was an ef-
fective defense to the missiles then there
would be a more complex situation, but
now we have had almost unanimous ap-
proval of the ABM agreement. The effect
is that both sides give up the idea of try-
ing to create an effective ABM defense
weapons system, effective against the in-
tercontinental ballistic missile. That is a
very significant agreement.
I am very glad the ABM Treaty has
been approved. But accepting that at its
true value, and I have no reason to be-
lieve either side does not intend to abide
by it, then the question is how much
overkill, how much surplusage of de-
structive power is needed when we both
can inflict unacceptable damage on the
other.
That gives us a very different picture.
The argument about superiority of num-
bers on the one side as opposed to the
other has become almost irrelevant.
However, that the core of the argument
now being used is that westill must have
superiority.
Mr. President, much has-been written
to the effect that the President has lent
the prestige of his office to support the
amendment by the Senator from Wash-
ington (Mr. JACKSON), the amendment
to the resolution authorizing the Presi-
dent to accept the Interim Agreement on
Offensive Weapons, the agreement the
President signed in Moscow, subject to
congressional approval.
I am struck by the irony of the situa-
tion. The most prominent, vocal critic of
the Moscow agreements, the Senator
from Washington, has enlisted the sup-
port of the President in opposition to, the
principal agreement the President
brought back from Moscow, an agree-
ment the President himself hailed as
tangible evidence that mankind need not
live forever in the dark shadow of nu-
clear war.
An agreement which, said the Presi-
dent, will provide renewed hope that men
and nations working together can suc-
ceed in building a lasting peace.
The President is supporting the prin-
cipal critic of these agreements--the
Senator who has characterized the In-
terim Agreement negotiated by the
President as one which puts the United
States in a position of subparity.
Here are the words on August 7 of the
Senator from Washington, Mr. JACKSON:
We have, in the few brief years since the
Kennedy Administration, gone from strategic
superiortty to parity to sufficiency-whatever
that means-to interim subparity.
Who got the United States into a posi-
tion of interim subparity?
None other than the President of the
United States, says Mr. JAcKsoN. The
President signed the agreement which
Mr. JACKSON describes as putting the
United States in a position of interim
subparity. Lest there be doubt, the Sen-
ator from Washington removes it in
these words: "in the interim agreement
before the Senate we have subparity."
The Senator from Washington was
referring to the interim agreement
signed by President Nixon in Moscow in
late May-let me make that crystal
clear.
I happen to agree with the Nixon who
in late spring described the agreements
to Members of the Congress and the
American people as agreements in which
"neither side won and neither side lost-
if we were to look at it very, very
fairly, both sides won, and the whole
world won."
They were the words of President
Nixon.
I find myself in agreement with the
position which the President took in late
May-but opposed to his position in mid-
summer.
The careful examination which mem-
bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions gave the interim agreement sup-
ports the proposition that the interim
agreement is a good and significant first
step.
But a first step must be followed by a
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September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
second, and a third, so that finally we We should also be wary that by RP- Jackson amendment and Mr. Ziegler
may begin to move toward some control proval of the language of the Jackson said:
of man's ingenuity to the President of Tonkin resolution not endorsing oa Gulf f the feel that that is the Jackson consistent with our
Now it appears that tposition
but we do not endorse separate elaborations
himself is beginning to have doubt about arms race. of that amendment. We feel the amendment,
the wisdom of the first step he took in i anticipate that if this amend- as offered, speaks for itself.
late May. ment is approved, in the years to come
The officials who negotiated the agree- we will be confronted, each year, with the Mr. President, I once again emphasize
ment, Ambassador Gerard Smith and statement, "Well, you already approved these are the words of Mr. Ziegler. The
others, have been left dangling, not know- it." It will be argued that we will need words which I have quoted in other parts
ing what is going on. At a time when the more and more intercontinental ballistic of my statement indicating support for
White House needed people who could missiles, and cruise missiles, and every the agreement as negotiated were, in
read the fine print in amendments such other imaginable kind of weapons sys- many instances, the words of the Presi-
as that proposed by the Senator from tems in order to comply with the inter- dent of the United States. He stated di-agreement Washington, the expertise was lacking. pretation of the language of the Jackson eetly that this s was a interest and that
What I find most disturbing about the amendment. and that i In our
waffling of the administration on the lan- I think the amendment of the Senator it was quite adequate for our safety. Also
guage of the Jackson amendment is that from Washington should be examined Dr. Kissinger at the White House in the
it does not seem to realize that this very carefully as to what it really means, presence of about 100 Members of Con-
amendment not only condemns - the I personally have no intention of voting gress was introduced by the President
agreement which this administration for it, nor shall I vote for the resolution who said, after he had made a statement
negotiated, but that it ties the hands of if it contains the Jackson amendment, of his own:
beliauthabout oriz this. Kissinger to speak on my
not amended-in dto n oche words, it
our negotiators when the next round of even as
negotiations come up. said:
It was the President who announced during this debate. The President I have another engagement, but Mr. Kis-
many months ago that our nuclear ar- I think the administration should be
senal should be determined by the con- absolutely clear on the meaning of every
cept of sufficiency. But the sponsor of word. The President has himself, so far
the proposed amendment which he asks as I know, never given a definitive state- I consider these statements to be more
we adopt, refers to sufficiency as some- ment on his position on the Jackson significant bh n those made at a press
thing he does not understand; sufficiency, amendment. conference Mr. .
-
, in view
c
any
of t Wa h ng that is, said the Senator from memIt was suggesd by some committee bers that it wou d help if the minor- versy, I find itestrange th at thhis P esident
whatever'
Washington. has not seen fit to issue directly, over
Sufficiency, to me, and I believe to the sty leader would get a letter signed by
men who negotiated the accords, means the President making his position quite his own signature or in person, a defini-
that there is a limit to the need to have clear. This was not done, and we were Senate to stateith ment about tt this situation iagreementn he respect .
capacity to kill. told it could not be done. Fourth. One must ask, "What goes
The chairman of the Armed - Services It is not enough to issue vague state-
Committee told us a few days ago that ments through a press secretary, as was onWho interprets Mr. JACxsoN's lan-
stroy U.S. nuclear submarine could de- done recently.
stroy 25 percent of Soviet cities which Are Members of this body to accept a guage-Mr. JACKSON, or the White
have a significant industrial potential. statement from Mr. Ziegler that "We"- H been so rampant that
Surely 20 or 30 times that amount is and I do not know who "we" is, "We en- Confusion has
it has been necessary for the rampant that
sufficiency. dorse the Jackson amendment but we do
But the thrust of the Jackson amend- not endorse the separate elaboration of Union to issue a clarifying statement,
ment-the thrust which the administra- the amendment." Confusion about the meaning of the
tion does not seem to comprehend, is that This, I think is, at best, a very ain- Jackson amendment led to stories in the
sufficiency is no longer to be the under- biguous or ambivalent statement. press suggesting that the amendment by
girding of our negotiating posture. The WAFFLING ON TIIE JACKSON AMENDMENT Mr. JACKSON had either been submitted
new word is superiority. First. In early August, a version of the to, or cleared by, the Russian Embassy.
If we are to base our negotiations on Jackson amendment was circulated and But the Soviet Embassy, in order to
the concept of superiority, we might as sponsors were invited to join it on the clarify the situation-this is rather un-
well save the time and effort of our nego- ground that it was endorsed by the White usual, I may say-issued the following
tiators because the other side will believe House. That was the amendment which statement, and circulated it to a num-
Mr. JACKSON, not the President, and will stated that Congress would consider ber of Senators, I being one of them, al-
see us moving once again toward the con- action on deployment by the Soviet though I know that others have received
cept of a first strike. Union, having the effect of endangering it as well.
if the administration has not seen the the survivability of the strategic deter- It was a simple statement, on one
writing on the wall, as it is revealed most rent forces of the United States, whether page, which read as follows:
skillfully in the Jackson amendment, or not such action or deployment was In connection with the reports published
surely they must see it in the rash of undertaken within the terms of the in the American press to the effect that So-
news stories in recent days which show interim agreement referred to in section viet diplomats were consulted on Senator
our Military Establishment moving to- 2, to be contrary to the supreme national Jackson's resolution etand mbaallegedly gas Sevier
ward cruise missiles, not covered by the interests of the United States. This was Union would oke it the dmb sesy the Soviet there is no
accords, and toward hardened war heads an invitation to the Soviet Union to de- truth i these epoots.
capable of a first strike designed to de- nounce the agreement.
stroy retaliatory weapons in the hands of Second. When the White House read That is a rather unusual statement to
the Soviet Union. this fine print, and received word that a be issued by any foreign embassy that I
The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. number of Senators were appalled by this know of. I do not recall any precedent
BROOKE) has properly asked the Presi- language,- the White House found it quite like it from the Soviet Union.
dent to tell the Senate what is up. I think necessary on August 7 to abandon this Mr. President, there have been some
he deserves an answer. language and to approve some substitute very good discussions about the signi-
For months now we have been told how language. On that date the White House ficance of overkill, the significance of
inferior the United States is in weapons stated in a press conference that "the the development of the enormous capac-
of all kinds. Jackson amendment is consistent with sty for destruction that exists in nuclear
This is part of the annual rite by which the undertakings in Moscow." weapons, and the distinction which
the Department of Defense gets appro- Third. Two days later, on August 9, should be drawn between ordinary con-
that houd be smart enough to the Whe House found it o clarify its attitude necessary toward the customed to fighting realize with, such weapons
priations. We
thnow. again t
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RESSIONAT. R FC0R n __ cFly A rrr
rya w~ ~.au ua wuria war ii, for exam- under the aegis of the Kennedy adminis- ers on continuous, quick-reaction alert
pie, and nuclear weapons. So I shall tration. status and a fleet of 41 nuclear
address myself for a few minutes to this By the midpoint of the 1960's, the at- submarines, each of which carries 16
subject. ta,inment of an invulnerable deterrent medium-range Polaris missiles over
WHAT IS AT ISSUE posture by the Soviet Union had changed half of which remain constantly on oper-
Over the weeks since Mr. Nixon visited things a great deal. Despite the repeated ational patrol. Each of these additional
Moscow to sign the strategic arms limi- political crises and conflicts which beset force categories would complicate the
tation agreements, the Senate has gone it, the Soviet-American relationship had Soviet Union's war-planning effort enor-
to great lengths to learn as :much as come to assume a remarkable degree of mously. The B-52 bomber contingent
possible about these agreements and stability at the strategic level. The main- has the capability of being launched on
their implications. Now the Senate must spring of that stability was, and A ill is, sufficiently short warning to stand a
decide whether to support those agree- the mechanism of mutual deter rence, good chance of evading destruction on
ments or not-and, if it chooses to sup- created and maintained by the existence the ground by any incoming missile at-
port them-what the nature of that of credible second-strike nuclear forces tack, and these aircraft still possess a
support will be. Will the Senate express in the strategic arsenals of each side. respectable capability for penetrating
unequivocal support for a limitation of These forces, in the form of hardened Soviet air defenses and geting through
the arms race Or will the Senate qualify land-based ICBM's and submarine-de- to their assigned targets. The Polaris
its support by appending an ambiguous ployed medium-range missiles, gave both fleet, for its part, is virtually invulner-
statement of philosophy heavy with sus- countries the assured ability to ride out abel to attack and will remain so un-
picion and distrust? The Jackson amend- a premeditated nuclear first strike with til the Soviets can acquire an antisub-
ment is an amendment with serious im- enough residual arms to guarantee a marine capability, a development which,
plications and it deserves therefore the crippling reprisal against the attacker. according to all testimony, lies far be-
serious consideration of every Senator. The paradoxical result was that each yond any foreseeable technological hori-
With the knowledge, born of experience, country, though totally vulnerable as zon. Thus the Soviet Union's defense
that such resolutions may well acquire never before, now assumed an unpre- would have to depend solely upon ABM's
even greater importance as time passes, cedented degree of security from its op- to sustain the brunt of retaliation. And
the Senate should not now give voice to ponent's certitude that starting a gener- so the fear that either side might,
a statement of philosophy without first al nuclear war would be suicidal. As a
through an ABM-MIRV combination,
.;edging carefully its full implications. consequence, nuclear weapons had be- suddenly emerge wtih a-first-strike capa-
The Jackson amendment hinges upon come both self-negating and substantial- bility is still ill-founded. Even if either
its contention that a stable strategic bal- Iy devoid of political exploitability. side undertook to acquire that vastly ex-
ance is difficult to preserve. The amend- The recent advent of ABM and PMIIRV pensive combination, it would still be vul-
ment implies that we must be ever vigi- technology and the continued expansion nerable. It is ironic that the Senate has,
lant, else the other side suddenly emerge of the Soviet ICBM force throughout by approving the ABM treaty, now re-
one day with a power that renders us the past half decade, however, have moved even the assumptions behind this
"inferior." Is this a possibility? if it is aroused widespread fears among some illusory ABM-MIRV first-strike possibil-
not, then the Jackson amendment should Americans that the Soviet Union is now ity; but we are still left with the cli-
ne rejected: for the assumption that we somehow set on a course of acquiring mate of fear engendered by the advent
are threatened by inferiority leads something called strategic "superiority." of MIRV and ABM technology.
inevitably to far-reaching conclusions. In its more alarmist variations, this a:rgu- Eventually, what all Americans must
We are quickly led to believe that we must ment maintains that the Soviet Union is be brought by their leaders to recognize
be satisfied in future arms agreements moving dangerously close to achieving a is that the United States and the Soviet
only with some kind of measurable nuclear first-strike capability against Union have long since reached a plateau
equality. And we are quickly convinced the United States, that Moscow's appar- in their strategic relationsip. The terms
that, in the meantime, we must continue ently eouneiliatory conduct in the SALT "mutual deterrence" and "nuclear stale-
to purchase every available weapons sys- talks has been only a ruse to lull us into mate" both describe it appropriately.
tem not specifically limited by agree- a false sense of security, and that we are From a strategic nuclear perspective,
ment. Those are weighty and expensive now in jeopardy of having our deterrent both sides are now inexorably equal, re-
conclusions. If the assumption from capacity compromised. gardless of the further numerical addi-
which they are drawn is faulty or mis- THE DURABILITY OF MUTUAL DETERR#XCE tions or qualitative improvements in
conceived, then we will have erred seri- All of these apprehensions are built either side's arsenal. This is a funda-
ously. So that assumption must be care- upon the assumption that there are cer- mental and critically important point:
fully examined: Could we become "in- tain inherent qualities in such weapons we are equal not because we have nu-
ferior?" as MIRV's and ABM's which make them merically equivalent arsenals; our equal-
BACKGROUND fundamentally different from existing ity arises from the fact that we are alike
Beginning back in the mid-1950's, after weapons systems. The idea has emerged in being deterred. This equality is not
the Soviet Union had acquired a nuclear that, because MIRV's provide their pos_ subject to sudden change or gradual
delivery capability, we began to realize sessors with at least a fourfold increase erosion in the foreseeable future. It can-
that our ability to deter an attack upon in deliverable warheads, either side might not be altered by the deployment of ad-
us rested in our ability to convey to any be able to almost completely disarm its ditional weapons today, nor is there fore-
opponent an absolute certainty that any opponent's land-based missile force by seeable technology that could alter it.
attack, however massive, would be an- attacking it with a skillfully planned THE "SUPERIORITY" FALLACY
swered by an unacceptably devastating MIRV barrage. If the attacker also had Somehow, the notion that the United
reprisal. We began to appreciate that if an effective ABM system, according to States should maintain strategic "super-
a combined bomber and missile strike this conception, it could blunt any small iority" over the Soviet Union, or that
against us could succeed in decimating retaliatory strike that the attacked we should live in anxiety about the pos-
our nuclear forcesto the point of virtual country might still be capable of. Thus sibility that they will attain "superi-
uselessness, we would in fact have no the advent of ABM's and MIRV's have ority," has for years enjoyed an almost
deterrent. That realization had a revolu- revived the specter of a first-strike pos- mystical fixation in our thinking. Per-
sionary impact on the pattern of our sibility. If both sides, by deploying an haps this fixation can be partly explained
strategic thinking. We began to reassess appropriate ABM-MIRV combination, by the natural psychological and chau-
some of the assumptions underlying our developed such a first-strike capability, vinistic satisfaction that Americans tra-
defense posture and we decided that the then we would be returned to the "deli- ditionally have drawn from being
American deterrent was in need of some cate balance of terror" which existed in "stronger than," "better than," or
drastic revisions. The ultimate outcome the 1950's. "ahead of" their Communist adversary.
of this reassessment was the far-reach- But the ABM-MIRV first-strike threat For the most part, however, it
ing decision to expand, disperse, and pro- is deceptive. For the U.S. retaliatory ca- seems to have arisen from a gen-
tect the American retaliatory force, a pability consists of a good deal more nine belief that "superiority" some-
decision made during the latter years of than just land-based missiles. It Includes how would give us advantages-either
the Eisenhower era and carried through also a sizable number of manned bomb- political or military or of some other sort.
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Indeed, even some strategic analysts have requiring a full retaliatory response off, President Kennedy was more realis-
been quick to assume that U.S. "superi- against the Soviet Union. Kennedy did tic about the outcome. He said that the
ority" has been the determining factor in not, however, promise or threaten the Soviets had backed down, in the final
various foreign against therSov et Un on.oS ch an successes failed to with their missiles from C ba. wrong land that, atbsome future time, if
nter interests to protect, theyh
It might
sumption widely agreed, f course, that nu- retaliation in the event that the missiles had vital thought
clear weapons perform a deterrence func- were actually fired. His threat may or very well not back down. In other words,
tion: They deter a premeditated attack may not have been believable-perhaps they might choose to fight, even with a
directly upon one's homeland. ; This is a tit was. But the main point is that his so-called hreat concerning our retaliating was not cumstanc sllcwere inferiority, I Kennedy,
rather o not have g function; thew but directed toward the objective of getting much to his credit, realized that we had
pone do not have to do anything but the Soviet missiles physically removed been lucky in the Cuban crisis. Under
merely exits at can retaliate quantity against from Cuba. If he had threatened a nu- other circumstances, he realized, with
anyone else's we can upon us. F or thise clear attack against the Soviet Union if mutual deterrence preventing either side
function, o el's first strike discussed, relative they did not remove their missiles, they from employing nuclear weapons, the So-
numbers in has been discus, strategic air surely would not have believed him. viets might have felt that they had con-
senals are, the and large, unimportant. owever greater our nuclear forces may ventional superiority and that the battle
sepals are, s and large, unimport. have been in terms of numerical quan- was worth fighting. I would say that that
All one needs for that strength is is on less, 'in tity, they were not enough to perform a is probably true with respect to their ex-stre quan ati even if s, t than that of in successful first strike. The Soviet Union ploits in Eastern Europe.
adv terms, than that of the even with far less numerical strength, To underscore this point, we need only
adveerairyrsary. . still possessed a second strike capability, recall the success of the Soviet Union in
But some people have adopted the tea and everyone on both sides knew it. occupying Hungary in 1956 and in build-
secondlefthat function nuclear :weapons pons even can without perform a a Of course, it can be asked: why, then, ing the Berlin Wall in 1961. In both cases,
That,
first-strike capability, they can provide did Khrushchev back down) And for the the United States had a so-called "su-k to
power,
nuclear
periority"
other
and it a foreign of lever we act pursuit of our tors-apart from so-called Amer can facu-- not change a thing. The Soviets had dhe
can get psome olicy objectives: a uIn out this oview, we ur nu- clear superiority. First of all, the crisis force of resolve and conventional supe-
clear get weapons, over an above outour pri- took place virtually within an arm's riority on their side, and we were un-
mary of deterring an attack k on our willing to risk war in order to avert their
mart' mde, of demour adversaries r n our preach onderance of on ent conventional power in a this lans. In none of these crises-Hungary,
fearful omelan that, making akin with oua ea From the Soviet point of view, once Berlin, Cuba, or, I might add, Czechoslo-
h
will ubj wth our they saw that we were concerned about vakia-did the strategic nuclear equation
global activities, shey they interfere
selves ohpossibility subject them- the missiles, there was no guarantee really play any significant role in shap-
edible a losses, either lity c because we al- that we would not use this conventional ing the outcome of events. Indeed, it is
crediively against their interf retaile capability to remove the missiles from one of the greatest ironies of the nuclear
fate massively confrontation could es- Cuba forcibly. That would have been a age that while enthusiasts in both Wash-
serious humiliation to the Soviet Union, ington and Moscow have often lauded
c because fee Now, it could possible
pa alate out of control. . Now, it is possible much worse than that which occurred "superiority" as a goal, neither side has
been performed kind of function weapons could have when they removed the missiles on their ever behaved internationally as though
ingn that when wapondues own decision under the terms of an un- it mattered. The meaning of this is pro-
was that period hnn the Unisetem. i t derstanding. foundly important: unless a nation
was probably as pro onlynation to believable to other o othsthem. It nations A second factor was that we had the uniquely possesses a first-strike capa-
bility-something no longer a possi-
in the immediate postwar years-after we force of resolve on our side. The Soviet ility-then nuclear longer give no
had shown ourselves willing to drop two Union had created the problem by alter- advantage. Our nuclear weapons eervo
atomic bombs on the cities of Japan- ing the status quo; we had responded only . urncucla depo any eve
al
us-t hie.
that we might use such weapons against by making it clear that we found that the onone
enemy y from from FOR ARMS hi CONTROL
those who confronted us around the presence of Soviet weaponry in the West- tential one
world. But today is far different. Now ern Hemisphere posed a direct threat to REASONS
that other nations possess these weapons, our interest. The burden of responsibility Now the question might be asked: If
any threat-implied or otherwise-that for ending this tension was thus placed mutual deterrence is so durable and mere
we would resort to their use to support upon the Soviet Union. And third, when numerical superiority gives no advan-tage
SALT
have
then
why
agre our objectives would certainly be met Placed a naval quarantine
and threatened to launch anua rr all? That is a question worth cons dering
v to be sushown utter disbelief. We Cuba strike against the missiles already there, carefully. The administration, of course,
with incredulity,
have, to be sure, shown ourselves
upon a gonn a we placed the onus of decision directly has to its credit the achievement of hav-
co wreak massive destruction upon the Soviets: any Soviet ship at- ing negotiated these agreements. Regret-
Vietnam-but is cannot unlikely strike that anyone a tempting to run the blockade would have tably, however, they have given a sort of
d o such to face the possibility of being sunk by distorted justification for having done so.
in the world believes we would d
to the in Vietnam anywhere else-if our naval forces. While Khrushchev may According to the administration, we
thereswer any possibility we have wanted the missiles in Cuba to start needed these agreements to keep the
there were any red, even at all that t wack with, he was certainly under no obliga- Soviet Union from rushing ahead and
would c attacked, even a small attack, tion to risk armed conflict of any kind to gaining "superiority"-as if that were
to be lebe sure, weapons. theere have been many keep them there. something they could actually do. By giv-
Now, with nuclear
occasions when the Soviet Union has So it is in these more conventional, ing credence to the idea that there
backed away from crises when confronted less apocalyptic factors that the explana- such a thing as "superiority," the admin-
with American diplomatic and military tion of that classic and often cited epi- istration has, indirectly, given support to
pressure. The question, however, is sode must be found. It was a case not those in our country who are unhappy
whether it was some kind of strategic where nuclear "superiority" triumphed, about the agreements and suspicious of
"superiority" or really other factors but where the United States was able, the Soviet Union. For now that the no-
which were the deciding elements in our by threatening the Soviet Union with tions of superiority and inferiority are
favor. The Cuban missile crisis is the the prospect of conventional war, to abroad in the land, many people are
classic example often cited. In his famous make the Soviet Union change its plans. doing a lot of mathematics and coming
nationwide television address, President The whole episode would very probably to alarming conclusions. They are say-
Kennedy did indeed state that it would have occurred in the same way even if ing that, in negotiating these agree-
be our policy to regard any nuclear mis- nuclear weapons did not exist. After- ments, we lost. We are in danger, they
sile launched from Cuba against any na- ward, although there was a good deal of say, because even with the agreements,
tion in this hemisphere as an attack by self-congratulation about how our nu- the Soviet Union may be able to acquire
the Soviet Union on the United States, clear superiority had scared the Soviets "superiority." Of course, the administra-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September- 13, 1972
tion has its reasons for wanting to keep method of stepping off the treadmill
the specter of superiority alive. In this together,
cay, they can frighten the Congress and Second. Nuclear proliferation. The sec-
the people into paying billions more for and reason for supporting the offensive-
new weapons systems-the Trident, the weapons limitation has to do with the
B-1, and so on-as the only way, even rest of the world. Today, as both the
with the agreements, of preventing the United States and the Soviet Union have
Soviet Union from acquiring "superi- apparently recognized, we live in a world
ority." that is not very easy to control. People
6o it is worthwhile to look carefully at everywhere are nationalistic; they care
the reasons for having and supporting more about themselves and their own
a limitation on offensive weapons. This countries than about the ideologies of the
agreement should be supported not be- two so-called powers. They are, as they
cause it offers a techni
ue of k
i
th
q
eep
ng
ehld b ittb
soue,nracale-going their own
Soviet Union from acquiring a nuclear way in the world. But it is a world in
"superiority;" the possibility of "superi- which nuclear weapons technology has
ority" is an illusion. There are other rea- become virtually a free-market commod-
sons far more sound for supporting such ity. And many of the countries on the
agreements: threshold of acquiring a nuclear capa-
First. Rationality and economy. First, bility have made it abundantly clear that
there is the very rational justification a precondition of their acceptance of
that the agreement provides each side nonproliferation must be a demonstrated
with a systematic, fear-reducing method willingness on the part of the superpow-
of cutting back its vast expenditures on ers to modulate their own nuclear arms
new weapons. As it is, each time either race. When the United States and the
side spends billions of dollars on a new Soviet Union
i
th
s
gned
e nonproliferation
weapons system, that expenditure proves treaty, they acknowledged that precon-
to have no significance other than waste. dition. Now we are obliged to follow
We are on a treadmill. Each side has al- through with substantive action. To do
ready gained from its nuclear weapons otherwise-preaching the virtues of non-
as much securit
lif
i
thi
y as
e
n
s age will
allow. Thus the new weapons which each
;ide continues to acquire, each in emula-
ion of the other, provide no gain. Like
Mice in Wonderland, it takes all the run-
aing we can do just to keep in the same
xilace. If we stood still, we would get just
:io far. And if these new strategic weap-
ons have nothing to offer, then it it pat-
ently wasteful to expend the gargantuan
amounts of our national resources which
are necessary to produce and maintain
them. As everyone now knows, modern
weapons systems are enormously costly
to create, develop, and deploy. If we
spend our moneys and our energy on
i.liern, then we cannot do other things.
President Eisenhower understood this
perfectly:
Every gun that is made, every warship
launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the
final sense, a theft from those who hunger
and are not fed, those who are cold and are
not clothed. The world in arms is not spend-
iag money alone. It is spending the sweat
'Ir its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the
1;opes of its children. The cost of one mod-
ern bomber is this: a modern brick school in
raore than 30 cities. It is two electric power-
ilants, each serving a town of 60,000 popula-
tion. It is two fine, fully equipped hospi-
tals.... We pay for a single fighter plane
with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay
i.,r a single destroyer with new homes that
could have housed more than 8,000 people.
proliferation while at the same time con-
tinuing on as we have-would be seen,
and rightly, as a kind of double dealing.
It could only serve to aggravate the prob-
ability that those nations with the sci-
entific ability to develop nuclear weapons
will do so.
Third. The value of dialog. A third
cogent reason for supporting the SALT
limitations is that these continuing
negotiations, and the contact they pro-
vide. afford us an opportunity to get to
know the Soviet Union better. And like-
wise for them to know us better. Not
nearly enough attention has been paid,
either by scholars or government officials,
to the persistent mutual misperceptions
and misunderstandings which have con-
tinually plagued Soviet-American rela-
tions. More often than not, these mis-
perceptions and misunderstandings have
been substantially due to distorted im-
ages generated by insufficient informa-
tion. Much of this groping in the dark
can be significantly reduced in the course
of the continuing dialog we have now
begun. While the subject matter will
often be weapons interactions and strat-
egy trade-offs. which are technical mat-
ters, we eventually in such discussions
begin to learn a great deal about the
fears, calculations, and motivations
which move the two sides. These con-
These astounding sacrifices of needed tinuing talks give us the opportunity to
trod, housing, and social services are now learn from experience, in a way that no
i;eing made on both sides, so much so preaching or theorizing can teach us
,
that there are probably no two countries what the other side Is really like. Viewed with this perspective, it be-
in the world in greater need of a radical Fourth. Tension reduction. Finally, we comes clear that the current Senatorial
shift in economic priorities than the should support the SALT agreements be- debate over the Jackson amendment rep-
United States and the Soviet Union. A cause our own country, and surely the resents a very fundamental choice. The
truly rational decision by either side Soviet Union as well, needs some psychic argument is not between those who ad-
would be to step off the nuclear arms relief from the breathtaking pace and vocate American strength and those who
treadmill unilaterally, for each side al- continuing tension of the nuclear arms think we can get by with weakness. The
ready has enough. But that kind of su- race. Whether or not we have in recent argument is not between those who trust
preme rationality on either side is un- years been secure in any objective sense, the Soviets and those who do not. The
likely in the real world. This is why the we have certainly not behaved like a argument is between those who still be-
SALT agreements are so valuable and nation which felt secure. Perceptions of lieve that security in the nuclear age
so deserving of our unequivocal support: security are, at bottom, rooted In obscure depends upon the numerical measure-
they offer both sides a calm, calculated processes of the mind; surely they do not ment of destructive power and those who
come from the logical deductive schemes
of the strategic theoretician. The arms
race, as it continues, may not alter the
security of either side at all-objectively,
it almost surely would not-but the race
does tend to maximize each side's inner
feeling of insecurity and to heighten the
compulsions which we feel: to be "vigi-
lant" and ever watchful of new danger,
unseen but just around the corner. Arms
control, as we begin slowly to perform it
with these first agreements, can help us
to begin to eliminate the sources of these
perceived insecurities. And by doing that,
arms control can reduce the tension, both
within each of the two superpowers and
between them.
CONCLUSION
Twice in the past 20 years, we have
had to accommodate, in our thinking
and planning, qualitative changes in our
strategic nuclear position. The first came
in the early 1950's, when the Soviet Union
initially acquired an air-deliverable nu-
clear capability, and we were confronted
for the first time with the realization that
an unrestricted war could now mean un-
imaginable destruction to both sides. We
had lost our nuclear monopoly.
The second change, described earlier,
came in the later 1950's, as the Soviet
Union attained a large enough strategic
capability to place our vulnerable retali-
atory forces in possible danger of being
destroyed by a surprise first strike. We
realized that such situation was un-
stable, and we moved to harden and dis-
perse our strategic arsenal so as to pro-
vide a guaranteed nuclear second-strike
capability. The Soviet Union followed
suit shortly thereafter with a similar
hardening and dispersal program of its
own, and the nuclear era evolved from its
second phase-a delicate balance of ter-
ror-into its third and present phase of
stable mutual deterrence.
Somehow the heightened activity of
recent American and Soviet weapons-
development programs has led many
Americans to fear that the East-West
nuclear equation is once again on the
verge of a qualitative shift. But, particu-
larly in light of the open abandonment
by each side of the attempt to shield
itself with antiballistic missiles, there is
simply no reasoned basis for this fear.
The Soviet-American strategic relation-
ship has become firmly immobilized-at
least for any foreseeable future-by the
durability of mutual deterrence; and
while new weapons deployments by either
or both superpowers may induce numeri-
cal fluctuations in the strategic balance,
neither the stability of that balance nor
the security it provides will be signifi-
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September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
realize that we have entered an era in Mr. President, there is another item can Bar Association urges the Senate and
which such measurements no longer have that I wish to draw to the attention of House of Representatives to authorize ap-
proval by.the President Representatives the United States
any meaning. In sum, we can choose now the Senate. of the interim agreement on certain meas-
between continuing to deploy newer and The House of Delegates of the Ameri- ures with respect to the limitation of stra-
ever newer weaponry in a perpetual yet can Bar Association has passed a reso- tegic offensive arms, and the associated pro-
illusory pursuit of additional security lution firmly supporting the interim tocol, all of which were signed at Moscow
and Nixon and Gen-
Brezh sident
and additional advantage or we can ren- agreement between the Soviet Union and on Secret26, ary 1972
der firm and unequivocal support to a the United States on the limitation Of al a further resolved, That the President
meaningful and productive arms-limits- strategic offensive arms. or hBe It is designee be authorized to appear be-
The association urges that the COn-
tion dialog with the Soviets. fore the appropriate committees of the Con-
Much of the importance of the SALT gress authorize approval by the Presi- gross in support of such action; and
agreements arises from their symbolism. dent of the agreement and the associ- 'Be it further resolved, That the American
They represent the realization by both at protocol. The association also asks UBar nited AssociStatesation urges s the Governy meto of the
sides that arms spending is inherently that- to
limiting the and red Soviet ucing Union strategic on fur furthher
wasteful and that neither side, with all The Government of the United States agremeeememesent with
er
uci and comclof-
its astronomical spending, is achieving seek promptly to reach agreement with the sur
arms, and on general
anything by it. The creation of that sym- Soviet Union on further measures limiting
and reducing strategic offensive arms, and disarmament, in accordance with the pro-and bsllsm is actually the most important on general and complete disarmament, in said treaty and of a table VII of ticleinte iof said
aspect of what has thus far been accom- accordance with the provisions of the pre- agreement.
plished; for neither side has yet agreed amble and Article XI of said treaty and of J. BURNS, Jr.,
to give up a great deal in substance. We Article VII of said interim agreement. KENNETH
Secretary of the American Bar Association.
have, however, made a of thinking g about I ask unanimous consent that the tele-
weaponses anew represents way of tan mp rtnt gram from the Secretary of the Ameri- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
first tep in bringing them underl control. can Bar Association be printed in the mhave, of en to the Jacksssubmitted an t mend-
But that symbolism is delicate. It could RECORD, half t myself Jackson I amend men nine other
still be destroyed, and with it the spirit There being no objection, the telegram half of m. As I said believe, beginning Of
of trustful negotiation for mutual benefit was Ordered to be printed in the RECORD, alf o my rel s yore. As Foreign Relations g of , the which has now been born. Were the Sell- as follows:
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., mittee has long felt that this resolution
ate to approve the Jackson amendment, , August 17,1972, approving the Interim Agreement should
it would not only jeopardize that spirit, Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, not have any amendments whatever to
it would compound our mistake by giving Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Com- detract from its significance.
voice to outmoded notions of nuclear inittee, New Senate Building, Capitol the House of Representatives, I un-
superiority that can only lead to the Hill, D.C.: derstand, has passed a resolution in that
further purposeless waste of our re- On Wednesday afternoon, August 16, 1972, form. I offer my amendment to the
sources, energy, and national spirit. the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association adopted the following resole- Jackson amendment regretfully because
Mr. President, in connection with my tions: I would not have offered a clarifying
earlier comments on the mutual sufTi- Whereas, the United States has under- amendment of any kind except for the
ciency we and the Russians have to de- taken by the terms of article VI of the non- doubts the Jackson amendment has cre-
stroy each other, on September 7, there proliferation treaty of 1968, to which it is a ated as to the serious intent of the Presi-
was an interesting report from the Inter- party, to "pursue negotiations in good faith dent to negotiate further nuclear weap-
national institute for Strategic Studies on effective measures relating to cessation ohs limitations. I want to make that very
in London. I wish to read an article en- of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty clear.
titled "Nuclear Aggressor Doomed, Study on general and complete disarmament under If my amendment is agreed to, its
Finds," published in the Washington Post strict and effective international control", effect would be to clarify the significance
on September 8, 1972. It reads as fol- and expressed a similar intention in the pre- of the whole question. I believe that the
lows' amble of the limited test ban treaty of 1963; Jackson amendment is ambiguous. It has
NUCLEAR AGGRESSOR DOOMED, STUDY FINDS and been packaged and sold so that many
that its purpose is to
LONDON, September 7.-The International Whereas, it has for some years been a ma- understand
Institute for Strategic Studies said today jor objective of the United States to reduce People
that nuclear parity has made it impossible the risk of military confrontation with the provide guidelines for future negotiations
for the United States or the Soviet Union Soviet Union, particularly if involving the requiring our negotiators to seek equality
to launch a nuclear war without incurring use of strategic or nuclear weapons; and of strategic nuclear forces with the So-
"obliteration." Whereas, it has also been a major objec- viet Union. This seems reasonable. Who
Neither superpower can disarm the other tive of the United States to slow down and could be against equality?
arrest the escalation of armaments, in par- However, the implication is quite
b a "first seicles ike" and and each has enough ay titular in the field of strategic weapons; and
livery v vehs weapons "to destroy any the needs of the people, in the clear from the way it was phrased that
conceivable combination in a second-strike Whereas, United States and elsewhere, require the al- the Interim Agreement is not based upon
weer' territory tl the The location of greater financial and other re- a one for one equality of strategic forces.
sttuts within a the
i
Military said in a survey report ent itled "The sources, some of which might not be avail- The real meaning of the Jackson amend-
"Whatever r detailed iled calculations e able if increased military expenditures oc- ment calling for equality is not that there
"Whate may be cur; and be overall strategic equality of nuclear
e overer Whereas, the United Nations and various
constructed, have neither any ny significant t superpower advantage can consider
itself t to o ha av have for many years urged force, but numerical equality and, one
the other in terms of freedom to engage in of its committees strategic nuclear arms control and disar~na- could say megatonnage equality, if he
nuclear war without incurring obliteration," ment measures; and wishes. However, if there is required to
it concluded.itute said 1972 could be viewed Whereas, the United States and the Soviet be one for one specific numerical equality
The Institute because t SALT Union have sought since 1967 to begin ne- with respect to ICBM's, submarines, and
as a "turning point" Uniof the SALT gotiations on agreements to limit strategic other items which are covered in the lan-
agreementa between the United States and weapons, and began such negotiations in guage of the Jackson amendment's refer-
Russia. November 1969, and have reached certain ence to "intercontinental strategic
The Institute, founded in 1968 as a re- agreements expressed in a proposed treaty is inequality or su-
,"y then
search center on problems of defense, secu- and interim agreement, both signed in Mos- forces,"
our there part, because we are su-
rety and arms control, describes itself as in- cow on May 26, 1972, by President Nixon and p
dependent of governments. It has an inter- General Secretary Brezhnev; and ahead of the Russians when one takes
national council and staff. Whereas, the Senate, on August 3, 1972, ad- into account MIRV weapons, geographi-
Mr. President, I might add that that vised and consented to the ratification of the cal factors, war heads, et cetera.
institution over the years has had a repu- said treaty; and But in any case I believe it is the over-
Whereas, negotiations on further agree- all equality in strategic nuclear weapons
tatian for being extremely conservative ments will be facilitated by approval by the
in these matters. This report conforms Congress of the said interim agreement as that the President had, in mind as a basis
with my earlier remarks about our nu- well; and for the agreement. In fact, I am con-
clear deterrent. Therefore, be it resolved, That the Amer- vinced of that. The agreement was nego-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13, 1972
hated on that basis. It did not include
such items as aircraft carriers and for-
ward based nuclear attack weapons and
bombers. At this stage, those factors were
too difficult to reconcile. But this agree-
ment is a first step, achieved with great
difficulty.
It has been suggested by some of those
"upporting the Jackson amendment-
;uggested privately; I am not sure I heard
it publicly-that after this long period of
dearly 3 years of negotiations with no
agreement having been achieved, the
'resident, for his own purposes, this be-
ing an election year, was determined to
;et an agreement. It has been suggested
by some in my presence that the Presi-
dent went to Moscow and accepted an im-
oroper, improvident, and unwise agree-
ment, because of his anxiety to obtain an
=agreement now, so that it could become
it foreign policy asset in his election this
year. I have heard this suggested in the
last 2 days.
This is the kind of statement or sug-
gestion that I guess is intended to appeal
to Democrats and persuade them to sup-
p?ort the Jackson amendment. I reject
that. Obviously I am not a greater sup-
porter or confidant, politically speak-
Lig, of the President. I do not believe he
went to Moscow, not having achieved an
agreement in Helsinki or Vienna, and
insisted on an agreement against the in-
terests of the United States. After long
and thorough study of the agreement I
do not believe it is against the interest
of the United States, and I do not think
Caere is any real substance to the argu-
ment that we have an inferior position.
It is incredible to me that there are
people in this body who on one occasion
brag about the technical superiority of
the United States, about the efficiency
of our private enterprise system-people
who state we are the most advanced
country in the world in the field of in-
dustrialization, that we have done the
most in the highly sophisticated realm
of computers and guidance systems, and
so :forth, and they brag on it; and then,
when we come to an argument like this,
suddenly we become inferior, and sud-
dt>nly, although we have spent far more
money on weapons than the Russians,
we become inferior. They cannot have
it both ways.
Mr. President, one cannot in 1 day
engage in self-adulation and brag about
our superiority-as a matter of fact I
subscribe to our superiority. If we had
not wasted our resources on the war in
Vietnam we would have outdistanced all
countries. We still are the most indus-
trialized Nation. But you cannot, on the
one hand, say we are far ahead in our
technological capacity to produce and
then turn around and say that we are
inferior by 3 to 2. We cannot say we
have a far more sophisticated populous,
people trained in the sciences and math-
ematics, and so forth, and far superior
to the Russians, and then say we do not
get our money's worth when we buy
weapons.
Mr. President, these arguments do not
pan out. We are either efficient or we are
not. I believe we are. We have more and
better weapons than any nation in the
world, including Russia. I do not mean by
that they do not have the capacity to September 5, 1972, entitled "Soviet Says
build weapons; of course, they do. But Pentagon Violates Arms Spirit."
we are told the implication of the Jack- There being no objection, the article
son amendment is that we are inferior was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
and rapidly deteriorating. as follows:
We made deliberate choices in past SOVIET SAYS THE PENTAGON VIOLATES ARmus-
years and I think they were correct. We PACT SPIRIT
made these choices when there was not Moscow, September 4.-The Soviet Union
an ulterior motive. We were told that a accused the Pentagon today of violating the
choice between the Minuteman and the spirit of Soviet-American agreements limit-
Titan was a good choice; that it was effi- ing their strategic arsenals and jeopardizing
cient to make smaller weapons rather their effectiveness by pressing for acceler-
than larger weapons. Even small and ated development of new American offensive
large are not good descriptions because military systems.
a small nuclear weapon is so large it can izvestia, the Government newspaper,
wreak havoc on any city in the world, this fall pointed to the nexxt t round of negotiations
broad-
destroy tens of thousands of people ening the agreesaidnnents that "will ill be possibilities
deettermfarined, in
and determined, in
if dropped in the middle of New York or many respects, by the degree to which the
Moscow. But we were told we made a sides observe not only the letter but also the
So tar as I can see it is a good choice.
Data supplied to the committee still sub-
stantiates that.
But what of the future? What is the
motive for continuing the arms race?
What could be the possible objective of
sabotaging our effort to approve the first
phase of the'SALT talks? What can pos-
sibly be accomplished by raising doubt
that the first agreement made in this
area by the President of the United
States is a dubious agreement and that
it does not provide for the security of this
country, and that in the future we have
to resume the concept of superiority,
phrased in the terminology of equality in
certain areas? It can mean nothing else
but that we are not content with over-
all equality, or parity, or sufficiency, such
as the President stated, but that we are
to return to negotiations based on the
concept of superiority. We already have
superiority. As I said, with respect to
aircraft carriers and bombers, there is
no prospect whatever that the Russians
plan to build aircraft carriers, because
they are very vulnerable. No other coun-
try in the world in recent years has built
them, The British have stopped it.
But in any case this interim agree-
ment is one of the most important mat-
ters we have to deal with this year. If we
cannot make any progress in this area,
I see no end to the arms race. This would
be a most serious setback if at this late
date, after all the attention given to this
matter we should be qualified in our ap-
proval of this agreement.
As I-said in my prepared remarks about
symbolism, there are many implications.
Many things indicate the reaction of the
Russians. If we adopt the Jackson
amendment, unamended, the Russians
will take it to mean we are not serious
position of Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird
that the Pentagon could not support the
agreements signed in Moscow last May unless
funds were voted by Congress for acceler-
ated development of the new longer-range
Trident underwater missile and the B-1 stra-
tegic bomber.
FIRST ATTACK ON POSITION
Although the commentary did not men-
tion Mr. Laird by name, this was the first
time that his position had been so forth-
rightly attacked in the Soviet press since
President Nixon's visit here in May.
The lengthy Izvestia commentary also re-
newed earlier Soviet objections to Senator
Henry M. Jackson's effort to attach condi-
tions to a Congressional resolution approving
the interim agreement to limit offensive nu-
clear arsenals.
It was seen as an effort by Moscow to dis-
courage support for the Washington Demo-
crat's maneuver when the resolution comes
up for a vote in the Senate. The House has
already overwhelmingly approved the reso-
lution,
Senator Jackson is trying to attach a rider
that would require future agreeemnts-to be
based on the principle of equality of forces
because of his objections to certain numeri.-
car advantages granted to Moscow under the
current formula.
Today's commentary was directed not only
against such a move, which it dismissed as
an unwarranted re-interpretation of the
agreement, but also against the longer-terra
programs of the Pentagon although they
do not abrogate any specific terms of the
accords.
"Opposition to the Soviet-American
agreements, mostly coming from the Penta-
gon and industrialists linked with it, stands
in the way of limiting the arms race and
general prospects for disarmament," Izvestia
said.
The commentary told Soviet readers that
expenditures sought by the Pentagon for the
new bomber and the underwater missile were
being justified not so much because of their
desirability but on the contention that they
were necessary "to force the U.S.S.R. to take
trol. They would take it to mean that further steps" to curb the arms race.
"It is evident," paxen Ia asserted, "that
Congress is still determined to go forward without
to acquire new superiority or possibly letter ter of app the parent l ly formally violating the
Moscow agreements, one can
even resumption of the concept of try- still fundamentally violate the general spirit
ing to acquire a first-strike capability, of the agreement by unilateral acts,. thus
That concern is strengthened by both jeopardizing the effectiveness of the agree-
the Jackson amendment and the recent meat itself."
discussion of further steps to create Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this
weapons to destroy hard-site missiles. is simply an indication of the first reac-
However, the Senator from Massachu- tion, to my knowledge, on the part of the
setts (Mr. BROOKE) has an amendment Soviets to both the enormous increase
dealing with this subject, which we have just authorized in our
I ask unanimous consent to have new weapons systems, specifically the
printed in the RECORD at this point an Trident and the B-l, and the Jackson
article from the New York Times of amendment.
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September 13, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
I wish to make this record as complete to the Moscow "basic principles of revela-
as I can, because I anticipate this will be tions" and that we can expect to see a lot
the last primary discussion of this mat- more "confrontation" along with future "ne-
gotiation." Indeed, the "trust" about which
ter, and I ask unanimous consent to have Kissinger spoke seems close to non-existent.
printed in the RECORD an article by Chal- Jackson made his own motivation clear
mers Roberts in the Washington Post on enough. He considered the offensive weapons
the 16th of August, entitled "Promise of agreement put the United States at a disad-
SALT: What's Happening?" which I vantage and he used the amendment device
think is an interesting observation. to lock the administration into a SALT II
of n.ecentine nothing less than what
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
BACKWARD OR FORWARD?-PROMISE OF SALT:
WHAT'S HAPPENING?
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
Less than three months ago Richard Nixon
and Leonid Brezhnev signed their names to
"basic principles of relations" between the
two superpowers, a sort of codification of the
President's pledge that the United States
would move from "an era of confrontation"
to an "era of negotiation." The Nixon-
Brezhnev "principles" included a statement
that "differences in ideology and in the social
systems" are not a bar to normal relation-
ships, that both nations "will always exer-
cise restraint in their mutual relations" and
that both recognize they should eschew "ef-
forts to obtain unilateral advantage at the
expense of the other, directly or indirectly."
Three days earlier the two leaders had
signed the strategic arms limitation (SALT)
agreements. In assessing the Soviet-Amer-
ican atmosphere at the end of the Moscow
summitry Henry Kissinger remarked that "I
think trust has developed but not the point
that it could survive a major challenge that
one side would put to the other that affects
its own estimate of its vital interests. "
It is against this background, it seems to
me, that one should assess the Jackson
amendment to one of the two SALT pacts,
that limiting offensive weapons. The fate of
the amendment is far less important that
what the discussion of it disclosed about the
post-summit attitudes in Washington. The
same is true of the related new, more accurate
and more powerful American missile war-
heads that the administration has requested.
Like a summer lightning storm the discus-
sion suddenly illuminated the landscape in
this capital, both in the Senate and in the
White House and elsewhere in the executive
branch.
"Confrontation" and "negotiation" are not,
of course, mutually exclusive and that is
just as true in Moscow as in Washington.
Mr. Nixon last July 27 said that "the deci-
sion with regard to the SALT agreements
involved a fight between the hawks and
doves" in his own administration. On July 15
Kissinger remarked at a congressional brief-
ing that during the SALT negotiations "we
were acutely conscious of the contradictory
tendencies at work in Soviet policy"--in other
words, the hawk-dove problem in the
Kremlin.
In asking both for congressional approval
of the two SALT pacts and for money for the
Trident submarine and B-1 bomber pro-
grams the President said Brezhnev and his
colleagues "made it absolutely clear that
they are going forward with defense programs
in the offensive area which are not limited
by these agreements." Soviet sources in a
position to know about those conversations,
however, contend that Mr. Nixon's version
stretched Brezhnev's remarks for his own
purposes. But American sources, equally in
the know, contend Brezhnev left no doubt
about what Mr. Nixon said he said. Jackson
commented that he was "disturbed by the
report of the President" on Brezhnev's
remarks.
What the Jackson amendment affair plus
the revelation of the new missile warhead
program demonstrates is the limited meaning
being applied by the Nixon Administration
he supplied on what constitutes "parity"
made it clear he meant what those Americans
who negotiated the agreements and many
others consider old fashioned "superiority."
What Jackson could not do by direction-de-
feat the agreement in the Senate-he sought
to do by indirection-tie the administration's
hands in the negotiations ahead that are de-
signed to turn the five year agreement into
a permanent treaty.
The Kremlin reaction to all this is unclear
but not difficult to imagine. Quite probably
the Moscow hawks have gained a point in
their continuing suspicion of arms agree-
ments with the United States. Whatever
chance there was for both Washington and
Moscow to exercise mutual restraint by not
doing what they legally could do within terms
of the SALT pacts has been diminished.
The history of the action-reaction phe-
nonemon in the Soviet-American arms race
clearly indicates that the dominant pressure
in both capitals is to build those arms not
forbidden by agreement out of fear that the
other side will do so to its own advantage.
The tragedy is that the long history of
the Cold War, of Soviet-American ideological
differences on top of clashes of national in-
terest, makes mutual restraint exceedingly
difficult to achieve. As Jerome H. Kahan of
the Brookings Institution put it to the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28:
"In theory, both nations ought to exercise
unilateral restraint and pursue purely sta-
bilizing strategic policies. But experience
shows that neither nation has taken such
initiatives."
The promise of SALT was more than just
the important limitations for the first time
on both offensive and defensive strategic
weapons. The hope of Mr. Nixon's Moscow
visit, in Kissinger's words, was that it would
"mark the transformation from a period of
rather rigid hostility to one in which, with-
out any illusions about the differences in
social systems, we would try to behave with
restraint and with a maximum of creativity
in bringing about a greater degree of sta-
bility and peace." Hence the language of
the "basic principles" signed in Moscow.
Hence Mr. Nixon's remark in his address to
Congress that his Moscow and Peking trips
had done away with "the kind of bondage"
of which George Washington had said: "The
nation which indulges toward another in
habitual hatred is a slave to its own ani-
mosity."
In this larger context both the Jackson
amendment and the new missile warhead
program represent backward, not forward,
steps.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I also
noticed in this morning's newspaper a
significant article, which does not bear
directly upon this agreement, but which
revives memories of the period of
Khrushchev. When Khrushchev visited
the United States, he visited the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. The reason
why he visited the Committee on Foreign
Relations was that the House of Repre-
sentatives had an antagonistic attitude
toward, him, and the Speaker of the
House refused to have a joint session for
the leader of one of the most powerful
nations in the world, with whom our re-
S 14773
lations are so important. so as a resuia,
as a sop to him, the Foreign Relations
Committee was asked to receive Mr.
Khrushchev. He went about this country,
visited Iowa, and was shown the corn-
growing operations there, and so on.
As I look back on that period-not only
I, but many people, astute observers, in
my opinion-feel the United States
missed an opportunity at that time to
take steps toward the improvement of
our relations with the Soviet Union
which could lead to a limitation of arms,
to an increase in trade, and so forth. I
believed-others shared that view; I
.have read that-that Khrushchev was
making gestures, within the climate in
his own country that would allow him to
do so, suggesting better relations with
us, and during his trip he made many
statements which the record in our com-
mittee indicated were designed, in many
cases, to show that he wanted to imitate
the economic accomplishments of the
United States.
On the whole, we rejected any such
overtures. Our reaction and particularly
the Cuban affair led to the removal of
Khrushchev. His polities of rapproche-
ment with the United States had proved
to the Russians that he was ineffective
and futile, and he was removed. I believe
that was one of the principal reasons
why he was removed.
This morning in the Washington Post
there is an article by Mr. Victor Zorza,
who, I believe, is admitted as being an
expert on the Soviet Union, entitled
"Storm Brewing for Brezhnev." His arti-
cle is related to the point I have dis-
cussed.
I ask unanimous consent that that
entire article be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STORM BREWING FOR BREZHNEV
(By Victor Zorza)
The storm clouds gathering over the Krem-
lin could be the first intimation of a new
conflict in the Soviet leadership.
This year's disastrous harvest is being
blamed on the weather, while the expulsion
of the Russians from Egypt is blamed on the
undependable Arabs, but a good management
team in Moscow might have averted both
mishaps.
This at any rate, is what would be said by
those who have been kept off the team by
Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist
Party's general secretary, and who believe
that they could have done better, as unsuc-
cessful aspirants to high office everywhere
believe.
In the West, they would have an oppor-
tunity to trumpet their claims from the
election hustings every four years or so. in
the Soviet Union, they have usually had to
wait for an accumulation of bad luck and
political errors on the part of an incumbent
leader to trip him up.
The first indications of leadership trouble
are usually provided by the Moscow rumor
mill, and by indications between the lines
of the Soviet press that not all is well.
The U.S. embassy in Moscow has now
picked up enough of the background noise
to send Washington a dispatch detailing the
reasons $rezhnev's position might be re-
garded as somewhat shaky. Both the harvest
and the Middle East fiasco loom large in its
assessment.
The United States has made use of Brezh-
nev's political need for foreign grain and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13, 1972
other goods to force him into concessions.
The bombing and mining of North Vietnam
just before the May summit was the stick,
and the possibility of large and promptgrain
supplies to avert a domestic crisis was an
important part of the carrot.
Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz was
ent to Moscow to explore the possibilities
just before the summit. On his return, he
said that the Russians "understand the lan-
guage of naked power-the kind of language
President Nixon is now speaking."
The Soviets virtually abandoned Hanoi,
and pressed it so hard to make a deal with
the United States as to cause the North Viet-
namese press to hint at betrayal by Moscow.
Soon after that American grain began to flow
to the Soviet Union.
But this was before the full extent of the
harvest failure became evident even to the
Russians. Further indications of future food
shortages have become available since then,
and present sabotages are already being re-
ported from such sensitive areas as the high-
ly industrialized Gorky Province.
Brezhnev's need for foreign grain is likely
to become greater, not less, and so is his vul-
nerability both to pressure from abroad, and
to criticism at home.
The critics could blame him first for fail-
ing to put agriculture on its feet, which he
promised to do when he overthrew Khru-
:hhchev, and then for making concessions to
he United States in exchange for the grain
he has failed to produce himself.
Khrushchev's own position was weakened
considerably by his agricultural failures and
his decision to pour Moscow's precious hoard
of gold into capitalist coffers in exchange
"or grain.
Brezhnev's failure in Egypt is also linked
with his dealings with the White House. Cairo
,laims that it ordered the expulsion oY the
Russians only after Brezhnev had committed
himself at the Moscow summit to withhold
the arms Egypt wanted. Brezhnev's domestic

t;lie basic Intention of this is to establish ment will contribute to "Fiialandizing" tend- research laboratory engaged in technical
the beginnings of a freeze on strategic of- enoles in the policies of our allies. studies for the Government. In addition to
?ensive forces. The trouble is simply that it Fourth, enshrining this degrees of Soviet his technical research there, he devoted sub-
is a bad beginning, not that the objective superiority as a substantially permanent stantial time to studies of arms control and
ioielf is unwise. On many occasions in the thing will almost certainly have adverse con- national security problems.
past, both in published articles and in lee- sequences in any serious crisis that may Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms con-
tures, I have urged a freeze of some kind develop. For instance, we could not reason- trol began in 1957, when he was organizer
for offensive forces. However, I never sup- ably expect as favorable an outcome in a of a group that led to the 1958 Summer
posed that the United States would formally replay of the Cuban missile crisis. (The suc- Study on Arms Control held in Cambridge,
accept ceilings that, in every particular con- cess of that outcome did not reside so much Massachusetts, under the auspices of the
trolled by the agreement, allowed the Sov- in the immediate outcome in Cuba as that American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He
lets substantially greater capability than the Soviets were deterred from counter- was an organizer and co-director of the 1960
permitted the United States. escalating in Turkey, or, especially, in Ber- Summer Study on Arms Control, again held
The Interim Agreement does exactly that. Lin, a fact that apostles of parity find con- in Cambridge under American Academy aus-
It may be that, in some particulars not con- venient to ignore.) pices. He was a member of the Academy's
trolled by the agreement, such as members of It is in a certain sense true that different Committee on International Studies of
warheads, the United States still retains degrees of superiority can in the last ana- Arms Control in 1961-66, serving as its chair-
some kind of lead; however, under the terms lysis be translated only into different degrees man In 1961-62, and has been a frequent
,of the agreement, it is open to the Soviets of "victory" that would in any event be participant in international conferences re-
to close the leads that we have, and then Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated obser- lating to arms control.
some, while it Is not open to us to close the vation conveniently ignores the fact that Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to
Soviet leads. most political leaders and many military the Department of State, the Department of
The payload capacity, or "throw weight" leaders are not academic strategists: These Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament
as it is often called, permitted the Soviets leaders not only count weapons, they tend Agency, the Executive Office of the President,
in their ICBM and SLBM forces is perhaps to think in terms of who will come Out and to several research organizations. He is
'our times ours. The throw weight of a "ahead," and their (perhaps simplistic) at- editor of the well-known anthology, Arms
strategic force is unquestionably the most titudes about these matters will influence Control, Disarmament, and National Security
important single parameter for characteriz- their expectations, demands and flexibility (New York, George Braziller, 1961), spon-
ing the potential of that force, even though in a crisis (other things-such as the guts sored by the American Academy of Arts and
other parameters-notably the number, yield and the political support of the leaders on Sciences, and guest editor of its predecessor,
and accuracy of warheads that can be de- the scene-being equal). Therefore, a eom- the special (Fall 1960) issue of Daedalus on
livered--are of more immediate importance. mitment to a position of strategic disad- "Arms Control". He has edited studies of
If the Soviets choose to do so, they call vantage is. at least in some statistical sense, future military technology and several pub-
deploy as many warheads per ton of throw an invitation to be pushed around in the lications on arms control. He has contributed
-weight as we can, and since they are per. next crisis, The Soviets understand this very articles on arms control to a number of
:witted roughly four times as many tons, well. journals and books, and has lectured on na-
they can ultimately deploy roughly four In a press conference in Moscow on the tional security subjects at many universi-
times as many warheads as we. They may occasion of the signing of these agreements, ties, the U.S. National, Air, and Naval War
not choose to do so; they may choose some Henry Kissinger repeatedly made the point Colleges, The Canadian National Defense
other way of using their payload; but the that the terms of the Interim Agreement College, and defense study centers in Lon-
important fact is, we have signed an agree- were influenced by the fact that the Soviets don, Bonn, Paris, and Oslo, among others,
went that says, in effect, that we have not had ongoing ICBM and SLBM construction and has given seminars on arms control in
only become, but are willing to remain, the programs, while we did not. As he put it on Moscow. He is a frequent witness at Con-
second nuclear power. one occasion, it was not the most brilliant gressional-hearings concerned with national
The real Administration argument for the bargaining position he would recommend security affairs.
Interim Agreement is that it will limit people to find themselves in.. He could not Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut,
the extent to which the Soviets will achieve reasonably have made the point in that set- Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955) and
strategic-force lead more reliably than any ting that, if the American Government found Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from
other approach in sight. But that Soviet itself in that uncomfortable position, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
advantage, by any reasonable assessment, is responsibility must rest with the American where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and re-
already real, and may well become greater Government: but I can, and do, make that ceived other graduate and undergraduate
as the Soviets deploy MIRVs and otherwise point here. There has been a collective prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T.,
upgrade their permitted force in the coming failure. he was engaged in radio engineering as a
years. The political consequences of this This brings me to the final point of wheth- registered professional engineer in the State
superiority, or more precisely of the general er to recommend acceptance or rejection of of Connecticut. He is a Senior Member of the
public recognition of it, are several, and all these agreements. The argument can reason- Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engi-
bad. ably be made that, although both agree- neers and a member of Sigma Xi, the Ameri-
First, it will reinforce and confirm pre- ments represent important failures, the best can Mathematical Society, The Council on
viously established Soviet, images and ex- course of action in view of current political Foreign Relations, and the International In-
pectations of a declining American role in realities is simply to accept them. I am sym- stitute for Strategic Studies. He was a mem-
world affairs. Within the past two years, pathetic to this argument. I also doubt very ber of the President's National Citizens'
Soviet commentators on the American scene much whether any recommendation of mine Commission on International Cooperation
have exhibited increasing contempt for the will alter the expected acceptance of these Year in 1965.
United states, its power and its role in in- agreements.
ternational affairs. For instance, Soviet ana- But it seems appropriate that someone [From the National Review, June 23, 1972[
lysts often make such remarks as: "The should say, unambiguously and on the rec- SALT HITS THE FAN
United States must be adjusting itself, in ord, that both of these agreements are (By Donald G. Brennan)
the manner of the United Kingdom at the wrong, that the United States ought not to INTRODUCTION
end of World War II, to its loss of power and be in the position these agreements will
influence in the world." The Soviets cor- leave us in. and that the country would ulti- On Friday, May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon
respoudingly think of themselves as very mately be best off by rejecting them both (for the United States) and Leonid Brezhnev
much in the ascendant. These Soviet atti- and then doing what is right. I hereby take (for the Soviet Union) signed what will prob-
tudes and expectations will be reflected in this position. ably prove to be the most important arms-
their peacetime bargaining and will increase I shall be pleased to answer any questions, control agreements yet negotiated in the nu-
their aggressiveness in possible crisis Con- BIOGRAPHICAL, SKETCH clear era-or, it may be, in any other era. But
Irontations. their Indubitable importance does not, un-
Second. the Agreement and the Soviet Donald G. Brennan Is a mathematician fortunately, automatically make them a
lead it establishes will do much to establish and student of national security problems. cause for rejoicing; the San Francisco earth-
an image of American inferiority in American His special interests are in advanced mili- quake, for instance, was important too. It
government circles. The effects of this, of tary policy, alliance relationships In Europe, remains to be seen whether the agreements
,-nurse, will be the obverse of those to be ex- and selected areas of arms control, such as of May 26 will prove to be more or less of a
petted from the attitudes in the Soviet bu- policy issues relating to ballistic missile de- disaster than the earthquake. Unlike the
reaucracy, though probably less marked in fense. earthquake, there is some possibility, not as
degree, Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of large as we should wish, that the agreements
Thard. the new imbalance of power will which he was President from July, 1962 until will not be a disaster at all; and some very
lleccine established in the minds of our May, 1964 and where he now conducts re- remote chance, which neither the American
allies. which will ultimately lead them to be search studies, Dr. Brennan worked for nine body politic nor the Administration bureauc-
more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, years as a research mathematician and com- racy deserve, that they will prove a resound-
,;o Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. munication theorist at Lincoln Laboratory ing success.
1'o awe the current jargon, the Interim Agree- of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Whatever their chance of success, they are
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- SENATE S10959
profoundly unwise. And the unwisdom is not permitted. Fifth, it is provided that corn- Soviets a throw weight roughly four times
confined to the United States merely; it is pliance with the agreement shall be moni- ours, with present booster technology. Either
certainly shared by some of our Allies, and tored with "national technical means of veri- side is a liberty to improve its booster tech-
may well be shared, though in reduced de- fication", meaning such things as reconnais- nology; in fact, the Soviets have recently
gree, by the Soviet Union. sance satellites, and it is also agreed not to given evidence of a new model of SS-9 that
The agreements are two: A proposed treaty interfere with each other's means of obser- might have perhaps twice the payload capa-
limiting the deployment of defense against vation or to use deliberate concealment meas- bility of earlier models.
ballistic missiles, called the Treaty on ABM's, ures that could impede that verification. Some Administration analysts argue that
and a proposed Interim Agreement limiting The intended immediate purpose of this the Soviets do not now have MIRV technoI-
certain kinds of strategic offensive forces, agreement is to freeze strategic offensive ogy and could not deploy significant num-
namely ICBM's and SLBM's (Inter-Continen- forces where they now stand, understanding bers of MIRV warheads within the lifetime
tal and Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles, re- that whatever is under construction at the of the Interim Agreement, which is limited
spectively). The problems of these two are prescribed date is to be included as if fin- to five years. However, we ourselves devel-
very different, ished. Such an objective, is not fundamen- oped MIRV from "scratch" in about six years,
The Interim Agreement enshrines, not tally irrational; I have myself urged consid- and the system development for the ad-
merely Soviet parity, but Soviet strategic oration of a different freeze in other times vanced specific systems probably did not take
superiority, of a potentially substantial de- arcircumstances. The difficulties with this more than three or four years. Since our own
gree. The unwisdom of this agreement resides Proposal stem largely from the fact that the MIRV programs have been noisily advertised
in the dramatic proclamation it provides that United States strategic forces have not to the Soviets since early 1968 (and public
the United States has not only become, but changed very much in basic capacity for the mention of the Idea can be found as far
is apparently willing to remain, a second- past eight years, while the Soviet payload back as 1963), it would be very surprising
class power. This foolishness is, of course, in capacity-the amount of weight their mis- indeed if the Soviets did not by now have
no way shared by the Soviets; indeed, as one sile force could deliver on targets, sometimes some very advanced ideas on how to do
prominent American. strategist put it, the called the "throw weight"-has increased MIRV. And some Administration analysts do
Soviets must be pinching themselves to make enormously since 1966, and it now stands at in fact believe that the Soviets could achieve
sure they are not dreaming, something perhaps four times the payload substantial MIRV capability within the life-
The ABM Treaty is more symmetric in its capacity of the American force. A secondary time of the Interim Agreement; for instance,
immediate effects; in contrast to the Interim problem resides in the extraordinarily gen- Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the
Agreement,
iemen, it doss not contrast the Soviets Interim erous terms given to the Soviets for convert- Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in his statement
as much o we are allow the Apart from four ing some of their obsolete missiles into addi- before the Senate Armed Services Committee
a limited es ht we re a weed. A m tional modern SLBM's and submarines, on 15 February that: " . our intelligence
aense of national capittlapotentially and a limited significant) (and de-
Supporters of the agreement will point specialists believe that by the mid or late
strategic ally anal capitals, and a li of d d out, and correctly, that, while the Soviet Un- 1970's the Soviets could have MIRVed deefnse fields, is and the Soviets have agreed not ion has more launchers than does the United SLBM's in their operational forces."
to defend ourselves-not only
against each States, we have-we believe-many more Thus, published comparisons of Soviet and
other, but, Interestingly, against anyone else warheads deployed on those launchers. This American missile forces showing a substan-
either. On the American side, this agreement estimate stems from the belief that the dial American lead in warheads, as for in-
stems purely from ideology and fashion, and American technology for MIRV (Multiple In- stance in a chart on the front page of The
is pure insanity; on the Soviet side, the dividually-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) Is New York Times for May 27 showing 5,700
is pure In may have aecSovie the some much further advanced than the Soviet tech- warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 warheads for
ideology, in which case they share a hall a nology, and that we have deployed MIRV the Soviet Union, should be understood as
the insanity. It which
is we as if e and a the Soviets warheads on a substantial fraction of our having, in all probability, a highly limited
had become seized with a theory that motor strategic force while the Soviets have scarce- lifetime of validity. It should also be under-
vehicles were bad for us, and, proceeding ly started, if they have begun at all. However, stood that, even at present, these Soviet war-
from that were ba we both agreed to destroy if the Soviets wish to achieve large numbers heads are very much larger and more de-
from t motor vehicles we of all agreed kinds we pro- of warheads by deploying lighter MIRV war- structive than ours. (The Soviets also derive
all tthe hin the future. This example kin illwe pro- heads within their existing payload capacity, certain other technical advantages from
that the mere fact that we and the Soviets the technology for doing so is easily within their large payload capability. )
might agree on some completely symmetric their reach; we are precluded from Supporters of the agreement have already
arrangement would not of itself prove that achieving the payload capacity of the Soviets argued, and will surely further argue, that
the arrangement was in our interest. In my by the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Soviets cannot deploy large numbers of
view, the ABM Treaty provides an equally The throw weight of a strategic force is MIRV warheads within the lifetime of the
good illustration. unquestionably the most important single agreement. In evaluating this position, at
In the immediately following analysis of parameter for characterizing that force, even least two points should be borne in mind.
the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treat though other parameters--notably the num- First, if no better agreement is negotiated
I In r m greem t their shBM Treaty, ber, yield, and accuracy of warheads that can as a successor to this one before its expira-
I shall return later to the circumstances and be delivered-are of great importance. Some tion, there will very likely be intense pres-
forces that led to these agreements. examples of how payload capacity can be sures simply to renew it. Second, the ?esti-
used may be instructive. For example, the mates that the Soviets could not get substan-
II. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT maximum capacity of a Poseidon launcher tial MIRV capability come from the same
ment are as
The basic provisions of the Interim Agree- is probably In the region of 3,000 pounds. It community of Intelligence analysts who, for First undertake notlo start construc ion of addi- missile been
Mat
can accommdorted that the Poseidon to from 10 to 14 MIRV Namara to announce former in the mid-1960's
tional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after warheads, which must therefore weigh the Namara Soviets to aocpen permanent str tgic
July 1, 1972. Second, it is agreed not to con- something in the neighborhood of 300 inferiority, and who were confident in ado
vert land-based launchers for "light" ICBM's pounds each. They would be relatively vance o
into launchers for "heavy" ICBM's. Third, "small" weapons of perhaps 50 kilotons each, October, b the first Chinese nuclear be
a
it is agreed to limit SLBM launchers and but they could attack 10 separate targets. plutonium , 1964, device. that bomb would uranium
submarines therefor to the numbers opera- Some models of the Soviet SS-9 missile have bomb; . It proved to be a operm
and it is easy point that an operat-
tional and under construction as of the date only a single large warhead, and some might ing diffusion plant for separating U-235 is
of signature (May 26), except that additional think that, at least for many purposes, a very much harder to conceal than a MIRV
launchers (and appropriate numbers of sub- single Poseidon missile was worth 10 SS-9's. test,
marines) may be constructed as replacements In fact, however, that single SS-9 warhead I myself believe that, if the Soviets have
for an equal number of obsolete ICBM is often estimated to be perhaps 25 mega- paid any significant attention to MIRV tech-
launchers or for launchers on older submna- tons, which would suggest that the missile nology in the past, as is very likely, it would
rives. In a protocol appended to the Interim payload capability should be in the region of be well within their capability to deploy up
Agreement, this is spelled out; the U.S. may 12,000 pounds, or about four time the pay- to 10,000 or more MIRV warheads on their
have no more than 710 SLBM launchers, and load capability of a Posidon missile. There- allowed booster force within the lifetime of
no more than 44 submarines; of those, fore, if a Poseidon booster could launch 10 this agreement if they choose to do so. They
launchers above 656 and submarines above MIRV warheads, the SS-9 could launch 40 could do this with sufficient yield in war-
41 (the current numbers) must be replace- of the same kind. The SS-9 probably has heads, combined with sufficiently upgraded
ments for equal numbers of obsolete ICBM from 5 to 10 times the payload capacity of guidance in their missiles, so that they could
launchers (in our case, the Titan II), The our various models of Minuteman missile, virtually wipe out the whole of the Minute-
Soviet Union may have no more than 950 and the Soviet force of approximately 300 man force with less than half of their missile
SLBM launchers and no more than 62 "mod- SS-9's would alone probably have two to force.
ern" submarines therefor; of those, launch- three times the payload capability of our en- This Is not to say that the prospect of
ers over 740 (the presumptive current num- tire Minuteman force. However, the Soviets launching such an attack would be attrac-
ber) must similarly be replacements for older have perhaps another 1,300 ICBM's in' ad- tive to the Soviets under ordinary circum-
ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. dition to their SS-9 force, most of which are stances; the United States has important
Fourth, subject to the foregoing restrictions, also larger than our Minutemen. Considering offensive forces other than Minuteman, and
modernization and replacement of strategic both SLBM and ICBM payload, it is probably these other forces will, in all likelihood, re-
offensive ballistic missiles and launchers is that the Interim Agreement will allow the tain considerable deterrent persuasiveness.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 30, 197:
311t the lopsided nature of this situation
would likely have important adverse oonse-?
'.(uences, as discussed below.
The estimates that are given for the Soviet
ICBM force, incidentally, such as the num-
ber 1.618, are all derived from American In-
telligence; the Soviets have firmly resisted
confirming these estimates. Hence, the limi-
tation in the Interim Agreement on num-
bers is stated as a prohibition on new silo
starts, not as an absolute ceiling on numbers.
Thus, our estimates of the Soviet strategic
forces are really lower bounds. If we later
discover a whole field of ICBM's, which I
am told has happened in the past, there may
he some controversy over just when it was
started. There may also be possible room for
controversy over what constitutes "light" or
"heavy" ICBM's.
The chief justification heard within the
Administration for not only accepting, but
engraving this embarrassing posture In a
formal agreement, is that the Congress would
not in any event provide the money to pro-
vide the forces that would be necessary to
equalize the Soviet strategic force. Inndeed,
i.t is believed, and sincerely, that, if it were
not for this agreement, the Soviets would
increase their margin of superiority to some
even larger, and perhaps Indefinitely in-
creasing, extent. For example, the current
rate of construction of Soviet ballistic-mis-
sile submarines is around 9 or 10 per year,
and if that rate were continued, in five years
the Soviets could have not 62, but perhaps
00 modern missile-launching submarines.
Therefore, instead of having the 50 percent
superiority in submarines the agreement will
give the. at least potentially, they could have
a two-to-one margin on the assumption that
Congress would not provide the several billion
dollars necessary to keep such Soviet supe-
riority from developing. While this argument
is perhaps fairly widely believed within the
Administration, it is at the bery least not
seriously tested, and may well be false, as I
shall indicate later.
Some Administration analysts would also
like to argue that the degree of strategic
superiority given the Soviets by the Interim
Agreement, while admittedly large, is never-
theless less than I have depicted it above.
The chief arguments they would advance
are. (a) the agreement does not include
bombers, in which we have substantial su-
periority; ( b) the agreement also omits what
are called the "Forward-Based Systems", i.e.,
nuclear delivery systems we have based. in
Europe; and (c) the apparent Soviet su-
periority in submarines (62 Soviet versus 44
American subs allowed) is not real, since the
Soviets do not or cannot operate their sub-
marines as efficiently as we can with our
bases (in Rota and in Holy Loch) closer to
the Soviet Union. These arguments, in fact,
are much more cosmetic than tenable. As
for (a), it is possible to believe in the su-
periority of American bomber forces only as
long as Soviet medium bombers are not
counted; they have some seven hundred of
these, for which they have refueling capa-
bility sufficient to enable them to attack
targets in the United States and continue on
to :airfields in Cuba and Mexico, so they do
nol even have to rely on suicide missions,
for (b), the Soviets have some seven
hundred ICBM's or MRBM's that can attack
European targets, to which our Forward
Based Systems are mainly in response, and
these Soviet missiles are in no way con-
strained by the agreement; they can build
as many more as they please. As for (c),
there is nothing to prevent the Soviets from
adopting more efficient means of using their
submarines; for instance, they could re-sup-
ply the submarines, and change their crews,
from ocean-going tenders so as to enable
them to keep a larger fraction of the sub-
marines on station a larger fraction of the
time. Of course, the Soviets may not do this,
but it would certainly not be difficult for
them to do so and there is no obligation in
the proposed agreement for them not to do
so. The real argument for the Interim Agree-
ment, in the minds of its supporters within
the Administration bureaucracy, is that it
will limit the extent to which the Soviets
will achieve srategic superiority more reli-
ably than any other approach In sight.
But that Soviet strategic superiority, by
any reasonable assessment,- is already real,
and will likely become more stark with the
passage of time as the Soviets deploy MIRV
and otherwise upgrade their permitted force.
The political consequences of this superior-
ity, or more precisely of the general public
recognition of it, are several, and all bad.
First, it will reinforce and confirm Soviet
images and expectations already established
of a declining American role in world affairs.
Within the past two years, Soviet commenta-
tors on the American scene have exhibited
increasing contemptuousness of the United
States, its power, and its role in interna-
tional affairs; for instance, Soviet analysts
can often be heard or seen making remarks
such as: "The United States must be ad-
justing itself, in the manner of the United
Kingdom at the end of World War II, to its
loss of power and influence in the world."
The other side of this coin, of course, is that
the Soviets correspondingly think of them-
selves as very much in the ascendant. These
Soviet attitudes and expectations will pre-
dictably be reflected bothIn their peacetime
bargaining positions and in their aggressive-
ness in possible crisis confrontations.
Second, and conversely, the agreement will:
more clearly, widely, and unambiguously es-
tablish an image of American inferiority in
many pertinent minds in the bureaucracy
of the American Government. The effects
of this, of course, would be the obverse of
those to be expected from the attitudes in
the Soviet bureaucracy.
Third, these attitudes and expectation
will become much more clearly and firmly
established in the minds of our Allies, which
will ultimately lead them to be more re-
sponsive, and perhaps unduly responsive, to
Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives
To use the jargon currently used by profes-
sionals in regard to these matters, the In -
terim Agreement will contribute to "Finland -
izing" tendencies in the policies of our Al-
lies.
Fourth. enshrining this degree of Soviet
superiority as a substantially permanent
matter. and therefore Inculcating attitudes
and expectations of the type mentioned
above, will almost certainly have advertise
effects in any serious crisis that may develop.
For instance, we could not reasonably expect
nearly as favorable an outcome in a replan
of the Cuban missile crisis. (The success of
that outcome did not resideso much in the
immediate outcome in Cuba itself as in the
fact that the Soviets were deterred from
counter-escalating in Turkey, or, especially,
in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find
convenient to ignore.)
There is, of course, a certain sense in
which it is true that different degrees of
superiority could in the last analysis only
be translated into different degrees of "vic-
tory" that would in any event be completely
Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated ob-
observation conveniently ignores that most
political leaders, and many military leaders,
are not academic strategists: these leaders
not only count weapons, they are prone to
thinking of such questions as who will come
out "ahead", and their (possibly simplistic)
attitudes about these matters will Influence
their expectations, demands, and concession
in a crisis, other things (such as guts and
political support of the leaders on the seer-e)
being equal. Therefore, a commitment to a
position of strategic inferiority is, at least
in some statistical sense, an Invitation to
being pushed around in the next crisis. Mr.
Nixon has just engraved this Invitation and
handed it to the Soviets in Moscow on a
platter.
III. THE ABM TREATY
The key terms of the Treaty on ABM's are
as follows. To begin with, "Each party un-
dertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a
defense of the territory of its country and
not to provide a base for such a defense, and
not to deploy ABM systems for defense of
an individual region except as provided for
in Article III of this treaty." Thus, the basic
philosophy is clear: apart from the excep-
tions indicated, we may not defend our
homeland against missile attack. Second,
Article III provides for a limited defense of
one hundred interceptors of Moscow and
Washington, and another defense system
similarly limited to one hundred intercep-
tors of ICBM silo launchers in some area
remote from the defense of the national
capitals. Third, both we and the Soviets un-
dertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based,
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
Fourth, it is prohibited to transfer ABM
systems or their components to other states
or to deploy them outside Soviet and Ameri-
can national territory. Fifth, it is provided
that compliance with the provisions of the
treaty shall be monitored by "national tech-
nical means of verification", as in the In-
terim Agreement, and similarly there are
obligations not to interfere with such means
or to use deliberate concealment measures.
Many readers will not be familiar with the
bizarre rationale on which this proposed
treaty rests. It may therefore be useful to
explain the conceptions that the architects
of this treaty had in mind, and to show that
the ideology on which the treaty rests is, in
fact, just as bizarre as it seems.
American strategic nuclear policy has been
dominated in recent years by an Idea called
"assured destruction." This concept is that
the dominant task of the U.S. strategic forces
is to be able to amount a nuclear attack that
would reliably destroy a substantial fraction
of the Soviet society, even after a major So-
viet strike on American forces. Recent public
statements of the Nixon Administration have
emphasized a doctrine called "strategic suffi-
ciency", but it is clear that something like
the concept of "assured destruction" still do-
minates American strategic policy, even If the
terminology itself is no longer used in offi-
cial statements.
This domination extends to strategic arms-
control matters. It is widely argued that the
most peaceful, stable, secure, cheap, and gen-
erally desirable arrangement is one in which
we and the Soviets maintain a "mutual as-
sured destruction" posture, in which no seri-
ous effort is made by either side to limit the
civilian damage that could be inflicted by the
other. Most of the opposition in the West to
substantial systems of missile defense for
cities, including the opposition embodies in
the proposed ABM Treaty, derives from the
alleged benefits of such a posture. And much
of the opposition to the Safeguard ABM
system, which was not intended to provide
a substantial defense of cities, stemmed from
a concern that it might expand to provide
such a defense.
I believe that the concept of mutual assured
destruction provides one of the few instances
in which the obvious acronym for something
yields at once the appropriate description for
It; that is, a Mutual Assured Destruction pos-
ture as a goal is, almost literally, mad. MAD.
If the forces of technology and interna-
tional politics provided absolutely no alterna-
tive, one might reluctantly accept a MAD
posture. But to think of It as desirable-for
instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our
arms-control negotiations, as the current
SALT proposal automatically assumes-is
bizarre. This can be made very clear by con-
sidering the simplest and most effective
means of realizing it.
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At present, we and the Soviet achieve a While these advocates are undoubtedly sin- no doubt that Soviet strategic views favored
MAD posture by means of long-range missiles cere, and many of them are even intelligent, heavy emphasis on active defense, at least
and bombers armed with thermonuclear I believe they have been bemused by then- up through 1968 and at least some portion
weapons. There are, however, many problems retical models of strategic interactions, of 1969. Beginning in about 1969 or 1970,
associated with these forces; missiles and models which seem sophisticated and In- either the Soviet Government began chang-
bombers may be attacked before they are tellectually appealing but which are in fact ing its views, or else they decided at least to
launched, they may fall to perform proper- much oversimplified descriptions of reality. make us think they had changed their views,
ly, or they may fail to penetrate enemy de- Indeed, some few technical people, who have and the overt indications in the negotiations
fenses. Concern about such vulnerabilities in at least had the integrity to follow the logic in the SALT for the past two years have sug-
our posture helps drive the arms race. These of their analysis to its conclusion, have been gested whole-hearted Soviet acceptance, at
forces are also expensive; the U.S. alone so bemused by these models that they have least at the top of the Soviet Government,
spends about $8 billon a year on them, seriously advocated the actual deployment of the MAD Philosophy.
Now, if it were genuinely desirable to have of a mined-city system. If the Soviets have indeed accepted this
a MAD posture, we could achieve it far more Well, if an institutionalized MAD posture position, they had a good deal of American
effectively, reliably and cheaply than at pres- is not desirable as a permanent way of life, help in getting there. Throughout almost
ent. We and the Soviets could have an arms- and it is not, what alternative is available? the whole of the 1960's, almost every Ameri-
control agreement to mine each other's cities. The answer is to provide increasing emphasis can who argued with almost any Russian
We could install very large thermonuclear on defense, and corresponding reduction in about arms-control matters tried to make the
weapons with secure firing arrangements in the relative effort devoted to strategic often- point that missile defenses were wicked. This
Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and so on, while sive forces. stemmed, of course, from the commitment in
the Soviets could install similar weapons and There is much controversy about just how certain American quarters to the MAD ideo-
arrangements in New York City, Chicago, effective defense (such as ABM) can be made logy. Up until 1968, the universal Soviet re-
Los Angeles, and so on. against current offensive forces, or against action to this argument was a polite
It is technically feasible to make such a further enlarged offensive forces. I cannot raspberry.
system very secure, and the vulnerabilities discuss this controversy here. However, there However, some of the spokesmen from
mentioned above could be eliminated, which is very little controversy over the fact that whom they heard could not be easily ignored.
Would reduce arms-race pressures. While defense can be made quite effective if the op- In particular, Mr. McNamara did his very
such a system would have its own technical posing offense is suitably reduced, while al- best to persuade the Soviets of this philoso-
problems, simpler to analysis y indicates
than ic those they the would be lowed defense is built up. This Is precisely phy, both in his public statements (such as
pres- the direction that the Strategic Arms Limi- the successive "Posture Statements") and in
ent system. It would also be much cheaper tation Talks should have taken, but did not. his private meetings with Soviets, notably
than the current system; it could save bil- Even if it were held that currently achiev- at the Glassboro Conference in June 1967,
lions. able defense is too ineffective to be useful when he forcefully argued the case for a
sibs et a emos afveryone will considerat judge it sta key y against even a suitably reduced offensive MAD posture directly to Kosygin. The Soviet
threat (a position that few informed per- Premier did not assimilate this idea, at least
a mined-city system is clearly the best way sons would believe), it makes little sense to at that time. Another forceful input to the
of realizing a MAD posture, it follows that a preclude the possiblity of a more effective Soviets came from then-President Lyndon B.
MAD posture as a goal is itself fundamentally defense being found in the future. The cur- Johnson, who, according to his memoirs, sent
absurd-it is, indeed, mad. rent proposed treaty would do so. Premier Kosygin a secret letter In January
This reduction-to-absurdity argument is It might be possible to achieve similar 1967, warning him that the incipient de-
useful for sharply drawing attention to the effects simply by sharply reducin offensive ployment of Soviet missile defenses had put
fact that something must be wrong with forces, without any defense, if i t were not him under pressure to "increase greatly our
MAD as a way of life. However, one can dis- for two factors: (a) there are other coun- capabilities to penetrate any defensive sys-
cuss the problems of MAD directly. There are tries in the world besides the United States tems which you might establish". Johnson
at least three interrelated problems. and the Soviet Union, and (b) perfect in- continued: "If we should feel compeled to
The first is that, in spite of our best efforts, spection of sharply reduced offensive forces make such major increases in our strategic
a major nuclear war could happen. An in- probably cannot be achieved, and defense can weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that
stitutionalized MAD posture is a way of in- provide protection against clandestine wea- you would in turn feel under compulsion to
suring, now and forever, that the outcome of pons. do likewise." It seems very likely that this
such a war would be nearly unlimited dis- The MAD philosophy originally took hold letter was stimulated by McNamara.
aster for everybody. While technology and in the American arms-control communit Perhaps the most
politics may conspire for a time to leave us yin persuasive argument
temporarily in such a about 1960. This might have been ultimately brought to bear on the Soviets was not an
posture, we should unimportant but for the fact that Robert argument per se, but the American decision
not welcome it-we should rather be looking S. McNamara became a fanatic adherent of of late 1967 and early 1968 to proceed with
for ways out of it. And they can be found. this school, and he imposed an "Assured De- a major MIRV program for the American
The second fundamental difficulty is, in struction" philosophy on the civilian staffs strategic offensive force, leading to the de-
essence, political: The body politic of the in the Pentagon with the full force of his ployment of Minuteman III and Poseidon.
United States did not create a Department arrogance. This was, in some sense, a tour This program was intended to add something
of Defense for the purpose of deliberately de force, because at the time he did so, the like five thousand additional warheads to
making us all hostages to enemy weapons. Soviets conspicuously did not share this the American offensive force. The almost
The Government is supposed, according to philosophy, although he often asserted that theological, not to say fanatic, attachment
the Constitution, to "provide for the com- they did. But the evidence is enormous that, Mr. McNamara had for the MAD philosophy
mon defense", and plainly most Americans at least up until the late 1960's, the Soviets is reflected in the fact that, while he viewed
would revolt at the idea that a mined-city did not hold the view that a MAD posture the beginnings of a Soviet system for the
system is a sensible way to do this. They was desirable. For instance, Premier Kosygin defense of their homeland as highly provoca-
would be quite right. The Defense Depart- himself, when asked about a moratorium on tive, he apparently saw nothing provoca-
ment should be more concerned with assur- missile defenses at a presaconference in Lon- tive in spending several billion dollars to add
ing live Americans than dead Russians. don on February 9, 1967, replied, in part, "I several thousand additional warheads to the
The third fundamental difficulty is moral. believe that defensive systems, which prevent American force, especially at a time and
We should not deliberately create a system attack, are not the cause of the arms race, under circumtances that would have made
in which millions of innocent civilians would but constitute a factor preventing the death it impossible for the Soviets to know what
by intention be exterminated in a fail- of people. Some argue like this: What is accuracy these weapons might achieve.
ure of the system. The system is not that cheaper, to have offensive weapons which For whatever combination of reasons, the
reliable. If we accept a MAD posture as an can destroy towns and whole states or to have Soviets have now either accepted the MAD
interim solution, we should be seeking ways defensive weapons which can prevent this philosophy or have at least decided to humor
out of it, not ways to enshrine it. destruction? At present the theory is current us by pretending that they have. It should y, then
some
advocat
ere that
stem MADhpostu e? The dv cates ic nvolved are,ein shouldhbe developed. Such so-cal led theo eti- on mentioned that, to the time of writiphng,
i-
the main, technical or technically oriented cians argue to the costs killing a maple one losophy inth cannot the tect ma rrsny of signs Soviet this ees
people accustomed to theoretical models, and O $100,000. Maybe other colonels
the arguments involve appeals to "stabil- system i is more expensive than an toffensive writing for only other in at t the m; sa wehas
ity" of various kinds and reference to other system, but it is designed not to kill people not this may onp Indicate qu tyre message has
sophisticated jargon-jargon that I under- but to preserve human lives. I understand yet eome down adequately from the top.
stand very well, having helped to articulate that I do not reply to the Some well- Ame ans, very y have in ly, at
it a decade or more ago. For instance, one asked, but can dryourselves theiaa ap rro was aicece A of mer the i cans, ABM very privately,
will n, eh-
argument sometimes heard-it is, e.g., re- ate conclusions." This does not sound like tate acceptance a major doctrinal overhaul Treaty will the Soviet
flected in the preamble of the proposed ABM the comment of a man who was friendly m to a military st , and may in well Soviet
Treaty-is that this posture will best establishment, shmenty weer require
pro- moratorium on missile defense. a considerable shuffling of ma of senior personnel.
tect against nuclear war altogether, but this Many other Soviet pronouncements, both It will be interesting to watch if such a
proposition Is very dubious indeed, public and private, official and unofficial, left development does in fact come to pass.
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 Approved For Release, MR5k'2/AJ-8DP57
R0 5R000400010((8g4 10, 1972
5 10962 CONGRESS
Some kinds of ABM systems could be de- tect Minuteman against the threat now per- .o bat for his military establishment, apart
ployed for some objectives that would be mitted the Soviets under the Interim Agree- from Vietnam. The Congress may make an
compatible with a generally prevailing MAD ment; yet we have negotiated away all but easy scapegoat, but the Congress cannot
posture. In fact, the Sentinel ABM system a small part of that Safeguard System, to say fairly be reckoned the chief villain of the iece
when
has initiated by McNamara in September, 1967, nothing of the capability to add additional pone to the cthe President ain that ve r once
and the Safeguard System that the Nixon active defense.
Administration has been constructing, were Evidently the gains of this agreement are tary posture was in jeopardy and that more
both designed to be compatible with a MAI) not to be found in terms of the often- money was needed for strategic forces. If
us chosen believe to that lead on n this
posture. This compatibility resided in the expressed objectives of the Safeguard pro- the President t had
fact that the defense of the entire country gram. There are two possible intellectual matter, well have fbut the ex-
what these systems would have provided was justifications for accepting this treaty, in try might t w never have followed; ol
what :s called a "light" or "thin" defense; the light of the objectives the Government periment buyer tried. force behind the
bureaucratic
a large and sophisticated attack, such as the has expressed. The first is that, while these The main
was for Arms Control
ABM reament Treaty known as nDA_
Soviets would be capable of mounting, would agreements themselves are inadequate, sup- proposed
has had a
easily have overwhelmed a thin overall de- plementary agreements to be sought in fol- and r staff Ayewas enc agency
tense of our cities. (At McNamara's instruc- lowing negotiations will redress these im- Most the
commitment to a MAD posture,
tion, the Sentinel system design also had balances. However, the Soviets will surely e g degree to of opposition posture,
some specific weaknesses intended to make have very little motivation to degrade the and theological
a active defenses corresponding ng cities, years. lves
for Ir
Soviets.) Such a light area defense was in- I do not believe an argument of this form other agencies, especially
tended, in the case of the Sentinel System, should be given any significant weight. The can the be Department found found in in oi of State, and are mainly
to provide protection of the entire country other possible justification would be of the in less ideological and character;
against possible Chinese attacks that may form that, while the agreements may in but but not wholly, ys etss deolo in become feasible if the Chinese develop an some sense constitute an immediate strategic some
for means of s v-
money, or as a additi al
ICBM force. loss, the various political and economic gains ing the momentum of the strategic arms
The Nixon Administration retained the that may develop as a consequence of these reduce
and are simply less conratngd with
anti-Chinese light area defense objective of agreements in the future will more than race, raceinc and between defensive and offensive with
the Sentinel System and added additional compensate for the strategic costs. An argu- above
objectives for the Safeguard System, chiefly ment of this form is in fact indicated in forces.
prospect And ome a are ach simply ieving pessimistic teout sufficient the provision of added protection of our President Nixon's last foreign policy state- the ospect off ss h missile defense, now
ical futvee.
ICBM and bomber forces. The three-fold ob- ment. While this argument cannot be dis- nor in
jectives of the Safeguard program have been missed, there is no doubt that such a calcu- One of the more interesting bureaucratic
stated many times by the Nixon Administra- lation of gains and losses requires consider- case studies, in relation to these agreements,
tion; for instance, as given in the most recent able optimism about the consequences of can be found in the Department of De,
"Posture Statement" issued by Defense See- having these agreements and considerable fence. A decade ago, it would have been abso-
retarv Melvin Laird in February 1972 (p. 76) : pessimism about the future if the agree- lutely inconceivable that, for instance, the
"Protection of our land-based retaliatory ments were not in force. I shall return to Joint Chiefs of Staff would have approved
forces against a direct attack by the Soviet this issue below. either of these agreements, much less both
Union; defense of the American people rv. WHAT BROUGHT US HERE? of them. Their approvalwould have been al-
against the kind of nuclear attack which The question of what brought us to the most as unthinkable five years ago, and they
the People's Republic of China is kdly pro- point of accepting these agreements can be probably would have resisted the agree-
be able to mount within the decade; and pro- answered at several different levels, and In ments as recently as three years ago. Within
tection against the possibility of accidentas terms of several different individuals and the past three years, however, and especially
attacks from any source." These objectives groups within the Government. within the past two, a very noticeable loss
made sense, even within the framework of a President Nixon, for example, genuinely of morale has been detectable within the
MAD posture, and the program was accord- wants peace, he genuinely would like to save Defense Department. In the face of the
ingly 11 supported, especially in its early phases money, and he genuinely would like to be bueffeetiirom he have President received ro the Con-
,were in 1969 and 1970, by many people who re-elected. With respect to this last objective, gr, willing to accept such a posture. he obviously understands quite well that the Budget, and from the general public,
it is instructive that nothing in either negotiation of these agreements, especially the military staffs themselves have been
Moscow agreement provides a substitute if they are accepted without too much of a looking increasingly to the SALT to help
means (to Safeguard) for satisfying these
objectives. - "save" their situation.
battle, will be of substantial domestic Polit even to the time, however, it is
of fnt_ our land- land- not ical value. I believe it is quite fair to say m present
suffiThecient Interim protection Agreement-does
based provide that this fact contributed significant pals- oat implausible that the Joint Chiefs could
regard these agreements with enthusiasm;
tack d by retaliatory the Soviets he Sv(Iforces a shall givv e e a evideden ect fo- sure to the American negotiators. However, more likely they simply faced their own set
t
this shortly), and of course ge nothing in ce ePer' ither it would be quite wide of the mark to think of the agreements merely as a cheap elec- of unpleasant alternatives, and judged these
agreement does or can do anything about the toral trick or to think that the agreement3 agreements to be the least unpleasant. Th
acce
iility of nuclear attacks from China or do not have a substantial base of support bureaucratic history of the proposed g
accidedental attacks from any source. There- in the bureaucracy. ments probably contributed some share of
fore, the Administration's previously de- Many people in the Executive office-i.e , the unpleasant way the alternatives were
claret objectives for Safeguard combined the President's own staff-place considerable structured.
with the current proposed agreements con- emphasis, in justifying these agreements, on. Some comments in the press have tended
inters a strategic non sequitur. the argument that-as concerns the Interim to suggest that Henry Kissinger was the
The worst aspect of this relates to the pro- Agreement most especially-the Congress chief architect of these agreements. It would
iection of our retaliatory forces. The repeat- would not provide the wherewithal to close probably be much more accurate to think
edly declared Administration objective in an increasing gap in strategic forces. of him as presiding over the national se-
linking the negotiation of an ABM agree- While this argument is probably sincere, it curity apparatus as a sort of chairman, and
anent to an agreement limiting strategic of- is possible to believe that it may in fact be attempting to impose some degree of order
Pensive forces was that it was necessary to less important than a perception that is less and competence on that apparatus, than as
Limit the threat to Minuteman in order to frequently articulated, but which is likely a personal mastermind of the agreements.
accept constraints that would limit our abil- held by the President and by some of his key Kissinger's main (and very considerable)
ity to protect Minuteman. However, we are people in the Executive Office, that money for strength is in international politics; perhaps
quite some distance from having achieved military purposes would be very scarce even because of the technical components in-
that; link-up. To quote again from Secretary if Congress itself were not an obstacle. Trying solved, he has never been as strong with
i',aird's most recent Posture Statement (P. to find several billion dollars a year in stategic nuclear issues. Kissinger's personal
78) "With significant qualitative improve- extra money for the Defense Department at contribution toevents can probably be found
meats in Soviet ICBM's even without in- the present time would entail choices among much more in the President's determined
creases in the number of Soviet ICBM's I i.e., very unpleasant alternatives, such as rais- resistance to cutting American troop levels
exactly the situation permitted by the in- ing taxes, attempting some kind of tax in Europe, and in the missions to Peking and
term Agreement], the postulated threat to reform, or taking large amounts of money Moscow, than in these two strategic agree-
Minuteman in the last half of the 1970's out of other programs the Administration ments. Their origins are both more diffuse in
could grow to a level beyond the capabilities was only recently supporting. These alter- character and remote in time.
of ,he four-site Safeguard defense of Min- natives would, of course, look especially un- V: WHERE NEXT?
uteman. Therefore, we propose [initiating an pleasant in an election year. It is clear that these are not the arms-
additional ABM defense program for protect- This perception is probably at least par-
ing Minuteman beyond the four-site Safe- tially responsible for the high hopes that control agreements one would wish to have
guard System]." Thus, even the full four- many Administration people have placed on in an ideal world. I personally have sup-
site Safeguard System, which would have achieving suitable agreements in the SALT. ported, and without serious reservation,
entailed many more than 100 Interceptors, It may also be related to the fact that the every arms-control agreement or treaty that
was judged by Mr. Laird inadequate to pro- President himself has not conspicuously gone has come up for acceptance or ratification
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June 30, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
since World War II. For the first time, I
find it doubtful that one should counsel
acceptance of these agreements. (The ABM
Treaty will require a two-thirds vote for
ratification in the Senate; the Interim Agree-
ment will require a majority vote in both
houses.)
The basic difficulty, of course, Is that one
does not have a free choice to start over
again to produce better agreements; it would
otherwise be easy to advise rejection. But
the choice Is not free. In view of all the cir-
cumstances prevailing, both domestically
and internationally, should one therefore ac-
cept a conspicuous American declaration of
strategic inferiority, and accept the con-
spicuous idiocy of a permanent commitment
to a MAD posture, and simply hope that the
agreements will ultimately contribute to the
evolution of a secured peace with freedom?
Or should one attempt to insist that the
President should do what is right, and the
Congress should do what is right, and the
public should do what is right, including a
willingness to spend much more money if
the Soviets are recalcitrant about establish-
ing more sensible agreements-and, inci-
dentally, almost surely lose the battle? I do
not know, and I can believe that honest and
intelligent men, who understand the issues
thoroughly, and who are as hostile as I am
to the agreements, could easily differ on the
answers.
At the very least, the debate associated with
these agreements, in the Congress and out of
it, should force attention to a number of im-
portant questions. Some of these concern
technical details, but which may be of suffi-
cient importance to influence the accepta-
bility of the agreements. For example, in the
ABM Treaty, why should a local defense of
ICBM silos limited to 100 interceptors re-
quire the astonishing total of 20 radars?
With respect to the Interim Agreement, what
kind of confidence can the Administration
have that the Minuteman force is not seri-
ously jeopardized? Is there any sensible way
to require, as a condition of acceptance, that
the Soviets must at least provide declara-
tions of their own force levels? Other types
of questions should concern more basic phil-
osophical issues, such as whether we wish to
live forever under a MAD posture or whether
we wish to provide formal acknowledgment
(via the Interim Agreement) of Soviet su-
periority. It may well be that some judicious
reservations could be attached to these
agreements that would lessen their unfor-
tunate effects.
The United States has suffered something
like wounds from a number of sources in
recent years--Vietnam, student activism, de-
clining credibility of both the Government
and the media, and, not least, a declining
American role in world affairs, occasioned
largely by declining morale at home. Many
of us will feel that Mr. Nixon has now rubbed
SALT in our wounds. But we should not for-
get that there are, in fact, good reasons to
slow down the strategic arms race; and If
the agreements are accepted, we must, of
necessity, share Mr. Nixon's hope that their
positive effects will, over the long term, out-
weigh their immediate strategic costs.
The costs are real.
THE WAR STILL TEARS AMERICANS'
CONSCIENCES
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, opposi-
tion to our military adventurism in
Southeast Asia continues to flow deeply
In the conscience of the Nation, despite
the gratifying reduction In American
troop casualties.
While our troops in Vietnam have fall-
en below 50,000 for the first time in 8
years, there has been a relentless In-
crease In the number of American fight-
ing men stationed in Thailand and with
the 7th Fleet In the South China Sea.
With this manpower, the intensity of
our unilateral air war has escalated to
its highest pitch ever. The massive de-
struction from our tons and tons of
bombs and thousands of gallons of na-
palm has laid waste a productive land
and killed and maimed its people.
A decade ago, many Americans felt
that altruism and brotherhood were jus-
tification for our forcible intervention in
Vietnam. Today, those same humanistic
feelings have become the basis for the
pity and mercy that a majority of the
citizens of this country now hold out to
the hundreds of thousands of Indochi-
nese civilians whose lives and families
have been shattered by our impersonal
bombing from on high.
The executive refuses to end this war,
so the legislative branch must-totally
and at the earliest practicable time.
That is the message that I am receiv-
ing In letters from around the country,
and I am sure other Senators are receiv-
ing the same message from thousands of
Americans.
One notable example of this feeling
came in my mail yesterday, and I want-
ed to share it with the Senate. It is a pe-
tition from 256 faculty members of Iowa
State University at Ames, Iowa. There
are 25 graduate assistants among the
signatories, but all the remainder are
members of the faculty.
Mr. President, I sincerely welcome the
receipt of this petition and ask unani-
mous consent that it be printed in the
RECORD along with a letter from two
members of the faculty council, trans-
mitting the petition.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY,
Ames, Iowa, June 26, 1972.
Hon. HAROLD HUGHES,
U.S. Senator, Senate Office Building, Wash-
ington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR HUGHES: At Its regular
meeting on May 9, 1971, the Faculty Council
of Iowa State University passed a resolution
providing for the Initiation and distribution
of the enclosed petitions among the faculty
of this university. We feel that it would be
helpful to outline the debate which took
place that evening.
At the request of a constituent, the Coun-
cil considered a motion which would have
put the Faculty Council on record as oppos-
ing the mining of the North Vietnamese har-
bors by American forces. A full discussion
followed during which it was pointed out that
the Faculty Council, as a body representing
many Individual faculty members, should not
take sides on highly controversial issues, The
motion was defeated.
Following this, a motion was introduced
that the Faculty Council Initiate the distri-
bution of a petition expressing opposition to
the American posture In Indochina and to the
mining of the harbors in order that faculty
members, as individuals, might express their
opinions, The motion passed, and the peti-
tions enclosed are the result of that action.
A third motion, which would have Involved
the Council in initiating a petition to be sent
to you and to Hanoi condemning the actions
of the North Vietnamese was discussed. It
was noted that faculty members at Iowa State
S 10963
do not participate in the election of the gov-
ernment of North Vietnam, so that our stand-
ing in relation to that government does not
lend itself to petitioning. The motion was de-
feated.
These petitions have been signed by faculty
members of this University and, where in-
dicated, by graduate assistants. We respect-
fully submit them to you for your considera-
tion.
For the Faculty Council,
BENJAMIN S. COOPER,
Assistant Professor of Physics.
W. DOUGLAS PRITCISARD,
Associate Professor of Music.
On May 9, 1972, Faculty Council at Iowa
State University voted to authorize the estab-
lishment and distribution of petitions in op-
position to the American posture in the In-
dochina conflict. The resolution stipulates
that the petitions be sent to the President
of the United States as well as to all mem-
bers of the Iowa delegation in Washington,
D.C.
"We, the undersigned Faculty Members,
stand in opposition to the U.S. military pres-
ence in Indo-China and to the current
escalation of the conflict as manifested by
the President's mining of the harbors in
North Vietnam."
D. K. Bruner, English, James A. Lowrie,
English, N. W. Yates, English, R. W. Daven-
port, Speech, Pearl Hogrefe, English, Lillian
0. Feinberg, English, James Weaver, Speech,
Richard L. Herrnstadt, English, Richard Gus-
stafson, English, R. E. Hoover, English, Will
C. Jumper, English.
Robert R. Bataille, English, Frank E. Hag-
gard, English, Genevieve Meininger, Foreign
Language, George Lopos, English, Julie
Braun, English, Leonard Feinberg, English,
Albert L. Walker, English, Gordon W. Herb-
ster, English.
W. Douglas Pritchard, Music, Richard H.
von Grabow, Music, Charles Stark, Music,
Mildred Laughlin, Music, Ruth Wagner,
Music, Laurie Ticehurst, Music, Martha N.
Folts, Music, Marion Barnum, Music, Gary
0. White, Music, Jerry Pruett, Music, Joseph
Messenger, Music, Carl O. Bleyle, Music, Ilia
Niemack, Music.
Jeanette Bohnenkamp, Food and Nutri-
tion, Edythe Glass, Child Development, Willa
Choper, Child Development, Donna C. Nel-
son, Child Development, Patricia A. Johnson,
Linda Carson, Joan Herwig, Child Develop-
ment, Carol L. Anderson, Child Development
Extension, Michael Jacobowitz, Child Devel-
opment, Jeanne Dixon, Child Development,
Shirley Shaw, Child Development, Lynn M.
Graham, Child Development, Stefan M. 511-
verston, Computer Science, D. L. Ulrichson,
Computer Science.
Alan F. Wilt, History, Dan Robinson, Edu-
cation, Suzanne Robinson, Reg Smith, Dan-
ielle Harder, Sociology.
Patrick Kavangh, Mechanical Engineering,
E. E. Anderson, Mechanical Engineering,
Premo Chiotti, Metallurgy, Arnold Kahn,
Psychology, Kenneth Carlander, Zoology and
Entymology, Mike White, Math, Clair W. Kel-
ler, History and Education, Mark E. Neely,
History, Marvin C. Papenfuss, Math, H. C.
Brearley, Electrical Engineering and Com-
puter Science, J. W. Menne, Psychology.
Richard Van Iten, Philosophy, Barton C.
Hacker, History and Mechanical Engineering,
Wayne S. Osborn, History, Steffen Schmidt,
Political Science, J. B. Scheeler, Civil En-
gineering, Richard W. Pohl, Botany, Richard
Koupal, Music, Thomas A. Weber, Physics.
Joseph H. Kupfer, Philosophy; John W.
Elrod, Philosophy; Harold I. Sharlin, History;
Adrian A. Bennett, History; Philip B. Zaring,
History; Achilles Avraamides, History; James
W. Whitaker, History; Richard N. Kottman,
History; Philip H. Vaughan, History; Faye P.
Whitaker, English; Kenneth G. Madison, His-
tory; Dorothy Schwieder, History; John Han-
naway, History; George T. McJinlsey, History;
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE June 30, 197
Don C. Rawson, History; James B. Sinatra,,
Landscape Architecture; Robert S. Hansen,
Chemistry.
Benjamin S. Cooper, Physics; Robert A.
Leacock, Physics; D. M. Roberts, Nuclear En-?
?;ineering; N. W. Dean, Physics; S. A. Wil-
liams, Physics; Bing-lin Young, Physics; Mike
It. Haas, Physics; Laurent Hodges, Physics;
David R. Torgeson, Physics; James W. Bloom,
Physics; P. Spencer Young, Physics; Stan W.
Kocimski, Physics; William C. Egbert, Phys-
ics; R. H. Good, Jr., Physics; L. D. Krase,
Physics.
Joseph J. Fitter, Physics; Cheryl Cate,
Physics; M. S. Haque, Physics; Tom Corrigan,
Physics; E. M. Jensen, Physics; Robert M.
Jacobel, Physics; James R. Toplicar, Physics;
Fred L. Ridener, Physics.
Duncan Mallem, English, C. Buell Lipa,
English, Dale McCay, English, Keith G. Hurt-
tress, English, Gretchen Hettinga, English,
Rachel M. Lowrie, English, M. B. Drexler,
Speech.
Sherry Hoopes, Speech, Eric G. Clemens,
Architecture, Linda R. Galyon, English, J. D.
Beatty, English, Gayle Emmel, English, Bev
Benson, English, A. E. Gaylon, English, Eliza-
beth Bukels, English, Charles H. Sohn, Eng-
lish, M. H. Dunlop, English, Phyllis Glass,
English, Donald Dunlop, English, Patrick D.
Gouran, Speech, Dalnis Bisenieks, English.
Betty Morgan, Speech, Robert F. Charles,
Speech, N. E. Hagler, Speech, Frank E. Brandt,
Speech, Jane Cox, Speech, Claudia Edwards,
English, Pearl Zinober, English, Russel O.
Peterson, English, Paul B. Nemiroff, Speech,
Terrence Horland, Speech, Patricia Hendricks,
English, Janellyn Staley, English, Ronetta
Kahn, English.
Carol Harms, English, Cheryl Marsh, Eng-
lish, Alan D. Beals, English, Victor Vrbano-
witz, English, Robert S. Boston, English, Mary
Spraggins, English, Cynthia Davenport, Eng-
lish, Richard Phenegar, Speech, Max K. Cul-
ver, Speech, Owen D. Thorson, Speech, H. C.
Eichmeier, Speech, Barbara Matthies, English,
Mary Catherine Limbird, English, Frances
Pedtke, English, Candace Strawn, English,
Judi Berzon, English, Annabelle Irwin, Eng-
lish.
Hugo F. Franzen, Chemistry, Jerome W.
McAllister, Chemistry, B. G. Gerstein, Chem-
istry, R. E. McCarley, Chemistry, G. J. Small,
Chemistry, W. Trahanovsky, Chemistry.
George Zyskind, Statistics, H. T. David,
Statistics, Oscar Kempthorne, Statistics,
Barry C. Arnold, Statistics, Glen Meeden,
Statistics, Dean Isaacson, Mathematics, K,
Robert Kern, Extension, Marjorie Graves, Ex-
tension, D. Candace Hurley, Extension, Joy
C. Banyas, Extension, Leon E. Thompson,
Extension, Carl Hamilton, Vice Pres. for In-
formation & Development.
Robert P. Hogan, Information Asst., Don-
ald J. Wishart, Extension, James L. Warner,
Information Service, Paul Lem, Extension
Visual Planner, J. Clayton Herman, Exten-
sion, Larry R. Whitting, Editor, C.A.R.D..
Virginia Harding, Extension, John F. Heer,
Editor, Ag., David L. Lendt, Asst. to Vice
Pres., Ellis A. Hicks, Zoology & Entomology,
Cordon Munson, Information Assistant, Rob-
ert W. Pritchard, Extension.
George G. Koerber, Electrical Engineering,
W. B. Boast, Electrical Engineering, .J. P.
Basart, Electrical Engineering, J. W. Nilsson,
Electrical Engineering, John R. Pavlat, Elec-
trical Engineering, Thomas M. Scott, Elec-
trical Engineering, M. H. Mericle, Electrical
Engineering, E. C. Jones Jr., Electrical :Engi-
neering.
Clayton G. Holloway, English, Richard R.
Wright, English, James R. Dow, Foreign Lan-
guage, Helga B. Van Iten, Foreign Language,
Dennis Phillips, Foreign Language, G. Bu-
ford Nosman, Jr., Foreign Language, Ann
Vinograde, Foreign Language, Rainer Rum-
old, Foreign Language, Patricia Sullivan,
Foreign Language, Barbara von Wittich, For-
eign Language, Raymond Vondran, Library,
Joanna Courteau, Foreign Language. Fred-
erick Schwartz, Foreign Language, Harry A.
Kahn, Foreign Language, Margaret S. John-
son, Foreign Language, Charlotte Bruner,
Foreign Language, Allen S. Grossman,
Physics.
J. C. Mathews, Mathematics, George Sei-
fert, Mathematics, Norman Parker, Mathe-
matics, K. A. Heimes, Mathematics, D. E.
Sanderson. Mathematics, Chuck Riley,
Mathematics, R. W. Neufeld, Mathematics.
J. Colby Kegley, Mathematics, David F.
Wooten, Mathematics, George W. Peglar,
Mathematics, Edward S. Allen, Mathematics.
C. J. Triska, Electrical Engineering.
A. V. Pohm, Electrical Engineering.
C. S. Comstock, Electrical Engineering.
T. A. Smay, Electrical Engineering.
R. J. Zingg, Electrical Engineering.
C. L. Townsend, Engineering Extension.
Robert E. Post, Electrical Engineering.
Paul R. Bond, Electrical Engineering.
Glenn E. Fanslow, Electrical Engineering.
Robert L. Samuels, Electrical Engineering.
Richard C. Morrison, Physics.
David W. Lynch, Physics.
Ronald Fuchs, Physics.
Richard G. Barnes, Physics.
Kenneth L. Kliewer, Physics.
Michael Yester, Physics.
F. C. Peterson, Physics.
Lester T. Earls, Physics.
Charles L. Hammer, Physics.
James L. Wolf, Physics.
John R. Clem, Physics.
G. C. Danielson, Physics.
Jon J. McCarthy, Physics.
Clayton A. Swensen, Physics.
William J. Kernan, Physics.
Percy Carr, Physics.
Sunil Sinha, Physics.
C. Stassis, Physics.
D. K. Finnemore, Physics.
UNION CARBIDE CORP. AWARDS
SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CITIZEN-
SHIP EDUCATION
Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, last week
our Government renewed its commit-
ment to the youth of America with the
President's signing of the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1972-S. 659. Just as the
Government has Its stake In our Nation's
young people, so do many in the private
sector. Among these Is the Union Car-
bide Corp., which this week is sponsoring
a constituent of mine, Miss Katrina
Knox, of Columbia, Tenn., for participa-
tion in the Washington Workshops
Congressional Seminar.
Each year the Union Carbide Corp.
selects a number of highly qualified
high school students to join in the fine
learning experience offered by the Wash-
ington Workshops, and I congratulate
Katrina on her being chosen as a Union
Carbide scholar.
In spite of the brief time the par-
ticipants are on Capitol Hill, valuable
experience in the legislative process is
gained. Such experience cannot be
acquired in the classroom, the media,
or from books on the subject, but only
through direct involvement in the daily
activities of Congress.
Mr. President, the image held by many
people who have not had the oppor-
tunity to be involved in such activities,
differs widely from that held by the Sen-
ators, Representatives, and the Capitol
Hill staff. Katrina and the other students
will leave after a week on Capitol Hill
with a greater understanding of and new
insights Into the legislative process.
Katrina is one of 200 Washington
Workshops students directly learning
about American Government this week
on Capitol Hill. I heartily commend
Union Carbide and the many private or-
ganizations who make such scholarships
available to outstanding young Ameri-
cans.
JACL CONVENTION
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, this week
representatives of the Japanese Ameri-
can Citizens League-JACL-are hold-
ing their biennial convention in Wash-
ington, D.C. It is my pleasure to note
their presence in this city, our Nation's
Capital, and to welcome them.
Concurrent with this meeting is the
exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution
concerning the internment of thousands
of Japanese Americans during World
War II. This exhibit serves to remind all
Americans of the terrible injustice which
was inflicted on our Japanese American
citizens at that time.
Japanese Americans have good reason
to be proud of their heritage and their
traditions, of their culture and the ex-
ample they set of constructive citizen-
ship. I welcome those who have come to
Washington this week, and I send best
wishes on this occasion to all Japanese
Americans throughout the land.
ANNOUNCEMENT OF POSITION ON
LEGISLATIVE ROLLCALL NO. 265
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLEN-
DER) was unavoidably absent from the
Senate yesterday at the time of the final
passage of legislation to amend and ex-
tend programs administered by the Office
of Economic Opportunity.
I wish to announce that Senator EL-
LENDER desires to be recorded in favor
of the legislation.
CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATION OF
CARROLL G. BRUNTHAVER, OF
OHIO, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF AGRICULTURE FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND COM-
MODITY PROGRAMS
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, on June 22
the Senate confirmed the nomination of
an exceptionally qualified man, Mr. Car-
roll G. Brunthaver, of Ohio, to be Assist-
ant Secretary of Agriculture for Inter-
national Affairs and Commodity pro-
grams.
Carroll G. Brunthaver has been deeply
Involved in agriculture all of his life.
Born in Fremont, Ohio, on March 27,
1932, he grew up on his family's grain
and livestock farm, and later farmed it
with his father. Mr. Brunthaver's brother
still operates the home farm. Mr. Brunt-
haver was active in 4-H and FFA, earn-
ing the F'FA State Farmer degree in his
senior year of high school.
He received his B.S. degree in agricul-
tural economics from Ohio State Univer-
sity in 1954, and after 4 years as an Air
Force jet pilot he returned to Ohio State
and received his Ph. D. in agricultural
economics in 1960.
Mr. Brunthaver has served as an as-
sistant county extension agent, and on
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 10905
be voting this afternoon. I am sorry West Virginia has interposed an objec- dress the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the
that this is the way it has gone. tion to the unanimous-consent request, American Nuclear Society here in Las Vegas,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- and the junior senator from Alabama Nevada. I shall not speak this evening on
ator from Oklahoma has the floor. has withdrawn his suggestion of the ab any of the more familiar topics which have
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, sence of a quorum. been discussed at great length in the past
will the Senator from Oklahoma yield? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, trolled daynucl cleaewr as fusion, but siting or cress
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield would the Senator from Oklahoma yield myself f n to what I , consider nbut rather the most
to the distinguished acting majority me 1 minute? of to be the most
leader. significant achievement of the 1970's-the
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, 1 minute to the Senator from West Agreements in Moscow, May 26.
I say to the distinguished Senator from Virginia. The agreements are historic for many rea-
New York that I have no feelings on this Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- sons, but none so persuasive as what they
matter one way or the other. The only dent, I extend my appreciation to the w w
repres orldorld. T .e Tt in hough terms only a oa hope for beginning, the agree-
reason -
that I objected was that we have junior Senator from Alabama for with- ments constitute the first time since man
gotten a hangup now on the debt limit holding his suggestion regarding the ab- developed the atomic bomb, that he has
bill. The bill seemed to be moving rather sence of a quorum, because I was only stepped away from the brink of nuclear dis-
well before this discussion developed. The interested in moving the program along, aster rather than closer. As such, these his-
distinguished Senator from Massachu- Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I appre- blong oric agreements mark the beginning of a
setts (Mr. KENNEDY) is here and ready elate that. when an all and dmankind mighty toward awe day
to offer his amendment. Once we get M1. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. awesome world,
through with the debt limit bill, we could Presi- at last free e from m the e awesomme e threat t of nu-
then move rapidly, because the two re- dent, as I said, I had no feeling one way clear war.
then m items rapidly, t have re- or the other on allowing committees to the We cannot realistically
ining
nuclear w expect u of exist-
r
agreements thereon. meet. I l~,d intended to call up some ence, but we can minimize the potential for
Once we finish the debt limit bill, later consent items on the calendar at this its usage and thereby minimize its threat.
this afternoon, I would not object. But time. However, I think I have imposed This is what the soviet Union and the
for the moment I object for the reasons on the time of the Senator from Okla-
stated. homa too much already. I shall defer
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- calling the consent items, and I thank
ator from Oklahoma has the floor. the Senator from Oklahoma very much
Senator yield? (This marks the end of the colloquy
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I yield which took place earlier in the day and
to the distinguished Senator from 'III- which, by unanimous consent, was or-
nois. dered to be printed at this point in the
RECORD.)
Mr
PERCY
M
.
.
r. President, i feel it
very important that we establish in the
RECORD that the minority as of this mo-
ment, 12 o'clock noon, has removed its
objection and we stand ready to move
forward with the legislation that over-
whelmingly passed the Senate in 1970.
We are, I think, within an hour or
two of finishing the markup of the bill
and reporting it.
I deeply regret this. I fully take into
account that other Senators do have
th
o
er things on their schedule. How-
ever, I want to make it absolutely clear
that the minority stands ready now to
move the bill out of the committee so
that it can be reported to the Senate.
Mr. JAVITS. And the agreement would
only have to apply to this one committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Oklahoma has the floor.
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, i yield
to the Senator from Alabama.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Alabama is recognized.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the junior
Senator from Alabama stated when he
reserved the right to interpose an objec-
tion to the unanimous-consent request
that he would not interpose an objection,
but he thought it was only fair, since at
the time he originally planned to object
to the request, he was the only Demo-
cratic member, out of some 10 members
of the committee, who was present on
the Senate floor.- And since this seemed
to be a colloquy between Members on the
other side of the aisle, he thought it only
fair that the Democratic members of the
committee be consulted as well. So to
that end he wished to suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
The distinguished junior Senator from
ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED
The Secretary of the Senate reported
that on today, June 30, 1972, he present-
ed to the President of the United States
the following enrolled bills:
S. 1893. An act to amend the Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act to restore the
Golden Eagle Passport Program, and for oth-
er purposes;
S. 3338. An act to amend title 38, United
States Code, to increase the rates of com-
pensation for disabled veterans; and
S. 3715. An act to amend and extend the
Defense Production Act of 1950.
ADDRESS BY SENATOR BAKER ON
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
AGREEMENTS
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Tennes-
see (Mr. BAKER) drafted an excellent
speech on the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements in which he described
the signing as "the most significant
achievement of the 1970's." Although
he had intended to deliver the speech
as the keynote speaker at the 18th an-
nual meeting of the American Nuclear
Society, several critical votes made it
impossible for him to attend the meeting
in Las Vegas. As a fellow member of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy I
ask unanimous consent to have the re-
marks of Senator BAKER printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ADDRESS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
Good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am
indeed honored to have been asked to ad-
cord on these first Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreements. The premise upon which
these agreements were based, their effect,
and prospects for further limitation shall
be the subject of my talk tonight.
To say that the SALT agreements were
plistic for there were hundreds of factors
that played a role in the four long years of
negotiations, but for reasons of time, I
should like to boil down all of those factors
into two basic concepts which I believe were
at the heart of our position-Nuclear Suffi-
ciency and Mutual Vulnerability.
Sufficiency is the cornerstone of our posi-
tion and appropriately so, for it represents
the unalterable view that while we must al-
low virtual parity or equality to exist before
both sides would find it to their mutual ad-
vantage to negotiate limitations, we must
never negotiate from a position of clear stra-
tegic inferiority. It is for this reason that
neither side found it to their advantage to
unilaterally disarm and that the decision of
the Congress to fund construction of an
Anti-Ballistic Missile system proved, In retro-
spect, to be a wise one.
During the mid-1960's, when we noticed
that the Soviets were constructing nuclear
missiles and submarines at an alarming rate
and that the clear first-strike advantage that
we had held for some twenty years was
beginning to diminish, we changed our strat-
egy and undertook to establish a credible
deterrent capability. The fact that many
were unsure about the effectiveness of our
ABM became inconsequential to the Soviets
who primarily took note of the fact that we
were constructing a $10 billion system to de-
fend our second-strike capability. Had we
not begun construction of an ABM system,
the Soviets very easily could have felt that
a massive first-strike would inflict such
heavy damage upon the 'U.S. that we would
be rendered virtually impotent to retaliate,
and even if we did retaliate, the damage
would be so slight as to make the price
worth paying. But, the Soviets were not of-
fered such an opportunity and were instead
faced with the very real probability that if
they attempted a surprise first-strike attack,
they, too, would suffer massive damage and
loss of life.
Once both nations knew that the other
had the power to inflict irreparable damage,
the question became how fast and how ir-
reparable. Fortunately, this is a question
that neither side could find a satisfactory an-
swer to, and so they turned to negotiations.
The purpose of such negotiations was to as-
sure that neither side found an answer to
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-
Cae question: the question of Mutual Vul-
nerability.
Mutual Vulnerability depicts the situation
lii which both nations consider their defen-
sive capability inadequate to avoid massive
toss of life in the result of a nuclear war and
therefore consider nuclear war too costly to
initiate,
it is a little frightening, but in my view,
very realistic. You may recall that before the
'soviet Union had the bomb, Bernard Baruch
recommended that we share all secrets with
the Soviets in return for guarantees that
I he atom only be used for peaceful purposes,
lout the Soviets refused. They refused be-
cause they felt that they were at a distinct
disadvantage and they were determined to
catch up with the United States. At any rate,
the agreements just signed, more than any-
thing else, serve to guarantee that we remain
mutually vulnerable.
The Defensive Agreement, which is in the
corm of a treaty, limits each side to two
ABM sites: one for defense of their national
capital and one for defense of an ICBM field.
Each site would consist of 100 ABM inter-
ceptors or a total of 200 per country. The
limitation on number of sites and missiles, in
addition to the limitations on radar and the
stipulation that the two ABM sites be no
closer than 1300 kilometers or 800 miles,
guarantees that huge populated areas of
both countries will be exposed or vulnerable.
This was the intent of the treaty. t on the
negotiate further limitations. It should be creased dramatically in number so that
noted that the United states offered to ban they are located in every State except
testing of the multiple warhead before we Montana and Wyoming.
ever tested ours, but the Soviet Union re- The President's action, therefore, can
fused. It should also be noted that the B-1 only inhibit the local service which such
supersonic bomber and the Trident subma-
rine programs are not projects to increase
the size of our bomber or submarine fleets. As part of my longstanding commit-
but rather to replace the aging B-52 and the ment to public broadcasting I shall do
old Polaris which have been around for years. my utmost to help override the Presi-
Frcan this position of strength, we shall dent's veto. In view of the overwhelming
proceed with caution to negotiate what is majority, 82-1, by which H.R. 13918
now called SALT II or the second round of passed the Senate, I believe the possi-
the arms limitation talks. Goals for these bilities are good for favorable action
talks include a more permanent offensive
agreement which might result in reductions here. I am less optimistic about the
of the large SS-9's in exchange for an ag- chances in the House of Representatives,
gregate reduction on the part of the United however.
States, limitations on "throw-weight" or Nevertheless, we cannot allow a pro-
megatonnage, and limitations On technical gi.am which has given the American peo-
advances in warheads such as the MIRY. le so much, and has the potential to
These are all obtainable goals if both sides p
work in earnest toward their achievement give even more, wither for want of ade-
and abide by the spirit of the first agree- quate funding. Long-range financing is
menta. Without trust, negotiations are an ex- still the absolute necessity if public
ercise in futility. It is my hope, as I think it broadcasting is to succeed. In the mean-
is of most Americans, that we canWroceed to- time, the administration which is re-
gethertnand disargmaamendifficult ' fof sponsible for initiating such a plan,
our own sake, but for the sake of all mankind should not be allowed to hinder- even the
whose hope hofor a world, free from the locaust indeed, hdaag puminimal blic broadcasting which the 2-year au-
become a reality. thorization in H.R. 13918 would provide.
The Interim Offensive Agreemen ,
other hand, is much more complex and THE PRESIDENT'S VETO OF THE
slightly different in intent. It limits each PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT
country to the number of ICBM's that are
currently deployed or under construction Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, to-
at the time of the signing of the treaty or day the President has seen fit to veto
July 1. This means that the Soviet Union is H.R. 13918. In doing so, he has left the
limited to about 1618 ICBM's and that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
United States is limited to 1054. Although without an authorization of funds for fis-
the Soviet Union will be allowed about 313 cal year 1973, which begins tomorrow:
large under the agreement, they will
be prohibited from converting other ICBM mand o substantially to reduced
individual amount
States to
Other silos Vcan be modified, but not "sig-
nificantly."
Construction of submarine launched bal-
listic missiles on all nuclear submarines will
be frozen at current levels. This means
that SLBM's may be constructed only to
replace either land based ICBM's or older
submarine launchers.
The results of these freezes are that the
United States accepts a position of inferiority
to the Soviets in number of missile launch-
ers (2,359 to 1,710), but this numerical in-
ferlority is not to be confused with any sort
of qualitative inferiority and those worried
by the numerical question may rest assured
that the nation's security t has
in been
disadvantage-
jeopardized by the apparent
fact, to the contrary.
Nidlifying the effect of a numerical in-
feriority in missiles is the fact that not
only does the UnitedStates possess signifi-
cantly more nuclear warheads and delivery
vehicles in strategic bombers, but it also
holds a decisive advantage in sophistica-
tion of warheads. Some experts estimate that
are at least two Years ahead of the
CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1973
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAF-
FORD). Pursuant to the previous order, the
Chair now lays before the Senate, House
Joint Resolution 1234, which the clerk
will state.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
H.J. Res. 1234, making continuing ap-
propriations for the fiscal year 1973, and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the joint resolution?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the joint resolu-
tion.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
would ask the Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. MCCLELLAN) if he will kindly defer
so that the Senate may receive a mes-
sage from the House of Representatives.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the House
had disagreed to the amendments of the
Senate to the bill (H.R. 15390) to provide
for a 4-month extension of the pres-
ent temporary level in the public debt
limitation, requests a conference with the
Senate on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS
of Arkansas, Mr. ULLMAN, Mr. BURKE Of
Massachusetts, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin,
and Mr. BETTS were appointed managers
of the conference on the part of the
House.
Mutiple Independently-targetaote ne-eMry h_&% received hundreds, even thousands,
Vehicle (MIRY).
,rich an advantage currently gives the of letters from grateful mothers tellin
United States a clear edge in effectiveness of of their esteem for these wounderful pro -
how in President
his Nixon
wec.awns, but this edge will not last for long, grams. answer wor wthern onder
for under the agreements, modernization is would allowed to continue, and the Soviets have an- today.
nounced that they will proceed with their The program for construction of ed_.-
work on the MIRV, as they expect us to pro- recd with construction of the 13-1 super- cational broaeasting facilities began in
sonic boniner and the new Trident missile 1962 has suffered as well today. This
launching submarine, and proceed we must, program has enabled the individual
Although a continuation of the arms race States to build educational radio and
seems inconsistent with the goals of the 1stt- television stations which in turn serve
eat agreements, it is, in fact, quite consistent the individual communities and regions
of throughout the country. These individ-
for it continues our position of s a cnce of
strengtth h serves to maintain the ba la
stre between the two forces, a balance ual stations are the cornerstone of public
without which there would be no reason to broadcasting. Since 1962, they have in-
construct educational broadcasting fa-
cilities.
In its short existence, the Corporation
has been responsible for "Sesame
Street." "Misterogers Neighborhood,"
the "Electric Company" and many other
such programs which have not only edu-
cated our children, but inspired them to
become better human beings.
The Corporation has been able to do
this, and more, while still in its infancy
and operating without permanent fi-
nancing as promised by this adminis-
tration and the preceding one.
The administration has not submitted
an alternative-a permanent financing
plan as promised-and it has, by vetoing
H.R. 13918, left public broadcasting with
no alternative.
At a time when the Surgeon General
of the United States has told us we need
more of the-prosocial programs provided
PUBLIC DEBT LIMITATION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
the Chair to lay before the Senate a
message from the House of Representa-
tives on H.R. 15390.
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THE EVENING STAR
DATE '_ )C"T
New Panel to Monitor
Arms Curb Compliance
New York Dimes New Service
TLS. intelligence officials
have establis e a comma ee-
_ cow on
n May 26.
The five-man committee is
to begin functioning on Satur-
day, the cutoff date agreed on
by the two governments for
the construction of new sites
for offensive missiles.
Administration officials said
the committee was set up to
avoid the repetition on a
broader scale of the violation
of the Suez Canal truce in Au-
gust 1970, when the Soviet Un-
ion and Egypt moved into po-
sition SAM-2 and. SAM-3 anti-
aircraft missiles after the
cease-fire with Israel.
At that time, U.S. intelli-
gence services were unpre-
pared to monitor Soviet and
Egyptian fulfillment of the
truce terms. This was a source
of major embarrassment to
the United States, which had
negotiated the truce, and the
incident nearly led to the col-
lapsed of the cease-fire.
.Jhe new committee, officials
cQn yernon A a tors, ceuu-
--
Its members are to be Lt.
G ld V. Benn head
of the Defense Intelligence
Agency; Q- l c (!lino irector
of the State Department's In-
telligence and Research Agen-
cy; Andrew Marshall +ntelli-
gence coordinator of the Na-
tional Security Council at the
White House; and p CIA offi-
cial still to he desicnated
T h e committee, officials
said, will be linked to the,
White House verification pan-
el, a senior body of the Nation-
al Security Council responsible
for the strategic arms negotia-
tions.
The Moscow agreements on
the limitation of defensive and
offensive nuclear weapons for-
mally come into force on rati-
fication by the U.S. Senate and
the Supreme Soviet. However,
both sides have agreed to
abide by the treaty from the
date it was signed by Presi-
dent Nixon and Soviet Party
Leader Leonid I. Brezhnev.
PAGE
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June 26, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks
Can we not show a love for our country?
A love that surmounts all fears, all weak-
nesses and dedicates men to preserve with
their lives the land they love?
I am not asking that we dedicate our-
selves to becoming a nation of warmongers.
No, I ask that we dedicate ourselves to work
for peace. I firmly believe a strong aggressive,
defensive posture is the best offense avail-
able to a country whose democratic ideals
prevents it from initiating an attack against
any enemy unless provoked beyond endur-
ance.
Until we have made our country so im-
pregnable, so invulnerable that an attack
would be suicidal, will our enemies keep their
distance. Until we have done this, the possi-
bility of America becoming a major battle-
field in a new world conflict becomes more
apparent with each passing day.
Gentlemen. Now is the time for us to
look to our defenses, time to follow the
heritage which is ours. The time to demon-
strate, once again, to all the world, that
democracy is a living thing, transcending all
other ways of life, and worth protecting at
any cost.
VA DIRECTOR JOE ANDERSON
HONORED FOR SERVICE
HON. ED EDMONDSON
OF OKLAHOMA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 26, 1972
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, prob-
ably no other Member of this body is
more aware than yourself of the many
outstanding abilities of the man who
served as your administrative assistant
for nearly 3 years, Mr. Joe Anderson.
Since leaving your staff and becoming
Muskogee Regional Director of the Vet-
erans' Administration, Joe Anderson has
unselfishly dedicated his time and efforts
in behalf of the veterans of Oklahoma
and our Nation.
I was recently provided with a resolu-
tion adopted by the Disabled American
Veterans of Oklahoma which indicates
the very high regard and appreciation
felt for Joe by all veterans in Oklahoma.
This recognition of Joe's consistent and
tireless efforts, above and beyond the call
of duty, demonstrates the outstanding
record he has achieved as our Regional
Director for the Veterans' Administra-
tion, and I include the text of the DAV
resolution at this point in the RECORD:
RESOLUTION
Whereas, the Disabled American Veterans
of Oklohoma hold many meetings each year
at. the state, district, and chapter level to
inform veterans and their beneficiaries of
changes in laws and regulations affecting
veterans' programs; and
Whereas, Joe W. Anderson, Director, Vet-
erans Administration Regional Office, Musko-
gee, Oklahoma, has contributed significantly
to the success of these meetings by having
himself and/or other members of his staff
present to discuss various phases of veterans'
programs. Many of the meetings convened
on weekends, but participation of the Direc-
tor and his staff was not reduced on this
account, and, now, therefore, be it
Resolved, that the Department Convention,
Department of Oklahoma, Disabled American
Veterans, held in Lawton, Oklahoma, June 9,
10, and 11, 1972, does hereby express and
record its appreciation to Joe W. Anderson
and his staff for outstanding service far be-
yond normal duty requirements to the ex-
servicemen of Oklahoma; and, be it further
Resolved, that copies of this resolution be
sent to Joe W. Anderson, Director, Veterans
Administration Regional Office, Muskogee,
Oklahoma; to Donald E. Johnson, Adminis-
trator, Veterans Affairs, Veterans Administra-
tion Central Office, Washington, D.C., and to
the members of the Oklahoma Congressional
Delegation.
HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 26, 1972
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speak-
er, last Saturday the Washington Post
carried an excellent background article
by Chalmers Roberts on the strategic
arms limitation agreement reached in
Moscow. Mr. Roberts notes that the con-
cessions made by both sides involved a
mixed nuclear basket of apples and
oranges, and the ability to reconcile this
mix has produced an agreement which is
a sensible and stabilizing step in the di-
rection of curbing the arms race.
In discussing the prospects for SALT
II and the use of the proposed Trident
submarine and B-1 bomber as bargaining
chips, Mr. Roberts says:
A good many in and out of Congress de-
ride the bargaining chip argument. I do not.
History teaches that Moscow respects muscle,
not weakness. I thought there was validity
in years past to the contention that keeping
the American ABM program going was a
bargaining chip; I think it proved so. The
same argument now has validity.
Mr. Roberts concludes that the SALT
agreements are very important in them-
selves, but that they are far more im-
portant in terms of a continuing process
of attempting to achieve "a more stable
and rational relationship. " Mr. Speaker,
at this point in the RECORD I include the
Roberts article and commend it to the
reading of my colleagues. The article
follows:
JUDGING THE MERITS OF THE SALT
AGREEMENT
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
In judging the merits of the strategic
arms limitation (SALT) agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union it
is necessary to do two things: first, to ap-
praise the meaning of the anti-ballistic mis-
sile (ABM) treaty and the details, includ-
ing the numbers, of the interim agreement
on offensive weapons; second, to judge the
twin pacts in the larger context of the
changing Washington-Moscow relationship.
The two seem to me to be inseparable.
The ABM treaty has the great virtue of so
limiting such defensive measures as to re-
move fears on either side that the other
could indulge in a first strike attack. If such
an attack could ever be conceivable to any
rational leader, it would become so only
when he felt that his own weapons and the
bulk of his population would be so protected
by an elaborate nation-wide ABM system
as to make a second or retaliatory strike by
the other nation a risk worth taking.
Given the undoubted ability of the offen-
sive to overwhelm the defensive and given
the grave doubts by many experts as to the
efficacy of any ABM system, such fears
doubtless have been gravely exaggerated in
both Washington and Moscow. But that does
not detract from the fact that such fears
have existed, that they impelled vast ex-
penditures regardless of their validity and
that under terms of the SALT treaty on
ABMs this should come to a halt if not an
end. "Zero ABMs," which means a complete
abolition by both sides of any ABMs, would
have been better than the two site option
agreed upon. But two, at least, is far, far bet-
ter than unlimited ABMs.
So at least one factor that threatend to
destabilize the balance of terror has been
cut back to manageable proportions. It
seems to me it would make sense for Con-
gress to refuse funds for the building of an
ABM around Washington despite the asym-
metry that would involve, given the exist-
ence of a site now in existence around Mos-
cow. Likewise it would make sense for the
Soviets not to build their second site around
an offensive missile field. Should Congress
so decide, the Moscow decision is most likely
to be affected by the Soviet perception of a
changing Moscow-Washington relationship.
Now turn to the offensive weapons agree-
ment. It is evident enough that the Nixon
Administration paid a stiff price, negotiated
at the finale in Moscow, to win Soviet assent
to inclusion of a limitation on submarine
launched missiles (SLBMs). I think, how-
ever, it was a price worth paying.
The United States long has had a triad of
strategic weapons systems: ICBMs, SLBMs
and long-range bombers. According to the
figures presented to the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer,
the sum total of the rival triads (one bomber
being equated with one missile) will be 2,499
for the Soviets to 2,167 for the United States,
Even these figures are not the whole story,
however. The total megatonnage in the So-
viet arsenal under the agreements is much
the larger but the total number of American
warheads, due to the American multiples
(MIRVs), is far larger than that of the Rus-
sians.
In sum, the Apples and oranges of nuclear
weaponry have been added up to what can
fairly be termed rough parity for weapons
of one nation that can reach the soil of the
other. Even here, it should be noted, some
of the American apples have been excluded
from the basket: the fighter-bombers based
in Western Europe and on carriers, known
as forward based systems (FBS). It seems
to me the net of all these figures and factors
is that the offensive agreement is a good deal
for both superpowers.
In reading over all the official American
explanations, by the President, Secretaries
Laird and Rogers, Adm. Moorer and above
all by Henry Kissinger, one is struck by a
single theme: it would have been much
worse if there had been no agreements
reached. It is an uncontroverted fact that, as
See. Laird kept saying so loudly and so long,
the Soviets did have a great momentum
going on offensive arms, from the giant SS-9
missiles to submarines. So, as the admiral
put it, "we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of
about three to two in their favor." I have no
doubt he Is right because I have no doubt
that Moscow would have gone on building,
lacking an agreement, to something like that
amount of superiority. At some point the
United States would have responded with a
new program of its own.
The action-reaction phenomenon in stra-
tegic arms has been evident for years, for
decades in fact. The current Soviet momen-
tum clearly dates from the humilitation Mos-
cow suffered in the 1963 Cuban missile
crisis. The American preponderance at that
time, in turn, was the result of early Ken-
nedy Administration decisions to build a
vastly superior force, rather than to accept
some form of parity.
President Nixon was the first chief execu-
tive to accept parity as a principle though
he sought to soften the blow to American
pride by using instead the word "sufficien-
cy." Whether he did so as an intellectual
exercise, or whether he did so because he
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 26, 1972
knew the Congress and the country simply
would not put up the money for superiority
in such costly weapons, is not material. That
can be left to the historians. The fact is he
did so. And only because he did so Is there
the agreement now before Congress for ap.
proval. Perhaps the best clue to Mr. Nixon's
submarine decision was Dr. Kissinger's re-
mark at a Moscow press briefing. Discussing
the high price paid for the submarine sec-
tion of the agreements, Dr. Kissinger re-
marked that "the United Stacey was in ;a
rather complex position to recommend a
submarine deal since we were not building
any and the Soviets were building eight or
nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant
bargaining position I would recommend
people find themselves in."
In discussing the agreements, Secretary
Laird has said he accepted them only on the
premise that the United States will go for-
ward with the multi-billion dollar Trident
submarine and the equally costly B-1 bomb-
er and some other programs as well. In es-
sence, this is the old bargaining chip idea
now being applied to the SALT II round due
to begin this fall. The hope is to reach a per-
manent treaty covering offensive weapons
systems to replace the five-year interim
agreement now before Congress.
A good many in and out of Congress de-
ride the bargaining chip argument, I do not.
History teaches that Moscow respects muscle,
not weakness. I thought there was validity
in years past to the contention that keeping
the American ABM program going was a bar-
gining chip; I think it proved so. The same
argument now has validity. But that is not
to say that everything that Sec. Laird and
the Joint Chiefs would like is necessary, or
even desirable at the speed they request. It
seems to me further funding of the Trident
project makes sense, in part because it will
tend to move the core of the strategic power
more to sea where it is least vulnerable. The
B-1 is of lesser value, in my view, and should
receive only limited funding at this point.
In hisremarks at a Moscow dinner for Mr.
Nixon, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny re-
marked that despite "differences of social sys-
tems," there are "objective factors that deter-
mine similarity of interests" that influence
Soviet-American relations. It was of course
such a Kremlin view that permitted the So-
viet leaders to let the President come to Mos-
cow at a time he had challenged Soviet in-
terests by mining the harbors of North Viet-
nam. It was simply one more demonstration
of practicality over principle. One could say
the same thing about Mr. Nixon's climb down
from "superiority" to "sufficiency."
Tb is sort of thing was codified in the dec-
laration of basic principles signed in Mos-
cow by President Nixon and Soviet Commu-
nist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev. They said,
among other things, that the two nations
"will proceed from the common determina-
tion that in the nuclear age there is no alter-
native to conductingtheir mutual relations
on the basis of peaceful coexistence." Or as
Dr. Kissinger put it to members of Congress
at the White House: "We are compelled to
coexist."
This theme, of course, is not new. Back in
1954 President Eisenhower declared that
"since the advent of nuclear weapons, it
seems clear that there is no longer any alter-
native to peace, if there is to be a happy and
well world."
Just as many Americans have difficulty ac-
cepting parity instead of superiority, so the
Russians have difficulty abandoning the
secrecy on which they have so long counted,
from Stalin through Khrushchev. This is
evident in their refusal to give the numbers
of their own ICBMs or to agree to a definition
of "heavy" missiles and other pertinent
terms. In short, the old suspicions of the
Cold War are far from gone. It took a long
time, on our side, for officials to abandon
such terms as "international Communism."
It would be useful for Secretaries Rogers and
Laird to abandon the phrase "negotiating
from a position of strength," which they
both used in their testimony to Congress.
And it would be useful for the Soviets to
abandon some of the jargon of their own
ideology such as "the Imperialists."
The SALT agreements seem to me to be
very important in themselves. But they are
far more important if they form part of
what Dr. Kissinger has called "vested inter-
ests in a continuation of a more formal rela-
tionship" between the two nations. We
should, as Dr. Kissinger went on to say,
"have no illusion" that such will occur or
that, if it does, it will be quick and simple.
The Ideological differences, and the national
rivalries too, remain. But there are, as Pod-
gorny said, "objective factors" as well which
tend to force each nation to move in the
direction of a more stable and rational rela-
tionship.
Each side interacts on the other. In the
past when the Soviets were weak the Ameri-
cans sought to exploit that weakness. If
America becomes weak, I have no doubt the
Soviets will exploit that weakness. The
changes therefore must be gradual, not pre-
cipitate. To me, theNixon demand-as speci-
fied by Sec. Laird-for massive new arms
goes too far. But so, in the other direction,
does the budget cutting program of Sen.
George McGovern. It is up to Congress, as it
approves the SALT agreements, to find the
mean between the extremes. If it does, then
1972 could well become a date to remember
when hope superceded fear without allowing
illusion to supplant rationality.
HON. JAMES ABOUREZK
OF SOUTH DAKOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 26, 1972
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. Speaker, when
talking about educational problems, the
word "crisis" automatically springs to
mind. One year there is a crisis in sci-
ence education and we are not keeping
ahead of the Russians. The next year
we discover a reading crisis and that
Johnny cannot read. The year after that
it is something else. The fact of the mat-
ter is, there are crises. But they are
symptoms of a much bigger, more per-
vasive, and continual crisis that has been
present in education for some time and
has been growing worse and worse. That
is the financial crisis.
The real irony of this situation is that
in terms of supply and demand, there are
almost enough qualified teachers to pro-
vide the needed educational services of
our society for the first time since World
War II. Yet we find that because of cost
factors and inflation, school district after
school district cannot take advantage
of the supplyand instead find themselves
cutting back in terms of educational
services. This means that instead of
smaller classes, there are larger ones. In-
stead of more individualized instruction,
there is less. Instead of more time to meet
the pupils' needs, the teacher has less.
Then comes the demand to cut back
on the frills. I do not believe that special
teachers for art, music, drama, indus-
trial arts, and physical education are
frills. Yet these are the first to go.
I want to make- it clear that I do not
believe that the culprit in the increasing
cost of education and the cutbacks is
teachers' salaries. It is true that teach-
ers' salaries have gone up-but at a pace
that is behind and not ahead of other
professional workers. This despite the
fact that teacher salaries have long been
considered notoriously and even scan-
dalously low in our society.
For the most part, one cannot fault
the efforts that have been made at the
local level to provide adequate funding
to meet the educational needs of the
community. Since 1966 when the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Act went into
effect, State and local taxes have sup-
plied an additional $15.7 billion for
schools raising the total revenue collected
from their own tax sources to $39 billion.
Over the same time, funds from the Fed-
eral Government have increased from
$900 million to $2.9 billion.
It is clear that States and localities
cannot continue their massive efforts
without help. I recognize that there are
many problems with Federal aid to ed-
ucation that must still be worked out.
For all of that, the Federal Government
remains that last major untapped source
of adequate funding to meet the financial
crisis about which I have been talking.
I was pleased to have been a supporter
of the Quality Education Appropriations
Amendment to the Office of Education
Appropriations bill. This successful
amendment added nearly $354 million to
key education programs. This is an en-
couraging step for those of us who be-
lieve in a reordering of our national pri-
orities. Education must come higher on
our list of national concerns.
IN MEMORIAM-MARTHA TURNER
LONG
HON. BILL CHAPPELL, JR.
OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 26, 1972
Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Speaker, I want
to join the people of Marion County,
Fla., in acknowledging their deep sense
of loss at the untimely passing of Martha
Turner Long at the young age of 35. Mrs.
Long gave 7 years of loyal, efficient, and
devoted service as secretary to the
Marion County Planning and Zoning
Board and its director. By her courteous
and polite manner, she brought great
credit and recognition to herself, her
office, and to Marion County. She was a
dedicated wife and mother, held in high
esteem by all whose lives she touched.
Her exemplary life has contributed to
our heritage and traditions and will
serve as a goal that we and future gen-
erations should strive to attain. I wish
to express my sympathy to the family of
Martha Turner Long, an ever-faithful
servant of the public and a contributor
to good government.
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 SAIT
THE W I q,5$~ ,fie 2005/12/14: CIA-nP, O4o"Kf0'MOOI 4G7
Inspector Satellite to Police
SALT Weighed by Air Force
BY George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
U.S. Air Force is taking
a. new Too s es_ at
could rocket into space an}
spect forei spacecraft lool-
]}iaht now. both the 17pi d
The arms control agreement
with the Soviet Union has
given impetus to proposals for
such inspector satellites. Presi-
dent Nixon has assured Con-
gress that the United States
will keep track of the Soviet
missile buildup, a promise
hinged on the ability to keep
counting missiles with observ-
ation satellites.
interfered with the oche
contrast to Russi desperate
e o o noc own spv
planes which used to fly over
her territory-an effort that
rs.
Nevertheless,
ITninn over the last fe ears inspector effort has been heav-
has conducted several sets of
exercises which many Western
space specialists see as-de-
ace to perlect sau nrtes
The United States is be and
Russia in this field. The Air
Force has sponsored a number
of studies but has yet to fly
the first inspector satellite.
One argument against doing it
has been the fear of looking
provocative and extending the
arms race to outer space.
In the environment of the
recent Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Treaty (SALT), aerospace
companies see their chances
improved for getting beyond
paper studies and individual
pieces of hardware.
inspector._
Several of the companies
are preparing proposals for
submission this week to the
Pentagon in hopes of obtain-
ing one of two Air Force study
contracts for the satellite
Soviet' The off-and-on
ily classified by the Pentagon
through the years. But the
basic idea has not changed
much since former Defense
Secretary . Robert S. Mc-
Namara told Congress in se-
cret testimony in 1968 that
"we are exploring the develop-
ment of a non-nuclear surveil-
lance or destruction capability
against hostile satellites ..."
McNamara said any one of a
number of rockets could carry
the satellite inspector into
space-the Spartan, Polaris,,
Thor or Minuteman. One way
for the satellite to home in on
another would be by the heat
it would give off in space-so-
called infra-red sensors.
LTV Aerospace worked with
the Air Force on a sensor for
a satellite inspector under a
secret project called 922. The
ensor was launched into
pace successfully from Cape
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June 22, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks
EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS
HON. HASTINGS KEITH
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, June 14, 1972
Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, I was deeply
saddened to learn of the death of our
former colleague and friend from Mas-
sachusetts, Philip Philbin. Phil had many
virtues, among which were numbered
kindness, competency and, above all, in-
tegrity.
I would like to make the observation
that during all the years I knew Phil
not once did I hear him make a remark
criticizing another person. This rare
trait has and will always come to mind
when I think of Phil, for it is indeed rare
to know a man of such great benevolence,
During his 26 years in the Congress
Phil never turned a constituent or a fel-
low colleague away who came to him
for help. Even while he helped others he
went about his own work quietly and ex-
pertly and diligently.
On Saturday I, with many of my col-
leagues, traveled to Clinton to pay my
last respects to this man I had known
so well and had liked so much. I would
like to share with you.the words of the
pastor of Our Lady of the Rosary Church
in Clinton-a tribute delivered from a
fellow Clintonian on behalf of all of us
who had the privilege of knowing Phil
Philbin.
At the time when Congressman Philbin
retired from public life we who were his col-
leagues and friends gave him testimony of
our love and affection.
Today we are again gathered together, this
time to mark his passing on to eternal life.
This is another expression for a beloved
friend.
As a Congressman, Philip Philbin worked
with you as a colleague or served you as
Representative; as a fellow Clintonian he was
a life-long friend to his town and its people;
and as a faithful Christian he shared the
same hope and ideals we are expressing today.
Congressman Philbin was a politician here
in his district-that is a title of respect-
none of this cynicism is attached to it which
is found in some other places. Here we have
his example of 28 years of integrity and hon-
esty in public service. The newspapers have
recorded the accomplishment of those years
of service but this morning we have another
sort of testimony-the presence of so many
of his former colleagues. This confirms our
high opinion of the job he did in Washing-
ton. Perhaps an even greater tribute is the
presence of the so many people he served-
those for whom he managed to make the im-
personal procedure of the Government per-
sonal and for whom he removed the road-
blocks of bureaucracy.
Phil Philbin was also our fellow Clintonian.
Years of service in Washington never sepa-
rated him from his home town. He always
found the time to keep up contact with its
people. He had a keen sense of family ties
and local tradition. You could not meet him
without being reminded of some family mem-
ber he knew of or inquired for.
A fine example of his capacity for friend-
ship was his association with the late Sena-
tor David I. Walsh. His loyalty outlasted
death, for each year since Senator Walsh's
death, Phil Philbin arranged for memorial
ceremonies, and so kept alive the memory of
another great Clintonian.
Lastly, Phil Philbin was a faithful Chris-
tian-which is not a separate title but the
sum of all his roles in life.
It is our sincere hope that today, together
with his namesake, the Apostle Philip, his
wish has been fulfilled. To this we add our
love and affection for a friend we will greatly
miss, but never forget.
CS'Aj
HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, June 21, 1972
Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, Gen.
Thomas S. Power, "Design for Survival,"
said:
It is, therefore, up to the American people
to decide which road to survival they want
to choose. The choice is by no means easy.
The active proponents of one-world govern-
ment have a very saleable product to sell-
peace without an arms race-and they are
both vocal and convincing.... Unfortunately,
however, our approach-survival through
military supremacy-ostensibly entails far
greater sacrifices and risks, and therefore has
less appeal to those who seek a quick and
easy way out. Still, it is the only approach
which will permit national survival, This is
the approach we have followed to this day,
and it has proved successful.... The two ap-
proaches permit of no compromise because
they point in exactly opposite directions.
Therefore, in making their choice, our citi-
zens must select one or the other, realizing
that once they have chosen the road to dis-
armament and one-world government, there
can be no turning back.
The principal features of the SALT
arms limitation agreements made in
Moscow between the United States and
Soviet Russia, and soon to be presented
to both Houses of Congress, are sum-
marized as follows by a select group of
Senators including BARRY GOLDWATER
and JAMES BUCKLEY :
The Moscow agreements freeze the
United States at a 4-to-1 disadvantage
comparing our overall missile payload to
that of the Soviet Union;
The Soviet Union has three missiles
for every two of ours, theirs are sub-
stantially larger, and the agreements
guarantee that this gap will remain and
probably widen;
Soviet missiles carry payloads several
times larger than those of U.S. missiles,
an advantage which the agreements not
only protect, but allow to be enhanced;
The agreements forbid the United
States to increase the number of its nu-
clear submarines while authorizing the
Soviets to continue building them until
they equal and then surpass the United
States.
On the House Floor recently some fis-
cal conservatives were trying to cut ap-
propriations to the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. I raised the
question: For what purpose are we
supporting a Disarmament Agency in
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E 6389
any form? The fact is that since 1962
we have been enagegd in formal dis-
armament negotiations in Geneva, con-
ducted by this Agency, always with the
stated purpose of "the total elimination
of all armed forces and armaments ex-
cept those needed to maintain internal
order within states and to furnish the
United Nations with peace forces." It is
significant to note that Paul Nitze, As-
sistant Secretary of the Navy in 1962
under a Democratic administration when
these negotiations began, reappears 10
years later under a Republican adminis-
tration as a leading big-name negotiator
of the SALT agreements. Reducing
American forces to a level of permanent
inferiority to the Soviets is a long step
toward the kind of disarmament sought
since 1962, most likely to be followed,
once accomplished, by a push to limit
U.S. arms to the point that they are
inferior to those of the United Nations as
well.
Such disarmament is buying national
suicide on the installment plan. Last
year Gen. Curtis LeMay, former Air
Force Chief of Staff and founder of the
Strategic Air Command, warned that if
present trends in arms limitation con-
tinue, this country can look forward
within 18 months to some type of ulti-
matum from our principal arms rivals.
Even the disarmament-prone New York
Times pointed out in an editorial June 5:
That [Soviet] edge includes 40 per cent
more intercontinental ballistic missiles (1408
to 1000) and missile-launching submarines
(62 to 44), one-third more submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (950 to 710) and
a_ threefold Soviet advantage in megaton-
nage of total missile payload. Much of this
appears in writing in the five-year agreement
freezing strategic offensive missiles.
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird ad-
mitted a year ago that "we have been in
a period of almost moratorium since 1967
on new strategic weapons deployment"
while noting in the May 4, 1972, issue of
Commander's Digest that we are "in a
period of vigorous Soviet military expan-
sion at sea, on the land, in the air and
in space."
Shortly before the SALT agreements
were finalized in Moscow, the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee released an updated
study pointing out that of 25 agreements
signed at previous summit meetings, 24
had been violated. So we dare not even
fall back on the forlorn hope expressed
in a recent State Department briefing for
congressional wives, admitting that the
SALT agreements establish a missile gap
favoring the Soviet Union, but neverthe -
less justifying them on the grounds tha'k
without the agreements the gap would
expand. If we abide by the agreements,
we can be sure that the gap will expand
as soon as the Soviets decide that the
time has come to break it.
Let the State Department be advised
never to talk to women, especially when
one of those women is my wife. Let the
American people be advised that we must
pay heed to General Power's warning and
fight for America's national survival.
SALT must be returned to its proper
place-the dinner table.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 22, 1) 2
OF NEW YORK
?N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, June 21, 1972
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, to follow is
the full text of House Concurrent Reso-
lution 634 which I have introduced. It is
my fervent hope that this resolution will
make it possible for this Chamber to en-
dorse a goal of peace in Vietnam with
a unanimity to which it is seldom ac-
customed.
The resolution follows:
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 634
Whereas the continuing war in Southeast
Asia is of great concern to the people of the
United States:
Whereas the current military invasion of
South Vietnam by the forces of North Viet-
nam has contributed to the escalation of the
war;
Whereas a lasting peace in that region can
be achieved only through agreement between
the Great Powers, the Democratic Republic
of (North) Vietnam, the Republic of (South)
Vietnam, and the indigenous people of the
latter two countries; and
Whereas the United States Congress can-
not by a leigslative Act impose an agreement
upon the parties so as to end the war, guar-
aantee the release of the prisoners of war,
settle political issues, guarantee the peace,
alleviate human suffering in the region,
guarantee self-determination of the people of
Vietnam, and reunite the American people:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives
(-qte Senate concurring), That it is the sense
of the Congress that the policy of the United
States for the promotion of peace in South-
east Asia should be to immediately resume
and continue negotiations to achieve the fol-
lowing objectives and agreements:
1, An immediate cease-fire by all forces;
2. Complete and total withdrawal by the
Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam of
al men and equipment from the Republic
of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos;
3. Concurrent withdrawal of all remain-
ing military forces of the United States, the
People's Republic of China, and of the Soviet
Union, and all other foreign military forces,
from Vietnam:
4. A cessation of the shipment of arms
and war materials to the Democratic- Repub-
lie of (North) Vietnam and to the Republic
Of (South) Vietnam;
ii. Free elections, supervised by the United
Nations :
(a) to determine whether the two coun-
tries should be reunited under a common
government;
(b) to determine the form of government
for the reunited country if a reunited coun-
try is preferred by the people of both
countries:
(c) to determine the form of government
for each country if separate and sovereign
countries are preferred by the people or each
country:
6. Supervision and enforcement of the
neace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by
the United Nations: and
7. Economic aid to the countries of South-
nsst Asia by the United States and other
members of the United Nations: Be it fur-
her
h.esolved-
A. That in order to facilitate negotiations
ohward the objectives and agreements enum-
erated above. it is the sense of Congress that
immediately after the achievement of a
cease-fire, all prisoners of war then held by
the Democratic Republic of (North) Viet-
nam, the Republic of (South) Vietnam, :aid
by insurgent forces, be released, under the
supervision of the International Red Cross
for voluntary repatriation, and that all
parties to negotiations prepare and exchange
lists of the missing and unrecovered dead so
that the International Red Cross may make
a full accounting for all missing persons.
B. Immediately after the confirmation by
formal agreement of the policies and pro-
cedures set forth in this resolution between
the national parties named herein and any
necessary additional parties and the comple-
tion of action taken to return all prisoners of
war, as specified in paragraph A; the parties
to this agreement shall announce a certain
date for the complete and final withdrawal
of all foreign military personnel from all
[ndochina, and the total withdrawal must
take place on or before December 31, 1972,
ZION. HAMILTON FISH, JR.
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIP ES
Wednesday, June 21, 1972
Mr. FISH. Mr. Speaker, on Monday,
June 19, 1972, the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board held a licensing hear-
ing at Croton on Hudson concerning the
licensing of a proposed atomic enc cgy
plant known as Indian Point No. 2.
Due to severe environmental effects
caused by Indian Point No. 1 plant which
is in operation, the present proposal to
license a second nuclear energy plant in
the same location has caused grave con-
cern among residents of that area. At the
June 19, 1972, hearing I made a limited
appearance before the Board and issued
the following statement. I include it in
the RECORD so that my position in this
matter will be known not only to the
Board, by to my colleagues in the House :
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAMILTON FISH,
JR., BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LI-
CENSING BOARD
Mr. Chairman, I am Hamilton Fish, Jr.,
Member of Congress representing the 26th
Congressional District of New York. My pres-
ent District includes four counties which
border the Hudson River and the entire area
I represent has had a long continuing, his-
toric interest in the Hudson for transporta-
tion, fishing and recreation. Further, I am
now running for re-election in the new 25th
Congressional District. which contains
Dutchess, Putnam and Northern Westchester
Counties, as well as parts of Ulster and Co-
lumbia Counties. All of these counties border
on the Hudson River. Most significantly. the
Indian Point plant is physically located in
the new 25th.
Thus, it is for the purpose of protecting
these traditional interests of my present and
future constituents that I am making this
limited appearance before you today. I am
appearing to express my concern over the
possible consequences of a nuclear accident
at this plant, as well as the environmental
and public health implications of the pro-
posed routine emission of radioactive mate-
rials from this plant into the water and into
the air.
THE CRAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASLB
Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues
have a grave responsibility, one that demands
the best of scientific and technological com-
petence on one hand and the rare ability to
integrate into your deliberations, consid-
eration of. public welfare on the other, You
have before you a record in which the utility
argues strongly about the need for this ad-
ditional generating facility and warns of the
potential power shortages that could occur
should this project be delayed. It further
asserts that the anticipated environmental
effects are at least balanced in the scale of
public values by the benefit of the electrical
output of the plant. To counter the powerful
voice of this utility, which is well amplified
by the voices of its experts, there is only the
feeble voice of the intervenors, who lack the
resources to launch the exhaustive analysis
of the assumptions, oversights, or even pos-
sible errors in the analyses of the utility and
of the AEC itself. So the fundamental
thought I would leave with you is that this
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should
assert to the utmost its independence under
AEC regulations, and that it probe deeply
and incisively into the assertions of the
utility. Further, that it treat with close at-
tention the views of the intervenors, for in
those views may be contained the kernels of
some fundamental truths that bear directly
upon the issue whether this plant should
be licensed to operate, and, if so, under
what special conditions.
ATTENTION TO NONRADIOLOGICAL FACTORS
Mr. Chairman, at this stage of the licensing
process for the Indian Point 2 nuclear power
plant, you have to dal with the non-nuclear
environmental effects. You well know, the
Calvert Cliffs decision with its judicial react-
ing of the National Environmental Policy Act.
You may know that in the Congress, I was
an original co-sponsor of this legislation and
have since been a vigorous supporter of it.
Because of the interest of my constituents
in the Hudson River, in preserving its quality
and character, I particularly welcomed that
part of this decision having to do with AEC's
responsibility to consider the effects of nu-
clear power plants upon water quality. I
would recall for the Board part of what Judge
Skelley Wright wrote. He said, and I quote:
"NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing
judgement on the part of federal agencies.
In each individual case, the particular eco-
nomic and technical benefits of planned ac-
tion must be assessed and then weighed
against the environmental costs; alternatives
must be considered which would affect the
balance of values. . . . In some cases, the
benefits and possible costs may. lie anywhere
on a broad spectrum.... The point of the
individualized balancing analysis is to ensure
that, with possible alternations, the optimal) y
beneficial action is finally taken."
Going further, the Court made it abun-
dantly clear that while the granting of a
license by the AEC is contingent upon a
water quality certification, the AEC is not
precluded from demanding water pollution
controls from its licensees which may be
more strict than those demanded by the
certifying agency. The Court clearly expects
the Commission to balance the overall bene-
fits and costs of a particular proposed proj-
ect, and consider alterations (above and be-
yond the applicable water quality standards)
which would further reduce environmental
damage. Yours is the heavy responsibility of
giving substance to this judicial reaffirma-
tion of the purposes of NEPA.
THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION
At the outset let me say that I do not pre-
tend to know about the intricacies and sub-
tleties of design of a nuclear power plant. I
am not a professional nuclear engineer. nor
a health physicist, nor an expert in the effects
of waste heat and what to do about it. I-arn
none of these. Rather what I have to say re-
flects my continuing awareness as a Member
of Congress who has strongly supported and
closely followed the enactment and subse-
quent application of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act.
THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE INTERVENOR
In preparing this statement of concern, I
have come to learn something of the built-
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Campanella arrived later to thank Locust and
pick up his car,
Locust had paid a $20 wrecker charge,
taken the car home, bought parts and re-
paired the defects himself. He did that not
with the idea of being repaid but to help his
new-found friends.
Campanelli finally persuaded Locust to ac-
cept partial repayment, but it was only after
he had stayed the night and promised to call
if the car broke down on the way to New
York.
Peking, and two summit meetings having difference is Whether they are actually out,
been held-it seems to me this scenario is or what is an agreement to get them out,
quite clear. We are very close to some kind and I would be willing to settle for an agree-
of understanding. ment, because I can't imagine Hanoi not ob-
Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, are you express- serving that agreement if they signed and
ing a personal opinion? You are often privy sealed it,
to what is going on In the administration at Mr. CLARK. To get back for a moment to
the highest levels. Do you have reason to what is going on currently, we have had a
believe that we are close to reaching an un- brief moratorium on the bombing of Hanoi,
derstanding? the Hanoi area, while President Podgorny
Senator JACKSON. It is a personal judgment was there. Would either of you feel that this
on my part but there are other factors that might be the time, again, to call a temporary
I think give some credence to that personal halt in the bombing of North Vietnam u til
share that optimism? about U wnt in bring
Mr. AXBE, Mr. President, President a negotiated settlement n Paris which
Nixon returned from Moscow with two Senator PERCY. There is no hard evidence would end this war totally and completely-
important agreements on strategic arms at ha that we are close to ant understanding. not just our involvement but for everyone-
limitations. These agreements are a good resuming there the Paris peace talks. There may be e I a would certainly support it, but we would
first step toward eventual lessening of evidence now that Henry Kissinger does in- have to have some evidence that it would
_bring that about.
the arms race. tend to discuss Vietnam in Peking, and from Mr. CLARK. Senator Jackson, you have been
The SALT agreements have been in- Mr. Podgorny's statement alone there is evi optimistic that something is happening.
appropriately criticized. Some people dente now for the first time that the Soviet Would you stop the bombing?
claim we are defenseless or might be left Union is attempting to work toward some Senator JACKSON. I am not saying they are
defenseless. The fact is we can destroy sort of a cease-fire across the board, and about to settle this long, drawn out conflict
def sel es many tact i over. an me Sroy assist in this regard, all of which, I think, but before we stop the military pressure
ea_ is part of the initiative undertaken by the which obviously is having some impact, I
ators are saying we did not get as much President to have a new solid foundation on would certainly say that it would be manda-
as we gave. Still, we must begin some- Which we can build our relationships with tory that we have a definite understanding
where, and again the fact is that we can the Soviet Union. There is hope, but nothing that there is going to be some kind of resolu-
both destroy each other, hard in evidence today that would say that tion within a period of time. Otherwise we
It is true that the agreements were not we are on the brink of an understanding, get into this old filibuster business that has
final. We must continue to develop some Mr. KOPPEL. Well Senator Jackson, let me been going on over four years now, the Paris
new weapons systems to be prepoed some approach this from a slightly different angle, talks, and I want to get all our men out, I
You have expressed some fear that perhaps want to get all our prisoners out, and I want
the next round of talks. But we must be- the President settled for a weaker kind of to get our involvement to an end. But I think
gin somewhere. We must make serious SALT agreement simply because this is a po- we would have to have some kind of very
attempts to talk to the Soviets and the litical year. Can we take that similar approach clear and unambiguous arrangement by
Chinese. on the Vietnam settlement, wouldn't it be- which the final phases of the talks could be
In all the debate, the Senator from Il- hoove the President before early November held and terminated.
lanais (Mr. PERCY) has been outstanding to reach some kind of settlement, even if it Mr. CLARK. So until you see more concrete
in his ability to pick out the important is less than we should be settling for? signs of what is going on you would not
issues. ability He need to has tocpick out the m o tant Senator JACKSON. I don't think there is call a halt to the current bombing of North
any doubt about that. The President, of Vietnam2
reasonable risks for peace. His June 18, course, modified in his speech his position Senator JACKSON, No, I would not.
1972, interview on ABC's "Issues and An- regarding a settlement on Vietnam. You will Senator PERCY. The most hopeful thing
swers," along with the Senator from recall that he agreed to have all of our troops would be to have a stand-still cease-fire
Washington (Mr. JACKSON), is an excel- out in four months, provided that our prison- right now. All bombing, all ground action, all
lent example of Senator PERCY's defense ers are returned. There Is an immediate sea action stopped. If we stand on that
of President commendable and stand-still cease-fire. And that got lost in ground, then I would tend to say the chances
c futious first Nixon's ixop tow omd ending the the rhetoric of the moment. And the facts of working out something are better. But as
are that this was quite a significant con- long as the hostilities are carried on at the
arms race. cession made by our government. Therefore present level that they are, working the rest
I ask unanimous consent to have the I wouldn't be surprised that we are able to of it out is much more difficult.
text of the program printed in the reach some understanding on a stand-still Mr. KOPPEL. Now Senator Percy, the Presi-
RECORD. cease-fire. There isn't any doubt that the dent suggested just that a couple years ago.
There being no objection, the program North Vietnamese are really being hurt now, We haven't heard a great deal about this
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, and they are in a better position on the stand-still, or cease-fire in the past two
as follows: ground than they were a few months ago years. To the best of your knowledge does
because of the invasion across the DMZ. that offer still stand?
"ISSUES AND ANSWERS," JuNE 18, 1972 Mr. KOPPEL. Well Senator Percy, other than Senator PERCY. I think it certainly would.
Guests: Senator Charles H. Percy (R. Ill.) the proposals that the President made on I would support such an offer.
and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash.) May 8 can you see the United States making Senator JACKSON. I happened to have been
Interviewed by: Ted Koppel, ABC news any more concessions? We have been very the author of course of the bipartisan letter
diplomatic correspondent; and Bob Clark, tough up until this point and yet now we that went to the President in September of
ABC News Capitol Hill correspondent. seem to have made about as many conces- 1970 suggesting a stand-still cease-fire. I
Mr. CLARK. Gentlemen, welcome to "Issues sions as we can. If it turns out in a few weeks supported it.
and Answers." that we have given away something more Senator PERCY. And I remember co-spon-
We want to get your reaction first if we would you be satisfied with a settlement like soring that. It was a fine initiative.
may to some mysterious signs that something that? Senator JACKSON. That's right. And the
is going on in various capitals of the world Senator PERCY. I want to see us get out of President utilized a part of that In connec-
in a new effort to end the Vietnam War. Vietnam and settle this war and end our in- tion with these talks that were held in secret
Soviet President Podgorny was interviewed volvement in it, totally and completely. I through Dr. Kissinger, when he revealed that
in India this morning on his way back to think the President's proposals are imagi- we had done that. But now, you see we are
Russia from Hanoi and he says among other native, creative, and they do not leave our in a little different context, are we not, we
things that the Soviets will do everything pos- destiny in the hands of South Vietnam. They are in the context of there having gone over
sible to bring about deescalation of the war are agreements that we can reach directly the DMZ, holding certain areas of South
in Vietnam, and he also told newsmen that with Hanoi. I fully support his initiatives in Vietnam, and I believe the President's re-
he expects the Vietnam peace talks in Paris this regard. quirement, of course, involves the tying of
will be resumed soon. Senator JACKSON. I think there Is a clear all three 'things together.
Do either of you think that we are at long point we want to get out, but we want to get Mr. KOPPEL. But I mean the President has
last succeeding in enlisting the support of our prisoners of war out, and this is the big not withdrawn that offer, has he; it is still
the Communist powers in bringing the Viet- hang-up. Let's not kid ourselves. This is the on the table?
nam war to an end? hang-up about getting our prisoners of war Senator JACKSON. That may be technically
Senator JACKSON. I really think there is out. Every time we get down to, about to true, but I believe what we are really talking
some movement here. It is my judgment that reach some kind of general understanding, it about now is a standstill cease-fire as a part
we are very close to reaching an understand- is always on the prisoners of war, plus other of a package involving all of our troops being
ing. Certainly Podgorny wouldn't be in demands. out in four months and a return of our pris-
Hanoi, and the top Hanoi representative in Senator PERCY. But this is one of the three oners. That Is it. It is 1, 2, 3, and I support
Peking and Dr. Kissinger about to arrive in parts of the President's proposal. The only that move. I think it makes sense.
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June 22, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
S 9967
On the House side, this critical situa- Our society and the technology which TROUBLE-PLAGUED FAMILY FINDS FRIEND
tion has been actively studied by the dis- supports it continue to increase in coin- IN DURHAM
B Jim Lasley)
tinguished chairman of the House Re- plexity and require individuals possessed y
publican Task Force on Labor-Manage- of more sophisticated educational back- There will forever be a place in the hearts Auburn ment Relations, Representatije SHER- ground and preparation. In addition, one Lof an ocust of bur , New York, family for Lewis
MAN P. LLOYD, of Utah. RepreVentative of the dominant features of contempo- two days he assumed the responsibil-
and
LLOYD put his finger on then of the rary life is change. It is all about us, For
matter when he declared on th floor of its pace increasing, its impact on our ity of r the family's welfare, r did not
s because they were friends or family but sim-
the House recently that Congres should lives more insistent. ply because of his concern.
be taking advantage of this resent High technology, population growth, Locust was recognized at a Durham City
respite from recurring transpo tation greater human density, unprecedented Council meeting Monday night and is sched-ognition strikes and emergency atmospher they advances in communications and data night by additional ecl Human next
engender to enact a permanent in cha- processing, the systematic pursuit of Tuesday lotions Commission.
nism to prevent future crises. knowledge, and the managerial revolu.- He rescued Mrs. L. J. Campanelli and her
Mr. President, I applaud the dis- tion have stamped the present and the five children when their car broke down on
tinguished gentleman from Utah fo his future with the characteristic of con- Interstate 85. Never having seen them before
perceptive remarks, which I believe re tinual change. he.took the six into his home, gave them
worth repeating for thoughtful consl' - Things are moving so fast we are be- money to continue the trip by train, repaired
eration by the Members of this Chamb ginning to suffer from what author Alvin their car and later received Campanelli into home. as well. Accordingly, I ask unanimou Toffler calls future shock. He contends his Locust did all that, and more, because he
consent that they be printed in the that the rapid pace of change is not thought it was the right thing to do.
but ?
ed society
han
ti
,
g
ng a c
"I didn't think it was going out of my way
RECORD. merely crea
There being no objection, the remarks developing an entirely new society. or it was an imposition. You just don't put
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, The study of the future as a way of a lady and five children out on the side of
as follows. ining a firmer grasp on the prese, the road," he said. Locus
eteran t
[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 24, h s begun to attract the attention f at No ht Carolinaa vet U iverndystudent
1972, page H4953] an increasing number of scholars d that anyone with any concern for humanity
COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR CONGRESS anNysts. The presence of change p ces would have done the same.
Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, our existing labor
laws provide cooling-off periods for the par-
ties to negotiate a settlement free from the
heated and emotional atmosphere of a strike.
We are all too sadly familiar with the tragic
and economically devastating consequences
which result when they fail to effectively
use these "cooling-off" periods.
Mr. Speaker, from recent accounts in the
press, it appears that the threats of a re-
newed dock strike and a nationwide railroad
strike have apparently dissipated. This is
news for which I know everyone is most
grateful. Beyond that, however, Congress has
in a very real sense now been given its own
cooling-off period-in other words, a chance
to debate and vote a permanent mechanism
to prevent damaging transportation strikes
free from a crisis atmosphere.
Mr. Speaker, in testimony earlier this
year, our Task Force on Labor Management
Relations warned that continued congres-
sional inaction in this area would be an open
invitation to repeated tragedy.
In this regard, we cannot ignore the fact
that a number of major labor contracts in
We transportation industry will be expiring
next year.
Mr. Speaker, Congress must act before the
present cooling-off period expires.
SALUTE TO EDUCATION
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish
to join Senators in a salute to education.
Education plays a critical role in the
lives of all Americans. More than 60 mil-
lion Americans are now full-time stu-
dents; 3.3 million more are professional
staff. These figures do not include the
millions of children who watch "Sesame
Street," or the millions who receive for-
mal education each year from industry,
the Peace Corps, the military, Federal
manpower programs, and adult and con-
tinuing education. When we include all
of these people, 125 million Americans
are part of this country's education
system.
Expenditures for formal education ex-
ceeded $65 billion last fiscal year and
were handled by 50 States, five terri-
tories, the Federal Government, 18,000
operating school districts, and more than
2,500 institutions of higher education.
gre stress on education. In e rher "They were just nice people," he said. "And
time for example, we could off rd to you treat nice people right.... I don't
think of education as preparat' n for think I've done anything so great."
life. O r society, our technology, ur way Campanelli, however, was overwhelmed by
of life volved at a comparat' ely slow Locust's actions, so much so that he wrote
pace so'ithat each of us coulft prepare Mayor James R. Hawkins.
for a ca er upon which we ould then "Mr. Mayor," the letter said, "If your city
has a man of the year award, or it you award
enter and emain.
a citation for exceptional deeds or acts of
Now we perience thre , four, or five kindness I would be most pleased if you were
career than s in the cou se of our lives. to submit the name of Lewis Locust. . . .
Old techniq s and s - s become ob- "Unselfish actions such as those can be ex-
solescent; ne ones ne to be acquired. pected from family or best friends, but from
Education is st 1 prep ation, to be sure, a complete stranger I would call this extraor-
but it now m st b preparation for dinary."
For Campanelli and his wife it was a les-
Change. And euC tion has become son in action, something they maybe never
equally important, s a continuing or would have truly gotten across to their
recurrent activity, ollowing us along in children.
our professional a personal lives to the "With today's constant reference in news-
point of retirem t and beyond. papers and on TV concerning the problems
I am sure th with proper leadership between blacks and whites this experience
and appropri e Bove ental assist- was the living proof for my children, of what
ance our edu ational stem will meet we have tried to instill in them, that regard-
less of color it is the individual that counts."
the challeng of the fut1 'e. Locust is black; the Campanelli's are white.
INASMUCIt AS YOU HAVE DONE IT
UNTO ONE OF THE LEAST F THESE
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Dur-
ham, N. O., Morning Herald for ednes-
day, Jt he 7, 1972, contains an rticle
entitled "Trouble-Plagued Family nds
Campanelli told it:
Locust was at a service station filling up
with gas. Mrs. Campanelli and her children
were on the way to Miami to meet Cam-
panelli.
There was trouble with the car. She pulled
in at a service station and asked the young
man for help. Repairs were made by Locust
Lewis Locust, of Durham, befriendeal a interstate highway when the brakes failed.
famiry of strangers who virtually became The car went out of control but didn't wreck.
stratlided in Durham when their car,,,, Locust took charge, transferring belong-
it.
Gospel according to Matthew, chapter Train time was that night, so Lewis took
25, verse, 40, where the King says: the family to the zoo, lunch, and a movie,
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of paying for everything himself.
the least of these my brethren, ye have done At the end of the day Locust was still in
it unto me. charge. He saw the family on the train,
I ask unanimous consent that this hu- leaving them with a container of fried chick-
en to eat on the way.
man interest story be printed in the As the train was leaving, he shook hands
RECORD. with Mrs. Campanelli, pressing $48 in her
There being no objection, the article hand for emergencies.
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, In the next few days Locust had the car
as follows: repaired. It was ready and paid for when
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June 22, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Mr. CLARK. Senator Jackson, you have been
leading almost a one-man fight in the Senate
protesting the nuclear arms agreements that
were signed in Moscow. There appears to be
at this moment overwhelming support in
Congress in favor of those agreements.
Do you have any new evidence or any rea-
son to believe that somehow you can turn
the tide and convince Congress that these
nuclear arms pacts are dangerous to the
United States.
Senator JACKSON. Well, I think this coming
week as the hearings get under way we will
try to find out what is in the agreement.
You know, there are a lot of misconcep-
tions, The American people have the idea
that this is going to end the arms race.. It is
a license on both sides to spend tens of bil-
lions of dollars.
Mr. KOPPEL. Senator Jackson, you were just
about to outline what you consider to be
some of the major weaknesses of the SALT
agreements.
Senator JACKSON. Yes. We all want to see
an end to the arms race. We all join in that
effort. We all want to see less tensions in
the world. The problem, I think, is that the
public has certain misconceptions. They
think that this is going to mean an end to
the arms race. The facts are, on both sides,
under the agreements, tens of billions of dol-
ars will be invested on the part of the respec-
tive countries on strategic arms. The Rus-
sians will spend more; they will get more. We
don't have parity. Most Americans thought
we would end up with parity. We don't know
how many missiles we are talking about that
are decontrolled. We have a lot -of miscon-
ceptions about what is in this agreement.
Mr. KOPPEL, Well now, Dr. Kissinger was
talking about, for example, the figure of 1618
offensive missiles.
Senator JACKSON. Yes, sir, and I asked him
the question, why is it that we have in the
agreement a specific limitation on the num-
ber of Polaris-type submarines with missiles,
but we don't have it on land-based missiles,
and he has told me he doesn't know for sure
why that is the case. What we are relying on
is our estimate of what the Russians have
land-based. I think it is a good question.
Why are we specific on one and not on the
other?
Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, Dr. Kissinger did
say at that briefing you both attended at
the White House this past week that our
detection procedures are good enough that
they can't be off significantly; that 1618
figure might be off slightly, but not signifi-
cantly.
Senator JACKSON. Let me give a simple ex-
planation to that question. All we have to
do is watch one place where the submarines
are turned out. That task is totally differ-
ent than watching the whole Eurasian land
mass, where the land-based missiles are de-
ployed. This is why the Russians agreed on
the number of submarines, but didn't agree
on the number of land-based missiles to be
deployed.
Now, this can be an element of great con-
troversy because the cut-off date is coming
soon, July 1st, and it is the number of mis-
siles deployed or under construction.
I think we have to know, don't we, how
many we are talking about?
Mr. CLARK. Do you really feel the Russians
might have substantially more than 1600
missiles?
Senator JACKSON. What do you mean ny
"substantial?" These are significant. This is
part of the problem. We have got to nail it
down. I think the constitutional responsi-
bility of the Congress is to nail down these
ambiguities. Who ever heard of an agree-
ment being worth anything that failed to be
explicit? What we want to do is to avoid
future tensions so there are misunderstand-
ings. We want to see a stabilization of rela-
tions, not a destabilization.
Mr. KOPPEL. Senator Percy, Senator Jack-
son believes there is a very broad issue, and
an important one: The question of American
intelligence-gathering abilities. Can we really
keep accurate track of how many land-based
missiles the Soviets have?
Senator PERCY. I think that Senator Jack-
son himself, who incidentally I believe is
performing a great service, in exactly what
the President would want the Congress to do,
a searching inquiry into these agreements
and every conceivable question that can be
asked about them, and we will begin that
process in the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee tomorrow with Secretary Rogers and Sec-
retary Laird.
But Senator Jackson has himself revealed
movements the Soviet Union have made, dig-
ging more holes, enlarging those holes. He
revealed intelligence reports which he felt
was for the good of the country and I agree
with him.
Our aerial reconnaissance is so accurate and
so good I do not doubt that we can verify
these agreements and maintain them. Our
technology in that area is absolutely superior,
and I will admit there are certain phases of
the agreement that should be brought out.
I go back to this premise: No agreement
we have ever entered into with any other
nation has ever been more thoroughly and
exhaustively researched and prepared for.
No; one is more confident to put a final seal
of 'approval on those agreements from the
Executive Branch than President Nixon. He
has thoroughly done his homework over a
lifetime and particularly intensively for three
and a half years so I believe these agree-
ments will be Supported by the Congress but
we will be performing our separate and ab-
solute obligation that we have to ask the
searching questions that Senator Jackson
has been asking and will be asking.
Mr. KOPPELL. Senator Percy, you had a dis-
tinguished record in business. Would you
enter into a contract where the considera-
tion and basic subject matter is not spelled
out on a bilateral basis?
Senator JACKSON. Now, this is what we are
talking about and this, of course, is one of
the key questions that we want to ask this
coming week. It is spelled out on' submarines.
Why didn't we get the Russians to agree
on the same basis on land-based missiles, and
I am not-
Senator PERCY. You have asked the ques-
tion and I will try to answer it. I have
negotiated international agreements in busi-
ness over a period of a quarter of a century.
I have never seen as thoroughly prepared
a set of agreements as these. I have never
entered into one that didn't have some area
of disagreement as to interpretation.
Senator JACKSON. But, Senator, this is the
heart of the whole agreement; it isn't a minor
detail.
Senator PERCY. Mr. Brezhnev and the Presi-
dent initialed, even, a memorandum which
interpreted the agreement, to try to nail
down every single thing that they could, and
I really feel that these have been as thor-
oughly prepared as any agreements that
could possibly be entered into.
Senator JACKSON. How do you explain why
you have spelled out the number-there is 62
Polaris-tye submarines, and agreed to, but
they are not spelled out on the biggest part
of the agreement and that is on land-based
missiles. Now how would you explain-how
would you write a letter and explain it?
Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, if we could relate
this to your specific concerns what is it you
are worled about, that somehow the Russians
are going to cheat on this agreement?
Senator JACKSON. No, I think that the key
thing that we must do first of all is to nail
down these ambiguities. It is that simple.
If you don't, you are immediately going to be
in a debate here-----
Mr. CLARK. Except the agreement.has al-
ready been signed with the Russians. How
do you nail it down now?
S 9969
Senator JACKSON. Well, I think you nail
it down' by calling-there are a lot of things-
this is what we will get into. You can have
reservations, you can have understandings.
After all, bear in mind, Mr. Clark, they sent
up not just these agreements, but they sent
up understandings that are a mile long, and
there are our interpretations not joined in
by the Russians. It is obvious there has to
be further clarification.
Senator PERCY. Well, there is going to be,
too. We know this is just the beginning
phase-we trust a period of refined agree-
ments that will cover everything, mutual re-
duction of forces, that will cover bombers.
They could well say "Why don't you cover
bombers? You have got far more bombers
than we have, why don't we cover the inter-
mediate missiles?"
Senator JACKSON. Why don't we cover spe-
cifically what we are talking about first. How
can you possibly have an on-going viable
agreement that will stand up and not cause
conflict? I want to get an agreement that' will
work, and this is just but one example. What
is a heavy missile? It is not defined.
Senator PERCY. Fine. What do we consider
is an SS-9?
Senator JACKSON. Well, that is not defined.
Can you take that kind of missile and put it
in another missile of that size. We think they
are allowed 313.
Senator PERCY. In the memorandum of in-
terpretation they have said if you increase
the size of the missile by more than 15 per-
cent, this is substantial upgrading of that
missile. I think that interpretation was very
clear-
Senator JACKSON. We say it is 313. The Rus-
sians don't agree as to the number, and that
again is an example of the kind of clarifica-
tion I think that we need to have. What we
want is-
Senator PERCY. You are asking the question
will we strengthen SALT II negotiating hand
in nailing down some of these things?
Mr. CLARK. Gentlemen, if we can go back
very briefly to the Moscow Agreements, they
would permit each of the two countries, Rus-
sia and the United States, to complete two
ABM sites. The United States is completing
one in North Dakota. The Administration
also wants to ring the capital, to ring Wash-
ington with a defensive missile system. Are
each of you ready to vote the money to
complete or to start-we haven't started
yet-a defensive missile system around
Washington? Senator Percy.
Senator PERCY. I much preferred a zero
ABM all along. I much prefer a single site to
a double site. I would want more evidence as
to what the ABM around Washington will
really accomplish.
Mr. CLARK. At the moment you would not
expect, to support the Administration on
this, Senator Jackson?
Senator PERCY. It is a quarter of a billion
dollar decision.
Senator JACKSON. Well, this is one of the
great mistakes the Administration made.
They are on notice that they can't get the
fight through on Washington. We voted it
down two years ago in the Armed Services
Committee. I led that effort, and I also led
the effort to save the ABM, but this is a silly
arrangement that was made, in my judg-
ment, and at best they will get the one site
in North Dakota.
Mr. CLARK. So you would agree then that
is unlikely the President is going to gat a
defense missile system-
Senator'PERCY: It would be quite a strug-
gle-
Mr. KOPPEL. Well, gentleman doesn't that
kind of eliminate one of the crucial aspects
of the SALT agreement? Do we still have an
agreement-
Senator JACKSON. Well, we are not required
to-we are permitted to, but we are not re-
quired to.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -. SENATE June 22, 1972
Mr. KOPPEL. Will it considerably weaken us,
enough, Senator.
Senator JACKSON. Absolutely. The real
:.iagedy-the Administration had held out
what all of us had fought for, and that is a
s wo-site minimum, to defend Minuteman.
Now, that makes sense because we did not
:'dd on to our offensive forces, and I sup-
l7orted that effort. But to turn around and
l=our hundreds of millions of dollars into de-
landing Washington, which is not defend-
able in a missile context that we are talking
sbout, to me makes no sense, and they were
zaware of it and they were on notice and that
is why I think the ABM agreement was an
a.nwise one, because we came out on the short
end of the stick. Moscow's not dismantling
anything. We are dismantling the site in
Montana. They get to go forward with the
site they already have, this huge complex
around Moscow, whichalso covers some of
Liseir-
Senator PERCY. But, as you say, if it makes
no sense at all, why do we care if they want
to make a mistake, rather than our making
a. mistake?
Senator JAcxsoN. Senator Percy, their site
is Moscow also covers some of their offensive
systems, which an ABM site here will not do.
Senator PERCY. A system around Moscow
isn't worth a thing. You cannot defend that
an a practical basis.
Mr. KOPPEL. Gentlemen, while we are on
tae subject of money, though, I would like
to ask what seems to me to be a very basic
question: The administration seems to have
rationalized this kind of agreement to the
public at large on the basis of cutting mili-
tary spending. Instead we find that we are
going to have a larger military budget next
year than-we have this year. Why?
Senator PERCY. Our budget request is $83.4
billion. We are going ahead apparently, ac-
cording to the administration, with two sites
Instead of twelve. They are prepared to cut
out three-quarters of a billion dollars right
away because of the SALT agreements, and
that should multiply many fold In future
years.
Mr. KOPPEL. But we do have a bigger mili-
tary budget upcoming for next year than
we had this year.
Senator PERCY. That is mainly because of
pay Increases which now constitute 54 per-
cent of our whole budget.
Mr. KOPPEL. What I am concerned about,
Senator, is that we seem to be getting into
kind of a spiral where Dr. Kissinger, for
example, the other day says we have to
o ahead with certain programs, otherwise
we are weakened in our negotiations in
SALT-II.
I can just see this going on for years
where the administration will be saying:
We are not going to be able to trust the
Russians, or if the Russians break an agree-
rnent, we still have to go along preparing
the same kinds of systems, new systems, that
we have all along.
Senator PERCY. Assume that this agree-
ment will suddenly and dramatically cut
our defense budget in half and that would
be a delusion. We are not implying that at
all. But it is the beginning of arresting an
>.nlimited nuclear arms race and that is
what it is. It is a beginning. You have to
begin this journey at some point, and it
has now begun.
Senator JACKSON. Ted, let's be frank about
this. The administration's presentation of
this proposal makes it mandatory for Con-
l;ress to increase funds for strategic arms.
It is going to increase our budget. It is not
?;oing to cut it in half, it is not going to
decrease it, it is going to increase it. Not
this coming year, but the year after and the
rear after. Now that is what is involved here.
Now let's get these facts out on the table.
We are going to start doing It in the Armed
Services committee on Tuesday, and they
are going to build the so-called new 'ype
of ULMS submarine which will cost $1 bil-
lion a boat. Now that is what the admin-
istration is proposing.
Senator PERCY. I don't agree with thaw at
all and I will have no part in that kind of
an escalated step-up because of the agree-
ment.
Senator JACxso:N. That is your President's
proposal.
Senator PERCY. Absolutely not. That is a
misinterpretation of what his intention is.
Senator JACKSON. Well that is his proposal.
The budget is already up there.
Mr. CLARK. I would like to ask you at
least one political question. You are still a
candidate for the Democratic Presidential
nomination, though you dropped out of the
primaries. Senator McGovern Is expected to
pick up some 200 votes on Tuesday in the
New York primary which will put him within
almost 200 votes of the number he needs to
go over the top. Is McGovern stoppable at
this stage?
Senator JACKSON. I believe that he is run-
ning into real resistance. It is possible. but
not probable.
Mr. KoPPEL. On that note, thank you very
much, Senator Jackson, Senator Percy for
being with us on Issues and Answers.
GETTING THE MOST OUT OF OUR
SCHOOLS
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, two re-
cent articles by Sylvia Porter tell us how
communities across the Nation often ig-
nore one of the their most valuable re-
sources, their schools, through "wasteful
disuse." And Miss Porter goes on to sug-
gest that the community education con-
cept is one of the best ideas she has
found to stop this extravagance and
make the schools full-time partners in
the community.
As the Porter articles make clear, the
benefits of a community school program
can be made available through only a
modest increase in the school budget.
The school can become a total commu-
nity center for people of all ages, operat-
ing extended hours throughout the year.
To get the most out of our schools, I
have introduced S. 2689, The Commu-
nity School Center Development Act,
which would promote the development
and expansion of community schools in
all 50 States. Senator WILLIAMS joined
me in introducing this bill last fall, and
20 other Senators have since become co-
sponsors.
I invite more Senators to join in sup-
port of S. 2689. Sylvia Porter's articles
point to many of the compelling reasons
why such support is in the best interests
of citizens of all ages throughout the Na-
tion.
Mr. President. I ask unanimous con-
sent that these articles be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Evening Star, June 13, 1972;
WASTEFUL DISUSE OF SCHOOLS
(By Sylvia Porter)
in one rural area near New York, property
taxes have just about gone out of sight-pri-
marily, of course, to finance the handsome,
beautifully landscaped elementary and high
schools.
In a matter of days, these schools will be
closing for the term and in large part will be
unused and wasted until the, kids go back
in the fall.
This is a real squandering of resources. This
Is, in the words of. Sen. Frank Church, ID-
Idaho, "a kind of disuse of schools and ex-
travagance that modern America cannot
abide." This is, in today's environment plain
stupid.
Last year property taxes climbed more than
9 percent, on top of a 35 percent upsurge be-
tween 1967 and 1970.
Many older Americans are now paying 20
to 40 percent of their incomes to the local
tax collector. So distasteful and oppressive
have local property taxes become that only
47 percent of local school bond issues were
approved during the last fiscal year, a new
record low and- a resounding come-uppance
for school officials-for the biggest chunk
of all property taxes goes for schools. Also,
the National Education Association points
out, local school districts bear more than
half of school costs today; the state kicks
in 41 percent, the federal government about
7 percent.
Yet, while the cost of supporting the ele-
mentary and high school system has nearly
tripled during the past decade to almost $50
billion, the typical school is locked up about
50 percent of the time.
The majority of the schools are used only
five days a week, 39 weeks a year. The schools
are restricted to the formal education of
Americans between the age of five and 17 or
18. Even pre-school "Head Start" children
have been banned from the elementary school
in some cases.
Meanwhile, there is a mounting need for
further education of the older American-
ranging from vocational retraining to retire-
ment preparation and planning, consumer
education, nutrition, music, arts, crafts.
What's the answer?
One is to find new ways to use idle public
schools, And this answer also would help to
slash local tax bills by avoiding the need to
build additional expensive facilities and by
keeping more real estate from falling off
local town tax rolls.
In fact, some 300 U.S. communities have
done precisely this-with a wondrous array
of activities and services and with refresh-
ingly positive results. For instance:
In Gloucester City, N.J., a broad tutorial
program has been set up, using the elderly
along with elementary school students to
"help kids with their homework" and per-
sonal counseling.
In Salem, Oregon, about 100 different
classes and activities are going on, with some
2,000 attending each week-ranging from
knitting lessons to mountain climbing and
small business administration. One lady in-
volved in the program noted tartly that this
was the first time she had set foot in the
local school in 32 years. The extra cost of
expanding the Salem school has been about
6 percent of the regular budget. "With that
6 percent, the time the school is open can
be increased by two-thirds," say officials in
charge.
Your local school could be, in the words of
Barry E. Herman of New Haven's Winches-
ter Community School, a place where:
Children and adults can study and learn
and where learning can take place 18 hours
a day or more;
Educational or vocational skills of people
of all ages can be upgraded for the benefit of
the individual and the community;
People of all ages can take part in such
activities as sports, physical fitness programs,
informal recreation, arts and crafts, musical
programs, civic meetings, adult education,
home economics, tutoring;
People can find health services, counseling
services, legal aid, employment services,
homemaking help;
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 21, 1972
are "more than five years behind the U.S." in narcotic crisis, pushers continue to ply for at least 30 days of treatment. The most
multiple warhead technology. their dirty trade in cities and suburbs Draconian fact-by American standards-
There is no doubt that the Soviets are alike. We passed new laws to combat is that each addict's treatment begins with
somewhat behind on MIRV technology, be- narcotics, but more and more narcotics "cold turkey," or withdrawal unassisted by
cause they took the wrong road to begin chemical crutches such as methadone.
with. But in numbers of missiles, in war- flow into the country from places like The ordeal can be excruciating. Early in
head weight, and in all other respects one Southeast Asia, Turkey, and France. The the process, which can take a week or ten
can think of, the Soviets now have every ad- fact is, hard drugs are now easier to get days, the addict's eyes water and his nose
vantage that a MIRV technologist could ask than ever. Moreover, they are cheaper. runs while sweat pours from his body. By
for. They also have excellent scientists. Hard drugs are one of the few commodi- the third day, he is likely to be wracked by
If the Soviets are going to go "all out," ties in America which have escaped the severe intestinal cramps, diarrhea, vomiting
therefore, they sould soon be MIRVing their effects of inflation. Heroin is actually get- and nerve spasms. Goose bumps cover his
SS-9 missiles, and also the still bigger mis- ting cheaper, reportedly costing on the body; they make his skin resemble that of a
siles they will soon be deploying. They may street now only about co 40 percent of plucked fowl and give the process its name
even multiply greatly their MIRVing capa- in the U.S. Cold turkey is rarely fatal-
bility, by adapting the "cold launch" tech- what it cost in 1965. the Japanese claim 100% survival for those
nique of our Polaris-Poseidons to their SS-9 As addiction increases, so does crime. treated in hospitals-but the urge to commit
missiles. The crime rate in the United States runs suicide can be strong.
The calculated risk in SALT, in short, is an about 10 times higher than our popula- VERGE OF IIELL
immensely big risk. If we do not want the
tion growth. Addicts, men, women, and
most disagreeable kind of surprise, we have children, turn to lawlessness and vio-
to do three things, regardless of cost.
We have to go ahead, full speed, with lence in order to support their habit.
the ULMS or Trident program. We have to go Drugs and narcotics are unraveling the
ahead with the B-52 replacement, the B-1 country's moral fiber, turning human be-
bomber. Above all, we have to go ahead ings into desperate animals and making
with maximum improvement of the Minute- cities unsafe for law-abiding people. The
man system-which can more or less true problem is particularly acute among our
up the nuclear-strategic balance in a fairly young people. There are daily reports of
short time. drug traffic and addiction in our col-
This will cost a lot of money. The arms
race will not end, as the Whl a House warned leges, high schools, and even elementary
the congressional leaders. That leads to the schools.
real criticisms of the President. First, he did If the ever-increasing rate of drug ad-
not directly ask the country, three years ago, diction is any indication, if higher and
for the kind of maximum effort that might higher crime is any indication, our Na-
have prevented the present imbalance. tion's approach to narcotic control and
The President did not do this because he enforcement is a failure. We seem to be
thought he could not defeat the Democratic trying to shovel out the ocean with a tea-
opposition in Congress. Against the back- spoon.
ground of the SALT agreement, however,
the President will again have great difficulty To my way of thinking, there could be
with Congress in doing what needs to be no penalty too harsh for someone who
done now. One has to conclude that he is peddles the ruin, the wasted lives, and
gambling, probably quite shrewdly, on a human suffering and agony that comes
much more pliant Congress after election from drug addiction, Drug traffickers are
JAPAN'S FIGHT AGAINST ITS DRUG
AND NARCOTIC PROBLEM
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I in-
vite the attention of the Senate to an
article published in the June 19 issue of
Time magazine, which recounts Japan's
fight against its drug and narcotic prob-
lem.
About 10 years ago, Japan cracked
down on the hard drug problem with a
vengeance. It is a harsh program which
confines addicts for a minimum of 30
days of treatment, and forces them to go
through the pain process of "cold tur-
key"-withdrawal unassisted by chemi-
cal crutches. It is a program of tough
law enforcement, which hands out a life
sentence for narcotic pushers.
But, more important, in terms of the
overall well-being of the Japanese so-
ciety, it is an effective program. Heroin
use in Japan has been virtually elimi-
nated. Even organized crime there has
wu ao oiiuti LIiuLueL"CIS, auU Lriey snouia
be treated as capital felons.
We need a nationwide assault on il-
legal drugs and narcotics, at every level
of government, Federal, State, and local.
We need tougher laws and tougher en-
forcement and tougher courts that will
take narcotic pushers off the streets and
put them away where they will no longer
be a menace to the American society.
I ask unanimous consent that the
Time magazine article be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:.
[From Time magazine, June 19 19721
Many U.S. physicians believe that such
agony is neither necessary nor desirable. They
prefer to assist the addict through his with-
drawal with other drugs (TIME, Jan. 4, 1971)
and even to keep a patient on a heroin substi-
tute indefinitely if necessary. But the Jap-
anese, who have always taken a puritanical
attitude toward drugs, regard this as a con-
tinuation of addiction.
The country's first antidrug law, adopted
in the 1880's, prescribed zanshu, decapitation
with a samurai sword, for those trafficking in
narcotics. Opium eating, a major problem in
19th century China, never caught on in
Japan. After World War II, however, heroin
began to gain a foothold. Rival gangs pushed
the drug among prostitutes and in the un-
derworld generally, bringing Japan to what
Tokyo Social Worker Michinari Sugahara
called "the verge of hell."
The authorities moved to end heroin use
before it spread to the country's teen-agers.
A government-financed public relations cam-
paign, assisted by the press, lectured the pub-
lic on the drug's social, moral and medical
dangers. The 1963 statute persuaded drug
abusers that the government meant business.
Some pushers reacted to the new law by sim-
ply dropping out of the business. In some
brothels, the gangsters themselves forced girls
to go through cold turkey; those reluctant to
kick the habit were sometimes tied to their
beds until withdrawal symptoms ended.
Others were put in government-run hospitals
that had been constructed specifically for
drug offenders.
The medical profession cooperated fully
with law enforcement agencies, taking the
attitude that addiction is not merely a per-
sonal medical problem but an offense against
society. Says Tokyo Narcotics Agent Hiro-
masa Sato: "Addicts found no alternative but
to capitulate, and eventually submitted to
cold turkey. Sayonara."
NOT FOR EXPORT
SAYONARA HEROIN Drug abuse has not been completely era-
era-
dicated, of course. Youngsters now go in for
Only a decade ago, a heroin epidemic glue sniffing and amphetamines, and a heroin
threatened Japan. An estimated 40,000 ad- arrest is still made occasionally. But Japan's
dicts provided a market for the growing traf- success has been dramatic enough to awe
fic in hard drugs, and some users brazenly visiting American experts. Can the Japanese
mainlined on street corners in such areas as system be exported to the U.S.? Many U.S.
Yokohama's Kogane-cho (Gold Town). To- exports think not. Japan's population is
day, says Dr. Yoshio Ishikawa of the Serigaya- homogeneous, generally law-abiding and,
on mental hospital, heroin addiction "has where national goals are concerned, respon-
become~a subject without a living example sive to official appeals for cooperation. Ameri-
The , in
that the U.S. Government might Vvery out seeing an-actual addict. Police and nar- particular, insist increasi reaching.
onyasserrting
well examine closely. Although some peo- cotics agents face the same triumphant their "individual rights." Many officials feel
ple might flinch at the toughness of scarcity. that it would be difficult to get wide support
Japan's crackdown on drugs, it produces Heroin use in Japan has been virtually for a system that emphasizes the punishing
the desired results of protecting in- eliminated by stringent enforcement of a process of withdrawal.
dividuals in society from the evils of drug 1963 law that provided for harsh handling Dr. Vincent Dole of New York's Rockefeller
abuse and addiction. of both pushers and addicts. A life sentence is University Hospital, a pioneer in the use of
This is not the case here in the United meted out for selling butsu (the Japanese methadone, argues that physicians should
States, where drug addiction has become gangsters' untranslatable coinage for heroin). relieve, not increase, the suffering of the hero-
hero-
State ere drug possession can mean several years in in addict. Most drug users apparently agree.
virtually epidemic. jail. To out off the demand, the government Addicts are far more likely to turn them-
In the midst of the national drug and required that every user caught be confined selves in for treatment if chemical substitutes
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 9843
the association to seek a college degree
in their chosen field of endeavor.
Mr. President, I know my colleagues
will join me in saluting the Red River
Valley Fighter Pilots Association for its
good works and dedication to repatria-
tion of the POW's and MIA's. Our hats
off to the River Rats.
;SALUTE TO EDUCATION
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President,
today's Salute to Education comes at an.
:appropriate time, just as teachers and
-parents, school administrators and gov-
ernment and judicial officers are ponder-
ing the means by which we can best
furnish quality education and equality
of educational opportunity to all the Na-
tion's children.
America's schools should be compli-
mented on the way they have performed
a difficult task that involved 46 million
children and $45 billion last year, each
figure a substantial increase over the
year before.
The task will be no easier in the future.
Problems of higher enrollments, prob..
lems with school support and financing
of facilities are becoming more and more
complex.
We are all confident that the good
work will continue and will improve just
as it has for almost 200 years-since the
Government first granted funds and de-
termined that an education should be
the right of every child.
American citizens, involved in a re-
sponsible partnership of local, State and
Federal governments, will keep in sight
the goal of ever improving education for
their children.
A MONUMENT TO THE
BLACK SOLDIER
Mr, MATHIAS. Mr. President, on June
12, the city of Baltimore unveiled a new
sculpture in Monument Square in the
heart of the city. The Memorial to the
Black Soldier, sculpted and presented to
the city by Prof. James E. Lewis of
Morgan State College, represents long-
overdue recognition of the contribution
which our black community has made
and continues to make to Maryland and
to this Nation. Both in military and ci-
vilian endeavors, the black citizens have
been full participants in meeting the ob-
ligations of citizenship, in spite of the
fact that they have not always been par-
ticipants in enjoying the benefits of citi-
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Mayor Schaefer has asked me to preside on
this significant occasion, and I am honored
by the request.
Mayor Schaefer's administration has been
marked by an earnest desire to bring the
different peoples of Baltimore together. This
ceremony today is part of that kind of pro-
gressive administration all cities need if they
are to thrive.
This ceremony is also symbolic for another
reason. We are, with this monument, trying
to erase some of our errors of the past. In
this country we have done the Blacks two
types of disservice. We have either excluded
Blacks altogether from an area of activity or
we have let him participate but never ac-
knowledged his participation. The total ex-
clusion of Blacks can be seen in such an
area of American life as professional baseball
where for years Blacks were so excluded that
they had to form their own leagues. The
tragedy is that there languished probably
some of the great baseball players of the age.
We can see how many by just looking at
how many Black stars appeared once the
odious color barrier was lowered.
But the second form of discrimination?
letting Blacks participate but ignoring that
participation, has been as tragic. We have,
for instance, let Blacks fight in our wars but
we have done little or nothing to recognize
their contribution. Our history books were
blank. Our newspapers were vacant. Our ar-
chives are bare. Blacks have fought for this
country, died Tor this country, and, yet, one
would hardly know it by looking around.
This discrimination of silence has had its
corrosive effects as much as the discrimina-
tion of exclusion. Not only have Blacks been
denied pride in their own people's accom-
plishments, but we have been kept ignorant
and stifled about our true history and our
common humanity. As with all other forms of
discrimination this, too, has served to im-
poverish both those discriminated against
and those discriminating.
A hopeful sign is that we are finally try-
ing to do something about it. Our schools are
beginning to teach Black history. Our tele-
vision stations are starting to run programs
on Black culture. Our government is trying
to acknowledge the contributions of the
Blacks.
This monument and this ceremony are part
of that effort. But monuments are static sym-
bols of the past unless they spur us to ac-
tion. Our former silence will be truly broken
when we recognize by word and deed that
Blacks, who have been slaves in this land,
have contributed significantly to the prog-
ress of America because they, too, believe this
can be a Promised Land.
Letour history books and our governments
and our newspapers and our television sta-
tions recognize this, but most importantly,
let each of us remember the important part
Blacks have played and are playing in Amer-
zenship. ican life.
The new monument is also indicative
of the efforts of Mayor William Schaefer THEY'LL GO ALL OUT
tion of Baltimore to-
l
th
a
e popu
to bring
gether, to emphasize the unity requisite Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the dis- Third, however, that last "if" is certain to
to the survival of our cities. tinguished columnist, Joseph Alsop, in be decisive. There is zero room for maneuver
The master of ceremonies at the dedi- an article printed today in the Wash- if the U.S. government's optimists (who in-
cation was the Honorable Theodore R. ington Post points out some of the poten- clude the people in the White House, for
McKeldin, twice Governor of Maryland tial danger to the national security once) prove to be as wrong as usual.
and twice mayor of Baltimore. Governor should the Congress fail to provide an One thinks of 1949, when the great Dr.
Vannevar Bush had to tear a whole chapter
McKeldin has, during a long career of adequate defense budget. from his forthcoming book, because the So-
dedicated service to Maryland, gained a Mr. Alsop points out that the reason viets had just tested their first nuclear wea-
deep appreciation for the commitment of some have criticized the SALT agree- pon. (In the chapter, he had said this could
our black citizens. I ask unanimous con- ments with the Soviet Union is that in not happen for fifteen years!)
'nt that, for the benefit of my colleagues, 1966, "the United States began to One thinks of 1949, in turn, because the
vernor McKeldin's remarks at the neglect the nucelar-strategic balance." White House has alsobought the view of the
riling of the Monument to the Black The columnist contends that Persident Bush-like people in the U.S. Intelligence
'.r be inserted in the RECORD. Nixon, to meet his duty to insure the na- community. These people hold the Soviets
tional security, was forced to negotiate
the SALT agreements because-
The Joint Chiefs judged that if we start
from scratch, where we are now, and the
Soviets go on at their present tempo, the
Soviets will be even further ahead five years
from now without the SALT agreement.
He says that we can expect the Soviets
to "go all out" in an effort to achieve
maximum strategic weapons develop-
ment.
Mr. President, the Congress must
examine carefully all of the facts and
probabilities in consideration of the stra-
tegic arms situation and apply those
findings accurately in development of a
sufficient defense budget. I ask that Mr.
Alsop's article be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 21, 19721
THEY'LL Go ALL OUT
(By Joseph Alsop)
Privately, both President Nixon and Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger have warned congres-
sional leaders that they still expect the
Soviets to make a "maximum" effort of stra-
tegic weapons development, within the limits
of the SALT agreement.
"They'll go all out," is the quoted assess-
ment on this highest of all levels.
If this is the message that Moses-Nixon has
brought down from the mountaintop in Mos-
cow, a serious question arises. The question
is why it is sensible to sign a SALT agree-
ment, aimed to halt the arms race, which
will admittedly do no such thing. The answer
comes in three parts.
First, the SALT agreement writes into a
treaty and the accompanying executive agree-
ment what seem like great advantages for
the Soviets; yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were strongly favorable. The JCS are favor-
able, in turn, because they believe that in the
existing situation, the U.S. will be worse off
without the SALT agreement's extremely
modest limits on Soviet weapons-deployment.
In other words, the Joint Chiefs judged
that if we start from scratch, where we are
now, and the Soviets go on at their present
tempo, the Soviets will be even further ahead
five years from now without the SALT agree-
ment. This is the bitter result of the follies
committed since 1966, when the U.S. began
to neglect the nuclear-strategic balance.
Second, no sort of change in the basic pat-
tern of Soviet behavior is promised by the
Nixon-Kissinger warning, "They will go all
out." But there is a real chance of this kind
of change if the United States also does what
needs to be done about the nuclear-strategic
balance in the vital interval just ahead.
We got a SALT agreement, such as it is,
because we rejected the advice of the wise
fools who favored unilateral disarmament.
Conceivably, at this strange stage in history,
we may get something like enduring stability
for this weary world, if we just do a bit more
to keep our guard up in the years immedi-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 1972
and rivers. We cannot neglect our other
conservation practices on the land. There
is also a need for more county SCS
technicians to help with technical assist-
ance, and early announcement of the pro-
gram in July so lay-out and survey work can
be done in the fall and plans drawn up
during winter months. Our county had 4 and
6 county SCS technicians about 5 years ago.
Now we have only 2 and 3. In many cases
today, the. $2500.00 limit that each farmer
can earn, does not cover but 25% of the
cost of large pollution control practices, and
many erosion control structures, if they are
large, due to the fact of increased coats in
the last five years. Cost of earth moving
equipment has raised from 1.5 to 25 dollars
per hour. With this great part of the cost
that must be born by the farmer, he cannot
afford to control the problems on his farm.
Many young farmers today do not have over
10% net worth in their operation, and can-
not borrow the additional money needed.
I urge you to consider that this cost share
limit be raised to $5,000, for large pollution
and erosion control practices. I also urge
that Congress continues to permit ASC Com-
mittees to maintain practices of 1970 and
earlier years in their county programs where
they feel the need arises. Farmers should
have 100% cost sharing on a stream bank
fencing practice as he is giving up land on
each side of the stream or river, from which
he has no source of income. Keeping cattle
out of streams is the greatest method I know
to stop stream bank erosion.
When local, state. and private individuals
contribute 114 million dollars per year to
help out on water shed protection and for
conservation practices and soil surveying;
and the farmers have and are willing to
match every dollar the federal government
will provide in REAP funds; let it not be
said by future generations that their fore-
fathers did not care or understand the nec-
essity of controlling erosion and pollution.
Now man has only one choice left. To con-
serve what he has left of the soil and water,
or face poverty and starvation as many of
the older countries of the world that did
not conserve their soil, have experienced.
This is God's land for today's generation
to use and preserve for future generations.
Remember, man cannot survive without
the fertile soil and unpolluted air and water.
Let us get closer to the problem by putting
ourself in the place of a raindrop.
A RAINDROP FELL
"There's nothing unusual about that, but
its environment decides whether it will cause
destruction or add to the bounties of the
earth.
"I fell to earth, I know not where, but the
soil was hard and barren. Small as I was, I
moved a small particle of soil. In no time at
all, there were millions more like me, and
now we formed a body of water. We started
moving, taking the path of least resistance,
which was easy because there was no plant
cover and the soil was smooth. As we moved,
we picked up particles of soil, making us
more abrasive, causing other particles to
move. Soon we had a small ditch started, and
as we moved along at an ever increasing
speed, we loft much damage behind us on the
field. Not many of us stayed behind to soak
into the soil.
"We met many others coming from another
direction, also seeking a lower level. We were
no longer a trickle, we were now a stream
with considerable more power. Look! There's
a sharp curve ahead! It looks like some be-
fore had started to cut the bank. We are
strong, fortified with good top soil. Each one
of us took on a little more, making a great
cut in the bank. What was that? A tree just
fell behind us I We washed the dirt away
fuom its roots. So on we go, ever increasing
in size and power until the river banks will
not be able to hold us within its bounds. Just
as I thought, we are now beginning to spread
out over lush farm land where there is some-
thing planted in rows. The dirt is loose and
moves very easily. Soon the plants have be-
come our victims and travel along with us.
The plants caught on to something, probably
a fence which caused us to slow down and
back up and spread out over more fertile
fields until we can break down the fences.
As we slow down, we are losing the soil par-
ticles. They are settling back on the ground.
Many of these particles we have moved hun-
dreds of miles.
"At last we are back in the banks of the
river, leaving destruction untold behind.
Some buildings destroyed, roads washed out,
crops destroyed, bridges washed away and
huge piles of earth moved to where it is of
no value, so man will have to move it in
order to farm his land. Also along the way
we have picked up chemicals and much un-
purified sewage, we are not pure and clean
like we were when we started out. Certain
species of fish cannot live in our environment
any longer. As we slow down, we deposit
acres of new land that was not here years
ago. Now we are mixing with other water
which seems salty. We must have reached
the ocean! What will my destiny be?
"A few years later! Something is happen-
ing! I'm being picked up as vapor into the
air and carried by wind and clouds out over
the land. Suddenly some cold air is encoun-
tered and condensation takes place. Down
I come as a rain drop once more. Where will
I land? If it is the same area as before, great
changes have taken place. This is called con-
servation, maybe even a watershed area. That
was a soft landing. Either trees or grass has
been planted here. There are millions of us
here, but we aren't moving fast. Many of
our number are soaking into the soil, as we
move slowly down the slope, to provide
moisture for the crops until more of us
arrive.
"At last we are forming a body of water,
but we are quite clear yet. We have very little
soil with us. Maybe we can move some now.
Guess not! This must be a terrace as there
is not much slope and we move very slow.
What's ahead? Looks like a creek, but it
seems different. It must be a sod waterway or
a diversion.
"There is grass on the bottom and on the
sides, and we are moving toward a larger
body of water. Must be a structure to hold
water back, but I am clean, and not carry-
ing much soil with me. I think there are fish
in my presence. Look! On the bank there is
a boy and a girl fishing. Is it a farm boy
and girl, or is it a boy and girl from the city,
who may never have come so close to nature
before?
"Well, I must say, this journey was shorter
than the last one, and not as exciting as I
caused no destruction. But I am proud that
someone was caring for his land and conserv-
ing the water for the benefit of all mankind."
Thank you, gentlemen, for the opportunity
of sharing some of my views with you today.
A TRIBUTE TO EDUCATION
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, edu-
cation has played a unique role in the
history of our country. Our educators
are probably best known as innovators,
but let us also remember-that we are the
first country in the world to have pro-
vided universal education for our chil-
dren. We are continuing to devote in-
creasing resources to the education of
our citizens.
The presence of not only a literate but
also a knowledgeable citizenry has con-
tributed to the rapid economic develop-
ment which has characterized our past.
It has also been essential to the proper
operation of our political process.
If we are to continue to improve the
quality of life for all of our citizens, we
must place high priority on education in
the future. We must be willing to pro-
vide educational opportunities which
satisfy the needs of our diverse citizenry.
Only when we have an equality of op-
portunity, allowing people to develop
their talents to the limits of their abili-
ties, will education have gained the posi-
tion which it must have in our society.
BARBITURATE LEGISLATION SUP-
PORTED BY SENATOR FRANK E.
MOSS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I commend
the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss) for
his support of two bills which I have in-
troduced relating to barbiturate drugs.
S. 3538, would require all manufacturers
and producers of solid oral form bar-
biturates to place identifying marks or
symbols on their products. This would
facilitate police efforts in tracing bar-
biturates diverted to the illicit market
back to the original production and dis-
tribution sources. S. 3539, would provide
for the rescheduling of four commonly
abused short acting barbiturates from
schedule III to schedule II of the Con-
trolled Substances Act. This change
would subject these particular barbitu-
rates to stricter production and distribu-
tion controls as well as to more stringent
import and export regulations.
These two bills attempt to deal with the
most significant aspects of production,
distribution, and diversion of the short-
acting barbiturates. I welcome Senator
Moss as a cosponsor of both of these
needed pieces of legislation.
Mr. President, Senator Moss has sup-
plied a statement for the hearing record
relating to barbiturate legislation that I
held on June 12 and 13, 1972. For the
benefit of Senators, I ask unanimous
consent that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK E. MOSS
Subject: S. 3538 and S. 3539, to curb Drug
Abuse,
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the
Subcommittee for holding hearings on these
bills (S. 3538 and 5.3539), which place mis-
used drugs under greater restrictions.
All too many of our citizens-and our
young people especially-are using, and mis-
using, barbiturate drugs. Because they are
inexpensive, they are readily available. We
have all known young men and women whose
wide use of "Downers" has brought tragedy
into their lives.
The abuse of psychotropic drugs has been
increasing at an alarming rate. On the street
these sedatives are known as "Red Devils,"
"Red Balls," "Rainbows," "Goofers," and
"Downers."
This abuse, however, is not limited ex-
clusively to the street culture. More and more
these drugs are being introduced into our
American way of life. Drug abuse has been
introduced into such diverse groups as col-
lege, high school, and junior high school stu-
dents, industrials workers, businessmen, mid-
dle-class party-goers, and members of the
Armed Forces. Even children in the fourth
grade of grammar school are not immune to
the dangers of these drugs.
It has been estimated that as many as four
million school age youth have abused barbi-
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21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
I ar afraid the administration must be
eourued among them-who argue that be-
vause we now have more MIRV (multiple-in-
dependently-targeted reentry vehicle) war-
heads than the Soviets it is safe for the
resident to have granted the Soviets (as
he has done) a license to outdistance us by
4 -l. in payload capacity.
But MIRV is not frozen under this agree-
ment. The Soviets, therefore, can-and will-
procead very rapidly under the agreement to
catch up with us in the MIRV field. We
'snow they are hard at work on it. Since the
Soviets are permitted so many more missiles
than we have and so many missiles many
Limes more powerful than our own (as much
as tour or five times as large), the Russians
could end up overwhelming us in numbers
of warheads as well as numbers of missiles
and missile size.
In the course of our Senate hearings on
SALT-long before the Moscow summit-we
warned the administration many times that
the Congress, at my initiative, had turned
down funds for an ABM site around Wash-
ington, D.C., on the grounds it would not be
effective. The Soviets could easily overwhelm
that ABM site. I was amazed, therefore, to
learn that the President had signed an agree-
ment in Moscow that called for a deployment
on our part that the Congress had previously
rejected while abandoning a sensible deploy-
ment that the Congress had approved--
namely, additional ABM sites to protect our
deterrent land-based missile forces.
I think we must also recognize that the
next phase of the SALT negotiations cannot
help but be influenced by the outcome of
SALT I. Within the five-year life of the in-
terim arms agreement, that is, by mid-1977,
we will be In the position of having to ask
the Soviets for parity. In other words, we will
be asking them to give up in SALT II what
they have gained in SALT I. Yet what pos-
sible reason is there to expect that the So-
viets will be willing to do this? Or, more to
the point, what political and diplomatic con-
cessions will we be forced to make so that the
Soviets will not further widen their margin
of superiority? For is it reasonable to believe
that the Soviets will not attempt to gain po-
litical and diplomatic benefits from the stra-
tegic arsenal in which they have invested so
heavily, and which we have now licensed
them to expand?
I have said on several occasions that in-
creased Soviet strategic capabilities can em-
bolden the Soviets, can increase their will-
ingness to take risks, can harden their bar-
gaining position in negotiations, and can
therefore lead to new instability in interna-
tional affairs. Operating from a much more
favorable correlation of forces, the Soviet
leaders could be expected to seek fresh ad-
vances, especially in the third world.
Nothing that has happened in recent
months-whether on the Indian subconti-
nent, in the Mideast or with the Soviet sup-
plied North Vietnamese offensive across the
DMZ-can be cause for altering this assess-
ment.
Summits are difficult at best and a summit
in an election year before a nationwide TV
audience is a very doubtful instrument of
sound diplomacy. One must ask whether we
would not have been much better off to con-
tinue the SALT I negotiations, do some tough
bargaining, and seek secure agreements ra-
ther than insist on the hasty signing of less
secure ones.
The American people will be bitterly dis-
appointed if the many serious problems in
the SALT accords have the effect of both
diminishing our security and forcing In-
creases in the defense budget. As the ad-
ministration has presented its program, there
will be no savings in the defense budget as
a result of SALT, and already there are pro-
posed increases.
As much as I can understand the desire
to believe that the Moscow summit heralds a
new era of peace and cooperation, I must say
S 9835
that there Is no substitute for facing facts.
conservation treatment as follows: 3.2
mil-
The Moscow arms agreements, I believe, raise
lion acres need planting; 3.6 million
acres
as many questions as they answer. 3
needs Timber Stand Improvement.
With
these needs and interest by farmers to carry
out these practices, many farmers' requests
THE COUNTY ASC COMMITTEES
have to be turned down, due to a shortage
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, some-
times, because of our frustrations with
modern problems, we tend to overlook
the great good being accomplished by
many American citizens in on-going,
long-term Government programs. A pro-
gram of this nature which very much
deserves credit is that of the county ASC
committees which function throughout
the Nation in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Just recently I was reminded of this
again when I read the testimony given
before the Senate Subcommittee on
Agricultural Appropriations by Mr. Boyd
Frank of Clear Lake, Wis., which hap-
pens to be my hometown. Mr. Frank, as
his testimony demonstrates, is the type
of selfless American who makes our
Government function at its best. His
thoughtful and constructive testimony
epitomizes the excellent approach of a
good organization to one of those per-
sistent problems, soil erosion, that wor-
ries all thoughtful Americans But while
many of us just worry, Mr. Frank and
his associates are working diligently and
intelligently on our behalf. Because of
the importance of his work, I askunani-
mous consent that Mr. Frank's thought-
ful testimony be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF BOYD FRANK
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com-
mittee:
I am Boyd Frank of Clear Lake, Wisconsin.
I am a dairy farmer and operate a 200 acre
farm. I have also served for 13 years on the
County ASC Committee and have had a great
interest in the conservation of our soil and
water of our County, State and Nation.
I certainly appreciate the opportunity to
appear today in support of increased funding
for the Rural Environmental Assistance
Program to 500 million dollars, which was
authorized by Congress in 1936. Much has
been accomplished in the years past, under
the program known as the Agriculture Con-
servation Program, more recently named
the REAP (Rural Environmental Assistance
Program). In our State of Wisconsin which
I am familiar with and also in other States,
I am sure this program has offered much in
its more than 35 years of existence.
According to the latest survey of Wiscon-
sin, 521,% of our cropland, or 6.4 million acres
needs conservation practices applied. Of the
6.4 million acres, 3.6 million acres need the
extra protection of terraces, stripcropping,
contour farming, grassed waterways and
other water outlets and diversion terraces, to
properly manage runoff water. 541,000 acres
need annual cover of crop residues or other
cover crops for protetcion to meet conserva-
tion needs as well as pollution abatement.
566,000 acres need a permanent type of
grass or legume cover used in a long rotation
so that land is under cover for a longer period
of time, maybe five years at a time.
482,000 acres should be planted to trees or
left in grass on a permanent basis. Also, there
are 1.2 million acres that have too much
water and need proper drainage. Of our 2.8
million acres of pasture land, 72% needs
conservation practices applied. Nearly 1 mil-
lion acres need to be re-established to grass
and legumes which require lime and fertilizer.
Forest land-14 million acres-48% needs
of funds each year. (As of this date, more
than $70,000.00 in requests remain unap-
proved in our county).
With this great amount of our land that
is not under erosion control practices, it is
no wonder that the mouth of the Mississippi
River is constantly being moved south. As
I stood by the Mississippi River in New
Orleans, I was told that the mouth of the
river was originally at that point, but now it
is many miles south and the Mississippi delta
:which covers 15,000 square miles of land had
passed this point. I realized that some of it
was from our county and state, and that it
was the best part of our soil; the organic
matter which is the easiest to move.
This is in fact the greatest loss of our na-
tion's assets, as It is top soil that cannot
be replaced by man, but only by nature. It
would take 1000 years to build one inch of
soil by natural decay of plant growth. With
this loss of 1/3 or 3 inches of our top soil,
it is causing the use of larger amounts of
fertilizer to be applied to produce crops, and
greater losses of fertility due to elements
leaching out of the soil. There is a direct
relationship between the amount of organic
matter and calcium (commonly called lime)
in the soil and the amount of nutrients and
moisture it will absorb and hold.
As farms get larger, machinery must also
get larger to operate these farms. The fields
have doubled and tripled in size, causing
more opportunity for erosion. There are also
larger concentrations of cattle on given areas.
As 1 see it, our problem of soil erosion and
the pollution of our lakes and streams is
becoming greater because the amount of
land we have to raise crops and use for recre-
ation is less each year. Also, more and more
of our land is being covered with concrete,
asphalt, or buildings, which causes greater
water run-off.
In my observation concerning how govern-
ment money Is spent to control water and
prevent soil erosion, certainly that spent on
small structures and practices on the land
are far more important and outweigh the
benefits of those for large dams.
For example-a Corps of Engineers dam
in our county and an adjoining county,
about 10 million dollars was spent to protect
one city, but it did nothing for the protec-
tion of soil and control of water on farm
land except right near the river below the
dam. If this had been used in REAP prac-
tices, I am sure all the run-off water and
erosion in the county could have been con-
trolled. We also have a watershed that has
done a wonderful job. It consists of 11 major
dams, and several small dams in the area
constructed under ACP funds. This only cost
about 1.5 million dollars and covers about
36,000 acres.
I cannot emphasize enough that the duty
of sharing the cost of preserving our soil
and water, is the duty of each and every
citizen. Therefore, the federal government
should surely share In the cost with the
farmers, who are caretakers of the land only
for their generation. The time has come when
we can no longer move on to new land, when
what we have is the spoils of man's neglect.
Today we also haveother problems arising.
Air and water pollution from many sources.
The one covered by REAP funds pertains to
animal waste, which again is brought about
by larger units of farming operations where
large numbers of livestock are confined in
smaller areas. Farmers are aware of what is
happening, and are willing to try and do
something about it, but they cannot stand
the cost involved to correct them without
cost sharing. Because of this, there is a
greater need to Increase REAP funds to in-
clude this part of pollution of our streams
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June 21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
that there is a clear margin of benefits
over the costs, for Indians.
TO ESTABLISH ELIGIBILITY OF URBAN AND RURAL
INDIANS
What are clearly required to y are
specific actions by the Federal G vern-
ment to end its long history of b "ken
commitments to the Indian peo e. I
strongly believe, for example, that the
concept of trust responsibility ext ds
to all Indian people, regardless of wh re
pleted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
which calls for extending eligibility for
Federal services to three main groups of
off-reservation Indians-urban, rural,
and state reservation. The time has come
to fulfill the commitment of the United
States to all of the 800,000 Indians who
for too long have known only the re-
peated violation of their civil rights, a
struggle against ill health, malnutrition,
and poverty, and the dental of equal op-
portunity in education and employment.
It is particularly important that all
relevant programs and services be coor-
dinated under the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs to reach those Indians who are iso-
lated in rural poverty or condemned to
an existence of despair in the city, for
their migrations can be traced precisely
to the encouragement provided by a fed-
eral policy or program.
I strongly supported the enactment of
the Indian Education Act of 1971, subse-
quently incorporated in the Education
Amendments of 1972 passed by Congress.
This act launched the needed shift in
eligibility policies in authorizing in-
creased Federal financial assistance to
meet the special education needs of In-
dian children. For it based this new
assistance directly on the number of
Indian children enrolled. The clear in-
tent of Congress is that the discrimina-
tory allocation of educational services for
Indians under Public Law 874 shall end
forthwith. A further important provision
in this legislation calls for direct Indian
participation in education policy deter-
mination, from the local to the national
level.
I have also joined several Senators in
immediately communicating to the Sen-
ate Appropriations Committee our strong
support for additional funds recently
passed by the House to establish addi-
tional urban Indian service centers. It is
important to recognize that this appro-
priation will help the BIA extend its
services to off-reservation Indians for the
and to obtain vital health, educational,
and employment services. ;
TO PROVIDE JOBS AND ECONOMIC OPPORT NITY
I believe the decade of the 1970' must
be the decade of decisive advan in In-
dian economic Self-developm t. The
economic condition of the 450, 00 Ameri-
cans of Indian ancestry living on or near
a federally recognized reservation, col-
ony, rancheria, or pueblo is appalling, not
to mention the desperate plight of In-
dians who have relocated into urban and
rural poverty.
I have long been involved in encourag-
ing corporations to locate on or near res-
ervations, including the Navajo lands,
to provide critically needed jobs. I am
fully aware of the problems which must
be met, but I strongly believe this direc-
tion must be pursued to promote eco-
nomic self-sufficiency among the tribes.
I am committed to a Federal Policy
of Indian self-determination, without
termination of the legal and historical
relationship between the Indians and the
Federal Government. And I have jointly
sponsored, with Senator HENRY JACKSON,
a bill to authorize the Secretary of the
Interior to contract with tribal organiza-
tions so they may directly plan and ad-
criti
Finally, I have ly supporte the
establishment of an\ American ndian
Development Bank, to ssist Ind ns and
e elopm t of in-
Indian tribes in the des
dustrial and agricultur fac' ities and
enterprises, and in the v opment of
their natural resources. believe the
initial capitalization fort s dank should
With 80 percent of re rvatio Indians
living in poverty, a otal app ach to
Indian socio-econom developIn e t must
be launched witho t delay. Urba In-
dians must also b enabled to unde ake
development.
needs of rura
S 9833
key to social mobility and the self-ac-
tualization of countless individuals in our
society today.
As indication of the impact of educa-
tion, in 1971 estimated fall enrollment
in our public schools was 46.1 million;
projected figures reveal that by the fall
of 1978, 6.2 million more students will
have enrolled-an increase of nearly 1
million students per year. During the
same 7 years, college enrollment is ex-
pected to increase by 63 percent. These
young people will comprise the future
leadership of our country. Education has
played a vital role in preparing them to
deal with the complex problems of today.
The mainstay of our education system
is the dediction of teachers throughout
this Nation. Approximately 2 million
men and women have given their time
and talents to the education not only of
our children, but also of adults interested
in continuing their education. During
the fiscal year 1970, over 8 million adults
were enrolled in education programs-
Ex
as
parents how to make education more
vital to their children. More important,
librarians across the country have given
their time so that many public schools
library facilities can stay open at night
for community use. All of these programs
are possible because teachers are willing
to devote their extra energy to special
evening programs in addition to regular
daytime classes.
Of course higher education is increas-
ingly crucial in this technological age.
This year, Congress passed a bill, S. 659,
which promises to have a revolutionary
impact on our system of higher educa-
tion. The bill attempts to establish access
to higher education as a basic Federal
right by providing financial assistance to
all those who need it. The bill also pro-
vides desperately needed operating sub-
sidies to help meet the skyrocketing costs
nf educatinn Congressional passage of
ooperatives is+now required me particular pride. I personally would
ans and to end their exploitation
than to again stand with pride and to
have hope in the tomorrows of this great
land. We must acknowledge the rich
heritage this pluralistic Nation enjoys
in the traditions and values of the In-
dian people, and the strength it can
receive from their direct involvement in
its economic, educational, social, and
political life.
SALUTE TO EDUCATION
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I commend
the National Education Association for
initiating a salute to education today,
June 21. Education continues to hold the
administrators or education, and count-
less individuals who have contributed to
the\passage of this legislation. Women
are ow guaranteed equal opportunities
in admissions, scholarship aid, and fac-
ulty status.
The academic community is to be
commended for its continued advance-
ments-not only in the area of improved
teaching techniques,. but also in the effort
to expand equal educational opportunity
to all.
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FAILS IN
ITS DUTY-WHAT DO THEY HAVE
TO HIDE?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am
sorry to report that the Federal Reserve
Board ducked, misled, hid out, avoided
calls, and gave us the idiot treatment in
connection with my request Monday for
a report to me on the name of the bank
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 1972
or banks involved in issuing the $100
Federal Reserve bills found on the men
caught bugging the Democratic National
Committee.
I think their refusal to cooperate was
both a despicable act and unworthy of
tl iem as an arm of the Congress.
As the ranking Democratic member of
the Senate Banking Committee and as
chairman of the Financial Institutions
Subcommittee, before 10 a.m. on Monday,
June 19, I not only requested the names
of the bank or banks which issued the
notes but also the name of the person
or persons receiving the funds--esti-
mated at $6,300-the source of the check
or financial instrument used to purchase
the $100 bills, and other pertinent details.
FEDERAL RESERVE KNOWS WHO ISSUED $100
BILLS
t did this for several reasons. First,
Federal Reserve notes were involved, they
were in numerical sequence, and com-
mercial banks keep details of transac-
tions of this size. Those who paid for this
job could be traced through the bills.
Second, in this case the executive
blanch is a party of interest. One of the
men caught was directly connected with
the Nixon campaign. I hope that higher
ups may be innocent of these wrong-
doings. But with the executive branch
having a conflict of interest, it was essen-
tial that the Federal Reserve Board,
which is an agent of the Congress, should
give Congress the facts promptly, fully,
and completely.
WRONG AND MISLEADING INFORMATION
Until 4 p.m. on Tuesday, the Federal
Reserve gave us the run-around. For
example, at the same time that the FBI
told my staff on Monday they had al-
ready been in touch with the Federal
Reserve to identify where the bills came
from, Chairman Arthur Burns wrote me
that :
We at the Board have no knowledge of the
Federal Reserve bank which issues those
particular notes.
Until 4:00 p.m. Tuesday, even after news
men had traced the bills to the Miami and
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Districts, the
Federal Reserve was telling my staff they had
no information and the Reserve Bank at
Philadelphia refused to return our calls.
Finally, at 4:00 Tuesday the Federal Reserve
stated that the information ". . . should not
be released to anyone other than the investi-
gative authorities," namely the FBI and Jus-
tice Department.
FEDERAL RESERVE FORGETS IT IS AN AGENT OF
CONGRESS
The fact that the Federal Reserve, an
agent of Congress and independent of
the executive branch refused to cooper-
ate with Congress while falling all over
itself to aid the executive branch sug-
gests they have something to hide.
One would have to be extraordinarily
naive not to feel the Federal Reserve may
be covering up for someone high In the
executive branch of our Government who
is directly involved with the espionage
action against the Democratic National
Committee.
Chairman Arthur Burns should reread
the Constitution. It provides that Con-
ress, not the executive, has the money
power. Under our Constitution the Fed-
eral Reserve Board is directly obligated
to Congress and is independent of the
executive branch.
Certainly with the President of the
United States and his supporters a party
at interest, the Federal Reserve Board
should recognize their clear constitu-
tional obligation to the Congress. In this
case they have failed to do so.
SALT: SOME BASIC QUESTIONS
"-Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in con-
nection with the scrutiny by Congress of
the Moscow arms limitation agreements,
I ask unanimous consent that the text of
my article raising some basic questions
about SALT, which was published in
Newsday on Sunday, June 18, 1972, be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
From Ideas, Newsday's Journal of Opinicm,
June 18, 19721
ARE WE No. 2?
(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON)
With President Nixon to the Moscow sum-
init went the hopes of all Americans for pro-
gress toward a lessening of international ten-
sions and the instabilities that cause wars.
Individual views of the results of the sum-
mit may vary, but I believe all Americans
respect the President's sincerity and thescale
of his efforts in Moscow.
President Nixon has now submitted the
strategic arms limitation agreements signed
in Moscow to the Congress for its advice and
perhaps consent. The Congress, in carrying
out its constitutional responsibilities, must
:study carefully the impact of these agree-
ments on our deterrent posture and the fu-
ture foreign policy of this country. One can-
not give a responsible final judgment until
all of the hearings have been held and until
all the evidence is in. I will endeavor to play
the role of a good lawyer in examining the
witnesses and pursuing the facts.
I must say, however, that what I already
know is enough to raise some very serious
questions that go to the heart of the security
of the United States and the future of indi-
vidual liberty. All Americans want to see the
strategic balance become more stable. We all
desire the increased security that flows from
a potential aggressor's knowledge that he
simply can't execute a disarming first strike
against our deterrent forces. Unfortunately, I
see nothing in the present agreements that
lessens the threat to security of these deter-
rent forces. On the contrary, far from placing
us in a condition of stable deterrence, the
agreement permits the Soviet Union to con-
tinue its offensive build-up in a way and on
a scale that could prove highly dangerous.
Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets
more of everything: more light ICBMs (In-
tercontinental ballistic missile), more heavy
ICBMs, more submarine-launched missiles,
more submarines, more payload, even more
ABM (anti-ballistic missile) radars. In no
area covered by the agreement is the United
States permitted to maintain parity with the
Soviet Union.
Something was basically wrong with the
administration's approach to such difficult
and vital arms control negotiations. In May
1971, the agreements existed only in outline
and many critical issues were still outstand-
ing. Nevertheless, President Nixon publicly
announced that there definitely would be a
U.S.-USSR agreement on thestrategicarms.
In effect, he said we had decided to pur-
chase the house even before knowing the
price! The administration then compounded
its error by instructing our SALT delegation
to see to it that President Nixon had a final
agreement ready to sign at the Moscow sum-
mit. We thus put ourselves over a barrel.
As in all bargaining, the side more eager for
agreement at a specified date will pay more
to get it. There is clear evidence that the
self-imposed deadline led to major conces-
sions by the United States that have had
the result of gravely increasing the disadvan-
t ges to us of the agreements.
For example, on May 20, just six days be-
fore the signing, the U.S. caved in to the
Russians and withdrew our key proposal to
include in the agreement a mutual ban on
the deployment of land-mobile ICBM
launchers. On May 26-the very day of the
Moscow signing-the President capitulated
on the vital requirement to get agreement
with the Russians on a common definition
of the all important term "heavy missile."'
The administration resorted to a weak and
unilateral assertion as to what we under-
stand a "heavy missile" to be, while the So-
viets have chosen even to withhold com-
ment on our definition. The failure to re-
solve disagreement on this term raises doubt
about the central claim that is being made
for the agreement: that it will prevent the
Soviets from deploying more huge SS-9 type
missiles.
The pressures imposed by public relations
requirements at the summit made matters
even worse. We were still negotiating on the
plane carrying the two SALT delegations
from Helsinki to Moscow for the signing cere-
monies. There existed no copies of the agree-
ment other than the ones signed by the prin-
cipals so that the press corps was left to rely
on vague and partly misleading briefings
about the contents of the agreements. The
initial press, radio and TV reports from Mos..
cow were full of misinformation. As a re-
sult, the false figures circulated in these
early stories confused most Americans. Top
administration officials are still contradict-
ing each other about what these agreements
mean. The full content of the agreements--
essential to any evaluation of their import--
was not given to the Congress or made avail-
able to the public until 19 days after the
Moscow signing.
It was only after I made repeated demands
for these additional "private understandings"
that the administration admitted their ex.
istence and announced its willingness to re-
lease them.
This is no way to negotiate. If you nego..
trate this way you inevitably end up with
unsatisfactory agreements. And as Robert A.
Lovett has warned: "Do not give unilateral
concessions, particularly to the Russians.
They will not feel gratitude. They will feel
contempt for your gullibility."
The strategic arms agreements have one
overriding fault: They freeze the United
States at a serious numerical inferiority in
both ICBMs and submarines while they
authorize the Russians to continue their
buildup. Not only do the Soviets get 1.618
ICBMs to our 1,054 ICBMs, but they are per-
mitted to exercise options that would give
them 62 modern nuclear ballistic missile
submarines to our 44. The crucial question
for the nation and for the cause of world
peace is whether these numbers add up to
stable parity or unstable inferiority.
Now there are some who argue that "num-?
bers don't matter-that both sides have
"sufficiency" and that therefore the strategic
balance is stable. Wishful thinking springs
eternal and strong. How curious it is that
the people who hold to the "numbers don't
matter" doctrine are the same ones who
believe that without an immediate arms con-
trol. agreement the world is in danger of a
greater nuclear war. Either numbers matter
or arms limitation agreements don't-you.
can't have it both ways.
Among those who acknowledge that num-
bers do indeed matter there are those-and.
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June 21, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 9845
are offered than if the prospect is cold turkey.
The flaws in that argument are that Ameri-
can treatment programs have a high relapse
rate and that the addiction epidemic is no-
where near being checked in the U.S.
r. STEVENSON. Mr. President, Dr.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., in the June edition
of Scientific American, gives us a schol-
arly description of the nuclear deterrent
on which the United States increasingly
relies for its defense-our submarine-
based nuclear missiles. He points out that
from submarines alone the United States
will soon be able to deliver 5,540 nuclear
warheads against 5,120 targets. With a
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on the limita-
tion of ABM's, our invulnerable subma-
rines will continue to have the power to
virtually destroy the U.S.S.R.
In short, our submarine-based deter-
rent is secure. The restraint with which
Dr. Scoville describes the administra-
tion's plans to inflict a new $40 billion
missile submarine fleet upon the taxpay-
ers is admirable, if unwarranted. These
new nuclear submarines would be larger
than the Soviet's newest cruiser, so large
I am told, that we will not have bases ca-
pable of serving them. The bases will be
constructed or expanded at an additional
cost. The environmental and political
consequences of a sunk Trident subma-
rine armed with perhaps 240 nuclear
warheads are rarely considered, even by
Dr. Scoville. And for the phenomenal ex-
pense and all the implicit dangers, the
greatest of which is the destabilizing ef-
fect of another lurch forward in the arms
race, we gain at best a marginally im-
proved strategic submarine force.
It was not long ago that Mr. Laird said
the United States had to proceed with a
15-percent increase in strategic programs
for fiscal year 1973 because we could not
bank upon a SALT agreement. Now he
says that we must go forward because
we do have a SALT agreement. I urge
Members of Congress to read Dr. Sco-
ville's article before accepting Mr. Laird's
logic, and I ask unanimous consent that
it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MISSILE SUBMARINES AND NATIONAL SECURITY
(Land-based missiles are giving way to sub-
marine missiles as a secure deterrent to a
nuclear first strike. The question now is
whether or not the U.S. should spend per-
haps $40 billion on a new missile fleet)
The primary attribute required of any de-
terrent force is the ability to survive a "coun-
terforce," or preemptive, attack. Ballistic-
missile submarines are almost ideally suited
to satisfying this requirement. Although they
are expensive compared with other strategic
weapons (more than $100 million per subma-
rine exclusive of the missiles), their mobility
and invisibility make them virtually immune
to destruction in a surprise attack. In con-
trast, land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM's) can readily be located with
the aid of surveillance satellites, so that they
must be regarded as "targetable" in the
event of an enemy first strike. Attempts to
"harden" such fixed missile-launchers (that
is, to Increase their resistance to the effects
of nuclear explosions) are in the long run
doomed to futility, since in the absence of
qualitative arms-control agreements improve-
ments in offensive missiles, particularly im-
provements in accuracy, will inevitably make
fixed missile-launchers vulnerable and hence
reduce confidence in their deterrence value.
The advent of multiple independently tar-
getable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), which are
currently being deployed on a large scale by
the U.S., creates a situation in which the
"exchange ratio" strongly favors the attack-
er. Thus a single missile with, say, six war-
heads can potentially destroy six enemy
ICBM's if they are caught in their silos.
Moreover, strategic bombers are extremely
vulnerable while they are on the ground and
would therefore be very susceptible to anni-
hilation in a surprise missile attack. At-
tempts to avoid this weakness by maintain-
ing aircraft on continuous airborne alert
have proved to be expensive and potentially
dangerous. Even the current 15-minute
ground alert is not completely satisfactory,
since adequate warning would be more diffi-
cult to obtain if fractional-orbital-bombard-
ment systems (FOBS) or depressed-trajec-
tory missiles launched from submarines were
used to attack the bombers.
Hence given the present state of military
technology and reasonable anticipated ad-
vances, the primary element in the strategic-
deterrent forces of both the U.S. and the
U.S S .R. will continue to be the ballistic-
missile submarine. All other strategic sys- The submarines must also be able to navi-
tems will remain secondary. Moreover, it gate accurately, so that after they have
seems likely that any agreement that may moved through the oceans into their opera-
emerge in the near future from the strate- tional areas they will always be in a position
gic-arms-limitation talks (SALT) will fur- to fire their missiles at predetermined tar-
ther enhance the relative importance of the gets. High navigational accuracy is not as
the chances great a requirement for a retaliatory strike
that MIRV's will be limited forces. Since by a
that SALT against cities as it would be if the subma-
become extremely l l el y low, ICBM's will rines were to be used in a counterforce role
becoomme e increasingly vulnerable. The more for destroying such "hard" targets as enemy
likely limitations tanti-ballistic-missile
other hand, , would missile sites. In fact, if one side wishes to
hand, would use missile submarines only as deterrent
(ABM) guarantee systems, the the retaliatory
the capability
weapons, then it is important that the ac-
rine-launched comparatively arat small all ballistic mnummberberissiles of of subma- curacy-yield combination of the system not
's) .
The expected failure to limit antiaircraft be so great as to give the other side con-
defenses and to restrain qualitative improve- cern that the submarines have a first-strike
ments in offensive-missile systems would capability against land-based ICBM's; other-
further decrease the value of strategic bom- wise the position of mutual stable deterrence
bers. Although there will probably not soon will be eroded.
be restrictions on antisubmarine-warfare With these general principles in mind, let
(ASW) measures, the technology in this area us examine how the U.S. missile-submarine
In recent years, as the nuclear-weapons is so far behind that it could not possibly forces have developed over the years. The U.S.
arsenals of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. threaten the submarine deterrent, if it can launched the first Iiuclear-powered subma-
have continued to grow, the concept of de- threaten It at all, until far in the future. rine, the Nautilus, in 1955, but it was not
terrence has become almost universally ac- In sum, the Navy will increasingly be the until the late 1950's that development of
cepted as the key to maintaining national principal military guardian of our national long-range missiles had proceeded to the
security and preventing the outbreak of a security. point that these could be installed in such
nuclear war. "Winning" a nuclear exchange What characteristics must an SLBM force submarines. The first ballistic-missile sub-
is no longer regarded as a rational strategic have in order to fulfill its function as a marine, the George Washington, became op-
objective;. in such an exchange everyone, par- deterrent against the initiation of nuclear erational in November, 1960. It was armed
ticipant and nonparticipant alike, would be warfare by the U.S.S.R.? (Since China is with 16 solid-fuel Polaris A-i missile, which
a loser. In keeping with the deterrence prin- so far behind both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could be fired at a rate of about one per
ciple President Nixon affirmed in his State in this respect, the same forces would be minute. The range of this missile was about
of the World Message of February 9 that "our more than adequate to deter China as well.) 1,200 nautical miles and the warhead yield
forces must be maintained at a level sufficient First of all, the submarines should be de- about one megaton. The submarines were de-
to make it clear that even an all-out surprise signed to operate in, and fire their missiles signed to fire their missiles while sub-
attack on the U.S. by the U.S.S.R. would not from, large enough ocean areas in a variety merged, using compressed gases to expel the
cripple our capability to retaliate." For the of directions around the U.S.S.R. so as to missile; the rocket engine is then ignited
Russians to feel secure they must have a decrease their vulnerability to ASW detec- after the missile has cleared the surface. By
similar capability; only then would a stable tion and tracking and to facilitate the pene- 1963, 12 more Polaris submarines were oper-
strategic balance exist. tration of any ABM system. The closer these ational.
areas are to ports in the U.S.,.the less will
be the time lost in moving to and from
operational stations and the less will be the
need for overseas bases. Higher submarine
speeds will also reduce this travel time and
increase the ability to break contact with
a trailing ASW submarine or surface vessel.
The gains here may be marginal, particu-
larly since tracking vessels will probably be
faster than any missile submarine. The fast-
er a submarine moves through the water,
however, the more noise it will produce, and
in countering ASW measures quietness may
be much more important than speed. The
reduction of submarine noise is the most
critical element in preventing detection and
continuous covert tracking, both of which
must rely on passive acoustic sensors.
If an ABM defense is a realistic possibil-
ity, then the submarine missiles must have
enough payload capacity to allow the use of
multiple warheads and other penetration
aids. The entire submarine force should be
large enough so that the destruction of a
few submarines by a concerted enemy at-
tack, by slow attrition or perhaps by a series
of accidents does not seriously degrade its
overall capability. If continuous tracking by
antisubmarine submarines or other ASW ves-
sels ever becomes a realistic operation on a
large scale, then the more vessels there are
in the missile-submarine fleet, the harder it
will be for this tactic to be successful in de-
stroying the entire force. Ballistic-missile
submarines cannot be used to attack other
submarines and are no threat to the SLBM
deterrent of the other side.
In addition to an adequate number of sub-
marines, missiles and warheads, it is essen-
tial to have secure and reliable communi-
cations between these vessels and their com-
mand. authorities. It is not enough to send
the submarines to sea with sealed orders.
Controls to prevent inadvertent or unau-
thorized firing are an absolute necessity, and
reliable methods for ordering retaliation in
the event of a surprise attack are required.
These communications must be jam-proof;
the potential attacker cannot be allowed to
hope that a communications failure might
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 1972
Meanwhile the development of more ad-
vanced missiles continued. The next genera-
tion missile, the A-2, had a range of about
1,500 nautical miles. The first test of the
A-3 missile, with a range of 2,500 nautical
miles and a "triplet" reentry vehicle, was
conducted from a submerged submarine In
the fall of 1963. The triplet reentry vehicles,
which could carry three individual nuclear
warheads each, did not have independent
guidance; the three warheads were intended
to reenter the atmosphere in a shotgun- pat-
tern with the target at the center. Since such
warheads cannot be aimed at separate tar-
gets, they do not alter the exchange ratio
and do not provide any first-strike advan-
tage. Their advent was therefore not in itself
regarded as destabilizing.
In the early 1960's there was considerable
debate over the appropriate size of the Polaris
fleet. The Navy originally sought 48 ships, and
the final decision was to build 41. One factor
limiting the number of submarines is the
problem of manpower recruitment. Nuclear-
submarine duty, which involves 60-day un-
derwater cruises, calls for a certain type of
person who is not easy tofind and who must
be highly trained. Normally each vessel has
two crews of about 140 men who go on alter-
nate patrols.
By the end of 1966 all 41 Polaris submarines
were operational; eight carried A-2 missiles
and 33 were eventually fitted out with A-3's.
Thus the force carried a total of 1,712 war-
heads, but since the triplet warheads cannot
be aimed separately, 656 was the maximum
number of separate targets that could be hit.
Of course, not all of these submarines can
be kept at operational stations at all times.
In general a submarine spends 60 days at
sea and 30 days in port for maintenance. In
addition the submarine might take five or
more days to move from the U.S. to its launch
point and the same period to return. If a
submarine wished to avoid detection by mov-
ing quietly and therefore slowly, the travel
time would be even greater. Thus the number
of submarines at launch stations at any one
time could be reduced to some 20 to 25 ships.
The situation is improved by using forward
bases (on Guam, at Holy Loch in Scotland
and at Rota in Spain), which reduces the
time needed to reach launch stations from
five or six days to one or two days.
With a range of 2,500 nautical miles, a
submarine-launched missile can hit Moscow
from most of the North Atlantic (inside an
arc extending from the tip of Greenland to
North Africa), from the Mediterranean and
even from some parts of the Indian Ocean, a
total sea area of about six million square
miles [see illustration below]. The sea area
from which a submarine-launched missile
could hit important targets other than Mos-
cow, say targets only 200 miles inside the
U.S.S.R., is even larger [see illustration on
opposite page]. One high-ranking Navy of-
ficer reported in 1964 that a Polaris sub-
marine equipped with the A-3 missile could
operate in 15 million square miles of ocean
area while covering its targets In the U.S.S.R.
No land target anywhere in the world is in-
accessible from attack by the A-3 missile.
Although mobility provides a submarine
with the tremendous advantage of improving
its survivability, it creates a new problem: the
determination of its location at the moment
when the missile is to be launched toward its
target several thousand miles away- Unless
the missile is provided with some means of
determining its position during flight or
with a terminal-homing capability, the ac-
curacy at the impact point can never be
better than the uncertainty in the launch
point. To determine the launch position calls
for accurate submarine navigation, which is
made more difficult by the requirement that
in order to avoid disclosing its presence the
submarine shouldnot surface to determine
its location. The attitude of the ship with
respect to the vertical and true north at the
time of the launch is also needed. When the
missile force is being used for deterrent pur-
poses, an accuracy greater than a few thou-
sand feet is not needed; it Is only necessary
to be able to hit a large urban complex. Today
this order of accuracy in locating the posi-
tion and attitude of a submarine can be
readily achieved. The U.S. has made tre-
mendous advances in the development of
inertial-navigation systems in recent years,
and reasonably accurate position fixes can
be obtained even after the submarine has
been submerged at sea for many days.
The inertial-navigation system in a Polaris
submarine is a complex system of gyroscopes,
accelerometers and computers that relate
the movement and the speed of the ship in
all directions with respect to true north.
If an initial position is known, then this
system will provide continuous data on the
ship's position. For an absolutely stationary
submarine, or one whose motion can be cor-
rected for, inertial sensors can determine
without external data the vertical, the true
north, the latitude and all velocity compo-
nents by inertially sensing the earth's gravi-
tational and rotational vectors, but there
is no way of determining the longitude by
inertial means. Submarines that have been
voyaging at sea for protracted periods and
whose inertial-navigation errors may have
become unacceptably large can, by trailing
an antenna while they are still submerged,
get a radio "position fix" from navigation
satellites or land-based transmitters. It may
also be possible to locate a submarine by
reference to accurately known geographical
landmarks on the ocean bottom such as sea-
mounts. In sum, the present technology has
advanced to the point where the location
and attitude of the submarine could In prin-
ciple no longer be the critical factor in ob-
taining missile accuracies down to less than
an eighth of a mile.
A deterrent force must also be able to re-
ceive communications from national com-
mand centers. Direct command and con-
trol originating with the President and with
many verification checks is vital to prevent
unauthorized launching; it is also essential
that command authorities be able to com-
municate in times of crisis with the sub-
marine captains without fear of interference
by the other side. Otherwise communication
would be the Achilles' heel of the submarine
deterrent. There are a number of means of
communicating with a submarine, at least
one way from shore to ship, that do not
require the submarine to surface. Very-low-
frequency (VLF) radio waves can penetrate
a short distance into the water, so that a
receiving antenna does not need to be ex-
posed at the surface. Moreover, the sub-
marine can operate at a considerable depth,
since it can trail an antenna as much as
several hundred feet above its deck. The
U.S. has a number of land-based VLF trans-
mitters at various locations around the world
for communication with Polaris submarines,
and more recently an airborne VLF system
has been devised in order to eliminate the
possibility that the fixed land-based stations
would be destroyed in a surprise attack-
The use of satellites for relaying mes-
sages to submarines provides an alternative
means of communication. Recently much
research has been devoted to extremely-low-
frequency (ELF) waves, which can penetrate
even deeper into the water. The Navy proj-
ect named Sanguine proposed to set up a
vast antenna for this purpose In Wisconsin.
The data rate of such a system would be
quite low, but it would be adequate for
command-communication purposes. The
project has run into difficulties with local
residents because the large antenna currents
and the potential hazard to living things.
For comunication from a submarine to the
command center the problem is more diffi-
cult; it calls at the very least for trailing an
antenna close to the surface and must in any
case be avoided in order to prevent disclosure
of the submarine's location to listening
enemy radios. Fortunately such communica-
tion is not essential to the viability of the
submarine deterrent force.
By the end of 1966 the U.S. submarine-
missile force together with its support sys-
tems was by itself more than adequate to
deter any nuclear attack on the U.S. It had
more than enough missiles and warheads to
devastate the U.S.S.R. even when only a
fraction of the submarines were on station.
It could operate in ocean areas on all sides
of the U.S.S.R., and the Russians ASW capa-
bility was quite rudimentary, with virtually
no ability to "draw down" the size of the
U.S. fleet. At that time the Russians had no
ABM system deployed.
Military technology did not, however,
stand still. The need to operate in restricted
sea areas close to the northern coast of Eu-
rope and the Mediterranean in order to reach
Moscow and other interior Russian cities
created fears that someday ASW measures
might become a threat. More important, con-
cern that the U.S.S.R. might deploy a large
ABM system capable of coping with our mis-
sile-submarine force was becoming more
acute every day. The Russians were in the
process of deploying an ABM defense around
Moscow, using a large interceptor missile es-
timated to have a single-warhead yield large
enough to destroy all three warheads of the
Polaris A-3. In addition they were deploying
radars and defensive missiles in the "Tallinn
system" widely throughout the U.S.S.R.
Some "worst case" analyses of U.S. planners,
particularly during the early phases when
that hese facilities were for ABM defense.
factual information was limited, postulated
that these facilities were for ABM defense.
Later, as more data became available, the
predictions were scaled down to the effect
that the Tallinn system was an antiaircraft
defense that could perhaps be upgraded to
provide an ABM-capability. (Now even this
upgrading Is not considered practicable by
most experts.)
As a result research and development pro-
ceeded on a next-generation missile for the
Polaris submarine that would give increased
future assurance of penetrating any ABM de-
fense and would at the same time give the
submarines enough flexibility to operate at
greater distances from the U.S.S.R. To in-
crease either the payload or the range signifi-
cantly called for a larger missile, and the re-
sulting Poseidon missile required enlarging
the launching tubes in the Polaris subma-
rines, a costly and time-consuming task re-
quiring 13 or more months. Since many of
the submarines were due for overhaul in any
case, however, the two shipyard activities
could be combined with a minimum loss in
operational readiness for the fleet as a whole.
The cost of converting a Polaris submarine to
carry the advanced Poseidon missiles is on
the average $29 million, with another $38
million for normal submarine overhaul and
replacement of the nuclear fuel.
The new Poseidon missile Is about twice as
heavy as the Polaris A-3 and. has a payload
about four times as great. Although its
nominal range of about 2,500 nautical miles
is the same as that of the A-3, a trade-off be-
tween range and payload is always possible,
so that the potential range of the Poseidon
is somewhat greater. The new missile in-
corporates MIRV technology, that is, the
ability to disperse many warheads aimed at
separate targets. The technique developed
for this purpose employs the "bus" approach,
in which shortly after burnout of the propul-
sion stages the missile's final stage (the bus)
is aimed at a first target point and releases
a warhead, which then follows a ballistic tra-
jectory to that target while the bus is re-
directed toward a second aim point. The same
procedure can be repeated until all the war-
heads have been sent to Individual targets.
If a single target is to be attacked, then
MIRV technology allows the warheads to
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approach the target at widely spaced inter- therefore had limited endurance and cruising no locations available for forward bases,
vals and on different trajectories so that no ing range. Their first nuclear-powered mis- more time is wasted getting submarines on
more than one warhead can be destroyed by silo submarine carried only three missiles station and it takes more submarines to
a single ABM Interceptor. The Poseidon is with a 300-nautical-mile range, which in maintain the same deterrent force opera-
reported to be capable of carrying 14 war- later models was extended to about 700 nau- tional at any one time. It would take Rus-
heads, each with a.yleld of about 50 kilotons, tical miles, sian submarines a minimum of six days in
several times the yield of the bomb that de- By the late 1960's it must have been ob- the Atlantic and eight days in the Pacific to
stroyed Hiroshima. Warheads can be traded vious to military planners in the U.S.S.R. reach the nearest launch stations, so that
off for either ABM penetration aids or in- that their land-based ICBM's would become the transit time to and from home ports,
creased range. The nominal complement is increasingly vulnerable to the U.S. MIRV's, in many cases a quarter to a third of the
usually taken as being 10 MIRV warheads, which were then under development and duration- of the patrol, seriously degrades
Department of Defense officials have repeat- which had been publicly justified as provid- the operational - readiness of the Russian
edly stated that these warheads do not ing an improved counterforce capability. The fleet. This disadvantage can be only partly
have the accuracy-yield combination to pro- Russian deterrent needed shoring up with alleviated by using submarine tenders for
vide a first-strike capability against hard- a more effective SLBM force, whose value maintenance and crew exchange at sea.
ened silos (a "circular-error probability" of had been demonstrated by the U.S. In 1966 Moreover, In any East-West comparison the
about an eighth of a mile or better would the U.S.S.R. launched its first Y-class sub- small British and French missile-submarine
be needed with that yield), but the Russians marine, which carries 16 missiles with a fleets, each of which may eventually consist
might still be concerned on this score. reported range of 1,300 miles. This class of four submarines and 64 missiles, must be
As with the Polaris A-3, a Poseidon mis- of vessels was similar to the Polaris sub- added to the U.S. total.. Thus, whereas the
sile with a range of 2,500 nautical miles can marines, which the U.S. had put into oper- Russians now have an adequate missile-
launch warheads at Moscow not only from ation seven years earlier. All the Russian submarine deterrent, their fleet is markedly
large areas of the North Atlantic and the SLBM's deployed so far have had storable inferior to that of the U.S. and its allies and
Mediterranean but also from some parts of liquid fuels, whereas all the U.S. missiles provides no threat to the U.S. deterrent.
the Indian Ocean, a total area of about six have had solid fuels. The Russians appar- As the first phase of SALT is drawing to
million square miles. Targets within 200 ently decided to continue with the Y-class an end, then, it is becoming universally
miles of the border of the U.S.S.R. can be design and began building submarines at a recognized that ballistic-missile submarines
reached from some 15 million square miles. rapid pace, initially at the rate of six to are the essential foundation of a secure and
These large ocean areas present great prob- eight per year and currently at nine per year. stable strategic balance. Under these circum-
lems for any possible future ASW system. Two shipyards are engaged in this work, one stances it is only natural to investigate ways
To deploy detection and tracking systems at Severodvinsk on the Arctic Sea and one to still further improve submarine missile
throughout these waters is a prodigious, if in Siberia on the Pacific. At present the Rus- systems. The U.S. has had a research and
not impossible, task. Furthermore, on short sians have about 26 Y-class submarines oper- development program in this area for several
notice these areas might be somewhat en-
larged if it ever became critical by reduc- ational and another 16 under construction. years, so that the developments at the fron-
ing the Poseidon payload, either by elimi- Although the Russians have tested a new tiers of technology could be incorporated in
nating penetration aids or by cutting down missile with a range of about 3,500 miles, the successor to the Polaris-Poseidon system.
the number of warheads, in each missile. John Stuart Foster, Jr., chief research scion- The particular system proposed by the Navy
The first Poseidon missile was tested in tist for the Department of Defense, recently for this role has been called ULMS, for un-
August, 1968, and the development of the reported that this missile was so long that dersea long-range missile system.
entire Poseidon system was completed two he did not believe the Y-class submarine One obvious way to improve the present
years later. The first Polaris submarine went could be modified to launch it. The Russians submarine missile would be to extend its
to sea with Poseidon missiles in March of have never even tested multiple warheads on range, making possible the launching of mis-
last year. At present about 10 submarines their submarine missiles, let alone MIRV's. siles from larger ocean areas in all directions
have been converted. The program calls for Their missiles are each armed with a single around the U.S.S.R. Increasing the missile's
modifying 31 submarines to carry these new warhead with a yield of about one megaton. payload would allow the incorporation of
missiles, leaving 10 to be equipped with the These missiles have no capability for attack- more warheads per missile or additional
older A-3's. When the program is completed ing our ICBM silos, but it has been postu- ABM-penetration aids. Payload can, of course,
in 1976, the U.S. submarine force will be able lated that they might be employed to at- always be traded off for range. A longer-
to launch 5,440 warheads at 5,120 separate tack our bombers on the ground and our range missile would reduce the time required
targets. It should be possible to keep con- command and control centers, using a de- to move from U.S. ports to launching areas
siderably more than half of these submarines pressed trajectory to achieve the necessary and thereby reduce the need for overseas
on station at all times, and in times of surprise. The missiles have not, however, basing in order to maintain the submarines
crisis the operational readiness can be been tested in this mode, and this approach on station for a larger fraction of their cruis-
stepped up if necessary. This is an awesome would,. in any case, entail a reduction in ing time. With a range of 4,500 nautical miles
force, capable of overwhelming even a mas- their already limited range. a missile could reach Moscow shortly after
sive ABM defense system. There is, of course, The U.S.S.R. will have a slightly larger the submarine leaves the U.S., whereas with
no evidence that the Russians have Any in- ballistic-missile submarine fleet than the a range of 2,500 nautical miles at least three
tention of building a large ABM system with U.S. when it completes those vessels now days' travel would be required. Thus for a
nationwide coverage, and it is highly likely under construction (42 to 41). Even then, 60-day cruise lengthening the missile range
that such a system will be precluded in the however, the capabilities of the Russian fleet by 2,000 miles could increase the period of
first stage of a strategic-arms-limitation will be far inferior to those of the U.S. operational effectiveness by about 10 percent
treaty. Polaris fleet. President Nixon in his 1972 if forward bases were abandoned.
Even one missile submarine can launch State of the World Message said that "our More advanced guidance systems employ-
160 warheads at separate industrial centers missiles have longer range and are being ing terminal control (the ability to change
in the U.S.S.R., an attack that the Russiains equipped with multiple independently tar- the path of the warhead during reentry) are
could not afford even if the U.S. had been getable warheads. Moreover, our new subma- being developed to avoid interception by
annihilated. This means that any ASW sys- rines are now superior in quality." The ABM systems or to improve accuracy. Higher
tem would have to be able to eliminate al- shorter range of the Russian missiles requires accuracy obtained by this means or others is
most instantaneously every single submarine, that their submarines operate fairly close not required if missiles are to be used as
a herculean task. Today it is difficult, if not to the U.S. coast in order to be able to deterrent weapons. Indeed, it might be con-
impossible, to destroy even a single subma- strike inland U.S. targets; this makes the strued by the other side as an attempt to
rine that follows skilled evasion tactics. Yet Russian submarines potentially more vulner- attain a counberforce capability for a first
if ABM defenses were forbidden by treaty, able to a U.S. ASW system [see illustration strike. Although it is more difficult to acquire
an ASW system that has still to be devised on page 201. On the other hand, the popula- such a capability with a submarine missile
would be the only threat to the submarine tion centers and industrial complexes on system than with an ICBM because of the
deterrent. That is one reason why an ABM the east and west coasts of the U.S. can be inherent limitations on the payload and the
agreement at SALT would by itself be such reached from much larger ocean areas, and nuclear explosive yield and because of navi-
an important gain to the security of both the these targets would be quite satisfactory if gational complications, there are no scientific
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the SLBM's were to be used for deterrent barriers to its achievement. The greatest
The U.S.S.R. has always lagged consider- purposes [see illustration on page 21]. The technical restriction on the use of SLBM's
ably behind the U.S. in the development of restricted range would be a serious factor for a counterforce first strike may lie in com-
nuclear submarines and SLBM's. The first only if the SLBM's were to be used against mand and control. It may be feasible to pre-
Russian nuclear submarine was built about our bomber bases or missiles In the interior program and command the initial launch-
four years after the Nautilus, and Admiral of the U.S. ings, but there will inevitably be failures.
Hyman 0. Rickover, the director of the U.S. There are other reasons why the parity The difficulties of directing subsequent fir-
nuclear-submarine program from the begin- between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in opera- ings to destroy the silos missed the first time
ning has made it clear he believes the Rus- tional submarines cannot be evaluated on appear to be virtually insurmountable.
sian submarines are technically inferior to numerical grounds alone. Since bases in the The submarine itself can be improved by
the U.S. ships. The first Russian ballistic- U.S.S.R. are farther from the operational making it quieter as it moves through the
missile submarines were diesel-powered and launching areas and since the Russians have water, thereby rendering detection and track-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 21, 19721
ing by passive acoustic techniques more dif-
ticult. Although increasing the speed of the
submarine will make it somewhat harder for
enemy ASW ships to follow it, the higher
speed will also raise the level of noise pro-
duced by the submarine. In any case it Is
probably -a losing proposition for a missile
submarine to try to outrun an ASW vessel,
which can always be designed to move faster.
High speed will enable the submarine to
reach its launch area more rapidly and thus
reduce the time it spends in a nonopera-
tional condition, but again the potential
' gins are not large, and they may be out-
weighed by the disadvantages. If all other
factors are equal, it will require a bigger
power plant and larger submarine, both of
which will increase cost and detectability. In-
creasing the depth at which a submarine can
Operate is not particularly significant, at
mast for the depths that are likely to be
achieved In the next generation of subma-
rines; submarines can be detected acousti-
cally and destroyed by nuclear depth charges
or homing torpedoes at any reasonable depth.
If space for more and larger missiles is
needed to increase the destructive capacity
and the ABM-penetrability of any single
submarine, then larger submarines with
bigger power plants will be required. The
larger the submarines, however, the fewer
the ships that will be available for the same
investment. Therefore, If funds are limited
(and they always are), this means a smaller
fleet, which is more vulnerable to being
wiped out in a simultaneoussurprise attack.
Thus there are many trade-offs in system de-
sign, and the final decision on a successor to
the Polaris-Poseidon system should be based
only on the nature of the specific threat.
In 1971 $104.8 million was appropriated
for the advanced development of ULMS. Al-
though this evpenditure still left options
through this expenditure still left options
procuring a specific new submarine system.
This year the Department of Defense is seek-
ing $977 million for ULMS. If that amount
is authorized, the U.S. will be irrevocably
committed to a large and very expensive new
shipbuilding program. Unclassified details
of the proposed ULMS program are still
scarce, but It appears that the submarine in
the system would be quite large (more than
twice the size of the Polaris ships) and that
t would be capable of launching 20 to 24
large missiles equipped with MIRV's. It is
proposed to have a higher maximum speed
and to incorporate the latest available silenc-
ing techniques, although these two objectives
are competitive.
The ULMS program has been divided Into
two parts. The first stage (ULMS 1) would
involve a new missile with a range of about
1,500 nautical miles capable of being deployed
in the present Polaris submarines as well as
in any new vessel. The second stage (ULMS
I) would include the development of the
new submarine and a still more advanced
missile with a rangeof about 6.000 miles that
would be too big to be substituted for the
,'oseidon in the existing Polaris ships. A
maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) Is also
Icing developed for the new ULMS missiles.
According to one estimate, the total cost of a
program for 30 such ULMS vessels would be
339.6 billion [see illustration at right[.
So far no convincing case has been made
or the need to proceed with a replacement
-or the Polaris-Poseidon system and for mak-
'ng a commitment to a new large, high-speed
submarine. Russian construction of SLBM's
no justification for ULMS; the Russian
msissile submarines do not in any way
!,hreaten the Polaris deterrent. Numerical
superiority in launchers Is meaningless; all
au.thorlties agree that the U.S. Is far ahead
qualitatively and can deliver from sub-
muarines about 5,000 warheads to fewer than
"00 for the U.S.S.R. Even if we foolishly
choose to race the Russians In the number
o;f SLBM's, ULMS is certainly not the way to
do it; each ULMS system will probably cost
five or more times per missile launched than
the Russian Y-class system.
The Poseidon with 10 or more MIRV's on
each missile has a far greater capability than
is needed to overwhelm any Russian ABM sys-
tem that can he foreseen at present. Admiral
Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, testified in February that
"the Moscow ABM system even with improved
radars andmore and better interceptors could
still be saturated by a very small part of our
total missile force. In any event, the pro-
grammed Minuteman III and Poseidon Forces,
with their large number of reentry vehicles,
provide a hedge against a future large-scale
Soviet ABM deployment." Since such a large-
scale ABM deployment will almost certainly
be precluded by a first-stage SALT agree-
ment, there is nothing in the ABM area that
would require replacement of the Poseidon;
in fact, even the Poseidon MIRV's will not
be needed If a SALT ABM treaty is realized.
Therefore it is necessary to examine anti-
sn.''marine warfare to determine if there is
anything that would currently justify the
major ULMS step. Without going into a de-
tailed analysis of possible ASW measures and
cou itermeasures, suffice it to say that no
evidence has yet been presented that the
Russian ASW program could present a threat
to the Polaris deterrent in the next decade,
[An article on the ASW situation by Richard
L. Garwin will appear in next month's ScIEN-
TiFrc AMERICAN.] Admiral Levering Smith,
director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Proj-
ect, testified in 1969 that even the new gen-
eration of Russian ASW submarines will not
be able to follow our Polaris submarine, and
that the U.S.S.R. has no specific new ASW
methods that would make the Polaris fleet
vulnerable to attack. That is still true to-
day. The U.S. has spent tens of billions of
dollars on ASW efforts over the past 20 years
and still does not have any system that
could even begin to approach the kind of
capability that would be needed to elimi-
nate 20 to 30 missile submarines almost
simultaneously. The Russians are far behind
the U.S. In this area, and they have the se-
rious geographical disadvantages of remote-
ness from and unavailability of land areas
contiguous to the oceans in which this ASW
systems would have to operate. Since the
nature of the potential ASW threat to the
Polaris-Poseidon system cannot even be fore-
seen at this point, ULMS, if built now. may
be designed to cope with the wrong threat.
The most obvious improvement to Polaris-
Poseidon would be to increase the range of
the missile in order to enlarge the ocean
areas from which missiles could be launched.
The deployment of such a new long-range
missile might cost nearly seven billion dol-
lars, however, and in any case, as the reaps
on pages 18 and 19 how, the Poseidon sys-
tem already has a tremendous operational
flexibility and is not threatened in its pres-
ent launch areas.
Thus there are strong arguments for keep-
ing both the ULMS missile and the ULMS
submarine options in the research and early
development stage. This would allow the ex-
ploration of all approaches, Including smaller,
slower but quieter submarines, and would
avoid the making of a premature commit-
inent to a large, expensive submarine and
missile program. We must not fall into the
trap of buying new military hardware just be-
cause we have made technological advances;
there is no quicker way to price ourselves
out of the security market. The submarine
missile force is the backbone of our deter-
rent; its present strength and invulnerabil-
ity obviate the nee for Its replacement for
at least a decade.
DEATH OF HAROLD WESTON
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on Monday,
April 10, Harold Weston, past president
of the Federation of Modern Painters
and Sculptors, and chairman of the Na-
tional Council on the Arts and Govern-
ment, died at his home.
Mr. Weston was long one of the leaders
championing the concept of Federal sup-
port for the arts. Indeed, he was one of
the first witnesses in the early 60's when
hearings were held on what was to be-
come the legislation which established
the National Endowment for the Arts.
From that time on, Mr. Weston contin-
ued to work with the Special Subcommit-
tee on Arts and Humanities. His views
were incisive and of much value, and his
death deprives us of a leader in this field.
I ask unanimous consent that this obit-
uary, biography, and eulogy be printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, April 12, 19721
HAROLD WESTON, LED ARTISTS' FEDERATION
Harold Weston, artist and past president
of the Federation of Modern Painters and
Sculptors, died Monday at his home, 282
Bleecker Street. He was 78 years old and lived
also at St. Hubert's, N.Y., in the Adirondacks.
Mr. Weston prepared at Phillips Exeter
Academy for Harvard, from which he was
graduated in 1916. A volunteer Y.M.C.A. sec-
retary in World War I, he served with British
forces in India, Mesopotamia and Iran, and
then traveled in that area, picking up themes
for his first one-Ivan show here in 1922. His
last was in 1961.
In between, his works included murals in
the lobby of the Federal Procurement Build-
ing in Washington, 1936-38, and many paint-
ings in the Phillips Gallery and other col-
lections.
Mr. Weston, as vice chairman of the Na-
tional Council on the Arts and Government,
was active in urging art patronage by the
Federal and state governments. In World
War II he was director of Food for Freedom.
Inc., urging relief measures.
Surviving are his widow, the former Faith
Borton; 2 daughters, Mrs. Esty Foster Jr. and
Mrs. William H, Sudduth Jr.; a son, Bruce;
and 11 grandchildren.
BIOGRAPHY OF HAROLD WESTON
Harold Weston, painter, etcher, muralist
and author, was born In Merlon, Pennsyl-
vania, on February 14, 1894, and died at his
home in New York City on April 10, 1972.
Mr. Weston attended Phillips Exeter Acad-
emy, class of 1912, and was graduated from
Harvard in 1916, magna cum laude and Phi
Beta Kappa.
He began painting as a child, influenced,
perhaps, by winning fist prize in a children's
competition at John Wanamaker's store in
Philadelphia. His first one-man show of oils,
consisting of 150 Adirondack and Persian
landscapes, was held at the Montross Galler-
ies in 1922. His canvases of that period, exe-
cuted in brilliant color with bold outlines
and distorted forms, were widely publicized
and created for the artist an immediate
reputation.
Forty one-man exhibits of Weston's oils,
watercolors and etchings have been held in
New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Chi-
cago, St. Louis, San Francisco, Paris, arid
other cities. He has participated in numerous
group shows in the United States and Europe.
He received the Third Prize for American
Painting at the Golden Gate nternational
Exposition in 1939.
Paintings and etching by Harold Weston
are owned by many private collectors, and
over 300 examples of his work are in museums
or public collections, among them: Phillips
Collection, Washington; Whitney Museum of
American Art; Museum of Modern Art; Fogg
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 20, 1972
Public Law 119, 84th congress, approved collected in the past from other Government
June 30, 1955 (69 Stat. 225); agencies.
Public Law 295, 84th Congress, approved
August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 580). ORDER OF BUSINESS
ved
Public Law 632, 84th Congress, appro
June 29, 1956 (70 Stat. 408).
Public Law 85-471, approved June 28,
1958 (72 Stat. 241).
Public Law 86-560, approved June 30, 1960
(74 Stat. 282).
Public Law 87-305, approved September 26,
1961 (75 Stat. 667).
Public Law 87-505, approved June 28, 1962
112)
(76 Stat
.
.
Public Law 88-343, approved June 30, 1964
(78 Stat. 235).
Public Law 89-348, approved November 8,
1965 (79 Stat. 1310).
Public Law 89-482, approved June 30, 1966
(80 Stat. 235).
Public Law 90-370, approved July 1, 1968
(82 Stat. 279).
Public Law 91-151, approved December 23,
1969 (82 Stat. 856).
Public Law 91-300, approved June 30, 1970
(84 Stat. 367).
Public Law 91-371, approved August 1,
694)
1970 (84 Stat
.
.
Public Law 91-379, approved August 15, resent probably the most important in-
1970 (84 Stat. 796). ternational accords presented for con-
Public Law 92-15, approved May 18, 1971 gressional approval since the Versailles
(85 Stat. 38). Treaty following World War I. I think
Titles II and VI termin une 30, 1953. it is highly significant that the President 1953. Th
ept himself made this analogy, in his re-
The ies remaining andaining V powers terminated of ed April
titles I 30 (e,xccept
section 104), title III, and title VII (except marks to Members of Congress at the
sections 708, 714, and 719) under present White House on June 15. It is an analogy
law will terminate June 30, 1972. which highlights the authority and re-
RECORDS OF EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD sponsibility of Congress with respect to
During the hearings on S. 699 and S. 1901, these agreements-and the life and death
the Comptroller General testified about access issues they deal with. The SALT agree-
to information on the Lockheed loan guar- ments are easily the most outstanding
antee. The Comptroller General indicated. achievement of President Nixon's ad-
that while the GAO has received all the ministration-an administration which
data it has requested from Lockheed Air- already had a number of outstanding
office of has the not been Emergency able Loan to diplomatic accomplishments to its credit.
obtain craft Corp., certain r records his
Guarantee Board established by the Emer- Thus far, the role of the executive
gency Loan Guarantee Act (Public Law 92- branch has been primary with respect to
70). These records involve the information these agreements; and its conduct of the
on which the Board relied in approving a $250 complex negotiations leading to the
million loan guarantee for the Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., including several credit analyses Within the spectrum of the negotiating
of the company prepared by the New York
Federal Reserve Bank. The Act requires the possibilities, the results must be judged
Board to make certain statutory findings be- a maximal rather than a minimal
fore approving a loan guarantee, including a achievement.
finding that the prospective earning power But, the focus of attention now has
of a loan guarantee applicant furnishes rea- shifted to the Congress, and particularly
Congress role with respect to the vital
issues involved in these particular agree-
ments, and the constitutional question of
the relationship of congressional and Ex-
ecutive authority on arms agreement and
warmaking powers.
I believe that President Nixon by unty-
ing our hands on the new offensive weap-
ons systems has consciously create an
opportunity for us jointly to restore a
good measure of the proper constitu-
tional balance between the Executive
and the Congress in national security af-
fairs and thus to reduce the strain which
has resulted from the constitutional im-
balance which reached crisis proportions
with respect to the Vietnam war.
In his June 1 report to the Congress
at the conclusion of his trip to the So-
viet Union, President Nixon said:
We can undertake agreements as impor-
tant as these only on a basis of full partner-
ship etween the executive and legislative
branches of our Government.
This statement, together with the very
act of making an immediate report to a
joint session of Congress, represents a
marked departure from the approach
contained in President Nixon's April 26
and May 8 speeches in which he took the
position that the strength and authority
of the office of the President is the key-
stone to our national security and mo-
rality.
On June 15, in quite a different vein,
President Nixon told Members of Con-
gress:
I think that the hearings that you will
conduct must be searching because only in
that way will you be able to be convincing to
yourselves and only In that way will the Na-
tion also be convinced ... What we are asking
for here, in other words, is cooperation and
not just rubber-stamping by the House anji
the Senate. That is essential because there
must. be follow-through on this and the
members of the House and Senate, it seems to
me, must be convinced that they played a
role as they have up to this point, and will
continue to play a role in this very, very
important field of arms control.
In the same spirit, on June 19 Secre-
tary Rogers told the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee:
sonable assurance that the loan will be re- the Senate. In my judgment, the Sena a We are pleased to know that the Congress
paid. already has played a very important role
The Comptroller General has testified that plans full consideration of these two docu-
the chairman of the Emergency Loan Guar- in success of the SALT negotiations. The ments, both with officials of the Executive
antee Board has clearly violated the Budget great Senate debates of 1968, 1969, and branch and with the public. This is a process
and Accounting Act of 1921, as well as other 1970 on strategic arms issues helped im- that Is fundamental to our American system.
statutes in not giving the GAO access to the portantly to guide the executive branch This new spirit in the executive branch
aforementioned records of the Emergency of our Government and the Soviet Gov- respecting the authority and responsi-
Loan Guarantee Board. On the other hand, ernment-for we know that the Soviets bility of Congress in national security
the General Counsel of the Treasury has avidly read the Senate debates. The matters could lead to enactment of a war
written that the Board is not legally required issues and the principles which were powers bill, settle vexing questions of the
to make such information available to the established and clarified in the Senate
General Accounting Office. debates have now found expression in the invocation of executive privilege and
This committee does not wish to referee a agreements. overclassification of documents, and
legal dispute between the Comptroller Gen- SALT limit the use of executive agreements
eral and the Emergency Loan Guarantee I urge the President to accelerate the without congressional consent. It could
Board. However, there are certain overriding pace of negotiations with the Soviet in this way signal an important trans-
questions of public policy which transcend Union to limit these weapons systems formation in the politics of our Nation
the legal arguments involved. In view of the which might be pursued by each as "bar- and help significantly to restore unity
highly controversial nature of the Lockheed gaining chips," so that both sides can and concord within 'our deeply' divided
loan guarantee and the size of the U.S. finan-
cial commitment, this committee believes the avoid expenditures and obligations for society. Healing the wounds of Vietnam
Emergency Loan Guarantee Board should new weapons systems which could be is an overriding challenge and a neces-
cooperate fully with the GAO in making its justified only as "bargaining chips." The sity to our well-being as a nation.
records available. In passing the Emergency relationship established with the Soviet As the President himself has said in a
Loan Guarantee Act, the committee does not Union should now be such as to make spirit of respect-cooperation by the
believe that Congress intended to deny to the this entirely feasible. Congress does not mean "rubberstamp-
GAO any information of a type which it has
customarily collected in the past from other As the primary role with respect to ing"-if the Congress is to fulfill its own
Government agencies, or authorize .GAO ac- the SALT agreements now passes to Con- responsibilities. With respect to the
cess to records which it has not customarily gress we should consider at the same time SALT agreements the - President has
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The distinguished Republican lead-
er is now recognized.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield
back my time.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order, the dis-
tinguished Senator from New York (Mr.
JAVITS) is now recognized for not to ex-
ceed 15 minutes.
THORITY AND THE SALT AGREE-
MENTS
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the SALT
agreements now before the Congress rep-
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Senate
"'he Senate met at 9 a.m., on the ex-
piration of the recess, and was called to
order by Hon. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., a Sen-
ator from the State of Virginia.
PIIAYER
The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward
L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following
prayer:
Almighty God, before whom the gen-
erations rise and pass away, we thank
Thee for days that are past and work
that is done. We thankThee now for the
new day and for work yet to be done. By
Thy strength and in Thy wisdom help
us to undertake our tasks as did our fore-
fathers, holding firmly to truth and jus-
tice, striving for the better world that is
yet to be-
"March on, 0 soul, with strength,
As strong the battle rolls,
Gainst lies and lusts and wrongs,
Let courage rule our souls :
In keenest strife, Lord, may we stand
Upheld and strengthened by Thy hand."
-GEORGE T. COSTER.
We pray in the Redeemer's name.
Amen.
APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESI-
DENT PRO TEMPORE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will please read a communication to the
Senate from the President pro tempore
(Mr. ELLENDER).
The second assistant legislative clerk
read the following letter:
U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1972.
To the Senate:
Being temporarily absent from the Senate
on official duties, I appoint Hon. HARRY F.
BYRD, JR., a Senator from the State of Vir-
ginia. to perform the duties of the Chair
during my absence.
ALLEN J.
ELLE
President proND empore.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., thereupon
took the chair as Acting President pro
tempore.
THE JOURNAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, task
unanimous consent that the Jour al of
the proceedings of Monday, J e 1.9,
The ACTING PRESIDENT/pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is, 4o ordered.
COMMITTEE MEETIN(AS DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. President, I ask
unanimous consent A.Kat all committees
may be authorized o meet during the
session of the Senate today.
TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1972
(Legislative day of Monday, June 19, 1972)
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
OF 1950
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to th4 consideration of Calendar No.
829, S. 3745.
The AC'H`ING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The bill will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
S. 3715, to mend and extend the Defense
Production Act of 1950.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there, objection to the present
consideration 61 the bill?
There being uo objection, the Senate
proceeded to coh.sider the bill, which was
ordered to be engrossed for a third read-
ing, was read the':third time, and passed,
as follows:
S. 3715
Be it enacted by tide Senate and House of
Representatives of the united States of Amer-
ica in Congress asseipbled, That sectl9n
303(b) of the Defen Production Act of
1950, as amended (50 U'6S.C. App. 2093.) ),
is amended by striking dut "June 30,'197,6--
and inserting in lieu they f "June 36, 1965".
SEC. 2. The first sentenc :of sec,Yon 717(a)
of the Defense Production`, Act. of 1950, as
amended (50 U.S.C. ApP\,./216d(a)), is
amended by striking out "Ju e 30; 1972" and
inserting in lieu thereof dun 30, 1974".
Mr. MANSFIELD,Ir. President, I ask
unanimous cons to have},printed in
the RECORD excerpt from 'the report
(No. 92-M85explaining the p& poses of
the measure. k -1
There being no objection, the' xcerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
The bill would extend the Defense Pro-
duction Act of 1950 for 2 years-from 14he
present expiration date of June 30, 191,
to June 30, 1974. The bill would also amen
may be entered into concerning materials
in the Defense Production Act inventory.
GENERAL STATEMENT
The bill would extend for 2 additional
years, through June 30, 1974, the remaining
temporary powers of the President under
the Defense Production Act of 1950. These
include power to establish priorities for
defense contracts; power to allocate ma-
terials for defense purposes; authority to
guarantee loans made in connection with
defense contracts; authority to make loans
and purchases to build up our defense ca-
pacity and assure supplies of defense ma-
terials and to carry out existing contracts;
authority to employ without compensation
and when actually employed employees, in-
cluding advisers and consultants; and pro-
vision for the establishment of a reserve
of trained executives to fill Government po-
sitions in time of mobilization. The Act also
establishes the Joint Committee on Defense
Production.
These powers are scheduled to expire on
June 30, 1972. They must be extended. Some
of the powers are needed now to maintain
production schedules on missiles and all
other defense contracts; others are needed
for longer range preparedness programs; and
other powers must be maintained in readi-
ness for immediate use in possible future
emergencies.
The bill would also amend section 303(b)
of the act to extend from June 30, 1975, to
June 30, 1985, the authority to enter into
commitments to purchase materials for the
Defense Production Act inventory and sell
materials already ontained in that inven-
tory. The exte on of this restriction is
important not ly from the standpoint of
new purchases hick might be contemplated,
but it is Grit' al from the standpoint of on-
going disp I programs for the sale of ex-
cess Gov meat contracts which would ex-
tend b and 1975. The bulk of the remain-
ing Tense Production Act inventory con-
sist of materials which can best be dis-
p ed- of through long-term contracts which
markets with minimum disruption. The Gen-
eral Services Administration would be pre-
cluded from entering into favorable long-
term agreement for the disposal of such
excess materials unless this extension is
made. The most recent amendment of this
section was contained in Public Law 88-343,
approved June 30, 1964, which extended from
June 30, 1965, through June 30, 1975, the
maximum period which these sales could be
made.
Hearings were held on two bills to amend
the Defense Production Act, S. 669 and S.
1901, on April 12 and 13, 1972. Testimony
was received from Gen. George A. Lincoln,
Director of the Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness, Hon. Elmer B. Starts, Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, and other inter-
ested persons. The committee voted unani-
mously to report this committee bill to the
Senate.
PREVIOUS LEGISLATION
The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub-
lic Law 774, 81st Congress, 64 Stat. 799, 50
app., U.S.C. 207) was approved September 8,
1950. The original act contained seven titles:
Title I. Priorities and allocations.
Title II. Authority to requisition.
Title III. Expansion of productive capacity
tnd supply.
Title IV. Price and wage stabilization.
`Title V. Settlement of labor disputes.
stat credit.
Tit VII. General provisions.
The arious titles of the act were amended,
extended,,, or 'terminated by the following
Public Law 69, 82d Congress, approved June
30, 1951 (65 Stat. 110).
Public Law 96, 82d Congress, approved
July 31, 1951 (65 Stat. 131).
Public Law 429, 82d Congress, approved
June 30, 1952 (66 Stat. 296).
Public Law 94, 83d Congress, approved
June 30, 1953 (67 Stat. 121).
Public Law 95, 83d Congress, approved
June 30, 1953 (67 Stat. 129).
Public Law 94, 84th Congress, approved
June 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 180).
S 9697
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June 20, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
thereby facilitated a responsible and in-
dependent role for Congress. The main
issue before the Nation is not ratification
of the SALT agreements. The treaty and
agreement, quite rightly, enjoy over-
whelming support in the Congress and
will certainly be approved, but the key
question is what the United States
should do respecting new offensive stra-
tegic weapons systems not prohibited by
the SALT agreements. What is there to
the bargaining chip arguments as to
induce Congress to authorize major
weapons systems as bargaining chips?
President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger,
quite properly, have forcefully stated the
sincere view of the executive branch
that rapid development of such new
offensive strategic systems as the B-1
bomber and the Trident/ULMS subma-
rine system are needed for national se-
curity-and especially as "bargaining
chips" for the next round of SALT nego-
tiations.
But quite significantly, Dr. Kissinger,
speaking for the President respecting the
relationship between the SALT agree-
ments and the new arms requests, said:
Our position is that we are presenting both
of these programs on their merits. We are not
making them conditional. We are saying that
the treaty is justified on its merits, but we
are also saying that the requirements of na-
tional security impel us in the direction of
the strategic programs, and we hope that
the Congress will approve both of these pro-
grams as it examines each of them on its
merits.
In this respect, the President has left
us free by untying our hands on the new
weapons systems issue for the next 5
years. It is a tribute to the President, as
well as to the Congress that he has
chosen to do this, without of course
sacrificing his own right of advocacy and
persuasion.
Together with some of my colleagues,
I approach the need as well as the pru-
dence of pushing ahead with expensive
new offensive strategic weapons systems
with concern and doubt. I shall, of course,
reserve final judgment on each system
respectively pending full investigation of
all the pertinent considerations respect-
ing each system.
The reasons for my skepticism con-
cerning the need to push ahead now with
new offensive weapons systems, as well
as my concern regarding the efficacy of
such measures as "bargaining chips" for
SALT II, found expression in Dr. Kissin-
ger's own extraordinary briefing of June
15. On that occasion, Dr. Kissinger told
us:
But to the extent that balance of power
means constant jockeying for marginal ad-
vantages over an opponent, it no longer ap-
plies. The reason is that the determination of
national power has changed fundamentally
in the nuclear age . . . now both we and the
Soviet Union have begun to find that each
increment of power does not necessarily
represent an increment of usable political
strength. With modern weapons, a poten-
tially decisive advantage requires a change
of such magnitude that the mere effort to
obtain it can produce disaster. The simple
tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs
of a decade ago is in danger of being over-
taken by a more or less simultaneous and
continuous process of technological advance,
which opens more and more temptations for
seeking decisive advantage.... In other
words, marginal additions of power cannot
be decisive.... There was reason to believe
that the Soviet leadership might also be
thinking along similar lines as the repeated
failure of their attempts to gain marginal ad-
vantage in local crises or in military com-
petition underlined the limitation of old
policy approaches.
Later on in his briefing, Dr. Kissinger
told us:
As long as it-ABM Treaty-lasts, offensive
missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to
their targets. Beyond a certain level of suffi-
ciency, differences in numbers are therefore
not conclusive.
Dr. Kissinger also told us:
The quality of the weapons must also be
weighed. We are confident we have a major
advantage in nuclear weapons technology and
in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's
we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers
of warheads and this lead will be maintained
during the period of the agreement, even if
the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of
their own.
It is evident that the issue resolves
down to the question of basic judgments
respecting the best way to enhance our
national security and strengthen the
structure of world peace. As a Senator
and member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, I am deeply gratified by the
approach taken by President Nixon in
the SALT agreements and in his attitude
of partnership with the Congress.
It is the duty of Congress to reciprocate
and to join with the President in finding
the best means to protect our security.
Equally, we must respond to the offer of
partnership by seeking a new stability of
relationship between Congress and the
Executive on national security issues. I
hope the new partnership can be con-
summated by enacting, with Presidential
concurrence, the War Pow r Act recent-
ly adopted by the Senat
COMPREHENSIVE HEADSTART,
CHILD DEVELOPMENT, AND
FAMILY SERVICES ACT OF 1972
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.). Under
the previous agreement, the Chair lays
before the Senate S. 3617, which the clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Calendar No. 760 (S. 3617), a bill to
strengthen and expand the Headstart pro-
gram, with priority to the economically dis-
advantaged, to amend the Economic Op-
portunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The pending question is on agree-
ing to the amendment of the Senator
from Colorado (Mr. DoMINICK), which
the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 16, lines 5 and 6, beginning with
the word "which" strike all through the word
"sponsor" in line 6.
On page 18, line 8, beginning with the word
"except" strike out through line 10.
On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert
the following new paragraph:
"(2) In the event that a state has sub-
mitted a prime sponsorship plan under sub-
section (a) of this section to serve a geo-
graphical area covered by the plan of an
applicant under paragraphs (2), (3), or (4)
of subsection (a), the Secretary shall desig-
S 9699
nate to serve such .area the applicant which
he determines has the capability of more
effectively carrying out the purposes of this
title with respect to such area."
On page 20, line 4, strike out "(2)" and in-
sert in lieu thereof "(3) ".
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Chair will state that debate
on this amendment is limited to 1 hour,
to be equally divided and controlled by
the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DoMI-
NICK) and the Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. NELSON) or his designee.
Who yields time?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask
unanimous consent that the time be
equally charged against both sides of the
bill.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there objection? The Chair hears
no objection, and it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 1251
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I
yield myself 15 minutes and call up my
amendment No. 1251.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will read the amendment.
The legislative clerk read the amend-
ment (No. 1251) as follows:
On page 16, lines 5 and 6, beginning with
the word "which" strike all through the word
"sponsor" in line 6.
On page 18, line 8, beginning with the word
"except" strike out through line 10.
On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert
the following new paragraph:
"(2) In the event that a State has sub-
mitted a prime sponsorship plan under sub-
section (a) of this section to serve a geo-
graphical area covered by the plan of an ap-
plicant under paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of
subsection (a), the Secretary shall designate
to serve such area the applicant which he de-
termines has the capability of more effective-
ly carrying out the purposes of this title with
respect to such area."
On page 20, line 4, strike out "(2)" and
insert in lieu thereof " (3) ".
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, the
committee, in drafting the legislation
which we have before us, foresaw and
provided for the possibility of two or more
local applicants seeking designation as
the prime sponsor to serve the same area,
insofar as the child development facilities
may be concerned. What they did not do,
however, was to make any determination,
except by implication, as to what should
be done where a State and local applicant
also applied to be the prime sponsor in
any given geographical area.
It strikes me that, instead of setting
up a predetermination, which the com-
mittee bill has in fact done, to see that
whenever there is an application by a
local sponsor for a geographic area and
by the State which would cover the same
area, the local sponsor would succeed in
this, what we really should do is give the
Secretary the discretion to select, from
among competing applicants, the one
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June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 6323
for its fine work toward the goal of im-
proving the quality of education for all
of our citizens. But, moreover, I think
that this is an appropriate time to pay
tribute to education itself.
As a former educator I am familiar
with the value that a good education
has for our young peo e. I have no
fonder memories than oft a times in my
high school classes when I uld broaden
the world of my studen with new
knowledge and new underst nding. To
be complete men and wome we must
all try to expand our views of e world
around us. We must learn tolera ee and
understanding by becoming more Umil-
iar with the hopes and fears of our n6jgh-
bors. We must employ our talents knd
abilities to the fullest possible extent by
being better informed of the many op'. cency and honest scholarship we urge yo
portunities which exist in our society. to publicly withdraw your name from thj
Education is an invaluable tool in ` book and to dissociate yourself from ti{is
achieving these necessary elements of insidious campaign.
community, and since coming to Con-
gress I have sought to do everything pos-
sible to see that the good educational
system in our country is maintained.
HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 19, 1972
Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, last fall I
agreed to write the introduction for a
most interesting and significant book by
Gary Allen entitled "None Dare Call It
Conspiracy," which I will soon be bring-
ing before you serial fashion in the
RECORD. It explores the evidence for a
concerted plan and pattern in the many
reverses freedom, law, and faith have
suffered in this century.
This book included a prediction that,
like virtually all others on this subject,
it would be attacked by the Anti-De-
famation League of B'nai B'rith-an or-
ganization which, as William Buckley
once said, itself frequently engages in
defamation. This prediction was right on
target, and the attack began with the
letter to me which follows, together with
reply :
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF
B'NAI B'RITH,
June 1, 1972.
Hon. JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
Irvine. Calif.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN SCHMITZ: We were dis-
tressed to read your introduction to and en-
dorsement of None Dare Call It Conspiracy
by Gary Allen, and we hereby call upon you
to withdraw your endorsement and repudi-
ate this anti-Semitic propaganda book.
Because you are a political scientist, we
would have expected you to detect quickly
the long discredited anti-Jewish charges that
allegean insidious role being played by so-
called "international bankers" which this
book exhumes.
Despite Mr. Allen's pitifully weak dis-
claimer about anti-Semitism, his book re-
vives anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1920's
carried out by agents of the late Henry Ford,
Sr. through the Dearborn Independent--
charges later repudiated publicly by M:r.
Ford-and again revived in the 1930's by
Father Charles E. Coughlin, the notorious
radio-priest.
We can only assume that you read the
book too quickly or that you did not read it
at all, a not uncommon problem plaguing
very busy public officials who, too often, un-
fortunately rely upon the judgment of
others.
As a political scientist, we urge you to
check with Professor Carroll Quigley, of
Georgetown University, whose writings are
cited extensively in None Dare Call It Con-
spiracy as being supportive of Gary Allen's
thesis, whereas the exact opposite is true.
The Birch Society's campaign to distribute
millions of copies of None Dare Call It Con-
spiracy is a very serious matter because the
kinds of anti-Jewish lies contained in the
Allen book have been used by hate groups
throughout the world for more than 50 years
to foster hatred of Jews. During the 1930's
and the 1940's we saw the ugly consequences
of such campaigns.
Mr. HARVEY B. SCHECHTER,
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
Los Angeles, Calif.
DEAR MR. SCHECHTER: Your let
Dare Call It Conspiracy, ocgasioned by
the fact that I wrote the Intro uction to it.
is one of the most remarkable /confirmations
of the book's thesis I have sen. For if you
turn to pages 39 and 40, you /will read:
The Jewish members of /the conspiracy
all honest scholarship on ,ti ernational bank-
ers and made the subject t4boo within uni-
versities.
"Any individual or 'book 'Vxploring this
subject is immediately!attacked,by hundreds
of A.D.L. committees.' all over he country.
The A.D.L. has never: let =s r logic in-
terfere with its hily al smear
jobs. When no evidence is app ent, the
A.D.L., which staunchly opposed o-called
'McCarthyism,' accuses people of be g 'lat-
ent anti-Semitics.i Can you imagin how
they would yowl a/id scream if someo a ac-
cused them of beia9g 'latent' Communist?
"Actually, nobody has a right to be n re
angry at the hschild clique than th
fellow Jews. T44ee Warburgs, part of th
Rothschild empire, helped finance Adolf Hit-
ler. There were' few if any Rothschilds or
Warburgs in tie Nazi prison camps! They
sat out the wa# in luxurious hotels in Paris
or emigrated Ito the United States or Eng-
land. As a gro p, Jews have suffered most at
the hands of here power seekers."
Gentlemen you are right on cue.
Of course, I would not deny that some
bigoted indi iduals might distort the facts
and conclu ons in Gary Allen's book to fit
their own Prejudices, just as they might do
with manyjother books, As a Catholic, I have
seen anti-Catholic bigots do this just as anti-
Semites have done it. Gary Allen specifically
warns on page 10 against those who "be-
cause of racial or religious bigotry ... will
take small fragments of legitimate evidence
and expand them into a conclusion that will
support their particular prejudice, i.e., the
conspiracy is totally 'Jewish.' 'Catholic' or
'Masonic.' These people do not help to ex-
pose the conspiracy, but sadly play into the
hands of those who want the public to be-
lieve that all conspiratorialists are screw-
balls." But if the possibility of distortion is
to be accepted as a reason for the suppres-
sion of truth, then all of us are the losers.
Insofar as you speak for one of the world's
major religious faiths, going back to Abraham
who is the "father in faith" for Christians,
Jews and even Moslems, I believe you have a
duty to make an objective examination of
the evidence which suggests that many of
the principal manipulators of twentieth cen-
tury history are characterized by a deep and
abiding hostility to any genuine belief in
and worship of God and any attempt to live
and work according to His commandments.
My experience in public life has shown me
that I have much more in common with be-
lieving Jews than with the secular human-
ists who have gained such a predominant
position in our nation today. It would be
rllost interesting to see with which of these
two groups you find yourself and your or-
ganization most often in alignment.
There is not a word in Gary Allen's book
which could possibly be construed by any
reasonable man as an attack on any religious
faith. Rather, he points out repeatedly that
the conspirators of our time are dedicated
to the destruction of all religious faith. Even
for those who do not accept his thesis, the
hostility of the dominant forces in the mod-
ern world to religion is very obvious and
should provide a solid basis for cooperation
and alliance among all believers as against
nonbelievers. Gary Allen and I and The John
Birch Society and many others are ready and
eager for such cooperation and alliance. We
have not attacked your faith. Why then do
you attack us?
As for your objections to his thesis itself, it
is a subject on which reasonable men may
differ-but not one which you can reasonably
claim to be "discredited." The arguments for
it deserve to be considered on their merits.
Your letter gives no indication that you haves
done so. In fact, I can only describe your po-
sition on the issues raised by this book as
betraying a deeply entrenched intellectual
bias of your own. In the interest of the hon-
est scholarship to which you refer in your
concluding paragraph, I would urge you and
your colleagues to try to free your minds of
this bias and then take another look at this
question. .
Jews and Catholics suffered and died to-
gether in both Nazi and Soviet concentra-
tion camps. You may have read of the recent
beatification at the Vatican of Blessed Father
Maximilian Kolbe of Poland, who was starved
to death in a Nazi death camp after volun-
teering to take the place of a young father
originally i elected for the same kind of death.
By your campaign against those who are
making every effort to arouse the American
people to the danger of totalitarian world
conquest, you are making it more likely that
similar horrors will take place here in Amer-
ica. If this happens, those on what you call
"the right" will be among the first victims-
I sincerely hope, not with your approval.
Yours very truly,
JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
Member of Congress.
MASS INHUMANITY TO MAN-
HOW LONG?
HON. `WILLIAM J. SCHERLE
IN THE HOU OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monda June 19, 1972
Mr. SCHERLE". Mr. Speaker, a child
asks: "Where is dA, dy?" A mother asks:
"How is my son?" iQ wife asks: "Is my
husband alive or dea ?"
Communist North Vietnam is sadisti-
cally practicing spirit al and mental
genocide on over 1,600 A'srierican prison-
ers of war and their families.
How long?
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The ongoing U.S. deployment of Multiple indeed, in the new strategic environment cient shrouds over the advanced technology
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles the effect of MIRV systems is not to bolster of both sides may now be partially removed.
(MIRY) on both Minuteman III and Posei- deterrence by hedging against a non-existent Even without local inspection, however, a
don missiles is sure to maintain that advan- ABM system but to weaken it by posing a stringent prohibition against testing multiple
gage for the period of the agreement; the threat to the survivability of land-based payloads could be verified reliably; since
U.S. warhead inventory may well exceed ICBMs. Thus, in light of the guiding stand- neither side could maintain MIRV systems
10,000 by 1977. and of stable deterrence, both sides should and crews without frequent operational tests,
Having flight-tested no MIRV system to perceive their common interest in seeking a this kind of ban would provide high, con-
date, the Soviet Union can hardly convert its ban on MIRV systems. fidence that neither, was retaining such
throw-weight advantage into a warhead ad- The potential centerpiece of SALT II could weapons. Elimination of large, "MIRV-able"
vantage during these years. Even if they suc- well be a trade of the U.S. MIRV systems boosters would mean that any clandestine
cessfully develop MIRV technology, only the now in deployment for a comparable number work on a Soviet MIRV would be futile, since
larger Soviet missiles look promising as MIRV of Soviet missiles, including the gigantic there would be no significant force to carry
platforms, and it is not realistic to expect a SS-9s which have caused such consternation. such payloads.
complete replacement of their existing mis- Land-based forces might be phased down to In short, having forestalled the instabilities
sile force with MIRV-capable boosters. Judg- 500 single-warhead systems, while the U.S. that might flow from large-scale ABMd de-
ments may vary, but no one can doubt that Poseidon fleet could be converted to single ployment, the two powers could drastically
Soviet acceptance of continued U.S. MIRV warhead systems, reduce the potential installibities on the
deployment represents a concession of the The Soviets have been reticent about en- offensive side by precluding MIRV systems.
first magnitude. tering a MIRV limit until they perfect the And such a measure could be enforced
The Stough Soviet delegation made other technology, but skillful diplomats should be through precisely the kinds of test con-
adjustments In its original positions, as did able to underscore the advantages Moscow straints they are relying on to verify com-
the American team. The illustrations here would reap by foregoing MIRV development pliance with the ABM limitations.
suffice, however, to highlight the fact that in return for a suspension of U.S. MIRV pro- ANTI-SUBMARINE WAREPARE
SALT I began an important learning process grams before they are fully deployed and re- If limits on MIRV would enhance the sur-
for both sides and persuaded each that its fined to pinpoint accuracies, The President vivability of the land-based deterrent, there
own security required realistic consideration has stressed that U.S. MIRV systems are in- is comparable value in measures to reduce
of the other's security needs. There were no tended exclusively for retaliatory purposes, the likelihood that sea-based forces will be-
one-sided or disproportionate concessions. but the Sovhes must realize that unrestricted come vulnerable. This suggests that SALT II
testing snthe future may push th e e technol- should give intensive study to controls over
PRELUDE TO PARITY agy to such precise delivery accuracies that anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
One can only appraise the achievements even relatively small U.S. warheads would A first and rt urgent goal would be to limit
of SALT I by examining the agenda for jeopardize hardened missile silos. That pros- the number of urgent -oill wool be to s and hunter SALT II, the second phase of the negotia- pect is still some years away, but only con- other number forces to levels subm nine wand ASW
tions which is expected to begin later this certed measures to inhibit MIRV testing and SLBM
year. The true worth of the ABM treaty -and deployment can guard against it. the fleets. It may maximum be helpful to survivability yon of f the
certain
in-
the five-year missile freeze lies in what Each side clearly has a greater interest in undersea sayvbelhelp systems, since cer in-
President Nixon has rightly termed the "un- persuading the other not to deploy MIRV undersea sur ei the subs hinges teethe
paralleled opportunity" they create. than it has in deploying such systems itself. vulnerability
lir ability to evade detection. One impor-
surrounding may damn the frenetic atmosphere So long as the United States persists in its that possibility would et c carve out por-
surrounding the last hours of diplomatic ac- own MIRV deployment, It cannot hope to able areas it the oceans would be SLBM saoutsize
tivity, although the issues resolved in those induce the Soviet Union to refrain from Simi- able areas ASW forces would nanctu ins
final moments were relatively marginal ones lar weaponry. There is a powerful case for the trade.
on which the options had been thoroughly United States to slow its MIRV programs and third major objective of the coming phase
explored in advance. Arms control advocates to offer SALT II a chance to devise mutual re- A
of arms control discussions ought to be e
may lament the tardiness and scope of the straints on this provocative and unnecessary of arms come ban on nuclear ought to tests.
strategic freeze. Yet the delay in setting the technology. There h growing confidence that national
freeze may prove invaluable, because the MIRV is the principal qualitative innova- means of verification can monitor such an
long and methodical diplomacy preceding it tion which might undermine the quantitative meraeement and the administration is actively
has engendered a degree of mutual confi- limitations sketched by SALT I. Henry Kis- agreement the proposal. administration
By inhibiting fur-
toward which is indispensable to further steps singer has intimated that "questions of tech- considering the of warheads for either offur-
toward reinforcing strategic stability. SALT nological change" will be addressed in SALT tier refinement or missiles, an end h oft under-
at has made the cautious decision; the time is II. The ABM treaty not only facilitates such nucsive tests missiles, could contribute
hand for bolder action, an effort; it offers vital precedents, for it -sive uor nd to other efforts told prevent ribur-
desta-
moved tight limits 'on ABM have virtually re- specifically establishes a number of qualita- gro marked yr okotheughs.
moved the threats to stability which might tive limits on defensive systems. Under the bilizg
and other options for
arise from defensive deployments. The press- treaty, development, testing and deployment In SALT II a weighing cardinal rule of systematic armr
ing need now is to curb the instabilities of rapid-reload launchers and multiple- control comes into play. It is extremely helps
which might arise through offensive deploy- interceptor launchers are banned. Sea-based, col to have a broad and diverse set l rein-
side's threatening the survivability of either air-based, space-based or mobile ABM com- forcing agreements, the violation Of of in-
side's deterrent weapons. Ambassador Gerard Ponents are ruled out and radars are strictly forcing would ithe viola t to des any
Smith stressed this point on May 9 when he controlled in numbers and characteristics. of quite sufficient destabilize
Indicate
told the Soviet SALT delegation that the Test activities are restricted to designated the h that one cauld e b other side s was acting in bad the follow-on negotiations should seek "to con- ranges and the upgrading of anti-aircraft tith. Conversely, compliance with a num-
strain and reduce on a long-term basis systems is closely regulated. bar of interlocked arrangements would testify
threats to the survivability of our respective All of these controls deal with qualitative ante to the continued deould
ion strategic retaliatory forces." Both countries features of defensive systems. Parallel con- powerfully hi partners t the common edicatit enof
well understand that, unless progress is made trols applied to offensive systems and moni- shrined n the ogteemcom.
on this front, the ABM limits may not en- tried by the highly effective means planned As the two countries approach SALT It,
ide a strong
ld
ro
p
v
dure. for the ABM treaty cou
they face a special hazard. Both sides may be
Two central threats loom on the offensive barricade against destabilizing modifications so busy hedging against possible violation of
side of the equation: (1) Highly accurate, of offensive missiles. the first accords-by all-out programs to
multiple warhead systems which could de- A sensible course would be to limit future modernize their allowable missiles, subma-
stroy land-based ICBM silos, and (2) develop- missile tests to perhaps 10 or 20 a year, rines, and bombers-that they will lose sight
ments in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and to specify that there be no testing at all of the unprecedented chance to reduce their
capabilities which might jeopardize the sea- of multiple warheads or penetration aids. need for such hedges.
based forces, To convince the Soviet Union that the United, President Nixon has won some vindication
The logic and the structure of the ABM States actually eliminates its existing MIRV for his thesis that he needs on-going strategic
treaty open promising possibilities for co- boosters should pose no difficulty. Satellites programs to gain bargaining leverage in the
ping with these problems. The prohibition of could monitor the destruction of Minuteman negotiations. But it would be tragic indeed if
extensive defenses greatly simplifies the de- III silos, just as they could the SS-9 and that proposition were taken to warrant full-
terrent problerri. No feasible attack could de- other complexes. speed ahead on a host of possibly superfluous
stroy all oo' either side's retaliatory weapons; In the radically altered setting of joint programs. That tragedy can only become
even a small fraction of surviving, single- planning for mutual security, it is conceiv- more likely if the administration feels com-
warhead systems would be able to deliver un- able that the two sides can agree to more pelled to defend the agreements of SALT I
acceptable damage to an attacker. intimate inspection to guarantee that Posei- by buying off its critics with promises of
Thus, there is no longer any need for the don and analogous Soviet missiles are carry- major new weapons.
United States or the Soviet Union to retain, ing only single warheads. The exchange of The United States certainly will wish to
the option of MIRVing its boosters, since technical information and crew training ar- continue gradual improvements in its arsenal,
MIRV is superfluous to deterrence in a situa- rangements for the proposed joint space but SALT I justifies a moderate, not an ac-
tion where there are no defenses to penetrate. venture afford encouragement that- the an- . celerated, pace in this-realm.
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E 6326 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 19, 1972
From the diplomatic standpoint, it is for-
tunate that the planned modernization ef-
forts take time; for example the Soviets
could not reach their potential ceilings on
SLBM deployment for several years. The U.S.
Trident SLBM system would not go on sta-
tion until late in the decade and the B-1
bomber, if approved, is some years away from
operation. There is ample time to use them as
bargaining chips, and absolutely no necessity
to become wedded to them before diplomacy
determines whether both sides can safely
content themselves with lower hedges against
some hypothetical future attempt to upset
the equilibrium.
The imperative task now is to sustain the
momentum toward a reliable system of mu-
tual security, a momentum which will be
seriously threatened if either nation embarks
on a campaign to pacify domestic criticism
by intensifying the qualitative arms race.
Nothing Richard Nixon has done speaks so
well of his judgment and his courage as the
beginning he has made on strategic arms
limitation. If SALT II Is to fulfill the im-
mense. promise of SALT I, the President's
diplomacy needs-and deserves the confidence
of the Congress and the country. He has
earned it.,, jif
HON. JAMES J. DELANEY
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 19, 1972
Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, so often
we take for granted many of our national
Institutions. For this reason millions of
people were shocked to learn that one
of America's great and revered insti-
tutions, the Honorable James A. Farley,
former chairman of the Democratic Na=
tional Committee, distinguished prior
Postmaster General, statesman, and a
legend to legions, had been incapacitated
by exhaustion and forced to rest in the
hospital,
Jim Farley has for so many years
shared his wisdom, counsel, and insight
with the Nation at large it somehow
seemed he would go on and on, not even
having time to rest.
I know his great multitude of friends
will be delighted to know that he is re-
covering quickly and will soon resume his
arduous schedule. In this connection, I
would like to share with my colleagues a
recent article by Ernest Cuneo concern-
ing the hectic pace maintained "Genial
Jam," which recently appeared in the
Paterson, N.J. News.
The article follows:
How DARE FARLEY GET CHEST PAINS
(By Ernest Cuneo)
WASHINGTON.-A wave of indignation swept
New York City, as it became known that the
ubiquitous General James A. Farley, follow-
ing a few pains in the chest, had ordered
himself off to a hospital for an examination.
It must be explained to outsiders that the
health of General Farley, eighty-four this
month, is regarded as the final proof that
New York City is the healthiest city in the
world, come hell, high water or smog, which,
incidentally, frequently happens.
Farley fans were quickly reassured, how-
ever, as the burly giant from Grassy Point
brushed aside the medicos to issue his own
bulletins. He was feeling fine, he reported,
but the doctors had insisted on a rest and,
a reasonable man, he had met them more
than half-way.
He would confine his working day while
in the hospital to a strict eight hours and
utilize only two of his battery of secretaries.
Incoming calls would be restricted to mem-
bers of his family because, following the old
Farley formula, if you receive one you receive
all, and there's no point in tying up the
switchboard of the hospital.
He also agreed to restrict outgoing calls:
this he has faithfully done, confining them
to his famed-far-flung network of prominent
Democrats, and confining his inquiries into
the health of his beloved Democratic party.
which, of course, has been in more or less
failing health since Mr. Farley departed as
its national and New York State chairman.
The Hon. James A. noticed the pain in his
chest as he prepared to go to a banquet. He
has attended 105 banquets and 131 luncheons
within the last 12 months, which is enough
to give most people a pain just to think of
it. :During this time, an average of 120 let-
ters a day went out over his famed green-ink
signature.
At the end of this month, as he has for
years, he will receive over 6,000 birthday cards
from every state of the Union and every quar-
ter of the globe, remarkably enough. Even
more remarkably though, they will be an-
swered on a first name basis. His record of
personal thank-you letters still stands, and
presumably will for sometime.
More particularly, after the 1936 Presiden-
tial Election, James A. satdown and dictated
no less than 36,000 letters to the Democratic
workers, precisely enumerating what each
did and assuring each that his efforts made
the total possible.
This crash job wore out six secretaries; it
was completed just in time to get out the
Christmas cards.
Let no man decry the power of the letter.
On contributed volume alone, James A. Far-
ley was entitled to hold his Cabinet office
of Postmaster General. Actually, however, the
general dates his success in politics to a sin-
gle letter he wrote when he was a young
Democrat in a Republican county. His town
was about even when James A. became a
candidate for town clerk, which he won by
one vote.
As the new town clerk made his way down
the village street in the fall night, an elderly
pillar of the Republican party accosted him.
"Jim," he said, "I voted for you, because
you were the only one who wrote us a
letter of sympathy when our daughter died.
I think anybody that much interested in
other people would be good for the town -as
its clerk"
Well, of course, letters have taken Amer-
ica's most prolific letter writer a long way
since-and so has his interest in people. It
is said of him that he is the only man who
can walk from Seattle to Key West and never
be out of hailing distance of a friend.
The personnel is different, of course, but
the patttern is the same; younger people
come up to him and say, "Mr. Farley, you
were my father's friend, and you wrote him
when he was ill," etc. etc.
The Hon. James A. Farley doesn't smoke,
and pursuant to a promise he made his moth-
er when he was a boy. he has never taken
a drink, nor indeed, does he take the Lord's
name in vain.
All this adds up to proof that none of
these are needed to be the merriest man
and the warmest companion in New York
City. Like Central Park, James A. Farley is
a New York landmark, the living symbol of
its open-handed and open-hearted tradi-
tions.
That's why everybody is a bit indignant
at the general, in violation of his own ebul-
lient tradition, getting a pain in the chest.
Thousands, of course, have written him in
conventional manner. This, perhaps, explains
his terrific spirit, hospital or not; James A.
Farley always feels well when there are moun-
tains of mail to answer, and from the amount
of it being delivered where he's at, it is per-
fectly apparent that the U.S. Mails are about
to receive another massive transfusion of
James A. Farley's famous green ink.
CAPT. ROLAND BRANI-AN OUT-
STANDING POLICE OFFICER
HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 19, 1972
Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to
pay tribute to the memory of Roland
Bran!, who died recently after having
served as a member of the Cicero, Ill.,
police department for three and a half
decades.
During my postcollege days when I
was a news reporter and columnist, I had
occasion to cover the Cicero Police De-
partment and local court sessions. It was
during this time that I met and came to
know Patrolman Brani. He was a sincere,
dedicated officer of the law who moved
from the bottom of the ladder in his de-
partment to the rank of captain and then
chief of detectives. He maintained this
post up until the time of his death.
One of the truly great tributes paid to
him was by the International Association
of Chiefs of Police which voted him one
of the 10 outstanding police officers in
the Nation. Certainly the best way to
judge an individual and his professional
worth is by the esteem in which he is
held by those who are most closely asso-
ciated with him in his field.
Mr. Speaker, the town of Cicero has
adopted a resolution which I insert in
the RECORD as further recognition that
Captain Brani served his community
with great distinction throughout his
long career.
The resolution follows:
RESOLUTION
Whereas, the Good Lord Is his infinite wis-
dom has chosen to take unto his fold Cap-
tain Roland Brani, an outstanding member
of the Police Department of the Town of
Cicero for the past 35 Years, and
Whereas, notwithstanding his-mild, friend-
ly and modest nature, he was the recipient of
the greatest respect of each and every man
who served in his command, and
Whereas, Captain Roland Brani, known by
his many friendsas "Beef", had achieved an
enviable record, second to none in the entire
Nation, filled with feats of bravery, courage,
wisdom and accomplishment in the finest
tradition of American Law Enforcement, and
Whereas, his reputation-as a "Law Enforce-
ment Officer" was justly recognized and com-
plimented when he was chosen by the Inter-
national Association of Chiefs of Police, an
organization comprising over 400,000 mem-
bers, as one of the "Ten Most Outstanding
Police Officers In The Nation",
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Presi-
dent and Board of Trustees of the Town of
Cicero, individually, and as duly elected
representatives of the industrial, commercial
and residential citizens of the Town of Cicero,
and on behalf of the many Judges of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Court Person-
nel, Police Officers throughout the State, and
all others who had the privilege of knowing
or working with the "Captain," we offer his
bereaved family our deepest and most sin-
cere sympathy for the great loss they have
suffered by his passing.
Be it further resolved that Captain Brani
will forever be in our hearts and thoughts
and we shall be eternally indebted to him
for the unselfish and total dedication of his
entire self to the health, welfare, safety and
betterment of this Community and all of its
people, and "Our Captain Roland Brani" will
always be remembered by the proud citizens
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in danger of becoming delinquent. There-
fore, the training authority established un-
der title II of the Juvenile Delinquency Pre-
vention and Control Act has been retained.
The committee also understands that
YDDPA's responsibility for providing train-
ing will cease when and if H.R. 45 is enacted
into law. H.R. 45 would establish an Institute
for,Continuing Studies of Juvenile Justice,
one of the primary purposes of which is to
provide training.
The committee also recognizes the im-
portance of the Federal role in providing
technical assistance to State, local, and
private agencies in the area of delinquency
prevention and rehabilitation. The 1972
amendments retain the technical assistance
authority contained in title III with the re-
quirements that particular emphasis be
placed on technical assistance relating to
the development of juvenile delinquency
plans. The special expertise developed under
the act should be readily available to LEAA
and to state planning agencies in the prepa-
ration of comprehensive State juvenile delin-
quency plans.
The committee retains its concern about
the administration of the 1968 act, partic-
ularly with regard to the level of funding.
The 1972 amendments provide for a $75 mil-
lion authorization. However, the pattern of
severely limited budget requests and appro-
priations appears to be a continuing prob-
lem. In fiscal 1972, for example, although $75
million was authorized, only $10 million was
requested and $10 million appropriated. In
fiscal 1973, although the committee's amend-
ments contain a $75 million authorization,
only $10 milion has been requested.
In reporting the 1972 amendments to the
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con-
trol Act, the committee accepts the YDDPA
program in its present form as a possible
means for improving the administration of
tion next year. Those committee members
who supported a longer extension of the act
were concerned about the difficulties of ad-
ministering the program on a short-term
basis. However, a majority of the committee
is agreed that the 1972 amendments are no
substitute for the vigorous national leader-
ship, coordinating authority, and substantial
resources necessary for an effective Federal
response to the problems of juvenile delin-
quency.
The amendments were agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading, read the third time,
and passed.
FLAMMABLE FABRICS ACT-AU-
THORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the vote by
which H.R. 5066 was passed last Fri-
day, and its third reading, be reconsid-
ered, for the sole purpose of offering a
technical amendment which is made
necessary by the changes that were made
in the bill by the floor amendments
adopted by the Senate last Friday.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered,
and the bill will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows :
H.R. 5066, an act to authorize appropri-
ations for fiscal year 1972, to carry out the
Flammable Fabrics Act.
standard he promulgates for Children's
Sleepwear, but the standard once developed
will not wait for the routine twelve months
delay for it to take effect. As a result of the
action of the Senate, if joined in by the
House, the standard for Children's Sleepwear
will be effective not later than July 1, 1973.
I commend the able senior Senator from
New Hampshire (Mr. CorroN) and the other
able members of this body who worked with
me to arrive at a solution to the problems
confronting our nation's children arising out
of the intrinsic flammable character of most
fabrics.
I am looking forward to the support of the
members of the House and the responsible
members of industry. The Secretary of Com-
merce will need our support as he seeks an
appropriate standard. If this effort receives
the attention it deserves there should be a
major improvement in the availability of
flame resistant farbrics for all types of chil-
dren's garments in the marketplace within
the next few years, and at least for children's,
sleepwear, an absence of any garment which
does not meet an adequate test for flame re-
sistance, after July 1, 1973.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently
said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that H.R. 5066 be printed as it
passed the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CHILES). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
hearings on the Nixon-Brezhnev treaty
start this morning in the Committee on
Foreign Relations. They will be most im-
portant, I think, to the future of this
Nation, to the Soviet Union, and very
likely to the rest of the world.
The President has indicated that one
of his principal goals is a generation of
peace. I want to assure him that that is
the goal of the Senate, the Congress, and
the American people, as well.
I wish to express the hope that the
hearings will be gone into in detail and
that then a favorable report from the
Committee on Foreign Relations will be
issued expeditiously so that the Nixon-
Brezhnev treaty can be taken up on the
floor of the Senate as soon as possible.
If things work out, I would hope it
would be possible to do so before we
recess at the end of this month. If not,
then certainly when we come back be-
tween the two national conventions.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
On page 1, after line 7, insert:
"SEC. 2. That the Flammable Fabrics Act
be amended by adding a new section at the
end thereof, as follows.
The amendment was agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading, was read the third
time, and passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
behalf of the Senator from Washington
(Mr. MAGNUSON) I ask unanimous con-
sent to insert a statement regarding the
Flammable Fabrics Act amendments
adopted by the Senate on Friday.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON
the act, but does not consider this to be a
comprehensive response to the delinquency
crisis. At the April 28, 1972, hearings, a repre-
sentative of the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency (NCCD) testified that the
youth service system is a worthwhile con-
cept but does not present the total answer
to the national problem of juvenile delin-
quency prevention. The NCCD concluded
that the low level of funding fo YDDPA as
well as the emphasis on utilizing existing
services assures that juvenile delinquency
prevention will be an appurtenance to other
program goals.
In moving into programing youth services
systems, YDDPA has relinquished responsi-
bility for coordinating the current diverse
array of juvenile delinquency programs. The
need for such coordination remains. At the
April 28 hearings, representatives of the De-
partment.of Health, Education, and Welfare
and LEAA testified favorably on the progress
of the Interdepartmental Council. The
Council, under the chairmanship of the At-
torney General, has met regularly during the
past year to review ways In which the Fed-
eral effort might be made more effective.
Since the Council appears to be a useful
mechanism for providing communication be-
tween Federal agencies concerned with juve-
nile delinquency, the committee recom-
mends the transfer of the annual reporting
requirement regarding Federal juvenile delin-
quency activities from YDDPA to the Inter-
departmental Council.
In reaching its decision to recommend a
two year extension of the Juvenile Delin-
quency Prevention and Control Act, the com-
mittee had extensive discussion of how long
an extension would be appropriate. Some
members were concerned that the 1972
amendments might be regarded as a com-
prehensive answer to the delinquency prob-
blem of this Nation. They emphasized the
need for continued study of the entire Fed-
eral juvenile delinquency effort with a view
toward enacting new comprehensive legisla-
On Friday the Senate took a major step
toward protecting our nations' children from
the risks of injury by fire from childrens'
sleepwear.
Our amendment to H.R. 5066, adopted as
amended by a vote of 65 to 0, directs the Sec-
retary of Commerce to promulgate a flamma-
bility standard for children's sleepwear to be
effective no later than July 1, 1973,
Under the procedures of the Flammable
Fabrics Act routine standards are not of-,
fective for one year after the date of their
final promulgation. However the Act does
contemplate some occasions when more rapid
ma
f fl
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD three
editorials which were published in the
Great Falls Tribune of Great Falls,
Mont., under date of May 25, 1972, en-
titled "Generation of Peace May 28,
entitled "The Arms Treaty"; and June
6, entitled "Harnessing the Missiles";
and an article entitled "The Rationale
for Defense Spending Grows More and
More Irrational," written by D. J. R.
Bruckner, and published in the Los
Angeles Times of June 19, 1972.
There being no objection, the editorials
and article were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
GENERATION OF PEACE
am
action is necessary. In the case o
ity standards for Children's Sleepwear, sizes A "generation of peace," which President
7 to 14, the secretary is directed to utilize Nixon has declared is one of his principal
the procedures of the Act in so far as prat- goals, may be assured it he and Russian Party
ticable. This means that he will hold -hear- Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev agree on an arms
ings and receive public comment on the limitation program.
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5 9595
authorized under title III are made, so that Prevention and Control Act. However, only Federal effort was coordinated and efficient.
special emphasis will be placed on providing $15 million was requested and only $10 mil- The 1971 amendments also gave YDDPA an
technical assistance in the development of lion appropriated. In fiscal 1971, $75 million additional year to prove its effectiveness in
juvenile delinquency prevention and control was authorized, $15 million requested, and the fight against juvenile crime and to de-
plans. Further, the requirement of making $15 million appropriated. From 1968 to 1971, velop a strategy which would efficiently cle-
an annual report is shifted to the Interde- HEW requested only $49.2 million for opera- ploy the limited resources of HEW.
partmental Council, established by the 1971 tion of the act out of a total authorized
amendments, as a means of increasing co- amount of $150 million. The serious deficien- NEED FOR LEGISLATION
ordination among Federal agencies respon- cies in HEW's administration of the Juve- Juvenile crime in this country has reached
sable for juvenile delinquency prevention and nile Delinquency Prevention and Control crisis proportions in the past decade. Arrests
control. The amendments also provide ade- Act are further demonstrated by the failure of juveniles for violent crimes have increased
quate fiscal authorization for the operation of of YDDPA to expend the limited resources by 167 percent. Arrests of juveniles for prop-
the act. appropriated. From 1968 to 1971, out of the erty crimes, such as burglary and auto theft,
33ACKGROUND small sum of $30 million appropriated, only have jumped 89 percent. Almost two-thirds
'.'he Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and half, or $15 million, was actually expended, of all arrests for serious crimes are of young
Control Act was enacted by Congress in 1968 The fiscal record of the administration of people under the age of 21. Our failure as a
to help States and local communities the 1968 Act reflects HEW's limited view :?u nation to deal with this crisis is tragically
strengthen their juvenile justice programs. the Department's role in developing a pro- clear. The recidivism rate for institutional-
'I'bis assistance was to be broad in scope in- gram commensurate with the delinquency ized delinquents Is the highest of any age
eluding courts, correctional systems, police problem. Thus, the fulfillment of the oriV- group-between 74 and 85 percent. Many if
agencies, law enforcement, and other agencies inal purposes of the act has been rendered not most adult criminals have a juvenile
which deal with juveniles, and was to en- virtually impossible because of inadequacies record..
compass a wide range of preventive and re- both in appropriations and in admini.stra- Congress responded to the alarming in-
habilitative services to delinquent and pre- tion. crease in juvenile crime by enacting the Ju-
delinquent youth. The act also provided for One of the major problems In the admin- venile Delinquency Prevention and Control
the training of personnel employed or about istration of the 1963 act has been the con- Act in 1968. The first 3 years of the act's
to be employed in the area of juvenile de- fusion of roles In the juvenile delinquency operation were marked by administrative
linquency prevention and control, and for field between HEW and the Law Enforce-- weakness and lack of direction. In extending
comprehensive planning, development of im- meet Assistance Administration of the De- the act for i year, in 1971, Congress clearly
proved techniques and information services partment of Justice set up under the Omni- indicated its intention to review carefully
in ,he field of juvenile delinquency. The De- bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of the administration of the 1968 act.
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare 1968. Under the Juvenile Delinquency Pre- At committee hearings on April 28, 1972,
was charged with administering the act, be- ventlon and Control Act of 1968, HEW wa, representatives of the Department of Health,
cause that Department was believed to have intended to provide assistance to states in Education, and Welfare testified on the prog-
particular expertise in dealing with the pre- preparing and implementing comprehensive ress that YDDPA has made during the past
ventive and rehabilitative aspects of delin- State juvenile delinquency plans. But LEAA. year in increasing its effectiveness. In defin-
quency. with vastly larger resources than YDDPA ing the Department's role in preventing juve-
'the report accompanying the act clearly soon became dominant in the criminal jus- nile delinquency more clearly, YDDPA has
sets forth the congressional intent that the` tico planning field. specifically concentrated its work on the de-
act be administered as part of an integrated In an exchange of letters on May 25, 1971 velopment of systems which provide coordi-
network of antipoverty, antislum, and youth the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney Gen- nated youth services as well as funds for ini-
programs. The report states that the legisla- oral acknowledged the existing inadequacy tiation of needed services which are other-
tion should not be just another categorical in coordinating the juvenile delinquency wise not available. Twenty-three youth serv-
program administered in relative isolation activities of their respective agencies. The ices systems were started in fiscal 1971, and
from much larger efforts such as the com- May 25 letters specified that each State YDDPA estimates that there will be 13 more
munity action program, model cities, and the should develop a single comprehensive crimi- such systems by the end of fiscal 1972.
Manpower Development and Training Net. nal justice plan which would comply with YDDPA also testified that the present act,
Thus, Congress clearly intended that the pro- the statutory requirements of both the with its emphasis on state juvenile delin-
grams administered under the act serve to Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets quency planning perpetuates the confusion
coordinate all Government efforts in the area Act and the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention about HEW's role In the criminal justice
of juvenile delinquency and to provide na- and Control Act. The Secretary and the At- planning process and in providing grants for
tional leadership in developing new ap- torney General agreed thatHEW was to con- preventive and rehabilitative services.
preaches to the problems of juvenile crime. centate its efforts on prevention and rehabil- It was in light of this testimony that the
As the committee noted in the report ac- iiation programs administered outside the committee developed the 1972 amendments
companying the 1971 amendments, the orig- traditional juvenile correctional system while to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and
anal promise of the Juvenile Delinquency LEAA was to focus its efforts on programs Control Act. These amendments are de-
Prevention and Control Act has not been ful- within the juvenile correctional system. De- signed to reflect the focus on youth services
filled. The first 3 years of the administration spite this allocation of responsibility for de- systems which HEW itself feels would be the
of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and linquency prevention to HEW, the minimal most effective use of its limited resources in
Control Act of 1968 were marked by delay level of funding for the operation of the the juvenile delinquency area. The principal
and inefficiency in implementing the broad Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con- amendment, the new title I, would encourage
legislative mandate. More than a year and a trol Act raises serious doubts about the pos- the development of coordinated youth serv-
half elapsed before a Director was appointed sible effectiveness of YDDPA in providing ices systems separate from the juvenile jus-
for the Youth Development and Delinquency national leadership in the prevention of tice system through grants to public or non-
Prevention Administration, the agency with- delinquency. profit private agencies. YDDPA is to serve as
in HEW charged with administering the act. The problems of the role of HEW under the a catalyst to bring together resources from a
To date, only one annual report has been Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con- broad range of public and private health,
published, despite a legislative requirement trot Act should be viewed in the larger can- education, employment, and other agencies
that such reports be made each fiscal year. text of the lack of primary responsibility in which would provide services to delinquents
In this March 1971 report, YDDPA conceded any one Federal agency for all juvenile de- or youth in danger of becoming delinquent
its own failure to implement the goals of linquency programs. Juvenile Delinquency and their families. YDDPA's funds will be
the 1968 Act. With the exception of the or_ programs are presently spread among more concentrated on selected youth services sys-
tion of the YDDPA budget s par- than 40 different agencies. There are no cen- tems to maximize fully the- impact on this
pent on State tral goals and priorities to guide the plan- program.
comprehensive juvenile delinquency plan- ning and development of these diverse and
ning, funds were spread throughout the The committee believes that the adminie.
country in a series of underfunded, scat- scattered programs. The national direction tration of the Juvenile Delinquency Preven-
Lered, unrelated projects. The subcamreat- and coordination of delinquency programs Lion and Control Act has improves during
tee fthat projects delinquency pro- envisioned by the Juvenile Delinquency Pre- the past year and can be substantially im-
tee lound
have not been a major vention and Control Act for HEW has not proved in the future by defining the scope
grams priority of the engaged in that De artment.
Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
In P of its menttces in accordance with the 1972
rare even though it has had responsibility a response to the. clear need to develop amendments. Therefore, the committee ree-
fer administering the Juvenile Delinquency more effective coordination of the Federal ommends repeal of the sections of the. 1968
Prevention and Control Act. j
in the 1971 amendments to the uvenile delinquency effort. the committee act relating to grant authority for State
This lack of priority by HEW has been corn- linquency Prevention and Control Actrestab- tive services. Underethet1972came dme its,
riounded by the consistent failure of the De- lished an Interdepartmental Council consist- grants may be madefor preventive and re-
,)artment to request more than a small pro- ing of representatives of the major Federal habilitative services if such services are part
ssortion. of the amount authorized by Con- agencies Involved In the area of juvenile de- of a coordinated youth services system and
g ress for each fiscal year, resulting In piti- linquency. The Council was to meet on a are not already available in the community.
fully small appropriations for YDDPA. In regular basis to review the efforts of the vari- The committee recognizes the great need
fiscal 1970, example, $50 million was au- ous agencies In combating juvenile delin- for improved training of personnel working
thorized under the Juvenile Delinquency quency and make certain that the overall with youths who are delinquent or who are
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President Nixon's journey to Moscow al- HARNESSING THE MISSILES
ready has succeeded in several significant The nuclear arms limitation treaty which
areas. The delegations of the two superpowers President Nixon signed in Moscow May 28
have agreed to cooperate in.research on en- has been greeted with a favorable response
vironmental problems. They also formalized throughout the nation but also has raised
an earlier agreement for coordinated health strong opposition in many quarters.
research on cancer, heart disease and environ- The treaty, which must be ratified by the
mental health.
It's encouraging that President Nixon and
Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev are realistic
enough to attempt to set limits on the nu-
clear arms race. Each knows that the chances
for peaceful coexistence in a troubled world
will be enhanced greatly if the superpowers
agree to establish a ceiling on both offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons.
President Nixon and Party Chief Brezhnev
know that the two nations now have a nu-
clear capacity to destroy the world, that each
power has sufficient intercontinental nuclear
missiles to accept a devastating surprise
strike and still have enough nuclear might to
destroy the attacking nation. They know that
the U.S. has an estimated nuclear capacity
equivalent to 18 billion tons of TNT and that
Russia has an estimated 19-billion-ton arse-
nal of nuclear weapons. There won't be much
left on earth if the weapons in the two
arsenals are exploded.
The best wishes of the entire world, con-
cerned about the possibility of a nuclear
holocaust if an atomic war breaks out, will
rest with President Nixon and Party Chief
Brezhnev.
THE ARMS TREATY
The nuclear arms limitation agreement
signed in Moscow Friday by President Nixon
and Russian Party Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev
marks an historic milestone in world history.
The treaty, if ratified by the U.S. Senate,
may bring an end to the costly arms race in
which both superpowers have been compet-
ing for more than two decades. Without such
a treaty, the two great nations will continue
the shaky state of equilibrium called the
"balance of terror," a state in which each
nation has more than enough nuclear weap-
ons to demolish the other within a few hours.
Under the arms limitation agreement, each
of the superpowers still is left with the abil-
ity to accept a surprise strike and be able to
retaliate with sufficient power to destroy
the attacking nation.
Military experts say the U.S. has nuclear
warheads with the power of 18 billion tons
of TNT and that Russia has a nuclear arsenal
with the power of about 19 billion tons of
TNT. The other nuclear nations, Britain,
France and China, also have nuclear weap-
ons so the total world nuclear tonnage is
equivalent to more than 40 billion tons of
TNT.
Only two atomic bombs have been ex-
ploded in war. The first killed 78,150 persons
in Hiroshima, Japan, Aug. 8, 1945; the sec-
ond killed 73,394 persons three days later
when dropped by a U.S. plane over Nagasaki,
Japan. The two bombs, each with an atomic
power equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT,
injured about as many persons as they killed
and the effects of radioactive damage still
linger In the two cities.
The two bombs dropped over Japan are
baby ones when compared to the giant nu-
i t ti t 1 is
nen a m
i
th
d
debated thoroughly in Congress in coming
weeks.
Many who are criticizing the agreement
are saying that the pact gives the Russians
an edge in the nuclear weapon field. Presi-
dent Nixon answered such fears by saying
that the nation will continue to be stronger
than any other nation on earth.
Opponents apparently fail to understand
that each of the two superpowers has an
overkill capacity almost beyond comprehen-
sion. Each nation possesses the nuclear
capability to accept a surprise attack and
still retaliate with sufficient might to de-
stroy the attacking country.
Many fail to appreciate that war has
changed so radically in the nuclear age that
began at the end of World War II. In that
war, the United States exploded a total ton-
nage of bombs equivalent to 2 million tons
of TNT-bombs dropped over a period of
four years.
Two of the 200 nuclear-tipped Minuteman
missiles now deployed in Montana pack as
much explosive fury as all the bombs we
dropped over Germany and Japan in World
War II. A Minuteman missile can race
through space at 15,000 miles per hour and
rain nuclear death on an entire city within
a half hour from the time the signal is
flashed in Washington, D.C.
The Minutemen missiles In Montana have
100 times more explosive power than all the
bombs we dropped in World War II. The
Montana missiles are only part of the 1,054
intercontinental missiles in the U.S. arse-
nal-which also include powerful missiles
in our submarines-and giant nuclear
bombs in our bombers.
Military experts estimate the U.S. has a
nuclear arsenal equivalent to 18 billion tons
of TNT and that Russia's arsenal may be
equivalent to 19 billion tons of TNT.
. That's enough nuclear power to devastate
the entire earth-a fact opponents of the
arms limitation treaty may want to think
about as they attempt to defeat the treaty.
THE RATIONALE FOR DEFENSE SPENDING
GROWS MORE AND MORE IRRATIONAL
(By D. J. R. Bruckner)
NEw YoRx-Early this year the Adminis-
tration justified its increased military budget
requests by arguing that it would need funds
for new weapons if the Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks failed. Last week it was
arguing that it needs more funds for new
weapons to give the Russians an incentive
to proceed with SALT II and agree to a
treaty limiting offensive weapons.
Some congressional critics of the military
budget have been trying to find a way to tie
the arms agreements to the debate over
spending, in an effort to cut funds, but the
Administration could have ignored that
S 9597
suggested to its constituency that security
might be best achieved by disarmament
rather than by armament. In fact, the chief
U.S. arms negotiator Gerard Smith told the
Russians on May 9 that an objective of the
Salt II talks on offensive weapons "should be
to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis
threats to the survivability of our respective
strategic retaliatory forces." That means, in
translation, that our safety lies in our un-
restrained ability to bomb one another to
hell.
Mr. Nixon displayed his mastery of this
weird language of the politics of war when
he told the congressmen that the Russians
told him that "they were going forward with
defense programs in the offensive area .
His conclusion was that "since they will be
going ahead with their programs, for" the
United States not to go forward with its
programs would mean that any incentive
that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow-
on agreement would be removed." -Do you
understand?
This is all of a piece with the American
threat to abrogate and ABM treaty if SALT
II does not produce an offensive weapons
treaty within five years. Henry Kissinger ac-
tually argued in the congressional briefing
at the White House that it was our deploy-
ment of the Safeguard ABM missile that
made the new ABM limitation treaty possi-
ble.
We are invited to conclude that, if one
step up in the arms race made one treaty
possible, another step up will make another
treaty possible. The theory that an increase
in military spending will encourage Russia
to make more arms limitation treaties gains
an illusory persuasiveness from the fact that
there is an ABM treaty before Congress. But
why would not a cutback in military spend-
ing encourage the Russians to negotiate just
as well? We do not know; we have never
tried that method.
The proposed $83.2 billion Defense Depart-
ment budget includes initial funds for Min-
uteman II and Poseidon missiles, a new B-1
bomber for the strategic arsenal, a new Tri-
dent submarine to cost something more than
$1 billion. Wonderful. In 25 years we have
spent more than $1,000 billion on our war,
machine. This commitment, we are supposed
to believe, has persuaded the Russians to sign
a treaty limiting additions to one part `off
the machine; spending billions more to im-
prove other parts of the machine will lead to
another treaty. And then?
If a new and different reason is needed to
justify this increased military budget, you
must expect that one will be found, treaty
or no treaty. We have seen the unsettling
spectacle of Admiral Thomas Moorer, chief
of the Joint Chiefs, telling Congress that
the military might withhold its approval
of the ABM treaty unless the military budget
for offensive weapons goes up. Defense Sec-
retary Laird then issued a warning that the
Russians are building multiple warhead mis-
siles, although it turns out in fact that there
has been no testing of such weapons by
Russia and that the situation has remained
unchanged all year. Then Laird was up in
the Capitol arguing that the arms limitation
agreements would be dangerous unless we be-
come better armed.
-
e n ercon
n
clear warhea
s
siles Russia and the U.S. are able to launch . President finds some advantage in co-opting Interntaional affairs might be in fact as
at 15,000-miles-an-hour speeds against tar- the tactic of his critics; it is probably a totally unreasonable, perhaps lunatic, as
gets as far as 10,000 miles away. political advantage in an election year. these guys want to make us believe. But I
President Nixon and the Russain lead- The rot set Into our thinking about the suspect there is another angle to this effort,
ers know that if the nuclear weapons are military when Congress agreed 25 years ago a political angle. A storm will be stirred up in
turned lose, no nation will win-that it will to eliminate the War Department and call Congress, but Mr. Nixon's treaty and agree-
be a case of murder-suicide if one nation the new combined services agency the De- ment will be approved anyway, and he can
starts such a nuclear war. fense Department. And last week the Presi- go before the voters as a victor in a tough
President Nixon and the Russian leaders dent was telling more than 100 members of fight with a stubborn Congress. And Sen.
rate a "thank you" from all nations for Congress at the White House that his aim Hubert Humphrey, in his California cam-
agreeing to limit the nuclear race. President is to insure the "security" of the nation. The paign, demonstrated to the White House the
Nixon is entitled to great personal credit for Russian leaders were telling their people the effective use of frightening people about any
his efforts to obtain the agreement, one he same thing in one of those long, allusive, cuts in the military budget, convincing them
has maintained is needed to assure a "gen- code-worded articles In Pravda defending that restraint is weakness abroad and a
eration of peace." the summit agreements. Neither leadership source of unemployment at home.
effort safely. The arms agreements and the
budget are two quite distinct matters which
could be handled separately. Evidently the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 19, 1972
'he words are used in different ways now, of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will convinced that they played a role as they
and the arguments sound different, but in then make a statement, and then it will be have up to this point, and will continue to
fact, the condition of the war machine will open to questions to members of the corn- play a role in this very, very important field
be a chief concern of this campaign as it has mittees who are present here. of arms control.
been the chief concern of every campaign In order to facilitate recognition of Mezn- Now, let me go to the agreements, them-
since 1940. hers, someone who knows all of the Members selves, and express briefly some of my own
+,Ir. SCOTT. Mr. President, I merely who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate views that I think are probably quite familiar
want to SCOTT. Mr. the statement just ely the question and answer period, but we will to you, but which I think need to be under-
try to be just as fair as possible among the lined.
made by the distinguished majority members of the committees and between I have noted a great deal of speculation
leader that the hearings on the Nixon- the House and the Senate, and Clark will, of about who won and who lost in these ne-
Brezhnev treaty began at 10 a.m. today. course, be responsible in the event it isn't gotiations. I havesaid that neither side won
I hope that they can be conducted as fair. and neither side lost. As a matter of fact,
expeditiously as is necessary for a full In any event, let me come directly now to if we were to really look at it very, very
m own remarks, which will not be too ex- fairly, both sides won, and the whole world
if we hearing. It
could act td w on n this excellent
treaty ty thing
before tended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be won. presenting the Presidential views. He will he Let me tell you why I think that is im-
we adjourn for the first of the two na- telling you what the President's portant. Where negotiations between
lion l n..,,ve tior,s If not of course T participation _ great
it between the conventions. But I hope
we can do it. as the distinguished major-
ity leader says, in the near future.
'!'here is, so far as I know, no great, no
massive objection to the terms of the
treaty in any area of which I am aware.
It is another way to bring about a better-
ment of our chances for peace. It is an-
other step in the search for peace. Mean-
whle, other steps are going on with Mr.
Podgorny in Hanoi, Mr. Kissinger in the
People's Republic of China and, perhaps,
Mr Le Due Tho in the People's Republic
of China.
'l.'he number of nations interested in
putting an end to this ulcer which bleeds
away the strength of the North Viet-
namese, the South Vietnamese, the
United States, and its allies is, of course,
of the greatest importance to all of us.
It is the prayer of all Americans and. of
people of good will everywhere that we
find an end to this utterly miserable con-
dition in which we find ourselves.
We wish success to all who are engaged
in this common search for peace.
L11
AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last
will express I have gone over with him in other loses clearly, then you have a built-in
great detail, and I will stand by them. tendency or incentive for the side that loses
I noted in the press that it was suggested to break the agreement and to do everything
that I was calling down the members of these that it can to regain the advantage.
committees for the purpose of giving you This is an agreement which was very
a pep talk on these two agreements. Let me toughly negotiated on both sides. There are
lay that to rest right at the outset. This is advantages in it for both sides. For that rea-
not a pep talk and Dr. Kissinger is not going sons, each side has a vested interest, we be-
to make you a pep talk either. lieve, in keeping the agreement rather than
When I came back from the Soviet Union, breaking it.
you will recall in the Joint Session I said I would like you to examine Dr. Kissinger,
that I wanted a very searching inquiry of and the other witnesses, before the commit-
these agreements. I want to leave no doubt tee on that point. I think you also will be
about my own attitude. convinced that this was one of those cases
I have studied this situation of arms con- where it is-to the mutual advantage of each
trol over the past 31,~ years. I am totally con- side, each looking to its national security.
vinced that both of these agreements are in Another point that I would like to make
the interest of the security of the United Is Presidential intervention in this particular
States and in the interest of arms control matter, Presidential coordination, due to the
and world peace. fact that what we have here is not one of
I am convinced of that, based on my study. those cases where one department could
However, I want the members of the House take a lead role.
and the members of the Senate also to be This cut across the functions of the De-
convinced of that. I want the Nation to be partment of State, the Department of De-
convinced of that. fense, it cut across, also, the AEC, and, of
I think that the hearings that you will con- course, the Arms Control Agency.
duct must be searching because only in that Under these circumstances, there is only
way will you be able to be convincing to one place where it could be brought together,
yourselves and only in that way will the Na- and that was in the White House, in the
tion also be convinced. National Security Council, in which all of
In other words, this is not one of those these various groups participated.
cases where the President of the United There is another reason, which has to do
States in asking the Congress and the Nation with the system of government in the Soviet
to take on a blind faith a decision that he Union. We have found that in dealing with
has made in which he deeply believes. the system of govenment in the Soviet Union,
I believe in the decision, but your ques- that where decisions are made, that affect the
tions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and vital security and in fact, the very survival
others in the Administration for the purpose of a nation, decisions and discussions in
of finding any weaknesses that you think in those cases are made only at the highest level.
the negotiations or in the final agreements Consequently, it is necessary for us to have
that we have made. discussions and decisions at the highest level
As far as the procedures are concerned, as if we are going to have the breakthroughs
you know, you will be hearing the Secre- that we have had to make in order to come
tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the to this point of a successful neeotiation.
head of the CIA, and of course, Ambassador The other point that I would make has
Smith, in the sessions of your various com- to do with what follows on. The agreement
mittees. that we have here, as you know, is in two
I know that a number have suggested that stages: One, the treaty with regard to ABM
Dr. Kissinger should appear before the com- defensive weapons; and second, the offensive
mittees as a witness. I have had to decline limitation, the Executive Agreement, which
that particular invitation on his part, due to is indicated as being, as you know, not a
the fact that Executive privilege had to pre- permanent agreement-it is for five years-
vail. and not total.- It covers only certain categories
On the other hand, since this is really an of weapons.
week the President and Dr. Henry Kis-
singer met with approximately 130
Members of Congress to discuss and ex-
plain the Moscow agreements on the
Arms Limitation Treaty and Agreement.
Because these talks encompassed such
vital elements on these particular mat-
ters, I ask unanimous consent that the
President's statement, Dr. Kissinger's
statement, and the question-and-answer
session-all at the White House-be in-
serted at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE WHITE HOUSE REMARKS of THE Pea,sr-
DENT-'PHE STATE unprecedented situation, it seemed to me Now we are hoping to go forward with the
DINING ROOM that it was im
ortant th
second
t h
d
f
p
a
roun
e appear before
o
neotiations. That second
Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning the members of the committee in this for- round will begin, we trust, in October. That
a little late because I understand traffic is mat. This is on the record. means that we can begin in October, pro
quite heavy around the White House this All of you will be given total transcripts of vided action is taken on the treaty and on
morning due to the arrival of the President what he says. All of you will have the op- the offensive agreement that we have before
of Mexico. We must go forward with the portunity to ask these questions and In the you at this time, sometime in the summer
schedule, because there is a Joint Session, event that all of the questions are not asked months; we would trust before the 1st of
as you know, today and we do want the mein- on this occasion, he, of course, will be avail- September. I don't mean that it should take
hers of the committees present here today to able to answer-other-questions in his office that long, but I hope you can finish by the
be able to attend that session. We will have from members of the committee as time goes 1st of September so we can go forward with
to adjourn this meeting at approximately on, during the course of the hearings. the negotiation in October.
12:00 o'clock, or at best, five minutes after What we are asking for here, in other The other point that should be made with
12:00, to give you plenty of time for ques- words, is cooperation and not just rubber- regard to the follow-on agreements is not re-
tions. stamping by the House and the Senate. That lated to your approval of these agreements.
A word about the format of this meeting. is essential because there must be follow- It is related to the actions of the Congress
I will make a statement, and then I will have through on this and the members of the on defense. I know there is disagreement
to depart in order to prepare for the arrival House and Senate, it seems to me, must be among various Members of Congress with re-
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E 6324 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks June 19, 1972
ELT: THE ACCORD DESERVES OUR strategic weapons the first priority of the given the Soviets more than 80 missile-
SUPPORT SALT negotiations. While a freeze then launching submarines by 1977, just as their
would have set somewhat lower and more present pace of ICBM construction would
advantageous ceilings, the Moscow agree- have produced by that year a land-based
HUN. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER ments contain a reasonable approximation force alone in excess of 2,800 missiles.
OF ILLINOIS of this objective-which was recommended The blunt truth is that no U.S. effort, even
by an overwhelming majority of senators. on a crash basis, could have matched this
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES The proposed treaty limits anti-ballistic Soviet rate, launcher for launcher and boat
Monday, June 19, 1972 missile deployment to no more than two sites for boat, during the five years governed by
with a maximum of 100 defensive missiles the interim agreement. The Interruption of
Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, Alton each, a force totally insufficient to weaken the massive Soviet building program is a
Frye, a joint fellow of the Council of For- the credibility of either side's capacity to stupendous gain to American security and
eign Relations and the Woodrow Wilson retaliate and hence to deter war. The interim international stability.
International Center for Scholars has agreement on offensive weapons halts ICBM. Any genuine negotiation must produce
written a number of studies on the deployments at the existing levels (about movement toward accommodation by both
foreign strategies as 1,618 on the Soviet side and 1,054 on the parties. One can only gain a distorted pic-
United States and American) and limits modern submarine- ture of the process by focusing exclusively
well as foreign policy. launched missiles (SLBMS) to those now op- on the concessions made by one side. Yet
He has written an extremely detailed erational and under construction (710 on the some commentators have done precisely that,
article in the Sunday Star of June 18 in Soviet side and 656 on the American). implying that the United States has been too
which he says: Unnecessary confusion has grown out of eager in conceding presumed advantages to
Nothing Richard Nixon has done speaks so the provision permitting conversion of some the Soviets. As a partial corrective, one ought
well of his judgment and his courage as the land-based missiles into sea-based weapons; to understand the numerous and substantial
beginning he has made on strategic arms briefly put, the Soviet Union can build to a concessions made by Moscow in its deter-
limitation. total of 950 missiles on subbmarines but only mination to promote a mutually acceptable
if it phases out 240 launchers already de- balance.
? In view of the length of the SALT talks ployed, i.e., if it actually reduces its land- The-foremost issue on which the Soviet
and the details that were considered as based force to 1,400 missiles or so. Union yielded is one which casts an utterly
well as the need of the discussions, I felt In sum, the ceilings provided in the in- different light on the gross balance in ICBMs
sure my colleagues would want to read terim agreement would permit the Soviets to and Strategic Land-Based Missiles. At the
con-
the splendid article by Mr. Frye titled, deploy up to 2,350 long-range missiles on outset the Russians had insisted with con-
land and sea, compared with a total of 1,710 siderable justification that a fair definition
"SALT: The Accord Deserves Our Sup- for the United States. It is the starkness of of "strategic weapons" would include all sys-
port." this numerical contrast which suggests, at tems capable of delivering a nuclear attack
The article follows: first glance, that the United States accepted on the homeland of the other party. In or-
[From the Washington Star, June 18, 1972] less equitable terms than it should have de- der to facilitate a preliminary understanding
manded. they reluctantly agreed to treat only long-
SALT: THE ACCORD DESERVES Oua SUPPORT But these gross figures do not reflect the range missiles, excluding not only the U.S.
(By Alton Frye) crucial dimensions of the strategic bargain strategic bomber fleet of about 460 planes
Cynics say it is a typical American failing struck at SALT. Imbedded in that bargain but also the enormous number of forward-
to know the price of everything and the are other commitments and detailed re- based systems maintained by the United
value of nothing. This human frailty is se- straints which leave little doubt that the States in Europe and on aircraft carriers.
rious enough in the routine exchanges of outcome of SALT is a decisive turn toward These latter types of weapons are unique
everyday life. In the great transactions of greater security. It is remarkable how far to the United States, in the sense that Mos-
international politics, the tendency can be these understandings go toward fulfilling the cow has no true carriers and no forward
fatal to the most enlightened and essential U.S. conceptions of the requirements of bases from which to mount a strike on this
undertakings. strategic stability. country with tactical flghter-bombers.
The point comes to mind because of the The United States sought explicit confirma- What this means is that the Soviets have
surprising reaction in some quarters to the tion that mutual deterrence would be the
historic Nixon-]3rezhnev agreements to limit basis for erecting a stable balance. The granted the Americans at least for the short Soviets agreed. By curtailing ABM deploy- run, more than 2,000 additional aircraft
strategic arms. The general enthusiasm for capable of devastating all of the Soviet
this momentous breakthrough in the Stra- ment, both sides have ratified the principle Union west of the Ural Mountains. Further-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) has that mutual deterrence depends on mutual more, the U.S. B-52s are being modernized
been tempered not only by grumblings on vulnerability. They may not welcome the with the Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM)
the far right but by the disturbing response condition of reciprocal terror, but they rec- which will vastly increase the lethality of the
of a few respected commentators and con- ognize the fact and acknowledge that force; each plane can carry 24 such missiles.
gressmen., neither has yet conceived a safe way to alter And, expensive though they are, the B-52s
it.
. Crosby Noyes alleges in The Star that the The United States sought explicit accept- have demonstrated over Haiphong in recent
agreements give Russia nuclear "superiority ante of the de facto "open skies" arrange- days that they can survive and function in
on a silver platter." Seeking to ward off un- ments, through which satellites keep each the densest anti-aircraft environment yet
justified euphoria. The Wall Street Journal side appraised of the other's strategic inven- tested in combat.
wonders whether the accords should be ap- tory and innovations. The Soviets agreed. By Those who are tempted to toss off the sig-
' proved "anytime during a presidential cam- committing themselves to avoid interference nificance of the Soviet concession on th)s
paign." Paul Warnke terms the agreement to with observation- satellites and other veri- point should ask themselves how we would
limit offensive weapons "slightly worse than flcation techniques, and by foregoing delib- view an understanding which left the Rus-
none at all," although he warmly endorses erate measures to conceal strategic capabil- sians with a free and unrestricted ride on
the ABM treaty. Sen. Henry Jackson, D- ities from observation, the two countries have more than two thousand delivery vehicles,
Wash., reserves his final judgment on the installed a necessary building block for con- each one of which is quite capable of de-
understandings, but blasts the "comic opera" fident progress on more substantial arms ar- inolishing any city in the United States. Had
procedures in Moscow and charges that the rangements. the Soviets been adamant in demanding im-
agreements give the Soviets "more of every- The United States sought to test Russian mediate limits on forward-based systems-
thing." acceptance of the principle of mutual deter- which play a dual conventional-nuclear role
These are thoughtful and knowledgeable rence by demanding that the overall freeze in the NATO posture-SALT could well have
observers. Their opinions will carry weight include a firm limit on the gigantic SS-9 collapsed.
with many of their fellow citizens. But close class missile, weapons which have perplexed Clearly, SALT II and the coming confer-
analysis reveals that the hasty critiques of U.S. planners because of their'potential ca- exces on European security will face hard
the SALT agreements share a common fault: pacity to destroy American missile silos. The and complex negotiations on these systems
They are preoccupied with short-term Soviets agreed. The interim agreement sup- and similar Soviet weapons targeted on
balances which are totally inadequate to presses the number of supersize boosters to Western Europe, including particularly the
measure the long-term investment in mutual around 300, a level well below the danger several hundred Soviet intermediate- and
security which the United States and the So- point calculated by the Department of De- medium-range ballistic missiles,
viet Union have now made. And even in fense. Another factor is central to evaluating the
gauging the short-term balances, they badly The United States insisted that the freeze simple numbers of launchers controlled by
misread the ledger written in Moscow. In ef- cover ballistic missile submarines, since the the interim agreement. The superficial Soviet
feet the early criticisms of the Moscow sum- Soviet Union has been building such systems advantage in numbers and sizes of missiles
mit overstate the price and understate the at a rapid clip (eight or nine a year) while is paired against a staggering American ad-
value of what was done there, Let us see why the United States in the next five years will vantage in deliverable warheads. Roughly de-
this is so. add no subs to the 41 it now has in service. scribed, the Soviets will have a three-to-one
THE CONTEXT OF SALT In a decision critical to the success of the lead in "throw-weight" or megatonnage,
In 1970 the Senate urged President Nixon negotiation, the Soviets agreed. Without such while the United States will have a three-
to make a freeze on further deployment of a limit, the present building rate would have to-one lead in warheads.
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June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 6323
for its fine work toward the goal of im- We can only assume that you read the Insofar as you speak for one of the world's
proving the quality of education for all book too quickly or that you did not read it major religious faiths, going back to Abraham
of our citizens. But, moreover, I think at all, a not uncommon problem plaguing who is the "father in faith" for Christians,
that this is an appropriate time to pay very busy public officials who, too often, un- Jews and even Moslems, I believe you have a
fortunately rely upon the judgment of duty to make an objective examination of
tribute to education itself. others. the evidence which suggests that many of
As a former educator I am familiar As a political scientist, we urge you to the principal manipulators of twentieth cen-
with the value that a good education check with Professor Carroll Quigley, of tury history are characterized by a deep and
has for our young people. I have no Georgetown University, whose writings are abiding hostility to any genuine belief in
'
fonder memories than of t
high school classes when I
with new
nding. To
ce and
understanding by becoming more YAmil-
iar with the hopes and fears of our neigh-
bors. We must employ our talents ',nd
abilities to the fullest possible extent by
being better informed of the many op'
portunities which exist in our society.
Education is an invaluable tool in
achieving these necessary elements of
adulthood. I am proud to have been a
part of the educational system in my
community, and since coming to Con-
gress I have sought to do everything pos-
sible to see that the good educational
system in our country is maintained.
HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ
OF CALIFORNIA
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 19, 1972
Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, last fall I
agreed to write the introduction for a
most interesting and significant book by
Gary Allen entitled "None Dare Call It
Conspiracy," which I will soon be bring-
ing before you serial fashion in the
RECORD. It explores the evidence for a
concerted plan and pattern in the many
reverses freedom, law, and faith have
suffered in this century.
This book included a prediction that,
like virtually all others on this subject,
it would be attacked by the Anti-De-
famationLeague of B'nai B'rith-an or-
ganization which, as William Buckley
once said, itself frequently engages in
defamation. This prediction was right on
target, and the attack began with the
letter to me which follows, together with
reply:
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF
B'NAI B'RITH,
Hon. JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
Irvine, Calif.
cited extensively in None Dare Call It Con- and worship of God and any attempt to live
spiracy as being supportive of Gary Allen's and work according to His commandments.
thesis, whereas the exact opposite is true. My experience in public life has shown me
The Birch Society's campaign to distribute that I have much morw in common with be-
millions of copies of None Dare Call It Con- sieving Jews than with the secular human-
spiracy is a very serious matter because the ists who have gained such a predominant
kinds of anti-Jewish lies contained in the position in our nation today. It would be
Allen book have been used by hate groups most interesting to see with which of these
throughout the world for more than 50 years two groups you find yourself and your or-
to foster hatred of Jews. During the 1930's ganization most often in alignment.
and the 1940's we saw the ugly consequences There is not a word in Gary Allen's book
of such campaigns. which could possibly be construed by any
Mr. Schmitz, in the name of human de-.' reasonable man as an attack on any religious
cency and honest scholarship we urge yolli faith. Rather, he points out repeatedly that
to publicly withdraw your name from this the conspirators of our time are dedicated
book and to dissociate yourself from t7N is to the destruction of all religious faith. Even
insidious campaign. ! for those who do not accept his thesis, the
We await your reply. hostility of the dominant forces in the mod-
Sincerely, / ern world to religion is very obvious and
Los Angeles. Calif. / have not attacked your faith. Why then do
DEAR MR. SCHECHTER: Your let r of June you attack us?
I to me regarding Gary Allen's /book None As for your objections to his thesis itself, it
Dare Call It Conspiracy, oc9~sioned by is a subject on which reasonable men may
the fact that I wrote the Introduction to it. differ-but not one which you can reasonably
is one of the most remarkable konfirmations claim to be "discredited." The arguments for
of the book's thesis I have se?n. For if you it deserve to be considered on their merits.
turn to pages 39 and 40, you /will read: Your letter gives no indication that you have
The Jewish members of ;the conspiracy done so. In fact, I can only describe your po-
have used an organization palled the Anti- sition on the issues raised by this book as
Defamation League as`,an ii$lstrument to try betraying a deeply entrenched intellectual
to convince everyone thflt spy mention of the bias of your own. In the interest of the hon-
Rothschilds or their alliq.4s an attack on all est scholarship to which you refer in your
Jews. In this way they save stifled almost concluding paragraph, I would urge you and
all honest scholarship on ddternational bank- your colleagues to try to free your minds of
ers and made the subject tgboo within uni- this bias and then take another look at this
versities. question.
"Any individual or fbook""exploring this Jews and Catholics suffered and died to-
subject is immediatelyiattacke4 by hundreds eether in both Nazi and Soviet concentra-
of A.D.L. committees .all over 'the country. lion camps. You may have read of the recent
The A.D.L. has neverr"let truth r logic in- beatification at the Vatican of Blessed Father
terfere with its hi ly professiidpal smear Maximilian Kolbe of Poland, who was starved
jobs. When no evi ence is app ent, the to death in a Nazi death camp after volun.
A.D.L., which stau~ichly opposed o-called teering to take the place of a young father
'McCarthyism,' acc4ses people of be g 'rat- originally :;elected for the same kind of death.
ent anti-Semitics.' Can you imagin how By your campaign against those who are
they would yowl ajhd scream if someo a ac- making every effort to arouse the American
cused them of bei~ig 'latent' Communist ? people to the danger of totalitarian world
"Actually, nobody has a right to be more conquest, you are making it more likely that
angry at the Rothschild clique than thkr similar horrors will take place here in Amer-
fellow Jews. T e Warburgs, part of tho, ica. If this happens, those on what you call
Rothschild empire, helped finance Adolf Hit_\' "the right" will be among the first victims-
ler. There were/ few if any Rothschilds or \I sincerely hope, not with your approval.
Warburgs in the Nazi prison camps! They Yours very truly,
sat out the wad' in luxurious hotels in Paris JOHN G. SCHMITZ,
or emigrated to the United States or Eng- Member of Congress.
land. As a gro~p, Jews have suffered most at
the hands of these power seekers."
Gentlemen you are right on cue.
Of course,/i would not deny that some MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN-
bigoted indi*iduals might distort the facts HOW LONG?
and conclusions in Gary Allen's book to fit
their own Prejudices, just as they might do
with many/other books. As a Catholic, I have HON,'ILLIAM J. SCHIiRLE
seen anti-Catholic bigots do this just as anti- OF IOWA
DEAR CONGRESSMAN SCHMITZ: We were dis-
tressed to read your introduction to and en-
dorsement of None Dare Call It Conspiracy
by Gary Allen, and we hereby call upon you
to withdraw your endorsement and repudi-
ate this anti-Semitic propaganda book.
Because you are a political scientist, we
would have expected you to detect quickly
the long discredited anti-Jewish charges that
allege an insidious role being played by so-
cailed "international bankers" which this
look exhumes.
Despite Mr. Allen's pitifully weak dis-
claimer about anti-Semitism, his book re-
vives anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1920's
carried out by agents of the late Henry Ford,
Sr. through the Dearborn Independent-
ch:axges later repudiated publicly by Mr.
Ford-and again revived in the 1930's by
Father Charles E. Coughlin, the notorious
radio-priest,
conspiracy is totally 'Jewish,' 'Catholic' or "How is my son?" 'W wife asks: "Is my
'Masonic.' These people do not help to ex- husband alive or dea ?"
pose the conspiracy, but sadly play into the Communist North 'etnam is sadisti-
hands of those who want the public to be- Gaily practicing 5pirial and mental
lieve that all conspiratorialists are screw-
balls." But if the possibility of distortion is genocide on over 1,600 A'iserican prison-
to be accepted as a reason for the suppres- ers of war and their families.
sion of truth, then all of us are-the losers. How long?
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should provide a solid basis for cooperation
and alliance among all believers as against
nonbelievers. Gary Allen and I and The John
Birch Society and many others are ready and
 June 19, 1972Approved For CONGRESSIONAL ftEGOI~I3 745~iVA'1ff000400010018-4
S 9599
gard to what our defense levels ought to be. vital interests? Second, will they lead to a admit of resolution by victory in the classi-
I think, however, I owe it to you and to the more enduring structure of peace? cal sense. We are compelled to coexist. We
Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his col- In the course of the formal hearings over have an inescapable obligation to build
leagues made it absolutely clear that they the coming days and weeks, the Administra- jointly a structure for peace. Recognition
are going forward with defense programs in tion will demonstrate conclusively that they of this reality is the beginning of wisdom
the offensive area which are not limited by serve both of these goals. I will begin that for a sane and effective foreign policy today.
these agreements. process this morning by offering some general President Nixon has made it the starting
Under those circumstances, since they will remarks on the agreement, after which I will of te United States policy Is s ssine 1969.
be going forward with their programs, for the be happy to take your questions. point
ch isaaAdministration's being polibacy on occas nally
United States not to go forward with its pro- UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE
grams-and I am not suggesting which ones 1970'S ciples of the classical balance of power. To
at this point; you can go into that later- The first part of my remarks will deal with the extent that that term implies a belief
but for the United States not to go forward U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these that security requires a measure of equi-
right to validity.
eh its offensive programs, or worse, for aments. The agreement which was signed tibonal nleader has the certain
th the
mortgage
the United States s unilaterally to reduce its gree 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on survival of his people to the good will of
offensive programs would mean that any in- the evening of May 28th by President Nixon
e that the Soviets had to negotiate the and General Secretary Brezhnev is without another state. We must seek firmer restraints
follow-on agreement would be removed. precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all on the actions of potentially hostile states
It is for that reason, without getting into relevant modern history. than a sanguine appeal to their good nature.
the specifics as to what the level of defense Never before have the world's two most But to the extent that balance of power should
the
offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that powerful nations, divided by ideology, his- means constant jckfit noa longer
tort' and conflicting interests, placed their vantages over an opponent ,fit ap
if we want the follow-on agreement, we have central armaments under formally agreed plies. The reason is that the determination
to take two steps: First to approve these limitation and restraint. It Is fair to ask: of national power has changed fundamentally
agreements; and second, we need a credible What new conditions now prevail to have in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the
defensive position so that the Soviet Union made this step commend itself to the calcu- primary concern of most national leaders
will have an incentive to negotiate a perms- fated self-interests of both of the so-called has been to accumulate geopolitical and mili-
nent offensive freeze. That is what we all superpowers, as it so clearly must have done tary power. It would have seemed incon-
want. for both willingly to undertake it? ceivable even a generation ago that such
These are just some random thoughts that Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of power once gained could not be translated
I had on this matter. I will simply close by the broad design of what the President has directly into advantage over one's opponent.
saying that as one stands in this room in this been trying to achieve in this country's rela- But now both we and the Soviet Union have
house, one always has a tendency to think of tions with the Soviet Union, since at each begun to find that each increment of power
some of the tragedies of history of the past. important turning point in the SALT nego- does not necessarily represent an increment
As many of you know, I have always been, and tiations we were guided not so much by the of usable political strength.
am, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. As tactical solution that seemed most equitable With modern weapons, a potentially de-
you , ws of that after know h e came the back great with tragedy of o his sty or prudent, important as it was, but by an cisive advantage requires a change of such
was Versailles and u oNations, due underlying philosophy and a specific percep- magnitude that the mere effort to obtain
to ineffective and the League h Senate due tion of international reality. it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-re- jected the treaty y and consultation,
and rejected the the League. The international situation has been un- tat reaction to each other's programs of a
d decade ago is in danger of being overtaken
We, of course, not want that to happen. dergoing a profound structural r since by a more or less simultaneous and contin-
have por think k that it will happen. We at least the mflation s The post-World
W- uous process of technological advance, which
have appreciated eciated the consultation we have II pattern n of relations among the he great pow- p
had up to this point, and we are now going ers had been altered to the point that when opens more and more temptations for seek-
this Administration took office, a major re- ing decisive advantage.
I
fo will with
only say tgay- that in lati in l this ooking timate.what assessment was clearly in order. A premium is put on striking first and on
will a defense to blunt the other side's
Wilson said during that debate, when he The nations that had been prostrate in creating a capability. defense to In other words, mars
was traveling the country, he made a very, 1946 had regained their economic strength foci additions power o cannot be de-
ment. seemed to me, moving and eloquent state- and their political vitality. The Communist cisive. of pow decisive additions be
d-
ment. He said: "My clients are the children. bloc was divided into contending factions, sial additione. Potentially the quest for e ex-
My clients are the future generation." and nationalistic forces and social and eco- tremely
are destabilizing. The argument that arms
This is an election year, and i realize nomic pressures were reasserting themselves are
produce war has often been at arms exagger that in an election year it is difficult to move within the individual Communist states. races The nuclear has if overshadowed by
as objectively as we ordinarily would move Perhaps most important for the United its peril . T.
on any issue, but I would respectfully re- States, our undisputed strategic predomi- All this was in the President's mind as
quest the Members of the House and Senate, nance was declining just at a time when d the new directions of American
Republican and Democratic, to approach this there was rising domestic resistance to mili- he at mapped the outset of ecti Administration,
in the spirit that Wilson explained in that tary programs, and impatience for redistribu- policy There was reason out t f this that the Soviet
period when they were debating whether they tion of resources from national defense to might also be thinking the Soviet along
should go forward with the League of Na- social demands. leaders lines the repeated failure of tong simil as Lions, remembering that our clients are the Amidst all of this profound change, how- attempts to gain marginal advantage in local
next generation, that approval of these agree- ever, there was one important constant-the crises or in military competition underlined
ments, the treaty limiting defensive weap- continuing dependence of most of the world's the limitation of old policy approaches.
one, the agreement limiting offensive weap- hopes for stability and peace upon the ability The President, therefore, decided that the
ons in certain categories, and also the con- to reduce the tensions between the United United States should work to create a set of
tinution of credible defense posture, will States and the Soviet Union. circumstances which would offer the So-
mean that we will have done our duty by our The factors which perpetuated that rivalry viet leaders an opportunity to move away
clients, which are the next generation. remain real and deep. from confrontation through carefully pre-
Thank you. We are ideological adversaries, and we will pared negotiations. From the first, we re-
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY A. in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable jetted the notion that what was lacking was
KISSINGER future. a cordial climate for conducting negotia-
We are political and military competitors, tions.
Dr. KISSINGER. Gentlemen, the President and neither can be indifferent to advances by Past experience has amply shown that
has asked me to present to you the White the other in either of these fields. much heralded changes in atmospherics, but
House perspective on these agreements, and We each have allies whose association we not buttressed by concrete progress, will re-
the general background, with the technical value and whose interests and activities of vent to previous patterns, at the first sub-
information and some more of the details to each impinge on those of the other at numer- Sequent clash of interests.
be supplied by the formal witnesses before ous points. We have, instead, sought to move for-
your various committees. each possess an awesome nuclear force ward across a broad range of issues so that
I will read a statement to you which we We created and designed to meet the threat im- progress in one area would add momentum
will distribute. It is still in the process of licit in the other's strength and aims. to the progress of other areas.
being typed. p licit hoped that the Soviet Union would
In considering the two agreements before Each of us has thus come into possession acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of nego-
the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of power singlehandedly capable of extermi- tiations and that it would become con-
of available missile systems and the interim nating the human race. Paradoxically, this vinced that its interests would be best served
agreement on the limitation of offensive very fact, and the global interests of both if the entire process unfolded. We have
arms, the overriding questions are these: sides, create a certain commonality of out- sought, in short, to create a vested interest
Do these agreements permit the United look, a sort of interdependence for survival in mutual restraint.
States to maintain a defense posture that between the two of us. At the same time, we were acutely con-
guarantees our security and protects our Although we compete, the conflict will not sicous of the contradictory tendencies at
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S CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19,' 1972
work in Soviet policy. Some factors--such
as the fear of nuclear war; the emerging con-
sumer economy, and the increased pressures
of a technological, administrative society-
have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek
a more stable relationship with the United
States. Other factors-such as ideology,
bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic ef-
fect of turmoil In peripheral areas-have
prompted pressures for tactical gains.
The President has met each of these man-
ifestations on its own terms, demonstrating
receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives
and firmness in the face of provocations or
adventurism. He has kept open a private
channel through which the two sides could
communicate candidly and settle matters
rapidly. The President was convinced that
agreements dealing with questions of arma-
ments in isolation do not, in fact, produce
lasting inhibitions on military competition
because they contribute little to the kind of
.stability that makes crises less likely. In re-
cent months, major progress was achieved
in moving toward a broadly-based accommo-
dation of interests wtih the USSR, in which
an arms limitation agreement could be a
central element.
This approach was called linkage, not by
the Administration, and became the object
of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three
years later, the SALT agreement does not
stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the
relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any
moment to the shock of some sudden crisis.
it stands, rather, linked organically, to a
chain of agreements and to a broad under-
standing about international conduct ap-
propriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.
The agreements on the limitation of stra-
tegic arms is, thus, not merely a technical
accomplishment, although it Is that in part,
but is must be seen as a political event of
some magnitude. This is relevant to the ques-
tion of whether the agreements will be easily
breached or circumvented. Given the past,
no one can answer that question with cer-
tainty, but it can be said with some assur-
ance that any country which contemplates
a rupture of the agreement or a circumven-
tion of its letter and spirit must now face
the fact that It will be placing in jeopardy
not only a- limited arms contml agreement,
but broad political relationship.
PRE. PARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS
Let me turn now to the more specific de-
cisions we had to make about what the agree-
ment should do and how it could be achieved.
We knew that any negotiations on arms
control, especially ones Involving those cen-
tral weapons systems which guarantee each
side's security, were found to be sensitive
and complicated, requiring frequent high-
level decisions.
The possibility of a deadlock would be ever
present, and the repercussions of a deadlock
could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet rela-
each approaching the anti-missile problem In the spring and summer of 1970, each
from a different standpoint. The Soviets country put forward more concrete pro-
wanted to protect their capital. The United posals, translating some of the agreed prin-
States' program concentrated on protecting ciples into negotiating packages. During this
our retaliatory forces. Both sides also pos- period, we, on the American side, had hopes
sessed weapons which, although not central of reaching a comprehensive limitation. How-
to the strategic balance, were nevertheless ever, the initial search for a comprehensive
relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at solution gradually broke down over the ques-
forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet tion of defining the scope of the forces to be
Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate- included.
range missiles able to attack our forward The Soviets believed that strategic meant
bases and devastate the territory of our allies. any weapons system capable to reaching the
A further complication was that the com- Soviet Union or the United States. This
position of forces on the two sides was not would have included our forward-based air-
symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given craft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet
priority to systems controlled within its own intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe
territory while the United States had turned and other areas.
increasingly to sea-based systems. We opposed this approach, since it would
The result was that they had a panoply have prejudiced our alliance commitments
of different ICBM's while weessentially had and raised a distinction between our own se-
one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, curity and that of our European allies.
together with a more effective and modern We offered a verifiable ban on the deploy-
submarine force operating from -bases over- ment and testing of Multiple Independent
seas and equipped with longer-range mis- Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by
siles. offering a totally unverifiable production ban,
All of this meant that even arriving at a while insisting on the freedom to test, thus
basic definition of strategic equivalency placing the control of MIRV's effectively out
would be technically demanding and polit- of reach.
ically intricate. At this juncture, early in 1971, with the
Looking beyond to the desired limitations, stalemate threatening, the President took a
it appeared that neither side was going to major new initiative by opening direct con-
make major unilateral concessions. When the tact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the
national survival is at stake, such a step SALT discussions and for that matter, the
could not contribute to stability. The final Berlin negotiations, and providing progress
outcome would have to be equitable and to could be achieved on these two issues, to ex-
offer a more reliable prospect for maintain- plore the feasibility of a summit meeting.
ing security than could be achieved without The Soviet leaders' first response was to
the agreements. Insist that only the ABM's should be limited,
With these facts In view, the President, and that offensive systems should be le7t
In the spring of 1969, established a group of aside. But as far as we were concerned, the
senior officials responsible for preparing and still incipient ABM systems on both sides
conducting the SALT negotiations. were far from the most dynamic or dan-
I acted as Chairman, and the other mem- gerous factors in the strategic equation. It
bers included the Under Secretary of State, was the Soviet offensive programs, moving
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chair- ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director based and 100 sea-based missiles a year,
of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the which we felt constituted the most urgent
Director of the Arms Control and Disarma- issue. To limit our option of developing the
ment Agency. ABM system without at the same time check-
This group, called the Verification Panel, ing the growth of the Soviet offensive threat
has the task of analyzing the issues and fac- was unacceptable.
tors and submitting for the President's de- Exchanges between the President and the
cisions those options which commanded sup- Soviet leaders embodying these views pro-
port in the various departments and agen- duced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As
cies. any workable compromise In the field must
The Verification Panel analyzed each of the do, that understanding met each side's es-
weapons systems which could conceivably be sential concerns. Since the offensive systems
involved in an agreement. It compared the were complex and since agreement with re-
effect of different limitations on our program spect to all of them had proved impossible,
and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the it was agreed that the initial offensive set-
resulting balance. It analyzed the possibili- tlement would be an interim agreement and
ties of verification, and the precise risk of not a permanent treaty, and that it would
evasion, seeking to determine at what point freeze only selected categories at agreed
evasion could be detected and what meas- levels.
ures would be available for a response. This On the defensive side, the understanding
was done In various combinations so that if called for negotiations towards a permanent
one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM solution with talks on both issues to
proceed simultaneously to a common conclu-
sion.
This left two major issues for the negotia-
tors, the precise level of the allowed ABM's,
and the scope of the Interim agreement, spe-
cifically what weapons would be included in
the freeze.
Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's
proved extremely difficult. The United States
had virtually completed Its ABM site at
Grand Forks, and we were working on the
second site at Malmstrom Hence
was in terms of armaments in place and other components of a particular negotiating
under construction; what realistic alterna- package.
tives we had at the negotiating table; and Our aim was to be in a position to give
how a tentative or partial agreement would the negotiations a momentum. We wanted
compare with no agreement at all. to be sure that when stalemates developed,
For various reasons during the 1960s, the the point at Issue would not be largely tac-
United States had, as you know, made the tical, and that the alternative solutions
strategic decision to terminate its building would be analyzed ahead of time and ready
programs in major offensive systems and to for immediate decision by the President.
rel
Instead on
ualit
ti
i
y
q
a
ve
mprovements.
By 1969, therefore, we had no active or plan-
ned programs for deploying additional
ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the
other hand, had dynamic and accelerated
deployment programs in both land-based and
sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the
interval between conception and deployment
of strategic weapons systems is generally
Five to ten years.
At the same time, both sides were in the
initial stage of strategic defense programs,
SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS , we pro-
posed freezing deployments at levels opera-
In the first round of the talks, which be- tional or under construction, that is to say,
gan in November of 1969, the two sides two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow
established a work program and reached defense on the other.
some tentative understanding of strategic The Soviets objected this would deny them
principles. the right to have any protection for their
For example, both sides more or less agreed ICBM's, a new formula was then devised al-
at the outset that a very heavy ABM system lowing each side to choose two sites, one each
could be a destabilizing factor, but that the for national capital and ICBM defense or
precise level of ABM limitations would have both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the
to be set according to our success in agreeing ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs
on offensive limitations. of Staff, supported by the Secretary of De.
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 June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
S 9601
tense, decided that a site in Washington to nor the freeze of submarine-launched mis- the B--i is within the purview of the freeze
defend the National Command Authority siles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not and since the ULMS submarine system is
was to be preferred over the second ICBM- an American concession. On the contrary, in not, or never was planned for deployment
protective site at Malmstrom, They reasoned both cases it was the Soviet Union which until after 1977. The agreement will stop
that while a limited defense would not as- reluctantly acceded to American proposals the Soviet Union from increasing the exist-
sure the ultimate survival of the National after long and painful deliberation. ing numerical gap in
number lchers.
which umeber of of i interp to the
Command Authority, it would buy time PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT Finally, there are a
against a major attack while the radars in I will not spend this group's time in further tive Congress along statements with
hi the agreements. These
both the NCA defense and the defense of review of the frequently arduous negotia-
statements Initialed are Initialed in seveveraal l forms: deleg Agreed
ICBM's would provide valuable warning. tions in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the Interpretations
d
Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the summit in Moscow leading to the final agree- by common a under-
of National Command Authority in the event ment. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of agreed standings which were interpretations not or
set down formally
of a small attack by some third country or the President to Ambassador Smith and his and initialed, unilateral Interpretations to
--even an accidental or unauthorized launch delegation, whose dedication, negotiating our position clear in instances where
could not do tclea tin instances
of a weapon toward the United States. skill and patience contributed decisively to make
The President accepted their recommenda- the outcome. we ake In any negotiation total a this complexity,
tion. Let me summarize the principal provisions which
What about the offensive weapons freeze? of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty there parties willinevitably be agree. details
made upon cwhich
Early in the discussions about the Imple- allows each side to have one ABM site for the he statements agree. order We insure
mentation of this portion of the May 20 un- defense of its national command a}ithority unilateral our positions these details was ire
derstanding between the President and the and another for the defense of interconti- t our negotiating record and under-
the leaders, it was decided to exclude from nental ballistic missiles. that that
stood u o the nby the other side.
the freeze bombers and so-called forward- The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, The agreed Interpretations and common
based systems. To exclude, that is, the weap- or 800 miles apart in order to prevent the
ons in which this country holds an advan- development of a territorial defense. Each understandings for the most part deal with
tage. ABM site can have 100 ABM Interceptors. detailed technical aspects of limitations on
We urged the Congress to keep this fact The treaty contains additional provisions ABM systems and offensive weapons. For ex-
in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios ample, it was agreed that the size of missile
ase for either
rabase prohibit
for ththee the defense e o off silos could not be significantly increased and
weapons which are subject to the offen- which et of a radar effectively
sive freeze, populated areas or the attainment of cap- that "significantly" meant not more than
There was also relatively. rapid agreement abilities to intercept ballistic missiles by 10 to 15 percent.
following the May 20 breakthrough that in- conversion of air defense missiles to anti- In the more important unilateral declara-
tercontinental ballistic missiles would be ballistic missiles. tions we made clear to the Soviets that the
covered. This left the issue of the inclusion It provides for withdrawal by either party introduction of land mobile ICBM's would
of submarines. on six months' notice, If supreme national be inconsistent with the agreement. Since
With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the interests are judged to have been jeopardized the publication of the various unilateral in-
situation was as follows: The Soviet Union by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to terpretative statements, suggestions have
had been deploying at the average annual ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates been heard that the language of the treaty
rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles ones area of potentially dangerous defensive and agreement in fact hide deep-seated dis-
and 100 sea-based ballistic, missiles a year. competition, but it reduces the Incentive for agreements. But it must be recognized that
The U.S. had completed deployments of continuing deployment of offensive systems, in any limited agreements, which are be-
Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces tween old time adversaries, there are bound
in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are en- have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. to be certain gaps.
gaged in increasing the number of warheads Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, In this case the gaps relate not so much
ences in numbers are therefore not conclu- to the terms themselves, but rather to what
on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched differ-
missiles. We were, and are, developing a new save. it was impossible to Include. The interpreta-
submarine system, although it cannot be The interim agreement on offensive arms tions do not vitiate these agreements, but
deployed until 1978 or until after the end is to run for five years, unless replaced by a they expand and add to the agreements.
of the freeze. In other words, as a result of more comprehensive permanent agreement WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN?
decision in Bible with th the made time- the frame 0 1'x, of and the not protected rever- which will be the subject of further negotia- Taking the longer perspective, what can
sable wimd tions, or unless terminated by notification we say has been accomplished?
agreement, there would be a numerical gap similar to that for the treaty. First, it is clear that the agreement will
against us in the two categories of land- and In essence this agreement will freeze the enhance the security of both sides. No agree-
-based th re was issile meneteors shout whether
an a oagreene- numbers of strategic offensive misssiles on ment which fails to do so could have been
then wag agree. Wi thout - both sides at approximately the levels cur- signed in the first place or stood any chance
nett, the gap would steadily widen. rently operational and under construction. of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to
The agreement would not create the gap. For ICBM's this is 1054 for the United States gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic
It would prevent its enlargement our aand 1618 for the Soviet Union. Within this field must be self-defeating.
advantagesea-base systems In short, a freeze ve ICBMs and n overall limitation, the Soviet Union has ac- The President has given the most careful
in the United States' ould be overwhelmingly cepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, consideration to the final terms. He has
in the e baassic Statinterest. considerations undoubtedly the weapons most threatening to our strate- asked me to reiterate most emphatically this
These bubteem gis forces. morning his conviction that the agreements
impelled the recommendation on of the
was e to There is also a prohibition on conversion fully protect our national security and our
which Joint
Chiefs of Staff that any freeze include the of lights ICBM's into heavy missiles. These vital interests.
summand their support must are buttressed by verifiable pro- Secondly, the President is determined that possible alternative uwas based a crasystem, sh rash program The only
for only building ldihe visions and criteria, specifically the prohibi- our security and vital interests shall remain
tion against any significant enlargement of fully protected. If the Senate consents to
explored e idea The missile silos. ratification of the treaty and if the Congress
President
Presidexplothis this idra with the Set The submarine limitations are more com- approves the interim agreement, the Admin-
tary Chiefs of of f Staff, and and the the e Chief of Chairman Naval of the Joint - plicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to istration will, therefore, pursue two parallel
Chi their claimed current level, operational and courses.
Their pions. program wa firm judgment was that such a under construction, of about 740 missiles, On the one hand, we shall push the next pro- duce results was before 1976-that undesirable. It is, not some of them on an older type nuclear sub- phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
very end of projected freeze-and , toward othe by by marine. They are permitted to build to a with the same energy and conviction that
building end of a erof submarine i similar only nl ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only have produced these initial agreements.
ent a fleet, type d and of without mthe e our if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine- On the other hand, until further Arms
1980's and beyond. based missiles to offset the new construction. limits are negotiated, we shall push research
tares current
most needed for the many
he
The President once again used d his s direct This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and development and the production capacity
channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to and some 30 missiles on some nine older to remain in a fully protected strategic pos-
urge the Inclusion of missile-launching sub- nuclear submarines. Bombers and other air- ture should follow-on agreements prove un-
marines in the offensive agreement. craft are not included in this agreement. attainable and so as to avoid giving the other
After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet In sum, the interim offensive agreement side a temptation to break out of the agree-
leaders agreed an principle at the end of will keep the overall number of strategic ment.
April. Final details were worked out in Moe- ballistic missile launchers both on land and Third, the President believes that these
cow between the President and the Soviet at sea within an agreed ceiling which is agreements, embedded as they are in the
leaders. essentially the current level, operational or fabric of an emerging new relationship, can
My purpose in dwelling at such length under construction. It will not prohibit the hold tremendous political and historical sig-
upon the details of our internal delibcra- United States from continuing current and nificance in the coming decades. For the first
tions and negotiations has been to make one planned strategic offensive programs, since time, two great powers, deeply divided by
crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBMs neither the multiple-warhead conversion, nor their divergent values, philosophies, and so-
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139602 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1972
cial systems, have agreed to restrain the very 1977 without a freeze? Considering the cur- pressed concern about the agreements not
armaments on which their national survival rent momentum by the Soviet Union, in both because they object to their terms, but be-
depends. No decision of this magnitude could ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic cause they are afraid of the euphoria that
have been taken unless it had been part of missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agree- these agreements might produce.
a larger decision to place relations on a new ment can only be interpreted as a sound ar- But surely we cannot be asked to maintain
foundation of restraint, cooperation and rangement that makes a major contribution unavoidable tension just to carry out pro-
steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of to our national security. grams which our national survival should
agreements on joint efforts with regard to Does the agreement jeopardize our secu- dictate in any event. We must not develop
the environment, space, health, and promis- rity in the future? - a national psychology by which we can act
fug negotiations on economic relations pro- The current arms race compounds num- only on the basis of what we are against and
vides a prospect for avoiding the failure of bers by technology. The Soviet Union has not on what we are for.
the Washington Naval Treaty and the proved that it can best compete in sheer Our challenges then are: Can we chart a
Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which numbers. This is the area which is limited new course with hope but without illusion,
collapsed in part for lack of an adequate po- by the agreement. with large purposes but without sentimental-
litical foundation. Thus the agreement confines the competi- ity? Can we be both generous and strong?
The final verdict must wait on events, tion with the Soviets to the area of technol- It is not often that a country has the op-
but there is at least reason to hope that ogy? And, heretofore, we have had a sig- portunity to answer such questions meaning-
these accords represent a major break in the nificant advantage. fully. We are now at such a juncture where
pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confron- The follow-on negotiations will attempt to peace and progress depend on our faith and
tation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet rela- bring the technological race under control. our fortitude.
tions for a generation. The two great nuclear Until these negotiations succeed, we must It is in this spirit that the President has
powers must not let this opportunity slip take care not to anticipate their outcome by negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit
away by jockeying for marginal advantages, unilateral decisions. that he asks the approval of the treaty and
Inevitably an agreement of such conse- Can we trust the Soviets? the Interim Agreement and that I now stand
quence raises serious questions on the part The possibility always exists that the So- ready to answer your questions.
of concerned individuals of quite different viets will treat the Moscow agreements as
persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of they have sometimes treated earlier ones. as
them here. Let me deal with some of the just another tactical opportunity in the pro- QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION AFTER A
most frequently asked since the agreements tracted conflict. If this happens, the United BRIEFING BY Da. HENRY KISSINGER
were signed three weeks ago. States will have to respond. This we shall Mr. MACGREGOR. Gentlemen, as the Presi-
Who won? plan to prepare to do psychologically and dent indicated in his report to the Joint
The President has already answered this strategically and provided the Congress ac- Session of Congress two week ago tonight, he
question. He has stressed that it is inappro- cepts the strategic programs on which the places the highest importance on executiVe-
priate to pose the question in terms of vic- acceptance of the agreements was predicated. legislative partnership in the further carry-
tory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, I have said enough to indicate we advocate ing forward of the constitutional process
either both sides win or both sides lose. This these agreements not on the basis of trust, with respect to the treaty and the agreement.
will either be a serious attempt to turn the but on the basis of the enlightened self-in- This session this morning is designed to
world away from time-worn practices of terests of both sides. This self-interest is further that commitment on the President's
jockeying for power, or there will be end- reinforced by the carefully drafted verifica- part and to give to you and through you
less, wasteful and purposeless competition in tion provisions in the agreement. Beyond the the American people, an opportunity for the
the acquisition of armaments. legal obligations, both sides have a stake in fullest possible debate and the fullest range
Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. stra- all of the agreements that have been signed, of questions.
tegic disadvantage? and a large stake in the broad process of im- The President has asked me, and I would
We reject the premise of that question on provement in relations that has begun. The like to do so, to recognize the Chairman of
two grounds. First, the present situation is Soviet leaders are serious men, and we are the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
on balance advantageous to the United confident that they will not lightly abandon Senator Fulbright.
States. Second, the Interim Agreement per- the course that has led to the summit meet- Senator FuLBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Mac-
petuates nothing which did not already ing and to these initial agreements. For our Gregor.
exist in fact and which could only have own part, we will not abandon this course Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that
gotten worse without an agreement. without major provocation, because it is in was an extraordinarily thorough and en-
Our present strategic military situation is the interest of this country and in the in- lightening statement. The only regret I have
sound. Much of the criticism has focused on terest of mankind to pursue it. is that he didn't make it public so all the
the imbalance in number of missiles between PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE country could have heard it, because I think
the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, it is a very great description, I think, of
only examines one aspect of the problem. the President and General Secretary Brezhnev what these agreements mean.
To assess the overall balance it is necessary signed a Declaration of Principles to govern I am thoroughly in accord with the spirit
to consider those forces not in the agree- the future relationship between the United with which you have given them and the way
merit; our bomber force which is substan- States and the Soviet Union. These Principles the President has presented this agreement
tially larger and more effective than the state that there is no alternative to peaceful for our country. I have only one serious
Soviet bomber force, and our forward base coexistence in the nuclear age. They commit question about it.
systems. both sides to avoid direct armed confronts- There does appear to me to be an in-
''he quality of the weaponsmust also be tion, to use restraint in local conflicts, to as- herent inconsistency in the attitude as ex-
weighed. We are confident we have a major sert no special claims in derogation of the pressed by the Secretary of Defense the other
advantage in nuclear weapons technology sovereign equality of all nations, to stress co- day. For background, I will read one sentence.
and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our operation and negotiation at all points of This is a quote from his testimony before the
MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in our relationship. Armed Services Committee: "I could not sup-
numbers of warheads and this lead will be At this point, these principles reflect an port the agreements if the Congress fails
maintained during the period of the agree- aspiration and an attitude. This Administra- to act on movement forward of the Trident
ment, even if the Soviets develop and deploy tion will spare no effort to translate the as- system, the B-i bombers or other programs
MIRV's of their own. piration into reality. We shall strive with that we have outlined to improve our stra-
'l'hen there are such factors as deployment determination to overcome further the tegic offensive systems during this five-year
characteristics. For, example, because of the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming pre- period."
difference in geography and basing, it has emptive actions which have characterized the Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger
been estimated that the Soviet Union re- Cold War, has made about maintaining our security
quires three submarines for two of ours to Of course the temptation is to continue during the five-year period I accept as a
be able to keep an equal number on station. along well worn paths. The status quo has general statement, but in view of the fact
When the total picture is viewed, our stra- the advantage of reality, but history is strewn that we know the Soviets have no aircraft
tegic forces are seen to be completely sufii- with the wreckage of nations which sought carriers whatever, they have a very small and
cient. their future in their past. Catastrophe has not very modern bomber force, they have
The Soviets have more missile launchers, resulted far less often from conscious deci- no forward bases similar to ours, unless you
but when other relevant systems such as sions than from the fear of breaking loose consider Cuba perhaps a forward base.
bombers are counted there are roughly the from established patterns through the inex- But so far, we have no evidence that it is
same number of launchers on each side. We orable march towards cataclysm because no- being so prepared. They are not planning a
have a big advantage on warheads. The So- body knew what else to do. The paralysis of Trident system that I know of. Their system
viers have an advantage on megatonnage. -policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would of submarines is traditional and similar to
What is disadvantageous to us, though, is surely destroy the world if we let it happen the ones they already have.
the trend of new weapons deployment by the again in the nuclear age. In view of this, it seems to me to couple
Soviet Union and the projected imbalance Thus the deepest question we ask is not the approval of the ABM and the interim
five years hence based on that trend. The whether we can trust the Soviets, but agreement with Congressional approval of
relevant question to ask, therefore, is what whether we can trust the Soviets, but whe- these vastly expensive programs raises a seri-
the freeze prevents; where would be be by ther we can trust ourselves. Some have ex- ous question about our determination to
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June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENE
accept this agreement in the spirit In which he spelled out the reason why this had to press here? Anyway, the reservation I have is
I think it was negotiated and the spirit be done in Moscow at such a high level, be- on this surveillance, our power to detect any
which you have stated. That is a gradual cause it crossed over so many agencies and cheating. That hadn't been gone into here
relaxation of the tensions, and not to use because of the form of government of the and it hasn't been gone into in other briefings
these agreements as an excuse for a greatly Soviet Union. that I have been to, and I don't insist on
enlarged arms system of our own. He also ended up by saying that you would any question being answered on it, but I
This is the only thing that has bothered not be available for testimony on Capitol raise that point.
me about them. I, of course, am personally Hill, in which I agree. But I just wondered, If you want to comment on it, you may.
extremely pleased with the overall. agree- with the five committees who are represented I want to make this observation. I think that
ments with the sole exception, do we mean here today, who are going to consider over we are more than doers out there in the
it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, in the Senate side the Treaty of the ABM's Congress. We are not going to say just Yes
r
put yourself in the place of the Russians, and over on the House side this, the limita-
the or Noon this, and to takeactivelposit ma for up our
if we proceed immediately to a very large tion that has been set by you
expansion of our weapons system, would this President, of September 1, whether you generations.
not leave in the mind of General Grechko would be available by these committees for I believe that will help us approach it. Do
and his colleagues a question about our sin- consultation as we go along. you want to comment on that detection and
cerity in really moving toward a reduction ewith KISSINGER.
committees delighted to in suDr.iKISSINGER. Well, I am sure that when
members of would
these be
in the
in the arms race. meet
on an individual basis, or in the kind Mr. Holms testifies in executive sessions,
This is the only question I have and it you groups,
the one which bothers m me e and I wish you of setting that we have worked out before, that he can go into more detail than I can. In
would enlarge upon the necessity of proceed- in which I will meet with the committees at fact, all I can do is to make the statement
ing at once and tying these agreements with the invitation of the Chairman in some set- that we are confident that national means
the approval of programs about which there ting that maintains the position of Execu- of verification are sufficient to monitor the
tive privilege. numerical limitations of this agreement.
were serious questions r before suques- agree-
ment was made, , there e were e very serious qBut I will be fully available to answer any We studied this problem in great detail
tions about the A-14 and B-1 before these questions and we are prepared to go as far before we entered negotiations, and deter-
negotiations were agreed on, as is humanly possible with respect to Execu- mined for each category of weapon the mar-
Now, we seem to be put in the position privilege. gin of error that we thought our collection
being pressured into o that in order to o get get of an certainly, to make available to the Con- systems had and what we could do to react
agreement with which I thoroughly in accord. gress any answers that we can. once we found out that there had been a
Dr. KISSINGER. As the President pointed Congressman MORGAN. I want to assure you violation.
out, and as I also said in my statement, Mr. that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will go In each of these cases, we found that the
Chairman, we intend to move on two tracks: to work on this as soon as we get back from margin was well within tolerable limits. In
One, we hope to start the second round of the Democratic Convention. this case, however, where we are dealing with
SALT negotiations as soon as the Senate Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure we would like numbers, we are confident that the national
ive
ratifies the treaty and the Congress approves to hear from the Chairman of the Senate means of verification are sufficient
nee that give
t
us the the highest est degree of lived confidence a that we
the interim agreement. Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable us
If the schedule that was tentatively sug- John Stennis.
gested to you by the President were met, Senator STENNIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, and will know it almost immediately if it is not
that is to say, approval by the end of August, colleagues of the Congress, I certainly didn't lived up to.
we would hope to have the first session of come here to make a statement. I came to lis- Mr. MACGREGOR. The President Is aware
the second round of SALT sometime during ten and to learn. I did respond when I walked that the members of the Joint Committee on
October and then to begin the process again. In, to a request that I would say just a word. Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous
We will pursue those negotiations with the Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, expertise which applies directly to the Stra-
attitude towards bringing about a change in I have been on the Armed Services Commit- tegic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the in-
the international climate that I have' de- tee since before we had ICBM's and I have terim agreement and we are delighted to see
thought many times the growing realization the Chairman of the Joint Committee on
scAbed. I had of what these could mean and now what Atomic Energy, the Honorable John Pastore,
At the same time, the question arises s of they do mean in our hands and then this from Rhode Island.
we In what posture should do g our national ee i- same weapon in the hands of our adversaries. Senator Pastore, do you have a question?
tions. I while been ngage in these this Ad- So, I have been driven Into a corner of Senator PASTORE. Not exactly a question
ministration bons. It has bethat we must he mucontinue continue roue these ese wanting very much to have some kind of an for the moment because I have asked it be-
programs which preserve our strategic posi- agreement that would be the germ, perhaps, fore fhink and the I one think it has dominant been question answerbreded. I
is
tion. I do not, in this setting, want to go into of something that would relieve the tensions whether or not in these agreements we have
each individual weapon system because I be- and assure our safety. whetve r or
ourselves e the a regimen potehave
lieve that the appropriate committees will I do have one major reservationabout this that will co ourselves a deterrent against an
examine the Secretary of Defense and the situation I am going to mention, but I do attack upon fit, and also errent whether or not in
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with believe if we can approve it, it is a start, consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
respect to them. maybe not much of a start, but it Is a start. they are all unanimous that this is a good
Our view, however, is that we must con- That is the biggest thing I see about it. agreement.
tinue those strategic programs which are I do have one major reservation about this Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, we would
permitted by the agreement and those re- situation I am going to mention, but I do be- not have entered into this man, we if we
search and development efforts in areas that lieve if we can approve it, it is a start, maybe thought it impaired our capacity for deter
are covered by the agreement in case the not much of a start, but it is a start. That is rence. houg As was pointed out in my statement
agreement cannot be negotiated. the biggest thing I see about it. r e believe tit maintains my the capacity
Our experience has been that an on-going May I just respond one moment to the very w dbelieve that
and at the same time, enables
program is no obstacle to an agreement and, major point that the Senator from Arkansas the world to start toward turning away from
on the contrary may accelerate it. That was made, about if we get these agreements, why the arms race as well as improving the whole
certainly the case with respect to Safeguard. go on with the ULM's. I remember so well the nternationcl climate.
We are in the position with respect to vari- ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The Secondly at every stage of this agreement
ous categories of weapons that the Soviet most outstanding point in my mind, I was we consulted in the greatest detail with the
Union has an accelerated program, and we convinced that the great probability was that Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed
have none. Therefore, our position is that by putting in the ABM for whatever it was
we are presenting both of these programs on worth, it might increase the chances of get- out, both throughout in m my the stateworkmofent, the but it it was Verification done
one
their merits. We are not making them con- ting some kind of a start on agreements. Pnel in which the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff the
ditional. We are saying that the treaty is Not that I have any perception, but as I a
and at every
justified on its merits, but we are also say- have understood, from the President at other decision that is President made, the In-
ing that the requirements of national seen- briefings, they thought that was a major tecisional Security Council
rity impel us in the direction of the strategic point in getting this. I do not know of any significant decision-
programs, and we hope that the Congress This same reasoning applies, I think. I am I don't know of any decision with respect to
will approve both of these programs as it going to support the B-1 and the ULM's and this agreement that was made which the
examines each of them on its merits. frankly, I am going all of the way on ULM's Joint Chiefs of Staff have not unanimously
Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure if the President now, even though I had in mind supporting it supported.
were here, he would like to have recognized only for a limited amount this year, and not During the final stages of the negotiation
the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs on an all-out program. in Moscow, we were in direct touch with the
Committee, Chairman Morgan. I have in mind now, the statement you Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals
Congressman MORGAN. Thank you, Clark, made, Dr. Kissinger, but I am not under its unfolded, and, of course, you will be calling
and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger in inviting impact exactly, and I have said these things Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain
us to brief us on it. because they were old thoughts. But It is. that he will confirm the unanimous support
When the President appeared here in the quite helpful. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agree-
short appearance he made before this group, By the way, is this an open meeting, is the ment.
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 S 9604
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Mr. MCGREGOR. Yes, Congressman, push forward for authorization and construe- a precise characteristic is because un-.
Congressman NEnzI. Dr. Kissinger, on tion of this system around Washington and doubtedly they are planning to modernize
March 14, the President gave as a rationale how important Is It to the credible defense within the existing framework some of the
for the broad safeguard system, part of his to which reference was made that we do pro- weapons they now possess.
rationale, was the defense of the American ceed to authorize and construct this protec- The agreement specifically permits the:
people against the kind of nuclear attack tion for the Nation's Capital? Will our posi- modernization of weapons. There are, how-
which the People's Republic of China is tion be significantly weakened In terms of ever, a number of safeguards. First there is
likely to be able to mount within the decade. future negotiations if we fail to take this the safeguard that no missile larger than the
las anything happened to that threat, and step? heaviest light missile that now exists can be
in that connection, are you able to tell us Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, we will request substituted.
anything about your forthcoming visit to this authorization. Secondly, it was the judg- Secondly, there is the provision that the
China? ment of our senior military leaders that a silo configuration cannot be changed in a
Jr. KISSINGER. Our estimate of the Chinese second site in the Capital area would be significant way and then the agreed interpre-
u.uclear capability is still approximately what more useful than a second site In Malstrom. tive statement or the interpretive statement
it was at the time that Safeguard was devel- It would give additional warning time in which we made, which the other side stated
oped. Our estimate of the likelihood of our case of a major attack and it would give reflected its views also, that this meant that
being involved in any nuclear conflict with protection against an attack by a third it could not be increased by more than 10
the People's Republic of China is considerably country. It is for this reason that we are to 15 percent.
less than it was at the time that the Safe- recommending to the Congress and request:- We believe that these two statements,
guard program was submitted to the Con- ing the Congress to authorize its construe- taken in conjunction, give us an adequate
gress, because of the political developments tion. safeguard against a substantial substitution
that have happened since then, specifically Senator JACKSON. Dr. Kissinger, first I of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we
the opening toward China, want to compliment you on a very fine think we have adequate safeguards with
Therefore, we accept now that in the over- statement. I think we all want to see an respect to that Issue.
all context of the contribution that this end to the arms race, but I think we all It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that
agreement could make toward world peace should agree that if you are going to have within these limitations, improvements,
and toward improving general relationships, an agreement it should be one that will qualitative improvements, are possible which
and in the light, also, of improvement of re- stabilize and not destabilize. When you have will increase the capabilities of each of these
lations with the People's Republic of China, a number of ambiguities such as we have missiles and this is one of the reasons why
that we could pay this price of foregoing the in the present arrangement, I think it is we have advocated qualitative improvements
additional protection that the President re- fraught with some trouble. in our strategic forces. But as far as the break
quested in his original statement. For example, I just want to illustrate a between the light and the heavy missiles is
`hie could do this all the more so because if couple: There are a lot of them. But we do concerned, we believe that we have assurances
our estimates turn out to be incorrect., we have, for example, a bilateral understanding through the two safeguards that I have
have such an overwhelming retaliatory capa- on the number of advanced strategic type mentioned to you.
bility vis-a-vis any other country other than submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is de- Congressman STRATTON. Dr. Kissinger, I
the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third fined specifically. But there is no specific have one question with regard to one of the
nuclear country attacking the United States limitation other than our unilateral state- unilateral statements that was published the
is a rather remote possibility ment as to the number of land-based mis- other day. Under the agreement, as I under-
Congressman NEDZI. Didn't we have it three sales, intercontinental, that are permitted. stand it, we have 41 Polaris submarines and
months ago? Would you comment? The same is true of we could go to 44 if we turned in our Titans.
Or. KISSINGER. I was talking about the jus- "What is a heavy missile?" But the Soviets say that they are considering
tification which the President gave when he Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the num- the British and the French Polaris sub-
started the Sagefuard Program. I don't know hers of- missiles actually being deployed, the marines to be part of our force and that if
what March 14th statement you are talking Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant the total goes over 50 they will consider the
about. It must have been March 14, 1969. to specify precise numbers, that is true. We agreement breached. The British have four.
Congressman NEDZI. My apologies, have operated with a number of 1618. There The French have one and three others in
Dr. KISSINGER. It was not March 14th of is absolutely no question that if our intelli- constructton, which means that if the French
this year. gence should reveal that the Soviet num- ones are completed, then we could only have
Congressman NEDZI. I stand corrected, hers significantly exceed that figure that the 42 without putting it over the total of 50.
Dr. KISSINGER. That was 1969. Then with whole premise of the agreement will be in Could you comment on how we can hold
respect to my visit to the Peoples Republic of question, down the British and French as part of this
China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Com- Now. what will maintain this agreement agreement?
munique. It was tentatively agreed to at the Is not the fact that we can wave these pro- Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, the Soviet Union
time of the President's visit to Peking that visions and take it to court at any partic- has not said that they would consider the
sometime during the course of the summer ular moment, but what will maintain this agreement breached. The Soviet Union has
Ave would send a senior representative to the agreement is the consequences the other side said that they would then reserve the right
Peoples Republic. We intend to review the will face if it turns out that it has turned to
whole range of international problems as they into a scrap of paper and that it is being Secondly, e additional compensation.
c for d we have emphatically rejected
affect American-Chinese relationships. circumvented. that interpretative recitation and have
Mr. MACGREGOR. When I recognized Con- If this agreement were being circum- written our rejection of that into the record.
gressman Nedzi. I was looking unsuccess- vented, obviously we would have to take So, we do not consider that we have agreed
fully for the Chairman of the House Com- compensatory steps in the strategic field. But to this Soviet Interpretation. You have to
mittee on Armed Services, Congressman beyond-that, as is pointed out in my state- remember the Interpretative statements are
Hebert of Louisiana. I don't see Eddie, but I ment, the two countries have a unique op- in a number of categories. There are those
do see the ranking majority Member of the portunity right now to move into an entirely that are agreed and initialed. There are
Committee, and the Vice Chairman of the different relationship of building additional those orally agreed. There are those that are
Committee on Atomic Energy. I would like to trust. unilateral and not challenged and then there
recognize Congressman Mel Price. If it turns out that through legalistic in- are those that are unilateral and challenged.
Congressman PRICE. Mr. MacGregor, Mr. terpretations of provisions of the agreement I would think that a unilateral statement
Hebert has important business in Louisiana ofthrough failing to specify numbers about that was challenged at the time it was made
today and could not be here. But I would like which we have left absolutely no doubt as would not be the most determining feature
to advise the group that the committee will to our interpretation and where are hereby in our own policy with respect to this.
mark up the Procurement Bill and all the reaffirmed, if it should turn out that those But, finally, the provisions that permit the
items in there are going to be approved this numbers are being challenged in any signifi- afternoon. cant way at all, then this would cast a do not trading have of one type of missile for another
have the
. ve to be implemented. We have the
enator BENNETT. My question is partly a doubt. It would not only threaten disagree-
request for additional clarification. Do I un- ment, but it would threaten the whole basis trade in the e Titans for additional , but a't re the obligation, that Mr. Kissinger's statement will of this new relationship which I have de- ines and given our consttruction on roam
derstand -
be available to us as well as that of the scribed. ants aruc p b subma-
at this moment, with no additional subm a
President? We are very confident that our national rines of the Polaris type being built, we may
Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct. means of detection give us the highest de- well decide not to exercise the option and
Congressman HANSON. Dr. Kissinger, as I gree of confidence that these numbers car.- keep the Titans, in which case your question
understand the ABM Treaty, it anticipates not be exceeded without our knowing and would be moot.
the tai of each construction
of the two site e at the capi- that If T ne Cnare exceededl that the conse- But in any event, we have not accepted
"bO Now, with respect to the definition of Congressman PIKE. Dr. Kissinger, if I un-
Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct. heavy missiles, this was the subject of ex- derstand the philosophy whereby one of these
Congressman HANSON. With -respect to an tensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, agreements requires a treaty and the other
ABM system to protect our Nation's Capital, and finally Moscow. No doubt, one of the Is an executive agreement, it has to do with
is it the intention of the Administration to reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify the fact that the executive agreement is lim-
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June 19, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ited to a term of years. As we look ahead to
SALT II, I would like to ask this question:
For how long a period of years could an ex-
ecutive agreement be made which was not
required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25
years, for example?
I would also like to ask a question in this
regard: the tentative agreement was fairly
well leaked or publicized in some manner be-
fore the President went to Moscow. I would
simply like to ask whether there were any
substantive changes made at Moscow.
Dr. KISSINGER. The first question is an im-
portant Constitutional question: At what
point does an executive agreement achieve
character of such permanence that it should
really more properly be in the form of a
treaty?
There were two reasons why the executive
agreement was put into that form. One was
because of its limited duration and secondly
because of its limited scope. That is to say,
here we had an agreement, the major cate-
gories of which were going to be included
again in a more comprehensive negotiation
leading to a more permanent arrangement.
For example, the disparity which is in-
volved for a limited period of time might not
prove acceptable for a more permanent
arrangement.
For this reason, that is to say, the limited
duration and the limited scope, it was de-
cided that an Executive Agreement which,
however, is submitted to the entire Congress,
was more appropriate.
If you got to the point where you made a
25-year agreement, I don't want to prejudge
that issue, but as a political scientist and not
as a presidential assistant, it would look more
like a treaty to me. But I don't want to get
into that.
Now, with respect to the second question,
the general outlines of the agreement were
shaped, really, in three ways. One was by
negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna, which
did most of the detail. But the policy de-
cisions that were brought about through di-
rect contact between the President and the
Soviet leaders which led to the May 20, 1971
breakthrough and then, again, to the for-
mula which led to the inclusion of the sub-
marines-which we were in Moscow there
were four major issues that had not been
resolved in Helsinki, which were known as
issues, but the solution of which could not
have been leaked because it hadn't been
achieved. Those were the subjects that were
most intensively discussed between the Presi-
dent and the General Secretary, primarily the
issue of how you calculate the submarine
limits, and at what point the replacement
of submarines has to Start, and which sub-
marines had to be counted for replacement
purposes, and questions of this type.
There were subsidiary issues having to do
with the silos, I mentioned interpretative
statements, and matters of this kind, none of
which had been settled in Helsinki, and had
to be settled in very extensive conversations
between the president and the General Sec-
retary and between members of our delega-
tion in Moscow and their Soviet colleagues.
Mr. MCGREGOR. Senator Javits?
Senator JAVITS. I would like to revert to the
question asked by Senator Fulbright and
Senator Stennis, because they raise some, to
my mind, very serious points.
On the assumption that the treaty can be
denounced in six months, but the agreement
S 9605
systems to come within the next five years where we were talking about two sites, the
that we are going to have to authorize be- Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
cause we have made this deal? Staff concluded that if there were to be two
Dr. KISSINGER. First, I think it is not cor- sites, they would rather have the second
rect to say that you have been asked to au- site around the National Command Authority
thorize weapons because we have made this than in Malmstrom. Whether we could have
deal. All of the weapons that you are being obtained Soviet acquiescence in two ICBM
asked to authorize had been requested prior sites rather than having the second site in
to the deal and were judged to be necessary Washington, we cannot judge today, because
before the deal. The question is not whether we accepted the recommendations of our
the deal impels them, but whether the deal military leaders that if there were to be a
makes them dispensable. second site, that second site should be in
This is the shape of the debate. Washington.
Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the Congressman FASCELL. Dr. Kissinger, what
withdrawal provisions of the defensive agree- does the protocol address itself to, and what
ht it
h brou
hi
s
g
c
w
ment. I thought it had the same withdrawal were the circumstance
provisions. about; and, seco _dly, we know what is ex-
It is my impression that the offensive cluded from the Interim Agreement and we
agreement has exactly the same withdrawal know what we can proceed with in terms of,
provisions of the defensive treaty, so that qualitative improvements because they won't
we are protected. be deployed until 1975. What is it that the
Thin-ly, as I have said, we are requesting Russians have excluded from the Interim
both of these programs on their own merit, Agreement and what is it that the Russians
t
decide how to deal with them.
Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, I would like
to first express that in dealing with our two
major adversaries, you will always be as skill-
ful and successful as you have in skirting
around the Executive privilege question.
I think in the case of the treaty and the
agreements, you have been, and the Presi-
dent has been, and Secretary Rogers.
My question pertains to the second allow-
able site that each party can have. Neither
one of us has even begun the preparation of
those two sites. Neither one of us have either
site in our original defense strategy plan. Is
it possible that we could reach an agreement
that neither one of us go ahead with those
two sites and would we take the initiative
in suggesting that might be a possibility?
Dr. KISSINCER. The question of the defer-
ral of the second site had been considered
and had been rejected by both sides. The
Soviet Union had taken the position that
it could not agree to an ABM limitation that
did not give it the right as long as we were
in a position to defend ICBM's in which they
could not also defend some ICBM's of their
own.
So, therefore, our failure to go ahead with
our second site would, in effect, give them
two sites to our one. The only possibility for
us would have been to scrap the site we had
and build an entirely new one in Washing-
ton, and it seemed to us not a good policy
to begin a disarmament agreement by which
we had to scrap everything that we had done
in order to build something entirely different
from what we started out to do.
Mr. MACGREGOR. If you have any complaint
about this process, I am the one to complain
to, but I have not identified to date the
following hands, and I would like to recog-
nize you in this order, if I may. Senator
Ervin, Congressman Gubser, Congressman
Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congress-
man Frelinghuysen, and then we will go on
from there.
Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask this
question. I think we had the wisest of all
Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he
said, "Beware of being lulled into dangerous
security." My question is this: Wouldn't a
ratification of the treaty and the approval
of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all
the more imperative for us to go forward with
the Trident and with the B-1 bomber, and
other programs to keep from being lulled
into a dangerous sense of security?
Dr. KISSINCER. That is the position of the
Administration.
cannot be denounced at all, it is is breached,
either party can treat it as an end. What do
you advise us to about the September 1 date
the President names, if by then we have not
determined that we wish to authorize any
additional weapons systems in view of the
fact that the President has made it clear that
he made this agreement on the assumption
that we, too, would press forward with our
weapons plans as the Russians are?
And the second part of that question is: Is
this the total bill or are there more weapons
Congressman GussER. I seem to get from ligence ys adequate to tell us when they are
your remarks that we do, under the treaty, putting submarines at sea, and how many
have the option of going ahead with Maim- submarines are under construction in the
Strom instead of the protection of the Na- sheds at any given moment, there is some
tional Capital. Is that correct or was that difficulty in defining the term "under con-
possible at one time? struction."
Dr. KISSINGER. This was considered at one If you start the process of "under con-
time, and then when we reached a point struction" when the hull sections are being
il
provement that might not be deployed un
after 1975?
Dr. KISSINCER. The protocol came about
because the submarine question could have
been an extraordinarily complicated one, and
the complicates s arose from this fact. We
do not have a program for building missile-
carrying submarines until 1978 at the earliest.
The Soviet Union had been producing over
the last last few years at the rate of eight
missile-carrying submarines a year. It has
built additional facilities which would en-
able it nearly to double this production rate,
although up to now they have used it mostly
for the conversion cf older submarines into
more modern types. But they do have a very
substantial production capability.
Therefore, a freeze on submarine con-
struction was bound to stop a very dynamic
Soviet program, and it was not affecting
any on-going American program. Therefore,
a formula had to be found which at one and
the same time met our needs for some
equivalent, and took account of the reality
that the Soviet Union without this agree-
ment could have produced at the rate at
least of eight to. nine a year, so that over
the period of the freeze, the Soviet Union
could have built up to eighty to ninety sub-
marines, that is an additional 40 to 45 to
something like 43 to 44 they now have under
construction.
This was the situation we faced. So we
developed a formula which enabled the So-
viet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their
present level up to 62, which is well short
of their capacity, but only at the price of
trading in some of the older ICBMs and some
of the older missiles on earlier nuclear sub-
marines, so that the Soviet Union has to
trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to
build up to this agreed level.
So the submarine agreement has the dual
advantage of stopping the Soviet program
on construction well short of its capacity;
and secondly, retiring for the first time by in-
ternational agreement a substantial number
of other missiles that we, in our annual
statements, had been carrying as part of the
Soviet missile force.
So we needed a protocol to determine those
things.
Then there was the second question of at
what level does the process of trading-in
start? That is to say, at what point do you
determine that the Soviet Union must trade
in these ICBMs and older submarine mis-
siles for newer ones. The ambiguity here
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S~ 9606 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 19, 1972
built, before they are moved into the sheds, zero defects and a third of a mile CPI. It is year and last year we saw a $6 billion in-
you get a different figure than if you get the hard to conceive that they are obsolete or crease in defense spending requested and if
figure In the sheds. Therefore, this was a sub- will be. the estimates given us by the Assistant Secre-
ject of some complicated negotiation to de- Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to go into the tary of Defense Moot are correct, we can ex
termine the level at which the trade-in technical weapons characteristics. I think pect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia.
would start, which is, as expressed in the you will get more competent witnesses than I have seen before the tide was even out,
communique, at the level of 740 ballistic me on that subject. before our committee, hundreds of millions
missiles on submarines, which includes 30 Congressman FREYLINGHUYSEN. I am sure of dollars sought for additional spending in
older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the we all appreciate both your presentation and the procurement bill for the betterment of
level of 704 to 710 of the newer submarines, the question and answer period which you systems that were not part of your agree-
'I'bis is the explanation for this rather have given us. I would like to congratulate ment in Russia.
complex calculation of the protocol. you on a masterful presentation, I think On three levels I am puzzled, one, sound
Now as far as the Soviet Union is con- Clark is to be congratulated on the music economic policy which appeared to be both
cerned, their bombers are outside of this that he has provided to supplement the centered in the White House as a concern
system and theoretically they could start high points. prior to the present occupancy in the White
building up their bomber force without be- My question gets back to this level of de- House looking toward the era of 1964 and
ing, limited by this agreement. fense spending. The President and you both 1968, public confidence that has been led to
historically, the Soviet Union has not put said you hoped for an earlier resumption of believe that somehow out of this whole busi-
the emphasis on its bomber force that we the SALT talks. Assuming ratification of the ness will come a reduction, not an increase,
have. Its operating procedures and expert- treaty, you didn't really answer Senator Ful- in the overall spending In the defense area,
once is far below the level of our Air Force. bright's question as to whether the Soviets and in general, whether or not In going- to
We do not consider it probable that they might not consider defense spending an in.. these talks you didn't have enough of an,
will make a maior effort in that field, but dication of our sincerity or Insincerity. Do outline of questions in coming before Con-
this is one field in which they could make you think that there is any chance that there gressional committee and members of the
progress. is not an expectation. on the part of the Executive Branch did to be able to live this.
The field in which it is most likely that Soviets with respect to defense spending that year with the procurement and appropria-
they will make progress is in the moderniza- might jeopardize successful talks following tions bill as they were without adding to
tion of the missiles that are permitted un- the ratification of the treaty? them in the way and with the timing I
der the agreement. That is, they will not In other words, does the other side hook think has been chosen to do it.
violate the numbers of the agreement, but our spending and our attitude towards de- I would like to have you address yourself
they will improve the quality, accuracy, fense to further talks? to some of those considerations, particularly
number of warheads and this is what will Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, this last round as a constituent might say to me "What do
represent a threat to our strategic forces. of talks took nearly 21/2 years. So, even if the you mean it is going to cost more for de-
Congressman LEGGETT. Doctor, I waist to talks start again this fall, they are likely to fense? I thought you fellows were negotiat-
commend you-and the Administration on the be prolonged. We would expect that the ing for reductions in tensions and costs." I
negotiation of what I think is an extremely first session will deal with general princi- think that is the problem most of us have.
remarkable agreement. I have my reserva- ples rather than with detailed negotiating Dr. KISSINGER. It is our intention and con-
tions that perhaps the Department of De- packages. viction that as these talks proceed into other
fense is stampeding in the opposite direction, All the more so in the next round, we are areas that we will be able to bring about
though, of the spirit of the negotiations. getting into the more complicated issues of a substantial reduction in defense expendi-
I am concerned that in the bill that we how to control technological change where tures as a result of these talks.
marked up yesterday in the Armed Services national means of inspection are not as relia- There are, of course, certain savings in
Committee we increased the hard site Snrint ble as they are with respect to sheer num- the ABM program. What we are finding out
nuclear program clearly outlawed as far as bers. is that the combination of certain trends
deployment 100 percent. Now, there Is no question that the Soviet has produced requirements which are not
We accepted the budget figures which had Union will judge our intentions in part by themselves the cause of the agreement, but
a 900 percent increase in the ULMS or Tri- the level of our defense spending, for good or which have come to a head at about the
dent program. Of course, the answer you evil, and that we cannot take the position same time by accident as the agreement.
originally gave was that we needed this as a that our defense spending is irrelevant to One of these problems is that for a num-
bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, our general political relationship. her of years we had significantly slowed down
however, it seems to me we have successfully The question is: If we speed too little on the modernization of our strategic programs
negotiated the limitation on the number of defense, if we create such a unilateral weak. so that our strategic weapons now were es-
land-based missiles without an accelerated ness then we destroy their incentive to nego- sentially designed in the early 60s, while
program, limited the submarine tubes with- tiate seriously. If we spend too much and those of the Soviet Union were designed in
out an accelerated program. give them the idea that we are gearing up the late 60s and this has created a certain
We perhaps have wasted several million simply for getting a tremendous spurt to get technological requirement.
dollars in tha ABM program in making that a ahead of them, then we create the other This is the reason for this additional ex-
bargaining chip and aren't we perhaps doing problem. penditure. This other figure for Southeast
the same thing in developing the big bar- So our problem is to get our defense ex- Asia that you mentioned is a projection for-
gaining things which obviously will never be penditures at a level that does not create a ward of current rates and may or may not be
deployed if you are successful in your ne- unilateral weakness and give them pressure necessary, depending on how long current
gotiating program? for agreement but does not get us into an rates are being sustained.
Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: One, area where it had the counter-productive Congressman HARRINGTON. I am quoting
it is not easy to prove the motivations of the tendency of generating a new round on their Assistant Secretary Moot.
other side in making an agreement. I would side. Dr. KlssINGER. I know and he projected
think it probable however that we could not We believe that we are navigating that them forward over a period of months which
have negotiated the limitations on offensive course. But it Is a serious question and it may or may not be necessary because he was
weapons if it had not been linked to the is a serious problem and we have to be alert being proper with the Congress by giving his
limitations on defensive weapons and to their to both of these dangers. best estimate, but he was projecting current
desire of stopping the deployment of the ABM Mr. MACGREGOR. John Hunt wishes to make expenditure rates.
system. a statement in explanation for the departure If there were negotiations, for example, if
So, what drove these negotiations for the of a number of members of Congress. the offensive slows down, there are many fac-
first year was their desire to limit our ABM Congressman HUNT. Let me thank you for tors that could affect this. I am just trying
deployment. And it was not until we insisted the clear and concise explanation of your to give you an idea.
that we could not agree to an ABM treaty mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Thirdly, the Increase in the defense spend-
without offensive limitations that they re- Services Committee, you will notice some of Ing has been caused to a considerable extent
luctantly Included the offensive limitations, us are leaving. It is not because of any dis- also by military pay increaess which now
Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if courtesy to you, sir, or because we are not consume about 54 percent of our defense
we are successful in the negotiations that it interested, budget. I have seen a chart-I think the
is very likely we will deploy ULMS and Tri- The fact is we have a conflicting schedule Secretary of Defense can do it much better
dent and then retire a similar number of the of subcommittees that are getting ready for than I-that shows what the present defense
older submarines, use them for replacement an important mark-up of the legislation this establishment would cost if the pay scales
purposes rather than additions to the cur- afternoon in the absence of Mr. Hebert. were still those of eight or 10 years ago.
rent submarine fleet. So, if you permit me for a moment to ex- So, it is a combination of these factors
So, I cannot fully accept the assumption plain, that is the reason they are leaving, that have produced the increase of defense
that they will not be deployed. What would Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you. I thought they costs while forces have actually been shrink-
almost certainly happen though If an agree- were like my Harvard students. (Laughter.) ing.
ment were successful is a substantial re- Congressman HARRINGTON. At the risk of Senator COOPER. I would like to join with
placement of the older Polaris boats. being repetitive, to follow on Congressman others in thanking you and showing appre-
Congressman LEGGETT. Of course, those old- Freylinghusen's question and Senator Ful- elation for your very fine statement.
er Polaris are a quarter billion dollars a piece, bright's question, I am puzzled that this The first question I will ask is not one
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 June 19, 1972 ' ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
that I suggest myself, but it was asked the
day the agreement was announced. I am
sorry Senator Jackson is not here, but he
wouldn't mind my saying he asked the ques-
tion.
Are there any other understandings, se-
cret understandings, which have not been
made public or will not be made public? I
think we will be asked, and it is just as well
to ask it now.
Dr. KISSINGER. There are no secret under-
standings. We have submitted to the Con-
gress the list of all the significant agree-
ments and interpretive statements, and so
forth. What we have not done is to go
through the record to see whether Ambassa-
dor Smith might have said something that
they interpreted in a certain way, and this
is why we put on the qualification "signifi-
cant", because otherwise we would have to
submit the entire record.
According to the best of our judgment,
there are no secret understandings, and all
the significant interpretive statements have
been submitted to the Congress.
Senator COOPER. May I ask one more ques-
tion? I notice in your explanation, it is said
that the United States asked for a prohibi-
tion on mobile land-based missiles. You lat-
er withdrew that. But you did say that if
the Soviet Union went ahead with deploy-
ment, you would consider it serious enough
to break the agreement. Is the Soviet Union
going ahead with mobile land-based mis-
siles?
Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make one other
comment with respect to the first thing about
secret understandings.
There are, of course, in the discussions,
general statements of intentions. For exam-
ple, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I
have also said here publicly on the record:
that the option of converting the Titans into
submarines, given our present construction
program, was not something we would nec-
essarily carry out. But we do not consider
that as a secret agreement, that sort of thing.
This was simply a statement of general uni-
lateral intentions.
Now, with respect to the land-based mo-
bile missiles, we have made an interpretive
statement according to which the deploy-
ment of land-based mobile missiles would
be inconsistent with the purposes of the
agreement. Then this raises the question of
whether our national means of verification
are adequate to monitor this.
The national means of verification are
adequate to monitor over a period of time
whether a land-based mobile missile is being
deployed. The margin of error with respect
to total numbers would be great, if you have
a margin of error of five percent, and I am
giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 1,9
percent with respect to mobile missiles.
But the fact of the matter is, what we
have to monitor is not total numbers of
land mobile missiles; what we have to mon-
itor is the fact that they are deploying any
of them. We are quite confident that within
a reasonable period of time after the initial
deployment, and maybe not in the first
month, but over a three- to four-month pe-
riod, and well before they can develop a
substantial capability, we will be able to tell
whether they have deployed a land mobile
missile and we can draw the appropriate
conclusions.
So as to the fact of deploying a land mo-
bile missile, we are confident that we will
discover it well before they could deploy
enough to have any effect.
Congressman MONAOAN. Dr. Kissinger,
you have said that these agreements, our
confidence in them, is not based on trust,
but enlightened self-interest, and yet I think
you would agree with any bilateral arrange.
ments, with the credibility of the other party
to the contract, where that is very impor-
tant, you have also said that there is reason
to believe that the area of distrust and sus-
picion may be at an end.
I just wonder, in view of that question of
credibility, is there any specific reason that
you have for coming to this conclusion?
Dr. KISSINGER. We are not basing this
agreement on trust, and we believe that this
agreement can be verified; and secondly,
that it has adequate safeguards to prevent
its being violated. We also believe that we
have started a process by which we can move
international relations into a new era, and
we base this on the fact that we agreed with
the Soviet Union over the past two years on
the issue of Berlin, which has removed one of
the primary causes of tension in the world
for the foreseeable future, and a whole spec-
trum of agreements on health, space, envi-
ronment, rules of navigation, that we are on
the verge of making progress with them in
other fields such as commercial agreements,
and finally, we have signed a Declaration of
Common Principles which it would have
been no point to sign unless we meant to
move in a major effort in that direction.
So, for all of these reasons, we believe that
there is a basis, that we have an opportunity
both in the Soviet Union and in the United
States, to move into a new era. Whether both
sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if
they have the wisdom they are not caught by
events in areas in which they cannot con-
trol their decision, this remains to be seen.
But I think we have the opportunity to turn
a significant page in history, and as far as
this Administration is concerned, we are
going to make a major effort in that direc-
tion.
Senator PELL. It is an excellent presenta-
tion. I have three short questions.
First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms
remains static, or should decline, or ours go
up, wouldn't that have a reverse effect on
their willingness to move into SALT II?
Secondly, are any of the provisions of the
seabed disarmament treaty in conflict with
our own treaty which you have negotiated,
in view of the fact that we apparently still
consider the possibility of weapons of mass
destruction stored on the seabed floor, and
they are prohibited by the seabed disarma-
ment treaty?
Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was
the constitutionally normal course of Con-
gressional consultation, advise as well as
consent, not engaged in?
Mr. MACGREGOR. When did you stop beating
your wife?
Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the seabed,
I am not aware that we have any intention
of deploying weapons on the seabed, and we
have no intention of violating the seabed
agreement, so unless you know of some
weapon that I am not aware of, I would have
to say that this is not planned.
We believe that the defense expenditures
will stay roughly in balance and that the
Soviet incentive to come to an agreement
will not be reduced by our being stronger.
On the contrary. So the judgment has been
that our strength, if anything, gives them
an additional incentive to make a negotia-
tion, if we do not carry it to a point where
they are convinced that this is just a sub-
terfuge for a massive effort to get ahead of
them. If that should become their convic-
tion, then, in fact, we have a problem.
I have to repeat: We have to navigate be.
tween that, on the one hand, weakening our-
selves unilaterally, and on the other hand
between having them see these negotiations
simply as a stage by which we try to achieve
superiority. Either of these things would be
self-defeating.
As for the process of consultation with the
Senate, as Senator Fulbright knows, this is
not my specialty, but it has been my under-
standing that Mr. Smith and the appropriate
Secretaries have been in close consultation,
and we have tried from here to be on a per-
sonal basis in contact with key Senators.
S 9607
Mr. MACGREGOR. Might I add in that respect,
Senator Pell, that at least since I have been
here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has
been Ambassador Gerard Smith's intention,
following the directions of the President, to
make himself readily available to the Mem-
bers of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives, here in Washington as well as in
Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted to
talk to you further about that, but I had
thought that was worked out to the reason-
able satisfaction of the Members of the Con-
gress.
Congressman FRASER. Dr. Kissinger, let me
say first that I have thought that the con-
sultations with Ambassador Smith have been
good, both here in Washington and in Vien-
na.
I listened with some care to the answer
you gave to Senator Percy's question on the
ABM sites. I can appreciate the Soviets would
want to have a symmetrical arrangement
with ours, but I was not quite clear from your
answer whether in fact you have evidence
that the Soviets intend to go ahead with
their option to protect an offensive missile
site.
The reasons I ask that is that since build-
ing the National Capital Defense is not a
bargaining chip clearly because we have now
put a cap on ABM and since we have a two
to three times lead over the Soviet Union
building a site over the Capital is not going
to give us any significant benefit from the
possibility of attack. It will not even give us
more time.
Unless we already know the Soviets are
going to build a second ABM, why couldn't
we wait on ours and save the taxpayers sev-
eral billions of dollars?
Dr. KISSINGER. It depends on how you de-
fine "how do we know". We have no evidence
that they have started construction. We have
the impression that they have the firm inten-
tion of proceeding. I have no evidence what-
ever to the contrary that they do not intend
to proceed.
All the conversations the Presidential party
had with them left the impression that they
have a firm intention of proceeding with
their second site. As for the argument of how
much time you gain, the effort to over-
whelm, in itself, is apt to give some addi-
tional time but I would not insist that this
will add a huge span of time to the warning.
Congressman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Kissinger, the
President and you have made it quite clear
that it would be desirable to have the treaty
ratified and the Executive Agreements ap-
proved by Congress in order that Phase II
could begin in October.
We fully understand the system of the So-
viets and there is no ratification on their
part as we have it here, and I am sure the
Soviets understand that this is an election
year and we have political conventions and
there may be an opportunity not to meet,
that is a ratification and approval of the
Executive Agreements.
Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty
be ratified and Executive Agreements ap-
proved by Congress before Phase II can begin,
sometime in October? Indeed, cannot Am-
bassador Smith meet with his counterparts,
even though the Senate and the Congress
have not finished their work as far as the
treaty and Executive Agreement are con-
cerned?
If I may ask just a second question, I
think it is in the report, but what problems
were there, or why didn't we pursue with
greater determination the inclusion of
MIRV's in the Executive Agreement?
Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the first
question actually, the Soviets do go through
a ratification procedure. They have their Su-
preme Soviet approve it but with all respect,
it is a little more tractable than our Con-
gress.
The reason why, really, we can have some
exploratory informal talks and we probably
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 19, 1972
will at various levels, but the reason it
would be difficult to start formal sessions is
because we have to know from what base
we are operating. It is rather an- embarrass-
ing position to have a senior negotiator op-
erate on the basis of the assumption of a rati-
fication.
Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous
towards the Congress to assume a ratification
that has not in fact taken place. Yet, on the
other hand, unless you make some assump-
tion, you really have not got a fixed base
from which you-can operate.
Therefore, the beginning of the second
phase of SALT really has to follow congres-
sional ratification. We understand the pres-
sures of this year and this is simply a fact.
Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a com-
plex issue for this reason: You can count
numbers with national means of verification,
but it is much more difficult to determine
how many warheads are confined in the mas-
ter warhead.
Now, you have some indications but it is
not very easy. Therefore, with respect to the
deployment of MIRV, the inspection require-
ments have to be a little bit more rigid than
would be otherwise the case,
Now, we have made two proposals, two
linked proposals, one is a ban on the testing
of MIRV, this we are prepared to monitor by
national means of inspection, and second, a
ban on the deployment of MIRV for which
we asked for spot-checks on on-site inspec-
tion. Now we considered the test ban ab-
solutely crucial because we could have been
somewhat more lenient on the frequency of
on-site inspection if there had been a test
ban on MIRV's because without testing, by
definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It
is, in fact, impossible to deploy them.
The Soviet Union, for not ununderstand-
able reasons, because they are behind in
MIRV technology, refused a test ban. They
also refused a deployment ban as such. What
they proposed was a production ban but
without inspection. A ban on production is
totally unverifiable in the Soviet Union while
they could verify ours through our budget
and other methods through which our in-
dustrial production generally becomes
known.
do, the Soviet counter-proposal for a pro-
duction ban without a test ban was gen-
erally unacceptable to us and when we reach-
ed that stalemate, we could not proceed any
further. This was the obstacle to proceeding
on the MIRV's.
Congressman ZABLOCItI. What encourage-
ment do you see, or optimism that this may
be an area that in Phase II we may find some
common ground on?
Dr. KISSINGER. Phase II, Mr. Congressman,
will be very much more difficult than Phase
I, because there, we will deal with tech-
nological problems and there we will require
even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II
than was shown in Phase I.
if one can have optimism with respect to
it, it is because now the Soviet technology
has gone somewhat further probably so that
they may be more willing to accept a test
ban which will at least put a limit on further
deployments, and secondly, you will remem-
ber when we started these negotiations in
1969, we were going through a crisis in the
Middle East and the Berlin Critis. We 'were
emerging out of this whole miasma of sus-
picion and it was the first time we engaged
with the Soviets in any major negotiation, so
the climate was different.
Now, we have established a pattern in
which the Chief of State on our side, the
President and their political leaders, can
be in constant contact with each other and
I believe we can perhaps move a little more
creatively in the early stages of SALT II than
we could in the early stages of SALT I.
L must also say that the subject is more
difficult. Certainly, we had conversations of
the breadth and precision in Moscow that
would have been unimpaginable three or
four years ago with respect to strategic ques-
tions, but this gives us some hope that at
least we can talk about the gut issues.
Senator FULBRIGHT: Can I ask you to
comment on one aspect, on the significance
of ABM, so much more has been said about
the agreement.
How do you evaluate what appears to me
to be a renunciation of the effort to create
a defense? What you have left in the ABM
Is, surely nothing more than a token. Hasn't
each country, in effect, said, "We recognize,
we have no defense to almost total devasta-
tion in view of the capacities for destruction,
or within the existing weapons", and if that
is true, isn't this the experience, and I don't
know why you would say it would be much
more difficult.
If they live up to that and we give them
no reason to believe we haven't accepted
in good faith that our population is hostile
to their weapons, and vice versa, and it seems
to me it ought not to be more difficult
if you believe in that.
Dr. KISSINGER: I believe, Mr. Chairman,
this is a very good point. The limit on ABM's
or effective ABM's of both sides, really cre-
ates a situation, as I said in my statement,
in one sentence, in which the offensive weap-
ons of both sides really have a free ride into
the country of the other.
So that therefore, the difference in num-
bers is somewhat less signficaiit than you
would assess otherwise. There is still a dam-?er
that one side will get such an enormous
numerical advantage in warheads that it can
completely obliterate the force of the other.
But in the absence of significant defenses,
even relatively small forces can do an enor-
mous amount of damage.
Therefore, too, if we can move into the
second phase of SALT, into an explicit rec-
ognition that both sides will try to stay
away from counter-force strategies, from the
one danger that now exists, or the over-
whelming danger, that they will try to de-
stroy each other, then perhaps the premium
on MIRV's will be reduced, because, as you
remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MER.V's
were developed at first as a hedge against
ABM.
So I think we will find, in perhaps unex-
pected ways, that the new strategic relation-
ship that is created by this treaty will create
realizations on both sides as to the signifi-
cance of usable strategic power that over a
period of the next negotiations could have
quite dramatic impacts.
I am very glad that you asked that.
Mr. MACGREGOR: It is very close to 12
noon. We appreciate your participation and
your presence and your patience, and we
thank you for launching what the President
has called aid effective Legislative-Executive
partnership. I
MEXICO'S PRESIDENT-AN OUT-
SPOKEN VISITOR
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an article published in the
U.S. News & World Report for June
26, 1972, entitled "Mexico's President-
An Outspoken Visitor."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MEXICO'S PRESIDENT-AN OUTSPOKEN VISITOR
It is a concerned and frank-speaking Presi-
dent of Mexico who has been touring the
United States on a six-day visit.
From the start, Luis Echeverria Alvarez
made it clear that he had no intention of
confining himself to the sort of "hands across
the border" platitudes that have character-
ized previous state visits between the two
nations.
Addressing a joint session of the U.S.
Congress, President Echeverria strongly
criticized an American foreign policy of com-
ing to terms with other strong countries
while "ignoring the rights and interests of
less-developed nations."
Mexico's leader noted that the U.S. "is
encouraging dialogue with other world pow-
ers that have different ideologies"-namely,
Russia and Communist China.
"Nevertheless," Mr. Echeverria told Con-
gress, "these changes have not yet been re-
flected in the policy of the United States
toward the Third World and toward the
Latin-American countries, in particular."
The Mexican President, both in his speech
to Congress and in talks at the White House,
pinpointed specific problems that, in his
view, now cloud relations between his nation
and the U.S.
Biggest of these is the high salt content
of the Colorado River. The U.S., in agreeing
to share its water, had also agreed to improve
its quality. Mexicans maintain the salinity
in the Mexicali Valley and sharply reduced
farm output.
"It is impossible to understand," Mr. Eche-
verria told Congress, "why the United States
does not use the same boldness and imagina-
tion that it applies to solving complex prob-
lems with its enemies to the solution of
simple problems with - its friends."
The Mexican leader's words drew a quick
response. President Nixon next day agreed
that Mexican farmers should get water as
pure as Americans do. He pledged prompt
action to achieve this.
TRADE PROBLEMS
Trade between the two nations has emerged
as a special concern of President Echeverria,
who warns of the damage caused by protec-
tionist measures taken at the behest of
American "minority groups."
An example cited by Mr. Echeverria is
imports into the U.S. of Mexican winter
fruits and vegetables. These now are con-
trolled by strict "voluntary" quotas set in
consultation with Florida and California
growers. They sometimes have forced the
Mexicans to destroy strawberry and tomato
harvests.
Another worry "south of the border" is the
possible passage of a measure currently be-
fore Congress, which would affect more than
300 "in-bond" factories, American-owned, op-
erating in Mexico. Organized labor in the U.S.
is giving considerable support to the bill as a
means of blocking the "export of U.S. jobs."
On this point, the Mexican President is be-
lieved to have received assurance from Presi-
dent Nixon of his opposition to the bill, as
well. Studies carried out for the White House
conclude that the bill would cause little
change in the job picture-and might even
worsen it. The bill's prospects for passage are
rated as "very dim."
The visit of President Echeverria is a break
with the past in another important respect-
after two days in Washington, he became the
first Mexican President in history to cross the
U.S. on a series of personal appearances.
Cities on the schedule included New York,
Chicago, San Antonio and Los Angeles.
President Echeverria's plans on this whirl-
wind tour of major cities include meetings
with Mexican-American groups.
The changes in Mexico's foreign policy that
caused President Echeverria to do things
differently on this U.S. trip have been dic-
tated by economic problems at home as well
as by a changing world picture.
Mexico, after years of rapid growth, is be-
set with the sort of economic headaches that
plague many other developing countries. It
runs a trade deficit of 1 billion dollars, has a
foreign debt of 4.5 billion dollars, and a heavy
debt-servicing burden.
DRIVE TO EXPORT
To improve its foreign-payments position,
the nation has pushed a major export drive,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 14, 1972
rents with that of other areas, can intensify
the plague on other localities.
The air we breathe knows no city, county
and state boundaries. When a polluter in
Pennsylvania can put a Miamian in the hos-
pital, the problem obviously is nationwide,
not local. It behooves every citizen to de-
mand strict Federal action to control the
smokey stacks even a thousand miles away;
the cough he prevents may be his own.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
woman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG) is
recognized for 30 minutes.
[Mrs. ABZUG addressed the House.
Her remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.]
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
EDITH GREEN
(Mr. SIKES asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, those of us
who have enjoyed the privilege and honor
of serving in the House with Representa-
tive EDITH GREEN, know of her dedication
to America and of her valuable contri-
butions to sound legislation, particularly
in the field of education.
Long known for her distinguished work
in that field, she has again been brought
deservedly to the attention of the entire
country through a recent article in the
Christian Science Monitor. It appeared
on Monday, June 12, 1972, under the
heading "School-Trend Watcher." In this
article Mrs. GREEN talks with a reporter
about her views on education, the finan-
cial difficulty facing our schools, and mis-
use of schools as a tool for social change.
No one is better qualified than Mrs.
GREEN to speak on this matter.
I commend the article to my colleagues
and I congratulate Mrs. GREEN not only
for what she has said but for the out-
standing work she has done in this most
important field throughout her career,
The article is reprinted below.
CONGRESSWOMAN GREEN-SCHOOL-TREND
WATCHER
(By Marion Bell Wilhelm)
When Edith Starrett, the bright-eyed
daughter of two dedicated teachers, yearned
to become an electrical engineer, she was
advised not to try for a "man's career."
Her second choice was law. Again, she was
counseled out of a profession that would rel-
egate a young woman to a "back office."
So Edith Starrett grew up to become a
teacher, as was advisable for a woman look-
ing for regular employment in the 1930's. To-
day she is one of the most powerful spokes-
men for American education in the U.S.
Congress.
After 18 years on the House Education and
Labor Committee, Rep. Edith Starrett Green
(D) of Oregon says philosophically: "As it
turned out, the career that was chosen for me
has been invaluable to my work in Congress,
and I suppose it even makes me a little.im-
patient with those of my colleagues who have
never taught school."
As the chairman of the Special Subcom.
mittee on Education, Mrs. Green keeps her
eye on trends and changes throughout the 50
states and the District of Columbia. She has
sponsored major legislation to help rescue
the nation's schools from the gathering
storms of "a social hurricane."
DECLINE OF CONFIDENCE
All over the United States, she notes, school
tax levies and bond issues are being defeated.
Property taxes are high and uneven. Too
often, she says, those making school polio.
are untrained in educational and professional
skills.
"People seem to be losing confidence in the
public schools," she observed in a recent
interview. "I fear the day may be coming
when we just won't have an educated citi-
zenry. Already, we can see some evidence of
this in some of our big cities."
Representative Green's goal is to see the
federal government eventually take over 35
percent of all educational costs from kinder-
garten through college. This would help
equalize education for all Americans, she
believes, while maintaining the quality of
their best schools. She calls the coming
changes in the financing of education "revo-
lutionary."
However, the trend toward national financ-
ing contains some pitfalls, she cautions.
In a number of states, she points out, suits
have been brought by citizens questioning
the equality of education in school districts
with widely divergent tax revenues. If the
local property tax is abandoned for some kind
of statewide tax, parents in states such as
Mississippi or Alabama might also bring suits
claiming inequality with states such as Con-
necticut. National equalization, though ben-
eficial in some ways, could be disastrous, in
Mrs. Green's opinion, "if we settle for medi-
ocrity."
LEGISLATION INTRODUCED
"I introduced a bill last year in which I
proposed that the federal government by the
year 1976 would contribute 25 percent of the
total cost of education in the average dis-
trict," she says, "and this session I am in-
troducing a bill that would provide one-
third of the cost. At present, we are contrib-
uting 7 or 8 percent.
"But I am not persuaded that money alone
is going to buy quality. Here in the District
of Columbia, for example, our schools are
decaying before our eyes. And yet they have
the highest per capita expenditure for educa-
tion of any city of similar size in the nation."
Nor does Mrs. Green-think that busing is
the way to achieve the best education. She
says: "I think a careful reading of the
evidence shows that a child's education and
his ability to be educated depend more upon
the environment in which he lives than on
the six hours a day in which he is trans-
ported to a school outside his neighborhood.
I think that the task is much greater than
we have assumed. We're going to have to
change homes, and we're going to have to
change neighborhoods."
TOO BIG A BURDEN
Any attempt to place the major responsi-
bility for social reform on the schools alone
is doomed to failure, she asserts.
"It may be that a youngster who is at-
tending a very poor school and is bused has
an opportunity for a higher quality of edu-
cation," she adds, "but I think that, overall,
the reverse is accomplished. I had lunch with
some school-board members in Los Angeles,
for example, a year and a half ago. This last
year they had to cut out $50 million in pro-
grams and services for children in the Los
Angeles schools because they didn't have
enough money.
"Then a state court came along and said,
'You're going to have to desegregate.' The
superintendent's office told me last Novem-
ber that for the first year their estimate on
the cost of buying buses and hiring bus
drivers will be $42 million."
(Mr. SIKES asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
[Mr. SIKES' remarks will appear here-
after in the Extensions of Remarks.]
KISSINGER TESTIFIES IN NIGHT-
CLUBS BUT NOT BEFORE CON-
GRESS
(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, Presi-
dential Adviser Henry Kissinger is a law
unto himself. While his `ee wheeling
antics make him a one-man successor to
the old rat pack which used to be fash-
ionable at the White House, he appar-
ently holds out a double standard on his
briefings. Rarely will he be quoted. He
will not testify before congressional com-
mittees and yet, according to an article
in the May 29, 1972, International Herald
Tribune, he ,s Qwed no 9ualms a.t "tas-
tifvin " in a. Mnc~nw mrrhf elnh shout
T.S. defense and negotiation information
which-should be treated -
i no Secret. will he make the
same statements before appropriate con-
gressional committees or does he limit
his discussions of our Nation's secrets to
bars and the jet set crowd?
According to that news report, Mr.
Kissinger discussed the balance of Amer-
ican-Soviet nuclear weaponry in the dim
Skylight Room of the Intourist Hotel.
The account noted:
To American newsmen based in Moscow,
it was astonishing to hear the principal stra-
tegic adviser to the American President dis-
cussing the level of both nations' nuclear ar-
senals in a Moscow nightclub.
Astonishing to them, possibly, Mr.
Speaker, but not astonishing to many
Americans who do not trust Mr. Kissin-
ger. One of the reasons that many of
us have so little confidence in President
Nixon's foreign policy conduct is Mr.
Nixon's confidence in Mr. Kissinger and
his coterie. There are many reasons for
firing Henry Kissinger. This is probably
the least of them and yet it is a part of
the story of arrogance at the seat of
power and national security in Washing-
ton.
The entire story is included at this
point:
KISSINGER TELLS ALMOST ALL: STORY OF
SUCCESS COMES OUT IN MOSCOW NIGHT-
CLUB
(By Murrey Marder)
Moscow, May 28.-None who experienced
it will quickly forget the climax of an im-
probable diplomatic presentation that leaped
between the Kremlin Palace of the Czars;
a well-worn diplomatic bargaining room in
Helsinki; the American Embassy here, and
ultimately the nightclub of Moscow's In-
tourist Hotel. No one fully orchestrated this
production, which dramatized the world's
first nuclear arms limitation.
In the seductively dim Skylight Room,
which happens to be on the hotel's ground
floor, between a bandstand and a circular,
raised dance floor, against a background of
champagne buckets, President Nixon's Inex-
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June 14, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
exercise, weight control, stress, hyper-
tension, and cigarette smoking.
Fifth. Better administration, to be
achieved by giving the National Heart
and Lung Institute greater authority to
coordinate the activities of the Federal
Government relating to heart diease.
Sixth. Closer cooperation between the
National Institute, the medical profes-
sion, and the concerned public. The ve-
hicle for this will be a restructured Na-
tional Heart and Lung Advisory Council,
in which Federal officials, medical ex-
perts, and public representatives will
participate.
The prospects are good that we will
see enactment of this legislation before
the end of this year. In the House, floor
action on the proposals which I am sup-
porting should take place in a few weeks.
In the Senate, a similar bill, which in-
corporates - all of the principal features
of the legislation pending in the House,
has already been passed.
The proposals now being considered in
Congress will give a strong impetus to
the campaign against heart disease, but
success will not be possible' without the
active involvement of concerned citizens
throughout the country.
HEART ASSOCIATIONS
That is why it is essential to have the
continued support of heart associations.
These organizations bring together peo-
ple who want to do something about
heart disease in communities in all parrs
of the United States. They provide a val-
uable link between the medical profes-
sion and the general public. They have
helped build the foundation of popular
support that has made it possible to win
Congressional approval of expanded
Federal heart programs.
Volunteers are the most important re-
source of every heart association.
Thanks to the support of public-spirited
persons who are. willing to contribute
their time and skills, heart associations
have compiled an impressive record of
accomplishments.
These associations have helped to in-
form the people about the symptoms of
heart disease and to alert them to the
risks inherent in smoking, improper diet,
overwheight, and high blood pressure.
This has involved the distribution of
school health kits, the organization of
nutrition and weight control classes, and
the provision of speakers and informa-
tional materials.
The heart associations have intro-
duced a new preventive technique,
sounds in school-age children.
Another valuable association servi
is supplying data on the latest develo
nurses. Training sessions in mouth-
mouth resuscitation and closed chest
heart massage have prepared firemen,
police, school personnel, and other in-
dividuals to give emergency assistance
to heart attack victims.
Volunteers have made all of these pro-
grams possible. Volunteers will be needed
to continue and expand them so that
your association can contribute to the
stepped-up campaign against heart dis-
case that is now commencing.
With the vigorous support of heart
association members throughout the
United States, I am confident we can
look forward to new progress in con-
trolling the ravages of heart disease.
TAXATION WITHOUT
JUSTIFICATION
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House. the gentle-
man from North Carolina Mr. GALIFI-
without representation op-
merican people. Two hun-
but without justification.
rogress, but I doubt it.
Mr. GAL
1772 taxatio
pressed the
withheld unn
American tax
for up to 1 ye
compensation.
The excuse, of
situation is the
she, we are told,
sense tooverdecl
This is no m
provisions of
In realit
and inepti
Govern
the A
Pell
uld have had enough
personal exemptions,
uld
s the at
crime.
to the U.S. Treasury.
eral of my colleagues
ecting this gross inequity without s
stantial damage to the fight against i
flation.
and the administration to expedite its
consideration of this subject and make
a prompt effort to right this obvious
wrong.
iy opinion the
mistake. The
quately alert
POLLUTION RESPECTS NO
BOUNDARIES
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Florida (Mr. GIBBONS) is rec-
ognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, much of
Florida was plagued earlier this month
by smog and haze which has been traced,
by weather satellite photographs and
other means, to smokestack emissions
from as far away as Ohio. Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee.
H 5639
In some areas of Florida these air pol-
lution conditions caused a significant in-
crease in respiratory ailments and in hos-
pitalizations for these ailments. The
situation in Dade County, Fla., became so
bad that county officials have threatened
Federal court action against these out
of State polluters.
I think that this incident is just one
more indication that we are going to
have to be sure that strict Federal air
pollution standards are enforced na-
tionwide if any of us are to live to enjoy
the benefits of clean air and clean water
in our local communities. It also serves
as a warning that we as a community of
nations are going to have to do a good
deal more than we are now doing if we
are to stop the pollution of our planet.
At this point in the RECORD, I would
like to insert an editorial on the recent
"out of State pollution" problem in Flor-
ida which appeared in the Tampa
Tribune of June 2:
POLLUTION RESPECTS No BOUNDARY LINES
A complaint from Dade County this week
emphasizes that the problem of air pollu-
tion is national, not local, and why national
standards are so important.
Dade County (as was much of the rest of
Florida) was blanketed with haze last week.
In the Miami area particularly, there was
a notable increase in respiratory attacks
and hospitalization of victims.
In a protest to Federal officials and pol-
lution control directors of three states, Peter
Baijet, Dade pollution control chief, said
weather satellite photographs and other
studies had clearly established that smoke-
stack emissions from Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Tennessee had ridden air currents south-
ward, and a temperature inversion had
trapped the smog over Florida.
Baijet asked the three states and the U.S.
Environmental Protective Agency to act im-
mediately against offenders. He said under
the Federal anti-pollution act the county
could go into a U.S. court for injunctions
against out-of-state polluters, and threat-
ened to do so "if the administrative route
fails."
That the Environmental Protection Act
has sufficient teeth in it to assure clean air
for everyone was made plain Tuesday by the
action of U.S. District Court Judge John H.
Pratt in Washington. Judge Pratt, acting in
a suit brought by four ecology groups, ruled
that the Federal law requires not only that
states adopt pollution standards, but that.
they also prohibit high-quality air from de-
teriorating even to the level of the standards.
He ordered William D. Ruckelshaus, di-
rector of the EPA, not to approve statepol-
lution control standards unless they ex-
pressly contained the non-degradation ele-
ment. The four plaintiffs argued that
Congress, In enacting the law, held its pur-
pose was to protect and enhance air quality.
and Judge Pratt, agreeing, stated, "On the
Ruckelshaus responded that he doesn't
lieve he has the authority to require a
if Nudge Pratt is upheld the courts must
deft a the principle clearly enough for him
to w to appropriate regulations. He said the
court's decision would open up a new area
of standards for state anti-pollution plans.
including those nine states, Florida among
them, whose rules have received final Fed-
eral approval.
Judge Pratt's ruling, however, makes spe-
cial sense in light of Dade County's plight.
Even mild pollution at the point of emis-
sion, when combined in the upper air cur-
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June .14, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
haustible security adviser, Henry A. Kis-
singer, gave the American version of what
Mr. Nixon described as the "enormously im-
portant" strategic arms agreement signed
two hours earlier in the Kremlin.
LL
KISSINGER HUMOR
the sobering statistics of nuclear warfare and
grueling around-the-clock sessions of inten-
sive bargaining here, was on display in an
incongruous setting. Pressed by American
newsmen to supply hard details on the bal-
ance of American-Soviet nuclear weaponry.
Mr. Kissinger was saying: "The Soviet Union
has been building missiles at the rate of
something like 250 a year. If I get arrested
here for espionage, gentlemen, we will know
who is to blame."
To American newsmen based in Moscow,
it was astonishing to hear the principal stra-
tegic adviser to the American President dis-
cussing the level of both nation's nuclear
arsenals in a Moscow nightclub.
The nightclub revelation was anticipated
by no one, including Mr. Kissinger. The road
to it was long, tortuous, and constantly sub-
ject to the unpredictable interplay of inter-
national developments that reached from
Moscow and Washington to the mined har-
bors of North Vietnam.
It was learned here yestreday from Nixon
administration sources that one critical
breakthrough to an American-Soviet agree-
ment on strategic arms limitation was
reached during Mr. Kissinger's initially secret
Moscow talks with the Soviet Communist
party's general secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev,
April 20-24.
In their meeting, which centered both on
Vietnam and the scheduled summit talks,
Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev reached
basic agreement, it is said, on including a
limitation on nuclear missile-firing subma-
rines in a first-stage SALT agreement. The
accord was considered a breakthrough for
the United States, which pushed hard for
submarine limitations, although later new
problems were to arise over exactly how the
complex submarine freeze would be applied.
Simultaneously, the United States and the
'Soviet Union were sliding toward new ten-
sion over the American bomber attacks on
the Hanoi and Haiphong region prior to Mr.
Kissinger's arrival in Moscow. That slide to-
ward the risk of a great power confronta-
tion sharply accelerated with President
Nixon's May 8 decision to order the mining of
North Vietnam's harbors to try to cut the
Soviet Union's sea supply line to its allies
in Hanoi. American-Soviet developments
were heading in exactly opposite directions
at the same time: toward high prospects of
coexistence, and toward confrontation.
The total inside story of the tense days
Moscow May 22 Is still buried in secrecy. But
as portions of the tale emerge they reveal in-
summit from postponement or collapse over
President Nixon's mining order was that by
then the two nations were deeply involved in
negotiating subjects of superior mutual inter-
est-most especially SALT.
By the time Mr. Nixon arrived here last
Monday, it was expected on both sides that
a SALT agreement would be reached during
his visit because the basic political decisions
and most of the technical decisions has been
thrashed out during 30 months of negotiat-
ing, with meetings alternately in Vienna and
in Helsinki. But last-minute bargaining
hangups, it was conceded, might possibly
extend beyond the summit: So the pressure
was on for both sides.
On Tuesday, Mr. Kissinger said., the Presi-
dent and Mr. Brezhnev spent the afternoon
and evening on four unresolved SALT dis-
agreements, resolving all but two of them.
One group of remaining problems concerned
the terms for interchanging land missiles
with submarines, and another obstacle was
how to deal with older Soviet submarines.
STALEMATES BROKEN
By noon Friday, the stalemates were
broken, and the Russians were anxious to
announce the result Friday night to avoid
disrupting the summit schedule. Joint in-
structions were flashed to the U.S. and Soviet
negotiators in Helsinki, and the final agree-
ment was literally pieced together by Ameri-
can Ambassador Gerald C. Smith and chief
Soviet negotiator Vladimir S. Semyonov on
an American plane that brought them to
Moscow Friday evening.
But the task of publishing the agreement
and explaining it to the world was barely
beginning at that point, with a signing cere-
mony set for 11 p.m. in the Kremlin.
At 10:02 p.m., American newsmen travel-
ing with the President were assembled in the
U.S. Embassy for an on-the-record briefing
by Ambassador Smith and Mr. Kissinger, both
operating under heavy strain.
Mr. Smith called it "the freshest treaty
that I have ever talked about." In fact, it
was so fresh that no one in the room had a
copy to show to newsmen. That produced
tumult.
Criticism already was being raised in Con-
gress about the still-unseen treaty, especial-
ly charges that it gave lopsided submarine
advantages to the Soviet Union. Mr. Smith
and Mr. Kissinger firmly denied that, and
then-in an unusual sequence-began re-
vealing, in Moscow, intelligence information
to sustain the American assurances.
This session, and the one afterward in the
Intourist Hotel, produced on-the-record ex-
changes between American newsmen and of-
ficials never before heard in Moscow.
Reporter: "The basic story (about the
treaty) is going to go out of this session. I
think we have to get figures on submarines
and other estimates, otherwise the story will
go out in a garbled way ... Is this figure
of 42 Y-class submarines an accurate one
that they will be allowed to complete, and
we with 41?"
Mr. Smith: "I don't know about this figure
of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of
speculations about Soviet submarines, but
it is perfectly clear that under this agree-
ment, if the Soviets want to pay the price
of scrapping a substantial number of other
important strategic weapons systems, they
can build additional submarines."
NOT AS CONSTRAINED
Reporter: ". . . I think you are evading the
point .
Mr. Smith: "I am purposely evading the
point because that is an intelligence estimate
that I am not in a position to give out . , .
Mr. Kissinger: "ySincg I am not quite as
constrained or don't feel Ac crrA;nP. A4
assador Smith. Irnt ?,Pbv;td un a nro-
~fottnd atmosphere of mystery about the s -
Tna a issuTll S, gh teen I ou a
can
"i base number of Soviet submarines is
in dispute. It has been in dispute in our in-
telligence estimate exactly how much it is,
though our intelligence estimates are in the
range that was suggested."
Question "41 to 43?"
Mr. Kissinger: "I am not going to go be-
yond what I have said. It is in that general
range. The Soviet estimate of their program
is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course,
have the advantage that they know what it
is precisely." (Laughter).
The briefing was interrupted for the 11
p.m. signing ceremony. The frustrated news-
men watched the three official documents be-
ing signed on television. They still had no
copies of the "landmark" treaty.
Later, over 100 weary, deadline-stricken
U.S. reporters were assembled to meet with
II 5641
an equally tired Mr. Kissinger in the only
available hall, the Intourist Hotel nightclub.
As he proceeded through 45 minutes of ex-
hausting questioning, Mr. Kissinger, sleepless
most of the past furious week of diplomacy,
still displayed his whimsical aplomb and
command of detail on a subject that has pre-
occupied him for years before and since he
came to the White House,
NO SPRINKLING OF LEVITY
There was no sprinkling of levity to ease
tension, however, when Mr. Kissinger was
asked if "the United States got stuck with a
submarine deal." Replied Mr. Kissinger firmly
"that is an absurdity. It is a total absurdity.
It was the United States which insisted that
the submarines be included.... So this is
not something that the Soviets forced on us.
It is something we urged on the Soviets .
If this "important first step" in limiting
defensive and offensive nuclear missiles suc-
ceeds, said Mr. Kissinger, "the future will
record that both sides won."
(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
[Mr. ASHBROOK'S remarks will ap-
pear hereafter in the Extensions of
Remarks.]
NETWORK ANTI-NIXON BIAS
DOCUMENTED
(Mr. DEVINE asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. DEVINE: Mr. Speaker, the pub-
lication known as First Monday, spon-
sored by the Republican National Com-
mittee, revealed some very interesting
facts about the networks, as well as their
commentators.
Although First Monday is a political-
ly oriented journal, the revelations in the
June 5 issue should have much broader
exposure for the benefit of the public;
thus I am including the following:
SOVIET SUMMIT LEAVES MEDIA CHICKEN
LITTLES WITH EGG ON THEIR FACES
(By John Heywood)
The U.S.-Soviet summit meeting has
among other things, left the media Chicken
Littles with egg on their faces.
The President had barely faded from the
TV screen on May 8 when the network sneer-
leaders, hand-wringers and hand-shakers
went to work.
As a result of the President's just an-
nounced initiatives in Vietnam, steps taken
to protect American lives and prevent a Com-
munist take-over of South Vietnam, CBS's
Eric Sevareid stated flatly: "I would suspect
that the summit will not come off." His
CBS colleagues Marvin Kalb and Coiling-
wood voiced similar opinions. Collingwood
said "... certainly the Moscow summit meet-
ing, from which so much had been expected,
is now in jeopardy ..." Kalab declared: "One
casualty of the President's milting andblock-
ade may well be his upcoming summit to
Moscow. Those who began packing and
dreaming of caviar in Russia are beginning
to unpack and return to some dry cereal."
CHANCELLOR: SUMMIT IN JEOPARDY
NBC's John Chancellor said on May 8: "The
summit is in jeopardy today." Saying the
USSR "can't sit still for this," NBC White
House correspondent Richard Valeriani asked
"How can they receive him (the President)
now?"
Edmund Stevens of NBC observed: "The
President's announceemnt will be pretty hard
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -E ",)USE June 14, 1972
"'--r them (the Soviets) to swallow . . ,
it oracticaIly killed the prospects (of a sum-
mit) .". ABC's Ted Koppel said: "I don't
see how he (the President) can go."
Characterizing the President's actions as
a "threat to the peace of the world," inviting
"Soviet retaliation," the New York Times
ccii.torialized that "a big question mark hangs
over projected summit" and "there remains
no certainty that it will take place." Times
columnist Wicker branded the President a
"true emperor" and worried about the world
turning into an "ash."
Not to be out-done in their denunciation
of the President, the Washington Post opin-
ionized: "The Moscow summit is inthe bal-
ance, if it has not yet toppled over." In an-
other editorial wondering about the national
inierest and the self-respect of the Soviet
Union, the Post foresaw a possibility that
"the China glow," "the Moscow summit," and
"the prospects of reaching SALT, trade and
European agreements before next January"
might all go down the drain. Post columnist,
Joseph Kraft proclaimed the summit "in
hazard" and blasted the President for putting
up for grabs "the structure of world order,
and the lives of thousands of Vietanmese and
hundreds of Americans."
The fact of the matter is, as columnist
Joseph Alsopput-it: "The Soviet response to
the mining of Haiphong harbor was about
as tough and stiff as a length of sadly over-
cooked spaghetti." Those who made hysteri-
cal predictions conjuring up the wildest sort
of apocalypse performed a disservice to their
readers and viewers in that their ravings
contributed to an irrational dialog on a sub-
ject of the utmost sensitivity, a subject which
cried out for sensible discussion.
In short, much of the media's post-May 8
commentary on the President, Vietnam and
the summit gives reasons to question not the
judgment of the President, but rather the
perspicacity of those who so badly misjudged
him and subsequent events.
CBS NEWS ACCENTUATES NEGATIVE, DISTORTS
L''ACTS IN REPORTING VIETNAM ACTION
During the past several weeks since the
North Vietnamese Invasion of South Viet-
nam, the First Monday Media Monitor has
picked up a few Items of interest, Items
which show that when it comes to astigma-
tisms nothing sees things quite like the CBS
eye:
"DEFEAT" NOT A DEFEAT
()it the evening of May 6, 1972, CBS Eve-
ning News viewers were greeted by anchor-
man Roger Mudd telling them: "The South
Vietnamese suffered two more defeats today
trying to push back the Communists in the
Central Highlands." One of the "defeats"
cited by Mudd was at Firebase 42 where
enemy forces reportedly killed or wounded at
least 100 South Vietnamese in a three-hour
assault.
Meanwhile. on NBC, Don North was re-
porting from Firebase 42 and his more de-
tailed account showed that the battle wasn't
quite the defeat CBS had made it out to be.
Pointing out that the attackers were an
estimated company of North Vietnamese
sappers ("probably the most feared enemy
soldiers in Vietnam"), North reported that
the base had been destroyed but "if the
enemy mission had been to overrun and hold
this firebase, as they have so many others,
they failed," North said the base was not
overrun due to the fighting of the elite South
Vietnamese airborne unit that had "beaten
off" the attack by the North Vietnamese.
VOLUNTEER ARMY MISREPRESENTED
La the same May 6 CBS Evening News
broadcast, there was a film report from Rue,
South Vietnam, showing a volunteer army
marching through the streets. As the cam-
era focused on a close-up of a man who
looked like a 150-year-old Ho Chi Minh in a
helmet, CBS reporter David Henderson ::r;
Hue) intoned ominously:
"Led by a brass band playing patriotic
marching tunes, the local militia for the
ancient imperial capital of Hue paraded
through the streets today to show off their
strengths. The ragged army of volunteers will
be the first line of defense when the expected
enemy attack comes. The militia is made up
of men too old or too young to be in he
regular army, veterans--some of them ciis-
abled, local officials and teachers."
Henderson went on to point out that the
parade was throuph mostly empty streets
because most of the people left as "they
were not impressed with the militia to pro-
tect them. Local armies in this country have
a reputation for panicking and running away
when attacked."
NOT FIRST DEFENSE LINE
The fact of the matter is that the volu-i-
teer army shown on CBS News was not and
is not the "first line of defense" of the city
of Hue. As an Associated Press story re-
ported: "The government has provided 20,000
weapons for volunteers to defend the city
if the army cannot hold off the North Viet-
namese." The AP report labeled the local
militia "the last-ditch volunteer defenders
of Hue." Thus, by presenting this disorga-
nized group of volunteers as the primary
defenders of Hue, CBS gave their view-Ts
a much gloomier picture than the facts war-
ranted.
The final items involve CBS reporter Bob
Simon and things he said and didn't say.
Tn in April 29 report from Hue, Simon
was reporting on the Communist shelling
of Highway One and the thousands of refu-
gees on the road. Commenting at one point
on how the people had to learn for them-
selves that the road was being bombarded.
Simon said: "The Communists were not aim-
ing for civilians, at least one can't Imagine
why they would, there were more important
targets on the road ..."
COMMUNIST TERROR TACTIC
at one can't imagine is why Simon
would wonder why the Communists would
shell civilians. They have done so as a terror
tactic since the beginning of the Vietnam
war.
Just last week in a press conference, De-
fense Secretary Laird cited facts and figures
to show the Communists "complete lack of
regard" for civilians: Since the Communists
invaded six weeks ago, the South Vietnamese
city of An Loc. a two square mile area con-
centrated with a civilian population, has
been hit by 35,000 rounds of enemy artillery.
The four days before Quang Trl fell, the
Communists were putting into that civilian
population area a total of 3,000 rounds a day.
The last day before it fell, the city took
4,600 rounds. As Laird put it: "They sprayed
artillery into those civilian centers just as
if they were using a water hose."
Another Simon report, April 28, ended on-
a very moving note. As the camera pans,.
slowly showing the bodies of dead and in-?
jured men, women and children, South Viet-
namese refugees, strewn across a road after
their truck had hit a Communist mine, SI-
nion says:
NOTHING LEFT TO SAY?
??By evening government spokesmen :,se
saying another grand victory has been won
In Quang Tri province, the situation is once
again stabilized. But there will be more fight-
ing and more words. Words spoken by gen-
erals, journalists, politicians. But here on
Route One, it is difficult to imagine what
those words can be. There is nothing left to
say about this war. There is just nothing
left to say."
Nothing left for Bob Simon to say obvi-
ously. But Is there really nothing left to say
about a truckload of innocent refugees
killed and maimed by a Communist mine
put there by an enemy who throughout the
entire war in Vietnam has deliberately mur-
dered civilians as an Instrument of national
policy? Is there really nothing left to say
about an enemy who after years of aggression
continues to try and enslave his fe cvr
countrymen by force and violence? Is therg
nothing to be said about how 12 of Nortg)
Vietnam's 13 regular army divisions are, ngvr
engaged in aggression outside Its borders
against Laos, Cambodia and South Viet-
nam? Is there nothing to be said about North
Vietnam's violation of the 1954 Geneva Ac-
cords and the 1968 understandings which led
to a cessation of U.S. bombing? Is there
nothing to be said about North Vietnam's
truculence and refusal to negotiate in good
faith an end to the war?
Of course there is plenty to be said about;
the war. But the odds are you won't hear it,
or see it on CBS.
(Mr. GUDE asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
[Mr. GLIDE'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
THE ABSURDITY OF SOME
FEDERAL PROGRAMS
(Mr. SKUBITZ asked and was given
permission to extendhis remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-,
traneous matter.)
Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, it is not
often that I find myself unable to re-,
spond to inquiries from my constitu-
ents. Some 30 years on Capitol Hill, as
an aide to two Senators and as a sitting
Member of this honorable body, have,
given me the experience not to be sur-
prised by any inquiry, to expect almost
anything from a citizen and even more
and stranger things from Government,
and to cope with all of these.
But I confess that two recent letters
from constituents have me nonplussed.
I am chagrined at my own ignorance of
what brought the circumstances about,
when and how I, as one Congressman,
supported such a proposition, what to do
about it, and how to answer the plain-
tive comments of my constituents.
In the interest of brevity, I want to
read the two letters. I have, of course,
deleted the names of the writers and
other personal references.
-, KANS.,
May 2, 1972.
Hon. JOE SKUBTTz,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR JoE: Curiosity combined with anger
(perhaps you have heard from others before
now) prompt this letter to you.
and his wife , who live about
one and a half blocks east of me in
and who have lived on welfare all of their
life are building a new house and it's noth-
ing small. Of course, it can't be because
they have either thirteen or fourteen chil-
dren.
By the grape vine-they got an FHA loan
and are to repay It at forty something dol-
lars a month.
Those of us who work for a living, pay our
taxes, contribute to all drives, etc., can't even
consider such a thing as a new home-many
of us even have to study all circumstances
before we can even invest in a car. Yet we
have to support such as this and can't help
but wonder how such things are done.
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