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November 16, 2016
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April 24, 2000
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April 22, 1972
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00001R000100010043-9.pdf123.62 KB
' . 2 2 APR 1972 Ur/-\LrJ /05/23: CIA-RDP75-0000'f R ehien: Spy of the Century by E. H. Cook idge (Random House; $10) CPYRGHT CPYRG'H.T The'General Was a Spy by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling (Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; $8.95). Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, which formally stated the theme of Act I of the Cold War, a prologue was being written and played backstage in Europe by Americans and Germans. They had already identified Soviet Communism as Enemy Number One, not primarily because Russia had Eastern Europe in its-grip, but because Soviet Commu- nism was satanic and was set on con- quering the world. And as Hugh Trevor- Roper remarks in his introduction to* The General Was a Spy, "it is legitimate to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan." Beelzebub was willing. Both these spy stories describe how and why, with the collapse of the German armies, . the Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of Intelligence against the Soviet Union and underwrote his postwar espionage operations. Reinhard Gehlen was a professional, an experienced, single-minded anti- Communist with exceptional contacts. Those who hired him were not of the breed of Henry Stimson, who once said quaintly that gentlemen don't read other people's mail. They were what came to be called realists, and they dominated US foreign policy for the next quarter of a century. The US gov- ernment secretly financed General Geh- len to the amount of $200 million, and HdLLdUb1!11U LIPS on Eastern Europe an the USSR. Toward the end, it learne that much of the information was us Iess; and it learned something mom disturbing: the Gehlen organization ha been penetrated by the Soviets. By th early '60s, Washington's interest ha cooled. The General Was a Spy is drawn froth Nazi leaders. He waited until the end and then escaped to Bavaria, in early 1945, taking with him files he knew would interest theAmericans-to whom he intended to surrender at a price. He met with Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, senior intelligence officer-of the American Zone, who (report Hohne and Zolling) "while fighting was still in progress in France . . . had been pre- -pared to make use of Adolf Hitler's officers. in the cause of 'American strat- egy" and who "had a most excellent impression of him [Gehlenj at'once." Sibert promptly took up with General Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's proposal to set up a German intelligence service "financed by the US and directed against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith "okayed" the project, according to Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, who had forbidden fraternization with Germans. After lengthy interrogation in Germany, Gehlen was flown to Washington. series of articles written by two Germa Though friendship with Moscow was journalists for Der Spiegel. Gehlen: Sp hen. official US policy, Cookbridge of the Century is the product of a Euro oints out, Gehlen knew that "many pean educated British journalist who enerals, above all General George V. was himself an intelligence agent i trong, the chief of G-2 army intelli- World War II and was imprisoned b ence, and Sibert, were very far from the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer egarding the Soviet Union as a future more detailed and dispassionate ac Ily. In fact, a vastly different vision was count and focus more sharply on the aking place at the Third Army head- intricacies of the postwar intelligent uarters at Bad Toelz, near where he network inside Germany; they are less Gehlenj had buried his ... files. There revealing than Cookbridge, however, eneral Patton was dreaming of rearm- on the American involvement and o g a couple of Waffen SS divisions to the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen' corporate them into his Third Army associates. nd 'lead them 'against they Reds."' Gehlen served any master who served aid Patton: "We're going to have to his purpose, which was the undermin- ght them sooner or later. Why not now ing and the destruction of Communism, hale our army is intact and we can When it could no longer be doubted ick the Red army back into Russia? We that the German armies were defeated, c in do it with my Germans.... They Gehlen turned to the Werewolfs, the to those Red bastards." s young terrorists who were to carry on hat, of course, went way beyond after Hitler's collapse. The Werewolf a ything Gehlen's captors had in mind. project had been discussed at one of ey wanted information; Gehlen had Gehlen's last meetin s ith h g w t e Fuhrer, i So, says Cookbridge, they treated when he finally left his American super- whom Gehlen found "most h " c arming. h in with great courtesy, "wooing him visors and went to work directly for the They had also discussed Hitler's order . li e a wayward lass who can bring a Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells that "gramophone records with sound large dowry to offset the blemishes of us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden effects of combat noise and rolling tanks her past.... Gehlen bargained his way handshake in appreciation of the great . . . be distributed to front line com- i to the gray dawn of Cold War espio- work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of mands and played from dugouts as near n ge, conceding or compromising on 250,000 marks had been authorized. as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler s me points, using pressures near to Dulles added the not entirely seriously was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen .'bl ckmail to gain others. It says much meant condition that Gehlen should accepted this. order, as all the others, fo his shrewdness, self-assurance and use the money to buy a fine house knowing it was too late to stave off p rsistence that he was able to take on somewhere in the Bavarian mo t ins." For the iear FC9X in@6se ty ~08) ob Fqrk At RDP7 00 0 G!0 0QOQ43a~of top rank- AM no esert until there was in American experts." They agreed to mountains of paper and thousands of nothing to desert from. He played no co errly subsidize "an autonomous