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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200940176-6
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A3892 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX May fj
ideas which flowed from the academic com-
munities of the Nation in the early days of
the Roosevelt Presidency. The social science
faculties of the universities doubtless miss
an interplay with the problem-oriented
workings of the Government in its day-to-
day affairs.
I am making a systematic endeavor, in my
position as chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, to promote a better two-
way communications channel between Gov-
ernment and the universities especially at
the policy level. The Committee on Foreign
Relations has contracts with some 20 educa-
tional institutions (including the Russian
Institute here at Columbia) in connection
`with an overall foreign policy review which
we expect to have completed by early next
year. This Is an attempt to spur the rate
at which ideas can flow directly from the
universities to the practicing politician.
The Committee on Foreign Relations has
also been promoting a series of informal ex-
changes between outstanding scholars in the
field of foreign affairs and Members of the
Senate. This is not an isolated phenomenon.
Similar activtles are underway in the House
of Representatives and in fields other than
foreign policy.
Perhaps out of this process and out of
literally thousands of discussion and study
groups throughout the country, there can be
developed the kind of agreement on our for-
eign policy objectives which is based on a
habit of the mind; the kind which will come
only after we, as people, have steeled our-
selves to look unpleasant facts in the face
and to react rationally instead of trying to
wish them away.
There is nothing inevitable about the sur-
vival of the United States. Survival is the
reward of civilizations which meet the re-
sponsibilities history thrusts upon them. .It
is the job of you, of me, of every American
to see to it that our country, in this age,
meets those reponsibilities.
Every generation has what Franklin Roose-
velt called a rendezvous with destiny. We
Americans in 1959 have to determine-and
soon-whether we are going to keep our
rendezvous.
I hope it is not later than we think.
I had the honor
group, which was
T
was
959
in Gary, Ind.
if, Ray, mayors, friends, and fellow
De rats all, this is my first trip back to
Gary 'Vince the eventful election of last
Man Imes since then I have been re-
minded dfthe day the people of Lake Coun-
ly that Sendlij. business has not permitted
me as much a in Indiana as I would like
to have. God ling, I shall tour the State
I am reminde so tonight of another
election campaign, a that took place 10
Well we remember th Harry S. Truman
stood almost alone at nomination in
Philadelphia. Among th w with him was
During the campaign t followed, we
heard everywhere that ever had desert-
ed Harry Truman and the De cratic Party.
Gone were the extreme copse tives of the
day. Gone were the extreme rals of the
thought of President Truman as light-
weight. And there were those of u ho in-
area floor of the Fort Wayne Coliseum.
"I don't give 'em hell," he declare
smile, hearty of handshake, pr ical as a
Missouri farm boy, wise as a d renown
statesman, political as only a r party man
can be-turned 75 years old. AlWbody in his
man's occupancy of White House that we
have forgotten wha eal leadership Is. One
the White House, ere was never any ques-
tion about who )ffs boss, where we were go-
where we sto
are learni how overwhelmingly often he
was right Harry Truman made decisions and
Wake land to see General MacArthur. Yet,
whe he general failed to heed orders from
consulted and prayed. Then he ordered the
bomb dropped. "I did not like the capon,"
Mr. Truman said. "But I had no , alms if,
in the long run, millions of livould be
isions was
.This capacity /a
brought to my miyesterday.
The day before I wahave break-
fast with Mr. Truompany of
several other Senaas Wednes-
day. Then, on Thun the Wash-
ington Post that nhower be-
fore leaving for a ghad decided
that the 22d amee Constitu-
tion was perhaps This is the
amendment barrin rom serving
Over and over esident Eisenhower has
told news conf ces that he believes the
amendment is. . Suddenly, and without
any apparent information, he decides it
I wonder he is just trying to disagree
with Presi t Truman.
Of cour Mr. Truman made other deci-
sions, bu elieve a few-mostly in the field
of forei affairs-are sufficient to recount
here to ht to prove the very greatness of
Is a doubt in anyone's mind here to.
nigh at the Truman doctrine, the Mar-
sha Ian and point 4 preserved the free
wo ? Without them, I fear, the Middle
ould be more Communist than it is.
The Truman doctrine rescued Greece and
to rebuild these strife-torn lands so that now
they are bulwarks guarding our interests in
the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Turkey, for instance, Is all that stands be-
tween Soviet Russia and the vast oil reserves
of the Middle East. Turkey, for instance,
has supplied proportionately more troops for
U.N. actions than we have.
Then there was Italy. Communists had
ached a pinnacle of success in that land.
through the ballot. But Harry Tru-
s bold action aided the gallant fighters
idly xectively e White House or Burning Tree
Coulub or Augusta Golf Club. He
ordee Berlin airlift. And thus we
stopfor the first time, Russian
From , all our allies and the neutrals
of the w were on notice that we had
principles d that we would, above all, stick
by these pr pies.
The Marsh plan has rebuilt Europe until
today the We rn countries of the continent
are proud pr that our system works. I
wish you all id see, as I have recently,
the vast differe between East and West in
Germany. And at has happened in West
Germany has ha ned everywhere In Eu-
Mr. Truman's po ; 4 program Is a bold,
Imaginative prograr4gito provide technical
know-how to backwWd- countries. It has
taken the stigma of c ialism from us. It
has helped countries themselves. It
has built new free coun s loyal to us and
our way of life-vital a s in a life and
You know and I know tha rry Truman's
most controversial deeisio ?,was Korea.
When he made it, Congress ed him to
the hilt. The vote was virtually unanimous.
But when the war dragged on, his critics
called it Truman's war.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A3891
but cast off the anchor of economic shib-
boleths that keep up tied to a rate of eco-
nomic growth of 2 to 3 percent a year. The
Rockefeller Brothers Fund report; last spring
put the attainable minimum rate of growth
at 5 percent a year.
I know that this figure was described 'as
visionary by the apostles of economic
standpattism. Yet I also recall that the
same adjective was used in 1941 when
Franklin Roosevelt called for the production
of 50,000 airplanes a year. The stand-
patters did not begrudge him what they felt
was just a propaganda gambit to frighten
the enemy. Yet they were certain among
themselves that such an actual production
goal was unattainable. As the event proved,
Roosevelt was guilty of a gross understate-
rnen.t of purpose. For we were producing
100,000 planes a year before long.
We could do much the same sort of thing
for our current needs, if we had the leader-
ship, that could make its own vision and its
own determination the source of the Na-
tion's vision and determination.
Why do we keep kidding ourselves that
we can get along with a little more when
we know very well that we need is great deal
more? Why do we congratulate ourselves
that the shortage of classrooms, far from
getting better, Is simply not getting worse?
Why do we think it is progress if we stand
still?
In my judgment, we give too little atten-
tion to the long-range questions of national
policy, and too much, relatively, to short-
term tactical problems. Since last summer,
our national attentions has been focused,
In turn, on the Middle East, the Far East,
and Europe. Jarred by a revolution in Iraq,
we sent troops to Lebanon and vowed that
we needed a long-term policy to bring peace
and stability to the Middle East.. Then we
withdrew the troops from Lebanon, and the
Middle East continues to fester like a
running sore. It Is without peace, without
stability, and without much of it policy on
our part.
Next we were confronted with the crisis
last fall over Quemoy and Matsu. During
that period, a few people pointed out that
what was really needed was not so much a
solution of the Quemoy-Matsu question,
but a long-term policy which would take
into account the realities in the Far East.
Then the Chinese Communists turned off
the heat as suddenly as they had turned it
on, and today, several months later, we are
no nearer a Far Eastern policy then we were
before.
At the moment, our attention is centered
on Berlin. I do not want to minimize the
grav.ty of the Berlin crisis. It could supply
the cause of world war III; just as the Mid-
dle East could have supplied it; and might
yet; just as Quemoy and Matsu could have
supplied it, and might yet,
The point is that we have to keep Ber-
lin in perspective. It is illustrative of many
of the long-term issues between us and the
Soviets; but in itself it is only a short-term
tactical move on their part.
I think the Berlin crisis will be settled.
I hope it will. be settled in a way which will
lead to a broader settlement of at least some
of the issues which divide Eastern and
Western Europe. But the most ideal set-
tlement one can imagine would still leave
us with many serious problems in other
parts of the world; and especially it would
leave us in our same position vis-a-vis the
Soviets in. the economic competition which
will determine whether or not the United
States remains a first-class power.
And after the Berlin crisis is settled, we
have to be prepared to meet another crisis
somewhere else. So long as we stay on the
defensive, it is folly to assume that the
Soviets will not continue to probe and
trust and keep us off balance.
Our Government ought to take to heart
the sage advice of Demosthenes: "As a gen-
eral marches at the head of his troops, so
ought-politicians-to march at the head of
affairs; insomuch that they ought not to
wait the event, to know what measures to
take, but the measures which they have
taken, ought to produce? the event."
It would be rather satisfying, just once,
we could get in the position where it is the
Soviets who are reacting to our initiatives
and not the other way around.
In order to get -Into such a position, a
number of things are necessary.
We need a State Department that is hos-
pitable to new suggestions instead of fore-
closing all inquiry with an automatic "no".
We need more concentrated Executive
energy instead of buckshot spray In the
White House.
We need more broad international vision
and less local politics in Congress.
We need a national resurgence of self-
awareness about where we stand in history.
But above all, we need to learn how to
talk to each other again--to reach a working
agreement on what our parramount national
interests really are.
THE ROLE OF THE SENATE
It is on this last point, which is central
to all the others, that I think the Senate
has its greatest role to play.
Despite the large measure of agreement on
many of our foreign policy actions in re-
cent years, we do not have in this country
a national agreement on what our role in
the world really is. We agree on the kind of
world we want to live in-we agree that we
want it to be peaceful, prosperous, secure,
and preferably one in which the Commu-
nists have gone away sorae place else. But
these are ideal objectives. The likelihood of
attaining all of them is as improbable as the
hope an elephant might; have of turning
itself into a ballet dancer. In any case, we
have only the foggiest notions of how even
to approach our prescription for an ideal
world.
Here again, it is necessary to distinguish
between short-term tactics and long-term
policy. We do have a deep-seated national
unity in regard to protecting our rights in
Berlin. But we do not have anything like
this same kind of unity in regard to meeting
the Soviet economic threat. Indeed, we are
not even united on the nature and magni-
tude of that threat.
The kind of national agreement on our
world role which I have :ln mind is akin to
the sort of natural consensus that has been
present in support of British foreign policy
for many generations. In many respects,
it is an unspoken agreement which in large
measure is taken for granted and which, in
turn,-takes a great deal for granted. It is
the kind of agreement which develops over
a period of years as a result of much public
thought and discussion. But it is also the
kind of agreement which creates a national
confidence and assurance out of which come
predictable public reactions to specific
situations.
It is the lack of this sort of agreement
that has made so much of our recent for-
eign policy both half-hearted and halfway.
If Americans were thoroughly convinced
that we were in the world to say and were
well-settled in our own mind as to how we
fit into the world, we would not go through
our annual soul-searching debates over for-
eign aid. We would not go through our
quadrennial wrangles over the reciprocal
trade program. We would not be trying to
fight change around the world. Instead, we
would be trying to influence the direction
the movement -for change takes and we
would be in tune with it. We would be ex-
ercising the world leadership role in which,
in large part, we are defaulting.
Our defaults in world leadership are not
exclusively faults of foreign policy. The
image which we present to the world is
based on many policies we think oiras do-
mestic in nature. This is one of our weak-
nesses. We have failed to relate domestic
policies to foreign policies.
For the same reason, we have sacrificed
the interests of the whole people to the
demands of the few-the few who prefer
high prices to full steel production, the few
who prefer uneconomic protective tariffs to
low prices, the few who oppose the use of
our resources for education, housing, high-
ways, and who, in effect, prefer that our
resources go into the high profit luxury
trades.
In short, our foreign policy has repre-
sented the lowest common denominator of
national agreement because too many people
and too many special Interests have been
given a practical veto over policy.
It Is precisely at this point that I think the
Congress as an educational institution-has
its greatest opportunity. That is the oppor-
tunity of increasing the understanding of
all Americans of the interaction of domestic
and foreign policy, so that the parochial in-
terests of the few may not thwart the Nation.
Not until we agree in the very marrow of
our bones that most of our domestic policies
have foreign policy aspects and most foreign
affairs affect our domestic life will we be
able to discharge our world responsibilities.
As has often been said, there are limits on
what the United States can do abroad-just
as there are limits to what the Senate can
do about the general conduct of foreign
policy.
Constitutionally, our role is essentially
negative. We can refuse to ratify treaties or
to pass legislation which the President wants.
We can attach reservations to treaties or we
can amend bills to bring them more nearly
in line with our own views. But these ac-
tions, too, are more likely to be effective if
they are negative than if they are positive.
We can, for example, keep the President from
spending money by denying appropriations.
But we cannot force the President to spend
more money, simply by increasing appropria-
tions. We can advise the President that he
ought to enter negotiations for a given
treaty. But we cannot force him to do so.
For both constitutional and practical rea-
sons, the Senate should not concern itself
obsessively with the day-to-day conduct of
foreign policy. I repeat that this is the pre-
rogative of the executive branch, and prop-
erly so. I also repeat that the Senate itself
,}s very poorly equipped to engage in admin-
istrative matters.
But over and beyond this, the Senate can,
I think, make a useful contribution through
the public discussion of long-range, basic
problems of foreign policy. I have touched
on some of these problems today, and I have
alluded briefly to others. In the months
ahead, I intend to explore these further.
I have said many times that we in the
United States operate under a most extraor-
dinarily difficult system of government.
Democracy may have reached its peak in our
country, buts it is an extremely complicated
piece of machinery to operate, it requires
of the people that extra measure of deter-
mination and ability often characteristic of
a few individuals in a community, but
seldom a characteristic of most of the people.
It requires especially education and self-
discipline.
I hope In the months ahead we may draw
on the wealth of information, the ideas and
Moll ablIfty that $.re to , ;,found ?in
ttitid-'tiYYYYYiifniatfessuc`h as' ~ Unfor-
tunate experiences during the past decade
have, I fear, seriously damaged good relations
between government and the academic world.
We have both suffered. Government misses
the bold, astringent, pragmatic, inventive
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A3890 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPND May f
not our own, which so many other peoples with the precision of an experiment con- time, we must deal with a set of variables
of the world have adopted for their own ducted in a laboratory. If the Soviet Union, that enter into the international politics
usage-to their own eventual sorrow. for example, is quite different in an indus- of the present hour, and promise to continue
Still, we have to deal with the world, not trial sense from what it was less than a dec- to do so for the next decade or two,
as we would like it to be, but as it is. And ade ago, the pressures of technological It seems to me that within this time span,
as much of the world is, the Soviets, by change have unleashed social and political the growing Soviet wealth can be used by the
parading themselves as the example of a pressures that the rulers of the Russian state Kremlin to meet the following objectives:
peasant people made over swiftly into a giant have not fully subdued. (1) reinvestment to make possible still fur-
industrial power, have become the merchants One thing, however, can be said in this ther expansion; (2) Increased living stand-
of hope. We, on our part, have been made general connection. If the Soviet Union ards; (3) greater arms production; (4) more
out to seem the defenders of hopelessness, did not start the worldwide technological loans and other investments in underdevel-
and the arch beneficiaries of a status quo revolution, any more than it started the . aped countries generally and perhaps also in
outstripped by history. other two revolutions I have mentioned, It Communist China and the East European
What can we do about all this? It does is exploiting all three to its advantage in satellites; (5) trade wars with the West,
not lie within our power to prevent the Com- a degree to which we are not. And the We do not know, of course, in what pro-
munists from peddling hope; but it does lie reason, I suspect, is that they know more portion these purposes will be served. We
within our own power to prevent ourselves clearly what they want to do and work harder do know that the Soviets can switch from
from representing despair. at it. one purpose an another as It suits their
I turn now briefly to the second world Consider, for example, our relative per- convenience. Khrushchev has bluntly and
force I mentioned-the demand for improved formance in the matter of economic growth. forthrightly declared economic war on us.
living standards. The figures are not so spectacular as the We discount at our peril his seriousness of
The material wealth of this world is poorly sputniks and missiles, but they are more purpose and his ability to carry it out.
distributed, to say the least. The United alarming. Indeed, In my judgment one- of the most
States, with 7 percent of the world's popula- Brie$y, even when we discount the U.S. difficult problems we face is how to meet
tion, produces 50 percent of the world's recession year of 1958, Soviet Industrial Soviet trade practices. For in a growing line
wealth. At the other end of the scale, India, growth during the 1950's has been in ex- of products, the Soviets are reaching a point
Pakistan, and Indonesia-to give but three cess of 21/2 times the American growth rate- where they can disrupt world markets and
examples-have more than 20 percent of the 9.5 percent a year as against 3.6 percent. world trade patterns almost at will. This
world's population, yet produce only 7 per- And the rate in Communist China is even has happened already with tin, aluminum,
cent of its wealth. greater than in the Soviet Union. I recognize and benzene. And the list is growing, while
The implications this has for us, as the the need for a qualification-that the per- the practice itself finds the decentralized,
greatest of all creditor nations, are plain centages are computed from vastly different private trading economies of the West poorly
enough, if only we would stop snoring with base points of reference. Still, despite this equipped to deal with this kind of compe-
our eyes open. Our creditor position de- qualification, and despite the element of tition from the Soviet Union.
mands that we give our debtors a chance to spread-eagle oratory in Khrushchev's prom- F ankl 1 do not know how to meet Sglet
buy in our markets by selling their own ise that the Soviet Union will outstrip the eoono ~f~ "ffut- .alo Riitjil5 Hiatt e
pr(Wucts here more readily. Our position United States per capita production by 1970, ~~=eriee tC#think about the prob-
also demands that we export more capital to the threat is real enough. Whether it ma- lem in a systematic way. I also know how
underdeveloped countries so that they can terializes in 1970 or later, it will surely come not to meet the Soviet economic challenge.
increase their own industrial production to unless the disparity in present trends of I know that it cannot be met so long as we
our mutual advantage. For it is a demon- growth is changed. make a balanced budget the sole and over-
strable fact that the greatest volume of for- To be sure, the theoreticians in the U.S. riding aim of Government policy--as if Gov-
eign trade from which everyone stands to Chamber of Commerce would have a rough ernment itself were just a bookkeeping op-
gain is carried on not between industrial and time of it. For they have taught us that eration. If that is all there is to it, then we
nonindustrial nations: It is carried on with- free enterprise is inherently and absolutely would be well advised to abolish the Presi-
in the community of industrial nations-be- more productive than any other system; and dency, the Congress, and the courts, and
tween the United States and Canada, the moreover, that democracy and capitalism install some certified public accountants in
United States and Great Britain, the Euro- are one and the same thing. They would their place.
therefore be hard pressed to explain how it
peon Common io, and. on. I also know that Soviet economic warfare
We are in for r serious trouble if we think was that communism, based on State capital, cannot be met so long as it is our national
that we are at liberty to get richer while outdistanced us in the production of things. policy t pay a one-fifth higher for
I also recognize that if we were no longer price
most of the rest of the world gets poorer. the richest nation in the world, we might generators to be used in an Arkansas dam,
In a poker game played with stacked cards, suffer in the eyes of the underdeveloped na- merely to give the order to a Philadelphia
and where all the chips come to be con- tions-who would then look to communism firm instead of to one in England. If Ameri-
centrated in relatively few hands, the other and not to us as having the more promising can business cannot compete even with Brit-
players will be tempted to do one of three ish business, which works in approximately
things: to change the rules, to quit, or to method of economic advancement. Yet the
shoot from the hip. Leaving the econom_cs Soviet growth has already been such as to the same kind of economic framework, how impress many underdeveloped countries with can we ever expect to compete with Rus-
of the matter out of account, the political this general idea. sign buisness, which operates as a political
imperatives of the universal demand for a What ought to count is not wealth per arm of the state?
rising standard of living are such that, un- se, but what one does with it. Indeed, If The question as to how we allocate our
less we act sensibly to help meet it, the So- we could be sure that the increased Russian resources is certainly as important, and in
viets will appropriate that demand for their production would be applied in full to an many respects, more important than the
own purposes, in the same way that they increase in Russian living standards, we rate of our economic growth. What counts
have captured and distorted nationalism. ought to welcome the development. Paul is the uses to which the growth is put.
The technological revolution is the third Henri-Spaak, the wise and distinguished sec- Leaving the question of quality to one side,
force within whose context we must give retary general- of NATO, has said that "a we ought to be sobered by one single repre-
form and focus to our foreign policy. My rich Communist is probably less to be feared sentative fact. It is that the Soviet Union
comments on this score, like those which than a poor Communist." We might even devotes 8 percent of its gross national prod-
have come before, will have the character of look forward to the day when the Soviets uct to education, while the United States
truisms. Yet they are worth reemphasis become as snug and complacent as we have devotes but 3 to 4 percent. Yet there is in
just the same. become. In fact, when I lie in bed at night the United States an enormous margin for
Technology works in chain reactions, For wondering what I can do to help the cause luxury that could be drawn upon for pur-
example, the. improvement in transportation of peace in the world, my fancy starts to poses that are in the interest of the whole
and communication was in part responsible play with this idea that we should use some Nation, without depriving anyone of what
for the growth of nationalism. From the $20 billion of our $40 odd billion defense would still remain the highest material
same cause, the poor nations of the world budget on the purchase of television sets, standard of life in the world.
could better see how the rich nations lived. hi-fi phonographs, ankle-deep carpets, block- The question we have to decide is a ques-
This in turn spurred the demands of the long automobiles-and give the lot of these . tion of priorities. It is not-or need not
poor for economic development-even as annually to the Russian people as a free be-difficult to resolve. For it does not call
those same technological advances made it gift. The argument can be rather per- for a choice between guns and butter, or
feasible to meet the demand. And so on suasively made that something of the sort between electronic computers and television
and on-up to the final step in the chain will eventually happen through the growth, sets. It may call-for a choice between bet-
reaction, namely, the creation of military of the Soviet Union's own economy. ter schools and teachers, or more country
weapons. that can destroy everything. But the fanciful elements to one side, club memberships. But this could hardly
Now the key point in all this is, that tech- what worries me about this argument is the be called an austerity program. Moreover,
nology is becoming `progressively interns- emphasis on "eventually". Eventually can the whole of the educational and other pro-
tionalized. No nation now has a clear mo- be a long time; and even then we would still grams that we need for national strength-
nopoly. over its secret. Nor can any nation be faced with the growing and ominous here at home and abroad-would bear all
fully control its social and political effects, power of Communist China. In the mean- the more lightly on the Nation if we could
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MAY 11 195'9
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - AP
seem
Our Responsibilities in World Affairs-
Address by Senator Fulhright
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or..
HON. JOHN SPARKMAN
OF ALABAMA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May :t1, 1959
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, on
the evening of May 7? 1959, the very
learned and distinguished chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIG13T1,
delivered the Gabriel Silver lecture on
international understanding at Colum-
bia University in New York. His subject
was "Our Responsibilities in World Af-
fairs." It was a fine presentation and
thought provoking. I ask unanimous
consent, therefore, that it be printed in
the Appendix of the RECORD:
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS
(Remarks of Senator J. W. FuLBRIGIST, chair-
man, Senate committee on Foreign Rela-
tions; Gabriel Silver Lecture on Interna-
tional Understanding, Columbia Univer-
sity, May 7, 1959)
In the Constitutional Convention, when
it was proposed that each session be opened
with prayer, Alexander Hamilton jumped
to his feet with an objection. "I am op-
posed on principle," he said, "to calling oil
any foreign power for help."'
As a new chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, this narrow
view from a Founding Father is not at all
to my liking. On the contrary, I seek help
from various sources-and especially from
the "foreign power" Alexander Hamilton
tried to keep outside the 3-mile limit.
I have come to do this for many reasons.
In the first place, I have had pointed re-
minders that a chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee is also a Senator
from a single State-a State whose people
have legitimate local interests which demand
his attention in the Congress. If he fails
to speak the local voice-while trying at the
same time to serve the national interest-it
seems safe to make one prediction about his
future. The people of his State will see that
he bas time to write his memoirs, following
the ;next election.
In the second place-and this is much
more important where foreign affairs are
concerned-the chairman and his committee
colleagues often find themselves in a consti-
tutional no man's land. We want to do our
best to contribute to the energy, the
strength of will, and the clarity of purpose
which the effective conduct of our external
relations demands. But the question con-
stantly is: How can we make this contri-
bution when the constitutional boundary
line between the Senate and the Executive
bi this general area is so uncertain?
,,In times past, the rivalry between the
Senate and the Executive, over the conduct
of foreign affairs, found both too weak to
advance, too strong to surrender-and may I
add, too proud to ask for mercy. We want
to avoid such a result today. But the prac-
tice of the matter is shot through with
problems.
For example, if my committee colleagues
and I tried to detail a solution to any crisis
of the moment in our foreign affairs, the im-
mediate effect would be an increase in the
post office deficit. For there would follow a
flood of mail charging its with a dangerous
usurpation of the Executive's constitutional
responsibility for the conduct of foreign re-
lations. On the Other hand, if we tried
to lay down guidelines for the longer range
problems of foreign policy, the same letter-
writers would inform us that we have a spe-
-cial taste for the fuzzy and impractical,
when America's real need is for specific solu-
tions to the latest problem in the headlines.
Meanwhile, whether we deal with the
problems of the here and the now, or with
those of the day after tomorrow, my com-
mittee colleagues-indeed all the Members
of the Senate-face a further complication.
The professionally trained personnel, and
the complex communication network that is
involved in formulating and executing for-
eign policy, are not, and should not be, un-
der the direct control of the Senate. They
are, and should remain, under the direct
control of the President-if for no other
purpose than to read and answer Mr. Kru-
shch.ev's latest note, but it is a complex sys-
tem.
TO all this, there is a more immediate rea-
son why I feel the need of guidance from
above. It is, quite simply, that you have
asked inc to speak this evening about "Our
Responsibilities in World Affairs." The dan-
ger here takes the form of an analogy to a
German professor who spent his life writing
a three-volume treatise on the "Secret of
Hegel." When the work was finally pub-
lished, the reviewer observed that the "au-
thor should be congratulated for having
written so much about the secret of Hegel
yet managing just the same to keep the
secret to himself."
Still, despite the danger that you will ap-
ply that same judgment to what I have to
say, let me come to my theme by putting
three questions. First, what are the issues
of foreign policy which now face the. Na-
tion? Second, among those issues, which
are as transient as the wind, and which are
like the deep current of a, river? And third,
what is the proper role of the Senate with
respect to those issues? Our responsibility
in world affairs is to understand these three
Issues and then to take appropriate, effec-
tive action to meet them.
The issues of foreign policy that we face
are born of three revolutions abroad in the
world. One is the revolution of nationalism.
The second revolution is in the will for im-
proved living conditions. And the third is
the technological revolution. Each of these
has an inner connection with the other. All
share the common word "revolution." All
defy the attempt of any single nation to
exercise a full control over the course the
three revolutions take. All three would
have occurred if Karl Marx and Joseph
Stalin had never been born. And perhaps
most ominous of all, few Americans seem
yet to have grasped the :rull significance of
these three worldwide revolutions.
Let me take them up in order.
First, nationalism: We :must disabuse our-
selves of the notion that the American War
of Independence had anything in common
with the spirit of nationalism that Is now
sweeping through the newly independent
countries and through most colonial areas.
Our own case was one where American Eng-
lishmen had demanded English rights from
British Englishmen-including the right to
be represented in the British Parliament.
Indeed, had Benjamin Franklin's plan for
representation been accepted by King George
III, with a little stretch of the imagination
one can conceive of a sequel, admirably
suited to be scenario material for Hollywood.
Specifically, in the year 1860, the popula-
tion of America for the first time exceeded
that of Great Britain. Hence the American
members of the English Parliament would
have been in the majority and would
promptly have voted to move the English
Crown to this country. Whereupon there
would have followed the spectacle of Queen
Victoria sailing up the Potomac River, to be
greeted at the Georgetown landing by her
new Prime Minister-Abraham Lincoln.
Unfortunately for Hollywood, Benjamin
Franklin's plan was rejected and we had our
revolution. But unlike the general case
nowadays in nationalist revolutions, the ra-
cial factor did not enter into the picture.
The social factor did not enter either, since
the chief revolutionaries in America were
card-carrying English Whig gentlemen of
the highest pedigree. Nor, for that matter,
was the technological element a motive for
revolution. The greater part of England,
like the greater part of the United States,
still lived off a barnyard economy in rural
isolation.
Today, by marked contrast, the national
revolutions going on all around us repre-
sent, only in part, a desire for political in-
dependence for its own sake. They also ex-
press a desire to erase the memory of racial
subservience; a desire to be the author of
one's own history, and a desire Ito stand i$$ the
sun with a distinctive national personality.
For the latter reason, it is closely related to
the demand for better living conditions, for
the prestige and the respectability associated
with industrialization and material pros-
perity.
In the maturity of our own industrial
civilization, it is easy enough for us to ser-
monize the newly independent nation on the
theme that the producer, net production,
should be the object of social effort; that the
human soul, and not the human body, should
be the paramount good one ought to seek.
But we can scarcely blame these people if,
to our sermonizing, they answer: "It is true
enough that man does not live by bread
alone; but at least he lives if he has bread."
Nor can we blame them if they go on to add:
"Unless we can get bread-producing ma-
chines from the West, then we will get them
from the Communist bloc, and, if necessary,
in the Communist manner."
Meanwhile, the daily spectacle unfolding
before our eyes is the way the Soviet Union
has identified itself in many countries with
the cause of nationalism while we are Identi-
fied with that of imperialism. Why should
this be so, in defiance of all logic and the
history of our actual interests? The reason,
I suspect, is that the Soviet :Foreign Office
and the Politburo are better at simple arith-
metic than are the American State Depart-
ment and the National Security Council. For
the Soviets and their local Communist agents
make it appear that they are on the side of
the people; whereas we make It appear that
we are on the side of the oligarchs who rule
the people. -Too often we find our friends
and allies liquidated as a new group takes
over.
To be sure, both we and the Soviets use the
same words-peace, freedom, democracy,
self-government, social justice, and indepen-
dence. And I suppose that we aught to take
a certain pride in the fact that these words,
first taught in the West, express such uni-
versal hopes that the Soviets have seized
upon them for their own purposes. Yet it
Is Infuriating to see that in the Russian
translation and application, these words are
twisted Into a caricature of the meaning we
give them. It Is all the more frustrating to
observe that it Is the Russian version, and
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