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January 14, 1966
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January 14, 1966 Approved For ReleaseCIA-RDP75-00149RO006002400'16-6` CONGRESSIONAL tECO1 t - SENATE physics', and electronics to enable themi;o liye au adventurous efciting-and wondrous life, with 'Will m1te~d o ortunlty for high= paid Income THE PENIIOVSSY PAPERS Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, a famous American who has long been intimately associated with efforts to combat the encroachments of com- munism 1 i the United States has said that today's headlines remind us there has been no basic change in Communist imperialism and that the danger which world communism presents to the free nations has not abated, but, if anything, has increased. And he has rhetorically stated the question, "Why is our free society inher- ently superior to communism?" and an- swered by pointing out that, among other vital principles, in our American society freedom of speech, the press, and as- sembly are protected not only in con- stitutional guarantees but in practice and that media of mass communication are free to praise or criticize without fear of Government control or governmental retaliation. By contrast, under commu- nism, freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, are permitted only to the ex- tent that they support official policy, and media of mass communication-such as newspapers, magazines, radio, and television-are strictly controlled by the government. Late in 1965, an event occurred in So- viet Russia which is a classic example of this cardinal Communist tenet-that freedom of the press is permitted only to the extent that it supports that nation's official policy and the privilege of serving as a member of the press in the U.S.S.R. is strictly controlled by that government. Any so-called violation-failure to sup- port or cater to the party line-brings swift retaliation. On November 25, 1965, the Soviet Union ordered the closing of the Mos- cow Bureau of the Washington, D.C., Post and the expulsion of that newspa- per's correspondent, Mr. Stephen S. Ros- enfeld, because of the publication by the Washington Post of portions of the Pen- kovsky papers. It is noteworthy that a number of other newspapers have pub- lished or reported in detail on the con- tests of those papers. Believing firmly in the right of freedom of speech for all mankind, the right of the press, radio, and television to freely and objectively report news and facts to those interested in learning the facts, and the right of responsible men to ex- press their views and opinions openly and without fear of retaliation, I wish to express strong personal censure of the punitive action by the U.S.S.R. against the free American press. I wiskj. to point out that the Post, In publishing he Penkovsky papers ex- cerpts, reported fairly" critiques which questioned the authenticity of the pa- pers, oe portions thereof, so that the reading public might' have access to ava f4le facts and expressions of views both in support of and in opposition to the cQnl ents pf the Tapers Indeed, as No 4-'11 243 recently as this past Sunday, January 9, kovsky's true function and the importance the Parade-magazine section-of the of his action to the West. Washington Post carried statements Penkovsky's work as deputy chief of the which critically appraised the contents committee's foreign department was merely a cover for his function as a general staff of these papers. Intelligence officer. And as a former aide I shall not attempt to evaluate the and confidant of the chief marshal of Soviet contents of the Penkovsky papers; how- tactical missile forces, Marshal Sergei Varent- ever, I do wish strongly to affirm the sov, Penkovsky was privy to the most inti right of American newspapers ko pub- mate details of high Russian military and lish openly and in an unbiased manner political planning. material which throws light on the polit- For the next 16 months, Penkovsky con- ical structure of one of the world's ducted the most amazing s campaign of espionage in mod ern leha ern history. ory. great powers, believing that wisdom in He rocked Nikita Khrushchev's policy to its conduct of our national affairs arises foundations. For 1961 and 1962, the 2 years from knowledge of governments, whether in which Penkovsky worked for British and free or totalitarian in nature. American intelligence, marked the freezing I do not personally always agree with Point of the cold war. editorial policies of various newspapers, In June, 1961, Khrushchev risked war with but as a citizen of a free nation, I am his decision to force an Allied retreat in Ber- pr0ud to affirm that right of disagree- lin. In August, he put up the Berlin Wall. In September, 1961, he resumed nuclear test- ment and the right to express it openly. ing, breaking agreements with the United I shall continue to defend to the fullest States. His missile buildup of 1962 was cli- extent in my power the right of the maxed in the Cuban confrontation with the American press to report fairly, objet- United States, when Krushchev almost threw tively, and openly that which is news- the world into total war. worthy. Throughout this time, Penkovsky furn- I desire to encourage those who direct fished the West with high-priority informa- tion media of communications to con- tion on Soviet missile strength, Soviet nuclear capabilities and the Soviet plans for tinue to provide such material as reveals a localized shooting war in Germany. Ulti- the world behind the Iron Curtain to mately, he was a key factor in our ability to the citizenry of the United States so identify so swiftly the configurations of that judgments. may be openly derived Soviet missile installations on Cuban soil. based on the widest range of fact and He also prepared American intelligence for opinion which can be made available. Khrushchev's decision to use them. I believe that the entire episode of the THREE LONDON VISITS publication of portions of the Penkovsky Three times Penkovsky made his way to papers by the Washington Post, and the London and Paris, ironically using his confi- retaliatory action by the Soviet Russian dential Soviet intelligence assignments as a Government, deserves national review. cover for his real espionage work with Ameri- . Therefore, I ask unanimous consent backt t can to and British Moscow officers to o get Three further times information to have printed in the RECORD the col- for the West. In October, 1962 he was finally lections which I have amassed of Wash- detected and arrested by the Soviet secret ington Post articles, editorials thereon, police, the State Security. and pertinent material from other How badly he hurt Moscow's plans for an sources such as the New York Times. aggressive breakthrough against the West in There being no objection, the material those two critical years can be gathered from was ordered to be printed in the REC- the public aftermath of his arrest; one chief marshal of the Soviet Union demoted and ORD, as follows: disgraced; the chief of Soviet military intel- [From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965] ligence, Gen. Ivan Serov (the "Hangman of WHEN WEST HAD A MAN IN KREMLIN-A RED Hungary" in 1956) demoted; some 300 Soviet WAR HERO PREPARED UNITED STATES FOR ITS, intelligence officers recalled to Moscow from CONFRONTATION WITH MR. K. ON CUBAN their foreign posts. MISSILES Penkovsky had exposed them all. Soviet (By Frank Gibney) military intelligence has not yet recovered On April 12, 1961, at an unobstrusive meet- from the blow. ing in Moscow, a high Russian official quietly The recapitulation of matters covered in handed a double-wrapped, double-sealed en- Penkovsky's Soviet indictment suggests the velope to an English acquaintance. He extent of his intelligence achievement: "Top asked that it be given to "interested parties" secret information; documents of great in the West. value; of an economic, political and military Later that same month, the Russian said, nature; Soviet space secrets; material on he would himself be in London. He wanted Soviet troops in the German Democratic Re- to talk to people in the West "to tell them public; new Soviet war material; command what conditions in the Soviet Union are personnel of the antiaircraft defenses; really like." The time was short, he said, (material on) atomic energy, rocket tech- and it was a critical time. nology and the exploratoin of outer space." With this action, Col. Oleg Penkovsky, The trial of Colonel Penkovsky and his Russian war hero, senior officer in Soviet British contact, Greville Wynne, began in military intelligence, graduate of the Staff Moscow May 7, 1963, and lasted 4 days. It College and the Missile Academy, friend and was carefully organized by the Soviet au- confidant of Soviet marshals and generals, thorities. began his secret career as a volunteer spy for Penkovsky and Wynne had been under the West. Interrogation in Lubianka Prison for 6 A SCIENTIFIC COVER months preceding it. Both prisoners ad- Greville Wynne, the British business- mitted their "guilt." Penkovsky apparently man to whom Penkovsky entrusted his mes- did so in an effort to secure decent treatment sage, knew Penkovsky only in his capacity for his family. as an official of the Soviet State Committee Wynne was sentenced to a long prison term for Coordination of Scientific Research, the but was released in 1964 in exchange for the huge subministry in charge of all Soviet Soviet spy Konon Molody, who had been business and technical exchanges with for- arrested by the British under the name of eigners. He had" then little Idea of Pen- Gordon Lonsdale. Penkovsky was sentenced Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 pr __ 1 0O600,240Oi s: -01- 4 CONG SIONA R : QR -SENATE January 14, 1966 R, {teeth?. Soviet authorities said lie:was,shot, Mo cow in my apartment and write down my senior officers, members of the Central Com- ee countries. The Pe- nkovsky Papers, ex- useihem_for the truth they say. Khrushchev's is a government of adven- g ez ssse seol n_ cy omcer. told me that my father saw-me for the first pared to begin a war if circumstances turn } a papers have never before appeared any.. favorable to him. This he must not be per- ,w ere. They will be published in book form and last time when I was only 4 months old. mitted to do. My father was a lieutenant in the white by outileday November 19. In the past, our general staff and our he,Penkc k _ papers comprise a strange, army. I learned this only recently. My 5 father fought against the Soviets. I still do foreign representatives condemned the con. . RT-Lestitrp document-partly a day by day ac- not think they know the whole truth about cept of surprise attack such as Hitler used. Count of Penkovsky's personal struggle gle him. If the state security forces had known Now they have come around to the viewpoint against the Soviet regime; partly a running that there is great advantage to the side fever chart of Klirushchev's drive for aggres- all along that he was in the white army which makes a sudden. missive attack first. alo in Berlin and Cuba. They were written (although I was only a few months old at From what I have learned and what I at eat personal risk while Penkovsky was the time), every door would have been closed ~' have heard, I know now that the leaders of livirng his double life as a secret agent for to me: for an officer's career, for membership our Soviet state are the willing provocateurs th West. in the party and especially for the inteili- of an atomic war. At one time or another g QVrgtg th1 m bycausehe was not contept gen5e'service. they may lose their heads entirely and start me e1y with transmitting his intelligence re- Yet -I-began my life as a believer in the an atomic war, See what Khrushchev is po ts. Colonel ?enkovsky was a single- Soviet system. I was brought up in a Soviet doing over Berlin? ml ded zealot who hated the Khrushchev environment said - from the very first, when In Moscow, I have lived a nuclear night- ie me because he feared that Khrushchev 1- wend at-18 to the Second Kiev Artillery mare. I know the extent of their prepara- W Ieading the world into a nuclear war. School, I wanted to be a commander in the tions. I know the poison of the new mill- 'lie wanted ordinary .people in the West, not Soviet Army. tary doctrine as outlined in the top-secret ust Intelligence officers, to hear his story and During the war, I commanded a battalion. special collection-the plan to strike first at is reasons for breaking with a lifetime of By the end of the war, H was a lieutenant any cost. service to the Soviet regime. colonel. After one action, Marshal Konev I know the design of the new missiles and " * a real sense of the word, for the brief recommended me for the Military Staff their warheads. I am decribing them to my I'd months in which he worked, Oleg Pen- College. friends in the West. Imagine the horror of 111 sky was our man in the -kremlin. With- In 1945, I. began the 3-year course at the a 50-megaton bomb with an explosive force Abhis guidance and information, Washing- Frunze Military Academy and in 1918 I almost twice what one expects. The people to could not have acted In either Berlin pinned on my chest the diamond-shaped of Moscow congratulated themselves on this. ,or tuba with the sureness it did. insigna of a Frunze graduate. At the end my by reading Penkovsky can Americans of 1949, I was transferred to the Military USING THE PEACELOVERS ,fin My understand the pressures and tensions Diplomatic Academy, the training school for The Soviet leaders know that the Western th t were driving the Soviet leadership to 114 war in 1961 and 1962, 2 years when the Cold war almost became hot. nage and completed 3-year course in the _.. - .--' language, which I mastered, I be- IFrom the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965] lieve, fairly well. In September 1958, after serving as assistant military attache in PVp Y THE S-THE C PEKO NHoV s#iY PP ANAPERS RED HIS Turkey, I was sent to the DzerbhinskY Mill- COLORS-T ($y Oleg Penkovsky) tary Engineering Academy to attend a 9-mgnth-acade.mir,Course for the study of y name is bleg Vladirnirovich Penkovsky. missile weapons I was born April 23, 1919, In the Caucasus, in the city of Ordzhonikidze (formerly Vladi- DEEDS DELIED WORDS It was during the struggles kagkaz),In the family of a salaried worker; g of World 'War Russian by nationality, by profession an II that I first became convinced that it was {offer o f military intelligence with the rank not the Communist Party which moved and of olonel. inspired us all to walk the fighting road from have received higher education. I have Stalingrad to Berlin. There was something 'begn a member of the Communist Party of else behind us: Russia. the Soviet Union since March 1910 , I am Even more than the war itself, my eyes m Tied; as dependents I have my wife, one were opened by ray work with the higher da ghter and my mother. authorities and general officers of the Soviet have never been on trial for criminal or Army. I happened to marry a general's political offense. I have been awarded 13 daughter and quickly found myself in a government decorations (5' orders and society of the Soviet upper class. I was one a I,.edals). I am a resident of the city of of the privileged. M caw and live on Marxim Gorky Embank- But I soon realized that their praise of iiieit, House No. 36, Apartment 59. the party and communism was only in words. 'f amii beginning the notes that follow to ex- In their private lives, they lie deceive western amine for peace Go rnerr own aa- vantage. It is necessary somehow to drain the en- ergy and to divert the great material and living strength of the Soviet Union to peace- ful purposes-not to bring about a great world conflict. I think it is necessary to have meetings secretly conducted, not sum- mit meeting. Those Khrushchev welcomes. He will use the decisions reached at summit meetings to increase his own prestige. This you must understand. That is why I write these observations of mine to the people of the United States and Britain. I ask only that you believe the sincerity of my thoughts. Henceforth I am your soldier, pledged to carry out everything which is entrusted to me. In presenting the above, I want to say that I have not begun work for my new cause with empty hands. I understand perfectly well that to correct words and thoughts, one must add concrete proof confirming these words. I have had and do have now a deli- nits capabilty for doing this. lain my thoughts about the system in which scheme against each other, intrigue, inform, [From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965] T live and min revolt against this system. cut each other's throats. In pursuit of more A KREMLINOLOGIST TRrrsTo SRIKE A Lan fully aware of what I am setting out to money and advancement for themselves, they BALANCE do. I ask that you believe in my sincerity, in become informants for the state security on (By Edward Crankshaw) bayidedication to the real struggle for peace. their, friends and fellow worlrers. Their (The following is a condensation of the must write hurriedly, hoping that I will children despise everything Soviet, watch foreword to "The Penkovsk. Pa ers" b the 80 me day have the time to elaborate or ex- only foreign movie films and look down on y p y - -- plan, I am unable to do this all at once-or ordinary people. British journalist and expert on Soviet to write all 1 .know and feel-for the simple Our communism, which we have been Russia.) ,physical lack of time and space. I imagine that the eeneral reader will he -? cv - uaaa xu ysru ~r wis i.raua. :tome alsease or in- ------ --- --- ?--- ?' -----_.-._",, - ???? typ p g( Is anoisy ) t Durin wrking hours, fection is gnawing and eating at our country count system. workings may very well be appalled E in is very g g from within. t an always busy, running like a madman and dismayed by their scope and sheer mag- The ideals that so many of our fathers between the visiting (foreign) delegations nitude. But I think we should try to keep aril military intelligence headquarters and and brothers died for have turned out . be a sense of proportion here. nothing more tha bluff and a deceitit. I theLofflces of my committee. I am not for a moment suggesting that g ve a a y w ys n r- ee ]lt they know nothing. I associate ,with . highly placed; important rafsingly reckless in the expenditure of man- east I, have a hiding place in my desk. My been nuts about espionage and counter- :amity could not find it even if they knew. GOVERNMENT OF ADVENTURERS espiona e and the ha l b h i - -- - e country, it am doing. Someone may al- 'WV $,A ask sk what I a we all work separately. Each man here is as the KGB and GRU. The Russians, not g. Here at home at alone. to put too fine a paint on it, have always Approve&For Release,: CIA-RDP75-00'149R0006002400I6 6 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE :k.. am quite sure that the material the Russians receive from their agents is not worth anything like the expenditure of man- power, ingenuity and cash which they con- sider an. appropriate price. I am not an expert in these matters, but there is one thing that stands out even to a layman; that is, that some of the most valuable in- telligence coups ever achieved by the Rus- sians have fallen into their laps, contributed by oddities like Nunn-May and Fuchs, act- ing from individual conviction. Conversely, invaluable information pre- sented to us by Penkovsky was obtained not as.a result of the efficiency of our own secret services but as a free gift arising from the Idiosyncratic behavior of an individual Russian. Penkovsky was shocked by the size and magnitude and malevolence of the secret service of which he formed a part. He was also shocked by the behavior of Khrushchev and others. Here, I think, he can be very misleading. He was brought up as a young Com- munist and developed into an eager careerist In the regular army, on the lookout for patronage, keen for promotion, cultivating the sort of gifts which enabled him quite naturally and easily to make an extremely useful marriage, one of the privileged new class and enjoying it. It is impossible to decide from his papers the precise point at which the whole thing went sour, and why. That he took violently against the whole system, for the reasons he gives is entirely understandable; tens of thousands of intel- ligent Russians-hundreds of thousands, in- deed-feel the same way. But this does not lead them to spy on their own country for the benefit of the West. One thing is very clear-and this should be borne in mind constantly when consider- ing Penkovsky's Indictment of Khrushchev as 'a man actively preparing to launch a nu- clear war-and that is that, like so many defectors from the West, this Soviet army colonel was in some measure unbalanced. (A man who will take it upon himself to be- tray his government because he is uniquely convinced that he is right and it is wrong is by definition unbalanced, although he may also be a martyr.) And almost cer- tainly, this lack of balance made it impossible for distinguish between government intentions and government precautions. Or, like so many others, he confused loose, menacing talk with tight-lipped calcula- tion; contingency planning with purposive strategy. Having said all this, read Penkovsky also for the light he throws on the Soviet world, which is an illumination rarely vouchsafed foreigners. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 1, 19651 OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN SECRET POLICE, SPYING DOMINATE REGIME AND ALL AGENCIES ABROAD ' (By Frank Gibney) By mid-April 1961, Greville Wynne, the British businessman in whom Colonel Pen- kovsky confided, had taken Penkovsky's letter to British and American intelligence officers in London. In it, the Soviet General Staff officer described in detail his position in Mos- cow, together with his motives of volunteer- ing to spy against the Soviet regime. He promised to arrive in London later that month, in charge of a visiting Soviet dele- gation of technical and industrial experts. Many of these were in fact intelligence specialists from Penkovsky's own committee, the State Committee for Coordination of Scientifle Research, which regulated all con- tacts and exchanges -between foreign and Soviet scientists and businessmen. Pei4ov?ky's, own record and position were quickly checked out in London and Wash- ington-and If Western intelligence had dreamed up the perfect man to penetrate the Kremlin's secrets, it could hardly have done better. He was then 43 years old. Made a full colonel in the Soviet Army at 31, he had graduated both from the Frunze Military Academy (the Soviet staff college) and the Military-Diplomatic Academy-cover name for the 3-year Soviet military intelli- gence school. He had served as assistant military attache in Turkey in 1956, run an area desk in Soviet intelligence headquarters, and helped select and train intelligence offi- cer candidates-one of the most sensitive jobs in the Soviet system. The colonel was also a veteran artilleryman who had taken the special Soviet Army course in military missilery at the Dzher- zshinsky artillery school. He was the former aide and still the confidant oT Chief Marshal Varentsov, who commanded the Soviet tacti- cal missile troops. In almost every respect Penkovsky was wired into the Soviet hierarchy. His great uncle, Valentin Penkovsky was a lieutenant general; his wife was a general's daughter. Penkovsky was on the friendliest of terms with his boss, Gen. Ivan Serov, Khrushchev's secret police expert, who now commanded Military Intelligence. Through Serov and Marshal Varentsov, he had pipelines to the highest levels of the Soviet regime and al- most unlimited access to secret files and documents. Other Soviet officers had defected to the West, over the years, but never anyone this high up in the Kremlin's operating com- mand structure. In his own biography, he gave one big reason for his anger at the Soviet regime. Only a year or two before the State Security had discovered that Pen- kovsky's father had been a White officer in 1919-thus putting a sudden black mark on his record (and probably blocking his promotion to general). As a professional soldier and general staff officer, also, Penkovsky was increasingly ap- palled by the network of spies and informers he found throughout his own government- fully 8 years after de-Stalinization has sup- posedly thawed Soviet society. In the following excerpt from "The Pen- kovsky Papers," he writes about the secret police dominance over the Soviet regime: (By Oleg Penkovsky) The Soviet Government goes in force for espionage on such a gigantic scale that an outsider has difficulty in fully comprehend- ing it. Daily we expand our already swollen spy apparatus. That is what Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and "struggle for peace" really mean. We are all spies. Any Soviet citizen who has anything at all to do with the work of foreign countri' s or who is connected with foreigners in the course of his work, is perforce engaged in intelligence work. There is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does not have in it an intelligence officer or agent. Here are some of the Soviet ministers and committees through which we conduct in- telligence: Intourist and the International Book Association (almost 100 percent state security) ; Ministry of Foreign Trade; Coun- cil for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church; The Academy of Sciences; Union of the Red Cross; State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. * ? * The list is almost endless. State security officers and agents are every- where, literally everywhere. I saw fewer of them under Stalin than now. They control our whole army and military intelligence, too. These security police scoundrels even forced my aunt to be an informer. She worked for them the whole time she was a housekeeper in the Afghan and the Italian Embassies in Moscow. My poor aunt often came to my mother, crying and complaining about the degrading and dishonest things she had to do. She eavesdropped, stole documents, cleaned out waste baskets, wrote reports on diplomats, helped with provocations against them. Many time she complained to me. But this was before I began working for military in- telligence. I could give her no advice only sympathy. Khrushchev himself directly supervises the work of the state security. In this matter he trusts no one else; he controls the State Security as First Secretary of the Communist Party. It Is said that Shelepin, the state security boss, spends more time in Khru- shchev's office than in his own headquarters or. Dzerzhinsky Square. If it were not for the state security police and General Serov, Khrushchev could never have become the "supreme commander in chief." SPIES ABROAD The majority of the personnel in Soviet embassies abroad are military intelligence or state security employees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs anC the Ministry of Foreign Trade exist as such only in Moscow. Abroad everything is controlled by us. Three out of five Soviet embassy officers are either from state security or military intelligence. Thus, it can be stated wtihout error that 60 percent of Soviet embassy personnel are serving of- ficers in intelligence. In Soviet consulates the figure is almost 100 percent. In an embassy the state security spies on everyone, including us in military intelli- gence Security police watch absolutely everything that goes on: the purchases peo- ple make, how they live and whether it ac- cords with their salary, where they go, which doctors they visit, how much drinking they do, their morals. Meanwhile we in military intelligence watch the security police in re- turn. We want to establish which of our own men are connected with them or work as their informants. A Soviet Ambassador is first of all an em- ployee of the central committee of the party, only secondly of the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs. Often he is himself part of the mili- tary intelligence or the state security police. A great many of the Soviet Ambassadors in foreign countries are intelligence officers. Before my duty in the Embassy in Turkey, I thought that the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs and the embassies were important orga- nizations with authority. Now I know there is only the Central Committee of the Com- iunist Party and the two intelligence orga- nizations. To process people traveling abroad, there Is a special commission for trips abroad under the central committee. It consists entirely of state security officers. Any per- son, even a tourist, going overseas comes for a conference to the central committee. When I was leaving, this scoundrel Daluda from the state security poked through my file for 2 hours. What was he looking for? He questioned me about all my relatives, living and dead, about my family life, whether I drink, quarrel with my wife, etc. He also asked me about international prob- lems. This was done to me, an officer of the general staff and the military intelli- gence. INDISCRIMINATE ESPIONAGE We are engaged in espionage against every country in the world. And this includes our friends, the countries of the peoples' democracies. Who knows, some fine day they may become our enemies. Look what hap- pened with China. Months before the break with China became clear, Instructions came direct from the central committee to being intensive intelligence activity against China. Quietly, the Chinese section was transferred from the directorate dealing with peoples' democracies to that for neutral or enemy countries in the Far East. Col. Pavel Demetriyevich Yerzin was for- merly the state security resident in Turkey, Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016.6 Approved For-Releas6--:_ CIA-Rpfl75-00149R000600240016-6 wigre I. knew him.. Later he was promoted to ? t rank _9f,?Figadier general and appointed- xeCtor of the Patrice Lumumba Friend - 0e~ur,Ity police-even the people in charge of dormitories. Only a few professors are t ere as co-optees," i.e., people who have Greed to work with the state security. The basic task of the Friendship University is to pf'opare a fifth column for the African coun- tries. apy of the African students there have aleady been recruited. They are now work- ing for the Soviet Intelligence. They are st ldying Marxism and Leninism, preparing to become the future leaders of the African countries. Pis a first step, after their return from Moscow, they are directed to organize strikes, demonstrations to overthrow governments, etp. At the university they live better than t11e average Soviet student. Almost every- nehas special "residencies" (i.e. self-con to ned operative units) on the territory of the United States. One Is in Washington, i) 1C -"residency" personnel include in- dividual Soviet Embassy secretaries, com- et rcial representatives, and other employees. ere are two "residencies" in New York, o e under the cover of the U.N. (The other, tY1e "illegal residency," has direct independ- en contact with Moscow.) sically "oldtimers" who were recruited a > g time ago. e e New York "residencies" are of greater s ength. They have, new agents from whose Tasks they build up the illegal residency." intelligence officers of legal "residencies" (i.e. officers who have legally entered the Vziited States with an official "cover" post- tign) always use their cover, such as: Tass CO~esporldent, Aeroflot representative, mer.-. c ant marine, member of a trade mission. Sometimes, in order to evade FBI sur- ,V'ellance, Soviet intelligence officers stay in ,the embassy overnight, sleeping on desks, then get up early in the morning to leave the embassy unnoticed. In this way, they man- agle tometimes to avoid surveillance. fter, 'the Powers affair (the U-2 incident Of May 1960) Khrushchev issued an order to,all_WIlts ofhe intelligence service, espe- i Cia11y those , in the United States, to cease th it active work temporarily-in order to to e no chance of putting into enemy hands evidence pointing to Soviet espionage agkinet the United States and other coun- :trt~es. in November 1960, this order was rescinded. Intelligence activities began ag n in full swing. Recent directives have Of eyed establishment of social contacts with asLlglany Americans as possible. te#igence officer with the military rank of lieutenant colonel. He knows English very weli. At one time he was, an instructor of English at the Military Diplomatic Academy, Which trains pfficers for Military Intelligence. ter special training, Melekh was sent ut der the cover of,the United Nations see- Te ariatin *few York to carry out his intelli- ge ce missions.. That was in 1955. On Oc- tober 27, 1960, he was arrested by the Federal Bt}r'eau of Investigation on charges of espio- nage. In April 1961, the U.S. Government dropped its charges on condition that Melekh, leave the United States before April 17. This should help us to judge the value of Soviet prbbtests and declarations at, the U.N. FRIEND OE' SEROV... The present Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. Alexander I. Serov, is not the most bril- liant of men. He knows how to interrogate people, imprison them, and shoot them. In sophisticated intelligence matters, he Is not so skilled. Serov was a Beria man. :Beria took a liking to him and pushed him to the top quickly. Before coming to Military Intelligence, Serov was Chairman of the State Security. After his appointment to Military Intelli- gence, he remembered my name from my Turkish assignment and. became personally interested in.rny work. Eventually a certain degree of friendship developed between us and I visited him several times at his apart- ment and his country house. My personal relationship with Serov placed me in the forefront of Military Intelligence officers. Serov lives on Granovsky Street. Many ministers, members of the Central Commit- tee, and marshals live there. Rudenko, the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. lives on the same floor as Serov. When Serov was Chairman of the State Security, he arrested people and Rudenko signed the death sen- tence. One would drop into the other's place in the evening for a drink and they together would decide who should be put in jail and who should be shot. Very convenient. IFrom the Washington Post, Nov. 2, 19651 OUR. MAN IN THE KREMLIN-KHRUSHCHEV'S POLICIES COULD HAVE MEANT WAR (By Frank Gibney) On April 20, 1961, at 11 p.m. a trimly dressed foreign gentleman, handsome, red haired, and of medium height, walked with- out notice through the lobby of the Mount Royal Hotel I. London and made his way to an inconspicuous suite upstairs. ThV door was quickly opened. Inside the room, Col. Oleg Penkovsky had his first face- to-face meeting with British and American intelligence officers, the "interested parties" in the West whom he had been trying to contact for almost a year. For hours, Penkovsky talked. He had brought with him from Moscow two packets of handwritten notes and documents, mate- rials taken from Soviet top-secret files. The range of his information was almost ency- clopedic-the design of new missiles, names of Soviet undercover intelligence agents in Europe, troop deployments in East Germany. As the intelligence officers talked with him, they began to grasp not only the breadth of his knowledge about Soviet plans, but the intensity of his conviction that Moscow's dangerous brinkmanship in 1961 could well lead to war. A lonely Idealist, Penkovsky wanted neither money nor immediate asylum. Of the intelligence officers in London he asked only that he be given either British or American citizenship and some employment commensurate with his experience, if cir- cumstances ever compelled him to flee the Soviet Union. On another floor of the Mount Royal Hotel, Penkovsky had housed members of the 45-man Soviet delegation he headed. The delegation had been sent to London osten- sibly to discuss trade prospects, but actually to gather intelligence, of an industrial and military nature. It was a sign of the Com- munist regime's trust in Penkovsky that he was assigned to lead it. Throughout this first 2-week visit to Lon- don, Penkovsky continued to hold night meetings with the British and American in- telligence officers, whom he knew only by their code names, the British intelligence officers called "G;rille" and."Miles" and the Amretcans,Alexander" and "Oslav." Since the U-2 surveillance flights had been abandoned in 19(10, the West badly needed January 14, 1966 and new rocket technology. As a missile specialist himself, Penkovsky had a wealth of technical background on the state of So- viet missile readiness--and most important- ly, plans for missile production and deployment. The configuration of missile sites, the type of troops used, war- heads, performance details-all this in- formation Penkovsky possessed, from his own experience and his close association as aide to Marshal Varentsov, the Soviet tacti- cal missile commander. In that London hotel room Penkovsky began the vital flow of information which, barely a year later, en- abled the West to understand the serious- ness of Khrushchev's threat in Cuba, as well as recognize the exact nature of his missile weapons there. In the following excerpt from the papers, Penkovsky outlines the real facts behind the Soviet missile effort. These notes represent only a tiny portion of the information Pen- kovsky revealed in this area. For 16 months he produced a stream of reliable intelligence, technical and strategic, on Khrushchev's missile buildup. His guidance lay behind the quick identification of the Cuba-based missiles in aerial photographs. Also, his re- ports of Khrushchev's lagging production on long-range missiles explained the reasoning behind the risky shipment of medium-range Soviet missiles to Cuba. Millions breathed a sigh of relief over President Kennedy's facedown of KhriL- shchev's Cuban threat in October 1962. But until now only a small group of intelligence experts knew the great contribution made by Colonel Penkovsky to this U.S. victory. (By Oleg Penkovsky) Khrushchev is blabbing that we are ready, we have everything. That is so much idle talk. He talks about the Soviet Union's capability to send missiles, to every corner of the world, but he has not done anything about it, because he knows that we are actu- ally not ready. Of course we can send our big missiles in different directions, as far. as the United States or Cuba. But we are not yet capable of launching a planned missile attack to destroy definite targets long range. As Mar- shal Varentsov, who commands the ground missile forces, tells me: "We still have a long way to go before we actually achieve the things about which Khrushchev keeps talk- ing and boasting." Of course, there have been fine achieve- ments in developing tactical and operational short-range missiles. But it is too early to speak of our strategic missiles as per- fected. Many of the big ones are still on the drawing boards, in the prototype stage or undergoing tests. There are altogether not more than a few dozen of these-not the 'shower" of missiles with which Khru- shchev has been threatening the West. Only the smaller (IRBM) missiles are in production. The R-12 missile, now being mass produced, has a range of 2,500 kilo- meters (1,650 miles). Our "cruise" missile has been adopted for use by the submarine fleet as well as ground troops. But our big R-14 missile is only In the development stage. The range of the R-14 with a nuclear war- head is 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles). Often a new model missile is still only in the testing stage-in fact the tests may have proved unsuccessful. But there is Khru- shchev, already screaming to the entire world about his "achievements" in new types of Soviet weapons. COSMONAUTS DIE All the money made available from the military reorganization is put Into missile production, and sputnik required the com- bined efforts of all available Soviet scientists and technical personnel, with the entire Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Marshal Varentsov warns in private con- versations that we do not have enough qualified people in the missile and sputnik programs, that training is inadequate, the quality of production poor. Quantity is in- adequate, also. Accidents and all sorts of troubles are daily occurrences. In this con- nection, there is much talk about short- comings in the field of electronics. There have been many cases during the test launchings of missiles when they have hit inhabited areas, railroad tracks, etc., instead of the designated targets, after deviating several hundred kilometers from their prescribed course. Sometimes Khrushchev's pushing for pre- mature achievement in missiles and sput- .niks has disastrous results. Several, sputniks were launched into the stratosphere and never heard from again. They took the lives of several specially trained cosmonauts. The sudden death of Marshal Nedelin, former chief of our missile forces, was an- other case in point. Khrushchev had been demanding that his specialists create a missile engine powered by nuclear energy. The laboratory work for such an engine had even been completed prior to the 43d Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1960, and the people involved wanted to give Khrushchev a "present" on this anniversary-a missile powered by nu- clear energy. Present during the tests on this new en- gine were Marshal Nedelin, many specialists on nuclear equipment, and representatives of several government committees. When the countdown was completed, the missile failed to leave t(he launching pad. After 15 to 20 minutes had passed, Nedelin came out of the shelter, followed by the others. Sud- denly there was an explosion caused by the mixture of the nuclear substance and other components. Over 300 people were killed. A few people miraculously survived, but all of them were in deep shock. Some of them died soon afterward. What was brought to Moscow were not Nedelin's and other victims' remains, but urns filled with dirt. Yet we all had read in the "truthful" official government statements printed in the newspaper Pravda and Izvestiya only that Nedelin died, "* *- * in the line of duty-in an air accident," and we also read about how these bodies were cremated, as well as other details about the funeral. MORE SPACEFAILURES This is not the first time that a missile accident took place. There had been others before this, but the government keeps silent about them. When Khrushchev announced at the begin- ning of 1960 that the Soviet Union possessed a completely new and terrifying type of bal- listic missile, he actually had in mind the order he had issued to invent or prepare this new type of propellant based on nuclear energy. Some of the work in this direction proved quite successful, even after Nedelin's accident, but it is still far from what Khru- shchev had in mind. There is a big lag in electronics, There were more accidents during tests. In this respect my sympathies are with the Americans. If they have an accident, it is all in the papers; everyone knows about it. But in our country everything is kept secret. For example: There were several unsuc- cessful launchings of sputniks with men killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the missile would explode on the launching pad, or it would go up and never return. When Gagarin made his flight, it was said officially that there was not a single camera in his sputnik. This-was a big lie. There was, a whole system -of camefas'with different lenses fpr },eking pictures and for intersec- Lion. The photographic equipment was turned on and off during the flight by the astronaut. But Khrushchev tells everybody that nothing was photographed. Photo- graphic equipment has been installed on all sputniks, but this has been denied in order to prevent the Americans from launching espionage sputniks, or as we call them: "spies in the sky." Right now we have a certain number of missiles with nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States or South Amer- ica; but these are single missiles, not in mass production, and they are far from perfect. Every possible measure is taken to improve the missiles and their production. Money is saved everywhere and allocated to the building of kindergartens. That is the slang expression we use for missile produc- tion. Many different towns have been spe- cially built for these scientists and the tech- nical and engineering personnel. Scientists and engineers not only have been awarded decorations and medals, but some have been awarded the. title of Hero of Socialist Labor three or four times. They have received the Lenin Prize, and other prizes. The work of these people is not publicized and their pictures do not appear in the newspapers. I have already heard some talk about a woman astronaut being readied for a flight into the stratosphere in a sputnik for propa- ganda purposes. All the higher commanders think that such a flight will have a strong propaganda effect. The launching is planned for the beginning of 1963. The vigilance of the Western powers must not be weakened by the shortcomings men- tioned above. If at the present time the Soviet ballistic missiles are still far from being perfect, in 2 or 3 years-perhaps even sooner-Khrushchev will have achieved his goal. In 1961, a firm directive was issued to equip the satellite countries with missile weapons. This was by a special decision of the Central Committee CPSU. Marshal Varentsov made the following comment: "They say we must give our brother Slavs missile weapons. So we give them missiles now, and later they will stick a knife in our back." In my opinion as a general staff officer, it will take a year or a year and a half for us to be able to equip all the Eastern European countries with missiles. In order to stop this armament of Khrushchev's and his attempts to launch an attack, the Western countries must triple both their efforts at unity and increase their armaments, Only then will Khrushchev realize that he is dealing with a strong adversary. [From The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1965] OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-TRICKERY USED BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WEST REVEALED BY PENKOVSKY (By Frank Gibney) Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the brilliant Soviet general staff officer who volunteered to spy for the West, was almost the exact opposite of the drab, mousy professional spy, as cele- brated in current "realistic" espionage novels. A sociable man who liked good food and good conversation, he had a ready wit and was prone to parlor card tricks. When he arrived in London, in late April 1961, he was consciously setting out to play an incredibly dangerous game of espionage against his own regime. But he managed to enjoy his stay, at least ostensibly, as thoroughly as any tourist. The colonel took long walks through the city, visited department stores, restaurants and theaters, generally in the company of Greville Wynne, his British businessman friend. The obvious freedom of the British people delighted him. He told Wynne, again and again, how different it was from the closed society of Moscow. Personally, he was manifestly relieved for 247 once to be out of the orbit of Soviet secret police surveillance. He even managed some discreet nightclubbing and a few dancing lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in Lon- don, assumed that Penkovsky, a trusted offi- cer, was attempting to "recruit" Wynne as a Soviet agent. So his association with Wynne was not under suspicion.) Penkovsky also did some guide work of his own, which considerably helped his standing in Soviet military intelligence. Shortly be- fore he left Moscow, General Seroy, the chief of military intelligence, had called him into his office and informed him that his wife and daughter were also flying to London for an unofficial tourist visit. He asked Pen- kovsky to look after them and give them any help they needed in getting around in a strange city. Accordingly, the colonel helped Mrs. Serov and her attractive daughter Svetlana make their purchases (with money drawn from local Soviet intelligence funds). He even managed to take Svetlana on a tour of the better London night spots without arousing undue attention. Beneath this facade of socializing, however, Penkovsky's new work continued in earnest. On the basis of the information he had sub- mitted, the British and American intelligence oiicefs were now convinced that his desire to work with them was genuine. In their nocturnal meetings, they gave the Soviet colonel a complete short course in clandestine radio communications, as well as a small Minox camera for photographing documents. It was arranged to make con- tact with him through Wynne or another Western emissary, if he found it impossible to return to Western Europe in the near fu- tue. If necessary, instructions would be transmitted to him by radio. When he finally left London on May 6, Penkovsky carried with him presents for his highly placed Soviet friends, including Gen- eral Serov, a full report of the trade and technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success) and a complete set of in- structions and equipment for getting further espionage information out of his "new friends" in the West. In the following excerpt from the papers, Penkovsky has some more to say about the real nature of his own Soviet delegation- and the stern ground rules still laid down to cover all Soviet contacts with foreigners. (By Oleg Penkovsky) The State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work is like a ministry. Our chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the priv- ileges of a minister in the U.S.S.R. The committee is in charge of all scientific and technical exchanges with foreigners, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In fact, it is a large espionage apparatus, which not only collects scientific and technical infor- mation, but tries to recruit Western technical specialists. When I began my work in the committee, I was myself astounded by the number of intelligence officers working there. Eighty or ninety senior intelligence officers work in the foreign relations section alone. When one walks down the halls in our offices, one can see some of them saluting each other in the military manner. They have conspic- uous difficulty getting away from military habits, even getting used to their civilian clothes. The friendly contacts and "services" we provide visiting foreign delegations we might better call "friendly deceit." Often we mili- tary intelligence officers cannot understand ourselves why the foreigners believe us. Do they not understand that we show them in the U.S.S.R. only those things which are well known to everybody? If there is something new at a plant which foreigners are about to visit, we simply give orders to its director: Approved For Release :,CIA-RDP75-00-1 9R000240076-6 Approved For Release :.CIA-RDP 5=001498000600240016-6 on May 6, 1961, from his first visit to London On May 1 when this incident happened, I and set about in earnest to gather more in- -was duty officer at GRU (military intelli- formation for Western intelligence. gene) headquarters. I was the first one to Some of this intelligence turned out to report it to the GRU officials. be the first accurate account of two troubling At that moment, the ROB did not have an incidents on the Soviet-American policy fron- tiers-the downing of the U-2 reconnaissance to him because I was the only one around plane in 1960 and the later Soviet attack on who had some understanding of English-I another American aircraft off the coast of had already reported the incident to some Siberia. generals, If they had not found a KGB When he returned to Moscow, he stored interpreter at the last minute, I would. have his new camera, film, radio receiver and fre- been the first one to interview Powers. quency instructions in a secret drawer in Ultimately, they called up to say that I the apartment which he and his family oc- was not needed. It seems that the KGB cupied on the Maxim Gorky Embankment. (State Security) chief, this young fellow But he kept all knowledge of his new espion- Shelepin, who used to run the Komsomol age role from tl,,em. (he replaced Serov at the KGB), wanted to As far as Vera Penkovsky was concerned, make the report to Khrushchev personally. her husband was busy at his normal. con- So he get an interpreter and picked Powers fidential talks. Her own background as the up himself. But the military had knocked daughter of a "political" general conditioned Powers down and Powers was considered Approved For Release : CIA-RDPJ5-001498000600240016-6 CO IF RESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Januciry 14, 1966 Sbow them everything, but have shops 1 to go abroad. But lately, because these 444 5 closed for repairs.' That is all. scientists must learn something about mis- ,rg tcernate,-,proposals which we use to.keep been given permission to travel-provided foreigners out of certain. areas___of.___tile hhy_.baye_notparticipated in any missile 1. ~hepianz is under repair. If they defected to the West, their knowledge 2. abridge is closed., would not be so fresh. '8. There is,, no airport and the railroad TOURING ENSTR I C U T ONS tracks. have been damaged by recent frost; Our intelligence instructions to traveling therefore- for the time bein there a r to g forms and autobiographies must be filled 4. The local hotel, is not ready for guests. + hor e e +re , , --------- . t-- - ---- submit 18 photographs before a single trip. t ometimes we take foreign delegates What are they going to do with them? Mari- through museums and parks in Moscow nate them? My wife and I worked on them Iuntil the.members are so tired they them- iseIves call off the trip to a factory, preferring for 2 days, and. still could not finish all the forms. (to rest, Or, instead of taking the delegation Instructions we lby plane, we put them on a train. As a give to Soviet travelers stipulate that when traveling by train, you eslilt, the delegation has enough time to see should always be seated with your own sex. only one or two installations in which they Do not drink, do not talk too much and art.interested, instead of five or six. Their report any incidents on the trip to the con- visas expire and they have to leave after sul or Soviet :Embassy representatives. Do having seen nothing but vodka and caviar. not carry any confidential materials with RECRUITING TASKS you, do not leave your hotel room, do not In Moscow our main task as intelligence make any notes, but if this is unavoidable, officers inside the committee it to recruit keep them on your person. .S.S R. Of course, this does not often tion to the Federal Republic of Germany. sonal conversations, eavesdropping, examin- delegation. He: was co-opted, i.e., forcibly Ong baggage, literally stealing secrets from recruited ' by military intelligence. He had the visitors' pockets. a notebook for making notes on the infor- I have been assigned to British delegations rriation he gathered. He left the notebook iendly relations with these men, assess was conducted. We found nothing. The Lh their intelligence possibilities, then write a engineer became so upset that when his e port on each to our intelligence people in Comrades went out shopping, he hanged ndon. It will be up to them to collect himself in his hotel room. He used the iuid technical information as possible of grad by plane. Later, at the enterprise value to our Soviet industry-everything where he worked, it was announced that he rom cheaper methods of getting fresh wa- was not normal and suffered from constant er , from sea water to the manufacture of headaches. That is how things are done in rtificial fur. Thanks to visits to our coun- our country. -try by foreign delegations, we obtain vast (quantities of extremely valuable information. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1965] loos traveling abroad are carefully in TRUE ACCOUNT Or U-2 PLANE INCIDENT tructed how to answer questions that might (By Frank Gibney) nere Is nothing new-that_Western scientists d specialists could, learn from, the Soviet ecialists-or Soviet exhibitions abroad. or, example, the be shown at our odon exhibition in 1961 were first care- ully checked by intelligence technicians to Zee sure there was nothing new which oreign scientists could see or steal. Some xhibits were purposely put together in a istorted way; the cone of the sputnik on isplay was not built that way the spheres , Mere of another type. Trips of Soviet delegations to foreign cGountries require special preparation. The departure of any delegation requires a sepa- te decree from the Communist Party Cen- 'I'al Committee. And no delegation ever goes broad without some form of state security e ua 195 err 6 past in y ,re, and made their own Of the Communist Central, Committee, Ten Turkey, where she could practice her French report. He needed medical treatment, be- T-.?r},iH ~,rw i?+viis,.ea-.o ., .... ,..a,. a..._ ?---'--- --- . .- - - -- -- ---- - ...wj.a" '-' a,J CSJliVa.. file -'----,-.? -""` "`? "c '-,cuccuuf ,Lail. 1VVnetne- Iieed, _ Take? my own 45-man delegation to best Vera hoped for was another attache's less, the KGB seized him, took him to ondon. Five of its members were employees assignment abroad lik Dzerzhinski S th --- ?--ro - ------- ~?.. v,.aiaai Vl Lf1C DllL- Veen notnmg to snout with. As soon as the As a rule, Soviet scientists and technicians ish firms he represented. Penkovsky, met new rockets appeared, Khrushchev gave the production missile work are not allowed him with a car at Sheremetevo Airport. On order to use them. So they fired at Powers NEW ROCKETS cohere or tourists, There were also three Greville Wynne flew back into Moscow on Earlier, when a U--2 flight came over in other military intelligence colonels.-l12_ the Maw 97 +? rec,..r.,, ---- ____.,-.,-- .- -. the way. into the city, "Alex," as Wynne called him, handed the Englishman a packet of some 211 exposed films and other documents, including his own reports, for delivery to British and American Intelligence. The same evening Penkovsky visited Wynne in his room at the Metropol Hotel. Taking care to keep their conversation In- nocuous (the room of a foreign visitor like Wynne would probably be wired), Wynne gave Penkovsky a package containing 30 fresh rolls of film and further instructions from the Anglo-American intelligence team in Lon- don. Far from suspecting anything strange in Penkovsky's meetings with Wynne, his su- periors in Soviet military intelligence con- tinued to think that he was "developing" a promising British contact. Penkovsky's work with the Soviet delegation in London was so highly regarded, in fact, that his pleased superiors arranged to send him there again in July, to attend the opening of a Soviet Industrial Exhibition., This time he was to travel alone, without any delegation. American and British intelligence could hardly have wished for such a nice arrange- ment. One presumes that Western Intelligence found intensely valuable. not only Penkov- sky's estimates of future Soviet plans, but his reconstruction of recent events in Soviet- American relations-most of which served only to underline his warnings about Khru- shchev's new policy of aggression. For Penkovsky the intelligence informa- tion he gave was only a means to an end. His real purpose was to alert the American and British people to the danger of Khru- shchev's "adventurist" tactics. (By Oleg Penkovsky) The American U-2 Pilot Gary Powers was shot down on May 1, 1960. Prior to the Powers flight, other U-2 flights had been made over the Kiev and Kharkov, but Khru- shchev kept his mouth shut, because at that time there were no missiles that could be effective at the altitudes where the U-2 air- craft were flying. When Powers was shot down over Sverd- lovsk, it was not a direct hit but rather the shock wave that did it. The aircraft simply fell apart from it. During his descent Pow- ers lost consciousness several times. ? He was unconscious when they picked him up from the ground; therefore, he was helpless to do January 14, 1966 Approved For Release: CIA-RDP75-00149R00060024001,6-6 'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE on May 1, 1960. Of course, we had anti- aircraft defenses before, but not in quantity, and they were not able to go into action so quickly. Marshal Biryuzov, then commander-in- chief of missile forces, was reprimanded be- cause he had not correcty estimated the probable direction of the U-2 flights-he misgaged the importance of the targets. His forces wanted to fire when the aircraft from Turkey flew over Kiev, but there was nothing to fire with and the aircraft es- caped. Powers would have escaped if he had flown one or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path. On May 5, after Powers was knocked down, Khrushchev ordered a suspension of (secret) agent operations to avoid the risk of being caught by a Western provocation or, possi- bly, of further material for Western count- erpropaganda. There were many protests about dropping scheduled meetings and other contacts, but it had to be done. The resident in Pakistan decided on his own to pick up material from a dead drop which was already loaded, in order to avoid possible compromise to the agent. For this he was severely reprimanded by his superior at the GRU even though he did the right thing. Thus, despite the damage it did to the agent network, Khrushchev ordered ces- sation 9f agent contacts during the period when he was going to capitalize on the Powers incident. KHRUSHCHEV LIED Khrushchev followed Powers' investiga- tion and trial with great interest. He per- sonally conducted the propaganda activity connected with the case. He was the first who began to shout about the direct hit, al- though actually there had been no such thing. Khrushchev wanted to brag about his missiles. Khrushchev lied when he says that Powers was shot down by the first missile fired. Actually, 14 missiles were fired at his plane. The shock wave produced by the bursts caused his plane to disintegrate. The ex- amination of Powers' plane produced no evi- dence of a direct hit; nor were there any mis- sile fragments found on it. One of the 14 missiles fired at Powers' plane shot down a Soviet MIG-19 which went up to pursue Powers. Its pilot, a junior lieutenant, perished. The U.S, aircraft RB-47 shot down on Khrushchev's order (in July, 1960) was not flying over Soviet territory; it was flying over neutral waters. Pinpointed by radar, it was shot down by Khrushchev's personal order. When the true facts were reported to Khrushchev, he said: "Well done, boys, keep them from even flying close." Such is our way of observing international law. Yet Khrushchev was afraid to admit what had actually happened. Lies and de- ceit are all around us. There is no truth anywhere, I know for a fact that our mil- itary leaders had a note prepared with apol- ogies for the incident, but Khrushchev said: "No, let them know that we are strong." [From the Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1965] OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-PENKOVSKY FED DATA To KEEP BOSSES HAPPY (By Frank Gibney) Between July f5 and August 10, 1961, Col. Oleg Penkovsky played out the second round of his'harrowing espionage game in London. He spent part of each day working with Soviet delegates to the trade exhibition, or running through plans for Soviet espionage work in Britain with other Russian intelligence of- ficers In the soundproofed basement room used by the intelligence "president" (i.e., the officer in charge) of the Soviet Embassy at ington Gardens. K9,34 At" night, or during other off-hours, he would n}eet with` "the four American and British intelligence officer$ assigned ao him in one of MI-6's safe houses for his real In- telligence mission-explaining the documents he had obtained from the secret files in Moscow, exposing further Soviet intelligence missions in the West, elaborating on technical aspects of the Soviet missile program as well as information on Khrushchev's political and diplomatic strategy. Rarely in the history of espionage has any country's high com- mand been so thoroughly penetrated as the, Kremlin was during the critical 16 months when Colonel Penkovsky worked for the West.. Since Penkovsky had come to Britain again on a Soviet spying mission, it was necessary for the British and Americans to give him some intelligence material of apparent value to forward to his superiors in Moscow. This was provided. Penkovsky thus kept sending reports to Moscow of ostensibly new informa- tion On military as well as political objec- tives (e.g. "In traveling from London to Shef- field I observed for the second time in the southern outskirts of the city of Stamford a military airfield, on which British air force planes were based. I had the opportunity to study more carefully the indicated objec- tives"). Such reports kept Penkovsky's su- periors in Moscow happy and unsuspecting. AMAZING COOLNESS With amazing coolness, the volunteer spy for the West also went on to advance his standing as a loyal Communist Party man with Moscow in other ways. One quiet morning he and Greville Wynne took a trip to see Karl Marx's grave in Highgate Ceme- tery and discovered it was in a bad state of neglect. Penkovsky wrote a letter of pro- test directly to the First Secretary of the Central Committee in Moscow. In the let- ter, Comrade Penkovsky told Comrade Khrushchev that, as a loyal Marxist he found such neglect an appalling reflection on communism and the Soviet Union. Moscow took swift "action. The London Embassy was ordered to set things right immediately and Penkovsky was commended for his socialist vigilance. All the while new assignments for Pen- kovsky came from Washington. It was a tense summer In Europe. The continent still shook from Khrushchev's threats to sign a treaty with East Germany and force the Western allies out of Berlin. If anything, the Vienna meeting of Krushchev and Presi- dent Kennedy had increased the political electricity. It was absolutely vital that the White House and Whitehall have every available piece of information on the extent of Khruschev's military preparations and his political planning. Above all, they needed to know how far Khruschev was pre- pared to go in pursuit of his German objective. Some of Penkovsky's sessions with the Anglo-American team lasted as long as 10 hours at a stretch. Now that he had switched his allegiance, his dedication to the West was a single-minded as his youthful allegiance to communism. As a literal sign that he was now your colonel, he asked his contacts to provide him with both a British and an American colonel's uniform V They did so. Pleased as punch, he had his picture taken in both. As the following excerpt from the Papers indicates, Penkovsky was amazed that both- the Western peoples and their governments seemed disposed to accept Khrushchev's boasts at face value. This only made Khru- shchev's brinkmanship or adventurism grow more dangerous. A firm Western stand was needed, particularly in the case of Berlin. (By Oleg Penkovsky) In my considered opinion, as an officer of the general staff, I do not believe Khru- shchev is too anxious for a general war at the present time. But he is preparing earnestly. If the situation is ripe for war he will start It first in order to catch the probable enemy (the United States and Western States) un 249 awares. He would of course like to reach the level of producing missiles by the tens of thousands, launch them like a rainstorm against the West, and, as he calls it, "bury capitalism." In this respect even our mar- shals and generals consider him to be a provocateur, the one who incites war. The Western powers must do something to stop him. Today he will not start a war. Today the Soviet Union is not ready for war. Today he is playing' with missiles, but this is playing with fire, and one of these days he will start a real slaughter. Look what happened during the Hungarian events and Suez crisis in 1956. We in Moscow felt as if we were sitting on a powderkeg. Everyone in the general staff was against the "Khrushchev adventure." It was better to lose Hungary, as they said, than to lose everything. THANKS TO KHRUSHCHEV But what did the West do? Nothing. It was asleep. This gave Khrushchev confi- dence, and after Hungary he began to scream: "I was right." After the Hungarian incident he dismissed many generals who had spoken out against him. If the West had slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in power today and all of East- ern Europe could be free. Kennedy must carry out a firm and con- sistent policy in regard to Khrushchev. There is nothing to fear. Khrushchev is not ready for war. He has to be slapped down again and again every time he gets ready to set off on one of his adventures. Kennedy has just as much right to help the patriots of Cuba as we had when we helped the Hungarians. This is not just my opinion. Everyone at the general staff said this. It was said in Marshal Varentosv's home, even on the streetcars in Moscow. If the West does not maintain a firm policy, then Khrushchev's position will become stronger, he will think even more about his might and right, and in this case he might strike. The people are very unhappy with Khru- shchev's militant speeches. One can hear this everywhere, listening to conversations. Now, at least, one can breathe a little easier than, in Beria's time. So one can hear and say a few things. On the other hand, the world can be thankful to Khrushchev for his militant words. They forced Kennedy, Macmillan, and De Gaulle to double or triple their mili- tary budgets and defense preparedness. If Stalin were alive he would have done all this quietly, but this fool Khrushchev's loudmouthed. He himself forces the West- ern powers to strengthen their defense weap- ons and military potential. The generals on the general staff have no love for Khrushchev. They say that he is working to his own detriment. Why is this bald devil allowed to do as he pleases? He blabs too much about Soviet military suc- cesses in order to frighten the West, but the West is not stupid, they are also getting ready. What else can they do? I believe Marshal Varentosv and Khru- shchev's assistant Churayev; it was they who claimed that Khrushchev said, "I will drop a hail of missiles on them." At the Soviet Embassy in London I saw a short comment on Mr. Kennedy's recent speech. The speech was called "the militant speech of the President of the United States." That is all we say officially. The Tass Inter- cepts, however, contain the entire speech point by point: first, second, third. First, Kennedy's references to the increase in the budget, next, the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces, in connection with the new Army draft, then the new specific cate- gories of naval flyers, etc. If necessary, the increases must be even greater. But when we speak privately, it is a dif- ferent story. At our Embassy, I heard many good comments on. Kennedy's speech. It Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149ROD060024001.6-6 CI RDP75-00149R000600240016, 6 Abp rev d or'Re#eas stopped to watch three English children play- ing by a sandbox along Tt`svetnoy Boulevard in Moscow. He handed them a small box of candy, which the children brought obediently to their mother, who was sitting nearby. The Russian gentleman was Col. Oleg Pen- kovsky, the English .mother Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a British Embassy attache. .Concealed in the innocent-looking candy box was a package of exposed film, which Penkovsky urgently wanted to put in the hands of British and American intelligence, in the course of his extraordinary voluntary spy mission for the West. The bizarre meeting with the children was of course carefully planned. Penkovsky had net Mrs. Chisholm during his second trip to London and he had been drilled in this procedure by his Western intelligence con- tacts. A few weeks before, the British business- man, Greville Wynne, Penkovsky's original contact with the West, had arrived again In Moscow to attend the French industrial fair. In Wynne's room at the Metropol, Penkov- sky had turned over the film and several packets of highly classified information from the Kremlin files, as well as a broken Minox camera-he had dropped it during one of his nocturnal photograpy sessions. Wynne had given him a replacement camera and the little box of candy lozenges to use in the contact with Mrs. Chisholm. RISKY FOR FOREIGNERS The meeting with Mrs. Chisholm was risky in a city where foreigners are as closely watched as they are in Moscow. Wynne, however, and Penkovsky continued to meet with impunity, because of Penkovsky's official dealings with him. When Penkovsky saw Wynne, he told him that he was about to take a trip to Paris himself with another Soviet trade delegation, for the purpose of attending the Soviet industrial fair there. As Wynne later recalled, Penkovsky seemed cool, self-possessed and happy in their con- versation at that time. He was cheered by the way his intelligence information was .egistering with London and Washington and buoyed up, against the hazards of his lonely espionage mission, by the thought that he was materially damaging the Moscow regime which he hated so bitterly. In the following excerpts from the papers, he emphasized his disgust at the immorality of the Kremlin hierarchy. (By Oleg Penkovsky) It Is Interesting to observe our prominent Soviet personages. What a difference there is between them when they are on the speak- er's platform and when they are in their fam- ily circles with a glass of vodka in their hands. They become entirely different types. They are very much like the personalities which are portrayed by Gogol in "Deal Souls" and "The Inspector General." In writing these notes, I have intentionally omitted the subject of moral degradation and drunkenness among the top military person- nel-because there are already too many dirty stories on this subject. I know one thing for sure, though: all our generals have mistresses and some have, two or more. Family fights and divorces are a usual oc- currence, and nobody tries to keep them se- cret. IMMORAL BEIFAVIOR Every month at our party meetings in the GRU we examine three or four cases of so- called immoral behavior and lack of dis- cipline among our officers. The party committee and the chief po- litical directorate of the GRU examine the cases involving generals and colonels, while those cases involving marshals are examined by the Central Committee CPSU. The Cen- tral Committee naturally discusses such mat- ters behind closed doors, in order to conceal from the general public and the rank and file officers the dirt in which our high com- mand personnel Is involved. Besides, marshals are not punished so severely as others. In most cases they are just given a warning. The explanation for this given by the Cen- tral Committee is the same simple answer once given by Stalin: "A marshal and his services are more valu- able than a female sex organ." Khrushchev has shown special favor to our Minister of Culture, the lady Furtseva, In the anti-party fight against Bulganin and the others in 1957 Furtseva helped him a great deal; she worked day and night dis- patching planes, and some say that she her- self made some of the flights campaigning for support for Khrushchev. She is power- mad, everybody in Moscow calls her "Cather- ine the Third." Later Furtseva fell from favor. After the party congress in 1960, Furtseva was ousted from the Presidium of the Central Commit- tee CPSU. As a result of ;this, her husband Firyubin was unable to go to the United States as the Soviet Ambassador. OUSTER PLEASED ARMY The entire Army was happy aboutLthe news of Furtseva's ouster from the Presidium. At one of the Presidium'meetings, she had proposed that the additional pay the Soviet army officers get for their respective ranks be discontinued. The answer to her was: "What is the matter with you? You want to leave them without pants?" What a fool. And yet there she was, oc- cupying the post of Minister of Culture. How can such a person carry culture to the masses. Take my friend Brig. Gen. Ivan Vladimiro- vich Kupin. He is Marshal Varentsov's pro- tege and a distant relative of his; Varent- sov's daughter Yelena Is married to Kupin's nephew. Kupin is the commander of artillery and missile troops of the Moscow Military Dis- trict. Prior to this post, Kupin served in the German Democratic Republic as commander of artillery of the 1st Tank Army. AMOROUS ESCAPADES He was in a lot of trouble due to his amorous escapades. While in Germany, he lived with his cipher clerk Zaytseva. After Kupin's departure from Germany, she hanged herself because Kupin had left her pregnant. During the investigation, a photo- graph of Kupin had been found among her belongings. Kupin confessed that he had lived with Zaytseva while concealing this fact from his wife; he admitted that he.promised Zaytseva to marry her. When he arrived in Moscow, General Kry- lov, commander of the Moscow Military Dis- trict, refused to see him, but, because the decision concerning Kupin's assignment had already been approved by the Central Com- mittee CPSU, the case was hushed up. Varentsov persuaded Krylov to forget the Approved For Release : C[A-RDP75-00149ROOO6OO240016-6 CONGRESSIONAL * RECORD - SENATE January 14, 1966 WEST MUST PREPARE sires, electronics, and other types of equip- ment. Khrushchev has lately become confused on the Berlin matter, particularly because he has realized that the West is firm there. He would like to pursue a hard policy and rattle his saber, but our country suffers from a great many shortages and difficulties which must be eliminated before the West is to be frightened further. [F'rom the Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1965] fight, but to be 'ready for a fight if it RUSSIAN ELITE DISGUSTED PENKOVSKY Mien the. time for a showdown (By Frank Gibney) Lat on i h in he afternoon s e g hg roads. and rue cuter ai _ ro tos_ to ast. be -- - , - l ~ r day in 1961, a smiling Russian gentleman The. first echelon will consist of East Ger- an troops, the second of Soviet troops. As whole, the plan provides for combined op- by Soviet and East German troops. f the first echelon is defeated, the second chelon advances, and so on. Khrushchev Tropes that before events have reached the Phase of the second echelon, the West will ~ate jointly in this operation because the Germans cannot be trusted to act independ- ently. In the first place, the East German {11 my is poorly equipped and insufficiently prepared because we are afraid to supply hem with everything. The Germans have So love of us, and there is always a chance that in the future they may turn against ifs, as it happened with the. Hungarians. I Volodya Khoroshilov came home on leave. is is chief of the artillery staff of the tank "As soon as the treaty with Germany is 1fined, an alert will be declared immediately, 4nd the troops in East Germany will occupy 1 the controlpoints and will take over their efense and support. Our troops will stand by on alert, but they will not occupy these Cites immediately because this might be onsidered a provocation. We will simply day, 'Please,_Americans, British, and French, o to Berlin, but, you must request permis- ion from East Qermany.' "If the Americans, British, and French do 2of want to confer with the East Germans 4nd try to use force, the Germans will open re.. Of course, the Germans do not have lxgh strength, and then our tanks will drove directly into Berlin." I heard this from many officers, specifically trOm General Pozovuy, and also from Fed- tt and Marshall Varentsov. Varentsov, owever, added, "We are taking a risk, a big ~ 14tFORTANcZ OF. TANKS In 1961, when Khrushchev decided, to re- eolve the Berlin question, a tank echelon was rought to combat readiness on the border as well as in Czechoslovaka Find. Poland. That is the truth. I The NATO countries should give particu- att~ention to enttarnk,,.weapons. Why? eeai. se East Germany has two tank armies ill full readiness; this is In addition to the t armies -which are part 'of the second ehelon located on the territories of the Czechoslovakia, and Poland. I Ehrushchev personally attached a great deal of importance to tank troops, especially attached to tanks in connection with the rlin crisis, that controversies have already a-bd that there will not be enough for mis- Approved For'Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 January, 1., 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 251 This ie, the way it goes in our country. Marshal Konev's son,_ Getty Ivanovich secret conferences with them at various safe As ;long as the Central Committee approves, Konev, is a woman-chaser And a drunkard. apartments in the city. As before in Lon- as long as one has connections, one can get He also is a member of that same, group of don, Penkovsky gave them a vast store of away with anything, even crimes; but if a sons of marshals and otiier high officials. military and political information, supple- similar incident happens to an ordinary offi- He is a motorcycle enthusiast, and he loves menting the documents he had photographed cer without any connections, he is punished to play the horses. with his own informed analyses of current immediately-either his rank is reduced, or I studied with Getty at the Military Acad- Soviet plans and military preparations. he is discharged from the army entirely. emy. During that time Getty had an accident He also laid the groundwork for an even Look at Krupchinskiy, head of the School while riding his motorcycle. He hit a man more widespread network of communications for Nurses, and a friend of General Smblikov. who later died. Papa, however, took care with Western agents in Moscow which would They drink together and indulge in sexual of everything and Getty was not jailed. He allow him to continue his secret communica- orgies with girls attending the school. was graduated from the academy in 1953, and tions with Washington and London with a Krupchinskly also provides girls for other is now working in the Information Direc- minimum of risk. generals of the general staff. torate of the GItU, an the American desk. Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubei got He knows English well. FRESH ASE himself soeeply involved with some actress Corkin, chairman of the supreme court, When he was not engaged with either set that it almost led to divorce, He was given has a son-in-law named Lieutenant Com- of intelligence officers, Penkovsky again a warning by Khrushchev himself to be more mander Ivanov, a GRU military intelligence turned tourist, with his British friend, Gre- careful in his adventures. Adzhubei is the employee. (This is the same Ivanov who was villa Wynne, acting as guide. The paint- chief editor of the newspaper Izvestia, and connected with the Profumo scandal in Eng- ings at the Louvre and the night club ex- every day he writes articles about Commu- land.) He and I studied together at the travaganzas at the Lido, Penkovsky viewed nist morality. Military Diplomatic Academy. At present he with" apparently equal interest. Once again, Yet, look at his own behavior. All the is the Assistant Naval Attache in Great Brit- he acted like a man who had suddenly been other journalists hate him. ain. His wife is one of Gorkin's daughters. exposed to a draft of fresh air after long Even Satyukov, the editor of Pravda, has Ivanov loves going to night clubs in London. confinement in a closed place. slid down to second place after Izestia. As one can well see, all the sons and rela- Without constant Soviet surveillance to Adzhubei received a Lenin prize for his so- tives of our Soviet leaders and high-level per- worry about, occasionally he lost his normal called work about Khrushchev's trip to the sonnel are well taken care of. I have told caution. Once, when he and Wynne stum- United States. This work was compiled and only about those who work in the GRU. bled on an emigre Russian restaurant in written by the Central ,Committee. All But the same thing may be said about those Paris, Penkovsky could hardly be restrained Adzhubet did was put his signature to it as who are in the Central Committee, the Coun- from staying far into the night, singing and its editor. cil of Ministers, the KGB and various other talking Russian with the proprietor-hardly In our own committee in Moscow, Yevgeniy ministries. the safe thing for a visiting Soviet intelli- Ilich Levin, secret police (KGB) worker and All roads are open for them. They are the gence officer to do, especially when he was Ovishlani's deputy, is a drunkard and dis- first ones who get promoted to higher ranks actually working for the West. solute man. The stories he tells about the and better jobs. Everything is done by pull, Penkovsky liked London better, however. cheap dives he frequents are hardly con- through friends and family connections. In Paris, also, he faced what he must have sonant with what the party tells us about The newspapers scream that a struggle suspected was a final decision: to go back Socialist mprality. must be waged against such practices. But or remain in the West. After his nightly drunken escapades and what happens? They punish some factory The American and British intelligence of- amorous-adventures, Levin invariably sleeps director for giving a job to his niece, and he ficers were perfectly willing to have Penkov- Until noon. Almost every morning Gvishiani is criticized for it in the newspapers. But sky remain then and there, to receive asylum looks for him: we must look higher and see what is going and a job suitable to his talents in Europe "Where is my deputy?" Someone says: on at the top level. That is where all the or the United States. "He has not arrived yet. Probably he is at big crimes are committed. It is they who set The information he had already given on his other office (that is, KGB)." Gvishiani the example for the others to follow. Khrushchev's missile and Berlin offensives is afraid of Levin. He knows very well that was so important that they were concerned Levin is at home sleeping off his rough night, [From the Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1965] about his future personal security. but he will do notllin For days before his departure Oleg Pen- g? Qua M4N IN THE KREMLJIQ-SPY's CHOICE: kovsky debated with himself as he walked The relatives of the highly placed do very HOME OR SAFETY well in our Socialist society. Almost all of the streets of Paris. He had pressing family the marshals' sons have finished the Military (By Frank Gibney) considerations at home-a pregnant wife, a Diplomatic Academy. All of them would like Colonel Penkovsky arrived at LeBourget mother, a teenage daughter? Could he cut to be sent abroad to work, but the Govern- Airport, near Paris, on September 20, 1961. them from his life forever? And to leave ment will not let them. His British friend, Greville Wynne, met him the familiar world of Russia, much as he There is a special decree of the Central at the airport. hated the Soviet regime, meant a cruel Committee CPSU forbidding the sons of Penkovsky obviously could not have in- wrench. Yet everything in his immediate marshals to go abroad. Many of them tried, formed Wynne of his exact arrival time with- surroundings argued that he stay. but to no avail. out arousing suspicion among his superiors He almost did. The plane for Moscow Marshal Sokolovskiy's son was given a 25-, in Moscow. At the request of the British was delayed by fog and the omen did not year prison term. He belonged to a large and American intelligence team, Wynne, still escape him. For hours he paced the floor group of sons of marshals and ministers- Penkovsky's safest contact, had flown to Paris of the waiting room at Orly Airport, virtually some of our so-called golden youth-who and gone to the airport every day for 2 weeks, arguing out loud with himself, as Wynne had organized druken orgies at their coun- watching the arrivals on each flight from patiently listened. He hesitated, literally try houses outside Moscow. Moscow. at the customs barrier, but at the last min- At one of these, orgies, a girl who had just From the standpoint of Western intelli- ute he said goodby to Wynne and marched come to Moscow from Leningrad was raped gence, his vigil was wen spent. The brilliant back into a world from which he had long After she was raped, the girl was placed photographs of secret intelligence docu- the papers, when he wrote shortly after his in a car and taken somewhere behind the ments, technical processes, order of battle return to Moscow: "I feel that for another Byelorussian Railroad Station, where they information on Soviet dispositions in Ger- year or two I must continue in the general dumped her. Because the whole gang was many, and-most important of all-more staff of the U.S.S.R. In order to reveal all the drunk, the driver of_ the car was driving very top-secret details of the Kremlin's missile villainous plans and plottings of our common poorly. An militiaman noticed this and production and deployment. enemy; i.e., I consider myself as a soldier of blocked the car, One of the boys in the car As usual, Penskovsky checked in promptly the West, so my place during these troubled with the Paris "resident" of the Soviet mill- times is on the frontline. I must remain on bb i d t l d fi d b k ot gra e s an a p o re lan a sh . The oar was stopped. tart' Intelligence and went over details of the this frontline in order to be your eyes and This happened under Stalin, and he said, after the Soviet exhibition in Paris. useful in the fight for our hig h ideals for "I respect Sokolovskiy very much, but there Three days after his arrival, however, the mankind." will be a trial just the same." And so a colonel began the real business of his trip. The following excerpt from the Penkovsky trial was held, and Sokolovskiy's son was Wynne drove him to one of the Seine River papers suggests how powerful some of Pen- given a 25 year prison term. He stayed in bridges, where he met the members of the kovsky's immediate efforts were. He dis- jail only 3 years, however, and then he "be- British and American intelligence team who cusses the extent of the Soviet intelligence came ill," allegedly suffering from an, ulcer or had worked with him in London. network operating out of the Paris embassy. something of that sort. He was ,released. Through the next month he continued his It is now clear that Penkovsky exposed most Approved ForRelease CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 Approved 'For Release : C1A-FDP75-00149R000600240016-6 CO IG RESSf0Nr S L RECO1 fl GATE January 14, 1966 6f the Soviet spy network in Western Europe ' It is true that if we approach an ordi.nar' to United States and British intelligence dur- Frenchman, and he learns that he is speak- u :-I the same month when he was a temporary ing with Russians, he will immediately rn mbar of Soviet Military Intelligence in and report the contact to the police. But Peris. French Coinnamaists, generally speaking, (By Oleg Penkovsky) readily agree to work for us, asking only di- o er military intelligence officers, of collect- According to Prokhorov, we could not work iAs I was in charge of the delegation, I did n BE A( w we call It. It established contacts, made quaintances, collected literature which I- intelligence staff school in Moscow I was taught entirely different things about the enchand British "secret police." After spending some time in those two countries I saw how natural and unaffected v.lov, loves England-"Mother England," as he calls it. While l was in London, I asked about the cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin's visit to England. Gargarin does not speak English, but he had 4mo excellent translators. Everyone as- signed to him was selected from our "neigh- rs," the secret police. Shapovalov told me t at it was uncomfortable to see so many sate security police surrounding Gargarin. While he was in London, he lived in House } o.,,. 13, on the second floor (Kensington glace Gardens). People by the hundreds o)ae British girl waited 18 hours to catch a glimpse of him. When Gargarin was told a out this, he said, "What a fool. It would have been better if she "lead shared my bed for a couple of hours." Here is the new his- torical personality for you. 7-1 BERLIN CRISES? entral committee CPfU in my delegation. hey had a lengthy conference with Ambas- i;dor Soldatov. Later I was told by our tion . and. on the probable reaction of the British,Goveqnlnent in case of a .Berlin crisis. ~entral Committee and military intelligence to employ all agents and friendly contacts in assy took off in various directions all over ngland to gather` the needed information. The entire force of operational, strategic, and bou ht- rance easily, and for a cheap price. "We bought the harlot cheap"-those were the words he used. Military intelligence has levied a require- went on all residencies, especially those in France, to obtain information on the new models of NATO weapons. They are to use all possible contacts, including all the rep- resentatives of. the countries of the people's democracies, acquaintances and Communists. There were many other requirements re- garding the collection of information of vari- ous sorts, including approximately 20 to 25 items directly concerned with electronics, especially electronic technology as used by missile troops of the American and British Armies. We were also directed to obtain Information about certain kinds of small American missiles launched from aircraft, which create various forms of interference in the air and disrupt radar scanning. All operational intelligence officers were assigned the task of visiting chemical enter- prises in France, America, and England in order to learn the process and ingredients of solid fuel for missiles. Information. was desired on heat-resisting steel; there seemed to be some reason to be- lieve that the United States had done some very good work in this field. The GRU con- siders that the "French have an excellent solid fuel for missiles and have made great progress in this direction. I told the resident in Paris that I would be traveling through France and could select suitable sites for dead crops. The resident replied that they had all the dead drop, sites needed. He told me not to waste my time on this. The resident also said that it was very easy to arrange agent meetings in France, to transmit and receive materials, etc. He even indicated that dead drops were seldom used because It was simple to arrange direct meetings with agents. These are not set up very frequently, however, only when neces- sary. At the embassies in Paris and London, Tass Intercepts and prints all communications which do not find their way into the Soviet press. This is done for all the Ambassadors, Ministers, and Deputy Ministers. In military intelligence they are read by everyone down to and including the chief of a directorate. This is how they learn about everything that goes on in the world but does not get into their own press. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1965] OUR MAN IN 'THE KREMLIN-DEAD DROPS AND RED SURVEILLANCE (By Frank Gibney) Colonel Penkovsky's Paris visit was his last to the West. Although his superiors in military intelligence later made several pro- posals to send him on foreign assignments, it became clear that the state security police were watching him. for some reason. Pen- aMMUNI oTACTe 3fftcer in the, rE Volution.: He correctly be, ai"alienations France, especially In Paris. gence methods: . (1) carefully arranged "chance encounters"; (2) meetings at' the homes of British or Americans he might normally be expected to visit; (3) the device of the "dead drop," the inconspicuous hiding place where a package can be left for a later pick up, without the need' for either party to the transaction to meet face to face. On October 21, just 2 weeks after his re- turn from Paris, Penkovsky had his first meeting with one of his contacts. At 9 p.m. he was walking near the Balchug Hotel, smoking a cigarette and holding in his hand a package wrapped in white paper. A man walked up to him, wearing an overcoat, un- buttoned, and also smoking a cigarette. "Mr. Alex," he said in English, "I am from your two friends who send you n big, big welcome." The package changed hands. Another hoard of documents and observations on Soviet military preparations was on its way west- ward. "Alex," for such was his code name, kept on collecting and transmitting information, without skimping on his normal daily rounds. More than ever, he maintained con- tacts with his friends in the Army. He ex- uded confidence. In December Penkovsky resumed meetings with his Western contacts, but the risks in- volved grew ever more apparent. On Jan- uary 5, after he had passed some more film to Mrs. Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a British Embassy attache, in an elaborately casual encounter, he noticed a small car, violating traffic regulations, had swung around to observe them. Later that month the same car appeared again at one of his meetings, a small brown sedan with the license plate BHA 61-45, driven by a man in a black overcoat. Pen- kovsky wrote a letter to a prearranged ad- dress in London, advising, that no further meetings with Mrs. Chisholm be attempted. From that time on, Penkovsky relied on the two remaining methods of communica- tion. He either handed over material In the houses of Westerners, to which he was in- vited in the course of his duties, or relied on the relative anonymity of dead-drops which were, of course, the safest way to communi- cate. But they had their own peculiar sus- penses and horrors. In effect, an agent working through dead-drops finds himself playing a grown-up game of blindman's buff. Through the spring of .1962 Penkovsky's existence was bounded by a collection of these inconspicuous hiding places. Drop No. 1 was located in the doorway of No. 5-6 Pushkin Street, behind a radiator painted dark green. Messages to be sent were placed in a matchbox wrapped in light blue paper, bound with cellophane tape and wire, and hung on a certain hook behind the radiator. When Penkovsky had something to leave there, he was to make a black mark on Post No. 35 on the Kutuzov Prospect. He would then put the materials in the drop, and make two telephone calls to numbers G 3-26-87 and G 3-26-94, each with a set number of rings. And so it went. Such are the com- plexities of a working intelligence operation. Through it all, Penkovsky continued to jot down his observations and his own warning to the West. The following excerpt discusses one of the most chilling aspects of Soviet war preparation: unrestricted chemical warfare. (By Oleg Penkovsky) It is not enough for Krushchev to pre- pare for atomic and hydrogen warfare. He is also preparing for chemical warfare. A special 7th Directorate in the general staff Is Involved In working out methods of chem- ical and bacteriological warfare. The Chief Chemical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense 3s also concerned with the-prof [ems of chemical andbacteriOlogieal warfare. We also have the Voroshilov Mili- tary Academy of Chemical Defense, several Approved ForRRelease: CIA-RDP75-00149ROO06002400' 6-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE military-chemical schools, and scientific, re- selreil institutes, and laboraWries i11 the field of chemistry and bacteriology. They are?all, working on these military projects. Near Moscow there is a special proving ground for chemical defense. I know a new gas has been invented which is colorless, tasteless, and without odor. The gas is avowed to be very effective and highly toxic. The secret of the gas is not known to me. It has been named "American." Why this name was chosen, I can only guess. Many places in the country have experf- mental centers for testing various chemical and bacteriological devices. One such base is in Kaluga. The commanding officer of this base is Nikolay Varentsov, the brother of Marshal Varentsov, Near the city of Kalinin, on'a small island in the Volga, there is a special bacteriological storage place. Here they keep large con- tainers with bacilli of plagues and other contagious diseases. The entire island Is surrounded by barbed wire and is very se- curely guarded. But my readers in the West must not be under any illusions. This is not the only place where there are such con- tainers. ARTILLERY EQUIPPED Soviet artillery units all are regularly equipped with chemical warfare shells. They are at the gunsights, and our artillery is routinely trained in their use. And let there be no doubt; If hostilities should erupt, the Soviet Army would use chemical weapons against its opponents. The politi- cal decision has already been made and our strategic military planners have developed a doctrine which permits the commander In the field to decide whether to use chemical weapons, and when and where. I recently read an article entitled "Princi- ples of the Employment of Chemical Mis- siles" of the top secret military publication "Information Collection of Missile Units and Artillery." It is being distributed this month, August 1961. (This publication is intended to explain the latest in tactical and operational doctrine to the highest rank- ing officers, i.e., major general and above.) The article wastes no time and minces no words. It opens with the statement that under modern conditions highly toxic chem- teal agents are one of the most powerful means of destroying the enemy. There is no mention made of waiting until the enemy uses chemical weapons; there is no reference to the need. for a high-level political decision for the use of such weap- ons. From the start to finish the article makes It clear that this decision has been made, that chemical shells and missiles may be considered just ordinary weapons available to the military commander, to be used rou- tinely by him when the situation calls for it. The article specifically states, "The com- mander of the army (front) makes the deci- sion to use chemical weapons." The authors add that one of the most im- portant uses for chemical missiles will be the destruction of the enemy's nuclear strike capability. Specific mention is made of the Little John, Horrest John, Lacrosse, Corporal, Redstone, and Sergeant units, the width and depth of their dispersed formations under tactical conditions, and their vulnerabilities to the chemical attack. Also American cruise missile and atomic ar- tillery units. The article contains the usual precautions about the necessity to prevent damage to friendly troops, and discussed the operational situations in which chemical weapons could be used to greatest advantage. This is how ~t con_ dudes: "The purpose`of this article is to present the main fundamental principles of using chemical missiles: Those principles should not, under any circumstances, be considered as_.iirnly established, because they can be defined with greater, precision as practical experience is accumulated." Soviet officers generally consider Americans to be extremely lax in matters of training and discipline for defense against chemical at- tack. I have heard that American soldiers even boast of throwing away their gas masks and other protective equipment, claiming they have lost them. I can hardly believe this, but even if it is only partly true, it is a training deficiency which must be corrected immediately. Such crucial flaws in an enemy's defensive armor are not overlooked by Soviet planners. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1965] OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-PENKOVSKY ON LAST ARRIVAL IN Moscow KNEW SOVIET NET WAS CLOSING ON HIM (By Frank Gibney) "I am under observation," Colonel Pen- kovsky said, when his British businessman contact, Greville Wynne, arrived in Moscow for what proved to be his last visit before Penkovsky's arrest. It was July 1962. Penkovsky had continued to produce tre- mendous quantities of information for American and British intelligence, but by now he was considering means of making his escape. He still could not be sure what. the state security police suspected, but he realized that a net of surveillance was tightening around him. A less bold or zealous man would have curtailed his activities. But Penkovsky knew the extent of Khrushchev's buildup in missiles, as well as his continued plans for military provocation over Berlin. He sacrificed caution in his effort to get his warning across to Washington and London. Wynne brought Penkovsky letters from his contacts in ,the West, which improved his spirits. Western intelligence officers had forged a new passpRrt for Penkovsky to use within the Soviet Ulaton in case surveillance increased to the danger point. He had previously discussed the possibility of leav- ing Moscow for Leningrad and somehow mak- ing a rendezvous with a submarine in the Baltic. However farfetched the plan seemed, he was also thinking of some way to get his family out as well. On the fourth of July 1962, Penkovsky at- tended a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, where he apparently succeeded in turning over information on the Soviet mis- sile buildup to U.S. officers. On July 5, he and Wynne had a last meeting, at dinner, at the Peiping Restaurant in Moscow. There they ran into the most obvious kind of sur- veillance by the state security. Penkovsky wrote down this account of the event after it happened. "On approach- ing the Peiping I noticed surveillance of Wynne. I decided to go away without ap- proaching him. Then I became afraid that he might have some return material for me before his departure from Moscow. I de- cided to enter the restaurant and to have dinner with Wynne in plain sight of every- one. "Entering the vestibule I saw that Wynne was surrounded (and that surveillance was either a demonstrative or an inept one). Having seen that there were no free tables, I decided to leave, knowing that Wynne would follow me, I only wanted to find out if he _,had material for me and then to part with him until morning, having told him that I would see him off. I went 100 to 150 meters beyond into a large, through courtyard with a garden. Wynne followed me, and the two of us immediately saw the two detectives following us. Exchanging a few words, we separated. "I was.very indignant about this insolence, X53 and on the following day, I reported officially to my superiors that State security workers had prevented me from dining with a for- eigner whom we respect, have known for a long time, with whom we have relations of mutual trust, with whom I have been working for a long time, etc. I said that our guest felt uncomfortable when he saw that he was being tendered such attention. "My superiors agreed with me that this was a disgrace, and Levin (the State security representative) was equally indignant about the surveillance. Levin said that the com- mittee and I as its representative, granted the necessary courtesies to Wynne and that we (State security) do not have any claims on him." Pankovsky's cool-headed bluff bought him time-almost 3 months' worth. He con- tinued to photograph secret documents in the general staff library, relying on his good con- nections in Soviet military circles to hold off further action by the State security police. Later, the Moscow press strenuously at- tempted to play down Penkovsky's influence and associations with Soviet generals and marshals. Izvestia, for example, called him "a rank and file official whose contacts and acquain- tances did not go beyond a limited circle of restaurant habitues, drunkards, and phil- anderers." How true this characterization was may be gaged from the papers themselves, a record of which the regime was, of course, ignorant. In the following excerpt, Penkovsky describes one of the many intimate gatherings at which he hobnobbed with the Kremlin hierarchy: Marshal Varenstov's birthday party in Sep- tember 1961. (By Oleg Penkovsky) Marshal Varentsov's birthday party was held at his country home. Many guests were invited, including the minister of defense, Marshal Malinovsky. My whole family, in- cluding even my mother, was invited long in advance. Yekaterina Karpovna, Varen- tsov's wife, asked me to be master of cere- monies (temadan). On the evening of September 16, 1961, the guests began to arrive: Marshal Malinovsky with his wife; Chruayev, Khrushchev's right- hand man in the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.); Lieu- tenant Ryabchikov; Major General Semenov, and many others. All the military were in civilian clothes with the exception of Malinovsky, who came wearing his uniform. Some of those invited could not come because they were busy, many of them out of town on business trips. The most important guests, of course, were, Malinovsky and Churayev. Both arrived in Chaikas (the largest Soviet luxury car). Malinovsky presented Varentsov with a large (3-liter) bottle of champagne, Chura- yev gave him a large wooden carved eagle, someone even gave Sergey Sergeyevich a black dog. The best and the most original presents were those from me and my family. They were the things I had bought in London. Varentsov openly admitted it by declaring loudly: "My boy has really outdone himself this time." And my presents went from one guest to another. Everyone asked where and how I managed to get such beautiful things. Mrs. Varentsov and my wife quietly explained to the guests about my latest trip to London. The answer was always the same: "Oh, well, that of course explains it." MOTHER'S QUESTION At some point, while the party was in full swing, my mother approached Malinovsky and out of a clear sky asked him: "Forgive me, an old woman, Comrade Minister, my dear Rodion Yakovlevich, tell me please will there be a war? This question worries all of Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149ROO060024001:6-6- 'r-d For ease 0 LA-k DP75-00149f 000600240016-6 STCAL ~tbtfi SNA'I January' ~ rYi tie ashngton 7Sov. il, T$$5j strut bons 3or Wt,sterri enacts-tie_C.olo-_ Bien s actii,at force equals thaw o 8Zf mega- o i e t force w s not expect.erl gr a pt and met Greville Wynne in the passenger contacts and, above all, destroyed the incrim- megatons. Wing loom inattng materials in his desk drawer. Why did Khrushchev unexpectedly begin sing his Party card to Overawe customs He did not do this precisely because he to conduct new nuclear tests? (The Soviets resumed nuclear testing on and and e __ . r .rw. -- e itr t westbound plane, an S.A,S. flight headed world. All nuclear tests have had and some still The first phase deals with s h o t . ase p w foCopenhagen. In the following excerpt from the papers, have he discusses the So- the explosive force in TNT equivalents. ing on the heels of their surveillance of the last he wrote , one m atk a Peking Restaurant the night before, viet nuclear menace-and Khrushchev's dis- In these tests the bombs were dropped The ecial masts s f ft . p rom or this hasty departure must inevitably have regard of any test ban in. 1961 and 1962. from aircra deepened the suspicions of the State Been- (We must remember that Khrushchev second phase tests nuclear payloads lifted rl~y Police. But Penkovsky knew that agreed to a test ban in 1963, only after the by missiles. -Wynne was in some danger. United States faced him clown in Cuba.) The present tests are almost exclusively on =--- * _- _ - lay "`Ce ----,Y) are conducted with missiles. safety, t Wynne's thre c is to assure Man of our nuclear explosions (tests) o months the colonel y Why Is Khrushchev pushing these nuclear xt thre n th e x e e e ver succeeded in getting several packets of in- have been conducted in the central part of tests? Why is he unwilling to sign the a fio?mail" on out to his Western contacts, most- the U.S.S.R., mostly in Kazakhstan. Some agreement forbidding nuclear weapons tests? of the smaller tests were not noticed at all B st of our missiles have not even " ' ecause mo and pre- dead drops ly through the use of arranged messages. and were not recorded by the Western states. passed the necessary tests, let alone of mis- On September 5,'he brought some film to The large nuclear explosions are reported sile production, as regards quality and there an American Embassy reception, but he could by Tass and the Soviet press, but nothing is have been many instances of missiles and find no safe Opportunity to transfer it. ever said about the smaller ones. At the gen- satellites exploding in the air or disappearing sts bein f t i e mes now o g completely. 1'Thenext day he tried to establish con- eral staff we somet ne of-his British sources That conducted on a, certain type of nuclear But Khrushchev persistently does every- it1'? ;ee} o w say about this. If Tass keeps silent, then we . Y He wants to seize the initiative and to show ti htened t that he is ahead in the field of silent too k th W , . eep e es On October 22, according to official Soviet 1 Cord, Col. Oleg Penkovsky was arrested by Tests of various new types of nuclear missile production, as regards quality as well r presentatives of the State Security, in Moe- weapons are conducted daily. Nuclear test as quantity. c ii, and. taker, to Lubianka Prison. On explosions take place more often than re- Khrushchev and our scientists are still N vember 2, Greville Wynne was kidnaped ported by Tass or the Soviet press. All this quite far from being able to prove such a it Budapest, where he had gone to make pre- talk about the Soviet Union advocating the superiority; but they are working hard to im- l nary arran4ements for a mobile trade prohibition of nuclear tests is nothing but prove all types of missile weapons. edition in Eastern Europe. He was flown lies. General Kupin says there are insufficient t Moscow in an aircraft commanded by a Khrushchev will fire anyone who mentions defense facilities in case of war, particularly S ate aecLirity general and` thrown into Lu- complete suspension of nuclear tests. He is as regards defense against radioactive sub- b anka for interrogation. not ready for it. ^M1N^^_^ stances. _ _ ul, a t rohibi+in n .. lon i? n p g .. g d defense plants that every hing Is u11de1 ynne was-to last ullif six months. clear tests only alter ho b e co111os convi? ce ? hat i? lly'betra.yed Penknvslcy? It was that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United control and that there is no danger of con- ouse srne played by an- all-seeing State tary purposes. The negotiations could last Many become ill, after working for 6 and to temporize with, in an effort to learn nuclear warheads. Almost all the ore con- low radioactive leakage. ore about his contacts, sources, etc. taming uranium comes to the Soviet Union (EDITOI'S NOTE.-On August 25, 1962, Colo- x nutp_ is~?pying was discovered, it from Czechoslovakia? nel Penkovsky added the following personal ust have'been made just before his arrest. been round in China, out they are very 111- entries with a date amxea. it was the last Me State Security's original discovery significant. Soviet monazite sands and ore thing ever received from him.) ___ t . ti l l rich either in r Lava already t the f t th t _ - .. -- _~_____i ts no ar cu ar y used o ac a a t e coursg of the investigation, the State Se- materials, it is small wonder that our govern- "neighbors" continue to study me. There is Bven~though Penkovsky's position in In.- ore deposits are in the Congo. I a!.i very far from exaggerating the dangers. elligence permitted such associations, there When Lumumba was temporarily in power StiL', I am an optimist and I try to evaluate The expensive gifts he brought back from Egypt and Sudan. The aircraft were Of the work. The most important thing is that lso aroused some suspicion, Wynne still be- not land on the Sudanese airfield, and other tinuc this work. To tell the truth about the f th i i or ss on e Soviet system-it is the goal of my life. And eves that Penkovsky was first suspected of countries would not give perm lacklnark6teering-not an unusual crime Soviet aircraft to land for refueling. If I succeed in contributing my little bricks -A good friend of mine, Maj. Aleksey Our- to this great ziiohg Joviet officials. +^he^~ ^~+H cause, there can be no greater ension with the West was built up by Khru- this mission was toreesittablish Soviet control [From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1965] ` nl o the C ng ? h e ra u a._ Tronlcally, the same collision course fore bomb. This was the first test explosion Y v'raiiK x' .., _ . -.. _ i the So iet i f f n v pornsiblbie 4 1 for r thtersifi" -ed sw ve surveillance ~ that An R-12 missile was used in this test. The of Session Hall of the Supreme Court of the he ein inten se n _ 'r ~ +h--- be?...n e, ..h...i 9r the he + Ks +riol to the U R op was o an quad the secret drawer with Penkovsky's Later, when a 50?-megaton bomb was of the U.S.S.R. O. V. Penkovsky and the bet een Gre- -'_,_ _._`.__ i .,na _ . -._- ' - ? - of Brit t py w urprise the a Appr? ved.?or f i - ~5-0E 14 ROG06O0240O16.6 Approved For Release: CIA-RDP75-00149R0006002400116-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 255 Ville Wynne." (Information release, Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court.) The trial of Colonel Penkovsky and Grevill . Wynne lasted all of 4 days, and one of these days was occupied by a closed session. The verdict was never in doubt. Penkovsky was sentenced to death, Wynne tt 16 years' imprisonment. Both defendants confessed their guilt, as agreed on during the long months of brutal state security interrogation. Wynne dis- played some obvious reservations, however, and he left little doubt about the extent of his coaching and coercion. Penkovsky had agreed to the humiliation of a Soviet "show" trial for only one reason: to safeguard the lives of his family. As Wynne later said, it was clear that he had made a bargain with his state security interrogators. If he played the game, as they ordered it, his wife and children would be spared the imprisonment they might or- dinarily have expected, as close relatives of an enemy of the state. He was probably safe in assuming the bargain would be kept. The Stalinist terror has left such a bad taste in, the mouth of all Russians that reprisals against a political prisoner's family are generally unpopular. Penkovsky's wife and children never sus- pected the dangerous crusade to which he had committed himself. He naturally wanted to spare them'the worst of its conse- quences. WYNNE FREED IN EXCHANGE Wynne was released in 1964, in exchange for the Soviet spy Konon Melody, who under the name of Gordon Lonsdale had been passing information to Moscow from London. Although "Lonsdale's" espionage against the British can hardly be compared to the magni- tude of Penkovsky's disclosures to the West, he was a professional Soviet intelligence offi- cer and they wanted him back in Moscow. The very fact that a trial had to be held must have been embarrassing to the Krem- lin. But Penkovsky had to have a public trial. Eight British and U.S. diplomats in Moscow had been declared persona non grata for their connections with him. A foreign national, Wynne was directly implicated. But Penkovsky himself was too big a fish to dismiss with the minimal notice reserved for most such offenses. The wave of trans- fers and demotions in the Soviet intelligence service and the army, following Penkovsky's arrest, was too large to avoid explaining. (Some 300 intelligence officers alone were hastily recalled to Moscow. Finally Penkovsky's associates in the army were too highly placed to avoid the most pub- lic sort of warning. TRIAL PLANNED 6 MONTHS For 6 months the prosecution had worked out the details of those 4 days in court. Wynne was interrogated steadily, since the day-November 3, 1962, when he was flown to Moscow after his abduction In Budapest by Soviet and Hungarian security men. Inside the Lubianka Prison, the State Se- curity arranged a meeting with both Pen- ovsky and Wynne. There Penkovsky begged ynne to cooperate in a public trial. Wynne reed to cooperate within limits. After 6 lpless months in a solitary cell of the ibianka, there was little option left to him, E`ie feared also, that without a public trial, nothing would be known of his fate. In the pretrial interrogations Penkovsky, who ad a rough time of it, made no attempt to disguise his motives and actions. He told his interrogators that he had acted not pri- marily to help the West, but in the best in- terests of his. own people, the Russians. This was hardly a defense which a Soviet court would permit him to repeat in public. (It is of interest that the. flual statements Of both defendants were, made in a closed cow t session.) The two defense attorneys assigned to Wynne and Penkovsky went.through the mo- tions of talking to their "clients," but, only after the interrogators had finished. (Wynne's attorney, who spent most of his time in court agreeing with the.prosecution, later presented him with a capitalist-sized bill.) DEFENDANTS REHEARSED When the trial was finally staged, both defendants had been rehearsed thoroughly, even to the point of visiting the courtroom in advance. The military court, presided over by Lt. Gen. V. V. Borisoglebskly, called four witnesses, two of them acquaintances of Penkovsky's, and produced nine experts to certify the equipment found in Penkov- sky's apartment, the security nature of the information which he gave, and other things. In the orderly process of question and answer the whole story of Penkovsky's es- pionage against the Soviet Union was re- peated, from the first meeting with Wynne in Moscow and the confrontation with the British and American intelligence officers in London. Lt. Gen. A. G. Gornyy, the chief military prosecutor, summarized it at the outset: "? * * the accused Penkovsky is an oppor- tunist, a careerist and a morally decayed per- son who took the road of treason and be- trayal of his country and' was employed by imperialist intelligence services. - "By the end of 1960 he attempted to get in touch with the American intelligence serv- ice, further exploiting the undeserved trust placed in him and his position as deputy head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scien- tific Research Work-having, through the nature of his work, the opportunity to meet foreigners visiting the Soviet Union as mem- bers of the various scientific and cultural delegations." NO DOUBT OF GUILT There was no doubt that Penkovsky had engaged in the most serious sort of espio- nage. The catalog of material confiscated in his apartment as read off at the Soviet trial would in itself offer ample grounds for an espionage conviction. "During the search at Penkovsky's apart- ment, in addition to the already mentioned records with the telephone numbers of the foreign intelligence officers, six message post- cards with Instructions for them, the report and the exposed rolls of film, the following articles were discovered in a secret hiding place installed in his desk, and were attached to the file as tangible evidence: a forged passport, six cipher pads, three Minox cam- eras and a description of them, two sheets of specially treated paper for writing secret text, a memorandum with an indication of the frequencies on which Penkovsky re- ceived instructional radio transmission from the foreign intelligence services, the draft of a report from Penkovsky to the intelli- gence headquarters, the article which Pen- kovsky had received from the foreign in- telligence services and which he intended to publish in the Soviet Union, 15 unexposed rolls of film for the Minox camera, and vari- ous instruction manuals provided by the foreign intelligence services-the Sonlya (Sony) radio receiver which he had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he used-to receive enciphered radio messages from the intelligence headquarters, and the typewriter on which Penkovsky typed his reports." There was no doubt, either, whom Pen- kovsky had been dealing with. Witness the prosecutor's angry tirade: "A leading role in this belongs to the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency of the United States-J e?s tpport of the most adventur- ist circles iz the, United, States., bike a, giant octopus It extends its tentacles into all corners of the earth, supports a tremendous number of spies and secret informants, con- tinually organizes plots and murders, provo- cations and diversions. Modern techniques are put to the service of espionage: from the miniature Minox cameras which you see be- fore you up to space satellites, spies in the sky." IMPORTANT FACTS HIDDEN But what the Soviet prosecutors could not do was admit the two most Important facts in the whole case: (1) Penkovsky's real iden- tity as a colonel in Military Intelligence and the real extent of his contacts with the Soviet hierarchy; and (2) Penkovsky's real motive in betraying the Soviet regime. In the Soviet record, he could be a drunk- ard, a philanderer, greedy, and a girl chaser- all these motives the prosecution clumsily at- tempted to adduce. But the Communist sys- tem is too brittle and insubstantial to admit that such a highly placed official could revolt against it because he thought the system was bad and wrong. As a result the trial showed up as a farce. (Even witnesses from military intelligence had to be disguised as officers from the edu- cational branch of the Ministry of Defense.) The Soviet prosecutors left only an agonizing question mark, when they tried to show how such a brilliant and promising officer had gone wrong. Time and time again Penkovsky's past credentials were certified: a war hero, a brilliant officer (and even more brilliant if one included his real record in intelligence), and a responsible Soviet official. Then suddenly came the fall in 1960. Despite all the prosecutor's attempts to trace the beginning of careerism, it was, as they depicted it, a fall as abrupt as original sin and about as rationally explainable. An ex- traordinary gap yawned between the able, hardworking, trusted Soviet official and the cringing specimen of "moral depravity" which General Gornyy presented, in a sum- mation titled "Penkovsky's path from ca- reerism and moral degradation to treachery." "Penkovsky is dead," the prosecutor told Izvestia and the world, a few days after the 'trial ended. "The sentence was carried out on May 16, in the second half of the day. When it was announced to him that the Supreme' Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had denied his petition for mercy and he was to be executed, there was not a trace of the poseur's manner which he had maintained in court. He met death like a despicable coward." So ended the career of the most extraor- dinary volunteer spy of this century. The free world is forever in his debt. (By Greville Wynne) (The following description of Oleg Penkov- sky was written after Wynne returned from Soviet captivity, Wynne was the last west- erner to see Penkovsky alive.) Oleg Penkovsky was a most extraordinary man. It was an unforgettable experience to accompany him, particularly during his first visits to London and Paris, and to see the tremendous impact of our free society on a decent, and by Soviet standards, sophisticated man, but a man who had been sheltered all his life inside the prison of the Soviet system. It was the people in the West who im- pressed him most. He was amazed, for example, to find that the assistants in de- partment stores were clean, neat in dress and well groomed, that nearly all the young ladies there were attractive, smiling and anxious to please. I had often visited the gloomy GUM de- partment store in Moscow and the 'drab shops in Gorky street with their drab, surly attendants. So I had some idea of the mental contrast he must have been making. Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R00060024001=6-& LLApproved For Release" : 'CIA-RQP75-00149 R000600240016-6 CONGRES IONAL - RECO1W - SENATE January 14, 1966 `ire was -interested in religion. Ile had _ Penkovsky first read it in the Course of a 'money,' which means that such a person n`&c ee' i"Taptizea himself by his pious briefing sesedoil In Moscow while prepay- has a lot of money. ft 4inr ? `Tb Y:nnrinn one day we. were pasting ia-g for a mission to the United States, which The other side of the question, specifically O loo around.opTe" of the extent to which Soviet espio- body. t Americans encourage id th It b ' a e sa formalized, its od, He was fascinated. "This is go he rage has expanded, In fact, can. d. `"perhaps the religious doctrine is not widespread undercover activities in the any method of getting rich. ntirely correct, but at least it gives us a United States. American bourgeois propaganda tries in ,principle to guide our life. At home in the Although the language of the Prikhodko every way to convince the population that Soviet Union we have nothing. There are lecture in professorial, its content is hair anyone can make money if he is sufficiently o j~lincip]es-only what the Party tells raising. It is literally a professional working resourceful. it.anual for Soviet intelligence officers in the Such a one-sided upbringing engenders in _"_ W4=_V0r we went he was accepted as my United States, complete with instructions on some of the people an indifference to every- Mend... This, first amazed him? but. also how to recruit American agents to do their thing unconnected with business, profits, Such a terrific con- spying work---tea, most-sini.ster variety of how- and gain. - The American love of money can d him immensel le s y a e . cast from the Soviet system where it is still to-do-it book. be exploited by paying an agent for his work highly dangerous for citizens to mix socially As his first step, Colonel Prikhodk.o tries in order to increase his personal interest in with Westerners. to give his pupils-most of them Soviet in- working for us. rompt and equitable ments must be Pa ' . p y s or lieutenant He was bitter about the Soviet regime. telligence officers of major He would weep, quite literally, when he colonel's rank---an objective introduction to This disciplines the agent and improves the talked about its misdeeds and the sufferings the strange ways and customs of Americans, Soviet officer's authority. . or.unhapptness of his friends in the Soviet regarded in his Soviet classroom as virtually To encourage an agent, monthly payments ,Union, citizens of another world. are increased or bonuses, awards, or valu- At the very, end of his Paris trip he worried coMMUMST CONTACT able gifts are given. . Thus, for example, agent B, who was on ld t s ay He knew he cou bout going back. shall never forget that day when I picked Although Co:[. Prikhodko was trying a monthly salary, reduced his production objective, his guidebook is a weird article appreciably. His attendance at meetings and up Oleg In the early morning for a drive with observed reality constantly being con- visits to dead drops were irregular. Despite to the airport in thick fog. Then we waited fused with the necessity to interpret every- rebukes by the intelligence officer, the agent's for over 4 hours for the plane to take off. thing in a Communist context. While the work did not improve. almost stayed. His face was tense with colonel finds the Americans, on the one hand, The intelligence officer decided that he phis decision, Finally he made up his mind, turncd-to me~nd-said, "Oh Oreville, I must energetic, enterprising, and open people, re- would have to use ninducement. sourceful, courageous and industrious, they With the Center's permission he began to go back.- I have more work to do." are at,the same time demoralized by bour- the only agent for those actually months worked and 'KNEW HE WAS WATCHED g' Bois societYandconstantlYdiverted by' mo= fog pay the which agent and . ` It was then July 1962, and he knew that nopolists" into spending their time in silly performed his operational activities. the State Security was watching him. He amusements ir.:stead of "meditative and de- Soon B realized' that further backsliding was a lonely man in` those last months in liberative activity." would result only in the loss of all his extra Moscow. 'What a burden he carried. They have a natural love of freedom and income, He began to perform his tasks more The more I knew him, the more I realized independence, but they are always swayed by efficiently. that Penkovsky was an extraordinarily high- money and indifferent to anything not con- An American's circle of interests is often minded man. He did what he did because nected with business. rather small. Many Americans do not read it was the one way he, as an individual, If this clinical Soviet appraisal of Ameri- books. Their main interest lies in advertise- could strike back at a system that had de- cans is unintentionally funny, it is also ments, sports news, and cartoons; on the based his country. I never saw him waiver frightening. For the Soviet intelligence of- front pages they only glance at the large Ffrom this basic decision from the moment we ficers who study lectures like this are the sensational headlines. first met, very men the gremlin relies on to make Generally speaking, bourgeois society de- ' He, had thought things through many estimates of American responses to Soviet moralizes people. months before I first made contact with him. actions. Every American family tries to save money He was willing to put up with the basic de- THE LECTURE for a rainy day; therefore a certain amount is ceptions of spying and the tremendous strain Agent communications and agent handling set aside from each pay check. of this lonely life, because he believed in a involve first and last working with people, Wall Street does everything possible to cause. He believed simply that a free society as a rule from the bourgeois world. For keep Americans from devoting their free time should emerge in the Soviet Union, and that this work to be successful, it is necessary that to meditation and 'deliberation. Movies, it could only come by toppling the only Soviet officers know these people well, their cheap concerts, boxing, parks, horse races, government he knew. He was a heroic figure. characteristics and their personality traits, baseball, football, restaurants-all these are I shall never forget him. and the political and economic circumstances used to divert the masses from the realities - ;which condition their behavior. around them. [Prom the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965] In the recruitment of agents, preference In general, an Americann's wants Consist of C OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-SPY LECTURE should be iven to Americans because they -having his own autonia BROUGHT -OUT-PENKOVSKY SMUGGLED are highly trusted both in the United States apartment, and a time. Most Ameri- ri ofagent urpe. deliver It Is much cans, oth men andgwom bile, a comfortable n, smoke. TRAINING, DATA To WARN AMERICA and for (By Frailk Gibney) CONCERNED OVER CLOTHES for the "Center" "i.e., intelligence head- (A Soviet Spy's Guidebook to the United quarters in Moscow" from the United States y States: a -top-secret -lecture, given to Soviet to one of theWest European countries (a and outward appearances. They try always intelligence officers 1n Moscow at the 1Vtili- neutral country or an ally of the United to have a clean suit, well pressed with a tary-Diplomatic Academy, by it. Col. I. E. States) and mail to our residencies In the good crease in the trourers, a clean shirt, and Prikhodko, officially titled: "Characteristics United States, shoes well polished. They send their suits of Agent Communications and of Agent An intellignce officer, however, Who does regularly to the cleaner and their shirts to Handling In the U.S.A."). not know the characteristics of the Ameri- the laundry, both of which are everywhere In. the vast amount of intelligence material can way of life or who neglects those aspects in the United States. It is customary-" which Col. Oleg Penkovsky smuggled out of cannot be trusted to handle and control change white b shirts noted, and therefore, daily. Moscow-Soviet prosecutors at his trial in American agents working for us, at should erefore, than an 1968 themselves, admitted he had passed on TRAITS. STUDIED telligence officer who has an outwai 11 ,000 separate photographed Items-Penkov- slovenly appearance will- not comma sky ajaparently thought this one item, In The way of life, customs, temper, de- respect from an American agent. particular, should receive the widest dis- meaner, and personality traits of Americans In American clothing;, light colors pre- tributlon. have specific significance. Most Americans dominate. Americans like loose-fitting shoes, are energetic, enterprising, and open people, as a rule one or two sizes larger than neces- alnt tralSoviet g lecture was given 19 with with a great sense of humor. sary. some acquaint intelligence officers They can be described as having business In his free time, when not at work, and of the problems and opportunities wuni of acumen and as bein resourceful, coura- especially in the United States. g pecially during the summer, the American users short- genus and industrious orts clothes: light tr ears s o p w ,.,s SERVED TN THE UNITED STATES 1 11 IF Shirts, no nec tie. Sunglasses are it The over-all situation and the absolute sleeved, Its author, Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko, had power of money in the United States arouses common use. orem oosire in many people-to make ~r ei and relaffixed.a American's behavior hew We York, from as to 1955, under "cover" just 14 'Many Americans liki of a post with the Soviet Mission to the In describing a person, Americans often to keep their hands in their pockets and chev Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R00060Q240016F6 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Americans listen to the weather forecast and, if bad weather is predicted, they take an umbrella and raincoat; Americans do not wear rubbers. Both men and women use umbrellas. Thus, before going to a meeting, an intelligence officer should listen to the weather forecast and, if necessary, take an umbrella or a raincoat. Americans like to spend their time in bars. Many bars have no tables. Customers sit on high round stools next to the bar. As a rule, bars do not provide snacks or hot dishes. One can order only drinks: whisky, gin, beer, etc. In order not to attract undue attention, the intelligence officer must know how to or- der sufficiently well. It is not enough, for example, to ask, "Give me a glass of beer." It is also necessary to name the brand of beer, "Schlitz," .. Rhefngold," etc. For the cus- tomers' amusement, most proprietors install a television set in a corner above the bar. Customers often sit over a single glass of beer for several hours watching television pro- grams American drugstores, especially in large cities, have almost become department stores. Therefore they are never without customers. Drugstores can be used to hold short meet- ings with agents, as well as for other agent activities, e.g., signaling, clandestine phone calls, Even American movie theaters are distinc- tive. Most movie theaters in large cities are open from 12 noon t2 1 a.m. Moviegoers enter as soon as they get their tickets, and they may take any unoccupied seat. Films are shown continuously, Americans are not content with only a single feature. There- fore, movie theater proprietors show two films, one after the other, which last 3 to 4 hours. Intelligence officers can make extensive use of movie theaters when organizing agent communications by spending a certain amount of time in them before a meeting. The fact is that there are few people in most movie theaters, especially on weekdays dur- ing working hours. GOLF COURSE MEETINGS Golf is the most popular sport among the well to do in the United States. Agent meetings can be held at golf courses as easily as in other athletic clubs. During the week there are very few people at the golf'courses. On weekdays the intelligence officer and his agent can arrive at the golf course (prefer- ably at different times, 20 to 30 minutes apart), each can begin to play alone, and at a previously designated time .can meet at, let us say, the 16th hole or at some other hole (there is a total of 18 holes). Saturdays and Sundays are less suitable days for holding agent meetings at golf courses because on these days many players gather, tournaments are held, and single play is not permitted. Golf courses are found on the edges of wooded areas or parks in broken terrain where there are many hid- den areas. These hidden areas are the best places for holding meetings. In some cases, meetings can be held in clubhouse restaurants. To hold successful meetings at a golf course, one should learn the conditions there ahead of time. A basic requirement is to know the game and how to play, it. There- fore students should learn this game while still here in Moscow at the academy. Golf club membership is rather expensive, however. Also, not all clubs are equally ac- cessible tp our Intelligence officers. It is even difficult for local residents, to say noth- ing of foreigners, to get into some golf clubs, if they do not have a certain position in society. With club memberships so difficult to ob- tain it is advisable to use public golf courses. The technical knowledge of the average American is rather high. In his everyday life he makes wide use of machines, equip- ment, and instruments. Therefore the train- ing of an American agent in operational technology is all the easier. Yet it should be emphasized that the na- tional characteristics of American agents are such that they are often careless in their operations. Americans make poor conspira- tors. They therefore need extremely careful briefing. When necessary, the intelligence officer must brief the agent on how to smuggle ma- terial out of an installation, how to return it undetected, and how to reproduce the ma- terial at home or at work. .It is very impor- tant that our American agents know how to develop proper and plausible cover stories for their extra income and for their periodic absences, The Soviet intelligence officer can skill- fully put to use such American traits as efficiency, resourcefulness, boldness, and per- severance. These will help an American agent to carry out operational tasks and to exploit his operational capabilities fully. Americans, to a larger degree than repre- sentatives of many other peoples, have a natural love of freedom and independence, and do not like discipline. The officer must respect this characteristic and not resort to open pressure on the agent. Realizing that the majority of Americans are open, straightforward, and happy people with a great sense of humor, the intelligence officer can prepare for and conduct a con- versation with an agent that is not dull but lively and witty. When preparing for a meeting he must try to anticipate the agent's questions, pre- pare good answers to them, and at the meet- ing to answer the agent in such a manner that the agent will feel that the intelligence officer is being frank with him. Americans, like other people, are patriots. They are proud of their country's achieve- ments; they honor their national heroes, and value their cultural monuments. Therefore the intelligence officer must be careful not to indiscriminately criticize things American, but must remember that an unfortunate statement, for example, about some popular U.S. President (George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jef- ferson) might offend the agent. A negative result might also come from an officer's un- derrating American culture. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 19651 OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-HOW RUSSIAN AGENTS COMMUNICATE WITH SPIES IN THE UNITED STATES (By Frank Gibney) One of the most significant documents Which Col. Oleg Penkovaky managed to smuggle out of Moscow to the West was the top-secret lecture given by Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko to a select audience of Soviet in- telligence officers in Moscow, in 1961. Titled "Characteristics of Agent Commu- nications and Agent Handling in the United States," the lecture is nothing less than a detailed instruction manual for the use of Soviet spies and their American agents, in spying on U.S. secrets. Probably never in the history of espionage has a document like this ever been surfaced to public view. In yesterday's excerpt from the Prikhodko lecture, the Soviet "American expert," who had once done spying work in New York under cover of his nominal work as a Soviet U.N. delegation member, gave his Moscow listeners an outline of American national characteristics, with special reference to the virtues and defects of Americans in espionage work. The following excerpt goes Into the details of how Soviet intelligence spies in the Approved For Release : 257 United States, the signals Soviet officers use, the places they like to meet their agents, the, methods they use to avoid surveillance and detection by the FBI. THE LECTURE Under modern conditions, when the U.S.A., as the principal imperialist power, is prepar- ing to unleash a surprise war with the mass employment of nuclear/missile weapons, the basic task of our strategic agent intelligence is to give early warning of U.S. preparations for an armed attack against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries. In view of the probable nature of a future war, an important task is the systematic collection of the most complete data on the following questions: 1. The locations of U.S. missile bases, de- pots for nuclear weapons, plants producing atomic weapons and missiles of various des- ignations, scientific research institutes, and laboratories developing and perfecting wea- pons of mass destruction. 2. Information as to the nature and re- sults of scientific research work in the field of creating new models of nuclear and mis- sile weapons and improving existing ones. 3. The status of antiaircraft defense, in- cluding the entire radar detection and warn- ing system. 4. The plans of U.S. military commanders on the use of nuclear/missile weapons. 5. U.S. military preparations in the vari- ous theaters of operations. If the imperialists unleash a war, the United States will be the target of a crush- ing retaliatory strike causing damage to all the most important political and economic centers of that country. The most impor- tant tack of intelligence is the prompt re- porting of objectives in the United States against which we plan to carry out the first strikes. Soviet intelligence, therefore, should adopt timely measures to guarantee the security of its intelligence net. To achieve this it is necessary to disperse our operating "resi- dences" and to move some valuable single agents some distance outside the limits of large cities. As for agent nets engaged in collecting intelligence on atomic and missile bases, they should preferably consist of in- dividual sources equipped with radio having direct communications with the "Center" in Moscow. MEETING VULNERABLE A meeting between intelligence officer and agent is one of the most vulnerable means of communications. Therefore, in organiz- ing meetings, our intelligence officers must anticipate everything in order to guarantee security. In the United States where the counter- intelligence effort of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is highly developed, planning and preparation for a meeting are of the greatest importance. In planning a meeting one should give the greatest consideration to the characteristics of the American people and of the country, which we have already mentioned, the working and family situation of the agent, his capabilities, etc. Meetings should be varied as to time of day, days of the week, and dates of the month. For example, meetings should not be held on the fifth day of each month, on Wednesday of every week, or consistently at 8 p.m., because such consistency in the ac- tivities of an intelligence officer makes the work of American counterintelligence easier. Under present working conditions in the United States, one should start for a meeting not later than 2 to 3 hours before the sched- uled time, and establish a good "cover" story for the meeting. For example: An intelligence officer in the United States had a Sunday meeting sched- uled for the latter part of the day. After breakfast he took his family for a walk in CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 roued-F.iar-R lease.-.~:[A RDP7-5-00-1498000600240016-6 CONORESSION'AL R2ECOIYD SENATE 7_77 7 he? park. FIe usually took such a walk every - We 'do not recommend that meetings be .4y. On the way, he invited a friend: Held in the area between 42d and 34th he_ park and talked and glanced through town and therefore has the widest coverage ewspapers and magazines which they had by the police and by counterintelligence. ut at a stand while the children played Likewise, it is unadvisable to hold meet- The all visited-the z66-fog ether, ings in the vicinity of the U.N. Building t the advertising dis=play and decided to see permanent representattons of various coun- new new film. They all went inside. The tries to the U.N. and, above all, the delega- previously selected route. The meeting 880 Park Avenue), nor in the vicinity of was successful. Toward evening the intelli- -large banks, jewelry stores, etc. Bence officer and his family returned home WASHINGTON DETAILS after a restful Sunday. In Washington, meetings should not be 'however. 'As rule, the agent does not work departmental buildings, and other govern- ;the evening and does not have to ask per- mental offices, large banks, stores, and res- rmission of his boss to leave. In addition, taurants are located. Neither should they evenings provide the greatest security. It is be held on the main streets of the city hIIOt,reconlmended, however, to hold meetings or in areas where foreign embassies and, -#n a"park, because, unlike Nuropeans, Amer- especially, the embassies of the U.S.S.R. and leans visit parks only during the day. other countries of the Socialist camp are lo- At the approach of darkness nobody uses cated. Meetings should also not be held in the parks. At that time of the day only areas near military objectives or in the Negro criminal elements and persons who are district. {>!tientaIly in can be found in the parks. In Generally, an. operation can be compro- Ithe press one can find special warnings con- mised through the improper selection of a earning the danger in going to parks in the meeting site. For example, an intelligence evening. It is not unusual for the news- Officer, who dad not know the city well, papers to publish detailed accounts of rapes once selected a meeting place with an agent ahd murders which were committed in the on a street corner in the evening. A large 1parks'during the night. bank stood on this corner. choosing a meeting place, it is necessary The intelligence officer arrive for the of course to consider the character of the meeting exactly at the appointed time. The Country as a whole and, above all, the char- agent was late. The intelligence officer was iecteristics of the area. As a whole, condi- there for less than 2 minutes when a police- f tions in the cities of New York and Wash- 'man approached, asked him what he was lligton, for example, are favorable for the doing there, and requested him to move organization of agent communications, along. The intelligence officer had to leave The existence of a subway in New York quickly. In addition, two plainclothesmen helps in locating different places in the city. followed him until he entered a subway sta- It should be borne in mind, however, that tion. The meeting was not held. the subwa system there is quite compli- New York and Washington have numer- yy ous restaurants, many' of them representing tore eaten'and it o use sho us studied for carefully be- different nati nalities. Each restaurant has planning to os operational its own distinctive characteristics. One may f pure specialize in steaks (the most expensive In New York it is easy to establish a cover steaks are sirloin and T-bone steak) another story for going downtown either during the is seafood; some restaurants have orchestras, day or at night; because New York has many others have not. Before selecting a certain public places. Skillful use of transportation restaurant as a meeting site, one should facilities makes it possible to make a good learn everything about the restaurant; the check for the detection of surveillance. system of service, the type of customers, { Finally, an intelligence officer who speaks whether it has a bad reputation with the with an accent in New York is quite accept- police, etc. able since a large segment of the city's popu- It is the practice in all restaurants to tip lotion speaks with an accent. the waitress 10 percent of the amount shown On the other hand the organization and on the check, "utilization of agent communications in Washington are full of difficulties because of Depending on the nature of the agent a the city's small size, its limited number of, -operation, the officer and agent may sit at public places, no subways, and an inadequate the same table and hold the meeting during public transportation system, especially in dinner. Or they may sit at separate tables, +.>,e sub ,~bs keeping only visual contact, for the purpose -i -Differences exist net only among the sec- tions and cities of the United States, but also among different sections of cities, often with- 1n tile very same borough or area. 17or example, let us take Manhattan, which is the busine s area of New York. Negro Har- lam I. unsuitable for the organization of { agent communications in Manhattan. It is located north of Central Park, and the Chi- nese quarter,, located "downtown, is also { difficult for agents. _- Extreme squalor dis- tinguishes the Chinese quarter. A properly dressed person will stand out sharply there. As for Negro Harlem,- white people cross it only by automobile. A white person is Unsafe there, because the Negroes regard every white person who comes there as a DuIfos y seeker who came to view them much as people go to the zoo to view the animals AVOID TisE PRESS American stores periodically hold sales of their merchandise at lowered prices. At the beginning of the sale a large number of people usually gather at the store. In their efforts to advertise the sale, the proprietors invite newspaper photographers to the opening of the sale. To, avoid being caught by the photographer's lens, our intelligence officers and members of their families should not visit the store during the beginning of the sale. In New York there are no ticket collec- tors on the subway. The ticket office does not sell tickets but only metal tokens which cost.15 cents. In passing through the re- -volving gate at the entrance, the passenger inserts the token in a special slot. An intelligence officer-should always have several tokens with liiin, especially on the Approved:FarRefeas C1A_-RDP7-001 49-R000600240016e6 January 14, 1966 trace. It is hard to imagine how agent communi- -cations would be conducted in New York without using the subway, which, despite its complexity, facilitates one's orientation in the city. It also affords a convenient place to check on the existence or absence of sur- veillance. In some cases, :inadequate knowl- edge of the subway system has forced officers to cancel meetings with their agents. Buses also operate without conductors. The driver allows the entrance and departure of passengers, makes change, and hands out transfers (at the request of the passenger). Be `gives change for bills,but only up to $5. Thus the intelligence officer must always be .certain that he has small change or $1 bills. A taxi can be stopped anywhere; this is done merely by waving the hand or, by loudly shouting. "Taxi" when an empty one passes. The driver writes in his log the place a fare entered the taxi, the place he got out, and the time. Therefore, an intelligence offi- cer must never take a taxi directly to the meeting place. There are many companies in the United States which rent cars. Use of rented cars in the organization of agent communications is recommended, because this has a number of advantages. For instance, an intelligence officer can drive to the city in his own car, check for surveillance, and then leave it in a suitable area or in a ptoking. lot. He can then complete his job in a rented car. This makes the work of the American counter- intelligence service more difficult. USE OY DEAD DROPS Dead drops (i.e., hiding places where ma- terial can be left for prearranged pickups) are extensively used for communication with- in agent nets, or with individual agents. Stationary dead drops are selected or spe- cially prepared in parks and squares, in trees, in the ground, in fences, in benches, in monu- ments, in public buildings, and beyond popu- lated places such as forests, fields, seashores, riverbanks, etc. In selecting and preparing a "dead drop" in a park, one must bear in mind that a num- ber of American parks (for example, Central Park in New York) have many squirrels which can destroy the "dead drop" (especially in hollow trees) and carry off our material. The United States has up to 2,000 daily newspapers with a circulation of about 57 million and more than 7,000 magazines. Both newspapers and magazines are consid- erable space to advertisements and all kinds of announcements. Newspaper companies receive sizable profits from advertisements and announcements and therefore accept them very readily. Advertisements published in American newspapers differ greatly in content and in length. The most common ones deal with the sale and rental of living quarters, the sale of personal effects, employment oppor- tunities, announcements of weddings, di- vorces, births, and deaths, the loss of valu- ables and pets, etc. 'Bel'ow are several sam- ples of advertisements which could be used in intelligence work. (Following samples appear in English.) "POSITION WANTED "Housework: Mature Colombian maid speaking a little English will give consider- able care to children or invalid lady; do effi- cient general housework; $25-$30 per week. Exeter 4-0482, 7-10 p.m "DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT "Chauffeur, white-wanted. Age 35, mar- ried. 12 years experience. Intelligent, alert, neat. Fordham 4-7457 before noon." "PUBLIC NOTICES AND COMMERCIAL NOTICES "My wife, Jane Smith Doe, has left my bed and board. I am no longer' responsible for Approved For Release :'CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL REWRD - SENATE 259 her debts. John Doe, 17 Leslie Lane, Dobbs "There are other people like him" he said, ever the interview threatened to become in- Ferry, N.Y." "But, of course, you don't hear about them teresting. One can see from these examples that until they get caught." Neither Mr. Wynne nor Mr. Gibney said many advertisements can be adapted quite' Penkovsky "was in the holy of holies and enough to dispel the widespread doubts easily to the transmittal of information. he blew it sky high," Wynne said, describing about the origin of the Penkovsky journal. Among the code words which can be used his late friend's importance. "They (the It is said to have been smuggled out of Mos- are: the names or description of a lost arti- Russians) haven't recovered yet and they cow just before the colonel's arrest October cle; a description of the circumstances' the won't for a long time." Wynne said he did 22, 1962. Mr. Wynne said that, in more than place and time it was lost; the size of the not bleieve that Russians were aware of his 50 meetings with Penkovsky, the colonel reward for returning the valuable or pet; etc. own real role in the espionage link despite never mentioned the secret diary by which illegal' residences have a greater oppor- his prison Interrogation and learned the he allegedly wanted one day to reveal and tunity to make use of the press in arranging story only when he came back and made justify his treason to the world. agent communications. Residences under public disclosures. He is writing his own The book, called "The Penkovsky Papers," cover may use the press on a lesser scale, pri- book about the affair. says nothing more about how it came to be marily to transmit information or signals Lonsdale, now back In Russia has also published. "Penkovskiy" is a more literal from agent to intelligence officer. On the published a book about his activities in the rendering a final double vowel in Rus- whole, the United States presents favorable West. Wynne said this extraordinary change lion under a transliteration system preferred conditions for the use of the press for intel- in Soviet policy against discussing Moscow's by the U.S. Government, including the ligence work. intelligence activities was almost certainly Central Intelligence Agency. -A sum of money is paid to place an adver- provoked by word that the "Penkovsky Without necessarily questioning that tisement or some kind of announcement In Papers" would. be published. Penkovsky was the author of most of the the~ press. The text of these advertisements Lonsdale's book naturally puts Soviet book's anti-Soviet information, speculation will cQ tarn a prearranged coded secret espionage in a good light while the "Pen- and gossip, many Soviet specialists in Wash- message. kovsky Papers" does exactly the opposite. ington doubt that he actually duplicated -A thorough study of the specific features many of his reports to the West in a secret of the country enables one to select the most [From the New York Times, Nov. 12, 1965] diary. Some officials believe that British natural signals. For example one of our in- PENKOVSKY's FELLOW SPY HAILS HIS SERVICE and American intelligence services created telligence officers called an agent for an intro- TO WEST the memoir from the record of their three ductory meeting by sending the newspaper (By Max Frankel) Interrogations of Penkovsky in London and Washington Daily News to his apartment. Paris during his 16-month career as a spy. The intelligence officer went to the city, Oleg V. Penkovsky's service to the capital- The "A is known to have checked the made a careful check, and then called the 1st world-considerable while he lived and book for security, and, according to Mr. Gib- ,newspaper office from a public telephone and still unfinished in death-reached a pecu- ney, "took out a few things, I assume," Mr. asked them to start delivery on the next day niary culmination here yesterday. Gibney said he had obtained the papers al- to the address he gave them (the agent's The mysterious forces of espionage and the ready translated from Peter Deriabin, a de- address), A week after delivery started, the obvious forces of commerce joined to pro- fector from Soviet intelligence, whose pres- agent appeared at the prearranged meeting mote a book that purports to be the secret ent job and whereabouts are secret. place. journal of Colonel Penkovsky, the West's Mr. Gibney would not describe the orig- Radio communications provide the most best-placed Moscow spy in memory. Thus inal manuscript except to say that it con- rapid means for transmitting orders and in- they produced yet another extrarordinary sisted of several hundred pages, mostly type- -struction from the center. chapter in an extraordinary but slippery written, plus pictures of Penkovsky and Because of our distance from the United tale. photocopies of personal documents, includ- States, should the need arise, we can set up With an expression of regret that the ling his Communist Party membership card, radio relay stations which can be located on - executed colonel was unfortunately "not with which appear in the book. ships, submarines, and aircraft. We also us," the publishers of the book, Doubleday & ,must not exclude the possibility that In the Co., presented the nextbest pitchman, Gre- [From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965] not too distant future we can install a radio Ville Wynne, just 19 months out of a Soviet SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS PuBLICA- station on an earth satellite. Jail for his contact work with Penkovsky in TION OF INISTR SKY PAPERS 'In certain special situations, we might 1961 and 1962. consider the possibility of getting a courier to Mr. Wynne, whose dark hair and curled The Soviet Foreign Ministry yesterday the American mainland by submarine. It mustache make him look a little like the called in Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Moscow cor- must be remembered, however, that the actor Terry-Thomas in repose, showed a cer- respondent of the Washington Post, and pro- United States shore defenses are stronger tain flair for dramatic narrative but, so as tested this newspaper's publication of the than those of other countries of the Ameri- not to spoil his own, as yet unwritten book, Penkovsky Papers. can continent. Therefore one should not Held back most of his own story of 7 years of F. M. Simonov, deputy head of the Min- always attempt to land an agent directly in 'business journeys in Communist Europe. istry's press department, read the following the United States. At times it is possible to PENKOVSKY'S FEAT PRAISED statement to Rosenfeld: send mail to a third country (for example, He was happy, however, to have flown the "The Washington Post began on October 31 Mexico) and then deliver It overland to the Atlantic to help drum up business for the the publication of so-called Penkovsky Pa- United States. Mail sent in this manner can penkovslsy papers, to be published Friday, pers. The claimed author is allegedly Pen- be placed in the center's dead drops. because, he said, he wished to call attention kovsky, who was condemned for espionage to a courageous man, to his warning that and high treason In 1963 for American and [From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1965] the West must show strength to the Soviet British intelligence services. WEST's SPms ACTIVE, WYNNE HINTS Union and to the importance of their joint "The papers are a falsified story, a mix- (By Flora Lewis) venture in espionage. ture of anti-Soviet inventions and slander NEW YORK, November 11.-The Englishman "If it hadn't been for Penkovsky, you which are put into the mouth of a demasked V ho was freed from a Moscow jail in exchange would have had more than a blackout In spy, provocatory claims whose purpose is to this fine citY:Mr. Wynne remarked. "Pen- denigrate the Soviet Union, poison the inter- for Soviet Spy Gordon Lonsdale today indi- national atmosphere, and make difficult a gated that there are 'top Western spies now kovsky saved a war, in my opinion." search for ways to improve relations between 'functioning In the Soviet Union. The evidence for this judgment could not states. Greville Wynne, who served as contact for be drawn from Mr. Wynne or Frank Gibney, ..publication of the Penkovsky Papers can- Western intelligence with -Soviet State Se- the papers' editor, except for vague sugges- not be understood otherwise than as an in- curity Col. Oleg Penkovsky, appeared at tions that Penkovsky passed along very im- tentional act in the spirit of the worst tradi- a press conference here to help launch the portant information during a time of crisis tions the cwar, which cannot but in- serialized Papers." The book, now being in Germany and Cuba. The judgment flint dof the cold f Soviet-American rot but serialized in the Washington Post, Is said greatly exceeds even the most generous ap-on . to be Penkovsky's memoirs smuggled to the predation of Penkovsky ever heard in "The press department of the Foreign Min- W-est before the writer was convicted of spy- Washington. istry is authorized to invite the attention hag and executed in Russia. At a news conference In the Doubleday of the editorial board of the Washington Wynne was arrested in Hungary 10 days offices, Mr. Wynne also hinted that he had Post to the provocative character of this pub- ,after Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. gone to Moscow with the express purpose of lication. It is clear that responsibility for The Englishman was taken to Russia im- appraising Penkovsky after the colonel had this is shared by anybody who has anything mediately, tried, sentenced to 8 years in twice tried to make contact with Western to do with the publication of the Penkovsky prison but sent home after 18 months in intelligence. Soviet efforts to recruit Mr. Papers. return for Lonsd,ale. Wynne for espionage and Western efforts to "We expect that measures will be taken Be spoke WWI -ardenteadmiration for Pen- " hi a -their contacts appear like a back- so that no articles and materials of such kovsky, whose main aiinin providing valua- market conspiracy, at worst, also figured kind will be published in the Washington ble information to the West was "to prevent - somehow in the story, Mr. Wynne suggested, Post in the future." :a war," Wynne said. but he kept plugging his own book when- In answer to a question, Simonov added: Appr`oved:' or leas .CIA-RDP75: (1 ROfl060 40016-6 ppravecf For Release : CIA-RDP 5-001498000600240016-6 y $0 _ CONE .ESSIONAL RECORD SENATE January 14, 1966 8 rve the righ5for ourselves to take neces- went on October 21, Edward Crankshaw of Xy measures." makes one peculiar assertion, namely that ire Washington Post on October 31 com- Col. Oleg Penkovsky was "in some measure ~~r#1eneed publication of a syndicated version unbalanced." He supports this contention {. "1 "The Penkovsky Papers" distributed by with another Sweeping assertion that "a man P blishers Syndicate (The New York Herald who will take it upon himself to betray his ri__ bune-Chioago Sun Times). The finalf in- Government because uniquely T will .appear as scheduled on Mon- vinced that he is right he and is it is g is by ,da y, November 15. definition unbalanced." =nTh! excerpts from the papers have created Having thus ;laid a foundation for his n~ueh controversy among Soviet experts. The argument, Mr.. Crankshaw implies that Pen- -1pi sl 0 pets have been credited by Edward Crank- kovsky s indictment of Khrushchev as a man aw, writer on Soviet affairs for the London actively preparing to launch a nuclear war iserver, as being the authentic narrative is false because the presumably mentally d comment of one of the West's major in- disordered colonel of the Soviet military in- telligence sources. They are criticized for telligence could not possibly "distinguish be- defects in translation and attacked as part tween government intentions and govern- iorgery by Victor Zorza of the Manchester meet precautions" and that he almost ,a ardtan. certainly "confused loose, menacing talk with tight-lipped calculation; contingency plan- The first article of Zorza's critique of the papers will be printed in the Washington nine with purposive strategy." oSt on Monday, as previously scheduled, The so far published summaries by Frank P ~ ~ the second article on Tuesday. Gibney and excerpts from the book fail to give the faintest, evidence that Oleg, Pen- -print, as scheduled, a concluding install- _" ui ,cuss he definition unbalanced" is ridiculous on. the ffi?nt of syndicated excerpts from the book face of it. Whatever the British Krem- tbe "Penkovsky Papers." They have aroused linologist might think of Benedict Arnold, a great deal of discussion among American the participants in the July 20, 1944, anti- a d British experts on Soviet, affairs with Hitler plot, the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss, Bur- patent opinion divided as to the form in Bess and MacLean, Igor Gouzenko and the W ch the papers were released and as to the host of others, these men were not mentally ox ent to which they were wholly in the sick either in the legal or clinical sense. W rds of Penkovsky No one has challenged Another point is that Mr. Crankshaw- the essential point thatPenkovsky was for a who does not fora moment question the au- source of the West. sumes to know actual intentions of the ,. ~t would Pot. be conceivable that respon- Kremlin leadership better than a Soviet ofii- -81 le newspapers in this country would sup- cer who directly and on a high level par- pr ss notice of a book of this significance in ticipated in the development of his Govern- hi tort' or . of such 'consequence in foreign ment's strategic moves. airs, The Washington Post, as one of the In fact, the reason for Mr. Crankshaw's n , spapers which have published excerpts warning not to trust Penkovsky is trans- frgnt the papers, has unsuccessfully solicited parent to those familiar with the tenor of criticism and, comment on, them from the his many writings: Penkovsky's revelations Soviet Er bassy and will .publish Monday a run contrary to that line of thought which critique by Victor Zorza of the Manchester Mr. Crankshaw represents and which stub- Guardian, who doubts that the papers origi- bornly insists that the Soviet Government nated in the form in which they are pre- under Khrushchev genuinely wished to seated in the book and who suspects the become friendly with the West. intrusion of material not originating with With all due respect for Mr. Crankshaw's Peii,_koysky. No doubt this will long remain concern in preserving his reputation as a ati interesting subject of conjecture and Soviet expert, one cannot escape the con ap4culation, and the Washington Post will elusion that the technique he chose to em- try, to present opposing views as.they appear. ploy to that end--that of discrediting Pen- the readers of this newspaper should know kovsky's testimony by implying that the man that the Washington Post's Moscow corre- was essentially insane-serves no good pur- sp~ndent was summoned to the Soviet For- pose. It does not mean that "The Penkovsky deign Ministry at 5 o'clock on Saturday after- Papers" should be accepted uncritically. But noon and told-that 'we expect that measures, it does mean that any serious critical analy- Will be taken so that no articles and mate-' sis of them must be based on a much more ria s of such kind will be published in the solid foundation than that laid by Edward Washington Post in the future." He was Crankshaw. further told that "if publication continues K. L. LONDON, We reserve the right for ourselves to take V. PETROV, lie essary measures." with stereotyped anti-Soviet insinuations. Using Penkovsky's name, they ascribe to the Soviet Union such concepts as, for instance, the concept of preventive war, which in reality is hatched by certain quarters in the West. The authors of the papers apparently assume that any sort of slander might be put into the traitor's mouth and that they could easily get away with that. The provocative cooking entitled "The Penkovsky Papers" no doubt deserves serious analysis. This is not the first case of pub- lishing slanderous stuff about the U.S.S.R. and it has the only purpose-to smear the Soviet Union, to poison international atmos- phere, to hinder the search for ways of Im- proving relations between nations. The publication of the "Penkovsky Pa- pers" is to be regarded as nothing but a premeditated act in the worst traditions of the cold war. Such actions cannot but dam- age the interests of the development of friendly relations between the American and the Soviet peoples. And if those who are directly or indirectly associated with the publication of the papers pretend that they do not understand it, they only reveal the insincerity of their statements about their desire to improve relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States; [From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965] ON SEVERAL FRONTS-PENKOVSKY DISPUTE CONTINUES To BOIL The Washington Post today concludes publication of the "Penkovsky Papers" around which has swirled much controversy as to their source and authenticity. The Soviet Union on Saturday protested the publication. In addition, a letter to the editor of the Washington Post from the Soviet Embassy, printed today on page A21, calls the papers "a crude forgery cooked up 2 years after Penkovsky's conviction by those whom the exposed spy served." The Washington Post also is printing, on page A22, the first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet affairs expert of the Manchester Guardian, analyzing the paperx He writes that "the book itself contains the evidence showing certain parts of It to be a forgery even though other sections of the book are evidently made up of intelligence informa- tion provided by Penkovsky long before his arrest." Last month Zorza had written Vladimir E. Semichastny, chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee, asking for evidence to support the charge that the papers were forgeries. On Saturday an official from the Soviet Embassy in London asked to meet Zorza and declared that the book Is "a fabrication from beginning to end." Zorza said the official gave only one piece of evidence-an inconsistency of dates. At one point Penkovsky had said that recruit- ment of Communist Party members in the West for work with Soviet intelligence had resumed in 1956-57. At another point it said this occurred in 1980. Officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents dealt with and interrogated Penkovsky before his arrest, say that they read the papers only to determine whether their publication would compromise intelli- gence sources. They refuse to pass judgment for the press on authenticity. States, the Soviet Government should know in May of 1963 was convicted in the U.S.S.R. [Flom the New York Times, Nov. 15, 1965] by this time, are not to be told by govern- of treason and espionage on behalf of the PENIcOVSKY PAPERS STIR SOVIET PROTEST melts, either foreign or domestic, what they United States and British intelligence sere- WASHINGTON, November 14.-The Soviet must Print or must not nrlnt 4--- They Till not cause the Washington Post to -WASHINGTON. ct cycura Onzverszry. is . alter i intent regarding this series of arts- _ cior any subsequent publication. We re- [Flom the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965 fuse to accept the inadmissible suggestion 1 th t this newspaper must not print material A COMMUNICATION FROM PRESS DEPARTMENT which the Soviet Government may find in- OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY ace ptable. Recently the Washington Post and some I will fulfill its responsibilities as it sees other American newspapers have started there whatever "necessary measures" of in- publishing the so-called Penkovsky Papers. tin}idation and censorship Moscow under- The authorship of these papers is attributed F.t,... +.. ?----. ,i --- .. __ .. _ ._ Apr' ed_For. Release : C1A-RDP7:6-00149800060024001;6; 6 iAppruveu rur rcelease ; '. iM-rcur1 a-UU-I4UM000CUUL4UU-IO-n January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 261 issued a statement tonight attacking the right to supply this information. But he - two employers, the Committee.for the Co Penkovsky papers. -Would hardly write it all down for posterity. ordination of Scientific Research, and the FEAT Military Intelligence Headquarters. His l news INTELLIGENCE tement was handed to severa The,sta bureaus here. It was in the form of a com- The introduction says that the extent and, evenings are generally occupied, nor can he municatlon to the, editor of the Washington ingenuity of Penkovsk 's work add up per- write while visiting his friends In the coun- Post, which the Embassy noted, along with y y try. "Someone may always ask what I am other U.S. newspapers had been publishing Nape to the most extraordinary intelligence doing." At home, at least, "I have a hiding the so-called Penkovsky papers. feat of this century. If there is no Soviet place in my desk." On his own showing, he that authorship of the spy now working at an even higher level in is hardly likely to have produced in these cir- The papers was statement attributed d to "the person of Pen- the West, then this claim may well be valid. cumstances the manuscript of what is now a Much of the intelligence information repro- sizable book. kovsky-the man who in May of 1963 was duced in the book is obviously genuine. convicted in the U.S.S.R. of treason and Western government experts revealed their AUTOBIOGRAPHY QUESTIONED espionage on behalf of the United States and knowledge of it some time ago in the course The description of his domestic circum- British intelligence services." Col. Oleg V. of discussion about Soviet affairs. Penkov- stances comes from Penkovsky's autobio- Penkovsky was arrested in October 1962 and sky's information about the ignominious graphical outline, of a kind that any intelli- was executed after conviction. failure of Khrushchev's "secret weapon," gence service would require from a prospec- The Soviet Embassy statement also said: which blew up on the launching pad, en- tive spy, so that it could check his credentials "In fact, the so-called Penkovsky papers is abled the Western leaders to treat Soviet before employing him. nothing but a crude forgery cooked up, 2 threats and boasts with composure. Pen- Penkovsky passed a paper of this kind to years after Penkovsky's conviction, by those kovsky's information about Khrushchev's an American Embassy official in Moscow, to- whom the exposed spy had served. * * * plans during the German crisis of 1961 en- gether with .an offer of his service, but this "This Is not the first case of publishing abled the West to make the dispositions was not taken up because it was thought that slanderous stuff about the U.S.S.R. and it has which warded off the Soviet threat to Berlin. he had been put up to it by Soviet counter- the only purpose-to smear the Soviet Union, _ Penkovsky sent reports on the bickering intelligence. Only 6 months later, when he to poison the international atmosphere, to over the building up of the Soviet missile made another approach to the British, was hinder the search for ways of improving force, favored by Khrushchev, and the main- his offer accepted. relations between nations. tenance of adequate conventional forces, fa- But even the autobiography Is not wholly "The publication of the Penkovsky papers vored by the marshals. genuine. The description of Penkovsky's Is to be regarded as nothing but a pre- GREMLIN own war service is woven into a three-page meditated act in the worst traditions of the DISPUTE IN G potted history of the war in Russia. A man cold war. Such actions cannot but damage This gave Western intelligence analysts the of Penkovsky's intelligence would not have .the interests of the development of friendly clues that helped them to study between thought it necessary to waste his time on relations between the American and the the lines of the Soviet press the most im- supplying this kind of "background." Soviet peoples." portant political dispute that raged in the A Western compiler of the Penkovsky pa- Soviet leadership in recent years-on the pers, on the other hand, might have thought [From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 19651 allocation of resources between civilian and it useful to provide the wide readership of _BOVIET ExPERT THINKS PENKOvsKY PAPERS military needs, within the military field the book with a historical sketch that would ARE A`FORGERY Itself. have made Penkovsky's war career more ,(By Victor Zorza) This contributed greatly to the Western meaningful. governments' understanding of the factors KHRIISHCHEV IN UKRAINE .LONDON.-"Their authenticity," say the in- that caused the fall of Khrushchev, even However, it is not safe to sketch in the ;troduction to the "Penkovsky Papers," the though this occurred some 2 years after Pen- background without being familiar with the memoirs of the Anglo-American spy in kovsky's arrest. details of which it is composed. Penkovsky Russia, "is beyond question." It is not. For some months before the Cuban mis- -Indeed, the book itself contains the evi- sile crisis, Penkovsky and his Western mas- spent the last 2 years before the war in a dence showing certain parts of it to be a ters knew that he was being watched by military school and then in an artillery unit forgery, even though other sections of the Soviet counter-intelligence. He could In the Ukraine, to which he was posted as book are evidently made up of intelligence therefore neither acquire nor send any in- a political officer. information provided by Penkovsky before telligence on what was to prove the most On one occasion the unit was visited by his arrest. fateful confrontation between East and a number of Soviet military leaders, whom But the book does not, in fact, claim to be West, and suggestions that he was asked Penkovsky recognized, but there was one made up of Penkovsky's intelligence reports to report on Soviet operations in Cuba just person "whom I had never seen before." He to the West. On the contrary, it is said to before the crisis would appear to be with- was told later that this was a certain N. S. be quite distinct from them, and to consist out foundation. Yet paradoxically, his con- Khrushchev. Yet for the past 2 years Khru- of notes, sketchies and comments accumu- tribution was probably decisive. shchev had been the first secretary of the fated by him during his spying career in 1961- He had sent out, earlier, details of the de- Ukrainian Party, carrying out a ruthless and 62 and smuggled out of the Soviet Union only ployment pattern of Soviet missiles. This bloody purge, feared and hated by all-the in the autumn of 1962, at the time of his enabled U.S. air reconnaissance experts to virtual master of the Ukraine, the "Little arrest. it is said that Penkovsky hoped that identify the missile sites at an early stage Stalin," with his picture frequently dis- they might eventually be published to clarify of construction. The early warning made it played in public places and in the news- --~his motives and to clear his name beyond possible for President Kennedy to make in papers which would have been obligatory :question. It is curious that a work with so secret the preparations that played so major reading for an aspiring political officer. ,unable \a purpose should include so much a part in his later management of the crisis, No doubt the account of the incident was purely military and political intelligence. and in compelling Khrushchev to withdraw. Inserted into the papers to make them appear more authentic, but the result, as happens THE LOWDOWN LACK OF TIME _so often when enthusiasm outruns good Much of the book seems calculated to show The most important part of the informa- judgment, is the opposite of what was In- the Soviet system in the worst possible light, tion he sent out consisted of some 5,000 tended. but this would be consistent with Penkov- photographs of documents, sketches, etc., There is much tedious repetition which sky's attempt to justify his defection. It is taken with a miniature camera. Yet we are is hardly accounted for by the explanation even possible to stretch this interpretation to asked to believe that this highly professional that the papers are arranged with little .at- explain the "lowdown"-and it really is and valuable spy added to the great risks he tempt at order and none at literary style. low-on the sexual mores, the drunkenness was already running by keeping a detailed That this is so is painfully obvious, but it and cupidity of some of the people he knew account of his activities and views, virtually still does not explain why the book should 'in the higher ranks of the political, military every page of which contained enough secret contain several accounts of Khrushchev's and intelligence quarters. --I have absolutely information to send him straight to the firing intended strategy for the Berlin confronta- no intention of defaming the marshals and squad. tion, all more or less the same, and two of generals," he says, after giving some partic- In the foreword we are told that "through- them separated by only one page-a curious ularly choice details. out the period during which Penkovsky was waste of time and space by one so short of He ands that he had "intentionally omitted turning over infomation to the West, he sat both. the subject of moral degradation and drunk- up night after night composing a journal." Nor can these be the written reports sent eniiess"-which `he had not. "I know one Ye`, in a passage that has the ring of truth out by Penkovsky at the time, re-edited, and thing for sure, though: all our generals have Penkovsky himself makes it clear that this Is put together in a book. He was clearly much mistresses, and some have two or more." All? just what he could not do. He has to write too intelligent and efficient a spy to waste For sure? ' hurriedly, he says, "for the simple lack of his efforts on writing down laboriously, in It is conceivable that Western intelligence time and space." minute detail, and repetitively, the views, biganizations might have been Interested in When he writes at night in his two-room impressions and facts which would have suf- the peccadilloes of members of the Soviet flat he disturbs his family's sleep : typing fieed in much shorter outline. General' Staff, just as Soviet intelligence is very noisy. During the day he is always Yet sometimes the book arouses the read- wottld a interested It their Western opposite busy, `running like a madman," in a typically er's curiosity, only to frustrate it with lack numbers, and that `Penkovsky thought it Russian phrase, between the offices of his of detail. The introduction makes for Pen- - Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R00060024001.6-6 i~rQ~red For'R easy -CIA- RDP -00149 8000600240016-6 LONG SSIO,~T~9,~ -TAx Janu_ar 141966 =fit ,.pw es ujL a wormauxon swept up by nim the Penkovsky Papers was reported in the e - ke professional would never make the mistake the, eaac planned ddimensions of the world press, the American publishers of the of listing Marshal Zhukov as "Khrushchev'a - v ~N a. roaaavvsn 2t.true this.-is- very, important, for it may 8,13A16 publish it in foreign languages. would certainly have known it to be wrong. ;c pro trouble between Washington and Lon- Among these requests _was one from_ a nzEANfNCfESS TITLES --021on the one hand, and Berlin on the small Russian emigre publishing house in o K can hardly have intended. This was accepted without any haggling, Soviet oficers, he often describes them as go deputies of the Supreme Soviet"-a mean- t it has always been assumed that the slow since all the proceeds from the book are to ingless dignity on which the good spy that d fumbling nature of the Western response to the Penkovsky Foundation, formed in the the-wallwas due in, large measure to the United States for this purpose, he was would not waste his breath. How- t etxt, he is made to say that "I learned about to the Penkovsky Foundation, the Russian at Khrushchev's recklessness in 1961 in-test- the Berlin wall 4 days before the Soviet text has not been made available, and it ing a 50-megaton bomb which he describes s Government, actually closed it oil " Yet the looks as if it never will be. as having a yield of 80 and, elsewhere, of 100 account of his travels given in the book, and On Monday, the Russian emigre publisher megatons---although the accurate measure- -- t -at record of his trial, makes it clear that made a telephone call from Frankfurt to menu taken by Western experts have put it "4 days before" that date Penkovsky was still Doubleday, the New York publishers, to get at under 60 megatons. Similarly, he reports -London, on one of those extended duty the final answer which had been promised that several Soviet launches of manned trips on which he took time off from shep- for the beginning of this week. He was sputniks took the lives of !their crews. In 'h ding Soviet delegations-the official rea- told by R. E. Banker, for Doubleday, that fact, all Russian launchings have been 84 S for_hb visits to the West-to spend long they were still unable to provide a Russian monitored. by Western radio and radar track- :h urs-with the special Anglo-American team text. However, they were prepared to let the ing devices which would have revealed be- of our intelligence officers who used every Russian publisher go ahead-if he was pre- yond any doubt, through the nature -of the available minute _to milk _him,of any in- Pared to retranslate the Penkovsky text from communications passing between the satel- f tipn he alight have. English back into Russian. AS for the Rus- lite and the base, the presence of a human `SfNLIKELY ANSWERS - - - sian "original," Banker said, they had twice being aboard. Western experts have re- asked the State Department about it, but peatedly dismissed this particular rumor. the extremely unlikely event that he had were still not able to provide it. CONFUSION OVEU EVENTS learned about the Berlin wall still STIUNGE PHRASES The report attributed to I Penkovsky that ~Lg ladon, would he have gone back ck to to Moscow w and reported later to his masters that he had The English text is peppered with words Mar al Chulkov, the mander in chief a 's pf the ground known about the wall 4 days in advance? and phrases that no man with Penkovsk w missed from this a y t PP t o andpp and aasted W y Would he do that-to show them after Soviet background would use. He is made in 1oin d chief of civil de- thee event how well-informed he was? to refer repeatedly to Soviet Russians or to sense is wrong. It is true that he got the YiotFeB he kept in 'Moscow, would he simply terms would sound as strange in Russian as tinned as the commander'of the ground hakve Made a bald statement of fact like that, United States Americans or British English- forces-and the Soviet military press referred almost conversationally, and then gone on man would sound in ordinary English usage, to him repeatedly as such., wi h his discussion of Khrushchev's tactics These are not mistakes in translation, but It was only in 1964 that he lost this post, on----I.-,Berlin? Neither explanation seems credi- they arise from Ignorance of Soviet ter- nearly 2 years after Penkovsky's arrest. It C answer is that the words attributed to kind of political deviation for which Mar- papers" more recently has confused the two Pe kovsky were written by someone else-un- shal Zhukov, the Defense Minister, was events and dates, making Penkovsky report I this was a remark he made in one of his' purged in 1957 is. "Bonapartist tendencies." something that occurred after he was ex- enequrit conversations with, a member of Yet :Penkovsky is made to report Khrushchev ecuted in 1963. Similar confusion is evident the,Anglo-American team, who took it down. as saying that Marshal Zhukov was display- in Penkovsky's references to the removal by th very opposite of what one would expect read an account of the Zhukov affair, -a with membership in the group. fro a man writing in Penkovsky's difficult faulty memory for phrases might have easily Virtually the whole section on the Soviet cir umstances, At one point, when discuss- led him to use the associated but, incorrect, military doctrine appears to have been writ- s Soviet military maneuvers, he is made to term, ten by a Western pen. It is here that the ask What is the point of these exercises"- Penkovsky is made to Illustrate the change references to "Soviets" and "Soviet Russians" and then proceeds to give a detailed reply. in Sino-Soviet relations by remarking that are most obtrusive. Penkovsky is made to on - -- ------+ _-- _ wa it perhaps, a -question put to Penkovsky China." However, the official usage was trine to the West-and at the same time to by one of his Interrogators, and then, road- never "great China"-it was "the great go on for pages on end, giving long quota- Ver~ently, allowed to remain in the edited Chinese people." tions from it. transcript of the conversation that might Penkovsky is made to refer to a high party Would Penkovsky really have bothered to have formed the basis of this passage in the official as an "lt.S.F.S,R. Communist Party write out long passages from a publication book? leader" ~a ?hr~re ?ro The conversational origin of a number of by a Soviet official, who would know that the to his Western masters? This whole section, a z n ^ p h s i i R ers ..ay , us g v- - ~, ussian cce- _ - n he book, is ac- tng the lie to the claim that the book is made public-has no Communist j Party distinct companied 'by repeated warnings from Pen- LIP of Penkovsky's written notes. This, how- from the Soviet Party. One of the chapters kovsky about the Soviet determination to .eve , does not mean that the book as a whole begins with a reference by Penkovsky to his acquire a first-strike posture, and to launch ma be regarded as a genuine edited tran- recent trip to "Europe"-although a Russian a surprise nuclear attack on the West. Script of Penkovsky's conversations with returning to Moscow would speak of a visit The chapter on strategy is made the main Western intelligence officers, ,There are many to the "West." But the reference to a trip vehicle for the message, and the long quota- 7ther passages, and sometimes whole sections, to "Europe" would[ have come naturally to tions from the "Special Collection" are de- 'ghihch betray the, alien hand.or tongue. an American compiler of the papers. signed to give it an air of authority. But Among Penkovsky's many unlikely digres- the impression is false, for General Gastilo- q'oin the Washington Post, Nov. 16, 19651 sions, his excursion into the history of the vich, on whose contribution the compiler re- 13o T Ekpswr DouBTS VALmrry of Coxrao- party appears particularly improbable-and lies to drive the first strike lesson home, was To PROVE FORGERY party leaders over the years who, as suee e s- tative contributors to the "Special Collec- zBy Victor Zorza) sive editions of the party history went to tion." But the Penkovsky Papers give no press, were purged and described variously hint of this. LQxnpN.-Sorfar as can be established, the as enemies of the people, traitors, and im- UNDOUBTED FORGERY ~Lusian manuscript of Penkovsky's memoirs perfalist hirelings. This is an exercise be- General Kurochkin, a respected Soviet jtmst does not exist. _ loved by -Approved For Release. CtA RDP75-OO 149RO006002400a6-66- Approved. For Release: -CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE the more extreme views as anti-Marxist, This is the chapter that can be described without any hesitation as forged. The com. piler of the book adds insult to injury by making Penkovsky say that "I am sorry that I Cannot copy here the entire 'Special Col- lection"'-or is it, perhaps, a private joke inserted for the entertainment of the com- piler's colleagues? The use-or misuse- of the "Special Collection" in this way is a great pity. Its publication in full would have added greatly to the understanding of Soviet strategy among students in the West. But there is now reason to fear that the ac- count given in the papers will prevent the full publication which would inevitably show up the imbalance of the Penkovsky book. It may be that some of the errors pin- pointed in this article are not necessarily evidence of forgery, but the cumulative weight of the evidence is too great to sup- port any other interpretation. W 6--?'F'-^9ir' The book could have been compiled only, by the Central Intelligence Agency. No other org zatio i apart from British Intelligence, and certainly no indi- vidual, could have had access to the infor- mation of which the book is made up. Brit- ish Intelligence officers did at one time en- tertain the idea of building Penkovsky up posthumously as something of a hero, but permission to proceed was withheld. The has been repeatedly stung and _QIA provoke by the attempts of the Disinfor- mation Department of the Soviet intelli- gence organization to discredit its activities throughout the world. The "Penkovsky Papers" are the CIA's answer. But in psy- chological warfare of this kind the intelli- gence agencies of the democratic countries suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public. It is the function of a free press to uncover such deception. Some of my best friends are in the Q,IA, but if th;y want their psychologi- cal warfare efforts to remain undiscovered, they must do better than this. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1965] GIBNEY DEFENDS PENKOVSKY PAPERS On two separate occasions the Soviet Gov- ernment has attacked the authorship and the authenticity of "The Penkovsky Papers." Both the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the press department of the Soviet Embassy in Washington have commented predictably. Such terms as "anti-Soviet invention and slander," "provocative character," and "crude forgery" are commonplace In most efforts of the Soviet regime to discredit anyone who disagrees with it. It is typical of this ap- proach that the Washington Post and other newspapers running the papers were threatened by unspecified forms of Soviet retaliation, if publication continued. ' Actually, there is no better evidence of the papers' honesty, accuracy and authenticity than this loud, almost unprecedented pro- test from Moscow. As I said in the intro- duction to the papers, the continuing power of state security apparatus-over Soviet citi- zens is the greatest problem In the way of any real rapprochement between the West and the Russians. Penkovsky felt this strongly himself, as the papers reveal. The sharp protest of the Moscow leadership suggests that his arrow struck home. A further charge of "forgery"-or partial forgery, if I interpret his article correctly- was made by Victor Zorza, of the Manchester Guardian. His comment relies on conjec- tures about what Pelikovskywould or should have done. It abounds In phrases like "would hardly write," "it is curious that," "it is conceivable-that,", or "he is hardly likely to have produced." This .is understandable. I am sure that if Mr. Zorza had been In Colonel Penkovsky's shoes, he would have behaved differently; and if a panel of Western Soviet experts had written the papers for Penkovsky, they would have undoubtedly written them differently. The fact is that Colonel Penkovsky was very much his own man. He was a zealot and an individualist who lived with risk and whose desire to have his views known drove him to take even more risks. Mr.. Zorza does have one point of factual criticism, which he interpreted incorrectly, however. He asserts that the acocunt of Colonel Penkovsky's movements which I gave in my introduction to the papers and "the record of his trial" show that he was in London on August 9, 1961, the day he found out about the proposed erection of the Ber- lin wall. Mr. Zorza understandably questions why Penkovsky did not warn his Western contacts then about the building of the wall, since he had free access to them in London. From this he somehow concludes that "The Penkovsky Papers" are not genuine. . I owe him and other readers an apology for this confusion. In the process of editing, I incorrectly gave the date for Penkovsky's arrival in Moscow at that time as August 10, 1961. Actually, it was August 8-and I have since asked the publisher to correct this er- ror in subsequent editions. If Mr. Zorza rereads the October 1963 transcript of Penkovsky's Soviet trial-one of: the principal sources of this book-he will discover that the correct date was August 8. Hence, Penkovsky was in Moscow at the time he found out about the Berlin wall-and unable to communicate immediately with the West. Mr. Zorza points out that Penkovsky's writings were often discursive, verbose, al- most conversational. I am sure any expert on Russian-English translation would have his own pet way of rendering them into English-just as Mr. Deriabin, the trans- lator, and I have ours. But this discursive- ness hardly detracts from their authenticity. On the contrary, I deliberately held all editing down to an absolute minimum. Neither Mr. Deriabin nor I felt we had the right to add any literary or factual embel- lishments to the words of a brave man, who wanted to get his own language out to the world. FRANK GIBNEY. [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Nov. 18, 1965] HIS GREATEST SERVICE-PENKOVSKY UNMASKED THREE SOVIET SPIES IN WEST (By Don Cook) PARIS, November 17.-Whatever the value of the spy papers of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, or even their validity, which Is being questioned by some experts on Soviet affairs, his greatest service to the West was the unmasking of key Russian agents in Paris, London, and Stockholm, The three most important espionage cases in the West in the last 5 years were all broken by counterintelligence services on the basis of information passed to Britain and the United States by Penkovsky. The cases In- volved: Georges Paques, a senior French civil serv- ant who spied for the Russians In the Min- istry of National Defense and later in NATO headquarters in Paris. He was caught and sentenced to life. imprisonment in July of 1964. Col. Stig Wennerstrom of the Swedish Army, who spied for the Russians in the Swe- dish Defense Ministry and also while serving as Swedish military attache in Washington. He was caught and sentenced to life impris- onment in July 1963, at about the same time that Penkovsky went on trial in Moscow with his British contact, Greville Wynne. 263 William J. C. Vassall, a senior clerk in the British Admiralty, who had been recruit- ed by the Russians through homosexual blackmail during a tour of duty In Moscow. He was apprehended and sentenced to 18 years in prison in September 1962. Penkovsky did not finger these Russian agents directly. But he did pass to the Brit- ish and American intelligence services in- formation that enabled them to trap the three spies. A Penkovsky speciality was sending the Identify numbers on Western documents that were reaching the Russians. The identity numbers were sufficient to start the coun- terintelligence search for the spies in the West who were passing the documents to Soviet intelligence. In the case of the British Admiralty docu- ments and the Swedish Defense Ministry documents, the work of isolating Vassall and Wennerstrom went fairly rapidly. But the apprehension of Georges Paques was more complicated and took more time. Partly this was because many hundreds of documents had to be sifted and checked. Partly it was because the French counter- intelligence services, which are highly effec- tive, do not as a rule respond very swiftly to Information provided from American or British sources. In the end, the break in the Paques case came as a result of the assiduous espionage the Frenchman had done. Paques served from 1958 to 1962 in the private office of French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer. He later became chief press officer at NATO with a "cosmic top secret" clearance, NATO's highest security classification. Among the document identity numbers Penkovsky sent to the West was one with a very unusual and limited classification. It was a French NATO standing group docu- ment-in other words, a French position paper prepared for the NATO military stand- ing group in Washington. When the French checked on the document, they discovered that it was the draft of a French ' position that eventually was altered and renumbered before it was actually submitted to the standing group. The document, therefore, had received very limited circulation. It had been pre- pared In Washington by the French element on the standing group and sent to Paris for clearance at the Ministry of Defense. Only six persons signed for it at the Ministry when it was discussed, altered and sent back to Washington. One of these was Georges Paques. Had Paques limited his activities to gen- eral Ministry of Defense documents or NATO documents, with much wider circulation, it might have taken months to narrow the search. But in the brief period of approxi- mately 36 hours in which that particular French standing group document was in Paris for clearance, he took it home, photo- graphed it and returned It to its proper place next day. When the French identified the document on the basis of the number transmitted from Moscow to the British and Americans by Penkovsky, they immediately put a 24-hour tail on each of the six who had signed for it-including the Minister of Defense. In about 10 days, Paques was seen in contact with a member of the Soviet Embassy staff in Paris whom the French knew to be a KGB agent. His arrest followed swiftly, and he con- fessed promptly. At his trial, he testified in words reminiscent of some of the Penkovsky papers that he spied for Russia because he felt that it would help preserve peace if the Russians were fully informed of NATO plans. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1965] PENKOVSKY PAPERS DEFENDED As the translator of "The_ Penkovsky Papers," I would like to make some com- Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-001 8000600240016-6 < f. p o~ _ r R a e R P75=041498000600240016=6 rn-N t 5S ONA'L RECORD - SENATE January 14, 1966 p pme'ts on Victor ZOrza s rev ew. o j!K- _t involved in polemics with Mr. Papers," as Mr. Zorza seems to believe, why anti-Soviet concoction of the CIA and evi- i did the not use the correct figures? dently its British associates." d erta wrote "The Penkovsky describ the volume today as the "latest I d not If C&estern ex m re . y Zorza, whose previous work i have a j l rxaw,`better than anyone, that the papers PETER DERIADIN. In an article by V. Golubov, the newspaper are genuine, but I also know that there is New York City. said the book "dcea not deserve analysis," {$o way`to prove this to the satisfaction of and added: "It has been compiled so crudely th a determilied to degrade Penkovsky's [From the Washington Post, Nov. 21, 19651 that self-respecting British: newspapers at leg'y ae the Soviets sought to degrade first lance could not but expose its PEI7KOVSKYS SPY-CATCHING ROLE DENIED very g Pen kovaky. Reports that Coi. Oleg Penkove tty supplied authors." td it surprising that Mr. Zorza has Pravda went on to quote from British press materials that led to the detection and ar- up his mind that "the Russian manu- comment that cast doubt on the authenticity Made Stig ine pt of the Penkovsky memoirs just does Wenrestn of erstra the m , are are fl mflatlyaster denied spy, by Col. sources ces of the alleged memoir. he exist" simply because r do not wish to close to the case. DERIABIN CITED re] ase it in Its original form. The published Wcnnerstrom reportedly first came under Soviet sources have suggested privately that fo t is' as Q. to Penkovsky's notes as it suspicion in 1959--2 years before Penkovsky the book, even if based In part on intelli- cb Id be, even though Mr. Gibney and I started assisting the West. gence supplied by Penkovsky to the West, irlgvitably had to translate, select, and edit The Swedish officer had served as air at- was embroidered with information already in them for publication. I will not, however, _, _ tach? In Moscow and Washington before: re-. the hands of Western agencies. s-~^- -RWSian" or "SovIet" for purposes of aim- Tile Penkovsky papers we1'e serialized in on the private lives of the Kremlin leaders is licit and consistency. newspapers, including the Washington Post also contained in "The Penkovsky Papers." p previted with words and phrases no man last year-to 11fe Imprisonment. He Gould nal that allegedly was used. in the volume. i.e. hesky's Soviet background would be released after 10 years and it is under- Mr. Deriabin, a former ; official in the u4 tI ,e. he cites the terms "Soviet Rus- stood that he, too, is writing his memoirs. Okhrana, the secret service responsible for eI ns" or `Soviets" in describing-his country PENK,7vsKY PROTEST guarding Soviet leaders, has refused to make m n. 'Mr. Zorza's quotes are in English, thus the Russian manuscript public and has de- they are my translations. But Penkovsky In. another development, the State Depart- clined to say how it came into his possession. 014iarly distinguished between the Russian ment disclosed yesterday that it has received In testimony before the House Committee pe 'plc and tie Soviet regime. In the papers, a protest from the Soviet Union about publi- on Un-American Activities, made public in pe}iikovsky used a variety of terms: "Soviet cation of papers atributed to Penkovsky. March 1959, Mr. Deriabin gave a detailed view t me cite details from Mn Zorza's Ministry in Stockholm. S. Deriabin, was identified as the translator enkovsky referred to Marshal Zhukov's re- and are now out t III book form. According to reports from Washington, the ti 4a1 because of his "Napoleonic characteris- A State Department spokesman said that CIA said its representatives had read the ti 1Vir, Zorza thinks that this should Soviet Ambassador Anat:oly P. Dobrynin ex- book to guard against "security violations," red "Bonapartist tendencies" and concludes pressed concern last Monday in a talk with but the Agency disclaimed responsibility for that "no translator would depart so far from Russian affairs expert Llewellyn E. Thump publication and refused to vouch for the pa- t1ie original." The exact Russian term used son. pers' accuracy. by Penkovsky was "Khg,ushchev ego ubral za Later, the spokesman said, Thompson re- t WYNNE IS DENOUNCED "had no res on- En Mr. Zorza's opinion no Soviet official While not further explaining what was in was r uld refer to -a party h _ official as an the Ravers. Pravda said. that "this fabrics- Gordon A. Lonsdale, who had been convicted g. -_ _ ~. _ _ .... e..,,i..+ ?., i? itr9 to In Pravd A. alluded 81 n lJred4 lit+itln. Vur '"o y, +awruuy newspaper Pravda rererrea to them yesterday - - - w not writing an editorial for Pravda. as "another anti-Soviet concoction of the Wynne allegedly was Penkovsky's Principal "llelikiy Kitay" was what he wrote and that's American Central Intelligence Agency and Western contact. how I translated it.. apparently of its British associates" Wynne was sentenced to 8 years in jail but -leased in April 1964 in exchange for napoleonovskiye zamashki." Colonel Penkov- plied that the GovernmOn p sky' evidently knew Bonaparte's first name sibility in the matter:' The Soviet denunciations of "The Pen- aid, prrred to use the term "napoleonov- crA. c O ~~I kovsky Papers" have also been directed In the first report on the Penkovsky papers against Greville M. Wynne, a British bust- e lye zamashki." ?va~?,~? ?h was Penknvskv'A codefendant o x ll w at a ovs y wro e a s the work of Penkovsky with the uncovering I 16st their lives._ of three Westerners spying for the Soviet [From the New York Times, Nov. 21, 19651 however, "tak nazyvayemyy partlynyy fiections on the character of Greville Wynne, Pravda a d.. gqzhd RSFSR." the British businessman convicted with assailed Wynne for promoting "The y0 With regard to Penkovsky's statement that Penkovsky and later exchanged for Gordon Penkovsky Papers" by holding widely pub- several Soviet cosmonauts had lost their lives, Lansdale, a Soviet spy caught in England. licized news conferences in London and New I loan only repeat that r merely translated Last week, a news story from Paris linked York. m of them k t th t P i ssgran wututut+ta~ rtr.~y .. -e =~4^= tion does not aeserve analysis: - Penkovsky was well aware that there is no A Moscow dispatch from the Washington two the exchange today by saying Wynne had .. a?- ??ae- ,.ne+nin rnirnnmafannna translated what he wrote. (With regard to the antiparty group: Vagain I simply translated. what Penkovsky wrote. citizens, it was apparently of little impor- tance'that BulganIn managed to hang on 1fr. Zorza shows a lack of 'knowledge of ' l e everyday Soviet language when he claims that a "Russian returning to Moscow would speak of 'a visit to'the West, not to Europe" Wenneratrom; George Paques, a senior TAR i French civil servant who worked in NATO, (By C. L. Sulzberger) and William J., C. Vassall, a British Ad- PARIS,-"Any fiction spy story you have miralty clerk. Other sources have denied ever read pales in comparison with Oleg Pen- that information furnished by Penkovsky kovsky's dramatic account of his extraordi- led to the apprehension of any of the three, nary personal adventure," says the advertlse- Times, Nov. 20, 19651 ment of an American best seller. Simultane- [From the New York ously, English readers are offered memoirs PENKOVSKY Booic SCORED BY SOVIET-ANTI- called "Spy" by a Soviet agent known in Lon- RUSSIAN PAPERS CALLED CONCOCTION OF don as Gordon Lansdale until his arrest for CIA espionage and really named Konon Trofimo- Moscow, November 20.-Soviet authorities, apparently embarrassed by the publication in the West of "The Penkovsky Papers," are strongly denouncing the controversial book as a forgery of the Qeatral._Intelligence A"ggascy-of the United Suites. - O e Soviet Intent ence omcers uo not ?l'ne papers, pcDasnea IRIS monmu m 1.OU- P n f ' I talk of their travels to Euro can - y P dole and New York, are it coriipiraIori of ant - o untries as, to "the West' ; they refer to _. ' evgopa" or the country which they visited. As far ass the $?80m-I0 megaton bomb Is ` g hCeStY , i en ovs' y was aarently nom Tn a position to' measure 'the"pp bombs yield as a ourately as Western experts or Mr. Zorza. purported _to have been supplied to Western intelligence agencies by Oleg V. Penkovsky, w`ho was executed by the Russians in 1963 as '6-0-16-r y for the West. Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, vitch Molody. Molody-Lonsdale was subse- quently exchanged for Greville Wynne, a British associate of Penkovsky Imprisoned in the U.S.S.R. Wynnehas not yet published a book. A CIA PRODUCT? Victor Zorza, t/ c(Manheter) Guardian's Kremlinologist, believes "The Penkovsky Pa- pers" are not wholly genuine. He contends no Russian text has been produced and the English version Is peppered with words and phrases no man with Penkovsky's Soviet background would use. Zorza adduces errors in dates and facts, asserting much of Pen- M- QQ '' -24M Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R0:00600240016-6 January 1"', 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 265 kovsky's memoir must have been written "by a Western pen." He concludes: "The book could hive been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency." The genesis of Penkovsky's papers seems valid_but whether part 'of the wgrk is fake cannot be judged. Whatever its origin, the work provides juicy reading and embarrasses Moscow just as Lonsdale's possibly spurious work embarrasses Washington. Penkovsky was undoubtedly an efficient Western agent in the Soviet hierarchy where his boss was Kosygin's son-in-law. After Penkovsky's ar- rest in 1962, almost 300 Soviet intelligence officers were recalled as intelligence networks were overhauled. SPIES, FORGERIES, AND FAKES The period since World War II has been gaudy with spies, forgeries, and fakes. In- deed some spies have been widely publi- cized-like Col, Rudolf Abel, traded for U-2 Pilot Gary Powers; Lonsdale; Ivan Egorov, a Soviet official in the U.N.; Giuseppe Martelli, an Italian who spied for Moscow in hollow- heeled shoes; Burgess, Maclean, and Philby, who skipped to Russia when their cover wore thin. Yet intelligence services don't limit them- selves to ferreting out secrets; they calumni- ate each other whenever possible. Moscow's KGB has its disinformation section with a subsidiary branch in East Germany that dis- seminates false papers. Some of these have included crude documents bearing U.S. Cabi- net or CIA signatures. Four y-eA rs ago the CIA claimed it had uncovered 32 such forgeries in 4 years. British counterintelligence is equally alert. Some documents are*sold and others merely given to naive newspapers. The befuddled public derives particular entertainment from the cold war's fake lit- erary productions. Among these Prof. Paul W. Blackstock of the University of South Carolina lists: the purported diary of Maxim Litvinov, late Soviet Foreign Minister; the strategic thesis of Marshal Bulganin; mem- oirs of General Viassov, who organized an army of Russian prisoners for Hitler and was later hanged; and two volumes of fas- cinating recollections by a nonexistent nephew of Stalin, Budu Svanidze. Excellent works in this category-including those of Lltvinov and "Svanidze"-were ap- parently manufactured in Paris by the lit- erary artel of a refugee 'Soviet diplomat named Grigori Bessedovsky. In 1929 Bes- sedovsky, then counselor at the Russian Em- bassy in Paris, sought political asylum. WRITTEN FOR IDIOTS According to Blackstock, Bessedovsky, a gentleman of talent and imagination, once wrote a fellow emigre from Poland: "Sir, I write books for idiots. Do you imagine that anyone in the West would read what you call my apocrpyhal works if, in quoting Kag- anovich, Zhukov, Mikoyan or Bulganin, I tried to be faithful to the manner, sense and form of their speeches? "But when I portray Stalin or Molotov in pajamas, when I tell the dirtiest possible stories about them-never mind whether they are true or invented-rest assured that not only all intellectuals will read me, but also the most important capitalist states- man, on his way to a peace conference, will pick up my book before going to sleep in his Pullman. Allah has given money to the stupid in order that the intelligent can live easily." Facts, fiction, Half-truths and distortions are mixed together in the strange game played by competing intelligence services and ambi- tious entrepreneurs. When an American military 'attache in Moscow lost his diary, Russian security officials published it with fall fled In , serts a ch ap: 1! ."s soon as Chinese Communist charges that Moscow has not acted firmly enough on the Communist side in that conflict. It also was felt here that one chapter of "The Penkovsky Papers," commenting un- favorably on personal habits of high Soviet officials and officers, was particularly offensive to Moscow, which has always been highly sensitive about such criticism. The most recent correspondent expelled this year was Sam Jaffe, of the American Broadcasting Co., who was ordered out in September because of a report by ABC's Washington diplomatic correspondent on possible changes in the Kremlin. Adam Clymer of the Baltimore Sun was expelled last February after being accused of striking a Soviet policeman during a demonstration by Asian students in Moscow outside the U.S. Embassy protesting American policy in Vietnam. A Newsweek correspondent was expelled in 1962, a National Broadcasting Co. reporter was ordered out in 1963 and Time magazine's Moscow bureau was closed in 1964. News- week and NBC have since been allowed to re- open their bureaus. Here is the chronology of the current case: The Washington Post began publication of the Penkovsky Papers on October 31. The last of 14 installments ran on November 15. On November 2 it was reported to this news- paper that Soviet Embassy officials were say- ing the papers were a forgery. A Washing- ton Post representative called on Embassy Counselor Alexander I. Zinchuk, by appoint- ment, the following day to ask any proof of the accusation. Zinchuk was told that the Washington Post would publish any such proof. His reply was that he would look into it and he asked and was told how long the series would run. On November 5, at the Embassy's national day party, a representative of the newspaper was told by another Soviet official that he expected "a strong reaction" to the publica- tion very shortly. He was told that the Washington Post would publish the reaction. The reaction did not come until November 13. On that day Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Ministry's press department in Mos- cow. F. M. Simonov, a department deputy, read him a statement describing the "Pen- kovsky Papers" as a falsified story, a mixture of anti-Soviet inventions and slander and stating that their publication "cannot be considered otherwise than as an intentional act in the spirit of the worst traditions of the cold war." Simonov said the press department was "authorized to invite the attention of the editorial board of the Washington Post to the provocative character of this publica- tion," adding that "we expect that measures will be taken so that no articles and ma- terials of such a kind will be published in the Washington Post in the future." Simonov added to this threat by saying that "if publication continues we reserve the right for ourselves to take necessary meas- ures." The text of the complaint was pub- lished in the Washington Post the next day. The same day it commented editorially that it would complete publication of the papers, adding that "we refuse to accept the inadmissible suggestion that this newspaper must not print material which the Soviet Government may find unacceptable." On November 15 the newspaper published a communication from the Embassy's press department condemning the papers as a forgery and a scar on the Soviet Union. It also published, as previously scheduled, the first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet specialist of the Manchester Guardian, ana- lyzing the papers. He questioned their au- thenticity and suggested they had been written in part by the Central Intelligence Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6 SOME EXPERTS FOOLED Among amateur factories, Bessedovsky's ranks high. He fooled some of the most pretentious Kremlinologists. Even General Bedell Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and CIA boss, was persuaded to write an "introductory note" for the highly sus- pect Litvinov "memoirs." Penkovsky and Molody may be genuine authors but, at any rate, the late Ian Flem- ing had many unannounced anonymous cold war competitors. Like Fleming's works, they are pleasant bedside reading. [From the Washington, Post, Nov. 23, 1965] AROVAlD THE WORLD: WIFE OF PENKOVSKY IS REPORTED To DOUBT HE AUTHORED PAPERS Moscow.-The wife of Col. Oleg Penkovsky was reported yesterday as saying she did not believe her husband, executed in 1963 for spying for the West, could have authored "The Penkovsky Papers." The papers, se- rialized by the Washington Post, have been denounced by Soviet news media as CIA forgeries. Mrs. Vera Penkovsky told Viktor Louis, a Soviet citizen who works for a London daily newspaper, that her husband was lazy about writing, never kept a diary, and typed labori- ously with one finger. Mrs. Penkovsky still lives in the apartment she shared with her husband and works as a French-language translator. Her 65-year-old mother-in-law and her two daughters live with her. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1965] ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN CHARGED-RUSSIA EX- PELS POST CORRESPONDENT OVER "PENKOV- SKY PAPERS" SERIES (By Chalmers M. Roberts) The Soviet Union yesterday ordered the closing of the Moscow bureau of the Wash- ington Post and the expulsion of this news- paper's correspondent, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, because of the publication of "The Penkovsky Papers." Rosenfeld, 33, was given 7 days to leave with his wife, Barbara, and their two children, David, 16 months old, and Rebecca, born in Moscow 3 months ago. He opened the Washington Post's bureau there on November 12, 1964. Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Min- istry's press department at noon and was read a statement charging that the Wash- ington Post had engaged in "an anti-Soviet campaign" around "The Penkovsky Papers" and that it had refused to halt their pub- lication after a warning on November 13. Oleg Penkovsky was a Soviet colonel exe- cuted by his government for serving as a spy for the West. The papers, serialized to newspapers from a just published book, pur- port to be his diary smuggled out of the Soviet Union. There has been considerable controversy as to the paper's authenticity but the value of Penkovsky's work for the West was acknowledged at his trial. An editorial in the Washington Post today states that Rosenfeld's expulsion is a de- plorable exercise of arbitrary power and an attempt by the Soviet Government "to im- pose on the press of other countries, by treat- ing the correspondents from these countries as virtual hostages, a control and dictation to which no reputable newspaper can submit." The editorial also terms "a remarkable hallucination" the charge that the news- paper had launched a "campaign" against the __Soviet Union, adding that it "will not be plunged" into any "campaign of denigration" because of the expulsion. Rosenfeld is the third American corre- spondent to be expelled from Russia this year. American officials view the action as part of the hardening Soviet attitude toward the II i tecl States over the. war in. Vietxtlini, an attitude pot unrelated to the, bitter o r 1 _ G RDPr oat GO6OO2400=1 -6 OONGRESSIONAL REWORD SENATE January Y4, kf November 18, Rosenfeld was told by a ov et'rrTead-R Moscow that"a decision had Tree taken to expel him. He also was told 1 M the Central Committee of the Commu- 2 arty had given the Foreign Ministry 11sion to threaten Rosenfeld with ex- y"11 on unless the Washington Post ceased nb ication of the papers. pAii1Y Pi}S?URl .- - _ terthe newspaper ran the two conclud- ing lartIcles the Centralonimittee was re- pgrted tp.. hays asked the Foreign Ministry why it had not expelled Rosenfeld. The in- iorzant said, that the Ministry would have like id to forget the affair but that it was tllier Communist Party pressure and so agr ed to the exptilsion. I wss reported here in 'Washington to t11,e or~t that the Embassy had recommended exp Ision. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly I)obnin formally protested publicai ion of the papers to the State Vie- partment and in dab' on t a Soviet Ambassador called at the t[Pi Office to complain about publication of he, Penkovsky Papers in Britain. The on Observer serialized the papers as did ino 4e than 30 _ papers in the United States IGG- 1 elsewhere,-, - __ - . _ . . _ . _ - ' Qrei n Ministry's press depart- lgo tie Soviet. ine t to be read t_ a following statement by - dep, ty chief Pyatisnev: " A November 13 you were asked to the ]?'e _(epaitment and the attention of the iddlt~orial board of the Washington Post was 1AV ted to the provocative character of the publication of the anti-Soviet entitled the fro- ailed Penkovsky Papers. "n our statement we pointed out that +l .e so-called papers were a coarse fraud, a ure of provocative Invention and anti- So et slander. Publication of these notes in the, Washington Post cannot be considered ith r than as premeditated action in the wol1t traditions of the cold war, which can- not but harm .Soviet-American relations. prsed the hope that measures would be taken so that no such articles and materials )f 1h is_kind would appear in this newspaper [n e future. respite that the Wash n Post continued to publish the notes An4 other material which popularized this rraud onsidering such a position of the edi- torai board of your newspaper, which con- 114 ed a _n. anti-soviet campaign around the io alled Penkovsky Papers, the press de- pparrrrrr'ttttttment is authorized to state that your rutuurre stay in the Soviet Union as corre- tpoYident- of the Washington post is uinde- eirble and it is proposed that you leave the territory of the Soviet Union." yatisnev, after reading the prepared state- aseit, told Rosenfeld that "we would like to add that , this measure is not directed ,,against you personally but was made neces- Sar by actions of the editorial board of your ne spaper." 1osenfeld asked how much time he had to lea e. Pyatfinev inquired as to how much ti a he would need. When Rosenfeld sug- ggee ed 2 or 3 weeks, Pyatisnev replied that he cold have b to .7 days.-:- They agreed on- 7. ass, the Soviet news agency, then made pu sic the action. It included the state- ment that abricated the by papers U.S. "are an Intelligence obvious ce service rvfce which the exposed spy had served." jFro board of the Post of conducting an anti- Soviet campaign In publishing the Penkov- sky Papers, a "premeditated action in the worst traditions of the cold war which can- not but harm Soviet-American relations." Stephen Rosenfeld, correspondent here Since the Washington Post opened its bureau a year ago, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to receive the expulsion order. He was given 7 days to leave the country. The U.S. Embassy expressed regret at the Soviet move. A spokesman said no official protest was planned since such representa- tions were not considered likely to reverse the decision. THIRD EXPULSION THIS YEAR Mr. Rosenfeld is the third American corre- spondent to be expelled this year. The rep- resentative of the Baltimore Sun, Adam Clymer, was ordered to leave In February. He was charged with having struck a police- man during an -anti-American student demonstration. In September, Sam Jaffe, the American Broadcasting Co.'s correspondent, was ex- pelled because of a news report originating in the network's Washington bureau that a shakeup in the Kremlin leadership was imminent. As in Mr. Jaffe's case, the Foreign Ministry made it clear that the action against Mr. Rosenfeld was not directed against the corre- spondent personally for anything he had reported under a Moscow dateline. It was rather a punitive action-appar- ently the most direct one open to the Soviet Government-aimed at the newspaper. "The Penkovskiy Papers," published as a book in London and New York this month, are random notes critical of the leadership of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. They allegedly disclose details of the operations of Soviet intelligence organizations. The publishers described the material as the informal comments of Mr. Penkovsky, smuggled out of the Soviet Union shortly be- fore he was convicted as a spy for the West and shot in 1963. The name is spelled in the book with a literal rendering of the Russian i the Washington Posts Nov. 26 1966] about this court that is daily fare iri the final vowel. pl$N%OVS%Y REGRETS IS-.,i'.+ r. T - .... ~ _ isrom sne wasninglon rost, LJec. S, iaboi -, f1-eC~8I0n OhLe ~iOVOrnjrlent O~tle --S-o-- as are 1.lle reI'et.i Over this incident, pyrP1KOYSKY REACTION 71e Union- to close the Moscow . ureau of the lV'ashin ton Past for ally the incont en- ` ,t1i Washington Post and to expel this news- iences and un]calpy consequences cannot 3 share Your regrets aver the obtuseness of iv. regret Yts ie us IT`i c ow Eo tits demands of "the Soviet authorities in matters pertaining a erg comes ondent In reprisal for the publication ofp the Penkovsky Papers is a the 86viet dovermnent that it suspend pub- 'to freedom of the press. -Obviously, you are ieglorable exercise of arbitrary power. lication of the installments of the Penkovsky under no obligation to show a correct point cates tha the short-lived relaxation follow- sponsibie newspaper in this country could ing the death of Stalin has indeed proved submit to such imperious dictation by any to be a reversible process. Instead of loosen- government. Ing the rigorous and inhibiting control of its The repressive policies of the Soviet Union own Writers, the Soviet Government now, are not going to alter the principles of the attempts to impose upon the press of other free press in this country; but we hope that, countries, by treating correspondents from in time, the survival of the Government of these .countiies as virtual hostages, a con- the United States, despite the continuous trot-,and dictation to. which no reputable and unrelenting criticisms by the press, may newspaper can submit. persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its This decision also is to be regretted be- paranoiac and lunatic apprehension that cause it will diminish the access of the every unfriendly printed word is an assault readers of. the Washington Post and of upon the foundation of the regime. Perhaps, other, newspapers in which Stephen Rosen- on that happy day, the Washington Post will feld's objective accounts have appeared, of be able again to establish a bureau in Mos- his lucid reporting. (It is to be noted that cow. Until then it will cheerfully rely upon the-Soviet _Governalent has specifically de- the excellent services that previously pro- clare4Ir-Rosenfeld in no way to blame for vided it with coverage of the Soviet Union. this act of reprisal against the Washington -- Post.) [From the New York Times, Nov. 26, 1965] The _Soviet action also As . to be regretted Moscow EXPELS A U.S. REPORTER-RETALIATES because this drastic course seems to be pre- FOR WASHINGTON POST'S PENKOVSKY mised upon the erroneous notion that, the SERIES Washington Post has launched a campaign Moscow, November 25.-The Soviet Union against the Soviets Union. That is a remark- today ordered the explosion of the Washing- able 1ttahle in ble in ron?ulerrbut s s who probably have one that ton Post's Moscow correspondent in retalla- ia_inivie grown so tion for the newspaper's refusal to cease accustomed to utter immunity to internal publication of the purported memoirs of criticism that any reproach appears to them to take on the a sects of deliberate peraec - Oleg V. Penkovsky, a convicted Soviet spy. tion. Thee Washington Post published excerpts from the Penkovsky Papers, which were dis- tributed to it as a. conventional syndicated newspaper feature, just as did more than 30 other newspapers. The publishing company (tioubleday) that produced the book is a responsible firm. The editor of the-papers (Frank Gibney) is a man of sound reputa- tion. We have no,-reason to believe, and no one has produced evidence to show, that the published matter did not represent the views and opinions of Penkovsky. In conformity with the best prevailing American newspaper practice, the Washing- ton Post also published attacks on the views =`of e: ovs y and on the authenticity of the papers, including the criticisms by the Soviet Embassy in Washington. It proposes to deal in the same way with interesting and signifi- cant material about the Soviet Union that may come to hand in the future, but it is not in the midst of any campaign of denigration aimed at the Soviet Union and will not be plunged into one by this misguided effort at press coercion by Soviet officials. The Soviet Government's action, also, is to be regretted, because it is bound to result: in future interruptions and obstructions to a flow of information between the two coun- tries that already is frighteningly dispropor- tionate to their need to know more of each other. American newspapers inclined to es- tablish correspondents in the Soviet Union will be made hesitant by the knowledge that the Communist government there not only asserts the right to obstruct, censor, and punish the correspondent for acts of his own, but also reserves the right to take reprisal against him for publications in which he is not at all involved. There also will be a strong impulse in many governmental quarters in the United States to imitate the reactionary notions of press freedom that possessed the Soviet Govern- ment. We hope that this impulse will be resisted, because not a single Soviet oorre- spondent would remain in America If the United States embraced this theory of re- prisal in order to punish Soviet publications Approved -Foy- R I as 1,C ' A4R 1 t~0~1a4'9R000S0 24 0' 51 ,January -14, 1966 -!CON 1ES1ONA1J R OkD -, s, ,ATE 29 S -v'. I are even ei eC 1y at liberty to Rosehierd was given 7 days to leave Russia sonal`in`this-and seriously ii`eved that he -pi'Int an hing that fis"tbe empty spaces after"lie-eras aJkeS to have his newspaper halt was an adventurer. After the removal of Russian officers had for whom man ko f a Zh t ll y s o u v, men between chuck roast ads. 1rowev2 it is the publication of the last 2 insta re tta -Ti diet ' e a si`n o your able sey it es of" 14 from "The Yenhovsky Papers," a high respect, it appeared to Penkovsky that and amiable l oscow c e o deii't should reputedly the notes of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, Khrushchev was surrounded only by military ltacl from- f'i'e p 1 on of so un- a Soviet intelligence officer executed for spy- yes-men. Ile reproduces extracts from theo- s h ave re u #l,worthy maieriai as-' ee Pehkov`skyPapers:" ing for the West. retical military studies which show a danger- . -- . . ___... _... -. _ --- i dli.,. ossibility of world e to the n suc p -wo st they trend t6 arouse life suspicions of PENxovsKY's ROLE: A Bxrrlsi4-REVIEW It may well be, as Mr. Edward Crankshaw the Soviet ,au f`britls that the timing of (-rho Times literary supplement) says in a sympathetic and entertaining fore- "the pubAca on was?r`not accidental:" word, that Penkovsky confused contingency o "banned in Boston" used seful strate but he l n a r ith N t l i p g g po so o pu o ann ng w f The issue is not really the authenticity ogy, the papers (although I personally consider to be one of the most valuable puffs a book was close to the source of danger, and he '!them, on't'he internal' evidence of the text, could earn. "Pfotested against in Downing believed it real. 'a rather `sulstandard forgery or a doctored 'Street" is less promising in one respect, but The book is made up partly of documents version_ o' _ marks by Penkovsky re- Messrs. Collins (British publishers of the attributed to Penkovsky himself and partly eorded orb tape ii``hfs London contacts). Penkovsky papers) must be profoundly grate- of a connecting narrative. American edit- The bu inesk of spies is to forward factual ful for the publicity which the Soviet Gov- ing and adaptation have been responsible d' 1 1 t there ernment has given to a book which, by reason for attracting some attacks on the authen- a tu403 pL5I Z ; leave ana ys s o As Edwar `hranlzs~haw so ably pointed out in of a rather scrappy composition and alien ticity of the former, unjustified except pas- the rear 1cs which you used as a scanty fig- -subject, might otherwise not have received sibly in matters of detail; certain verbal -leaf for iC papers, Penkovsky confused ca- the attention it richly deserves. infelicities may be attributable to the same pabilitles with int'entio'ns, a cardinal sin In But for the opportune diplomatic inter -cause. Some have also found it inconceiv- 'ntelligence analysis. - The papers also con- -vention many people might have remained able that Penkovsky could have committed -''use eonttngency reasoning with evidence of under the impression, which was pretty gen- so much to paper; but it is clear from the planning, It is interesting and important eral at the time of the trial in May 1963, that evidence of the book and of the trial that to know. that there exists somewhere in Penkovsky was 6; mere accessory to the case he was madly reckless, and his record of suc- arguing the merits of against the British businessman, Greville cess shows him skilled at directing material 'Moscow a eta' paper surprise attack or preventive war or -bad- Wynne, framed to justify the latter's kid- in bulk to the correct address. As a whole, teriolQgicaf warfare. Such contingency pa- naping in Hungary. This book reveals the what is presented here has the stamp of -pers arr produced by the dozens in real seriousness of the affair. The trial and genuineness- t onviction of Penkovsky was to the Sovie c Washington and elsewhere and they are the legitimate province of strategic military Establishment as damaging a blow as was the 'Chinking. But it is the business of political Hiss case to America. The repercussions were analysts to assign to them the exact weight of seismic intensity. --they deserve. It is precisely because Penkovsky was so "The publication of the papers comes at a highly placed that these papers are of such time when the Soviet-Union is in an ex- -interest - From a material point of -trrmely delicate position with respect to the -view Penkovsky was thoroughly well off and tltside world, ppressured by the Chinese as to all appearances an efficient and convinced virtually a i ckey of Wall Street and at -member of the ruling class when hevolun- 'the same 'time, charged with responsibility tartly got in touch with British Intelligence fox real or ,imaginary disturbances in places and during a short run of 16 months handed 'far'removed Irrom 'Moscow's Influence. It over to them more than 5,000 items of infor- takes little to' gener'at'e in l"ie min of the mation of political, military and economic Soviet leaders the notion that someone was matters (the figures come from the indict- trying dellberatefy to complicate still fur- 'ment at this trial) * * ". What were his 'ther the otherwise delicate relations between motives? the U.S.S R, and the United States. At the trial he was made out to be a disso- 't would, of course,be-of help if the So- lute playboy. The usual antisemitic over- Viet leaders- or their advisers knew more tones were also brought in. The importance about the free-wheeling habits of the Amer- of his position was minimized, though scarce- loan publishing industry. At the very - ly consistently with the details of the indict- least, the customary delay between the an. ment, and this is still the official line. From = -the Communist point of view it is difficult to ra s a tu n p c a d 'it e of a manuscript a ceptanc pearanee in _print should seriously impair see why this should be found necessary: after the "curious timing" theory. 'On'the other all, nothing in the history of treachery can hand, once the editors of the 'Was`'fiiiigton equal the record of the Russian ruling class Post have digested their' indignation, -tilSy since the revolution, if the official version is be believed . might take some 'time to ;ponder this friend- ly suggestion: The publication of drivel, Why should it be surprising that a colonel __ _, ht should be in touch for 16 months with Brit- mat [From Parade Magazine section, the Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1966] Question. In "The Penkovsky Papers," al legedly the.diary of a Russian agent who de- fected, there is a statement to the effect that' Yekaterina Furtseva, the Soviet Minister of Culture, was Khrushchev's mistress. Is there any truth to that statement? Is there any truth to the book? Penkovsky must have been a stupid secret agent to keep a diary.- Allen James, New York, N.Y. Answer. Penkovsky probably never kept a diary. Intelligence agents suggest that the book consists of transcribed reports from tape recordings he made for British Intel- ligence and the,-CU. Khrushchev and Furt- seva were close friends, but she was never his T THE UNPRECEDENTED SUPPOR FOR A WAR AGAINST WANT Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, at the opening of this session of Congress I am gratified to report to the Senate the remarkably widespread support ex- pressed during the congressional recess for revision and expansion of our food- for-peace effort into an international 1a not the best way of discharging the pre- ~equirefl to believe that Berta, a marshal of food program that will close the world cioua resionsibIIities of a free press. the Soviet Union, was a paid employee of food gap. Many thoughtful people see n e nEr n' -Ar- the same service for 86 years, from 1917 to such a program, as I do, as an oppor- n ions ~ i t r e a onaZ o}error of Interndt ,.Professocen'university. 1953? Perhaps it is the difference between tunity to reduce hunger in the world WASHINGTON, '- truth and official truth that calls for con- while opening up new production and cealdlJent oil the Governments part; and his 3ricome benefits to the American farmer ~ ~' 3'" m 'ealization of i [From the Wa shington ost beo.' 4 ~'I9$5rfw r - and our economy as a whore, to make sure the rea- d Penkovsk i y sp re , ,,t - . ,~.CPELLEI1 NpwsrvlAN 1sACK IN TxE 'Vr lift son for his action were recorded. Before I report further concerning the ?~TA"~ Isis flgst motive was revulsion against the - tea tion which has been pouring into my ,NEW YORK, Decem g.-Ste hen S. y a rruiig this propose for the Rosenfeld, expelled Moscow corr"esonderit sionedz aristocrat ~is a~ovelliknawn phenome- .-~Q en~js, 15~1ou-ldlilie t ~0 ~~SS of the Washington Post, said on his arrival non in all regimes based on privilege. Pen- for -moment to congratulate PreeWellt - d t h b is friend en s was being entertained y apparentily regard foreign correspon --"hostages" for the performances of the Varentsov at a table collapsing with food, organization -they rep esent, "safe on, fish in aspic, sprats, cheese, 10 dif- I a x e}ys,paper' or a network does some- Yerent kinds of sausage, over 50 bottles of #Ling the `Russians don t dike "the corr- vodka and cognac, champagne, cakes, pastry, res tlndent_i? the'hostage and`dut"he goes," ice cream and so on," people in Voronezh Fibsenlel i said-'rdIe qne elirg'tor horeemeat. He was scan- "`It silly idea and t fey 1the' 'fuss aris"ftlized-by the behavior of some of his fellow don't pi to n 'l he -Ton't - have a -aristocrats, their dissolute private lives, their freeg pre V~ ea. themselves aaTy using Y"dreign 'Immunity -from the law. 01'~t`00thdeitts as hostages they attempt to " His seooni3mo~ive was fear of nuclear war. ,COrltrol the 16relgnpress, but of course they -Be evidently hated and distrusted Khru- tan; v, "-?" ahd?hdv-there inlay have-been something per- "Approved For Release : CIAADP75-00:1 Johnson on what I regard as a superb state of the Union message. It was.-a message of peace and progress for our Country. - Z was especially pleased with the Presi- :dent's call for a "maximum attack," as he called it, on hunger and disease and ignorance in the world. The President's vigorous espousal of a "worldwide attack" on human hunger and misery has my strong support. I believe that is the kind of war that most