LAST OF THE GIANTS INSIDE STORIES FROM TALKS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100020082-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: October 28, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

PHIL MDFLPIIIA, PA.
L3ULL4'Pi4)1oved For Releas
-640,783
its arise, on ,e ra
Intelligence. Ae-oncy, is?,:.~the
;`third in a series of selections
from "The Last of the
lGiants," a new 4-volume of
I memoirs of C. L. Sulzberger,
iforeign affairs columnist of
The New York Times.
FOIAb3b
2000/06/13: CIA-RDP75-00001
25X1 A9a
-
- -
+??,??.?, ??'~ -
.-.?y ,v. a.., u~a.aut:.n vl;iC _ Washing;ton, July 24 1958 v?,???.?v?.,_ --_ - , vi u+c
Special !o The Bulletin Dined with Allen Dulles and hidl he was 'Captures`, sent out by Eisenhower him-,
~ronto-on landing. self sought to try and make
and not for the British, who theory that no man should Kim was in charge of the
didn't know. ever be ordered to commit operation in Iran when we got.
o a o : suicide if captured and this rid of Mossadegii in.1933. That
Washington, July 23, 1958 was not in contracts with one was relatively- easy as we
Dined last night at Wisner's. -aeeints. were able to calculate that if
Allen Dulles boasted to me The CIA thought there was we could produce an open
.that CIA had been seeing do I more chance of a man's indi- fight between Mossadegh and
Gaulle regularly before he vidual nobility prompting him the Shah, the Shah would gain
came to power, through a to such an act if there were popular support. He did. The
French contact. He also said ? no such advance order. British had tried to get up to
they had an excellent agent ' Allen said Powers had done take the line of intervention
among the ultras who plotted nothingghwave hrongad a and hard tin Le probably many months earlier, but we
in AIgeria' NIaYlie, but it ,gold waited until the local situation ! ght - unlike Cuba.
seems indiscreet to say as
much. committing was -rib suicide either by. Kim was on a secret mis-
AppiOved For'Relee5L120XT0/d$1Ir13h?sCI1 RDP7s5nefh00,$,R0ioalGWf20 -5
needle, even had he wanted in 1935 with Bob Anderson,
to. First he was parachuted later Eisenhower's . secretary
out and secondly he was in a
.British from Romanian LU L1 Jews We -talked - about Gary in charge of government rely
in Palestine, were working for Powers. (U-2 spy shot dowriJ lions, but he is still linked
:Zaslani's network all th t" e over Russia). The CIA has a with the CIA.
the agents furnished by Zas- said the takco,f point was de-
i-n, /1.,+,,,' n..,,....,, nw:n.,.u% liha.ratnly rhanaarl nn thn man
-- he has been exiled to a con- ter to have the organization tan jet pilot t,cts. files -well filled with Kim's
,'sular position at the fever-hole known. ,
Under the laws, he must be name. +
.bf Paratiiaraibo, (then capital c+ 0 o
0 Dutch Gui_ana), the nearest Washington, October 12, 1960 paid as Iong as his contract Were Kim to be our am-
. post we have to Devil's Is- This `afternoon, saw Allen runs, even though in jail. (He bassador, Nasser would be to
land. Dulles in his CIA office. was jater freed in an ex- a position to blackmail him
Frank told me that he was On the wall a map shows the change,) and us by releasing such
astonished to discover, when route of the Soviet ICBMs to a c documents whenever con
he went to Romania duriri the Pacific from the general venient. l
the war, that practically all region of Kirtghlzstan. Allen Paris, April 19, 1961 .
? T.nnr?hrrl tnrlav with Kim i
forget this. M, who was sus- Dulles thinks the way. our with Powers' behavior but
pended'front the State Depart- intelligence is set up'is more,, doesn't like to say-so. Po .ers Kim told Bowles it would be
ment on a phony, trumlfed-up logical than Britain's. We had a specific, short-term con useless to send him to Cairo.
charge, was finally forced have in one organization what tract with CIA and was paid olutit od,e time Nasser sthe entlraglteam
back by pressure. they have in three and a half' between S''l5 hftl and $30,000 r
3 into I,agdad which grabbed all
But now - two years later It is better that way, and bet- year, about what a good, civil- the Bagdad Pact intelligence
. i The ' military information clear no nap torn wt 1~u,~n~,~
Wisner t o I d in e and plans of the Bagdad Pact mere than emerged, because he could not go to Iran be-
McCarthyism is, unfortunate- that are now available to Nas his previous "testimony" was cause the Russians had evi-
ly, by no means dead in the ser (and Russia?) are admit- always referred to. dente of what his activities
government, and'I should?not tell embarrassing, I after Dulles is unhappy had been ' in overthrowing
vlossade7h in 1953. Likewise,
y g I
B
N
tier and ~~Gates Lloyd. They polite and friendly with e,~ch , ever L There was a corollary mission
other, but Fulbright made no with ' the impression he Ben Gurion.
are in the same trade (CIA), bones about his intentions. to thought Powers should some- to
Frank said Allen Dulles (then I make Dulles squirm. Ile fci- how have knocked himself off. Chet Bowles (then under
head of the CIA) was ex- secre4ary of state) offered
CIA should have known more le said Powders had been
ire kilt upset by my column about the Iraqi coup in ad-Jrrai;a'.vashed or brain-condi- Kim these ambassador and
criticizing American propa tinnerl nrior to-the trial. It was posts; Tehran, Cairo, and
Washington, August 7, 1956 Senator hulbright. Tomorrow, - ease between Egypt and I_-
Dined and talked until the Fulbright's committee investi- f, Ethos' View pal. Anderson and Kim talked
early hours with Frank Wis- gates Dulles's CIA. They were T
less Dullo left me to Nasser hour after hour
tl